diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-023/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-023/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2b33d2a15cd5bbb1800cefe377a9b9901b541960
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-023/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "00000032cdede209", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-001", "height": 82, "page": 2, "phash_256": "822e7dd15dd0822e7d914d58a26f73994d68b067c29c8d6738f3c388b62779d1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "403da8548203c7c4da6c4cfc4b1e981b10b5f45a269cf08306cd7f3ff5180abb", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "00004805dae88c23", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-002", "height": 82, "page": 2, "phash_256": "d5ec2a132a93d56c29926ae3d76c299a76e3862df1da4c632e0dd1fa8d026e85", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "74f291da38df79efd0b17f87b234ec4c330462e4dc7cacb0fefa369e0af5757e", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0000000000000000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-003", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "8000000080000000800000000000800000008000800000000000800000008000", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "5383f0ec06841bf9737cf48b4ce96e71c52667e834e552c9e6147dfebde7627a", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0000000000000000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-004", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "8000000080000000800000000000800000008000800000000000800000008000", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "1e13ef06c37a12fd06769214d1e2888e81ab4e7bc683db34993a2b1bf7c7c52f", "width": 511}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "008010cde6a6a3e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-005", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "807b7f847f84846b7397887177868d78911fe2f31d387d0c80f3b2b3aae85506", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "a9774598eeb6b084862781c4fd7dfecde314071adf6485dc68077441fd00085f", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0000188484a4a4e4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-006", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "e466199d1f9de46101dec7ce3991c63ff303ccec30333f11c4e6008cffee3111", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "38b69f5d79b787c0087e6d6f9446d8cb09b4583213eeb0fdfb8f126a0332e134", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c498e6d594d4f205", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-007", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "809d7e627f62809da0ca8f35c75d7e429936a2d94e284d347bc35b14cc3c7ec3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "45250f0d06291e332125f9ac33d4bc3d40159ce01c3fb2e9baa1b1ed7efab4dc", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-008.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0428d1c444449468", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-008", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "cce811033117cff8c738c8c6cdfc33337c0e6e6641c168d93e373a07c8dc0bf5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "e4a9b440640a360c623f419dbf28b06711d082d7e5d87df21fa0cd29166f833e", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-009.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4a4a4a4c8200000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-009", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "c4fcc4ff33833b80333033383f033b833be038f83e1c3e0f3e0fc078c0fdc1e7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "a0aa1c830ce38d1107ee6b8c937aa0f7ef19b0b9a6427dbd0d4f3084a981e580", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-010.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0000000000000000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-010", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "8000000000000000800000000000800080008000800000008000000000008000", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "1f9d0d3a66ce6413fe80fedef02700e203a926bcc26046e0c01338d190d2db25", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-011.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "000000005002fad9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-011", "height": 82, "page": 2, "phash_256": "804f7fb1804e7ea1835e7c2383dc982377b58a5e54a3ab5c54232bdc9a2755b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "13ab5f607cd7c66a5dd164a1c98f8990766b1ae9113b7f584702e1f0b8c3e3bd", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-012.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "00000000004620a9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-012", "height": 82, "page": 2, "phash_256": "db2924d4db6f2490db6f2c10f3efd81024d3db6e2c91d36f0c10f36f01ac7e11", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "b4d19b7d45795daa30613582a4116925bf5de78542fbf90f0012be918eac888b", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-013.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c904800000000000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-013", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "827c827c827c827c827c827c827c827c837c837e837e837e837e837e837e83fe", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "df835ec64292e200a66471c809c7c756fd5a4d868ce42b8a6e42829068c924bf", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-014.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b156080000000000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-014", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "d84cd84cd84ed84ed86ed866da67da67da67da23da23d223d223d223d223d223", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "b4c13c105e0a9004d8ff03a95d78eca2dbae0bbd7257983957b94af32710d3cf", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-015.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "00000a2d8d00d5fe", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-015", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b66d6a56cd324893b6ed3a56d966493636adaa93548ba95b51644934b6a92699", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "1e8e335963491cafa8ec3883f36670551b35a3596210dd9d6a191583f2b5e18b", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-016.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0201a65850e354ff", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-016", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "d5ec756caa136ad3d18c552c247324f35bcedb084b91b5ad247e2052db865b8d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "a0ae872b1465343e04d8a8dbd8837b93f241bbe23ace6e1809b988308c44bfdb", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-017.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "fcfcf4f4c4c5c5c3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-017", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "80b23d846b0bc3cc13253c671d4b629d27cc386e1ed6c719664b36e4391f673f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "56f3a61059a7905a090fc1c71c6cb7b87f4ec66c6091a717593461938c669a8f", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-018.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5fefe3616cd4b8b0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-018", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "c6b42f7b680ff2fd5bc20bc7442ff67876100b59c131c0f30ed21ecb390521b7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "114043b5da71b46b88cbfbbc4fd8c63a69e09559f6f2ae08a8855f641b1f51e9", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-019.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ebe3f3e3e3e3e7e7", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-019", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "8f839b33757272997623e2453bb3a91ea34cd0ab44da519d9935ac466489b3ba", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "fbbdb01a1364d3c39ac3721d6e4dc3729a6402f5ab5a249ec0df0808b2d56357", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-020.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b0b069a9696971b1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-020", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "cb24f020049607f4e01303f01edffb6d92fbff7f0fe0f0ff4d0501bff4004039", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "90d6a51690ac8a6d07b411e9e3b21b568cb737a64ee2821553d9c174a9c83618", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-021.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "cbcbcbcbc7436beb", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-021", "height": 82, "page": 2, "phash_256": "ab4ac3c7c631c71ccc73c738c78cce71c627cc7131c1e7309ce331878e3339cc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "874fea13b6fecb442c90c110d239c1a2d6f277d0093f7fe3b32a7391cf45ea43", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-022.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f173333232333a3b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-022", "height": 82, "page": 2, "phash_256": "d933cbcc330ee1c164c798701e683c3c668fc19e03e638f964f91932c0cfe3cf", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "377217e106d5ea06541d62fc9ada5ef0839bcdc6e09b6462cf480372425ed2db", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-023.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f3b3f3f3b3b3b1b1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-023", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "88cea458a66d6732533b73262392a355237646335623cf33a77b25597315339d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "7669d888bde6cd16d8d3d7d6ef34aac9090d131d14ee2f53c67ddc1bcdf0e121", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-024.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3935191939383e3a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-024", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "f82fc0fa25a39a37492a95b11b262d0b92266c5b9a979f5b5a0f2d061b2fac93", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "10f122a9b7a49270dc63e1ec6595c362a4c6fdfe471827c6b2858fed0d64472b", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-025.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b1f9f9f9d9d9dbdb", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-025", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "990c9cce44d392692c929c6c6533ab319e49cce692696db29b6dcce6ecb69269", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "db839161047b32a192722237782964ae51283b3dcc66579d043252445a27d3cf", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-026.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2a34341c1c0c0c2c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-026", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "f68169171b49b7e995a2906c1fa5b52497a5b1245b24e96d492d6934bda4b5b6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "48180b1823af89a7259539be7b4eccc0a63f04feeedcae70a6c695e8cc898377", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-027.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "dbd3d3d3d3d3d3d3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-027", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "999b9936766488c93b33e66d5b33999266c989199b26993366cd99931bb2664c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "eb92bcc96645b9643cc76805d0539debd7bfdff9e927ffc96102850fe52e1400", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-028.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2c2c2c7cf4fdf7fb", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-028", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b6a4b6a8764aeadb25bfcdb47b68ba85149b085bb6b6ff644940200500bfd752", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "1449cf46d5d8380d8af490087c9ca5b9d8a8a0af03db9098a951c095f712d1f3", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-029.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d35353002048a6b6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-029", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "89999999899999997a48c46c7a44847c3ba38dd9d2666b52446e7306bd7b93b7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "bc52a5a427319571ed951780122acb9285319f9c2f52d809500ce2dce6f125a2", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-030.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "fffda50000491626", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-030", "height": 83, "page": 2, "phash_256": "a4c8aabfa4ca8b1c2b7755482b37f4c08b1fa4e2991867565df8631ebce1a11e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "7dcfa7eb6ac534e0ec00ff6954e58bbbd299b5cdb6e312095d2f2bd9247908ff", "width": 510}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0003-001", "height": 203, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0005-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0141919191914101", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0005-001", "height": 50, "page": 5, "phash_256": "f00087ff8ffff800f018f078f0008fff8ffff800f000f07ef0308fc78fc3f030", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "a5e4d251dcf87c0feaeb1137086aef76b9ce900ff8b7ea1f1b1531e328f185d9", "width": 764}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0013-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0013-001", "height": 289, "page": 13, "phash_256": "bfe1801ec21e67a13d511cf1d01e6726e31e3df198d856aae30e2f6598d81ce9", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "9c9f7f02d5be6f261d273dbe95e17b67d65acbb8ab306dafee025897b75c6df8", "width": 415}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0014-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "02021200f0020666", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0014-001", "height": 197, "page": 14, "phash_256": "d55595552f556aa992aaf7aa69509ad5f4a105fb9940f21707b51809e35e6eb0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "36a0ef9708a1660a20cc451af3434209d33ceff0dd70997a878667e2608fd079", "width": 654}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0014-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "30306169b4726244", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0014-002", "height": 327, "page": 14, "phash_256": "8f40f01ff0361df8f01b1f4007eff01f792007e7664b7c7841f7f0010fc03e7e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "cf75026f809b49fb42baa39f0ef467184e40b392300ee17d23e86d4b84aebaee", "width": 376}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8081838c1860c080", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0015-001", "height": 231, "page": 15, "phash_256": "aa80e88bc1bf9f62b00fe77c4cc1789f53b0d623146fb1c8671b6d3768e4c384", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "25846b1af6b7ae10c64fa512b304d927b3716aa0599f454bda99553bcd034c1e", "width": 405}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": "Figure 6. Cumulative Percent Increase Granted by Government Decrees, 2013-2016", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "84d88db9296d4cc4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0016-001", "height": 308, "page": 16, "phash_256": "926fc136a5910e0b582a6cf98c6632e3b316db196878c4e3b7c3f01ecef0cc67", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "ea7419ad85156a44496ce6717dc270f3649de55ba857fd3a970e88bb18d66f4c", "width": 598}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0016-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0016-002", "height": 174, "page": 16, "phash_256": "fda0d80dd80958a858a8d889c88dc98c89dc87ecc38ec7ae83de87de87de07f6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "b68e40b2c57ad686c3bd36dfbd7d6f837bbb18ae2f5e39d74f52ccfedeb059d5", "width": 330}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "04a4a6a4a4a69b03", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0017-001", "height": 215, "page": 17, "phash_256": "8cf9a4d5f3015b2bd4a23b1c0e7e9b3e13be94a6eb41b495c90373800c7bab55", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "c72dd420bca0448619cf2cc67ba25693ec335f5c2f7ed1051c51431d2baeaffe", "width": 395}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4824c04007130958", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-001", "height": 165, "page": 18, "phash_256": "cb81e7753381e3723381c3f00189c0fd034bc1ee02d7c7ea07b5cfca0f35df92", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "774db893e363d88287b591e02622cb8f6f48dd2afb474343787bec7d0a707087", "width": 122}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "002a8040090723d9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-002", "height": 180, "page": 18, "phash_256": "e3f0f55f8bf0f43f83f0c83f80f1d83f84b5d21f892d809f814380bf825281af", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "f04aadc939a2c156de4f4a3c25b52c6bcf41393327069fa216534cfc9369fe82", "width": 80}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "881121242b263c99", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-003", "height": 256, "page": 18, "phash_256": "ff808f79c07f2700c3f0963fcd813a5c46879978c61e38b1273ec8d1c63c3ce9", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "b9603ea3eabc44df08a5aff7c3e56d1208e426f410784137de4f44fd884b8621", "width": 192}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1020514d634e3813", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-004", "height": 261, "page": 18, "phash_256": "ffff830cf80037ffc07f9284c5fe1b4647c09d2fc3421cd4070bd86ac3971c24", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "a6ed1e278806803ea44f4a5a5ea5fd134699deaa515a1f396ceb5e527a44c51a", "width": 180}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "bb264cb972e00818", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-005", "height": 157, "page": 18, "phash_256": "d3ff9411e59f0d33d95e1a5302d63e9500b73d8d033b382b07ea380f07d87873", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "17cab02dd0d4204df07b90a1b5d8792a7b6c20ab0fc5af34b9afa69818f7ef33", "width": 128}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "268c39e2c4002000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-006", "height": 165, "page": 18, "phash_256": "dff080183ff86418cdf00d1cf9781b58f25007d6fe141cb5f0a51fadf1a01f2b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "4c59e971147fb5e58a567b67439544e2d3a520c1caef1aa6a22d9a124eee1f95", "width": 94}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1e0761659121473e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-007", "height": 352, "page": 18, "phash_256": "aaaad1e3b555682a95ea2f47daad01fadb55200fc97a3681c92b12fecda1124b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "7e07ff13fcbb248c719d5f6824b21a682d4141f11e39439c8478e85272e1d683", "width": 251}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-008.png", "caption": "Figure 9. The Composition of Wage Bill Spending", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ac86072b33270e0d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-008", "height": 415, "page": 18, "phash_256": "bc798bff92d02c709a4f6390d861738ec9b0f603e186cf3920cbcf2467d989a3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "1c01a23102a3e3e20c6bc7cc0243b0018209427b8f641db56271514657d09d0d", "width": 572}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f8bababab8bbbbba", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0020-001", "height": 195, "page": 20, "phash_256": "9b7e94b64e6b84f7c6e3e941d6a2e1c1e3c193b661c17388b1946b49b91414be", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "cd21f76c675482371ff6305a8fc90ef8382869a7ebe67573f624d48aa301620f", "width": 540}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": "Figure 11. Monthly Wage across Different Government Sectors", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "39c4e7aca6a5b533", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0023-001", "height": 309, "page": 23, "phash_256": "a66dc27559325a8dd9305ad87a574d3020fd6904247d7aec1a5aa55f1f8ba479", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "487eb87693b5601d86a442169d728a930d2140aa13ceb26367e38b8c85ea74b3", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0031-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a9b396969696966b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0031-001", "height": 152, "page": 31, "phash_256": "a0a25af62a187822cf5d70a387cc87c9b5e12fcd65a3bf09df5c20a300e62bfe", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "1815d2d2f3cf3cafe97b38e150be7a748475c17f4795271c0e7da6da879a9072", "width": 495}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-023/assets/figures/cr-2023-023-fig-p0033-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0383cc6a62646736", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-023-fig-p0033-001", "height": 111, "page": 33, "phash_256": "87ae73ea70b35aaa7c300fcf85150af50e283c70f8790f8e0bae27b3c3cd283a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "sha256_normalized_png": "62b6b4748d658c8841a88bc2d023493c6c11f84828e97c5724f637b991609984", "width": 693}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-023/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-023/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bbb4197dad912c18f8414f34189bf979e38ef567
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-023/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/23**\n# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — WAGE BILL AND** **CIVIL SERVICE REFORM**\n\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\n\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\n\n\ntime it was completed in September 2017.\n\n\n\n_**Disclaimer:**_\n_This report was prepared in 2017 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n###### **International Monetary Fund** **Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/23\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — WAGE BILL AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\ntime it was completed in September 2017.\n\n_Disclaimer:_\n_This report was prepared in 2017 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\nInternational Monetary Fund Washington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 746}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-004", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-005", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-006", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-007", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-008", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-009", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-010", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-011", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-012", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-013", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-014", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-015", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-016", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-017", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-018", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-019", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-020", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-021", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-022", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-023", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-024", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-025", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-026", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-027", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-028", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-029", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0002-030"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0311, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 264.0, 612.239990234375, 313.20001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 17, "size": 34735, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 264.0], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 312.9599914550781, 612.239990234375, 362.1600036621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 18, "size": 9606, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 312.9599914550781], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 361.91998291015625, 612.239990234375, 411.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 19, "size": 50172, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 361.91998291015625], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 410.8799743652344, 612.239990234375, 460.0799865722656)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 20, "size": 22722, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 410.8799743652344], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 459.8399963378906, 612.239990234375, 509.0400085449219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(175,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 21, "size": 27450, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 459.8399963378906], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 528.0, 612.239990234375, 577.2000122070312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(192,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 29, "size": 29892, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 528.0], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 576.9600219726562, 612.239990234375, 626.1600341796875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(203,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 30, "size": 36861, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 576.9600219726562], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 625.9199829101562, 612.239990234375, 675.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(241,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 31, "size": 29337, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 625.9199829101562], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 674.8800048828125, 612.239990234375, 724.0800170898438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 32, "size": 18660, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 674.8800048828125], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 723.8399658203125, 612.239990234375, 773.0399780273438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 33, "size": 33868, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 723.8399658203125], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 1.1444091796875e-05, 612.239990234375, 49.20001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 6, "size": 25671, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 1.1444091796875e-05], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 97.91999816894531, 612.239990234375, 147.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(72,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 7, "size": 13236, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 97.91999816894531], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 146.88002014160156, 612.239990234375, 196.08001708984375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(75,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 8, "size": 12033, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 146.88002014160156], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.0, 195.83998107910156, 612.239990234375, 245.03997802734375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(13,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 9, "size": 1081, "transform": [306.239990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 306.0, 195.83998107910156], "width": 1276, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 264.0, 306.0, 313.20001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 11, "size": 40574, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 264.0], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 312.9599914550781, 306.0, 362.1600036621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 12, "size": 11511, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 312.9599914550781], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 361.91998291015625, 306.0, 411.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 13, "size": 33657, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 361.91998291015625], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 410.8799743652344, 306.0, 460.0799865722656)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 14, "size": 32762, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 410.8799743652344], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 459.8399963378906, 306.0, 509.0400085449219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 15, "size": 22545, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 459.8399963378906], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 528.0, 306.0, 577.2000122070312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(225,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 23, "size": 26406, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 528.0], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 576.9600219726562, 306.0, 626.1600341796875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(219,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 24, "size": 22491, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 576.9600219726562], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 625.9199829101562, 306.0, 675.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(194,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 25, "size": 16425, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 625.9199829101562], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 674.8800048828125, 306.0, 724.0800170898438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 26, "size": 15493, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 674.8800048828125], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 723.8399658203125, 306.0, 773.0399780273438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 27, "size": 33110, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 723.8399658203125], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(305.2204284667969, 49.47737121582031, 611.220458984375, 98.6773681640625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(3,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 1, "size": 1081, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.19999694824219, 305.2204284667969, 49.47737121582031], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 1.1444091796875e-05, 306.0, 49.20001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 0, "size": 24070, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 1.1444091796875e-05], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 97.91999816894531, 306.0, 147.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(67,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 2, "size": 17751, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 97.91999816894531], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 146.88002014160156, 306.0, 196.08001708984375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(76,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 3, "size": 18249, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 146.88002014160156], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 195.83998107910156, 306.0, 245.03997802734375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(78,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 4, "size": 9441, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.20000076293945, 0.0, 195.83998107910156], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(0.0, 48.96003723144531, 306.0, 98.1600341796875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(3,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 205, "number": 35, "size": 1081, "transform": [306.0, 0.0, -0.0, 49.19999694824219, 0.0, 48.96003723144531], "width": 1275, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "", "text_characters": 0}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "##### F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n## **Republic of Mozambique** **Wage Bill and Civil Service Reform**\n\n###### Yuan Xiao, Chadi Abdallah, Christopher Bender, and Raildy Martins **Technical Assistance Report** **September 2017**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.25, 486.1099853515625, 366.0, 607.6099853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 209, "number": 5, "size": 66327, "transform": [120.75, 0.0, -0.0, 121.5, 245.25, 486.1099853515625], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nRepublic of Mozambique Wage Bill and Civil Service Reform\nYuan Xiao, Chadi Abdallah, Christopher Bender, and Raildy Martins Technical Assistance Report September 2017", "text_characters": 167}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Republic of Mozambique (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their\nrequest for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or\nsummaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the\nDissemination of Technical Assistance Information—\n[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).](http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf)\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Republic of Mozambique (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their\nrequest for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or\nsummaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the\nDissemination of Technical Assistance Information—\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.", "text_characters": 959}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0005-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**PREFACE _________________________________________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________________________ 9**\n\n\n**II. RECENT TRENDS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT __ 10**\n\n\n**III. KEY ISSUES FOR A REFORM STRATEGY ___________________________________________________ 19**\nA. Compensation ________________________________________________________________________________ 19\nB. Employment ___________________________________________________________________________________ 22\n\n\n**IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM AND THEIR FISCAL IMPLICATIONS _____________________________ 23**\nA. Reforms Related to Compensation ____________________________________________________________ 24\nB. Reforms Related to Employment ______________________________________________________________ 25\nC. Reforms Related to Public Financial Management ____________________________________________ 26\nD. Fiscal Implications of Short-Term Reforms ____________________________________________________ 27\n\n**FIGURES**\n1. Central Government Wage and Capital Spending ______________________________________________ 9\n2. Central Government Wage Bill Spending by Sector ___________________________________________ 11\n3. Central Government Wage Bill, Low Income and Developing Countries, 2016 _________________ 12\n4. Central Government Wage Bill and Employment ______________________________________________ 12\n5. Central Government Wage Bill Spending, 2010-2016 _________________________________________ 13\n6. Cumulative Percent Increase Granted by Government Decrees, 2013-2016 ___________________ 14\n7. Central Government Employment, 2010-2016 _________________________________________________ 14\n8. Contributions of Wages and Employment to the Wage Bill Growth, 2010-2016 _______________ 15\n9. The Composition of Wage Bill Spending ______________________________________________________ 16\n10. Deviation of Wage Outlays Relative to the Budget by Sector ________________________________ 18\n11. Monthly Wage across Different Government Sectors ________________________________________ 21\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Wage Spending Under the Baseline and Alternative Scenarios, 2016-2021 ____________________ 18\n2. Components of Total Compensation and Proportion of Beneficiaries, by Sector ______________ 21\n3. Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in percent of GDP) _________________________________ 28\n\n**APPENDICES**\nAppendix I. Projecting the Wage Bill _____________________________________________________________ 29\nAppendix II. Estimating the Public-Private Wage Premium _______________________________________ 32\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE _ 5\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6\n\nI. INTRODUCTION _ 9\n\nII. RECENT TRENDS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT 10\n\nIII. KEY ISSUES FOR A REFORM STRATEGY _ 19\nA. Compensation 19\nB. Employment _ 22\n\nIV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM AND THEIR FISCAL IMPLICATIONS _ 23\nA. Reforms Related to Compensation 24\nB. Reforms Related to Employment 25\nC. Reforms Related to Public Financial Management 26\nD. Fiscal Implications of Short-Term Reforms 27\n\nFIGURES\n1. Central Government Wage and Capital Spending 9\n2. Central Government Wage Bill Spending by Sector _ 11\n3. Central Government Wage Bill, Low Income and Developing Countries, 2016 _ 12\n4. Central Government Wage Bill and Employment 12\n5. Central Government Wage Bill Spending, 2010-2016 _ 13\n6. Cumulative Percent Increase Granted by Government Decrees, 2013-2016 _ 14\n7. Central Government Employment, 2010-2016 _ 14\n8. Contributions of Wages and Employment to the Wage Bill Growth, 2010-2016 _ 15\n9. The Composition of Wage Bill Spending 16\n10. Deviation of Wage Outlays Relative to the Budget by Sector 18\n11. Monthly Wage across Different Government Sectors 21\n\nTABLES\n1. Wage Spending Under the Baseline and Alternative Scenarios, 2016-2021 18\n2. Components of Total Compensation and Proportion of Beneficiaries, by Sector 21\n3. Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in percent of GDP) _ 28\n\nAPPENDICES\nAppendix I. Projecting the Wage Bill _ 29\nAppendix II. Estimating the Public-Private Wage Premium _ 32\n\n3", "text_characters": 1223}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**APPENDIX TABLES**\nAI.1. Number of Employees and Mean Annual Basic Salaries by Employment Group, 2016 ______ 29\nAI.2. Elements of Compensation, 2016 ___________________________________________________________ 30\nAI.3. Macroeconomic Assumptions ______________________________________________________________ 31\nAII.1 Average Wage and Worker Characteristics, 2015 ___________________________________________ 32\nAII.2 Estimate of the Public-Private Wage Gap ___________________________________________________ 34\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "APPENDIX TABLES\nAI.1. Number of Employees and Mean Annual Basic Salaries by Employment Group, 2016 29\nAI.2. Elements of Compensation, 2016 _ 30\nAI.3. Macroeconomic Assumptions 31\nAII.1 Average Wage and Worker Characteristics, 2015 _ 32\nAII.2 Estimate of the Public-Private Wage Gap _ 34\n\n4", "text_characters": 243}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **PREFACE**\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a\ntechnical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during the period June 15–26, 2017 to advise the authorities on options for\nrationalizing wage bill spending.\n\nThe mission was led by Mr. Yuan Xiao and comprised Mr. Chadi Abdallah (FAD Economist), Mr.\nChristopher Bender and Mrs. Raildy Martins (FAD Experts).\n\nThe mission met with officials of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), including Minister\nMr. Maleiane, Vice Minister Ms. Lucas, and Permanent Secretary Mr. lambo. Within the MEF, the\nmission met with officials from the Planning and Budget Directorate, Public Accounting\nDirectorate, National Treasury Directorate, and the IT Center. The mission also met with officials\nfrom the Ministry of State Administration and Civil Servants, National Statistics Institute, Ministry\nof Education, Ministry of Health, General Inspectorate of Finance, and Administrative Tribunal, as\nwell as representatives from professional associations for public employees. The mission would\nlike to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful collaboration provided by the\nauthorities. The mission would also like to thank all the participants to the various meetings for\ntheir active and constructive participation.\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a\ntechnical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during the period June 15–26, 2017 to advise the authorities on options for\nrationalizing wage bill spending.\n\nThe mission was led by Mr. Yuan Xiao and comprised Mr. Chadi Abdallah (FAD Economist), Mr.\nChristopher Bender and Mrs. Raildy Martins (FAD Experts).\n\nThe mission met with officials of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), including Minister\nMr. Maleiane, Vice Minister Ms. Lucas, and Permanent Secretary Mr. lambo. Within the MEF, the\nmission met with officials from the Planning and Budget Directorate, Public Accounting\nDirectorate, National Treasury Directorate, and the IT Center. The mission also met with officials\nfrom the Ministry of State Administration and Civil Servants, National Statistics Institute, Ministry\nof Education, Ministry of Health, General Inspectorate of Finance, and Administrative Tribunal, as\nwell as representatives from professional associations for public employees. The mission would\nlike to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful collaboration provided by the\nauthorities. The mission would also like to thank all the participants to the various meetings for\ntheir active and constructive participation.\n\n5", "text_characters": 1175}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**After two decades of sustained economic growth, Mozambique’s economy was hit by**\n**commodity price shocks in 2014 and has yet to recover.** External imbalances caused the value\nof the Meticais to depreciate, resulting in a critical loss of international currency reserves and\ndistressed levels of public debt. Inflation spiked—peaking at 26 percent in November 2016—and\nGDP growth collapsed to 3.8 percent in 2016, down from an average of more than 7 percent over\nthe previous decade. Substantial fiscal adjustment is now required to restore macroeconomic\nbalance over the medium-term.\n\n\n**Containing public wage spending will be essential for fiscal consolidation.** The central\ngovernment wage bill has grown rapidly in recent years, from 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to 11.3\npercent in 2016. The growth of the wage bill appears to have been driven by ad-hoc increases in\nbasic salaries and other elements of compensation, a sizeable increase in employment, and\nweaknesses in public financial management (PFM). Overruns in wage spending occurred in 2016\nand the first quarter of 2017.\n\n\n**In the absence of reform, wage spending is forecasted to rise, from 11.3 percent of GDP in**\n**2016 to 12.0 percent by 2021.** The level of the wage bill could be even higher than the\nmission’s baseline projection if the economy suffers another external shock, real GDP fails to\ngrow at the rate of 4.7 to 7.0 percent (as was assumed in the baseline), the government makes\nad-hoc adjustments that result in average wages growing even faster than allowed under the\nexisting wage rule, or public sector employment grows by more than the rate of overall\npopulation growth.\n\n\n**The mission’s analysis suggests that wage levels, rather than employment, are the main**\n**reason Mozambique’s wage bill is high relative to that of its peers.** In comparison to a broad\nsample of low-income and developing countries, Mozambique’s government employment lies\nonly slight above the average, whereas its wage bill (11.3 percent of GDP in 2016) is substantially\nhigher than the 6.6 percent median. Further, after accounting for socioeconomic characteristics,\nstatistical analysis suggests that central government workers in Mozambique earn, on average,\nabout 7 percent more than their private sector counterparts. This average, however, masks\nsignificant distributional differences; while most central government workers enjoy a sizeable\nwage premium, those with a university education earn less, on average, than their private sector\ncounterparts.\n\n\n**In the short-term, the growth of wage spending can be contained using three crude**\n**measures that address wage levels or employment.** Such measures, however, might be\npolitically constrained, hard to target, or unsustainable—risking their reversal or leading to the\ndegradation essential public services. Over the medium-term, wage spending is best controlled\nwith compensation and hiring policies that reduce the need for containment. The driving goal of\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nAfter two decades of sustained economic growth, Mozambique’s economy was hit by\ncommodity price shocks in 2014 and has yet to recover. External imbalances caused the value\nof the Meticais to depreciate, resulting in a critical loss of international currency reserves and\ndistressed levels of public debt. Inflation spiked—peaking at 26 percent in November 2016—and\nGDP growth collapsed to 3.8 percent in 2016, down from an average of more than 7 percent over\nthe previous decade. Substantial fiscal adjustment is now required to restore macroeconomic\nbalance over the medium-term.\n\nContaining public wage spending will be essential for fiscal consolidation. The central\ngovernment wage bill has grown rapidly in recent years, from 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to 11.3\npercent in 2016. The growth of the wage bill appears to have been driven by ad-hoc increases in\nbasic salaries and other elements of compensation, a sizeable increase in employment, and\nweaknesses in public financial management (PFM). Overruns in wage spending occurred in 2016\nand the first quarter of 2017.\n\nIn the absence of reform, wage spending is forecasted to rise, from 11.3 percent of GDP in\n2016 to 12.0 percent by 2021. The level of the wage bill could be even higher than the\nmission’s baseline projection if the economy suffers another external shock, real GDP fails to\ngrow at the rate of 4.7 to 7.0 percent (as was assumed in the baseline), the government makes\nad-hoc adjustments that result in average wages growing even faster than allowed under the\nexisting wage rule, or public sector employment grows by more than the rate of overall\npopulation growth.\n\nThe mission’s analysis suggests that wage levels, rather than employment, are the main\nreason Mozambique’s wage bill is high relative to that of its peers. In comparison to a broad\nsample of low-income and developing countries, Mozambique’s government employment lies\nonly slight above the average, whereas its wage bill (11.3 percent of GDP in 2016) is substantially\nhigher than the 6.6 percent median. Further, after accounting for socioeconomic characteristics,\nstatistical analysis suggests that central government workers in Mozambique earn, on average,\nabout 7 percent more than their private sector counterparts. This average, however, masks\nsignificant distributional differences; while most central government workers enjoy a sizeable\nwage premium, those with a university education earn less, on average, than their private sector\ncounterparts.\n\nIn the short-term, the growth of wage spending can be contained using three crude\nmeasures that address wage levels or employment. Such measures, however, might be\npolitically constrained, hard to target, or unsustainable—risking their reversal or leading to the\ndegradation essential public services. Over the medium-term, wage spending is best controlled\nwith compensation and hiring policies that reduce the need for containment. The driving goal of\n\n6", "text_characters": 2507}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "wage bill reform, therefore, should be to use short-term measures—consistent with fiscal\ntargets—that can later be complemented by structural reforms.\n\n\n- _**Wages can be fixed at their current nominal values or allowed to rise at a rate less than**_\n_**the rate of inflation**_ . Increasing basic salaries in such a manner would generate meaningful\nshort-term fiscal relief but could generate upward wage pressure if the real value of wages is\ntoo greatly degraded.\n\n\n- _**Other elements of compensation can be reduced or eliminated**_ **.** Allowances and other\nsupplements can be streamlined, eliminating those not essential to retaining qualified staff.\nOvertime can gradually be curtailed through improved workforce planning. The 13th month\nbenefit can be eliminated. Bonuses, while useful for motivating performance, are ultimately\ndiscretionary. Concerns about wage adequacy, compression, or disparities between public\nand private sector remuneration can be addressed through differential policies that treat\ncertain categories of workers and or sectors differently.\n\n\n- _**Employment can be reduced through attrition**_ **.** Attrition, however, is constrained by the\nnumber of persons leaving public employment and can result in the loss of critical skills and\ndeterioration in public services. Attrition-based policies should target non-essential\npersonnel and exempt critical sectors, such as education and healthcare.\n\n\n**In the medium-term, cost containment measures should be complemented by sustainable**\n**structural reforms, the most important of which are:**\n\n\n- _**Structural pay reforms to align job-specific requirements with compensation**_ and restore\nparity between public and private sector remuneration. The goal of structural pay reform is to\nidentify the proper level of remuneration—to include basic salaries and other elements of\ncompensation—for each position in the public sector for workers with different qualifications\nand experience.\n\n\n- _**A systematic review of elements of compensation with the objective of simplifying**_\n_**remuneration**_ **,** eliminating nonessential allowances and other supplements, and increasing\nthe share of basic salaries in compensation. The objective is to allocate the levels of\nremuneration identified by structural pay reform to other elements of compensation, revise\nthe wage grids for public employees, and set policies for other elements of compensation.\n\n\n- _**Functional reviews and restructuring of ministries, departments, and agencies**_ to\nidentify areas of overlap or duplication and to clarify and codify organizational goals and\nresponsibilities. Institution-level restructuring and process reengineering can be useful to\nalign personnel resources with mandates and spending priorities and to improve efficiency\nby leveraging technology and streamlining processes. Ultimately, process reengineering\nshould provide the basis for setting staffing (i.e., the number of authorized positions for\nevery category of employment) with the goal of “right-sizing” overall public employment.\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "wage bill reform, therefore, should be to use short-term measures—consistent with fiscal\ntargets—that can later be complemented by structural reforms.\n\n- _Wages can be fixed at their current nominal values or allowed to rise at a rate less than_\n_the rate of inflation_ . Increasing basic salaries in such a manner would generate meaningful\nshort-term fiscal relief but could generate upward wage pressure if the real value of wages is\ntoo greatly degraded.\n\n- _Other elements of compensation can be reduced or eliminated_ . Allowances and other\nsupplements can be streamlined, eliminating those not essential to retaining qualified staff.\nOvertime can gradually be curtailed through improved workforce planning. The 13th month\nbenefit can be eliminated. Bonuses, while useful for motivating performance, are ultimately\ndiscretionary. Concerns about wage adequacy, compression, or disparities between public\nand private sector remuneration can be addressed through differential policies that treat\ncertain categories of workers and or sectors differently.\n\n- _Employment can be reduced through attrition_ . Attrition, however, is constrained by the\nnumber of persons leaving public employment and can result in the loss of critical skills and\ndeterioration in public services. Attrition-based policies should target non-essential\npersonnel and exempt critical sectors, such as education and healthcare.\n\nIn the medium-term, cost containment measures should be complemented by sustainable\nstructural reforms, the most important of which are:\n\n- _Structural pay reforms to align job-specific requirements with compensation_ and restore\nparity between public and private sector remuneration. The goal of structural pay reform is to\nidentify the proper level of remuneration—to include basic salaries and other elements of\ncompensation—for each position in the public sector for workers with different qualifications\nand experience.\n\n- _A systematic review of elements of compensation with the objective of simplifying_\n_remuneration_ , eliminating nonessential allowances and other supplements, and increasing\nthe share of basic salaries in compensation. The objective is to allocate the levels of\nremuneration identified by structural pay reform to other elements of compensation, revise\nthe wage grids for public employees, and set policies for other elements of compensation.\n\n- _Functional reviews and restructuring of ministries, departments, and agencies_ to\nidentify areas of overlap or duplication and to clarify and codify organizational goals and\nresponsibilities. Institution-level restructuring and process reengineering can be useful to\nalign personnel resources with mandates and spending priorities and to improve efficiency\nby leveraging technology and streamlining processes. Ultimately, process reengineering\nshould provide the basis for setting staffing (i.e., the number of authorized positions for\nevery category of employment) with the goal of “right-sizing” overall public employment.\n\n7", "text_characters": 2578}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- _**Strengthening PFM to enable more effective wage bill budgeting, execution, and**_\n_**control.**_ Of particular importance is developing a PFM reform strategy to guide\nimprovements in forecasting and budgeting, budget execution, IT systems (for budget\nexecution, payroll, and human resources), auditing, and internal controls.\n\n\n- _**The table, below, presents a menu of short-term options to slow the growth of wages**_\n_**and contain the size of the public workforce.**_ Options are evaluated relative to a baseline\nprojection that incorporates assumptions regarding compensation policies and the evolution\nof the workforce (see Appendix I) and are intended to demonstrate the potential savings\nassociated with the measures described above. Options can be combined in various ways\nand are not exhaustive. Over time, short-term measures should be complemented by\nstructural reforms intended to bend the trajectory of the wage bill to a more sustainable path\nand improve the efficiency and efficacy of wage spending.\n\n\n**Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in percent of GDP)**\n\n**Wage Spending (in Percent of GDP) and Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in Percent of GDP)**\n\n\n2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\n\n**Baseline projection 1/** **11.3** **10.9** **11.4** **11.6** **11.8** **12.0**\n\n\n**Savings relative to the baseline projection (in percent of GDP)**\n\n\nOptions addressing basic salaries\n\nSuspend wage increases for one year (2018) - 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4\nSuspend wage increases for two years (2018-2019) - 1.3 2.2 2.2 2.3\nLimit wage increase to inflation (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0\nLimit wage increase to one percentage point below inflation (2018-202 - 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.3\nLimit wage increase to two percentage points below inflation (2018-20 - 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.6\n\n\nOptions addressing overtime, supplements, and bonuses\n\nEliminate overtime at the rate of 25 percent per year (2018-2021) - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2\nReduce supplements by 25 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2\nReduce supplements by 50 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4\nReduce bonuses by 10 percent (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nReduce bonuses by 25 percent (2018-2021) - 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8\n\n\nOptions addressing the \"13th month\" benefit 3/\n\nEliminate for managers and pay half to everyone else (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nEliminate for everyone (2018-2021) - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5\n\n\nOptions addressing employment\n\nFix the size of the workforce at its 2017 value (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3\nReplace only two out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4\nReplace only one out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5\n\n\nMemorandum items\n\nInflation (percent change in consumer price index, average) 19.2 18.1 10.5 5.8 5.5 5.6\nReal GDP growth 3.8 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.5 7.0\n\nSources: IMF staff calculation based on data provided by the authorities.\n1/ The methodology underlying the baseline is explained in Appendix 1.\n2/ For the purpose of estimating savings, supplements exclude the \"13th month\" benefit.\n3/ The 13th month benefit is paid each January on the basis of wages paid in the prior calendar/fiscal year.\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- _Strengthening PFM to enable more effective wage bill budgeting, execution, and_\n_control._ Of particular importance is developing a PFM reform strategy to guide\nimprovements in forecasting and budgeting, budget execution, IT systems (for budget\nexecution, payroll, and human resources), auditing, and internal controls.\n\n- _The table, below, presents a menu of short-term options to slow the growth of wages_\n_and contain the size of the public workforce._ Options are evaluated relative to a baseline\nprojection that incorporates assumptions regarding compensation policies and the evolution\nof the workforce (see Appendix I) and are intended to demonstrate the potential savings\nassociated with the measures described above. Options can be combined in various ways\nand are not exhaustive. Over time, short-term measures should be complemented by\nstructural reforms intended to bend the trajectory of the wage bill to a more sustainable path\nand improve the efficiency and efficacy of wage spending.\n\nSavings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in percent of GDP)\n\nWage Spending (in Percent of GDP) and Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in Percent of GDP)\n\n2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\nBaseline projection 1/ 11.3 10.9 11.4 11.6 11.8 12.0\n\nSavings relative to the baseline projection (in percent of GDP)\n\nOptions addressing basic salaries\n\nSuspend wage increases for one year (2018) - 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4\nSuspend wage increases for two years (2018-2019) - 1.3 2.2 2.2 2.3\nLimit wage increase to inflation (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0\nLimit wage increase to one percentage point below inflation (2018-202 - 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.3\nLimit wage increase to two percentage points below inflation (2018-20 - 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.6\n\nOptions addressing overtime, supplements, and bonuses\n\nEliminate overtime at the rate of 25 percent per year (2018-2021) - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2\nReduce supplements by 25 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2\nReduce supplements by 50 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4\nReduce bonuses by 10 percent (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nReduce bonuses by 25 percent (2018-2021) - 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8\n\nOptions addressing the \"13th month\" benefit 3/\n\nEliminate for managers and pay half to everyone else (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nEliminate for everyone (2018-2021) - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5\n\nOptions addressing employment\n\nFix the size of the workforce at its 2017 value (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3\nReplace only two out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4\nReplace only one out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5\n\nMemorandum items\n\nInflation (percent change in consumer price index, average) 19.2 18.1 10.5 5.8 5.5 5.6\nReal GDP growth 3.8 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.5 7.0\n\nSources: IMF staff calculation based on data provided by the authorities.\n1/ The methodology underlying the baseline is explained in Appendix 1.\n2/ For the purpose of estimating savings, supplements exclude the \"13th month\" benefit.\n3/ The 13th month benefit is paid each January on the basis of wages paid in the prior calendar/fiscal year.\n\n8", "text_characters": 2537}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n**1.** **After two decades of sustained economic growth, Mozambique has yet to recover**\n**from the international commodity price shocks that first hit the country in late 2014.**\nExternal imbalances resulted in sharp exchange rate depreciation and loss of international\nreserves during 2014-16. GDP growth decelerated sharply in 2016 to 3.8 percent—down from an\naverage of 7 percent over the previous ten years—and inflation peaked at 26 percent in\nNovember 2016. Monetary policy has been tightened and the external position started to\nrebalance in recent months, but the outlook remains challenging.\n\n\n**2.** **Significant fiscal adjustment is required over the medium term to restore**\n**macroeconomic balance.** Prior to the crisis, strong revenue performance, especially sizeable\ncapital gain taxes from the mining sector, provided amply fiscal space for spending, while the\ngovernment tapped into non-concessional borrowing to scale up public investment in\nanticipation of future revenues from natural gas production. However, the lack of fiscal buffers\nimplies that fiscal policy became unsustainable as the crisis hit, while the depreciation and the\ndisclosure in April 2016 of previously hidden debt caused the stock of public debt to surge to a\ndistressed level in 2016.\n\n\n**Figure 1. Central Government Wage and Capital Spending**\n\n(in percent of GDP)\n\n\n13.0\n\n\n12.0\n\n\n11.0\n\n\n10.0\n\n\n9.0\n\n\n8.0\n\n\n7.0\n\n\n6.0\n\n\n5.0\n\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\n\nWage spending Capital spending\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\nNote: Capital expenditures excludes those financed by project grants\n\n\n**3.** **In particular, policy measures focusing on containing spending on wage bill are at**\n**the core of such fiscal consolidation.** Mozambique’s central government wage bill has\nexperienced a rapid increase in recent years, rising from 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to 11.3 percent\nin 2016, which is significantly above the median across a sample of countries with similar level of\ndevelopment (around 7 percent of GDP). The observed increase in wage bill spending could\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. After two decades of sustained economic growth, Mozambique has yet to recover\nfrom the international commodity price shocks that first hit the country in late 2014.\nExternal imbalances resulted in sharp exchange rate depreciation and loss of international\nreserves during 2014-16. GDP growth decelerated sharply in 2016 to 3.8 percent—down from an\naverage of 7 percent over the previous ten years—and inflation peaked at 26 percent in\nNovember 2016. Monetary policy has been tightened and the external position started to\nrebalance in recent months, but the outlook remains challenging.\n\n2. Significant fiscal adjustment is required over the medium term to restore\nmacroeconomic balance. Prior to the crisis, strong revenue performance, especially sizeable\ncapital gain taxes from the mining sector, provided amply fiscal space for spending, while the\ngovernment tapped into non-concessional borrowing to scale up public investment in\nanticipation of future revenues from natural gas production. However, the lack of fiscal buffers\nimplies that fiscal policy became unsustainable as the crisis hit, while the depreciation and the\ndisclosure in April 2016 of previously hidden debt caused the stock of public debt to surge to a\ndistressed level in 2016.\n\nFigure 1. Central Government Wage and Capital Spending\n\n(in percent of GDP)\n\n13.0\n\n12.0\n\n11.0\n\n10.0\n\n9.0\n\n8.0\n\n7.0\n\n6.0\n\n5.0\n\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\nWage spending Capital spending\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\nNote: Capital expenditures excludes those financed by project grants\n\n3. In particular, policy measures focusing on containing spending on wage bill are at\nthe core of such fiscal consolidation. Mozambique’s central government wage bill has\nexperienced a rapid increase in recent years, rising from 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to 11.3 percent\nin 2016, which is significantly above the median across a sample of countries with similar level of\ndevelopment (around 7 percent of GDP). The observed increase in wage bill spending could\n\n9", "text_characters": 1724}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "potentially reflect several factors, including ad-hoc wage and salary adjustments, rapid increases\nin hiring, and public financial management (PFM) issues related to wage bill planning and\nbudgeting, payroll execution and control, as well as performance management in the civil service.\nBudget execution forecasts for 2016 and 2017 showed systematic wage overruns in both years,\npointing to potential issues in wage bill execution.\n\n\n**4.** **This report reviews compensation and employment policies and developments, and**\n**provides options to improve wage bill management.** However, the appropriate mix of policy\noptions depends on the objectives, priorities, and preferences of the government. To the extent\npossible, the report estimates the fiscal impact of the reform options. Section II discusses recent\ntrends in compensation and employment and places these considerations in an international\ncontext. Section III discusses issues related to wage bill management and identifies challenges in\nimplementing reforms. The last section provides options for reform and estimates their fiscal\nimpact.\n\n### **II. TRENDS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT** **COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT**\n\n\n**5.** **Overall, total compensation to employees by the central government reached 11.3**\n**percent of GDP in 2016.** The central government’s wage bill is set by the legislature as part of\nthe overall budget process and comprises wage bill spending by the budgetary central\ngovernment, the provinces and districts, the autonomous agencies, and other public bodies that\nare fully or partially funded by the state’s budget. The wage bill expenditure item recorded in the\nfiscal accounts excludes compensation paid to 3,755 doctors financed by the Common funds\n(0.15 percent of GDP in 2016), and social security contributions (0.54 percent. Central\ngovernment employment is estimated at around 393.7 thousand employees in 2016 (1.4 percent\nof the total population; 3.4 percent of the working age population). [1] This figure is based on data\nprovided by the authorities to the mission. The data covered all sectors except defense, police\nand security, on which information was not provided. [2] Overall, regular full time employees\nrepresent around 80 percent of the total workforce in the central government.\n\n\n**6.** **As to the functional composition, education and other (non-health) sectors absorb**\n**the largest shares of the wage bill (Figure 2).** Education is the largest employer, with a share\nof 52.2 percent of total employment in 2016, absorbing around 40.4 percent of total wage\nspending. The health sector’s share is rather small, at only 12.8 percent of total employment, and\n\n\n1 We estimate the numbers of workers in other sectors (for which information were not available) to be around\n45,000.\n\n2 The wage bill that is recorded in the fiscal accounts and is publicly available includes spending on wage and\nsalaries of the defense, security and police workers. While the authorities provided information on total wage\nspending for these three sectors, they did not provide data on their employment levels.\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "potentially reflect several factors, including ad-hoc wage and salary adjustments, rapid increases\nin hiring, and public financial management (PFM) issues related to wage bill planning and\nbudgeting, payroll execution and control, as well as performance management in the civil service.\nBudget execution forecasts for 2016 and 2017 showed systematic wage overruns in both years,\npointing to potential issues in wage bill execution.\n\n4. This report reviews compensation and employment policies and developments, and\nprovides options to improve wage bill management. However, the appropriate mix of policy\noptions depends on the objectives, priorities, and preferences of the government. To the extent\npossible, the report estimates the fiscal impact of the reform options. Section II discusses recent\ntrends in compensation and employment and places these considerations in an international\ncontext. Section III discusses issues related to wage bill management and identifies challenges in\nimplementing reforms. The last section provides options for reform and estimates their fiscal\nimpact.\nII. TRENDS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT\n\n5. Overall, total compensation to employees by the central government reached 11.3\npercent of GDP in 2016. The central government’s wage bill is set by the legislature as part of\nthe overall budget process and comprises wage bill spending by the budgetary central\ngovernment, the provinces and districts, the autonomous agencies, and other public bodies that\nare fully or partially funded by the state’s budget. The wage bill expenditure item recorded in the\nfiscal accounts excludes compensation paid to 3,755 doctors financed by the Common funds\n(0.15 percent of GDP in 2016), and social security contributions (0.54 percent. Central\ngovernment employment is estimated at around 393.7 thousand employees in 2016 (1.4 percent\nof the total population; 3.4 percent of the working age population). [1] This figure is based on data\nprovided by the authorities to the mission. The data covered all sectors except defense, police\nand security, on which information was not provided. [2] Overall, regular full time employees\nrepresent around 80 percent of the total workforce in the central government.\n\n6. As to the functional composition, education and other (non-health) sectors absorb\nthe largest shares of the wage bill (Figure 2). Education is the largest employer, with a share\nof 52.2 percent of total employment in 2016, absorbing around 40.4 percent of total wage\nspending. The health sector’s share is rather small, at only 12.8 percent of total employment, and\n\n1 We estimate the numbers of workers in other sectors (for which information were not available) to be around\n45,000.\n\n2 The wage bill that is recorded in the fiscal accounts and is publicly available includes spending on wage and\nsalaries of the defense, security and police workers. While the authorities provided information on total wage\nspending for these three sectors, they did not provide data on their employment levels.\n\n10", "text_characters": 2584}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0013-001"], "markdown": "absorbs 9.6 percent of total compensation. The other sectors (grouped together under one\ncategory), and for which a breakdown was not available, form the second largest group of\nemployer in the government at 35.0 percent in 2016, but absorbs the largest share of total\ncompensation (at around 50.0 percent). [3]\n\n\n**Figure 2. Central Government Wage Bill Spending by Sector**\n\n(percentage of total)\n\n\n100%\n\n\n90%\n\n\n80%\n\n\n70%\n\n\n60%\n\n\n50%\n\n\n40%\n\n\n30%\n\n\n20%\n\n\n10%\n\n\n0%\n\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\n\nEducation Health Other\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\n**7.** **The central government wage bill in Mozambique is very high compared to peers.**\nAt 11.3 percent of GDP in 2016, the wage bill exceeds the median for a group of 42 low-income\nand Developing countries (6.6 percent; Figure 3). It is the fourth highest after Zimbabwe, Lesotho,\nand Liberia. Moreover, it is very high as a share of primary expenditures (40.3 percent) and as a\nshare of domestic revenues (47.11 percent). The former indicator suggests that the control of\ngovernment spending dynamics can be a very challenging task, while the latter indicator points\nto sustainability issues of wage outlays in Mozambique.\n\n\n3 This category is referred to in the report as the “Other” sector.\n\n\n11\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "absorbs 9.6 percent of total compensation. The other sectors (grouped together under one\ncategory), and for which a breakdown was not available, form the second largest group of\nemployer in the government at 35.0 percent in 2016, but absorbs the largest share of total\ncompensation (at around 50.0 percent). [3]\n\nFigure 2. Central Government Wage Bill Spending by Sector\n\n(percentage of total)\n\n100%\n\n90%\n\n80%\n\n70%\n\n60%\n\n50%\n\n40%\n\n30%\n\n20%\n\n10%\n\n0%\n\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\nEducation Health Other\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n7. The central government wage bill in Mozambique is very high compared to peers.\nAt 11.3 percent of GDP in 2016, the wage bill exceeds the median for a group of 42 low-income\nand Developing countries (6.6 percent; Figure 3). It is the fourth highest after Zimbabwe, Lesotho,\nand Liberia. Moreover, it is very high as a share of primary expenditures (40.3 percent) and as a\nshare of domestic revenues (47.11 percent). The former indicator suggests that the control of\ngovernment spending dynamics can be a very challenging task, while the latter indicator points\nto sustainability issues of wage outlays in Mozambique.\n\n3 This category is referred to in the report as the “Other” sector.\n\n11", "text_characters": 1036}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0014-001", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0014-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 3. Central Government Wage Bill, Low Income and Developing Countries, 2016**\n\n(in percent of GDP)\n\n\n\n18.5\n16.8\n15.0\n13.3\n11.5\n9.8\n8.0\n6.3\n4.5\n2.8\n1.0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\n**8.** **The high wage bill** _**level**_ **compared to peers seems to reflect high average**\n**compensation, rather than high employment levels (Figure 4).** The central government\nemployment to population ratio in Mozambique is around the median ratio across peers (a\nsample of low income and developing countries). This suggests that high wage spending levels\nin Mozambique most likely reflect higher compensation levels.\n\n\n**Figure 4. Central Government Wage Bill and Employment**\n\n(Low income and developing countries, latest year)\n\n\n\n17.50\n\n\n15.50\n\n\n13.50\n\n\n11.50\n\n\n9.50\n\n\n7.50\n\n\n5.50\n\n\n3.50\n\n\n1.50\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0\n\n_Government Employment, in percent of Population_\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 3. Central Government Wage Bill, Low Income and Developing Countries, 2016\n\n(in percent of GDP)\n\n18.5\n16.8\n15.0\n13.3\n11.5\n9.8\n8.0\n6.3\n4.5\n2.8\n1.0\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n8. The high wage bill _level_ compared to peers seems to reflect high average\ncompensation, rather than high employment levels (Figure 4). The central government\nemployment to population ratio in Mozambique is around the median ratio across peers (a\nsample of low income and developing countries). This suggests that high wage spending levels\nin Mozambique most likely reflect higher compensation levels.\n\nFigure 4. Central Government Wage Bill and Employment\n\n(Low income and developing countries, latest year)\n\n17.50\n\n15.50\n\n13.50\n\n11.50\n\n9.50\n\n7.50\n\n5.50\n\n3.50\n\n1.50\n\n1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0\n\n_Government Employment, in percent of Population_\n\n12", "text_characters": 727}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "**9.** **Not only is the wage bill relatively high compared to peers, it has also been rising**\n**rapidly since 2010, reflecting compensation dynamics in some sectors and employment**\n**dynamics in other sectors.** The wage bill increased from around 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to\naround 11.3 percent of GDP in 2016 (Figure 5), raising concerns about fiscal sustainability going\nforward. This is partly explained by in large differential wage dynamics across different sectors in\nthe government since 2013. Government decisions to grant wage increases to different sectors\nhave favored mostly doctors and medical staff who organized strikes in 2013 demanding higher\nwages. Teachers and police workers have also received preferential wage increases since 2013.\nOverall, over 2013-2015, the cumulative, inflation adjusted, granted wage increases amounted to\naround 32, 18, and 11 percent for doctors, teachers and police, and other civil servants,\nrespectively (Figure 6). By 2016, the cumulative real wage increases that were granted by the\ngovernment were still relatively high for doctors, teacher and nurses, despite the large increase in\ninflation from 2.4 percent in 2015 to 19.2 in 2016. On the other hand, the rapid increase in wage\nspending seems to be also driven by an increase in employment outside the health and\neducation sector, over time (Figure 7). [4]\n\n\n**Figure 5. Central Government Wage Bill Spending, 2010-2016**\n\n(in percent of GDP)\n\n\n12.0\n\n\n11.0\n\n\n10.0\n\n\n9.0\n\n\n8.0\n\n\n7.0\n\n2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\n\nCompensation of employees (percent of GDP)\n\n\nTrend\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\n**10.** **Increases in wage bill spending have been discretional, driven by both**\n**compensation and employment dynamics over time (Figure 8).** We decompose the increase\nin the wage bill into the contributions of compensation and employment over time for the\noverall central government. [5] The analysis suggests that compensation has been the main driver\nbehind the recent increase in wage bill spending, with about 67 percent (median over 2014\n\n4 And while these other sectors received relatively more modest wage increases, the rapid increase in\nemployment that they experienced magnified the impact on the wage bill.\n\n5 For consistency, the decomposition analysis is performed using wage bill spending that excludes the\ncompensation of defense, police and security personnel, since, as pointed earlier, the employment figures for\nthese sectors were not provided to the mission team.\n\n\n13\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "9. Not only is the wage bill relatively high compared to peers, it has also been rising\nrapidly since 2010, reflecting compensation dynamics in some sectors and employment\ndynamics in other sectors. The wage bill increased from around 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to\naround 11.3 percent of GDP in 2016 (Figure 5), raising concerns about fiscal sustainability going\nforward. This is partly explained by in large differential wage dynamics across different sectors in\nthe government since 2013. Government decisions to grant wage increases to different sectors\nhave favored mostly doctors and medical staff who organized strikes in 2013 demanding higher\nwages. Teachers and police workers have also received preferential wage increases since 2013.\nOverall, over 2013-2015, the cumulative, inflation adjusted, granted wage increases amounted to\naround 32, 18, and 11 percent for doctors, teachers and police, and other civil servants,\nrespectively (Figure 6). By 2016, the cumulative real wage increases that were granted by the\ngovernment were still relatively high for doctors, teacher and nurses, despite the large increase in\ninflation from 2.4 percent in 2015 to 19.2 in 2016. On the other hand, the rapid increase in wage\nspending seems to be also driven by an increase in employment outside the health and\neducation sector, over time (Figure 7). [4]\n\nFigure 5. Central Government Wage Bill Spending, 2010-2016\n\n(in percent of GDP)\n\n12.0\n\n11.0\n\n10.0\n\n9.0\n\n8.0\n\n7.0\n\n2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\nCompensation of employees (percent of GDP)\n\nTrend\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n10. Increases in wage bill spending have been discretional, driven by both\ncompensation and employment dynamics over time (Figure 8). We decompose the increase\nin the wage bill into the contributions of compensation and employment over time for the\noverall central government. [5] The analysis suggests that compensation has been the main driver\nbehind the recent increase in wage bill spending, with about 67 percent (median over 2014\n\n4 And while these other sectors received relatively more modest wage increases, the rapid increase in\nemployment that they experienced magnified the impact on the wage bill.\n\n5 For consistency, the decomposition analysis is performed using wage bill spending that excludes the\ncompensation of defense, police and security personnel, since, as pointed earlier, the employment figures for\nthese sectors were not provided to the mission team.\n\n13", "text_characters": 2097}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0016-001", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0016-002"], "markdown": "2016) of the growth being due to rising compensation. Such relative importance of\ncompensation as a driver of wage bill growth has increased over time from about 43 percent\n(median over 2011-2013). Further decomposition of wage bill spending changes by sector over\nthe period from 2014 to 2016 suggests that while compensation has also been the main driver\nbehind the increase in wage bill spending in the health and “Other” sectors, employment\ndynamics have played a more prominent role in the education sector.\n\n\n**Figure 6. Cumulative Percent Increase Granted by Government Decrees, 2013-2016**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Figure 7. Central Government Employment, 2010-2016**\n\n(in percent of working age population)\n\n\n3.5\n\n\n3.0\n\n\n2.5\n\n\n2.0\n\n\n1.5\n\n\n1.0\n\n\n0.5\n\n\n0.0\n\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\n\nEducation Health Other\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\n14\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "2016) of the growth being due to rising compensation. Such relative importance of\ncompensation as a driver of wage bill growth has increased over time from about 43 percent\n(median over 2011-2013). Further decomposition of wage bill spending changes by sector over\nthe period from 2014 to 2016 suggests that while compensation has also been the main driver\nbehind the increase in wage bill spending in the health and “Other” sectors, employment\ndynamics have played a more prominent role in the education sector.\n\nFigure 6. Cumulative Percent Increase Granted by Government Decrees, 2013-2016\n\nFigure 7. Central Government Employment, 2010-2016\n\n(in percent of working age population)\n\n3.5\n\n3.0\n\n2.5\n\n2.0\n\n1.5\n\n1.0\n\n0.5\n\n0.0\n\n2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\nEducation Health Other\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n14", "text_characters": 702}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 8. Contributions of Wages and Employment to the Wage Bill Growth, 2011-2016**\n\n(in percent)\n\n\n35.00\n\n\n30.00\n\n\n25.00\n\n\n20.00\n\n\n15.00\n\n\n10.00\n\n\n5.00\n\n\n0.00\n\n\n\n-5.00\n\n\n-10.00\n\n\n\n\n\nContribution of employment\nContribution of average wage\n\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\n**11.** **Allowances, bonuses, and other supplements account for a large share of total**\n**compensation (Figure 9).** Allowances, bonuses and other supplements currently account for\nabout 43 percent of the total wage bill. This is well above the level typically found in OECD\ncountries, where the base wage component averages nearly 90 percent of the total wages of civil\nservants. Furthermore, the share of these salary supplements in the wage bill has been increasing\nover time, up from around 40 percent in 2012. Other supplements contain several categories of\nremuneration, including a “13 [th] month” salary. [6]\n\n\n**12.** **The contribution of seniority-related increments to the wage drift in Mozambique**\n**is estimated to be about 1.3 percent per year.** The wage drift refers to aspects of government\nemployment policy—such as seniority-related increases in compensation, promotion policies,\nand the reclassification of employment positions of their salary grade—that often automatically\ndrive public wage growth independently of wage policy and employment decisions. The\ncontribution of seniority-related increments to wage drift in the Mozambique is estimated to be\nabout 1.3 percent per year for civil servants who enter the workforce in their early 20s and retire\nat the statutory retirement ages (55 for women and 60 for men). Based on this information and\non regression analysis using microdata from the government employee registry, the wage drift\nfor the overall central government sector is estimated to be about 1.3 percent per year. While\noften unnoticed, the wage drift—which is not directly linked to either performance or\nproductivity—is inevitably compounding upward pressure on wage costs.\n\n\n6 The 13th month salary is an entitlement for civil servants in Mozambique, and is mandated by the government.\nIt is equal to the base salary of the current fiscal year, but is paid in the following fiscal year (typically in January).\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 8. Contributions of Wages and Employment to the Wage Bill Growth, 2011-2016\n\n(in percent)\n\n35.00\n\n30.00\n\n25.00\n\n20.00\n\n15.00\n\n10.00\n\n5.00\n\n0.00\n\n-5.00\n\n-10.00\n\nContribution of employment\nContribution of average wage\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n11. Allowances, bonuses, and other supplements account for a large share of total\ncompensation (Figure 9). Allowances, bonuses and other supplements currently account for\nabout 43 percent of the total wage bill. This is well above the level typically found in OECD\ncountries, where the base wage component averages nearly 90 percent of the total wages of civil\nservants. Furthermore, the share of these salary supplements in the wage bill has been increasing\nover time, up from around 40 percent in 2012. Other supplements contain several categories of\nremuneration, including a “13 [th] month” salary. [6]\n\n12. The contribution of seniority-related increments to the wage drift in Mozambique\nis estimated to be about 1.3 percent per year. The wage drift refers to aspects of government\nemployment policy—such as seniority-related increases in compensation, promotion policies,\nand the reclassification of employment positions of their salary grade—that often automatically\ndrive public wage growth independently of wage policy and employment decisions. The\ncontribution of seniority-related increments to wage drift in the Mozambique is estimated to be\nabout 1.3 percent per year for civil servants who enter the workforce in their early 20s and retire\nat the statutory retirement ages (55 for women and 60 for men). Based on this information and\non regression analysis using microdata from the government employee registry, the wage drift\nfor the overall central government sector is estimated to be about 1.3 percent per year. While\noften unnoticed, the wage drift—which is not directly linked to either performance or\nproductivity—is inevitably compounding upward pressure on wage costs.\n\n6 The 13th month salary is an entitlement for civil servants in Mozambique, and is mandated by the government.\nIt is equal to the base salary of the current fiscal year, but is paid in the following fiscal year (typically in January).\n\n15", "text_characters": 1867}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-001", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-002", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-003", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-004", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-005", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-006", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-007", "cr-2023-023-fig-p0018-008"], "markdown": "**Figure 9. The Composition of Wage Bill Spending**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**13.** **Recent slippages in the wage bill in 2016 are concerning and raise questions about**\n**compliance issues (Figure 10).** The high coverage of database and applications should, at least\nin principle, ensure that a substantial part of the civil service wage bill management benefit form\nembedded controls. The process for salary payment should also ensure controls at both the\nsector and ministry of finance levels. Nevertheless, the recent slippages of the wage bill in 2016\namounted to around 1.2 percent of GDP relative to the budgeted amount. [7] Data provided by the\nauthorities suggest that the health sector only accounts for 14 percent of the slippage, while the\nbulk of the slippage occurred in the education sector (around 72 percent). [8] Poor forecasting and\nunrealistic budgeting seems to have played a major role. For instance, salary increases granted\nby the government in April 2016 (between 4 and 9 percent, depending on the sector) were\nsomehow not incorporated in the revised supplementary budget of August 2016. The\ndeactivation or overriding of the controls embedded in the systems and legal procedures at the\ncentral or provincial and district levels may have also played a role. A buildup of wage arrears\nfrom previous years, other salary increases beyond those granted in April 2016, and a significant\nincrease in the hiring of new staff in other sectors are additional possible factors. Without\n\n\n\n7 The authorities argue that substantial amount of hiring occurred in the health sector, which explains most of the\nslippage. Data provided by the authorities suggests that there were no additional hiring above planned budgeted\namounts in the education sector.\n\n8 The category of all other sectors combined explains the remaining 14 percent of the slippage.\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0652, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(269.64569091796875, 115.21910095214844, 419.4119567871094, 326.09271240234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 560, "number": 9, "size": 2070, "transform": [149.76625061035156, 1.237764627148863e-05, 1.1814350727945566e-05, 210.8735809326172, 269.64569091796875, 115.21910095214844], "width": 398, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(200.0, 142.0, 315.0, 295.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 153, "number": 18, "size": 0, "transform": [115.0, 0.0, 0.0, 153.0, 200.0, 142.0], "width": 115, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(208.98460388183594, 141.22528076171875, 316.5518798828125, 297.07135009765625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 414, "number": 12, "size": 1158, "transform": [107.5672607421875, 8.890049684850965e-06, 8.731391062610783e-06, 155.84603881835938, 208.98460388183594, 141.22528076171875], "width": 286, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(240.257080078125, 218.489990234375, 316.5518798828125, 312.5242919921875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 250, "number": 11, "size": 1081, "transform": [76.29478454589844, 6.305491751845693e-06, 5.268340828479268e-06, 94.0342788696289, 240.257080078125, 218.489990234375], "width": 203, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(243.6480712890625, 124.64012145996094, 316.5518798828125, 222.8203125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 261, "number": 13, "size": 1081, "transform": [72.90379333496094, 6.0252382354519796e-06, 5.500618499354459e-06, 98.18019104003906, 243.6480712890625, 124.64012145996094], "width": 194, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(260.97979736328125, 218.48995971679688, 316.5518798828125, 317.04705810546875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 262, "number": 10, "size": 1081, "transform": [55.57206344604492, 4.5928327381261624e-06, 5.521734692592872e-06, 98.55709075927734, 260.97979736328125, 218.48995971679688], "width": 148, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(269.2688903808594, 115.21759796142578, 316.55438232421875, 222.8203125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 286, "number": 14, "size": 1081, "transform": [47.28548812866211, 3.907976861228235e-06, 6.028522420820082e-06, 107.60271453857422, 269.2688903808594, 115.21759796142578], "width": 126, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 9. The Composition of Wage Bill Spending\n\n13. Recent slippages in the wage bill in 2016 are concerning and raise questions about\ncompliance issues (Figure 10). The high coverage of database and applications should, at least\nin principle, ensure that a substantial part of the civil service wage bill management benefit form\nembedded controls. The process for salary payment should also ensure controls at both the\nsector and ministry of finance levels. Nevertheless, the recent slippages of the wage bill in 2016\namounted to around 1.2 percent of GDP relative to the budgeted amount. [7] Data provided by the\nauthorities suggest that the health sector only accounts for 14 percent of the slippage, while the\nbulk of the slippage occurred in the education sector (around 72 percent). [8] Poor forecasting and\nunrealistic budgeting seems to have played a major role. For instance, salary increases granted\nby the government in April 2016 (between 4 and 9 percent, depending on the sector) were\nsomehow not incorporated in the revised supplementary budget of August 2016. The\ndeactivation or overriding of the controls embedded in the systems and legal procedures at the\ncentral or provincial and district levels may have also played a role. A buildup of wage arrears\nfrom previous years, other salary increases beyond those granted in April 2016, and a significant\nincrease in the hiring of new staff in other sectors are additional possible factors. Without\n\n7 The authorities argue that substantial amount of hiring occurred in the health sector, which explains most of the\nslippage. Data provided by the authorities suggests that there were no additional hiring above planned budgeted\namounts in the education sector.\n\n8 The category of all other sectors combined explains the remaining 14 percent of the slippage.\n\n16", "text_characters": 1530}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "detailed data, the mission was not able to uncover the factors behind the observed slippage and\nquantify their relative contribution.\n\n\n**14.** **The government has undertaken several encouraging short-term (one-off)**\n**measures to contain wage bill spending in 2017, but these are not by themselves adequate**\n**to contain the observed rapid increase in the wage bill.** The government took a decision in\nDecember 2016 to suspend the 13 [th] salary owed from fiscal year 2016 for all managerial level\npositions in the government, and granted all other employees in the government only half of it. [9]\nOn another front, the government took a decision in April 2017 to increase the salaries of low\npaid government employees (those earning the minimum wage of around 3800 Meticais per\nmonth, as defined in the government sector) by 21 percent, in the context of a social dialogue\nwith the national organization of workers (OTM), a professional association that bargains on\nbehalf of civil servants. [10] The nominal amount of that increase was then granted to all other\nemployees in the government (which is very small relative to their wage levels).\n\n\n**15.** **In the absence of reforms, the mission projects wage spending to rise from 11.3**\n**percent of GDP in 2016 to 12.0 by 2021.** The mission’s baseline projection presumes that: (i)\nbasic salaries will rise at the rate of inflation plus one-half the rate of real GDP growth; [11] (ii) the\n“13th month” salary will be paid in full to all employees from 2018 onwards; (iii) the cost of\nallowances, overtime, bonuses, and other salary supplements (as a share of basic salaries) will\nremain unchanged over the projection horizon; (iv) the number of employees in the Education\nsector will grow in line with the population of persons under the age of 20; and (v) the number of\nemployees in the Health sector and the “Other” sector category will rise in line with overall\npopulation growth. Appendix I presents a detailed description of the model as well as the\nassumptions underlying the mission’s baseline projection.\n\n\n9 The suspension of the 13th salary may imply unpaid obligations to be paid in the future, especially since it was\nnot the result of a change in the law.\n\n10 Currently, no labor unions for government employees exist in Mozambique. There are professional associations\nthat engage in social dialogue with the government with respect to the wage adjustment mechanism. This is not\ndue to restrictions on government employees to organize and form labor unions. It is rather an issue of lack of\norganization that leads to requirements not being met for forming these unions per the laws. However, the\nrecent large increase in inflation and expectations about future inflation in these bad economic times have led\nsome associations such as a National Association of Teachers (ONP) to accelerate procedures to form a union\nover the next few months.\n\n11 This is consistent with the wage rule that is used by the government to adjust wages. Section III discusses the\nwage rule in more detail.\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "detailed data, the mission was not able to uncover the factors behind the observed slippage and\nquantify their relative contribution.\n\n14. The government has undertaken several encouraging short-term (one-off)\nmeasures to contain wage bill spending in 2017, but these are not by themselves adequate\nto contain the observed rapid increase in the wage bill. The government took a decision in\nDecember 2016 to suspend the 13 [th] salary owed from fiscal year 2016 for all managerial level\npositions in the government, and granted all other employees in the government only half of it. [9]\nOn another front, the government took a decision in April 2017 to increase the salaries of low\npaid government employees (those earning the minimum wage of around 3800 Meticais per\nmonth, as defined in the government sector) by 21 percent, in the context of a social dialogue\nwith the national organization of workers (OTM), a professional association that bargains on\nbehalf of civil servants. [10] The nominal amount of that increase was then granted to all other\nemployees in the government (which is very small relative to their wage levels).\n\n15. In the absence of reforms, the mission projects wage spending to rise from 11.3\npercent of GDP in 2016 to 12.0 by 2021. The mission’s baseline projection presumes that: (i)\nbasic salaries will rise at the rate of inflation plus one-half the rate of real GDP growth; [11] (ii) the\n“13th month” salary will be paid in full to all employees from 2018 onwards; (iii) the cost of\nallowances, overtime, bonuses, and other salary supplements (as a share of basic salaries) will\nremain unchanged over the projection horizon; (iv) the number of employees in the Education\nsector will grow in line with the population of persons under the age of 20; and (v) the number of\nemployees in the Health sector and the “Other” sector category will rise in line with overall\npopulation growth. Appendix I presents a detailed description of the model as well as the\nassumptions underlying the mission’s baseline projection.\n\n9 The suspension of the 13th salary may imply unpaid obligations to be paid in the future, especially since it was\nnot the result of a change in the law.\n\n10 Currently, no labor unions for government employees exist in Mozambique. There are professional associations\nthat engage in social dialogue with the government with respect to the wage adjustment mechanism. This is not\ndue to restrictions on government employees to organize and form labor unions. It is rather an issue of lack of\norganization that leads to requirements not being met for forming these unions per the laws. However, the\nrecent large increase in inflation and expectations about future inflation in these bad economic times have led\nsome associations such as a National Association of Teachers (ONP) to accelerate procedures to form a union\nover the next few months.\n\n11 This is consistent with the wage rule that is used by the government to adjust wages. Section III discusses the\nwage rule in more detail.\n\n17", "text_characters": 2520}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0020-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 10. Deviation of Wage Outlays Relative to the Budget, by Sector**\n\n(2016, in percent)\n\n\n25\n\n\n20\n\n\n15\n\n\n10\n\n\n5\n\n\n0\n\n\n\n\n\nEducation Health Agriculture Justice Trade\nAuthority of\nMozambique\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\n\nOther sectors\n\n\n\n**16.** **The baseline is subject to considerable uncertainty, however, and the wage bill**\n**could rise further than has been projected.** The primary sources of forecasting uncertainty and\nfiscal risk include: ad hoc increases to basic salaries (which, in turn, drive upward the cost of other\nelements of compensation), the risk of an exogenous economic shock, slower-than-projected\nrates of GDP growth, and higher-than-projected levels of recruitment. Table 1, below, illustrates\nthis uncertainty by projecting the wage bill under the mission’s baseline and three downside\nscenarios, all of which are conceivable considering the country’s recent trend.\n\n\n**Table 1: Wage Spending Under the Baseline and Alternative Scenarios, 2016-2021**\n\n(percent of GDP)\n\n\n2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\n\n**Baseline Scenario 1/** **11.3** **10.9** **11.4** **11.6** **11.8** **12.0**\nEconomic Shock 2/ 10.9 12.1 12.4 12.6 12.8\nSluggish Economic Growth 3/ 10.9 11.6 12.2 12.8 13.4\nHiring Exceeds Population Growth 4/ 10.9 12.8 14.0 14.2 14.5\n\n\nSources: IMF staff calculation based on data provided by the authorities.\n1/ The methodology underlying the baseline scenario is explained in Appendix I.\n2/ Real GDP contracts by 1.0 percent in 2018 but grows as projected thereafter.\n3/ Real GDP grows at half the rate projected in the baseline from 2018 to 2021.\n4/ Employment grows in 2017-2019 as projected by MEF in data provided to the mission.\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 10. Deviation of Wage Outlays Relative to the Budget, by Sector\n\n(2016, in percent)\n\n25\n\n20\n\n15\n\n10\n\n5\n\n0\n\nEducation Health Agriculture Justice Trade\nAuthority of\nMozambique\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations.\n\nOther sectors\n\n16. The baseline is subject to considerable uncertainty, however, and the wage bill\ncould rise further than has been projected. The primary sources of forecasting uncertainty and\nfiscal risk include: ad hoc increases to basic salaries (which, in turn, drive upward the cost of other\nelements of compensation), the risk of an exogenous economic shock, slower-than-projected\nrates of GDP growth, and higher-than-projected levels of recruitment. Table 1, below, illustrates\nthis uncertainty by projecting the wage bill under the mission’s baseline and three downside\nscenarios, all of which are conceivable considering the country’s recent trend.\n\nTable 1: Wage Spending Under the Baseline and Alternative Scenarios, 2016-2021\n\n(percent of GDP)\n\n2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\nBaseline Scenario 1/ 11.3 10.9 11.4 11.6 11.8 12.0\nEconomic Shock 2/ 10.9 12.1 12.4 12.6 12.8\nSluggish Economic Growth 3/ 10.9 11.6 12.2 12.8 13.4\nHiring Exceeds Population Growth 4/ 10.9 12.8 14.0 14.2 14.5\n\nSources: IMF staff calculation based on data provided by the authorities.\n1/ The methodology underlying the baseline scenario is explained in Appendix I.\n2/ Real GDP contracts by 1.0 percent in 2018 but grows as projected thereafter.\n3/ Real GDP grows at half the rate projected in the baseline from 2018 to 2021.\n4/ Employment grows in 2017-2019 as projected by MEF in data provided to the mission.\n\n18", "text_characters": 1377}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **III. KEY ISSUES FOR A REFORM STRATEGY**\n\n##### **A. Compensation**\n\n**17.** **Public sector wages in Mozambique are set per a formula that introduces a form of**\n**indexation, effectively reducing the flexibility of the government in addressing**\n**inefficiencies in wage levels and structures and in managing macroeconomic imbalances** .\nWithin this framework, the growth of public wages considers (i) the rate of inflation, (ii) half the\nrate of real GDP growth (as a proxy for productivity), and (iii) a factor “delta” that presumably\nreflects negotiations between the government and professional employee associations. [12] In\npractice, the factor “delta” is unpredictable and introduces a subjective and rather ad-hoc\nelement to the wage setting mechanism. This leads to unpredictable dynamics in public wages\nover time. For instance, the existing wage rule has resulted in basic salaries rising substantially\nfaster than inflation in previous years. In combination with the seniority-based wage tables\n(which provide an additional increase in basic salaries for each additional year of service), most\npublic sector employees can receive significant real increases in the value of their basic wages\nevery year, regardless of their productivity or performance.\n\n\n**18.** **While rule-based frameworks for wage setting may appear to offer a remedy**\n**against repeated and large public sector wage increases, they can have several**\n**disadvantages** . These include (i) limiting the ability of the government to use fiscal policy for\nmacroeconomic management [13] ; and (ii) potentially locking into place undesirable public sector\nwage levels and wage structures. The latter reduces the capacity of the public sector to address\ninefficiencies by automatically granting wage increases to a wide range of workers, regardless of\nany determination of whether their salaries are at an appropriate level.\n\n\n**19.** **Regression analysis on individual-level data from the Integrated Household and**\n**Labor Force Survey of 2015 suggests that central government employees appear to**\n**receive, on average, a wage premium over their private sector counterparts.** The mission’s\nanalysis suggests that, after accounting for differences in socio-economic characteristics of\nworkers, including age, gender, education, experience, and regional effects, the magnitude of the\nwage premium varies significantly by education level. The premium, in absolute terms, for lowerskilled employees with primary and secondary education is around 63 and 91 percent,\nrespectively, relative to private sector counterparts with similar socio economic characteristics.\n\n\n12 No labor unions currently exist for government employees in Mozambique. There are professional associations\nthat engage in social dialogue with the government on behalf of civil servants, with respect to the wage\nadjustment mechanism.\n\n13 For instance, under inflation indexation, wage bill spending increases at a time when fiscal restraint may be\nneeded to address macroeconomic imbalances. In that sense, it can contribute to inflationary pressures, and\nfurther jeopardize fiscal sustainability going forward.\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. KEY ISSUES FOR A REFORM STRATEGY\nA. Compensation\n\n17. Public sector wages in Mozambique are set per a formula that introduces a form of\nindexation, effectively reducing the flexibility of the government in addressing\ninefficiencies in wage levels and structures and in managing macroeconomic imbalances .\nWithin this framework, the growth of public wages considers (i) the rate of inflation, (ii) half the\nrate of real GDP growth (as a proxy for productivity), and (iii) a factor “delta” that presumably\nreflects negotiations between the government and professional employee associations. [12] In\npractice, the factor “delta” is unpredictable and introduces a subjective and rather ad-hoc\nelement to the wage setting mechanism. This leads to unpredictable dynamics in public wages\nover time. For instance, the existing wage rule has resulted in basic salaries rising substantially\nfaster than inflation in previous years. In combination with the seniority-based wage tables\n(which provide an additional increase in basic salaries for each additional year of service), most\npublic sector employees can receive significant real increases in the value of their basic wages\nevery year, regardless of their productivity or performance.\n\n18. While rule-based frameworks for wage setting may appear to offer a remedy\nagainst repeated and large public sector wage increases, they can have several\ndisadvantages . These include (i) limiting the ability of the government to use fiscal policy for\nmacroeconomic management [13] ; and (ii) potentially locking into place undesirable public sector\nwage levels and wage structures. The latter reduces the capacity of the public sector to address\ninefficiencies by automatically granting wage increases to a wide range of workers, regardless of\nany determination of whether their salaries are at an appropriate level.\n\n19. Regression analysis on individual-level data from the Integrated Household and\nLabor Force Survey of 2015 suggests that central government employees appear to\nreceive, on average, a wage premium over their private sector counterparts. The mission’s\nanalysis suggests that, after accounting for differences in socio-economic characteristics of\nworkers, including age, gender, education, experience, and regional effects, the magnitude of the\nwage premium varies significantly by education level. The premium, in absolute terms, for lowerskilled employees with primary and secondary education is around 63 and 91 percent,\nrespectively, relative to private sector counterparts with similar socio economic characteristics.\n\n12 No labor unions currently exist for government employees in Mozambique. There are professional associations\nthat engage in social dialogue with the government on behalf of civil servants, with respect to the wage\nadjustment mechanism.\n\n13 For instance, under inflation indexation, wage bill spending increases at a time when fiscal restraint may be\nneeded to address macroeconomic imbalances. In that sense, it can contribute to inflationary pressures, and\nfurther jeopardize fiscal sustainability going forward.\n\n19", "text_characters": 2645}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "On the other hand, high-skilled government employees with university level education tend to\nhave a wage _discount_, effectively earning around 100 percent _less_ than their private sector\ncounterparts. This tends to reflect the observed gap between lower-skilled and high-skilled wage\npremiums exists across countries, which is especially pronounced in low income and developing\neconomies. [14]\n\n\n**20.** **There is a widespread heterogeneity in the level of wages and other components of**\n**compensation, across government sectors, and even within sectors.** Micro data from the\nregistry of public employees (e-CAF) and the payroll management database system (e-Folha), [15]\nindicates that the median compensation is lowest among government employees working in the\nhealth sector and non-education sectors, while it is the highest in the education and other\nsectors. Besides this relatively large variation across sectors, compensation also displays\nsignificant variation _within_ sectors (Figure 11a and 11b). For example, compensation dispersion in\nthe education and other (non-health) sectors is particularly high. As Figures 11a and 11b suggest,\nother salary supplements, rather than the base salary itself, appear to be the major culprit behind\nsuch observed dispersion. [16]\n\n\n**21.** **Further disaggregating salary supplements into different components suggests that**\n**the compensation structure is very complex and entails large fiscal costs.** Micro data from\nthe e-Folha and e-CAF databases suggests that there are at least 46 different salary supplements.\nThese supplements comprise (i) 19 allowances; (ii) 4 types of bonuses; and (iii) 23 different other\nsalary supplements (including compensation for overtime). Some of these supplements are\nentrenched in the salary structure, and can lead to large fiscal costs. For example, the profitability\nbonus, which is awarded to civil servants or state officials who are deemed to have a very good\nperformance assessment, is equal to 100% of the corresponding base salary. Another example is\nthe reintegration allowance, which consists of the inclusion of 75 percent of the base salary, for\neach year spent in a governing position. [17 ] For instance, in the case where a civil servant occupies\na governing position (e.g., as Head of Administrative Post) for a period of four years, he or she is\nentitled to receiving a reintegration allowance of 300 percent (75 percent, cumulative over four\nyears) upon returning to his or her original position.\n\n\n14 Overall, the estimated premiums do not take account of the fact that government workers have access to\nnumerous generous benefits and are provided with greater job security. For example, generous public sector\npension schemes, and in-kind and non-monetary benefits make jobs in the government even more attractive.\nThus, the government does not always necessarily need to offer salaries that are on par with the private sector to\nretain high-quality employees. For this reason, a wage discount for public sector workers is sometimes expected,\nespecially if such benefits are extensive.\n\n15 The data from the e-CAF and e-Folha systems pertain to the June 2017 vintage.\n\n16 Albeit dispersion in the base salary within the other sectors category is also relatively high compared to that in\nthe education and health sectors.\n\n17 Law 7/98 establishes the rights and duties of governing positions (article 12(5)). Reintegration occurs when\nduties are terminated and the employee effectively returns to his/her previous position.\n\n\n20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "On the other hand, high-skilled government employees with university level education tend to\nhave a wage _discount_, effectively earning around 100 percent _less_ than their private sector\ncounterparts. This tends to reflect the observed gap between lower-skilled and high-skilled wage\npremiums exists across countries, which is especially pronounced in low income and developing\neconomies. [14]\n\n20. There is a widespread heterogeneity in the level of wages and other components of\ncompensation, across government sectors, and even within sectors. Micro data from the\nregistry of public employees (e-CAF) and the payroll management database system (e-Folha), [15]\nindicates that the median compensation is lowest among government employees working in the\nhealth sector and non-education sectors, while it is the highest in the education and other\nsectors. Besides this relatively large variation across sectors, compensation also displays\nsignificant variation _within_ sectors (Figure 11a and 11b). For example, compensation dispersion in\nthe education and other (non-health) sectors is particularly high. As Figures 11a and 11b suggest,\nother salary supplements, rather than the base salary itself, appear to be the major culprit behind\nsuch observed dispersion. [16]\n\n21. Further disaggregating salary supplements into different components suggests that\nthe compensation structure is very complex and entails large fiscal costs. Micro data from\nthe e-Folha and e-CAF databases suggests that there are at least 46 different salary supplements.\nThese supplements comprise (i) 19 allowances; (ii) 4 types of bonuses; and (iii) 23 different other\nsalary supplements (including compensation for overtime). Some of these supplements are\nentrenched in the salary structure, and can lead to large fiscal costs. For example, the profitability\nbonus, which is awarded to civil servants or state officials who are deemed to have a very good\nperformance assessment, is equal to 100% of the corresponding base salary. Another example is\nthe reintegration allowance, which consists of the inclusion of 75 percent of the base salary, for\neach year spent in a governing position. [17 ] For instance, in the case where a civil servant occupies\na governing position (e.g., as Head of Administrative Post) for a period of four years, he or she is\nentitled to receiving a reintegration allowance of 300 percent (75 percent, cumulative over four\nyears) upon returning to his or her original position.\n\n14 Overall, the estimated premiums do not take account of the fact that government workers have access to\nnumerous generous benefits and are provided with greater job security. For example, generous public sector\npension schemes, and in-kind and non-monetary benefits make jobs in the government even more attractive.\nThus, the government does not always necessarily need to offer salaries that are on par with the private sector to\nretain high-quality employees. For this reason, a wage discount for public sector workers is sometimes expected,\nespecially if such benefits are extensive.\n\n15 The data from the e-CAF and e-Folha systems pertain to the June 2017 vintage.\n\n16 Albeit dispersion in the base salary within the other sectors category is also relatively high compared to that in\nthe education and health sectors.\n\n17 Law 7/98 establishes the rights and duties of governing positions (article 12(5)). Reintegration occurs when\nduties are terminated and the employee effectively returns to his/her previous position.\n\n20", "text_characters": 2976}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "**22.** **Salary supplements varies widely across and within sectors (Table 2).** Micro data\nfrom the e-Folha and e-CAF databases suggests that allowances represents around 350 percent\nof the base salary (median estimate across recipients), around 150 percent in the health sector\nand 100 percent in the other sectors. On the other hand, bonuses represent around 30, 60, and\n30 percent of the base salary (median estimate across recipients) in the education, the other\ncategory and health sectors, respectively. Finally, overtime compensation represents around 40,\n49, and 30 percent of the base salary (median estimate across recipients) in the education, the\nother category and health sectors, respectively. Furthermore, the percent of recipients of those\nsupplements varies considerably across sectors and within the sectors themselves (Table 2). It is\nnot clear whether and to what extent compensation disparities across and within sectors reflect\ndifferences in skills and productivity.\n\n\n**Figure 11. Monthly Wage across Different Government Sectors**\n\n(2017, in Meticais)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNote: Data excludes employees in the defense, security and police sectors. In each graph, we report the median\n\n(blue dot), and the 25 [th] and 75 [th] percentiles (in red) from the distribution of employees in the e-Folha database.\n\n\n**Table 2. Components of Total Compensation and Proportion of Beneficiaries, by Sector**\n\n(in percent of the base salary, June 2017)\n\n\nEducation Other Health\n\n\n**Allowances** 350.0 100.0 150.0\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _42.1_ _34.8_ _41.1_\n**Bonuses** 30.0 60.0 30.0\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _48.0_ _32.1_ _20.7_\n**Overtime** 39.60 49.04 30.00\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _1.75_ _0.52_ _1.74_\n**Other supplements** 175.51 90.00 53.85\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _0.02_ _0.62_ _0.79_\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance; e-Folha database; and IMF staff calculations.\n\nNote: Data excludes employees in the defense, security and police sectors.\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "22. Salary supplements varies widely across and within sectors (Table 2). Micro data\nfrom the e-Folha and e-CAF databases suggests that allowances represents around 350 percent\nof the base salary (median estimate across recipients), around 150 percent in the health sector\nand 100 percent in the other sectors. On the other hand, bonuses represent around 30, 60, and\n30 percent of the base salary (median estimate across recipients) in the education, the other\ncategory and health sectors, respectively. Finally, overtime compensation represents around 40,\n49, and 30 percent of the base salary (median estimate across recipients) in the education, the\nother category and health sectors, respectively. Furthermore, the percent of recipients of those\nsupplements varies considerably across sectors and within the sectors themselves (Table 2). It is\nnot clear whether and to what extent compensation disparities across and within sectors reflect\ndifferences in skills and productivity.\n\nFigure 11. Monthly Wage across Different Government Sectors\n\n(2017, in Meticais)\n\nNote: Data excludes employees in the defense, security and police sectors. In each graph, we report the median\n\n(blue dot), and the 25 [th] and 75 [th] percentiles (in red) from the distribution of employees in the e-Folha database.\n\nTable 2. Components of Total Compensation and Proportion of Beneficiaries, by Sector\n\n(in percent of the base salary, June 2017)\n\nEducation Other Health\n\nAllowances 350.0 100.0 150.0\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _42.1_ _34.8_ _41.1_\nBonuses 30.0 60.0 30.0\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _48.0_ _32.1_ _20.7_\nOvertime 39.60 49.04 30.00\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _1.75_ _0.52_ _1.74_\nOther supplements 175.51 90.00 53.85\n_Recipients, as percent of total employees in the sector_ _0.02_ _0.62_ _0.79_\n\nSources: Ministry of Economy and Finance; e-Folha database; and IMF staff calculations.\n\nNote: Data excludes employees in the defense, security and police sectors.\n\n21", "text_characters": 1737}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **B. Employment**\n\n**23.** **The mission identified issues of compliance in the hiring process and the**\n**application of rules governing contracting employees.** The procedures of appointment are\nsubject to double-control by the Administrative Tribunal (AT)—first at the time of an employee’s\nprovisional appointment, and second at the permanent appointment. [18] The TA is responsible for\nensuring compliance with established procedures, most importantly with regard to the\nauthorization of appointments, which should reflect the need for the appointment, the presence\nof vacancies, and resource availability. Nevertheless, despite these procedures, there appear to\nbe problems with procedural compliance. The AT has identified challenges − relating to the\nadoption of manual procedures for ensuring compliance with hiring – which have led to hiring of\nemployees above the authorized figures. [19]\n\n\n**24.** **The decentralization process for hiring in some sectors seems to have aggravated**\n**these challenges.** The TA has identified issues related to (i) weak capacity of staff in\ndecentralized bodies and (ii) the adoption of manual procedures at the level of provinces and\ndistricts given weaknesses—or the absence of—IT infrastructure. This has hindered the TA’s\nability to exercise its control functions in real-time. Currently, the Central TA is only able to\nobserve ex-post information from the decentralized TAs by reviewing their annual reports.\n\n\n**25.** **Issues related to the identification of core functions within ministries merit**\n**examination, as they may be creating hiring pressure.** The mission identified issues that may\nbe related to the duplication of roles and responsibilities in some government ministries,\ndepartments, and agencies. For instance, in the education sector, a sizeable share of employees\nwho are teachers by training are actually working as public administrators. Effectively, there are\nteachers in the education sector who do not teach in classrooms. This raises serious concerns\nabout the definition of functions, roles and responsibilities in the sector, particularly given that\npressures on the hiring of teachers are mounting and are effectively driving an increase in\novertime pay. Overtime pay is costly, and can be reduced by redefining the functions and\nresponsibilities of teachers working as public administrators in the sector.\n\n\n**26.** **The challenges discussed above also reflect potential weaknesses in PFM.** (i) The\nbudgeting and forecasting framework does not always make use of all available information or\nrely on data with poor quality, resulting in underestimation in the budget. For instance, medical\nstaff who are funded temporarily by donor organizations and whose wage costs are accounted\nfor under investment spending, are not adequately incorporated in the wage bill forecasting and\nplanning process in anticipation of their transfer to the budget. (ii) There is an inadequate degree\n\n\n18 The awarding of positions is deemed provisional for the first two years, at the end of which employees are\nformally entered into the permanent civil service if the requirements specified by the General Statutes for Civil\nServants have been met.\n\n19 This seems to reflect ongoing technical difficulties with existing IT systems, which have, at least, partly\ncompounded compliance issues regarding the enforcement of procedural requirements.\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Employment\n\n23. The mission identified issues of compliance in the hiring process and the\napplication of rules governing contracting employees. The procedures of appointment are\nsubject to double-control by the Administrative Tribunal (AT)—first at the time of an employee’s\nprovisional appointment, and second at the permanent appointment. [18] The TA is responsible for\nensuring compliance with established procedures, most importantly with regard to the\nauthorization of appointments, which should reflect the need for the appointment, the presence\nof vacancies, and resource availability. Nevertheless, despite these procedures, there appear to\nbe problems with procedural compliance. The AT has identified challenges − relating to the\nadoption of manual procedures for ensuring compliance with hiring – which have led to hiring of\nemployees above the authorized figures. [19]\n\n24. The decentralization process for hiring in some sectors seems to have aggravated\nthese challenges. The TA has identified issues related to (i) weak capacity of staff in\ndecentralized bodies and (ii) the adoption of manual procedures at the level of provinces and\ndistricts given weaknesses—or the absence of—IT infrastructure. This has hindered the TA’s\nability to exercise its control functions in real-time. Currently, the Central TA is only able to\nobserve ex-post information from the decentralized TAs by reviewing their annual reports.\n\n25. Issues related to the identification of core functions within ministries merit\nexamination, as they may be creating hiring pressure. The mission identified issues that may\nbe related to the duplication of roles and responsibilities in some government ministries,\ndepartments, and agencies. For instance, in the education sector, a sizeable share of employees\nwho are teachers by training are actually working as public administrators. Effectively, there are\nteachers in the education sector who do not teach in classrooms. This raises serious concerns\nabout the definition of functions, roles and responsibilities in the sector, particularly given that\npressures on the hiring of teachers are mounting and are effectively driving an increase in\novertime pay. Overtime pay is costly, and can be reduced by redefining the functions and\nresponsibilities of teachers working as public administrators in the sector.\n\n26. The challenges discussed above also reflect potential weaknesses in PFM. (i) The\nbudgeting and forecasting framework does not always make use of all available information or\nrely on data with poor quality, resulting in underestimation in the budget. For instance, medical\nstaff who are funded temporarily by donor organizations and whose wage costs are accounted\nfor under investment spending, are not adequately incorporated in the wage bill forecasting and\nplanning process in anticipation of their transfer to the budget. (ii) There is an inadequate degree\n\n18 The awarding of positions is deemed provisional for the first two years, at the end of which employees are\nformally entered into the permanent civil service if the requirements specified by the General Statutes for Civil\nServants have been met.\n\n19 This seems to reflect ongoing technical difficulties with existing IT systems, which have, at least, partly\ncompounded compliance issues regarding the enforcement of procedural requirements.\n\n22", "text_characters": 2854}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "of monitoring and oversight in budget execution following the decentralized control over hiring\nat levels beneath the central government; (iii) There are capacity limits in the information\nmanagement (IT) system, which relies on many manual processes and is unable to create useable\nand timely reports for use in expenditure control. The Administrative Tribunal lacks an adequate\nIT system that is linked to personnel management and payroll systems at all levels of\ngovernment (central, provinces and districts). (iv) The auditing and internal control for the payroll\nsystems could be strengthened. There are 8000 employees whose proof-of-life verification\nprocess has been pending for over a year. The existence and eligibility of persons receiving\npublic sector pensions also requires a proof-of-life process.\n\n### **IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM AND THEIR FISCAL** **IMPLICATIONS**\n\n\n**27.** **Public wage spending is most efficient—and mostly likely to be sustainable—when**\n**it reflects sound compensation and hiring policies.** To a limited degree and for the shortterm, the growth of wage spending can be contained using crude measures that address wage\nlevels or employment. Such measures, however, are practically and politically constrained,\ncontentious, and typically have limited fiscal reach. Nominal wage levels can always be fixed—or\nprevented from rising faster than the rate of inflation—but typically cannot be reduced.\nMeasures to reduce public sector employment are, in practice, mostly limited to attrition-based\npolicies—given the job protections enjoyed by most public employees—and, consequently, can\nprovide only limited immediate fiscal relief. Over the medium-term, therefore, public wage\nspending is best managed by developing and implementing compensation and hiring policies\nthat reduce the need for short-term containment measures.\n\n\n**28.** **International experience shows that crude measures introduced in support of fiscal**\n**consolidation are often unsustainable.** Short-term wage policies that greatly degrade the real\n(i.e., inflation-adjusted) value of employee wages often generate upward pressure for wage\nincreases once consolidation targets have been met. Attrition-based hiring policies are difficult to\ntarget, which risks the loss of key personnel and the degradation of essential public services. For\nthese reasons, the driving goal of wage bill reform should be to introduce short-term\nmeasures—consistent with the authority’s immediate fiscal objectives—that can eventually be\ncomplemented by broader and more sustainable structural reforms.\n\n\n**29.** **Structural reforms should aim to address weaknesses in compensation and hiring**\n**policies and strengthen financial management.** Specifically, the objectives of structural\nreforms should include the following: (i) aligning public sector compensation to that paid in the\nprivate sector and eliminating existing pay disparities across—and within—the public sector for\nemployees of similar qualifications and experience; (ii) strengthening the link between employee\nperformance and pay; (iii) eliminating duplicative governmental functions, cutting (or curtailing)\nnonessential public services, and focusing personnel resources more tightly on spending\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "of monitoring and oversight in budget execution following the decentralized control over hiring\nat levels beneath the central government; (iii) There are capacity limits in the information\nmanagement (IT) system, which relies on many manual processes and is unable to create useable\nand timely reports for use in expenditure control. The Administrative Tribunal lacks an adequate\nIT system that is linked to personnel management and payroll systems at all levels of\ngovernment (central, provinces and districts). (iv) The auditing and internal control for the payroll\nsystems could be strengthened. There are 8000 employees whose proof-of-life verification\nprocess has been pending for over a year. The existence and eligibility of persons receiving\npublic sector pensions also requires a proof-of-life process.\nIV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM AND THEIR FISCAL IMPLICATIONS\n\n27. Public wage spending is most efficient—and mostly likely to be sustainable—when\nit reflects sound compensation and hiring policies. To a limited degree and for the shortterm, the growth of wage spending can be contained using crude measures that address wage\nlevels or employment. Such measures, however, are practically and politically constrained,\ncontentious, and typically have limited fiscal reach. Nominal wage levels can always be fixed—or\nprevented from rising faster than the rate of inflation—but typically cannot be reduced.\nMeasures to reduce public sector employment are, in practice, mostly limited to attrition-based\npolicies—given the job protections enjoyed by most public employees—and, consequently, can\nprovide only limited immediate fiscal relief. Over the medium-term, therefore, public wage\nspending is best managed by developing and implementing compensation and hiring policies\nthat reduce the need for short-term containment measures.\n\n28. International experience shows that crude measures introduced in support of fiscal\nconsolidation are often unsustainable. Short-term wage policies that greatly degrade the real\n(i.e., inflation-adjusted) value of employee wages often generate upward pressure for wage\nincreases once consolidation targets have been met. Attrition-based hiring policies are difficult to\ntarget, which risks the loss of key personnel and the degradation of essential public services. For\nthese reasons, the driving goal of wage bill reform should be to introduce short-term\nmeasures—consistent with the authority’s immediate fiscal objectives—that can eventually be\ncomplemented by broader and more sustainable structural reforms.\n\n29. Structural reforms should aim to address weaknesses in compensation and hiring\npolicies and strengthen financial management. Specifically, the objectives of structural\nreforms should include the following: (i) aligning public sector compensation to that paid in the\nprivate sector and eliminating existing pay disparities across—and within—the public sector for\nemployees of similar qualifications and experience; (ii) strengthening the link between employee\nperformance and pay; (iii) eliminating duplicative governmental functions, cutting (or curtailing)\nnonessential public services, and focusing personnel resources more tightly on spending\n\n23", "text_characters": 2756}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "priorities; (iv) facilitating improvements in public sector efficiency through the use of technology\nand improved processes and systems; and (v) strengthening wage bill budgeting, execution, and\ncontrol. Such structural reforms, however, require time and resources to design and implement,\nbut—in the medium-term—they are the best way of bending the trajectory of the wage bill to a\nsounder and more sustainable path while, at the same time, improving the efficiency and efficacy\nof wage spending.\n\n##### **A. Reforms Related to Compensation**\n\n\n**30.** **In the short-term, two policy levers are available for constraining the growth of**\n**compensation:**\n\n\n- **The existing wage rule can be replaced with a flexible wage policy that enables basic**\n**salaries to be increased more slowly.** In general, the mission urges caution with respect to\nrule-based wage policies and believes that wage-setting mechanisms should take into\naccount private sector wage dynamics and underlying productivity growth. Rule-based\npolicies are better used to limit the growth of public wages than to institutionalize wage\nincreases, particularly at rates higher than inflation. Wages can be fixed at their current\nnominal values or allowed to rise at a rate less than the rate of inflation. Increasing basic\nsalaries in such a manner would generate meaningful short-term fiscal relief but could\ngenerate upward wage pressure if the real value of wages is too greatly degraded.\n\n\n- **Other elements of compensation can be reduced or eliminated.** Excluding contributions\nfor social insurance, basic salaries represent only about 60 percent of the total compensation\npaid to public employees. The remaining 40 percent includes a large number of benefits and\nsupplements that, collectively, reduce the transparency and equity of public sector\ncompensation, engender wide disparities in the compensation paid to different categories of\nworkers, and frustrate the task of fiscal management. The provision of overtime pay can\ngradually be curtailed through improved workforce planning. The tremendous complexity of\nthe provisions governing allowances and other supplements can be greatly streamlined, with\nthe objective of eliminating benefits that are not actually essential to retaining qualified staff.\nSuch a step should be supported by an eligibility review designed to ensure that allowances\nand supplements are paid only to those employees who qualify for them. The decision to cut\nthe 13th month benefit in half in 2017—and to pay it only to non-managers—can be\nextended and applied to everyone. Bonuses, while useful in terms of motivating performance,\nare ultimately discretionary. If the authorities have concerned about issues of wage adequacy\nfor lower income workers, wage compression, or disparities between public and private\nsector remuneration, short-term measures can, to a degree, be applied differentially to\ncertain categories of workers and to different sectors of government.\n\n\n**31.** **Over the medium-term, these short-term fiscal consolidation measures can—and**\n_**should**_ **—be replaced by structural measures.** The most important structural measures relating\nto compensation include the following:\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "priorities; (iv) facilitating improvements in public sector efficiency through the use of technology\nand improved processes and systems; and (v) strengthening wage bill budgeting, execution, and\ncontrol. Such structural reforms, however, require time and resources to design and implement,\nbut—in the medium-term—they are the best way of bending the trajectory of the wage bill to a\nsounder and more sustainable path while, at the same time, improving the efficiency and efficacy\nof wage spending.\nA. Reforms Related to Compensation\n\n30. In the short-term, two policy levers are available for constraining the growth of\ncompensation:\n\n- The existing wage rule can be replaced with a flexible wage policy that enables basic\nsalaries to be increased more slowly. In general, the mission urges caution with respect to\nrule-based wage policies and believes that wage-setting mechanisms should take into\naccount private sector wage dynamics and underlying productivity growth. Rule-based\npolicies are better used to limit the growth of public wages than to institutionalize wage\nincreases, particularly at rates higher than inflation. Wages can be fixed at their current\nnominal values or allowed to rise at a rate less than the rate of inflation. Increasing basic\nsalaries in such a manner would generate meaningful short-term fiscal relief but could\ngenerate upward wage pressure if the real value of wages is too greatly degraded.\n\n- Other elements of compensation can be reduced or eliminated. Excluding contributions\nfor social insurance, basic salaries represent only about 60 percent of the total compensation\npaid to public employees. The remaining 40 percent includes a large number of benefits and\nsupplements that, collectively, reduce the transparency and equity of public sector\ncompensation, engender wide disparities in the compensation paid to different categories of\nworkers, and frustrate the task of fiscal management. The provision of overtime pay can\ngradually be curtailed through improved workforce planning. The tremendous complexity of\nthe provisions governing allowances and other supplements can be greatly streamlined, with\nthe objective of eliminating benefits that are not actually essential to retaining qualified staff.\nSuch a step should be supported by an eligibility review designed to ensure that allowances\nand supplements are paid only to those employees who qualify for them. The decision to cut\nthe 13th month benefit in half in 2017—and to pay it only to non-managers—can be\nextended and applied to everyone. Bonuses, while useful in terms of motivating performance,\nare ultimately discretionary. If the authorities have concerned about issues of wage adequacy\nfor lower income workers, wage compression, or disparities between public and private\nsector remuneration, short-term measures can, to a degree, be applied differentially to\ncertain categories of workers and to different sectors of government.\n\n31. Over the medium-term, these short-term fiscal consolidation measures can—and\n_should_ —be replaced by structural measures. The most important structural measures relating\nto compensation include the following:\n\n24", "text_characters": 2687}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Structural pay reforms to align job-specific requirements with compensation and to restore\nparity—in a systematic way—between public and private sector remuneration for workers of\ncomparable skill and experience. The objective of structural pay reform is to identify the\nproper level of remuneration—to include basic salaries and other elements of\ncompensation—for each type of position within the public sector for workers with different\nqualifications and experience. _In this regard, a structural pay reform should be the first step in_\n_a two-step process of compensation reform._\n\n\n- A systematic review of all elements of compensation with the objective of simplifying\nremuneration, eliminating nonessential allowances and other supplements, and substantially\nincreasing the share of basic salaries in total compensation. The objective of a systematic\nreview is to allocate the levels of remuneration developed during the structural pay reform\nacross the various components of compensation. _In this regard, a systematic review should be_\n_the second and final step in the process of revising the wage grids for public sector employees_\nand developing new laws and regulations to govern the other elements of compensation\npaid to public sector workers.\n\n##### **B. Reforms Related to Employment**\n\n\n**32.** **In the short-term, the size of the public sector workforce cannot be easily adjusted**\n**in direct proportion to a shrinking fiscal envelope.** To some degree, attrition-based measures\nfor cutting employment can be used in pursuit of fiscal consolidation, but their fiscal impact is\nconstrained by the number of persons leaving public employment. Moreover, attrition-based\nmeasures are not without risk as they can result in the loss of critical skills—ultimately leading to\ntheir subsequent reversal—or in the deterioration in the quality of public services. For this\nreason, when designing such measures, it is crucial to use—to the extent possible—a targeted\napproach (e.g., by focusing on non-essential personnel and exempting critical sectors, such as\neducation and healthcare). Other policy measures to reduce the size of the workforce—such as\nretrenchment and voluntary severance—entail similar risks and, because they take time to design\nand implement, are unlikely to generate meaningful fiscal relief in the short term.\n\n\n**33.** **Over the medium-term, attrition-based policies can—and** _**should**_ **—be replaced by**\n**structural measures to “right-size” public employment.** The most important structural\nmeasures for employment include the following:\n\n\n- Functional reviews of ministries, departments, and agencies to identify areas of overlap or\nduplication and to clarify and codify organizational goals and responsibilities. The objective\nof functional reviews is to look strategically at how the public sector is organized at the\ninstitutional level with the goal of eliminating duplicative governmental functions and cutting\n(or curtailing) nonessential public services.\n\n\n- Institution-level restructuring and process reengineering. The objective is to look surgically at\nindividual ministries, departments, and agencies with the aim of (i) aligning their personnel\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Structural pay reforms to align job-specific requirements with compensation and to restore\nparity—in a systematic way—between public and private sector remuneration for workers of\ncomparable skill and experience. The objective of structural pay reform is to identify the\nproper level of remuneration—to include basic salaries and other elements of\ncompensation—for each type of position within the public sector for workers with different\nqualifications and experience. _In this regard, a structural pay reform should be the first step in_\n_a two-step process of compensation reform._\n\n- A systematic review of all elements of compensation with the objective of simplifying\nremuneration, eliminating nonessential allowances and other supplements, and substantially\nincreasing the share of basic salaries in total compensation. The objective of a systematic\nreview is to allocate the levels of remuneration developed during the structural pay reform\nacross the various components of compensation. _In this regard, a systematic review should be_\n_the second and final step in the process of revising the wage grids for public sector employees_\nand developing new laws and regulations to govern the other elements of compensation\npaid to public sector workers.\nB. Reforms Related to Employment\n\n32. In the short-term, the size of the public sector workforce cannot be easily adjusted\nin direct proportion to a shrinking fiscal envelope. To some degree, attrition-based measures\nfor cutting employment can be used in pursuit of fiscal consolidation, but their fiscal impact is\nconstrained by the number of persons leaving public employment. Moreover, attrition-based\nmeasures are not without risk as they can result in the loss of critical skills—ultimately leading to\ntheir subsequent reversal—or in the deterioration in the quality of public services. For this\nreason, when designing such measures, it is crucial to use—to the extent possible—a targeted\napproach (e.g., by focusing on non-essential personnel and exempting critical sectors, such as\neducation and healthcare). Other policy measures to reduce the size of the workforce—such as\nretrenchment and voluntary severance—entail similar risks and, because they take time to design\nand implement, are unlikely to generate meaningful fiscal relief in the short term.\n\n33. Over the medium-term, attrition-based policies can—and _should_ —be replaced by\nstructural measures to “right-size” public employment. The most important structural\nmeasures for employment include the following:\n\n- Functional reviews of ministries, departments, and agencies to identify areas of overlap or\nduplication and to clarify and codify organizational goals and responsibilities. The objective\nof functional reviews is to look strategically at how the public sector is organized at the\ninstitutional level with the goal of eliminating duplicative governmental functions and cutting\n(or curtailing) nonessential public services.\n\n- Institution-level restructuring and process reengineering. The objective is to look surgically at\nindividual ministries, departments, and agencies with the aim of (i) aligning their personnel\n\n25", "text_characters": 2700}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "resources with their responsibilities and spending priorities, and (ii) improving public sector\nefficiency by leveraging technology and streamlining processes and administrative systems.\nUltimately, process reengineering should then be used as the basis for streamlining\ninstitutional staffing plans (i.e., the number of authorized positions for every category of\nemployment) with the goal of “right-sizing” overall employment.\n\n##### **C. Reforms Related to Public Financial Management**\n\n\n**34.** **The challenge of managing wage spending, however, extends beyond**\n**compensation and employment policy to issues of financial management** . Managing wage\nspending requires that public financial management processes and procedures be sufficiently\ndeveloped to enable effective wage bill budgeting, execution, and control. Of particular\nimportance are the following:\n\n\n- **PFM Reform Strategy:** develop a medium-term strategy for PFM reform, based on a\nstrategic plan and an appropriate action plan, taking into consideration the advice already\nprovided by development partners, including by the IMF’s 2016 PFM technical assistance\nmission.\n\n\n- **Forecasting and Budgeting:** expand the quantity and quality of data made available for\nfiscal analysis, budgeting, and the monitoring of public sector employment and\ncompensation; prepare budgets based on staffing priorities and limit hiring to fit within\nbudgetary resources; this is particularly important with respect to workers funded by donor\norganizations whose wage costs will eventually be transferred to the budget.\n\n\n- **Budget Execution:** strengthen procedures governing payroll and address the problems of\ndecentralized control over hiring at levels beneath the central government; develop an\noperational plan for strengthening oversight over budget execution.\n\n\n- **Information Management:** invest in the development of IT capabilities to automate existing\nmanual processes, enable real-time monitoring and control over budget execution, and the\ncreation of useable and timely reports for use in expenditure control; develop and maintain\nan IT system for the Administrative Tribunal and link it to personnel management and payroll\nsystems at all levels of government (central, provinces and districts).\n\n\n- **Payroll Systems:** automate existing manual systems to improve accuracy and strengthen\ncontrols; update and verify employee-related service records on a more routine and timely\nbasis; strengthen the regulations, guidelines, and responsibilities for the periodic\nreconciliation of payroll expenditures.\n\n\n- **Auditing:** investigate the 8000 employees who did not complete the proof-of-life verification\nprocess to ensure they are not being paid through “parallel systems”; conduct a proof-of-life\nprocess to verify the existence and eligibility of persons receiving public sector pensions.\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "resources with their responsibilities and spending priorities, and (ii) improving public sector\nefficiency by leveraging technology and streamlining processes and administrative systems.\nUltimately, process reengineering should then be used as the basis for streamlining\ninstitutional staffing plans (i.e., the number of authorized positions for every category of\nemployment) with the goal of “right-sizing” overall employment.\nC. Reforms Related to Public Financial Management\n\n34. The challenge of managing wage spending, however, extends beyond\ncompensation and employment policy to issues of financial management . Managing wage\nspending requires that public financial management processes and procedures be sufficiently\ndeveloped to enable effective wage bill budgeting, execution, and control. Of particular\nimportance are the following:\n\n- PFM Reform Strategy: develop a medium-term strategy for PFM reform, based on a\nstrategic plan and an appropriate action plan, taking into consideration the advice already\nprovided by development partners, including by the IMF’s 2016 PFM technical assistance\nmission.\n\n- Forecasting and Budgeting: expand the quantity and quality of data made available for\nfiscal analysis, budgeting, and the monitoring of public sector employment and\ncompensation; prepare budgets based on staffing priorities and limit hiring to fit within\nbudgetary resources; this is particularly important with respect to workers funded by donor\norganizations whose wage costs will eventually be transferred to the budget.\n\n- Budget Execution: strengthen procedures governing payroll and address the problems of\ndecentralized control over hiring at levels beneath the central government; develop an\noperational plan for strengthening oversight over budget execution.\n\n- Information Management: invest in the development of IT capabilities to automate existing\nmanual processes, enable real-time monitoring and control over budget execution, and the\ncreation of useable and timely reports for use in expenditure control; develop and maintain\nan IT system for the Administrative Tribunal and link it to personnel management and payroll\nsystems at all levels of government (central, provinces and districts).\n\n- Payroll Systems: automate existing manual systems to improve accuracy and strengthen\ncontrols; update and verify employee-related service records on a more routine and timely\nbasis; strengthen the regulations, guidelines, and responsibilities for the periodic\nreconciliation of payroll expenditures.\n\n- Auditing: investigate the 8000 employees who did not complete the proof-of-life verification\nprocess to ensure they are not being paid through “parallel systems”; conduct a proof-of-life\nprocess to verify the existence and eligibility of persons receiving public sector pensions.\n\n26", "text_characters": 2417}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- **Internal Control:** strengthen the internal control body, subordinating it directly to the MEF,\nand fund it adequately to enable it to fulfill its mandate; update the IGF’s normative\nframework to align it to international standards; refine existing tools and introduce\nperformance auditing, follow-up auditing, and other control procedures.\n\n##### **D. Fiscal Implications of Short-Term Reforms**\n\n\n**35.** **Table 3 presents a menu of options to slow the growth of wages and contain the**\n**size of the public workforce in the short-term.** These options were evaluated relative to the\nmission’s baseline projection for the wage bill that incorporates assumptions regarding\ncompensation policies and the evolution of the workforce (explained more fully in Appendix I).\nThe estimates shown in the table are cumulative, meaning that the savings in any given year\ninclude the fiscal impacts of all prior years (i.e., savings are _not_ _additive over time_ ). Moreover,\nwhen options are combined, their total savings may be less than the sum of their individual\nsavings estimates given interactions between the variables and how they collectively drive wage\nspending (i.e., savings are _not necessarily additive across measures_ ).\n\n\n**36.** **The policy options listed in Table 3 were chosen to illustrate the potential fiscal**\n**impact of the short-term measures described above.** The options were specified with the\nobjective of demonstrating the range of savings associated with each measure, subject to\nbounds of feasibility given international experience with wage bill reform. Suspending wage\nincreases, for example, tends to be highly contentious, particularly in countries with high levels of\ninflation, and, thus, is difficult to do for more than a year or two. Several of the options, such as\ngradually eliminating the need for overtime through staffing reform, will generate only modest\nsavings because they target compensation that constitutes only a small share of the wage bill.\nEliminating the 13 [th] month salary, however, will generate significant—and enduring—savings of\n0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP, making it worthy of serious consideration given the magnitude of its\nfiscal impact. The options in Table 3 can, of course, be combined in various ways to achieve fiscal\nconsolidation objectives and are not exhaustive. In the end, the overall strategy for containing\nwage spending in the short-term is a decision only the authorities can make. Ultimately, however,\nshort-term measures should be supplanted by structural reforms intended to bend the trajectory\nof the wage bill to a more sustainable path and improve the efficiency and efficacy of wage\nspending.\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Internal Control: strengthen the internal control body, subordinating it directly to the MEF,\nand fund it adequately to enable it to fulfill its mandate; update the IGF’s normative\nframework to align it to international standards; refine existing tools and introduce\nperformance auditing, follow-up auditing, and other control procedures.\nD. Fiscal Implications of Short-Term Reforms\n\n35. Table 3 presents a menu of options to slow the growth of wages and contain the\nsize of the public workforce in the short-term. These options were evaluated relative to the\nmission’s baseline projection for the wage bill that incorporates assumptions regarding\ncompensation policies and the evolution of the workforce (explained more fully in Appendix I).\nThe estimates shown in the table are cumulative, meaning that the savings in any given year\ninclude the fiscal impacts of all prior years (i.e., savings are _not_ _additive over time_ ). Moreover,\nwhen options are combined, their total savings may be less than the sum of their individual\nsavings estimates given interactions between the variables and how they collectively drive wage\nspending (i.e., savings are _not necessarily additive across measures_ ).\n\n36. The policy options listed in Table 3 were chosen to illustrate the potential fiscal\nimpact of the short-term measures described above. The options were specified with the\nobjective of demonstrating the range of savings associated with each measure, subject to\nbounds of feasibility given international experience with wage bill reform. Suspending wage\nincreases, for example, tends to be highly contentious, particularly in countries with high levels of\ninflation, and, thus, is difficult to do for more than a year or two. Several of the options, such as\ngradually eliminating the need for overtime through staffing reform, will generate only modest\nsavings because they target compensation that constitutes only a small share of the wage bill.\nEliminating the 13 [th] month salary, however, will generate significant—and enduring—savings of\n0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP, making it worthy of serious consideration given the magnitude of its\nfiscal impact. The options in Table 3 can, of course, be combined in various ways to achieve fiscal\nconsolidation objectives and are not exhaustive. In the end, the overall strategy for containing\nwage spending in the short-term is a decision only the authorities can make. Ultimately, however,\nshort-term measures should be supplanted by structural reforms intended to bend the trajectory\nof the wage bill to a more sustainable path and improve the efficiency and efficacy of wage\nspending.\n\n27", "text_characters": 2234}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 3. Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in percent of GDP)**\n\n**Wage Spending (in Percent of GDP) and Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in Percent of GDP)**\n\n\n2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\n\n**Baseline projection 1/** **11.3** **10.9** **11.4** **11.6** **11.8** **12.0**\n\n\n**Savings relative to the baseline projection (in percent of GDP)**\n\n\nOptions addressing basic salaries\n\nSuspend wage increases for one year (2018) - 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4\nSuspend wage increases for two years (2018-2019) - 1.3 2.2 2.2 2.3\nLimit wage increase to inflation (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0\nLimit wage increase to one percentage point below inflation (2018-202 - 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.3\nLimit wage increase to two percentage points below inflation (2018-20 - 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.6\n\n\nOptions addressing overtime, supplements, and bonuses\n\nEliminate overtime at the rate of 25 percent per year (2018-2021) - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2\nReduce supplements by 25 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2\nReduce supplements by 50 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4\nReduce bonuses by 10 percent (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nReduce bonuses by 25 percent (2018-2021) - 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8\n\n\nOptions addressing the \"13th month\" benefit 3/\n\nEliminate for managers and pay half to everyone else (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nEliminate for everyone (2018-2021) - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5\n\n\nOptions addressing employment\n\nFix the size of the workforce at its 2017 value (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3\nReplace only two out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4\nReplace only one out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5\n\n\nMemorandum items\n\nInflation (percent change in consumer price index, average) 19.2 18.1 10.5 5.8 5.5 5.6\nReal GDP growth 3.8 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.5 7.0\n\n\nSources: IMF staff calculation based on data provided by the authorities.\n1/ The methodology underlying the baseline is explained in Appendix 1.\n2/ For the purpose of estimating savings, supplements exclude the \"13th month\" benefit.\n3/ The 13th month benefit is paid each January on the basis of wages paid in the prior calendar/fiscal year.\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table 3. Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in percent of GDP)\n\nWage Spending (in Percent of GDP) and Savings from Policy Options (Cumulative, in Percent of GDP)\n\n2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\nBaseline projection 1/ 11.3 10.9 11.4 11.6 11.8 12.0\n\nSavings relative to the baseline projection (in percent of GDP)\n\nOptions addressing basic salaries\n\nSuspend wage increases for one year (2018) - 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4\nSuspend wage increases for two years (2018-2019) - 1.3 2.2 2.2 2.3\nLimit wage increase to inflation (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0\nLimit wage increase to one percentage point below inflation (2018-202 - 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.3\nLimit wage increase to two percentage points below inflation (2018-20 - 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.6\n\nOptions addressing overtime, supplements, and bonuses\n\nEliminate overtime at the rate of 25 percent per year (2018-2021) - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2\nReduce supplements by 25 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2\nReduce supplements by 50 percent (2018-2021) 2/ - 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4\nReduce bonuses by 10 percent (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nReduce bonuses by 25 percent (2018-2021) - 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8\n\nOptions addressing the \"13th month\" benefit 3/\n\nEliminate for managers and pay half to everyone else (2018-2021) - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3\nEliminate for everyone (2018-2021) - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5\n\nOptions addressing employment\n\nFix the size of the workforce at its 2017 value (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3\nReplace only two out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4\nReplace only one out of three departing workers (2018-2020) - 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5\n\nMemorandum items\n\nInflation (percent change in consumer price index, average) 19.2 18.1 10.5 5.8 5.5 5.6\nReal GDP growth 3.8 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.5 7.0\n\nSources: IMF staff calculation based on data provided by the authorities.\n1/ The methodology underlying the baseline is explained in Appendix 1.\n2/ For the purpose of estimating savings, supplements exclude the \"13th month\" benefit.\n3/ The 13th month benefit is paid each January on the basis of wages paid in the prior calendar/fiscal year.\n\n28", "text_characters": 1691}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0031-001"], "markdown": "#### **Appendix I. Projecting the Wage Bill**\n\n**Forecasts for the evolution of the wage bill from 2017 to 2021 were developed using a**\n**Microsoft Excel-based simulation model.** In addition to establishing a baseline projection to\ninform the mission’s understanding of the magnitude and potential trajectory of the wage bill\nover the medium term, the model was used to analyze how the wage bill could evolve under\ndifferent assumptions regarding inflation and real GDP growth and policies governing hiring and\ncompensation (i.e., to conduct _sensitivity analysis_ ) and to estimate the fiscal impact of potential\noptions for reform relative to the baseline projection.\n\n\n**Employees in the Education and Health sectors were disaggregated in the model from**\n**those working in other sectors.** This disaggregation of the workforce was necessary (i) given\nsignificant heterogeneity observed across key sectors of the government in the distribution of\ntheir employees and their mean wages by age and (ii) to simulate sector-specific options for\npolicy reform. No data was available to enable the mission to further disaggregate the workforce\ninto individual Ministries, Departments, or Agencies.\n\n\n**The model reconstructed the wage bill in 2016 using expenditure data from the authorities**\n**and employee records from e-CAF and e-Folha.** Individual employee records from e-CAF and\ne-Folha were used to create distributions for (i) the _relative number of workers by age_ and (ii)\ntheir associated _relative mean basic salaries by age_ . In combination with data on total headcounts\nand total basic salaries provided by the authorities, these _relative_ distributions were then scaled\nto create _absolute_ distributions which were then used in the model as the basis for projecting the\nage-structure of the workforce and their associated mean salaries forward in time.\n\n\n**One adjustment had to be made to the distributions described above before the**\n**distributions could be used in the model.** An estimated 45,000 employees working in sensitive\nareas had to be added to the “Other” sector for reasons of methodological consistency because\ntheir basic salaries were already included in the compensation paid to employees working in that\nsector. Note that employees paid by donors through the Common Fund – and the share of their\ntotal compensation attributable to basic salary – were not added to the Health sector.\n\n\n**Table AI.1. Number of Employees and Mean Annual Basic Salaries by Employment Group, 2016**\n\n\n**The distribution of the number of employees by age for each employment group was then**\n**projected forward from 2016 to 2022.** The number of employees by age for each employment\ngroup was projected forward on the basis of the following: (i) an input variable representing the\n\n\n29\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix I. Projecting the Wage Bill\n\nForecasts for the evolution of the wage bill from 2017 to 2021 were developed using a\nMicrosoft Excel-based simulation model. In addition to establishing a baseline projection to\ninform the mission’s understanding of the magnitude and potential trajectory of the wage bill\nover the medium term, the model was used to analyze how the wage bill could evolve under\ndifferent assumptions regarding inflation and real GDP growth and policies governing hiring and\ncompensation (i.e., to conduct _sensitivity analysis_ ) and to estimate the fiscal impact of potential\noptions for reform relative to the baseline projection.\n\nEmployees in the Education and Health sectors were disaggregated in the model from\nthose working in other sectors. This disaggregation of the workforce was necessary (i) given\nsignificant heterogeneity observed across key sectors of the government in the distribution of\ntheir employees and their mean wages by age and (ii) to simulate sector-specific options for\npolicy reform. No data was available to enable the mission to further disaggregate the workforce\ninto individual Ministries, Departments, or Agencies.\n\nThe model reconstructed the wage bill in 2016 using expenditure data from the authorities\nand employee records from e-CAF and e-Folha. Individual employee records from e-CAF and\ne-Folha were used to create distributions for (i) the _relative number of workers by age_ and (ii)\ntheir associated _relative mean basic salaries by age_ . In combination with data on total headcounts\nand total basic salaries provided by the authorities, these _relative_ distributions were then scaled\nto create _absolute_ distributions which were then used in the model as the basis for projecting the\nage-structure of the workforce and their associated mean salaries forward in time.\n\nOne adjustment had to be made to the distributions described above before the\ndistributions could be used in the model. An estimated 45,000 employees working in sensitive\nareas had to be added to the “Other” sector for reasons of methodological consistency because\ntheir basic salaries were already included in the compensation paid to employees working in that\nsector. Note that employees paid by donors through the Common Fund – and the share of their\ntotal compensation attributable to basic salary – were not added to the Health sector.\n\nTable AI.1. Number of Employees and Mean Annual Basic Salaries by Employment Group, 2016\n\nThe distribution of the number of employees by age for each employment group was then\nprojected forward from 2016 to 2022. The number of employees by age for each employment\ngroup was projected forward on the basis of the following: (i) an input variable representing the\n\n29", "text_characters": 2310}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "number of new hires in each year of the simulation period (the value for which is expressed in\nterms of “replacement”, so “100%” implies that every employee who retires is replaced by a new\nhire – resulting in zero net growth in the size of the workforce); and (ii) assumptions regarding\nthe timing of retirement and the mean age of entry of new entrants into the workforce.\n\n**The distribution of mean basic salaries by age for each employment group was also**\n**projected forward from 2016 to 2021.** Basic salaries by age were projected as follows: (i) an\ninput variable representing the annual rate of increase in basic salaries (which, in turn, drives the\nrate of increase in other elements of compensation, as are described further below); and (ii) an\ninput variable intended to capture the impact of wage drift. The term _wage drift_ refers to aspects\nof public employment policy – such as seniority-related increases in compensation, promotion\npatterns and policies, and practices regarding the reclassification of employment positions – that\ndrive wage growth independently of broader decisions regarding the overall size of the\nworkforce or wage-levels. Conceptually, the wage drift variable in the model is intended to\ncapture all factors that collectively create upward pressure on wage spending independent of\npolicy-driven changes in the number of employees or to their respective wage tables.\n\n\n**Other elements of compensation were modeled as a share of basic salaries.** These elements\ninclude (i) overtime, (ii) the “13th month” salary (i.e., the extra month of basic salary paid in\nJanuary for work performed in the previous fiscal year), [20] (iii) supplements, (iv) bonuses, and (v)\ncontributions for social insurance. These elements of compensation were modeled as a simple\nshare of the basic wages paid to all central government employees (i.e., they were estimated in\nthe aggregate) because no data was available to enable the mission to estimate them separately\nfor each employment group. Apart from the 13 [th] month salary (which can be directly computed\nbased on the prior year’s basic salaries), the shares for these other elements of compensation\nremain unchanged across the entire projection period because no historical data was available to\nsupport a different assumption.\n\n\n**Table AI.2. Elements of Compensation, 2016**\n\n**Elements of Compensation** **2016** **Share**\nBasic Salaries 44,313,736,334 56.8\nOvertime 1,155,372,433 1.5\nSupplements - 13th Month 3,119,559,459 4.0\nSupplements - Remainder 5,313,265,534 6.8\nBonuses 20,470,303,863 26.2\nSocial Insurance 3,699,180,322 4.7\n**Total** **78,071,417,944** **100.0**\n\nSources: data provided by the authorities.\n\n\n**Total wage spending in each year of the simulation period was then computed as the sum**\n**of these individual elements of compensation.** To enable the output to be used for fiscal\n\n\n20 From an accounting perspective, the 13th month salary is included in “supplements” but is treated as a separate\nline item in the model to facilitate the simulation of reforms that target this element of compensation directly.\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "number of new hires in each year of the simulation period (the value for which is expressed in\nterms of “replacement”, so “100%” implies that every employee who retires is replaced by a new\nhire – resulting in zero net growth in the size of the workforce); and (ii) assumptions regarding\nthe timing of retirement and the mean age of entry of new entrants into the workforce.\n\nThe distribution of mean basic salaries by age for each employment group was also\nprojected forward from 2016 to 2021. Basic salaries by age were projected as follows: (i) an\ninput variable representing the annual rate of increase in basic salaries (which, in turn, drives the\nrate of increase in other elements of compensation, as are described further below); and (ii) an\ninput variable intended to capture the impact of wage drift. The term _wage drift_ refers to aspects\nof public employment policy – such as seniority-related increases in compensation, promotion\npatterns and policies, and practices regarding the reclassification of employment positions – that\ndrive wage growth independently of broader decisions regarding the overall size of the\nworkforce or wage-levels. Conceptually, the wage drift variable in the model is intended to\ncapture all factors that collectively create upward pressure on wage spending independent of\npolicy-driven changes in the number of employees or to their respective wage tables.\n\nOther elements of compensation were modeled as a share of basic salaries. These elements\ninclude (i) overtime, (ii) the “13th month” salary (i.e., the extra month of basic salary paid in\nJanuary for work performed in the previous fiscal year), [20] (iii) supplements, (iv) bonuses, and (v)\ncontributions for social insurance. These elements of compensation were modeled as a simple\nshare of the basic wages paid to all central government employees (i.e., they were estimated in\nthe aggregate) because no data was available to enable the mission to estimate them separately\nfor each employment group. Apart from the 13 [th] month salary (which can be directly computed\nbased on the prior year’s basic salaries), the shares for these other elements of compensation\nremain unchanged across the entire projection period because no historical data was available to\nsupport a different assumption.\n\nTable AI.2. Elements of Compensation, 2016\n\nElements of Compensation 2016 Share\nBasic Salaries 44,313,736,334 56.8\nOvertime 1,155,372,433 1.5\nSupplements - 13th Month 3,119,559,459 4.0\nSupplements - Remainder 5,313,265,534 6.8\nBonuses 20,470,303,863 26.2\nSocial Insurance 3,699,180,322 4.7\nTotal 78,071,417,944 100.0\n\nSources: data provided by the authorities.\n\nTotal wage spending in each year of the simulation period was then computed as the sum\nof these individual elements of compensation. To enable the output to be used for fiscal\n\n20 From an accounting perspective, the 13th month salary is included in “supplements” but is treated as a separate\nline item in the model to facilitate the simulation of reforms that target this element of compensation directly.\n\n30", "text_characters": 2580}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-023-fig-p0033-001"], "markdown": "policy analysis, wage spending was expressed relative to nominal GDP using the macroeconomic\nforecast developed by IMF staff in consultation with the authorities. Two additional\nmacroeconomic assumptions are used in the model: inflation and real GDP growth. Both are\nused to compute wage increases under the existing wage-rule, as well as to inform decisions on\nthe part of model users when designing and simulating policy reforms.\n\n\n**Table AI.3. Macroeconomic Assumptions**\n\n\n**Reform options were evaluated relative to a baseline that reflects assumptions regarding**\n**the evolution of the workforce and compensation.** The mission’s baseline projection\npresumes that: (i) basic salaries will rise at the rate of inflation plus one-half the rate of real GDP\ngrowth (i.e., basic salaries will rise in accordance with the existing wage rule) [21] ; (ii) the “13th\nmonth” salary was reduced by half in 2017—and was paid only to non-managers—but will be\npaid in full to all employees in subsequent years; (iii) the cost of overtime, other supplements,\nand bonuses as a share of basic salaries will remain unchanged over the projection horizon; (iv)\nthe number of employees in the Education sector will grow in line with the population of persons\nunder age 20; and (v) the number of employees in the Health sector and Other sector will rise in\nline with the overall population.\n\n\n**The design of the simulation model enables it to be used to simulate a broad range of**\n**reforms relating to employment and compensation policy.** Collectively, the inputs and\nassumptions enable the model to simulate the impact on wage spending of policies regarding: (i)\nthe extent to which retiring employees are replaced by new recruits; (ii) the hiring of employees\ninto newly-created positions; (iii) changes in the retirement age; (iv) changes to the current policy\nof providing wage increases annually for all employees in accordance with the wage-rule); (v)\nchanges in the progression of employees across the their respective pay grades; and (vi) changes\nin policies regarding the provision of overtime, supplements to basic salaries, the “13th month\nsalary, bonuses, and the size of the levy for social insurance. The fiscal impact of policy measures\nthat treat some groups of employees disparately—such as measures that treat employees with\nhigher total compensation differently than those with lower total compensation—must be\nanalyzed separately before being evaluated, in the aggregate, using the model. The design of the\nsimulation model also enables it to be used to conduct sensitivity analysis and “what-if” analysis\nto evaluate the impact changes in macroeconomic conditions and other variables.\n\n\n21 The wage rule also provides for a “Δ” factor that represents an adjustment based on negotiations with labor\nassociations/unions. Because this factor can take on either a positive or negative value—and in the absence of\nhistorical data – the mission’s baseline projection ignores it.\n\n\n31\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "policy analysis, wage spending was expressed relative to nominal GDP using the macroeconomic\nforecast developed by IMF staff in consultation with the authorities. Two additional\nmacroeconomic assumptions are used in the model: inflation and real GDP growth. Both are\nused to compute wage increases under the existing wage-rule, as well as to inform decisions on\nthe part of model users when designing and simulating policy reforms.\n\nTable AI.3. Macroeconomic Assumptions\n\nReform options were evaluated relative to a baseline that reflects assumptions regarding\nthe evolution of the workforce and compensation. The mission’s baseline projection\npresumes that: (i) basic salaries will rise at the rate of inflation plus one-half the rate of real GDP\ngrowth (i.e., basic salaries will rise in accordance with the existing wage rule) [21] ; (ii) the “13th\nmonth” salary was reduced by half in 2017—and was paid only to non-managers—but will be\npaid in full to all employees in subsequent years; (iii) the cost of overtime, other supplements,\nand bonuses as a share of basic salaries will remain unchanged over the projection horizon; (iv)\nthe number of employees in the Education sector will grow in line with the population of persons\nunder age 20; and (v) the number of employees in the Health sector and Other sector will rise in\nline with the overall population.\n\nThe design of the simulation model enables it to be used to simulate a broad range of\nreforms relating to employment and compensation policy. Collectively, the inputs and\nassumptions enable the model to simulate the impact on wage spending of policies regarding: (i)\nthe extent to which retiring employees are replaced by new recruits; (ii) the hiring of employees\ninto newly-created positions; (iii) changes in the retirement age; (iv) changes to the current policy\nof providing wage increases annually for all employees in accordance with the wage-rule); (v)\nchanges in the progression of employees across the their respective pay grades; and (vi) changes\nin policies regarding the provision of overtime, supplements to basic salaries, the “13th month\nsalary, bonuses, and the size of the levy for social insurance. The fiscal impact of policy measures\nthat treat some groups of employees disparately—such as measures that treat employees with\nhigher total compensation differently than those with lower total compensation—must be\nanalyzed separately before being evaluated, in the aggregate, using the model. The design of the\nsimulation model also enables it to be used to conduct sensitivity analysis and “what-if” analysis\nto evaluate the impact changes in macroeconomic conditions and other variables.\n\n21 The wage rule also provides for a “Δ” factor that represents an adjustment based on negotiations with labor\nassociations/unions. Because this factor can take on either a positive or negative value—and in the absence of\nhistorical data – the mission’s baseline projection ignores it.\n\n31", "text_characters": 2496}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Appendix II. Estimating the Public-Private Wage Premium**\n\n**This appendix presents the details of the analysis on the relative competitiveness of**\n**compensation levels for government workers in Mozambique, as presented in the report.**\nSpecifically, it discusses the empirical approach used in estimating the wage premium of\ngovernment workers relative to private sector workers using micro-level data from the 2015\nIntegrated Household and Labor Force Survey.\n\n**Data from the labor force survey suggests that in 2015, the average wage was higher in the**\n**public sector by about 30 percent.** Nevertheless, in Mozambique, the share of better educated\nworkers is much higher in the public sector than in the private sector (Table A2.1). Given that\ncompensation is highly associated with levels of education (and other socio-economic factors), it\nis important to consider them when assessing wage differentials across individuals working in the\npublic and the private sectors. We turn next to a more careful empirical analysis that allows us to\ncontrol for such factors when estimating the wage premium.\n\n\n**Table AII.1 Average Wage and Worker Characteristics, 2015**\n\n\nEducational attainment (share of total)\n\n\n\nNumber of\n\nworkers\n\n\n\nAverage monthly\nwage (in Meticais) _Primary_ _Secondary_ _Tertiary_ _Professional_\n\n\n\nAverage\n\nage\n\n\n\nFemale\n(percent)\n\n\n\nPublic sector _3059_ 11189.3 0.075 0.464 0.352 0.109 38 0.375\n\n\nPrivate sector 6685 8603.1 0.400 0.478 0.091 0.031 35 0.194\n\n\nSource: Household and Labor Force Survey for Mozambique (2015) and IMF staff calculations\n\nWe use the following Mincer-type wage equation to estimate the public-private wage premium\n\n\n𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼+ 𝛿𝑥𝑖 + 𝜆 [𝑗] (𝑥𝑖𝑗. 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 (1)\n\n\nwhere 𝑦 is the logarithm of the monthly compensation, and 𝑥 is a vector comprising variables\nthat are found to be relevant for explaining wage differentials across individuals, including a set\nof binary variables indicating educational attainment, age and age squared (to proxy for\nexperience), gender, and area of residence (to control for price effects). The binary variable\n𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 takes the value of 1 if an individual works in the public sector. We control for potential\nheterogeneity in the effects, essentially allowing the wage differential estimate to differ across\nskill (or educational) levels. To do so, we include interaction terms between the public-sector\nbinary variable and the educational binary variables, where 𝑥 [𝑗] is a subset of 𝑥 that comprises four\nbinary variables indicating if an individual worker has tertiary, secondary, primary, or professional\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix II. Estimating the Public-Private Wage Premium\n\nThis appendix presents the details of the analysis on the relative competitiveness of\ncompensation levels for government workers in Mozambique, as presented in the report.\nSpecifically, it discusses the empirical approach used in estimating the wage premium of\ngovernment workers relative to private sector workers using micro-level data from the 2015\nIntegrated Household and Labor Force Survey.\n\nData from the labor force survey suggests that in 2015, the average wage was higher in the\npublic sector by about 30 percent. Nevertheless, in Mozambique, the share of better educated\nworkers is much higher in the public sector than in the private sector (Table A2.1). Given that\ncompensation is highly associated with levels of education (and other socio-economic factors), it\nis important to consider them when assessing wage differentials across individuals working in the\npublic and the private sectors. We turn next to a more careful empirical analysis that allows us to\ncontrol for such factors when estimating the wage premium.\n\nTable AII.1 Average Wage and Worker Characteristics, 2015\n\nEducational attainment (share of total)\n\nNumber of\n\nworkers\n\nAverage monthly\nwage (in Meticais) _Primary_ _Secondary_ _Tertiary_ _Professional_\n\nAverage\n\nage\n\nFemale\n(percent)\n\nPublic sector _3059_ 11189.3 0.075 0.464 0.352 0.109 38 0.375\n\nPrivate sector 6685 8603.1 0.400 0.478 0.091 0.031 35 0.194\n\nSource: Household and Labor Force Survey for Mozambique (2015) and IMF staff calculations\n\nWe use the following Mincer-type wage equation to estimate the public-private wage premium\n\n𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼+ 𝛿𝑥𝑖 + 𝜆 [𝑗] (𝑥𝑖𝑗. 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 (1)\n\nwhere 𝑦 is the logarithm of the monthly compensation, and 𝑥 is a vector comprising variables\nthat are found to be relevant for explaining wage differentials across individuals, including a set\nof binary variables indicating educational attainment, age and age squared (to proxy for\nexperience), gender, and area of residence (to control for price effects). The binary variable\n𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 takes the value of 1 if an individual works in the public sector. We control for potential\nheterogeneity in the effects, essentially allowing the wage differential estimate to differ across\nskill (or educational) levels. To do so, we include interaction terms between the public-sector\nbinary variable and the educational binary variables, where 𝑥 [𝑗] is a subset of 𝑥 that comprises four\nbinary variables indicating if an individual worker has tertiary, secondary, primary, or professional\n\n32", "text_characters": 2153}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "education. [22] The difference between the coefficients in 𝜆 and the coefficient on the corresponding\ncategory of education represents the percent difference of public sector workers’ average wage\ncompared to the average wage of private sector counterparts with similar socio-economic\ncharacteristics.\n\nThe wage equation is estimated using ordinary least squares regression techniques, using data\nfrom the 2015 Mozambique Integrated Household and Labor Force Survey. The focus of the\nanalysis is limited to salaried private sector workers who report monthly earnings, and thus\nexcludes self-employed workers. Furthermore, in an attempt to exclude workers in the informal\nprivate sector, we drop from the sample (i) workers earning below the minimum wage, (ii)\ndomestic workers, farmers, and agriculture workers, and (iii) workers with no education. For\nhypothesis testing, we use standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. The estimation\nresults are shown in TableA2.2, and can be summarized as follows: [23]\n\n- There is a wage premium, in absolute terms, for lower-skilled employees with primary\neducation of around 91 percent (Table A2.2).\n\n\n- There is a wage premium, in absolute terms, for lower-skilled employees with secondary\neducation of around 63 percent (Table A2.2).\n\n\n- On the other hand, high-skilled government employees with university level education tend\nto have, on average, a wage _discount_ of around 100 percent (Table A2.2).\n\n\n- Finally, government employees who hold a professional education (e.g., technical education\nand teacher training) earn a wage discount of around 11 percent relative to their private\nsector counterparts. However, the estimate is not significantly different from zero at the 5\npercent level (Table A2.2).\n\n\n22 The category of workers with professional education includes those with technical education and teacher\ntraining degrees.\n\n23 As a robustness check, the regression analysis has also been applied to male and female employees separately\nand the results remain consistent.\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "education. [22] The difference between the coefficients in 𝜆 and the coefficient on the corresponding\ncategory of education represents the percent difference of public sector workers’ average wage\ncompared to the average wage of private sector counterparts with similar socio-economic\ncharacteristics.\n\nThe wage equation is estimated using ordinary least squares regression techniques, using data\nfrom the 2015 Mozambique Integrated Household and Labor Force Survey. The focus of the\nanalysis is limited to salaried private sector workers who report monthly earnings, and thus\nexcludes self-employed workers. Furthermore, in an attempt to exclude workers in the informal\nprivate sector, we drop from the sample (i) workers earning below the minimum wage, (ii)\ndomestic workers, farmers, and agriculture workers, and (iii) workers with no education. For\nhypothesis testing, we use standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. The estimation\nresults are shown in TableA2.2, and can be summarized as follows: [23]\n\n- There is a wage premium, in absolute terms, for lower-skilled employees with primary\neducation of around 91 percent (Table A2.2).\n\n- There is a wage premium, in absolute terms, for lower-skilled employees with secondary\neducation of around 63 percent (Table A2.2).\n\n- On the other hand, high-skilled government employees with university level education tend\nto have, on average, a wage _discount_ of around 100 percent (Table A2.2).\n\n- Finally, government employees who hold a professional education (e.g., technical education\nand teacher training) earn a wage discount of around 11 percent relative to their private\nsector counterparts. However, the estimate is not significantly different from zero at the 5\npercent level (Table A2.2).\n\n22 The category of workers with professional education includes those with technical education and teacher\ntraining degrees.\n\n23 As a robustness check, the regression analysis has also been applied to male and female employees separately\nand the results remain consistent.\n\n33", "text_characters": 1730}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table AII.2 Estimate of the Public-Private Wage Gap**\n\n(by skill or educational level)\n\n\nCoefficient t-statistic\n\n\n_Tertiary_ x _Public_ -0.337 -7.33\n_Professional_ x _Public_ -0.112 -1.76\n_Secondary_ x _Public_ 0.147 7.14\n_Primary_ x _Public_ 0.128 3.08\n_Tertiary education_ 0.672 9.73\n_Secondary education_ -0.485 -8.46\n_Primary education_ -0.783 -13.42\n_Age_ 0.062 15.85\n_Age squared_ -0.001 -12.64\n_Male_ 0.180 10.89\n_Urban_ 0.042 1.79\n_Constant_ 7.574 78.76\n\n\n_N_ 9,744\n_R-squared_ 0.3064\n\n\nNote: Regressions are estimated by OLS. The t-statistics are computed from\nWhite's consistent estimator of the covariance matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity.\n\n\n34", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table AII.2 Estimate of the Public-Private Wage Gap\n\n(by skill or educational level)\n\nCoefficient t-statistic\n\n_Tertiary_ x _Public_ -0.337 -7.33\n_Professional_ x _Public_ -0.112 -1.76\n_Secondary_ x _Public_ 0.147 7.14\n_Primary_ x _Public_ 0.128 3.08\n_Tertiary education_ 0.672 9.73\n_Secondary education_ -0.485 -8.46\n_Primary education_ -0.783 -13.42\n_Age_ 0.062 15.85\n_Age squared_ -0.001 -12.64\n_Male_ 0.180 10.89\n_Urban_ 0.042 1.79\n_Constant_ 7.574 78.76\n\n_N_ 9,744\n_R-squared_ 0.3064\n\nNote: Regressions are estimated by OLS. The t-statistics are computed from\nWhite's consistent estimator of the covariance matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity.\n\n34", "text_characters": 561}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Fiscal Affairs Department**\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\n[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-023", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Fiscal Affairs Department\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\nhttp://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment", "text_characters": 122}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd7eb16c1dc8d77fdc24fffe7c055e8397604bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087
+size 58403
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82ec676712e6c74d8bff01f735bd0733a4dfe0e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f78c346820a5148b13987b497108362045636fa8a86e885f40d8512333134598
+size 82218
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..558e48aafceba57563ac1f65b43872f04031a870
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9e3da8f2063b7359c1f031c78b534bd4a81bd87bf1346afbcff8f2024f59260f
+size 1610
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f0a7cc7f70d85e3d3cf89290003e7877c854721f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:149229506ee4a8af8d09518b0adf2cc0ca899ef181b0df83e913c1a16a4861b9
+size 49794
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5450884b6f272d66fcdda8265f376b916cbebfb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2d2f0eb3519506f5cdb4ee1422ff348437fe3185dd2051d236138b45a7c060e1
+size 3955
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8ee1f3f779ccf2da0fbd12cc126468924019ba2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:43f9c812fdeb90471a144280c82f583db6d3bce953b8a4285ae6c7a6d38d75b3
+size 31146
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad4b993852f86678391a3b3c45cde4f6aa8db880
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4212e37ed7be603ba9e52dce767ff8610f437fc1048abbdfd28c0ddaf6083213
+size 20432
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7b8c41a1f051defa6f38e4b6898bbb56a083a9a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:06341ba43c220da28515e0a0d6772f6f17f1252c0e31d677c0f283ee0c4f1b8f
+size 168408
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55f76af5702fbc2b31a09f0c2503a9f0b7eae736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb
+size 33384
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0005-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0005-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..145f74eac7ccf9135a4c414f24c82c4bf588999d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0005-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a3e2e154665e535014165843d7adc019051bd44d0ad87256c5d7bf1de5ef8a7b
+size 2508
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0013-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0013-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67be6e5115cad33c036edb0367fd88a1080f02e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0013-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c31afefc68f9ca11d3d1c165a89d1ddbfd817e5578debd3a4b497ecbf4b7de45
+size 5519
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef8b38569b214e3f5d730522c9cc4b466f0fea1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b923a42c8a9acea9d88ab16e1380607731683204eacd6eb31e96c9e7022e46c1
+size 5045
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..29850a11d8e46b0c1b6a29608ba8a72e57f45e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c489476be754c069499b7c7cbef36ffeeaf8cdb6b3f23152e08fe990481b9a26
+size 111184
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d566b3d015cf3d7d2c57dfd0c7073114d2343d07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1943a4790025925a5eb957e6959e3ff8db7bcd43059e3111dd0f37558b517ecb
+size 5330
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d28a096a5f2ce098fcff07ac5502d31bf1a2fee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:57c6b83290778aa58b1f6f677dbb66ba9276ed259349a7d330edcfdf45b6e8d8
+size 4550
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..20960eaa82eea45292afa185e968ed61355539dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0391faacb2e4dda24758ab6ecb4124174b96e29202de3f5d4fb2a5a17c890574
+size 7528
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..52fc73ad0db730e7849979a919a952c927fd045d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:697636260885b130f2cf9964129ce8ba54342e9b5568ec94fdd40e37e8919785
+size 61648
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b03b5c31f852e4854cd40d16174a0c28561f2507
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fed9f552e3dbee65d71b781b493e82d46dadeab419359f8c8d845918c5ac765d
+size 212052
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0027-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0027-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a9ff7860297f2e161349419d15f7b895b1cfc37c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0027-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4972e6f30a6e6320d5058295f33daffe470bb0d10460395634816ef71055b0ce
+size 40801
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a428187797ba8140f6d2582a644190c29bfffcb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:024c6ed331933c8b1bd0b37889e3a46f8c1395e0812682b1423332be6dbe33fd
+size 29503
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cceb15eb3b59ab5cd71252f1d29f822a4fb0166a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:25b76cd9193642b8bed77a6257fed5ae34f41e896912ed7a9e021a9a5f729774
+size 43987
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0033-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0033-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e108bddbc0878db45455763af8257e6c22bf3131
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0033-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4477efa4990821407973bfc7fcb3d95475f70d0a147ad2f6bf3625301a54ebd5
+size 56094
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0036-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0036-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4eeec7db841f1afcecda790c9bd40d3a5e32146e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0036-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8bf1b766625b2eb02be177a2339f8e976f7ce271fa24fd289ff63f92aa81e282
+size 40737
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0037-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0037-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6301e547952a55d449a1947b12199b8fa9df01a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0037-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aa004f2797764c732661783b2a816b548a4e4180071ca0048445791bd108452b
+size 17538
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0038-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0038-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0d52c55e20f122c651063458cc49b331ef167a37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0038-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7a503735b58c0152ae8b28a857195f63df5dc8090ff243f0fc6c83b65ee9d7f8
+size 36082
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ccd32d2bea480401abcd1ef580d9d5c2779312db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9b31c7441eadd4f2a3e8aa40bad161b71099abd736f22a22e7b41b1353954699
+size 41184
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0042-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0042-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..875ca9f8a85238ffdd741c5190f3e56bbb986330
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0042-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fa125afb7fb7f06ef8b811988b6bc0cfb32113f799a102f05718ab2e576dec7d
+size 35617
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0043-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0043-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f45b5a5ecdde13436a0acdb07f080b1f6890f75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0043-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fae51c9e4ede5e53e461bc4da101591fe79176587c5a1c32a1d7d1858bb82e01
+size 139022
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..da4f5a61988cf3229c794dcde93f123c4cc32e14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-024",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Regaining Control Over Budget Execution",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-024.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "a8f6e2f9f5c0386a56133696ac7b2389e894f5aa1bcc36f4d9285f5a520eadd0",
+ "source_bytes": 1379557,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/13/republic-of-mozambique-regaining-control-over-budget-execution-528143",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-22T00:02:31+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 23.064,
+ "page_count": 47,
+ "text_characters": 102468,
+ "table_count": 11,
+ "figure_count": 28,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "ocr_applied_pages": [],
+ "ocr_engine": null,
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique Regaining Control Over Budget Execution"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Abbreviations and Acronyms"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Preface"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Executive Summary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Managing Domestic Arrears"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 20,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Strengthening the Budget Execution Process"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 26,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Optimizing Government Cash"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 33,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Enhancing the Credibility of the Budget"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 42,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "PROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 45,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main Outcomes)"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report - Regaining Control Over Budget Execution; IMF Country Report No. 23/24; April 2018",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 15 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 15.0",
+ "creationDate": "D:20180330162651-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230113124221-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e421449481e6d71674895b796d084bfaf961579e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2320 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/24**
+### **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — REGAINING**
+**CONTROL OVER BUDGET EXECUTION**
+
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff
+
+
+
+team of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the
+
+
+
+time it was completed in April 2018.
+
+
+
+_**Disclaimer:**_
+_This report was prepared in 2018 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_
+_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+#### **Republic of Mozambique** **Regaining Control Over Budget** **Execution**
+
+
+Benoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory Horman, Armando Manuel, and Esther Palacio
+
+
+**Technical Assistance Report**
+
+
+**April 2018**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by
+the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities
+of the Republic of Mozambique (the "TA recipient") in response to
+their request for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part)
+or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive
+Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or
+instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to
+World Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and
+donors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically
+objects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the
+Dissemination of Technical Assistance Information—
+[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).](http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf)
+Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof
+to parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities
+of the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance
+providers and donors with legitimate interest shall require the
+explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs
+Department.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Abbreviations and Acronyms ___________________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+
+**Preface ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+
+**Executive Summary _____________________________________________________________________________ 7**
+
+
+**Managing Domestic Arrears __________________________________________________________________ 9**
+
+Domestic Arrears, a Burden to Mozambique’s Economy _______________________________________ 9
+Clearing the Stock of Arrears __________________________________________________________________ 10
+Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears __________________________________________________ 17
+Recommendation 1. Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears _____________________________________ 16
+
+
+**Strengthening the Budget Execution Process _____________________________________________ 18**
+Loose Control over Budget Execution _________________________________________________________ 19
+Improving Expenditure Control ________________________________________________________________ 20
+Improving Fiscal Reporting ____________________________________________________________________ 23
+Recommendation 2. Restore the Expenditure Chain _____________________________________________ 22
+
+
+**Optimizing Government Cash _____________________________________________________________ 24**
+A Sound, yet Insufficiently Exploited Framework for Cash Management ______________________ 24
+Making the Best of the Treasury Single Account ______________________________________________ 25
+Improving Cash Planning______________________________________________________________________ 27
+Recommendation 3. Pro-actively Manage the Cash Balance _____________________________________ 30
+
+
+**Enhancing the Credibility of the Budget __________________________________________________ 31**
+Mozambique Budget Facing Headwinds ______________________________________________________ 31
+Enhancing the Accuracy of Budget Forecasts __________________________________________________ 32
+Improving Budget Allocations _________________________________________________________________ 34
+
+Reporting on Budget Credibility ______________________________________________________________ 38
+Recommendation 4. Enhance Budget Credibility _________________________________________________ 39
+
+
+**PROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS __________________________________________________ 40**
+Recommendation 5. Streamline Spending Units Network ________________________________________ 42
+
+
+**Annex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main Outcomes) _____________________________________ 43**
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+**BOXES**
+1. Clearing Outstanding Arrears, Angola Country Case, 2002-2003 ______________________________ 11
+2. Validation of Claims: the Angolan Experience _________________________________________________ 13
+3. Securitizing Arrears? Pros and Con ____________________________________________________________ 14
+4. Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears, the Angolan Experience _________________________ 15
+5. Building Cash Flow Forecasts __________________________________________________________________ 29
+6. Macro-Fiscal Forecasting and the Preparation of the MTFF____________________________________ 33
+7. Budget Preparation Based on Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches ___________ 38
+
+**FIGURES**
+1. Underlying Causes of the Arrear Fiscal Cliff ____________________________________________________ 17
+2. Three Key Phases in the Expenditure Chain ____________________________________________________ 18
+3. Institutional Changes Needed to Restore the Chain of Expenditure ___________________________ 21
+4. Current CUT and Banking Arrangements Architecture _________________________________________ 25
+5. Main Features of the Mozambique CUT _______________________________________________________ 26
+6. Total Expenditure and Total Tevenue __________________________________________________________ 31
+7. Change in Taxation Revenue from Budget Law to Financial Outcome _________________________ 34
+8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure __________________________________ 35
+9. Change in Composition of Expenditure by Classification ______________________________________ 36
+10. Change in Budget Balance ___________________________________________________________________ 37
+11. UGBs Distribution Across the Country ________________________________________________________ 41
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Five Recommendations to Regain Control over Budget Execution _____________________________ 8
+2. Process of Verification of Arrears ______________________________________________________________ 12
+3. Summary of the 2015 Fiscal Statement ________________________________________________________ 20
+4. Main Indicators for UGBs Across the Country _________________________________________________ 40
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+##### **Abbreviations and Acronyms**
+
+CEDSIF Finance Information System Development Center
+CFMP _Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo_ (Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF))
+CGE _Conta Geral do Estado_ (year-end budget execution report)
+CUT _Conta Unica do Tesouro_ (Treasury Single Account)
+DEEF Directorate for Economic and Financial Studies
+DNMA National Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation
+DNPO National Directorate for Planning and Budget
+DNT National Treasury Directorate
+e-SISTAFE Integrated Financial Management Information System (software)
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF
+FRS Fiscal Risk Statement
+FTAP Fiscal Transparency Action Plan
+GFSM Government Finance Statistics Manual
+GGR _Gabinete de Gestão de Risco_ (Cabinet for Fiscal Risks Management)
+IGF General Inspectorate of Finance
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+IT Information Technology
+MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance
+PFM Public Financial Management
+REO _Relatórios de Execução Orçamental_ (quarterly budget execution report)
+SOE State-Owned Enterprise
+SISTAFE Public Sector Financial Management System (framework)
+TA _Tribunal Administrativo_ (Administrative Court)
+UGB Beneficiary Management Units
+UGE Executor Management Units
+VAT Value Added Tax
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+##### **Preface**
+
+In response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a
+technical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,
+Mozambique during the period November 15-29, 2017, to improve budget execution and foster
+expenditure control. The main purpose of this mission was to take stock of workflows and
+processes in budget execution to assist the authorities in improving their control over the
+execution of the budget.
+
+The mission was led by Mr. Benoit Taiclet and comprised Ms. Laura Doherty (FAD staff),
+Messrs. Gregory Horman and Armando Manuel (FAD experts), and Ms. Esther Palacio (IMF TA
+coordinator and PFM expert in Mozambique). The mission benefitted from the support of the IMF
+office in Mozambique.
+
+The mission would like to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful collaboration
+provided by the authorities, especially Mr. Domingos Lambo, Permanent Secretary, who guided
+the work of the mission. The mission would also like to thank all the participants to the various
+meetings and workshops for their active and constructive participation.
+
+
+**This mission is part of the “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique Project” that is**
+
+**funded by the Government of Denmark and implemented by the IMF.**
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+##### **Executive Summary**
+
+**This mission contributed to the government public financial management strategy (PEFP**
+**2016-2019) at a pivotal time for Mozambique’s government** . Unlike previous DANIDA
+missions tasked with an overall review of the PFM system, this mission focused on expenditure
+control. It came at a critical moment when depleted revenues have shaken government balances,
+resulting in domestic arrears, which burden the public debt, and threaten fiscal sustainability.
+
+**The accumulated stock of arrears may adversely affect the country’s economy and its public**
+**finance.** Potential impacts include: shaking economic operators’ confidence in the government;
+potentially disrupting the public service delivery; and crowding out cash supply to the economy.
+Lastly, it may well induce second-round fiscal costs since suppliers to the government are now
+inclined to request payments in advance or withhold payment of taxes until they receive
+payments due to them from the government.
+
+**In this context, urgently assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears is a first and**
+**crucial step to be taken.** Based on other countries’ experience, the government should rapidly
+take stock of and validate legitimate suppliers’ claims. This will send a positive signal to creditors
+and raise officials’ awareness on the need to comply with budget ceilings and expenditure
+processes. Clearing these arrears will come afterward, with creditors’ agreements on clearance
+modalities (including discounts and possible securitization), and may take several years.
+
+**Just as urgent is the need to identify and eliminate the underlying causes of arrears**
+**accumulation.** In Mozambique, the major weaknesses to be dealt with are the following: the poor
+credibility of budget allocations; short-sighted cash projections; a lack of control over
+expenditure, which is operated by a large network of spending units; and, resulting from the
+latter, poor visibility as to government commitments and obligations through the existing fiscal
+reports. Key reforms must be undertaken to foster fiscal discipline, regain control over the
+expenditure chain, and stabilize and reduce the stock of arrears. They are presented in descending
+order of emergency:
+
+ - **Restore a legally compliant expenditure process.** Currently, the three phases of the
+expenditure (i.e., commitment, verification and payment) occur simultaneously. There is
+little information and control over commitments, expenditure float, and arrears. It is
+recommended to restore the commitment and verification phases.
+
+ - **Streamline the network of spending units (UGBs).** The sheer number of UGBs (over
+1,600) hampers the allocation of funds and budget monitoring. UGBs with low financial
+activity hardly reach best standards for an effective management of the budget. The
+government should gradually group UGBs and strengthen their capacities.
+
+ - **Improve the credibility of budget ceilings.** Although forecasts of macro-aggregates
+have improved, there is a need to enhance the credibility of the composition of budget.
+This can be done through a more efficient process and techniques for budget preparation.
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+- **Optimize government liquidity.** The government should pursue its efforts to pool cash
+inside the treasury single account. It should also introduce a more dynamic approach to
+cash management to avoid, to the best possible extent, disruptions in expenditure.
+
+
+**Table 1. Five Recommendations to Regain Control over Budget Execution**
+
+
+**Recommendations** **Timelines** **Possible support**
+
+**1** **Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears**
+
+
+
+**Action 1** Seek donor's funding and select consulting firm for stock taking of arrears **By March 2018**
+
+**Action 2** Design and publish a strategy, set data base framework and institutional **By June 2018**
+
+**Action 3** Open time widow for claimants to submit claims **June-July 2018**
+
+
+
+**IMF, Sweden**
+
+
+
+**Action 4** Verify claims, report related expenditure / debt to suppliers in e-SISTAFE, prioritize
+clearance, schedule payments and lending operations
+
+
+
+**September 2018**
+
+
+
+**Action 5** Proceed with, and report on, arrear clearance **Continued**
+
+
+
+**Action 6** Open second widow time for claimants **January 2019**
+
+
+
+**2** **Restore the Expenditure Chain**
+
+
+
+**Action 1** Set quarterly ceilings for commitments
+
+
+
+**Action 2, 3** UGBs record their commitments and verification in e-SISTAFE, in due time
+
+
+
+**IMF, European**
+
+
+
+**Action 4** Train budget managers (central and provinces levels)
+
+
+
+**Action 5** Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers
+
+**Action 6** Improve Treasury forecasting technics for Financial Programing
+
+
+
+**From January 2018,**
+**continuous**
+
+
+
+**Union, USAID,**
+
+
+
+**Action 7** Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored **From March 2018**
+
+
+
+**Switzeland,**
+
+**Austria, GIZ**
+
+
+
+**Action 8** Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs (all central level)… **March 2018**
+
+
+
+... (in some provinces) **June 2018**
+
+
+
+... (in all provinces) **September 2018**
+
+
+
+**Action 9** Approve a manual for expenditure and commitment control **By December 2018**
+
+**3** **Manage the Aggregate Cash Balance more Pro-Actively**
+
+
+
+**Action 1** Finalize and circulate the _diploma ministerial_ **End-2017**
+
+
+
+**Action 2** Introduce automatic end-of-day sweeping of balances in transit accounts and further
+minimize the use of advances
+
+
+
+**1st quarter 2018**
+
+
+
+**IMF/Denamrk,**
+
+**AFS, DFID**
+
+
+
+**Action 3** Continue to close accounts in commercial banks and transfer the balances to the CUT **Ongoing**
+
+
+
+**Action 4** Begin cash flow forecasting over six to 12-month horizon **Early 2018**
+
+
+
+**4** **Enhance Budget Credibility**
+
+
+
+**Action 1** Analyze and publish the deviations from Budget Law to CGE **2018**
+
+
+
+**Action 2** Determine expenditure aggregates and include identification of the stock of, and plan
+to clear arrears
+
+**Action 3** Continue to insist on a medium-term support framework with donors to ensure timely
+commitments and disbursements of project finance
+
+
+
+**2018**
+
+
+
+**Ongoing**
+
+
+
+**IMF/Belgium,**
+
+**Ireland, World**
+
+**Bank/DFID, AFS,**
+
+**European Union**
+
+
+
+**5** **Streamline Spending Units Network**
+
+
+
+**Phasing in:** Define targets, timelines and action plan **By March 2018**
+
+
+
+**Action 1** On a voluntary basis regroup small budget UGBs **By June 2018**
+
+
+
+**Action 2** Prepare large mergers simultaneous with budget preparation meetings **By September 2018**
+
+
+
+**AFS, European**
+
+**Union**
+
+
+
+**Action 3** Start FY 2019 under the new budget management framework **By January 2019**
+
+
+
+**Action 4** Complete remaining planned mergers **By September 2019**
+
+
+
+**Action 5** Start FY 2020 under the new framework **By January 2020**
+
+
+
+**Action 6** General Inspectorate of Finance reports on experience **By June 2020**
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+##### **Managing Domestic Arrears**
+
+**1.** **Expenditure** **arrears are financial obligations, incurred by any level of the public**
+**sector, for which payments have not been made by the due date.** Payments may be overdue
+based on a particular legal obligation (such as payment of social security benefits or salaries), a
+specific contractual commitment (such as payment for construction of a road), or a continuing
+service arrangement (such as payment for electricity supply). The value of expenditure arrears
+constitutes the amount of the original overdue payment, as well as any interest or financial
+penalties that the government might accrue.
+
+**2.** **Unlike Mozambique, many countries consider arrears as obligations that are due**
+**and not paid within 90 days following delivery or an agreed date for payment.** Expenditure
+arrears are a subset of payables that have remained unpaid beyond a due date for payment, that
+is, after a specified number of days after the date on the invoice or contract, in accordance with a
+law, regulation, government payment policy, or local practice. Among many other countries,
+Portugal, eight member-Countries of the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union
+(UEMOA), six member-Countries of the economic and monetary community for Central Africa
+(CEMAC) record arrears as the due obligations unpaid 90 days after delivery of service or good,
+adding to their public debt. Mozambique’s procurement law fixes a shorter time lapse of 30 days.
+
+**Domestic Arrears are a Burden on Mozambique’s Economy**
+
+
+**3.** **Mozambique’s accumulated stock of arrears adds to the debt burden.** Since 2015,
+the economy has been affected by lower commodity prices, declining foreign-exchange inflows,
+rising inflation, and substantial exchange rate depreciation. Following three years of large
+deficits, and absent further fiscal consolidation, the fiscal deficit is expected to expand, while
+domestic arrears stemming from overspending and limited access to domestic financing
+continue to build up. In 2017, the stock of arrears has reached 3.7 percent of GDP [ 1], further
+adding to the total stock of debt (78.2 percent of the GDP), which is already in distress. These
+arrears are not recorded in public financial accounts.
+
+**4.** **The accumulation of expenditure arrears can have serious negative effects on the**
+**domestic economy.** The economic consequences [2] can include the following:
+
+
+1 Stock disclosed by the authorities without many details (i.e., only an aggregate decomposition by (i) past three
+years and previous years, (ii) current versus capital expenditure, and (iii) central versus provincial and district
+levels of expenditure). The mission was unable to assess this amount.
+
+2 Adapted from the 2014 Fiscal Affairs Department Technical Note and Manual, _Prevention and Management of_
+_Government Expenditure Arrears_, by Prepared by Suzanne Flynn and Mario Pessoa.
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+- _Reduced economic growth_ . Payment arrears can cease or delay economic activity,
+resulting in a reduced pace of economic activity and increased unemployment.
+
+ - _Increased cost of service provision_ . Government suppliers try to mitigate the risks and
+opportunity cost of delayed payments by adjusting their initial prices upward.
+
+ - _Reduced or interrupted public service delivery_ . In the absence of payment, suppliers
+typically disrupt service delivery. Also, as the cost of supplies rise, the government may
+be forced to reduce their spending or put investment projects on hold.
+
+ - _Increased rent-seeking_ . Chronic payment delays also increase the incentives for rentseeking and collusion between government and suppliers, as the latter seek to accelerate
+payment or circumvent expenditure control procedures.
+
+ - _Increased interest rates_ . Illiquid suppliers typically borrow from banks to weather cash
+shortages, adding pressure to credit markets and driving up interest rates.
+
+ - _Second-round fiscal costs_ . Government suppliers are inclined to withhold payment of
+taxes until, in turn, they receive payments due to them from the government .
+
+**Clearing the Stock of Arrears**
+
+
+**5.** **The accumulation of government expenditure arrears is a common problem in**
+**public financial management (PFM).** A 2015 survey of 121 Public Expenditure and Financial
+Accountability (PEFA) assessments revealed that in only 31 percent of surveyed countries the
+stock of central government arrears was less than 2 percent. Some IMF program countries
+accumulated expenditure arrears in excess of 20 percent of GDP. Arrears-related structural
+benchmarks or performance criteria were included in 95 percent of 140 IMF-supported programs
+between 1999 and 2012, and included reforms to strengthen government capacity to identify,
+and clear existing arrears, and to avoid the accumulation of new arrears.
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+**Box 1. Clearing Outstanding Arrears, Angola Country Case, 2002-2003**
+
+Following the civil war, Angola reached a peace agreement in April 2002. From the period
+
+of 1992 to 2003, the Angolan Government acknowledged claims of arrears of
+US$13 billion. Shortly afterward, the government started implementing a 6-year strategy to
+clear the arrears. Subsequently, Angola suffered new rise of arrears due oil crisis in 2008
+and 2014, and applied the same approach. The strategy involved six stages:
+
+ - **Acknowledgement of claims** - The government established a calendar for all creditors to
+submit their claims of unpaid invoices dating from 1992, defined the information and documents
+required to support the claims, and set three different stages to handle the process: unpaid
+invoices for 1992-97, for 1998-2003, and all transactions after 2003.
+
+ - **Verification** - This stage comprised of the verification of the legal condition of the creditors,
+how well the companies were established, whether they complied with tax obligations, and
+whether the claims were recorded in the balance sheets. The process also included the
+verification of sufficient budget provisions in the related budgetary unit.
+
+ - **Validation** - The government contracted an independent auditing company to validate each
+claim based on the specific criteria to ensure its legitimacy.
+
+ - **Negotiation** –The Ministry of Finance reached an agreement through negotiation with
+legitimate creditors, set a calendar of payments, partly in cash and partly in treasury bonds with
+maturities up to 5 years, a 5 percent coupon, and payments per semester.
+
+ - **Payment** - Small claims where paid in cash, while others received bonds (at first indexed to the
+exchange rate, then later to the consumer price index) to ensure that creditors could have liquidity
+over time. Subsequently, the bonds were traded in secondary market.
+
+Source: Angola Archives.
+
+
+**Taking stock of arrears**
+
+
+**6.** **A thorough stock take of the outstanding stock of arrears is necessary**, in order to
+understand the extent, composition, and vintage of the government’s unpaid bills and prioritize
+their clearance. Governments typically use two approaches for a census of arrears:
+
+
+**•** **Purchasers’ side:** Out of spending units’ ledgers and records, the government takes
+stock of due obligations not paid. Absent a mechanism to track arrears from the systems
+in use to process expenditures, the Treasury must demand spending units’ records,
+pending invoices, and all other due obligations.
+
+**•** **Suppliers’ side** : A dedicated unit (most often an audit institution) opens a limited-time
+window for creditors to bring their claims forward. Claims should be documented to
+government specifications, including a timetable for the stocktaking exercise and a clear
+definition of the information requirements. A cut-off date for inclusion of new arrears
+should be established to encourage timely reporting and to avoid the possibility of
+fraudulent claims.
+
+
+**7.** **Once collected, data on the outstanding stock of arrears should be verified to**
+**ensure that the claims are genuine and not fraudulent.** This activity can be undertaken by the
+supreme audit institution, an inspectorate or internal audit function in the ministry of finance, or
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+private audit firms. This process of verification of claims should be subject to tests to verify their
+existence, value, and vintage, using the following guidelines:
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Check|Table 2. Process of Verification of Arrears Approach|
+|---|---|
+|**Check**
|**Approach**
|
+|**Legal validity**
|Check that the transaction was duly authorized and consistent with budgetary
authorizations. If otherwise, appropriate sanctions should be applied to officials,
and validity of the claim should be legally assessed.
|
+|**Evidence of**
**delivery**
|In case of doubt or for material transactions, delivery should be reconfirmed by
requesting information from the supplier (e.g., its financial records). In more
complex transactions, particularly those related to investment projects, evidence of
progress or a completion certificate should be required.
|
+|**Payable value**
|Invoices should contain the amount and the reference to the purchase order; If
doubtful, cross-check with suppliers’ financial statements.
|
+|**Payable vintage**
|Check by reference to the invoice and other supporting documentation.
|
+|**Tax compliance**|Revenue authority checks to ensure that suppliers are registered taxpayers and not
delinquent in tax payments.|
+
+
+**8.** **Once** **collected and verified, arrears data should be analyzed and classified for the**
+**purposes of arrears clearance.** A database of valid outstanding payments should be established
+and maintained centrally by the ministry of finance. This can be a resource-intensive and timeconsuming exercise, requiring dedicated staff resources. A practical approach would be to focus
+in the first instance on large claims, gradually expanding the coverage of the database. To allow
+for appropriate categorization, the following data should be captured for each outstanding claim:
+
+
+**•** **Vintage** : Classify arrears by how long they have been overdue: one to three months,
+three to six months, six to 12 months, and more than 12 months. Older arrears should be
+classified by the financial year of incurrence.
+
+**•** **Debtor** : Record the government entity incurring the liability: central or subnational
+government, extra-budgetary fund, or state-owned enterprise.
+
+**•** **Creditor** **:** Classify creditors’ names by type: employees, private individuals or businesses,
+financial institutions, extra-budgetary funds, or state-owned enterprise. Distinguishing
+extra- and intra-government obligations will facilitate clearance of the latter.
+
+**•** **Economic category** : Classify arrears by economic category, such as compensation of
+employees, acquisition of goods and services, transfers, acquisition of nonfinancial assets,
+and acquisition of financial assets.
+
+**•** **Currency** **:** Capture the currency in which the obligation was originally denominated to
+ensure that sufficient foreign exchange is available to meet external arrears.
+
+**•** **Contractual terms:** Identify any relevant information, including whether the outstanding
+balance results in interest and/or penalties for non-payment.
+
+**•** **Payment status:** Distinguish, within the total amount due, the amount already paid, the
+amount outstanding, and any rescheduling, discounting, or factoring of the unpaid
+obligation.
+
+12
+
+
+
+**9.** **When established, the database should be kept up-to-date, showing the discharge**
+**of arrears and any subsequent additions to the stock.** The entire stock of accounts payable
+should be classified as liabilities, further classified as either domestic or foreign, and included in
+the government’s measurement of gross debt. Payments in arrears should be included as a
+memorandum item to the government’s fiscal table (e.g., the _mapa fiscal_ ).
+
+
+**Box 2. Validation of Claims: the Angolan Experience**
+
+
+The process of validation, helped the Government to assess to the real value of the arrears, the
+
+total claims in the period amounted US$13.2 billion, only 51.5 percent equivalent to
+US$6.7 billion were certified and validated. The remaining 48.6 percent represented claims not
+recognized.
+
+
+Source: Angola Archives.
+
+**Clearing the stock of arrears**
+
+
+**10.** **Once a database of valid claims on government has been established, a set of**
+**criteria for prioritizing their verification should be determined.** The prioritization of arrears
+clearance should be based on transparent criteria. These might include the following:
+
+
+**•** **Socioeconomic impact:** Arrears to economically sensitive or vulnerable sectors, such as
+salaries of low-income workers, pensions, and social benefits, should be prioritized.
+
+**•** **Vintage:** Older obligations should have priority over newer obligations.
+
+**•** **Cost:** Arrears that accrue interest and penalty charges should be prioritized.
+
+**•** **Risk:** Arrears that may result in legal action, disruption of essential services, or cost
+escalation of future supplies to government should be prioritized.
+
+**•** **Currency** : Payment of foreign currency denominated debt should be prioritized if
+domestic currency devaluation is outpacing domestic inflation.
+
+**•** **Creditor** : The clearance of intra-government debts should be prioritized, as this can be
+done administratively though the annual budget at minimal net cost.
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**11.** **Once the criteria for prioritizing arrears for clearance have been established and**
+**published, the payment or verification of obligations can begin.** A technical group should
+oversee arrears verification to ensure the consistent application of the principles of the strategy.
+For repayment modalities, the following options may be considered:
+
+
+**•** **Pay cash and discount:** Depending on available fiscal space, the best option is cash
+payments to avoid further financial penalties or interest and enable suppliers to rebuild
+their working capital. As part of these negotiations, creditors may agree to a discount;
+however, this approach should be treated with caution, since it can have the effect of
+increasing costs to the government if suppliers inflate prices for future supplies in
+anticipation of expected future discounting.
+
+**•** **Reschedule payments:** If sufficient liquidity is not available, the Treasury may negotiate
+a schedule of payments with creditors according to a pre-defined calendar, a no-discount
+option, and an interest rate. This option may be more viable if the current market
+conditions are not ripe for the placement of sizeable amounts of new debt.
+
+**•** **Earmark loans:** Arrears can be paid off by borrowing in financial markets. The proceeds
+of the borrowing operations would be earmarked for the reduction of the stock of
+arrears. This option increases the stock of explicit government debt, as it records arrears
+as part of the domestic debt, but it does not decrease net worth, as government is
+explicitly recognizing a liability that existed as an implicit obligation to pay.
+
+**•** **Securitize arrears:** This approach directly transforms them into government debt.
+Securitization options include issuing promissory notes (discountable by commercial
+banks), marketable treasury bills, or bonds directly to creditors. However, the direct
+securitization of arrears also has many disadvantages (see Box 3).
+
+**•** **Settle with state-owned enterprises:** A book entry can be made reflecting all
+outstanding bills, leaving a single remaining debt that can be resolved through budget
+transfers to SOEs. If reciprocal payments are owed to government, such as in the form of
+dividends, these can be netted off against the required cash injection.
+
+
+
+
+
+|Box 3. Securitizing Arrears? Pros and Cons
Pros Cons|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|
Allows the government to select the
debt maturity structure and
repayment profile that best matches
its financing needs.
Gives creditors the opportunity to
raise liquidity by trading the
securities in the secondary market,
possibly at a discount.
|
Creates strong moral hazard incentives for budget managers
to continue to over-commit resources in the expectation that
they will eventually also be securitized and paid centrally.
Trading securitized instruments in secondary market(s) comes
at the cost of discounts that reduce the working capital
available to the supplier compared with cash payment.
Securitization of the outstanding stock of arrears hampers
prioritizing payment of the most urgent arrears, as securities
are issued to all creditors on equal terms.|
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+**Box 4. Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears: the Angolan Experience**
+
+
+the public financial management system. Issuance of a “commitment note” was required
+for all public acquisitions of goods and services, for the sake of commitment control. A
+legislation was passed with definition of arrears as invoices unpaid 90 days after issuance,
+this facilitated the monitoring process of arrears accumulation on a quarterly basis.
+
+Additional normative and operational measures were implemented to prevent public procurement
+loopholes, all contracts above US$ 0,5 million were subject to approval by the Minister of Finance, and
+contracts above US$ 10 million had to be signed by the President with pre-approval of the Mister of
+Finance prior submission to the Audit Office (Court of Account).
+
+With the oil price drop, Angola faced new arrears, mainly related to public investment projects (PIP). As a
+mitigation measure, authorities are now aligning the PIP portfolio to the medium term fiscal framework,
+and monitoring projects before they start. Kick starting new investment projects needs to meet the
+following prerequisites: transparent and sufficient budget allocations, and tenders under the oversight of
+the public procurement office.
+
+Source: Angola archives.
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommendation 1. Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears
Background
Despite government’s efforts to rein-in expenditure in line with target balances, domestic arrears are
being accumulated to the tentative estimate of Meticais 30 billion (roughly one fifth of 2017 projected
tax revenue). In addition, the overall debt remains in high risk of distress. A restructuring of public debt
owed to private creditors is unavoidable.
Key measures
• Kick-start a census of obligations not paid in due time by the public sector, and maintain a
comprehensive data base on creditors, claims, and repayments made.
• Check and reject illegitimate claims, seek creditors’ agreement on arrear clearance modalities
(including discounts, cash repayments, and possible securitization).
• Implement arrear clearance per a prioritized schedule consistent with government fiscal stance.
Institutional arrangements
The government needs to develop a strategy for arrear clearance including the following five steps:
stocktaking, verification, classification, prioritization, and verification of arrears. The institutional
framework for strategic guidance and oversight should involve the MEF, along with the court of account
(TA). Implementation of the strategy lies upon the Treasury department (repayments and lending
operations) and the General Inspectorate of Finance (census of creditors and verification of claims) with
support from a consulting firm to be financed by a donor.
Risks and mitigation measures
The government should publish its plans, timetable, and criteria for the verification of arrears, thereby
minimizing perception of favoritism and corruption in the process.
Financial instruments for arrear clearance should be wisely and transparently chosen to avoid downside
risks of debt sustainability, and budget managers’ lack of accountability.
Schedule for clearance should be included in multiyear projections for spending and debt.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|
Action 1|
Define main outlines of the strategy, seek donor funding and select a
consulting firm to stock take the arrears|By March 2018|
+|Action 2|Design and publish a strategy, set data base framework and institutional
arrangements|By June 2018|
+|Action 3|Open time widow for claimants to submit claims
|June-July 2018|
+|Action 4|Verify claims, report related expenditure / debt to suppliers in e-SISTAFE,
prioritize clearance, schedule repayments and lending operations in line with
multiyear fiscal policy|By September
2018|
+|Action 5|Proceed with, and report on, arrear clearance|Continued|
+|Action 6
|Open second widow time for claimants and collect remaining unsolved
legitimate claims|January 2019|
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+**Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears**
+
+
+
+**12.** **To fend off further accumulation of arrears, the Mozambique government needs to**
+**resolve the weaknesses in expenditure process, budget allocations and cash management.**
+Through meetings with officials and a one-day seminar, the mission identified the following
+underlying causes for arrear accumulation (also see Figure 1):
+
+**To be discussed in Chapter 2:**
+
+
+
+**To be discussed in Chapter 2:**
+
+
+
+
+**•** **The ministry of economy and finance has limited control on budget execution.** This
+major weakness stems from an overly simplified process that does not clearly distinguish
+the main phases of expenditure and prevents proper commitment control.
+
+
+
+**To be discussed in Chapter 3:**
+
+**•** **The budget, specifically its decomposition in administrative items, is not credible.**
+Despite rather accurate revenue forecasts, budget allocations to spending units are not
+properly calibrated to their financing needs, and subject to frequent in-year changes.
+These unstable budget allocations lead spending units to commit resources in excess of
+their budget allocation resulting in overspending and/or arrears.
+
+
+
+**To be discussed in Chapter 4:**
+
+**•** **Cash supply does not sustain a smooth continuation of expenses.** This results from
+revenue scarcity (which is largely out of the government’s hands) and a perfectible
+management of cash within and outside the treasury single account (CUT).
+
+
+
+**To be discussed in Chapter 5:**
+
+
+
+**The sheer number of spending units (UGBs) hampers all of the above-mentioned**
+**functions.** Budget execution and preparation and cash management are made uneasy. UGBs
+with low financial activity hardly reach best standards, skills, and economies of scale for budget
+
+
+
+management. There is a need to streamline this network.
+
+
+
+**Figure 1. Underlying Causes of the Arrear Fiscal Cliff**
+
+
+
+
+**•**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Inaccuracy of**
+
+**Expenditure**
+
+**Projections**
+
+
+
+**Poor Confidence in Government**
+
+**Financial Signature**
+
+
+
+**Lack of Fiscal Discipline**
+
+
+
+**In Year Changes**
+**to Spending Unit**
+
+**budgets**
+
+
+
+**No**
+**Commitment**
+
+**Control**
+
+
+
+**Idle Cash in**
+
+**Banks**
+
+
+
+**Too many**
+
+**UGBs**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Not credible**
+**Cash/Debt Plans**
+
+
+
+**Poor Control on Budget**
+
+**Execution**
+
+
+
+
+
+**Cash shortages**
+
+
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+##### **Strengthening the Budget Execution** **Process**
+
+**13.** **Expenditure control is an essential element for fiscal discipline, sustainability, and**
+**quality of expenditure** . There should be specific forms of control during the different stages of
+the budget execution process, some being centralized at the ministry of finance while others can
+be decentralized. Systematic controls of budget execution will help comprehend the dynamics of
+expenditure, the relevance of budget allocations, and the efficiency of policies implemented by
+the spending units.
+
+
+**14.** **The expenditure process should allow recording at least three key stages of**
+**expenditure** . For control purposes, the literature [3] distinguishes seven stages of the expenditure
+cycle (i.e. authorization, apportionment, reservation, commitment, verification, payment order
+and payment). Of these seven stages, three have a direct impact on government’s obligations
+and debt, as shown in Figure 2: (i) commitment; (ii) good/services receipt and verification; and (iii)
+payments. For the sake of arrear control, it is crucial to record at least these three stages.
+
+
+**Figure 2. Three Key Phases in the Expenditure Chain**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|ture, yet certain cost to the budget) Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+||Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|
+|This stage is marked by the
issuance of a purchase order
and funds must be
encumbered at this stage to
avoid any potential building
of arrears||||
+|This stage is marked by the
issuance of a purchase order
and funds must be
encumbered at this stage to
avoid any potential building
of arrears|,
r
i
|,
r
i
||
+|This stage is marked by the
issuance of a purchase order
and funds must be
encumbered at this stage to
avoid any potential building
of arrears|,
r
i
|,
r
i
|L
o
|
+
+
+
+**The three phases should be recorded separately** to ensure the predictability of, and allow control over
+expenses. Three main aggregates can be used for fiscal reporting and financial programming purposes:
+(i) commitments made, yet to be settled; (ii) verifications recorded yet to be paid (i.e. the expenditure
+float); and payments made (cash basis budget execution).
+
+**The Mozambique fiscal law** **[4]** **identifies the three stages of the expenditure execution**, that must
+happen separately from other stages of expenditure, and demands fiscal reporting be based on
+commitments. These legal provisions are practically not implemented.
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+
+3 See FAD Technical Note and Manual, _Expenditure Control, Key Features, Stages, and Actors_, by Sailendra
+Pattanayak.
+
+4 Law 9/2002 of 12 of February, Law of Financial Management System.
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+**Loose Control over Budget Execution**
+
+
+**15.** **The budget is executed through the public sector financial management system**
+**(SISTAFE), which can cover main stages of the expenditure.** The SISTAFE is robust enough to
+record all transactions made by the spending units (UGBs). It records different phases in the
+expenditure workflow including commitments, verifications and payments. Although
+commitments are not recorded yet, a simple patch could be implemented to do so. SISTAFE is
+about to be upgraded to cover all phases of budget execution from allotment of funds to
+payments, including the procurement phase (pre-commitment stage).
+
+
+**16.** **Not all UGBs have access to e-SISTAFE.** Due to constraints mainly related with
+interconnections and power supply, a set of UGBs, mainly at the district level, execute the budget
+with technical support from other spending units to access the system, or receiving advanced
+payments. As for the latter the expenditure process is made recessively, with payments occurring
+before the certification and commitment phases.
+
+
+**17.** **The Treasury has set a system by which transactions are entered in the system as**
+**they mature for payment, not when the individual stages happen.** Practically, spending units
+keep invoices and contracts in ad hoc ledgers, out of e-SISTAFE. Then they operate spending by
+the sole amount of transactions complying with the weekly cash ceiling set by the Treasury. All
+steps of expenditure are recorded within one week [5] as follows: commitments and verifications
+are recorded in SYSTAFE simultaneously; and payments are made within four days, e.g. the time
+lapse the Treasury needs to execute the disbursements.
+
+
+**18.** **Squeezing expenditure phases into such a short time lapse, denies capturing**
+**commitments and invoices when they occur.** It encourages the neglection of critical
+documents such as contracts, receipts and invoices that are put on the back burner until the last
+moment when transactions are done. Therefore, fiscal reporting in Mozambique is incomplete
+and does not provide a fair reflection on government obligations. Decisions on fiscal policies are
+poorly informed in the lack of accurate data on real execution process.
+
+
+**19.** **Commitment control is loose or inexistent.** Complying with Mozambique’s legal
+framework, investment contracts shall be submitted by spending units to the supreme audit (TA)
+for a control on procedural regularity, not budget compliance. Prior the TA’s control, the Treasury
+should conduct a preliminary control on commitments ( _pre-cabimento_ ). In practice, the ceiling
+issued by the Treasury is not binding the purchasing UGB, and does not prevent them from over
+purchasing in excess of their budget. Practically most commitments are not controlled upstream,
+and the financial sustainability of spending units’ procurement is not ensured.
+
+
+**20.** **Reports on budget execution produced by the General Accounting Directorate are**
+**not realistic.** Table 3 indicates the final report of operating expenditure for 2015, it is
+
+
+5 Source: SISTAFE database provided by CEDSIF.
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+symptomatic that the level of liquidated expenditure is exactly the same as the level of paid
+expenditure across the economic classification lines, assuming no existence of arrears. However,
+the stock disclosed by the authorities related to 2015 amounts to 3 billion meticais, and 9 billion
+meticais in 2016 although fiscal statements constantly report zero arrears.
+
+
+**Table 3. Summary of the 2015 Fiscal Statement**
+
+(in millions of meticais)
+
+
+
+**Committed**
+**Ord** **Economic Classification** **Adjusted Budget**
+**Expenditure**
+
+
+
+**Verified**
+**Expenditure**
+
+
+
+**Paid**
+**Expenses**
+
+
+
+1 Personnel Expenditure 64.484,8 64.105,5 64.092,1 64.092,1
+
+2 Goods and Services 23.403,3 22.537,2 22.452,7 22.452,7
+
+3 Interest on Debt 7.577,4 7.577,4 7.577,4 7.577,4
+
+4 Current transfers 20.016,9 19.864,7 19.858,0 19.858,0
+
+5 Subsidies 2.277,3 2.213,4 2.213,4 2.213,4
+
+6 Pending payments of previous Year 218,1 162,4 162,3 162,3
+
+7 Other current expenditure 781,8 745,8 745,8 745,8
+
+8 Capital Expenditure 5.113,2 400,3 400,3 400,3
+**9** **Total** **123.872,8** **117.606,7** **117.502,0** **117.502,0**
+
+Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) Expenditure Execution Report of 2015.
+
+
+**21.** **There is little financial information on UGBs’ financial needs during the fiscal year.**
+Absent any information on upcoming payments (i.e., verifications yet to be paid) the Treasury
+projections for expenditure are shorter than one month. Therefore, the Treasury provides UGBs
+their ceilings for expenditure on a weekly basis, based on short-term availability of cash, and
+UGBs proceed with payments within less than one week.
+
+**Improving Expenditure Control**
+
+
+**22.** **Controlling and recording commitments is key to preventing expenditure arrears.**
+The commitment of resources is a critical stage of the expenditure process. Controlling
+commitments is essential for controlling expenditure. The key objective of commitment control is
+to manage the initial incurrence of obligations, rather than the subsequent cash payments, in
+order to enforce expenditure ceilings and avoid expenditure arrears.
+
+
+**23.** **The UGBs should be given commitment ceilings sufficiently in advance so as to**
+**improve the quality of public expenditure management downstream.** Restoring an effective
+process for commitment control implies that apportionment by the Treasury will be made on a
+quarterly basis. This would provide the following improvements: (i) the UGBs will have sufficient
+room to enable records of verification stage; (ii) the process of programming can be
+implemented interactively, starting with the submission of financial needs of funds by the UGBs
+to the Treasury; and (iii) the Treasury would gain critical information to consolidate a quarterly
+cash plan.
+
+20
+
+
+
+**24.** **Restoring the normal functioning of the expenditure chain does not need further**
+**developments in the system.** A new functionality is being developed to record procurement via
+e-SISTAFE. This functionality could strengthen public procurement management and ensure
+budget allocations exist and are reserved before launching the public tender (adding a
+pre-commitment stage). However, the budget execution process for the stages of commitment
+and verification might still fall out of e-SISTAFE if the measures recommended above are not
+taken. Therefore, there is no need to wait to complete the current pilot of this new functionality
+to include public works and to roll-it throughout the country during the next two years.
+
+
+**25.** **The Treasury should change its business model and move from the current cash**
+**rationing to a financial programing approach.** Figure 3 indicates what should be the role of
+the Treasury in forecasting the quarterly expenditure, based on previsions made by spending
+agencies, the revenue authority and the debt management department. This action will give
+foster financial programming by the UGBs and restore the three phases of expenditure by
+recording the commitments in due time and the verifications in e-SISTAFE.
+
+
+**Figure 3. Institutional Changes Needed to Restore the Chain of Expenditure**
+
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommendation 2. Restore the Expenditure Chain
Background
The phases of the expenditure currently are recorded simultaneously, which is not compliant with the
fiscal law6. There is little information and control over commitments, expenditure, and arrears.
Key measures
• Set quarterly ceilings for commitments, based on revenue forecasts;
• Immediately restore the commitment and verification phases in e-SISTAFE;
• Raise awareness through seminars on the need to restore the normal expenditure process;
• Improve financial programing by the National Treasury Directorate;
• Revise the calendar of data collection from UGBs so that the Treasury can prepare the quarterly
financial programing;
• Gradually implement the commitment control, starting from the UGBs at central level.
Institutional arrangements
The National Directorate of Treasury will need to coordinate with CEDSIF to ensure availability of support
and ensure the implementation process goes smoothly.
Risks and mitigation measures
The restoration of the expenditure phases will require extensive capacity development. While the chain
of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and verifications
should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP) and reported in fiscal
reports. Communicating to the private sector is important to bring the awareness on how important is
the effective control of public expenditure.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|
Action 1
|
Set quarterly ceilings for commitments
|By January 2018
|
+|Action 2
|UGBs record their commitments in e-SISTAFE upon contracting
|January 2018
|
+|
Action 3
|
UGBs record their verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers'
invoices, per legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law
|
January 2018
|
+|Action 4
|Train budget managers (central and provinces levels)
|
From January 2018,
continuous
|
+|Action 5
|Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and
inform suppliers
|Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and
inform suppliers
|
+|Action 6
|
Improve the Treasury’s forecasting techniques for financial
programing
|
Improve the Treasury’s forecasting techniques for financial
programing
|
+|Action 7
|
Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is
effectively restored
|From March 2018,
continuous
|
+|Action 8
|
Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs all
central level
in some provinces
in all provinces
|
March 2018
June 2018
September 2018
|
+|Action 9
|
Based on the experience from the pilot, issue a manual for
expenditure and commitment control|
By December 2018|
+
+
+
+6 Law 9/2002 of 12 of February, Law of Financial Management System.
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+**Improving Fiscal Reporting**
+
+
+**26.** **Fiscal reporting fosters accountability and improves fiscal policy decision making** . It
+is a powerful tool to report on budget execution to the public, to base policy decision-making on
+a fair view of government finance, and to give clear outlook to managers on available resources.
+Fiscal reporting is a legal requirement in Mozambique’s legal framework. The Constitution
+requires fiscal reporting from the government to the Parliament and the public, and the SISTAFE
+law and regulations outline how and when this should be done. [7]
+
+
+**27.** **Quarterly and year-end execution reports are produced and submitted to the**
+**Parliament on time, but their content can improve** . The budget execution reports (REOs) are
+published 45 days after the end of each quarter, and the year-end execution report and financial
+statement (CGE) is submitted end-May of the following year. These reports are public and
+include data available for the period, on a cumulative basis, in great detail. A substantial part of
+these data is provided by the system, and the rest is captured from e-SISTAFE. However,
+important data such as information on real commitments and verifications are missing in these
+reports. Information on payments is available, but transactions outside the treasury single
+account (CUT) need manual processing before being reported. In some periods, large amounts of
+unexplained transactions have been observed. Other concerns are the misalignment with the
+2014 Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM 2014), the absence of balance sheet reporting
+on the main financial liabilities and assets, and late discussion of the CGE in Parliament with twoyear lag.
+
+
+**28.** **Fiscal reporting needs to be further** **streamlined and its production automated.**
+Financial reporting functionalities and accounting processes in e-SISTAFE could be further
+improved, mainly by incorporating data available in other IT systems and automatizing the
+production of the REOs and the CGE. These reports should adopt GFSM 2014 framework and
+include _Mapa Fiscal_ overall presentation of the transactions for the period _[8]_ . A simplified balance
+sheet should be included in the CGE to report on the main financial assets and liabilities known [9] .
+While the chain of expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on real
+commitments and verifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting
+directorate (DNCP) and reported in the REOs and CGE from end-2017. This transitory measure
+would be discontinued when the system starts capturing the information in due time.
+
+
+7 Articles 179, 206, and 230 of the Constitution; Articles 37, 48, and 50 of the SISTAFE Law; and Articles 24 and 27
+of SISTAFE regulations.
+
+8 Operational Statement in GFSM 2014, includes revenues, expenses, and transactions in assets and liabilities.
+
+9 This should include debt balances, payables, cash and bank balances, financial investments, other financial
+assets, and report on contingent liabilities. For further details see FAD TA Report from Delphine Moretti,
+_Reassessment of Public Accounting Reform Roadmap_ (July 2014).
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+**29.** **The stock of arrears resulting from the validation process must be immediately**
+**reported** . These arrears correspond to extra-budgetary expenditures that were not committed
+and verified when made in the past. Therefore, the related debt to suppliers is not accrued. Best
+practice suggests reopening the accounting of previous years and registering the liabilities and
+associated expenditures in the periods they occurred. Given the difficulty of this approach and
+possible legal constraints to do so, a more practical solution is the one adopted by Angola. It
+consists of recording the expenditure and the liability to suppliers in the year they are validated.
+The verified stock of arrears must be shown in fiscal reports and statistics, even before the
+solution to clear them is agreed.
+##### **Optimizing Government Cash**
+
+**30.** **Sound cash management contributes to orderly execution of the budget.** The
+objective of cash management is to ensure that the government has sufficient liquidity at all
+times to pay obligations as they fall due, without the need to ration cash (and thereby interrupt
+predictable execution of the budget) and without accumulating arrears. Whatever the country’s
+level of revenue, there are likely to be times during the year when there are mismatches between
+cash inflows and cash outflows, resulting in short-term cash surpluses or, more problematically
+for budget execution, short-term cash deficits. Banking arrangements that centralize the
+government’s liquidity within a treasury single account are critical for optimization of liquidity by
+reducing the possibility of idle cash. Cash flow forecasting facilitates pro-active management of
+the cash balance, to eliminate (or mitigate) temporary cash deficits.
+
+**A Sound, yet Insufficiently Exploited Framework for Cash**
+**Management**
+
+
+**31.** **The government’s banking arrangements are built around a main account at the**
+**central bank, with links to other accounts at both the central bank and commercial banks.**
+The main account functions as the CUT and is operated by the Treasury. It is possible with
+SISTAFE to set up sub-accounts within the CUT as ledger accounts. The government has other
+accounts, in both local currency and foreign currency, at the central bank that are outside the
+CUT; these are operated by the Treasury and by other entities. In some cases, legislation or
+contractual requirements may prevent deposits from being held within the CUT; in other cases,
+the accounts reflect custom and practice to-date. The degree to which these accounts are
+managed in coordination with the CUT varies, ranging from periodic or ad hoc pooling of
+liquidity to complete separation. The government also has accounts at commercial banks. Transit
+accounts are used to receive revenue and make payments when transactions cannot be executed
+directly from the CUT. There are other accounts at commercial banks in which cash is held on a
+more sustained basis; these accounts are operated largely by entities other than the Treasury. As
+with the non-CUT accounts at the central bank, the degree to which these commercial bank
+accounts are coordinated with the CUT varies (see Figure 4).
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+**Figure 4. Current CUT and Banking Arrangements Architecture**
+
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+**32.** **The main tools for cash planning are the “cash budget” and the “cash plan”.** At the
+start of the fiscal year, the Treasury prepares the cash budget, which decomposes the approved
+budget by month. It is a largely static document, which undergoes few amendments during the
+year, unless there are changes in revenue forecasts. In addition, each month the Treasury
+prepares the cash plan, which is a cash flow projection for the coming month, broken down by
+week. It incorporates recent information on revenue receipts, the requirements of the executing
+units reported in e-SISTAFE, and any new information from sectors. These plans, which are
+passed to the Bank of Mozambique, are discussed at a weekly meeting chaired by the Minister at
+which decisions are made on the financial quotas to be released to UGBs in the week ahead.
+
+
+**33.** **The Treasury does not currently actively manage the government’s aggregate cash**
+**balance.** It does not borrow or lend in the money market to maintain a steady balance in the
+CUT. The government is able to borrow short-term on an occasional basis when it forecasts an
+emerging cash flow constraint, but it does so by accepting liability for some of the treasury bills
+issued by the Bank of Mozambique for monetary policy purposes.
+
+**Making the Best of the Treasury Single Account**
+
+
+**34.** **Progress in the roll out of e-SISTAFE continues to expand the use of the CUT.** The
+number of UGBs has grown in line with the devolution of responsibility of some units in the
+provinces for service delivery, and currently stands at 1,654. Of them, however, 1,508 (or
+91 percent) are fully connected to e-SISTAFE.
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Benin
E|quatorial|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**go**|
**Guinea**|
|||||||
+|**Mali**
**Niger**
|
**Gabon**|**Burkin**
**Côte d'Iv**|** Faso**
** oire**||||||
+|**Centr**
**R**
**enegal**|**al Africa**
**public**
|** n**
|
|**Mozamb**|**ique**|**C**|**ngo, Re**
**of**|** ublic**|
+|**Chad**|**Cameroo**
|**n**|||||||
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Figure 5. Main Features Deposits at the central bank are more volatile than|of the Mozambique CUT The share of government deposits at the central|
+|---|---|
+|_Deposits at the central bank are more volatile than_
_other deposits. Deposits at commercial banks have_
_been increasing during 2017._
|_The share of government deposits at the central_
_bank, as opposed to at commercial banks, has been_
_on a downward trend._
|
+|**Benin**
**Burkina Faso**
**Cameroon**
**Central African**
**Republic**
**Chad**
**Congo, Republic**
**of**
**Côte d'Ivoire**
**Equatorial**
**Guinea**
**Gabon**
**Guinea Bissau**
**Mali**
**Niger**
**Senegal**
**Togo**
**Mozambique**
**0**
**1**
**2**
**3**
**4**
**5**
**6**
**0**
**0.5**
**1**
**1.5**
**2**
**2.5**
**3**
**3.5**
**4**
**4**
**All Deposits (in Months of expenditure**
**Share of Gov deposits at CB Compared w/ Deposits at Com**
**Banks**
**Comparator countries (2016)**|**Benin**
**Burkina Faso**
**Cameroon**
**Central African**
**Republic**
**Chad**
**Congo, Republic**
**of**
**Côte d'Ivoire**
**Equatorial**
**Guinea**
**Gabon**
**Guinea Bissau**
**Mali**
**Niger**
**Senegal**
**Togo**
**Mozambique**
**0**
**1**
**2**
**3**
**4**
**5**
**6**
**0**
**0.5**
**1**
**1.5**
**2**
**2.5**
**3**
**3.5**
**4**
**4**
**All Deposits (in Months of expenditure**
**Share of Gov deposits at CB Compared w/ Deposits at Com**
**Banks**
**Comparator countries (2016)**|
+
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+**35.** **Even so, significant liquidity lies outside the CUT—especially problematically**
+**outside the Bank of Mozambique, in commercial banks** (see Figure 5) **.** Cash advances
+continue to be made from the CUT into bank accounts outside the CUT, for instance, (i) in the
+case of UGBs that do not have access to e-SISTAFE; (ii) to pay transactions financed by donors
+that are not prepared to use the CUT for project expenditure; (iii) for payments made to suppliers
+in rural areas without bank accounts, for executing the budget in certain sectors; and (iv) and for
+petty cash payments. Advances are not swept back overnight into the CUT. Sectors tend also to
+have bank accounts for self-generated (or “technical”) revenue, although the same degree of
+visibility as to self-generated revenue could be achieved using sub-accounts within the CUT.
+Substantial assistance from donors continues to flow through accounts in the commercial banks,
+and not through the CUT. Prospects for moving donor funds into sub-accounts within the CUT
+should be investigated, but this is likely to be a medium-term endeavor.
+
+26
+
+
+
+**36.** **The Treasury’s efforts to close the accounts of budget entities at commercial banks**
+**need to continue** . Thousands of inactive, infrequently used, or inappropriately opened accounts
+have been closed in recent years. New accounts continue to be identified. Moreover, the opening
+of new accounts outside the CUT continues to be permitted, with authorization by the sector
+supervisor and by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. On a priority basis, revenue and
+expenditure accounts must be opened at the Bank of Mozambique, except for accounts to pay
+wages and those used to receive student fees. In the absence of routine reporting by line
+ministries and by commercial banks of the government accounts that exist at commercial banks,
+it is impossible for the Treasury to monitor the full extent of government liquidity. There is also
+the risk that line ministries may be opening bank accounts without permission from the Treasury.
+The Treasury has drafted a circular, in the form of a _diploma ministerial_, to clarify the regulations
+regarding accounts in commercial banks, and is awaiting approval to distribute it to UGBs; this
+should be pursued as a priority.
+
+
+**37.** **Delays in sweeping revenue into the CUT reduce the efficiency of cash**
+**management.** The delays are of different kinds. Payments of taxes or self-generated revenue
+into a commercial bank may be held by the bank for two days before sweeping it to an account
+in the name of the relevant Financial Management Directorate (DAF). Most DAF accounts are in
+the Bank of Mozambique. The balances of the DAF account are then swept into the CUT. In many
+cases, this does not occur until the end of the month, but the Treasury notes that it monitors DAF
+accounts and may request that larger sums be swept more promptly. Revenue awaiting
+classification, linking the taxpayer's deposit to the relevant tax, may take longer, however, and
+the cumulative balances may be substantial; nonetheless, in principle there need not be any
+delay in transferring such revenue to the CUT, as classifying and recording the revenue can be
+independent of the movement of cash into the CUT. Self-generated revenues may also be held in
+transit accounts, although to the extent that those revenues will be available to the UGBs, they
+have an incentive to expedite the transfer to the CUT because only then does the budget
+authority potentially become available.
+
+**Improving Cash Planning**
+
+
+**38.** **The cash budget is a useful tool to provide a monitoring benchmark.** It can also
+inform the annual borrowing plan prepared by the Debt Management Department of the
+Treasury, particularly the timing of the local issuance of domestic bonds through the stock
+exchange.
+
+
+**39.** **In Mozambique, the monthly cash plans are, in practice, an expenditure control**
+**tool, not a cash management tool.** The monthly cash plans are not unconstrained forecasts.
+The revenue component is an exception; it is based on an updated projection from the revenue
+administration. The expenditure data, however, are requests from UGBs for release of authority;
+they are not forecasts. The Treasury then decides how much to release depending on the
+expected adequacy of the cash reserves. This arrangement works well to manage the risk of a
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+cash shortfall at any time. It allows the Treasury to hold back or delay expenditure—in other
+words, to ration cash—if required. But this approach reduces the incentive for UGBs to plan their
+financial operations, and it risks creating unnecessary arrears or supply disruption.
+
+
+**40.** **The Treasury should adopt a more pro-active approach to managing the**
+**government’s aggregate liquidity to reduce the need to hold back or delay expenditure.**
+Restricting budget execution, i.e., cash rationing, should be the last course of action, not the first,
+once other measures to accommodate short-term mismatches in cash inflows and outflows have
+been exhausted. This would involve adjusting dynamically the volume of short-term financing
+that the government obtains through treasury bill issuance. Issuance would be augmented
+(beyond what was originally programmed) during periods when the cash balance would
+otherwise fall into deficit and, conversely, would be reduced during periods when the cash
+balance would otherwise be unduly excessive.
+
+
+**41.** **Under this more pro-active approach, cash flow forecasts become essential.** They
+are necessary for devising strategies to smooth the cash flow profile. Given that it may not be
+possible in practice to manage fluctuations in the cash balance entirely through dynamic
+issuance of treasury bills, cash flow forecasting can contribute to making cash rationing less
+disruptive. By planning ahead, fiscal policy authorities will be able to make more informed
+decisions as to which spending—sector versus sector, and within each sector—to constrain and
+which to allow to proceed and thereby better protect overall fiscal priorities.
+
+
+**42.** **To be useful for informing decision-making, the cash flow forecasts prepared by**
+**the Treasury will need to have several characteristics, and their quality can be**
+**strengthened over time.** The horizon is sufficiently long: at a minimum three months, ideally 12
+months (or longer). The time step within the forecasts is short: daily (if necessary, weekly) out
+three months, and weekly beyond three months. The forecasts are updated frequently: preferably
+every week, and at least every month, and rolled forward even across fiscal years. Variances
+between forecasts and actual outturns are investigated to determine whether they are only
+temporary and will correct themselves in the periods ahead. If the variances arise from more
+permanent shocks, a more substantial policy response is required, e.g., reducing expenditure,
+raising revenue, or tolerating a higher fiscal deficit for the year. Box 5 discusses the process of
+building cash flow forecasts.
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+**Box 5. Building Cash Flow Forecasts**
+
+The forecast period should extend ideally for at least 12 months, rolling into the next fiscal year when
+necessary. This relates to the time period within which offsetting action may usefully be taken—for
+example, by adjustment to the issuance volume of treasury bills. The design of an effective forecasting and
+monitoring capability is likely to be built around the following elements:
+
+
+
+(i) _A database of actual daily cash flows, as a means of identifying patterns for monitoring._ Actual cash
+
+
+
+flows should be closely tracked against profiles submitted by budget entities, and major divergences
+should be investigated as part of improving the forecasting processes.
+(ii) _Information flow from revenue and spending entities._ The preparation of short-term cash flow forecasts
+
+cannot be done effectively only at the center—that is, ignoring the knowledge of those budget entities
+that are closer to the interface between government and other sectors. Budget entities are best placed
+to supply information when actual flows are diverging from the budget.
+(iii) _A network of contacts, both voice and electronic, with the main revenue and spending entities, which_
+
+
+
+_would be used both to develop forecasts and monitor current flows._ The central cash manager should
+know precisely the timing of some major cash flows, such as debt service, for which data should be
+available directly. Some payments are likely to have a regular monthly pattern (such as payment of
+salaries or some transfers to individuals or to lower levels of government), and for others there may be
+an historical pattern. For example, major payments of some taxes may tend to repeat from year to year.
+
+
+
+Cash flow forecasts are built up from a mixture of knowledge about specific flows, historical experience of
+patterns, and judgments about the impact of any recent changes in policy or application of administrative
+rules. There is often a difference between the compilation of “above the line” (i.e., revenue and expenditure)
+forecasts, which may fall to those monitoring budget execution or receipts, and those “below the line”
+(debt and other financial transactions), where the cash and debt managers take responsibility. In general, it
+has been found that econometric techniques are not useful for daily or monthly projections—their main
+role is to help forecast annual or quarterly aggregates, which are used to act as a constraint or quota.
+Instead, the patterns in cash flows can be examined by plotting individual time series on a year-over-year
+basis to reveal annual seasonality. Many government expenditure and receipt data, and movements of cash
+balances, may exhibit strong and predictable seasonal variations. Equally important actions are the
+following:
+
+
+
+(i) Identifying the key people at the working level in the selected revenue and spending entities, who will
+
+
+
+be able to supply the relevant information.
+(ii) Setting up formal requirements to ensure that profiles are supplied and updated.
+(iii) Backing the latter by informal arrangements, whereby the central cash manager is given early notice of
+
+
+
+any major changes, which may need to be communicated not only in advance of the day being studied
+but also on the day itself, to ensure that any offsetting action can be taken, whether by the cash
+manager or the central bank.
+
+
+
+In an ideal world, efficient cash management systems enable daily forecasts of cash flows across the CUT,
+together with the monitoring of actual changes in close to real time. There is no simple technical short-cut
+that facilitates that. The focus should be on those sums that are large in size, most variable, and most
+unpredictable.
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+|Recommendation 3. Pro-actively Manage the Cash Balance
Background
Despite government efforts to pool cash in the CUT, substantial liquidity continues to lie outside the
CUT. Moreover, the Treasury does not manage the government’s aggregate liquidity pro-actively to
minimize the need to ration cash through holding back or delaying expenditure. The cash plans that are
currently prepared are used to control budget execution, not to manage the cash balance to avoid the
need for cash rationing.
Key measures
• Reduce the amount of government cash that sits in commercial banks and further improve the
functioning of the CUT.
• Introduce cash flow forecasting to facilitate pro-active management of the aggregate cash
balance through dynamic issuance of treasury bills, reducing the extent of recourse to cash
rationing.
Institutional arrangements
The recommended actions involve no change to existing institutional arrangements in UGBs. The
Treasury will need to strengthen its capacity to prepare high-frequency cash flow forecasts. A more
dynamic approach to treasury bill issuance would need to be introduced in close coordination with the
Bank of Mozambique.
Risks and mitigation measures
UGBs may resist shifting cash from commercial bank accounts to the CUT, but e-SISTAFE provides
functionality to set up sub-accounts within the CUT so that there is no loss of visibility as to the balances
for which they are responsible. Donors may resist allowing financing that they provide to be held within
the CUT, and progress will depend on the government demonstrating credibility to ensure that those
funds are not diverted from their intended purposes. There may, in practice, be limited scope to adopt a
more dynamic approach to treasury bill issuance.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|
Action 1
|
Finalize and circulate the_diploma ministerial_ to secure
information from commercial banks on government bank
accounts and to regulate more closely the opening and
operation of any new accounts
|End-December 2017
|
+|Action 2
|
Introduce automatic end-of-day sweeping of balances in transit
accounts and further minimize the use of advances
|1st quarter 2018
|
+|Action 3
|Continue to close accounts in commercial banks and transfer
the balances to the CUT
|Ongoing
|
+|Action 4
|Begin forecasting the government’s aggregate cash flows and
cash balance over six to 12-month horizon and use the
information to manage treasury bill issuance volumes in a
dynamic manner
|Starting in 1st quarter
2018|
+
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+##### **Enhancing the Credibility of the Budget**
+
+**43.** **A credible budget is one that is executed as planned, and is an important**
+**requirement for effective public financial management.** Sound and predictable budget
+allocations to spending units are key to fiscal discipline and make it easier to control government
+expenditures at the point of budget preparation rather than later during budget execution. Arrears are
+usually a symptom of weaknesses in the public finance management practices, exacerbated by a poorly
+formulated budget. Unrealistic budget planning underpinned by biased macroeconomic projections can
+pose challenges for budget execution. Conversely, the challenges in budget execution can also present
+challenges for budget preparations in subsequent years. For example, overspends leading to arrears,
+re-allocations undermining agreements during budget negotiations, and delayed investments that
+require financing to meet contract obligations.
+
+
+**Mozambique Budget Facing Headwinds**
+
+
+**44.** **Since 2014, total revenue has been falling as a percent of GDP and each year**
+**government has cut total expenditure to contain the budget deficit.** Comparing data from
+the Budget Law to CGE, Figure 6 shows total expenditure and revenue (including grants) in the
+Budget compared to actuals in the CGE. The decline in total revenue was primarily driven by
+economic conditions and the disclosure of borrowing by public companies which led to a freeze
+in donor budget support. The changes in expenditure were achieved through in-year
+reallocations and managed through tight controls on the processing of cash payments.
+
+**Figure 6. Total Expenditure and Total Revenue**
+
+(percent of GDP)
+
+
+Source: IMF Mission using data from Budget Law and the CGE.
+
+
+Note: F – forecast in Budget Law, O – outturn/actual in the CGE
+
+
+**45.** **In Mozambique, the annual budget is mainly prepared and executed according to**
+**an economic classification of expenditures** . It is presented and controlled in a detailed manner
+with many budget lines. The budget is compiled by aggregating submissions of budget users
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+formulated in economic classifications, and the same classifications are used for executing the
+budget. [10]
+
+**Enhancing the Accuracy of Budget Forecasts**
+
+
+**46.** **The principal weakness of the annual budget is that it is not always adequately**
+**costed and not used as the primary tool for decisions regarding the allocation of resources** .
+This is in part due to technical issues, but reflects that decisions on expenditure prioritization are
+often pushed out to the budget year and resolved only through in-year budget reallocations.
+
+
+**47.** **Further, decisions on reductions in expenditures to meet estimated cash payment**
+**availability, do not seek to identify lower priority spending or the changes to expected**
+**levels of activity.** As such, spending units have little incentive to change planned activities and
+they continue to spend according to their budget allocations, as evidenced by the accumulation
+of arrears despite total expenditure data showing cuts within the budget year (see Figure 6).
+
+
+**48.** **The result is there is little incentive at the budget preparation stage to ensure**
+**credibility of budget forecasts.** The credibility of the budget covers two components: the
+accuracy of macro-fiscal forecasts and reliability of allocations to spending units.
+
+
+**49.** **Currently, budget documentation provides insufficient detail on the assumptions**
+**underlying macro-fiscal forecasts and there is no information provided on the reasons for**
+**deviations of actual to forecast.** The realism of the assumptions underlying the macroeconomic
+and fiscal forecasts is critical for the realism of the budget. The MEF should seek to present
+accurately the assumptions in the budget documentation to ensure they are available for scrutiny
+by independent experts. Transparent reconciliation of the reasons behind changes to
+expenditure and revenue forecasts is also critical to demonstrating the government’s compliance
+with the expenditure ceilings approved by Parliament.
+
+
+**50.** **While MEF is working to improve macroeconomic analysis, a weak process to**
+**determine the fiscal aggregates for the budget, coupled with the absence of debt**
+**sustainability analysis, provides insufficient discipline to limit the size of the budget deficit**
+**at the beginning of the budget process.** Consequently, the budget preparation procedure is
+principally driven by the requests from the ministries for increased spending (i.e., the bottom-up
+approach). The MEF is taking steps to improve its macro-fiscal forecasting capacities and fiscal
+risk analysis (see Box 6).
+
+
+10 The economic classifications currently in use do not classify capital and recurrent spending per GFSM 2014.
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+**Box 6. Macro-Fiscal Forecasting and the Preparation of the MTFF**
+
+
+Macro-fiscal projections are prepared within the framework of the MTFF, the Cenário Fiscal de Médio
+Prazo (CFMP). The CFMP guides the planning and budgeting process and covers three-year forward
+estimates, as well as budgetary outturns for the two preceding years. Its objectives are drawn from the
+5-year Plano Quinquenal do Governo (PQG) and are informed by the Plano Economico e Social (PES)
+that translate medium term priorities into annual budgets. The CFMP includes projections of revenue,
+expenditure, and financing by economic classification, and by program, at the central, provincial, and
+district levels, as well as transfers to the municipal level.
+
+
+The process starts early 14 months in advance with the estimation of the resource envelope and the
+fiscal projections, the Mapa Fiscal. Revenue projections are prepared by the Autoridade Tributaria who is
+also in charge of collections. Based on macro forecasts prepared by the DEEF team, the Budget team
+(DNPO) determine expenditure allocations informed by fiscal policy objectives and finalize the Mapa
+Fiscal. These fiscal projections then inform the DEEF for the calculation of the indicative expenditure
+ceilings. By mid-December these ceilings are distributed to sectors and provinces to guide the
+preparation of their budget proposals. The CFMP process finalizes in May when estimates are approved
+by Cabinet. The Budget preparation process continues until September when the draft budget is
+finalized for discussion at Parliament.
+
+
+The process of preparing the CFMP is not anchored on medium-term debt sustainability analysis that
+informs the estimation of the resource envelope. With a weaker fiscal position, this input has become
+crucial and fiscal sustainability should be considered earlier in the budget preparation process.
+Moreover, the link between policy priorities and expenditure allocations needs to strengthen. Significant
+reallocation of expenditures during the budget discussions that follow the CFMP, between May and
+September, are undermining the policy objectives set forth at the initial budget preparation stage.
+
+
+Mozambique aims to introduce fiscal risk analysis in the budget preparation process. In 2016, the
+_Gabinete de Gestão de Risco_ (GGR) was established to strengthen the identification, monitoring and
+management of fiscal risks. An IMF resident advisor is currently supporting the unit in the preparation of
+the 2019 Fiscal Risk Statement to better inform macro-fiscal forecasts. This technical assistance will build
+capacity for macro-fiscal forecasting across the MEF and is a step towards strengthening the CFMP and
+the credibility of the budget.
+
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+
+**51.** **Uncertainty about donor funding further weakens the budget preparation process** .
+With the withdraw by donors of direct budget support, most donor funding is for direct project
+finance. In cases where the anticipated amount of project funding does not materialize or arrives
+late the government is forced to make sizeable adjustments to the state budget which was
+particularly a concern in 2016. This uncertainty is magnified over the medium-term, and
+reinforces the lack of credibility. The government should continue to insist on a medium-term
+support framework with the donors that ensures timely commitments and disbursement.
+
+
+**52.** **In previous years, cautious revenue assumptions contributed to the lack of**
+**credibility of the budget, however while uncertainties remain concerning donor grants, the**
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+**accuracy of taxation revenue forecasts is improving.** As shown in Figure 7, from 2012 to 2014,
+the estimates of taxation revenue in the Budget Law significantly underestimated the outcome of
+collections as reported in the CGE. However, in the two most recent years the deviation of
+forecasted taxation revenue to actual taxation revenue has improved. For example, in 2013 the
+Budget Law included taxation revenue of 95.5 billion Meticais, but 107.5 billion was collected
+resulting in a 12.6 percent deviation. However, the deviation in 2016 was only 1.7 percent.
+
+
+**Figure 7. Change in Taxation Revenue from Budget Law to Financial Outcome**
+
+(percent change from Budget estimate)
+
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+Note: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, a negative change means Budget was less
+than actual
+
+**Improving Budget Allocations**
+
+
+**53.** **Budget allocations to spending units are not reliable, undermining the role of**
+**Parliamentary approval in the Budget process.** As flagged in the 2010 and 2015 PEFA
+assessments [11], large deviations on Budget in the expenditure composition are a long-standing
+pattern. The main decisions on expenditure prioritization are often resolved only through in-year
+budget reallocations, this means the information presented to Parliament through the Budget
+Law are not credible estimates of the allocation of resources and therefore the Budget does not
+constitute a dependable framework for the planned allocation and efficient use of Mozambique’s
+resources.
+
+
+**54.** **While accuracy of taxation revenue forecasts is improving, the accuracy of total**
+**expenditure forecasts is worsening.** Figure 8 shows that in 2014, total expenditure was
+overestimated by 5.0 percent, this deviation increased to 13 percent in 2016. This overestimation
+was the result of under-execution of capital expenditure primarily driven by cancelled or delayed
+
+
+11 Refer to the report “Mozambique PEFA assessment of public financial management, 2015” by AECOM
+International Development Europe and CESO Consultants, funded by the EU. In 2007 -09 the variation was over
+15 percent which resulted in a "D" rating. The three-year period 2012-14 presented an even greater deterioration.
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+payments from donors, but also from significant cuts to expenditure within the budget year to
+reduce the size of the deficit.
+
+
+**55.** **The reductions and reallocations of expenditure within the budget year are made**
+**for cash rationing purposes, with little discussion of commensurate changes to policy**
+**priorities or the impact on the provision of services.** Allocations to spending units through
+Budget Law should provide a basis for planning activities throughout the budget year and an
+expectation of the level of service delivery. Reducing spending allocations in the absence of
+decisions regarding the re-prioritization of government services, provides no guidance to
+spending units on how spending cuts are to be achieved.
+
+
+**56.** **Expenditure reduction plans are not effective when they are made to spending**
+**allocations without accompanying changes in the underlying expenditure policies.** Just
+changing the estimates makes the budget provision less than objective; the likely consequence is
+overspending against appropriation and/or the emergence of payment arrears
+
+
+**57.** **The composition of expenditure changed significantly, which would further**
+**compound the challenges for spending units to deliver on planned activities.** As shown in
+Figure 8, the composition of expenditure by economic classification changed by 8.9 percent in
+2014, whereas it changed by 27.3 percent in 2016 - when funds for good & services were cut to
+fund the wage bill and interest payments with outturns higher than expected. The impact on
+budget credibility here is through the reallocation of current expenditures. This is a
+measurement of how the allocation of spending by economic classification changed from the
+Parliament-approved Budget Law to the outcome as stated in the end of year financial statement
+(CGE). [12] The reallocation between functional classification was not as large, at 8.1 percent change
+in composition in 2016.
+
+**Figure 8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure**
+
+(percent change from Budget estimate)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+||||||
+||||||
+||||||
+||||||
+||5.0%||||
+||||||
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Note: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual
+
+
+12 These calculations are consistent with Performance Indicator 2(i) of the Public Expenditure and Financial
+Accountability Assessment (PEFA) Framework.
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+**58.** **Unrealistic estimates of expenditure composition may also be contributing to the**
+**accumulation of arrears.** While a significant portion of the change in expenditure is a result of
+under-execution of capital expenditure, the changes in composition of current expenditure reveal
+that there are weaknesses in the execution process as a result of unrealistic budget estimates.
+Figure 9 shows the changes in expenditure by economic and functional classification for the
+estimates contained in the Budget Law compared to the actuals contained in the CGE.
+
+
+**59.** **Changes in the composition of economic classification are driven by delayed or**
+**cancelled funding by donors for investment projects.** That said, in 2016 the Budget Law
+underestimated expenditure on interest payments and on wages. Wages are an expense that
+should be easy to estimate (number of employees at each wage scale times by the wage rate,
+including expected growth), the significant change from Budget reflects the challenges
+associated with controlling the size of the civil service wage bill. [13]
+
+
+**60.** **Changes in the composition of functional classification reflect the uncertainty of**
+**funding by donors for investment projects.** Each year the Budget Law overestimates the
+expenditure in four key functions: economic matters, environmental protection, housing and
+development and health. Each being large areas for execution of capital expenditure.
+
+
+**Figure 9. Change in Composition of Expenditure by classification**
+
+(percent change from Budget Law to CGE)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Note: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, a negative change means Budget was less
+than actual
+
+
+13 IMF Technical Assistance Report “Republic of Mozambique: Public Finance Management” December 2016,
+examined this issue in further detail and made recommendations on managing the civil service wage bill.
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+**61.** **While there have been significant reallocations of expenditure within the budget**
+**year, there have also been efforts to reduce the size of the deficit through budget**
+**execution control.** Figure 10 shows the change in the budget balance from the estimates
+contained in the Budget Law, to the actuals contained in the CGE. While first the efforts of the
+MEF to reduce the size of the deficit must be acknowledge, the large deviations from Budget to
+CGE raise concerns of the credibility of budget estimates being presented to Parliament for
+legislative approval.
+
+
+**Figure 10. Change in Budget Balance**
+(percent change from Budget Law to CGE)
+
+**Overall Balance, Budget vs Outturns 2008-16**
+
+
+Source: IMF mission based on data contained in the Budget Law and the CGE.
+
+Note: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, in the figure above this means the Budget
+forecasted a larger deficit than the actual outcome.
+
+
+**62.** **Budget credibility can be enhanced by improving the realism of expenditure**
+**aggregates at the MTFF stage of budget preparation.** The development of fiscal aggregates
+through the MTFF will be improved by the focus on improving macro-fiscal forecasting
+capacities. For the development of the total expenditure ceiling, this can be further improved
+through a process of reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches (see Box 7).
+
+
+37
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Box 7. Budget Preparation Based on Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches**
+
+The MTFF should follow the following presentation: i) macroeconomic and fiscal projections; ii) updates
+to baseline expenditure; iii) the targeted amount of fiscal space, i.e. the resources available for new
+policy and how these should be allocated across sectors; iv) other issues for budget preparation.
+
+**Updating baseline estimates** in an objective manner will help to focus budget preparation discussions
+on prioritization of spending. Baseline estimates are the costs for future budget years based on no policy
+changes (no savings, no new policies) and are developed and agreed by staff between MEF and
+ministries. As updating baselines is technical in nature, by applying macro-economic indicators (e.g.,
+unemployment, inflation), other parameters (e.g., beneficiaries for social assistance programs),
+commitments for contracts for goods and services and capital projects, the parameters should be made
+explicit and agreed. At this stage, MEF should also identify in the baselines the plan for clearing the stock
+of arrears. While there might be some disagreement, this discussion should be built on facts and not
+mixed with budget negotiations on new spending.
+
+**The targeted amount of fiscal space** should be determined through a reconciliation of the updated
+baseline estimates and the targeted expenditure ceiling that would meet macro-fiscal objectives. Fiscal
+space can be positive or negative, the MTFF should then propose how the fiscal space should be
+allocated across sectors, whether through availability of finance for new spending proposals (if the fiscal
+space is positive); or through spending cuts that target low-priority and inefficient spending (if the fiscal
+space is negative).
+
+Source: Mission.
+
+
+**Reporting on Budget Credibility**
+
+
+**63.** **Current fiscal reporting compounds the challenges for budget credibility as it does**
+**not capture the accumulation of arrears** . As identified in previous sections, the process of
+budget execution does not permit the monitoring or prevention of arrears. As fiscal reporting is
+the output of execution processes, the information provided in the CGE provides incomplete
+information on the state of the government’s finances and therefore, does not provide accurate
+comparison to budget estimates.
+
+
+**64.** **The availability of fiscal information has improved, but more needs to be done to**
+**strengthen budget documentation and fiscal reporting.** As the SISTAFE remains focused on
+ensuring tight cash control, and there is no requirement to record all commitments and therefore
+fiscal information is not capturing the accumulation of arrears. This impacts on the credibility of
+budget year forecasts, but also on the ability of future budgets to be credible if arrears and
+multi-year commitments are not informing spending allocation decisions through the budget
+preparation process.
+
+
+38
+
+
+
+|Recommendation 4. Enhance Budget Credibility
Background:
Weaknesses in the preparation of the annual budget reflects that decisions on expenditure prioritization
are often pushed out to the budget year and resolved only through in-year budget reallocations. This
has meant significant reductions and reallocations of expenditure within the year without accompanying
changes in the underlying expenditure policies.
Key measures:
• Improve budget credibility by continuing to improve the realism of revenue estimates (including
donor funding), and of expenditure estimates both at the aggregate level (i.e. total recurrent
and capital expenditure) and at the composition level (i.e. allocations by classification).
• Publish a reconciliation of changes (and their reasons) from the Budget Law to CGE, and analyze
the largest deviations in allocations (both economic and functional classification).
• Identify the implications of deviation for the budget to inform the preparation of baseline
estimates in the MTFF.
Institutional arrangements:
Enhancing budget credibility requires stronger linkages between the MEF directorates with responsibility
for macro-fiscal forecasting, the Directorate for Budget Planning and the Directorate of Treasury. No
additional institutional arrangements are required, just strengthening of existing processes:
• Fiscal reporting should identify and analyze deviations from Budget to outturn.
• The preparation of expenditure aggregates at the MTFF stage should be determined through a
reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches (see Box 7)
Risks and mitigation measures:
This recommendation is to improve existing processes, in order to not create additional systems or
processes, the efforts to improve budget credibility must be integrated into the budget cycle.
Schedule for implementation:|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|
Action 1
|
Analyze and publish the deviations from Budget Law to CGE for
macroeconomic indicators, fiscal aggregates, and composition of
expenditure. Further identify the major causes for deviations and their
expected impacts for future budgets.
|For inclusion in
the 2017 CGE and
in the 2019 MTFF
|
+|Action 2
|
Determine expenditure aggregates, through updating the baseline
estimates and determining the allocation of fiscal space. Include
identification of the stock of, and plan to clear arrears.
|For preparation of
the 2019 MTFF
|
+|Action 3
|Continue to insist on a medium-term support framework with donors
to ensure timely commitments and disbursements of project finance.|Ongoing|
+
+
+
+39
+
+
+
+##### **PROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS**
+
+**65.** **Scattered spending units operate expenses across the country.** There are more than
+1,600 UGBs across the country, including 200 UGBs at the central government level, 650 at the
+provincial level, and 770 at the district level. At the central level, the bulk of budget execution is
+concentrated in a few spending units that collectively execute 90 percent of the central agencies’
+budgets. This extreme distribution is less pronounced at the provincial level (see Table 4).
+
+
+**66.** **Such a large network composed with many small-sized units needs to be**
+**streamlined for the sake of efficiency and capacity building.** Small provincial UGBs frequently
+over- or under-execute their budget. The sheer number of UGBs hampers sound allocation of
+funds, consolidation of fiscal reports, and budget monitoring. Staff capacity needs strengthening
+to reach standards of excellence and effectiveness and accountability in budget management.
+
+
+**Table 4. Main Indicators for UGBs Across the Country**
+
+
+
+**Province** **2016**
+**Budget**
+
+
+
+_(as a percent of total)_ _(as a deviation between outturn and budget)_
+
+
+
+**2016**
+**Outturn**
+
+
+
+**# of UGBs** **Overall Budget Credibility**
+
+
+
+**Central** 82.84% 85.17% 13.17% 3%
+**Niassa** 3.77% 4.81% 8.56% 27%
+**Nampula** 2.40% 1.62% 12.03% 32%
+**Zambezia** 2.11% 1.42% 9.99% 33%
+**Gaza** 1.55% 1.13% 8.32% 27%
+**Tete** 1.34% 0.91% 8.26% 32%
+**Sofala** 1.27% 1.00% 8.02% 21%
+**Cabo Delgado** 1.19% 0.77% 7.66% 35%
+**Inhambane** 1.08% 0.80% 7.96% 26%
+**Maputo Provincia** 1.01% 1.03% 6.40% 2%
+**Manica** 0.87% 0.73% 7.24% 16%
+**Maputo Cidade** 0.57% 0.61% 2.39% 7%
+
+Source: Mission
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+40
+
+
+
+**Figure 11. UGBs Distribution Across the Country**
+
+
+Source: SISTAFE database, staff calculations.
+
+**67.** **Streamlining the UGB network can bring manifold outcomes.** There are at least four
+main outcomes to expect from a streamlined network:
+
+- **More accountable and proficient staff in UGBs:** Capacity development and accountability
+frameworks are easier to implement in units with a critical mass of staff (e.g., 30 or more).
+
+- **More timely and accurate fiscal reports:** Consolidating more than 1,600 quarterly reports,
+some of which are sent manually, is a cumbersome and time-consuming process, hence the
+need to group and connect as many UGBs as possible.
+
+- **More accurate budget allotments:** Appropriating budget to so many units and
+subsequently reallocating them within the year to meet fiscal targets is a difficult exercise.
+
+- **Improved financial programming:** Fewer UGBs operating significant budgets will ease a
+bottom-up approach for the Treasury to anticipate financing needs in cash plans.
+
+**68.** **The approach should be pragmatic and does not involve drastic collapse of UGBs.**
+The mission recommends grouping small UGBs into larger-sized platforms for budget execution.
+This approach should be implemented case by case: shutting down inexistent UGBs without
+financial activities; grouping dependent UGBs under the authority of the same department,
+province, or district; assigning small UGBs to technical platforms that will implement technical
+steps of the expenditure chain while leaving the responsibility for signing contracts and receiving
+goods to the UGBs’ managers; and redeploying Treasury officials to best fit UGBs’ needs locally
+and centrally.
+
+
+41
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommendation 5. Streamline Spending Units Network
Background:
The sheer number of UGBs hampers the allocation of funds and budget consolidation. The MEF
reallocates funds during the year, depending on cash availability. Consolidation of UGBs
budgetary and financial transactions is uneasy. UGBs with low financial activity hardly reach best
standards, skills, and economies of scale for budget management
Key measures
Gradually regroup UGBs at center, province and district levels to divide their number by four with
the following indicative targets: 31 at central level (i.e. ministries and constitutional institutions);
240 at provincial level (i.e., governors, assemblies, regional directions, hospitals, and townships),
and 150 at district level (by grouping district UGBs in district secretariats).
Institutional arrangements
These key measures do not affect Mozambique’s decentralization framework. All UGBs to group
are reporting to central government agencies. The recommended approach is:
• Ministries: (i) first group small-budget UGBs and operate expenses on their behalf; (ii)
then constitute central spending centers for larger budget UGBs; and (iii) eventually
operate all central expenditure related to the ministry’s budget.
• Provinces: (i) group small-budget UGBs not related to central government ministries
under governors’ leadership; (ii) merge all UGBs related to regional directions; and (iii)
keep hospitals and large budget units as UGBs.
• Districts: Group all UGBs in district secretariats.
Risks and mitigation measures
One may expect resistance from small UGBs in fear that their budget could suffer haircuts or
administrative delays in expenditure from the merger. The MEF should make clear that funds will
be more easily funneled from the CUT to the UGBs and that larger and more professional UGBs
will be more efficient. Central ministries should make clear that deconcentrated units will not
suffer budget constraints beyond normal business. A communication campaign is needed.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|Phasing in:
|Define targets, timelines and action plan
|by March 2018 at latest
|
+|Action 1
|On a voluntary basis group small budget UGBs
|by June 2018
|
+|Action 2
|Prepare large mergers simultaneous with budget
preparation meetings
|by September 2018
|
+|Action 3
|
Start FY 2019 under the new budget management
framework
|by January 2019
|
+|Action 4
|
Complete remaining planned mergers
|by September 2019
|
+|
Action 5
|
Start FY 2020 under the new framework
|
by January 2020
|
+|
Action 6
|
General Inspectorate of Finance reports on experience|
by June 2020|
+
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+##### **Annex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main** **Outcomes)**
+
+The mission organized two half-day seminars for the authorities to discuss best practices in
+budget management and ways to resolve and prevent arrears in Mozambique. The seminar
+brought together senior and technical government officials, from the MEF and other sector
+ministries and entities involved in the budget process, including the external audit body.
+
+**The seminar was organized into two sessions:**
+
+
+ - **Day 1** included five short presentations by IMF team, followed by a rich discussion. The
+topics discussed included: an introduction mapping the problem of arrears; lessons from
+Angola on the management of arrears; budget credibility; expenditure process; and the
+CUT and cash management.
+
+
+ - **Day 2** consisted of two working groups that discussed detailed recommendations for
+strengthening the expenditure chain and cash management in Mozambique. The group
+identified ways to ensure better control over the three main phases of the expenditure
+chain (i.e., commitment, verification, and payment). It also addressed the issue of cash
+and debt planning, as well as banking arrangements, to make the best of the existing
+treasury single account.
+
+**Summary conclusions and recommendations from the working groups**
+
+
+The two groups came up with useful conclusions and recommendations, which were presented
+and discussed in a plenary session.
+
+The conclusions and recommendations resulting from the working session were used in finalizing
+this technical assistance report. They were also discussed with the Minister, the Vice Minister, and
+the Permanent Secretary in the wrap-up meeting of the mission.
+
+
+43
+
+
+
+**Group 1. Expenditure chain**
+
+
+- The main challenge is to change users’ practices, so the three phases of the expenditure
+
+chain can be restored in e-SISTAFE when they are done. This would require extensive
+training at various levels (e.g., spending units, supervisory bodies, and internal control)
+and clear manual of procedures.
+
+- Compliance over the execution process in e-SISTAFE should be enforced with support from
+
+the internal control (IGF).
+
+- The ‘commitment certificate’ issued by e-SISTAFE should start being used to provide
+
+suppliers with future proof of payment. Suppliers should be trained to stop requesting
+payments prior to the delivery of goods and services, and to only deliver them after
+commitments are made in the system.
+
+- Cash management tools should be put in place, so commitment ceilings can be provided in a
+
+quarterly basis. This would be very useful to strengthening the communication between
+spending units and the MEF. While the sectors would have some predictability to expend
+their budget, this would be done within fiscal sustainable limits. Moreover, e-SISTAFE
+would capture data on real budget execution which would then facilitate the decisionmaking process.
+
+- Some improvements should be done to the infrastructure which supports e-SISTAFE to
+
+ensure that spending units can have regular access from their local offices. When access
+to the system is temporary lost, the agents involved in the budget execution process
+must travel to another UGE to record their transactions in e-SISTAFE. For practical
+reasons, this might end up in all three expenditure phases being recorded
+simultaneously.
+
+**Group 2. Cash management**
+
+
+- The CUT could be strengthened by reducing Treasury accounts in commercial banks (e.g.,
+
+those created by spending units or external financed projects), and reinforcing existing
+procedures to ensure that surplus balances are immediately transferred to the CUT (e.g.,
+revenue accounts).
+
+- Cash management function ( _programação financeira)_ should be developed with improved
+
+and regularly updated forecasts of cash flows. This would help to ensure that the budget
+can be executed predictably, without having to ration cash or accumulate arrears.
+
+- The monthly and weekly mechanism used for cash rationing ( _requesição de necessidades_
+_financeiras_ ) should be complemented upstream with annual, quarterly, and monthly cash
+management plans (improving the existing _orçamento de tesoureria_ and _planos de_
+_tesoureria_ ).
+
+
+44
+
+
+
+**Fiscal Affairs Department**
+
+International Monetary Fund
+700 19th Street NW
+Washington, DC 20431
+USA
+[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e79167a01996b798e05b746db1feb81e2d83e372
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "aea9b086418462ac", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-001", "height": 769, "page": 2, "phash_256": "d0006fc69e796ffca10b654690080ff7f81e668735cfaef918846b9378869671", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "f78c346820a5148b13987b497108362045636fa8a86e885f40d8512333134598", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2da2d0f9b430328b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-002", "height": 44, "page": 2, "phash_256": "9c27c20e65183ca53ad03b4ad3e5a1db88bd0ed6558b8ee50eeb0e74456ea3b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "9e3da8f2063b7359c1f031c78b534bd4a81bd87bf1346afbcff8f2024f59260f", "width": 63}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f8dcb4accccecbcf", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-003", "height": 467, "page": 2, "phash_256": "83a09c1d29e963fe7e731ad41c896d527aa6216b581d2f8e0e165b0178bc45ff", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "149229506ee4a8af8d09518b0adf2cc0ca899ef181b0df83e913c1a16a4861b9", "width": 522}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9a72ec92a2929c78", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-004", "height": 123, "page": 2, "phash_256": "91008daf3bafe9016a57f19a475e16be6c4a86556c69c0f66de178c24e87f81a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "2d2f0eb3519506f5cdb4ee1422ff348437fe3185dd2051d236138b45a7c060e1", "width": 131}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f2e0c368d8feecfc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-005", "height": 534, "page": 2, "phash_256": "9792cb284492b5637826e49a695dd1b359e98a54336bb65a324d8dca0df79726", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "43f9c812fdeb90471a144280c82f583db6d3bce953b8a4285ae6c7a6d38d75b3", "width": 314}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d2dfdfdf44888800", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-006", "height": 177, "page": 2, "phash_256": "81c381c3a1c3655b2d8b855b9d197db9913b8dab85ab51332fae8152a55a7d5a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "4212e37ed7be603ba9e52dce767ff8610f437fc1048abbdfd28c0ddaf6083213", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "309084249cb4d2da", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-007", "height": 1320, "page": 2, "phash_256": "81837e6c6fc390bf7e782f93783ca30b4fa0b44ed1889e601f5e7bf0a902e21c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "06341ba43c220da28515e0a0d6772f6f17f1252c0e31d677c0f283ee0c4f1b8f", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0003-001", "height": 203, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0005-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8060909090904000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0005-001", "height": 49, "page": 5, "phash_256": "f00007ff0fff7c00f01c707cf0200fff8fff7c00f800707ef0380fc78fcf7030", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "a3e2e154665e535014165843d7adc019051bd44d0ad87256c5d7bf1de5ef8a7b", "width": 763}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0013-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f0333b3734733703", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0013-001", "height": 94, "page": 13, "phash_256": "bfd295a081ed96ffd487a35bcb497406cc372b58dc8c1667b3693894cc423625", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "c31afefc68f9ca11d3d1c165a89d1ddbfd817e5578debd3a4b497ecbf4b7de45", "width": 83}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f0333b37347b3703", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-001", "height": 86, "page": 15, "phash_256": "bfd295a081ed96ffd487a35bcb497406cc372b58dc8c1667b3693094cc423725", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "b923a42c8a9acea9d88ab16e1380607731683204eacd6eb31e96c9e7022e46c1", "width": 77}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "30303c2b2b2b2b2b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-002", "height": 170, "page": 15, "phash_256": "be7f9cbe959a6b7d6340c59ace6eb581c1ac6a41958aaac63a0581a72a15d5e2", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "c489476be754c069499b7c7cbef36ffeeaf8cdb6b3f23152e08fe990481b9a26", "width": 598}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f1333b3734733703", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0017-001", "height": 89, "page": 17, "phash_256": "bfd2952481ed96f7d487a35fcb597406c8372b58dc8c1667b3693094cc423725", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "1943a4790025925a5eb957e6959e3ff8db7bcd43059e3111dd0f37558b517ecb", "width": 80}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "51a88a6971152322", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-001", "height": 49, "page": 19, "phash_256": "8a3e5051e4be2aeb8eae3ee631a49914ca7b64fb6afb1bae9d2424a3850493cc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "57c6b83290778aa58b1f6f677dbb66ba9276ed259349a7d330edcfdf45b6e8d8", "width": 190}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "23232b880c88890c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-002", "height": 109, "page": 19, "phash_256": "ff232d032dc879c8b673523294dcb4bd492dadcf6b2dcd2794b6488cb4b23031", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "0391faacb2e4dda24758ab6ecb4124174b96e29202de3f5d4fb2a5a17c890574", "width": 220}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2a2ccecfcfcfefe7", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-003", "height": 104, "page": 19, "phash_256": "a71bd4a55af7a97a4da0070c229b50bd8f746dc8fbe43f627485807f6052e60b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "697636260885b130f2cf9964129ce8ba54342e9b5568ec94fdd40e37e8919785", "width": 432}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "363e031373737b47", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0023-001", "height": 559, "page": 23, "phash_256": "adaf3c1c92581e994ca1a17be13aceb69374d366ed2739629a41d8cec1c6c2c6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "fed9f552e3dbee65d71b781b493e82d46dadeab419359f8c8d845918c5ac765d", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0027-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "73510f2b2b555555", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0027-001", "height": 325, "page": 27, "phash_256": "eb859560c882956e6e7a3b8fb45ce6119725c2b1b7506b87e47a758bca9442f8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "4972e6f30a6e6320d5058295f33daffe470bb0d10460395634816ef71055b0ce", "width": 529}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0e8f365d2d2f2666", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-001", "height": 208, "page": 28, "phash_256": "b6d2c00dc12d76d25be83da73cd28c369a50db2cc12d2758d268372daf5ccc7a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "024c6ed331933c8b1bd0b37889e3a46f8c1395e0812682b1423332be6dbe33fd", "width": 350}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "170eccc1eb311d1e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-002", "height": 208, "page": 28, "phash_256": "a0ffa1bcfc007f00897f1a2f5e42835fcb1b728887ce14e789f5cbb096a37482", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "25b76cd9193642b8bed77a6257fed5ae34f41e896912ed7a9e021a9a5f729774", "width": 343}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0033-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "948a833571517333", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0033-001", "height": 221, "page": 33, "phash_256": "ebaae125855516fa1eda729a6ad2e15085641f6f92ad688160d88d5095de3fe7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "4477efa4990821407973bfc7fcb3d95475f70d0a147ad2f6bf3625301a54ebd5", "width": 337}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0036-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "81816f5356169769", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0036-001", "height": 191, "page": 36, "phash_256": "bd99c26cc26690938f6da56d3f98a561799b4228d2c65a9ac9e17e92a7542de1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "8bf1b766625b2eb02be177a2339f8e976f7ce271fa24fd289ff63f92aa81e282", "width": 364}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0037-001.png", "caption": "Figure 8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2babd1c92929a72e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0037-001", "height": 226, "page": 37, "phash_256": "ea5ac9dab5a43e257603c9c81a5a6e4fc1c491f94e3f95ec41ebd658c5889263", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "aa004f2797764c732661783b2a816b548a4e4180071ca0048445791bd108452b", "width": 399}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0038-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "518441d1598ba1b2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0038-001", "height": 298, "page": 38, "phash_256": "cbd84bdab42534b17bda4bde6e203e3114fe61cfa425b4215472c3c6b374b431", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "7a503735b58c0152ae8b28a857195f63df5dc8090ff243f0fc6c83b65ee9d7f8", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "92854544554b5171", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0039-001", "height": 186, "page": 39, "phash_256": "e6e280d6991d392991e346e267186e1468c7b8d77b1dd92995ea3fe281156fe0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "9b31c7441eadd4f2a3e8aa40bad161b71099abd736f22a22e7b41b1353954699", "width": 358}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0042-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2bd5d5d523541454", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0042-001", "height": 190, "page": 42, "phash_256": "ccff8f58fb06db0daf5418a72cc5fe1a10fa14fa26d140a59263b5d1f01cb0e1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "fa125afb7fb7f06ef8b811988b6bc0cfb32113f799a102f05718ab2e576dec7d", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-024/assets/figures/cr-2023-024-fig-p0043-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "86624ae2660e3ece", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-024-fig-p0043-001", "height": 254, "page": 43, "phash_256": "a7f6c96db003bf904afeb8ffb103870068ee28df4bf9e9211941a7d0486d08cf", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "sha256_normalized_png": "fae51c9e4ede5e53e461bc4da101591fe79176587c5a1c32a1d7d1858bb82e01", "width": 703}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-024/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76f0ede91642a52b2198372e5d30bb8377f3192e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-024/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/24**\n### **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n\n**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — REGAINING**\n**CONTROL OVER BUDGET EXECUTION**\n\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\n\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\n\n\ntime it was completed in April 2018.\n\n\n\n_**Disclaimer:**_\n_This report was prepared in 2018 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/24\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — REGAINING\nCONTROL OVER BUDGET EXECUTION\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\ntime it was completed in April 2018.\n\n_Disclaimer:_\n_This report was prepared in 2018 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 748}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-004", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-005", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-006", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0002-007"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 1.0318, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(-139.86001586914062, -81.70001220703125, 781.1400146484375, 461.29998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 724, "number": 551, "size": 16310, "transform": [921.0, 0.0, -0.0, 543.0, -139.86001586914062, -81.70001220703125], "width": 1228, "xres": 72, "yres": 72}, {"bbox": "Rect(-63.360015869140625, 686.3599853515625, 674.6400146484375, 854.3599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 224, "number": 548, "size": 8261, "transform": [738.0, 0.0, -0.0, 168.0, -63.360015869140625, 686.3599853515625], "width": 984, "xres": 72, "yres": 72}, {"bbox": "Rect(246.0, 417.0, 559.0, 697.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 280, "number": 538, "size": 0, "transform": [313.0, 0.0, 0.0, 280.0, 246.0, 417.0], "width": 313, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(26.0, 430.0, 214.0, 750.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 320, "number": 542, "size": 0, "transform": [188.0, 0.0, 0.0, 320.0, 26.0, 430.0], "width": 188, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(490.0, 634.0, 568.0, 707.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 73, "number": 547, "size": 0, "transform": [78.0, 0.0, 0.0, 73.0, 490.0, 634.0], "width": 78, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(532.0, 608.0, 569.0, 634.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 26, "number": 546, "size": 0, "transform": [37.0, 0.0, 0.0, 26.0, 532.0, 608.0], "width": 37, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nREGAINING CONTROL OVER BUDGET\nEXECUTION\n\n\n\n\nBenoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory Horman, Armando Manuel,\nEsther Palacio\n\n Technical Assistance Report | April 2018\n\n\n\n\n\nI N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D", "text_characters": 206}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n#### **Republic of Mozambique** **Regaining Control Over Budget** **Execution**\n\n\nBenoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory Horman, Armando Manuel, and Esther Palacio\n\n\n**Technical Assistance Report**\n\n\n**April 2018**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.24974060058594, 486.11083984375, 365.9997253417969, 607.61083984375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(255,ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1))", "has-mask": true, "height": 209, "number": 5, "size": 38469, "transform": [120.74999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 121.49998474121094, 245.24974060058594, 486.11083984375], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nRepublic of Mozambique Regaining Control Over Budget Execution\n\nBenoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory Horman, Armando Manuel, and Esther Palacio\n\nTechnical Assistance Report\n\nApril 2018", "text_characters": 183}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof the Republic of Mozambique (the \"TA recipient\") in response to\ntheir request for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part)\nor summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the\nDissemination of Technical Assistance Information—\n[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).](http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf)\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof the Republic of Mozambique (the \"TA recipient\") in response to\ntheir request for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part)\nor summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the\nDissemination of Technical Assistance Information—\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.", "text_characters": 962}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0005-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**Abbreviations and Acronyms ___________________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**Preface ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**Executive Summary _____________________________________________________________________________ 7**\n\n\n**Managing Domestic Arrears __________________________________________________________________ 9**\n\nDomestic Arrears, a Burden to Mozambique’s Economy _______________________________________ 9\nClearing the Stock of Arrears __________________________________________________________________ 10\nPreventing Further Accumulation of Arrears __________________________________________________ 17\nRecommendation 1. Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears _____________________________________ 16\n\n\n**Strengthening the Budget Execution Process _____________________________________________ 18**\nLoose Control over Budget Execution _________________________________________________________ 19\nImproving Expenditure Control ________________________________________________________________ 20\nImproving Fiscal Reporting ____________________________________________________________________ 23\nRecommendation 2. Restore the Expenditure Chain _____________________________________________ 22\n\n\n**Optimizing Government Cash _____________________________________________________________ 24**\nA Sound, yet Insufficiently Exploited Framework for Cash Management ______________________ 24\nMaking the Best of the Treasury Single Account ______________________________________________ 25\nImproving Cash Planning______________________________________________________________________ 27\nRecommendation 3. Pro-actively Manage the Cash Balance _____________________________________ 30\n\n\n**Enhancing the Credibility of the Budget __________________________________________________ 31**\nMozambique Budget Facing Headwinds ______________________________________________________ 31\nEnhancing the Accuracy of Budget Forecasts __________________________________________________ 32\nImproving Budget Allocations _________________________________________________________________ 34\n\nReporting on Budget Credibility ______________________________________________________________ 38\nRecommendation 4. Enhance Budget Credibility _________________________________________________ 39\n\n\n**PROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS __________________________________________________ 40**\nRecommendation 5. Streamline Spending Units Network ________________________________________ 42\n\n\n**Annex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main Outcomes) _____________________________________ 43**\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Abbreviations and Acronyms _ 5\n\nPreface _ 6\n\nExecutive Summary _ 7\n\nManaging Domestic Arrears 9\n\nDomestic Arrears, a Burden to Mozambique’s Economy _ 9\nClearing the Stock of Arrears 10\nPreventing Further Accumulation of Arrears 17\nRecommendation 1. Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears _ 16\n\nStrengthening the Budget Execution Process _ 18\nLoose Control over Budget Execution _ 19\nImproving Expenditure Control 20\nImproving Fiscal Reporting 23\nRecommendation 2. Restore the Expenditure Chain _ 22\n\nOptimizing Government Cash _ 24\nA Sound, yet Insufficiently Exploited Framework for Cash Management 24\nMaking the Best of the Treasury Single Account 25\nImproving Cash Planning 27\nRecommendation 3. Pro-actively Manage the Cash Balance _ 30\n\nEnhancing the Credibility of the Budget 31\nMozambique Budget Facing Headwinds 31\nEnhancing the Accuracy of Budget Forecasts 32\nImproving Budget Allocations _ 34\n\nReporting on Budget Credibility 38\nRecommendation 4. Enhance Budget Credibility _ 39\n\nPROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS 40\nRecommendation 5. Streamline Spending Units Network 42\n\nAnnex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main Outcomes) _ 43\n\n3", "text_characters": 957}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**BOXES**\n1. Clearing Outstanding Arrears, Angola Country Case, 2002-2003 ______________________________ 11\n2. Validation of Claims: the Angolan Experience _________________________________________________ 13\n3. Securitizing Arrears? Pros and Con ____________________________________________________________ 14\n4. Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears, the Angolan Experience _________________________ 15\n5. Building Cash Flow Forecasts __________________________________________________________________ 29\n6. Macro-Fiscal Forecasting and the Preparation of the MTFF____________________________________ 33\n7. Budget Preparation Based on Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches ___________ 38\n\n**FIGURES**\n1. Underlying Causes of the Arrear Fiscal Cliff ____________________________________________________ 17\n2. Three Key Phases in the Expenditure Chain ____________________________________________________ 18\n3. Institutional Changes Needed to Restore the Chain of Expenditure ___________________________ 21\n4. Current CUT and Banking Arrangements Architecture _________________________________________ 25\n5. Main Features of the Mozambique CUT _______________________________________________________ 26\n6. Total Expenditure and Total Tevenue __________________________________________________________ 31\n7. Change in Taxation Revenue from Budget Law to Financial Outcome _________________________ 34\n8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure __________________________________ 35\n9. Change in Composition of Expenditure by Classification ______________________________________ 36\n10. Change in Budget Balance ___________________________________________________________________ 37\n11. UGBs Distribution Across the Country ________________________________________________________ 41\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Five Recommendations to Regain Control over Budget Execution _____________________________ 8\n2. Process of Verification of Arrears ______________________________________________________________ 12\n3. Summary of the 2015 Fiscal Statement ________________________________________________________ 20\n4. Main Indicators for UGBs Across the Country _________________________________________________ 40\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BOXES\n1. Clearing Outstanding Arrears, Angola Country Case, 2002-2003 11\n2. Validation of Claims: the Angolan Experience _ 13\n3. Securitizing Arrears? Pros and Con 14\n4. Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears, the Angolan Experience _ 15\n5. Building Cash Flow Forecasts 29\n6. Macro-Fiscal Forecasting and the Preparation of the MTFF 33\n7. Budget Preparation Based on Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches _ 38\n\nFIGURES\n1. Underlying Causes of the Arrear Fiscal Cliff 17\n2. Three Key Phases in the Expenditure Chain 18\n3. Institutional Changes Needed to Restore the Chain of Expenditure _ 21\n4. Current CUT and Banking Arrangements Architecture _ 25\n5. Main Features of the Mozambique CUT _ 26\n6. Total Expenditure and Total Tevenue 31\n7. Change in Taxation Revenue from Budget Law to Financial Outcome _ 34\n8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure 35\n9. Change in Composition of Expenditure by Classification 36\n10. Change in Budget Balance _ 37\n11. UGBs Distribution Across the Country 41\n\nTABLES\n1. Five Recommendations to Regain Control over Budget Execution _ 8\n2. Process of Verification of Arrears 12\n3. Summary of the 2015 Fiscal Statement 20\n4. Main Indicators for UGBs Across the Country _ 40\n\n4", "text_characters": 1028}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Abbreviations and Acronyms**\n\nCEDSIF Finance Information System Development Center\nCFMP _Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo_ (Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF))\nCGE _Conta Geral do Estado_ (year-end budget execution report)\nCUT _Conta Unica do Tesouro_ (Treasury Single Account)\nDEEF Directorate for Economic and Financial Studies\nDNMA National Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation\nDNPO National Directorate for Planning and Budget\nDNT National Treasury Directorate\ne-SISTAFE Integrated Financial Management Information System (software)\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF\nFRS Fiscal Risk Statement\nFTAP Fiscal Transparency Action Plan\nGFSM Government Finance Statistics Manual\nGGR _Gabinete de Gestão de Risco_ (Cabinet for Fiscal Risks Management)\nIGF General Inspectorate of Finance\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nIT Information Technology\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance\nPFM Public Financial Management\nREO _Relatórios de Execução Orçamental_ (quarterly budget execution report)\nSOE State-Owned Enterprise\nSISTAFE Public Sector Financial Management System (framework)\nTA _Tribunal Administrativo_ (Administrative Court)\nUGB Beneficiary Management Units\nUGE Executor Management Units\nVAT Value Added Tax\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Abbreviations and Acronyms\n\nCEDSIF Finance Information System Development Center\nCFMP _Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo_ (Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF))\nCGE _Conta Geral do Estado_ (year-end budget execution report)\nCUT _Conta Unica do Tesouro_ (Treasury Single Account)\nDEEF Directorate for Economic and Financial Studies\nDNMA National Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation\nDNPO National Directorate for Planning and Budget\nDNT National Treasury Directorate\ne-SISTAFE Integrated Financial Management Information System (software)\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF\nFRS Fiscal Risk Statement\nFTAP Fiscal Transparency Action Plan\nGFSM Government Finance Statistics Manual\nGGR _Gabinete de Gestão de Risco_ (Cabinet for Fiscal Risks Management)\nIGF General Inspectorate of Finance\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nIT Information Technology\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance\nPFM Public Financial Management\nREO _Relatórios de Execução Orçamental_ (quarterly budget execution report)\nSOE State-Owned Enterprise\nSISTAFE Public Sector Financial Management System (framework)\nTA _Tribunal Administrativo_ (Administrative Court)\nUGB Beneficiary Management Units\nUGE Executor Management Units\nVAT Value Added Tax\n\n5", "text_characters": 1060}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Preface**\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a\ntechnical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during the period November 15-29, 2017, to improve budget execution and foster\nexpenditure control. The main purpose of this mission was to take stock of workflows and\nprocesses in budget execution to assist the authorities in improving their control over the\nexecution of the budget.\n\nThe mission was led by Mr. Benoit Taiclet and comprised Ms. Laura Doherty (FAD staff),\nMessrs. Gregory Horman and Armando Manuel (FAD experts), and Ms. Esther Palacio (IMF TA\ncoordinator and PFM expert in Mozambique). The mission benefitted from the support of the IMF\noffice in Mozambique.\n\nThe mission would like to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful collaboration\nprovided by the authorities, especially Mr. Domingos Lambo, Permanent Secretary, who guided\nthe work of the mission. The mission would also like to thank all the participants to the various\nmeetings and workshops for their active and constructive participation.\n\n\n**This mission is part of the “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique Project” that is**\n\n**funded by the Government of Denmark and implemented by the IMF.**\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Preface\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a\ntechnical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during the period November 15-29, 2017, to improve budget execution and foster\nexpenditure control. The main purpose of this mission was to take stock of workflows and\nprocesses in budget execution to assist the authorities in improving their control over the\nexecution of the budget.\n\nThe mission was led by Mr. Benoit Taiclet and comprised Ms. Laura Doherty (FAD staff),\nMessrs. Gregory Horman and Armando Manuel (FAD experts), and Ms. Esther Palacio (IMF TA\ncoordinator and PFM expert in Mozambique). The mission benefitted from the support of the IMF\noffice in Mozambique.\n\nThe mission would like to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful collaboration\nprovided by the authorities, especially Mr. Domingos Lambo, Permanent Secretary, who guided\nthe work of the mission. The mission would also like to thank all the participants to the various\nmeetings and workshops for their active and constructive participation.\n\nThis mission is part of the “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique Project” that is\n\nfunded by the Government of Denmark and implemented by the IMF.\n\n6", "text_characters": 1098}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Executive Summary**\n\n**This mission contributed to the government public financial management strategy (PEFP**\n**2016-2019) at a pivotal time for Mozambique’s government** . Unlike previous DANIDA\nmissions tasked with an overall review of the PFM system, this mission focused on expenditure\ncontrol. It came at a critical moment when depleted revenues have shaken government balances,\nresulting in domestic arrears, which burden the public debt, and threaten fiscal sustainability.\n\n**The accumulated stock of arrears may adversely affect the country’s economy and its public**\n**finance.** Potential impacts include: shaking economic operators’ confidence in the government;\npotentially disrupting the public service delivery; and crowding out cash supply to the economy.\nLastly, it may well induce second-round fiscal costs since suppliers to the government are now\ninclined to request payments in advance or withhold payment of taxes until they receive\npayments due to them from the government.\n\n**In this context, urgently assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears is a first and**\n**crucial step to be taken.** Based on other countries’ experience, the government should rapidly\ntake stock of and validate legitimate suppliers’ claims. This will send a positive signal to creditors\nand raise officials’ awareness on the need to comply with budget ceilings and expenditure\nprocesses. Clearing these arrears will come afterward, with creditors’ agreements on clearance\nmodalities (including discounts and possible securitization), and may take several years.\n\n**Just as urgent is the need to identify and eliminate the underlying causes of arrears**\n**accumulation.** In Mozambique, the major weaknesses to be dealt with are the following: the poor\ncredibility of budget allocations; short-sighted cash projections; a lack of control over\nexpenditure, which is operated by a large network of spending units; and, resulting from the\nlatter, poor visibility as to government commitments and obligations through the existing fiscal\nreports. Key reforms must be undertaken to foster fiscal discipline, regain control over the\nexpenditure chain, and stabilize and reduce the stock of arrears. They are presented in descending\norder of emergency:\n\n - **Restore a legally compliant expenditure process.** Currently, the three phases of the\nexpenditure (i.e., commitment, verification and payment) occur simultaneously. There is\nlittle information and control over commitments, expenditure float, and arrears. It is\nrecommended to restore the commitment and verification phases.\n\n - **Streamline the network of spending units (UGBs).** The sheer number of UGBs (over\n1,600) hampers the allocation of funds and budget monitoring. UGBs with low financial\nactivity hardly reach best standards for an effective management of the budget. The\ngovernment should gradually group UGBs and strengthen their capacities.\n\n - **Improve the credibility of budget ceilings.** Although forecasts of macro-aggregates\nhave improved, there is a need to enhance the credibility of the composition of budget.\nThis can be done through a more efficient process and techniques for budget preparation.\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Executive Summary\n\nThis mission contributed to the government public financial management strategy (PEFP\n2016-2019) at a pivotal time for Mozambique’s government . Unlike previous DANIDA\nmissions tasked with an overall review of the PFM system, this mission focused on expenditure\ncontrol. It came at a critical moment when depleted revenues have shaken government balances,\nresulting in domestic arrears, which burden the public debt, and threaten fiscal sustainability.\n\nThe accumulated stock of arrears may adversely affect the country’s economy and its public\nfinance. Potential impacts include: shaking economic operators’ confidence in the government;\npotentially disrupting the public service delivery; and crowding out cash supply to the economy.\nLastly, it may well induce second-round fiscal costs since suppliers to the government are now\ninclined to request payments in advance or withhold payment of taxes until they receive\npayments due to them from the government.\n\nIn this context, urgently assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears is a first and\ncrucial step to be taken. Based on other countries’ experience, the government should rapidly\ntake stock of and validate legitimate suppliers’ claims. This will send a positive signal to creditors\nand raise officials’ awareness on the need to comply with budget ceilings and expenditure\nprocesses. Clearing these arrears will come afterward, with creditors’ agreements on clearance\nmodalities (including discounts and possible securitization), and may take several years.\n\nJust as urgent is the need to identify and eliminate the underlying causes of arrears\naccumulation. In Mozambique, the major weaknesses to be dealt with are the following: the poor\ncredibility of budget allocations; short-sighted cash projections; a lack of control over\nexpenditure, which is operated by a large network of spending units; and, resulting from the\nlatter, poor visibility as to government commitments and obligations through the existing fiscal\nreports. Key reforms must be undertaken to foster fiscal discipline, regain control over the\nexpenditure chain, and stabilize and reduce the stock of arrears. They are presented in descending\norder of emergency:\n\n - Restore a legally compliant expenditure process. Currently, the three phases of the\nexpenditure (i.e., commitment, verification and payment) occur simultaneously. There is\nlittle information and control over commitments, expenditure float, and arrears. It is\nrecommended to restore the commitment and verification phases.\n\n - Streamline the network of spending units (UGBs). The sheer number of UGBs (over\n1,600) hampers the allocation of funds and budget monitoring. UGBs with low financial\nactivity hardly reach best standards for an effective management of the budget. The\ngovernment should gradually group UGBs and strengthen their capacities.\n\n - Improve the credibility of budget ceilings. Although forecasts of macro-aggregates\nhave improved, there is a need to enhance the credibility of the composition of budget.\nThis can be done through a more efficient process and techniques for budget preparation.\n\n7", "text_characters": 2673}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- **Optimize government liquidity.** The government should pursue its efforts to pool cash\ninside the treasury single account. It should also introduce a more dynamic approach to\ncash management to avoid, to the best possible extent, disruptions in expenditure.\n\n\n**Table 1. Five Recommendations to Regain Control over Budget Execution**\n\n\n**Recommendations** **Timelines** **Possible support**\n\n**1** **Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears**\n\n\n\n**Action 1** Seek donor's funding and select consulting firm for stock taking of arrears **By March 2018**\n\n**Action 2** Design and publish a strategy, set data base framework and institutional **By June 2018**\n\n**Action 3** Open time widow for claimants to submit claims **June-July 2018**\n\n\n\n**IMF, Sweden**\n\n\n\n**Action 4** Verify claims, report related expenditure / debt to suppliers in e-SISTAFE, prioritize\nclearance, schedule payments and lending operations\n\n\n\n**September 2018**\n\n\n\n**Action 5** Proceed with, and report on, arrear clearance **Continued**\n\n\n\n**Action 6** Open second widow time for claimants **January 2019**\n\n\n\n**2** **Restore the Expenditure Chain**\n\n\n\n**Action 1** Set quarterly ceilings for commitments\n\n\n\n**Action 2, 3** UGBs record their commitments and verification in e-SISTAFE, in due time\n\n\n\n**IMF, European**\n\n\n\n**Action 4** Train budget managers (central and provinces levels)\n\n\n\n**Action 5** Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers\n\n**Action 6** Improve Treasury forecasting technics for Financial Programing\n\n\n\n**From January 2018,**\n**continuous**\n\n\n\n**Union, USAID,**\n\n\n\n**Action 7** Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored **From March 2018**\n\n\n\n**Switzeland,**\n\n**Austria, GIZ**\n\n\n\n**Action 8** Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs (all central level)… **March 2018**\n\n\n\n... (in some provinces) **June 2018**\n\n\n\n... (in all provinces) **September 2018**\n\n\n\n**Action 9** Approve a manual for expenditure and commitment control **By December 2018**\n\n**3** **Manage the Aggregate Cash Balance more Pro-Actively**\n\n\n\n**Action 1** Finalize and circulate the _diploma ministerial_ **End-2017**\n\n\n\n**Action 2** Introduce automatic end-of-day sweeping of balances in transit accounts and further\nminimize the use of advances\n\n\n\n**1st quarter 2018**\n\n\n\n**IMF/Denamrk,**\n\n**AFS, DFID**\n\n\n\n**Action 3** Continue to close accounts in commercial banks and transfer the balances to the CUT **Ongoing**\n\n\n\n**Action 4** Begin cash flow forecasting over six to 12-month horizon **Early 2018**\n\n\n\n**4** **Enhance Budget Credibility**\n\n\n\n**Action 1** Analyze and publish the deviations from Budget Law to CGE **2018**\n\n\n\n**Action 2** Determine expenditure aggregates and include identification of the stock of, and plan\nto clear arrears\n\n**Action 3** Continue to insist on a medium-term support framework with donors to ensure timely\ncommitments and disbursements of project finance\n\n\n\n**2018**\n\n\n\n**Ongoing**\n\n\n\n**IMF/Belgium,**\n\n**Ireland, World**\n\n**Bank/DFID, AFS,**\n\n**European Union**\n\n\n\n**5** **Streamline Spending Units Network**\n\n\n\n**Phasing in:** Define targets, timelines and action plan **By March 2018**\n\n\n\n**Action 1** On a voluntary basis regroup small budget UGBs **By June 2018**\n\n\n\n**Action 2** Prepare large mergers simultaneous with budget preparation meetings **By September 2018**\n\n\n\n**AFS, European**\n\n**Union**\n\n\n\n**Action 3** Start FY 2019 under the new budget management framework **By January 2019**\n\n\n\n**Action 4** Complete remaining planned mergers **By September 2019**\n\n\n\n**Action 5** Start FY 2020 under the new framework **By January 2020**\n\n\n\n**Action 6** General Inspectorate of Finance reports on experience **By June 2020**\n\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Optimize government liquidity. The government should pursue its efforts to pool cash\ninside the treasury single account. It should also introduce a more dynamic approach to\ncash management to avoid, to the best possible extent, disruptions in expenditure.\n\nTable 1. Five Recommendations to Regain Control over Budget Execution\n\nRecommendations Timelines Possible support\n\n1 Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears\n\nAction 1 Seek donor's funding and select consulting firm for stock taking of arrears By March 2018\n\nAction 2 Design and publish a strategy, set data base framework and institutional By June 2018\n\nAction 3 Open time widow for claimants to submit claims June-July 2018\n\nIMF, Sweden\n\nAction 4 Verify claims, report related expenditure / debt to suppliers in e-SISTAFE, prioritize\nclearance, schedule payments and lending operations\n\nSeptember 2018\n\nAction 5 Proceed with, and report on, arrear clearance Continued\n\nAction 6 Open second widow time for claimants January 2019\n\n2 Restore the Expenditure Chain\n\nAction 1 Set quarterly ceilings for commitments\n\nAction 2, 3 UGBs record their commitments and verification in e-SISTAFE, in due time\n\nIMF, European\n\nAction 4 Train budget managers (central and provinces levels)\n\nAction 5 Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers\n\nAction 6 Improve Treasury forecasting technics for Financial Programing\n\nFrom January 2018,\ncontinuous\n\nUnion, USAID,\n\nAction 7 Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored From March 2018\n\nSwitzeland,\n\nAustria, GIZ\n\nAction 8 Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs (all central level)… March 2018\n\n... (in some provinces) June 2018\n\n... (in all provinces) September 2018\n\nAction 9 Approve a manual for expenditure and commitment control By December 2018\n\n3 Manage the Aggregate Cash Balance more Pro-Actively\n\nAction 1 Finalize and circulate the _diploma ministerial_ End-2017\n\nAction 2 Introduce automatic end-of-day sweeping of balances in transit accounts and further\nminimize the use of advances\n\n1st quarter 2018\n\nIMF/Denamrk,\n\nAFS, DFID\n\nAction 3 Continue to close accounts in commercial banks and transfer the balances to the CUT Ongoing\n\nAction 4 Begin cash flow forecasting over six to 12-month horizon Early 2018\n\n4 Enhance Budget Credibility\n\nAction 1 Analyze and publish the deviations from Budget Law to CGE 2018\n\nAction 2 Determine expenditure aggregates and include identification of the stock of, and plan\nto clear arrears\n\nAction 3 Continue to insist on a medium-term support framework with donors to ensure timely\ncommitments and disbursements of project finance\n\n2018\n\nOngoing\n\nIMF/Belgium,\n\nIreland, World\n\nBank/DFID, AFS,\n\nEuropean Union\n\n5 Streamline Spending Units Network\n\nPhasing in: Define targets, timelines and action plan By March 2018\n\nAction 1 On a voluntary basis regroup small budget UGBs By June 2018\n\nAction 2 Prepare large mergers simultaneous with budget preparation meetings By September 2018\n\nAFS, European\n\nUnion\n\nAction 3 Start FY 2019 under the new budget management framework By January 2019\n\nAction 4 Complete remaining planned mergers By September 2019\n\nAction 5 Start FY 2020 under the new framework By January 2020\n\nAction 6 General Inspectorate of Finance reports on experience By June 2020\n\n8", "text_characters": 2765}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Managing Domestic Arrears**\n\n**1.** **Expenditure** **arrears are financial obligations, incurred by any level of the public**\n**sector, for which payments have not been made by the due date.** Payments may be overdue\nbased on a particular legal obligation (such as payment of social security benefits or salaries), a\nspecific contractual commitment (such as payment for construction of a road), or a continuing\nservice arrangement (such as payment for electricity supply). The value of expenditure arrears\nconstitutes the amount of the original overdue payment, as well as any interest or financial\npenalties that the government might accrue.\n\n**2.** **Unlike Mozambique, many countries consider arrears as obligations that are due**\n**and not paid within 90 days following delivery or an agreed date for payment.** Expenditure\narrears are a subset of payables that have remained unpaid beyond a due date for payment, that\nis, after a specified number of days after the date on the invoice or contract, in accordance with a\nlaw, regulation, government payment policy, or local practice. Among many other countries,\nPortugal, eight member-Countries of the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union\n(UEMOA), six member-Countries of the economic and monetary community for Central Africa\n(CEMAC) record arrears as the due obligations unpaid 90 days after delivery of service or good,\nadding to their public debt. Mozambique’s procurement law fixes a shorter time lapse of 30 days.\n\n**Domestic Arrears are a Burden on Mozambique’s Economy**\n\n\n**3.** **Mozambique’s accumulated stock of arrears adds to the debt burden.** Since 2015,\nthe economy has been affected by lower commodity prices, declining foreign-exchange inflows,\nrising inflation, and substantial exchange rate depreciation. Following three years of large\ndeficits, and absent further fiscal consolidation, the fiscal deficit is expected to expand, while\ndomestic arrears stemming from overspending and limited access to domestic financing\ncontinue to build up. In 2017, the stock of arrears has reached 3.7 percent of GDP [ 1], further\nadding to the total stock of debt (78.2 percent of the GDP), which is already in distress. These\narrears are not recorded in public financial accounts.\n\n**4.** **The accumulation of expenditure arrears can have serious negative effects on the**\n**domestic economy.** The economic consequences [2] can include the following:\n\n\n1 Stock disclosed by the authorities without many details (i.e., only an aggregate decomposition by (i) past three\nyears and previous years, (ii) current versus capital expenditure, and (iii) central versus provincial and district\nlevels of expenditure). The mission was unable to assess this amount.\n\n2 Adapted from the 2014 Fiscal Affairs Department Technical Note and Manual, _Prevention and Management of_\n_Government Expenditure Arrears_, by Prepared by Suzanne Flynn and Mario Pessoa.\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Managing Domestic Arrears\n\n1. Expenditure arrears are financial obligations, incurred by any level of the public\nsector, for which payments have not been made by the due date. Payments may be overdue\nbased on a particular legal obligation (such as payment of social security benefits or salaries), a\nspecific contractual commitment (such as payment for construction of a road), or a continuing\nservice arrangement (such as payment for electricity supply). The value of expenditure arrears\nconstitutes the amount of the original overdue payment, as well as any interest or financial\npenalties that the government might accrue.\n\n2. Unlike Mozambique, many countries consider arrears as obligations that are due\nand not paid within 90 days following delivery or an agreed date for payment. Expenditure\narrears are a subset of payables that have remained unpaid beyond a due date for payment, that\nis, after a specified number of days after the date on the invoice or contract, in accordance with a\nlaw, regulation, government payment policy, or local practice. Among many other countries,\nPortugal, eight member-Countries of the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union\n(UEMOA), six member-Countries of the economic and monetary community for Central Africa\n(CEMAC) record arrears as the due obligations unpaid 90 days after delivery of service or good,\nadding to their public debt. Mozambique’s procurement law fixes a shorter time lapse of 30 days.\n\nDomestic Arrears are a Burden on Mozambique’s Economy\n\n3. Mozambique’s accumulated stock of arrears adds to the debt burden. Since 2015,\nthe economy has been affected by lower commodity prices, declining foreign-exchange inflows,\nrising inflation, and substantial exchange rate depreciation. Following three years of large\ndeficits, and absent further fiscal consolidation, the fiscal deficit is expected to expand, while\ndomestic arrears stemming from overspending and limited access to domestic financing\ncontinue to build up. In 2017, the stock of arrears has reached 3.7 percent of GDP [ 1], further\nadding to the total stock of debt (78.2 percent of the GDP), which is already in distress. These\narrears are not recorded in public financial accounts.\n\n4. The accumulation of expenditure arrears can have serious negative effects on the\ndomestic economy. The economic consequences [2] can include the following:\n\n1 Stock disclosed by the authorities without many details (i.e., only an aggregate decomposition by (i) past three\nyears and previous years, (ii) current versus capital expenditure, and (iii) central versus provincial and district\nlevels of expenditure). The mission was unable to assess this amount.\n\n2 Adapted from the 2014 Fiscal Affairs Department Technical Note and Manual, _Prevention and Management of_\n_Government Expenditure Arrears_, by Prepared by Suzanne Flynn and Mario Pessoa.\n\n9", "text_characters": 2417}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- _Reduced economic growth_ . Payment arrears can cease or delay economic activity,\nresulting in a reduced pace of economic activity and increased unemployment.\n\n - _Increased cost of service provision_ . Government suppliers try to mitigate the risks and\nopportunity cost of delayed payments by adjusting their initial prices upward.\n\n - _Reduced or interrupted public service delivery_ . In the absence of payment, suppliers\ntypically disrupt service delivery. Also, as the cost of supplies rise, the government may\nbe forced to reduce their spending or put investment projects on hold.\n\n - _Increased rent-seeking_ . Chronic payment delays also increase the incentives for rentseeking and collusion between government and suppliers, as the latter seek to accelerate\npayment or circumvent expenditure control procedures.\n\n - _Increased interest rates_ . Illiquid suppliers typically borrow from banks to weather cash\nshortages, adding pressure to credit markets and driving up interest rates.\n\n - _Second-round fiscal costs_ . Government suppliers are inclined to withhold payment of\ntaxes until, in turn, they receive payments due to them from the government .\n\n**Clearing the Stock of Arrears**\n\n\n**5.** **The accumulation of government expenditure arrears is a common problem in**\n**public financial management (PFM).** A 2015 survey of 121 Public Expenditure and Financial\nAccountability (PEFA) assessments revealed that in only 31 percent of surveyed countries the\nstock of central government arrears was less than 2 percent. Some IMF program countries\naccumulated expenditure arrears in excess of 20 percent of GDP. Arrears-related structural\nbenchmarks or performance criteria were included in 95 percent of 140 IMF-supported programs\nbetween 1999 and 2012, and included reforms to strengthen government capacity to identify,\nand clear existing arrears, and to avoid the accumulation of new arrears.\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- _Reduced economic growth_ . Payment arrears can cease or delay economic activity,\nresulting in a reduced pace of economic activity and increased unemployment.\n\n - _Increased cost of service provision_ . Government suppliers try to mitigate the risks and\nopportunity cost of delayed payments by adjusting their initial prices upward.\n\n - _Reduced or interrupted public service delivery_ . In the absence of payment, suppliers\ntypically disrupt service delivery. Also, as the cost of supplies rise, the government may\nbe forced to reduce their spending or put investment projects on hold.\n\n - _Increased rent-seeking_ . Chronic payment delays also increase the incentives for rentseeking and collusion between government and suppliers, as the latter seek to accelerate\npayment or circumvent expenditure control procedures.\n\n - _Increased interest rates_ . Illiquid suppliers typically borrow from banks to weather cash\nshortages, adding pressure to credit markets and driving up interest rates.\n\n - _Second-round fiscal costs_ . Government suppliers are inclined to withhold payment of\ntaxes until, in turn, they receive payments due to them from the government .\n\nClearing the Stock of Arrears\n\n5. The accumulation of government expenditure arrears is a common problem in\npublic financial management (PFM). A 2015 survey of 121 Public Expenditure and Financial\nAccountability (PEFA) assessments revealed that in only 31 percent of surveyed countries the\nstock of central government arrears was less than 2 percent. Some IMF program countries\naccumulated expenditure arrears in excess of 20 percent of GDP. Arrears-related structural\nbenchmarks or performance criteria were included in 95 percent of 140 IMF-supported programs\nbetween 1999 and 2012, and included reforms to strengthen government capacity to identify,\nand clear existing arrears, and to avoid the accumulation of new arrears.\n\n10", "text_characters": 1602}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0013-001"], "markdown": "**Box 1. Clearing Outstanding Arrears, Angola Country Case, 2002-2003**\n\nFollowing the civil war, Angola reached a peace agreement in April 2002. From the period\n\nof 1992 to 2003, the Angolan Government acknowledged claims of arrears of\nUS$13 billion. Shortly afterward, the government started implementing a 6-year strategy to\nclear the arrears. Subsequently, Angola suffered new rise of arrears due oil crisis in 2008\nand 2014, and applied the same approach. The strategy involved six stages:\n\n - **Acknowledgement of claims** - The government established a calendar for all creditors to\nsubmit their claims of unpaid invoices dating from 1992, defined the information and documents\nrequired to support the claims, and set three different stages to handle the process: unpaid\ninvoices for 1992-97, for 1998-2003, and all transactions after 2003.\n\n - **Verification** - This stage comprised of the verification of the legal condition of the creditors,\nhow well the companies were established, whether they complied with tax obligations, and\nwhether the claims were recorded in the balance sheets. The process also included the\nverification of sufficient budget provisions in the related budgetary unit.\n\n - **Validation** - The government contracted an independent auditing company to validate each\nclaim based on the specific criteria to ensure its legitimacy.\n\n - **Negotiation** –The Ministry of Finance reached an agreement through negotiation with\nlegitimate creditors, set a calendar of payments, partly in cash and partly in treasury bonds with\nmaturities up to 5 years, a 5 percent coupon, and payments per semester.\n\n - **Payment** - Small claims where paid in cash, while others received bonds (at first indexed to the\nexchange rate, then later to the consumer price index) to ensure that creditors could have liquidity\nover time. Subsequently, the bonds were traded in secondary market.\n\nSource: Angola Archives.\n\n\n**Taking stock of arrears**\n\n\n**6.** **A thorough stock take of the outstanding stock of arrears is necessary**, in order to\nunderstand the extent, composition, and vintage of the government’s unpaid bills and prioritize\ntheir clearance. Governments typically use two approaches for a census of arrears:\n\n\n**•** **Purchasers’ side:** Out of spending units’ ledgers and records, the government takes\nstock of due obligations not paid. Absent a mechanism to track arrears from the systems\nin use to process expenditures, the Treasury must demand spending units’ records,\npending invoices, and all other due obligations.\n\n**•** **Suppliers’ side** : A dedicated unit (most often an audit institution) opens a limited-time\nwindow for creditors to bring their claims forward. Claims should be documented to\ngovernment specifications, including a timetable for the stocktaking exercise and a clear\ndefinition of the information requirements. A cut-off date for inclusion of new arrears\nshould be established to encourage timely reporting and to avoid the possibility of\nfraudulent claims.\n\n\n**7.** **Once collected, data on the outstanding stock of arrears should be verified to**\n**ensure that the claims are genuine and not fraudulent.** This activity can be undertaken by the\nsupreme audit institution, an inspectorate or internal audit function in the ministry of finance, or\n\n\n11\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0057, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(97.49999237060547, 88.70068359375, 146.99998474121094, 144.25067138671875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 116, "number": 12, "size": 14847, "transform": [49.49999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 55.54998779296875, 97.49999237060547, 88.70068359375], "width": 104, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Box 1. Clearing Outstanding Arrears, Angola Country Case, 2002-2003\n\nFollowing the civil war, Angola reached a peace agreement in April 2002. From the period\n\nof 1992 to 2003, the Angolan Government acknowledged claims of arrears of\nUS$13 billion. Shortly afterward, the government started implementing a 6-year strategy to\nclear the arrears. Subsequently, Angola suffered new rise of arrears due oil crisis in 2008\nand 2014, and applied the same approach. The strategy involved six stages:\n\n - Acknowledgement of claims - The government established a calendar for all creditors to\nsubmit their claims of unpaid invoices dating from 1992, defined the information and documents\nrequired to support the claims, and set three different stages to handle the process: unpaid\ninvoices for 1992-97, for 1998-2003, and all transactions after 2003.\n\n - Verification - This stage comprised of the verification of the legal condition of the creditors,\nhow well the companies were established, whether they complied with tax obligations, and\nwhether the claims were recorded in the balance sheets. The process also included the\nverification of sufficient budget provisions in the related budgetary unit.\n\n - Validation - The government contracted an independent auditing company to validate each\nclaim based on the specific criteria to ensure its legitimacy.\n\n - Negotiation –The Ministry of Finance reached an agreement through negotiation with\nlegitimate creditors, set a calendar of payments, partly in cash and partly in treasury bonds with\nmaturities up to 5 years, a 5 percent coupon, and payments per semester.\n\n - Payment - Small claims where paid in cash, while others received bonds (at first indexed to the\nexchange rate, then later to the consumer price index) to ensure that creditors could have liquidity\nover time. Subsequently, the bonds were traded in secondary market.\n\nSource: Angola Archives.\n\nTaking stock of arrears\n\n6. A thorough stock take of the outstanding stock of arrears is necessary, in order to\nunderstand the extent, composition, and vintage of the government’s unpaid bills and prioritize\ntheir clearance. Governments typically use two approaches for a census of arrears:\n\n• Purchasers’ side: Out of spending units’ ledgers and records, the government takes\nstock of due obligations not paid. Absent a mechanism to track arrears from the systems\nin use to process expenditures, the Treasury must demand spending units’ records,\npending invoices, and all other due obligations.\n\n• Suppliers’ side : A dedicated unit (most often an audit institution) opens a limited-time\nwindow for creditors to bring their claims forward. Claims should be documented to\ngovernment specifications, including a timetable for the stocktaking exercise and a clear\ndefinition of the information requirements. A cut-off date for inclusion of new arrears\nshould be established to encourage timely reporting and to avoid the possibility of\nfraudulent claims.\n\n7. Once collected, data on the outstanding stock of arrears should be verified to\nensure that the claims are genuine and not fraudulent. This activity can be undertaken by the\nsupreme audit institution, an inspectorate or internal audit function in the ministry of finance, or\n\n11", "text_characters": 2720}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "private audit firms. This process of verification of claims should be subject to tests to verify their\nexistence, value, and vintage, using the following guidelines:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Check|Table 2. Process of Verification of Arrears Approach|\n|---|---|\n|**Check**
|**Approach**
|\n|**Legal validity**
|Check that the transaction was duly authorized and consistent with budgetary
authorizations. If otherwise, appropriate sanctions should be applied to officials,
and validity of the claim should be legally assessed.
|\n|**Evidence of**
**delivery**
|In case of doubt or for material transactions, delivery should be reconfirmed by
requesting information from the supplier (e.g., its financial records). In more
complex transactions, particularly those related to investment projects, evidence of
progress or a completion certificate should be required.
|\n|**Payable value**
|Invoices should contain the amount and the reference to the purchase order; If
doubtful, cross-check with suppliers’ financial statements.
|\n|**Payable vintage**
|Check by reference to the invoice and other supporting documentation.
|\n|**Tax compliance**|Revenue authority checks to ensure that suppliers are registered taxpayers and not
delinquent in tax payments.|\n\n\n**8.** **Once** **collected and verified, arrears data should be analyzed and classified for the**\n**purposes of arrears clearance.** A database of valid outstanding payments should be established\nand maintained centrally by the ministry of finance. This can be a resource-intensive and timeconsuming exercise, requiring dedicated staff resources. A practical approach would be to focus\nin the first instance on large claims, gradually expanding the coverage of the database. To allow\nfor appropriate categorization, the following data should be captured for each outstanding claim:\n\n\n**•** **Vintage** : Classify arrears by how long they have been overdue: one to three months,\nthree to six months, six to 12 months, and more than 12 months. Older arrears should be\nclassified by the financial year of incurrence.\n\n**•** **Debtor** : Record the government entity incurring the liability: central or subnational\ngovernment, extra-budgetary fund, or state-owned enterprise.\n\n**•** **Creditor** **:** Classify creditors’ names by type: employees, private individuals or businesses,\nfinancial institutions, extra-budgetary funds, or state-owned enterprise. Distinguishing\nextra- and intra-government obligations will facilitate clearance of the latter.\n\n**•** **Economic category** : Classify arrears by economic category, such as compensation of\nemployees, acquisition of goods and services, transfers, acquisition of nonfinancial assets,\nand acquisition of financial assets.\n\n**•** **Currency** **:** Capture the currency in which the obligation was originally denominated to\nensure that sufficient foreign exchange is available to meet external arrears.\n\n**•** **Contractual terms:** Identify any relevant information, including whether the outstanding\nbalance results in interest and/or penalties for non-payment.\n\n**•** **Payment status:** Distinguish, within the total amount due, the amount already paid, the\namount outstanding, and any rescheduling, discounting, or factoring of the unpaid\nobligation.\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.0, 107.75808715820312, 540.0, 338.3999938964844], "columns": 2, "rows": 6}], "text": "private audit firms. This process of verification of claims should be subject to tests to verify their\nexistence, value, and vintage, using the following guidelines:\n\n Check Table 2. Process of Verification of Arrears Approach \n\n Check Approach \n Legal validity Check that the transaction was duly authorized and consistent with budgetary authorizations. If otherwise, appropriate sanctions should be applied to officials, and validity of the claim should be legally assessed. \n Evidence of delivery In case of doubt or for material transactions, delivery should be reconfirmed by requesting information from the supplier (e.g., its financial records). In more complex transactions, particularly those related to investment projects, evidence of progress or a completion certificate should be required. \n Payable value Invoices should contain the amount and the reference to the purchase order; If doubtful, cross-check with suppliers’ financial statements. \n Payable vintage Check by reference to the invoice and other supporting documentation. \n Tax compliance Revenue authority checks to ensure that suppliers are registered taxpayers and not delinquent in tax payments. \n\n8. Once collected and verified, arrears data should be analyzed and classified for the\npurposes of arrears clearance. A database of valid outstanding payments should be established\nand maintained centrally by the ministry of finance. This can be a resource-intensive and timeconsuming exercise, requiring dedicated staff resources. A practical approach would be to focus\nin the first instance on large claims, gradually expanding the coverage of the database. To allow\nfor appropriate categorization, the following data should be captured for each outstanding claim:\n\n• Vintage : Classify arrears by how long they have been overdue: one to three months,\nthree to six months, six to 12 months, and more than 12 months. Older arrears should be\nclassified by the financial year of incurrence.\n\n• Debtor : Record the government entity incurring the liability: central or subnational\ngovernment, extra-budgetary fund, or state-owned enterprise.\n\n• Creditor : Classify creditors’ names by type: employees, private individuals or businesses,\nfinancial institutions, extra-budgetary funds, or state-owned enterprise. Distinguishing\nextra- and intra-government obligations will facilitate clearance of the latter.\n\n• Economic category : Classify arrears by economic category, such as compensation of\nemployees, acquisition of goods and services, transfers, acquisition of nonfinancial assets,\nand acquisition of financial assets.\n\n• Currency : Capture the currency in which the obligation was originally denominated to\nensure that sufficient foreign exchange is available to meet external arrears.\n\n• Contractual terms: Identify any relevant information, including whether the outstanding\nbalance results in interest and/or penalties for non-payment.\n\n• Payment status: Distinguish, within the total amount due, the amount already paid, the\namount outstanding, and any rescheduling, discounting, or factoring of the unpaid\nobligation.\n\n12", "text_characters": 2644}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-001", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0015-002"], "markdown": "**9.** **When established, the database should be kept up-to-date, showing the discharge**\n**of arrears and any subsequent additions to the stock.** The entire stock of accounts payable\nshould be classified as liabilities, further classified as either domestic or foreign, and included in\nthe government’s measurement of gross debt. Payments in arrears should be included as a\nmemorandum item to the government’s fiscal table (e.g., the _mapa fiscal_ ).\n\n\n**Box 2. Validation of Claims: the Angolan Experience**\n\n\nThe process of validation, helped the Government to assess to the real value of the arrears, the\n\ntotal claims in the period amounted US$13.2 billion, only 51.5 percent equivalent to\nUS$6.7 billion were certified and validated. The remaining 48.6 percent represented claims not\nrecognized.\n\n\nSource: Angola Archives.\n\n**Clearing the stock of arrears**\n\n\n**10.** **Once a database of valid claims on government has been established, a set of**\n**criteria for prioritizing their verification should be determined.** The prioritization of arrears\nclearance should be based on transparent criteria. These might include the following:\n\n\n**•** **Socioeconomic impact:** Arrears to economically sensitive or vulnerable sectors, such as\nsalaries of low-income workers, pensions, and social benefits, should be prioritized.\n\n**•** **Vintage:** Older obligations should have priority over newer obligations.\n\n**•** **Cost:** Arrears that accrue interest and penalty charges should be prioritized.\n\n**•** **Risk:** Arrears that may result in legal action, disruption of essential services, or cost\nescalation of future supplies to government should be prioritized.\n\n**•** **Currency** : Payment of foreign currency denominated debt should be prioritized if\ndomestic currency devaluation is outpacing domestic inflation.\n\n**•** **Creditor** : The clearance of intra-government debts should be prioritized, as this can be\ndone administratively though the annual budget at minimal net cost.\n\n\n13\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0747, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(158.99998474121094, 251.935302734375, 517.4999389648438, 352.935302734375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 211, "number": 10, "size": 30614, "transform": [358.4999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 100.99999237060547, 158.99998474121094, 251.935302734375], "width": 747, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(95.25, 192.3114013671875, 140.64999389648438, 243.3114013671875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 107, "number": 9, "size": 13605, "transform": [45.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 51.000003814697266, 95.25, 192.3114013671875], "width": 95, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "9. When established, the database should be kept up-to-date, showing the discharge\nof arrears and any subsequent additions to the stock. The entire stock of accounts payable\nshould be classified as liabilities, further classified as either domestic or foreign, and included in\nthe government’s measurement of gross debt. Payments in arrears should be included as a\nmemorandum item to the government’s fiscal table (e.g., the _mapa fiscal_ ).\n\nBox 2. Validation of Claims: the Angolan Experience\n\nThe process of validation, helped the Government to assess to the real value of the arrears, the\n\ntotal claims in the period amounted US$13.2 billion, only 51.5 percent equivalent to\nUS$6.7 billion were certified and validated. The remaining 48.6 percent represented claims not\nrecognized.\n\nSource: Angola Archives.\n\nClearing the stock of arrears\n\n10. Once a database of valid claims on government has been established, a set of\ncriteria for prioritizing their verification should be determined. The prioritization of arrears\nclearance should be based on transparent criteria. These might include the following:\n\n• Socioeconomic impact: Arrears to economically sensitive or vulnerable sectors, such as\nsalaries of low-income workers, pensions, and social benefits, should be prioritized.\n\n• Vintage: Older obligations should have priority over newer obligations.\n\n• Cost: Arrears that accrue interest and penalty charges should be prioritized.\n\n• Risk: Arrears that may result in legal action, disruption of essential services, or cost\nescalation of future supplies to government should be prioritized.\n\n• Currency : Payment of foreign currency denominated debt should be prioritized if\ndomestic currency devaluation is outpacing domestic inflation.\n\n• Creditor : The clearance of intra-government debts should be prioritized, as this can be\ndone administratively though the annual budget at minimal net cost.\n\n13", "text_characters": 1615}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**11.** **Once the criteria for prioritizing arrears for clearance have been established and**\n**published, the payment or verification of obligations can begin.** A technical group should\noversee arrears verification to ensure the consistent application of the principles of the strategy.\nFor repayment modalities, the following options may be considered:\n\n\n**•** **Pay cash and discount:** Depending on available fiscal space, the best option is cash\npayments to avoid further financial penalties or interest and enable suppliers to rebuild\ntheir working capital. As part of these negotiations, creditors may agree to a discount;\nhowever, this approach should be treated with caution, since it can have the effect of\nincreasing costs to the government if suppliers inflate prices for future supplies in\nanticipation of expected future discounting.\n\n**•** **Reschedule payments:** If sufficient liquidity is not available, the Treasury may negotiate\na schedule of payments with creditors according to a pre-defined calendar, a no-discount\noption, and an interest rate. This option may be more viable if the current market\nconditions are not ripe for the placement of sizeable amounts of new debt.\n\n**•** **Earmark loans:** Arrears can be paid off by borrowing in financial markets. The proceeds\nof the borrowing operations would be earmarked for the reduction of the stock of\narrears. This option increases the stock of explicit government debt, as it records arrears\nas part of the domestic debt, but it does not decrease net worth, as government is\nexplicitly recognizing a liability that existed as an implicit obligation to pay.\n\n**•** **Securitize arrears:** This approach directly transforms them into government debt.\nSecuritization options include issuing promissory notes (discountable by commercial\nbanks), marketable treasury bills, or bonds directly to creditors. However, the direct\nsecuritization of arrears also has many disadvantages (see Box 3).\n\n**•** **Settle with state-owned enterprises:** A book entry can be made reflecting all\noutstanding bills, leaving a single remaining debt that can be resolved through budget\ntransfers to SOEs. If reciprocal payments are owed to government, such as in the form of\ndividends, these can be netted off against the required cash injection.\n\n\n\n\n\n|Box 3. Securitizing Arrears? Pros and Cons
Pros Cons|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|
Allows the government to select the
debt maturity structure and
repayment profile that best matches
its financing needs.
Gives creditors the opportunity to
raise liquidity by trading the
securities in the secondary market,
possibly at a discount.
|
Creates strong moral hazard incentives for budget managers
to continue to over-commit resources in the expectation that
they will eventually also be securitized and paid centrally.
Trading securitized instruments in secondary market(s) comes
at the cost of discounts that reduce the working capital
available to the supplier compared with cash payment.
Securitization of the outstanding stock of arrears hampers
prioritizing payment of the most urgent arrears, as securities
are issued to all creditors on equal terms.|\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.18000030517578, 486.719970703125, 539.8200073242188, 665.6000366210938], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}], "text": "11. Once the criteria for prioritizing arrears for clearance have been established and\npublished, the payment or verification of obligations can begin. A technical group should\noversee arrears verification to ensure the consistent application of the principles of the strategy.\nFor repayment modalities, the following options may be considered:\n\n• Pay cash and discount: Depending on available fiscal space, the best option is cash\npayments to avoid further financial penalties or interest and enable suppliers to rebuild\ntheir working capital. As part of these negotiations, creditors may agree to a discount;\nhowever, this approach should be treated with caution, since it can have the effect of\nincreasing costs to the government if suppliers inflate prices for future supplies in\nanticipation of expected future discounting.\n\n• Reschedule payments: If sufficient liquidity is not available, the Treasury may negotiate\na schedule of payments with creditors according to a pre-defined calendar, a no-discount\noption, and an interest rate. This option may be more viable if the current market\nconditions are not ripe for the placement of sizeable amounts of new debt.\n\n• Earmark loans: Arrears can be paid off by borrowing in financial markets. The proceeds\nof the borrowing operations would be earmarked for the reduction of the stock of\narrears. This option increases the stock of explicit government debt, as it records arrears\nas part of the domestic debt, but it does not decrease net worth, as government is\nexplicitly recognizing a liability that existed as an implicit obligation to pay.\n\n• Securitize arrears: This approach directly transforms them into government debt.\nSecuritization options include issuing promissory notes (discountable by commercial\nbanks), marketable treasury bills, or bonds directly to creditors. However, the direct\nsecuritization of arrears also has many disadvantages (see Box 3).\n\n• Settle with state-owned enterprises: A book entry can be made reflecting all\noutstanding bills, leaving a single remaining debt that can be resolved through budget\ntransfers to SOEs. If reciprocal payments are owed to government, such as in the form of\ndividends, these can be netted off against the required cash injection.\n\n Box 3. Securitizing Arrears? Pros and Cons Pros Cons Col2 \n\n Allows the government to select the debt maturity structure and repayment profile that best matches its financing needs. Gives creditors the opportunity to raise liquidity by trading the securities in the secondary market, possibly at a discount. Creates strong moral hazard incentives for budget managers to continue to over-commit resources in the expectation that they will eventually also be securitized and paid centrally. Trading securitized instruments in secondary market(s) comes at the cost of discounts that reduce the working capital available to the supplier compared with cash payment. Securitization of the outstanding stock of arrears hampers prioritizing payment of the most urgent arrears, as securities are issued to all creditors on equal terms. \n\n14", "text_characters": 2601}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "**Box 4. Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears: the Angolan Experience**\n\n\nthe public financial management system. Issuance of a “commitment note” was required\nfor all public acquisitions of goods and services, for the sake of commitment control. A\nlegislation was passed with definition of arrears as invoices unpaid 90 days after issuance,\nthis facilitated the monitoring process of arrears accumulation on a quarterly basis.\n\nAdditional normative and operational measures were implemented to prevent public procurement\nloopholes, all contracts above US$ 0,5 million were subject to approval by the Minister of Finance, and\ncontracts above US$ 10 million had to be signed by the President with pre-approval of the Mister of\nFinance prior submission to the Audit Office (Court of Account).\n\nWith the oil price drop, Angola faced new arrears, mainly related to public investment projects (PIP). As a\nmitigation measure, authorities are now aligning the PIP portfolio to the medium term fiscal framework,\nand monitoring projects before they start. Kick starting new investment projects needs to meet the\nfollowing prerequisites: transparent and sufficient budget allocations, and tenders under the oversight of\nthe public procurement office.\n\nSource: Angola archives.\n\n\n15\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0052, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(96.75000762939453, 108.01221466064453, 144.15000915527344, 161.26220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 111, "number": 8, "size": 13491, "transform": [47.39999771118164, 0.0, -0.0, 53.24999237060547, 96.75000762939453, 108.01221466064453], "width": 99, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Box 4. Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears: the Angolan Experience\n\nthe public financial management system. Issuance of a “commitment note” was required\nfor all public acquisitions of goods and services, for the sake of commitment control. A\nlegislation was passed with definition of arrears as invoices unpaid 90 days after issuance,\nthis facilitated the monitoring process of arrears accumulation on a quarterly basis.\n\nAdditional normative and operational measures were implemented to prevent public procurement\nloopholes, all contracts above US$ 0,5 million were subject to approval by the Minister of Finance, and\ncontracts above US$ 10 million had to be signed by the President with pre-approval of the Mister of\nFinance prior submission to the Audit Office (Court of Account).\n\nWith the oil price drop, Angola faced new arrears, mainly related to public investment projects (PIP). As a\nmitigation measure, authorities are now aligning the PIP portfolio to the medium term fiscal framework,\nand monitoring projects before they start. Kick starting new investment projects needs to meet the\nfollowing prerequisites: transparent and sufficient budget allocations, and tenders under the oversight of\nthe public procurement office.\n\nSource: Angola archives.\n\n15", "text_characters": 1078}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Recommendation 1. Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears
Background
Despite government’s efforts to rein-in expenditure in line with target balances, domestic arrears are
being accumulated to the tentative estimate of Meticais 30 billion (roughly one fifth of 2017 projected
tax revenue). In addition, the overall debt remains in high risk of distress. A restructuring of public debt
owed to private creditors is unavoidable.
Key measures
• Kick-start a census of obligations not paid in due time by the public sector, and maintain a
comprehensive data base on creditors, claims, and repayments made.
• Check and reject illegitimate claims, seek creditors’ agreement on arrear clearance modalities
(including discounts, cash repayments, and possible securitization).
• Implement arrear clearance per a prioritized schedule consistent with government fiscal stance.
Institutional arrangements
The government needs to develop a strategy for arrear clearance including the following five steps:
stocktaking, verification, classification, prioritization, and verification of arrears. The institutional
framework for strategic guidance and oversight should involve the MEF, along with the court of account
(TA). Implementation of the strategy lies upon the Treasury department (repayments and lending
operations) and the General Inspectorate of Finance (census of creditors and verification of claims) with
support from a consulting firm to be financed by a donor.
Risks and mitigation measures
The government should publish its plans, timetable, and criteria for the verification of arrears, thereby
minimizing perception of favoritism and corruption in the process.
Financial instruments for arrear clearance should be wisely and transparently chosen to avoid downside
risks of debt sustainability, and budget managers’ lack of accountability.
Schedule for clearance should be included in multiyear projections for spending and debt.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|
Action 1|
Define main outlines of the strategy, seek donor funding and select a
consulting firm to stock take the arrears|By March 2018|\n|Action 2|Design and publish a strategy, set data base framework and institutional
arrangements|By June 2018|\n|Action 3|Open time widow for claimants to submit claims
|June-July 2018|\n|Action 4|Verify claims, report related expenditure / debt to suppliers in e-SISTAFE,
prioritize clearance, schedule repayments and lending operations in line with
multiyear fiscal policy|By September
2018|\n|Action 5|Proceed with, and report on, arrear clearance|Continued|\n|Action 6
|Open second widow time for claimants and collect remaining unsolved
legitimate claims|January 2019|\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.00038146972656, 72.1199951171875, 540.00048828125, 635.0996704101562], "columns": 3, "rows": 7}], "text": "Recommendation 1. Identify and Clear the Stock of Arrears Background Despite government’s efforts to rein-in expenditure in line with target balances, domestic arrears are being accumulated to the tentative estimate of Meticais 30 billion (roughly one fifth of 2017 projected tax revenue). In addition, the overall debt remains in high risk of distress. A restructuring of public debt owed to private creditors is unavoidable. Key measures • Kick-start a census of obligations not paid in due time by the public sector, and maintain a comprehensive data base on creditors, claims, and repayments made. • Check and reject illegitimate claims, seek creditors’ agreement on arrear clearance modalities (including discounts, cash repayments, and possible securitization). • Implement arrear clearance per a prioritized schedule consistent with government fiscal stance. Institutional arrangements The government needs to develop a strategy for arrear clearance including the following five steps: stocktaking, verification, classification, prioritization, and verification of arrears. The institutional framework for strategic guidance and oversight should involve the MEF, along with the court of account (TA). Implementation of the strategy lies upon the Treasury department (repayments and lending operations) and the General Inspectorate of Finance (census of creditors and verification of claims) with support from a consulting firm to be financed by a donor. Risks and mitigation measures The government should publish its plans, timetable, and criteria for the verification of arrears, thereby minimizing perception of favoritism and corruption in the process. Financial instruments for arrear clearance should be wisely and transparently chosen to avoid downside risks of debt sustainability, and budget managers’ lack of accountability. Schedule for clearance should be included in multiyear projections for spending and debt. Schedule for implementation Col2 Col3 \n\n Action 1 Define main outlines of the strategy, seek donor funding and select a consulting firm to stock take the arrears By March 2018 \n Action 2 Design and publish a strategy, set data base framework and institutional arrangements By June 2018 \n Action 3 Open time widow for claimants to submit claims June-July 2018 \n Action 4 Verify claims, report related expenditure / debt to suppliers in e-SISTAFE, prioritize clearance, schedule repayments and lending operations in line with multiyear fiscal policy By September 2018 \n Action 5 Proceed with, and report on, arrear clearance Continued \n Action 6 Open second widow time for claimants and collect remaining unsolved legitimate claims January 2019 \n\n16", "text_characters": 2278}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-001", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-002", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0019-003"], "markdown": "**Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears**\n\n\n\n**12.** **To fend off further accumulation of arrears, the Mozambique government needs to**\n**resolve the weaknesses in expenditure process, budget allocations and cash management.**\nThrough meetings with officials and a one-day seminar, the mission identified the following\nunderlying causes for arrear accumulation (also see Figure 1):\n\n**To be discussed in Chapter 2:**\n\n\n\n**To be discussed in Chapter 2:**\n\n\n\n\n**•** **The ministry of economy and finance has limited control on budget execution.** This\nmajor weakness stems from an overly simplified process that does not clearly distinguish\nthe main phases of expenditure and prevents proper commitment control.\n\n\n\n**To be discussed in Chapter 3:**\n\n**•** **The budget, specifically its decomposition in administrative items, is not credible.**\nDespite rather accurate revenue forecasts, budget allocations to spending units are not\nproperly calibrated to their financing needs, and subject to frequent in-year changes.\nThese unstable budget allocations lead spending units to commit resources in excess of\ntheir budget allocation resulting in overspending and/or arrears.\n\n\n\n**To be discussed in Chapter 4:**\n\n**•** **Cash supply does not sustain a smooth continuation of expenses.** This results from\nrevenue scarcity (which is largely out of the government’s hands) and a perfectible\nmanagement of cash within and outside the treasury single account (CUT).\n\n\n\n**To be discussed in Chapter 5:**\n\n\n\n**The sheer number of spending units (UGBs) hampers all of the above-mentioned**\n**functions.** Budget execution and preparation and cash management are made uneasy. UGBs\nwith low financial activity hardly reach best standards, skills, and economies of scale for budget\n\n\n\nmanagement. There is a need to streamline this network.\n\n\n\n**Figure 1. Underlying Causes of the Arrear Fiscal Cliff**\n\n\n\n\n**•**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Inaccuracy of**\n\n**Expenditure**\n\n**Projections**\n\n\n\n**Poor Confidence in Government**\n\n**Financial Signature**\n\n\n\n**Lack of Fiscal Discipline**\n\n\n\n**In Year Changes**\n**to Spending Unit**\n\n**budgets**\n\n\n\n**No**\n**Commitment**\n\n**Control**\n\n\n\n**Idle Cash in**\n\n**Banks**\n\n\n\n**Too many**\n\n**UGBs**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Not credible**\n**Cash/Debt Plans**\n\n\n\n**Poor Control on Budget**\n\n**Execution**\n\n\n\n\n\n**Cash shortages**\n\n\n\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0329, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(176.80319213867188, 642.2740478515625, 435.1893310546875, 704.0660400390625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": false, "height": 129, "number": 16, "size": 13340, "transform": [258.3861389160156, 0.0, -0.0, 61.79197311401367, 176.80319213867188, 642.2740478515625], "width": 539, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Preventing Further Accumulation of Arrears\n\n12. To fend off further accumulation of arrears, the Mozambique government needs to\nresolve the weaknesses in expenditure process, budget allocations and cash management.\nThrough meetings with officials and a one-day seminar, the mission identified the following\nunderlying causes for arrear accumulation (also see Figure 1):\n\nTo be discussed in Chapter 2:\n\nTo be discussed in Chapter 2:\n\n• The ministry of economy and finance has limited control on budget execution. This\nmajor weakness stems from an overly simplified process that does not clearly distinguish\nthe main phases of expenditure and prevents proper commitment control.\n\nTo be discussed in Chapter 3:\n\n• The budget, specifically its decomposition in administrative items, is not credible.\nDespite rather accurate revenue forecasts, budget allocations to spending units are not\nproperly calibrated to their financing needs, and subject to frequent in-year changes.\nThese unstable budget allocations lead spending units to commit resources in excess of\ntheir budget allocation resulting in overspending and/or arrears.\n\nTo be discussed in Chapter 4:\n\n• Cash supply does not sustain a smooth continuation of expenses. This results from\nrevenue scarcity (which is largely out of the government’s hands) and a perfectible\nmanagement of cash within and outside the treasury single account (CUT).\n\nTo be discussed in Chapter 5:\n\nThe sheer number of spending units (UGBs) hampers all of the above-mentioned\nfunctions. Budget execution and preparation and cash management are made uneasy. UGBs\nwith low financial activity hardly reach best standards, skills, and economies of scale for budget\n\nmanagement. There is a need to streamline this network.\n\nFigure 1. Underlying Causes of the Arrear Fiscal Cliff\n\n•\n\nInaccuracy of\n\nExpenditure\n\nProjections\n\nPoor Confidence in Government\n\nFinancial Signature\n\nLack of Fiscal Discipline\n\nIn Year Changes\nto Spending Unit\n\nbudgets\n\nNo\nCommitment\n\nControl\n\nIdle Cash in\n\nBanks\n\nToo many\n\nUGBs\n\nNot credible\nCash/Debt Plans\n\nPoor Control on Budget\n\nExecution\n\nCash shortages\n\n17", "text_characters": 1770}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Strengthening the Budget Execution** **Process**\n\n**13.** **Expenditure control is an essential element for fiscal discipline, sustainability, and**\n**quality of expenditure** . There should be specific forms of control during the different stages of\nthe budget execution process, some being centralized at the ministry of finance while others can\nbe decentralized. Systematic controls of budget execution will help comprehend the dynamics of\nexpenditure, the relevance of budget allocations, and the efficiency of policies implemented by\nthe spending units.\n\n\n**14.** **The expenditure process should allow recording at least three key stages of**\n**expenditure** . For control purposes, the literature [3] distinguishes seven stages of the expenditure\ncycle (i.e. authorization, apportionment, reservation, commitment, verification, payment order\nand payment). Of these seven stages, three have a direct impact on government’s obligations\nand debt, as shown in Figure 2: (i) commitment; (ii) good/services receipt and verification; and (iii)\npayments. For the sake of arrear control, it is crucial to record at least these three stages.\n\n\n**Figure 2. Three Key Phases in the Expenditure Chain**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|ture, yet certain cost to the budget) Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n||Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor|\n|This stage is marked by the
issuance of a purchase order
and funds must be
encumbered at this stage to
avoid any potential building
of arrears||||\n|This stage is marked by the
issuance of a purchase order
and funds must be
encumbered at this stage to
avoid any potential building
of arrears|,
r
i
|,
r
i
||\n|This stage is marked by the
issuance of a purchase order
and funds must be
encumbered at this stage to
avoid any potential building
of arrears|,
r
i
|,
r
i
|L
o
|\n\n\n\n**The three phases should be recorded separately** to ensure the predictability of, and allow control over\nexpenses. Three main aggregates can be used for fiscal reporting and financial programming purposes:\n(i) commitments made, yet to be settled; (ii) verifications recorded yet to be paid (i.e. the expenditure\nfloat); and payments made (cash basis budget execution).\n\n**The Mozambique fiscal law** **[4]** **identifies the three stages of the expenditure execution**, that must\nhappen separately from other stages of expenditure, and demands fiscal reporting be based on\ncommitments. These legal provisions are practically not implemented.\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n\n3 See FAD Technical Note and Manual, _Expenditure Control, Key Features, Stages, and Actors_, by Sailendra\nPattanayak.\n\n4 Law 9/2002 of 12 of February, Law of Financial Management System.\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0005, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [109.52694702148438, 387.5869445800781, 437.1559143066406, 504.84600830078125], "columns": 4, "rows": 4}], "text": "Strengthening the Budget Execution Process\n\n13. Expenditure control is an essential element for fiscal discipline, sustainability, and\nquality of expenditure . There should be specific forms of control during the different stages of\nthe budget execution process, some being centralized at the ministry of finance while others can\nbe decentralized. Systematic controls of budget execution will help comprehend the dynamics of\nexpenditure, the relevance of budget allocations, and the efficiency of policies implemented by\nthe spending units.\n\n14. The expenditure process should allow recording at least three key stages of\nexpenditure . For control purposes, the literature [3] distinguishes seven stages of the expenditure\ncycle (i.e. authorization, apportionment, reservation, commitment, verification, payment order\nand payment). Of these seven stages, three have a direct impact on government’s obligations\nand debt, as shown in Figure 2: (i) commitment; (ii) good/services receipt and verification; and (iii)\npayments. For the sake of arrear control, it is crucial to record at least these three stages.\n\nFigure 2. Three Key Phases in the Expenditure Chain\n\n Col1 ture, yet certain cost to the budget) Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor Col3 Col4 \n\n Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor Verification: acknowledges cost and debtor \n This stage is marked by the issuance of a purchase order and funds must be encumbered at this stage to avoid any potential building of arrears \n This stage is marked by the issuance of a purchase order and funds must be encumbered at this stage to avoid any potential building of arrears , r i , r i \n This stage is marked by the issuance of a purchase order and funds must be encumbered at this stage to avoid any potential building of arrears , r i , r i L o \n\nThe three phases should be recorded separately to ensure the predictability of, and allow control over\nexpenses. Three main aggregates can be used for fiscal reporting and financial programming purposes:\n(i) commitments made, yet to be settled; (ii) verifications recorded yet to be paid (i.e. the expenditure\nfloat); and payments made (cash basis budget execution).\n\nThe Mozambique fiscal law [4] identifies the three stages of the expenditure execution, that must\nhappen separately from other stages of expenditure, and demands fiscal reporting be based on\ncommitments. These legal provisions are practically not implemented.\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n3 See FAD Technical Note and Manual, _Expenditure Control, Key Features, Stages, and Actors_, by Sailendra\nPattanayak.\n\n4 Law 9/2002 of 12 of February, Law of Financial Management System.\n\n18", "text_characters": 2259}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Loose Control over Budget Execution**\n\n\n**15.** **The budget is executed through the public sector financial management system**\n**(SISTAFE), which can cover main stages of the expenditure.** The SISTAFE is robust enough to\nrecord all transactions made by the spending units (UGBs). It records different phases in the\nexpenditure workflow including commitments, verifications and payments. Although\ncommitments are not recorded yet, a simple patch could be implemented to do so. SISTAFE is\nabout to be upgraded to cover all phases of budget execution from allotment of funds to\npayments, including the procurement phase (pre-commitment stage).\n\n\n**16.** **Not all UGBs have access to e-SISTAFE.** Due to constraints mainly related with\ninterconnections and power supply, a set of UGBs, mainly at the district level, execute the budget\nwith technical support from other spending units to access the system, or receiving advanced\npayments. As for the latter the expenditure process is made recessively, with payments occurring\nbefore the certification and commitment phases.\n\n\n**17.** **The Treasury has set a system by which transactions are entered in the system as**\n**they mature for payment, not when the individual stages happen.** Practically, spending units\nkeep invoices and contracts in ad hoc ledgers, out of e-SISTAFE. Then they operate spending by\nthe sole amount of transactions complying with the weekly cash ceiling set by the Treasury. All\nsteps of expenditure are recorded within one week [5] as follows: commitments and verifications\nare recorded in SYSTAFE simultaneously; and payments are made within four days, e.g. the time\nlapse the Treasury needs to execute the disbursements.\n\n\n**18.** **Squeezing expenditure phases into such a short time lapse, denies capturing**\n**commitments and invoices when they occur.** It encourages the neglection of critical\ndocuments such as contracts, receipts and invoices that are put on the back burner until the last\nmoment when transactions are done. Therefore, fiscal reporting in Mozambique is incomplete\nand does not provide a fair reflection on government obligations. Decisions on fiscal policies are\npoorly informed in the lack of accurate data on real execution process.\n\n\n**19.** **Commitment control is loose or inexistent.** Complying with Mozambique’s legal\nframework, investment contracts shall be submitted by spending units to the supreme audit (TA)\nfor a control on procedural regularity, not budget compliance. Prior the TA’s control, the Treasury\nshould conduct a preliminary control on commitments ( _pre-cabimento_ ). In practice, the ceiling\nissued by the Treasury is not binding the purchasing UGB, and does not prevent them from over\npurchasing in excess of their budget. Practically most commitments are not controlled upstream,\nand the financial sustainability of spending units’ procurement is not ensured.\n\n\n**20.** **Reports on budget execution produced by the General Accounting Directorate are**\n**not realistic.** Table 3 indicates the final report of operating expenditure for 2015, it is\n\n\n5 Source: SISTAFE database provided by CEDSIF.\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Loose Control over Budget Execution\n\n15. The budget is executed through the public sector financial management system\n(SISTAFE), which can cover main stages of the expenditure. The SISTAFE is robust enough to\nrecord all transactions made by the spending units (UGBs). It records different phases in the\nexpenditure workflow including commitments, verifications and payments. Although\ncommitments are not recorded yet, a simple patch could be implemented to do so. SISTAFE is\nabout to be upgraded to cover all phases of budget execution from allotment of funds to\npayments, including the procurement phase (pre-commitment stage).\n\n16. Not all UGBs have access to e-SISTAFE. Due to constraints mainly related with\ninterconnections and power supply, a set of UGBs, mainly at the district level, execute the budget\nwith technical support from other spending units to access the system, or receiving advanced\npayments. As for the latter the expenditure process is made recessively, with payments occurring\nbefore the certification and commitment phases.\n\n17. The Treasury has set a system by which transactions are entered in the system as\nthey mature for payment, not when the individual stages happen. Practically, spending units\nkeep invoices and contracts in ad hoc ledgers, out of e-SISTAFE. Then they operate spending by\nthe sole amount of transactions complying with the weekly cash ceiling set by the Treasury. All\nsteps of expenditure are recorded within one week [5] as follows: commitments and verifications\nare recorded in SYSTAFE simultaneously; and payments are made within four days, e.g. the time\nlapse the Treasury needs to execute the disbursements.\n\n18. Squeezing expenditure phases into such a short time lapse, denies capturing\ncommitments and invoices when they occur. It encourages the neglection of critical\ndocuments such as contracts, receipts and invoices that are put on the back burner until the last\nmoment when transactions are done. Therefore, fiscal reporting in Mozambique is incomplete\nand does not provide a fair reflection on government obligations. Decisions on fiscal policies are\npoorly informed in the lack of accurate data on real execution process.\n\n19. Commitment control is loose or inexistent. Complying with Mozambique’s legal\nframework, investment contracts shall be submitted by spending units to the supreme audit (TA)\nfor a control on procedural regularity, not budget compliance. Prior the TA’s control, the Treasury\nshould conduct a preliminary control on commitments ( _pre-cabimento_ ). In practice, the ceiling\nissued by the Treasury is not binding the purchasing UGB, and does not prevent them from over\npurchasing in excess of their budget. Practically most commitments are not controlled upstream,\nand the financial sustainability of spending units’ procurement is not ensured.\n\n20. Reports on budget execution produced by the General Accounting Directorate are\nnot realistic. Table 3 indicates the final report of operating expenditure for 2015, it is\n\n5 Source: SISTAFE database provided by CEDSIF.\n\n19", "text_characters": 2585}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "symptomatic that the level of liquidated expenditure is exactly the same as the level of paid\nexpenditure across the economic classification lines, assuming no existence of arrears. However,\nthe stock disclosed by the authorities related to 2015 amounts to 3 billion meticais, and 9 billion\nmeticais in 2016 although fiscal statements constantly report zero arrears.\n\n\n**Table 3. Summary of the 2015 Fiscal Statement**\n\n(in millions of meticais)\n\n\n\n**Committed**\n**Ord** **Economic Classification** **Adjusted Budget**\n**Expenditure**\n\n\n\n**Verified**\n**Expenditure**\n\n\n\n**Paid**\n**Expenses**\n\n\n\n1 Personnel Expenditure 64.484,8 64.105,5 64.092,1 64.092,1\n\n2 Goods and Services 23.403,3 22.537,2 22.452,7 22.452,7\n\n3 Interest on Debt 7.577,4 7.577,4 7.577,4 7.577,4\n\n4 Current transfers 20.016,9 19.864,7 19.858,0 19.858,0\n\n5 Subsidies 2.277,3 2.213,4 2.213,4 2.213,4\n\n6 Pending payments of previous Year 218,1 162,4 162,3 162,3\n\n7 Other current expenditure 781,8 745,8 745,8 745,8\n\n8 Capital Expenditure 5.113,2 400,3 400,3 400,3\n**9** **Total** **123.872,8** **117.606,7** **117.502,0** **117.502,0**\n\nSource: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) Expenditure Execution Report of 2015.\n\n\n**21.** **There is little financial information on UGBs’ financial needs during the fiscal year.**\nAbsent any information on upcoming payments (i.e., verifications yet to be paid) the Treasury\nprojections for expenditure are shorter than one month. Therefore, the Treasury provides UGBs\ntheir ceilings for expenditure on a weekly basis, based on short-term availability of cash, and\nUGBs proceed with payments within less than one week.\n\n**Improving Expenditure Control**\n\n\n**22.** **Controlling and recording commitments is key to preventing expenditure arrears.**\nThe commitment of resources is a critical stage of the expenditure process. Controlling\ncommitments is essential for controlling expenditure. The key objective of commitment control is\nto manage the initial incurrence of obligations, rather than the subsequent cash payments, in\norder to enforce expenditure ceilings and avoid expenditure arrears.\n\n\n**23.** **The UGBs should be given commitment ceilings sufficiently in advance so as to**\n**improve the quality of public expenditure management downstream.** Restoring an effective\nprocess for commitment control implies that apportionment by the Treasury will be made on a\nquarterly basis. This would provide the following improvements: (i) the UGBs will have sufficient\nroom to enable records of verification stage; (ii) the process of programming can be\nimplemented interactively, starting with the submission of financial needs of funds by the UGBs\nto the Treasury; and (iii) the Treasury would gain critical information to consolidate a quarterly\ncash plan.\n\n20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "symptomatic that the level of liquidated expenditure is exactly the same as the level of paid\nexpenditure across the economic classification lines, assuming no existence of arrears. However,\nthe stock disclosed by the authorities related to 2015 amounts to 3 billion meticais, and 9 billion\nmeticais in 2016 although fiscal statements constantly report zero arrears.\n\nTable 3. Summary of the 2015 Fiscal Statement\n\n(in millions of meticais)\n\nCommitted\nOrd Economic Classification Adjusted Budget\nExpenditure\n\nVerified\nExpenditure\n\nPaid\nExpenses\n\n1 Personnel Expenditure 64.484,8 64.105,5 64.092,1 64.092,1\n\n2 Goods and Services 23.403,3 22.537,2 22.452,7 22.452,7\n\n3 Interest on Debt 7.577,4 7.577,4 7.577,4 7.577,4\n\n4 Current transfers 20.016,9 19.864,7 19.858,0 19.858,0\n\n5 Subsidies 2.277,3 2.213,4 2.213,4 2.213,4\n\n6 Pending payments of previous Year 218,1 162,4 162,3 162,3\n\n7 Other current expenditure 781,8 745,8 745,8 745,8\n\n8 Capital Expenditure 5.113,2 400,3 400,3 400,3\n9 Total 123.872,8 117.606,7 117.502,0 117.502,0\n\nSource: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) Expenditure Execution Report of 2015.\n\n21. There is little financial information on UGBs’ financial needs during the fiscal year.\nAbsent any information on upcoming payments (i.e., verifications yet to be paid) the Treasury\nprojections for expenditure are shorter than one month. Therefore, the Treasury provides UGBs\ntheir ceilings for expenditure on a weekly basis, based on short-term availability of cash, and\nUGBs proceed with payments within less than one week.\n\nImproving Expenditure Control\n\n22. Controlling and recording commitments is key to preventing expenditure arrears.\nThe commitment of resources is a critical stage of the expenditure process. Controlling\ncommitments is essential for controlling expenditure. The key objective of commitment control is\nto manage the initial incurrence of obligations, rather than the subsequent cash payments, in\norder to enforce expenditure ceilings and avoid expenditure arrears.\n\n23. The UGBs should be given commitment ceilings sufficiently in advance so as to\nimprove the quality of public expenditure management downstream. Restoring an effective\nprocess for commitment control implies that apportionment by the Treasury will be made on a\nquarterly basis. This would provide the following improvements: (i) the UGBs will have sufficient\nroom to enable records of verification stage; (ii) the process of programming can be\nimplemented interactively, starting with the submission of financial needs of funds by the UGBs\nto the Treasury; and (iii) the Treasury would gain critical information to consolidate a quarterly\ncash plan.\n\n20", "text_characters": 2260}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "**24.** **Restoring the normal functioning of the expenditure chain does not need further**\n**developments in the system.** A new functionality is being developed to record procurement via\ne-SISTAFE. This functionality could strengthen public procurement management and ensure\nbudget allocations exist and are reserved before launching the public tender (adding a\npre-commitment stage). However, the budget execution process for the stages of commitment\nand verification might still fall out of e-SISTAFE if the measures recommended above are not\ntaken. Therefore, there is no need to wait to complete the current pilot of this new functionality\nto include public works and to roll-it throughout the country during the next two years.\n\n\n**25.** **The Treasury should change its business model and move from the current cash**\n**rationing to a financial programing approach.** Figure 3 indicates what should be the role of\nthe Treasury in forecasting the quarterly expenditure, based on previsions made by spending\nagencies, the revenue authority and the debt management department. This action will give\nfoster financial programming by the UGBs and restore the three phases of expenditure by\nrecording the commitments in due time and the verifications in e-SISTAFE.\n\n\n**Figure 3. Institutional Changes Needed to Restore the Chain of Expenditure**\n\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n\n21\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.3112, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 338.4345397949219, 540.0, 673.6845092773438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 411, "number": 7, "size": 242610, "transform": [449.9999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 335.2499694824219, 90.0, 338.4345397949219], "width": 670, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "24. Restoring the normal functioning of the expenditure chain does not need further\ndevelopments in the system. A new functionality is being developed to record procurement via\ne-SISTAFE. This functionality could strengthen public procurement management and ensure\nbudget allocations exist and are reserved before launching the public tender (adding a\npre-commitment stage). However, the budget execution process for the stages of commitment\nand verification might still fall out of e-SISTAFE if the measures recommended above are not\ntaken. Therefore, there is no need to wait to complete the current pilot of this new functionality\nto include public works and to roll-it throughout the country during the next two years.\n\n25. The Treasury should change its business model and move from the current cash\nrationing to a financial programing approach. Figure 3 indicates what should be the role of\nthe Treasury in forecasting the quarterly expenditure, based on previsions made by spending\nagencies, the revenue authority and the debt management department. This action will give\nfoster financial programming by the UGBs and restore the three phases of expenditure by\nrecording the commitments in due time and the verifications in e-SISTAFE.\n\nFigure 3. Institutional Changes Needed to Restore the Chain of Expenditure\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n21", "text_characters": 1132}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Recommendation 2. Restore the Expenditure Chain
Background
The phases of the expenditure currently are recorded simultaneously, which is not compliant with the
fiscal law6. There is little information and control over commitments, expenditure, and arrears.
Key measures
• Set quarterly ceilings for commitments, based on revenue forecasts;
• Immediately restore the commitment and verification phases in e-SISTAFE;
• Raise awareness through seminars on the need to restore the normal expenditure process;
• Improve financial programing by the National Treasury Directorate;
• Revise the calendar of data collection from UGBs so that the Treasury can prepare the quarterly
financial programing;
• Gradually implement the commitment control, starting from the UGBs at central level.
Institutional arrangements
The National Directorate of Treasury will need to coordinate with CEDSIF to ensure availability of support
and ensure the implementation process goes smoothly.
Risks and mitigation measures
The restoration of the expenditure phases will require extensive capacity development. While the chain
of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and verifications
should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP) and reported in fiscal
reports. Communicating to the private sector is important to bring the awareness on how important is
the effective control of public expenditure.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|
Action 1
|
Set quarterly ceilings for commitments
|By January 2018
|\n|Action 2
|UGBs record their commitments in e-SISTAFE upon contracting
|January 2018
|\n|
Action 3
|
UGBs record their verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers'
invoices, per legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law
|
January 2018
|\n|Action 4
|Train budget managers (central and provinces levels)
|
From January 2018,
continuous
|\n|Action 5
|Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and
inform suppliers
|Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and
inform suppliers
|\n|Action 6
|
Improve the Treasury’s forecasting techniques for financial
programing
|
Improve the Treasury’s forecasting techniques for financial
programing
|\n|Action 7
|
Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is
effectively restored
|From March 2018,
continuous
|\n|Action 8
|
Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs all
central level
in some provinces
in all provinces
|
March 2018
June 2018
September 2018
|\n|Action 9
|
Based on the experience from the pilot, issue a manual for
expenditure and commitment control|
By December 2018|\n\n\n\n6 Law 9/2002 of 12 of February, Law of Financial Management System.\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21818542480469, 72.1199951171875, 539.7817993164062, 654.1796264648438], "columns": 3, "rows": 10}], "text": "Recommendation 2. Restore the Expenditure Chain Background The phases of the expenditure currently are recorded simultaneously, which is not compliant with the fiscal law6. There is little information and control over commitments, expenditure, and arrears. Key measures • Set quarterly ceilings for commitments, based on revenue forecasts; • Immediately restore the commitment and verification phases in e-SISTAFE; • Raise awareness through seminars on the need to restore the normal expenditure process; • Improve financial programing by the National Treasury Directorate; • Revise the calendar of data collection from UGBs so that the Treasury can prepare the quarterly financial programing; • Gradually implement the commitment control, starting from the UGBs at central level. Institutional arrangements The National Directorate of Treasury will need to coordinate with CEDSIF to ensure availability of support and ensure the implementation process goes smoothly. Risks and mitigation measures The restoration of the expenditure phases will require extensive capacity development. While the chain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and verifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP) and reported in fiscal reports. Communicating to the private sector is important to bring the awareness on how important is the effective control of public expenditure. Schedule for implementation Col2 Col3 \n\n Action 1 Set quarterly ceilings for commitments By January 2018 \n Action 2 UGBs record their commitments in e-SISTAFE upon contracting January 2018 \n Action 3 UGBs record their verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law January 2018 \n Action 4 Train budget managers (central and provinces levels) From January 2018, continuous \n Action 5 Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers \n Action 6 Improve the Treasury’s forecasting techniques for financial programing Improve the Treasury’s forecasting techniques for financial programing \n Action 7 Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored From March 2018, continuous \n Action 8 Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs all central level in some provinces in all provinces March 2018 June 2018 September 2018 \n Action 9 Based on the experience from the pilot, issue a manual for expenditure and commitment control By December 2018 \n\n6 Law 9/2002 of 12 of February, Law of Financial Management System.\n\n22", "text_characters": 2266}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Improving Fiscal Reporting**\n\n\n**26.** **Fiscal reporting fosters accountability and improves fiscal policy decision making** . It\nis a powerful tool to report on budget execution to the public, to base policy decision-making on\na fair view of government finance, and to give clear outlook to managers on available resources.\nFiscal reporting is a legal requirement in Mozambique’s legal framework. The Constitution\nrequires fiscal reporting from the government to the Parliament and the public, and the SISTAFE\nlaw and regulations outline how and when this should be done. [7]\n\n\n**27.** **Quarterly and year-end execution reports are produced and submitted to the**\n**Parliament on time, but their content can improve** . The budget execution reports (REOs) are\npublished 45 days after the end of each quarter, and the year-end execution report and financial\nstatement (CGE) is submitted end-May of the following year. These reports are public and\ninclude data available for the period, on a cumulative basis, in great detail. A substantial part of\nthese data is provided by the system, and the rest is captured from e-SISTAFE. However,\nimportant data such as information on real commitments and verifications are missing in these\nreports. Information on payments is available, but transactions outside the treasury single\naccount (CUT) need manual processing before being reported. In some periods, large amounts of\nunexplained transactions have been observed. Other concerns are the misalignment with the\n2014 Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM 2014), the absence of balance sheet reporting\non the main financial liabilities and assets, and late discussion of the CGE in Parliament with twoyear lag.\n\n\n**28.** **Fiscal reporting needs to be further** **streamlined and its production automated.**\nFinancial reporting functionalities and accounting processes in e-SISTAFE could be further\nimproved, mainly by incorporating data available in other IT systems and automatizing the\nproduction of the REOs and the CGE. These reports should adopt GFSM 2014 framework and\ninclude _Mapa Fiscal_ overall presentation of the transactions for the period _[8]_ . A simplified balance\nsheet should be included in the CGE to report on the main financial assets and liabilities known [9] .\nWhile the chain of expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on real\ncommitments and verifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting\ndirectorate (DNCP) and reported in the REOs and CGE from end-2017. This transitory measure\nwould be discontinued when the system starts capturing the information in due time.\n\n\n7 Articles 179, 206, and 230 of the Constitution; Articles 37, 48, and 50 of the SISTAFE Law; and Articles 24 and 27\nof SISTAFE regulations.\n\n8 Operational Statement in GFSM 2014, includes revenues, expenses, and transactions in assets and liabilities.\n\n9 This should include debt balances, payables, cash and bank balances, financial investments, other financial\nassets, and report on contingent liabilities. For further details see FAD TA Report from Delphine Moretti,\n_Reassessment of Public Accounting Reform Roadmap_ (July 2014).\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Improving Fiscal Reporting\n\n26. Fiscal reporting fosters accountability and improves fiscal policy decision making . It\nis a powerful tool to report on budget execution to the public, to base policy decision-making on\na fair view of government finance, and to give clear outlook to managers on available resources.\nFiscal reporting is a legal requirement in Mozambique’s legal framework. The Constitution\nrequires fiscal reporting from the government to the Parliament and the public, and the SISTAFE\nlaw and regulations outline how and when this should be done. [7]\n\n27. Quarterly and year-end execution reports are produced and submitted to the\nParliament on time, but their content can improve . The budget execution reports (REOs) are\npublished 45 days after the end of each quarter, and the year-end execution report and financial\nstatement (CGE) is submitted end-May of the following year. These reports are public and\ninclude data available for the period, on a cumulative basis, in great detail. A substantial part of\nthese data is provided by the system, and the rest is captured from e-SISTAFE. However,\nimportant data such as information on real commitments and verifications are missing in these\nreports. Information on payments is available, but transactions outside the treasury single\naccount (CUT) need manual processing before being reported. In some periods, large amounts of\nunexplained transactions have been observed. Other concerns are the misalignment with the\n2014 Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM 2014), the absence of balance sheet reporting\non the main financial liabilities and assets, and late discussion of the CGE in Parliament with twoyear lag.\n\n28. Fiscal reporting needs to be further streamlined and its production automated.\nFinancial reporting functionalities and accounting processes in e-SISTAFE could be further\nimproved, mainly by incorporating data available in other IT systems and automatizing the\nproduction of the REOs and the CGE. These reports should adopt GFSM 2014 framework and\ninclude _Mapa Fiscal_ overall presentation of the transactions for the period _[8]_ . A simplified balance\nsheet should be included in the CGE to report on the main financial assets and liabilities known [9] .\nWhile the chain of expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on real\ncommitments and verifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting\ndirectorate (DNCP) and reported in the REOs and CGE from end-2017. This transitory measure\nwould be discontinued when the system starts capturing the information in due time.\n\n7 Articles 179, 206, and 230 of the Constitution; Articles 37, 48, and 50 of the SISTAFE Law; and Articles 24 and 27\nof SISTAFE regulations.\n\n8 Operational Statement in GFSM 2014, includes revenues, expenses, and transactions in assets and liabilities.\n\n9 This should include debt balances, payables, cash and bank balances, financial investments, other financial\nassets, and report on contingent liabilities. For further details see FAD TA Report from Delphine Moretti,\n_Reassessment of Public Accounting Reform Roadmap_ (July 2014).\n\n23", "text_characters": 2654}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**29.** **The stock of arrears resulting from the validation process must be immediately**\n**reported** . These arrears correspond to extra-budgetary expenditures that were not committed\nand verified when made in the past. Therefore, the related debt to suppliers is not accrued. Best\npractice suggests reopening the accounting of previous years and registering the liabilities and\nassociated expenditures in the periods they occurred. Given the difficulty of this approach and\npossible legal constraints to do so, a more practical solution is the one adopted by Angola. It\nconsists of recording the expenditure and the liability to suppliers in the year they are validated.\nThe verified stock of arrears must be shown in fiscal reports and statistics, even before the\nsolution to clear them is agreed.\n##### **Optimizing Government Cash**\n\n**30.** **Sound cash management contributes to orderly execution of the budget.** The\nobjective of cash management is to ensure that the government has sufficient liquidity at all\ntimes to pay obligations as they fall due, without the need to ration cash (and thereby interrupt\npredictable execution of the budget) and without accumulating arrears. Whatever the country’s\nlevel of revenue, there are likely to be times during the year when there are mismatches between\ncash inflows and cash outflows, resulting in short-term cash surpluses or, more problematically\nfor budget execution, short-term cash deficits. Banking arrangements that centralize the\ngovernment’s liquidity within a treasury single account are critical for optimization of liquidity by\nreducing the possibility of idle cash. Cash flow forecasting facilitates pro-active management of\nthe cash balance, to eliminate (or mitigate) temporary cash deficits.\n\n**A Sound, yet Insufficiently Exploited Framework for Cash**\n**Management**\n\n\n**31.** **The government’s banking arrangements are built around a main account at the**\n**central bank, with links to other accounts at both the central bank and commercial banks.**\nThe main account functions as the CUT and is operated by the Treasury. It is possible with\nSISTAFE to set up sub-accounts within the CUT as ledger accounts. The government has other\naccounts, in both local currency and foreign currency, at the central bank that are outside the\nCUT; these are operated by the Treasury and by other entities. In some cases, legislation or\ncontractual requirements may prevent deposits from being held within the CUT; in other cases,\nthe accounts reflect custom and practice to-date. The degree to which these accounts are\nmanaged in coordination with the CUT varies, ranging from periodic or ad hoc pooling of\nliquidity to complete separation. The government also has accounts at commercial banks. Transit\naccounts are used to receive revenue and make payments when transactions cannot be executed\ndirectly from the CUT. There are other accounts at commercial banks in which cash is held on a\nmore sustained basis; these accounts are operated largely by entities other than the Treasury. As\nwith the non-CUT accounts at the central bank, the degree to which these commercial bank\naccounts are coordinated with the CUT varies (see Figure 4).\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0007, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "29. The stock of arrears resulting from the validation process must be immediately\nreported . These arrears correspond to extra-budgetary expenditures that were not committed\nand verified when made in the past. Therefore, the related debt to suppliers is not accrued. Best\npractice suggests reopening the accounting of previous years and registering the liabilities and\nassociated expenditures in the periods they occurred. Given the difficulty of this approach and\npossible legal constraints to do so, a more practical solution is the one adopted by Angola. It\nconsists of recording the expenditure and the liability to suppliers in the year they are validated.\nThe verified stock of arrears must be shown in fiscal reports and statistics, even before the\nsolution to clear them is agreed.\nOptimizing Government Cash\n\n30. Sound cash management contributes to orderly execution of the budget. The\nobjective of cash management is to ensure that the government has sufficient liquidity at all\ntimes to pay obligations as they fall due, without the need to ration cash (and thereby interrupt\npredictable execution of the budget) and without accumulating arrears. Whatever the country’s\nlevel of revenue, there are likely to be times during the year when there are mismatches between\ncash inflows and cash outflows, resulting in short-term cash surpluses or, more problematically\nfor budget execution, short-term cash deficits. Banking arrangements that centralize the\ngovernment’s liquidity within a treasury single account are critical for optimization of liquidity by\nreducing the possibility of idle cash. Cash flow forecasting facilitates pro-active management of\nthe cash balance, to eliminate (or mitigate) temporary cash deficits.\n\nA Sound, yet Insufficiently Exploited Framework for Cash\nManagement\n\n31. The government’s banking arrangements are built around a main account at the\ncentral bank, with links to other accounts at both the central bank and commercial banks.\nThe main account functions as the CUT and is operated by the Treasury. It is possible with\nSISTAFE to set up sub-accounts within the CUT as ledger accounts. The government has other\naccounts, in both local currency and foreign currency, at the central bank that are outside the\nCUT; these are operated by the Treasury and by other entities. In some cases, legislation or\ncontractual requirements may prevent deposits from being held within the CUT; in other cases,\nthe accounts reflect custom and practice to-date. The degree to which these accounts are\nmanaged in coordination with the CUT varies, ranging from periodic or ad hoc pooling of\nliquidity to complete separation. The government also has accounts at commercial banks. Transit\naccounts are used to receive revenue and make payments when transactions cannot be executed\ndirectly from the CUT. There are other accounts at commercial banks in which cash is held on a\nmore sustained basis; these accounts are operated largely by entities other than the Treasury. As\nwith the non-CUT accounts at the central bank, the degree to which these commercial bank\naccounts are coordinated with the CUT varies (see Figure 4).\n\n24", "text_characters": 2658}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0027-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 4. Current CUT and Banking Arrangements Architecture**\n\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n**32.** **The main tools for cash planning are the “cash budget” and the “cash plan”.** At the\nstart of the fiscal year, the Treasury prepares the cash budget, which decomposes the approved\nbudget by month. It is a largely static document, which undergoes few amendments during the\nyear, unless there are changes in revenue forecasts. In addition, each month the Treasury\nprepares the cash plan, which is a cash flow projection for the coming month, broken down by\nweek. It incorporates recent information on revenue receipts, the requirements of the executing\nunits reported in e-SISTAFE, and any new information from sectors. These plans, which are\npassed to the Bank of Mozambique, are discussed at a weekly meeting chaired by the Minister at\nwhich decisions are made on the financial quotas to be released to UGBs in the week ahead.\n\n\n**33.** **The Treasury does not currently actively manage the government’s aggregate cash**\n**balance.** It does not borrow or lend in the money market to maintain a steady balance in the\nCUT. The government is able to borrow short-term on an occasional basis when it forecasts an\nemerging cash flow constraint, but it does so by accepting liability for some of the treasury bills\nissued by the Bank of Mozambique for monetary policy purposes.\n\n**Making the Best of the Treasury Single Account**\n\n\n**34.** **Progress in the roll out of e-SISTAFE continues to expand the use of the CUT.** The\nnumber of UGBs has grown in line with the devolution of responsibility of some units in the\nprovinces for service delivery, and currently stands at 1,654. Of them, however, 1,508 (or\n91 percent) are fully connected to e-SISTAFE.\n\n\n25\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1271, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(156.34983825683594, 99.36231994628906, 473.14166259765625, 293.81231689453125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(168,ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1))", "has-mask": true, "height": 539, "number": 9, "size": 36117, "transform": [316.79180908203125, 0.0, -0.0, 194.4499969482422, 156.34983825683594, 99.36231994628906], "width": 878, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 4. Current CUT and Banking Arrangements Architecture\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n32. The main tools for cash planning are the “cash budget” and the “cash plan”. At the\nstart of the fiscal year, the Treasury prepares the cash budget, which decomposes the approved\nbudget by month. It is a largely static document, which undergoes few amendments during the\nyear, unless there are changes in revenue forecasts. In addition, each month the Treasury\nprepares the cash plan, which is a cash flow projection for the coming month, broken down by\nweek. It incorporates recent information on revenue receipts, the requirements of the executing\nunits reported in e-SISTAFE, and any new information from sectors. These plans, which are\npassed to the Bank of Mozambique, are discussed at a weekly meeting chaired by the Minister at\nwhich decisions are made on the financial quotas to be released to UGBs in the week ahead.\n\n33. The Treasury does not currently actively manage the government’s aggregate cash\nbalance. It does not borrow or lend in the money market to maintain a steady balance in the\nCUT. The government is able to borrow short-term on an occasional basis when it forecasts an\nemerging cash flow constraint, but it does so by accepting liability for some of the treasury bills\nissued by the Bank of Mozambique for monetary policy purposes.\n\nMaking the Best of the Treasury Single Account\n\n34. Progress in the roll out of e-SISTAFE continues to expand the use of the CUT. The\nnumber of UGBs has grown in line with the devolution of responsibility of some units in the\nprovinces for service delivery, and currently stands at 1,654. Of them, however, 1,508 (or\n91 percent) are fully connected to e-SISTAFE.\n\n25", "text_characters": 1417}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-001", "cr-2023-024-fig-p0028-002"], "markdown": "\n\n\n|Benin
E|quatorial|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**go**|
**Guinea**|
|||||||\n|**Mali**
**Niger**
|
**Gabon**|**Burkin**
**Côte d'Iv**|** Faso**
** oire**||||||\n|**Centr**
**R**
**enegal**|**al Africa**
**public**
|** n**
|
|**Mozamb**|**ique**|**C**|**ngo, Re**
**of**|** ublic**|\n|**Chad**|**Cameroo**
|**n**|||||||\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Figure 5. Main Features Deposits at the central bank are more volatile than|of the Mozambique CUT The share of government deposits at the central|\n|---|---|\n|_Deposits at the central bank are more volatile than_
_other deposits. Deposits at commercial banks have_
_been increasing during 2017._
|_The share of government deposits at the central_
_bank, as opposed to at commercial banks, has been_
_on a downward trend._
|\n|**Benin**
**Burkina Faso**
**Cameroon**
**Central African**
**Republic**
**Chad**
**Congo, Republic**
**of**
**Côte d'Ivoire**
**Equatorial**
**Guinea**
**Gabon**
**Guinea Bissau**
**Mali**
**Niger**
**Senegal**
**Togo**
**Mozambique**
**0**
**1**
**2**
**3**
**4**
**5**
**6**
**0**
**0.5**
**1**
**1.5**
**2**
**2.5**
**3**
**3.5**
**4**
**4**
**All Deposits (in Months of expenditure**
**Share of Gov deposits at CB Compared w/ Deposits at Com**
**Banks**
**Comparator countries (2016)**|**Benin**
**Burkina Faso**
**Cameroon**
**Central African**
**Republic**
**Chad**
**Congo, Republic**
**of**
**Côte d'Ivoire**
**Equatorial**
**Guinea**
**Gabon**
**Guinea Bissau**
**Mali**
**Niger**
**Senegal**
**Togo**
**Mozambique**
**0**
**1**
**2**
**3**
**4**
**5**
**6**
**0**
**0.5**
**1**
**1.5**
**2**
**2.5**
**3**
**3.5**
**4**
**4**
**All Deposits (in Months of expenditure**
**Share of Gov deposits at CB Compared w/ Deposits at Com**
**Banks**
**Comparator countries (2016)**|\n\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n**35.** **Even so, significant liquidity lies outside the CUT—especially problematically**\n**outside the Bank of Mozambique, in commercial banks** (see Figure 5) **.** Cash advances\ncontinue to be made from the CUT into bank accounts outside the CUT, for instance, (i) in the\ncase of UGBs that do not have access to e-SISTAFE; (ii) to pay transactions financed by donors\nthat are not prepared to use the CUT for project expenditure; (iii) for payments made to suppliers\nin rural areas without bank accounts, for executing the budget in certain sectors; and (iv) and for\npetty cash payments. Advances are not swept back overnight into the CUT. Sectors tend also to\nhave bank accounts for self-generated (or “technical”) revenue, although the same degree of\nvisibility as to self-generated revenue could be achieved using sub-accounts within the CUT.\nSubstantial assistance from donors continues to flow through accounts in the commercial banks,\nand not through the CUT. Prospects for moving donor funds into sub-accounts within the CUT\nshould be investigated, but this is likely to be a medium-term endeavor.\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0535, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(318.5998229980469, 141.56051635742188, 528.0997924804688, 265.260498046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(74,ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1))", "has-mask": true, "height": 345, "number": 10, "size": 24018, "transform": [209.49996948242188, 0.0, -0.0, 123.69998931884766, 318.5998229980469, 141.56051635742188], "width": 575, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(95.6499252319336, 141.56057739257812, 300.6776428222656, 265.26055908203125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(68,ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1))", "has-mask": true, "height": 342, "number": 9, "size": 25002, "transform": [205.0277099609375, 0.0, -0.0, 123.69998931884766, 95.6499252319336, 141.56057739257812], "width": 569, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.31459045410156, 71.03042602539062, 539.8200073242188, 489.0965576171875], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}, {"bbox": [128.96946716308594, 319.7784423828125, 412.72637939453125, 414.7100830078125], "columns": 9, "rows": 5}], "text": "Benin E quatorial Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 \n\n go Guinea \n Mali Niger Gabon Burkin Côte d'Iv Faso oire \n Centr R enegal al Africa public n Mozamb ique C ngo, Re of ublic \n Chad Cameroo n \n\n Figure 5. Main Features Deposits at the central bank are more volatile than of the Mozambique CUT The share of government deposits at the central \n\n _Deposits at the central bank are more volatile than_ _other deposits. Deposits at commercial banks have_ _been increasing during 2017._ _The share of government deposits at the central_ _bank, as opposed to at commercial banks, has been_ _on a downward trend._ \n Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Gabon Guinea Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo Mozambique 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4 All Deposits (in Months of expenditure Share of Gov deposits at CB Compared w/ Deposits at Com Banks Comparator countries (2016) Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Gabon Guinea Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo Mozambique 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4 All Deposits (in Months of expenditure Share of Gov deposits at CB Compared w/ Deposits at Com Banks Comparator countries (2016) \n\nSource: Mission.\n\n35. Even so, significant liquidity lies outside the CUT—especially problematically\noutside the Bank of Mozambique, in commercial banks (see Figure 5) . Cash advances\ncontinue to be made from the CUT into bank accounts outside the CUT, for instance, (i) in the\ncase of UGBs that do not have access to e-SISTAFE; (ii) to pay transactions financed by donors\nthat are not prepared to use the CUT for project expenditure; (iii) for payments made to suppliers\nin rural areas without bank accounts, for executing the budget in certain sectors; and (iv) and for\npetty cash payments. Advances are not swept back overnight into the CUT. Sectors tend also to\nhave bank accounts for self-generated (or “technical”) revenue, although the same degree of\nvisibility as to self-generated revenue could be achieved using sub-accounts within the CUT.\nSubstantial assistance from donors continues to flow through accounts in the commercial banks,\nand not through the CUT. Prospects for moving donor funds into sub-accounts within the CUT\nshould be investigated, but this is likely to be a medium-term endeavor.\n\n26", "text_characters": 1974}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**36.** **The Treasury’s efforts to close the accounts of budget entities at commercial banks**\n**need to continue** . Thousands of inactive, infrequently used, or inappropriately opened accounts\nhave been closed in recent years. New accounts continue to be identified. Moreover, the opening\nof new accounts outside the CUT continues to be permitted, with authorization by the sector\nsupervisor and by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. On a priority basis, revenue and\nexpenditure accounts must be opened at the Bank of Mozambique, except for accounts to pay\nwages and those used to receive student fees. In the absence of routine reporting by line\nministries and by commercial banks of the government accounts that exist at commercial banks,\nit is impossible for the Treasury to monitor the full extent of government liquidity. There is also\nthe risk that line ministries may be opening bank accounts without permission from the Treasury.\nThe Treasury has drafted a circular, in the form of a _diploma ministerial_, to clarify the regulations\nregarding accounts in commercial banks, and is awaiting approval to distribute it to UGBs; this\nshould be pursued as a priority.\n\n\n**37.** **Delays in sweeping revenue into the CUT reduce the efficiency of cash**\n**management.** The delays are of different kinds. Payments of taxes or self-generated revenue\ninto a commercial bank may be held by the bank for two days before sweeping it to an account\nin the name of the relevant Financial Management Directorate (DAF). Most DAF accounts are in\nthe Bank of Mozambique. The balances of the DAF account are then swept into the CUT. In many\ncases, this does not occur until the end of the month, but the Treasury notes that it monitors DAF\naccounts and may request that larger sums be swept more promptly. Revenue awaiting\nclassification, linking the taxpayer's deposit to the relevant tax, may take longer, however, and\nthe cumulative balances may be substantial; nonetheless, in principle there need not be any\ndelay in transferring such revenue to the CUT, as classifying and recording the revenue can be\nindependent of the movement of cash into the CUT. Self-generated revenues may also be held in\ntransit accounts, although to the extent that those revenues will be available to the UGBs, they\nhave an incentive to expedite the transfer to the CUT because only then does the budget\nauthority potentially become available.\n\n**Improving Cash Planning**\n\n\n**38.** **The cash budget is a useful tool to provide a monitoring benchmark.** It can also\ninform the annual borrowing plan prepared by the Debt Management Department of the\nTreasury, particularly the timing of the local issuance of domestic bonds through the stock\nexchange.\n\n\n**39.** **In Mozambique, the monthly cash plans are, in practice, an expenditure control**\n**tool, not a cash management tool.** The monthly cash plans are not unconstrained forecasts.\nThe revenue component is an exception; it is based on an updated projection from the revenue\nadministration. The expenditure data, however, are requests from UGBs for release of authority;\nthey are not forecasts. The Treasury then decides how much to release depending on the\nexpected adequacy of the cash reserves. This arrangement works well to manage the risk of a\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "36. The Treasury’s efforts to close the accounts of budget entities at commercial banks\nneed to continue . Thousands of inactive, infrequently used, or inappropriately opened accounts\nhave been closed in recent years. New accounts continue to be identified. Moreover, the opening\nof new accounts outside the CUT continues to be permitted, with authorization by the sector\nsupervisor and by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. On a priority basis, revenue and\nexpenditure accounts must be opened at the Bank of Mozambique, except for accounts to pay\nwages and those used to receive student fees. In the absence of routine reporting by line\nministries and by commercial banks of the government accounts that exist at commercial banks,\nit is impossible for the Treasury to monitor the full extent of government liquidity. There is also\nthe risk that line ministries may be opening bank accounts without permission from the Treasury.\nThe Treasury has drafted a circular, in the form of a _diploma ministerial_, to clarify the regulations\nregarding accounts in commercial banks, and is awaiting approval to distribute it to UGBs; this\nshould be pursued as a priority.\n\n37. Delays in sweeping revenue into the CUT reduce the efficiency of cash\nmanagement. The delays are of different kinds. Payments of taxes or self-generated revenue\ninto a commercial bank may be held by the bank for two days before sweeping it to an account\nin the name of the relevant Financial Management Directorate (DAF). Most DAF accounts are in\nthe Bank of Mozambique. The balances of the DAF account are then swept into the CUT. In many\ncases, this does not occur until the end of the month, but the Treasury notes that it monitors DAF\naccounts and may request that larger sums be swept more promptly. Revenue awaiting\nclassification, linking the taxpayer's deposit to the relevant tax, may take longer, however, and\nthe cumulative balances may be substantial; nonetheless, in principle there need not be any\ndelay in transferring such revenue to the CUT, as classifying and recording the revenue can be\nindependent of the movement of cash into the CUT. Self-generated revenues may also be held in\ntransit accounts, although to the extent that those revenues will be available to the UGBs, they\nhave an incentive to expedite the transfer to the CUT because only then does the budget\nauthority potentially become available.\n\nImproving Cash Planning\n\n38. The cash budget is a useful tool to provide a monitoring benchmark. It can also\ninform the annual borrowing plan prepared by the Debt Management Department of the\nTreasury, particularly the timing of the local issuance of domestic bonds through the stock\nexchange.\n\n39. In Mozambique, the monthly cash plans are, in practice, an expenditure control\ntool, not a cash management tool. The monthly cash plans are not unconstrained forecasts.\nThe revenue component is an exception; it is based on an updated projection from the revenue\nadministration. The expenditure data, however, are requests from UGBs for release of authority;\nthey are not forecasts. The Treasury then decides how much to release depending on the\nexpected adequacy of the cash reserves. This arrangement works well to manage the risk of a\n\n27", "text_characters": 2703}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "cash shortfall at any time. It allows the Treasury to hold back or delay expenditure—in other\nwords, to ration cash—if required. But this approach reduces the incentive for UGBs to plan their\nfinancial operations, and it risks creating unnecessary arrears or supply disruption.\n\n\n**40.** **The Treasury should adopt a more pro-active approach to managing the**\n**government’s aggregate liquidity to reduce the need to hold back or delay expenditure.**\nRestricting budget execution, i.e., cash rationing, should be the last course of action, not the first,\nonce other measures to accommodate short-term mismatches in cash inflows and outflows have\nbeen exhausted. This would involve adjusting dynamically the volume of short-term financing\nthat the government obtains through treasury bill issuance. Issuance would be augmented\n(beyond what was originally programmed) during periods when the cash balance would\notherwise fall into deficit and, conversely, would be reduced during periods when the cash\nbalance would otherwise be unduly excessive.\n\n\n**41.** **Under this more pro-active approach, cash flow forecasts become essential.** They\nare necessary for devising strategies to smooth the cash flow profile. Given that it may not be\npossible in practice to manage fluctuations in the cash balance entirely through dynamic\nissuance of treasury bills, cash flow forecasting can contribute to making cash rationing less\ndisruptive. By planning ahead, fiscal policy authorities will be able to make more informed\ndecisions as to which spending—sector versus sector, and within each sector—to constrain and\nwhich to allow to proceed and thereby better protect overall fiscal priorities.\n\n\n**42.** **To be useful for informing decision-making, the cash flow forecasts prepared by**\n**the Treasury will need to have several characteristics, and their quality can be**\n**strengthened over time.** The horizon is sufficiently long: at a minimum three months, ideally 12\nmonths (or longer). The time step within the forecasts is short: daily (if necessary, weekly) out\nthree months, and weekly beyond three months. The forecasts are updated frequently: preferably\nevery week, and at least every month, and rolled forward even across fiscal years. Variances\nbetween forecasts and actual outturns are investigated to determine whether they are only\ntemporary and will correct themselves in the periods ahead. If the variances arise from more\npermanent shocks, a more substantial policy response is required, e.g., reducing expenditure,\nraising revenue, or tolerating a higher fiscal deficit for the year. Box 5 discusses the process of\nbuilding cash flow forecasts.\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "cash shortfall at any time. It allows the Treasury to hold back or delay expenditure—in other\nwords, to ration cash—if required. But this approach reduces the incentive for UGBs to plan their\nfinancial operations, and it risks creating unnecessary arrears or supply disruption.\n\n40. The Treasury should adopt a more pro-active approach to managing the\ngovernment’s aggregate liquidity to reduce the need to hold back or delay expenditure.\nRestricting budget execution, i.e., cash rationing, should be the last course of action, not the first,\nonce other measures to accommodate short-term mismatches in cash inflows and outflows have\nbeen exhausted. This would involve adjusting dynamically the volume of short-term financing\nthat the government obtains through treasury bill issuance. Issuance would be augmented\n(beyond what was originally programmed) during periods when the cash balance would\notherwise fall into deficit and, conversely, would be reduced during periods when the cash\nbalance would otherwise be unduly excessive.\n\n41. Under this more pro-active approach, cash flow forecasts become essential. They\nare necessary for devising strategies to smooth the cash flow profile. Given that it may not be\npossible in practice to manage fluctuations in the cash balance entirely through dynamic\nissuance of treasury bills, cash flow forecasting can contribute to making cash rationing less\ndisruptive. By planning ahead, fiscal policy authorities will be able to make more informed\ndecisions as to which spending—sector versus sector, and within each sector—to constrain and\nwhich to allow to proceed and thereby better protect overall fiscal priorities.\n\n42. To be useful for informing decision-making, the cash flow forecasts prepared by\nthe Treasury will need to have several characteristics, and their quality can be\nstrengthened over time. The horizon is sufficiently long: at a minimum three months, ideally 12\nmonths (or longer). The time step within the forecasts is short: daily (if necessary, weekly) out\nthree months, and weekly beyond three months. The forecasts are updated frequently: preferably\nevery week, and at least every month, and rolled forward even across fiscal years. Variances\nbetween forecasts and actual outturns are investigated to determine whether they are only\ntemporary and will correct themselves in the periods ahead. If the variances arise from more\npermanent shocks, a more substantial policy response is required, e.g., reducing expenditure,\nraising revenue, or tolerating a higher fiscal deficit for the year. Box 5 discusses the process of\nbuilding cash flow forecasts.\n\n28", "text_characters": 2223}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 5. Building Cash Flow Forecasts**\n\nThe forecast period should extend ideally for at least 12 months, rolling into the next fiscal year when\nnecessary. This relates to the time period within which offsetting action may usefully be taken—for\nexample, by adjustment to the issuance volume of treasury bills. The design of an effective forecasting and\nmonitoring capability is likely to be built around the following elements:\n\n\n\n(i) _A database of actual daily cash flows, as a means of identifying patterns for monitoring._ Actual cash\n\n\n\nflows should be closely tracked against profiles submitted by budget entities, and major divergences\nshould be investigated as part of improving the forecasting processes.\n(ii) _Information flow from revenue and spending entities._ The preparation of short-term cash flow forecasts\n\ncannot be done effectively only at the center—that is, ignoring the knowledge of those budget entities\nthat are closer to the interface between government and other sectors. Budget entities are best placed\nto supply information when actual flows are diverging from the budget.\n(iii) _A network of contacts, both voice and electronic, with the main revenue and spending entities, which_\n\n\n\n_would be used both to develop forecasts and monitor current flows._ The central cash manager should\nknow precisely the timing of some major cash flows, such as debt service, for which data should be\navailable directly. Some payments are likely to have a regular monthly pattern (such as payment of\nsalaries or some transfers to individuals or to lower levels of government), and for others there may be\nan historical pattern. For example, major payments of some taxes may tend to repeat from year to year.\n\n\n\nCash flow forecasts are built up from a mixture of knowledge about specific flows, historical experience of\npatterns, and judgments about the impact of any recent changes in policy or application of administrative\nrules. There is often a difference between the compilation of “above the line” (i.e., revenue and expenditure)\nforecasts, which may fall to those monitoring budget execution or receipts, and those “below the line”\n(debt and other financial transactions), where the cash and debt managers take responsibility. In general, it\nhas been found that econometric techniques are not useful for daily or monthly projections—their main\nrole is to help forecast annual or quarterly aggregates, which are used to act as a constraint or quota.\nInstead, the patterns in cash flows can be examined by plotting individual time series on a year-over-year\nbasis to reveal annual seasonality. Many government expenditure and receipt data, and movements of cash\nbalances, may exhibit strong and predictable seasonal variations. Equally important actions are the\nfollowing:\n\n\n\n(i) Identifying the key people at the working level in the selected revenue and spending entities, who will\n\n\n\nbe able to supply the relevant information.\n(ii) Setting up formal requirements to ensure that profiles are supplied and updated.\n(iii) Backing the latter by informal arrangements, whereby the central cash manager is given early notice of\n\n\n\nany major changes, which may need to be communicated not only in advance of the day being studied\nbut also on the day itself, to ensure that any offsetting action can be taken, whether by the cash\nmanager or the central bank.\n\n\n\nIn an ideal world, efficient cash management systems enable daily forecasts of cash flows across the CUT,\ntogether with the monitoring of actual changes in close to real time. There is no simple technical short-cut\nthat facilitates that. The focus should be on those sums that are large in size, most variable, and most\nunpredictable.\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 5. Building Cash Flow Forecasts\n\nThe forecast period should extend ideally for at least 12 months, rolling into the next fiscal year when\nnecessary. This relates to the time period within which offsetting action may usefully be taken—for\nexample, by adjustment to the issuance volume of treasury bills. The design of an effective forecasting and\nmonitoring capability is likely to be built around the following elements:\n\n(i) _A database of actual daily cash flows, as a means of identifying patterns for monitoring._ Actual cash\n\nflows should be closely tracked against profiles submitted by budget entities, and major divergences\nshould be investigated as part of improving the forecasting processes.\n(ii) _Information flow from revenue and spending entities._ The preparation of short-term cash flow forecasts\n\ncannot be done effectively only at the center—that is, ignoring the knowledge of those budget entities\nthat are closer to the interface between government and other sectors. Budget entities are best placed\nto supply information when actual flows are diverging from the budget.\n(iii) _A network of contacts, both voice and electronic, with the main revenue and spending entities, which_\n\n_would be used both to develop forecasts and monitor current flows._ The central cash manager should\nknow precisely the timing of some major cash flows, such as debt service, for which data should be\navailable directly. Some payments are likely to have a regular monthly pattern (such as payment of\nsalaries or some transfers to individuals or to lower levels of government), and for others there may be\nan historical pattern. For example, major payments of some taxes may tend to repeat from year to year.\n\nCash flow forecasts are built up from a mixture of knowledge about specific flows, historical experience of\npatterns, and judgments about the impact of any recent changes in policy or application of administrative\nrules. There is often a difference between the compilation of “above the line” (i.e., revenue and expenditure)\nforecasts, which may fall to those monitoring budget execution or receipts, and those “below the line”\n(debt and other financial transactions), where the cash and debt managers take responsibility. In general, it\nhas been found that econometric techniques are not useful for daily or monthly projections—their main\nrole is to help forecast annual or quarterly aggregates, which are used to act as a constraint or quota.\nInstead, the patterns in cash flows can be examined by plotting individual time series on a year-over-year\nbasis to reveal annual seasonality. Many government expenditure and receipt data, and movements of cash\nbalances, may exhibit strong and predictable seasonal variations. Equally important actions are the\nfollowing:\n\n(i) Identifying the key people at the working level in the selected revenue and spending entities, who will\n\nbe able to supply the relevant information.\n(ii) Setting up formal requirements to ensure that profiles are supplied and updated.\n(iii) Backing the latter by informal arrangements, whereby the central cash manager is given early notice of\n\nany major changes, which may need to be communicated not only in advance of the day being studied\nbut also on the day itself, to ensure that any offsetting action can be taken, whether by the cash\nmanager or the central bank.\n\nIn an ideal world, efficient cash management systems enable daily forecasts of cash flows across the CUT,\ntogether with the monitoring of actual changes in close to real time. There is no simple technical short-cut\nthat facilitates that. The focus should be on those sums that are large in size, most variable, and most\nunpredictable.\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n29", "text_characters": 3115}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Recommendation 3. Pro-actively Manage the Cash Balance
Background
Despite government efforts to pool cash in the CUT, substantial liquidity continues to lie outside the
CUT. Moreover, the Treasury does not manage the government’s aggregate liquidity pro-actively to
minimize the need to ration cash through holding back or delaying expenditure. The cash plans that are
currently prepared are used to control budget execution, not to manage the cash balance to avoid the
need for cash rationing.
Key measures
• Reduce the amount of government cash that sits in commercial banks and further improve the
functioning of the CUT.
• Introduce cash flow forecasting to facilitate pro-active management of the aggregate cash
balance through dynamic issuance of treasury bills, reducing the extent of recourse to cash
rationing.
Institutional arrangements
The recommended actions involve no change to existing institutional arrangements in UGBs. The
Treasury will need to strengthen its capacity to prepare high-frequency cash flow forecasts. A more
dynamic approach to treasury bill issuance would need to be introduced in close coordination with the
Bank of Mozambique.
Risks and mitigation measures
UGBs may resist shifting cash from commercial bank accounts to the CUT, but e-SISTAFE provides
functionality to set up sub-accounts within the CUT so that there is no loss of visibility as to the balances
for which they are responsible. Donors may resist allowing financing that they provide to be held within
the CUT, and progress will depend on the government demonstrating credibility to ensure that those
funds are not diverted from their intended purposes. There may, in practice, be limited scope to adopt a
more dynamic approach to treasury bill issuance.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|
Action 1
|
Finalize and circulate the_diploma ministerial_ to secure
information from commercial banks on government bank
accounts and to regulate more closely the opening and
operation of any new accounts
|End-December 2017
|\n|Action 2
|
Introduce automatic end-of-day sweeping of balances in transit
accounts and further minimize the use of advances
|1st quarter 2018
|\n|Action 3
|Continue to close accounts in commercial banks and transfer
the balances to the CUT
|Ongoing
|\n|Action 4
|Begin forecasting the government’s aggregate cash flows and
cash balance over six to 12-month horizon and use the
information to manage treasury bill issuance volumes in a
dynamic manner
|Starting in 1st quarter
2018|\n\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 72.1199951171875, 539.7999877929688, 640.4996337890625], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "Recommendation 3. Pro-actively Manage the Cash Balance Background Despite government efforts to pool cash in the CUT, substantial liquidity continues to lie outside the CUT. Moreover, the Treasury does not manage the government’s aggregate liquidity pro-actively to minimize the need to ration cash through holding back or delaying expenditure. The cash plans that are currently prepared are used to control budget execution, not to manage the cash balance to avoid the need for cash rationing. Key measures • Reduce the amount of government cash that sits in commercial banks and further improve the functioning of the CUT. • Introduce cash flow forecasting to facilitate pro-active management of the aggregate cash balance through dynamic issuance of treasury bills, reducing the extent of recourse to cash rationing. Institutional arrangements The recommended actions involve no change to existing institutional arrangements in UGBs. The Treasury will need to strengthen its capacity to prepare high-frequency cash flow forecasts. A more dynamic approach to treasury bill issuance would need to be introduced in close coordination with the Bank of Mozambique. Risks and mitigation measures UGBs may resist shifting cash from commercial bank accounts to the CUT, but e-SISTAFE provides functionality to set up sub-accounts within the CUT so that there is no loss of visibility as to the balances for which they are responsible. Donors may resist allowing financing that they provide to be held within the CUT, and progress will depend on the government demonstrating credibility to ensure that those funds are not diverted from their intended purposes. There may, in practice, be limited scope to adopt a more dynamic approach to treasury bill issuance. Schedule for implementation Col2 Col3 \n\n Action 1 Finalize and circulate the_diploma ministerial_ to secure information from commercial banks on government bank accounts and to regulate more closely the opening and operation of any new accounts End-December 2017 \n Action 2 Introduce automatic end-of-day sweeping of balances in transit accounts and further minimize the use of advances 1st quarter 2018 \n Action 3 Continue to close accounts in commercial banks and transfer the balances to the CUT Ongoing \n Action 4 Begin forecasting the government’s aggregate cash flows and cash balance over six to 12-month horizon and use the information to manage treasury bill issuance volumes in a dynamic manner Starting in 1st quarter 2018 \n\n30", "text_characters": 2102}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0033-001"], "markdown": "##### **Enhancing the Credibility of the Budget**\n\n**43.** **A credible budget is one that is executed as planned, and is an important**\n**requirement for effective public financial management.** Sound and predictable budget\nallocations to spending units are key to fiscal discipline and make it easier to control government\nexpenditures at the point of budget preparation rather than later during budget execution. Arrears are\nusually a symptom of weaknesses in the public finance management practices, exacerbated by a poorly\nformulated budget. Unrealistic budget planning underpinned by biased macroeconomic projections can\npose challenges for budget execution. Conversely, the challenges in budget execution can also present\nchallenges for budget preparations in subsequent years. For example, overspends leading to arrears,\nre-allocations undermining agreements during budget negotiations, and delayed investments that\nrequire financing to meet contract obligations.\n\n\n**Mozambique Budget Facing Headwinds**\n\n\n**44.** **Since 2014, total revenue has been falling as a percent of GDP and each year**\n**government has cut total expenditure to contain the budget deficit.** Comparing data from\nthe Budget Law to CGE, Figure 6 shows total expenditure and revenue (including grants) in the\nBudget compared to actuals in the CGE. The decline in total revenue was primarily driven by\neconomic conditions and the disclosure of borrowing by public companies which led to a freeze\nin donor budget support. The changes in expenditure were achieved through in-year\nreallocations and managed through tight controls on the processing of cash payments.\n\n**Figure 6. Total Expenditure and Total Revenue**\n\n(percent of GDP)\n\n\nSource: IMF Mission using data from Budget Law and the CGE.\n\n\nNote: F – forecast in Budget Law, O – outturn/actual in the CGE\n\n\n**45.** **In Mozambique, the annual budget is mainly prepared and executed according to**\n**an economic classification of expenditures** . It is presented and controlled in a detailed manner\nwith many budget lines. The budget is compiled by aggregating submissions of budget users\n\n\n31\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0549, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(213.74972534179688, 442.9461364746094, 415.50103759765625, 574.9549560546875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 177, "number": 13, "size": 10607, "transform": [201.75131225585938, 0.0, -0.0, 132.00881958007812, 213.74972534179688, 442.9461364746094], "width": 270, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Enhancing the Credibility of the Budget\n\n43. A credible budget is one that is executed as planned, and is an important\nrequirement for effective public financial management. Sound and predictable budget\nallocations to spending units are key to fiscal discipline and make it easier to control government\nexpenditures at the point of budget preparation rather than later during budget execution. Arrears are\nusually a symptom of weaknesses in the public finance management practices, exacerbated by a poorly\nformulated budget. Unrealistic budget planning underpinned by biased macroeconomic projections can\npose challenges for budget execution. Conversely, the challenges in budget execution can also present\nchallenges for budget preparations in subsequent years. For example, overspends leading to arrears,\nre-allocations undermining agreements during budget negotiations, and delayed investments that\nrequire financing to meet contract obligations.\n\nMozambique Budget Facing Headwinds\n\n44. Since 2014, total revenue has been falling as a percent of GDP and each year\ngovernment has cut total expenditure to contain the budget deficit. Comparing data from\nthe Budget Law to CGE, Figure 6 shows total expenditure and revenue (including grants) in the\nBudget compared to actuals in the CGE. The decline in total revenue was primarily driven by\neconomic conditions and the disclosure of borrowing by public companies which led to a freeze\nin donor budget support. The changes in expenditure were achieved through in-year\nreallocations and managed through tight controls on the processing of cash payments.\n\nFigure 6. Total Expenditure and Total Revenue\n\n(percent of GDP)\n\nSource: IMF Mission using data from Budget Law and the CGE.\n\nNote: F – forecast in Budget Law, O – outturn/actual in the CGE\n\n45. In Mozambique, the annual budget is mainly prepared and executed according to\nan economic classification of expenditures . It is presented and controlled in a detailed manner\nwith many budget lines. The budget is compiled by aggregating submissions of budget users\n\n31", "text_characters": 1747}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "formulated in economic classifications, and the same classifications are used for executing the\nbudget. [10]\n\n**Enhancing the Accuracy of Budget Forecasts**\n\n\n**46.** **The principal weakness of the annual budget is that it is not always adequately**\n**costed and not used as the primary tool for decisions regarding the allocation of resources** .\nThis is in part due to technical issues, but reflects that decisions on expenditure prioritization are\noften pushed out to the budget year and resolved only through in-year budget reallocations.\n\n\n**47.** **Further, decisions on reductions in expenditures to meet estimated cash payment**\n**availability, do not seek to identify lower priority spending or the changes to expected**\n**levels of activity.** As such, spending units have little incentive to change planned activities and\nthey continue to spend according to their budget allocations, as evidenced by the accumulation\nof arrears despite total expenditure data showing cuts within the budget year (see Figure 6).\n\n\n**48.** **The result is there is little incentive at the budget preparation stage to ensure**\n**credibility of budget forecasts.** The credibility of the budget covers two components: the\naccuracy of macro-fiscal forecasts and reliability of allocations to spending units.\n\n\n**49.** **Currently, budget documentation provides insufficient detail on the assumptions**\n**underlying macro-fiscal forecasts and there is no information provided on the reasons for**\n**deviations of actual to forecast.** The realism of the assumptions underlying the macroeconomic\nand fiscal forecasts is critical for the realism of the budget. The MEF should seek to present\naccurately the assumptions in the budget documentation to ensure they are available for scrutiny\nby independent experts. Transparent reconciliation of the reasons behind changes to\nexpenditure and revenue forecasts is also critical to demonstrating the government’s compliance\nwith the expenditure ceilings approved by Parliament.\n\n\n**50.** **While MEF is working to improve macroeconomic analysis, a weak process to**\n**determine the fiscal aggregates for the budget, coupled with the absence of debt**\n**sustainability analysis, provides insufficient discipline to limit the size of the budget deficit**\n**at the beginning of the budget process.** Consequently, the budget preparation procedure is\nprincipally driven by the requests from the ministries for increased spending (i.e., the bottom-up\napproach). The MEF is taking steps to improve its macro-fiscal forecasting capacities and fiscal\nrisk analysis (see Box 6).\n\n\n10 The economic classifications currently in use do not classify capital and recurrent spending per GFSM 2014.\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "formulated in economic classifications, and the same classifications are used for executing the\nbudget. [10]\n\nEnhancing the Accuracy of Budget Forecasts\n\n46. The principal weakness of the annual budget is that it is not always adequately\ncosted and not used as the primary tool for decisions regarding the allocation of resources .\nThis is in part due to technical issues, but reflects that decisions on expenditure prioritization are\noften pushed out to the budget year and resolved only through in-year budget reallocations.\n\n47. Further, decisions on reductions in expenditures to meet estimated cash payment\navailability, do not seek to identify lower priority spending or the changes to expected\nlevels of activity. As such, spending units have little incentive to change planned activities and\nthey continue to spend according to their budget allocations, as evidenced by the accumulation\nof arrears despite total expenditure data showing cuts within the budget year (see Figure 6).\n\n48. The result is there is little incentive at the budget preparation stage to ensure\ncredibility of budget forecasts. The credibility of the budget covers two components: the\naccuracy of macro-fiscal forecasts and reliability of allocations to spending units.\n\n49. Currently, budget documentation provides insufficient detail on the assumptions\nunderlying macro-fiscal forecasts and there is no information provided on the reasons for\ndeviations of actual to forecast. The realism of the assumptions underlying the macroeconomic\nand fiscal forecasts is critical for the realism of the budget. The MEF should seek to present\naccurately the assumptions in the budget documentation to ensure they are available for scrutiny\nby independent experts. Transparent reconciliation of the reasons behind changes to\nexpenditure and revenue forecasts is also critical to demonstrating the government’s compliance\nwith the expenditure ceilings approved by Parliament.\n\n50. While MEF is working to improve macroeconomic analysis, a weak process to\ndetermine the fiscal aggregates for the budget, coupled with the absence of debt\nsustainability analysis, provides insufficient discipline to limit the size of the budget deficit\nat the beginning of the budget process. Consequently, the budget preparation procedure is\nprincipally driven by the requests from the ministries for increased spending (i.e., the bottom-up\napproach). The MEF is taking steps to improve its macro-fiscal forecasting capacities and fiscal\nrisk analysis (see Box 6).\n\n10 The economic classifications currently in use do not classify capital and recurrent spending per GFSM 2014.\n\n32", "text_characters": 2234}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 6. Macro-Fiscal Forecasting and the Preparation of the MTFF**\n\n\nMacro-fiscal projections are prepared within the framework of the MTFF, the Cenário Fiscal de Médio\nPrazo (CFMP). The CFMP guides the planning and budgeting process and covers three-year forward\nestimates, as well as budgetary outturns for the two preceding years. Its objectives are drawn from the\n5-year Plano Quinquenal do Governo (PQG) and are informed by the Plano Economico e Social (PES)\nthat translate medium term priorities into annual budgets. The CFMP includes projections of revenue,\nexpenditure, and financing by economic classification, and by program, at the central, provincial, and\ndistrict levels, as well as transfers to the municipal level.\n\n\nThe process starts early 14 months in advance with the estimation of the resource envelope and the\nfiscal projections, the Mapa Fiscal. Revenue projections are prepared by the Autoridade Tributaria who is\nalso in charge of collections. Based on macro forecasts prepared by the DEEF team, the Budget team\n(DNPO) determine expenditure allocations informed by fiscal policy objectives and finalize the Mapa\nFiscal. These fiscal projections then inform the DEEF for the calculation of the indicative expenditure\nceilings. By mid-December these ceilings are distributed to sectors and provinces to guide the\npreparation of their budget proposals. The CFMP process finalizes in May when estimates are approved\nby Cabinet. The Budget preparation process continues until September when the draft budget is\nfinalized for discussion at Parliament.\n\n\nThe process of preparing the CFMP is not anchored on medium-term debt sustainability analysis that\ninforms the estimation of the resource envelope. With a weaker fiscal position, this input has become\ncrucial and fiscal sustainability should be considered earlier in the budget preparation process.\nMoreover, the link between policy priorities and expenditure allocations needs to strengthen. Significant\nreallocation of expenditures during the budget discussions that follow the CFMP, between May and\nSeptember, are undermining the policy objectives set forth at the initial budget preparation stage.\n\n\nMozambique aims to introduce fiscal risk analysis in the budget preparation process. In 2016, the\n_Gabinete de Gestão de Risco_ (GGR) was established to strengthen the identification, monitoring and\nmanagement of fiscal risks. An IMF resident advisor is currently supporting the unit in the preparation of\nthe 2019 Fiscal Risk Statement to better inform macro-fiscal forecasts. This technical assistance will build\ncapacity for macro-fiscal forecasting across the MEF and is a step towards strengthening the CFMP and\nthe credibility of the budget.\n\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n\n**51.** **Uncertainty about donor funding further weakens the budget preparation process** .\nWith the withdraw by donors of direct budget support, most donor funding is for direct project\nfinance. In cases where the anticipated amount of project funding does not materialize or arrives\nlate the government is forced to make sizeable adjustments to the state budget which was\nparticularly a concern in 2016. This uncertainty is magnified over the medium-term, and\nreinforces the lack of credibility. The government should continue to insist on a medium-term\nsupport framework with the donors that ensures timely commitments and disbursement.\n\n\n**52.** **In previous years, cautious revenue assumptions contributed to the lack of**\n**credibility of the budget, however while uncertainties remain concerning donor grants, the**\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 6. Macro-Fiscal Forecasting and the Preparation of the MTFF\n\nMacro-fiscal projections are prepared within the framework of the MTFF, the Cenário Fiscal de Médio\nPrazo (CFMP). The CFMP guides the planning and budgeting process and covers three-year forward\nestimates, as well as budgetary outturns for the two preceding years. Its objectives are drawn from the\n5-year Plano Quinquenal do Governo (PQG) and are informed by the Plano Economico e Social (PES)\nthat translate medium term priorities into annual budgets. The CFMP includes projections of revenue,\nexpenditure, and financing by economic classification, and by program, at the central, provincial, and\ndistrict levels, as well as transfers to the municipal level.\n\nThe process starts early 14 months in advance with the estimation of the resource envelope and the\nfiscal projections, the Mapa Fiscal. Revenue projections are prepared by the Autoridade Tributaria who is\nalso in charge of collections. Based on macro forecasts prepared by the DEEF team, the Budget team\n(DNPO) determine expenditure allocations informed by fiscal policy objectives and finalize the Mapa\nFiscal. These fiscal projections then inform the DEEF for the calculation of the indicative expenditure\nceilings. By mid-December these ceilings are distributed to sectors and provinces to guide the\npreparation of their budget proposals. The CFMP process finalizes in May when estimates are approved\nby Cabinet. The Budget preparation process continues until September when the draft budget is\nfinalized for discussion at Parliament.\n\nThe process of preparing the CFMP is not anchored on medium-term debt sustainability analysis that\ninforms the estimation of the resource envelope. With a weaker fiscal position, this input has become\ncrucial and fiscal sustainability should be considered earlier in the budget preparation process.\nMoreover, the link between policy priorities and expenditure allocations needs to strengthen. Significant\nreallocation of expenditures during the budget discussions that follow the CFMP, between May and\nSeptember, are undermining the policy objectives set forth at the initial budget preparation stage.\n\nMozambique aims to introduce fiscal risk analysis in the budget preparation process. In 2016, the\n_Gabinete de Gestão de Risco_ (GGR) was established to strengthen the identification, monitoring and\nmanagement of fiscal risks. An IMF resident advisor is currently supporting the unit in the preparation of\nthe 2019 Fiscal Risk Statement to better inform macro-fiscal forecasts. This technical assistance will build\ncapacity for macro-fiscal forecasting across the MEF and is a step towards strengthening the CFMP and\nthe credibility of the budget.\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n51. Uncertainty about donor funding further weakens the budget preparation process .\nWith the withdraw by donors of direct budget support, most donor funding is for direct project\nfinance. In cases where the anticipated amount of project funding does not materialize or arrives\nlate the government is forced to make sizeable adjustments to the state budget which was\nparticularly a concern in 2016. This uncertainty is magnified over the medium-term, and\nreinforces the lack of credibility. The government should continue to insist on a medium-term\nsupport framework with the donors that ensures timely commitments and disbursement.\n\n52. In previous years, cautious revenue assumptions contributed to the lack of\ncredibility of the budget, however while uncertainties remain concerning donor grants, the\n\n33", "text_characters": 3011}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0036-001"], "markdown": "**accuracy of taxation revenue forecasts is improving.** As shown in Figure 7, from 2012 to 2014,\nthe estimates of taxation revenue in the Budget Law significantly underestimated the outcome of\ncollections as reported in the CGE. However, in the two most recent years the deviation of\nforecasted taxation revenue to actual taxation revenue has improved. For example, in 2013 the\nBudget Law included taxation revenue of 95.5 billion Meticais, but 107.5 billion was collected\nresulting in a 12.6 percent deviation. However, the deviation in 2016 was only 1.7 percent.\n\n\n**Figure 7. Change in Taxation Revenue from Budget Law to Financial Outcome**\n\n(percent change from Budget estimate)\n\n\nSource: Mission.\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, a negative change means Budget was less\nthan actual\n\n**Improving Budget Allocations**\n\n\n**53.** **Budget allocations to spending units are not reliable, undermining the role of**\n**Parliamentary approval in the Budget process.** As flagged in the 2010 and 2015 PEFA\nassessments [11], large deviations on Budget in the expenditure composition are a long-standing\npattern. The main decisions on expenditure prioritization are often resolved only through in-year\nbudget reallocations, this means the information presented to Parliament through the Budget\nLaw are not credible estimates of the allocation of resources and therefore the Budget does not\nconstitute a dependable framework for the planned allocation and efficient use of Mozambique’s\nresources.\n\n\n**54.** **While accuracy of taxation revenue forecasts is improving, the accuracy of total**\n**expenditure forecasts is worsening.** Figure 8 shows that in 2014, total expenditure was\noverestimated by 5.0 percent, this deviation increased to 13 percent in 2016. This overestimation\nwas the result of under-execution of capital expenditure primarily driven by cancelled or delayed\n\n\n11 Refer to the report “Mozambique PEFA assessment of public financial management, 2015” by AECOM\nInternational Development Europe and CESO Consultants, funded by the EU. In 2007 -09 the variation was over\n15 percent which resulted in a \"D\" rating. The three-year period 2012-14 presented an even greater deterioration.\n\n\n34\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0513, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(206.99977111816406, 207.3983612060547, 425.2484436035156, 321.3887023925781)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 153, "number": 13, "size": 8393, "transform": [218.24867248535156, 0.0, -0.0, 113.99034118652344, 206.99977111816406, 207.3983612060547], "width": 292, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "accuracy of taxation revenue forecasts is improving. As shown in Figure 7, from 2012 to 2014,\nthe estimates of taxation revenue in the Budget Law significantly underestimated the outcome of\ncollections as reported in the CGE. However, in the two most recent years the deviation of\nforecasted taxation revenue to actual taxation revenue has improved. For example, in 2013 the\nBudget Law included taxation revenue of 95.5 billion Meticais, but 107.5 billion was collected\nresulting in a 12.6 percent deviation. However, the deviation in 2016 was only 1.7 percent.\n\nFigure 7. Change in Taxation Revenue from Budget Law to Financial Outcome\n\n(percent change from Budget estimate)\n\nSource: Mission.\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, a negative change means Budget was less\nthan actual\n\nImproving Budget Allocations\n\n53. Budget allocations to spending units are not reliable, undermining the role of\nParliamentary approval in the Budget process. As flagged in the 2010 and 2015 PEFA\nassessments [11], large deviations on Budget in the expenditure composition are a long-standing\npattern. The main decisions on expenditure prioritization are often resolved only through in-year\nbudget reallocations, this means the information presented to Parliament through the Budget\nLaw are not credible estimates of the allocation of resources and therefore the Budget does not\nconstitute a dependable framework for the planned allocation and efficient use of Mozambique’s\nresources.\n\n54. While accuracy of taxation revenue forecasts is improving, the accuracy of total\nexpenditure forecasts is worsening. Figure 8 shows that in 2014, total expenditure was\noverestimated by 5.0 percent, this deviation increased to 13 percent in 2016. This overestimation\nwas the result of under-execution of capital expenditure primarily driven by cancelled or delayed\n\n11 Refer to the report “Mozambique PEFA assessment of public financial management, 2015” by AECOM\nInternational Development Europe and CESO Consultants, funded by the EU. In 2007 -09 the variation was over\n15 percent which resulted in a \"D\" rating. The three-year period 2012-14 presented an even greater deterioration.\n\n34", "text_characters": 1850}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0037-001"], "markdown": "payments from donors, but also from significant cuts to expenditure within the budget year to\nreduce the size of the deficit.\n\n\n**55.** **The reductions and reallocations of expenditure within the budget year are made**\n**for cash rationing purposes, with little discussion of commensurate changes to policy**\n**priorities or the impact on the provision of services.** Allocations to spending units through\nBudget Law should provide a basis for planning activities throughout the budget year and an\nexpectation of the level of service delivery. Reducing spending allocations in the absence of\ndecisions regarding the re-prioritization of government services, provides no guidance to\nspending units on how spending cuts are to be achieved.\n\n\n**56.** **Expenditure reduction plans are not effective when they are made to spending**\n**allocations without accompanying changes in the underlying expenditure policies.** Just\nchanging the estimates makes the budget provision less than objective; the likely consequence is\noverspending against appropriation and/or the emergence of payment arrears\n\n\n**57.** **The composition of expenditure changed significantly, which would further**\n**compound the challenges for spending units to deliver on planned activities.** As shown in\nFigure 8, the composition of expenditure by economic classification changed by 8.9 percent in\n2014, whereas it changed by 27.3 percent in 2016 - when funds for good & services were cut to\nfund the wage bill and interest payments with outturns higher than expected. The impact on\nbudget credibility here is through the reallocation of current expenditures. This is a\nmeasurement of how the allocation of spending by economic classification changed from the\nParliament-approved Budget Law to the outcome as stated in the end of year financial statement\n(CGE). [12] The reallocation between functional classification was not as large, at 8.1 percent change\nin composition in 2016.\n\n**Figure 8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure**\n\n(percent change from Budget estimate)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n||||||\n||||||\n||||||\n||||||\n||5.0%||||\n||||||\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual\n\n\n12 These calculations are consistent with Performance Indicator 2(i) of the Public Expenditure and Financial\nAccountability Assessment (PEFA) Framework.\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [223.0384063720703, 537.642333984375, 369.200439453125, 596.0988159179688], "columns": 5, "rows": 7}], "text": "payments from donors, but also from significant cuts to expenditure within the budget year to\nreduce the size of the deficit.\n\n55. The reductions and reallocations of expenditure within the budget year are made\nfor cash rationing purposes, with little discussion of commensurate changes to policy\npriorities or the impact on the provision of services. Allocations to spending units through\nBudget Law should provide a basis for planning activities throughout the budget year and an\nexpectation of the level of service delivery. Reducing spending allocations in the absence of\ndecisions regarding the re-prioritization of government services, provides no guidance to\nspending units on how spending cuts are to be achieved.\n\n56. Expenditure reduction plans are not effective when they are made to spending\nallocations without accompanying changes in the underlying expenditure policies. Just\nchanging the estimates makes the budget provision less than objective; the likely consequence is\noverspending against appropriation and/or the emergence of payment arrears\n\n57. The composition of expenditure changed significantly, which would further\ncompound the challenges for spending units to deliver on planned activities. As shown in\nFigure 8, the composition of expenditure by economic classification changed by 8.9 percent in\n2014, whereas it changed by 27.3 percent in 2016 - when funds for good & services were cut to\nfund the wage bill and interest payments with outturns higher than expected. The impact on\nbudget credibility here is through the reallocation of current expenditures. This is a\nmeasurement of how the allocation of spending by economic classification changed from the\nParliament-approved Budget Law to the outcome as stated in the end of year financial statement\n(CGE). [12] The reallocation between functional classification was not as large, at 8.1 percent change\nin composition in 2016.\n\nFigure 8. Change in Expenditure and the Composition of Expenditure\n\n(percent change from Budget estimate)\n\n Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 \n\n \n \n \n \n 5.0% \n \n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual\n\n12 These calculations are consistent with Performance Indicator 2(i) of the Public Expenditure and Financial\nAccountability Assessment (PEFA) Framework.\n\n35", "text_characters": 1918}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0038-001"], "markdown": "**58.** **Unrealistic estimates of expenditure composition may also be contributing to the**\n**accumulation of arrears.** While a significant portion of the change in expenditure is a result of\nunder-execution of capital expenditure, the changes in composition of current expenditure reveal\nthat there are weaknesses in the execution process as a result of unrealistic budget estimates.\nFigure 9 shows the changes in expenditure by economic and functional classification for the\nestimates contained in the Budget Law compared to the actuals contained in the CGE.\n\n\n**59.** **Changes in the composition of economic classification are driven by delayed or**\n**cancelled funding by donors for investment projects.** That said, in 2016 the Budget Law\nunderestimated expenditure on interest payments and on wages. Wages are an expense that\nshould be easy to estimate (number of employees at each wage scale times by the wage rate,\nincluding expected growth), the significant change from Budget reflects the challenges\nassociated with controlling the size of the civil service wage bill. [13]\n\n\n**60.** **Changes in the composition of functional classification reflect the uncertainty of**\n**funding by donors for investment projects.** Each year the Budget Law overestimates the\nexpenditure in four key functions: economic matters, environmental protection, housing and\ndevelopment and health. Each being large areas for execution of capital expenditure.\n\n\n**Figure 9. Change in Composition of Expenditure by classification**\n\n(percent change from Budget Law to CGE)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, a negative change means Budget was less\nthan actual\n\n\n13 IMF Technical Assistance Report “Republic of Mozambique: Public Finance Management” December 2016,\nexamined this issue in further detail and made recommendations on managing the civil service wage bill.\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "58. Unrealistic estimates of expenditure composition may also be contributing to the\naccumulation of arrears. While a significant portion of the change in expenditure is a result of\nunder-execution of capital expenditure, the changes in composition of current expenditure reveal\nthat there are weaknesses in the execution process as a result of unrealistic budget estimates.\nFigure 9 shows the changes in expenditure by economic and functional classification for the\nestimates contained in the Budget Law compared to the actuals contained in the CGE.\n\n59. Changes in the composition of economic classification are driven by delayed or\ncancelled funding by donors for investment projects. That said, in 2016 the Budget Law\nunderestimated expenditure on interest payments and on wages. Wages are an expense that\nshould be easy to estimate (number of employees at each wage scale times by the wage rate,\nincluding expected growth), the significant change from Budget reflects the challenges\nassociated with controlling the size of the civil service wage bill. [13]\n\n60. Changes in the composition of functional classification reflect the uncertainty of\nfunding by donors for investment projects. Each year the Budget Law overestimates the\nexpenditure in four key functions: economic matters, environmental protection, housing and\ndevelopment and health. Each being large areas for execution of capital expenditure.\n\nFigure 9. Change in Composition of Expenditure by classification\n\n(percent change from Budget Law to CGE)\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, a negative change means Budget was less\nthan actual\n\n13 IMF Technical Assistance Report “Republic of Mozambique: Public Finance Management” December 2016,\nexamined this issue in further detail and made recommendations on managing the civil service wage bill.\n\n36", "text_characters": 1562}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0039-001"], "markdown": "**61.** **While there have been significant reallocations of expenditure within the budget**\n**year, there have also been efforts to reduce the size of the deficit through budget**\n**execution control.** Figure 10 shows the change in the budget balance from the estimates\ncontained in the Budget Law, to the actuals contained in the CGE. While first the efforts of the\nMEF to reduce the size of the deficit must be acknowledge, the large deviations from Budget to\nCGE raise concerns of the credibility of budget estimates being presented to Parliament for\nlegislative approval.\n\n\n**Figure 10. Change in Budget Balance**\n(percent change from Budget Law to CGE)\n\n**Overall Balance, Budget vs Outturns 2008-16**\n\n\nSource: IMF mission based on data contained in the Budget Law and the CGE.\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, in the figure above this means the Budget\nforecasted a larger deficit than the actual outcome.\n\n\n**62.** **Budget credibility can be enhanced by improving the realism of expenditure**\n**aggregates at the MTFF stage of budget preparation.** The development of fiscal aggregates\nthrough the MTFF will be improved by the focus on improving macro-fiscal forecasting\ncapacities. For the development of the total expenditure ceiling, this can be further improved\nthrough a process of reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches (see Box 7).\n\n\n37\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0491, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(207.74974060058594, 256.123046875, 422.2576904296875, 367.1314392089844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 149, "number": 9, "size": 8720, "transform": [214.50794982910156, 0.0, -0.0, 111.00838470458984, 207.74974060058594, 256.123046875], "width": 287, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "61. While there have been significant reallocations of expenditure within the budget\nyear, there have also been efforts to reduce the size of the deficit through budget\nexecution control. Figure 10 shows the change in the budget balance from the estimates\ncontained in the Budget Law, to the actuals contained in the CGE. While first the efforts of the\nMEF to reduce the size of the deficit must be acknowledge, the large deviations from Budget to\nCGE raise concerns of the credibility of budget estimates being presented to Parliament for\nlegislative approval.\n\nFigure 10. Change in Budget Balance\n(percent change from Budget Law to CGE)\n\nOverall Balance, Budget vs Outturns 2008-16\n\nSource: IMF mission based on data contained in the Budget Law and the CGE.\n\nNote: a positive change means Budget was greater than actual, in the figure above this means the Budget\nforecasted a larger deficit than the actual outcome.\n\n62. Budget credibility can be enhanced by improving the realism of expenditure\naggregates at the MTFF stage of budget preparation. The development of fiscal aggregates\nthrough the MTFF will be improved by the focus on improving macro-fiscal forecasting\ncapacities. For the development of the total expenditure ceiling, this can be further improved\nthrough a process of reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches (see Box 7).\n\n37", "text_characters": 1134}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 7. Budget Preparation Based on Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches**\n\nThe MTFF should follow the following presentation: i) macroeconomic and fiscal projections; ii) updates\nto baseline expenditure; iii) the targeted amount of fiscal space, i.e. the resources available for new\npolicy and how these should be allocated across sectors; iv) other issues for budget preparation.\n\n**Updating baseline estimates** in an objective manner will help to focus budget preparation discussions\non prioritization of spending. Baseline estimates are the costs for future budget years based on no policy\nchanges (no savings, no new policies) and are developed and agreed by staff between MEF and\nministries. As updating baselines is technical in nature, by applying macro-economic indicators (e.g.,\nunemployment, inflation), other parameters (e.g., beneficiaries for social assistance programs),\ncommitments for contracts for goods and services and capital projects, the parameters should be made\nexplicit and agreed. At this stage, MEF should also identify in the baselines the plan for clearing the stock\nof arrears. While there might be some disagreement, this discussion should be built on facts and not\nmixed with budget negotiations on new spending.\n\n**The targeted amount of fiscal space** should be determined through a reconciliation of the updated\nbaseline estimates and the targeted expenditure ceiling that would meet macro-fiscal objectives. Fiscal\nspace can be positive or negative, the MTFF should then propose how the fiscal space should be\nallocated across sectors, whether through availability of finance for new spending proposals (if the fiscal\nspace is positive); or through spending cuts that target low-priority and inefficient spending (if the fiscal\nspace is negative).\n\nSource: Mission.\n\n\n**Reporting on Budget Credibility**\n\n\n**63.** **Current fiscal reporting compounds the challenges for budget credibility as it does**\n**not capture the accumulation of arrears** . As identified in previous sections, the process of\nbudget execution does not permit the monitoring or prevention of arrears. As fiscal reporting is\nthe output of execution processes, the information provided in the CGE provides incomplete\ninformation on the state of the government’s finances and therefore, does not provide accurate\ncomparison to budget estimates.\n\n\n**64.** **The availability of fiscal information has improved, but more needs to be done to**\n**strengthen budget documentation and fiscal reporting.** As the SISTAFE remains focused on\nensuring tight cash control, and there is no requirement to record all commitments and therefore\nfiscal information is not capturing the accumulation of arrears. This impacts on the credibility of\nbudget year forecasts, but also on the ability of future budgets to be credible if arrears and\nmulti-year commitments are not informing spending allocation decisions through the budget\npreparation process.\n\n\n38", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 7. Budget Preparation Based on Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches\n\nThe MTFF should follow the following presentation: i) macroeconomic and fiscal projections; ii) updates\nto baseline expenditure; iii) the targeted amount of fiscal space, i.e. the resources available for new\npolicy and how these should be allocated across sectors; iv) other issues for budget preparation.\n\nUpdating baseline estimates in an objective manner will help to focus budget preparation discussions\non prioritization of spending. Baseline estimates are the costs for future budget years based on no policy\nchanges (no savings, no new policies) and are developed and agreed by staff between MEF and\nministries. As updating baselines is technical in nature, by applying macro-economic indicators (e.g.,\nunemployment, inflation), other parameters (e.g., beneficiaries for social assistance programs),\ncommitments for contracts for goods and services and capital projects, the parameters should be made\nexplicit and agreed. At this stage, MEF should also identify in the baselines the plan for clearing the stock\nof arrears. While there might be some disagreement, this discussion should be built on facts and not\nmixed with budget negotiations on new spending.\n\nThe targeted amount of fiscal space should be determined through a reconciliation of the updated\nbaseline estimates and the targeted expenditure ceiling that would meet macro-fiscal objectives. Fiscal\nspace can be positive or negative, the MTFF should then propose how the fiscal space should be\nallocated across sectors, whether through availability of finance for new spending proposals (if the fiscal\nspace is positive); or through spending cuts that target low-priority and inefficient spending (if the fiscal\nspace is negative).\n\nSource: Mission.\n\nReporting on Budget Credibility\n\n63. Current fiscal reporting compounds the challenges for budget credibility as it does\nnot capture the accumulation of arrears . As identified in previous sections, the process of\nbudget execution does not permit the monitoring or prevention of arrears. As fiscal reporting is\nthe output of execution processes, the information provided in the CGE provides incomplete\ninformation on the state of the government’s finances and therefore, does not provide accurate\ncomparison to budget estimates.\n\n64. The availability of fiscal information has improved, but more needs to be done to\nstrengthen budget documentation and fiscal reporting. As the SISTAFE remains focused on\nensuring tight cash control, and there is no requirement to record all commitments and therefore\nfiscal information is not capturing the accumulation of arrears. This impacts on the credibility of\nbudget year forecasts, but also on the ability of future budgets to be credible if arrears and\nmulti-year commitments are not informing spending allocation decisions through the budget\npreparation process.\n\n38", "text_characters": 2475}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Recommendation 4. Enhance Budget Credibility
Background:
Weaknesses in the preparation of the annual budget reflects that decisions on expenditure prioritization
are often pushed out to the budget year and resolved only through in-year budget reallocations. This
has meant significant reductions and reallocations of expenditure within the year without accompanying
changes in the underlying expenditure policies.
Key measures:
• Improve budget credibility by continuing to improve the realism of revenue estimates (including
donor funding), and of expenditure estimates both at the aggregate level (i.e. total recurrent
and capital expenditure) and at the composition level (i.e. allocations by classification).
• Publish a reconciliation of changes (and their reasons) from the Budget Law to CGE, and analyze
the largest deviations in allocations (both economic and functional classification).
• Identify the implications of deviation for the budget to inform the preparation of baseline
estimates in the MTFF.
Institutional arrangements:
Enhancing budget credibility requires stronger linkages between the MEF directorates with responsibility
for macro-fiscal forecasting, the Directorate for Budget Planning and the Directorate of Treasury. No
additional institutional arrangements are required, just strengthening of existing processes:
• Fiscal reporting should identify and analyze deviations from Budget to outturn.
• The preparation of expenditure aggregates at the MTFF stage should be determined through a
reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches (see Box 7)
Risks and mitigation measures:
This recommendation is to improve existing processes, in order to not create additional systems or
processes, the efforts to improve budget credibility must be integrated into the budget cycle.
Schedule for implementation:|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|
Action 1
|
Analyze and publish the deviations from Budget Law to CGE for
macroeconomic indicators, fiscal aggregates, and composition of
expenditure. Further identify the major causes for deviations and their
expected impacts for future budgets.
|For inclusion in
the 2017 CGE and
in the 2019 MTFF
|\n|Action 2
|
Determine expenditure aggregates, through updating the baseline
estimates and determining the allocation of fiscal space. Include
identification of the stock of, and plan to clear arrears.
|For preparation of
the 2019 MTFF
|\n|Action 3
|Continue to insist on a medium-term support framework with donors
to ensure timely commitments and disbursements of project finance.|Ongoing|\n\n\n\n39", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.19200134277344, 72.1199951171875, 539.8079833984375, 606.9000244140625], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "Recommendation 4. Enhance Budget Credibility Background: Weaknesses in the preparation of the annual budget reflects that decisions on expenditure prioritization are often pushed out to the budget year and resolved only through in-year budget reallocations. This has meant significant reductions and reallocations of expenditure within the year without accompanying changes in the underlying expenditure policies. Key measures: • Improve budget credibility by continuing to improve the realism of revenue estimates (including donor funding), and of expenditure estimates both at the aggregate level (i.e. total recurrent and capital expenditure) and at the composition level (i.e. allocations by classification). • Publish a reconciliation of changes (and their reasons) from the Budget Law to CGE, and analyze the largest deviations in allocations (both economic and functional classification). • Identify the implications of deviation for the budget to inform the preparation of baseline estimates in the MTFF. Institutional arrangements: Enhancing budget credibility requires stronger linkages between the MEF directorates with responsibility for macro-fiscal forecasting, the Directorate for Budget Planning and the Directorate of Treasury. No additional institutional arrangements are required, just strengthening of existing processes: • Fiscal reporting should identify and analyze deviations from Budget to outturn. • The preparation of expenditure aggregates at the MTFF stage should be determined through a reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches (see Box 7) Risks and mitigation measures: This recommendation is to improve existing processes, in order to not create additional systems or processes, the efforts to improve budget credibility must be integrated into the budget cycle. Schedule for implementation: Col2 Col3 \n\n Action 1 Analyze and publish the deviations from Budget Law to CGE for macroeconomic indicators, fiscal aggregates, and composition of expenditure. Further identify the major causes for deviations and their expected impacts for future budgets. For inclusion in the 2017 CGE and in the 2019 MTFF \n Action 2 Determine expenditure aggregates, through updating the baseline estimates and determining the allocation of fiscal space. Include identification of the stock of, and plan to clear arrears. For preparation of the 2019 MTFF \n Action 3 Continue to insist on a medium-term support framework with donors to ensure timely commitments and disbursements of project finance. Ongoing \n\n39", "text_characters": 2166}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0042-001"], "markdown": "##### **PROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS**\n\n**65.** **Scattered spending units operate expenses across the country.** There are more than\n1,600 UGBs across the country, including 200 UGBs at the central government level, 650 at the\nprovincial level, and 770 at the district level. At the central level, the bulk of budget execution is\nconcentrated in a few spending units that collectively execute 90 percent of the central agencies’\nbudgets. This extreme distribution is less pronounced at the provincial level (see Table 4).\n\n\n**66.** **Such a large network composed with many small-sized units needs to be**\n**streamlined for the sake of efficiency and capacity building.** Small provincial UGBs frequently\nover- or under-execute their budget. The sheer number of UGBs hampers sound allocation of\nfunds, consolidation of fiscal reports, and budget monitoring. Staff capacity needs strengthening\nto reach standards of excellence and effectiveness and accountability in budget management.\n\n\n**Table 4. Main Indicators for UGBs Across the Country**\n\n\n\n**Province** **2016**\n**Budget**\n\n\n\n_(as a percent of total)_ _(as a deviation between outturn and budget)_\n\n\n\n**2016**\n**Outturn**\n\n\n\n**# of UGBs** **Overall Budget Credibility**\n\n\n\n**Central** 82.84% 85.17% 13.17% 3%\n**Niassa** 3.77% 4.81% 8.56% 27%\n**Nampula** 2.40% 1.62% 12.03% 32%\n**Zambezia** 2.11% 1.42% 9.99% 33%\n**Gaza** 1.55% 1.13% 8.32% 27%\n**Tete** 1.34% 0.91% 8.26% 32%\n**Sofala** 1.27% 1.00% 8.02% 21%\n**Cabo Delgado** 1.19% 0.77% 7.66% 35%\n**Inhambane** 1.08% 0.80% 7.96% 26%\n**Maputo Provincia** 1.01% 1.03% 6.40% 2%\n**Manica** 0.87% 0.73% 7.24% 16%\n**Maputo Cidade** 0.57% 0.61% 2.39% 7%\n\nSource: Mission\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n40", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0006, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PROFESSIONALIZING SPENDING UNITS\n\n65. Scattered spending units operate expenses across the country. There are more than\n1,600 UGBs across the country, including 200 UGBs at the central government level, 650 at the\nprovincial level, and 770 at the district level. At the central level, the bulk of budget execution is\nconcentrated in a few spending units that collectively execute 90 percent of the central agencies’\nbudgets. This extreme distribution is less pronounced at the provincial level (see Table 4).\n\n66. Such a large network composed with many small-sized units needs to be\nstreamlined for the sake of efficiency and capacity building. Small provincial UGBs frequently\nover- or under-execute their budget. The sheer number of UGBs hampers sound allocation of\nfunds, consolidation of fiscal reports, and budget monitoring. Staff capacity needs strengthening\nto reach standards of excellence and effectiveness and accountability in budget management.\n\nTable 4. Main Indicators for UGBs Across the Country\n\nProvince 2016\nBudget\n\n_(as a percent of total)_ _(as a deviation between outturn and budget)_\n\n2016\nOutturn\n\n# of UGBs Overall Budget Credibility\n\nCentral 82.84% 85.17% 13.17% 3%\nNiassa 3.77% 4.81% 8.56% 27%\nNampula 2.40% 1.62% 12.03% 32%\nZambezia 2.11% 1.42% 9.99% 33%\nGaza 1.55% 1.13% 8.32% 27%\nTete 1.34% 0.91% 8.26% 32%\nSofala 1.27% 1.00% 8.02% 21%\nCabo Delgado 1.19% 0.77% 7.66% 35%\nInhambane 1.08% 0.80% 7.96% 26%\nMaputo Provincia 1.01% 1.03% 6.40% 2%\nManica 0.87% 0.73% 7.24% 16%\nMaputo Cidade 0.57% 0.61% 2.39% 7%\n\nSource: Mission\n\n40", "text_characters": 1306}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-024-fig-p0043-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 11. UGBs Distribution Across the Country**\n\n\nSource: SISTAFE database, staff calculations.\n\n**67.** **Streamlining the UGB network can bring manifold outcomes.** There are at least four\nmain outcomes to expect from a streamlined network:\n\n- **More accountable and proficient staff in UGBs:** Capacity development and accountability\nframeworks are easier to implement in units with a critical mass of staff (e.g., 30 or more).\n\n- **More timely and accurate fiscal reports:** Consolidating more than 1,600 quarterly reports,\nsome of which are sent manually, is a cumbersome and time-consuming process, hence the\nneed to group and connect as many UGBs as possible.\n\n- **More accurate budget allotments:** Appropriating budget to so many units and\nsubsequently reallocating them within the year to meet fiscal targets is a difficult exercise.\n\n- **Improved financial programming:** Fewer UGBs operating significant budgets will ease a\nbottom-up approach for the Treasury to anticipate financing needs in cash plans.\n\n**68.** **The approach should be pragmatic and does not involve drastic collapse of UGBs.**\nThe mission recommends grouping small UGBs into larger-sized platforms for budget execution.\nThis approach should be implemented case by case: shutting down inexistent UGBs without\nfinancial activities; grouping dependent UGBs under the authority of the same department,\nprovince, or district; assigning small UGBs to technical platforms that will implement technical\nsteps of the expenditure chain while leaving the responsibility for signing contracts and receiving\ngoods to the UGBs’ managers; and redeploying Treasury officials to best fit UGBs’ needs locally\nand centrally.\n\n\n41\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1324, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(99.75, 93.01219177246094, 521.25, 245.246337890625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 549, "number": 8, "size": 40707, "transform": [421.5, 0.0, -0.0, 152.23414611816406, 99.75, 93.01219177246094], "width": 672, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 11. UGBs Distribution Across the Country\n\nSource: SISTAFE database, staff calculations.\n\n67. Streamlining the UGB network can bring manifold outcomes. There are at least four\nmain outcomes to expect from a streamlined network:\n\n- More accountable and proficient staff in UGBs: Capacity development and accountability\nframeworks are easier to implement in units with a critical mass of staff (e.g., 30 or more).\n\n- More timely and accurate fiscal reports: Consolidating more than 1,600 quarterly reports,\nsome of which are sent manually, is a cumbersome and time-consuming process, hence the\nneed to group and connect as many UGBs as possible.\n\n- More accurate budget allotments: Appropriating budget to so many units and\nsubsequently reallocating them within the year to meet fiscal targets is a difficult exercise.\n\n- Improved financial programming: Fewer UGBs operating significant budgets will ease a\nbottom-up approach for the Treasury to anticipate financing needs in cash plans.\n\n68. The approach should be pragmatic and does not involve drastic collapse of UGBs.\nThe mission recommends grouping small UGBs into larger-sized platforms for budget execution.\nThis approach should be implemented case by case: shutting down inexistent UGBs without\nfinancial activities; grouping dependent UGBs under the authority of the same department,\nprovince, or district; assigning small UGBs to technical platforms that will implement technical\nsteps of the expenditure chain while leaving the responsibility for signing contracts and receiving\ngoods to the UGBs’ managers; and redeploying Treasury officials to best fit UGBs’ needs locally\nand centrally.\n\n41", "text_characters": 1406}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Recommendation 5. Streamline Spending Units Network
Background:
The sheer number of UGBs hampers the allocation of funds and budget consolidation. The MEF
reallocates funds during the year, depending on cash availability. Consolidation of UGBs
budgetary and financial transactions is uneasy. UGBs with low financial activity hardly reach best
standards, skills, and economies of scale for budget management
Key measures
Gradually regroup UGBs at center, province and district levels to divide their number by four with
the following indicative targets: 31 at central level (i.e. ministries and constitutional institutions);
240 at provincial level (i.e., governors, assemblies, regional directions, hospitals, and townships),
and 150 at district level (by grouping district UGBs in district secretariats).
Institutional arrangements
These key measures do not affect Mozambique’s decentralization framework. All UGBs to group
are reporting to central government agencies. The recommended approach is:
• Ministries: (i) first group small-budget UGBs and operate expenses on their behalf; (ii)
then constitute central spending centers for larger budget UGBs; and (iii) eventually
operate all central expenditure related to the ministry’s budget.
• Provinces: (i) group small-budget UGBs not related to central government ministries
under governors’ leadership; (ii) merge all UGBs related to regional directions; and (iii)
keep hospitals and large budget units as UGBs.
• Districts: Group all UGBs in district secretariats.
Risks and mitigation measures
One may expect resistance from small UGBs in fear that their budget could suffer haircuts or
administrative delays in expenditure from the merger. The MEF should make clear that funds will
be more easily funneled from the CUT to the UGBs and that larger and more professional UGBs
will be more efficient. Central ministries should make clear that deconcentrated units will not
suffer budget constraints beyond normal business. A communication campaign is needed.
Schedule for implementation|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|Phasing in:
|Define targets, timelines and action plan
|by March 2018 at latest
|\n|Action 1
|On a voluntary basis group small budget UGBs
|by June 2018
|\n|Action 2
|Prepare large mergers simultaneous with budget
preparation meetings
|by September 2018
|\n|Action 3
|
Start FY 2019 under the new budget management
framework
|by January 2019
|\n|Action 4
|
Complete remaining planned mergers
|by September 2019
|\n|
Action 5
|
Start FY 2020 under the new framework
|
by January 2020
|\n|
Action 6
|
General Inspectorate of Finance reports on experience|
by June 2020|\n\n\n\n42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21333312988281, 72.1199951171875, 540.00048828125, 662.2200317382812], "columns": 3, "rows": 8}], "text": "Recommendation 5. Streamline Spending Units Network Background: The sheer number of UGBs hampers the allocation of funds and budget consolidation. The MEF reallocates funds during the year, depending on cash availability. Consolidation of UGBs budgetary and financial transactions is uneasy. UGBs with low financial activity hardly reach best standards, skills, and economies of scale for budget management Key measures Gradually regroup UGBs at center, province and district levels to divide their number by four with the following indicative targets: 31 at central level (i.e. ministries and constitutional institutions); 240 at provincial level (i.e., governors, assemblies, regional directions, hospitals, and townships), and 150 at district level (by grouping district UGBs in district secretariats). Institutional arrangements These key measures do not affect Mozambique’s decentralization framework. All UGBs to group are reporting to central government agencies. The recommended approach is: • Ministries: (i) first group small-budget UGBs and operate expenses on their behalf; (ii) then constitute central spending centers for larger budget UGBs; and (iii) eventually operate all central expenditure related to the ministry’s budget. • Provinces: (i) group small-budget UGBs not related to central government ministries under governors’ leadership; (ii) merge all UGBs related to regional directions; and (iii) keep hospitals and large budget units as UGBs. • Districts: Group all UGBs in district secretariats. Risks and mitigation measures One may expect resistance from small UGBs in fear that their budget could suffer haircuts or administrative delays in expenditure from the merger. The MEF should make clear that funds will be more easily funneled from the CUT to the UGBs and that larger and more professional UGBs will be more efficient. Central ministries should make clear that deconcentrated units will not suffer budget constraints beyond normal business. A communication campaign is needed. Schedule for implementation Col2 Col3 \n\n Phasing in: Define targets, timelines and action plan by March 2018 at latest \n Action 1 On a voluntary basis group small budget UGBs by June 2018 \n Action 2 Prepare large mergers simultaneous with budget preparation meetings by September 2018 \n Action 3 Start FY 2019 under the new budget management framework by January 2019 \n Action 4 Complete remaining planned mergers by September 2019 \n Action 5 Start FY 2020 under the new framework by January 2020 \n Action 6 General Inspectorate of Finance reports on experience by June 2020 \n\n42", "text_characters": 2195}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Annex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main** **Outcomes)**\n\nThe mission organized two half-day seminars for the authorities to discuss best practices in\nbudget management and ways to resolve and prevent arrears in Mozambique. The seminar\nbrought together senior and technical government officials, from the MEF and other sector\nministries and entities involved in the budget process, including the external audit body.\n\n**The seminar was organized into two sessions:**\n\n\n - **Day 1** included five short presentations by IMF team, followed by a rich discussion. The\ntopics discussed included: an introduction mapping the problem of arrears; lessons from\nAngola on the management of arrears; budget credibility; expenditure process; and the\nCUT and cash management.\n\n\n - **Day 2** consisted of two working groups that discussed detailed recommendations for\nstrengthening the expenditure chain and cash management in Mozambique. The group\nidentified ways to ensure better control over the three main phases of the expenditure\nchain (i.e., commitment, verification, and payment). It also addressed the issue of cash\nand debt planning, as well as banking arrangements, to make the best of the existing\ntreasury single account.\n\n**Summary conclusions and recommendations from the working groups**\n\n\nThe two groups came up with useful conclusions and recommendations, which were presented\nand discussed in a plenary session.\n\nThe conclusions and recommendations resulting from the working session were used in finalizing\nthis technical assistance report. They were also discussed with the Minister, the Vice Minister, and\nthe Permanent Secretary in the wrap-up meeting of the mission.\n\n\n43", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex 1. Seminar on Budget Control (Main Outcomes)\n\nThe mission organized two half-day seminars for the authorities to discuss best practices in\nbudget management and ways to resolve and prevent arrears in Mozambique. The seminar\nbrought together senior and technical government officials, from the MEF and other sector\nministries and entities involved in the budget process, including the external audit body.\n\nThe seminar was organized into two sessions:\n\n - Day 1 included five short presentations by IMF team, followed by a rich discussion. The\ntopics discussed included: an introduction mapping the problem of arrears; lessons from\nAngola on the management of arrears; budget credibility; expenditure process; and the\nCUT and cash management.\n\n - Day 2 consisted of two working groups that discussed detailed recommendations for\nstrengthening the expenditure chain and cash management in Mozambique. The group\nidentified ways to ensure better control over the three main phases of the expenditure\nchain (i.e., commitment, verification, and payment). It also addressed the issue of cash\nand debt planning, as well as banking arrangements, to make the best of the existing\ntreasury single account.\n\nSummary conclusions and recommendations from the working groups\n\nThe two groups came up with useful conclusions and recommendations, which were presented\nand discussed in a plenary session.\n\nThe conclusions and recommendations resulting from the working session were used in finalizing\nthis technical assistance report. They were also discussed with the Minister, the Vice Minister, and\nthe Permanent Secretary in the wrap-up meeting of the mission.\n\n43", "text_characters": 1399}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Group 1. Expenditure chain**\n\n\n- The main challenge is to change users’ practices, so the three phases of the expenditure\n\nchain can be restored in e-SISTAFE when they are done. This would require extensive\ntraining at various levels (e.g., spending units, supervisory bodies, and internal control)\nand clear manual of procedures.\n\n- Compliance over the execution process in e-SISTAFE should be enforced with support from\n\nthe internal control (IGF).\n\n- The ‘commitment certificate’ issued by e-SISTAFE should start being used to provide\n\nsuppliers with future proof of payment. Suppliers should be trained to stop requesting\npayments prior to the delivery of goods and services, and to only deliver them after\ncommitments are made in the system.\n\n- Cash management tools should be put in place, so commitment ceilings can be provided in a\n\nquarterly basis. This would be very useful to strengthening the communication between\nspending units and the MEF. While the sectors would have some predictability to expend\ntheir budget, this would be done within fiscal sustainable limits. Moreover, e-SISTAFE\nwould capture data on real budget execution which would then facilitate the decisionmaking process.\n\n- Some improvements should be done to the infrastructure which supports e-SISTAFE to\n\nensure that spending units can have regular access from their local offices. When access\nto the system is temporary lost, the agents involved in the budget execution process\nmust travel to another UGE to record their transactions in e-SISTAFE. For practical\nreasons, this might end up in all three expenditure phases being recorded\nsimultaneously.\n\n**Group 2. Cash management**\n\n\n- The CUT could be strengthened by reducing Treasury accounts in commercial banks (e.g.,\n\nthose created by spending units or external financed projects), and reinforcing existing\nprocedures to ensure that surplus balances are immediately transferred to the CUT (e.g.,\nrevenue accounts).\n\n- Cash management function ( _programação financeira)_ should be developed with improved\n\nand regularly updated forecasts of cash flows. This would help to ensure that the budget\ncan be executed predictably, without having to ration cash or accumulate arrears.\n\n- The monthly and weekly mechanism used for cash rationing ( _requesição de necessidades_\n_financeiras_ ) should be complemented upstream with annual, quarterly, and monthly cash\nmanagement plans (improving the existing _orçamento de tesoureria_ and _planos de_\n_tesoureria_ ).\n\n\n44", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Group 1. Expenditure chain\n\n- The main challenge is to change users’ practices, so the three phases of the expenditure\n\nchain can be restored in e-SISTAFE when they are done. This would require extensive\ntraining at various levels (e.g., spending units, supervisory bodies, and internal control)\nand clear manual of procedures.\n\n- Compliance over the execution process in e-SISTAFE should be enforced with support from\n\nthe internal control (IGF).\n\n- The ‘commitment certificate’ issued by e-SISTAFE should start being used to provide\n\nsuppliers with future proof of payment. Suppliers should be trained to stop requesting\npayments prior to the delivery of goods and services, and to only deliver them after\ncommitments are made in the system.\n\n- Cash management tools should be put in place, so commitment ceilings can be provided in a\n\nquarterly basis. This would be very useful to strengthening the communication between\nspending units and the MEF. While the sectors would have some predictability to expend\ntheir budget, this would be done within fiscal sustainable limits. Moreover, e-SISTAFE\nwould capture data on real budget execution which would then facilitate the decisionmaking process.\n\n- Some improvements should be done to the infrastructure which supports e-SISTAFE to\n\nensure that spending units can have regular access from their local offices. When access\nto the system is temporary lost, the agents involved in the budget execution process\nmust travel to another UGE to record their transactions in e-SISTAFE. For practical\nreasons, this might end up in all three expenditure phases being recorded\nsimultaneously.\n\nGroup 2. Cash management\n\n- The CUT could be strengthened by reducing Treasury accounts in commercial banks (e.g.,\n\nthose created by spending units or external financed projects), and reinforcing existing\nprocedures to ensure that surplus balances are immediately transferred to the CUT (e.g.,\nrevenue accounts).\n\n- Cash management function ( _programação financeira)_ should be developed with improved\n\nand regularly updated forecasts of cash flows. This would help to ensure that the budget\ncan be executed predictably, without having to ration cash or accumulate arrears.\n\n- The monthly and weekly mechanism used for cash rationing ( _requesição de necessidades_\n_financeiras_ ) should be complemented upstream with annual, quarterly, and monthly cash\nmanagement plans (improving the existing _orçamento de tesoureria_ and _planos de_\n_tesoureria_ ).\n\n44", "text_characters": 2099}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Fiscal Affairs Department**\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\n[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-024", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Fiscal Affairs Department\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\nhttp://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment", "text_characters": 122}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd7eb16c1dc8d77fdc24fffe7c055e8397604bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087
+size 58403
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5659f5cc0f32fd35ee7ce4d8ceeb1b18b738902e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:eb6458ea92fa074051d11743962071694afd5bc4f345ce5f98e56d40fb592aea
+size 24135
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2dd9e79aefe864b949344711ce2918d7215b8f8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fd03bf18c05503626f3702c439f2fc7fe2a557d6aa91b58f2aa27bcf65df9de2
+size 14273
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef04c6a35cf0d3dba54e47fb0ed7dadfe6e92012
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6635e5c63f630ad0d520dae7ef928a49abe2675800118e691f7e708f24b60401
+size 97017
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..52d558e498a06492226eb6cff2ec6585dad09d34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:105032e15eedef96291d06faaa26f138e821a63a4bec31fe9ed55a1a64e9db90
+size 117932
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65d4e3742bcf6b4f8c14b85d9533ae7ce62642aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f6fe4f1ad8b7cf0bfad1e6ed7cdf6c8510448bbc0e78725f5b3b71ba0d22e110
+size 137377
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e5a487eb90f3d74a5149ce34165321f04532f27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4316fbea191df1917893cc9c822acf308f4e9831263b6f7d974055b7f34b62a0
+size 83195
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bb25969f603d1d33ae548a8f54c901a0f5557379
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-025",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Strategy for Restoring the Expenditure Chain and Improving Financial Programming",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-025.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "662d254712b31fd4815471c667ec3745dfd6bf63aba973fd2f7b85fb9938a82e",
+ "source_bytes": 708649,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/13/republic-of-mozambique-strategy-for-restoring-the-expenditure-chain-and-improving-financial-528137",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:33:21+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 11.717,
+ "page_count": 35,
+ "text_characters": 67111,
+ "table_count": 5,
+ "figure_count": 7,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "TABLE OF CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "BACKGROUND"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "REFORM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "DRAFT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "JUNE 2018"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 12,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 13,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 16,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "I. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 29,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "II. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.6",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report - Strategy for Restoring the Expenditure Chain and Improving Financial Programming; IMF Country Report No. 23/25; October 2018",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 15 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 15.0",
+ "creationDate": "D:20190606113959+04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230113124127-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7f898fb8eb38142afbad5760cf1e3d95beda71e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2133 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/25**
+# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — STRATEGY FOR** **RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND** **IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**
+
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff
+
+
+
+team of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the
+
+
+
+time it was completed in October 2018.
+
+
+
+_**Disclaimer:**_
+_This report was prepared in 2018 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_
+_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+**OCTOBER**
+**2018**
+
+
+
+
+
+Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa
+
+International Monetary Fund
+7 [th] Floor, Bramer House, Ebene, Mauritius
+Tel.: +230-401-2500 **-** Fax: +230-468-1618
+
+# **MOZAMBIQUE**
+#### **STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND** **IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**
+
+
+**PREPARED BY**
+**JEAN LUC HELIS,** **GREG HORMAN,** **HERBERTO MONTEIRO, AND ESTHER PALACIO**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+#### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**
+
+**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS** **3**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** **4**
+
+**BACKGROUND** **4**
+
+**OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE**
+**REFORM** **6**
+**A. MAIN OBJECTIVES** **6**
+**B. KEY FEATURES OF THE STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN** **6**
+**C. IMPLEMENTATION RISKS** **9**
+**D. NEXT STEPS** **9**
+
+
+
+###### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**
+
+AFS IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa - AFRITAC
+South
+DNCP accounting directorate
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+IT Information technology
+MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance
+PEFP Strategic Public Finance Plan
+TA Technical Assistance
+UGE Spending Units
+UGB Beneficiary Management Units
+
+
+
+#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+
+
+**The Government of Mozambique is committed to strengthen its financial programming**
+
+
+
+**procedures in accordance with the Mozambique fiscal law (SISTAFE), and in line with the**
+
+
+
+**Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019.** The Ministry of Economy and Finance
+
+(MEF) and development partners have agreed on developing, adopting and implementing a
+
+
+
+strategy for the gradual restoration of the expenditure chain, and the improvement of financial
+
+programming techniques and cash management by the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) to
+
+
+
+prevent continued accumulation of arrears.
+
+
+
+**The related draft strategy, developed with the assistance of the mission and attached to**
+
+
+
+**the present report:** (1) takes stock of processes implemented, the IT system(s), and
+
+
+
+stakeholders’ responsibilities and task sharing; (2) describes good practices and main procedures,
+
+
+
+models, tools and methodologies that could be used to implementing the cash planning and
+
+
+
+management, and expenditure control functions; (3) identifies the related capacities that would
+
+need to be strengthened; and (4) presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions
+
+
+
+to be undertaken.
+
+
+
+**Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming would imply**
+
+
+
+**coordinating with other ongoing reform processes,** including: (1) improving the credibility of
+
+
+
+the budget; (2) assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears; [1] (3) expanding the
+
+
+
+Treasury single account system (CUT) coverage; (4) better coordinating cash and debt
+
+
+
+management; and (5) strengthening internal and external control/audit.
+
+
+
+1 A strategy for clearing the stock of public arrears has been recently supported by FAD assistance.
+
+
+
+#### **BACKGROUND**
+
+
+
+**The expenditure process is not implemented as legally defined in Mozambique’s fiscal law**
+
+
+
+**(SISTAFE).** Per the SISTAFE, three key stages of expenditure execution (i.e. commitments,
+
+verifications and payment) should be recorded, in due time when they occur, through the
+
+
+
+financial management (e-SISTAFE) system. Accordingly, fiscal reports should be articulated
+
+
+
+around these stages. In fact, transactions are entered late in the system, when cash is available
+
+
+
+per Treasury’s weekly ceilings. Meanwhile, invoices are kept in ad-hoc ledgers, outside the e
+
+
+SISTAFE.
+
+
+
+**Consequently, the government has cumulated large stocks of unreported arrears.** **[2]** Due
+
+
+
+obligations not recorded and not paid, have piled-up, undermining contractors’ trust in the
+
+
+
+government ability to honor its debts, thereby shifting business relations with the private sector
+
+
+
+towards pre-payment requirements. Moreover, spending units lack predictability to efficiently
+
+
+
+execute their budget, while expenditure controls remain weak, and the quality of financial
+
+
+
+information poor.
+
+
+
+**In line with the Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019, and** **2017 and 2018 FAD**
+
+
+
+**missions’ advice**, [3] **the Government has committed to develop a more pro-active approach**
+
+
+
+**to manage the governments aggregate liquidity.** This approach aims at improving cash
+
+
+
+management, and expenditure control–to ensure that the budget is executed predictably, the
+
+
+
+expenditure chain is restored, and arrear accumulation is fended-off. To this end, the short
+
+
+sighted mechanisms currently used for cash rationing should be complemented with appropriate
+
+
+
+release of commitments and improved annual and in-year cash management plans, and cash
+
+
+
+flows forecasts.
+
+
+
+**Against this background, the Minister requested further TA from the IMF.** The AFRITAC
+
+
+
+South (AFS) [4] mission assisted the authorities in defining a strategy and an action plan to restore
+
+
+
+a legally compliant expenditure process, and to improve financial programming. The mission also
+
+
+
+2 The March 2018 FAD mission received preliminary data of supplier arrears for the central government estimated
+at 29.8 million Meticais (MT) as of 2016, close to 5 percent of GDP. The Government has already validated and
+started clearing the arrears to utilities (at least MT 2.9 billion in 2018).
+
+3 “Republic of Mozambique: Regaining Control Over Budget Execution”, Benoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory
+Horman, Armando Manuel, and Esther Palacio (December 2017); “Republic of Mozambique: Managing Public
+Arrears”, Armando Manuel (February 2018).
+
+
+
+4AFS provides TA and training to Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique,
+
+
+
+Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. AFS donors are the European Union, the
+
+
+
+United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, China, Mauritius, Netherlands, European Investment Bank and Australia.
+
+
+
+participated in workshops on financial programming, and meetings with the authorities and
+
+relevant donors to discuss and agree on the strategy and facilitate TA coordination.
+#### **OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE**
+###### **REFORM**
+
+**A.** **Main Objectives**
+
+
+
+**The Draft Strategy (attached), prepared by the mission for restoring the expenditure chain**
+
+**and improving financial programming:**
+
+- Takes stock of the current processes, IT system(s), and stakeholders’ responsibilities and task
+
+sharing related to financial programming and expenditure control;
+
+- Describes good practices and main procedures, models, tools and methodologies that could
+
+
+
+be used to implementing the new cash planning and management, and expenditure control
+
+
+
+functions;
+
+
+
+
+- Identifies the related capacities that would need to be strengthened; and
+
+- Presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions to be undertaken.
+
+**B.** **Key features of the strategy and action plan**
+
+
+
+**Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming should be**
+
+
+
+**considered as medium/long term reforms.** it would take several years to effectively develop
+
+these functions, and the mission recommends a gradual approach with the following phases:
+
+- **Phase I.** What should be done by end 2018 to start implementing some priority actions in
+
+the context of the 2019 budget implementation?
+
+
+
+
+- **Phase I.** What should be done by end 2018 to start implementing some priority actions in
+
+
+
+
+- **Phase II.** What could be done in 2019 to support the implementation of key sub-reforms?
+
+- **Phase III.** What could be develop and implemented in the medium/long term?
+
+
+The strategy and action plan have been developed accordingly. Key actions for 2018 and 2019
+
+are presented in the boxes 1 and 2 below.
+
+
+**Implementing the strategy would imply:**
+
+- A more efficient use of e-SISTAFE (MEX [5] and MPE [6] in particular);
+
+
+5 _MEX: Modulo de Execução Orçamental (do e-SISTAFE) -_ Budget Execution Module (of e-SISTAFE).
+
+6 _MPE: Modulo de Administracao do Patrimonio do Estado –_ Public Procurement and State Assets Management
+Module of (e-SISTAFE).
+
+
+
+- Quarterly release of budget allocations/commitments versus current release of funds;
+
+- Financial programming for payment of expenditures when they should occur versus current
+
+financial programming to control budget execution (cash rationing); and
+
+- A different role for the treasury: pro-active manager of government liquidity.
+
+**Box 1: Illustrative list of tasks to complete Phase I (by end 2018)**
+
+_**General**_
+
+- Adopt the strategy and action plan to restore the expenditure chain and to improve
+financial programming.
+
+_**Expenditure Control Function**_
+
+- **Action 1:** Issue the decree to instore the apportionment phase, and to make real-time
+recording of commitment and verification of expenditures mandatory for all units
+operating within the e-SISTAFE.
+
+- **Action 2** : Make the necessary changes in e-SISTAFE (MEX) to support the revised
+expenditure process.
+
+- **Action 3** : Start the training on revised budget execution processes.
+
+- **Action 4** : Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform
+suppliers.
+
+_**Financial Programming Function**_
+
+- **Action 1** : Prepare a circular (or other guidance note) describing the new approach to
+financial programming and outlining the responsibilities of the Treasury, other units of
+the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and spending units (UGEs).
+
+- **Action 2** : Develop a uniform template for collecting cash flow forecasts from UGEs for
+goods, services, and capital spending.
+
+- **Action 3:** Develop an Excel-based cash planning model for compiling top-down
+estimates prepared by the Treasury and bottom-up estimates supplied by UGEs.
+
+- **Action 4:** Develop reports for analyzing variances between cash flow forecasts and actual
+outturns.
+
+- **Action 5:** Develop any necessary report-generation or data-extraction functionality in eSISTAFE to support the new approach to financial programming.
+
+Source: Mission
+
+
+**Against this background, priority actions (to be implemented in the context of the 2019**
+
+**budget) would include:**
+
+- An appropriate release of commitments by category of expenditure;
+
+
+
+- A restored expenditure process:
+
+
+
+
+`o` Commitment supported by adequate reservation of budget appropriation (commitment
+
+
+
+note - _Nota de Cabimentação_ );
+
+
+
+
+`o` Verification supported by a certification of good/service delivery (liquidation note - _Nota_
+
+
+
+_de Liquidação_ );
+
+
+
+
+`o` Payment supported by legally compliant commitment and verification (payment order
+
+
+
+note - _Ordem de Pagamento_ );
+
+
+
+
+- A more dynamic cash flow forecasting focusing on the largest and most problematic cash
+
+
+
+flows;
+
+
+
+
+- The related legal and regulatory framework reviewed and adopted (diplomas; circulars;
+
+manuals); and
+
+- Strengthened capacities (MEF, spending units, suppliers, etc.).
+
+
+**Box 2: Illustrative list of tasks to complete Phase II (2019)**
+
+_**Expenditure Control Function**_
+
+- **Action 5:** Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of
+the 2019 budget.
+
+- **Action 6:** Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of
+the 2019 budget.
+
+- **Action 7:** UGEs record verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per
+legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law.
+
+- **Action 8:** Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively
+restored.
+
+- **Action 9:** Implement commitment control pilots in some provinces.
+
+- **Action 10:** Revise the budget execution manual to restore the expenditure chain as
+legally defined in SISTAFE law.
+
+- **Action 11:** Continue to develop MPE and extend its use.
+
+_**Financial Programming Function**_
+
+- **Action 6** : Train UGEs in preparing cash flow estimates.
+
+- **Action 7:** Train the Treasury in preparing cash flow estimates and in operationalizing the
+new approach to financial programming.
+
+- **Action 8:** Progressively roll out the new approach to financial programming.
+
+Source: Mission
+
+
+
+**C.** **Implementation risks**
+
+
+
+**Managing the reform.** Reforms will need time, constant efforts, and strong commitment and
+
+
+
+ownership from the authorities, to be effectively implemented. Communicating to the private
+
+sector is important to bring the awareness on how important financial programming and the
+
+
+
+effective control of public expenditure is. The restoration of the expenditure phases, and the
+
+development of the new financial programming function, will also require extensive capacity
+
+
+
+development.
+
+
+
+**Implementing the Reform.** The implementation of the reform should be progressive. While the
+
+chain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and
+
+
+
+verifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP)
+
+
+
+and reported in fiscal reports.
+
+
+
+**D.** **Next steps**
+
+
+
+**The Draft Strategy is also expected to guide the complementary TA support** **from DFID** that
+
+
+
+has been planned on financial programming and expenditure control in furtherance of the Fiscal
+
+
+
+Affairs Department (FAD) and AFRITAC South (AFS) advice.
+
+
+
+**DFID has proposed to coordinate their support with FAD and AFS, using the same experts.**
+
+
+
+Further discussions would be needed to review, after this mission, the initial TOR to be fully
+
+
+
+consistent with the new framework, and with relevant coverage and timeframe.
+
+
+
+# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+### **STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN**
+##### **AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**
+
+### **DRAFT**
+
+##### **JUNE 2018**
+
+
+
+2
+
+#### **CONTENTS**
+
+
+**INTRODUCTION** 3
+
+A. Background 3
+
+B. Objectives of the strategy 4
+
+C. Related reforms and conditions 5
+
+**I. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS** 6
+
+A. Main features of an efficient expenditure process and control 6
+
+B. Main issues in Mozambique 7
+
+C. Addressing the main issues 8
+
+D. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement 16
+
+E. Strengthening capacities 16
+
+F. Action plan for restoring the expenditure chain 17
+
+**II. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING** 19
+
+A. Objectives of financial programming 19
+
+B. Main issues in Mozambique 19
+
+C. Defining the new process 20
+
+D. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement 24
+
+E. Strengthening capacities 24
+
+F. Action plan for improving financial programming 24
+
+
+
+3
+
+
+#### **INTRODUCTION**
+
+**A.** **Background**
+
+
+
+**1.** **Law No. 09/2002 of 12 February, led to the creation of the State Financial**
+
+
+
+**Administration System (SISTAFE).** Subsequently, decree No. 23/2004 of 20 August established
+
+
+
+and harmonized the rules and procedures for the programming, management, execution and
+
+
+
+control of the public treasury of Mozambique.
+
+
+
+**2.** **The financial programming envisaged in the legislation is yet to be fully**
+
+
+
+**implemented.** This is mainly due to the process of cash rationing implemented in 2013.
+
+
+
+Practically, Spending Units (UGE) and Beneficiary Management Units (UGB) send the Annual
+
+
+
+Treasury Plan disaggregated by month and by economic classification budget headings manually
+
+
+
+to the Directorate of National Treasury (DNT) or the corresponding Provincial Directorate of
+
+
+
+Economy and Finance (DPEF) at the beginning of each fiscal year. The Plan can then be adjusted
+
+
+
+throughout the fiscal year based on execution rates, changes in budget appropriations or new
+
+
+
+budget entries.
+
+
+
+**3.** **In addition to this, UGEs submit monthly budget requests at the beginning of each**
+
+
+
+**month, indicating the disbursement periods per week.** At the beginning of each week, the
+
+DNT releases commitment controls and financial quotas for the week based on these requests
+
+and available resources. In practice, the release of these limits at the same time and with short
+
+
+
+notice creates an incentive for the UGEs to execute the three phases of expenditure
+
+
+
+(Commitments, Verifications or Settlements and Payments) almost simultaneously, thereby failing
+
+
+
+to comply with the procedures defined in the legislation.
+
+
+
+**4.** **Financial programming, as defined in the legislation, ensures greater efficiency in**
+
+
+
+**the execution of public expenditure and should therefore be one of the main instruments**
+
+
+
+**guiding the execution of the State Budget.** To strengthen financial programming as defined in
+
+
+
+the legislation (articles 79 to 81 of the SISTAFE Regulation) it is necessary to define mechanisms
+
+
+
+which quantify financial flows from DNT over a given period. These should be quantified and
+
+
+
+established in line with existing revenue forecasts, budgetary constraints, expenditure forecasts,
+
+
+
+the financing outlook as well as the outturn trend for the fiscal year.
+
+
+
+**5.** **Recent country-evaluations have shown that expenditure process and financial**
+**programming in Mozambique is yet to become fully compliant with existing legislation**
+**and does not follow internationally recommended standards.** This, in turn, limits the DNT’s
+ability to predict expenditure in the budget execution process. This has also led to UGEs not
+registering the phases of expenditure at the moment of occurrence, leading to delays in public
+payments to suppliers of goods and services. This has led UGEs to accumulate arrears.
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+**B.** **Objectives of the strategy**
+
+
+
+**6.** **The Government of Mozambique is committed to strengthen its financial**
+
+
+
+**programming procedures in accordance with the Mozambique fiscal law (SISTAFE), and in**
+
+
+
+**line with the Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019.** The Ministry of Economy
+
+
+
+and Finance (MEF) and development partners have agreed on a strategy for the gradual
+
+
+
+restoration of the expenditure chain, and the improvement of financial programming techniques
+
+
+
+and cash management by the DNT to prevent continued accumulation of arrears.
+
+
+
+**7.** **The strategy defines the conditions for developing and implementing the cash**
+
+**planning and management, and expenditure control functions.** The strategy
+
+
+
+
+- Takes stock of processes implemented, the IT system(s), and stakeholders’ responsibilities
+
+and task sharing
+
+
+
+
+- Describes good practices and main procedures, models, tools and methodologies that
+
+
+
+could be used to implementing the cash planning and management, and expenditure
+
+
+
+control functions
+
+
+
+
+- Identifies the related capacities that would need to be strengthened
+
+- Presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions to be undertaken
+
+
+
+**8.** **The strategy is also expected to guide the complementary technical assistance (TA)**
+
+
+
+**support from DFID and other partners that has been planned on financial programming**
+
+**and expenditure control in furtherance of FAD and AFS advice.** The TA should support the
+
+
+
+MEF, particularly the DNT and the Centre for the Development of Public Finance Systems
+
+
+
+(CEDSIF) [7] . The TA should also assist UGEs and other relevant Directorates such as the National
+
+
+
+Plan and Budget Directorate (DNPO), the National Directorate of Public Accounting (DNCP), and
+
+
+
+the Finance General Inspection (IGF) when necessary.
+
+
+
+**9.** **The strategy is organized in two parts** :
+
+
+- **Part I:** Restoring a legally compliant expenditure process
+
+
+- **Part II:** Improving financial programming
+
+
+7 Also in charge of coordinating PFM reforms.
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+**C.** **Related reforms and conditions**
+
+**10.** **Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming will need to**
+**be coordinated and integrated with other ongoing reform processes.** While not covered by
+this strategy, other critical reforms should be implemented in parallel:
+
+- **Improving the credibility of the budget.** Although forecasts of macro-aggregates have
+improved, there is a need to enhance the credibility of the budget. This can be done
+through a more transparent process and efficient techniques for budget preparation.
+
+- **Urgently assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears.** [8] Based on other
+countries’ experience, the government should rapidly take stock of and validate
+legitimate suppliers’ claims. This will send a positive signal to creditors and raise officials’
+awareness on the need to comply with budget ceilings and expenditure processes.
+Clearing these arrears will come afterward, with creditors’ agreements on clearance
+modalities (including discounts
+
+- **Continued expansion of CUT coverage.** The process to identify inactive accounts then
+close them, and to roll-out of the e-SISTAFE to extend the use of the CUT, have to be
+continued.
+
+- **Stronger coordination of cash and debt management.** The capacity of domestic
+market to accommodate a more variable profile of treasury bill issuance and/or
+maintenance of a larger cash buffer within the CUT should be strengthened to absorb
+temporary shocks.
+
+- **A shorter “policy-reaction lag”** for determining which policy actions (i.e., tolerate a
+higher deficit, reduce low-priority expenditure, undertake revenue measures) need to be
+taken by fiscal authorities when cash flow shocks are likely to be permanent and not
+temporary.
+
+
+- **Strengthened internal and external controls and audits.** The IGF and the
+Administrative Court (TA) have a crucial role to help restoring the expenditure chain and
+improving financial programing, through the implementation of the accountability and
+sanctions framework.
+
+
+8 A strategy to clear and prevent arrears was recently developed by the Government with TA support from FAD,
+
+and is partially being implemented.
+
+
+
+6
+
+#### **I. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS**
+
+**A.** **Main features of an efficient expenditure process and control**
+
+
+
+**11.** **The objective of expenditure control is to ensure that public resources are spent as**
+
+
+
+**intended, within authorized limits, and following sound financial management principles.**
+
+
+
+The role of an expenditure control system is to ensure that the level and allocation of
+
+
+
+government expenditure reflect the will of the legislature as voted for in the budget. Expenditure
+
+
+
+controls should also reflect sound financial management principles, ensuring that public
+
+
+
+resources are utilized efficiently, incurred obligations are cleared in a timely manner,
+
+
+
+abuse/misappropriation of public money is prevented or sanctioned, and private actors compete
+
+
+
+on a level playing field for government contracts.
+
+
+
+**12.** **To ensure these objectives are met, government expenditures typically go through**
+**seven stages between authorization by the legislature and payment to the final beneficiary**
+(Figure 1). Of these seven stages, three have a direct impact on government’s obligations and
+debt, and should be recorded separately to ensure the predictability of, allow control over
+expenses, and for fiscal reporting and financial programming purposes: (1) commitments made,
+yet to be settled; (2) verifications recorded yet to be paid (i.e. the expenditure float); and (3)
+payments made (cash basis budget execution).
+
+
+
+**13.** **The Mozambique fiscal law** **[9]** **identifies these three stages of the expenditure**
+
+
+
+**execution**, that must happen separately from other stages of expenditure, and demands fiscal
+
+
+
+reporting be based on commitments. These legal provisions are practically not implemented.
+
+
+
+9 Law N. 9/2002 of 12 of February, on Public Financial Management System (SISTAFE), Article 30 on expenditure
+process.
+
+
+
+7
+
+
+**Figure 1. Seven key stages of the expenditure chain**
+
+
+
+
+
+**14.** **Due to cash rationing, the Treasury has set a system by which transactions are**
+
+
+
+**entered in the system as they mature for payment, not when the individual stages happen.**
+
+
+
+Practically, the spending units (UGEs) keep invoices and contracts in ad hoc ledgers, out of e
+SISTAFE. Then they operate spending by the sole amount of transactions complying with the
+
+
+
+weekly cash ceiling set by the Treasury. [10] Since request for limits are send only after invoices are
+
+received, the risk of accumulating arrears is very high (if not inevitable). All steps of expenditure
+
+
+
+are generally recorded within one week [11] as follows: commitments and verifications are recorded
+
+
+
+in e-SISTAFE simultaneously; and payments are made within four days, e.g. the time lapse the
+
+
+
+Treasury needs to execute the disbursements.
+
+
+
+10 The Treasury formally releases a “ _Limite de Cabimentacao_ ” (limit for commitment) to the UGE. This limit
+
+corresponds to available cash to be spent during a time slot of one week and is announced at the beginning of
+each week, based on the monthly requests received from UGEs.
+
+11 Source: e-SISTAFE database provided by CEDSIF.
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+**15.** **Squeezing expenditure phases into such a short time lapse, also denies capturing**
+
+
+
+**commitments and invoices when they occur.** It encourages the neglection of critical
+
+
+
+documents such as contracts, receipts and invoices that are put on the back burner until the last
+
+
+
+moment when transactions are done. Therefore, fiscal reporting in Mozambique is incomplete
+
+
+
+and does not provide a fair reflection on government obligations. Decisions on fiscal policies are
+
+
+
+poorly informed in the lack of accurate data on real execution process.
+
+
+
+**16.** **Commitment control is loose or inexistent.** Complying with Mozambique’s legal
+
+
+
+framework, investment contracts shall be submitted by UGEs to the supreme audit court (TA) for
+
+
+
+a control on procedural regularity, not budget compliance. Prior the TA’s control, the Treasury
+
+should conduct a preliminary control on commitments ( _pre-cabimento_ ). In practice, the ceiling
+
+
+
+issued by the Treasury is not binding the purchasing UGE, and does not prevent them from over
+
+
+
+purchasing more than their budget. Most commitments are not controlled upstream, and the
+
+
+
+financial sustainability of spending units’ procurement is not ensured.
+
+
+
+**C.** **Addressing the main issues**
+
+**Adequate release of appropriations: restore the apportionment phase**
+
+
+
+**17.** **A clear differentiation should be made between the role of the budget release and**
+
+
+
+**cash release.** Extending time horizons on budget releases enables compliant and timely
+
+
+
+recording of commitment and facilitate budget implementation; while cash release means that
+
+
+
+cash is available at the right place at the right time to facilitate payment.
+
+
+
+**18.** **For goods and services, the UGEs should be given commitment ceilings/allotments**
+
+
+
+**sufficiently in advance to improve the quality of public expenditure management**
+
+
+
+**downstream.** This would provide the following improvements: (1) the UGEs would have
+
+
+
+sufficient room to enable records of commitment and verification stages; (2) the process of
+
+
+
+programming can be implemented interactively, starting with the submission of financial needs
+
+
+
+of funds by the UGEs to the Treasury and with accurate information on real commitments and
+
+
+
+verifications; and (3) the Treasury would gain critical information to consolidate a quarterly cash
+
+
+
+plan.
+
+
+
+**19.** **Hereinafter, the quarterly apportionment/commitments ceilings could be made on**
+
+
+
+**a quarterly basis, based on revenue forecasts.** It could represent 25 percent of the annual
+
+
+
+appropriation, or less if the MEF would prefer a more conservative release of commitment in case
+
+
+
+revenue collections fall short of estimates (e.g. based on 90 percent of revenue collections). In
+
+
+
+some special cases, such as the consumption of public utility services and the execution of
+
+
+
+medium- or long-term leasing contracts, the apportionment could be annual, in order to sign the
+
+
+
+contract (commitment), with monthly/quarterly payments based on invoices.
+
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+**20.** **For the other categories of expenditures, the apportionment could be made in the**
+
+**system by the Budget Department following a top-down approach:**
+
+- For **payroll expenses and social contributions**, the apportionment could be done
+annually, quarterly of monthly and correspond to the amount of the compensations,
+subsidies and contributions owed during the period of reference.
+
+
+- In relation to **debt servicing**, the apportionment could be done annually based on the
+schedule of reimbursement prepared by the Public Debt Management Department.
+
+
+- For **spending related to capital projects**, apportionment is in general annual in
+accordance with the contract (multiyear and annual legal commitments).
+
+
+- For **transfers**, the commitment ceilings would depend on the nature of the transfer
+(defined by law, regulation, and/or policy decisions by the government): for example,
+quarterly for study scholarships, in accordance with specific schedules for transfers to
+local governments, state-owned enterprises (SOE) or public entities, or based on specific
+contracts.
+
+
+**21.** **The implications for e-SISTAFE would be to separate budget release from cash**
+**release** and extend the time horizon for budget releases: quarterly for ongoing/continuing
+expenditure, and longer for contracts and other specific items.
+
+
+**A more efficient use of the existing functionalities of e-SISTAFE**
+
+**22.** **The budget is executed through the public sector financial management system (e-**
+
+
+
+**SISTAFE), which has been developed to cover the main stages of the expenditure.** **[12]** The e
+
+
+SISTAFE and its Budget Execution Module (MEX) are robust enough to record all transactions
+
+
+
+made by the UGEs when they occur. It records different phases in the expenditure workflow
+
+
+
+including commitments, verifications and payments.
+
+
+
+**23.** **E-SISTAFE is being upgraded with the progressive implementation of the public**
+
+
+
+**procurement and asset management module** (MPE) _._ This functionality should strengthen
+
+
+
+public procurement management and ensure budget allocations/allotments exist and are
+
+
+
+reserved before launching the public tender (adding a pre-commitment stage). The module
+
+
+
+should also improve the:
+
+
+
+12 The SISTAFE is the financial administration framework of the State, composed by five subsystems: (1) State
+
+Budget Subsystem (SOE); (2) Public Accounting Subsystem (SCP); (3) Public Treasury Subsystem (STP); (4) State
+Asset Subsystem (SPE); and (5) Internal Control Subsystem (SCI). This framework is supported by an integrated
+financial management information system called e-SISTAFE, composed by several modules. Some of these
+modules, such as the Budget Preparation Module (MEO, _Modulo de Elaboração do Orçamento_ ) and the Budget
+Execution Module (MEX, _Modulo de Execução Orçamental_ ) are operational, and some are still being developed,
+such as the State Assets Module (MPE, _Modulo do Patrimonio do Estado_ ).
+
+
+
+10
+
+
+- _**Control of procurement,**_ to obtain high quality goods and services at a competitive
+price; to provide a fair opportunity for all bidders to compete for government contracts,
+and to get good value for money and to minimize risks of corruption and patronage.
+
+
+- **Verification of goods and services (and public works) and accounting control**
+involving: (1) verification of the goods and/or services delivered by a supplier to ensure
+that these and/or public works conform to the specified quality and quantity; (2) a
+calculation of the liability incurred by the government to the supplier; (3) the prevention,
+identification and mitigation of arrears; and (3) the proper recording of State assets.
+
+
+
+**24.** **The interfaced functionalities of the budget preparation module (MEO),** **MEX and**
+
+
+
+**MPE should allow in the medium-term to cover all phases of budget execution from**
+
+
+
+**allotment of funds to payments** (as presented in Figures 2 and Table 1). However, there is no
+
+
+
+need to wait to complete the current pilot of the MPE to include public works and to roll-it
+
+
+
+throughout the country during the next two years. [13] The functionalities of MEX could be used to
+
+
+
+record on real time all commitments and verifications with the 2019 budget implementation.
+
+
+
+**Enforcing the commitment note**
+
+
+
+**25.** **A feature of e-SISTAFE is the possibility to issue a “commitment note”** **(** _**Nota de**_
+
+
+
+_**Cabimentação**_ **).** Designed to increase suppliers’ confidence, the commitment note is an official
+
+statement which may be printed out from e-SISTAFE and sent to suppliers to confirm that has or
+
+
+
+will have resources to pay what is ordered, when the obligation to pay become due.
+
+
+
+**26.** **But the way the commitment note has been used has not allowed to monitor**
+
+
+
+**commitments.** If it was issued at the date of the purchase order, and if the latter was registered
+
+
+
+in e-SISTAFE, it would be a valid source of information to monitor budget execution. However,
+
+
+
+this note can be generated only when a commitment is registered in e-SISTAFE and, so far,
+
+
+
+purchase orders are issued outside e-SISTAFE. As a result, the “ _Nota de Cabimentação_ ” has not
+
+
+
+brought added value to the control of budget execution, and is not trusted by suppliers as a
+
+
+
+future obligation of the State to pay them, subject to the fulfillment of the contract of service
+
+
+
+delivery.
+
+
+
+13 In 2017, MPE was implemented as a pilot test in CEDSIF, National Directorates of the Ministry of Finance,
+
+ministries of Education and Health. The full roll-out of MPE for all ministries/departments is expected for 2020.
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+**Figure 2. Budget execution process in e-SISTAFE for goods, services, and public works**
+
+
+
+
+
+**27.** **Issuing and enforcing compliant "Nota de Cabimentação" should be one of the**
+
+**main features in restoring the expenditure cycle and control.** It should be the only valid
+
+
+
+document confirming that: (1) the purchase has strictly respected the first phases of the
+
+
+
+expenditure process (phases 1 to 4); (2) the supplier has the obligation to deliver in due time the
+
+good and services in accordance with the contract (phase 5); then (3) Government will pay in due
+
+
+
+time what has been delivered (phases 5 and 6) The supply of goods or services outside the
+
+
+
+normal procedure should be prohibited. Internal and external audits from the IGF and the TA
+
+
+
+should verify compliance with these procedures and apply sanctions when necessary.
+
+
+
+**A strict and limited use of advances and operating accounts**
+
+
+
+**28.** **The SISTAFE Law authorizes the processing of expenditure under cash advance**
+
+
+
+**arrangements**, called an operating fund, to pay for expenditure in small amounts and for which
+
+compliance with the normal way of processing expenditure has been waived (Article 30.2). These
+
+expenditures are by nature limited, and the conditions for their implementation should be strictly
+
+
+
+defined. Box 1 presents good practices for managing cash advances and related operating
+
+
+
+accounts, in the case of Mozambique.
+
+
+
+**29.** **However, advance payments to suppliers have become the general practice at**
+**provincial and district levels** . Suppliers are reluctant to deliver goods and services prior to
+receiving payment, to avoid the risk of incurring into arrears. Private sector outside the capital
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+usually has limit liquidity and does not have the capacity to finance the government. The recent
+increase in the government stock of arrears has contributed to shifting business relations
+towards pre-payment requirements.
+
+
+**Box 1. Recommendations for managing cash advances and related operating funds**
+
+**Establishment and ceiling of operating funds**
+
+The Treasury shall have the sole authority to approve the establishment of operating funds of any ministries,
+departments, and agencies, and shall set a ceiling on the amount of each standing operating account.
+
+**Advance to an operating fund**
+
+No advance shall be given to replenish an operating fund, unless all the utilized amount has been acquitted in
+accordance with regulations; the UGEs shall request an advance to create or replenish a standing operating fund
+through the e-SISTAFE.
+
+The UGE shall, through e-SISTAFE: (a) record a commitment of expenditure, the amount of which is equal to the
+advance to the standing operating fund; (b) generate and approve a payment voucher; (c) send a bank
+instruction to make electronic fund transfer to a bank account opened for the operating fund; and (d) record the
+amount of the advance as an asset.
+
+**Advance payment to supplier**
+
+An advance payment for goods and services and public works of an UGE may be made only when all the
+following conditions are met: (a) the advance payment is required by a written public contract within a
+percentage of a total price to be paid under the contract; (b) a supplier or contractor has obtained from a
+financial institution a guarantee on payments of damages to the Government in case of its non-performance of
+contractual obligations; and (c) the term of the guarantee covers the entire contract period.
+
+The UGE shall verify the validity, legality, and accuracy of an advance payment for goods and services and civil
+works before recording the commitment through the e-SISTAFE.
+
+When recording the commitment, the UGE shall verify whether the requested advance payment is within the
+commitment control limit, and through e-SISTAFE, (a) record a commitment of expenditure, the amount of which
+is equal to the advance payment; (b) generate and approve the payment voucher and make the payments; and
+(c) record the amount of the advance payment as an asset.
+
+The UGE shall verify the delivery of goods and services, the completion of civil works, or the satisfaction of any
+other contractual terms before acquitting the advance payments and recording the same amount of expenditure
+through e-SISTAFE.
+
+The consolidated annual accounts shall include a list of outstanding advance payments for goods and services
+and civil works with the breakdown to each supplier, contractor, and project.
+
+Source: Mission
+
+
+**A different role for the National Treasury**
+
+
+
+**30.** **With the revised process for expenditure, the role of the National Treasury in**
+
+
+
+**Mozambique would change.** Because of the centralized and time-consuming cash rationing
+
+
+
+system managed by the Treasury, the latter is overloaded and cannot focus on its core functions.
+
+
+
+Revised core functions for the Treasury could be as follows:
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+- **Financial planning and cash flows forecasting** : ensure that cash outflows are
+compatible with cash inflows and to prepare borrowing plans.
+
+- **Compliance control to cash advances and related operating funds** : including the
+approval of advance ceilings and the oversight of cash advances and related operating
+funds.
+
+- **Cash management** : controlling spending in the aggregate, implementing the budget
+efficiently, minimizing of the cost of government borrowing, and maximizing the
+opportunity cost of resources.
+
+- **Public debt** : manage the Government borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit.
+
+- **Management and oversight of the Government bank accounts (CUT system)** :
+supervising all central government bank accounts, including any extrabudgetary funds.
+
+- **Administration of foreign grants and counterpart funds** from international aid.
+
+- **Government financial assets management** : consisting of shares in enterprises, loans
+granted by the government, payments of guarantees not honored by debtors,
+preparation of consolidated financial statements for State Own Enterprises (SOE), etc.
+
+
+**Main features of the reviewed expenditure process and control**
+
+**31.** **The main features of the revised process and related flows of information would be**
+**as presented below (Table 1).**
+
+
+
+**Table 1. Main features of the revised expenditure process**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Stage|Action|Responsibility|Flows of Information|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**1.**
**Authorization**|• Government prepares and submits the budget for legislative
approval based on a realistic medium-term fiscal framework
or annual budget projections. Government has
comprehensive assessment of fiscal risks.
• Contingency provisions are used to accommodate
unplanned, unavoidable, and unforeseen expenditures.
• Budget reflects expenditure commitments carried forward
from prior years.|Budget
Directorate of
the MEF|Finance Law approved by Parliament, and**detailed**
**appropriations** downloaded in MEO and MEX|
+|**2.**
**Apportionment**|• Spending authority is apportioned for specific periods|Budget
Directorate of
the MEF|**Annual or quarterly**
**allotments/warrants/commitment ceilings**
downloaded in MEX|
+|**3. Reservation**|• Funds (part of a budget allocation) are blocked for a specific
expense|UGEs|In accordance with the authorized allotment, and
based on**quarterly/monthly**
**procurement/expenditure plans**, UGEs prepare a
**requisition** to reserve the funds during the tendering
process compliant with Contractors and Suppliers List
(CEF) - Catalog of Goods and Services (CBS) - and
Reference Prices (PRF).|
+|**4. Expenditure**
**commitment**|• Legal right to acquire goods or services is made with the
issuance of a purchase order or contract and commitments
are recorded at this stage for all types of expenditures.
• Monitoring and control mechanisms cover all budgetary and
extra-budgetary funds for the public sector.|UGEs
|The specificities of**the purchase order/contract** are
recorded in MEX. Commitment approval linked to
reservations.
The UGE controls the regularity of the commitment
and issues through MEX a**commitment note** to the
supplier. The commitment note must be annexed to
the contract that is submitted to the TA for approval.
Thus, the commitment in e-SISTAFE is recorded before
the contract enters into force.|
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Stage|Action|Responsibility|Flows of Information|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**5. Expenditure**
**verification**
**(liquidation)**|• Work is completed, goods and services are delivered, and the
invoice is received.
• The liability arises when the third party satisfies contractual
obligations. The invoice becomes an obligation, and the
payment due date is registered in the accounting system.
• Payment orders issued only after documented verification.|UGEs
|**A certification of goods delivery/service rendered** is
prepared and signed by the UGE, and recorded in MEX
with**the invoices** as supporting document.
Issuance of**a liquidation note** (_Nota de Liquidação_)
through the system (MEX).
Monitoring by the Treasury of overdue
verification/payables (**reports**).|
+|**6. Financial**
**needs**|• UGE sends quarter/monthly financial requests to the Treasury
through e-SISTAFE, indicating for each period, the forecast of
cash inflows needed to attend its commitments.|UGEs
Treasury|**Update of financial requests** (_Requisicao de_
_Necesidades Financeiras_)
Treasury approves UGEs financial ceilings for payment,
per aggregate economic classifiers.|
+|**7. Payment**
|• Payment is made by the UGE and recorded in the accounting
system, removing the liability.
• UGE processes orders and issues checks or electronic
transfers.
• Payment due date is known, and available funds are in
government bank accounts on the due date.
• Checks are cashed/electronic transfers made expeditiously in
favor of the creditor.|UGEs
Treasury
IGF
UGEAs|Issuance of a**payment order note** (_Ordem de_
_Pagamento_) on due dates.
Treasury performs**regular bank reconciliations, cash**
**planning and management and arrears tracking**
**and management** (regular reporting/monitoring of
overdue payments).
IGF performs audits and controls of regularity to
ensure that the payment is supported by legally
compliant commitment and verification.
Assets are recorded in MPE (**inventory**) by sector
procurement units (UGEAs).|
+
+
+
+**D.** **Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement**
+
+
+
+**32.** **A more efficient use of e-SISTAFE to restore the expenditure chain and improve**
+
+
+
+**financial programming.** MEX should be upgraded to allow the allotment and requisition phases
+
+
+
+in particular.
+
+
+
+**E.** **Strengthening capacities**
+
+
+
+**33.** **The main challenge is to change users’ practices, so the three main phases of the**
+
+
+
+**expenditure chain can be restored in e-SISTAFE when they are done.** This would require
+
+
+
+extensive training at various levels (e.g., spending units, supervisory bodies, and internal control)
+
+
+
+and clear manual of procedures.
+
+
+
+**34.** **The skill levels of staff will be a key determinant in efforts to improve budget**
+
+**execution.** The authorities agree that there is an overall skills deficit in UGEs about budget
+
+
+
+execution processes. In this regard, training should cover not only new IT functionalities, but also
+
+
+
+an explanation of budget execution functions and processes, flows of information, and basic
+
+principles in restoring the expenditure chain and preparing cash flow forecasts. For instance,
+
+UGEs should be trained to make appropriate use of the quarterly allotment or commitment
+
+
+
+ceilings and do not pretend cash payments would follow within four days, as nowadays.
+
+
+
+**35.** **Training and seminars should also be organized for suppliers.** The commitment note
+
+
+
+issued by e-SISTAFE should start being used to provide suppliers with a certificate or proof of
+
+
+
+future payment. Suppliers should be trained to stop requesting payments prior to the delivery of
+
+
+
+goods and services, and to only deliver them after commitments are made in the system.
+
+
+
+**36.** **Because of the changes in roles and responsibilities in the expenditure process,**
+
+
+
+specific and intensive training should also be provided to the Budget Directorate of the MEF and
+
+
+
+the National Treasury on the revised core functions.
+
+
+
+**37.** **Segregation of duties at budget unit level is clearly defined but not yet effective in**
+
+**practice.** Behavior of staff and appropriation of rules and principles remains a concern. Any user
+
+
+
+of e-SISTAFE is requested by a permanent message to avoid using the password of any
+
+
+
+colleague. The simultaneous registration of Commitment, Verification and Payment is made
+
+
+
+possible insofar a single agent can use password and e-profile of the committing officer ( _agente_
+
+
+
+_de cabimentação_ ), the verification officer ( _agente de liquidação_ ), and the compliance officer
+
+
+
+( _agent de control interno_ ). Staff are also used to maintain parallel records.
+
+
+
+**38.** **Some improvements should be done to the infrastructure which supports e-**
+
+**SISTAFE to ensure that spending units can have regular access from their local offices.**
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+When access to the system is temporary lost, the agents involved in the budget execution
+
+process must travel to another UGE to record their transactions in e-SISTAFE. For practical
+
+reasons, this might end up in all three expenditure phases being recorded simultaneously.
+
+**F.** **Action plan for restoring the expenditure chain**
+
+**Background**
+
+The phases of the expenditure currently are recorded simultaneously, which is not compliant with
+the fiscal law. There is little information and control over commitments, expenditure, and arrears.
+
+**Key measures**
+
+
+
+
+- Review/complete the regulatory framework needed to restore the expenditure chain; [14]
+
+
+
+
+- Set quarterly allotments or ceilings for commitments, based on revenue forecasts;
+
+
+
+
+- Immediately restore the commitment and verification phases in e-SISTAFE;
+
+
+
+
+- Make the use of the commitment note mandatory;
+
+
+
+
+- Raise awareness through seminars on the need to restore the normal expenditure process;
+
+
+
+
+- Gradually enforce the commitment control, starting from the UGEs at central level, with
+
+
+
+support from IGF and TA.
+
+
+
+**Institutional arrangements**
+
+The National Directorate of Treasury will need to coordinate with CEDSIF to ensure availability of
+support and ensure the implementation process goes smoothly. The Budget Directorate, the
+UGEs and the IGF/TA should contribute to this process.
+
+**Risks and mitigation measures**
+
+The restoration of the expenditure phases will require extensive capacity development. While the
+chain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and
+verifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP)
+and reported in fiscal reports. Communicating to the private sector is important to bring the
+awareness on how important the effective control of public expenditure is.
+
+
+14 The initial Budget Execution Manual developed after the adoption of the SISTAFE Law included chapters on
+
+financial programming and the administrative procedures for the different phases of the expenditure chain,
+including apportionment, commitment and verifications. These chapters should be reintroduced.
+
+
+
+**Table2. Schedule for restoring the expenditure chain**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Action|Deadline|Technical Assistance|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Action 1:** Issue the decree to instore the apportionment phase with quarterly commitment ceilings, and make real-time
recording of commitment and verification of expenditures mandatory for all units operating within the e-SISTAFE
|By October 2018
|X
|
+|**Action 2:**Make the necessary changes in e-SISTAFE (MEX) to support the revised expenditure process
|By October 2018
|X
|
+|**Action 3:** Training on revised budget execution processes
|From November
2018 -
Continuous
|X
|
+|**Action 4:** Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers
|By end 2018
|
|
+|**Action 5:** Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of the 2019 budget
|From January
2019
|
|
+|**Action 6:** UGEs record commitments in e-SISTAFE upon contracting
|From January
2019
|
|
+|**Action 7:** UGEs record verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law
|From January
2019
|
|
+|**Action 8:** Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored
|From March 2019
Continuous
|
|
+|**Action 9:** Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs:
in some provinces
in all provinces
|
From June 2019
From January
2020
|
|
+|**Action 10:** Revise the budget execution manual to restore the expenditure chain as legally defined in SISTAFE law
|By end 2019
|X
|
+|**Action 11:** Continue to develop MPE and extend its use|2019 - 2020||
+
+
+
+#### **II. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**
+
+**A.** **Objectives of financial programming**
+
+**39.** **Financial programming is a key enabler of orderly execution of the budget.** The
+objective of cash management is to ensure that the government has sufficient liquidity at all
+times to pay obligations as they fall due, without the need to ration cash (and thereby interrupt
+predictable execution of the budget) and without accumulating arrears. Whatever the level of
+revenue, there are times during the year when there are mismatches between cash inflows and
+cash outflows, resulting in short-term cash surpluses or, more problematically for budget
+execution, short-term cash deficits. Cash planning facilitates pro-active management of the cash
+balance, to eliminate (or mitigate) temporary cash deficits. Banking arrangements that centralize
+the government’s liquidity within the treasury single account (CUT) are critical for optimizing
+liquidity by reducing the possibility of idle cash.
+
+**B.** **Main issues in Mozambique**
+
+**40.** **The principal tools for cash planning have been the “cash budget” and the “cash**
+**plan”.** At the start of the fiscal year, the Treasury prepares the cash budget, which decomposes
+the approved budget by month. It is a largely “static” document as it undergoes no other
+amendments during the year, than changes in revenue forecasts. In addition, each month the
+Treasury prepares the cash plan, which is a cash flow projection for the coming month, broken
+down by week. It incorporates recent information on revenue receipts, the requirements of the
+executing units reported in e-SISTAFE, and new information from sectors. These plans, which are
+passed to the Bank of Mozambique, are discussed at a weekly meeting chaired by the Minister at
+which decisions are made on the financial quotas to be released to UGEs in the week ahead.
+
+
+**41.** **The cash budget and the cash plan are important tools, but they have weaknesses.**
+The cash budget is a largely static document and undergoes few amendments during the year,
+unless there are material changes in revenue forecasts. The short forecast horizon of the cash
+plan limits its usefulness as a tool for anticipating likely or possible cash deficits that may occur
+several months later in the fiscal year, so that action may be taken, well in advance, to correct
+those deficits through short-term debt issuance or, if necessary, to adjust expenditure execution
+in an orderly manner. Moreover, large variances between forecasts and actual outturns are not
+systematically investigated to determine whether they reflect unexpected timing differences or
+are more permanent in nature.
+
+
+**42.** **The cash budget and the cash plan have been, in practice, a cash rationing tool, not**
+**a cash management tool.** The monthly cash plans are not unconstrained forecasts. The revenue
+component is an exception; it is based on an updated projection from the revenue
+administration. The expenditure data, however, are functioning as requests from UGEs for release
+
+
+
+20
+
+
+of authority; they are not forecasts. The Treasury then decides how much to release depending
+on the expected adequacy of the cash reserves. Although this arrangement works to manage the
+risk of a cash shortfall, it places the Treasury in the position of taking decisions on which
+expenditure to hold back or delay—a responsibility more appropriately of budget management
+authorities. The current practice also reduces the incentive for UGEs to plan their financial
+operations, and it risks creating unnecessary arrears or supply disruption.
+
+
+**43.** **The Treasury does not currently actively manage the government’s aggregate cash**
+**balance.** It does not borrow or lend in the money market to maintain a steady balance in the
+CUT. The government is able to borrow short-term on an occasional basis when it forecasts an
+emerging cash flow constraint, but it does so by accepting liability for some of the treasury bills
+issued by the Bank of Mozambique for monetary policy purposes.
+
+
+**44.** **Progress continues to be made in rationalizing the government’s banking**
+**arrangements.** Those arrangements are built around a main account at the Bank of
+Mozambique, the CUT, with links to other accounts at both the central bank and commercial
+banks. Delays in sweeping balances in transit and other accounts into the CUT reduce the
+efficiency of cash management. In many cases, this does not occur until the end of the month,
+but the Treasury monitors the accounts and may request that larger sums be swept more
+promptly. [15] Liquidity lying outside the CUT—especially problematic when outside the central
+bank in commercial banks—is being reduced through the ongoing closure of inactive or
+unnecessary accounts. Importantly, in February 2018, Ministerial Diploma 23/2018 was issued to
+reinforce management of the government’s banking accounts, including ensuring that Treasury is
+a co-signatory for any accounts operated by execution units and is able to obtain, without
+hindrance, information on activity in those accounts.
+
+**C.** **Defining the new process**
+
+**45.** **Under this strategy, the Treasury will adopt a pro-active approach to ensuring that**
+**the government has sufficient liquidity to execute the budget as planned.** Restricting
+budget execution—in other words, cash rationing—should come in last resort, not first, once
+other measures to accommodate short-term mismatches in cash inflows and outflows have been
+exhausted. This would involve adjusting dynamically the volume of short-term financing that the
+government obtains through treasury bill issuance. Issuance would be augmented (beyond what
+was originally programmed) during periods when the cash balance would otherwise fall into
+deficit and, conversely, would be reduced during periods when the cash balance would otherwise
+be unduly excessive.
+
+
+15 One source of delay is revenue awaiting classification, linking the taxpayer's deposit to the relevant tax. The
+cumulative balances may at times be substantial. Nonetheless, in principle there need not be any delay in
+transferring such revenue to the CUT, as classifying and recording the revenue can be independent of the
+movement of cash into the CUT.
+
+
+
+21
+
+
+**46.** **Under this pro-active approach, good financial programming becomes essential.**
+Cash flow forecasts are necessary for devising strategies to smooth the cash flow profile and,
+thus, the profile of liquidity at hand. Given that it may not be possible in practice to manage
+fluctuations in the cash balance entirely through dynamic issuance of treasury bills, cash flow
+forecasting can contribute to making cash rationing less disruptive. By planning ahead, budget
+management authorities would be able to make more informed decisions as to which
+spending—sector versus sector, and within each sector—to constrain and which to allow to
+proceed and thereby better protect overall budgetary priorities.
+
+
+**47.** **To be useful for informing decision-making, the cash plans would need to have**
+**several characteristics.** The provisions in Law 09/2002 establishing the public financial
+management system and also in Ministerial Diploma 169/2007 [16] are consistent with this strategy.
+
+
+**48.** **The forecast horizon must be sufficiently long and the timestep short.** The horizon
+would extend out a minimum of six months and ideally 12 months (or longer). As each month
+passes, the plans would be extended out another month, including into the next fiscal year. The
+plans would be of expected cash flows per week out at least three months and per month
+beyond three months. A weekly timestep out six months, however, would be preferable.
+
+
+**49.** **The cash plans must be reliable.** The Treasury should prepare them, using both topdown and bottom-up information. Many cash flows are likely to have a regular monthly pattern
+(such as payment of salaries and pensions, as well as transfers to lower levels of government or
+statutory agencies outside the budget) or are already known by the Treasury (such as debt
+service). The Treasury should hence be able to forecast those flows without active input from
+UGEs. Other cash flows are more volatile (such as payments for some goods and services, as well
+as capital spending). To estimate those flows, the Treasury depends on data from UGEs, as they
+are best placed to know when flows are likely to, and optimally will, occur. To that end, the
+Treasury need to maintain network of contacts, both voice and electronic, at the technical level,
+with the main revenue and spending entities, which it may call on both to develop the cash plans
+and to monitor actual flows. It should not be dependent solely on formal information-exchange
+mechanisms to obtain the necessary data.
+
+
+**50.** **The cash plans must be updated frequently.** Updates should take place at least
+monthly, but fortnightly or even weekly would be preferable. In addition, the Treasury must
+always be able to know the precise timing of any major cash flows. To that end, UGEs could be
+required to provide advance notification of at least a week of individual payments that exceed a
+certain (high) threshold value. In addition, the cash budget should be updated on a quarterly
+basis as the fiscal year progresses.
+
+
+16 Ministerial Diploma 169/2007 approved the first Budget Execution Manual under SISTAFE law. Further updates
+
+of this manual are not consistent with this strategy for restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial
+programing.
+
+
+
+22
+
+
+**51.** **Variances between forecasts and actual outturns should be investigated with**
+**executing units.** It is critical to determine as soon as possible whether divergences from the
+forecasts are only temporary and will correct themselves in the periods ahead. If variances arise
+from more permanent shocks, however, a policy response is required, and decisions as to
+reducing expenditure, raising revenue, or tolerating a higher fiscal deficit are taken by budget
+management authorities. The emphasis should be on variances that exceed a nominal threshold
+value (regardless of their size in percentage terms), as they are the ones most disruptive to a
+predictable profile for government’s liquidity and to orderly execution of the budget. Variances
+that exceed a percentage threshold, however, should also be discussed with UGEs, as they may
+point to weaknesses in their financial and operational management capacities.
+
+
+**52.** **It is not necessary to prepare the cash plans within e-SISTAFE; an Excel-based**
+**spreadsheet model is sufficient.** It is not necessary the cash plans be of accounting quality or
+exhaustively cover all UGEs or all budget line items; what matters is that they capture the flows
+that are most material, in terms of size, variability, and unpredictability. It is likely that a modest
+number of UGEs, as well as only a few budget line items, account for over 80 percent of all flows.
+Other flows can be accounted for in the model based on uncomplicated assumptions. Moreover,
+the data can be easily manipulated in Excel to explore different scenarios. To obtain the
+necessary bottom-up inputs for the model—in contrast to those flows estimated using a topdown approach—the Treasury needs to be able to extract from e-SISTAFE data that UGEs have
+loaded in respect of commitments recorded in real time. These data from e-SISTAFE could be
+compared with data supplied by UGEs using a uniform Excel-based collection template
+periodically circulated by the Treasury. All cash plans need to be retained, not just overridden
+with each update, to allow analysis of forecast performance.
+
+
+**53.** **Full implementation of a pro-active approach to managing the government’s**
+**liquidity would be likely to happen gradually, as it would depend on factors beyond just**
+**good financial planning.** There would need to be strong coordination at both the operational
+and the strategic policy level between cash management and debt management. The domestic
+financial market would need to be able to accommodate a more variable profile of treasury bill
+issuance in terms of volumes and tenors. There may also be consequences for the
+implementation of monetary policy, so periodic consultation with the Bank of Mozambique
+would be important. Likewise, maintaining a larger cash buffer within the CUT so as to absorb
+temporary shocks would help to facilitate orderly execution of the budget. Importantly, the
+“reaction lag” for determining the appropriate policy response when cash flow shocks are likely
+to be permanent needs to be short, so there must be in place a mechanism for altering budget
+management authorities of those shocks.
+
+
+
+**Table 3. Main features of the revised financial programming process**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Task|Action|Responsibility17|Flows of Information|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
**Preparation of cash budget**
(annually)
|
Annual cash budget is prepared, as per current practice
|
Treasury
|
Data from e-SISTAFE; estimates by the Treasury in
consultation with Revenue Authority, larger spending
units and other relevant counterparts
|
+|**Update of cash budget**
(quarterly)
|Cash budget is updated for the remainder of the fiscal year, taking
account of actual outturns to-date and revised estimates of
expenditure and revenue
|Treasury
|
Data from e-SISTAFE; top-down estimates prepared by
the Treasury; bottom-up estimates prepared by UGEs
for goods, services, and capital spending
|
+|**Preparation of cash plan** (at
least monthly)
|Cash plan is prepared, with a horizon of at least six (ideally, 12)
months and a weekly timestep out at least three (ideally, six) months
and a monthly timestep thereafter
|Treasury
|Treasury
|
+|**Analysis of variances between**
**forecasts and outturns** (at least
monthly)
|Variances that exceed a nominal threshold are systematically
investigated to determine whether they are temporary or permanent
|Treasury and UGEs
|Previous cash plan(s); data downloaded from e-SISTAFE;
other information from UGEs
|
+|**Analysis of variances between**
**forecasts and outturns** (at least
monthly)
|Variances that exceed a percentage value are examined
|Treasury and UGEs
|Treasury and UGEs
|
+|**Analysis of variances between**
**forecasts and outturns** (at least
monthly)
|Permanent cash flow shocks are raised with budget management
authorities for their consideration
|Treasury, UGEs,
and Budget
|Previous cash plan(s); data from e-SISTAFE; analyses by
Treasury; other data from UGEs
|
+|**Update of cash plans** (at least
monthly)
|Cash plan is updated and extended another month (including into the
following fiscal year, when necessary), taking account of actual
outturns to-date and revised estimates of expenditure and revenue
|Treasury
|Previous cash plan(s); data from e-SISTAFE; top-down
estimates prepared by the Treasury; bottom-up
estimates prepared by UGEs for goods, services, and
capital spending
|
+|**Notification of large payments**
(weekly)
|Treasury is notified of all individual payments that exceed a threshold
value
|UGEs
|Payment orders prepared by UGEs
|
+|**Management of cash balance**
(at least monthly)
|Volumes and tenors of treasury bill issuance are adjusted in order to
smooth the aggregate cash balance, consistent with market
conditions and monetary policy considerations|Treasury|Cash plan; information on market conditions;
consultation with the Bank of Mozambique|
+
+
+
+17 In this table, UGEs refers to the largest UGEs that collectively account for over 80 percent of all expenditure and revenue.
+
+
+
+**D.** **Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement**
+
+**54.** **Systems development and enhancement requirements are likely to be modest.** No
+new modules in e-SISTAFE need to be developed to enable better financial programming. Some
+work may be needed to enable the Treasury to easily extract data from e-SISTAFE for the
+purpose of populating the cash planning model and analyzing variances between forecasts and
+actual outturns.
+
+**E.** **Strengthening capacities**
+
+**55.** **Capacity will need to be strengthened within the Treasury and within the UGEs that**
+**account for the largest share of expenditure.** Within the Treasury, capacity-building should
+focus on (i) developing the cash planning model; (ii) developing a uniform template for collecting
+data from UGEs; (iii) drafting guidance for UGEs; (iv) preparing top-down estimates for the
+model; and (v) analyzing variances in order to improve the quality of forecasts. Within UGEs,
+capacity-building should focus on (i) implementing the guidance from the Treasury;
+(ii) improving the quality of forecasts of cash flows for goods and services, as well as for capital
+expenditure; and (iii) analyzing variances in order to improve the quality of forecasts.
+
+
+**56.** **DfID is prepared to support the authorities in strengthening financial**
+**programming.** To that end, the terms of reference for technical assistance to be provided by
+external consultants have been developed in collaboration with the authorities. Further
+discussions would be needed after this mission to make these terms of reference fully consistent
+with the new framework, and set reasonable coverage and timeframe.
+
+**F.** **Action plan for improving financial programming**
+
+**57.** **The action plan is summarized in Table 4.**
+
+
+
+**Table4. Schedule for improving financial programming**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Action18|Deadline|Technical
Assistance|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Action 1:** Prepare a circular (or other guidance note) describing the new approach to financial programming and
outlining the responsibilities of the Treasury, other units of the MEF, and UGEs|October 2018|X|
+|**Action 2:**Develop a uniform template for collecting cash flow forecasts from UGEs for goods, services, and capital
spending|November 2018|X|
+|**Action 3:** Develop an Excel-based cash planning model for compiling top-down estimates prepared by the Treasury
and bottom-up estimates supplied by UGEs|November 2018|X|
+|**Action 4:** Develop reports for analyzing variances between cash flow forecasts and actual outturns|November 2018|X|
+|**Action 5:** Develop any necessary report-generation or data-extraction functionality in e-SISTAFE to support the new
approach to financial programming|December 2018|X|
+|**Action 6:** Train UGEs in preparing cash flow estimates|December 2018
Continuous|X|
+|**Action 7:** Train the Treasury in preparing cash flow estimates and in operationalizing the new approach to financial
programming|December 2018
Continuous|X|
+|**Action 8:** Roll out the new approach to financial programming
|Ongoing, starting
January 2019||
+
+
+
+18 In this table, UGEs refers to the largest UGEs that collectively account for over 80 percent of all expenditure and revenue.
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..69470f83e4af944d120befb731f929c9b5e9577a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332b3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-001", "height": 119, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb3a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538d19e1ec393ce69ce78982d7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "eb6458ea92fa074051d11743962071694afd5bc4f345ce5f98e56d40fb592aea", "width": 118}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "37237123271b6303", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-002", "height": 145, "page": 2, "phash_256": "ee440f4591bbb4bab4e691f293a9c2792d696d27969c3f146a52a67e6d0330c1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "fd03bf18c05503626f3702c439f2fc7fe2a557d6aa91b58f2aa27bcf65df9de2", "width": 133}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "036531054d4f4997", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-003", "height": 280, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aaafcad5ad555353a564dad4a52cda6ba5845a1aaaadd41aa9f1aa9145d0ae15", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "6635e5c63f630ad0d520dae7ef928a49abe2675800118e691f7e708f24b60401", "width": 789}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a5e5a9cecccccecd", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-004", "height": 135, "page": 2, "phash_256": "8233781d5f6060e6b4efb3e3d88618869d85865dc5d8c778ff5c0332f22ea685", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "105032e15eedef96291d06faaa26f138e821a63a4bec31fe9ed55a1a64e9db90", "width": 912}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. Seven key stages of the expenditure chain", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "99155509232b2b2f", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0017-001", "height": 551, "page": 17, "phash_256": "baf210fa50ef2a6a38c8d0edc3d03f80d2afd687ed80af35c11dc515ac72c457", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "f6fe4f1ad8b7cf0bfad1e6ed7cdf6c8510448bbc0e78725f5b3b71ba0d22e110", "width": 713}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-025/assets/figures/cr-2023-025-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": "Figure 2. Budget execution process in e-SISTAFE for goods, services, and public works", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0b4b0b4b4b6b0b0b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-025-fig-p0021-001", "height": 477, "page": 21, "phash_256": "eb16d4cb0c519f2924e9c0f81e51f1fa4cd13306cce9cd2f360dc8f77316330e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "sha256_normalized_png": "4316fbea191df1917893cc9c822acf308f4e9831263b6f7d974055b7f34b62a0", "width": 750}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-025/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3b8bcb37ff15b07e1061f0df6064f60f391cfbf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-025/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-025-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/25**\n# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — STRATEGY FOR** **RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND** **IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**\n\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\n\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\n\n\ntime it was completed in October 2018.\n\n\n\n_**Disclaimer:**_\n_This report was prepared in 2018 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/25\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\ntime it was completed in October 2018.\n\n_Disclaimer:_\n_This report was prepared in 2018 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 786}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-025-fig-p0002-004"], "markdown": "\n\n**OCTOBER**\n**2018**\n\n\n\n\n\nRegional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n7 [th] Floor, Bramer House, Ebene, Mauritius\nTel.: +230-401-2500 **-** Fax: +230-468-1618\n\n# **MOZAMBIQUE**\n#### **STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND** **IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**\n\n\n**PREPARED BY**\n**JEAN LUC HELIS,** **GREG HORMAN,** **HERBERTO MONTEIRO, AND ESTHER PALACIO**\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.091, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(41.5, 636.1730346679688, 588.2183227539062, 716.873046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 191, "number": 9, "size": 37314, "transform": [546.7183227539062, 0.0, -0.0, 80.69999694824219, 41.5, 636.1730346679688], "width": 1294, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(36.75, 32.99999237060547, 116.20565795898438, 119.54998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 264, "number": 8, "size": 8835, "transform": [79.45565795898438, 0.0, -0.0, 86.54999542236328, 36.75, 32.99999237060547], "width": 243, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(507.2499694824219, 42.14991760253906, 577.5499877929688, 113.34991455078125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 217, "number": 7, "size": 13067, "transform": [70.29999542236328, 0.0, -0.0, 71.19999694824219, 507.2499694824219, 42.14991760253906], "width": 215, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "OCTOBER\n2018\n\nRegional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n7 [th] Floor, Bramer House, Ebene, Mauritius\nTel.: +230-401-2500 - Fax: +230-468-1618\nMOZAMBIQUE\nSTRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING\n\nPREPARED BY\nJEAN LUC HELIS, GREG HORMAN, HERBERTO MONTEIRO, AND ESTHER PALACIO", "text_characters": 308}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS** **3**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** **4**\n\n**BACKGROUND** **4**\n\n**OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE**\n**REFORM** **6**\n**A. MAIN OBJECTIVES** **6**\n**B. KEY FEATURES OF THE STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN** **6**\n**C. IMPLEMENTATION RISKS** **9**\n**D. NEXT STEPS** **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 3\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4\n\nBACKGROUND 4\n\nOBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE\nREFORM 6\nA. MAIN OBJECTIVES 6\nB. KEY FEATURES OF THE STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN 6\nC. IMPLEMENTATION RISKS 9\nD. NEXT STEPS 9", "text_characters": 209}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**\n\nAFS IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa - AFRITAC\nSouth\nDNCP accounting directorate\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nIT Information technology\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance\nPEFP Strategic Public Finance Plan\nTA Technical Assistance\nUGE Spending Units\nUGB Beneficiary Management Units", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\nAFS IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa - AFRITAC\nSouth\nDNCP accounting directorate\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nIT Information technology\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance\nPEFP Strategic Public Finance Plan\nTA Technical Assistance\nUGE Spending Units\nUGB Beneficiary Management Units", "text_characters": 323}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n\n\n**The Government of Mozambique is committed to strengthen its financial programming**\n\n\n\n**procedures in accordance with the Mozambique fiscal law (SISTAFE), and in line with the**\n\n\n\n**Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019.** The Ministry of Economy and Finance\n\n(MEF) and development partners have agreed on developing, adopting and implementing a\n\n\n\nstrategy for the gradual restoration of the expenditure chain, and the improvement of financial\n\nprogramming techniques and cash management by the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) to\n\n\n\nprevent continued accumulation of arrears.\n\n\n\n**The related draft strategy, developed with the assistance of the mission and attached to**\n\n\n\n**the present report:** (1) takes stock of processes implemented, the IT system(s), and\n\n\n\nstakeholders’ responsibilities and task sharing; (2) describes good practices and main procedures,\n\n\n\nmodels, tools and methodologies that could be used to implementing the cash planning and\n\n\n\nmanagement, and expenditure control functions; (3) identifies the related capacities that would\n\nneed to be strengthened; and (4) presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions\n\n\n\nto be undertaken.\n\n\n\n**Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming would imply**\n\n\n\n**coordinating with other ongoing reform processes,** including: (1) improving the credibility of\n\n\n\nthe budget; (2) assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears; [1] (3) expanding the\n\n\n\nTreasury single account system (CUT) coverage; (4) better coordinating cash and debt\n\n\n\nmanagement; and (5) strengthening internal and external control/audit.\n\n\n\n1 A strategy for clearing the stock of public arrears has been recently supported by FAD assistance.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThe Government of Mozambique is committed to strengthen its financial programming\n\nprocedures in accordance with the Mozambique fiscal law (SISTAFE), and in line with the\n\nStrategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019. The Ministry of Economy and Finance\n\n(MEF) and development partners have agreed on developing, adopting and implementing a\n\nstrategy for the gradual restoration of the expenditure chain, and the improvement of financial\n\nprogramming techniques and cash management by the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) to\n\nprevent continued accumulation of arrears.\n\nThe related draft strategy, developed with the assistance of the mission and attached to\n\nthe present report: (1) takes stock of processes implemented, the IT system(s), and\n\nstakeholders’ responsibilities and task sharing; (2) describes good practices and main procedures,\n\nmodels, tools and methodologies that could be used to implementing the cash planning and\n\nmanagement, and expenditure control functions; (3) identifies the related capacities that would\n\nneed to be strengthened; and (4) presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions\n\nto be undertaken.\n\nRestoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming would imply\n\ncoordinating with other ongoing reform processes, including: (1) improving the credibility of\n\nthe budget; (2) assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears; [1] (3) expanding the\n\nTreasury single account system (CUT) coverage; (4) better coordinating cash and debt\n\nmanagement; and (5) strengthening internal and external control/audit.\n\n1 A strategy for clearing the stock of public arrears has been recently supported by FAD assistance.", "text_characters": 1445}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n\n\n**The expenditure process is not implemented as legally defined in Mozambique’s fiscal law**\n\n\n\n**(SISTAFE).** Per the SISTAFE, three key stages of expenditure execution (i.e. commitments,\n\nverifications and payment) should be recorded, in due time when they occur, through the\n\n\n\nfinancial management (e-SISTAFE) system. Accordingly, fiscal reports should be articulated\n\n\n\naround these stages. In fact, transactions are entered late in the system, when cash is available\n\n\n\nper Treasury’s weekly ceilings. Meanwhile, invoices are kept in ad-hoc ledgers, outside the e\n\n\nSISTAFE.\n\n\n\n**Consequently, the government has cumulated large stocks of unreported arrears.** **[2]** Due\n\n\n\nobligations not recorded and not paid, have piled-up, undermining contractors’ trust in the\n\n\n\ngovernment ability to honor its debts, thereby shifting business relations with the private sector\n\n\n\ntowards pre-payment requirements. Moreover, spending units lack predictability to efficiently\n\n\n\nexecute their budget, while expenditure controls remain weak, and the quality of financial\n\n\n\ninformation poor.\n\n\n\n**In line with the Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019, and** **2017 and 2018 FAD**\n\n\n\n**missions’ advice**, [3] **the Government has committed to develop a more pro-active approach**\n\n\n\n**to manage the governments aggregate liquidity.** This approach aims at improving cash\n\n\n\nmanagement, and expenditure control–to ensure that the budget is executed predictably, the\n\n\n\nexpenditure chain is restored, and arrear accumulation is fended-off. To this end, the short\n\n\nsighted mechanisms currently used for cash rationing should be complemented with appropriate\n\n\n\nrelease of commitments and improved annual and in-year cash management plans, and cash\n\n\n\nflows forecasts.\n\n\n\n**Against this background, the Minister requested further TA from the IMF.** The AFRITAC\n\n\n\nSouth (AFS) [4] mission assisted the authorities in defining a strategy and an action plan to restore\n\n\n\na legally compliant expenditure process, and to improve financial programming. The mission also\n\n\n\n2 The March 2018 FAD mission received preliminary data of supplier arrears for the central government estimated\nat 29.8 million Meticais (MT) as of 2016, close to 5 percent of GDP. The Government has already validated and\nstarted clearing the arrears to utilities (at least MT 2.9 billion in 2018).\n\n3 “Republic of Mozambique: Regaining Control Over Budget Execution”, Benoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory\nHorman, Armando Manuel, and Esther Palacio (December 2017); “Republic of Mozambique: Managing Public\nArrears”, Armando Manuel (February 2018).\n\n\n\n4AFS provides TA and training to Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique,\n\n\n\nNamibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. AFS donors are the European Union, the\n\n\n\nUnited Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, China, Mauritius, Netherlands, European Investment Bank and Australia.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BACKGROUND\n\nThe expenditure process is not implemented as legally defined in Mozambique’s fiscal law\n\n(SISTAFE). Per the SISTAFE, three key stages of expenditure execution (i.e. commitments,\n\nverifications and payment) should be recorded, in due time when they occur, through the\n\nfinancial management (e-SISTAFE) system. Accordingly, fiscal reports should be articulated\n\naround these stages. In fact, transactions are entered late in the system, when cash is available\n\nper Treasury’s weekly ceilings. Meanwhile, invoices are kept in ad-hoc ledgers, outside the e\n\nSISTAFE.\n\nConsequently, the government has cumulated large stocks of unreported arrears. [2] Due\n\nobligations not recorded and not paid, have piled-up, undermining contractors’ trust in the\n\ngovernment ability to honor its debts, thereby shifting business relations with the private sector\n\ntowards pre-payment requirements. Moreover, spending units lack predictability to efficiently\n\nexecute their budget, while expenditure controls remain weak, and the quality of financial\n\ninformation poor.\n\nIn line with the Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019, and 2017 and 2018 FAD\n\nmissions’ advice, [3] the Government has committed to develop a more pro-active approach\n\nto manage the governments aggregate liquidity. This approach aims at improving cash\n\nmanagement, and expenditure control–to ensure that the budget is executed predictably, the\n\nexpenditure chain is restored, and arrear accumulation is fended-off. To this end, the short\n\nsighted mechanisms currently used for cash rationing should be complemented with appropriate\n\nrelease of commitments and improved annual and in-year cash management plans, and cash\n\nflows forecasts.\n\nAgainst this background, the Minister requested further TA from the IMF. The AFRITAC\n\nSouth (AFS) [4] mission assisted the authorities in defining a strategy and an action plan to restore\n\na legally compliant expenditure process, and to improve financial programming. The mission also\n\n2 The March 2018 FAD mission received preliminary data of supplier arrears for the central government estimated\nat 29.8 million Meticais (MT) as of 2016, close to 5 percent of GDP. The Government has already validated and\nstarted clearing the arrears to utilities (at least MT 2.9 billion in 2018).\n\n3 “Republic of Mozambique: Regaining Control Over Budget Execution”, Benoit Taiclet, Laura Doherty, Gregory\nHorman, Armando Manuel, and Esther Palacio (December 2017); “Republic of Mozambique: Managing Public\nArrears”, Armando Manuel (February 2018).\n\n4AFS provides TA and training to Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique,\n\nNamibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. AFS donors are the European Union, the\n\nUnited Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, China, Mauritius, Netherlands, European Investment Bank and Australia.", "text_characters": 2443}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "participated in workshops on financial programming, and meetings with the authorities and\n\nrelevant donors to discuss and agree on the strategy and facilitate TA coordination.\n#### **OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE**\n###### **REFORM**\n\n**A.** **Main Objectives**\n\n\n\n**The Draft Strategy (attached), prepared by the mission for restoring the expenditure chain**\n\n**and improving financial programming:**\n\n- Takes stock of the current processes, IT system(s), and stakeholders’ responsibilities and task\n\nsharing related to financial programming and expenditure control;\n\n- Describes good practices and main procedures, models, tools and methodologies that could\n\n\n\nbe used to implementing the new cash planning and management, and expenditure control\n\n\n\nfunctions;\n\n\n\n\n- Identifies the related capacities that would need to be strengthened; and\n\n- Presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions to be undertaken.\n\n**B.** **Key features of the strategy and action plan**\n\n\n\n**Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming should be**\n\n\n\n**considered as medium/long term reforms.** it would take several years to effectively develop\n\nthese functions, and the mission recommends a gradual approach with the following phases:\n\n- **Phase I.** What should be done by end 2018 to start implementing some priority actions in\n\nthe context of the 2019 budget implementation?\n\n\n\n\n- **Phase I.** What should be done by end 2018 to start implementing some priority actions in\n\n\n\n\n- **Phase II.** What could be done in 2019 to support the implementation of key sub-reforms?\n\n- **Phase III.** What could be develop and implemented in the medium/long term?\n\n\nThe strategy and action plan have been developed accordingly. Key actions for 2018 and 2019\n\nare presented in the boxes 1 and 2 below.\n\n\n**Implementing the strategy would imply:**\n\n- A more efficient use of e-SISTAFE (MEX [5] and MPE [6] in particular);\n\n\n5 _MEX: Modulo de Execução Orçamental (do e-SISTAFE) -_ Budget Execution Module (of e-SISTAFE).\n\n6 _MPE: Modulo de Administracao do Patrimonio do Estado –_ Public Procurement and State Assets Management\nModule of (e-SISTAFE).", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "participated in workshops on financial programming, and meetings with the authorities and\n\nrelevant donors to discuss and agree on the strategy and facilitate TA coordination.\nOBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE\nREFORM\n\nA. Main Objectives\n\nThe Draft Strategy (attached), prepared by the mission for restoring the expenditure chain\n\nand improving financial programming:\n\n- Takes stock of the current processes, IT system(s), and stakeholders’ responsibilities and task\n\nsharing related to financial programming and expenditure control;\n\n- Describes good practices and main procedures, models, tools and methodologies that could\n\nbe used to implementing the new cash planning and management, and expenditure control\n\nfunctions;\n\n- Identifies the related capacities that would need to be strengthened; and\n\n- Presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions to be undertaken.\n\nB. Key features of the strategy and action plan\n\nRestoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming should be\n\nconsidered as medium/long term reforms. it would take several years to effectively develop\n\nthese functions, and the mission recommends a gradual approach with the following phases:\n\n- Phase I. What should be done by end 2018 to start implementing some priority actions in\n\nthe context of the 2019 budget implementation?\n\n- Phase I. What should be done by end 2018 to start implementing some priority actions in\n\n- Phase II. What could be done in 2019 to support the implementation of key sub-reforms?\n\n- Phase III. What could be develop and implemented in the medium/long term?\n\nThe strategy and action plan have been developed accordingly. Key actions for 2018 and 2019\n\nare presented in the boxes 1 and 2 below.\n\nImplementing the strategy would imply:\n\n- A more efficient use of e-SISTAFE (MEX [5] and MPE [6] in particular);\n\n5 _MEX: Modulo de Execução Orçamental (do e-SISTAFE) -_ Budget Execution Module (of e-SISTAFE).\n\n6 _MPE: Modulo de Administracao do Patrimonio do Estado –_ Public Procurement and State Assets Management\nModule of (e-SISTAFE).", "text_characters": 1740}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Quarterly release of budget allocations/commitments versus current release of funds;\n\n- Financial programming for payment of expenditures when they should occur versus current\n\nfinancial programming to control budget execution (cash rationing); and\n\n- A different role for the treasury: pro-active manager of government liquidity.\n\n**Box 1: Illustrative list of tasks to complete Phase I (by end 2018)**\n\n_**General**_\n\n- Adopt the strategy and action plan to restore the expenditure chain and to improve\nfinancial programming.\n\n_**Expenditure Control Function**_\n\n- **Action 1:** Issue the decree to instore the apportionment phase, and to make real-time\nrecording of commitment and verification of expenditures mandatory for all units\noperating within the e-SISTAFE.\n\n- **Action 2** : Make the necessary changes in e-SISTAFE (MEX) to support the revised\nexpenditure process.\n\n- **Action 3** : Start the training on revised budget execution processes.\n\n- **Action 4** : Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform\nsuppliers.\n\n_**Financial Programming Function**_\n\n- **Action 1** : Prepare a circular (or other guidance note) describing the new approach to\nfinancial programming and outlining the responsibilities of the Treasury, other units of\nthe Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and spending units (UGEs).\n\n- **Action 2** : Develop a uniform template for collecting cash flow forecasts from UGEs for\ngoods, services, and capital spending.\n\n- **Action 3:** Develop an Excel-based cash planning model for compiling top-down\nestimates prepared by the Treasury and bottom-up estimates supplied by UGEs.\n\n- **Action 4:** Develop reports for analyzing variances between cash flow forecasts and actual\noutturns.\n\n- **Action 5:** Develop any necessary report-generation or data-extraction functionality in eSISTAFE to support the new approach to financial programming.\n\nSource: Mission\n\n\n**Against this background, priority actions (to be implemented in the context of the 2019**\n\n**budget) would include:**\n\n- An appropriate release of commitments by category of expenditure;", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Quarterly release of budget allocations/commitments versus current release of funds;\n\n- Financial programming for payment of expenditures when they should occur versus current\n\nfinancial programming to control budget execution (cash rationing); and\n\n- A different role for the treasury: pro-active manager of government liquidity.\n\nBox 1: Illustrative list of tasks to complete Phase I (by end 2018)\n\n_General_\n\n- Adopt the strategy and action plan to restore the expenditure chain and to improve\nfinancial programming.\n\n_Expenditure Control Function_\n\n- Action 1: Issue the decree to instore the apportionment phase, and to make real-time\nrecording of commitment and verification of expenditures mandatory for all units\noperating within the e-SISTAFE.\n\n- Action 2 : Make the necessary changes in e-SISTAFE (MEX) to support the revised\nexpenditure process.\n\n- Action 3 : Start the training on revised budget execution processes.\n\n- Action 4 : Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform\nsuppliers.\n\n_Financial Programming Function_\n\n- Action 1 : Prepare a circular (or other guidance note) describing the new approach to\nfinancial programming and outlining the responsibilities of the Treasury, other units of\nthe Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and spending units (UGEs).\n\n- Action 2 : Develop a uniform template for collecting cash flow forecasts from UGEs for\ngoods, services, and capital spending.\n\n- Action 3: Develop an Excel-based cash planning model for compiling top-down\nestimates prepared by the Treasury and bottom-up estimates supplied by UGEs.\n\n- Action 4: Develop reports for analyzing variances between cash flow forecasts and actual\noutturns.\n\n- Action 5: Develop any necessary report-generation or data-extraction functionality in eSISTAFE to support the new approach to financial programming.\n\nSource: Mission\n\nAgainst this background, priority actions (to be implemented in the context of the 2019\n\nbudget) would include:\n\n- An appropriate release of commitments by category of expenditure;", "text_characters": 1718}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- A restored expenditure process:\n\n\n\n\n`o` Commitment supported by adequate reservation of budget appropriation (commitment\n\n\n\nnote - _Nota de Cabimentação_ );\n\n\n\n\n`o` Verification supported by a certification of good/service delivery (liquidation note - _Nota_\n\n\n\n_de Liquidação_ );\n\n\n\n\n`o` Payment supported by legally compliant commitment and verification (payment order\n\n\n\nnote - _Ordem de Pagamento_ );\n\n\n\n\n- A more dynamic cash flow forecasting focusing on the largest and most problematic cash\n\n\n\nflows;\n\n\n\n\n- The related legal and regulatory framework reviewed and adopted (diplomas; circulars;\n\nmanuals); and\n\n- Strengthened capacities (MEF, spending units, suppliers, etc.).\n\n\n**Box 2: Illustrative list of tasks to complete Phase II (2019)**\n\n_**Expenditure Control Function**_\n\n- **Action 5:** Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of\nthe 2019 budget.\n\n- **Action 6:** Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of\nthe 2019 budget.\n\n- **Action 7:** UGEs record verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per\nlegal provisions set in SISTAFE Law.\n\n- **Action 8:** Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively\nrestored.\n\n- **Action 9:** Implement commitment control pilots in some provinces.\n\n- **Action 10:** Revise the budget execution manual to restore the expenditure chain as\nlegally defined in SISTAFE law.\n\n- **Action 11:** Continue to develop MPE and extend its use.\n\n_**Financial Programming Function**_\n\n- **Action 6** : Train UGEs in preparing cash flow estimates.\n\n- **Action 7:** Train the Treasury in preparing cash flow estimates and in operationalizing the\nnew approach to financial programming.\n\n- **Action 8:** Progressively roll out the new approach to financial programming.\n\nSource: Mission", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- A restored expenditure process:\n\no Commitment supported by adequate reservation of budget appropriation (commitment\n\nnote - _Nota de Cabimentação_ );\n\no Verification supported by a certification of good/service delivery (liquidation note - _Nota_\n\n_de Liquidação_ );\n\no Payment supported by legally compliant commitment and verification (payment order\n\nnote - _Ordem de Pagamento_ );\n\n- A more dynamic cash flow forecasting focusing on the largest and most problematic cash\n\nflows;\n\n- The related legal and regulatory framework reviewed and adopted (diplomas; circulars;\n\nmanuals); and\n\n- Strengthened capacities (MEF, spending units, suppliers, etc.).\n\nBox 2: Illustrative list of tasks to complete Phase II (2019)\n\n_Expenditure Control Function_\n\n- Action 5: Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of\nthe 2019 budget.\n\n- Action 6: Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of\nthe 2019 budget.\n\n- Action 7: UGEs record verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per\nlegal provisions set in SISTAFE Law.\n\n- Action 8: Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively\nrestored.\n\n- Action 9: Implement commitment control pilots in some provinces.\n\n- Action 10: Revise the budget execution manual to restore the expenditure chain as\nlegally defined in SISTAFE law.\n\n- Action 11: Continue to develop MPE and extend its use.\n\n_Financial Programming Function_\n\n- Action 6 : Train UGEs in preparing cash flow estimates.\n\n- Action 7: Train the Treasury in preparing cash flow estimates and in operationalizing the\nnew approach to financial programming.\n\n- Action 8: Progressively roll out the new approach to financial programming.\n\nSource: Mission", "text_characters": 1471}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**C.** **Implementation risks**\n\n\n\n**Managing the reform.** Reforms will need time, constant efforts, and strong commitment and\n\n\n\nownership from the authorities, to be effectively implemented. Communicating to the private\n\nsector is important to bring the awareness on how important financial programming and the\n\n\n\neffective control of public expenditure is. The restoration of the expenditure phases, and the\n\ndevelopment of the new financial programming function, will also require extensive capacity\n\n\n\ndevelopment.\n\n\n\n**Implementing the Reform.** The implementation of the reform should be progressive. While the\n\nchain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and\n\n\n\nverifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP)\n\n\n\nand reported in fiscal reports.\n\n\n\n**D.** **Next steps**\n\n\n\n**The Draft Strategy is also expected to guide the complementary TA support** **from DFID** that\n\n\n\nhas been planned on financial programming and expenditure control in furtherance of the Fiscal\n\n\n\nAffairs Department (FAD) and AFRITAC South (AFS) advice.\n\n\n\n**DFID has proposed to coordinate their support with FAD and AFS, using the same experts.**\n\n\n\nFurther discussions would be needed to review, after this mission, the initial TOR to be fully\n\n\n\nconsistent with the new framework, and with relevant coverage and timeframe.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "C. Implementation risks\n\nManaging the reform. Reforms will need time, constant efforts, and strong commitment and\n\nownership from the authorities, to be effectively implemented. Communicating to the private\n\nsector is important to bring the awareness on how important financial programming and the\n\neffective control of public expenditure is. The restoration of the expenditure phases, and the\n\ndevelopment of the new financial programming function, will also require extensive capacity\n\ndevelopment.\n\nImplementing the Reform. The implementation of the reform should be progressive. While the\n\nchain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and\n\nverifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP)\n\nand reported in fiscal reports.\n\nD. Next steps\n\nThe Draft Strategy is also expected to guide the complementary TA support from DFID that\n\nhas been planned on financial programming and expenditure control in furtherance of the Fiscal\n\nAffairs Department (FAD) and AFRITAC South (AFS) advice.\n\nDFID has proposed to coordinate their support with FAD and AFS, using the same experts.\n\nFurther discussions would be needed to review, after this mission, the initial TOR to be fully\n\nconsistent with the new framework, and with relevant coverage and timeframe.", "text_characters": 1123}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n\n### **STRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN**\n##### **AND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**\n\n### **DRAFT**\n\n##### **JUNE 2018**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nSTRATEGY FOR RESTORING THE EXPENDITURE CHAIN\nAND IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING\nDRAFT\nJUNE 2018", "text_characters": 104}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "2\n\n#### **CONTENTS**\n\n\n**INTRODUCTION** 3\n\nA. Background 3\n\nB. Objectives of the strategy 4\n\nC. Related reforms and conditions 5\n\n**I. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS** 6\n\nA. Main features of an efficient expenditure process and control 6\n\nB. Main issues in Mozambique 7\n\nC. Addressing the main issues 8\n\nD. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement 16\n\nE. Strengthening capacities 16\n\nF. Action plan for restoring the expenditure chain 17\n\n**II. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING** 19\n\nA. Objectives of financial programming 19\n\nB. Main issues in Mozambique 19\n\nC. Defining the new process 20\n\nD. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement 24\n\nE. Strengthening capacities 24\n\nF. Action plan for improving financial programming 24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0031, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "2\nCONTENTS\n\nINTRODUCTION 3\n\nA. Background 3\n\nB. Objectives of the strategy 4\n\nC. Related reforms and conditions 5\n\nI. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS 6\n\nA. Main features of an efficient expenditure process and control 6\n\nB. Main issues in Mozambique 7\n\nC. Addressing the main issues 8\n\nD. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement 16\n\nE. Strengthening capacities 16\n\nF. Action plan for restoring the expenditure chain 17\n\nII. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING 19\n\nA. Objectives of financial programming 19\n\nB. Main issues in Mozambique 19\n\nC. Defining the new process 20\n\nD. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement 24\n\nE. Strengthening capacities 24\n\nF. Action plan for improving financial programming 24", "text_characters": 609}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "3\n\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n**A.** **Background**\n\n\n\n**1.** **Law No. 09/2002 of 12 February, led to the creation of the State Financial**\n\n\n\n**Administration System (SISTAFE).** Subsequently, decree No. 23/2004 of 20 August established\n\n\n\nand harmonized the rules and procedures for the programming, management, execution and\n\n\n\ncontrol of the public treasury of Mozambique.\n\n\n\n**2.** **The financial programming envisaged in the legislation is yet to be fully**\n\n\n\n**implemented.** This is mainly due to the process of cash rationing implemented in 2013.\n\n\n\nPractically, Spending Units (UGE) and Beneficiary Management Units (UGB) send the Annual\n\n\n\nTreasury Plan disaggregated by month and by economic classification budget headings manually\n\n\n\nto the Directorate of National Treasury (DNT) or the corresponding Provincial Directorate of\n\n\n\nEconomy and Finance (DPEF) at the beginning of each fiscal year. The Plan can then be adjusted\n\n\n\nthroughout the fiscal year based on execution rates, changes in budget appropriations or new\n\n\n\nbudget entries.\n\n\n\n**3.** **In addition to this, UGEs submit monthly budget requests at the beginning of each**\n\n\n\n**month, indicating the disbursement periods per week.** At the beginning of each week, the\n\nDNT releases commitment controls and financial quotas for the week based on these requests\n\nand available resources. In practice, the release of these limits at the same time and with short\n\n\n\nnotice creates an incentive for the UGEs to execute the three phases of expenditure\n\n\n\n(Commitments, Verifications or Settlements and Payments) almost simultaneously, thereby failing\n\n\n\nto comply with the procedures defined in the legislation.\n\n\n\n**4.** **Financial programming, as defined in the legislation, ensures greater efficiency in**\n\n\n\n**the execution of public expenditure and should therefore be one of the main instruments**\n\n\n\n**guiding the execution of the State Budget.** To strengthen financial programming as defined in\n\n\n\nthe legislation (articles 79 to 81 of the SISTAFE Regulation) it is necessary to define mechanisms\n\n\n\nwhich quantify financial flows from DNT over a given period. These should be quantified and\n\n\n\nestablished in line with existing revenue forecasts, budgetary constraints, expenditure forecasts,\n\n\n\nthe financing outlook as well as the outturn trend for the fiscal year.\n\n\n\n**5.** **Recent country-evaluations have shown that expenditure process and financial**\n**programming in Mozambique is yet to become fully compliant with existing legislation**\n**and does not follow internationally recommended standards.** This, in turn, limits the DNT’s\nability to predict expenditure in the budget execution process. This has also led to UGEs not\nregistering the phases of expenditure at the moment of occurrence, leading to delays in public\npayments to suppliers of goods and services. This has led UGEs to accumulate arrears.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0031, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3\nINTRODUCTION\n\nA. Background\n\n1. Law No. 09/2002 of 12 February, led to the creation of the State Financial\n\nAdministration System (SISTAFE). Subsequently, decree No. 23/2004 of 20 August established\n\nand harmonized the rules and procedures for the programming, management, execution and\n\ncontrol of the public treasury of Mozambique.\n\n2. The financial programming envisaged in the legislation is yet to be fully\n\nimplemented. This is mainly due to the process of cash rationing implemented in 2013.\n\nPractically, Spending Units (UGE) and Beneficiary Management Units (UGB) send the Annual\n\nTreasury Plan disaggregated by month and by economic classification budget headings manually\n\nto the Directorate of National Treasury (DNT) or the corresponding Provincial Directorate of\n\nEconomy and Finance (DPEF) at the beginning of each fiscal year. The Plan can then be adjusted\n\nthroughout the fiscal year based on execution rates, changes in budget appropriations or new\n\nbudget entries.\n\n3. In addition to this, UGEs submit monthly budget requests at the beginning of each\n\nmonth, indicating the disbursement periods per week. At the beginning of each week, the\n\nDNT releases commitment controls and financial quotas for the week based on these requests\n\nand available resources. In practice, the release of these limits at the same time and with short\n\nnotice creates an incentive for the UGEs to execute the three phases of expenditure\n\n(Commitments, Verifications or Settlements and Payments) almost simultaneously, thereby failing\n\nto comply with the procedures defined in the legislation.\n\n4. Financial programming, as defined in the legislation, ensures greater efficiency in\n\nthe execution of public expenditure and should therefore be one of the main instruments\n\nguiding the execution of the State Budget. To strengthen financial programming as defined in\n\nthe legislation (articles 79 to 81 of the SISTAFE Regulation) it is necessary to define mechanisms\n\nwhich quantify financial flows from DNT over a given period. These should be quantified and\n\nestablished in line with existing revenue forecasts, budgetary constraints, expenditure forecasts,\n\nthe financing outlook as well as the outturn trend for the fiscal year.\n\n5. Recent country-evaluations have shown that expenditure process and financial\nprogramming in Mozambique is yet to become fully compliant with existing legislation\nand does not follow internationally recommended standards. This, in turn, limits the DNT’s\nability to predict expenditure in the budget execution process. This has also led to UGEs not\nregistering the phases of expenditure at the moment of occurrence, leading to delays in public\npayments to suppliers of goods and services. This has led UGEs to accumulate arrears.", "text_characters": 2320}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "4\n\n\n\n**B.** **Objectives of the strategy**\n\n\n\n**6.** **The Government of Mozambique is committed to strengthen its financial**\n\n\n\n**programming procedures in accordance with the Mozambique fiscal law (SISTAFE), and in**\n\n\n\n**line with the Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019.** The Ministry of Economy\n\n\n\nand Finance (MEF) and development partners have agreed on a strategy for the gradual\n\n\n\nrestoration of the expenditure chain, and the improvement of financial programming techniques\n\n\n\nand cash management by the DNT to prevent continued accumulation of arrears.\n\n\n\n**7.** **The strategy defines the conditions for developing and implementing the cash**\n\n**planning and management, and expenditure control functions.** The strategy\n\n\n\n\n- Takes stock of processes implemented, the IT system(s), and stakeholders’ responsibilities\n\nand task sharing\n\n\n\n\n- Describes good practices and main procedures, models, tools and methodologies that\n\n\n\ncould be used to implementing the cash planning and management, and expenditure\n\n\n\ncontrol functions\n\n\n\n\n- Identifies the related capacities that would need to be strengthened\n\n- Presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions to be undertaken\n\n\n\n**8.** **The strategy is also expected to guide the complementary technical assistance (TA)**\n\n\n\n**support from DFID and other partners that has been planned on financial programming**\n\n**and expenditure control in furtherance of FAD and AFS advice.** The TA should support the\n\n\n\nMEF, particularly the DNT and the Centre for the Development of Public Finance Systems\n\n\n\n(CEDSIF) [7] . The TA should also assist UGEs and other relevant Directorates such as the National\n\n\n\nPlan and Budget Directorate (DNPO), the National Directorate of Public Accounting (DNCP), and\n\n\n\nthe Finance General Inspection (IGF) when necessary.\n\n\n\n**9.** **The strategy is organized in two parts** :\n\n\n- **Part I:** Restoring a legally compliant expenditure process\n\n\n- **Part II:** Improving financial programming\n\n\n7 Also in charge of coordinating PFM reforms.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "4\n\nB. Objectives of the strategy\n\n6. The Government of Mozambique is committed to strengthen its financial\n\nprogramming procedures in accordance with the Mozambique fiscal law (SISTAFE), and in\n\nline with the Strategic Public Finance Plan (PEFP) of 2016-2019. The Ministry of Economy\n\nand Finance (MEF) and development partners have agreed on a strategy for the gradual\n\nrestoration of the expenditure chain, and the improvement of financial programming techniques\n\nand cash management by the DNT to prevent continued accumulation of arrears.\n\n7. The strategy defines the conditions for developing and implementing the cash\n\nplanning and management, and expenditure control functions. The strategy\n\n- Takes stock of processes implemented, the IT system(s), and stakeholders’ responsibilities\n\nand task sharing\n\n- Describes good practices and main procedures, models, tools and methodologies that\n\ncould be used to implementing the cash planning and management, and expenditure\n\ncontrol functions\n\n- Identifies the related capacities that would need to be strengthened\n\n- Presents a few, feasible, and sequenced medium-term actions to be undertaken\n\n8. The strategy is also expected to guide the complementary technical assistance (TA)\n\nsupport from DFID and other partners that has been planned on financial programming\n\nand expenditure control in furtherance of FAD and AFS advice. The TA should support the\n\nMEF, particularly the DNT and the Centre for the Development of Public Finance Systems\n\n(CEDSIF) [7] . The TA should also assist UGEs and other relevant Directorates such as the National\n\nPlan and Budget Directorate (DNPO), the National Directorate of Public Accounting (DNCP), and\n\nthe Finance General Inspection (IGF) when necessary.\n\n9. The strategy is organized in two parts :\n\n- Part I: Restoring a legally compliant expenditure process\n\n- Part II: Improving financial programming\n\n7 Also in charge of coordinating PFM reforms.", "text_characters": 1626}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "5\n\n\n**C.** **Related reforms and conditions**\n\n**10.** **Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming will need to**\n**be coordinated and integrated with other ongoing reform processes.** While not covered by\nthis strategy, other critical reforms should be implemented in parallel:\n\n- **Improving the credibility of the budget.** Although forecasts of macro-aggregates have\nimproved, there is a need to enhance the credibility of the budget. This can be done\nthrough a more transparent process and efficient techniques for budget preparation.\n\n- **Urgently assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears.** [8] Based on other\ncountries’ experience, the government should rapidly take stock of and validate\nlegitimate suppliers’ claims. This will send a positive signal to creditors and raise officials’\nawareness on the need to comply with budget ceilings and expenditure processes.\nClearing these arrears will come afterward, with creditors’ agreements on clearance\nmodalities (including discounts\n\n- **Continued expansion of CUT coverage.** The process to identify inactive accounts then\nclose them, and to roll-out of the e-SISTAFE to extend the use of the CUT, have to be\ncontinued.\n\n- **Stronger coordination of cash and debt management.** The capacity of domestic\nmarket to accommodate a more variable profile of treasury bill issuance and/or\nmaintenance of a larger cash buffer within the CUT should be strengthened to absorb\ntemporary shocks.\n\n- **A shorter “policy-reaction lag”** for determining which policy actions (i.e., tolerate a\nhigher deficit, reduce low-priority expenditure, undertake revenue measures) need to be\ntaken by fiscal authorities when cash flow shocks are likely to be permanent and not\ntemporary.\n\n\n- **Strengthened internal and external controls and audits.** The IGF and the\nAdministrative Court (TA) have a crucial role to help restoring the expenditure chain and\nimproving financial programing, through the implementation of the accountability and\nsanctions framework.\n\n\n8 A strategy to clear and prevent arrears was recently developed by the Government with TA support from FAD,\n\nand is partially being implemented.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "5\n\nC. Related reforms and conditions\n\n10. Restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial programming will need to\nbe coordinated and integrated with other ongoing reform processes. While not covered by\nthis strategy, other critical reforms should be implemented in parallel:\n\n- Improving the credibility of the budget. Although forecasts of macro-aggregates have\nimproved, there is a need to enhance the credibility of the budget. This can be done\nthrough a more transparent process and efficient techniques for budget preparation.\n\n- Urgently assessing, then gradually clearing, the stock of arrears. [8] Based on other\ncountries’ experience, the government should rapidly take stock of and validate\nlegitimate suppliers’ claims. This will send a positive signal to creditors and raise officials’\nawareness on the need to comply with budget ceilings and expenditure processes.\nClearing these arrears will come afterward, with creditors’ agreements on clearance\nmodalities (including discounts\n\n- Continued expansion of CUT coverage. The process to identify inactive accounts then\nclose them, and to roll-out of the e-SISTAFE to extend the use of the CUT, have to be\ncontinued.\n\n- Stronger coordination of cash and debt management. The capacity of domestic\nmarket to accommodate a more variable profile of treasury bill issuance and/or\nmaintenance of a larger cash buffer within the CUT should be strengthened to absorb\ntemporary shocks.\n\n- A shorter “policy-reaction lag” for determining which policy actions (i.e., tolerate a\nhigher deficit, reduce low-priority expenditure, undertake revenue measures) need to be\ntaken by fiscal authorities when cash flow shocks are likely to be permanent and not\ntemporary.\n\n- Strengthened internal and external controls and audits. The IGF and the\nAdministrative Court (TA) have a crucial role to help restoring the expenditure chain and\nimproving financial programing, through the implementation of the accountability and\nsanctions framework.\n\n8 A strategy to clear and prevent arrears was recently developed by the Government with TA support from FAD,\n\nand is partially being implemented.", "text_characters": 1810}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "6\n\n#### **I. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS**\n\n**A.** **Main features of an efficient expenditure process and control**\n\n\n\n**11.** **The objective of expenditure control is to ensure that public resources are spent as**\n\n\n\n**intended, within authorized limits, and following sound financial management principles.**\n\n\n\nThe role of an expenditure control system is to ensure that the level and allocation of\n\n\n\ngovernment expenditure reflect the will of the legislature as voted for in the budget. Expenditure\n\n\n\ncontrols should also reflect sound financial management principles, ensuring that public\n\n\n\nresources are utilized efficiently, incurred obligations are cleared in a timely manner,\n\n\n\nabuse/misappropriation of public money is prevented or sanctioned, and private actors compete\n\n\n\non a level playing field for government contracts.\n\n\n\n**12.** **To ensure these objectives are met, government expenditures typically go through**\n**seven stages between authorization by the legislature and payment to the final beneficiary**\n(Figure 1). Of these seven stages, three have a direct impact on government’s obligations and\ndebt, and should be recorded separately to ensure the predictability of, allow control over\nexpenses, and for fiscal reporting and financial programming purposes: (1) commitments made,\nyet to be settled; (2) verifications recorded yet to be paid (i.e. the expenditure float); and (3)\npayments made (cash basis budget execution).\n\n\n\n**13.** **The Mozambique fiscal law** **[9]** **identifies these three stages of the expenditure**\n\n\n\n**execution**, that must happen separately from other stages of expenditure, and demands fiscal\n\n\n\nreporting be based on commitments. These legal provisions are practically not implemented.\n\n\n\n9 Law N. 9/2002 of 12 of February, on Public Financial Management System (SISTAFE), Article 30 on expenditure\nprocess.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0031, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "6\nI. RESTORING A LEGALLY COMPLIANT EXPENDITURE PROCESS\n\nA. Main features of an efficient expenditure process and control\n\n11. The objective of expenditure control is to ensure that public resources are spent as\n\nintended, within authorized limits, and following sound financial management principles.\n\nThe role of an expenditure control system is to ensure that the level and allocation of\n\ngovernment expenditure reflect the will of the legislature as voted for in the budget. Expenditure\n\ncontrols should also reflect sound financial management principles, ensuring that public\n\nresources are utilized efficiently, incurred obligations are cleared in a timely manner,\n\nabuse/misappropriation of public money is prevented or sanctioned, and private actors compete\n\non a level playing field for government contracts.\n\n12. To ensure these objectives are met, government expenditures typically go through\nseven stages between authorization by the legislature and payment to the final beneficiary\n(Figure 1). Of these seven stages, three have a direct impact on government’s obligations and\ndebt, and should be recorded separately to ensure the predictability of, allow control over\nexpenses, and for fiscal reporting and financial programming purposes: (1) commitments made,\nyet to be settled; (2) verifications recorded yet to be paid (i.e. the expenditure float); and (3)\npayments made (cash basis budget execution).\n\n13. The Mozambique fiscal law [9] identifies these three stages of the expenditure\n\nexecution, that must happen separately from other stages of expenditure, and demands fiscal\n\nreporting be based on commitments. These legal provisions are practically not implemented.\n\n9 Law N. 9/2002 of 12 of February, on Public Financial Management System (SISTAFE), Article 30 on expenditure\nprocess.", "text_characters": 1529}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-025-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "7\n\n\n**Figure 1. Seven key stages of the expenditure chain**\n\n\n\n\n\n**14.** **Due to cash rationing, the Treasury has set a system by which transactions are**\n\n\n\n**entered in the system as they mature for payment, not when the individual stages happen.**\n\n\n\nPractically, the spending units (UGEs) keep invoices and contracts in ad hoc ledgers, out of e\nSISTAFE. Then they operate spending by the sole amount of transactions complying with the\n\n\n\nweekly cash ceiling set by the Treasury. [10] Since request for limits are send only after invoices are\n\nreceived, the risk of accumulating arrears is very high (if not inevitable). All steps of expenditure\n\n\n\nare generally recorded within one week [11] as follows: commitments and verifications are recorded\n\n\n\nin e-SISTAFE simultaneously; and payments are made within four days, e.g. the time lapse the\n\n\n\nTreasury needs to execute the disbursements.\n\n\n\n10 The Treasury formally releases a “ _Limite de Cabimentacao_ ” (limit for commitment) to the UGE. This limit\n\ncorresponds to available cash to be spent during a time slot of one week and is announced at the beginning of\neach week, based on the monthly requests received from UGEs.\n\n11 Source: e-SISTAFE database provided by CEDSIF.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2907, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 88.060791015625, 517.4415283203125, 417.7607727050781)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 867, "number": 17, "size": 354717, "transform": [427.4415283203125, 0.0, -0.0, 329.6999816894531, 90.0, 88.060791015625], "width": 1124, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "7\n\nFigure 1. Seven key stages of the expenditure chain\n\n14. Due to cash rationing, the Treasury has set a system by which transactions are\n\nentered in the system as they mature for payment, not when the individual stages happen.\n\nPractically, the spending units (UGEs) keep invoices and contracts in ad hoc ledgers, out of e\nSISTAFE. Then they operate spending by the sole amount of transactions complying with the\n\nweekly cash ceiling set by the Treasury. [10] Since request for limits are send only after invoices are\n\nreceived, the risk of accumulating arrears is very high (if not inevitable). All steps of expenditure\n\nare generally recorded within one week [11] as follows: commitments and verifications are recorded\n\nin e-SISTAFE simultaneously; and payments are made within four days, e.g. the time lapse the\n\nTreasury needs to execute the disbursements.\n\n10 The Treasury formally releases a “ _Limite de Cabimentacao_ ” (limit for commitment) to the UGE. This limit\n\ncorresponds to available cash to be spent during a time slot of one week and is announced at the beginning of\neach week, based on the monthly requests received from UGEs.\n\n11 Source: e-SISTAFE database provided by CEDSIF.", "text_characters": 990}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "8\n\n\n\n**15.** **Squeezing expenditure phases into such a short time lapse, also denies capturing**\n\n\n\n**commitments and invoices when they occur.** It encourages the neglection of critical\n\n\n\ndocuments such as contracts, receipts and invoices that are put on the back burner until the last\n\n\n\nmoment when transactions are done. Therefore, fiscal reporting in Mozambique is incomplete\n\n\n\nand does not provide a fair reflection on government obligations. Decisions on fiscal policies are\n\n\n\npoorly informed in the lack of accurate data on real execution process.\n\n\n\n**16.** **Commitment control is loose or inexistent.** Complying with Mozambique’s legal\n\n\n\nframework, investment contracts shall be submitted by UGEs to the supreme audit court (TA) for\n\n\n\na control on procedural regularity, not budget compliance. Prior the TA’s control, the Treasury\n\nshould conduct a preliminary control on commitments ( _pre-cabimento_ ). In practice, the ceiling\n\n\n\nissued by the Treasury is not binding the purchasing UGE, and does not prevent them from over\n\n\n\npurchasing more than their budget. Most commitments are not controlled upstream, and the\n\n\n\nfinancial sustainability of spending units’ procurement is not ensured.\n\n\n\n**C.** **Addressing the main issues**\n\n**Adequate release of appropriations: restore the apportionment phase**\n\n\n\n**17.** **A clear differentiation should be made between the role of the budget release and**\n\n\n\n**cash release.** Extending time horizons on budget releases enables compliant and timely\n\n\n\nrecording of commitment and facilitate budget implementation; while cash release means that\n\n\n\ncash is available at the right place at the right time to facilitate payment.\n\n\n\n**18.** **For goods and services, the UGEs should be given commitment ceilings/allotments**\n\n\n\n**sufficiently in advance to improve the quality of public expenditure management**\n\n\n\n**downstream.** This would provide the following improvements: (1) the UGEs would have\n\n\n\nsufficient room to enable records of commitment and verification stages; (2) the process of\n\n\n\nprogramming can be implemented interactively, starting with the submission of financial needs\n\n\n\nof funds by the UGEs to the Treasury and with accurate information on real commitments and\n\n\n\nverifications; and (3) the Treasury would gain critical information to consolidate a quarterly cash\n\n\n\nplan.\n\n\n\n**19.** **Hereinafter, the quarterly apportionment/commitments ceilings could be made on**\n\n\n\n**a quarterly basis, based on revenue forecasts.** It could represent 25 percent of the annual\n\n\n\nappropriation, or less if the MEF would prefer a more conservative release of commitment in case\n\n\n\nrevenue collections fall short of estimates (e.g. based on 90 percent of revenue collections). In\n\n\n\nsome special cases, such as the consumption of public utility services and the execution of\n\n\n\nmedium- or long-term leasing contracts, the apportionment could be annual, in order to sign the\n\n\n\ncontract (commitment), with monthly/quarterly payments based on invoices.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "8\n\n15. Squeezing expenditure phases into such a short time lapse, also denies capturing\n\ncommitments and invoices when they occur. It encourages the neglection of critical\n\ndocuments such as contracts, receipts and invoices that are put on the back burner until the last\n\nmoment when transactions are done. Therefore, fiscal reporting in Mozambique is incomplete\n\nand does not provide a fair reflection on government obligations. Decisions on fiscal policies are\n\npoorly informed in the lack of accurate data on real execution process.\n\n16. Commitment control is loose or inexistent. Complying with Mozambique’s legal\n\nframework, investment contracts shall be submitted by UGEs to the supreme audit court (TA) for\n\na control on procedural regularity, not budget compliance. Prior the TA’s control, the Treasury\n\nshould conduct a preliminary control on commitments ( _pre-cabimento_ ). In practice, the ceiling\n\nissued by the Treasury is not binding the purchasing UGE, and does not prevent them from over\n\npurchasing more than their budget. Most commitments are not controlled upstream, and the\n\nfinancial sustainability of spending units’ procurement is not ensured.\n\nC. Addressing the main issues\n\nAdequate release of appropriations: restore the apportionment phase\n\n17. A clear differentiation should be made between the role of the budget release and\n\ncash release. Extending time horizons on budget releases enables compliant and timely\n\nrecording of commitment and facilitate budget implementation; while cash release means that\n\ncash is available at the right place at the right time to facilitate payment.\n\n18. For goods and services, the UGEs should be given commitment ceilings/allotments\n\nsufficiently in advance to improve the quality of public expenditure management\n\ndownstream. This would provide the following improvements: (1) the UGEs would have\n\nsufficient room to enable records of commitment and verification stages; (2) the process of\n\nprogramming can be implemented interactively, starting with the submission of financial needs\n\nof funds by the UGEs to the Treasury and with accurate information on real commitments and\n\nverifications; and (3) the Treasury would gain critical information to consolidate a quarterly cash\n\nplan.\n\n19. Hereinafter, the quarterly apportionment/commitments ceilings could be made on\n\na quarterly basis, based on revenue forecasts. It could represent 25 percent of the annual\n\nappropriation, or less if the MEF would prefer a more conservative release of commitment in case\n\nrevenue collections fall short of estimates (e.g. based on 90 percent of revenue collections). In\n\nsome special cases, such as the consumption of public utility services and the execution of\n\nmedium- or long-term leasing contracts, the apportionment could be annual, in order to sign the\n\ncontract (commitment), with monthly/quarterly payments based on invoices.", "text_characters": 2429}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "9\n\n\n\n**20.** **For the other categories of expenditures, the apportionment could be made in the**\n\n**system by the Budget Department following a top-down approach:**\n\n- For **payroll expenses and social contributions**, the apportionment could be done\nannually, quarterly of monthly and correspond to the amount of the compensations,\nsubsidies and contributions owed during the period of reference.\n\n\n- In relation to **debt servicing**, the apportionment could be done annually based on the\nschedule of reimbursement prepared by the Public Debt Management Department.\n\n\n- For **spending related to capital projects**, apportionment is in general annual in\naccordance with the contract (multiyear and annual legal commitments).\n\n\n- For **transfers**, the commitment ceilings would depend on the nature of the transfer\n(defined by law, regulation, and/or policy decisions by the government): for example,\nquarterly for study scholarships, in accordance with specific schedules for transfers to\nlocal governments, state-owned enterprises (SOE) or public entities, or based on specific\ncontracts.\n\n\n**21.** **The implications for e-SISTAFE would be to separate budget release from cash**\n**release** and extend the time horizon for budget releases: quarterly for ongoing/continuing\nexpenditure, and longer for contracts and other specific items.\n\n\n**A more efficient use of the existing functionalities of e-SISTAFE**\n\n**22.** **The budget is executed through the public sector financial management system (e-**\n\n\n\n**SISTAFE), which has been developed to cover the main stages of the expenditure.** **[12]** The e\n\n\nSISTAFE and its Budget Execution Module (MEX) are robust enough to record all transactions\n\n\n\nmade by the UGEs when they occur. It records different phases in the expenditure workflow\n\n\n\nincluding commitments, verifications and payments.\n\n\n\n**23.** **E-SISTAFE is being upgraded with the progressive implementation of the public**\n\n\n\n**procurement and asset management module** (MPE) _._ This functionality should strengthen\n\n\n\npublic procurement management and ensure budget allocations/allotments exist and are\n\n\n\nreserved before launching the public tender (adding a pre-commitment stage). The module\n\n\n\nshould also improve the:\n\n\n\n12 The SISTAFE is the financial administration framework of the State, composed by five subsystems: (1) State\n\nBudget Subsystem (SOE); (2) Public Accounting Subsystem (SCP); (3) Public Treasury Subsystem (STP); (4) State\nAsset Subsystem (SPE); and (5) Internal Control Subsystem (SCI). This framework is supported by an integrated\nfinancial management information system called e-SISTAFE, composed by several modules. Some of these\nmodules, such as the Budget Preparation Module (MEO, _Modulo de Elaboração do Orçamento_ ) and the Budget\nExecution Module (MEX, _Modulo de Execução Orçamental_ ) are operational, and some are still being developed,\nsuch as the State Assets Module (MPE, _Modulo do Patrimonio do Estado_ ).", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "9\n\n20. For the other categories of expenditures, the apportionment could be made in the\n\nsystem by the Budget Department following a top-down approach:\n\n- For payroll expenses and social contributions, the apportionment could be done\nannually, quarterly of monthly and correspond to the amount of the compensations,\nsubsidies and contributions owed during the period of reference.\n\n- In relation to debt servicing, the apportionment could be done annually based on the\nschedule of reimbursement prepared by the Public Debt Management Department.\n\n- For spending related to capital projects, apportionment is in general annual in\naccordance with the contract (multiyear and annual legal commitments).\n\n- For transfers, the commitment ceilings would depend on the nature of the transfer\n(defined by law, regulation, and/or policy decisions by the government): for example,\nquarterly for study scholarships, in accordance with specific schedules for transfers to\nlocal governments, state-owned enterprises (SOE) or public entities, or based on specific\ncontracts.\n\n21. The implications for e-SISTAFE would be to separate budget release from cash\nrelease and extend the time horizon for budget releases: quarterly for ongoing/continuing\nexpenditure, and longer for contracts and other specific items.\n\nA more efficient use of the existing functionalities of e-SISTAFE\n\n22. The budget is executed through the public sector financial management system (e-\n\nSISTAFE), which has been developed to cover the main stages of the expenditure. [12] The e\n\nSISTAFE and its Budget Execution Module (MEX) are robust enough to record all transactions\n\nmade by the UGEs when they occur. It records different phases in the expenditure workflow\n\nincluding commitments, verifications and payments.\n\n23. E-SISTAFE is being upgraded with the progressive implementation of the public\n\nprocurement and asset management module (MPE) _._ This functionality should strengthen\n\npublic procurement management and ensure budget allocations/allotments exist and are\n\nreserved before launching the public tender (adding a pre-commitment stage). The module\n\nshould also improve the:\n\n12 The SISTAFE is the financial administration framework of the State, composed by five subsystems: (1) State\n\nBudget Subsystem (SOE); (2) Public Accounting Subsystem (SCP); (3) Public Treasury Subsystem (STP); (4) State\nAsset Subsystem (SPE); and (5) Internal Control Subsystem (SCI). This framework is supported by an integrated\nfinancial management information system called e-SISTAFE, composed by several modules. Some of these\nmodules, such as the Budget Preparation Module (MEO, _Modulo de Elaboração do Orçamento_ ) and the Budget\nExecution Module (MEX, _Modulo de Execução Orçamental_ ) are operational, and some are still being developed,\nsuch as the State Assets Module (MPE, _Modulo do Patrimonio do Estado_ ).", "text_characters": 2434}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "10\n\n\n- _**Control of procurement,**_ to obtain high quality goods and services at a competitive\nprice; to provide a fair opportunity for all bidders to compete for government contracts,\nand to get good value for money and to minimize risks of corruption and patronage.\n\n\n- **Verification of goods and services (and public works) and accounting control**\ninvolving: (1) verification of the goods and/or services delivered by a supplier to ensure\nthat these and/or public works conform to the specified quality and quantity; (2) a\ncalculation of the liability incurred by the government to the supplier; (3) the prevention,\nidentification and mitigation of arrears; and (3) the proper recording of State assets.\n\n\n\n**24.** **The interfaced functionalities of the budget preparation module (MEO),** **MEX and**\n\n\n\n**MPE should allow in the medium-term to cover all phases of budget execution from**\n\n\n\n**allotment of funds to payments** (as presented in Figures 2 and Table 1). However, there is no\n\n\n\nneed to wait to complete the current pilot of the MPE to include public works and to roll-it\n\n\n\nthroughout the country during the next two years. [13] The functionalities of MEX could be used to\n\n\n\nrecord on real time all commitments and verifications with the 2019 budget implementation.\n\n\n\n**Enforcing the commitment note**\n\n\n\n**25.** **A feature of e-SISTAFE is the possibility to issue a “commitment note”** **(** _**Nota de**_\n\n\n\n_**Cabimentação**_ **).** Designed to increase suppliers’ confidence, the commitment note is an official\n\nstatement which may be printed out from e-SISTAFE and sent to suppliers to confirm that has or\n\n\n\nwill have resources to pay what is ordered, when the obligation to pay become due.\n\n\n\n**26.** **But the way the commitment note has been used has not allowed to monitor**\n\n\n\n**commitments.** If it was issued at the date of the purchase order, and if the latter was registered\n\n\n\nin e-SISTAFE, it would be a valid source of information to monitor budget execution. However,\n\n\n\nthis note can be generated only when a commitment is registered in e-SISTAFE and, so far,\n\n\n\npurchase orders are issued outside e-SISTAFE. As a result, the “ _Nota de Cabimentação_ ” has not\n\n\n\nbrought added value to the control of budget execution, and is not trusted by suppliers as a\n\n\n\nfuture obligation of the State to pay them, subject to the fulfillment of the contract of service\n\n\n\ndelivery.\n\n\n\n13 In 2017, MPE was implemented as a pilot test in CEDSIF, National Directorates of the Ministry of Finance,\n\nministries of Education and Health. The full roll-out of MPE for all ministries/departments is expected for 2020.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "10\n\n- _Control of procurement,_ to obtain high quality goods and services at a competitive\nprice; to provide a fair opportunity for all bidders to compete for government contracts,\nand to get good value for money and to minimize risks of corruption and patronage.\n\n- Verification of goods and services (and public works) and accounting control\ninvolving: (1) verification of the goods and/or services delivered by a supplier to ensure\nthat these and/or public works conform to the specified quality and quantity; (2) a\ncalculation of the liability incurred by the government to the supplier; (3) the prevention,\nidentification and mitigation of arrears; and (3) the proper recording of State assets.\n\n24. The interfaced functionalities of the budget preparation module (MEO), MEX and\n\nMPE should allow in the medium-term to cover all phases of budget execution from\n\nallotment of funds to payments (as presented in Figures 2 and Table 1). However, there is no\n\nneed to wait to complete the current pilot of the MPE to include public works and to roll-it\n\nthroughout the country during the next two years. [13] The functionalities of MEX could be used to\n\nrecord on real time all commitments and verifications with the 2019 budget implementation.\n\nEnforcing the commitment note\n\n25. A feature of e-SISTAFE is the possibility to issue a “commitment note” ( _Nota de_\n\n_Cabimentação_ ). Designed to increase suppliers’ confidence, the commitment note is an official\n\nstatement which may be printed out from e-SISTAFE and sent to suppliers to confirm that has or\n\nwill have resources to pay what is ordered, when the obligation to pay become due.\n\n26. But the way the commitment note has been used has not allowed to monitor\n\ncommitments. If it was issued at the date of the purchase order, and if the latter was registered\n\nin e-SISTAFE, it would be a valid source of information to monitor budget execution. However,\n\nthis note can be generated only when a commitment is registered in e-SISTAFE and, so far,\n\npurchase orders are issued outside e-SISTAFE. As a result, the “ _Nota de Cabimentação_ ” has not\n\nbrought added value to the control of budget execution, and is not trusted by suppliers as a\n\nfuture obligation of the State to pay them, subject to the fulfillment of the contract of service\n\ndelivery.\n\n13 In 2017, MPE was implemented as a pilot test in CEDSIF, National Directorates of the Ministry of Finance,\n\nministries of Education and Health. The full roll-out of MPE for all ministries/departments is expected for 2020.", "text_characters": 2092}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-025-fig-p0021-001"], "markdown": "11\n\n\n**Figure 2. Budget execution process in e-SISTAFE for goods, services, and public works**\n\n\n\n\n\n**27.** **Issuing and enforcing compliant \"Nota de Cabimentação\" should be one of the**\n\n**main features in restoring the expenditure cycle and control.** It should be the only valid\n\n\n\ndocument confirming that: (1) the purchase has strictly respected the first phases of the\n\n\n\nexpenditure process (phases 1 to 4); (2) the supplier has the obligation to deliver in due time the\n\ngood and services in accordance with the contract (phase 5); then (3) Government will pay in due\n\n\n\ntime what has been delivered (phases 5 and 6) The supply of goods or services outside the\n\n\n\nnormal procedure should be prohibited. Internal and external audits from the IGF and the TA\n\n\n\nshould verify compliance with these procedures and apply sanctions when necessary.\n\n\n\n**A strict and limited use of advances and operating accounts**\n\n\n\n**28.** **The SISTAFE Law authorizes the processing of expenditure under cash advance**\n\n\n\n**arrangements**, called an operating fund, to pay for expenditure in small amounts and for which\n\ncompliance with the normal way of processing expenditure has been waived (Article 30.2). These\n\nexpenditures are by nature limited, and the conditions for their implementation should be strictly\n\n\n\ndefined. Box 1 presents good practices for managing cash advances and related operating\n\n\n\naccounts, in the case of Mozambique.\n\n\n\n**29.** **However, advance payments to suppliers have become the general practice at**\n**provincial and district levels** . Suppliers are reluctant to deliver goods and services prior to\nreceiving payment, to avoid the risk of incurring into arrears. Private sector outside the capital", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2652, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 94.060791015625, 539.9956665039062, 379.7607727050781)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": true, "height": 450, "number": 20, "size": 171759, "transform": [449.99566650390625, 0.0, -0.0, 285.6999816894531, 90.0, 94.060791015625], "width": 800, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "11\n\nFigure 2. Budget execution process in e-SISTAFE for goods, services, and public works\n\n27. Issuing and enforcing compliant \"Nota de Cabimentação\" should be one of the\n\nmain features in restoring the expenditure cycle and control. It should be the only valid\n\ndocument confirming that: (1) the purchase has strictly respected the first phases of the\n\nexpenditure process (phases 1 to 4); (2) the supplier has the obligation to deliver in due time the\n\ngood and services in accordance with the contract (phase 5); then (3) Government will pay in due\n\ntime what has been delivered (phases 5 and 6) The supply of goods or services outside the\n\nnormal procedure should be prohibited. Internal and external audits from the IGF and the TA\n\nshould verify compliance with these procedures and apply sanctions when necessary.\n\nA strict and limited use of advances and operating accounts\n\n28. The SISTAFE Law authorizes the processing of expenditure under cash advance\n\narrangements, called an operating fund, to pay for expenditure in small amounts and for which\n\ncompliance with the normal way of processing expenditure has been waived (Article 30.2). These\n\nexpenditures are by nature limited, and the conditions for their implementation should be strictly\n\ndefined. Box 1 presents good practices for managing cash advances and related operating\n\naccounts, in the case of Mozambique.\n\n29. However, advance payments to suppliers have become the general practice at\nprovincial and district levels . Suppliers are reluctant to deliver goods and services prior to\nreceiving payment, to avoid the risk of incurring into arrears. Private sector outside the capital", "text_characters": 1378}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "12\n\n\nusually has limit liquidity and does not have the capacity to finance the government. The recent\nincrease in the government stock of arrears has contributed to shifting business relations\ntowards pre-payment requirements.\n\n\n**Box 1. Recommendations for managing cash advances and related operating funds**\n\n**Establishment and ceiling of operating funds**\n\nThe Treasury shall have the sole authority to approve the establishment of operating funds of any ministries,\ndepartments, and agencies, and shall set a ceiling on the amount of each standing operating account.\n\n**Advance to an operating fund**\n\nNo advance shall be given to replenish an operating fund, unless all the utilized amount has been acquitted in\naccordance with regulations; the UGEs shall request an advance to create or replenish a standing operating fund\nthrough the e-SISTAFE.\n\nThe UGE shall, through e-SISTAFE: (a) record a commitment of expenditure, the amount of which is equal to the\nadvance to the standing operating fund; (b) generate and approve a payment voucher; (c) send a bank\ninstruction to make electronic fund transfer to a bank account opened for the operating fund; and (d) record the\namount of the advance as an asset.\n\n**Advance payment to supplier**\n\nAn advance payment for goods and services and public works of an UGE may be made only when all the\nfollowing conditions are met: (a) the advance payment is required by a written public contract within a\npercentage of a total price to be paid under the contract; (b) a supplier or contractor has obtained from a\nfinancial institution a guarantee on payments of damages to the Government in case of its non-performance of\ncontractual obligations; and (c) the term of the guarantee covers the entire contract period.\n\nThe UGE shall verify the validity, legality, and accuracy of an advance payment for goods and services and civil\nworks before recording the commitment through the e-SISTAFE.\n\nWhen recording the commitment, the UGE shall verify whether the requested advance payment is within the\ncommitment control limit, and through e-SISTAFE, (a) record a commitment of expenditure, the amount of which\nis equal to the advance payment; (b) generate and approve the payment voucher and make the payments; and\n(c) record the amount of the advance payment as an asset.\n\nThe UGE shall verify the delivery of goods and services, the completion of civil works, or the satisfaction of any\nother contractual terms before acquitting the advance payments and recording the same amount of expenditure\nthrough e-SISTAFE.\n\nThe consolidated annual accounts shall include a list of outstanding advance payments for goods and services\nand civil works with the breakdown to each supplier, contractor, and project.\n\nSource: Mission\n\n\n**A different role for the National Treasury**\n\n\n\n**30.** **With the revised process for expenditure, the role of the National Treasury in**\n\n\n\n**Mozambique would change.** Because of the centralized and time-consuming cash rationing\n\n\n\nsystem managed by the Treasury, the latter is overloaded and cannot focus on its core functions.\n\n\n\nRevised core functions for the Treasury could be as follows:", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "12\n\nusually has limit liquidity and does not have the capacity to finance the government. The recent\nincrease in the government stock of arrears has contributed to shifting business relations\ntowards pre-payment requirements.\n\nBox 1. Recommendations for managing cash advances and related operating funds\n\nEstablishment and ceiling of operating funds\n\nThe Treasury shall have the sole authority to approve the establishment of operating funds of any ministries,\ndepartments, and agencies, and shall set a ceiling on the amount of each standing operating account.\n\nAdvance to an operating fund\n\nNo advance shall be given to replenish an operating fund, unless all the utilized amount has been acquitted in\naccordance with regulations; the UGEs shall request an advance to create or replenish a standing operating fund\nthrough the e-SISTAFE.\n\nThe UGE shall, through e-SISTAFE: (a) record a commitment of expenditure, the amount of which is equal to the\nadvance to the standing operating fund; (b) generate and approve a payment voucher; (c) send a bank\ninstruction to make electronic fund transfer to a bank account opened for the operating fund; and (d) record the\namount of the advance as an asset.\n\nAdvance payment to supplier\n\nAn advance payment for goods and services and public works of an UGE may be made only when all the\nfollowing conditions are met: (a) the advance payment is required by a written public contract within a\npercentage of a total price to be paid under the contract; (b) a supplier or contractor has obtained from a\nfinancial institution a guarantee on payments of damages to the Government in case of its non-performance of\ncontractual obligations; and (c) the term of the guarantee covers the entire contract period.\n\nThe UGE shall verify the validity, legality, and accuracy of an advance payment for goods and services and civil\nworks before recording the commitment through the e-SISTAFE.\n\nWhen recording the commitment, the UGE shall verify whether the requested advance payment is within the\ncommitment control limit, and through e-SISTAFE, (a) record a commitment of expenditure, the amount of which\nis equal to the advance payment; (b) generate and approve the payment voucher and make the payments; and\n(c) record the amount of the advance payment as an asset.\n\nThe UGE shall verify the delivery of goods and services, the completion of civil works, or the satisfaction of any\nother contractual terms before acquitting the advance payments and recording the same amount of expenditure\nthrough e-SISTAFE.\n\nThe consolidated annual accounts shall include a list of outstanding advance payments for goods and services\nand civil works with the breakdown to each supplier, contractor, and project.\n\nSource: Mission\n\nA different role for the National Treasury\n\n30. With the revised process for expenditure, the role of the National Treasury in\n\nMozambique would change. Because of the centralized and time-consuming cash rationing\n\nsystem managed by the Treasury, the latter is overloaded and cannot focus on its core functions.\n\nRevised core functions for the Treasury could be as follows:", "text_characters": 2605}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "13\n\n\n- **Financial planning and cash flows forecasting** : ensure that cash outflows are\ncompatible with cash inflows and to prepare borrowing plans.\n\n- **Compliance control to cash advances and related operating funds** : including the\napproval of advance ceilings and the oversight of cash advances and related operating\nfunds.\n\n- **Cash management** : controlling spending in the aggregate, implementing the budget\nefficiently, minimizing of the cost of government borrowing, and maximizing the\nopportunity cost of resources.\n\n- **Public debt** : manage the Government borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit.\n\n- **Management and oversight of the Government bank accounts (CUT system)** :\nsupervising all central government bank accounts, including any extrabudgetary funds.\n\n- **Administration of foreign grants and counterpart funds** from international aid.\n\n- **Government financial assets management** : consisting of shares in enterprises, loans\ngranted by the government, payments of guarantees not honored by debtors,\npreparation of consolidated financial statements for State Own Enterprises (SOE), etc.\n\n\n**Main features of the reviewed expenditure process and control**\n\n**31.** **The main features of the revised process and related flows of information would be**\n**as presented below (Table 1).**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "13\n\n- Financial planning and cash flows forecasting : ensure that cash outflows are\ncompatible with cash inflows and to prepare borrowing plans.\n\n- Compliance control to cash advances and related operating funds : including the\napproval of advance ceilings and the oversight of cash advances and related operating\nfunds.\n\n- Cash management : controlling spending in the aggregate, implementing the budget\nefficiently, minimizing of the cost of government borrowing, and maximizing the\nopportunity cost of resources.\n\n- Public debt : manage the Government borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit.\n\n- Management and oversight of the Government bank accounts (CUT system) :\nsupervising all central government bank accounts, including any extrabudgetary funds.\n\n- Administration of foreign grants and counterpart funds from international aid.\n\n- Government financial assets management : consisting of shares in enterprises, loans\ngranted by the government, payments of guarantees not honored by debtors,\npreparation of consolidated financial statements for State Own Enterprises (SOE), etc.\n\nMain features of the reviewed expenditure process and control\n\n31. The main features of the revised process and related flows of information would be\nas presented below (Table 1).", "text_characters": 1073}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 1. Main features of the revised expenditure process**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Stage|Action|Responsibility|Flows of Information|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**1.**
**Authorization**|• Government prepares and submits the budget for legislative
approval based on a realistic medium-term fiscal framework
or annual budget projections. Government has
comprehensive assessment of fiscal risks.
• Contingency provisions are used to accommodate
unplanned, unavoidable, and unforeseen expenditures.
• Budget reflects expenditure commitments carried forward
from prior years.|Budget
Directorate of
the MEF|Finance Law approved by Parliament, and**detailed**
**appropriations** downloaded in MEO and MEX|\n|**2.**
**Apportionment**|• Spending authority is apportioned for specific periods|Budget
Directorate of
the MEF|**Annual or quarterly**
**allotments/warrants/commitment ceilings**
downloaded in MEX|\n|**3. Reservation**|• Funds (part of a budget allocation) are blocked for a specific
expense|UGEs|In accordance with the authorized allotment, and
based on**quarterly/monthly**
**procurement/expenditure plans**, UGEs prepare a
**requisition** to reserve the funds during the tendering
process compliant with Contractors and Suppliers List
(CEF) - Catalog of Goods and Services (CBS) - and
Reference Prices (PRF).|\n|**4. Expenditure**
**commitment**|• Legal right to acquire goods or services is made with the
issuance of a purchase order or contract and commitments
are recorded at this stage for all types of expenditures.
• Monitoring and control mechanisms cover all budgetary and
extra-budgetary funds for the public sector.|UGEs
|The specificities of**the purchase order/contract** are
recorded in MEX. Commitment approval linked to
reservations.
The UGE controls the regularity of the commitment
and issues through MEX a**commitment note** to the
supplier. The commitment note must be annexed to
the contract that is submitted to the TA for approval.
Thus, the commitment in e-SISTAFE is recorded before
the contract enters into force.|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.20000457763672, 84.9113998413086, 719.7999877929688, 502.00799560546875], "columns": 4, "rows": 5}], "text": "Table 1. Main features of the revised expenditure process\n\n Stage Action Responsibility Flows of Information \n\n 1. Authorization • Government prepares and submits the budget for legislative approval based on a realistic medium-term fiscal framework or annual budget projections. Government has comprehensive assessment of fiscal risks. • Contingency provisions are used to accommodate unplanned, unavoidable, and unforeseen expenditures. • Budget reflects expenditure commitments carried forward from prior years. Budget Directorate of the MEF Finance Law approved by Parliament, anddetailed appropriations downloaded in MEO and MEX \n 2. Apportionment • Spending authority is apportioned for specific periods Budget Directorate of the MEF Annual or quarterly allotments/warrants/commitment ceilings downloaded in MEX \n 3. Reservation • Funds (part of a budget allocation) are blocked for a specific expense UGEs In accordance with the authorized allotment, and based onquarterly/monthly procurement/expenditure plans, UGEs prepare a requisition to reserve the funds during the tendering process compliant with Contractors and Suppliers List (CEF) - Catalog of Goods and Services (CBS) - and Reference Prices (PRF). \n 4. Expenditure commitment • Legal right to acquire goods or services is made with the issuance of a purchase order or contract and commitments are recorded at this stage for all types of expenditures. • Monitoring and control mechanisms cover all budgetary and extra-budgetary funds for the public sector. UGEs The specificities ofthe purchase order/contract are recorded in MEX. Commitment approval linked to reservations. The UGE controls the regularity of the commitment and issues through MEX acommitment note to the supplier. The commitment note must be annexed to the contract that is submitted to the TA for approval. Thus, the commitment in e-SISTAFE is recorded before the contract enters into force.", "text_characters": 1640}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "15\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Stage|Action|Responsibility|Flows of Information|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**5. Expenditure**
**verification**
**(liquidation)**|• Work is completed, goods and services are delivered, and the
invoice is received.
• The liability arises when the third party satisfies contractual
obligations. The invoice becomes an obligation, and the
payment due date is registered in the accounting system.
• Payment orders issued only after documented verification.|UGEs
|**A certification of goods delivery/service rendered** is
prepared and signed by the UGE, and recorded in MEX
with**the invoices** as supporting document.
Issuance of**a liquidation note** (_Nota de Liquidação_)
through the system (MEX).
Monitoring by the Treasury of overdue
verification/payables (**reports**).|\n|**6. Financial**
**needs**|• UGE sends quarter/monthly financial requests to the Treasury
through e-SISTAFE, indicating for each period, the forecast of
cash inflows needed to attend its commitments.|UGEs
Treasury|**Update of financial requests** (_Requisicao de_
_Necesidades Financeiras_)
Treasury approves UGEs financial ceilings for payment,
per aggregate economic classifiers.|\n|**7. Payment**
|• Payment is made by the UGE and recorded in the accounting
system, removing the liability.
• UGE processes orders and issues checks or electronic
transfers.
• Payment due date is known, and available funds are in
government bank accounts on the due date.
• Checks are cashed/electronic transfers made expeditiously in
favor of the creditor.|UGEs
Treasury
IGF
UGEAs|Issuance of a**payment order note** (_Ordem de_
_Pagamento_) on due dates.
Treasury performs**regular bank reconciliations, cash**
**planning and management and arrears tracking**
**and management** (regular reporting/monitoring of
overdue payments).
IGF performs audits and controls of regularity to
ensure that the payment is supported by legally
compliant commitment and verification.
Assets are recorded in MPE (**inventory**) by sector
procurement units (UGEAs).|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.19200134277344, 66.9113998413086, 719.8079833984375, 429.6479797363281], "columns": 4, "rows": 4}], "text": "15\n\n Stage Action Responsibility Flows of Information \n\n 5. Expenditure verification (liquidation) • Work is completed, goods and services are delivered, and the invoice is received. • The liability arises when the third party satisfies contractual obligations. The invoice becomes an obligation, and the payment due date is registered in the accounting system. • Payment orders issued only after documented verification. UGEs A certification of goods delivery/service rendered is prepared and signed by the UGE, and recorded in MEX withthe invoices as supporting document. Issuance ofa liquidation note (_Nota de Liquidação_) through the system (MEX). Monitoring by the Treasury of overdue verification/payables (reports). \n 6. Financial needs • UGE sends quarter/monthly financial requests to the Treasury through e-SISTAFE, indicating for each period, the forecast of cash inflows needed to attend its commitments. UGEs Treasury Update of financial requests (_Requisicao de_ _Necesidades Financeiras_) Treasury approves UGEs financial ceilings for payment, per aggregate economic classifiers. \n 7. Payment • Payment is made by the UGE and recorded in the accounting system, removing the liability. • UGE processes orders and issues checks or electronic transfers. • Payment due date is known, and available funds are in government bank accounts on the due date. • Checks are cashed/electronic transfers made expeditiously in favor of the creditor. UGEs Treasury IGF UGEAs Issuance of apayment order note (_Ordem de_ _Pagamento_) on due dates. Treasury performsregular bank reconciliations, cash planning and management and arrears tracking and management (regular reporting/monitoring of overdue payments). IGF performs audits and controls of regularity to ensure that the payment is supported by legally compliant commitment and verification. Assets are recorded in MPE (inventory) by sector procurement units (UGEAs).", "text_characters": 1641}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**D.** **Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement**\n\n\n\n**32.** **A more efficient use of e-SISTAFE to restore the expenditure chain and improve**\n\n\n\n**financial programming.** MEX should be upgraded to allow the allotment and requisition phases\n\n\n\nin particular.\n\n\n\n**E.** **Strengthening capacities**\n\n\n\n**33.** **The main challenge is to change users’ practices, so the three main phases of the**\n\n\n\n**expenditure chain can be restored in e-SISTAFE when they are done.** This would require\n\n\n\nextensive training at various levels (e.g., spending units, supervisory bodies, and internal control)\n\n\n\nand clear manual of procedures.\n\n\n\n**34.** **The skill levels of staff will be a key determinant in efforts to improve budget**\n\n**execution.** The authorities agree that there is an overall skills deficit in UGEs about budget\n\n\n\nexecution processes. In this regard, training should cover not only new IT functionalities, but also\n\n\n\nan explanation of budget execution functions and processes, flows of information, and basic\n\nprinciples in restoring the expenditure chain and preparing cash flow forecasts. For instance,\n\nUGEs should be trained to make appropriate use of the quarterly allotment or commitment\n\n\n\nceilings and do not pretend cash payments would follow within four days, as nowadays.\n\n\n\n**35.** **Training and seminars should also be organized for suppliers.** The commitment note\n\n\n\nissued by e-SISTAFE should start being used to provide suppliers with a certificate or proof of\n\n\n\nfuture payment. Suppliers should be trained to stop requesting payments prior to the delivery of\n\n\n\ngoods and services, and to only deliver them after commitments are made in the system.\n\n\n\n**36.** **Because of the changes in roles and responsibilities in the expenditure process,**\n\n\n\nspecific and intensive training should also be provided to the Budget Directorate of the MEF and\n\n\n\nthe National Treasury on the revised core functions.\n\n\n\n**37.** **Segregation of duties at budget unit level is clearly defined but not yet effective in**\n\n**practice.** Behavior of staff and appropriation of rules and principles remains a concern. Any user\n\n\n\nof e-SISTAFE is requested by a permanent message to avoid using the password of any\n\n\n\ncolleague. The simultaneous registration of Commitment, Verification and Payment is made\n\n\n\npossible insofar a single agent can use password and e-profile of the committing officer ( _agente_\n\n\n\n_de cabimentação_ ), the verification officer ( _agente de liquidação_ ), and the compliance officer\n\n\n\n( _agent de control interno_ ). Staff are also used to maintain parallel records.\n\n\n\n**38.** **Some improvements should be done to the infrastructure which supports e-**\n\n**SISTAFE to ensure that spending units can have regular access from their local offices.**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement\n\n32. A more efficient use of e-SISTAFE to restore the expenditure chain and improve\n\nfinancial programming. MEX should be upgraded to allow the allotment and requisition phases\n\nin particular.\n\nE. Strengthening capacities\n\n33. The main challenge is to change users’ practices, so the three main phases of the\n\nexpenditure chain can be restored in e-SISTAFE when they are done. This would require\n\nextensive training at various levels (e.g., spending units, supervisory bodies, and internal control)\n\nand clear manual of procedures.\n\n34. The skill levels of staff will be a key determinant in efforts to improve budget\n\nexecution. The authorities agree that there is an overall skills deficit in UGEs about budget\n\nexecution processes. In this regard, training should cover not only new IT functionalities, but also\n\nan explanation of budget execution functions and processes, flows of information, and basic\n\nprinciples in restoring the expenditure chain and preparing cash flow forecasts. For instance,\n\nUGEs should be trained to make appropriate use of the quarterly allotment or commitment\n\nceilings and do not pretend cash payments would follow within four days, as nowadays.\n\n35. Training and seminars should also be organized for suppliers. The commitment note\n\nissued by e-SISTAFE should start being used to provide suppliers with a certificate or proof of\n\nfuture payment. Suppliers should be trained to stop requesting payments prior to the delivery of\n\ngoods and services, and to only deliver them after commitments are made in the system.\n\n36. Because of the changes in roles and responsibilities in the expenditure process,\n\nspecific and intensive training should also be provided to the Budget Directorate of the MEF and\n\nthe National Treasury on the revised core functions.\n\n37. Segregation of duties at budget unit level is clearly defined but not yet effective in\n\npractice. Behavior of staff and appropriation of rules and principles remains a concern. Any user\n\nof e-SISTAFE is requested by a permanent message to avoid using the password of any\n\ncolleague. The simultaneous registration of Commitment, Verification and Payment is made\n\npossible insofar a single agent can use password and e-profile of the committing officer ( _agente_\n\n_de cabimentação_ ), the verification officer ( _agente de liquidação_ ), and the compliance officer\n\n( _agent de control interno_ ). Staff are also used to maintain parallel records.\n\n38. Some improvements should be done to the infrastructure which supports e-\n\nSISTAFE to ensure that spending units can have regular access from their local offices.", "text_characters": 2219}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "17\n\n\nWhen access to the system is temporary lost, the agents involved in the budget execution\n\nprocess must travel to another UGE to record their transactions in e-SISTAFE. For practical\n\nreasons, this might end up in all three expenditure phases being recorded simultaneously.\n\n**F.** **Action plan for restoring the expenditure chain**\n\n**Background**\n\nThe phases of the expenditure currently are recorded simultaneously, which is not compliant with\nthe fiscal law. There is little information and control over commitments, expenditure, and arrears.\n\n**Key measures**\n\n\n\n\n- Review/complete the regulatory framework needed to restore the expenditure chain; [14]\n\n\n\n\n- Set quarterly allotments or ceilings for commitments, based on revenue forecasts;\n\n\n\n\n- Immediately restore the commitment and verification phases in e-SISTAFE;\n\n\n\n\n- Make the use of the commitment note mandatory;\n\n\n\n\n- Raise awareness through seminars on the need to restore the normal expenditure process;\n\n\n\n\n- Gradually enforce the commitment control, starting from the UGEs at central level, with\n\n\n\nsupport from IGF and TA.\n\n\n\n**Institutional arrangements**\n\nThe National Directorate of Treasury will need to coordinate with CEDSIF to ensure availability of\nsupport and ensure the implementation process goes smoothly. The Budget Directorate, the\nUGEs and the IGF/TA should contribute to this process.\n\n**Risks and mitigation measures**\n\nThe restoration of the expenditure phases will require extensive capacity development. While the\nchain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and\nverifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP)\nand reported in fiscal reports. Communicating to the private sector is important to bring the\nawareness on how important the effective control of public expenditure is.\n\n\n14 The initial Budget Execution Manual developed after the adoption of the SISTAFE Law included chapters on\n\nfinancial programming and the administrative procedures for the different phases of the expenditure chain,\nincluding apportionment, commitment and verifications. These chapters should be reintroduced.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "17\n\nWhen access to the system is temporary lost, the agents involved in the budget execution\n\nprocess must travel to another UGE to record their transactions in e-SISTAFE. For practical\n\nreasons, this might end up in all three expenditure phases being recorded simultaneously.\n\nF. Action plan for restoring the expenditure chain\n\nBackground\n\nThe phases of the expenditure currently are recorded simultaneously, which is not compliant with\nthe fiscal law. There is little information and control over commitments, expenditure, and arrears.\n\nKey measures\n\n- Review/complete the regulatory framework needed to restore the expenditure chain; [14]\n\n- Set quarterly allotments or ceilings for commitments, based on revenue forecasts;\n\n- Immediately restore the commitment and verification phases in e-SISTAFE;\n\n- Make the use of the commitment note mandatory;\n\n- Raise awareness through seminars on the need to restore the normal expenditure process;\n\n- Gradually enforce the commitment control, starting from the UGEs at central level, with\n\nsupport from IGF and TA.\n\nInstitutional arrangements\n\nThe National Directorate of Treasury will need to coordinate with CEDSIF to ensure availability of\nsupport and ensure the implementation process goes smoothly. The Budget Directorate, the\nUGEs and the IGF/TA should contribute to this process.\n\nRisks and mitigation measures\n\nThe restoration of the expenditure phases will require extensive capacity development. While the\nchain of the expenditure is being reestablished in the system, information on commitments and\nverifications should be manually submitted by the UGBs to the accounting directorate (DNCP)\nand reported in fiscal reports. Communicating to the private sector is important to bring the\nawareness on how important the effective control of public expenditure is.\n\n14 The initial Budget Execution Manual developed after the adoption of the SISTAFE Law included chapters on\n\nfinancial programming and the administrative procedures for the different phases of the expenditure chain,\nincluding apportionment, commitment and verifications. These chapters should be reintroduced.", "text_characters": 1802}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table2. Schedule for restoring the expenditure chain**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Action|Deadline|Technical Assistance|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Action 1:** Issue the decree to instore the apportionment phase with quarterly commitment ceilings, and make real-time
recording of commitment and verification of expenditures mandatory for all units operating within the e-SISTAFE
|By October 2018
|X
|\n|**Action 2:**Make the necessary changes in e-SISTAFE (MEX) to support the revised expenditure process
|By October 2018
|X
|\n|**Action 3:** Training on revised budget execution processes
|From November
2018 -
Continuous
|X
|\n|**Action 4:** Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers
|By end 2018
|
|\n|**Action 5:** Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of the 2019 budget
|From January
2019
|
|\n|**Action 6:** UGEs record commitments in e-SISTAFE upon contracting
|From January
2019
|
|\n|**Action 7:** UGEs record verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law
|From January
2019
|
|\n|**Action 8:** Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored
|From March 2019
Continuous
|
|\n|**Action 9:** Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs:
in some provinces
in all provinces
|
From June 2019
From January
2020
|
|\n|**Action 10:** Revise the budget execution manual to restore the expenditure chain as legally defined in SISTAFE law
|By end 2019
|X
|\n|**Action 11:** Continue to develop MPE and extend its use|2019 - 2020||", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [38.38153839111328, 107.46000671386719, 753.7384033203125, 473.58001708984375], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table2. Schedule for restoring the expenditure chain\n\n Action Deadline Technical Assistance \n\n Action 1: Issue the decree to instore the apportionment phase with quarterly commitment ceilings, and make real-time recording of commitment and verification of expenditures mandatory for all units operating within the e-SISTAFE By October 2018 X \n Action 2:Make the necessary changes in e-SISTAFE (MEX) to support the revised expenditure process By October 2018 X \n Action 3: Training on revised budget execution processes From November 2018 - Continuous X \n Action 4: Make mandatory the commitment note issued by e-SISTAFE and inform suppliers By end 2018 \n Action 5: Set quarterly allotments/ceilings for commitments for the implementation of the 2019 budget From January 2019 \n Action 6: UGEs record commitments in e-SISTAFE upon contracting From January 2019 \n Action 7: UGEs record verifications in e-SISTAFE upon receiving suppliers' invoices, per legal provisions set in SISTAFE Law From January 2019 \n Action 8: Strengthen internal audit to control that expenditure chain is effectively restored From March 2019 Continuous \n Action 9: Implement commitment control pilots in a selected set of UGBs: in some provinces in all provinces From June 2019 From January 2020 \n Action 10: Revise the budget execution manual to restore the expenditure chain as legally defined in SISTAFE law By end 2019 X \n Action 11: Continue to develop MPE and extend its use 2019 - 2020", "text_characters": 1221}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **II. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING**\n\n**A.** **Objectives of financial programming**\n\n**39.** **Financial programming is a key enabler of orderly execution of the budget.** The\nobjective of cash management is to ensure that the government has sufficient liquidity at all\ntimes to pay obligations as they fall due, without the need to ration cash (and thereby interrupt\npredictable execution of the budget) and without accumulating arrears. Whatever the level of\nrevenue, there are times during the year when there are mismatches between cash inflows and\ncash outflows, resulting in short-term cash surpluses or, more problematically for budget\nexecution, short-term cash deficits. Cash planning facilitates pro-active management of the cash\nbalance, to eliminate (or mitigate) temporary cash deficits. Banking arrangements that centralize\nthe government’s liquidity within the treasury single account (CUT) are critical for optimizing\nliquidity by reducing the possibility of idle cash.\n\n**B.** **Main issues in Mozambique**\n\n**40.** **The principal tools for cash planning have been the “cash budget” and the “cash**\n**plan”.** At the start of the fiscal year, the Treasury prepares the cash budget, which decomposes\nthe approved budget by month. It is a largely “static” document as it undergoes no other\namendments during the year, than changes in revenue forecasts. In addition, each month the\nTreasury prepares the cash plan, which is a cash flow projection for the coming month, broken\ndown by week. It incorporates recent information on revenue receipts, the requirements of the\nexecuting units reported in e-SISTAFE, and new information from sectors. These plans, which are\npassed to the Bank of Mozambique, are discussed at a weekly meeting chaired by the Minister at\nwhich decisions are made on the financial quotas to be released to UGEs in the week ahead.\n\n\n**41.** **The cash budget and the cash plan are important tools, but they have weaknesses.**\nThe cash budget is a largely static document and undergoes few amendments during the year,\nunless there are material changes in revenue forecasts. The short forecast horizon of the cash\nplan limits its usefulness as a tool for anticipating likely or possible cash deficits that may occur\nseveral months later in the fiscal year, so that action may be taken, well in advance, to correct\nthose deficits through short-term debt issuance or, if necessary, to adjust expenditure execution\nin an orderly manner. Moreover, large variances between forecasts and actual outturns are not\nsystematically investigated to determine whether they reflect unexpected timing differences or\nare more permanent in nature.\n\n\n**42.** **The cash budget and the cash plan have been, in practice, a cash rationing tool, not**\n**a cash management tool.** The monthly cash plans are not unconstrained forecasts. The revenue\ncomponent is an exception; it is based on an updated projection from the revenue\nadministration. The expenditure data, however, are functioning as requests from UGEs for release", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0031, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "II. IMPROVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING\n\nA. Objectives of financial programming\n\n39. Financial programming is a key enabler of orderly execution of the budget. The\nobjective of cash management is to ensure that the government has sufficient liquidity at all\ntimes to pay obligations as they fall due, without the need to ration cash (and thereby interrupt\npredictable execution of the budget) and without accumulating arrears. Whatever the level of\nrevenue, there are times during the year when there are mismatches between cash inflows and\ncash outflows, resulting in short-term cash surpluses or, more problematically for budget\nexecution, short-term cash deficits. Cash planning facilitates pro-active management of the cash\nbalance, to eliminate (or mitigate) temporary cash deficits. Banking arrangements that centralize\nthe government’s liquidity within the treasury single account (CUT) are critical for optimizing\nliquidity by reducing the possibility of idle cash.\n\nB. Main issues in Mozambique\n\n40. The principal tools for cash planning have been the “cash budget” and the “cash\nplan”. At the start of the fiscal year, the Treasury prepares the cash budget, which decomposes\nthe approved budget by month. It is a largely “static” document as it undergoes no other\namendments during the year, than changes in revenue forecasts. In addition, each month the\nTreasury prepares the cash plan, which is a cash flow projection for the coming month, broken\ndown by week. It incorporates recent information on revenue receipts, the requirements of the\nexecuting units reported in e-SISTAFE, and new information from sectors. These plans, which are\npassed to the Bank of Mozambique, are discussed at a weekly meeting chaired by the Minister at\nwhich decisions are made on the financial quotas to be released to UGEs in the week ahead.\n\n41. The cash budget and the cash plan are important tools, but they have weaknesses.\nThe cash budget is a largely static document and undergoes few amendments during the year,\nunless there are material changes in revenue forecasts. The short forecast horizon of the cash\nplan limits its usefulness as a tool for anticipating likely or possible cash deficits that may occur\nseveral months later in the fiscal year, so that action may be taken, well in advance, to correct\nthose deficits through short-term debt issuance or, if necessary, to adjust expenditure execution\nin an orderly manner. Moreover, large variances between forecasts and actual outturns are not\nsystematically investigated to determine whether they reflect unexpected timing differences or\nare more permanent in nature.\n\n42. The cash budget and the cash plan have been, in practice, a cash rationing tool, not\na cash management tool. The monthly cash plans are not unconstrained forecasts. The revenue\ncomponent is an exception; it is based on an updated projection from the revenue\nadministration. The expenditure data, however, are functioning as requests from UGEs for release", "text_characters": 2509}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "20\n\n\nof authority; they are not forecasts. The Treasury then decides how much to release depending\non the expected adequacy of the cash reserves. Although this arrangement works to manage the\nrisk of a cash shortfall, it places the Treasury in the position of taking decisions on which\nexpenditure to hold back or delay—a responsibility more appropriately of budget management\nauthorities. The current practice also reduces the incentive for UGEs to plan their financial\noperations, and it risks creating unnecessary arrears or supply disruption.\n\n\n**43.** **The Treasury does not currently actively manage the government’s aggregate cash**\n**balance.** It does not borrow or lend in the money market to maintain a steady balance in the\nCUT. The government is able to borrow short-term on an occasional basis when it forecasts an\nemerging cash flow constraint, but it does so by accepting liability for some of the treasury bills\nissued by the Bank of Mozambique for monetary policy purposes.\n\n\n**44.** **Progress continues to be made in rationalizing the government’s banking**\n**arrangements.** Those arrangements are built around a main account at the Bank of\nMozambique, the CUT, with links to other accounts at both the central bank and commercial\nbanks. Delays in sweeping balances in transit and other accounts into the CUT reduce the\nefficiency of cash management. In many cases, this does not occur until the end of the month,\nbut the Treasury monitors the accounts and may request that larger sums be swept more\npromptly. [15] Liquidity lying outside the CUT—especially problematic when outside the central\nbank in commercial banks—is being reduced through the ongoing closure of inactive or\nunnecessary accounts. Importantly, in February 2018, Ministerial Diploma 23/2018 was issued to\nreinforce management of the government’s banking accounts, including ensuring that Treasury is\na co-signatory for any accounts operated by execution units and is able to obtain, without\nhindrance, information on activity in those accounts.\n\n**C.** **Defining the new process**\n\n**45.** **Under this strategy, the Treasury will adopt a pro-active approach to ensuring that**\n**the government has sufficient liquidity to execute the budget as planned.** Restricting\nbudget execution—in other words, cash rationing—should come in last resort, not first, once\nother measures to accommodate short-term mismatches in cash inflows and outflows have been\nexhausted. This would involve adjusting dynamically the volume of short-term financing that the\ngovernment obtains through treasury bill issuance. Issuance would be augmented (beyond what\nwas originally programmed) during periods when the cash balance would otherwise fall into\ndeficit and, conversely, would be reduced during periods when the cash balance would otherwise\nbe unduly excessive.\n\n\n15 One source of delay is revenue awaiting classification, linking the taxpayer's deposit to the relevant tax. The\ncumulative balances may at times be substantial. Nonetheless, in principle there need not be any delay in\ntransferring such revenue to the CUT, as classifying and recording the revenue can be independent of the\nmovement of cash into the CUT.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "20\n\nof authority; they are not forecasts. The Treasury then decides how much to release depending\non the expected adequacy of the cash reserves. Although this arrangement works to manage the\nrisk of a cash shortfall, it places the Treasury in the position of taking decisions on which\nexpenditure to hold back or delay—a responsibility more appropriately of budget management\nauthorities. The current practice also reduces the incentive for UGEs to plan their financial\noperations, and it risks creating unnecessary arrears or supply disruption.\n\n43. The Treasury does not currently actively manage the government’s aggregate cash\nbalance. It does not borrow or lend in the money market to maintain a steady balance in the\nCUT. The government is able to borrow short-term on an occasional basis when it forecasts an\nemerging cash flow constraint, but it does so by accepting liability for some of the treasury bills\nissued by the Bank of Mozambique for monetary policy purposes.\n\n44. Progress continues to be made in rationalizing the government’s banking\narrangements. Those arrangements are built around a main account at the Bank of\nMozambique, the CUT, with links to other accounts at both the central bank and commercial\nbanks. Delays in sweeping balances in transit and other accounts into the CUT reduce the\nefficiency of cash management. In many cases, this does not occur until the end of the month,\nbut the Treasury monitors the accounts and may request that larger sums be swept more\npromptly. [15] Liquidity lying outside the CUT—especially problematic when outside the central\nbank in commercial banks—is being reduced through the ongoing closure of inactive or\nunnecessary accounts. Importantly, in February 2018, Ministerial Diploma 23/2018 was issued to\nreinforce management of the government’s banking accounts, including ensuring that Treasury is\na co-signatory for any accounts operated by execution units and is able to obtain, without\nhindrance, information on activity in those accounts.\n\nC. Defining the new process\n\n45. Under this strategy, the Treasury will adopt a pro-active approach to ensuring that\nthe government has sufficient liquidity to execute the budget as planned. Restricting\nbudget execution—in other words, cash rationing—should come in last resort, not first, once\nother measures to accommodate short-term mismatches in cash inflows and outflows have been\nexhausted. This would involve adjusting dynamically the volume of short-term financing that the\ngovernment obtains through treasury bill issuance. Issuance would be augmented (beyond what\nwas originally programmed) during periods when the cash balance would otherwise fall into\ndeficit and, conversely, would be reduced during periods when the cash balance would otherwise\nbe unduly excessive.\n\n15 One source of delay is revenue awaiting classification, linking the taxpayer's deposit to the relevant tax. The\ncumulative balances may at times be substantial. Nonetheless, in principle there need not be any delay in\ntransferring such revenue to the CUT, as classifying and recording the revenue can be independent of the\nmovement of cash into the CUT.", "text_characters": 2659}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "21\n\n\n**46.** **Under this pro-active approach, good financial programming becomes essential.**\nCash flow forecasts are necessary for devising strategies to smooth the cash flow profile and,\nthus, the profile of liquidity at hand. Given that it may not be possible in practice to manage\nfluctuations in the cash balance entirely through dynamic issuance of treasury bills, cash flow\nforecasting can contribute to making cash rationing less disruptive. By planning ahead, budget\nmanagement authorities would be able to make more informed decisions as to which\nspending—sector versus sector, and within each sector—to constrain and which to allow to\nproceed and thereby better protect overall budgetary priorities.\n\n\n**47.** **To be useful for informing decision-making, the cash plans would need to have**\n**several characteristics.** The provisions in Law 09/2002 establishing the public financial\nmanagement system and also in Ministerial Diploma 169/2007 [16] are consistent with this strategy.\n\n\n**48.** **The forecast horizon must be sufficiently long and the timestep short.** The horizon\nwould extend out a minimum of six months and ideally 12 months (or longer). As each month\npasses, the plans would be extended out another month, including into the next fiscal year. The\nplans would be of expected cash flows per week out at least three months and per month\nbeyond three months. A weekly timestep out six months, however, would be preferable.\n\n\n**49.** **The cash plans must be reliable.** The Treasury should prepare them, using both topdown and bottom-up information. Many cash flows are likely to have a regular monthly pattern\n(such as payment of salaries and pensions, as well as transfers to lower levels of government or\nstatutory agencies outside the budget) or are already known by the Treasury (such as debt\nservice). The Treasury should hence be able to forecast those flows without active input from\nUGEs. Other cash flows are more volatile (such as payments for some goods and services, as well\nas capital spending). To estimate those flows, the Treasury depends on data from UGEs, as they\nare best placed to know when flows are likely to, and optimally will, occur. To that end, the\nTreasury need to maintain network of contacts, both voice and electronic, at the technical level,\nwith the main revenue and spending entities, which it may call on both to develop the cash plans\nand to monitor actual flows. It should not be dependent solely on formal information-exchange\nmechanisms to obtain the necessary data.\n\n\n**50.** **The cash plans must be updated frequently.** Updates should take place at least\nmonthly, but fortnightly or even weekly would be preferable. In addition, the Treasury must\nalways be able to know the precise timing of any major cash flows. To that end, UGEs could be\nrequired to provide advance notification of at least a week of individual payments that exceed a\ncertain (high) threshold value. In addition, the cash budget should be updated on a quarterly\nbasis as the fiscal year progresses.\n\n\n16 Ministerial Diploma 169/2007 approved the first Budget Execution Manual under SISTAFE law. Further updates\n\nof this manual are not consistent with this strategy for restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial\nprograming.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "21\n\n46. Under this pro-active approach, good financial programming becomes essential.\nCash flow forecasts are necessary for devising strategies to smooth the cash flow profile and,\nthus, the profile of liquidity at hand. Given that it may not be possible in practice to manage\nfluctuations in the cash balance entirely through dynamic issuance of treasury bills, cash flow\nforecasting can contribute to making cash rationing less disruptive. By planning ahead, budget\nmanagement authorities would be able to make more informed decisions as to which\nspending—sector versus sector, and within each sector—to constrain and which to allow to\nproceed and thereby better protect overall budgetary priorities.\n\n47. To be useful for informing decision-making, the cash plans would need to have\nseveral characteristics. The provisions in Law 09/2002 establishing the public financial\nmanagement system and also in Ministerial Diploma 169/2007 [16] are consistent with this strategy.\n\n48. The forecast horizon must be sufficiently long and the timestep short. The horizon\nwould extend out a minimum of six months and ideally 12 months (or longer). As each month\npasses, the plans would be extended out another month, including into the next fiscal year. The\nplans would be of expected cash flows per week out at least three months and per month\nbeyond three months. A weekly timestep out six months, however, would be preferable.\n\n49. The cash plans must be reliable. The Treasury should prepare them, using both topdown and bottom-up information. Many cash flows are likely to have a regular monthly pattern\n(such as payment of salaries and pensions, as well as transfers to lower levels of government or\nstatutory agencies outside the budget) or are already known by the Treasury (such as debt\nservice). The Treasury should hence be able to forecast those flows without active input from\nUGEs. Other cash flows are more volatile (such as payments for some goods and services, as well\nas capital spending). To estimate those flows, the Treasury depends on data from UGEs, as they\nare best placed to know when flows are likely to, and optimally will, occur. To that end, the\nTreasury need to maintain network of contacts, both voice and electronic, at the technical level,\nwith the main revenue and spending entities, which it may call on both to develop the cash plans\nand to monitor actual flows. It should not be dependent solely on formal information-exchange\nmechanisms to obtain the necessary data.\n\n50. The cash plans must be updated frequently. Updates should take place at least\nmonthly, but fortnightly or even weekly would be preferable. In addition, the Treasury must\nalways be able to know the precise timing of any major cash flows. To that end, UGEs could be\nrequired to provide advance notification of at least a week of individual payments that exceed a\ncertain (high) threshold value. In addition, the cash budget should be updated on a quarterly\nbasis as the fiscal year progresses.\n\n16 Ministerial Diploma 169/2007 approved the first Budget Execution Manual under SISTAFE law. Further updates\n\nof this manual are not consistent with this strategy for restoring the expenditure chain and improving financial\nprograming.", "text_characters": 2704}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "22\n\n\n**51.** **Variances between forecasts and actual outturns should be investigated with**\n**executing units.** It is critical to determine as soon as possible whether divergences from the\nforecasts are only temporary and will correct themselves in the periods ahead. If variances arise\nfrom more permanent shocks, however, a policy response is required, and decisions as to\nreducing expenditure, raising revenue, or tolerating a higher fiscal deficit are taken by budget\nmanagement authorities. The emphasis should be on variances that exceed a nominal threshold\nvalue (regardless of their size in percentage terms), as they are the ones most disruptive to a\npredictable profile for government’s liquidity and to orderly execution of the budget. Variances\nthat exceed a percentage threshold, however, should also be discussed with UGEs, as they may\npoint to weaknesses in their financial and operational management capacities.\n\n\n**52.** **It is not necessary to prepare the cash plans within e-SISTAFE; an Excel-based**\n**spreadsheet model is sufficient.** It is not necessary the cash plans be of accounting quality or\nexhaustively cover all UGEs or all budget line items; what matters is that they capture the flows\nthat are most material, in terms of size, variability, and unpredictability. It is likely that a modest\nnumber of UGEs, as well as only a few budget line items, account for over 80 percent of all flows.\nOther flows can be accounted for in the model based on uncomplicated assumptions. Moreover,\nthe data can be easily manipulated in Excel to explore different scenarios. To obtain the\nnecessary bottom-up inputs for the model—in contrast to those flows estimated using a topdown approach—the Treasury needs to be able to extract from e-SISTAFE data that UGEs have\nloaded in respect of commitments recorded in real time. These data from e-SISTAFE could be\ncompared with data supplied by UGEs using a uniform Excel-based collection template\nperiodically circulated by the Treasury. All cash plans need to be retained, not just overridden\nwith each update, to allow analysis of forecast performance.\n\n\n**53.** **Full implementation of a pro-active approach to managing the government’s**\n**liquidity would be likely to happen gradually, as it would depend on factors beyond just**\n**good financial planning.** There would need to be strong coordination at both the operational\nand the strategic policy level between cash management and debt management. The domestic\nfinancial market would need to be able to accommodate a more variable profile of treasury bill\nissuance in terms of volumes and tenors. There may also be consequences for the\nimplementation of monetary policy, so periodic consultation with the Bank of Mozambique\nwould be important. Likewise, maintaining a larger cash buffer within the CUT so as to absorb\ntemporary shocks would help to facilitate orderly execution of the budget. Importantly, the\n“reaction lag” for determining the appropriate policy response when cash flow shocks are likely\nto be permanent needs to be short, so there must be in place a mechanism for altering budget\nmanagement authorities of those shocks.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "22\n\n51. Variances between forecasts and actual outturns should be investigated with\nexecuting units. It is critical to determine as soon as possible whether divergences from the\nforecasts are only temporary and will correct themselves in the periods ahead. If variances arise\nfrom more permanent shocks, however, a policy response is required, and decisions as to\nreducing expenditure, raising revenue, or tolerating a higher fiscal deficit are taken by budget\nmanagement authorities. The emphasis should be on variances that exceed a nominal threshold\nvalue (regardless of their size in percentage terms), as they are the ones most disruptive to a\npredictable profile for government’s liquidity and to orderly execution of the budget. Variances\nthat exceed a percentage threshold, however, should also be discussed with UGEs, as they may\npoint to weaknesses in their financial and operational management capacities.\n\n52. It is not necessary to prepare the cash plans within e-SISTAFE; an Excel-based\nspreadsheet model is sufficient. It is not necessary the cash plans be of accounting quality or\nexhaustively cover all UGEs or all budget line items; what matters is that they capture the flows\nthat are most material, in terms of size, variability, and unpredictability. It is likely that a modest\nnumber of UGEs, as well as only a few budget line items, account for over 80 percent of all flows.\nOther flows can be accounted for in the model based on uncomplicated assumptions. Moreover,\nthe data can be easily manipulated in Excel to explore different scenarios. To obtain the\nnecessary bottom-up inputs for the model—in contrast to those flows estimated using a topdown approach—the Treasury needs to be able to extract from e-SISTAFE data that UGEs have\nloaded in respect of commitments recorded in real time. These data from e-SISTAFE could be\ncompared with data supplied by UGEs using a uniform Excel-based collection template\nperiodically circulated by the Treasury. All cash plans need to be retained, not just overridden\nwith each update, to allow analysis of forecast performance.\n\n53. Full implementation of a pro-active approach to managing the government’s\nliquidity would be likely to happen gradually, as it would depend on factors beyond just\ngood financial planning. There would need to be strong coordination at both the operational\nand the strategic policy level between cash management and debt management. The domestic\nfinancial market would need to be able to accommodate a more variable profile of treasury bill\nissuance in terms of volumes and tenors. There may also be consequences for the\nimplementation of monetary policy, so periodic consultation with the Bank of Mozambique\nwould be important. Likewise, maintaining a larger cash buffer within the CUT so as to absorb\ntemporary shocks would help to facilitate orderly execution of the budget. Importantly, the\n“reaction lag” for determining the appropriate policy response when cash flow shocks are likely\nto be permanent needs to be short, so there must be in place a mechanism for altering budget\nmanagement authorities of those shocks.", "text_characters": 2625}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 3. Main features of the revised financial programming process**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Task|Action|Responsibility17|Flows of Information|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
**Preparation of cash budget**
(annually)
|
Annual cash budget is prepared, as per current practice
|
Treasury
|
Data from e-SISTAFE; estimates by the Treasury in
consultation with Revenue Authority, larger spending
units and other relevant counterparts
|\n|**Update of cash budget**
(quarterly)
|Cash budget is updated for the remainder of the fiscal year, taking
account of actual outturns to-date and revised estimates of
expenditure and revenue
|Treasury
|
Data from e-SISTAFE; top-down estimates prepared by
the Treasury; bottom-up estimates prepared by UGEs
for goods, services, and capital spending
|\n|**Preparation of cash plan** (at
least monthly)
|Cash plan is prepared, with a horizon of at least six (ideally, 12)
months and a weekly timestep out at least three (ideally, six) months
and a monthly timestep thereafter
|Treasury
|Treasury
|\n|**Analysis of variances between**
**forecasts and outturns** (at least
monthly)
|Variances that exceed a nominal threshold are systematically
investigated to determine whether they are temporary or permanent
|Treasury and UGEs
|Previous cash plan(s); data downloaded from e-SISTAFE;
other information from UGEs
|\n|**Analysis of variances between**
**forecasts and outturns** (at least
monthly)
|Variances that exceed a percentage value are examined
|Treasury and UGEs
|Treasury and UGEs
|\n|**Analysis of variances between**
**forecasts and outturns** (at least
monthly)
|Permanent cash flow shocks are raised with budget management
authorities for their consideration
|Treasury, UGEs,
and Budget
|Previous cash plan(s); data from e-SISTAFE; analyses by
Treasury; other data from UGEs
|\n|**Update of cash plans** (at least
monthly)
|Cash plan is updated and extended another month (including into the
following fiscal year, when necessary), taking account of actual
outturns to-date and revised estimates of expenditure and revenue
|Treasury
|Previous cash plan(s); data from e-SISTAFE; top-down
estimates prepared by the Treasury; bottom-up
estimates prepared by UGEs for goods, services, and
capital spending
|\n|**Notification of large payments**
(weekly)
|Treasury is notified of all individual payments that exceed a threshold
value
|UGEs
|Payment orders prepared by UGEs
|\n|**Management of cash balance**
(at least monthly)
|Volumes and tenors of treasury bill issuance are adjusted in order to
smooth the aggregate cash balance, consistent with market
conditions and monetary policy considerations|Treasury|Cash plan; information on market conditions;
consultation with the Bank of Mozambique|\n\n\n\n17 In this table, UGEs refers to the largest UGEs that collectively account for over 80 percent of all expenditure and revenue.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [22.53818130493164, 93.5514144897461, 774.1417846679688, 449.8080139160156], "columns": 4, "rows": 10}], "text": "Table 3. Main features of the revised financial programming process\n\n Task Action Responsibility17 Flows of Information \n\n Preparation of cash budget (annually) Annual cash budget is prepared, as per current practice Treasury Data from e-SISTAFE; estimates by the Treasury in consultation with Revenue Authority, larger spending units and other relevant counterparts \n Update of cash budget (quarterly) Cash budget is updated for the remainder of the fiscal year, taking account of actual outturns to-date and revised estimates of expenditure and revenue Treasury Data from e-SISTAFE; top-down estimates prepared by the Treasury; bottom-up estimates prepared by UGEs for goods, services, and capital spending \n Preparation of cash plan (at least monthly) Cash plan is prepared, with a horizon of at least six (ideally, 12) months and a weekly timestep out at least three (ideally, six) months and a monthly timestep thereafter Treasury Treasury \n Analysis of variances between forecasts and outturns (at least monthly) Variances that exceed a nominal threshold are systematically investigated to determine whether they are temporary or permanent Treasury and UGEs Previous cash plan(s); data downloaded from e-SISTAFE; other information from UGEs \n Analysis of variances between forecasts and outturns (at least monthly) Variances that exceed a percentage value are examined Treasury and UGEs Treasury and UGEs \n Analysis of variances between forecasts and outturns (at least monthly) Permanent cash flow shocks are raised with budget management authorities for their consideration Treasury, UGEs, and Budget Previous cash plan(s); data from e-SISTAFE; analyses by Treasury; other data from UGEs \n Update of cash plans (at least monthly) Cash plan is updated and extended another month (including into the following fiscal year, when necessary), taking account of actual outturns to-date and revised estimates of expenditure and revenue Treasury Previous cash plan(s); data from e-SISTAFE; top-down estimates prepared by the Treasury; bottom-up estimates prepared by UGEs for goods, services, and capital spending \n Notification of large payments (weekly) Treasury is notified of all individual payments that exceed a threshold value UGEs Payment orders prepared by UGEs \n Management of cash balance (at least monthly) Volumes and tenors of treasury bill issuance are adjusted in order to smooth the aggregate cash balance, consistent with market conditions and monetary policy considerations Treasury Cash plan; information on market conditions; consultation with the Bank of Mozambique \n\n17 In this table, UGEs refers to the largest UGEs that collectively account for over 80 percent of all expenditure and revenue.", "text_characters": 2301}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**D.** **Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement**\n\n**54.** **Systems development and enhancement requirements are likely to be modest.** No\nnew modules in e-SISTAFE need to be developed to enable better financial programming. Some\nwork may be needed to enable the Treasury to easily extract data from e-SISTAFE for the\npurpose of populating the cash planning model and analyzing variances between forecasts and\nactual outturns.\n\n**E.** **Strengthening capacities**\n\n**55.** **Capacity will need to be strengthened within the Treasury and within the UGEs that**\n**account for the largest share of expenditure.** Within the Treasury, capacity-building should\nfocus on (i) developing the cash planning model; (ii) developing a uniform template for collecting\ndata from UGEs; (iii) drafting guidance for UGEs; (iv) preparing top-down estimates for the\nmodel; and (v) analyzing variances in order to improve the quality of forecasts. Within UGEs,\ncapacity-building should focus on (i) implementing the guidance from the Treasury;\n(ii) improving the quality of forecasts of cash flows for goods and services, as well as for capital\nexpenditure; and (iii) analyzing variances in order to improve the quality of forecasts.\n\n\n**56.** **DfID is prepared to support the authorities in strengthening financial**\n**programming.** To that end, the terms of reference for technical assistance to be provided by\nexternal consultants have been developed in collaboration with the authorities. Further\ndiscussions would be needed after this mission to make these terms of reference fully consistent\nwith the new framework, and set reasonable coverage and timeframe.\n\n**F.** **Action plan for improving financial programming**\n\n**57.** **The action plan is summarized in Table 4.**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. Specific IFMIS issues and proposals for enhancement\n\n54. Systems development and enhancement requirements are likely to be modest. No\nnew modules in e-SISTAFE need to be developed to enable better financial programming. Some\nwork may be needed to enable the Treasury to easily extract data from e-SISTAFE for the\npurpose of populating the cash planning model and analyzing variances between forecasts and\nactual outturns.\n\nE. Strengthening capacities\n\n55. Capacity will need to be strengthened within the Treasury and within the UGEs that\naccount for the largest share of expenditure. Within the Treasury, capacity-building should\nfocus on (i) developing the cash planning model; (ii) developing a uniform template for collecting\ndata from UGEs; (iii) drafting guidance for UGEs; (iv) preparing top-down estimates for the\nmodel; and (v) analyzing variances in order to improve the quality of forecasts. Within UGEs,\ncapacity-building should focus on (i) implementing the guidance from the Treasury;\n(ii) improving the quality of forecasts of cash flows for goods and services, as well as for capital\nexpenditure; and (iii) analyzing variances in order to improve the quality of forecasts.\n\n56. DfID is prepared to support the authorities in strengthening financial\nprogramming. To that end, the terms of reference for technical assistance to be provided by\nexternal consultants have been developed in collaboration with the authorities. Further\ndiscussions would be needed after this mission to make these terms of reference fully consistent\nwith the new framework, and set reasonable coverage and timeframe.\n\nF. Action plan for improving financial programming\n\n57. The action plan is summarized in Table 4.", "text_characters": 1446}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table4. Schedule for improving financial programming**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Action18|Deadline|Technical
Assistance|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Action 1:** Prepare a circular (or other guidance note) describing the new approach to financial programming and
outlining the responsibilities of the Treasury, other units of the MEF, and UGEs|October 2018|X|\n|**Action 2:**Develop a uniform template for collecting cash flow forecasts from UGEs for goods, services, and capital
spending|November 2018|X|\n|**Action 3:** Develop an Excel-based cash planning model for compiling top-down estimates prepared by the Treasury
and bottom-up estimates supplied by UGEs|November 2018|X|\n|**Action 4:** Develop reports for analyzing variances between cash flow forecasts and actual outturns|November 2018|X|\n|**Action 5:** Develop any necessary report-generation or data-extraction functionality in e-SISTAFE to support the new
approach to financial programming|December 2018|X|\n|**Action 6:** Train UGEs in preparing cash flow estimates|December 2018
Continuous|X|\n|**Action 7:** Train the Treasury in preparing cash flow estimates and in operationalizing the new approach to financial
programming|December 2018
Continuous|X|\n|**Action 8:** Roll out the new approach to financial programming
|Ongoing, starting
January 2019||\n\n\n\n18 In this table, UGEs refers to the largest UGEs that collectively account for over 80 percent of all expenditure and revenue.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-025", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.21600341796875, 117.53999328613281, 724.2239990234375, 415.260009765625], "columns": 3, "rows": 9}], "text": "Table4. Schedule for improving financial programming\n\n Action18 Deadline Technical Assistance \n\n Action 1: Prepare a circular (or other guidance note) describing the new approach to financial programming and outlining the responsibilities of the Treasury, other units of the MEF, and UGEs October 2018 X \n Action 2:Develop a uniform template for collecting cash flow forecasts from UGEs for goods, services, and capital spending November 2018 X \n Action 3: Develop an Excel-based cash planning model for compiling top-down estimates prepared by the Treasury and bottom-up estimates supplied by UGEs November 2018 X \n Action 4: Develop reports for analyzing variances between cash flow forecasts and actual outturns November 2018 X \n Action 5: Develop any necessary report-generation or data-extraction functionality in e-SISTAFE to support the new approach to financial programming December 2018 X \n Action 6: Train UGEs in preparing cash flow estimates December 2018 Continuous X \n Action 7: Train the Treasury in preparing cash flow estimates and in operationalizing the new approach to financial programming December 2018 Continuous X \n Action 8: Roll out the new approach to financial programming Ongoing, starting January 2019 \n\n18 In this table, UGEs refers to the largest UGEs that collectively account for over 80 percent of all expenditure and revenue.", "text_characters": 1141}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd7eb16c1dc8d77fdc24fffe7c055e8397604bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087
+size 58403
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5c367adc033c843a856a3420a0ddab9430b7fb61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c1569c4ef225ed41d7b09e9a501645d25e627bcc6ab7dfb5b4679f141f57201d
+size 95076
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3321fbb15206e2f1505bca140bffbd3a7f5047d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3498525da019172b76ff0e0159a8abe44cec2cabb592f21c0eabd7504ba635ba
+size 1570
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d33491c06828d67115f1fa9477de3ec6b81ac54b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7e7f6a7a6e8a499b71c225ff4cefe946cde785afdee381cdd51bf875b3a800d3
+size 50005
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..186e8c395ed0b5ec1caafb6918e6835a746a1357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f1cff500f7cd9d1ad49776637059a20b750706dd25f7de94f8faac7a3e5208a1
+size 3912
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48b7c6816feaf68b2856d36b84329285f5503ccd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a1930862fa22f5b983cc8147140083d5f7dc57a7f0f6c4cbc1e9f77330bb7c46
+size 33133
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..06af15fa6cb1e469c2c8c3d61a04c2bdf8982834
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dfc10874da0194d6d56f3b3ca7efc941c7f608f7a66c4c75ae1400937e83ae4c
+size 21947
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..652ffd0ae2428c559f12f7abc88b7a54226b9e00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8a63775efae13729b3b194a25854b049702ef17f2f73504cf32d6d999f8fe6b7
+size 183339
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a68e7eb55effe025d1db13d12cbba45b0222332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bfd048d3c4a463ab5a75ab5e621134ada3ae5415e0dabec49f72e0d432de2c22
+size 32380
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0005-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0005-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c8a891e9955dff93b105d7f80d22e65df7d9d35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0005-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:60ad455a74366b153dabc03f6d5da3e8a0dbe534dd701a1eaec23451365e2e19
+size 2458
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..de86722c1a9d1bce8e23347fce2d924c9ef99282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:00e981d6ac007b8d74b54b85d3ba0319c0f7a2fe1b296ebdcad3fb4719d5ec2f
+size 21826
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9b5de40150b4a3b373e302f766985d75d6c0f3c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d74e6117af3eb41474b5ab501c1b1c683695c34f4287c1d7bba37f03560ea1da
+size 24825
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e12f66be36b97227168de9bc29f2259060064352
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:df8a3004b384ef8d63d4b24821e78b9006588261b248280e4887681227c3fb38
+size 45060
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0047-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0047-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..471236a51065207bade8df1ab25bf2914537e66b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0047-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3cb2786e9f6e601f1250e31c4756f7426fb8ac83ab345bb504903329a9bb6e30
+size 239169
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0053-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0053-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5eaaa0d15dfca3c8c155ccdf9d76ccccd85c32b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0053-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9c79af76e972dc4c604ef68854b30162c145eddfb0cb7a0b4bf68652c138fb8e
+size 29558
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..39cc6d9ea9da90117390b896f3e446e9e43d5715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-026",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Managing Fiscal Decentralization and Strengthening Cash Management",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-026.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "d5bd5d2ad2c7b7289c7a708ce274b7c77ecef6eb899a91f8704be9bbb08a0016",
+ "source_bytes": 1361728,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/13/republic-of-mozambique-managing-fiscal-decentralization-and-strengthening-cash-management-528134",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-22T00:02:25+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 20.804,
+ "page_count": 60,
+ "text_characters": 146398,
+ "table_count": 3,
+ "figure_count": 15,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "ocr_applied_pages": [],
+ "ocr_engine": null,
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Mozambique"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Managing Fiscal Decentralization and Strengthening Cash Management"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "PREFACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "I. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 40,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "II. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 52,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "III. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL AND MANAGING ARREARS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report - Managing Fiscal Decentralization and Strengthening Cash Management; IMF Country Report No. 23/26; June 2019",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Adobe InDesign CC 2014 (Macintosh)",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 11.0",
+ "creationDate": "D:20160308113011-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230113123904-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fc8529635959cd22bfe6a5f32e34a23f906da5ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2911 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/26**
+### **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — MANAGING**
+**FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND STRENGTHENING**
+**CASH MANAGEMENT**
+
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff
+
+
+
+team of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the
+
+
+
+time it was completed in June 2019.
+
+
+
+_**Disclaimer:**_
+_This report was prepared in 2019 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_
+_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+#### **Mozambique**
+##### **Managing Fiscal Decentralization and** **Strengthening Cash Management**
+
+
+Sailendra Pattanayak, Felipe Bardella, John Gardner, Elizabeth Kariuki, Juliana Pigey, and
+Esther Palacio
+
+
+**Technical Report**
+
+
+**June 2019**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by
+the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities
+of Mozambique (the "TA recipient") in response to their request for
+technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries
+thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and
+members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or
+instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to
+World Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and
+donors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically
+objects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the
+Dissemination of Technical Assistance Information—
+http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).
+Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof
+to parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities
+of the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance
+providers and donors with legitimate interest shall require the
+explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs
+Department.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS _____________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+
+**PREFACE __________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 7**
+
+
+**I. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION ___________________________________________________ 12**
+A. Introduction and Background _________________________________________________________________ 12
+B. Current Budget and Financial Execution Processes and Systems ______________________________ 13
+C. Overall Strategic Context and Setting the Stage _______________________________________________ 15
+D. Establishing a PFM Framework and Legal Landscape for Provinces ___________________________ 17
+E. Provincial Responsibilities _____________________________________________________________________ 27
+F. Provincial Resources – Transfers from the State _______________________________________________ 30
+G. Provincial Resources – Own Source Revenues _________________________________________________ 35
+H. Transitional Approach for Fiscal Decentralization Law ________________________________________ 36
+
+
+**II. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL _________________ 38**
+A. Introduction ___________________________________________________________________________________ 38
+B. Budget Execution Reform ______________________________________________________________________ 39
+C. Active Cash Management Operations _________________________________________________________ 47
+D. Summary of Required Activities _______________________________________________________________ 49
+E. Summary of Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 49
+
+
+**III. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL AND MANAGING ARREARS ________________ 50**
+A. Controlling Wage Bill Expenditure _____________________________________________________________ 50
+B. Managing Historical and New Arrears _________________________________________________________ 52
+C. Summary of Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 54
+
+**BOXES**
+1.1. Potential Functions for Provinces and Districts ______________________________________________ 28
+1.2. Comments on Initial Proposals for Decentralization in Education Sector ____________________ 29
+1.3. International Lessons Learned: Setting the Size of the Transfer Pool ________________________ 33
+1.4. Criteria for the Design of Fiscal Transfers ____________________________________________________ 34
+
+**FIGURES**
+1.1. Structure of the Education Budget by Level of Implementation _____________________________ 14
+1.2. Public Financial Management Cycle _________________________________________________________ 20
+2.1. Building Cash Flow Forecasts ________________________________________________________________ 45
+3.1. Mozambique’s Estimated Wage Bill in 2019 Compared to Other Low-Income Countries in
+the Region _______________________________________________________________________________________ 51
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+**TABLE**
+1. Summary of Key Recommendations ___________________________________________________________ 10
+
+**ANNEXES**
+I. Example of Types of Expenditure Functions for Regional/Provincial Level of Decentralized
+Governance ______________________________________________________________________________________ 55
+II. Sample Terms of Reference for a Cash Management Committee _____________________________ 56
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+###### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**
+
+AL Autarquias locais and local authorities ( _autarquias locais)_
+AT Administrative Tribunal
+ANE National Roads Agency ( _Agencia Nacional de Estradas)_
+BoM Bank of Maozambique
+CoA Chart of Accounts
+CMC Cash Management Committee
+CMU Cash Management Unit
+CN Commitment Note
+CUT Treasury Single Account _(Conta Única de Tesouro)_
+DNB Directorate of National Budget
+DNT Directorate of National Treasury
+e-SISTAFE Computerized Finance Management System of the State
+FCA Local authorities Compensation Fund _(Fundo de Compensacoes Autarquicas_ )
+IGF General Inspectorate of Finance
+MAEFP Ministry of State Administration and Public Service
+MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance
+MOPHRH Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources
+MEX Transaction and Accounting Module of e-SISTAFE
+MPE State Assets Module of e-SISTAFE
+PES Economic and Social Development Plan ( _Plano Economico e Social_ )
+PFM Public Financial Management
+PQG Programa Quinquenal do Governo
+SISTAFE Finance Management System of the State ( _Sistema de Administracao Financeira_
+_do Estado_ ).
+SNG Subnational Governments
+SNGRH Human Resource Management Information System
+SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
+SU Sectorial Spending Units
+VAT Value Added Tax
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+###### **PREFACE**
+
+In response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a
+technical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,
+Mozambique during the period February 18 to March 1, 2019 to advise on strengthening
+expenditure control and cash flow management, and ensuring effective fiscal coordination and
+reporting in the context of the planned fiscal decentralization.
+
+The mission was led by Mr. Sailendra Pattanayak (FAD Deputy Division Chief), and comprised Mr.
+Felipe Bardella (FAD Staff), Mr. John Gardner, Ms. Elizabeth Kariuki and Ms. Juliana Pigey (all FAD
+Experts), and Ms. Esther Palacio (IMF TA coordinator based in Maputo). The mission benefitted
+from the support of Mr. Ari Aisen, IMF Resident Representative in Mozambique, and the local
+office.
+
+The mission would like to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful
+collaboration provided by the authorities, especially Mr. Domingos Lambo, Permanent Secretary,
+who guided and coordinated the work of the mission. The mission would also like to thank
+CEDSIF and Treasury staff for their valuable support, and all the participants to the various
+meetings and workshops for their active and constructive participation, including staff from
+Ministries of Public Administration, Health, Education, and Public Works.
+
+
+**This mission is part of the “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique Project” that**
+
+**is funded by the Government of Denmark and implemented by the IMF.**
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+###### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+**The Constitutional amendment of June 12, 2018 has placed a major decentralization**
+**reform front and center of the Government of Mozambique’s agenda.** The political pillar of
+this decentralization reform is the creation of directly elected provincial assemblies with an
+elected Governor, and directly elected district assemblies with their elected district administrator.
+The first elections for Provincial Assemblies/Governors under this reform will take place in 2019,
+along with the national elections. The first elections for District Assemblies and Administrators
+will take place in the next mandated elections of 2024. The administrative pillar of this reform is
+the definition of a significant set of service delivery and public administration competencies. The
+third core pillar of the decentralization reform is financial.
+
+
+**The fiscal decentralization of provinces and districts will build on the already highly**
+**deconcentrated public financial management (PFM) system.** Around 38 percent of the State
+budget is currently spent at provincial and district levels **.** Provinces and districts already execute
+their budgets with a high degree of administrative and financial autonomy.
+
+
+**The operationalization of the decentralization process should be gradual and take account**
+**of four factors:** maintaining overall macro-economic stability; ensuring allocation for national
+priorities; developing local capacity for budget management/PFM; and managing expectations of
+elected bodies at sub-national level to address local priorities and take budget policy decisions.
+
+
+**The fiscal decentralization law for the provinces should be comprehensive and cover the**
+**following key areas:** a clear budget calendar for coordination between provincial and central
+level, including sharing of key fiscal information at specific points in the calendar; timing,
+frequency and content of fiscal reporting by provinces; common chart of accounts (CoA) and
+budget classification architecture for all levels of government; banking arrangements/CUT for
+execution of provincial budgets; restrictions on borrowing by provinces or setting clear rules if
+they are allowed to borrow and issue guarantees; transfer of staff and assets (e.g., buildings and
+equipment) relating to the competencies that are decentralized; transparent rules/criteria for
+transfer of funds to provinces, including block and conditional transfers; and whether the
+provinces will continue to use the State budget execution system (e-SISTAFE) and treasury
+services (including cash management operations). There are pros and cons to various options
+and the report lists these but does not recommend specific options which the government
+should decide. For maintaining the unity of the structure of the budget, the budgets of the
+provinces could be incorporated as annexes in the State budget that is submitted to Parliament.
+
+
+**The fiscal decentralization law should include transitional provisions for budget**
+**management at provincial level until specific options are chosen in the above listed areas.**
+Further preparatory work will be needed in certain areas before decisions could be taken. For
+example, a survey or census will be required to identify the specific staff and assets to be
+transferred to the provinces based on the competencies transferred to them.
+
+
+**A step-by-step approach should be followed for developing a system of fund transfers to**
+**provinces.** The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) should review with respective sectorial
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+ministries the current amount of budget allocation for the provincial competencies and
+determine an allocation formula. The allocation formula should be simple and based on objective
+factors, with available data; predictable with shares to remain stable for the first few years to
+support provincial planning and service delivery; and transparent so that the basis of the
+allocation is clear. The MEF could consider an operating transfer which would consist of the
+following types of envelopes: one conditional grant for covering payroll expenditures; a basic
+pool with discretionary allocation for provincial executive council, administration and assembly
+operational costs, allocated among provinces by a clear formula; and one individual envelope per
+sector for goods and services (such as for provincial/regional roads maintenance, environmental
+protection), each allocated among the provinces according to a formula which could include
+general criteria (population, surface area) and specific criteria relevant to the specific area of
+competency. The formula used should be in an annex to the State budget. The fiscal
+decentralization law should also include rules for addressing any persistent cash surplus build-up
+at the provincial level.
+
+
+**The Government of Mozambique has received substantial technical assistance in the last**
+**decade – from the IMF and other partners – on budget execution and cash management.**
+This has been primarily diagnostic and has focused on issues arising from a lack of budget
+credibility, lack of enforcement of controls during budget execution, and poor cash management.
+These issues have resulted in a large stock of expenditure arrears and the imposition of strict
+cash rationing when responding to requests for payment of budget expenditures by sectorial
+spending units (SU). The authorities have prepared a strategy for strengthening expenditure
+control and cash management with support from AFRITAC South.
+
+
+**Based on previous FAD advice, there has been progress in validating and clearing the stock**
+**of arrears accumulated by end 2017, but substantial amounts of new arrears are emerging.**
+All the three sectorial ministries (health, education, and public works) that the mission met
+indicated that they have accumulated large amounts of unpaid invoices that were received
+during the FY 2018. The reasons for the emergence of new arrears are three-fold. First, actual
+revenues are typically lower that the forecast, partly due to non-realization of aid committed by
+donors. Second, due to weak ex-ante payroll control, some sectors recruit more staff than the
+number authorized in the budget and are provided additional allocation. Third, there is currently
+no system of controlling commitments/contracts by SUs within an authorized ceiling, which is a
+standard practice in many Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.
+
+
+**Weak ex-ante control over commitments and payroll, coupled with strict cash rationing,**
+**undermine the credibility of the PFM system and pose a serious risk to the build-up of**
+**further arrears.** Cash rationing has caused payments to be reduced at such times even though
+government obligations continue to be incurred. While some of these problems have been a
+legacy of the past, in the context of the upcoming decentralization there is an opportunity for
+the MEF to strengthen budget execution and cash management processes.
+
+
+**The only way to deal with the effects of non-credible budget and prevent expenditure**
+**arrears is to enforce controls at the commitment/contracting stage.** This would prevent
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+further arrears by reducing payment obligations before they are incurred. The report proposes a
+two stages approach which starts with making correct use of the commitment methodology.
+
+- The MEF – specifically the Directorate of National Budget (DNB) – should issue and enforce a
+
+commitment ceiling for SUs for the period ahead through the e-SISTAFE system by making it
+mandatory for SUs to have a system generated commitment note (CN) as a requirement for
+signing contracts. This will also help capturing the value of commitments in real-time in eSISTAFE to facilitate monitoring of SUs’ obligations by the MEF.
+
+~~~~ A high-level cash management committee chaired by the Minister of Finance or the
+
+Permanent Secretary should be established to decide the quarterly budget release envelope
+which would apply to commitment ceilings given to SUs by the DNB.
+
+- In the first stage, the current practice of reducing the available budget allocations on
+
+expenditure classification heads by withholding ten to fifteen percent of their value should be
+used to constrain commitments of SUs and enforced through the e-SISTAFE system. The SUs
+will see no difference in their budget execution other than the requirement to undergo a
+commitment ceiling check by the system in real time before signing a contract.
+
+- An official circular is required to specify the new commitment control process and its
+
+commencement date. This should also be accompanied by an outreach to sectorial ministries
+to explain the changes and to indicate to all government suppliers that, from the date of
+implementation of the new process, no contract entered into with a government entity will be
+valid for subsequent payment unless it is attached to a unique, and verifiable, CN.
+
+- In the second stage, reasonably accurate cash flow forecasting should be performed by a
+
+skilled cash management unit (CMU) with access to SU capital expenditure plans (when the
+MPE module is rolled out). Realistic revenue, debt and aid projections will also be necessary.
+The NDB would decide where the commitment restrictions would fall. This would entail
+consideration of procurement plans and apply to large, volatile expenditures whose delay
+would not impact adversely on government policy delivery or essential government services.
+
+- In the second stage, with an effective budget management system which anticipates cash
+
+shortage effects of a non-credible budget, there should be little need for cash rationing. The
+development of the Treasury bill market – separately from its use for monetary policy
+purposes – is therefore a medium-term goal to facilitate active cash management operations.
+
+
+**There is also a need to control wage bill expenditure.** Two key areas undermining
+government’s ability to control wage bill expenditure relate to bonuses and overtime payments,
+and staff establishment controls. The Ministry of State Administration and Public Service (MAEFP)
+identifies only ex-post the cases where staff ceilings have been exceeded. As new recruits are
+already on the e-payroll, the MEF is obliged to request for additional budget allocation to absorb
+the additional wage bill costs. The following measures are recommended.
+
+- The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) should undertake an audit of sectors where this
+
+problem is acute (e.g., agriculture, education and health) to identify the control weaknesses.
+
+- The MAEFP should verify ex-ante each request for new recruits against the approved staff
+
+ceiling, prior to its submission to the Administrative Tribunal.
+
+
+**Table 1 summarizes the key recommendations of the report.**
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+**Table 1. Summary of Key Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommended Measure (including recommendation no.)|Indicative
Timeline|Responsible
Agencies|
+|---|---|---|
+|**1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization**|**1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization**|**1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization**|
+|1.1: Consolidate the PFM related laws (Sistafe law, PFM law for_autarquias_
_locais_, planned fiscal decentralization law) in an overarching
comprehensive PFM law covering all levels of government.|2020-2024|MEF|
+|1.2: Incorporate a coordinated budget calendar, standard reporting and
transparency requirements, and harmonized budget classification and
accounting standards in the fiscal decentralization law.|2019|MEF|
+|1.3; 1.4; 1.5: Don’t provide for short term/long term borrowing and PPP
operations by provinces in the first provincial mandate|2020-2024|MEF|
+|1.6: Develop the necessary rules for borrowing and debt limits for
provinces and districts in the future and incorporate these rules in the
proposed overarching PFM law (Recommendation 1.1).|2025|MEF|
+|1.7: Provide guidance to sectorial ministries of some key norms and
principles to take into consideration in the identification of competencies
and authorities to be transferred to provinces and districts.|2019|MEF|
+|1.8; 1.9; 1.10: Instruct sectorial ministries that transfer of competencies to
provinces should be accompanied by the transfer of related personnel,
equipment and buildings.|2019|MEF/MAEFP|
+|1.11: Establish in the fiscal decentralization law basic principles and
guidelines to support preparing the transfer allocations to finance
provincial competencies.|2019|MEF|
+|1.12: Review with sectorial ministries current amount of budget allocation
for the proposed competencies and determine an allocation formula.|2019-20241|MEF/
Sectorial
Ministries|
+|1.13: Identify what service fees, charges or other non-tax revenue may be
associated with the competencies to be transferred to provinces and
districts.|2019-2024|MEF/MAEFP|
+|1.14: Include transitional provisions in the fiscal decentralization law
focused on the budget cycle for the coming years, in particular, the first
autonomous provincial mandate.|2019|MEF|
+|1.15: Design the transitional provisions with a two-phase approach to be
implemented over the first autonomous provincial mandate.|2019|MEF|
+|**2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control**|**2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control**|**2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control**|
+|2.1: Configure e-SISTAFE to control commitments through commitment
ceilings and the issuance of commitment notes|April 2019|Treasury,
CEDSIF|
+|2.2: Conduct outreach to all sectorial ministries and government suppliers
on the appropriate use of commitment notes|May 2019|MEF|
+|2.3: Use the current budget withholding methodology to set ceilings for
commitment controls by Sus, and issue a circular specifying the new
commitment control process|Start May
2019|MEF, DNB,
SUs|
+|2.4: Establish a Cash Management Unit (CMU) within the National
Directorate of the Treasury to perform government cash flow forecasting
and active cash management operations|July 2019|Treasury|
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+|2.5: Establish a skilled macrofiscal unit in the MEF tasked with producing
realistic revenue forecasts both for multiannual fiscal policy and in-year
budget management purposes|July 2019|MEF|
+|---|---|---|
+|2.6: Develop a capacity building program for CMU cash flow forecast
modelling and the production of expenditure plans at large SUs|Start July 2019|Treasury|
+|2.7: Establish a high-level Cash Management Committee (CMC) chaired
by the Minister or PS to decide the quarterly commitment envelope for
implementation by the DNB|January 2020|MEF, DNB|
+|2.8: Consider centralizing the payments process within the e-SISTAFE
once commitment controls are effective|Start January
2020|Treasury,
CEDSIF|
+|2.9: Consider standardizing suppliers’ payment terms within the e-
SISTAFE system and using these to develop more accurate short-term
payment forecasts|Start January
2020|Treasury,
CEDSIF|
+|2.10: In coordination with the BoM and the debt managers, commence
plans to develop the T-bill market specifically for cash management
purposes|Start July 2020|Treasury,
BoM|
+|**3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears**|**3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears**|**3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears**|
+|3.1: Undertake an audit of the processes and controls to safeguard staff
establishment and payroll control in agriculture, education and health|December
2019|IGF|
+|3.2: Institutionalize mechanism for verifying actual against approved
establishment prior to each new recruitment|July 2019|MAEFP|
+|3.3: Extend arrears clearance to cover the arrears accumulated during
2018|Start April
2019|Treasury,
IGF|
+|3.4: Prepare a strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears|Start April
2019|Treasury,
Revenue
Authority|
+|3.5: Regularly monitor and report on arrears in budget execution and year
end fiscal report|Start July 2019|Treasury,
Accounting,
CEDSIF|
+
+
+
+1 Until the allocation formula is defined, shorter-term indicative targets could usefully be set for the first few
+years.
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+###### **I. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION**
+
+**A. Introduction and Background**
+
+
+**1.** **The Constitutional amendment of 12 June 2018 has placed a major decentralization**
+**reform front and center of the Government of Mozambique’s agenda.** The implementation
+of decentralization is part of the country’s peace accords. This reform aims to associate citizens in
+resolving problems of their communities, promote local development, and deepen democracy,
+within the overall unity of the Mozambican state (Constitution Article 270-A). The
+decentralization reform comprises three pillars: political, administrative and financial.
+
+
+**2.** **The political pillar of this decentralization reform is the creation of directly elected**
+**provincial assemblies with an elected Governor, and directly elected district assemblies**
+**with their elected district administrator** . The first elections for Provincial Assemblies/Governors
+under the revised Constitution will take place in 2019, along with the national elections. The first
+elections for District Assemblies and Administrators will take place in the next mandated
+elections of 2024.
+
+
+**3.** **The administrative pillar of this reform is the definition of a significant set of**
+**service delivery and public administration competencies (further discussed in section E,**
+**below** ). Provinces, districts and municipalities ( _autarquias locais,_ AL) are to enjoy administrative
+autonomy (Constitution Article 270-C) and will have their own personnel, who are part of the
+overall state civil service (Constitution Article 270-I).
+
+
+**4.** **The third core pillar of the decentralization reform is financial** . Provinces, Districts
+and AL will have autonomy in the management of their financial affairs and properties. The
+analysis and recommendations of this chapter will focus on the public financial management
+(PFM) framework and principles for the financial resources of Provinces, that will make the
+Provincial Assemblies a reality starting 2020, while taking into consideration the fragile macroeconomic environment and PFM challenges of the Mozambican State. There is a very short time
+in which to define clearly the financial, staffing and asset / equipment transfers that will
+accompany the new competencies so that the provincial elections can take place with clarity on
+the roles for which assembly members and the Governors will be elected.
+
+
+**5.** **This reform will create two new levels of decentralized government in addition to**
+**the** _**autarquias locais**_ . These are expected to be subject to a dual accountability, upwards to the
+central government and downward to their respective constituents, thus being able to improve
+the quality of local and regional public services in line with local priorities. Among the many
+challenges which will have to be addressed in setting up the new Provincial Assemblies and
+Executive Councils in 2020 are ensuring that national priorities remain addressed and that PFM
+capacity is developed.
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+**6.** **The Government has begun the preparatory work for the legal framework that will**
+**accompany the decentralization reform.** The initial package of laws to enable the reform
+implementation were adopted by the Cabinet and submitted to the National Assembly by midFebruary 2018. This package consists of the following texts:
+
+ - Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized
+Provincial Governments
+
+ - Law on the Organization and Functioning of Provincial Assemblies
+
+ - Law on the Organization and Functioning of State Deconcentrated Services in the
+Provinces
+
+ - Law on the State Administrative Supervision ( _Tutela do Estado)_ on Decentralized
+Provincial Governments and on Local Authorities ( _Autarquias Locais)_
+
+ - Law for the Election of Members of the Provincial Assemblies
+
+
+The consultations and review of these draft texts are ongoing.
+
+
+**7.** **The last core element of the legal package is a law on the finances and PFM**
+**framework (fiscal decentralization law) for the provincial decentralized bodies.** This report
+examines the key principles, the current legal PFM framework and international experience to
+propose targeted recommendations. These are for consideration of the MEF in the development
+of the legal text itself as well as for beginning to plan the actual implementation subsequent to
+the elections and launch of the mandate of the Provincial Assemblies and Provincial Executive
+Councils. The legal framework that will apply for the Districts can be developed over a longer
+period of consultation and discussion and will thus benefit from the lessons learned during the
+implementation of the first mandate of the new Provincial Assemblies.
+
+
+**8.** **A definition of financial autonomy has been provided** in the draft Law on the
+Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized Provincial Governments,
+comprising three key elements:
+
+ - Develop, approve, amend and execute its program of activities and its own budget
+
+ - Develop and approve management accounts
+
+ - Dispose of own revenues, mandate ( _ordenar)_ and process expenditures, record revenues
+that according to law are authorized for decentralized governments, have recourse to
+loans, in the terms of the law.
+
+
+This initial definition is sufficiently broad to ensure the key elements of financial autonomy which
+will be further elaborated in the forthcoming fiscal decentralization law.
+
+
+**B. Current Budget and Financial Execution Processes and Systems**
+
+
+**Current share of provinces and districts in the State budget**
+
+
+**9.** **Public service delivery in Mozambique is already highly deconcentrated at the**
+**provincial and district levels.** Government units directly in charge of provision of public services
+in several sectors are administered by local bodies, such as Provincial Directorates and District
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+Entities ( _Delegações Provinciais e Servicos Distritais_ ). For example, in the health sector, such
+bodies have ultimate management responsibility in large provincial hospitals, rural hospitals and
+health centers dispersed all over the country. Although authorities are upwardly accountable to
+the central government, the administration of public services is clearly conducted at local level.
+
+
+**10.** **Budget and financial execution reflects this high degree of administrative**
+**deconcentration.** Provincial and district bodies comprise around 1300 sectorial spending units
+(SUs - around 85 percent of total) in the Mozambican national budget, representing
+approximately 38% of total government expenditure in 2018. They manage procurement
+processes, payroll (including recruiting and salary decisions) and operating expenses (electricity
+bills, water bills). The major exception in the health sector is the procurement of medicines,
+equipment and medical supplies, which is carried out centrally by the Ministry of Health.
+
+
+**11.** **Currently, 78 percent of total expenditure in education (largest function in the**
+**national budget) is executed at local level, mainly in the Districts.** This reflects operating – by
+educational district entities ( _Servicos Distritais de Educacao e Desenvolvimento Humano_ ) –the
+network of more than 12,500 primary and secondary schools, which includes recruiting teachers,
+controlling working hours and managing salary sheets. Furthermore, the major part of
+investments in the education sector in 2018 was developed by the Provinces (Figure 1.1). At
+central level, Ministry of Education focuses on the acquisition of goods and services, notably
+importation of textbooks, organizes national exams and standard learning tests, and establishes
+the strategic educational objectives and policies.
+
+
+**Figure 1.1. Structure of the Education Budget by Level of Implementation**
+
+
+Source: Authorities and staff estimates.
+
+
+**Allocation criteria and coordination mechanism**
+
+
+**12.** **There is no predetermined rule guiding budget allocation among the three**
+**administrative levels; but the payroll imposes some rigidity.** The discretionary allocative
+decision is taken each year by the Council of Ministers when preparing and submitting the
+budget proposal to the National Assembly. Such decision is subject to the approval of the
+parliament which has the constitutional prerogative to deliberate on the composition of the state
+budget. However, compulsory expenses impose certain rigidity in this composition, the most
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+relevant being the wage bill, pension payments and interest. Current payroll management
+practice drives towards deconcentration since the management of civil servants is carried out by
+local bodies, while the payment of pensions and interest is executed centrally.
+
+
+**13.** **However, administrative (and budgetary) deconcentration has been increasing in**
+**Mozambique in the last decade.** By 2008, only 24% of the state budget was executed at the
+provincial and district level, 14 percentage points less than in 2018. This evolution is explained, to
+large extent, by the administrative deconcentration of personnel management and payroll
+expenditure, which currently represents a major challenge for the country (see Section III).
+
+
+**14.** **On the other hand, the resource envelope and corresponding budget ceilings for**
+**Provinces are determined through a fixed formula.** The equation is based on a weighted
+average of population and poverty index of each Province, with a 70/30 percent weighting ratio,
+respectively. The rule is disclosed in the Medium-Term Fiscal Scenario, but it is not enforced by
+any legal or regulatory instrument. Although this approach has an equalization component
+(mainly per capita) for the distribution of resources among Provinces, it should be noted that the
+ceilings apply only to acquisition of goods and services and capital expenditures (investments),
+which have more discretionary characteristics.
+
+
+**15.** **Similar procedure is in place for Districts.** The formula, however, incorporates a
+territorial component and a measure of local capacity to raise own resources, in addition to the
+aforementioned population and poverty parameters. The ceilings apply only to capital
+expenditures in this case.
+
+
+**16.** **Fiscal coordination between the three administrative levels is closely monitored by**
+**central government due to the absence of political autonomy in the Provinces and**
+**Districts.** Public policies and government priorities are centrally decided, and the
+implementation responsibility is then delegated to local officers, with some administrative
+autonomy. Although there is some degree of discussion at the provincial and district levels about
+allocations of budget ceilings for goods and services and investments, the central government
+closely oversees the whole process since main provincial and district authorities are directly
+appointed by the president.
+
+
+**C. Overall Strategic Context and Setting the Stage**
+
+
+**17.** **A strategic medium-term vision for decentralization should be developed in**
+**parallel with the immediate steps to ensure that the Provincial Assemblies can launch in**
+**early 2020.** There are some decisions which may require longer term planning, development of
+the required legal amendments, revised regulations and systems preparation. This is likely to be
+the case especially for some of the resources which will be transferred to the Provinces. Thus,
+operationalization of the decentralization process should be gradual.
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+**18.** **Decentralization has many moving parts.** As discussed above, there is a political pillar,
+an administrative pillar and a fiscal pillar to decentralization. The three pillars need to work
+together and be consistent. When the three “legs” of the decentralization stool are not aligned,
+the new decentralized entities will not be able to provide the public services as expected and
+may be set up for failure. For example, establishing elected Provincial assemblies can backfire if
+there are no real decision-making powers to set local priorities, or if the all budget decisions
+appear to be imposed by the central government. Allocating service delivery competencies and
+responsibilities without adequate funding (unfunded mandates) will also weaken the newly
+decentralized governments as they will not be able to meet their constituents’ expectations.
+
+
+**19.** **Within this context it is also important to balance four factors/dimensions while**
+**rolling out fiscal decentralization** :
+
+
+- First, there are important national priorities, as well as standards and requirements that the
+newly decentralized provinces will have to respect. Examples may include:
+
+ - Basic standards required for a regional (provincial) or unclassified (district) road.
+
+ - Medium-term goal of number of students per classroom.
+
+ - Health and safety considerations in the construction of classrooms / schools.
+
+
+- The second dimension is to ensure overall macro-economic stability **.** The PFM rules (further
+discussed in section D, below) will have to ensure that provinces will not be in a position to
+take decisions which could affect the debt position or the overall budget deficit of the central
+government. For example, should a Province guarantee a loan for a local public or private
+company which provides regional services (such as public transport), the question is what
+happens should that enterprise default on the loan guaranteed by the Province? It could then
+be potentially the responsibility of the Province to ensure the debt payment, but from which
+revenues? This would thus create a potential risk on the overall budget.
+
+
+- The third dimension pertains to the local capacity for budget management and PFM
+processes, including adequate IT equipment and infrastructure **.** With budget autonomy the
+provinces will be responsible for preparing, executing and reporting their budgets and
+ensuring efficient management of public funds which are entrusted to them. Thus, it will be
+essential to develop systems of initial training and capacity building in PFM, both within the
+Provincial administration (under the Provincial Executive Council) as well as among the
+elected members of the Provincial Assembly.
+
+
+- The fourth dimension concerns a political economy consideration **.** As the overall PFM
+framework and resource envelope and their allocation mechanisms are developed, it should
+be borne in mind that there will be considerable expectations on the elected bodies to
+address local priorities and make decisions. Ensuring an effective decentralization in the
+medium term and enforcing increasing autonomy at the provincial level over time are more
+likely to help guarantee the success and the stability of Mozambique’s decentralization
+reform.
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+**D. Establishing a PFM Framework and Legal Landscape for**
+**Provinces**
+
+
+**Current PFM legislation**
+
+
+**20.** **The legal framework for budgeting and fiscal management in Mozambique is**
+**comprehensive yet very fragmented.** The Constitution includes several articles on
+development planning and the budget process and defines the roles of the executive branch and
+the National Assembly in the preparation and approval of the annual budget (notably Articles
+130, 179 and 204). Additional aspects of budgeting, accounting, fiscal reporting and auditing
+processes are legislated the by SISTAFE Law (9/2012), which is complemented by the SISTAFE
+Regulation (Decree 23/2004). There are other laws and decrees regulating specific areas within
+the PFM framework; the more relevant ones being summarized below:
+
+
+- **The Constitution** : besides the annual budget, it also includes provisions for the government
+five-year development plan ( _Programa Quinquenal do Governo - PQG_ ) and the annual
+Economic and Social Development Plan ( _Plano Economico e Social - PES_ ). It clearly requires
+that the executive branch prepares the draft PQP, PES and budget and sets out the
+competency of the national assembly to approve them.
+
+
+- **Sistafe** **[2]** **Law** : this is the core of the PFM legislation in Mozambique. It sets out a clear
+timetable for budget preparation and approval and the key contents of the budget
+documentation. It also includes provision for a standard budget classification structure to be
+used by all public entities. In addition, it defines the national accounting and transparency
+standards, including requirements for in-year and end-year fiscal reporting, and timeframe
+for preparation and auditing of annual financial statements. The law requires the chart of
+accounts to be updated on a regular basis. It also legislates on treasury operations, for
+example, by establishing guidelines for financial programming procedures and, more
+important, defining the centralization of all cash operations in the treasury single account
+(CUT). Finally, it makes provisions for internal control at all government levels.
+
+
+- **SISTAFE Regulation (Decree 23/2004)** : it sets out operational regulations on the matters
+covered by the Sistafe Law. For example, the decree provides the full architecture of the
+budget classification framework and the complete chart of accounts for the accounting
+system.
+
+
+- _**Lei de Bases**_ **(Tax system law):** it defines the principles and the design of the taxation
+system in Mozambique, which has the PIT, CIT and VAT as the main components of tax
+revenue in the country. The law also sets the tax rates for each tax. It is not applied to the
+_autarquias locais_ (AL) that have their own PFM and tax system law (PFM law for _autarquias_
+_locais_ ).
+
+
+2 SISTAFE means “Finance Management System of the State” ( _Sistema de Administracao Financeira do Estado_ ).
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+- **PFM Law for** _**autarquias locais**_ **:** this is a specific PFM and taxation law applied only to
+_autarquias locais_ (AL). It defines the budget procedures for the _autarquias locais_, including a
+timetable for budget preparation and approval. It also establishes a revenue sharing
+mechanism called _Fundo de Compensacoes Autarquicas_ (FCA), under which the central
+government transfers to _autarquias locais_ 1.5% of its total fiscal revenue. This is an
+unconditional transfer distributed to local administrations through a fixed formula that
+considers as parameters _autarquias locais_ ’ population and the territorial area, with a 70/30
+percent weighting ratio, respectively. The law establishes the same national CoA to be
+adopted by _autarquias locais_ and requires them to submit budget execution outturns to MEF
+on a quarterly basis and annual financial statements to corresponding local assemblies and
+to administrative tribunal. It also mandates each municipality to have its own treasury and to
+centralize its cash operations in a single account. Finally, the law allows _autarquias locais_ to
+undertake short-term debt transactions with local creditors but limited to three twelfths of
+their FCA transfers, and the debt should be repaid within the same fiscal year. For long-term
+borrowing from international creditors, approval of the Ministry of Finance is required.
+
+
+**21.** **Any ambiguity as to whether the** _**autarquias locais**_ **are subjected to the Sistafe law**
+**or not should be avoided when drafting the fiscal decentralization law.** The Sistafe law does
+not explicitly refer to _autarquias locais_ since they were not operational by the time the law was
+enacted. On the other hand, the PFM Law for _autarquias locais_ refers to Sistafe law only in article
+12, which deals with budget formulation and execution, by stating that _autarquias locais_ should
+observe Sistafe’s rules and procedures. Therefore, on all other PFM matters, the effectiveness of
+Sistafe law over the municipal administrations is unclear. For example, _autarquias locais_ may not
+fully comply with Sistafe’s transparency standards and reporting requirements. Care should be
+taken when drafting the fiscal decentralization law to avoid grey areas and ensure complete
+applicability of Sistafe’s discipline to the Provinces.
+
+
+**22.** **Furthermore, in case the FCA-type of unconditional transfer mechanism is to be**
+**adopted for the Provinces, it would be recommended to empower the MEF to block the**
+**transfer if provinces do not submit fiscal data on a regular basis.** This is a very effective way
+to ensure MEF receives the necessary information to proceed with systematic monitoring of fiscal
+performance of the Provinces.
+
+
+**23.** **In the medium-term, effort should be made to consolidate the PFM laws in one**
+**comprehensive legal instrument.** This opportunity will come by 2024 before the fiscal
+decentralization to Districts become operational. There is a five-year period for MEF to plan
+ahead and design a comprehensive PFM law covering central government, provinces, districts
+and _autarquias locais_ . If such initiative is not moved forward, by 2025 Mozambique will have four
+PFM laws, one for each level of government. This will be a very peculiar situation in which the
+multiple overlapping legislation can be potentially conflicting and adversely affect the orderly
+functioning of the PFM system.
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.1** . In the medium-term, consolidate the PFM related laws (Sistafe law, PFM
+law for _autarquias locais_, planned fiscal decentralization law) in an overarching comprehensive
+PFM law covering central government, provinces, districts and _autarquias locais._
+
+
+**The new fiscal decentralization law: key principles**
+
+
+**24.** **Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of financial responsibility and authority to the**
+**local governments and requires establishing a sound PFM framework.** Enhanced budgetary
+and financial management practices enables fiscal authorities to properly play their role in the
+preparation of policies and planning, as well as the appropriate allocation of available funds to
+effectively carry out activities and spending. More broadly, implementing fiscal decentralization
+relies on four main building blocks:
+
+
+- **Expenditure Assignment** : The expenditure assignments transferred from the center to the
+Provinces/Districts must be clearly defined.
+
+
+- **Funding** : Revenues at the disposal of the Provinces/Districts should be sufficient to finance
+their assigned expenditure responsibilities. Resource/budget envelopes should be
+determined through a transparent criterion.
+
+
+- **Budget Planning** : PFM framework should enable Provinces/Districts to define their priorities
+and development needs but should also ensure sound fiscal coordination among different
+levels of government.
+
+
+- **Budget Execution & Financial Audit** : PFM framework should provide for integrated
+financial management systems and centralization of cash operations, as well as standard
+reporting schemes and regular auditing processes.
+
+
+**25.** **Transfer of expenditure responsibilities and public resources to SNGs should go**
+**hand in hand with rolling out a complete PFM framework at local level.** Provincial
+authorities will be called to plan, budget, and execute government programs and activities with a
+greater sense of accountability, since local voters will demand more effective spending,
+accompanied by strengthened control and audit processes. Therefore, the overall PFM
+architecture for Provincial governments should be similar to national government (Figure 1.2),
+except for macro-fiscal policy formulation which, in most countries, is determined by central
+government as SNGs do not have the necessary tools to take part in the process.
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.2. Public Financial Management Cycle**
+
+
+**Budget preparation and approval**
+
+
+**26.** **As part of the new fiscal decentralization law, the MEF should consider a clear and**
+**coordinated budget calendar.** Such a calendar should be designed to allow the MEF to provide
+key budget information to the Provinces in a timely manner and to accommodate consultations
+with the Provinces during the central government budget preparation. The information to be
+provided by the MEF to the Provinces would include estimates for fiscal transfers (conditional
+and unconditional grants) from the state budget, shared macroeconomic assumptions to ensure
+consistent budgetary projections across all levels of government and other relevant data.
+
+
+**27.** **The composition of provincial and state budgets is a key decision to be taken.**
+Currently, the state budget comprises all SUs at provincial and district levels which might not be
+an appropriate set up under fiscal decentralization. From 2020, Provincial budget allocations will
+be debated and approved by elected provincial assemblies; therefore, submitting it to the
+national assembly as part of the main state budget documentation will mean a second layer of
+legislature appreciation. Alternatively, the approved budgets of the 10 provinces and the city of
+Maputo could be introduced in the state budget proposal as an annex to allow for a
+consolidated view of the total budget in the country, but not subject to national assembly
+approval. The national assembly would be approving the overall transfer amount for conditional
+and unconditional grants from the state budget to the Provinces. Other pros and cons of keeping
+the provincial budgets within the main state budget documentation can be cited:
+
+
+**Pros:**
+
+
+- Reduces initial cost of reform implementation, since there will be no change in the current
+practice. Potential costs related to changing processes in the MEF, Provinces and assemblies
+will not be incurred.
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+- State budget main documentation consolidates all levels of government, which allow for a
+comprehensive view of the programed budget for the entire country in a single document.
+
+
+- Place more direct oversight of compliance with national priorities in the Provinces given that
+the national assembly will debate on the approved provincial budgets
+
+
+**Cons:**
+
+
+- Requires more careful review of Provincial draft budget to allow for a full consolidation into
+the state budget proposal. Coordination in budget calendar and exchange information
+processes becomes even more relevant
+
+
+- Potentially implies national decision on Provincial budget because national assembly will be
+forced to deliberate on it. It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and
+patrimonial autonomy granted by the constitution
+
+
+- Maintains pre-decentralization practice (current), which can be understood as a step back in
+the decentralization process and inconsistent with the Constitutional Amendments
+
+
+**Budget execution**
+
+
+**28.** **Budget execution in central, provincial, and district levels is mainly performed**
+**through e-SISTAFE, the Mozambican integrated financial management system.** The system
+currently covers over 90% of the 1629 SUs but it does not track the transactions through the
+entire expenditure cycle, only payments. This happens because, although the functionality to
+input transactions on commitment and verification phases are fully operational, the current
+practice adopted by MEF and line ministries is to record all spending stages simultaneously at
+the time of payments. This is a major drawback in the current PFM framework, which prevents
+the proper control of commitments and leads to persistent accumulation of arrears and cash
+rationing (see Section II).
+
+
+**29.** **Maintaining the budget execution of provincial SUs in e-SISTAFE is another key**
+**decision to be taken under the new PFM framework.** Pros and cons of such decision can be
+cited:
+
+
+**Pros:**
+
+
+- SUs at provincial/district level already operate through e-SISTAFE. This is an advantage in
+terms of reducing potential costs related to changing processes in the Provinces.
+
+
+- The system has the required functionalities/tools.
+
+
+- It enforces a common Chart of Accounts and classification architecture in the Provinces, since
+e-SISTAFE operates with a single accounting and budget classification for all SUs
+
+
+- It allows real time access to financial information of the Provinces by the MEF, which can
+facilitate monitoring of provincial fiscal indicators and policy coordination
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+**Cons:**
+
+
+- It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy
+granted by the constitution.
+
+
+**30.** **Another valuable feature of e-SISTAFE is its interoperability with the treasury single**
+**account at the central bank (CUT).** Although some SUs still hold accounts in commercial banks
+under special circumstances, the transactions undertaken through e-SISTAFE are paid against the
+CUT. Therefore, expanding the coverage of the system among budget units leads to a broader
+use of the CUT within the government, with clear positive implications for cash management.
+
+
+**31.** **Therefore, an important decision that comes next is whether the Provinces will**
+**continue to operate under the CUT or not.** Having the provincial cash resources in the CUT
+allows the treasury to manage and control overall government's cash balances more efficiently. A
+mechanism of sub-accounts (or virtual accounts) embedded in the single account ensures the
+provincial ownership over the resources belonging to them. Alternatively, in case Provinces leave
+the CUT, it is desirable for each Province to set up a similar single account structure at the local
+level. Other pros and cons of continuing operating under the CUT are cited:
+
+
+**Pros:**
+
+
+- The CUT enhances cash management operations by centralizing the government’s liquidity
+within a single account
+
+
+- It prevents diversion of resources in multiple bank accounts leading to additional financial
+costs and hampering control of public funds
+
+
+- It limits accumulation of arrears by reducing the possibility of idle cash
+
+
+- It improves financial discipline and transparency of local governments
+
+
+**Cons:**
+
+
+- It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy
+granted by the constitution
+
+
+- There is a need to implement several sub-accounts (or virtual accounts) in the CUT, which
+would require reconfiguring the CUT architecture.
+
+
+- There would be challenges to operate the CUT in a way to ensure that subnational
+governments have access to their own cash resources in the CUT and their finances are not
+impacted by possible liquidity constraints of the central government.
+
+
+**Fiscal reporting and accounting**
+
+
+**32.** **The new fiscal decentralization law should define standard reporting and**
+**transparency requirements, in addition to the provisions of the SISTAFE law.** This should
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+include budget execution reports, financial statements and fiscal statistics for both in-year and
+year-end reporting schemes. In-year reporting should ideally be undertaken on a monthly basis,
+or at most quarterly. The reports should be submitted to the MEF, to Administrative Tribunal, to
+provincial agencies and should be made public for easy access of civil society. MEF should be
+responsible for consolidating in-year reports and statistics as well annual accounts and financial
+statements for the general government. Moreover, MEF should also rely on such reporting
+framework to actively monitor provincial fiscal performance and to carry out macro-economic
+and fiscal analyses and policy.
+
+
+**33.** **The legislation should provide for harmonized budget classification and accounting**
+**standards, including a common chart of accounts (CoA) to be used by all levels of**
+**government.** This is critical to ensure consistent consolidation of public finances and to make
+information comparable across jurisdictions. National accounting standards should be
+mandatory for Provinces as well as common budget classification structure; economic and
+functional classification should also be aligned to international standards, such as the IMF GFSM
+2014, to the extent possible. Such an approach will enhance international comparability of
+Mozambican fiscal data, and contribute to improve budget processes, control and accountability.
+Standardizing accounting and budget classifications is even more important in the case
+Provinces will be operating under separate information management systems.
+
+
+**34.** **Enhanced transparency practices are essential to successfully implement the**
+**concept of fiscal decentralization.** The main justification for decentralized fiscal government
+operations is improving the quality of service delivery through a dual accountability approach for
+local administrations. Provincial authorities will be accountable to the central government and to
+the local voters and civil society, who should be able to exert effective oversight on the local
+budget decisions and spending process.
+
+
+**35.** **The** _**Tribunal Administrativo**_ **– the supreme audit institution – is to play an**
+**important role to ensure accountability and governance standards.** **[3]** Regular auditing by the
+independent external auditor is required to strengthen controls and improve procedural
+weaknesses at the local level, in particular, by addressing capacity constraints, providing better
+guidance and documentation, and stronger accountability arrangements. The tribunal should
+also be in charge of auditing the provincial financial statements before appreciation by the
+provincial assemblies.
+
+
+**Fiscal coordination and macroeconomic stability**
+
+
+**36.** **Fiscal decentralization requires sound coordination among different levels of**
+**government to ensure macroeconomic stability in the country.** Provinces need a clear
+understanding of their likely transfers from the state budget for the year and for the medium
+
+3 A comprehensive review of the role of the _Tribunal Administrativo_ was beyond the scope of the mission; the
+point here is to ensure that the _Tribunal Administrativo_ audits the provinces the same way it does for the center.
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+term and an opportunity to comment on the formulation of any national policies with
+implications for their expenditures, revenues, or financial management. On the other hand, it is
+critical for the central government to monitor provincial fiscal performance to mitigate potential
+fiscal risks from the provincial level that could potentially jeopardize the overall fiscal position.
+
+
+**37.** **It will be essential that key macroeconomic rules are established** to ensure that
+Provinces (and later Districts) do not negatively impact on overall country macro-fiscal
+imbalances, in respect to deficit and budget balances (discussed above), borrowing and issuance
+of guarantees. Within the legal package which was submitted to Parliament on February 15, there
+are some general provisions on the authority of provinces to contract loans. For example, in
+Article 6 of the draft Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of
+Decentralized Provincial Governments, financial autonomy is defined to include having recourse
+to loans, in accordance with the law ( _…bem como recorrer aos empréstimos, nos termos da lei_ ).
+Further, Article 15 1.h of the draft Law on the Organization and Functioning of Provincial
+Assemblies provides that the assembly approves loan contracts as per the law, provided that the
+corresponding annual loan service is supported by a table attesting borrowing capacity. [4]
+
+
+**38.** **The question of borrowing by the provinces is one of the very key issues which will**
+**need to be decided by the forthcoming fiscal decentralization law.** The first consideration is
+to understand that the proceeds of borrowing are not a revenue, but a source of financing. The
+proceeds obtained from the lending financial institution will need to be paid back, with interest.
+Future flows of revenues of provinces should be adequate for debt service, including repayment
+of loans. The first question, therefore, is about the creditworthiness of the Provinces. Are they
+able to repay a loan? Are they willing to repay a loan? These questions should be examined
+separately for each of the two key types of borrowing which are most frequently defined as part
+of local government borrowing frameworks and regulations: short-term loans and long-term
+loans. [5]
+
+
+**39.** **Short-term borrowing for liquidity/cash management purposes would imply that**
+**there is some initial provincial control over its cash management processes.** Within local
+government borrowing frameworks, short-term loans (< 12 months) are often used to resolve a
+temporary cash shortage or address liquidity needs when there is a mismatch between ongoing
+expenditure commitments and the calendar for incoming revenue. For example, a key property
+tax could be collected during the month of September, while ongoing current operations need to
+be funded from January 2020. In many countries, subnational governments negotiate a shortterm credit line at the beginning of the fiscal year, which they may draw down and replenish
+based on their short-term funding needs and cash availability. At present, there are many
+unknowns for the establishment of Provinces and their PFM frameworks. It is clear, however, that
+
+
+4 Article 15 1.h - _aprovar a contracção de empréstimos nos termos da lei, desde que a sua amortização anual seja_
+_fundamentada em mapa demonstrativo da capacidade de endividamento_ .
+
+5 Issuance of municipal bonds is another form of subnational debt instrument, but it is not necessary to further
+elaborate on this question at present.
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+in an initial period, and given the current cash management problems and undershooting of
+revenue targets for the overall central government, regulating liquidity needs with short-term
+borrowing by the Provinces could create short-to medium-term macro-fiscal risks.
+
+
+**40.** **International experience in short-term borrowing and the pros and cons.** Some
+countries limit short term borrowing to a share of current year budget revenue or calculated on
+previous year revenues.
+
+ - Counties in Kenya may borrow up to the equivalent 5 percent of their last audited
+revenues; these loans must be repaid within twelve months.
+
+ - Ethiopia’s States and Addis Ababa City Government may borrow short-term to manage
+their consolidated fund, with the approval of the Federal Government (Ministry of
+Finance and Economic Development) and which must be repaid in the following fiscal
+year.
+
+ - So, while an argument in favor ( _pros)_ of short-term borrowing would be to enable the
+Province to cover necessary short-term budget items, a clear risk ( _cons_ ) is that repayment
+of such loans within the fiscal year may be compromised if the revenue shortfall is not
+made up or cash shortages reduce central government transfers that were initially
+budgeted for the Provinces.
+
+**41.** **Long-term borrowing to finance infrastructure investment would require that**
+**provinces have significant and dependable own-source revenues.** It is expected that at the
+start of Provincial decentralized government operations, the transfers from the central
+government will be required to cover payroll and goods and services expenditures. These funds
+will be committed/engaged quite quickly. In order to reimburse a long-term loan, Provinces will
+need to have access to own source revenues which are not earmarked for a specific service. In
+the absence of such own source revenues, the provinces would not have any financial basis on
+which to service the debt payments for a long-term loan.
+
+
+**42.** **International experience in long-term borrowing and the pros and cons.** The
+frameworks to regulate long-term borrowing may function based on an _ex_ ante direct control
+framework (pre-approval by national government, preferred lender; controls on loan conditions
+such as pricing, loan maturity) or according to a rule-based framework (setting of caps on debt
+service and outstanding debt; pricing and loan conditions based on negotiation between lender
+and borrower, due diligence carried out by lender who assumes non-payment risk).
+
+ - Kenya is an example of a direct control framework to regulate borrowing by Counties:
+long-term borrowing requires an approval and a guarantee of the National government
+and therefore approval by Parliament.
+
+ - Colombia is an example of a rules-based framework with caps set on debt service (40%
+of operating surplus); and outstanding debt (80% of current revenues). Such caps were
+introduced by the so-called “Traffic Light Law” (Law 358 of 1997). Under this law, SNGs
+were given a rating based on their ratios of debt to payment capacity. If one of the caps
+has been exceeded, the SNG is rated in the red-light zone and prohibited from further
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+borrowing; those complying with both caps are permitted to borrow up to limits based
+on debt sustainability calculations. In addition, departments and large _autarquias locais_
+must get a satisfactory credit rating from rating agencies before they borrow.
+
+ - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of long-term borrowing are that access to such funding would
+enable more rapid realization of strategic provincial investment projects and would
+enhance intergenerational equity (future generations benefitting from the infrastructure
+would contribute indirectly through their tax or fee payments to the debt service).
+
+ - Arguments which suggest caution in authorizing long-term borrowing by provinces
+( _cons)_ include fiscal risks and the current overall national debt profile; risk of implicit
+sovereign guarantee once MEF approves / authorizes specific borrowing by provinces;
+lack of availability of provincial own-source revenues to ensure debt payment. _[6]_
+
+
+**43.** **In addition to regulating provincial borrowing, the fiscal decentralization law**
+**should provide guidance on issuance of loan guarantees.** Depending on the competencies
+which will be transferred to the Provinces, some services may be associated with public
+companies for service provision or with private companies that are licensed to provide regular
+services (such as intra-provincial public transportation companies). This is a sensitive issue which
+could lead to a negative impact on macro-fiscal balances. Similar to long-term loans, should the
+initial borrower of a guaranteed loan default, there are not actually any revenue sources of the
+Province which would be available to ensure debt service. The debt could by default end up as
+the responsibility of MEF.
+
+
+**44.** **The law should also provide for central oversight of Public-Private Partnership**
+**(PPP) arrangements at sub-national level.** In PPP arrangements, the private sector provides
+infrastructure assets and services that have traditionally been provided by the government, such
+as hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, railways, and water and sanitation plants. In some PPP
+contracts, the government may provide a revenue or demand guarantee that requires it to make
+up the difference if revenue or demand falls short of an agreed level. Other contracts may
+include exchange rate or price guarantees. Such arrangements are complex to design and
+manage and require well-developed technical capacity to conduct proper project appraisals and
+detailed assessment of project-specific risks. PPPs generate long-term obligations to the
+government and expose the government to a wide range of associated fiscal risks. For this
+reason, central oversight and monitoring of sub-national PPP contracts—for example, by setting
+up a gateway function at the MEF to assess and approve all PPP proposals—will be important.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.2.** The fiscal decentralization law should provide for a coordinated budget
+calendar, standard reporting and transparency requirements, and harmonized budget
+
+
+6 Rather, as the own source revenues for provinces are not yet clearly defined, the amounts which may be
+available are presently unknown and there will need to be a few years to get this aspect of provincial
+management up and running.
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+classification and accounting standards, including a common chart of accounts (CoA), to be used
+by all levels of government.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.3.** Short term borrowing by provinces should likely NOT be authorized at
+the present time, as their funds will derive essentially from central government transfers and their
+liquidity position will be determined by central cash management and budget releases.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.4.** Long term borrowing and issuance of guarantees by provinces should
+likely NOT be authorized at the present time as they will not have access to significant own
+source revenues; were provincial loans to be approved by MEF, this could be viewed as a
+potential guarantee and create moral hazard risks.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.5.** PPP operations by provinces should likely NOT be authorized at the
+present time as they will not have the technical capacity to properly appraise projects, assess the
+long-term obligations to government and mitigate the associated risks.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.6.** During the first mandate of Provincial operations, their fiscal and
+financial performance can be observed in order to consider the necessary rules for borrowing
+and debt limits to establish for a later time when their finances are more stable and greater own
+source revenues available. The same scheme should be replicated for districts.
+
+**E. Provincial Responsibilities**
+
+
+**45.** **The decentralization of competencies to provinces and districts is potentially quite**
+**extensive.** Article 270-J of the amendment to the Constitution, adopted on 12-June-2018,
+provides a detailed list of sectors (see Box 1.1, below). The proposed general areas of
+competencies are to be exercised where they do not overlap with current functions of the
+_autarquias locais_ and which are not exclusive competencies of central state bodies ( _órgãos_
+_centrais_ ). The Constitution does not indicate what are to be the specific respective competencies
+of the provinces and the districts. The content, organization and functioning of these
+decentralized competencies are to be set in law. [7]
+
+
+7 The National Assembly has already requested the government to prepare a new law defining the allocation of
+competencies between the central government and provinces. The MEF is working on a draft of this new law.
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+**Box 1.1. Potential Functions for Provinces and Districts**
+
+As per Article 270-J of the amended Constitution
+
+
+a) agriculture, fisheries, cattle, forestry, food security and nutrition
+b) land management (according to measures defined in law)
+c) public transport in areas not under AL responsibility
+d) management and protection of the environment
+e) plant and animal life in conservation areas
+f) housing, culture and sports
+g) primary health care
+h) primary, secondary and technical and vocational education
+i) tourism, folklore, handicrafts and local fairs
+j) hotel management (up to 3-star establishments)
+k) promotion of local investment
+l) water and sanitation
+m) industry and trade
+n) roads and bridges of local, district and provincial interest
+o) prevention and fight against natural disaster
+p) promotion of local development
+q) territorial planning and development
+r) rural and community development
+s) other competencies, as determined by law
+
+
+**46.** **The subsequent laws and implementing regulations should clearly define the**
+**specific respective competencies of provinces and districts,** including their role in the
+investment and development of infrastructure or equipment; the transfer of and responsibility for
+required staffing, operations and associated assets. As was discussed above (see Section B), many
+functions have already been deconcentrated to the province and especially district level. For
+example, in the education sector, districts receive funding for the operation of primary schools
+from the Ministry of Education while the construction of primary schools is handled by the
+provinces. In the area of public works, districts receive an allocation from the Road Fund of two
+million meticais per district for the repair and maintenance of unclassified (district) roads.
+
+
+**47.** **Some inherent responsibilities for ensuring management and organization of**
+**public space are included as competencies of the Provincial Executive Council in the draft**
+**Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized**
+**Provincial Governments.** For example, article 42 of the draft includes the authority of the
+Executive Council to propose declaration of public need with effect of expropriation (h); order the
+total or partial demolition of buildings or other construction which pose a threat to public health
+and safety (k); decide on the administration of public water sources ( _àguas públicas)_ under their
+jurisdiction (j); and, propose to the Assembly and the tutelle the attribution of place names
+(atribuição de topónimos _)_ (i). The table in Annex 1 indicates the types of functions /
+responsibilities that are under the responsibility of the regional / provincial level in a range of
+other countries in Africa, Asia and Europe.
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+**48.** **The sectorial ministries are currently in the process of developing proposals for the**
+**decentralization of specific functions to provinces and districts, as per the request of the**
+**Ministry of State Administration and Public Service.** As of this writing, proposals had been
+received for the areas of health; education; roads; and, water resource management and water
+supply. The proposals for health and education have been communicated to the FAD team.
+Based on these proposals as well as the discussions with the three sectorial Ministries, there is
+clearly some confusion between the notions of deconcentration (already widely implemented in
+Mozambique) and decentralization (See Box 1.2). The implications for financial decentralization
+of elected Provincial / District Assemblies and Governors / Administrators are not clear, as is a
+confusion between a unitary system and unified budget (see discussion in paragraph 30, above).
+
+
+**Box 1.2. Comments on Initial Proposals for Decentralization in Education Sector**
+
+The Ministry of Education has proposed competencies to be transferred to decentralized governance organs
+(Provinces and Districts) in the areas of primary and general education as well as adult literacy. The
+competencies and functions proposed appear to be quite extensive, including management, oversight,
+policy (development of local curriculum content), training, etc.
+
+
+However, there are also considerable overlaps between the functions for the Provincial Executive council and
+the District Executive Council. For example, both are expected to:
+-Develop the content of local curricula
+-Plan, organize and promote school sports
+-Plan, build and maintain school infrastructure and equipment
+
+
+The text does not indicate what is the difference between the detailed overlapping activities that would be
+the responsibility of both Province and District level, which would make the management and allocation of
+funding challenging and risks creating confusion on the ground in practice.
+
+
+**49.** **The fiscal pillar of the decentralization process will necessarily involve the transfer**
+**of respective staff, equipment, building and other related assets.** It is not clear in the
+instructions provided to the sectorial ministries for the elaboration of their proposals whether it
+was indicated that the decentralization process would necessarily involve such transfers.
+However, as was clear from the team’s discussions with three sectorial ministries (Health,
+Education, and Public Works), this issue did not appear to have been previously
+mentioned/discussed between the MAEFP and the respective line Ministries.
+
+
+**50.** **There exist some key principles to consider in the allocation of expenditure**
+**responsibilities to decentralized entities.**
+
+**a.** **Exclusivity:** Expenditure responsibilities given to subnational government should
+
+generally be exclusive to ensure accountability for resourcing and delivery of the
+related services;
+**b.** **Authority:** Subnational governments should be given the full range of powers
+
+associated with the fulfillment of their responsibilities including ownership of assets
+used in their delivery, employment of relevant staff, and regulation of related
+activities;
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+**c.** **Compensation:** Local authorities should be given adequate revenues to cover their
+
+expenditure responsibilities through a combination of own revenues, shared taxes,
+and intergovernmental transfers;
+**d.** **Subsidiarity:** Expenditure responsibilities should be assigned to the level of
+
+government best able to execute them efficiency and effectively; and,
+**e.** **Equity:** All citizens should be entitled to a basic level of public services with
+
+redistribution of resources where necessary.
+
+**Recommendation 1.7 - IMMEDIATE**
+
+ - Guidance should be given to the sectorial ministries of some key norms to take into
+consideration in the identification of competencies and authorities to transfer and the
+adoption of some key principles, for example:
+
+ - _**Exclusivity**_ to the specific entity to ensure accountability for resources and
+delivery.
+
+ - _**Authority**_ on full range of powers to exercise the respective responsibilities.
+
+ - _**Compensation**_ with the provision of adequate revenues to cover expenditure
+responsibilities.
+
+**Recommendation 1.8 - IMMEDIATE**
+
+ - Information / instructions should be given to the sectorial ministries that every transfer of
+competency / function that is being proposed is to be accompanied by the transfer to
+the authority of the provinces of the related personnel, equipment and buildings
+associated with their effective implementation.
+
+**Recommendation 1.9 - 2-3 MONTH HORIZON**
+
+ - The MEF jointly with the MAEFP should prepare a methodology for a survey/census
+process to identify the specific personnel and assets to be transferred to the provinces
+based on the proposed competencies they have proposed.
+
+**Recommendation 1.10 - 5-8 MONTH HORIZON**
+
+ - Relevant sectorial ministries should establish survey sector teams and train in the survey
+methodology
+
+ - The sectorial ministries with MAEFP and MEF should prepare a census/survey of existing
+buildings / equipment / etc. for each of the proposed competencies and identify any
+existing liabilities and debts which should not be transferred.
+
+**F. Provincial Resources – Transfers from the State**
+
+
+**51.** **Intergovernmental transfers for the financing of decentralized entities can usually**
+**be divided into two main categories: unconditional transfers and conditional transfers.**
+Within these categories are a number of variations, for example on how the overall pool for
+transfer is defined, the types of formulae for allocation of the funds among the Provinces or
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+Districts, the extent of equalization which is built into the system and the allocation formulae. In
+all cases it is important that the process of determining the overall pool, and the allocation
+formulae (criteria and their respective weights) are transparent and published.
+
+
+**52.** **Unconditional transfers** **are usually allocated for general budget support with no**
+**strings or conditions attached** (other than the funds must be spent on the legally attributed
+functions and services of the decentralized entity). In many decentralized countries, such an
+unconditional transfer serves to address the vertical fiscal imbalance between the expenditures
+under local jurisdiction and their revenue raising responsibilities. Such transfers are typically
+mandated by law and are usually formulae-based. At the start of the first mandate of the new
+Provincial decentralized entities, it would be possible to develop an unconditional transfer for the
+Provinces that covers their basic expenditure needs (single pool) only if their functions and
+competencies have been clearly defined. It would also require that there are good skills in
+budget planning, development and management within the provincial administration.
+
+
+**53.** **International experience in unconditional transfers and the pros and cons.**
+
+ - Mozambique already has an example of an unconditional transfer for the _autarquias_
+_locais_, the Local Authorities Compensation Fund, which is based on a formula with two
+criteria (FCA, which was described above under paragraph 23). Other international
+examples of unconditional transfer include:
+
+ - France which distributes the Dotation _globale_ de _fonctionnement_, allocated to
+communes and _départements_ according to a formula that includes a fixed amount
+per commune, land area, compensation for past local resource modifications, a
+revenue guarantee and the presence of national parks on communal territory.
+
+ - Kenya distributes a county equitable share which includes five criteria in the
+allocation formulae: population (45%), equal share (26%), poverty index (18%), land
+area (8%), fiscal effort by countries (2%) and a development factor (1%).
+
+ - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a single unconditional transfer is that it would give Provinces
+greater autonomy in the development of their own budgets and could require only a
+simpler budget line management and reduce the number of transfers to Provinces that
+would need to be tracked. Arguments that are against ( _cons_ ) adopting such an
+unconditional transfer for Provinces include that it will entail more careful review of the
+Provincial draft budget and could _a priori_, result in less protection for national priorities,
+as well as place greater burdens on Provincial budget management.
+
+
+**54.** **Conditional transfers are attached to specific purposes and the conditionality can**
+**be more or less broad.** For example, a conditional block grant for roads could cover
+maintenance, rehabilitation and investment in Provincial (regional roads). Separate conditional
+envelopes could be proposed in the education sector, where there could be separate envelope
+each for payroll, for goods & services and for investment. These would be an example of inputbased condition. Such transfers require reporting on the actual spending and the budget and
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+service delivery performance linked to conditions. Conditional grants, whether block or inputbased can also be allocated among the Provinces according to a formula.
+
+
+**55.** **International experience in conditional transfers and the pros and cons.** Many
+decentralized countries have implemented conditional sectoral grants.
+
+ - In Uganda and Rwanda, there are sector conditional grants which are subdivided by type
+of economic expenditures (payroll, goods and services). In the case of Rwanda, nonpayroll conditional grants are allocated according to a formula developed by the
+respective line Ministries and published by the Ministry of Finance.
+
+ - Colombia distributes a conditional fund (the SGP) which requires that specific
+percentages be allocated to targeted sectors: education (59%), health (25%), water and
+sanitation (5%), and general purpose (11%).
+
+ - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a sector block or conditional transfers is that funding would
+be ensured for payroll; there could more oversight on the funding for national priorities;
+and based on the formula, it could ensure better correction of past inequitable revenue
+allocation.
+
+ - Arguments against ( _cons_ ) instituting conditional grants include that each sector line
+Ministry would have to develop a formula for allocation, and make sure that this formula
+corrects for past inequitable allocation; and, it places more limits on provincial decisionmaking.
+
+
+**56.** **In addition to general unconditional and conditional transfers, many countries have**
+**instituted separate allocations for capital projects.** Many of these funds are generated
+through development partner financed programs and often involve an element of performance
+and the meeting of certain required conditions.
+
+ - Examples of performance based conditional capital grants include Ghana’s District
+Development Fund and Tunisia’s _Dotation Globale Non-Affectée._ In both cases, the local
+governments (District Assemblies in Ghana, communes in Tunisia) can select the specific
+projects, but they must be infrastructure projects.
+
+ - Rwanda has its own domestically developed capital projects grant, which is administered
+by the Local Authorities Development Agency to which 10% of Rwanda domestic budget
+revenues are allocated. About 75% of that amount is allocated to the districts by a
+formula (40% population / 20% surface area / 40% poverty). Each District then takes its
+capital grant envelope and allocates the funds among projects, with some guidance
+based on national priorities. In recent years, about 60% of the amount had to be
+allocated to national priorities (education, health, feeder roads, environmental protection
+and agriculture) and the remaining 40% could be allocated to other District priorities.
+
+ - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a specific resource envelope for capital expenditures is that
+this financing approach could ensure a minimum of capital development in provinces;
+help correct for past inequitable development; and, enable provinces to select their
+priority projects within the limits of the conditionality.
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+- Arguments that are against ( _cons_ ) adopting such an unconditional transfer for Provinces
+is whether there would be sufficient funds available to enable development of more than
+micro-sized projects.
+
+
+**57.** **For both unconditional and conditional transfers, a clear system for determining**
+**the pool of funds will be an essential step in setting the Provincial resource framework (** see
+Box 1.3). In the first year, the total amount will likely be determined by the amount of existing
+budget which has been allocated for the respective services (or the total for all the services to be
+transferred to the Provinces). In the case of a single amount, the total could be associated with or
+calculated according to a share of central government fiscal revenues (as is the case currently
+with the FCA). If the transfers are broken down by sector envelope the law should set principles
+for how these conditional grants will evolve over time. In both cases, these approaches would
+provide some predictability to the provinces on the overall resource pool to enable them to
+prepare their medium-term expenditure framework.
+
+
+**Box 1.3. International Lessons Learned: Setting the Size of the Transfer Pool**
+
+From the points of view of both the grantor and recipient governments, it is generally advisable that the
+total pool of resources to be distributed in general-purpose transfers be set in a stable but flexible way (for
+example, as a percentage of central taxes, adjustable every few years). (Smart, 2007)
+
+
+Pools based on a predefined portion of national revenues in the current or recent fiscal year can provide an
+increased degree of certainty to subnational authorities that they will, in fact, receive the transfers. This
+approach can also ensure a growing source of revenues for subnational governments if the pool is tied to
+buoyant revenue sources such as income tax. The potential downside is that, by inflexibly dedicating a
+proportion of national revenues to subnational governments, the center will lose some control over
+macroeconomic fiscal policy. (Schroeder, 2003)
+
+
+**58.** **There are also some general guidelines to consider in the development of allocation**
+**formulae.** These general criteria are presented in Box 1.4 below. It is important in considering
+the types of allocation criteria that information be easily available, viable, reliable, and cannot be
+manipulated.
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+**Box 1.4. Criteria for the Design of Fiscal Transfers**
+
+**Predictability.** Shares of Provincial governments in the formula should remain stable over the medium-term
+(once a system is established). The grant mechanism could ensure predictability of subnational
+governments’ share by publishing multi-year (say, 3-5 years) projections of funding availability.
+
+
+**In accordance with changes in the economic growth rate.** The design should account for the central
+government’s capacity to provide transfers. During periods of fiscal austerity, transfers to subnational
+governments may have to decrease. When the economy improves, transfers may increase.
+
+
+**Simplicity.** The allocation to subnational governments should be based on objective factors over which
+individual Provinces have little control.
+
+
+**Transparency.** The transfer formula should be disseminated widely, and the basis of allocation should be
+clear.
+
+
+**Non-Discretionary budgetary allocation/Not subject to manipulation.** Formula-based revenue sharing is
+consistent with this objective. Potential recipients should not be able to manipulate their eligibility, nor the
+amount received.
+
+
+**Revenue adequacy** Subnational governments should have adequate revenues to carry out their designated
+responsibilities.
+
+
+**Equity.** Allocated funds should vary directly with fiscal need factors and inversely with the revenue raising
+capacity (fiscal potential).
+
+
+**Incentive for sound fiscal management.** The proposed design should provide incentives for sound fiscal
+management and discourage inefficient practices. There should be no specific transfers to finance
+operational deficits of subnational governments.
+
+
+**Generally perceived as fair.** The design should be perceived by all as objective and fair. It should rely on
+data that is readily available and recognized as valid and reliable.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.11 – 1-2 MONTH HORIZON**
+
+ - Pending greater clarity on the specific competencies for Provinces and their costs, the
+fiscal decentralization law should establish basic principles and guidelines which would
+need to be met by the MEF and sectorial ministries that are preparing the transfer
+allocations to finance Provincial competencies. These include:
+
+ - Required development and documentation of formulae for allocation among
+provinces
+
+ - Required consideration of the key guidelines pertaining to formula development
+(as proposed in Box F.2)
+
+ - Justification that the funding allocation is more equitable than the past
+distribution of resources
+
+**Recommendation 1.12 - 4-8 MONTH HORIZON**
+
+ - MEF should review with each Ministry current amount of budget allocation for the
+proposed competencies and determine an allocation formula.
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+- Allocation formulae may in an initial period be determined by each overall sector, taking
+into consideration that a formula should be:
+
+ - _**Simple**_ and based on objective factors, with available data
+
+ - _**Predictable**_ with shares to remain stable of first few years to support Provincial
+planning and service delivery
+
+ - _**Transparent**_ so that the basis of the allocation is clear
+
+ - The MEF could consider an operating transfer which would consist of the following types
+of envelopes
+
+ - One conditional grant for covering payroll expenditures
+
+ - A basic pool with discretionary allocation for provincial executive council,
+administration and assembly operational costs, allocated among provinces by a
+clear formula
+
+ - One individual envelope per sector for goods and services (such as for provincial
+/ regional roads maintenance, environmental protection, each allocated among
+the provinces according to a formula which could include general criteria
+(population, surface area) and specific criteria relevant to the specific area of
+competency
+
+ - The formula used could be included as an annex to the State budget
+
+**G. Provincial Resources – Own Source Revenues**
+
+
+**59.** **The Constitutional Amendment does not provide any detail about the potential**
+**sources of financing of the provinces and districts.** The Constitution does state that the
+creation and modification of taxes is an attribute of the State (Article 139 (n). Only in the draft
+Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized Provincial
+Governments, does the definition of financial autonomy mention that Provinces may dispose of
+own revenues.
+
+
+**60.** **Provinces’ own source revenues may be limited in first period to service charges**
+**and fees.** While the provinces will not be able to create their own taxes, it is understood from
+discussion with officials of the MEF that the intention is that they should be able to levy service
+charges and fees. MEF officials are also concerned that the provinces do not abuse this fiscal
+prerogative by imposing numerous new charges that weigh on the population.
+
+
+**61.** **Service charges and fees can generally be categorized in three general types** : i) a
+direct charge for a service (water usage, public transport); ii) payment for a license or permit to
+carry out an activity or obtain some certificate, etc. (restaurant liquor license, issuance of copy of
+birth certificate, construction permit, etc.); and, iii) payment for use of public space (outdoor
+advertising supports, restaurant sidewalk terraces). In a first period, the specific charges and fees
+to be transferred to the provinces should be directly linked to the functions and competencies
+which are to be transferred to them.
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+**62.** **It needs to be identified whether the legal framework has to be amended for**
+**provinces to levy service charges and fees.** As the list of potential provincial charges and fees
+is speculative, a key unknown is how these revenue sources are presently regulated in law and or
+other legal or regulatory instruments. In considering this framework, it could be possible for the
+central government to set rate ceilings or ensure that there is some guiding process to avoid
+overcharging of residents.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.13 - 3-8 MONTH HORIZON**
+
+ - During the process of identification of competencies, the joint Ministry – MEF – MAEFP
+teams should identify what service fees, charges or other non-tax revenue may be
+associated with the competencies to be transferred
+
+ - Identify the legal framework for the levying and collection of those fees and whether
+amendments will be required to enable transfer of the revenue source to the authority of
+the province
+
+ - Identify as well if any personnel, assets or equipment are associated with the respective
+charges and fees to be transferred
+
+**H. Transitional Approach for Fiscal Decentralization Law**
+
+
+**Decentralized Provinces – Kick off – January 1st, 2020**
+
+
+**63.** **The fiscal decentralization law should include transitional provisions given the**
+**short time left until the elections, scheduled to take place in October 2019.** The available
+timeframe is not sufficient to properly plan and build consensus on all competencies, resources,
+staffing and asset/equipment to be transferred to Provinces. In some matters, time consuming
+survey/census processes will be necessary to identify the specific personnel and assets to be
+transferred. Furthermore, the mission noticed some confusion between the notions of
+deconcentration and decentralization among government officials taking the lead in the process
+within the MEF and relevant sectors. Therefore, very specific transitional provisions are essential
+to make decentralized provinces operational beginning January 1 [st], 2020.
+
+
+**64.** **Such provisions should focus on the budget cycle for the coming years, in**
+**particular, during the first provincial autonomous mandate 2020-2024.** In accordance with
+the current legal calendar, the state budget proposal should be submitted by September 30 [th]
+and approved by December 15 [th], which means that, as per the law, the provincial elected
+Governors would execute in 2020 a budget formulated in 2019; therefore, not deliberated by the
+incoming elected provincial legislature. The mission was informed that, although not provided
+for in the PFM legislation, it is common practice, in electoral years, to postpone budget
+formulation to the beginning of the following year. Therefore, it is expected the 2020 budget to
+be submitted to parliament by March and approved by April/May 2020. The legal frameworks
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+provide the rule of twelfths [8] to be put in place whenever the budget law is not approved by the
+beginning of a fiscal year.
+
+
+**65.** **The mission recommends a two-phase approach.** For the first phase to take place in
+2020, transitional provisions should set up budget allocations for all provincial SU based on the
+rule of twelfths, for a maximum of six months, to allow for the budget law to be approved by the
+incoming provincial legislatures. The approved 2020 budget law should allocate budget ceilings
+for operational expenditures of provinces following the same approach currently in use.
+Furthermore, the same current resource envelope rule (see paragraph 13) regarding acquisition
+of goods and services and capital expenditures (investments) should be in place. Continuity of
+ongoing investment projects should be mandatory.
+
+
+**66.** **The second phase to commence in 2021 should provide for more aggregate budget**
+**ceilings for provinces, by sector, based on their competences which were decided in the**
+**previous year as a result of decentralization** . Going forward, the changes in the budget cycle
+will evolve progressively over the first provincial mandate as PFM capacities at the local level are
+built and decentralization decisions are taken. Decentralization of responsibilities and resources
+should follow the principles described in previous sections.
+
+
+**67.** **Analyzing the activities already under provincial administration and the**
+**corresponding SU’s budget structure would be helpful for deciding on decentralized**
+**provincial responsibilities and resources.** For example:
+
+
+- **Health Sector:** Provincial governments already administer large provincial hospitals, rural
+hospitals and health centers dispersed all over the country, including running procurement
+processes, the payroll and operating expenses. The provincial hospitals are SUs in the state
+budget while the other health units are financed by the health provincial directorates;
+directorates being SUs in the state budget. All these health institutions carry out programs
+and activities to provide health services, mainly primary health care, which is subject to
+decentralization. Therefore, the decentralization of competencies to Provinces can be linked
+to existing primary health care units.
+
+
+- **Education Sector:** Provincial governments execute the major part of investments in the
+education sector through the provincial directorates for education and human development.
+Such directorates are SUs in the state budget running investment projects in primary and
+secondary education, mainly construction and renewal of schools. The decentralization of
+competencies to Provinces in education can be linked to those directorates.
+
+
+- **Road Sector:** Provincial directorates for public works are responsible for maintaining the
+18,000 km long regional highway system under desirable conditions, while the national
+agency for roads takes responsibility over the 12,000 km long national highway system. Both
+
+
+8 Article 27 of Sistafe law. The rule of twelfths authorizes monthly spending ceilings of one twelfth of the budget
+appropriations for the preceding fiscal year.
+
+
+37
+
+
+
+systems are integrated in the so-called “classified” highways network, funded by earmarked
+revenues through the road fund. 80% of the fund resources, collected in the form of excise
+tax on fuel, is devoted to the network. All directorates and the agency are SUs, allowing for
+anchoring the decentralization in the road sector on those directorates.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.14.** Include transitional provisions to the fiscal decentralization law focused
+on the budget cycle for the coming years, in particular, the first autonomous provincial mandate
+2020-2024.
+
+
+**Recommendation 1.15.** Transitional provisions to be designed on a two-phase approach to take
+place over the first autonomous provincial mandate (2020-2024).
+###### **II. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT** **AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL**
+
+
+**A. Introduction**
+
+
+**68.** **The Government of Mozambique has received substantial technical assistance in**
+**recent years – from the IMF and other partners – on budget execution and cash**
+**management.** This has been primarily diagnostic and has discussed issues arising from a lack of
+budget credibility, ineffective budget execution processes, and poor cash management. [9] These
+problems are evidenced by the existence of a large stock of expenditure arrears and the
+imposition of strict cash rationing when responding to requests for payment of budget
+expenditures by SUs. With support from the IMF, the government has prepared a strategy to
+clear the arrears accumulated by end 2017 and take measures to prevent emergence of new
+arrears.
+
+
+**69.** **The current mission has, at the express request of the authorities, concentrated on**
+**determining and discussing various actions to resolve the issues found during previous**
+**diagnostic TA and implement the strategy mentioned above.** The mission has looked at the
+budget execution process and how it could be reformed to deal appropriately with the effects of
+non-credible budgeting and the avoidance of expenditure arrears. The government has not yet
+started to implement effective cash management. The mission provided guidance on the steps
+needed to build capacity in the MEF and the SUs for effective use of commitment controls,
+producing the required cash flow forecasts, and active cash management operations.
+
+
+9 In particular, see FAD-AFRITAC South ‘ _Strategy for Restoring the Expenditure Chain and Improving Financial_
+_Programming_ ’ Helis _et al,_ June 2018.
+
+
+38
+
+
+
+**B. Budget Execution Reform**
+
+
+**70.** **Despite a comprehensive expenditure arrears clearance program put in place since**
+**an inventory was determined by end 2017, further arrears continue to arise.** It is clear that
+attempts to execute a non-credible budget lead to the inability to make payments on all
+government budget obligations during the fiscal year. Such obligations, having already been
+committed by SUs – mostly under their legally appropriated budgets [10] - for the delivery of
+required goods and services, add to the existing stock of expenditure arrears and continue to
+adversely affect the reputation of the government and the cost of the goods and services it
+needs. At the time of this mission, the Ministries of Education and Health indicated that they
+were likely to accumulate significant amounts of additional arrears; the total amount of
+accumulated unpaid invoices in these ministries during 2018 were MT 2 billion (US$ 32 million)
+and MT 40 million (US$ 0.64 million) respectively.
+
+
+**71.** **The budget has lacked credibility in past years in the estimates of all elements**
+**making up its composition – revenues; expenditures; and deficit financing.** Overestimation
+of revenues coupled with unanticipated increases in payrolls have contributed to recent
+shortages of cash resources during budget execution. In addition, previous large expenditure
+arrears were caused by sudden withdrawal of budget support from donors.
+
+
+**72.** **Little or no control to adjust budget expenditures has occurred during times of**
+**cash shortages.** Strict cash rationing has caused payments to be reduced at such times even
+though government obligations continue to be incurred. The recommended method of
+managing execution of the budget during periods when cash shortages are anticipated is to
+control commitments of budget expenditures. This means that the level of obligations is reduced
+rather than deferring payments for previously incurred obligations. This process of budget
+management is used by many countries in the region and across the world where there is a
+reasonably high possibility that revenues may fall short of budget estimates.
+
+
+**Initiating Active Use of Commitment Controls**
+
+
+**73.** **The e-SISTAFE system and the SISTAFE law are already designed to handle**
+**commitment controls** **[11]** **.** However, the business processes have not been implemented. SUs do
+not enter commitments as they are made and the system does not check proposed
+commitments against the remaining level of budget appropriation or commitment ceiling. As
+described in previous reports, SUs sign contracts to obtain goods and services and wait until they
+receive these before informing the system of these obligations. The system does, however,
+require recording a commitment but this is only performed after the Treasury provides a cash
+
+
+10 Issues concerning expenditures in excess of appropriations – particularly payrolls – are considered in the
+section on expenditure controls.
+
+11 June 2108 report – _Ibid._
+
+
+39
+
+
+
+ceiling to the SUs based on their requests for paying the associated invoices. This process occurs
+on a weekly basis with the Treasury providing cash releases against requests determined by the
+available cash resources.
+
+
+_**First stage of implementing commitment control (through e-SISTAFE MEX module)**_
+
+
+**74.** **To reform these processes, it is necessary to implement a step-by-step approach**
+**which starts with making correct use of the commitment methodology.** Initially, the MEF
+must configure the e-SISTAFE to accept commitment proposals as they are made by the SUs
+against an authorized commitment ceiling. The system, at this stage, needs to be able to accept
+commitment ceilings for SUs for a longer time horizon at a high-level of economic classification –
+payrolls; recurrent expenditures; capital expenditures. Only at a later stage, will a more detailed
+level of classification be needed for control purposes. The MEF should be able to change these
+ceilings at any point in the fiscal year.
+
+
+**75.** **When a commitment proposal is entered by an SU in real time, the system will**
+**check to see if the available commitment ceiling is adequate to allow it to proceed.** If not, it
+will be rejected. If it is allowed, a commitment note (CN) is produced by the system for printing.
+The CN will have a unique code number which identifies that particular contract. At the same
+time, the commitment ceiling will be provisionally reduced by the contractual amount. For
+contracts covering a multi-year period, the reduction amount will be the value expected to be
+paid in the current fiscal year only.
+
+
+**76.** **Once the system has accepted the commitment and the CN has been produced, the**
+**contract should be signed in conjunction with its lawful approval by the Administrative**
+**Tribunal.** Following the legal finalization of the contract, the commitment must be formally
+entered into the e-SISTAFE where the appropriate commitment ceiling reduction is confirmed in
+real time for the contracted financial value. If the contract does not come to fruition, the SU
+should enter this fact into the system where the CN will be cancelled, and the commitment
+ceiling returned to its pre-proposal value. If the SU fails to return to the system for a formal
+confirmation or cancellation of the proposal, its commitment ceiling will remain at the reduced
+level and a reminder sent after a fixed time to demand a conclusion to the commitment
+proposal.
+
+
+**77.** **This use of the CN is designed to provide a strict incentive to the SUs to adhere to**
+**this business process for entering all commitments into the system at the point of**
+**contracting.** An official circular is required to specify the new process and its commencement
+date. In addition, the MEF must use outreach methods to indicate to all government suppliers
+that, from the date of implementation, no contract entered into with a government entity will be
+valid for subsequent payment unless it is attached to a unique, and verifiable, CN. If this outreach
+is successful, no contracts will be signed which have not been passed by the commitment control
+functionality of the e-SISTAFE and recorded in the system.
+
+
+40
+
+
+
+**78.** **For this first stage of commitment control, it is recommended that the budget is**
+**managed in the same way as at present.** Currently, the MEF uses its authority to reduce the
+available budget allocations on expenditure classification heads by withholding ten to fifteen
+percent of their value. This constraint is applied in a broad manner across the SUs and should be
+formally used to operate as a commitment ceiling. With the new automated commitment control
+process, the same constraint can be set through the commitment ceilings entered into the
+system. In this manner, the SUs will initially see no difference in their budget execution other
+than the requirement to undergo a commitment ceiling check by the system before signing a
+contract.
+
+
+_**Second stage of implementing commitment control (through the MPE module)**_
+
+
+**79.** **While the first stage of commitment control described above will be a good start to**
+**capture all commitments in real time, it should be followed by further measures during the**
+**second stage to fully resolve the problem of over-execution of a non-credible budget.**
+Unless the broad budget withholding factor is equal to, or greater than, the overall budget
+resource shortfall, it will not be capable of avoiding unpaid expenditure obligations. Moreover,
+the blanket reduction envisaged will be unsuitable for certain expenditure lines. These could
+include non-discretionary items such as debt service, salaries, continuous contracts such as
+utilities and medicines, and other vital government services.
+
+
+**80.** **As described in the June 2018 TA report,** **[12]** **the most appropriate method of**
+**ensuring that expenditure arrears are unlikely to occur is through active budget**
+**management.** This entails deciding, at certain points during the year, what level of commitments
+are to be permitted. The cash flow forecasts for the period ahead should provide suitable
+information to show whether commitment levels need to be reduced. If revenues are projected
+to fall short of the budget estimate, and assuming the fiscal deficit target is fixed, expenditures
+must be reduced accordingly before they have been committed.
+
+
+**81.** **Decisions restricting permission to make appropriated expenditures must be taken**
+**with sufficient authority** . The establishment of a high-level cash management committee
+(CMC) at the MEF should normally command this level of seniority. For this purpose, it should be
+chaired by the Minister of Finance with delegation, as necessary, to the Permanent Secretary. [13]
+The committee should consist of senior management officials of the MEF including those
+responsible for budget, Treasury (including the cash management unit (CMU) – see below),
+macrofiscal unit (see below), revenue authority, and senior officials of the BoM. The committee
+should have the authority to invite senior management officials from large sector ministries to
+attend its meetings as necessary. Sample terms-of-reference for the CMC is provided in Annex II.
+
+
+12 _Ibid._
+
+13 The CMC would be more strategic than the current Ministerial Consultative Council which meets weekly to
+determine cash availability and urgent needs.
+
+
+41
+
+
+
+**82.** **A regular senior MEF management decision is required to issue commitment**
+**ceilings through quarterly budget releases to SUs.** Using information provided by its
+members – particularly the CMU cash flow forecasts (see below) – the CMC would decide the
+overall commitment envelope suitable for the forthcoming quarter of the fiscal year. It would
+instruct the Directorate of National Budget (DNB) to issue the necessary commitment ceilings to
+the SUs. The ceilings would then be entered into the e-SISTAFE for automatic control in the same
+manner as described above.
+
+
+**83.** **Quarterly budget releases have been found to be the most suitable in countries**
+**which use this method of budget management** . Many governments have moved gradually
+from strict cash rationing to monthly budget releases and then to quarterly releases. During this
+process, it is often found that monthly releases do not provide sufficient time for control of the
+one-off, large, volatile expenditure items usually targeted. These items normally have significant
+contractual lead times and they need to be committed early in the fiscal year. Effective control of
+commitments is often performed later in the year when revenue shortfalls become more evident.
+
+
+**84.** **The DNB should be responsible for allocating the requisite commitment ceilings to**
+**those SU expenditure lines which are discretionary in nature and would not adversely**
+**affect government business.** Given its close relationships with SU budget managers, the DNB
+should have the experience to decide where commitment cuts could be most effective for
+dealing with an expected drop in available cash resources in the coming three months. Those
+expenditures planned to be committed during the coming period would be carefully analyzed
+and one-off items which least affect the provision of government policy would be selected for
+reduction or delay. These would normally be related to new or continuing project
+implementation. Depending on the size of the required cuts to committed spending, further
+discretionary lines would be reduced.
+
+
+**85.** **For this budget management process to be effective, the MEF needs to be able to**
+**forecast future government cash flows with reasonable accuracy.** This entails understanding
+the procurement plans of the SUs; debt servicing flows; payrolls and emoluments; and recurrent
+expenditures. These would need to be modelled as projected outflows from the treasury single
+account (CUT). Relevant projected inflows would be projected revenues, debt issuance, and aid
+receipts. Consequently, it is unlikely that this stage can be implemented before the MPE module
+of e-SISTAFE is configured for the provision of such data and rolled out to those SUs which have
+a significant impact on the overall government cash resource envelope.
+
+
+**86.** **The same commitment control process through the e-SISTAFE system set up in the**
+**first stage would be used to control budget execution.** The quarterly budget releases would
+act as commitment ceilings within the system but would need to be highly flexible and subject to
+change. It should be planned to control budget releases quarterly, but the associated
+commitment ceilings should be capable of amendment as soon as significant new information
+on future cash resources (higher or lower) was available.
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+**Establishing a macrofiscal unit for improving the credibility of revenue forecasts**
+
+
+**87.** **The cash flow forecasts leading to flexible budget management are critically**
+**dependent on accurate, realistic revenue forecasts** . For this purpose, a macrofiscal unit should
+be established with experienced macroeconomists responsible for forecasting the effects of
+changing economic variables and conditions on the budget revenue estimates. Instead of
+creating a new unit, one of the existing units analyzing macrofiscal related issues—Either the
+Macro studies unit or Fiscal Risks Management Unit—could be assigned this task of preparing
+and updating revenue forecasts. This is a specialized task and will require some technical
+assistance to implement.
+
+
+**88.** **It should be noted that, although information from the revenue authorities is a**
+**necessary input, it should not be the sole basis for forecasting future revenue flows.**
+Revenue authorities have collection targets to meet and their forecasts will often not be realistic.
+If revenue collection amounts are showing a shortfall during the year, the revenue authorities will
+be tempted to predict that they will raise enough revenue during the remainder of the year to
+meet the budget target. Even though they may understand that this is unlikely due to
+macroeconomic developments, they are not likely to admit this in their projections. Once a
+macrofiscal unit is established, its projections should be used by the cash flow forecasters since
+these should incorporate all realistic factors.
+
+
+**Establishing a cash management unit in the Treasury**
+
+
+**89.** **A cash management unit (CMU) should be established in the Directorate of**
+**National Treasury (DNT) to perform suitable cash flow forecasting for CMC decision-**
+**making.** This unit should comprise four to six operational staff who should be proficient in
+spreadsheet data operations. The spreadsheet data should be provided by various parts of the
+government and it will be important for these staff to be able to establish good working
+relationships with their counterparties. The process of compiling and aggregating this
+information within a comprehensive spreadsheet is not complex and the required staff would not
+need to be highly skilled since no mathematical calculations are involved. Templates for the
+required cash flow information spreadsheets themselves have already been provided through
+other TA. The format of these spreadsheets and the responsibilities for populating them at
+specified intervals, including the reporting obligations of the SUs to the CMU, should be backed
+up by legally-binding provisions such as Regulations.
+
+
+**90.** **The objective of the spreadsheet analysis is to produce a profile across the fiscal**
+**year of the expected balance in the CUT.** This would show the aggregate cash resources
+available to the government at each point in time and would highlight the periods where it is
+predicted that cash shortages would arise. It should be emphasized that this profile is a forecast
+and does not need to be of accounting accuracy. Therefore, much of the input data can be
+derived from historical understanding of expenditure patterns. For example, salaries should
+follow the same pattern each year and would be expected to be reasonably smooth in profile
+
+
+43
+
+
+
+across the year unless certain special payments and bonuses exist which could be incorporated
+from their regular pattern. Goods and service expenditures are also likely to follow similar
+patterns to those in preceding years and can therefore be extrapolated in the model.
+
+
+**91.** **The expenditure projections which need to be obtained directly from individual SUs**
+**are those which are likely to be significantly large and volatile.** That is, they cannot
+reasonably be assumed to follow previous patterns. The overall objective of this work is an
+aggregate of a large amount of individual expected payments. This means that the relevance of
+small items can be low and only those items which are large in comparison to the aggregate
+totals have to be reasonably accurate. Effort should be concentrated on such items and
+relationships should be established by CMU staff with those SUs where they are likely to exist.
+Such expenditures are likely to be related to reasonably large projects.
+
+
+**92.** **The cash flow forecast model should be maintained continuously which implies that**
+**all information which changes projections significantly should be incorporated as soon as**
+**it becomes available.** The model is a dynamic projection of government cash resources and will
+also need to be updated as budget releases are decided and implemented. It will also need to
+incorporate details of large commitments which are entered into the e-SISTAFE system since
+these should provide accurate information on forthcoming contract payments as they are
+agreed.
+
+
+**93.** **Modeling government cash flow forecasts takes a long time to come to fruition.**
+The model is large and contains many variable amounts at any one time. The accuracy of the
+modeling will vary a great deal but should rapidly improve once it has begun. It is of the greatest
+importance, therefore, that this work is commenced as soon as possible. Even if the information
+is, at first, not particularly useful due to its inherent inaccuracy, it can never be improved until it is
+started. The cash flow forecasting work of a CMU is described in Box 2.1.
+
+
+44
+
+
+
+
+
+45
+
+
+
+Equally important is to:
+
+- Identify the key people at the working level in the selected revenue and spending departments, who
+will be able to supply the relevant information.
+
+- Set up formal requirements to ensure that profiles are supplied and updated.
+
+- Back the latter by informal arrangements, whereby the cash managers are given early notice of any
+major changes. In many countries these changes will need to be communicated not only in advance of
+the day being studied but also on the day itself, to ensure that any offsetting action can be taken by
+the cash managers.
+
+- The focus should be on those sums that are large in size, most variable and most unpredictable. In the
+U.K., for example, the more detailed information is collected from just 15 departments who together
+account for over 80 percent of government spending.
+
+**Outcome of effective budget management**
+
+
+**94.** **Once the process of budget releases is established and operational, it should have a**
+**significant effect on the operation of budget execution.** If cash flow forecasts are reasonably
+accurate for the quarter ahead – in particular the revenue forecast – controls on commitments
+should automatically mean that sufficient cash is available for their payment obligations. By
+understanding the payment dates and amounts of committed items in advance, and by
+restricting these to the projected cash resources, there should be no further need for cash
+releases to be made at the time of payment. Since all commitments will be entered into the
+system, no ‘surprise’ invoices should arise for which there is no available cash.
+
+
+**95.** **The current budget execution process comprises a deconcentrated payments**
+**system.** This means that payment instructions for invoices are given by the responsible SUs
+using the e-SISTAFE system. SUs request cash releases for amounts which have been invoiced or
+expect to be invoiced during the following four weeks. Weekly cash releases are then issued by
+the Treasury. Once the cash release amount is known, the SU selects the invoices to be paid and
+enters these into the e-SISTAFE. The system compiles an electronic payment instruction file which
+is sent to the BoM. The BoM makes the required payments from the CUT account to suppliers
+detailed on the file.
+
+
+**96.** **The current deconcentrated payments system is sub-optimal because the Treasury**
+**does not have full information on invoices which need to be paid.** In a cash rationing
+environment, SUs select invoices for payment at their discretion. This can lead to corrupt
+practices and also avoidance of payments. When an invoice is not selected for payment because
+the cash release cannot cover it, the invoice may be put out of sight along with other similar
+invoices. These invoices become unpaid expenditure arrears which are non-transparent to the
+Treasury or other authorities.
+
+
+**97.** **However, once the budget release process is operational through commitment**
+**controls, the payments system can effectively be centralized.** Without the need for cash
+requests and cash releases, there should be no obstacle to SUs entering all their invoices directly
+
+
+46
+
+
+
+into the system. The system would be configured so that the payment instruction file would be
+produced automatically. This file would then need to be verified to ensure that sufficient cash is
+available in the CUT. This verification process could be automated in the system based on some
+clear criteria to prioritize payments; in the interim, the Treasury could verify to ensure that
+payment instructions sent to the bank are within the available cash balance in the CUT.
+
+
+**98.** **If a continuing unanticipated cash shortfall was experienced, these withheld**
+**invoices would again build up a stock of expenditure arrears.** This would indicate poor cash
+flow forecasts and that the budget management process was operating ineffectively. However,
+the major benefits of the centralized payments system at this point would be (i) that the arrears
+would be fully transparent; and (ii) that a clear, decision-free automated system could be devised
+to select delayed invoices for payment when cash was available. This could be, for example, on a
+first-in – first-out basis. It is recommended that the Treasury should actively consider moving to a
+centralized payments system when feasible during the second stage of commitment control and
+quarterly budget release system.
+
+
+**C. Active Cash Management Operations**
+
+
+**99.** **A primary task of the CMU is to provide the CMC with monthly and quarterly cash**
+**flow forecasts to inform decisions on budget management and releases.** Once the budget is
+managed in an effective manner through this process, budget execution should become
+reasonably credible. This implies that annual committed expenditures will approximately equal
+available revenues plus budget deficit financing. In other words, the starting balance of the CUT
+will be the same as the balance at the end of the fiscal year. At that point, temporary periods of
+cash shortages and surpluses will only occur during the year as timing mismatches between
+revenue collections and expenditure payments arise.
+
+
+**100. It is the task of active cash management operations by the CMU to manage these**
+**temporary mismatch periods efficiently** . The CMU should investigate whether the timing of
+revenues, expenditures, or debt transactions can be moved to reduce these periods since this is
+the most cost-effective way of handling mismatches. Any such movement must be agreed to by
+the parties concerned so that the process does not lead to a return of enforced cash rationing.
+
+
+**101. Alternatively, periods of cash shortage need to be filled by short-term borrowings**
+**and periods of surplus are used to repay the borrowings and invest excess cash efficiently.**
+In this way, it can be assured that expenditure payments will be made as and when necessary
+without abnormal delays. This enhances the credibility of the government and generally reduces
+its costs.
+
+
+**102. As described in Box 2.1, cash flow forecasting for cash management purposes**
+**needs to be finer in detail than for budget management purposes.** The CMU will need to
+become more proficient in producing these forecasts when deciding to embark on active cash
+management operations. It is necessary to have sufficient confidence in the cash flow forecast
+
+
+47
+
+
+
+accuracy to ensure that financial transactions are appropriate to the coming cash situation and
+will not be an additional cost.
+
+
+**Using suppliers’ standard terms of payment**
+
+
+**103. The current payments system does not utilize cash efficiently and provides little**
+**assistance to the task of cash flow forecasting.** The existing system, in common with many
+other countries in the region, creates a payment instruction file from selected invoices which is
+then transmitted to the central bank for immediate payment. The government payments system
+can become more effective by using invoicing practices which are commonplace in the private
+sector.
+
+
+**104. Private sector businesses usually provide their main clients with standard payment**
+**terms.** These normally include a provision that the payment is not due until a specified period
+following issuance of the invoice – very often 30 days but possibly up to 90 days – following
+which the client is considered to be in default. The government should commence a program to
+request similar terms from all its major suppliers. The e-SISTAFE should then include the payment
+period allowed by each supplier in its file of suppliers’ details.
+
+
+**105. The e-SISTAFE would be configured to ensure that invoices were put on the**
+**payment instruction file only at the latest date of payment – 30 days after the invoice date.**
+The government would hold its cash resources for longer than at present which is more costefficient. Additionally, a major benefit would be that the e-SISTAFE can then be programmed to
+produce the payments scheduled for the following 25 days, or so. If all suppliers were on 30-day
+payment terms, this payment schedule would be a precise projection of all payments due by the
+Treasury for almost the whole coming month. Such accurate cash flow projections would greatly
+assist in active short-term cash management operations.
+
+
+**Developing the use and depth of the Treasury bill market**
+
+
+**106. The need to incur short-term borrowing to counteract timing mismatches between**
+**revenues and expenditures is usually managed by issuing Treasury bills (T bills).** The T bill
+market is normally the most liquid and cheapest way for a government to borrow for a shortterm. In Mozambique, this market will need to be developed substantially before it can be used
+for active cash management operations.
+
+
+**107. At present, the government uses an informal and convoluted method of access to**
+**the T bill market for fiscal purposes** . When necessary, the government requests the BoM to
+borrow on behalf of the Treasury in the T bill market when it performs open market operations
+for monetary policy purposes. The BoM lends the proceeds to the government which takes
+responsibility for the repayment of the T bills when they mature. This methodology is
+cumbersome and confuses the operations of monetary policy and fiscal policy which is inefficient
+for market liquidity and pricing. It is recommended that the Treasury, the debt managers, and the
+
+
+48
+
+
+
+BoM coordinate a market development program once active cash management operations can
+be implemented feasibly.
+
+
+**D. Summary of Required Activities**
+
+
+ - Configure e-SISTAFE to produce commitment notes and enforce commitment ceilings
+
+ - Inform private sector on commitment note rules
+
+ - Ensure e-SISTAFE has commitment controls/ceilings in place
+
+ - Set up CMC
+
+ - Terms of reference
+
+ - Composition
+
+ - Meeting schedule
+
+ - Training for DNB to select and enforce commitment ceilings
+
+ - Refresh rules for compliance with entering commitments into the e-SISTAFE system as
+soon as they are made
+
+ - Set up CMU
+
+ - Staffing
+
+ - Spreadsheet model
+
+ - Training
+
+ - Capacity building for large SUs
+
+ - Configure e-SISTAFE (MPE Module) to report committed payment schedules to CMU
+
+ - Set up MFU
+
+ - Training
+
+ - Refresh rules for producing, updating, and distributing procurement plans
+
+ - Consider benefits of moving to centralized payments system
+
+ - Configure e-SISTAFE to handle invoices directly
+
+ - Determine rules for payment prioritization and train Treasury
+
+ - Rules disseminated to SUs
+
+ - Discuss and implement rules to implement suppliers’ standard payment terms
+
+ - Configure e-SISTAFE to determine correct payment dates for approved invoices
+
+ - Configure e-SISTAFE to report near-term payment schedule to CMU
+
+ - Coordinate with BoM and debt management to develop short-term T bill market for cash
+management
+
+**E. Summary of Recommendations**
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.1.** Configure e-SISTAFE to control commitments through commitment
+ceilings and the issuance of commitment notes.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.2.** Conduct outreach to all sector ministries and government suppliers on
+the appropriate use of commitment notes.
+
+
+49
+
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.3.** Use the current budget withholding methodology to set commitment
+ceilings for enforcing commitment controls, and prepare and issue a circular to SUs specifying
+the new commitment control process.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.4.** Establish a Cash Management Unit (CMU) within the National Directorate
+of the Treasury to perform government cash flow forecasting and active cash management
+operations.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.5.** Establish a skilled macrofiscal unit in the MEF tasked with producing
+realistic revenue forecasts both for multiannual fiscal policy and in-year budget management
+purposes.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.6.** Establish a high-level Cash Management Committee (CMC) chaired by
+the Minister or PS to decide the quarterly commitment control envelope for implementation by
+the NDB.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.7.** Develop a capacity building program for CMU cash flow forecast
+modelling and the production of expenditure plans at large Sus.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.8.** Investigate the need for regulations on the provision and updating of
+procurement plan information, expenditure plans, revenue projections, and anticipated debt and
+aid flows to the CMU under the authority of the CMC.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.9.** Consider the advantages of centralizing the payments process within the
+e-SISTAFE once commitment controls are effective.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.10.** Consider standardizing suppliers’ payment terms within the e-SISTAFE
+system and using these to develop more accurate short-term payment forecasts.
+
+
+**Recommendation 2.11.** In coordination with the BoM and the debt managers, commence plans
+to develop the Treasury bill market specifically for cash management purposes.
+
+###### **III. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL** **AND MANAGING ARREARS**
+
+
+**A. Controlling Wage Bill Expenditure**
+
+
+**108. The authorities have successfully implemented an initiative to minimize the number**
+**of ghost workers on its payrolls** . A proof of life exercise conducted by the Inspectorate of
+Finance (IGF) covering the period from 2015 to 2017, identified 30,000 ghost employees, costing
+government USD 250 million. The proof of life initiative has been institutionalized. Specifically,
+the e-payroll has an inbuilt control to prompt SUs to notify civil servants of their month of birth.
+The onus is on each civil servant to physically prove continued employment every year during
+his/her month of birth. A failure to do so leads to the immediate suspension of a non-compliant
+civil servant’s salary on e-payroll.
+
+
+50
+
+
+
+**109. However, control of wage bill expenditure remains an area of major concern** .
+Mozambique’s wage bill as a percentage of GDP is one of the highest among low income
+countries in the region (see 3.1). The estimates and projections of Mozambican authorities and
+IMF staff indicate that employee compensation in 2019 could be as high as 11.3 percent of GDP,
+and may grow to 12.2 percent of GDP by 2022. [14] Two key areas undermining government’s
+ability to control wage bill expenditure relate to: weak establishment controls (particularly in the
+health and education sectors); and bonuses and overtime payments arising from double shift
+teaching and the long hours worked by medical staff.
+
+
+**Figure 3.1. Mozambique’s Estimated Wage Bill in 2019 Compared to Other Low-Income**
+
+**Countries in the Region**
+
+
+**110. A 2017 study of wage bill and civil service reform identified that, in 2016, bonuses**
+**and overtime payments comprised 26.2 percent and 1.5 percent respectively of the total**
+**wage bill** . [15] The report estimated that by eliminating bonuses and overtime by 25 percent per
+annum over a four-year period, government could reduce the wage bill by one percentage point
+of GDP. It does not appear that the authorities have factored this recommendation to reduce the
+wage bill. At the time of this mission, the authorities indicated that there were pending arrears on
+overtime estimated at MT 3 billion.
+
+
+**111. Staff establishment controls remain weak** . Although Statutory Decree No 1 of 2018
+delegates oversight of this function to the Ministry of State Administration and Public Function
+(MAEFP), procedural guidelines to implement this oversight process have yet to be developed. At
+present, the authorities mainly rely upon the Administrative Tribunal (AT) to approve new
+
+
+14 IMF (2018) Republic of Mozambique: 2017 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement
+by the Executive Director for the Republic of Mozambique. Report No. 18/65.
+
+15 Xiao, Y., Abdullah, C., Bender, C. and Martins, R. (2017) Republic of Mozambique: Wage Bill and Civil Service
+Reform. IMF. Technical Assistance Report.
+
+
+51
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+recruits. However, the scope of AT’s verification is limited to ensuring that all the supporting
+paperwork has been completed for a new recruit. Once the AT approves a new recruit, it issues
+an approval number. A new recruit’s personnel details can only be entered onto the payroll when
+an AT approval number has been issued. No overall check is undertaken to ensure that
+recruitments are made within the approved establishment.
+
+
+**112. The MAEFP only identifies cases where establishment ceilings have been exceeded**
+**after the event** . As new recruits are already on the e-payroll, the MEF is obliged to request for
+additional budgetary allocations to absorb the additional wage bill costs. No action appears to
+be taken to recover any resulting over-expenditure and/or to sanction this practice. There is,
+therefore, a need for the MAEFP, in collaboration with the MEF, to issue a decree to SUs
+reiterating the steps to be taken to strengthen ex-ante controls over their staff establishments,
+and sanctions to be enforced when establishment ceilings are flouted.
+
+
+**113. Going forward, the monitoring of establishment ceilings would be easier in an**
+**automated environment** . The authorities anticipate that the ongoing development of a national
+human resources management information system (SNGRH) will enable the MAEFP, MEF and the
+AT to monitor whether new recruitments are within the establishment ceilings, and link/integrate
+the three personnel control functions—establishment control, payroll administration and the
+wage bill—through concurrent updates of the personnel database in SNGRH and the e-payroll.
+The MEF would thus be in a position to incorporate establishment ceilings in the budget law and
+enforce them properly.
+
+
+**114. However, in the short-term, the following measures could usefully be undertaken.**
+The IGF could be requested to undertake a targeted audit of the process in the agriculture,
+education and health sectors with a view to assessing compliance with regulations and
+ascertaining the effectiveness of internal controls for payroll. In addition, the SUs should be
+required to maintain up to date records of actual staff numbers against the approved
+establishment, and the impact that any new recruitment will have on the establishment. These
+establishment records, which could be maintained on a spreadsheet by each SU, should be
+provided to the MAEFP to carry out checks prior to submission to the AT to approve a new
+recruit.
+
+
+**B. Managing Historical and New Arrears**
+
+
+**115. Following a stock-take of arrears for the two-year period ending December 31,**
+**2017, the authorities computed the total amount owed to suppliers at MT 19.3 billion**
+**(USD 308.8 million).** A subsequent verification exercise undertaken by the IGF validated MT 13.4
+billion (USD 214.4 million) of the total stock of arrears as bona fide. In 2018, the government
+liquidated MT 4.2 billion (USD 67.2 million) of the validated claims using resources from capital
+gains tax received from the sales of natural resource assets. In 2019, the authorities indicated that
+they will liquidate another MT 2.7 billion (US$ 43.2 million) through securitization.
+
+
+52
+
+
+
+**116. It will be necessary to undertake a second stock-take of further arrears that have**
+**accumulated from January 1, 2018.** The stock take could be partly informed by a report from
+MEX (as at December 31, 2018) on the amounts requested by SUs to settle invoices from
+suppliers but not allocated by Treasury. This information would need to be supplemented by
+data from SUs on unpaid invoices, which have not been posted on MEX. To guide the process,
+the MEF should issue a decree to guide SUs on the process and timetable. Once the stock-take is
+complete, as before, the IGF should validate the claims for their accuracy and credibility. The
+validation process is intended to verify the documentation and transactions supporting the
+claims, and ensure that costs are bona fide and have not been inflated, fraudulently claimed or
+previously settled. The validation process could also help verify whether transactions complied
+with the regulatory framework for procurement.
+
+
+**Arrears on VAT refunds and related weaknesses**
+
+
+**117. Until recently the VAT refund process was cumbersome and undermined the**
+**government’s ability to repay taxpayers promptly** . The Decree 17 of 2017, which became
+effective on January 1, 2018, seeks to simplify the process. For example: (i) taxpayers with a credit
+balance of more than a specified threshold (domestic MT 500,000 and exporters MT 20,000) can
+apply for a refund after 4 months as opposed to the previous 12 months; and (ii) an earmarked
+fund account number 1598 operated by the Treasury has been opened at the BoM with a fixed
+percentage of VAT revenue to finance refunds.
+
+
+**118. As at November 2018, the potential maximum accumulated amount of VAT refund**
+**arrears stood at MT 22.8 billion (representing about 2.6 percent of GDP)** . The authorities are
+still in the process of validating most of these refund requests, but would not have the funds at
+hand to clear them in one go. A strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears has yet to be developed.
+Furthermore, the authorities should amend, as soon as possible, the VAT law to set a time limit
+for claiming VAT refunds.
+
+
+**Maintaining an arrears monitoring system**
+
+
+**119. Currently, SUs’ payables and payment arrears are not systematically recorded,**
+**monitored or reported** . Going forward, it will be important for the authorities to institutionalize
+regular monitoring and reporting on arrears. This could be done through e-SISTAFE (MEX
+module), for example, by requiring SUs to register all invoices in the system as and when they are
+received, including their respective amounts and due dates for payment. The system could
+profile arrears by their size, maturity and composition. A close monitoring of arrears will enable
+more effective management of the existing stock of payment arrears and provide an early
+warning signal of any risks of emerging arrears.
+
+
+53
+
+
+
+**D. Summary of Recommendations**
+
+
+**Recommendation 3.1.** The IGF should undertake targeted audit of the processes and controls
+related to establishment and payroll for sectors where the problem is most prevalent (agriculture,
+education and health sectors).
+
+**Recommendation 3.2.** The MAEFP should verify information against the approved
+establishment with each request to approve a new recruit, prior to submission to the
+Administrative Tribunal. Furthermore, once the SNGRH is operational, the MEF should
+incorporate the staff establishment ceilings in the budget law.
+
+**Recommendation 3.3.** Stock-take and validate the arrears accumulated during 2018 and
+provide for their clearance in the arrears clearance strategy.
+
+**Recommendation 3.4.** The MEF should prepare a strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears.
+
+**Recommendation 3.5.** Regularly monitor and report on arrears in in-year and year-end fiscal
+reports.
+
+**Recommendation 3.6.** The MAEFP should issue a decree to SUs reiterating the steps to be
+taken, including sanctions to be enforced, when establishment ceilings are flouted.
+
+
+54
+
+
+
+**Annex I. Example of Types of Expenditure Functions for**
+
+**Regional/Provincial Level of Decentralized Governance**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|COUNTRY|ANGOLA|SOUTH AFRICA|PHILIPPINES|CROATIA|CZECH
REPUBLIC|DENMARK|FRANCE|ITALY|NETHERLANDS|NORWAY|POLAND|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|INTERMEDIATE ‐ TYPE|Provinces|Provinces|Provinces|Counties|Regions|Regions|Regions|Regions|Provinces|Counties|Regions|
+|INTERMEDIATE ‐ NO.|18|9|81|21|14|5|18|20|12|18|16|
+|||||||||||||
+|**RESPONSIBILITIES**||||||||||||
+|Regional planning|X|||X|X|X||X|X|X||
+|Economic Development|X|||X|X||X|X|X||X|
+|Education (Secondary)|X|X||X|X|||X||X||
+|Health Care (Tertiary)|X|X|X|X|X|X||X|||X|
+|Social Welfare|X|X|X|X|X|||X|X||X|
+|Social Housing||X|X|X||||||||
+|Environment|X|||||X|X|X|X|X|X|
+|Roads / Transport||X||X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|
+|Solid waste management||||X||||||||
+|Wastewater||||X||||||||
+|Culture||||||||X|X|X||
+|Agriculture||X||||||X||||
+
+
+55
+
+
+
+**Annex II. Sample Terms of Reference for a Cash Management**
+
+**Committee**
+
+**The Cash Management Committee (CMC)**
+The CMC is a high-level decision-making committee for commitment and cash prioritization and
+allocation purposes. It provides high-level support and authority for the work of the CMU. A
+broad framework of the CMC is described below.
+
+**Objectives of the CMC**
+
+ - The CMC shall advise the Minister on the processes for optimum management of the
+
+budget and government cash resources;
+
+ - It shall provide the government and BoM revenue and expenditure forecasts, and its
+
+analysis based on these forecasts. It shall project the financing gap between government
+
+inflows and outflows for each quarter, or with such periodicity as may be asked for by the
+
+MEF;
+
+ - It shall advise the government and BoM on the best modality for financing the gap;
+
+ - It shall direct the Head of the Budget Directorate regarding any commitment ceilings
+
+decided at each meeting for the specified period ahead;
+
+ - The CMC shall work under the overall guidance of the Minister of Finance and shall take
+
+directions from the Minister on its mandate and objectives;
+
+ - The CMC shall issue directives as necessary to SUs, revenue projection officials, and the
+
+debt managers to improve the accuracy of their forecasts;
+
+ - The CMC shall decide when the cashflow forecasts are sufficiently accurate that the CMU
+
+should commence active cash management operations;
+
+ - The CMC shall supervise and approve in advance, as necessary, all active cash
+
+management transactions and instruments undertaken by the CMU.
+
+ - Membership
+
+The membership of the CMC shall comprise of the following.
+a. The Minister of Finance—Chair (Alternate – Permanent Secretary)
+
+b. The Permanent Secretary
+
+c. The Head of Budget Directorate
+
+d. The Head of the Treasury
+
+e. The Head of the macrofiscal unit
+
+f. The Heads of other MEF Directorates as necessary
+
+g. A nominee of the BoM
+
+h. A nominee of revenue authority
+
+i. A minimum of two nominees of high-spending ministries
+
+j. CMC may invite any nominee as a temporary member or an observer
+
+ - The secretariat of the CMC shall be the CMU
+
+
+56
+
+
+
+- Meetings
+
+a. The CMC shall meet monthly unless otherwise determined
+
+b. The agenda for the meeting shall be prepared and all information provided to the
+
+members at least three work days prior to the meeting
+c. Any member of the CMC may call for such additional information as may be
+
+needed.
+
+
+57
+
+
+
+**Fiscal Affairs Department**
+
+International Monetary Fund
+700 19th Street NW
+Washington, DC 20431
+USA
+[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..963b496d2e3f269085e0b191d5d3480eedc24941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "208688985984ecbc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-001", "height": 771, "page": 2, "phash_256": "d0006fccb77b6ff790b94642f00a2fdfe0048ef110588e6b39dec295718627f9", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "c1569c4ef225ed41d7b09e9a501645d25e627bcc6ab7dfb5b4679f141f57201d", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2ca2d0f9b430328b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-002", "height": 44, "page": 2, "phash_256": "9c27c20e65183ca53ad03b4ad3e5a1db88bd0ed6558b8ee50eeb0e74456ea3b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "3498525da019172b76ff0e0159a8abe44cec2cabb592f21c0eabd7504ba635ba", "width": 63}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f8d4b4accccecbcf", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-003", "height": 467, "page": 2, "phash_256": "83a09c1d29e963fe7e731bd41c896d527aa6a16b581d2f8e0e165b0178ac45fe", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "7e7f6a7a6e8a499b71c225ff4cefe946cde785afdee381cdd51bf875b3a800d3", "width": 522}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9a72ec92a2929c78", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-004", "height": 123, "page": 2, "phash_256": "91000daf3bafe9016a57f19a475e16be6c4a86556c69c0f66de178c26e87f81a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "f1cff500f7cd9d1ad49776637059a20b750706dd25f7de94f8faac7a3e5208a1", "width": 131}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f2e0c36898feecfc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-005", "height": 534, "page": 2, "phash_256": "9792cb284492b5637826e49a695dd1b359e98a54336bb65a324d8dca0df795a6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "a1930862fa22f5b983cc8147140083d5f7dc57a7f0f6c4cbc1e9f77330bb7c46", "width": 314}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d2dfdfdfc8c82140", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-006", "height": 172, "page": 2, "phash_256": "81c381c3a1c3455b655bad5f851b5d197d1c85ab91ab7e885dab81abab826d4b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "dfc10874da0194d6d56f3b3ca7efc941c7f608f7a66c4c75ae1400937e83ae4c", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0a8898ea9cb4d2de", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-007", "height": 1320, "page": 2, "phash_256": "81837e3c6fc390bf767c2fc318fca31b4eb0d44ec189aee02f5e63e58c06d214", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "8a63775efae13729b3b194a25854b049702ef17f2f73504cf32d6d999f8fe6b7", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0003-001", "height": 203, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "bfd048d3c4a463ab5a75ab5e621134ada3ae5415e0dabec49f72e0d432de2c22", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0005-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8060909090904080", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0005-001", "height": 49, "page": 5, "phash_256": "f00007ff0fff7c00f01c707cf0200fff8fff7c00fc00707ef0380fc78fc77030", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "60ad455a74366b153dabc03f6d5da3e8a0dbe534dd701a1eaec23451365e2e19", "width": 763}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "960b981b2d2d1890", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-001", "height": 227, "page": 16, "phash_256": "bb0cc598c5f13e67464631bec7c8c1c1c636cf4718389cc839c9ce4e4acf873b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "00e981d6ac007b8d74b54b85d3ba0319c0f7a2fe1b296ebdcad3fb4719d5ec2f", "width": 314}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "961660606b2b1716", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-002", "height": 227, "page": 16, "phash_256": "bcbfb1c2f0e03e1e8787c3c30a5cda0b974b78704a61852f1e3d60e1d7487e1e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "d74e6117af3eb41474b5ab501c1b1c683695c34f4287c1d7bba37f03560ea1da", "width": 416}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4d0c333333221716", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0022-001", "height": 319, "page": 22, "phash_256": "bc1d9346619cc3ce3e033c11ce62e1bdc1723c6331b2e3673e123c11c6cbe1fd", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "df8a3004b384ef8d63d4b24821e78b9006588261b248280e4887681227c3fb38", "width": 502}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0047-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8f335565b1d53981", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0047-001", "height": 1035, "page": 47, "phash_256": "aaaa7ff8e0050002d41137b6f79738f5b57564b095532f756030305db7d19dc7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "3cb2786e9f6e601f1250e31c4756f7426fb8ac83ab345bb504903329a9bb6e30", "width": 778}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-026/assets/figures/cr-2023-026-fig-p0053-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "111d1c189907061d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-026-fig-p0053-001", "height": 315, "page": 53, "phash_256": "baf03a7cc6476c99c989951b3662ca27b55a955ac367b6629503c9894c9bc70f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "sha256_normalized_png": "9c79af76e972dc4c604ef68854b30162c145eddfb0cb7a0b4bf68652c138fb8e", "width": 574}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-026/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..42d01b98299473d625f1cead0341d74f2c1d3f08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-026/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/26**\n### **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n\n**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — MANAGING**\n**FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND STRENGTHENING**\n**CASH MANAGEMENT**\n\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\n\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\n\n\ntime it was completed in June 2019.\n\n\n\n_**Disclaimer:**_\n_This report was prepared in 2019 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/26\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT — MANAGING\nFISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND STRENGTHENING\nCASH MANAGEMENT\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff\n\nteam of the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the\n\ntime it was completed in June 2019.\n\n_Disclaimer:_\n_This report was prepared in 2019 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its_\n_publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time._\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 772}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-004", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-005", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-006", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0002-007"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.9129, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(-33.3519172668457, -79.14419555664062, 715.4481201171875, 462.2958068847656)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 1504, "number": 551, "size": 56855, "transform": [748.800048828125, 0.0, -0.0, 541.4400024414062, -33.3519172668457, -79.14419555664062], "width": 2080, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(-58.011905670166016, 688.915771484375, 667.7481079101562, 854.5157470703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 460, "number": 548, "size": 23145, "transform": [725.760009765625, 0.0, -0.0, 165.60000610351562, -58.011905670166016, 688.915771484375], "width": 2016, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(246.0, 417.0, 559.0, 697.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 280, "number": 538, "size": 0, "transform": [313.0, 0.0, 0.0, 280.0, 246.0, 417.0], "width": 313, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(26.0, 430.0, 214.0, 750.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 320, "number": 542, "size": 0, "transform": [188.0, 0.0, 0.0, 320.0, 26.0, 430.0], "width": 188, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(490.0, 634.0, 568.0, 707.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 73, "number": 547, "size": 0, "transform": [78.0, 0.0, 0.0, 73.0, 490.0, 634.0], "width": 78, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(532.0, 608.0, 569.0, 634.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 26, "number": 546, "size": 0, "transform": [37.0, 0.0, 0.0, 26.0, 532.0, 608.0], "width": 37, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nMozambique\nManaging Fiscal Decentralization and\nStrengthening Cash Management\n\n\n\n\n\nSailendra Pattanayak, Felipe Bardella, John Gardner, Elizabeth Kariuki,\nJuliana Pigey, and Esther Palacio\n Technical Report | June 2019\n\n\n\n\n\n I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D", "text_characters": 235}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n#### **Mozambique**\n##### **Managing Fiscal Decentralization and** **Strengthening Cash Management**\n\n\nSailendra Pattanayak, Felipe Bardella, John Gardner, Elizabeth Kariuki, Juliana Pigey, and\nEsther Palacio\n\n\n**Technical Report**\n\n\n**June 2019**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.27999877929688, 486.1199951171875, 366.0, 607.6199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(255,ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998)))", "has-mask": false, "height": 209, "number": 5, "size": 37296, "transform": [120.72000122070312, 0.0, -0.0, 121.5, 245.27999877929688, 486.1199951171875], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nMozambique\nManaging Fiscal Decentralization and Strengthening Cash Management\n\nSailendra Pattanayak, Felipe Bardella, John Gardner, Elizabeth Kariuki, Juliana Pigey, and\nEsther Palacio\n\nTechnical Report\n\nJune 2019", "text_characters": 209}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Mozambique (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and\nmembers of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the\nDissemination of Technical Assistance Information—\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Mozambique (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and\nmembers of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the\nDissemination of Technical Assistance Information—\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.", "text_characters": 949}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0005-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS _____________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**PREFACE __________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 7**\n\n\n**I. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION ___________________________________________________ 12**\nA. Introduction and Background _________________________________________________________________ 12\nB. Current Budget and Financial Execution Processes and Systems ______________________________ 13\nC. Overall Strategic Context and Setting the Stage _______________________________________________ 15\nD. Establishing a PFM Framework and Legal Landscape for Provinces ___________________________ 17\nE. Provincial Responsibilities _____________________________________________________________________ 27\nF. Provincial Resources – Transfers from the State _______________________________________________ 30\nG. Provincial Resources – Own Source Revenues _________________________________________________ 35\nH. Transitional Approach for Fiscal Decentralization Law ________________________________________ 36\n\n\n**II. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL _________________ 38**\nA. Introduction ___________________________________________________________________________________ 38\nB. Budget Execution Reform ______________________________________________________________________ 39\nC. Active Cash Management Operations _________________________________________________________ 47\nD. Summary of Required Activities _______________________________________________________________ 49\nE. Summary of Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 49\n\n\n**III. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL AND MANAGING ARREARS ________________ 50**\nA. Controlling Wage Bill Expenditure _____________________________________________________________ 50\nB. Managing Historical and New Arrears _________________________________________________________ 52\nC. Summary of Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 54\n\n**BOXES**\n1.1. Potential Functions for Provinces and Districts ______________________________________________ 28\n1.2. Comments on Initial Proposals for Decentralization in Education Sector ____________________ 29\n1.3. International Lessons Learned: Setting the Size of the Transfer Pool ________________________ 33\n1.4. Criteria for the Design of Fiscal Transfers ____________________________________________________ 34\n\n**FIGURES**\n1.1. Structure of the Education Budget by Level of Implementation _____________________________ 14\n1.2. Public Financial Management Cycle _________________________________________________________ 20\n2.1. Building Cash Flow Forecasts ________________________________________________________________ 45\n3.1. Mozambique’s Estimated Wage Bill in 2019 Compared to Other Low-Income Countries in\nthe Region _______________________________________________________________________________________ 51\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS _ 5\n\nPREFACE 6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY _ 7\n\nI. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION _ 12\nA. Introduction and Background _ 12\nB. Current Budget and Financial Execution Processes and Systems 13\nC. Overall Strategic Context and Setting the Stage _ 15\nD. Establishing a PFM Framework and Legal Landscape for Provinces _ 17\nE. Provincial Responsibilities _ 27\nF. Provincial Resources – Transfers from the State _ 30\nG. Provincial Resources – Own Source Revenues _ 35\nH. Transitional Approach for Fiscal Decentralization Law 36\n\nII. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL _ 38\nA. Introduction _ 38\nB. Budget Execution Reform 39\nC. Active Cash Management Operations _ 47\nD. Summary of Required Activities _ 49\nE. Summary of Recommendations _ 49\n\nIII. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL AND MANAGING ARREARS 50\nA. Controlling Wage Bill Expenditure _ 50\nB. Managing Historical and New Arrears _ 52\nC. Summary of Recommendations _ 54\n\nBOXES\n1.1. Potential Functions for Provinces and Districts 28\n1.2. Comments on Initial Proposals for Decentralization in Education Sector 29\n1.3. International Lessons Learned: Setting the Size of the Transfer Pool 33\n1.4. Criteria for the Design of Fiscal Transfers 34\n\nFIGURES\n1.1. Structure of the Education Budget by Level of Implementation _ 14\n1.2. Public Financial Management Cycle _ 20\n2.1. Building Cash Flow Forecasts 45\n3.1. Mozambique’s Estimated Wage Bill in 2019 Compared to Other Low-Income Countries in\nthe Region _ 51\n\n3", "text_characters": 1247}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**TABLE**\n1. Summary of Key Recommendations ___________________________________________________________ 10\n\n**ANNEXES**\nI. Example of Types of Expenditure Functions for Regional/Provincial Level of Decentralized\nGovernance ______________________________________________________________________________________ 55\nII. Sample Terms of Reference for a Cash Management Committee _____________________________ 56\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TABLE\n1. Summary of Key Recommendations _ 10\n\nANNEXES\nI. Example of Types of Expenditure Functions for Regional/Provincial Level of Decentralized\nGovernance 55\nII. Sample Terms of Reference for a Cash Management Committee _ 56\n\n4", "text_characters": 192}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**\n\nAL Autarquias locais and local authorities ( _autarquias locais)_\nAT Administrative Tribunal\nANE National Roads Agency ( _Agencia Nacional de Estradas)_\nBoM Bank of Maozambique\nCoA Chart of Accounts\nCMC Cash Management Committee\nCMU Cash Management Unit\nCN Commitment Note\nCUT Treasury Single Account _(Conta Única de Tesouro)_\nDNB Directorate of National Budget\nDNT Directorate of National Treasury\ne-SISTAFE Computerized Finance Management System of the State\nFCA Local authorities Compensation Fund _(Fundo de Compensacoes Autarquicas_ )\nIGF General Inspectorate of Finance\nMAEFP Ministry of State Administration and Public Service\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance\nMOPHRH Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources\nMEX Transaction and Accounting Module of e-SISTAFE\nMPE State Assets Module of e-SISTAFE\nPES Economic and Social Development Plan ( _Plano Economico e Social_ )\nPFM Public Financial Management\nPQG Programa Quinquenal do Governo\nSISTAFE Finance Management System of the State ( _Sistema de Administracao Financeira_\n_do Estado_ ).\nSNG Subnational Governments\nSNGRH Human Resource Management Information System\nSSA Sub-Saharan Africa\nSU Sectorial Spending Units\nVAT Value Added Tax\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\nAL Autarquias locais and local authorities ( _autarquias locais)_\nAT Administrative Tribunal\nANE National Roads Agency ( _Agencia Nacional de Estradas)_\nBoM Bank of Maozambique\nCoA Chart of Accounts\nCMC Cash Management Committee\nCMU Cash Management Unit\nCN Commitment Note\nCUT Treasury Single Account _(Conta Única de Tesouro)_\nDNB Directorate of National Budget\nDNT Directorate of National Treasury\ne-SISTAFE Computerized Finance Management System of the State\nFCA Local authorities Compensation Fund _(Fundo de Compensacoes Autarquicas_ )\nIGF General Inspectorate of Finance\nMAEFP Ministry of State Administration and Public Service\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance\nMOPHRH Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources\nMEX Transaction and Accounting Module of e-SISTAFE\nMPE State Assets Module of e-SISTAFE\nPES Economic and Social Development Plan ( _Plano Economico e Social_ )\nPFM Public Financial Management\nPQG Programa Quinquenal do Governo\nSISTAFE Finance Management System of the State ( _Sistema de Administracao Financeira_\n_do Estado_ ).\nSNG Subnational Governments\nSNGRH Human Resource Management Information System\nSSA Sub-Saharan Africa\nSU Sectorial Spending Units\nVAT Value Added Tax\n\n5", "text_characters": 1063}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **PREFACE**\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a\ntechnical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during the period February 18 to March 1, 2019 to advise on strengthening\nexpenditure control and cash flow management, and ensuring effective fiscal coordination and\nreporting in the context of the planned fiscal decentralization.\n\nThe mission was led by Mr. Sailendra Pattanayak (FAD Deputy Division Chief), and comprised Mr.\nFelipe Bardella (FAD Staff), Mr. John Gardner, Ms. Elizabeth Kariuki and Ms. Juliana Pigey (all FAD\nExperts), and Ms. Esther Palacio (IMF TA coordinator based in Maputo). The mission benefitted\nfrom the support of Mr. Ari Aisen, IMF Resident Representative in Mozambique, and the local\noffice.\n\nThe mission would like to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful\ncollaboration provided by the authorities, especially Mr. Domingos Lambo, Permanent Secretary,\nwho guided and coordinated the work of the mission. The mission would also like to thank\nCEDSIF and Treasury staff for their valuable support, and all the participants to the various\nmeetings and workshops for their active and constructive participation, including staff from\nMinistries of Public Administration, Health, Education, and Public Works.\n\n\n**This mission is part of the “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique Project” that**\n\n**is funded by the Government of Denmark and implemented by the IMF.**\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Adriano Maleiane, a\ntechnical assistance (TA) mission from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during the period February 18 to March 1, 2019 to advise on strengthening\nexpenditure control and cash flow management, and ensuring effective fiscal coordination and\nreporting in the context of the planned fiscal decentralization.\n\nThe mission was led by Mr. Sailendra Pattanayak (FAD Deputy Division Chief), and comprised Mr.\nFelipe Bardella (FAD Staff), Mr. John Gardner, Ms. Elizabeth Kariuki and Ms. Juliana Pigey (all FAD\nExperts), and Ms. Esther Palacio (IMF TA coordinator based in Maputo). The mission benefitted\nfrom the support of Mr. Ari Aisen, IMF Resident Representative in Mozambique, and the local\noffice.\n\nThe mission would like to express its gratitude for the close cooperation and fruitful\ncollaboration provided by the authorities, especially Mr. Domingos Lambo, Permanent Secretary,\nwho guided and coordinated the work of the mission. The mission would also like to thank\nCEDSIF and Treasury staff for their valuable support, and all the participants to the various\nmeetings and workshops for their active and constructive participation, including staff from\nMinistries of Public Administration, Health, Education, and Public Works.\n\nThis mission is part of the “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique Project” that\n\nis funded by the Government of Denmark and implemented by the IMF.\n\n6", "text_characters": 1286}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**The Constitutional amendment of June 12, 2018 has placed a major decentralization**\n**reform front and center of the Government of Mozambique’s agenda.** The political pillar of\nthis decentralization reform is the creation of directly elected provincial assemblies with an\nelected Governor, and directly elected district assemblies with their elected district administrator.\nThe first elections for Provincial Assemblies/Governors under this reform will take place in 2019,\nalong with the national elections. The first elections for District Assemblies and Administrators\nwill take place in the next mandated elections of 2024. The administrative pillar of this reform is\nthe definition of a significant set of service delivery and public administration competencies. The\nthird core pillar of the decentralization reform is financial.\n\n\n**The fiscal decentralization of provinces and districts will build on the already highly**\n**deconcentrated public financial management (PFM) system.** Around 38 percent of the State\nbudget is currently spent at provincial and district levels **.** Provinces and districts already execute\ntheir budgets with a high degree of administrative and financial autonomy.\n\n\n**The operationalization of the decentralization process should be gradual and take account**\n**of four factors:** maintaining overall macro-economic stability; ensuring allocation for national\npriorities; developing local capacity for budget management/PFM; and managing expectations of\nelected bodies at sub-national level to address local priorities and take budget policy decisions.\n\n\n**The fiscal decentralization law for the provinces should be comprehensive and cover the**\n**following key areas:** a clear budget calendar for coordination between provincial and central\nlevel, including sharing of key fiscal information at specific points in the calendar; timing,\nfrequency and content of fiscal reporting by provinces; common chart of accounts (CoA) and\nbudget classification architecture for all levels of government; banking arrangements/CUT for\nexecution of provincial budgets; restrictions on borrowing by provinces or setting clear rules if\nthey are allowed to borrow and issue guarantees; transfer of staff and assets (e.g., buildings and\nequipment) relating to the competencies that are decentralized; transparent rules/criteria for\ntransfer of funds to provinces, including block and conditional transfers; and whether the\nprovinces will continue to use the State budget execution system (e-SISTAFE) and treasury\nservices (including cash management operations). There are pros and cons to various options\nand the report lists these but does not recommend specific options which the government\nshould decide. For maintaining the unity of the structure of the budget, the budgets of the\nprovinces could be incorporated as annexes in the State budget that is submitted to Parliament.\n\n\n**The fiscal decentralization law should include transitional provisions for budget**\n**management at provincial level until specific options are chosen in the above listed areas.**\nFurther preparatory work will be needed in certain areas before decisions could be taken. For\nexample, a survey or census will be required to identify the specific staff and assets to be\ntransferred to the provinces based on the competencies transferred to them.\n\n\n**A step-by-step approach should be followed for developing a system of fund transfers to**\n**provinces.** The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) should review with respective sectorial\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThe Constitutional amendment of June 12, 2018 has placed a major decentralization\nreform front and center of the Government of Mozambique’s agenda. The political pillar of\nthis decentralization reform is the creation of directly elected provincial assemblies with an\nelected Governor, and directly elected district assemblies with their elected district administrator.\nThe first elections for Provincial Assemblies/Governors under this reform will take place in 2019,\nalong with the national elections. The first elections for District Assemblies and Administrators\nwill take place in the next mandated elections of 2024. The administrative pillar of this reform is\nthe definition of a significant set of service delivery and public administration competencies. The\nthird core pillar of the decentralization reform is financial.\n\nThe fiscal decentralization of provinces and districts will build on the already highly\ndeconcentrated public financial management (PFM) system. Around 38 percent of the State\nbudget is currently spent at provincial and district levels . Provinces and districts already execute\ntheir budgets with a high degree of administrative and financial autonomy.\n\nThe operationalization of the decentralization process should be gradual and take account\nof four factors: maintaining overall macro-economic stability; ensuring allocation for national\npriorities; developing local capacity for budget management/PFM; and managing expectations of\nelected bodies at sub-national level to address local priorities and take budget policy decisions.\n\nThe fiscal decentralization law for the provinces should be comprehensive and cover the\nfollowing key areas: a clear budget calendar for coordination between provincial and central\nlevel, including sharing of key fiscal information at specific points in the calendar; timing,\nfrequency and content of fiscal reporting by provinces; common chart of accounts (CoA) and\nbudget classification architecture for all levels of government; banking arrangements/CUT for\nexecution of provincial budgets; restrictions on borrowing by provinces or setting clear rules if\nthey are allowed to borrow and issue guarantees; transfer of staff and assets (e.g., buildings and\nequipment) relating to the competencies that are decentralized; transparent rules/criteria for\ntransfer of funds to provinces, including block and conditional transfers; and whether the\nprovinces will continue to use the State budget execution system (e-SISTAFE) and treasury\nservices (including cash management operations). There are pros and cons to various options\nand the report lists these but does not recommend specific options which the government\nshould decide. For maintaining the unity of the structure of the budget, the budgets of the\nprovinces could be incorporated as annexes in the State budget that is submitted to Parliament.\n\nThe fiscal decentralization law should include transitional provisions for budget\nmanagement at provincial level until specific options are chosen in the above listed areas.\nFurther preparatory work will be needed in certain areas before decisions could be taken. For\nexample, a survey or census will be required to identify the specific staff and assets to be\ntransferred to the provinces based on the competencies transferred to them.\n\nA step-by-step approach should be followed for developing a system of fund transfers to\nprovinces. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) should review with respective sectorial\n\n7", "text_characters": 2997}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "ministries the current amount of budget allocation for the provincial competencies and\ndetermine an allocation formula. The allocation formula should be simple and based on objective\nfactors, with available data; predictable with shares to remain stable for the first few years to\nsupport provincial planning and service delivery; and transparent so that the basis of the\nallocation is clear. The MEF could consider an operating transfer which would consist of the\nfollowing types of envelopes: one conditional grant for covering payroll expenditures; a basic\npool with discretionary allocation for provincial executive council, administration and assembly\noperational costs, allocated among provinces by a clear formula; and one individual envelope per\nsector for goods and services (such as for provincial/regional roads maintenance, environmental\nprotection), each allocated among the provinces according to a formula which could include\ngeneral criteria (population, surface area) and specific criteria relevant to the specific area of\ncompetency. The formula used should be in an annex to the State budget. The fiscal\ndecentralization law should also include rules for addressing any persistent cash surplus build-up\nat the provincial level.\n\n\n**The Government of Mozambique has received substantial technical assistance in the last**\n**decade – from the IMF and other partners – on budget execution and cash management.**\nThis has been primarily diagnostic and has focused on issues arising from a lack of budget\ncredibility, lack of enforcement of controls during budget execution, and poor cash management.\nThese issues have resulted in a large stock of expenditure arrears and the imposition of strict\ncash rationing when responding to requests for payment of budget expenditures by sectorial\nspending units (SU). The authorities have prepared a strategy for strengthening expenditure\ncontrol and cash management with support from AFRITAC South.\n\n\n**Based on previous FAD advice, there has been progress in validating and clearing the stock**\n**of arrears accumulated by end 2017, but substantial amounts of new arrears are emerging.**\nAll the three sectorial ministries (health, education, and public works) that the mission met\nindicated that they have accumulated large amounts of unpaid invoices that were received\nduring the FY 2018. The reasons for the emergence of new arrears are three-fold. First, actual\nrevenues are typically lower that the forecast, partly due to non-realization of aid committed by\ndonors. Second, due to weak ex-ante payroll control, some sectors recruit more staff than the\nnumber authorized in the budget and are provided additional allocation. Third, there is currently\nno system of controlling commitments/contracts by SUs within an authorized ceiling, which is a\nstandard practice in many Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.\n\n\n**Weak ex-ante control over commitments and payroll, coupled with strict cash rationing,**\n**undermine the credibility of the PFM system and pose a serious risk to the build-up of**\n**further arrears.** Cash rationing has caused payments to be reduced at such times even though\ngovernment obligations continue to be incurred. While some of these problems have been a\nlegacy of the past, in the context of the upcoming decentralization there is an opportunity for\nthe MEF to strengthen budget execution and cash management processes.\n\n\n**The only way to deal with the effects of non-credible budget and prevent expenditure**\n**arrears is to enforce controls at the commitment/contracting stage.** This would prevent\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ministries the current amount of budget allocation for the provincial competencies and\ndetermine an allocation formula. The allocation formula should be simple and based on objective\nfactors, with available data; predictable with shares to remain stable for the first few years to\nsupport provincial planning and service delivery; and transparent so that the basis of the\nallocation is clear. The MEF could consider an operating transfer which would consist of the\nfollowing types of envelopes: one conditional grant for covering payroll expenditures; a basic\npool with discretionary allocation for provincial executive council, administration and assembly\noperational costs, allocated among provinces by a clear formula; and one individual envelope per\nsector for goods and services (such as for provincial/regional roads maintenance, environmental\nprotection), each allocated among the provinces according to a formula which could include\ngeneral criteria (population, surface area) and specific criteria relevant to the specific area of\ncompetency. The formula used should be in an annex to the State budget. The fiscal\ndecentralization law should also include rules for addressing any persistent cash surplus build-up\nat the provincial level.\n\nThe Government of Mozambique has received substantial technical assistance in the last\ndecade – from the IMF and other partners – on budget execution and cash management.\nThis has been primarily diagnostic and has focused on issues arising from a lack of budget\ncredibility, lack of enforcement of controls during budget execution, and poor cash management.\nThese issues have resulted in a large stock of expenditure arrears and the imposition of strict\ncash rationing when responding to requests for payment of budget expenditures by sectorial\nspending units (SU). The authorities have prepared a strategy for strengthening expenditure\ncontrol and cash management with support from AFRITAC South.\n\nBased on previous FAD advice, there has been progress in validating and clearing the stock\nof arrears accumulated by end 2017, but substantial amounts of new arrears are emerging.\nAll the three sectorial ministries (health, education, and public works) that the mission met\nindicated that they have accumulated large amounts of unpaid invoices that were received\nduring the FY 2018. The reasons for the emergence of new arrears are three-fold. First, actual\nrevenues are typically lower that the forecast, partly due to non-realization of aid committed by\ndonors. Second, due to weak ex-ante payroll control, some sectors recruit more staff than the\nnumber authorized in the budget and are provided additional allocation. Third, there is currently\nno system of controlling commitments/contracts by SUs within an authorized ceiling, which is a\nstandard practice in many Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.\n\nWeak ex-ante control over commitments and payroll, coupled with strict cash rationing,\nundermine the credibility of the PFM system and pose a serious risk to the build-up of\nfurther arrears. Cash rationing has caused payments to be reduced at such times even though\ngovernment obligations continue to be incurred. While some of these problems have been a\nlegacy of the past, in the context of the upcoming decentralization there is an opportunity for\nthe MEF to strengthen budget execution and cash management processes.\n\nThe only way to deal with the effects of non-credible budget and prevent expenditure\narrears is to enforce controls at the commitment/contracting stage. This would prevent\n\n8", "text_characters": 3012}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "further arrears by reducing payment obligations before they are incurred. The report proposes a\ntwo stages approach which starts with making correct use of the commitment methodology.\n\n- The MEF – specifically the Directorate of National Budget (DNB) – should issue and enforce a\n\ncommitment ceiling for SUs for the period ahead through the e-SISTAFE system by making it\nmandatory for SUs to have a system generated commitment note (CN) as a requirement for\nsigning contracts. This will also help capturing the value of commitments in real-time in eSISTAFE to facilitate monitoring of SUs’ obligations by the MEF.\n\n~~~~ A high-level cash management committee chaired by the Minister of Finance or the\n\nPermanent Secretary should be established to decide the quarterly budget release envelope\nwhich would apply to commitment ceilings given to SUs by the DNB.\n\n- In the first stage, the current practice of reducing the available budget allocations on\n\nexpenditure classification heads by withholding ten to fifteen percent of their value should be\nused to constrain commitments of SUs and enforced through the e-SISTAFE system. The SUs\nwill see no difference in their budget execution other than the requirement to undergo a\ncommitment ceiling check by the system in real time before signing a contract.\n\n- An official circular is required to specify the new commitment control process and its\n\ncommencement date. This should also be accompanied by an outreach to sectorial ministries\nto explain the changes and to indicate to all government suppliers that, from the date of\nimplementation of the new process, no contract entered into with a government entity will be\nvalid for subsequent payment unless it is attached to a unique, and verifiable, CN.\n\n- In the second stage, reasonably accurate cash flow forecasting should be performed by a\n\nskilled cash management unit (CMU) with access to SU capital expenditure plans (when the\nMPE module is rolled out). Realistic revenue, debt and aid projections will also be necessary.\nThe NDB would decide where the commitment restrictions would fall. This would entail\nconsideration of procurement plans and apply to large, volatile expenditures whose delay\nwould not impact adversely on government policy delivery or essential government services.\n\n- In the second stage, with an effective budget management system which anticipates cash\n\nshortage effects of a non-credible budget, there should be little need for cash rationing. The\ndevelopment of the Treasury bill market – separately from its use for monetary policy\npurposes – is therefore a medium-term goal to facilitate active cash management operations.\n\n\n**There is also a need to control wage bill expenditure.** Two key areas undermining\ngovernment’s ability to control wage bill expenditure relate to bonuses and overtime payments,\nand staff establishment controls. The Ministry of State Administration and Public Service (MAEFP)\nidentifies only ex-post the cases where staff ceilings have been exceeded. As new recruits are\nalready on the e-payroll, the MEF is obliged to request for additional budget allocation to absorb\nthe additional wage bill costs. The following measures are recommended.\n\n- The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) should undertake an audit of sectors where this\n\nproblem is acute (e.g., agriculture, education and health) to identify the control weaknesses.\n\n- The MAEFP should verify ex-ante each request for new recruits against the approved staff\n\nceiling, prior to its submission to the Administrative Tribunal.\n\n\n**Table 1 summarizes the key recommendations of the report.**\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "further arrears by reducing payment obligations before they are incurred. The report proposes a\ntwo stages approach which starts with making correct use of the commitment methodology.\n\n- The MEF – specifically the Directorate of National Budget (DNB) – should issue and enforce a\n\ncommitment ceiling for SUs for the period ahead through the e-SISTAFE system by making it\nmandatory for SUs to have a system generated commitment note (CN) as a requirement for\nsigning contracts. This will also help capturing the value of commitments in real-time in eSISTAFE to facilitate monitoring of SUs’ obligations by the MEF.\n\n~~~~ A high-level cash management committee chaired by the Minister of Finance or the\n\nPermanent Secretary should be established to decide the quarterly budget release envelope\nwhich would apply to commitment ceilings given to SUs by the DNB.\n\n- In the first stage, the current practice of reducing the available budget allocations on\n\nexpenditure classification heads by withholding ten to fifteen percent of their value should be\nused to constrain commitments of SUs and enforced through the e-SISTAFE system. The SUs\nwill see no difference in their budget execution other than the requirement to undergo a\ncommitment ceiling check by the system in real time before signing a contract.\n\n- An official circular is required to specify the new commitment control process and its\n\ncommencement date. This should also be accompanied by an outreach to sectorial ministries\nto explain the changes and to indicate to all government suppliers that, from the date of\nimplementation of the new process, no contract entered into with a government entity will be\nvalid for subsequent payment unless it is attached to a unique, and verifiable, CN.\n\n- In the second stage, reasonably accurate cash flow forecasting should be performed by a\n\nskilled cash management unit (CMU) with access to SU capital expenditure plans (when the\nMPE module is rolled out). Realistic revenue, debt and aid projections will also be necessary.\nThe NDB would decide where the commitment restrictions would fall. This would entail\nconsideration of procurement plans and apply to large, volatile expenditures whose delay\nwould not impact adversely on government policy delivery or essential government services.\n\n- In the second stage, with an effective budget management system which anticipates cash\n\nshortage effects of a non-credible budget, there should be little need for cash rationing. The\ndevelopment of the Treasury bill market – separately from its use for monetary policy\npurposes – is therefore a medium-term goal to facilitate active cash management operations.\n\nThere is also a need to control wage bill expenditure. Two key areas undermining\ngovernment’s ability to control wage bill expenditure relate to bonuses and overtime payments,\nand staff establishment controls. The Ministry of State Administration and Public Service (MAEFP)\nidentifies only ex-post the cases where staff ceilings have been exceeded. As new recruits are\nalready on the e-payroll, the MEF is obliged to request for additional budget allocation to absorb\nthe additional wage bill costs. The following measures are recommended.\n\n- The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) should undertake an audit of sectors where this\n\nproblem is acute (e.g., agriculture, education and health) to identify the control weaknesses.\n\n- The MAEFP should verify ex-ante each request for new recruits against the approved staff\n\nceiling, prior to its submission to the Administrative Tribunal.\n\nTable 1 summarizes the key recommendations of the report.\n\n9", "text_characters": 3028}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 1. Summary of Key Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Recommended Measure (including recommendation no.)|Indicative
Timeline|Responsible
Agencies|\n|---|---|---|\n|**1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization**|**1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization**|**1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization**|\n|1.1: Consolidate the PFM related laws (Sistafe law, PFM law for_autarquias_
_locais_, planned fiscal decentralization law) in an overarching
comprehensive PFM law covering all levels of government.|2020-2024|MEF|\n|1.2: Incorporate a coordinated budget calendar, standard reporting and
transparency requirements, and harmonized budget classification and
accounting standards in the fiscal decentralization law.|2019|MEF|\n|1.3; 1.4; 1.5: Don’t provide for short term/long term borrowing and PPP
operations by provinces in the first provincial mandate|2020-2024|MEF|\n|1.6: Develop the necessary rules for borrowing and debt limits for
provinces and districts in the future and incorporate these rules in the
proposed overarching PFM law (Recommendation 1.1).|2025|MEF|\n|1.7: Provide guidance to sectorial ministries of some key norms and
principles to take into consideration in the identification of competencies
and authorities to be transferred to provinces and districts.|2019|MEF|\n|1.8; 1.9; 1.10: Instruct sectorial ministries that transfer of competencies to
provinces should be accompanied by the transfer of related personnel,
equipment and buildings.|2019|MEF/MAEFP|\n|1.11: Establish in the fiscal decentralization law basic principles and
guidelines to support preparing the transfer allocations to finance
provincial competencies.|2019|MEF|\n|1.12: Review with sectorial ministries current amount of budget allocation
for the proposed competencies and determine an allocation formula.|2019-20241|MEF/
Sectorial
Ministries|\n|1.13: Identify what service fees, charges or other non-tax revenue may be
associated with the competencies to be transferred to provinces and
districts.|2019-2024|MEF/MAEFP|\n|1.14: Include transitional provisions in the fiscal decentralization law
focused on the budget cycle for the coming years, in particular, the first
autonomous provincial mandate.|2019|MEF|\n|1.15: Design the transitional provisions with a two-phase approach to be
implemented over the first autonomous provincial mandate.|2019|MEF|\n|**2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control**|**2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control**|**2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control**|\n|2.1: Configure e-SISTAFE to control commitments through commitment
ceilings and the issuance of commitment notes|April 2019|Treasury,
CEDSIF|\n|2.2: Conduct outreach to all sectorial ministries and government suppliers
on the appropriate use of commitment notes|May 2019|MEF|\n|2.3: Use the current budget withholding methodology to set ceilings for
commitment controls by Sus, and issue a circular specifying the new
commitment control process|Start May
2019|MEF, DNB,
SUs|\n|2.4: Establish a Cash Management Unit (CMU) within the National
Directorate of the Treasury to perform government cash flow forecasting
and active cash management operations|July 2019|Treasury|\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [85.48737335205078, 94.1400146484375, 567.0126342773438, 702.0], "columns": 3, "rows": 18}], "text": "Table 1. Summary of Key Recommendations\n\n Recommended Measure (including recommendation no.) Indicative Timeline Responsible Agencies \n\n 1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization 1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization 1. Managing Fiscal Decentralization \n 1.1: Consolidate the PFM related laws (Sistafe law, PFM law for_autarquias_ _locais_, planned fiscal decentralization law) in an overarching comprehensive PFM law covering all levels of government. 2020-2024 MEF \n 1.2: Incorporate a coordinated budget calendar, standard reporting and transparency requirements, and harmonized budget classification and accounting standards in the fiscal decentralization law. 2019 MEF \n 1.3; 1.4; 1.5: Don’t provide for short term/long term borrowing and PPP operations by provinces in the first provincial mandate 2020-2024 MEF \n 1.6: Develop the necessary rules for borrowing and debt limits for provinces and districts in the future and incorporate these rules in the proposed overarching PFM law (Recommendation 1.1). 2025 MEF \n 1.7: Provide guidance to sectorial ministries of some key norms and principles to take into consideration in the identification of competencies and authorities to be transferred to provinces and districts. 2019 MEF \n 1.8; 1.9; 1.10: Instruct sectorial ministries that transfer of competencies to provinces should be accompanied by the transfer of related personnel, equipment and buildings. 2019 MEF/MAEFP \n 1.11: Establish in the fiscal decentralization law basic principles and guidelines to support preparing the transfer allocations to finance provincial competencies. 2019 MEF \n 1.12: Review with sectorial ministries current amount of budget allocation for the proposed competencies and determine an allocation formula. 2019-20241 MEF/ Sectorial Ministries \n 1.13: Identify what service fees, charges or other non-tax revenue may be associated with the competencies to be transferred to provinces and districts. 2019-2024 MEF/MAEFP \n 1.14: Include transitional provisions in the fiscal decentralization law focused on the budget cycle for the coming years, in particular, the first autonomous provincial mandate. 2019 MEF \n 1.15: Design the transitional provisions with a two-phase approach to be implemented over the first autonomous provincial mandate. 2019 MEF \n 2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control 2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control 2. Strengthening Cash Management and Expenditure Control \n 2.1: Configure e-SISTAFE to control commitments through commitment ceilings and the issuance of commitment notes April 2019 Treasury, CEDSIF \n 2.2: Conduct outreach to all sectorial ministries and government suppliers on the appropriate use of commitment notes May 2019 MEF \n 2.3: Use the current budget withholding methodology to set ceilings for commitment controls by Sus, and issue a circular specifying the new commitment control process Start May 2019 MEF, DNB, SUs \n 2.4: Establish a Cash Management Unit (CMU) within the National Directorate of the Treasury to perform government cash flow forecasting and active cash management operations July 2019 Treasury \n\n10", "text_characters": 2662}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|2.5: Establish a skilled macrofiscal unit in the MEF tasked with producing
realistic revenue forecasts both for multiannual fiscal policy and in-year
budget management purposes|July 2019|MEF|\n|---|---|---|\n|2.6: Develop a capacity building program for CMU cash flow forecast
modelling and the production of expenditure plans at large SUs|Start July 2019|Treasury|\n|2.7: Establish a high-level Cash Management Committee (CMC) chaired
by the Minister or PS to decide the quarterly commitment envelope for
implementation by the DNB|January 2020|MEF, DNB|\n|2.8: Consider centralizing the payments process within the e-SISTAFE
once commitment controls are effective|Start January
2020|Treasury,
CEDSIF|\n|2.9: Consider standardizing suppliers’ payment terms within the e-
SISTAFE system and using these to develop more accurate short-term
payment forecasts|Start January
2020|Treasury,
CEDSIF|\n|2.10: In coordination with the BoM and the debt managers, commence
plans to develop the T-bill market specifically for cash management
purposes|Start July 2020|Treasury,
BoM|\n|**3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears**|**3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears**|**3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears**|\n|3.1: Undertake an audit of the processes and controls to safeguard staff
establishment and payroll control in agriculture, education and health|December
2019|IGF|\n|3.2: Institutionalize mechanism for verifying actual against approved
establishment prior to each new recruitment|July 2019|MAEFP|\n|3.3: Extend arrears clearance to cover the arrears accumulated during
2018|Start April
2019|Treasury,
IGF|\n|3.4: Prepare a strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears|Start April
2019|Treasury,
Revenue
Authority|\n|3.5: Regularly monitor and report on arrears in budget execution and year
end fiscal report|Start July 2019|Treasury,
Accounting,
CEDSIF|\n\n\n\n1 Until the allocation formula is defined, shorter-term indicative targets could usefully be set for the first few\nyears.\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [85.4815444946289, 72.1199951171875, 567.0184936523438, 464.6400146484375], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "2.5: Establish a skilled macrofiscal unit in the MEF tasked with producing realistic revenue forecasts both for multiannual fiscal policy and in-year budget management purposes July 2019 MEF \n\n 2.6: Develop a capacity building program for CMU cash flow forecast modelling and the production of expenditure plans at large SUs Start July 2019 Treasury \n 2.7: Establish a high-level Cash Management Committee (CMC) chaired by the Minister or PS to decide the quarterly commitment envelope for implementation by the DNB January 2020 MEF, DNB \n 2.8: Consider centralizing the payments process within the e-SISTAFE once commitment controls are effective Start January 2020 Treasury, CEDSIF \n 2.9: Consider standardizing suppliers’ payment terms within the e- SISTAFE system and using these to develop more accurate short-term payment forecasts Start January 2020 Treasury, CEDSIF \n 2.10: In coordination with the BoM and the debt managers, commence plans to develop the T-bill market specifically for cash management purposes Start July 2020 Treasury, BoM \n 3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears 3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears 3. Strengthening Control of Wage Bill and Managing Arrears \n 3.1: Undertake an audit of the processes and controls to safeguard staff establishment and payroll control in agriculture, education and health December 2019 IGF \n 3.2: Institutionalize mechanism for verifying actual against approved establishment prior to each new recruitment July 2019 MAEFP \n 3.3: Extend arrears clearance to cover the arrears accumulated during 2018 Start April 2019 Treasury, IGF \n 3.4: Prepare a strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears Start April 2019 Treasury, Revenue Authority \n 3.5: Regularly monitor and report on arrears in budget execution and year end fiscal report Start July 2019 Treasury, Accounting, CEDSIF \n\n1 Until the allocation formula is defined, shorter-term indicative targets could usefully be set for the first few\nyears.\n\n11", "text_characters": 1683}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **I. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION**\n\n**A. Introduction and Background**\n\n\n**1.** **The Constitutional amendment of 12 June 2018 has placed a major decentralization**\n**reform front and center of the Government of Mozambique’s agenda.** The implementation\nof decentralization is part of the country’s peace accords. This reform aims to associate citizens in\nresolving problems of their communities, promote local development, and deepen democracy,\nwithin the overall unity of the Mozambican state (Constitution Article 270-A). The\ndecentralization reform comprises three pillars: political, administrative and financial.\n\n\n**2.** **The political pillar of this decentralization reform is the creation of directly elected**\n**provincial assemblies with an elected Governor, and directly elected district assemblies**\n**with their elected district administrator** . The first elections for Provincial Assemblies/Governors\nunder the revised Constitution will take place in 2019, along with the national elections. The first\nelections for District Assemblies and Administrators will take place in the next mandated\nelections of 2024.\n\n\n**3.** **The administrative pillar of this reform is the definition of a significant set of**\n**service delivery and public administration competencies (further discussed in section E,**\n**below** ). Provinces, districts and municipalities ( _autarquias locais,_ AL) are to enjoy administrative\nautonomy (Constitution Article 270-C) and will have their own personnel, who are part of the\noverall state civil service (Constitution Article 270-I).\n\n\n**4.** **The third core pillar of the decentralization reform is financial** . Provinces, Districts\nand AL will have autonomy in the management of their financial affairs and properties. The\nanalysis and recommendations of this chapter will focus on the public financial management\n(PFM) framework and principles for the financial resources of Provinces, that will make the\nProvincial Assemblies a reality starting 2020, while taking into consideration the fragile macroeconomic environment and PFM challenges of the Mozambican State. There is a very short time\nin which to define clearly the financial, staffing and asset / equipment transfers that will\naccompany the new competencies so that the provincial elections can take place with clarity on\nthe roles for which assembly members and the Governors will be elected.\n\n\n**5.** **This reform will create two new levels of decentralized government in addition to**\n**the** _**autarquias locais**_ . These are expected to be subject to a dual accountability, upwards to the\ncentral government and downward to their respective constituents, thus being able to improve\nthe quality of local and regional public services in line with local priorities. Among the many\nchallenges which will have to be addressed in setting up the new Provincial Assemblies and\nExecutive Councils in 2020 are ensuring that national priorities remain addressed and that PFM\ncapacity is developed.\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. MANAGING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION\n\nA. Introduction and Background\n\n1. The Constitutional amendment of 12 June 2018 has placed a major decentralization\nreform front and center of the Government of Mozambique’s agenda. The implementation\nof decentralization is part of the country’s peace accords. This reform aims to associate citizens in\nresolving problems of their communities, promote local development, and deepen democracy,\nwithin the overall unity of the Mozambican state (Constitution Article 270-A). The\ndecentralization reform comprises three pillars: political, administrative and financial.\n\n2. The political pillar of this decentralization reform is the creation of directly elected\nprovincial assemblies with an elected Governor, and directly elected district assemblies\nwith their elected district administrator . The first elections for Provincial Assemblies/Governors\nunder the revised Constitution will take place in 2019, along with the national elections. The first\nelections for District Assemblies and Administrators will take place in the next mandated\nelections of 2024.\n\n3. The administrative pillar of this reform is the definition of a significant set of\nservice delivery and public administration competencies (further discussed in section E,\nbelow ). Provinces, districts and municipalities ( _autarquias locais,_ AL) are to enjoy administrative\nautonomy (Constitution Article 270-C) and will have their own personnel, who are part of the\noverall state civil service (Constitution Article 270-I).\n\n4. The third core pillar of the decentralization reform is financial . Provinces, Districts\nand AL will have autonomy in the management of their financial affairs and properties. The\nanalysis and recommendations of this chapter will focus on the public financial management\n(PFM) framework and principles for the financial resources of Provinces, that will make the\nProvincial Assemblies a reality starting 2020, while taking into consideration the fragile macroeconomic environment and PFM challenges of the Mozambican State. There is a very short time\nin which to define clearly the financial, staffing and asset / equipment transfers that will\naccompany the new competencies so that the provincial elections can take place with clarity on\nthe roles for which assembly members and the Governors will be elected.\n\n5. This reform will create two new levels of decentralized government in addition to\nthe _autarquias locais_ . These are expected to be subject to a dual accountability, upwards to the\ncentral government and downward to their respective constituents, thus being able to improve\nthe quality of local and regional public services in line with local priorities. Among the many\nchallenges which will have to be addressed in setting up the new Provincial Assemblies and\nExecutive Councils in 2020 are ensuring that national priorities remain addressed and that PFM\ncapacity is developed.\n\n12", "text_characters": 2492}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**6.** **The Government has begun the preparatory work for the legal framework that will**\n**accompany the decentralization reform.** The initial package of laws to enable the reform\nimplementation were adopted by the Cabinet and submitted to the National Assembly by midFebruary 2018. This package consists of the following texts:\n\n - Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized\nProvincial Governments\n\n - Law on the Organization and Functioning of Provincial Assemblies\n\n - Law on the Organization and Functioning of State Deconcentrated Services in the\nProvinces\n\n - Law on the State Administrative Supervision ( _Tutela do Estado)_ on Decentralized\nProvincial Governments and on Local Authorities ( _Autarquias Locais)_\n\n - Law for the Election of Members of the Provincial Assemblies\n\n\nThe consultations and review of these draft texts are ongoing.\n\n\n**7.** **The last core element of the legal package is a law on the finances and PFM**\n**framework (fiscal decentralization law) for the provincial decentralized bodies.** This report\nexamines the key principles, the current legal PFM framework and international experience to\npropose targeted recommendations. These are for consideration of the MEF in the development\nof the legal text itself as well as for beginning to plan the actual implementation subsequent to\nthe elections and launch of the mandate of the Provincial Assemblies and Provincial Executive\nCouncils. The legal framework that will apply for the Districts can be developed over a longer\nperiod of consultation and discussion and will thus benefit from the lessons learned during the\nimplementation of the first mandate of the new Provincial Assemblies.\n\n\n**8.** **A definition of financial autonomy has been provided** in the draft Law on the\nOrganization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized Provincial Governments,\ncomprising three key elements:\n\n - Develop, approve, amend and execute its program of activities and its own budget\n\n - Develop and approve management accounts\n\n - Dispose of own revenues, mandate ( _ordenar)_ and process expenditures, record revenues\nthat according to law are authorized for decentralized governments, have recourse to\nloans, in the terms of the law.\n\n\nThis initial definition is sufficiently broad to ensure the key elements of financial autonomy which\nwill be further elaborated in the forthcoming fiscal decentralization law.\n\n\n**B. Current Budget and Financial Execution Processes and Systems**\n\n\n**Current share of provinces and districts in the State budget**\n\n\n**9.** **Public service delivery in Mozambique is already highly deconcentrated at the**\n**provincial and district levels.** Government units directly in charge of provision of public services\nin several sectors are administered by local bodies, such as Provincial Directorates and District\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "6. The Government has begun the preparatory work for the legal framework that will\naccompany the decentralization reform. The initial package of laws to enable the reform\nimplementation were adopted by the Cabinet and submitted to the National Assembly by midFebruary 2018. This package consists of the following texts:\n\n - Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized\nProvincial Governments\n\n - Law on the Organization and Functioning of Provincial Assemblies\n\n - Law on the Organization and Functioning of State Deconcentrated Services in the\nProvinces\n\n - Law on the State Administrative Supervision ( _Tutela do Estado)_ on Decentralized\nProvincial Governments and on Local Authorities ( _Autarquias Locais)_\n\n - Law for the Election of Members of the Provincial Assemblies\n\nThe consultations and review of these draft texts are ongoing.\n\n7. The last core element of the legal package is a law on the finances and PFM\nframework (fiscal decentralization law) for the provincial decentralized bodies. This report\nexamines the key principles, the current legal PFM framework and international experience to\npropose targeted recommendations. These are for consideration of the MEF in the development\nof the legal text itself as well as for beginning to plan the actual implementation subsequent to\nthe elections and launch of the mandate of the Provincial Assemblies and Provincial Executive\nCouncils. The legal framework that will apply for the Districts can be developed over a longer\nperiod of consultation and discussion and will thus benefit from the lessons learned during the\nimplementation of the first mandate of the new Provincial Assemblies.\n\n8. A definition of financial autonomy has been provided in the draft Law on the\nOrganization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized Provincial Governments,\ncomprising three key elements:\n\n - Develop, approve, amend and execute its program of activities and its own budget\n\n - Develop and approve management accounts\n\n - Dispose of own revenues, mandate ( _ordenar)_ and process expenditures, record revenues\nthat according to law are authorized for decentralized governments, have recourse to\nloans, in the terms of the law.\n\nThis initial definition is sufficiently broad to ensure the key elements of financial autonomy which\nwill be further elaborated in the forthcoming fiscal decentralization law.\n\nB. Current Budget and Financial Execution Processes and Systems\n\nCurrent share of provinces and districts in the State budget\n\n9. Public service delivery in Mozambique is already highly deconcentrated at the\nprovincial and district levels. Government units directly in charge of provision of public services\nin several sectors are administered by local bodies, such as Provincial Directorates and District\n\n13", "text_characters": 2373}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-001", "cr-2023-026-fig-p0016-002"], "markdown": "Entities ( _Delegações Provinciais e Servicos Distritais_ ). For example, in the health sector, such\nbodies have ultimate management responsibility in large provincial hospitals, rural hospitals and\nhealth centers dispersed all over the country. Although authorities are upwardly accountable to\nthe central government, the administration of public services is clearly conducted at local level.\n\n\n**10.** **Budget and financial execution reflects this high degree of administrative**\n**deconcentration.** Provincial and district bodies comprise around 1300 sectorial spending units\n(SUs - around 85 percent of total) in the Mozambican national budget, representing\napproximately 38% of total government expenditure in 2018. They manage procurement\nprocesses, payroll (including recruiting and salary decisions) and operating expenses (electricity\nbills, water bills). The major exception in the health sector is the procurement of medicines,\nequipment and medical supplies, which is carried out centrally by the Ministry of Health.\n\n\n**11.** **Currently, 78 percent of total expenditure in education (largest function in the**\n**national budget) is executed at local level, mainly in the Districts.** This reflects operating – by\neducational district entities ( _Servicos Distritais de Educacao e Desenvolvimento Humano_ ) –the\nnetwork of more than 12,500 primary and secondary schools, which includes recruiting teachers,\ncontrolling working hours and managing salary sheets. Furthermore, the major part of\ninvestments in the education sector in 2018 was developed by the Provinces (Figure 1.1). At\ncentral level, Ministry of Education focuses on the acquisition of goods and services, notably\nimportation of textbooks, organizes national exams and standard learning tests, and establishes\nthe strategic educational objectives and policies.\n\n\n**Figure 1.1. Structure of the Education Budget by Level of Implementation**\n\n\nSource: Authorities and staff estimates.\n\n\n**Allocation criteria and coordination mechanism**\n\n\n**12.** **There is no predetermined rule guiding budget allocation among the three**\n**administrative levels; but the payroll imposes some rigidity.** The discretionary allocative\ndecision is taken each year by the Council of Ministers when preparing and submitting the\nbudget proposal to the National Assembly. Such decision is subject to the approval of the\nparliament which has the constitutional prerogative to deliberate on the composition of the state\nbudget. However, compulsory expenses impose certain rigidity in this composition, the most\n\n\n14\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0697, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(280.0799865722656, 430.3200378417969, 528.9599609375, 566.1600341796875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 566, "number": 11, "size": 64759, "transform": [248.8800048828125, 0.0, -0.0, 135.83999633789062, 280.0799865722656, 430.3200378417969], "width": 1037, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(89.76000213623047, 430.3200378417969, 277.44000244140625, 566.1600341796875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 566, "number": 10, "size": 49539, "transform": [187.67999267578125, 0.0, -0.0, 135.83999633789062, 89.76000213623047, 430.3200378417969], "width": 782, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Entities ( _Delegações Provinciais e Servicos Distritais_ ). For example, in the health sector, such\nbodies have ultimate management responsibility in large provincial hospitals, rural hospitals and\nhealth centers dispersed all over the country. Although authorities are upwardly accountable to\nthe central government, the administration of public services is clearly conducted at local level.\n\n10. Budget and financial execution reflects this high degree of administrative\ndeconcentration. Provincial and district bodies comprise around 1300 sectorial spending units\n(SUs - around 85 percent of total) in the Mozambican national budget, representing\napproximately 38% of total government expenditure in 2018. They manage procurement\nprocesses, payroll (including recruiting and salary decisions) and operating expenses (electricity\nbills, water bills). The major exception in the health sector is the procurement of medicines,\nequipment and medical supplies, which is carried out centrally by the Ministry of Health.\n\n11. Currently, 78 percent of total expenditure in education (largest function in the\nnational budget) is executed at local level, mainly in the Districts. This reflects operating – by\neducational district entities ( _Servicos Distritais de Educacao e Desenvolvimento Humano_ ) –the\nnetwork of more than 12,500 primary and secondary schools, which includes recruiting teachers,\ncontrolling working hours and managing salary sheets. Furthermore, the major part of\ninvestments in the education sector in 2018 was developed by the Provinces (Figure 1.1). At\ncentral level, Ministry of Education focuses on the acquisition of goods and services, notably\nimportation of textbooks, organizes national exams and standard learning tests, and establishes\nthe strategic educational objectives and policies.\n\nFigure 1.1. Structure of the Education Budget by Level of Implementation\n\nSource: Authorities and staff estimates.\n\nAllocation criteria and coordination mechanism\n\n12. There is no predetermined rule guiding budget allocation among the three\nadministrative levels; but the payroll imposes some rigidity. The discretionary allocative\ndecision is taken each year by the Council of Ministers when preparing and submitting the\nbudget proposal to the National Assembly. Such decision is subject to the approval of the\nparliament which has the constitutional prerogative to deliberate on the composition of the state\nbudget. However, compulsory expenses impose certain rigidity in this composition, the most\n\n14", "text_characters": 2159}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "relevant being the wage bill, pension payments and interest. Current payroll management\npractice drives towards deconcentration since the management of civil servants is carried out by\nlocal bodies, while the payment of pensions and interest is executed centrally.\n\n\n**13.** **However, administrative (and budgetary) deconcentration has been increasing in**\n**Mozambique in the last decade.** By 2008, only 24% of the state budget was executed at the\nprovincial and district level, 14 percentage points less than in 2018. This evolution is explained, to\nlarge extent, by the administrative deconcentration of personnel management and payroll\nexpenditure, which currently represents a major challenge for the country (see Section III).\n\n\n**14.** **On the other hand, the resource envelope and corresponding budget ceilings for**\n**Provinces are determined through a fixed formula.** The equation is based on a weighted\naverage of population and poverty index of each Province, with a 70/30 percent weighting ratio,\nrespectively. The rule is disclosed in the Medium-Term Fiscal Scenario, but it is not enforced by\nany legal or regulatory instrument. Although this approach has an equalization component\n(mainly per capita) for the distribution of resources among Provinces, it should be noted that the\nceilings apply only to acquisition of goods and services and capital expenditures (investments),\nwhich have more discretionary characteristics.\n\n\n**15.** **Similar procedure is in place for Districts.** The formula, however, incorporates a\nterritorial component and a measure of local capacity to raise own resources, in addition to the\naforementioned population and poverty parameters. The ceilings apply only to capital\nexpenditures in this case.\n\n\n**16.** **Fiscal coordination between the three administrative levels is closely monitored by**\n**central government due to the absence of political autonomy in the Provinces and**\n**Districts.** Public policies and government priorities are centrally decided, and the\nimplementation responsibility is then delegated to local officers, with some administrative\nautonomy. Although there is some degree of discussion at the provincial and district levels about\nallocations of budget ceilings for goods and services and investments, the central government\nclosely oversees the whole process since main provincial and district authorities are directly\nappointed by the president.\n\n\n**C. Overall Strategic Context and Setting the Stage**\n\n\n**17.** **A strategic medium-term vision for decentralization should be developed in**\n**parallel with the immediate steps to ensure that the Provincial Assemblies can launch in**\n**early 2020.** There are some decisions which may require longer term planning, development of\nthe required legal amendments, revised regulations and systems preparation. This is likely to be\nthe case especially for some of the resources which will be transferred to the Provinces. Thus,\noperationalization of the decentralization process should be gradual.\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "relevant being the wage bill, pension payments and interest. Current payroll management\npractice drives towards deconcentration since the management of civil servants is carried out by\nlocal bodies, while the payment of pensions and interest is executed centrally.\n\n13. However, administrative (and budgetary) deconcentration has been increasing in\nMozambique in the last decade. By 2008, only 24% of the state budget was executed at the\nprovincial and district level, 14 percentage points less than in 2018. This evolution is explained, to\nlarge extent, by the administrative deconcentration of personnel management and payroll\nexpenditure, which currently represents a major challenge for the country (see Section III).\n\n14. On the other hand, the resource envelope and corresponding budget ceilings for\nProvinces are determined through a fixed formula. The equation is based on a weighted\naverage of population and poverty index of each Province, with a 70/30 percent weighting ratio,\nrespectively. The rule is disclosed in the Medium-Term Fiscal Scenario, but it is not enforced by\nany legal or regulatory instrument. Although this approach has an equalization component\n(mainly per capita) for the distribution of resources among Provinces, it should be noted that the\nceilings apply only to acquisition of goods and services and capital expenditures (investments),\nwhich have more discretionary characteristics.\n\n15. Similar procedure is in place for Districts. The formula, however, incorporates a\nterritorial component and a measure of local capacity to raise own resources, in addition to the\naforementioned population and poverty parameters. The ceilings apply only to capital\nexpenditures in this case.\n\n16. Fiscal coordination between the three administrative levels is closely monitored by\ncentral government due to the absence of political autonomy in the Provinces and\nDistricts. Public policies and government priorities are centrally decided, and the\nimplementation responsibility is then delegated to local officers, with some administrative\nautonomy. Although there is some degree of discussion at the provincial and district levels about\nallocations of budget ceilings for goods and services and investments, the central government\nclosely oversees the whole process since main provincial and district authorities are directly\nappointed by the president.\n\nC. Overall Strategic Context and Setting the Stage\n\n17. A strategic medium-term vision for decentralization should be developed in\nparallel with the immediate steps to ensure that the Provincial Assemblies can launch in\nearly 2020. There are some decisions which may require longer term planning, development of\nthe required legal amendments, revised regulations and systems preparation. This is likely to be\nthe case especially for some of the resources which will be transferred to the Provinces. Thus,\noperationalization of the decentralization process should be gradual.\n\n15", "text_characters": 2517}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**18.** **Decentralization has many moving parts.** As discussed above, there is a political pillar,\nan administrative pillar and a fiscal pillar to decentralization. The three pillars need to work\ntogether and be consistent. When the three “legs” of the decentralization stool are not aligned,\nthe new decentralized entities will not be able to provide the public services as expected and\nmay be set up for failure. For example, establishing elected Provincial assemblies can backfire if\nthere are no real decision-making powers to set local priorities, or if the all budget decisions\nappear to be imposed by the central government. Allocating service delivery competencies and\nresponsibilities without adequate funding (unfunded mandates) will also weaken the newly\ndecentralized governments as they will not be able to meet their constituents’ expectations.\n\n\n**19.** **Within this context it is also important to balance four factors/dimensions while**\n**rolling out fiscal decentralization** :\n\n\n- First, there are important national priorities, as well as standards and requirements that the\nnewly decentralized provinces will have to respect. Examples may include:\n\n - Basic standards required for a regional (provincial) or unclassified (district) road.\n\n - Medium-term goal of number of students per classroom.\n\n - Health and safety considerations in the construction of classrooms / schools.\n\n\n- The second dimension is to ensure overall macro-economic stability **.** The PFM rules (further\ndiscussed in section D, below) will have to ensure that provinces will not be in a position to\ntake decisions which could affect the debt position or the overall budget deficit of the central\ngovernment. For example, should a Province guarantee a loan for a local public or private\ncompany which provides regional services (such as public transport), the question is what\nhappens should that enterprise default on the loan guaranteed by the Province? It could then\nbe potentially the responsibility of the Province to ensure the debt payment, but from which\nrevenues? This would thus create a potential risk on the overall budget.\n\n\n- The third dimension pertains to the local capacity for budget management and PFM\nprocesses, including adequate IT equipment and infrastructure **.** With budget autonomy the\nprovinces will be responsible for preparing, executing and reporting their budgets and\nensuring efficient management of public funds which are entrusted to them. Thus, it will be\nessential to develop systems of initial training and capacity building in PFM, both within the\nProvincial administration (under the Provincial Executive Council) as well as among the\nelected members of the Provincial Assembly.\n\n\n- The fourth dimension concerns a political economy consideration **.** As the overall PFM\nframework and resource envelope and their allocation mechanisms are developed, it should\nbe borne in mind that there will be considerable expectations on the elected bodies to\naddress local priorities and make decisions. Ensuring an effective decentralization in the\nmedium term and enforcing increasing autonomy at the provincial level over time are more\nlikely to help guarantee the success and the stability of Mozambique’s decentralization\nreform.\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "18. Decentralization has many moving parts. As discussed above, there is a political pillar,\nan administrative pillar and a fiscal pillar to decentralization. The three pillars need to work\ntogether and be consistent. When the three “legs” of the decentralization stool are not aligned,\nthe new decentralized entities will not be able to provide the public services as expected and\nmay be set up for failure. For example, establishing elected Provincial assemblies can backfire if\nthere are no real decision-making powers to set local priorities, or if the all budget decisions\nappear to be imposed by the central government. Allocating service delivery competencies and\nresponsibilities without adequate funding (unfunded mandates) will also weaken the newly\ndecentralized governments as they will not be able to meet their constituents’ expectations.\n\n19. Within this context it is also important to balance four factors/dimensions while\nrolling out fiscal decentralization :\n\n- First, there are important national priorities, as well as standards and requirements that the\nnewly decentralized provinces will have to respect. Examples may include:\n\n - Basic standards required for a regional (provincial) or unclassified (district) road.\n\n - Medium-term goal of number of students per classroom.\n\n - Health and safety considerations in the construction of classrooms / schools.\n\n- The second dimension is to ensure overall macro-economic stability . The PFM rules (further\ndiscussed in section D, below) will have to ensure that provinces will not be in a position to\ntake decisions which could affect the debt position or the overall budget deficit of the central\ngovernment. For example, should a Province guarantee a loan for a local public or private\ncompany which provides regional services (such as public transport), the question is what\nhappens should that enterprise default on the loan guaranteed by the Province? It could then\nbe potentially the responsibility of the Province to ensure the debt payment, but from which\nrevenues? This would thus create a potential risk on the overall budget.\n\n- The third dimension pertains to the local capacity for budget management and PFM\nprocesses, including adequate IT equipment and infrastructure . With budget autonomy the\nprovinces will be responsible for preparing, executing and reporting their budgets and\nensuring efficient management of public funds which are entrusted to them. Thus, it will be\nessential to develop systems of initial training and capacity building in PFM, both within the\nProvincial administration (under the Provincial Executive Council) as well as among the\nelected members of the Provincial Assembly.\n\n- The fourth dimension concerns a political economy consideration . As the overall PFM\nframework and resource envelope and their allocation mechanisms are developed, it should\nbe borne in mind that there will be considerable expectations on the elected bodies to\naddress local priorities and make decisions. Ensuring an effective decentralization in the\nmedium term and enforcing increasing autonomy at the provincial level over time are more\nlikely to help guarantee the success and the stability of Mozambique’s decentralization\nreform.\n\n16", "text_characters": 2727}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**D. Establishing a PFM Framework and Legal Landscape for**\n**Provinces**\n\n\n**Current PFM legislation**\n\n\n**20.** **The legal framework for budgeting and fiscal management in Mozambique is**\n**comprehensive yet very fragmented.** The Constitution includes several articles on\ndevelopment planning and the budget process and defines the roles of the executive branch and\nthe National Assembly in the preparation and approval of the annual budget (notably Articles\n130, 179 and 204). Additional aspects of budgeting, accounting, fiscal reporting and auditing\nprocesses are legislated the by SISTAFE Law (9/2012), which is complemented by the SISTAFE\nRegulation (Decree 23/2004). There are other laws and decrees regulating specific areas within\nthe PFM framework; the more relevant ones being summarized below:\n\n\n- **The Constitution** : besides the annual budget, it also includes provisions for the government\nfive-year development plan ( _Programa Quinquenal do Governo - PQG_ ) and the annual\nEconomic and Social Development Plan ( _Plano Economico e Social - PES_ ). It clearly requires\nthat the executive branch prepares the draft PQP, PES and budget and sets out the\ncompetency of the national assembly to approve them.\n\n\n- **Sistafe** **[2]** **Law** : this is the core of the PFM legislation in Mozambique. It sets out a clear\ntimetable for budget preparation and approval and the key contents of the budget\ndocumentation. It also includes provision for a standard budget classification structure to be\nused by all public entities. In addition, it defines the national accounting and transparency\nstandards, including requirements for in-year and end-year fiscal reporting, and timeframe\nfor preparation and auditing of annual financial statements. The law requires the chart of\naccounts to be updated on a regular basis. It also legislates on treasury operations, for\nexample, by establishing guidelines for financial programming procedures and, more\nimportant, defining the centralization of all cash operations in the treasury single account\n(CUT). Finally, it makes provisions for internal control at all government levels.\n\n\n- **SISTAFE Regulation (Decree 23/2004)** : it sets out operational regulations on the matters\ncovered by the Sistafe Law. For example, the decree provides the full architecture of the\nbudget classification framework and the complete chart of accounts for the accounting\nsystem.\n\n\n- _**Lei de Bases**_ **(Tax system law):** it defines the principles and the design of the taxation\nsystem in Mozambique, which has the PIT, CIT and VAT as the main components of tax\nrevenue in the country. The law also sets the tax rates for each tax. It is not applied to the\n_autarquias locais_ (AL) that have their own PFM and tax system law (PFM law for _autarquias_\n_locais_ ).\n\n\n2 SISTAFE means “Finance Management System of the State” ( _Sistema de Administracao Financeira do Estado_ ).\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. Establishing a PFM Framework and Legal Landscape for\nProvinces\n\nCurrent PFM legislation\n\n20. The legal framework for budgeting and fiscal management in Mozambique is\ncomprehensive yet very fragmented. The Constitution includes several articles on\ndevelopment planning and the budget process and defines the roles of the executive branch and\nthe National Assembly in the preparation and approval of the annual budget (notably Articles\n130, 179 and 204). Additional aspects of budgeting, accounting, fiscal reporting and auditing\nprocesses are legislated the by SISTAFE Law (9/2012), which is complemented by the SISTAFE\nRegulation (Decree 23/2004). There are other laws and decrees regulating specific areas within\nthe PFM framework; the more relevant ones being summarized below:\n\n- The Constitution : besides the annual budget, it also includes provisions for the government\nfive-year development plan ( _Programa Quinquenal do Governo - PQG_ ) and the annual\nEconomic and Social Development Plan ( _Plano Economico e Social - PES_ ). It clearly requires\nthat the executive branch prepares the draft PQP, PES and budget and sets out the\ncompetency of the national assembly to approve them.\n\n- Sistafe [2] Law : this is the core of the PFM legislation in Mozambique. It sets out a clear\ntimetable for budget preparation and approval and the key contents of the budget\ndocumentation. It also includes provision for a standard budget classification structure to be\nused by all public entities. In addition, it defines the national accounting and transparency\nstandards, including requirements for in-year and end-year fiscal reporting, and timeframe\nfor preparation and auditing of annual financial statements. The law requires the chart of\naccounts to be updated on a regular basis. It also legislates on treasury operations, for\nexample, by establishing guidelines for financial programming procedures and, more\nimportant, defining the centralization of all cash operations in the treasury single account\n(CUT). Finally, it makes provisions for internal control at all government levels.\n\n- SISTAFE Regulation (Decree 23/2004) : it sets out operational regulations on the matters\ncovered by the Sistafe Law. For example, the decree provides the full architecture of the\nbudget classification framework and the complete chart of accounts for the accounting\nsystem.\n\n- _Lei de Bases_ (Tax system law): it defines the principles and the design of the taxation\nsystem in Mozambique, which has the PIT, CIT and VAT as the main components of tax\nrevenue in the country. The law also sets the tax rates for each tax. It is not applied to the\n_autarquias locais_ (AL) that have their own PFM and tax system law (PFM law for _autarquias_\n_locais_ ).\n\n2 SISTAFE means “Finance Management System of the State” ( _Sistema de Administracao Financeira do Estado_ ).\n\n17", "text_characters": 2403}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- **PFM Law for** _**autarquias locais**_ **:** this is a specific PFM and taxation law applied only to\n_autarquias locais_ (AL). It defines the budget procedures for the _autarquias locais_, including a\ntimetable for budget preparation and approval. It also establishes a revenue sharing\nmechanism called _Fundo de Compensacoes Autarquicas_ (FCA), under which the central\ngovernment transfers to _autarquias locais_ 1.5% of its total fiscal revenue. This is an\nunconditional transfer distributed to local administrations through a fixed formula that\nconsiders as parameters _autarquias locais_ ’ population and the territorial area, with a 70/30\npercent weighting ratio, respectively. The law establishes the same national CoA to be\nadopted by _autarquias locais_ and requires them to submit budget execution outturns to MEF\non a quarterly basis and annual financial statements to corresponding local assemblies and\nto administrative tribunal. It also mandates each municipality to have its own treasury and to\ncentralize its cash operations in a single account. Finally, the law allows _autarquias locais_ to\nundertake short-term debt transactions with local creditors but limited to three twelfths of\ntheir FCA transfers, and the debt should be repaid within the same fiscal year. For long-term\nborrowing from international creditors, approval of the Ministry of Finance is required.\n\n\n**21.** **Any ambiguity as to whether the** _**autarquias locais**_ **are subjected to the Sistafe law**\n**or not should be avoided when drafting the fiscal decentralization law.** The Sistafe law does\nnot explicitly refer to _autarquias locais_ since they were not operational by the time the law was\nenacted. On the other hand, the PFM Law for _autarquias locais_ refers to Sistafe law only in article\n12, which deals with budget formulation and execution, by stating that _autarquias locais_ should\nobserve Sistafe’s rules and procedures. Therefore, on all other PFM matters, the effectiveness of\nSistafe law over the municipal administrations is unclear. For example, _autarquias locais_ may not\nfully comply with Sistafe’s transparency standards and reporting requirements. Care should be\ntaken when drafting the fiscal decentralization law to avoid grey areas and ensure complete\napplicability of Sistafe’s discipline to the Provinces.\n\n\n**22.** **Furthermore, in case the FCA-type of unconditional transfer mechanism is to be**\n**adopted for the Provinces, it would be recommended to empower the MEF to block the**\n**transfer if provinces do not submit fiscal data on a regular basis.** This is a very effective way\nto ensure MEF receives the necessary information to proceed with systematic monitoring of fiscal\nperformance of the Provinces.\n\n\n**23.** **In the medium-term, effort should be made to consolidate the PFM laws in one**\n**comprehensive legal instrument.** This opportunity will come by 2024 before the fiscal\ndecentralization to Districts become operational. There is a five-year period for MEF to plan\nahead and design a comprehensive PFM law covering central government, provinces, districts\nand _autarquias locais_ . If such initiative is not moved forward, by 2025 Mozambique will have four\nPFM laws, one for each level of government. This will be a very peculiar situation in which the\nmultiple overlapping legislation can be potentially conflicting and adversely affect the orderly\nfunctioning of the PFM system.\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- PFM Law for _autarquias locais_ : this is a specific PFM and taxation law applied only to\n_autarquias locais_ (AL). It defines the budget procedures for the _autarquias locais_, including a\ntimetable for budget preparation and approval. It also establishes a revenue sharing\nmechanism called _Fundo de Compensacoes Autarquicas_ (FCA), under which the central\ngovernment transfers to _autarquias locais_ 1.5% of its total fiscal revenue. This is an\nunconditional transfer distributed to local administrations through a fixed formula that\nconsiders as parameters _autarquias locais_ ’ population and the territorial area, with a 70/30\npercent weighting ratio, respectively. The law establishes the same national CoA to be\nadopted by _autarquias locais_ and requires them to submit budget execution outturns to MEF\non a quarterly basis and annual financial statements to corresponding local assemblies and\nto administrative tribunal. It also mandates each municipality to have its own treasury and to\ncentralize its cash operations in a single account. Finally, the law allows _autarquias locais_ to\nundertake short-term debt transactions with local creditors but limited to three twelfths of\ntheir FCA transfers, and the debt should be repaid within the same fiscal year. For long-term\nborrowing from international creditors, approval of the Ministry of Finance is required.\n\n21. Any ambiguity as to whether the _autarquias locais_ are subjected to the Sistafe law\nor not should be avoided when drafting the fiscal decentralization law. The Sistafe law does\nnot explicitly refer to _autarquias locais_ since they were not operational by the time the law was\nenacted. On the other hand, the PFM Law for _autarquias locais_ refers to Sistafe law only in article\n12, which deals with budget formulation and execution, by stating that _autarquias locais_ should\nobserve Sistafe’s rules and procedures. Therefore, on all other PFM matters, the effectiveness of\nSistafe law over the municipal administrations is unclear. For example, _autarquias locais_ may not\nfully comply with Sistafe’s transparency standards and reporting requirements. Care should be\ntaken when drafting the fiscal decentralization law to avoid grey areas and ensure complete\napplicability of Sistafe’s discipline to the Provinces.\n\n22. Furthermore, in case the FCA-type of unconditional transfer mechanism is to be\nadopted for the Provinces, it would be recommended to empower the MEF to block the\ntransfer if provinces do not submit fiscal data on a regular basis. This is a very effective way\nto ensure MEF receives the necessary information to proceed with systematic monitoring of fiscal\nperformance of the Provinces.\n\n23. In the medium-term, effort should be made to consolidate the PFM laws in one\ncomprehensive legal instrument. This opportunity will come by 2024 before the fiscal\ndecentralization to Districts become operational. There is a five-year period for MEF to plan\nahead and design a comprehensive PFM law covering central government, provinces, districts\nand _autarquias locais_ . If such initiative is not moved forward, by 2025 Mozambique will have four\nPFM laws, one for each level of government. This will be a very peculiar situation in which the\nmultiple overlapping legislation can be potentially conflicting and adversely affect the orderly\nfunctioning of the PFM system.\n\n18", "text_characters": 2851}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Recommendation 1.1** . In the medium-term, consolidate the PFM related laws (Sistafe law, PFM\nlaw for _autarquias locais_, planned fiscal decentralization law) in an overarching comprehensive\nPFM law covering central government, provinces, districts and _autarquias locais._\n\n\n**The new fiscal decentralization law: key principles**\n\n\n**24.** **Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of financial responsibility and authority to the**\n**local governments and requires establishing a sound PFM framework.** Enhanced budgetary\nand financial management practices enables fiscal authorities to properly play their role in the\npreparation of policies and planning, as well as the appropriate allocation of available funds to\neffectively carry out activities and spending. More broadly, implementing fiscal decentralization\nrelies on four main building blocks:\n\n\n- **Expenditure Assignment** : The expenditure assignments transferred from the center to the\nProvinces/Districts must be clearly defined.\n\n\n- **Funding** : Revenues at the disposal of the Provinces/Districts should be sufficient to finance\ntheir assigned expenditure responsibilities. Resource/budget envelopes should be\ndetermined through a transparent criterion.\n\n\n- **Budget Planning** : PFM framework should enable Provinces/Districts to define their priorities\nand development needs but should also ensure sound fiscal coordination among different\nlevels of government.\n\n\n- **Budget Execution & Financial Audit** : PFM framework should provide for integrated\nfinancial management systems and centralization of cash operations, as well as standard\nreporting schemes and regular auditing processes.\n\n\n**25.** **Transfer of expenditure responsibilities and public resources to SNGs should go**\n**hand in hand with rolling out a complete PFM framework at local level.** Provincial\nauthorities will be called to plan, budget, and execute government programs and activities with a\ngreater sense of accountability, since local voters will demand more effective spending,\naccompanied by strengthened control and audit processes. Therefore, the overall PFM\narchitecture for Provincial governments should be similar to national government (Figure 1.2),\nexcept for macro-fiscal policy formulation which, in most countries, is determined by central\ngovernment as SNGs do not have the necessary tools to take part in the process.\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Recommendation 1.1 . In the medium-term, consolidate the PFM related laws (Sistafe law, PFM\nlaw for _autarquias locais_, planned fiscal decentralization law) in an overarching comprehensive\nPFM law covering central government, provinces, districts and _autarquias locais._\n\nThe new fiscal decentralization law: key principles\n\n24. Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of financial responsibility and authority to the\nlocal governments and requires establishing a sound PFM framework. Enhanced budgetary\nand financial management practices enables fiscal authorities to properly play their role in the\npreparation of policies and planning, as well as the appropriate allocation of available funds to\neffectively carry out activities and spending. More broadly, implementing fiscal decentralization\nrelies on four main building blocks:\n\n- Expenditure Assignment : The expenditure assignments transferred from the center to the\nProvinces/Districts must be clearly defined.\n\n- Funding : Revenues at the disposal of the Provinces/Districts should be sufficient to finance\ntheir assigned expenditure responsibilities. Resource/budget envelopes should be\ndetermined through a transparent criterion.\n\n- Budget Planning : PFM framework should enable Provinces/Districts to define their priorities\nand development needs but should also ensure sound fiscal coordination among different\nlevels of government.\n\n- Budget Execution & Financial Audit : PFM framework should provide for integrated\nfinancial management systems and centralization of cash operations, as well as standard\nreporting schemes and regular auditing processes.\n\n25. Transfer of expenditure responsibilities and public resources to SNGs should go\nhand in hand with rolling out a complete PFM framework at local level. Provincial\nauthorities will be called to plan, budget, and execute government programs and activities with a\ngreater sense of accountability, since local voters will demand more effective spending,\naccompanied by strengthened control and audit processes. Therefore, the overall PFM\narchitecture for Provincial governments should be similar to national government (Figure 1.2),\nexcept for macro-fiscal policy formulation which, in most countries, is determined by central\ngovernment as SNGs do not have the necessary tools to take part in the process.\n\n19", "text_characters": 2001}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0022-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 1.2. Public Financial Management Cycle**\n\n\n**Budget preparation and approval**\n\n\n**26.** **As part of the new fiscal decentralization law, the MEF should consider a clear and**\n**coordinated budget calendar.** Such a calendar should be designed to allow the MEF to provide\nkey budget information to the Provinces in a timely manner and to accommodate consultations\nwith the Provinces during the central government budget preparation. The information to be\nprovided by the MEF to the Provinces would include estimates for fiscal transfers (conditional\nand unconditional grants) from the state budget, shared macroeconomic assumptions to ensure\nconsistent budgetary projections across all levels of government and other relevant data.\n\n\n**27.** **The composition of provincial and state budgets is a key decision to be taken.**\nCurrently, the state budget comprises all SUs at provincial and district levels which might not be\nan appropriate set up under fiscal decentralization. From 2020, Provincial budget allocations will\nbe debated and approved by elected provincial assemblies; therefore, submitting it to the\nnational assembly as part of the main state budget documentation will mean a second layer of\nlegislature appreciation. Alternatively, the approved budgets of the 10 provinces and the city of\nMaputo could be introduced in the state budget proposal as an annex to allow for a\nconsolidated view of the total budget in the country, but not subject to national assembly\napproval. The national assembly would be approving the overall transfer amount for conditional\nand unconditional grants from the state budget to the Provinces. Other pros and cons of keeping\nthe provincial budgets within the main state budget documentation can be cited:\n\n\n**Pros:**\n\n\n- Reduces initial cost of reform implementation, since there will be no change in the current\npractice. Potential costs related to changing processes in the MEF, Provinces and assemblies\nwill not be incurred.\n\n\n20\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1189, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(164.39999389648438, 93.1199951171875, 465.6000061035156, 284.3999938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 797, "number": 10, "size": 122284, "transform": [301.20001220703125, 0.0, -0.0, 191.27999877929688, 164.39999389648438, 93.1199951171875], "width": 1255, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 1.2. Public Financial Management Cycle\n\nBudget preparation and approval\n\n26. As part of the new fiscal decentralization law, the MEF should consider a clear and\ncoordinated budget calendar. Such a calendar should be designed to allow the MEF to provide\nkey budget information to the Provinces in a timely manner and to accommodate consultations\nwith the Provinces during the central government budget preparation. The information to be\nprovided by the MEF to the Provinces would include estimates for fiscal transfers (conditional\nand unconditional grants) from the state budget, shared macroeconomic assumptions to ensure\nconsistent budgetary projections across all levels of government and other relevant data.\n\n27. The composition of provincial and state budgets is a key decision to be taken.\nCurrently, the state budget comprises all SUs at provincial and district levels which might not be\nan appropriate set up under fiscal decentralization. From 2020, Provincial budget allocations will\nbe debated and approved by elected provincial assemblies; therefore, submitting it to the\nnational assembly as part of the main state budget documentation will mean a second layer of\nlegislature appreciation. Alternatively, the approved budgets of the 10 provinces and the city of\nMaputo could be introduced in the state budget proposal as an annex to allow for a\nconsolidated view of the total budget in the country, but not subject to national assembly\napproval. The national assembly would be approving the overall transfer amount for conditional\nand unconditional grants from the state budget to the Provinces. Other pros and cons of keeping\nthe provincial budgets within the main state budget documentation can be cited:\n\nPros:\n\n- Reduces initial cost of reform implementation, since there will be no change in the current\npractice. Potential costs related to changing processes in the MEF, Provinces and assemblies\nwill not be incurred.\n\n20", "text_characters": 1643}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- State budget main documentation consolidates all levels of government, which allow for a\ncomprehensive view of the programed budget for the entire country in a single document.\n\n\n- Place more direct oversight of compliance with national priorities in the Provinces given that\nthe national assembly will debate on the approved provincial budgets\n\n\n**Cons:**\n\n\n- Requires more careful review of Provincial draft budget to allow for a full consolidation into\nthe state budget proposal. Coordination in budget calendar and exchange information\nprocesses becomes even more relevant\n\n\n- Potentially implies national decision on Provincial budget because national assembly will be\nforced to deliberate on it. It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and\npatrimonial autonomy granted by the constitution\n\n\n- Maintains pre-decentralization practice (current), which can be understood as a step back in\nthe decentralization process and inconsistent with the Constitutional Amendments\n\n\n**Budget execution**\n\n\n**28.** **Budget execution in central, provincial, and district levels is mainly performed**\n**through e-SISTAFE, the Mozambican integrated financial management system.** The system\ncurrently covers over 90% of the 1629 SUs but it does not track the transactions through the\nentire expenditure cycle, only payments. This happens because, although the functionality to\ninput transactions on commitment and verification phases are fully operational, the current\npractice adopted by MEF and line ministries is to record all spending stages simultaneously at\nthe time of payments. This is a major drawback in the current PFM framework, which prevents\nthe proper control of commitments and leads to persistent accumulation of arrears and cash\nrationing (see Section II).\n\n\n**29.** **Maintaining the budget execution of provincial SUs in e-SISTAFE is another key**\n**decision to be taken under the new PFM framework.** Pros and cons of such decision can be\ncited:\n\n\n**Pros:**\n\n\n- SUs at provincial/district level already operate through e-SISTAFE. This is an advantage in\nterms of reducing potential costs related to changing processes in the Provinces.\n\n\n- The system has the required functionalities/tools.\n\n\n- It enforces a common Chart of Accounts and classification architecture in the Provinces, since\ne-SISTAFE operates with a single accounting and budget classification for all SUs\n\n\n- It allows real time access to financial information of the Provinces by the MEF, which can\nfacilitate monitoring of provincial fiscal indicators and policy coordination\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- State budget main documentation consolidates all levels of government, which allow for a\ncomprehensive view of the programed budget for the entire country in a single document.\n\n- Place more direct oversight of compliance with national priorities in the Provinces given that\nthe national assembly will debate on the approved provincial budgets\n\nCons:\n\n- Requires more careful review of Provincial draft budget to allow for a full consolidation into\nthe state budget proposal. Coordination in budget calendar and exchange information\nprocesses becomes even more relevant\n\n- Potentially implies national decision on Provincial budget because national assembly will be\nforced to deliberate on it. It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and\npatrimonial autonomy granted by the constitution\n\n- Maintains pre-decentralization practice (current), which can be understood as a step back in\nthe decentralization process and inconsistent with the Constitutional Amendments\n\nBudget execution\n\n28. Budget execution in central, provincial, and district levels is mainly performed\nthrough e-SISTAFE, the Mozambican integrated financial management system. The system\ncurrently covers over 90% of the 1629 SUs but it does not track the transactions through the\nentire expenditure cycle, only payments. This happens because, although the functionality to\ninput transactions on commitment and verification phases are fully operational, the current\npractice adopted by MEF and line ministries is to record all spending stages simultaneously at\nthe time of payments. This is a major drawback in the current PFM framework, which prevents\nthe proper control of commitments and leads to persistent accumulation of arrears and cash\nrationing (see Section II).\n\n29. Maintaining the budget execution of provincial SUs in e-SISTAFE is another key\ndecision to be taken under the new PFM framework. Pros and cons of such decision can be\ncited:\n\nPros:\n\n- SUs at provincial/district level already operate through e-SISTAFE. This is an advantage in\nterms of reducing potential costs related to changing processes in the Provinces.\n\n- The system has the required functionalities/tools.\n\n- It enforces a common Chart of Accounts and classification architecture in the Provinces, since\ne-SISTAFE operates with a single accounting and budget classification for all SUs\n\n- It allows real time access to financial information of the Provinces by the MEF, which can\nfacilitate monitoring of provincial fiscal indicators and policy coordination\n\n21", "text_characters": 2145}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Cons:**\n\n\n- It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy\ngranted by the constitution.\n\n\n**30.** **Another valuable feature of e-SISTAFE is its interoperability with the treasury single**\n**account at the central bank (CUT).** Although some SUs still hold accounts in commercial banks\nunder special circumstances, the transactions undertaken through e-SISTAFE are paid against the\nCUT. Therefore, expanding the coverage of the system among budget units leads to a broader\nuse of the CUT within the government, with clear positive implications for cash management.\n\n\n**31.** **Therefore, an important decision that comes next is whether the Provinces will**\n**continue to operate under the CUT or not.** Having the provincial cash resources in the CUT\nallows the treasury to manage and control overall government's cash balances more efficiently. A\nmechanism of sub-accounts (or virtual accounts) embedded in the single account ensures the\nprovincial ownership over the resources belonging to them. Alternatively, in case Provinces leave\nthe CUT, it is desirable for each Province to set up a similar single account structure at the local\nlevel. Other pros and cons of continuing operating under the CUT are cited:\n\n\n**Pros:**\n\n\n- The CUT enhances cash management operations by centralizing the government’s liquidity\nwithin a single account\n\n\n- It prevents diversion of resources in multiple bank accounts leading to additional financial\ncosts and hampering control of public funds\n\n\n- It limits accumulation of arrears by reducing the possibility of idle cash\n\n\n- It improves financial discipline and transparency of local governments\n\n\n**Cons:**\n\n\n- It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy\ngranted by the constitution\n\n\n- There is a need to implement several sub-accounts (or virtual accounts) in the CUT, which\nwould require reconfiguring the CUT architecture.\n\n\n- There would be challenges to operate the CUT in a way to ensure that subnational\ngovernments have access to their own cash resources in the CUT and their finances are not\nimpacted by possible liquidity constraints of the central government.\n\n\n**Fiscal reporting and accounting**\n\n\n**32.** **The new fiscal decentralization law should define standard reporting and**\n**transparency requirements, in addition to the provisions of the SISTAFE law.** This should\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Cons:\n\n- It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy\ngranted by the constitution.\n\n30. Another valuable feature of e-SISTAFE is its interoperability with the treasury single\naccount at the central bank (CUT). Although some SUs still hold accounts in commercial banks\nunder special circumstances, the transactions undertaken through e-SISTAFE are paid against the\nCUT. Therefore, expanding the coverage of the system among budget units leads to a broader\nuse of the CUT within the government, with clear positive implications for cash management.\n\n31. Therefore, an important decision that comes next is whether the Provinces will\ncontinue to operate under the CUT or not. Having the provincial cash resources in the CUT\nallows the treasury to manage and control overall government's cash balances more efficiently. A\nmechanism of sub-accounts (or virtual accounts) embedded in the single account ensures the\nprovincial ownership over the resources belonging to them. Alternatively, in case Provinces leave\nthe CUT, it is desirable for each Province to set up a similar single account structure at the local\nlevel. Other pros and cons of continuing operating under the CUT are cited:\n\nPros:\n\n- The CUT enhances cash management operations by centralizing the government’s liquidity\nwithin a single account\n\n- It prevents diversion of resources in multiple bank accounts leading to additional financial\ncosts and hampering control of public funds\n\n- It limits accumulation of arrears by reducing the possibility of idle cash\n\n- It improves financial discipline and transparency of local governments\n\nCons:\n\n- It can be seen as a limitation for the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy\ngranted by the constitution\n\n- There is a need to implement several sub-accounts (or virtual accounts) in the CUT, which\nwould require reconfiguring the CUT architecture.\n\n- There would be challenges to operate the CUT in a way to ensure that subnational\ngovernments have access to their own cash resources in the CUT and their finances are not\nimpacted by possible liquidity constraints of the central government.\n\nFiscal reporting and accounting\n\n32. The new fiscal decentralization law should define standard reporting and\ntransparency requirements, in addition to the provisions of the SISTAFE law. This should\n\n22", "text_characters": 1983}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "include budget execution reports, financial statements and fiscal statistics for both in-year and\nyear-end reporting schemes. In-year reporting should ideally be undertaken on a monthly basis,\nor at most quarterly. The reports should be submitted to the MEF, to Administrative Tribunal, to\nprovincial agencies and should be made public for easy access of civil society. MEF should be\nresponsible for consolidating in-year reports and statistics as well annual accounts and financial\nstatements for the general government. Moreover, MEF should also rely on such reporting\nframework to actively monitor provincial fiscal performance and to carry out macro-economic\nand fiscal analyses and policy.\n\n\n**33.** **The legislation should provide for harmonized budget classification and accounting**\n**standards, including a common chart of accounts (CoA) to be used by all levels of**\n**government.** This is critical to ensure consistent consolidation of public finances and to make\ninformation comparable across jurisdictions. National accounting standards should be\nmandatory for Provinces as well as common budget classification structure; economic and\nfunctional classification should also be aligned to international standards, such as the IMF GFSM\n2014, to the extent possible. Such an approach will enhance international comparability of\nMozambican fiscal data, and contribute to improve budget processes, control and accountability.\nStandardizing accounting and budget classifications is even more important in the case\nProvinces will be operating under separate information management systems.\n\n\n**34.** **Enhanced transparency practices are essential to successfully implement the**\n**concept of fiscal decentralization.** The main justification for decentralized fiscal government\noperations is improving the quality of service delivery through a dual accountability approach for\nlocal administrations. Provincial authorities will be accountable to the central government and to\nthe local voters and civil society, who should be able to exert effective oversight on the local\nbudget decisions and spending process.\n\n\n**35.** **The** _**Tribunal Administrativo**_ **– the supreme audit institution – is to play an**\n**important role to ensure accountability and governance standards.** **[3]** Regular auditing by the\nindependent external auditor is required to strengthen controls and improve procedural\nweaknesses at the local level, in particular, by addressing capacity constraints, providing better\nguidance and documentation, and stronger accountability arrangements. The tribunal should\nalso be in charge of auditing the provincial financial statements before appreciation by the\nprovincial assemblies.\n\n\n**Fiscal coordination and macroeconomic stability**\n\n\n**36.** **Fiscal decentralization requires sound coordination among different levels of**\n**government to ensure macroeconomic stability in the country.** Provinces need a clear\nunderstanding of their likely transfers from the state budget for the year and for the medium\n\n3 A comprehensive review of the role of the _Tribunal Administrativo_ was beyond the scope of the mission; the\npoint here is to ensure that the _Tribunal Administrativo_ audits the provinces the same way it does for the center.\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "include budget execution reports, financial statements and fiscal statistics for both in-year and\nyear-end reporting schemes. In-year reporting should ideally be undertaken on a monthly basis,\nor at most quarterly. The reports should be submitted to the MEF, to Administrative Tribunal, to\nprovincial agencies and should be made public for easy access of civil society. MEF should be\nresponsible for consolidating in-year reports and statistics as well annual accounts and financial\nstatements for the general government. Moreover, MEF should also rely on such reporting\nframework to actively monitor provincial fiscal performance and to carry out macro-economic\nand fiscal analyses and policy.\n\n33. The legislation should provide for harmonized budget classification and accounting\nstandards, including a common chart of accounts (CoA) to be used by all levels of\ngovernment. This is critical to ensure consistent consolidation of public finances and to make\ninformation comparable across jurisdictions. National accounting standards should be\nmandatory for Provinces as well as common budget classification structure; economic and\nfunctional classification should also be aligned to international standards, such as the IMF GFSM\n2014, to the extent possible. Such an approach will enhance international comparability of\nMozambican fiscal data, and contribute to improve budget processes, control and accountability.\nStandardizing accounting and budget classifications is even more important in the case\nProvinces will be operating under separate information management systems.\n\n34. Enhanced transparency practices are essential to successfully implement the\nconcept of fiscal decentralization. The main justification for decentralized fiscal government\noperations is improving the quality of service delivery through a dual accountability approach for\nlocal administrations. Provincial authorities will be accountable to the central government and to\nthe local voters and civil society, who should be able to exert effective oversight on the local\nbudget decisions and spending process.\n\n35. The _Tribunal Administrativo_ – the supreme audit institution – is to play an\nimportant role to ensure accountability and governance standards. [3] Regular auditing by the\nindependent external auditor is required to strengthen controls and improve procedural\nweaknesses at the local level, in particular, by addressing capacity constraints, providing better\nguidance and documentation, and stronger accountability arrangements. The tribunal should\nalso be in charge of auditing the provincial financial statements before appreciation by the\nprovincial assemblies.\n\nFiscal coordination and macroeconomic stability\n\n36. Fiscal decentralization requires sound coordination among different levels of\ngovernment to ensure macroeconomic stability in the country. Provinces need a clear\nunderstanding of their likely transfers from the state budget for the year and for the medium\n\n3 A comprehensive review of the role of the _Tribunal Administrativo_ was beyond the scope of the mission; the\npoint here is to ensure that the _Tribunal Administrativo_ audits the provinces the same way it does for the center.\n\n23", "text_characters": 2743}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "term and an opportunity to comment on the formulation of any national policies with\nimplications for their expenditures, revenues, or financial management. On the other hand, it is\ncritical for the central government to monitor provincial fiscal performance to mitigate potential\nfiscal risks from the provincial level that could potentially jeopardize the overall fiscal position.\n\n\n**37.** **It will be essential that key macroeconomic rules are established** to ensure that\nProvinces (and later Districts) do not negatively impact on overall country macro-fiscal\nimbalances, in respect to deficit and budget balances (discussed above), borrowing and issuance\nof guarantees. Within the legal package which was submitted to Parliament on February 15, there\nare some general provisions on the authority of provinces to contract loans. For example, in\nArticle 6 of the draft Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of\nDecentralized Provincial Governments, financial autonomy is defined to include having recourse\nto loans, in accordance with the law ( _…bem como recorrer aos empréstimos, nos termos da lei_ ).\nFurther, Article 15 1.h of the draft Law on the Organization and Functioning of Provincial\nAssemblies provides that the assembly approves loan contracts as per the law, provided that the\ncorresponding annual loan service is supported by a table attesting borrowing capacity. [4]\n\n\n**38.** **The question of borrowing by the provinces is one of the very key issues which will**\n**need to be decided by the forthcoming fiscal decentralization law.** The first consideration is\nto understand that the proceeds of borrowing are not a revenue, but a source of financing. The\nproceeds obtained from the lending financial institution will need to be paid back, with interest.\nFuture flows of revenues of provinces should be adequate for debt service, including repayment\nof loans. The first question, therefore, is about the creditworthiness of the Provinces. Are they\nable to repay a loan? Are they willing to repay a loan? These questions should be examined\nseparately for each of the two key types of borrowing which are most frequently defined as part\nof local government borrowing frameworks and regulations: short-term loans and long-term\nloans. [5]\n\n\n**39.** **Short-term borrowing for liquidity/cash management purposes would imply that**\n**there is some initial provincial control over its cash management processes.** Within local\ngovernment borrowing frameworks, short-term loans (< 12 months) are often used to resolve a\ntemporary cash shortage or address liquidity needs when there is a mismatch between ongoing\nexpenditure commitments and the calendar for incoming revenue. For example, a key property\ntax could be collected during the month of September, while ongoing current operations need to\nbe funded from January 2020. In many countries, subnational governments negotiate a shortterm credit line at the beginning of the fiscal year, which they may draw down and replenish\nbased on their short-term funding needs and cash availability. At present, there are many\nunknowns for the establishment of Provinces and their PFM frameworks. It is clear, however, that\n\n\n4 Article 15 1.h - _aprovar a contracção de empréstimos nos termos da lei, desde que a sua amortização anual seja_\n_fundamentada em mapa demonstrativo da capacidade de endividamento_ .\n\n5 Issuance of municipal bonds is another form of subnational debt instrument, but it is not necessary to further\nelaborate on this question at present.\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "term and an opportunity to comment on the formulation of any national policies with\nimplications for their expenditures, revenues, or financial management. On the other hand, it is\ncritical for the central government to monitor provincial fiscal performance to mitigate potential\nfiscal risks from the provincial level that could potentially jeopardize the overall fiscal position.\n\n37. It will be essential that key macroeconomic rules are established to ensure that\nProvinces (and later Districts) do not negatively impact on overall country macro-fiscal\nimbalances, in respect to deficit and budget balances (discussed above), borrowing and issuance\nof guarantees. Within the legal package which was submitted to Parliament on February 15, there\nare some general provisions on the authority of provinces to contract loans. For example, in\nArticle 6 of the draft Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of\nDecentralized Provincial Governments, financial autonomy is defined to include having recourse\nto loans, in accordance with the law ( _…bem como recorrer aos empréstimos, nos termos da lei_ ).\nFurther, Article 15 1.h of the draft Law on the Organization and Functioning of Provincial\nAssemblies provides that the assembly approves loan contracts as per the law, provided that the\ncorresponding annual loan service is supported by a table attesting borrowing capacity. [4]\n\n38. The question of borrowing by the provinces is one of the very key issues which will\nneed to be decided by the forthcoming fiscal decentralization law. The first consideration is\nto understand that the proceeds of borrowing are not a revenue, but a source of financing. The\nproceeds obtained from the lending financial institution will need to be paid back, with interest.\nFuture flows of revenues of provinces should be adequate for debt service, including repayment\nof loans. The first question, therefore, is about the creditworthiness of the Provinces. Are they\nable to repay a loan? Are they willing to repay a loan? These questions should be examined\nseparately for each of the two key types of borrowing which are most frequently defined as part\nof local government borrowing frameworks and regulations: short-term loans and long-term\nloans. [5]\n\n39. Short-term borrowing for liquidity/cash management purposes would imply that\nthere is some initial provincial control over its cash management processes. Within local\ngovernment borrowing frameworks, short-term loans (< 12 months) are often used to resolve a\ntemporary cash shortage or address liquidity needs when there is a mismatch between ongoing\nexpenditure commitments and the calendar for incoming revenue. For example, a key property\ntax could be collected during the month of September, while ongoing current operations need to\nbe funded from January 2020. In many countries, subnational governments negotiate a shortterm credit line at the beginning of the fiscal year, which they may draw down and replenish\nbased on their short-term funding needs and cash availability. At present, there are many\nunknowns for the establishment of Provinces and their PFM frameworks. It is clear, however, that\n\n4 Article 15 1.h - _aprovar a contracção de empréstimos nos termos da lei, desde que a sua amortização anual seja_\n_fundamentada em mapa demonstrativo da capacidade de endividamento_ .\n\n5 Issuance of municipal bonds is another form of subnational debt instrument, but it is not necessary to further\nelaborate on this question at present.\n\n24", "text_characters": 2965}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "in an initial period, and given the current cash management problems and undershooting of\nrevenue targets for the overall central government, regulating liquidity needs with short-term\nborrowing by the Provinces could create short-to medium-term macro-fiscal risks.\n\n\n**40.** **International experience in short-term borrowing and the pros and cons.** Some\ncountries limit short term borrowing to a share of current year budget revenue or calculated on\nprevious year revenues.\n\n - Counties in Kenya may borrow up to the equivalent 5 percent of their last audited\nrevenues; these loans must be repaid within twelve months.\n\n - Ethiopia’s States and Addis Ababa City Government may borrow short-term to manage\ntheir consolidated fund, with the approval of the Federal Government (Ministry of\nFinance and Economic Development) and which must be repaid in the following fiscal\nyear.\n\n - So, while an argument in favor ( _pros)_ of short-term borrowing would be to enable the\nProvince to cover necessary short-term budget items, a clear risk ( _cons_ ) is that repayment\nof such loans within the fiscal year may be compromised if the revenue shortfall is not\nmade up or cash shortages reduce central government transfers that were initially\nbudgeted for the Provinces.\n\n**41.** **Long-term borrowing to finance infrastructure investment would require that**\n**provinces have significant and dependable own-source revenues.** It is expected that at the\nstart of Provincial decentralized government operations, the transfers from the central\ngovernment will be required to cover payroll and goods and services expenditures. These funds\nwill be committed/engaged quite quickly. In order to reimburse a long-term loan, Provinces will\nneed to have access to own source revenues which are not earmarked for a specific service. In\nthe absence of such own source revenues, the provinces would not have any financial basis on\nwhich to service the debt payments for a long-term loan.\n\n\n**42.** **International experience in long-term borrowing and the pros and cons.** The\nframeworks to regulate long-term borrowing may function based on an _ex_ ante direct control\nframework (pre-approval by national government, preferred lender; controls on loan conditions\nsuch as pricing, loan maturity) or according to a rule-based framework (setting of caps on debt\nservice and outstanding debt; pricing and loan conditions based on negotiation between lender\nand borrower, due diligence carried out by lender who assumes non-payment risk).\n\n - Kenya is an example of a direct control framework to regulate borrowing by Counties:\nlong-term borrowing requires an approval and a guarantee of the National government\nand therefore approval by Parliament.\n\n - Colombia is an example of a rules-based framework with caps set on debt service (40%\nof operating surplus); and outstanding debt (80% of current revenues). Such caps were\nintroduced by the so-called “Traffic Light Law” (Law 358 of 1997). Under this law, SNGs\nwere given a rating based on their ratios of debt to payment capacity. If one of the caps\nhas been exceeded, the SNG is rated in the red-light zone and prohibited from further\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "in an initial period, and given the current cash management problems and undershooting of\nrevenue targets for the overall central government, regulating liquidity needs with short-term\nborrowing by the Provinces could create short-to medium-term macro-fiscal risks.\n\n40. International experience in short-term borrowing and the pros and cons. Some\ncountries limit short term borrowing to a share of current year budget revenue or calculated on\nprevious year revenues.\n\n - Counties in Kenya may borrow up to the equivalent 5 percent of their last audited\nrevenues; these loans must be repaid within twelve months.\n\n - Ethiopia’s States and Addis Ababa City Government may borrow short-term to manage\ntheir consolidated fund, with the approval of the Federal Government (Ministry of\nFinance and Economic Development) and which must be repaid in the following fiscal\nyear.\n\n - So, while an argument in favor ( _pros)_ of short-term borrowing would be to enable the\nProvince to cover necessary short-term budget items, a clear risk ( _cons_ ) is that repayment\nof such loans within the fiscal year may be compromised if the revenue shortfall is not\nmade up or cash shortages reduce central government transfers that were initially\nbudgeted for the Provinces.\n\n41. Long-term borrowing to finance infrastructure investment would require that\nprovinces have significant and dependable own-source revenues. It is expected that at the\nstart of Provincial decentralized government operations, the transfers from the central\ngovernment will be required to cover payroll and goods and services expenditures. These funds\nwill be committed/engaged quite quickly. In order to reimburse a long-term loan, Provinces will\nneed to have access to own source revenues which are not earmarked for a specific service. In\nthe absence of such own source revenues, the provinces would not have any financial basis on\nwhich to service the debt payments for a long-term loan.\n\n42. International experience in long-term borrowing and the pros and cons. The\nframeworks to regulate long-term borrowing may function based on an _ex_ ante direct control\nframework (pre-approval by national government, preferred lender; controls on loan conditions\nsuch as pricing, loan maturity) or according to a rule-based framework (setting of caps on debt\nservice and outstanding debt; pricing and loan conditions based on negotiation between lender\nand borrower, due diligence carried out by lender who assumes non-payment risk).\n\n - Kenya is an example of a direct control framework to regulate borrowing by Counties:\nlong-term borrowing requires an approval and a guarantee of the National government\nand therefore approval by Parliament.\n\n - Colombia is an example of a rules-based framework with caps set on debt service (40%\nof operating surplus); and outstanding debt (80% of current revenues). Such caps were\nintroduced by the so-called “Traffic Light Law” (Law 358 of 1997). Under this law, SNGs\nwere given a rating based on their ratios of debt to payment capacity. If one of the caps\nhas been exceeded, the SNG is rated in the red-light zone and prohibited from further\n\n25", "text_characters": 2637}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "borrowing; those complying with both caps are permitted to borrow up to limits based\non debt sustainability calculations. In addition, departments and large _autarquias locais_\nmust get a satisfactory credit rating from rating agencies before they borrow.\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of long-term borrowing are that access to such funding would\nenable more rapid realization of strategic provincial investment projects and would\nenhance intergenerational equity (future generations benefitting from the infrastructure\nwould contribute indirectly through their tax or fee payments to the debt service).\n\n - Arguments which suggest caution in authorizing long-term borrowing by provinces\n( _cons)_ include fiscal risks and the current overall national debt profile; risk of implicit\nsovereign guarantee once MEF approves / authorizes specific borrowing by provinces;\nlack of availability of provincial own-source revenues to ensure debt payment. _[6]_\n\n\n**43.** **In addition to regulating provincial borrowing, the fiscal decentralization law**\n**should provide guidance on issuance of loan guarantees.** Depending on the competencies\nwhich will be transferred to the Provinces, some services may be associated with public\ncompanies for service provision or with private companies that are licensed to provide regular\nservices (such as intra-provincial public transportation companies). This is a sensitive issue which\ncould lead to a negative impact on macro-fiscal balances. Similar to long-term loans, should the\ninitial borrower of a guaranteed loan default, there are not actually any revenue sources of the\nProvince which would be available to ensure debt service. The debt could by default end up as\nthe responsibility of MEF.\n\n\n**44.** **The law should also provide for central oversight of Public-Private Partnership**\n**(PPP) arrangements at sub-national level.** In PPP arrangements, the private sector provides\ninfrastructure assets and services that have traditionally been provided by the government, such\nas hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, railways, and water and sanitation plants. In some PPP\ncontracts, the government may provide a revenue or demand guarantee that requires it to make\nup the difference if revenue or demand falls short of an agreed level. Other contracts may\ninclude exchange rate or price guarantees. Such arrangements are complex to design and\nmanage and require well-developed technical capacity to conduct proper project appraisals and\ndetailed assessment of project-specific risks. PPPs generate long-term obligations to the\ngovernment and expose the government to a wide range of associated fiscal risks. For this\nreason, central oversight and monitoring of sub-national PPP contracts—for example, by setting\nup a gateway function at the MEF to assess and approve all PPP proposals—will be important.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.2.** The fiscal decentralization law should provide for a coordinated budget\ncalendar, standard reporting and transparency requirements, and harmonized budget\n\n\n6 Rather, as the own source revenues for provinces are not yet clearly defined, the amounts which may be\navailable are presently unknown and there will need to be a few years to get this aspect of provincial\nmanagement up and running.\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "borrowing; those complying with both caps are permitted to borrow up to limits based\non debt sustainability calculations. In addition, departments and large _autarquias locais_\nmust get a satisfactory credit rating from rating agencies before they borrow.\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of long-term borrowing are that access to such funding would\nenable more rapid realization of strategic provincial investment projects and would\nenhance intergenerational equity (future generations benefitting from the infrastructure\nwould contribute indirectly through their tax or fee payments to the debt service).\n\n - Arguments which suggest caution in authorizing long-term borrowing by provinces\n( _cons)_ include fiscal risks and the current overall national debt profile; risk of implicit\nsovereign guarantee once MEF approves / authorizes specific borrowing by provinces;\nlack of availability of provincial own-source revenues to ensure debt payment. _[6]_\n\n43. In addition to regulating provincial borrowing, the fiscal decentralization law\nshould provide guidance on issuance of loan guarantees. Depending on the competencies\nwhich will be transferred to the Provinces, some services may be associated with public\ncompanies for service provision or with private companies that are licensed to provide regular\nservices (such as intra-provincial public transportation companies). This is a sensitive issue which\ncould lead to a negative impact on macro-fiscal balances. Similar to long-term loans, should the\ninitial borrower of a guaranteed loan default, there are not actually any revenue sources of the\nProvince which would be available to ensure debt service. The debt could by default end up as\nthe responsibility of MEF.\n\n44. The law should also provide for central oversight of Public-Private Partnership\n(PPP) arrangements at sub-national level. In PPP arrangements, the private sector provides\ninfrastructure assets and services that have traditionally been provided by the government, such\nas hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, railways, and water and sanitation plants. In some PPP\ncontracts, the government may provide a revenue or demand guarantee that requires it to make\nup the difference if revenue or demand falls short of an agreed level. Other contracts may\ninclude exchange rate or price guarantees. Such arrangements are complex to design and\nmanage and require well-developed technical capacity to conduct proper project appraisals and\ndetailed assessment of project-specific risks. PPPs generate long-term obligations to the\ngovernment and expose the government to a wide range of associated fiscal risks. For this\nreason, central oversight and monitoring of sub-national PPP contracts—for example, by setting\nup a gateway function at the MEF to assess and approve all PPP proposals—will be important.\n\nRecommendation 1.2. The fiscal decentralization law should provide for a coordinated budget\ncalendar, standard reporting and transparency requirements, and harmonized budget\n\n6 Rather, as the own source revenues for provinces are not yet clearly defined, the amounts which may be\navailable are presently unknown and there will need to be a few years to get this aspect of provincial\nmanagement up and running.\n\n26", "text_characters": 2754}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "classification and accounting standards, including a common chart of accounts (CoA), to be used\nby all levels of government.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.3.** Short term borrowing by provinces should likely NOT be authorized at\nthe present time, as their funds will derive essentially from central government transfers and their\nliquidity position will be determined by central cash management and budget releases.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.4.** Long term borrowing and issuance of guarantees by provinces should\nlikely NOT be authorized at the present time as they will not have access to significant own\nsource revenues; were provincial loans to be approved by MEF, this could be viewed as a\npotential guarantee and create moral hazard risks.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.5.** PPP operations by provinces should likely NOT be authorized at the\npresent time as they will not have the technical capacity to properly appraise projects, assess the\nlong-term obligations to government and mitigate the associated risks.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.6.** During the first mandate of Provincial operations, their fiscal and\nfinancial performance can be observed in order to consider the necessary rules for borrowing\nand debt limits to establish for a later time when their finances are more stable and greater own\nsource revenues available. The same scheme should be replicated for districts.\n\n**E. Provincial Responsibilities**\n\n\n**45.** **The decentralization of competencies to provinces and districts is potentially quite**\n**extensive.** Article 270-J of the amendment to the Constitution, adopted on 12-June-2018,\nprovides a detailed list of sectors (see Box 1.1, below). The proposed general areas of\ncompetencies are to be exercised where they do not overlap with current functions of the\n_autarquias locais_ and which are not exclusive competencies of central state bodies ( _órgãos_\n_centrais_ ). The Constitution does not indicate what are to be the specific respective competencies\nof the provinces and the districts. The content, organization and functioning of these\ndecentralized competencies are to be set in law. [7]\n\n\n7 The National Assembly has already requested the government to prepare a new law defining the allocation of\ncompetencies between the central government and provinces. The MEF is working on a draft of this new law.\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "classification and accounting standards, including a common chart of accounts (CoA), to be used\nby all levels of government.\n\nRecommendation 1.3. Short term borrowing by provinces should likely NOT be authorized at\nthe present time, as their funds will derive essentially from central government transfers and their\nliquidity position will be determined by central cash management and budget releases.\n\nRecommendation 1.4. Long term borrowing and issuance of guarantees by provinces should\nlikely NOT be authorized at the present time as they will not have access to significant own\nsource revenues; were provincial loans to be approved by MEF, this could be viewed as a\npotential guarantee and create moral hazard risks.\n\nRecommendation 1.5. PPP operations by provinces should likely NOT be authorized at the\npresent time as they will not have the technical capacity to properly appraise projects, assess the\nlong-term obligations to government and mitigate the associated risks.\n\nRecommendation 1.6. During the first mandate of Provincial operations, their fiscal and\nfinancial performance can be observed in order to consider the necessary rules for borrowing\nand debt limits to establish for a later time when their finances are more stable and greater own\nsource revenues available. The same scheme should be replicated for districts.\n\nE. Provincial Responsibilities\n\n45. The decentralization of competencies to provinces and districts is potentially quite\nextensive. Article 270-J of the amendment to the Constitution, adopted on 12-June-2018,\nprovides a detailed list of sectors (see Box 1.1, below). The proposed general areas of\ncompetencies are to be exercised where they do not overlap with current functions of the\n_autarquias locais_ and which are not exclusive competencies of central state bodies ( _órgãos_\n_centrais_ ). The Constitution does not indicate what are to be the specific respective competencies\nof the provinces and the districts. The content, organization and functioning of these\ndecentralized competencies are to be set in law. [7]\n\n7 The National Assembly has already requested the government to prepare a new law defining the allocation of\ncompetencies between the central government and provinces. The MEF is working on a draft of this new law.\n\n27", "text_characters": 1927}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 1.1. Potential Functions for Provinces and Districts**\n\nAs per Article 270-J of the amended Constitution\n\n\na) agriculture, fisheries, cattle, forestry, food security and nutrition\nb) land management (according to measures defined in law)\nc) public transport in areas not under AL responsibility\nd) management and protection of the environment\ne) plant and animal life in conservation areas\nf) housing, culture and sports\ng) primary health care\nh) primary, secondary and technical and vocational education\ni) tourism, folklore, handicrafts and local fairs\nj) hotel management (up to 3-star establishments)\nk) promotion of local investment\nl) water and sanitation\nm) industry and trade\nn) roads and bridges of local, district and provincial interest\no) prevention and fight against natural disaster\np) promotion of local development\nq) territorial planning and development\nr) rural and community development\ns) other competencies, as determined by law\n\n\n**46.** **The subsequent laws and implementing regulations should clearly define the**\n**specific respective competencies of provinces and districts,** including their role in the\ninvestment and development of infrastructure or equipment; the transfer of and responsibility for\nrequired staffing, operations and associated assets. As was discussed above (see Section B), many\nfunctions have already been deconcentrated to the province and especially district level. For\nexample, in the education sector, districts receive funding for the operation of primary schools\nfrom the Ministry of Education while the construction of primary schools is handled by the\nprovinces. In the area of public works, districts receive an allocation from the Road Fund of two\nmillion meticais per district for the repair and maintenance of unclassified (district) roads.\n\n\n**47.** **Some inherent responsibilities for ensuring management and organization of**\n**public space are included as competencies of the Provincial Executive Council in the draft**\n**Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized**\n**Provincial Governments.** For example, article 42 of the draft includes the authority of the\nExecutive Council to propose declaration of public need with effect of expropriation (h); order the\ntotal or partial demolition of buildings or other construction which pose a threat to public health\nand safety (k); decide on the administration of public water sources ( _àguas públicas)_ under their\njurisdiction (j); and, propose to the Assembly and the tutelle the attribution of place names\n(atribuição de topónimos _)_ (i). The table in Annex 1 indicates the types of functions /\nresponsibilities that are under the responsibility of the regional / provincial level in a range of\nother countries in Africa, Asia and Europe.\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 1.1. Potential Functions for Provinces and Districts\n\nAs per Article 270-J of the amended Constitution\n\na) agriculture, fisheries, cattle, forestry, food security and nutrition\nb) land management (according to measures defined in law)\nc) public transport in areas not under AL responsibility\nd) management and protection of the environment\ne) plant and animal life in conservation areas\nf) housing, culture and sports\ng) primary health care\nh) primary, secondary and technical and vocational education\ni) tourism, folklore, handicrafts and local fairs\nj) hotel management (up to 3-star establishments)\nk) promotion of local investment\nl) water and sanitation\nm) industry and trade\nn) roads and bridges of local, district and provincial interest\no) prevention and fight against natural disaster\np) promotion of local development\nq) territorial planning and development\nr) rural and community development\ns) other competencies, as determined by law\n\n46. The subsequent laws and implementing regulations should clearly define the\nspecific respective competencies of provinces and districts, including their role in the\ninvestment and development of infrastructure or equipment; the transfer of and responsibility for\nrequired staffing, operations and associated assets. As was discussed above (see Section B), many\nfunctions have already been deconcentrated to the province and especially district level. For\nexample, in the education sector, districts receive funding for the operation of primary schools\nfrom the Ministry of Education while the construction of primary schools is handled by the\nprovinces. In the area of public works, districts receive an allocation from the Road Fund of two\nmillion meticais per district for the repair and maintenance of unclassified (district) roads.\n\n47. Some inherent responsibilities for ensuring management and organization of\npublic space are included as competencies of the Provincial Executive Council in the draft\nLaw on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized\nProvincial Governments. For example, article 42 of the draft includes the authority of the\nExecutive Council to propose declaration of public need with effect of expropriation (h); order the\ntotal or partial demolition of buildings or other construction which pose a threat to public health\nand safety (k); decide on the administration of public water sources ( _àguas públicas)_ under their\njurisdiction (j); and, propose to the Assembly and the tutelle the attribution of place names\n(atribuição de topónimos _)_ (i). The table in Annex 1 indicates the types of functions /\nresponsibilities that are under the responsibility of the regional / provincial level in a range of\nother countries in Africa, Asia and Europe.\n\n28", "text_characters": 2347}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**48.** **The sectorial ministries are currently in the process of developing proposals for the**\n**decentralization of specific functions to provinces and districts, as per the request of the**\n**Ministry of State Administration and Public Service.** As of this writing, proposals had been\nreceived for the areas of health; education; roads; and, water resource management and water\nsupply. The proposals for health and education have been communicated to the FAD team.\nBased on these proposals as well as the discussions with the three sectorial Ministries, there is\nclearly some confusion between the notions of deconcentration (already widely implemented in\nMozambique) and decentralization (See Box 1.2). The implications for financial decentralization\nof elected Provincial / District Assemblies and Governors / Administrators are not clear, as is a\nconfusion between a unitary system and unified budget (see discussion in paragraph 30, above).\n\n\n**Box 1.2. Comments on Initial Proposals for Decentralization in Education Sector**\n\nThe Ministry of Education has proposed competencies to be transferred to decentralized governance organs\n(Provinces and Districts) in the areas of primary and general education as well as adult literacy. The\ncompetencies and functions proposed appear to be quite extensive, including management, oversight,\npolicy (development of local curriculum content), training, etc.\n\n\nHowever, there are also considerable overlaps between the functions for the Provincial Executive council and\nthe District Executive Council. For example, both are expected to:\n-Develop the content of local curricula\n-Plan, organize and promote school sports\n-Plan, build and maintain school infrastructure and equipment\n\n\nThe text does not indicate what is the difference between the detailed overlapping activities that would be\nthe responsibility of both Province and District level, which would make the management and allocation of\nfunding challenging and risks creating confusion on the ground in practice.\n\n\n**49.** **The fiscal pillar of the decentralization process will necessarily involve the transfer**\n**of respective staff, equipment, building and other related assets.** It is not clear in the\ninstructions provided to the sectorial ministries for the elaboration of their proposals whether it\nwas indicated that the decentralization process would necessarily involve such transfers.\nHowever, as was clear from the team’s discussions with three sectorial ministries (Health,\nEducation, and Public Works), this issue did not appear to have been previously\nmentioned/discussed between the MAEFP and the respective line Ministries.\n\n\n**50.** **There exist some key principles to consider in the allocation of expenditure**\n**responsibilities to decentralized entities.**\n\n**a.** **Exclusivity:** Expenditure responsibilities given to subnational government should\n\ngenerally be exclusive to ensure accountability for resourcing and delivery of the\nrelated services;\n**b.** **Authority:** Subnational governments should be given the full range of powers\n\nassociated with the fulfillment of their responsibilities including ownership of assets\nused in their delivery, employment of relevant staff, and regulation of related\nactivities;\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "48. The sectorial ministries are currently in the process of developing proposals for the\ndecentralization of specific functions to provinces and districts, as per the request of the\nMinistry of State Administration and Public Service. As of this writing, proposals had been\nreceived for the areas of health; education; roads; and, water resource management and water\nsupply. The proposals for health and education have been communicated to the FAD team.\nBased on these proposals as well as the discussions with the three sectorial Ministries, there is\nclearly some confusion between the notions of deconcentration (already widely implemented in\nMozambique) and decentralization (See Box 1.2). The implications for financial decentralization\nof elected Provincial / District Assemblies and Governors / Administrators are not clear, as is a\nconfusion between a unitary system and unified budget (see discussion in paragraph 30, above).\n\nBox 1.2. Comments on Initial Proposals for Decentralization in Education Sector\n\nThe Ministry of Education has proposed competencies to be transferred to decentralized governance organs\n(Provinces and Districts) in the areas of primary and general education as well as adult literacy. The\ncompetencies and functions proposed appear to be quite extensive, including management, oversight,\npolicy (development of local curriculum content), training, etc.\n\nHowever, there are also considerable overlaps between the functions for the Provincial Executive council and\nthe District Executive Council. For example, both are expected to:\n-Develop the content of local curricula\n-Plan, organize and promote school sports\n-Plan, build and maintain school infrastructure and equipment\n\nThe text does not indicate what is the difference between the detailed overlapping activities that would be\nthe responsibility of both Province and District level, which would make the management and allocation of\nfunding challenging and risks creating confusion on the ground in practice.\n\n49. The fiscal pillar of the decentralization process will necessarily involve the transfer\nof respective staff, equipment, building and other related assets. It is not clear in the\ninstructions provided to the sectorial ministries for the elaboration of their proposals whether it\nwas indicated that the decentralization process would necessarily involve such transfers.\nHowever, as was clear from the team’s discussions with three sectorial ministries (Health,\nEducation, and Public Works), this issue did not appear to have been previously\nmentioned/discussed between the MAEFP and the respective line Ministries.\n\n50. There exist some key principles to consider in the allocation of expenditure\nresponsibilities to decentralized entities.\n\na. Exclusivity: Expenditure responsibilities given to subnational government should\n\ngenerally be exclusive to ensure accountability for resourcing and delivery of the\nrelated services;\nb. Authority: Subnational governments should be given the full range of powers\n\nassociated with the fulfillment of their responsibilities including ownership of assets\nused in their delivery, employment of relevant staff, and regulation of related\nactivities;\n\n29", "text_characters": 2731}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**c.** **Compensation:** Local authorities should be given adequate revenues to cover their\n\nexpenditure responsibilities through a combination of own revenues, shared taxes,\nand intergovernmental transfers;\n**d.** **Subsidiarity:** Expenditure responsibilities should be assigned to the level of\n\ngovernment best able to execute them efficiency and effectively; and,\n**e.** **Equity:** All citizens should be entitled to a basic level of public services with\n\nredistribution of resources where necessary.\n\n**Recommendation 1.7 - IMMEDIATE**\n\n - Guidance should be given to the sectorial ministries of some key norms to take into\nconsideration in the identification of competencies and authorities to transfer and the\nadoption of some key principles, for example:\n\n - _**Exclusivity**_ to the specific entity to ensure accountability for resources and\ndelivery.\n\n - _**Authority**_ on full range of powers to exercise the respective responsibilities.\n\n - _**Compensation**_ with the provision of adequate revenues to cover expenditure\nresponsibilities.\n\n**Recommendation 1.8 - IMMEDIATE**\n\n - Information / instructions should be given to the sectorial ministries that every transfer of\ncompetency / function that is being proposed is to be accompanied by the transfer to\nthe authority of the provinces of the related personnel, equipment and buildings\nassociated with their effective implementation.\n\n**Recommendation 1.9 - 2-3 MONTH HORIZON**\n\n - The MEF jointly with the MAEFP should prepare a methodology for a survey/census\nprocess to identify the specific personnel and assets to be transferred to the provinces\nbased on the proposed competencies they have proposed.\n\n**Recommendation 1.10 - 5-8 MONTH HORIZON**\n\n - Relevant sectorial ministries should establish survey sector teams and train in the survey\nmethodology\n\n - The sectorial ministries with MAEFP and MEF should prepare a census/survey of existing\nbuildings / equipment / etc. for each of the proposed competencies and identify any\nexisting liabilities and debts which should not be transferred.\n\n**F. Provincial Resources – Transfers from the State**\n\n\n**51.** **Intergovernmental transfers for the financing of decentralized entities can usually**\n**be divided into two main categories: unconditional transfers and conditional transfers.**\nWithin these categories are a number of variations, for example on how the overall pool for\ntransfer is defined, the types of formulae for allocation of the funds among the Provinces or\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "c. Compensation: Local authorities should be given adequate revenues to cover their\n\nexpenditure responsibilities through a combination of own revenues, shared taxes,\nand intergovernmental transfers;\nd. Subsidiarity: Expenditure responsibilities should be assigned to the level of\n\ngovernment best able to execute them efficiency and effectively; and,\ne. Equity: All citizens should be entitled to a basic level of public services with\n\nredistribution of resources where necessary.\n\nRecommendation 1.7 - IMMEDIATE\n\n - Guidance should be given to the sectorial ministries of some key norms to take into\nconsideration in the identification of competencies and authorities to transfer and the\nadoption of some key principles, for example:\n\n - _Exclusivity_ to the specific entity to ensure accountability for resources and\ndelivery.\n\n - _Authority_ on full range of powers to exercise the respective responsibilities.\n\n - _Compensation_ with the provision of adequate revenues to cover expenditure\nresponsibilities.\n\nRecommendation 1.8 - IMMEDIATE\n\n - Information / instructions should be given to the sectorial ministries that every transfer of\ncompetency / function that is being proposed is to be accompanied by the transfer to\nthe authority of the provinces of the related personnel, equipment and buildings\nassociated with their effective implementation.\n\nRecommendation 1.9 - 2-3 MONTH HORIZON\n\n - The MEF jointly with the MAEFP should prepare a methodology for a survey/census\nprocess to identify the specific personnel and assets to be transferred to the provinces\nbased on the proposed competencies they have proposed.\n\nRecommendation 1.10 - 5-8 MONTH HORIZON\n\n - Relevant sectorial ministries should establish survey sector teams and train in the survey\nmethodology\n\n - The sectorial ministries with MAEFP and MEF should prepare a census/survey of existing\nbuildings / equipment / etc. for each of the proposed competencies and identify any\nexisting liabilities and debts which should not be transferred.\n\nF. Provincial Resources – Transfers from the State\n\n51. Intergovernmental transfers for the financing of decentralized entities can usually\nbe divided into two main categories: unconditional transfers and conditional transfers.\nWithin these categories are a number of variations, for example on how the overall pool for\ntransfer is defined, the types of formulae for allocation of the funds among the Provinces or\n\n30", "text_characters": 2049}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Districts, the extent of equalization which is built into the system and the allocation formulae. In\nall cases it is important that the process of determining the overall pool, and the allocation\nformulae (criteria and their respective weights) are transparent and published.\n\n\n**52.** **Unconditional transfers** **are usually allocated for general budget support with no**\n**strings or conditions attached** (other than the funds must be spent on the legally attributed\nfunctions and services of the decentralized entity). In many decentralized countries, such an\nunconditional transfer serves to address the vertical fiscal imbalance between the expenditures\nunder local jurisdiction and their revenue raising responsibilities. Such transfers are typically\nmandated by law and are usually formulae-based. At the start of the first mandate of the new\nProvincial decentralized entities, it would be possible to develop an unconditional transfer for the\nProvinces that covers their basic expenditure needs (single pool) only if their functions and\ncompetencies have been clearly defined. It would also require that there are good skills in\nbudget planning, development and management within the provincial administration.\n\n\n**53.** **International experience in unconditional transfers and the pros and cons.**\n\n - Mozambique already has an example of an unconditional transfer for the _autarquias_\n_locais_, the Local Authorities Compensation Fund, which is based on a formula with two\ncriteria (FCA, which was described above under paragraph 23). Other international\nexamples of unconditional transfer include:\n\n - France which distributes the Dotation _globale_ de _fonctionnement_, allocated to\ncommunes and _départements_ according to a formula that includes a fixed amount\nper commune, land area, compensation for past local resource modifications, a\nrevenue guarantee and the presence of national parks on communal territory.\n\n - Kenya distributes a county equitable share which includes five criteria in the\nallocation formulae: population (45%), equal share (26%), poverty index (18%), land\narea (8%), fiscal effort by countries (2%) and a development factor (1%).\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a single unconditional transfer is that it would give Provinces\ngreater autonomy in the development of their own budgets and could require only a\nsimpler budget line management and reduce the number of transfers to Provinces that\nwould need to be tracked. Arguments that are against ( _cons_ ) adopting such an\nunconditional transfer for Provinces include that it will entail more careful review of the\nProvincial draft budget and could _a priori_, result in less protection for national priorities,\nas well as place greater burdens on Provincial budget management.\n\n\n**54.** **Conditional transfers are attached to specific purposes and the conditionality can**\n**be more or less broad.** For example, a conditional block grant for roads could cover\nmaintenance, rehabilitation and investment in Provincial (regional roads). Separate conditional\nenvelopes could be proposed in the education sector, where there could be separate envelope\neach for payroll, for goods & services and for investment. These would be an example of inputbased condition. Such transfers require reporting on the actual spending and the budget and\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Districts, the extent of equalization which is built into the system and the allocation formulae. In\nall cases it is important that the process of determining the overall pool, and the allocation\nformulae (criteria and their respective weights) are transparent and published.\n\n52. Unconditional transfers are usually allocated for general budget support with no\nstrings or conditions attached (other than the funds must be spent on the legally attributed\nfunctions and services of the decentralized entity). In many decentralized countries, such an\nunconditional transfer serves to address the vertical fiscal imbalance between the expenditures\nunder local jurisdiction and their revenue raising responsibilities. Such transfers are typically\nmandated by law and are usually formulae-based. At the start of the first mandate of the new\nProvincial decentralized entities, it would be possible to develop an unconditional transfer for the\nProvinces that covers their basic expenditure needs (single pool) only if their functions and\ncompetencies have been clearly defined. It would also require that there are good skills in\nbudget planning, development and management within the provincial administration.\n\n53. International experience in unconditional transfers and the pros and cons.\n\n - Mozambique already has an example of an unconditional transfer for the _autarquias_\n_locais_, the Local Authorities Compensation Fund, which is based on a formula with two\ncriteria (FCA, which was described above under paragraph 23). Other international\nexamples of unconditional transfer include:\n\n - France which distributes the Dotation _globale_ de _fonctionnement_, allocated to\ncommunes and _départements_ according to a formula that includes a fixed amount\nper commune, land area, compensation for past local resource modifications, a\nrevenue guarantee and the presence of national parks on communal territory.\n\n - Kenya distributes a county equitable share which includes five criteria in the\nallocation formulae: population (45%), equal share (26%), poverty index (18%), land\narea (8%), fiscal effort by countries (2%) and a development factor (1%).\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a single unconditional transfer is that it would give Provinces\ngreater autonomy in the development of their own budgets and could require only a\nsimpler budget line management and reduce the number of transfers to Provinces that\nwould need to be tracked. Arguments that are against ( _cons_ ) adopting such an\nunconditional transfer for Provinces include that it will entail more careful review of the\nProvincial draft budget and could _a priori_, result in less protection for national priorities,\nas well as place greater burdens on Provincial budget management.\n\n54. Conditional transfers are attached to specific purposes and the conditionality can\nbe more or less broad. For example, a conditional block grant for roads could cover\nmaintenance, rehabilitation and investment in Provincial (regional roads). Separate conditional\nenvelopes could be proposed in the education sector, where there could be separate envelope\neach for payroll, for goods & services and for investment. These would be an example of inputbased condition. Such transfers require reporting on the actual spending and the budget and\n\n31", "text_characters": 2798}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "service delivery performance linked to conditions. Conditional grants, whether block or inputbased can also be allocated among the Provinces according to a formula.\n\n\n**55.** **International experience in conditional transfers and the pros and cons.** Many\ndecentralized countries have implemented conditional sectoral grants.\n\n - In Uganda and Rwanda, there are sector conditional grants which are subdivided by type\nof economic expenditures (payroll, goods and services). In the case of Rwanda, nonpayroll conditional grants are allocated according to a formula developed by the\nrespective line Ministries and published by the Ministry of Finance.\n\n - Colombia distributes a conditional fund (the SGP) which requires that specific\npercentages be allocated to targeted sectors: education (59%), health (25%), water and\nsanitation (5%), and general purpose (11%).\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a sector block or conditional transfers is that funding would\nbe ensured for payroll; there could more oversight on the funding for national priorities;\nand based on the formula, it could ensure better correction of past inequitable revenue\nallocation.\n\n - Arguments against ( _cons_ ) instituting conditional grants include that each sector line\nMinistry would have to develop a formula for allocation, and make sure that this formula\ncorrects for past inequitable allocation; and, it places more limits on provincial decisionmaking.\n\n\n**56.** **In addition to general unconditional and conditional transfers, many countries have**\n**instituted separate allocations for capital projects.** Many of these funds are generated\nthrough development partner financed programs and often involve an element of performance\nand the meeting of certain required conditions.\n\n - Examples of performance based conditional capital grants include Ghana’s District\nDevelopment Fund and Tunisia’s _Dotation Globale Non-Affectée._ In both cases, the local\ngovernments (District Assemblies in Ghana, communes in Tunisia) can select the specific\nprojects, but they must be infrastructure projects.\n\n - Rwanda has its own domestically developed capital projects grant, which is administered\nby the Local Authorities Development Agency to which 10% of Rwanda domestic budget\nrevenues are allocated. About 75% of that amount is allocated to the districts by a\nformula (40% population / 20% surface area / 40% poverty). Each District then takes its\ncapital grant envelope and allocates the funds among projects, with some guidance\nbased on national priorities. In recent years, about 60% of the amount had to be\nallocated to national priorities (education, health, feeder roads, environmental protection\nand agriculture) and the remaining 40% could be allocated to other District priorities.\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a specific resource envelope for capital expenditures is that\nthis financing approach could ensure a minimum of capital development in provinces;\nhelp correct for past inequitable development; and, enable provinces to select their\npriority projects within the limits of the conditionality.\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "service delivery performance linked to conditions. Conditional grants, whether block or inputbased can also be allocated among the Provinces according to a formula.\n\n55. International experience in conditional transfers and the pros and cons. Many\ndecentralized countries have implemented conditional sectoral grants.\n\n - In Uganda and Rwanda, there are sector conditional grants which are subdivided by type\nof economic expenditures (payroll, goods and services). In the case of Rwanda, nonpayroll conditional grants are allocated according to a formula developed by the\nrespective line Ministries and published by the Ministry of Finance.\n\n - Colombia distributes a conditional fund (the SGP) which requires that specific\npercentages be allocated to targeted sectors: education (59%), health (25%), water and\nsanitation (5%), and general purpose (11%).\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a sector block or conditional transfers is that funding would\nbe ensured for payroll; there could more oversight on the funding for national priorities;\nand based on the formula, it could ensure better correction of past inequitable revenue\nallocation.\n\n - Arguments against ( _cons_ ) instituting conditional grants include that each sector line\nMinistry would have to develop a formula for allocation, and make sure that this formula\ncorrects for past inequitable allocation; and, it places more limits on provincial decisionmaking.\n\n56. In addition to general unconditional and conditional transfers, many countries have\ninstituted separate allocations for capital projects. Many of these funds are generated\nthrough development partner financed programs and often involve an element of performance\nand the meeting of certain required conditions.\n\n - Examples of performance based conditional capital grants include Ghana’s District\nDevelopment Fund and Tunisia’s _Dotation Globale Non-Affectée._ In both cases, the local\ngovernments (District Assemblies in Ghana, communes in Tunisia) can select the specific\nprojects, but they must be infrastructure projects.\n\n - Rwanda has its own domestically developed capital projects grant, which is administered\nby the Local Authorities Development Agency to which 10% of Rwanda domestic budget\nrevenues are allocated. About 75% of that amount is allocated to the districts by a\nformula (40% population / 20% surface area / 40% poverty). Each District then takes its\ncapital grant envelope and allocates the funds among projects, with some guidance\nbased on national priorities. In recent years, about 60% of the amount had to be\nallocated to national priorities (education, health, feeder roads, environmental protection\nand agriculture) and the remaining 40% could be allocated to other District priorities.\n\n - Arguments in favor ( _pros)_ of a specific resource envelope for capital expenditures is that\nthis financing approach could ensure a minimum of capital development in provinces;\nhelp correct for past inequitable development; and, enable provinces to select their\npriority projects within the limits of the conditionality.\n\n32", "text_characters": 2610}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Arguments that are against ( _cons_ ) adopting such an unconditional transfer for Provinces\nis whether there would be sufficient funds available to enable development of more than\nmicro-sized projects.\n\n\n**57.** **For both unconditional and conditional transfers, a clear system for determining**\n**the pool of funds will be an essential step in setting the Provincial resource framework (** see\nBox 1.3). In the first year, the total amount will likely be determined by the amount of existing\nbudget which has been allocated for the respective services (or the total for all the services to be\ntransferred to the Provinces). In the case of a single amount, the total could be associated with or\ncalculated according to a share of central government fiscal revenues (as is the case currently\nwith the FCA). If the transfers are broken down by sector envelope the law should set principles\nfor how these conditional grants will evolve over time. In both cases, these approaches would\nprovide some predictability to the provinces on the overall resource pool to enable them to\nprepare their medium-term expenditure framework.\n\n\n**Box 1.3. International Lessons Learned: Setting the Size of the Transfer Pool**\n\nFrom the points of view of both the grantor and recipient governments, it is generally advisable that the\ntotal pool of resources to be distributed in general-purpose transfers be set in a stable but flexible way (for\nexample, as a percentage of central taxes, adjustable every few years). (Smart, 2007)\n\n\nPools based on a predefined portion of national revenues in the current or recent fiscal year can provide an\nincreased degree of certainty to subnational authorities that they will, in fact, receive the transfers. This\napproach can also ensure a growing source of revenues for subnational governments if the pool is tied to\nbuoyant revenue sources such as income tax. The potential downside is that, by inflexibly dedicating a\nproportion of national revenues to subnational governments, the center will lose some control over\nmacroeconomic fiscal policy. (Schroeder, 2003)\n\n\n**58.** **There are also some general guidelines to consider in the development of allocation**\n**formulae.** These general criteria are presented in Box 1.4 below. It is important in considering\nthe types of allocation criteria that information be easily available, viable, reliable, and cannot be\nmanipulated.\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Arguments that are against ( _cons_ ) adopting such an unconditional transfer for Provinces\nis whether there would be sufficient funds available to enable development of more than\nmicro-sized projects.\n\n57. For both unconditional and conditional transfers, a clear system for determining\nthe pool of funds will be an essential step in setting the Provincial resource framework ( see\nBox 1.3). In the first year, the total amount will likely be determined by the amount of existing\nbudget which has been allocated for the respective services (or the total for all the services to be\ntransferred to the Provinces). In the case of a single amount, the total could be associated with or\ncalculated according to a share of central government fiscal revenues (as is the case currently\nwith the FCA). If the transfers are broken down by sector envelope the law should set principles\nfor how these conditional grants will evolve over time. In both cases, these approaches would\nprovide some predictability to the provinces on the overall resource pool to enable them to\nprepare their medium-term expenditure framework.\n\nBox 1.3. International Lessons Learned: Setting the Size of the Transfer Pool\n\nFrom the points of view of both the grantor and recipient governments, it is generally advisable that the\ntotal pool of resources to be distributed in general-purpose transfers be set in a stable but flexible way (for\nexample, as a percentage of central taxes, adjustable every few years). (Smart, 2007)\n\nPools based on a predefined portion of national revenues in the current or recent fiscal year can provide an\nincreased degree of certainty to subnational authorities that they will, in fact, receive the transfers. This\napproach can also ensure a growing source of revenues for subnational governments if the pool is tied to\nbuoyant revenue sources such as income tax. The potential downside is that, by inflexibly dedicating a\nproportion of national revenues to subnational governments, the center will lose some control over\nmacroeconomic fiscal policy. (Schroeder, 2003)\n\n58. There are also some general guidelines to consider in the development of allocation\nformulae. These general criteria are presented in Box 1.4 below. It is important in considering\nthe types of allocation criteria that information be easily available, viable, reliable, and cannot be\nmanipulated.\n\n33", "text_characters": 1993}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 1.4. Criteria for the Design of Fiscal Transfers**\n\n**Predictability.** Shares of Provincial governments in the formula should remain stable over the medium-term\n(once a system is established). The grant mechanism could ensure predictability of subnational\ngovernments’ share by publishing multi-year (say, 3-5 years) projections of funding availability.\n\n\n**In accordance with changes in the economic growth rate.** The design should account for the central\ngovernment’s capacity to provide transfers. During periods of fiscal austerity, transfers to subnational\ngovernments may have to decrease. When the economy improves, transfers may increase.\n\n\n**Simplicity.** The allocation to subnational governments should be based on objective factors over which\nindividual Provinces have little control.\n\n\n**Transparency.** The transfer formula should be disseminated widely, and the basis of allocation should be\nclear.\n\n\n**Non-Discretionary budgetary allocation/Not subject to manipulation.** Formula-based revenue sharing is\nconsistent with this objective. Potential recipients should not be able to manipulate their eligibility, nor the\namount received.\n\n\n**Revenue adequacy** Subnational governments should have adequate revenues to carry out their designated\nresponsibilities.\n\n\n**Equity.** Allocated funds should vary directly with fiscal need factors and inversely with the revenue raising\ncapacity (fiscal potential).\n\n\n**Incentive for sound fiscal management.** The proposed design should provide incentives for sound fiscal\nmanagement and discourage inefficient practices. There should be no specific transfers to finance\noperational deficits of subnational governments.\n\n\n**Generally perceived as fair.** The design should be perceived by all as objective and fair. It should rely on\ndata that is readily available and recognized as valid and reliable.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.11 – 1-2 MONTH HORIZON**\n\n - Pending greater clarity on the specific competencies for Provinces and their costs, the\nfiscal decentralization law should establish basic principles and guidelines which would\nneed to be met by the MEF and sectorial ministries that are preparing the transfer\nallocations to finance Provincial competencies. These include:\n\n - Required development and documentation of formulae for allocation among\nprovinces\n\n - Required consideration of the key guidelines pertaining to formula development\n(as proposed in Box F.2)\n\n - Justification that the funding allocation is more equitable than the past\ndistribution of resources\n\n**Recommendation 1.12 - 4-8 MONTH HORIZON**\n\n - MEF should review with each Ministry current amount of budget allocation for the\nproposed competencies and determine an allocation formula.\n\n\n34", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 1.4. Criteria for the Design of Fiscal Transfers\n\nPredictability. Shares of Provincial governments in the formula should remain stable over the medium-term\n(once a system is established). The grant mechanism could ensure predictability of subnational\ngovernments’ share by publishing multi-year (say, 3-5 years) projections of funding availability.\n\nIn accordance with changes in the economic growth rate. The design should account for the central\ngovernment’s capacity to provide transfers. During periods of fiscal austerity, transfers to subnational\ngovernments may have to decrease. When the economy improves, transfers may increase.\n\nSimplicity. The allocation to subnational governments should be based on objective factors over which\nindividual Provinces have little control.\n\nTransparency. The transfer formula should be disseminated widely, and the basis of allocation should be\nclear.\n\nNon-Discretionary budgetary allocation/Not subject to manipulation. Formula-based revenue sharing is\nconsistent with this objective. Potential recipients should not be able to manipulate their eligibility, nor the\namount received.\n\nRevenue adequacy Subnational governments should have adequate revenues to carry out their designated\nresponsibilities.\n\nEquity. Allocated funds should vary directly with fiscal need factors and inversely with the revenue raising\ncapacity (fiscal potential).\n\nIncentive for sound fiscal management. The proposed design should provide incentives for sound fiscal\nmanagement and discourage inefficient practices. There should be no specific transfers to finance\noperational deficits of subnational governments.\n\nGenerally perceived as fair. The design should be perceived by all as objective and fair. It should rely on\ndata that is readily available and recognized as valid and reliable.\n\nRecommendation 1.11 – 1-2 MONTH HORIZON\n\n - Pending greater clarity on the specific competencies for Provinces and their costs, the\nfiscal decentralization law should establish basic principles and guidelines which would\nneed to be met by the MEF and sectorial ministries that are preparing the transfer\nallocations to finance Provincial competencies. These include:\n\n - Required development and documentation of formulae for allocation among\nprovinces\n\n - Required consideration of the key guidelines pertaining to formula development\n(as proposed in Box F.2)\n\n - Justification that the funding allocation is more equitable than the past\ndistribution of resources\n\nRecommendation 1.12 - 4-8 MONTH HORIZON\n\n - MEF should review with each Ministry current amount of budget allocation for the\nproposed competencies and determine an allocation formula.\n\n34", "text_characters": 2281}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Allocation formulae may in an initial period be determined by each overall sector, taking\ninto consideration that a formula should be:\n\n - _**Simple**_ and based on objective factors, with available data\n\n - _**Predictable**_ with shares to remain stable of first few years to support Provincial\nplanning and service delivery\n\n - _**Transparent**_ so that the basis of the allocation is clear\n\n - The MEF could consider an operating transfer which would consist of the following types\nof envelopes\n\n - One conditional grant for covering payroll expenditures\n\n - A basic pool with discretionary allocation for provincial executive council,\nadministration and assembly operational costs, allocated among provinces by a\nclear formula\n\n - One individual envelope per sector for goods and services (such as for provincial\n/ regional roads maintenance, environmental protection, each allocated among\nthe provinces according to a formula which could include general criteria\n(population, surface area) and specific criteria relevant to the specific area of\ncompetency\n\n - The formula used could be included as an annex to the State budget\n\n**G. Provincial Resources – Own Source Revenues**\n\n\n**59.** **The Constitutional Amendment does not provide any detail about the potential**\n**sources of financing of the provinces and districts.** The Constitution does state that the\ncreation and modification of taxes is an attribute of the State (Article 139 (n). Only in the draft\nLaw on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized Provincial\nGovernments, does the definition of financial autonomy mention that Provinces may dispose of\nown revenues.\n\n\n**60.** **Provinces’ own source revenues may be limited in first period to service charges**\n**and fees.** While the provinces will not be able to create their own taxes, it is understood from\ndiscussion with officials of the MEF that the intention is that they should be able to levy service\ncharges and fees. MEF officials are also concerned that the provinces do not abuse this fiscal\nprerogative by imposing numerous new charges that weigh on the population.\n\n\n**61.** **Service charges and fees can generally be categorized in three general types** : i) a\ndirect charge for a service (water usage, public transport); ii) payment for a license or permit to\ncarry out an activity or obtain some certificate, etc. (restaurant liquor license, issuance of copy of\nbirth certificate, construction permit, etc.); and, iii) payment for use of public space (outdoor\nadvertising supports, restaurant sidewalk terraces). In a first period, the specific charges and fees\nto be transferred to the provinces should be directly linked to the functions and competencies\nwhich are to be transferred to them.\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Allocation formulae may in an initial period be determined by each overall sector, taking\ninto consideration that a formula should be:\n\n - _Simple_ and based on objective factors, with available data\n\n - _Predictable_ with shares to remain stable of first few years to support Provincial\nplanning and service delivery\n\n - _Transparent_ so that the basis of the allocation is clear\n\n - The MEF could consider an operating transfer which would consist of the following types\nof envelopes\n\n - One conditional grant for covering payroll expenditures\n\n - A basic pool with discretionary allocation for provincial executive council,\nadministration and assembly operational costs, allocated among provinces by a\nclear formula\n\n - One individual envelope per sector for goods and services (such as for provincial\n/ regional roads maintenance, environmental protection, each allocated among\nthe provinces according to a formula which could include general criteria\n(population, surface area) and specific criteria relevant to the specific area of\ncompetency\n\n - The formula used could be included as an annex to the State budget\n\nG. Provincial Resources – Own Source Revenues\n\n59. The Constitutional Amendment does not provide any detail about the potential\nsources of financing of the provinces and districts. The Constitution does state that the\ncreation and modification of taxes is an attribute of the State (Article 139 (n). Only in the draft\nLaw on the Organization and Functioning of the Executive Bodies of Decentralized Provincial\nGovernments, does the definition of financial autonomy mention that Provinces may dispose of\nown revenues.\n\n60. Provinces’ own source revenues may be limited in first period to service charges\nand fees. While the provinces will not be able to create their own taxes, it is understood from\ndiscussion with officials of the MEF that the intention is that they should be able to levy service\ncharges and fees. MEF officials are also concerned that the provinces do not abuse this fiscal\nprerogative by imposing numerous new charges that weigh on the population.\n\n61. Service charges and fees can generally be categorized in three general types : i) a\ndirect charge for a service (water usage, public transport); ii) payment for a license or permit to\ncarry out an activity or obtain some certificate, etc. (restaurant liquor license, issuance of copy of\nbirth certificate, construction permit, etc.); and, iii) payment for use of public space (outdoor\nadvertising supports, restaurant sidewalk terraces). In a first period, the specific charges and fees\nto be transferred to the provinces should be directly linked to the functions and competencies\nwhich are to be transferred to them.\n\n35", "text_characters": 2273}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**62.** **It needs to be identified whether the legal framework has to be amended for**\n**provinces to levy service charges and fees.** As the list of potential provincial charges and fees\nis speculative, a key unknown is how these revenue sources are presently regulated in law and or\nother legal or regulatory instruments. In considering this framework, it could be possible for the\ncentral government to set rate ceilings or ensure that there is some guiding process to avoid\novercharging of residents.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.13 - 3-8 MONTH HORIZON**\n\n - During the process of identification of competencies, the joint Ministry – MEF – MAEFP\nteams should identify what service fees, charges or other non-tax revenue may be\nassociated with the competencies to be transferred\n\n - Identify the legal framework for the levying and collection of those fees and whether\namendments will be required to enable transfer of the revenue source to the authority of\nthe province\n\n - Identify as well if any personnel, assets or equipment are associated with the respective\ncharges and fees to be transferred\n\n**H. Transitional Approach for Fiscal Decentralization Law**\n\n\n**Decentralized Provinces – Kick off – January 1st, 2020**\n\n\n**63.** **The fiscal decentralization law should include transitional provisions given the**\n**short time left until the elections, scheduled to take place in October 2019.** The available\ntimeframe is not sufficient to properly plan and build consensus on all competencies, resources,\nstaffing and asset/equipment to be transferred to Provinces. In some matters, time consuming\nsurvey/census processes will be necessary to identify the specific personnel and assets to be\ntransferred. Furthermore, the mission noticed some confusion between the notions of\ndeconcentration and decentralization among government officials taking the lead in the process\nwithin the MEF and relevant sectors. Therefore, very specific transitional provisions are essential\nto make decentralized provinces operational beginning January 1 [st], 2020.\n\n\n**64.** **Such provisions should focus on the budget cycle for the coming years, in**\n**particular, during the first provincial autonomous mandate 2020-2024.** In accordance with\nthe current legal calendar, the state budget proposal should be submitted by September 30 [th]\nand approved by December 15 [th], which means that, as per the law, the provincial elected\nGovernors would execute in 2020 a budget formulated in 2019; therefore, not deliberated by the\nincoming elected provincial legislature. The mission was informed that, although not provided\nfor in the PFM legislation, it is common practice, in electoral years, to postpone budget\nformulation to the beginning of the following year. Therefore, it is expected the 2020 budget to\nbe submitted to parliament by March and approved by April/May 2020. The legal frameworks\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "62. It needs to be identified whether the legal framework has to be amended for\nprovinces to levy service charges and fees. As the list of potential provincial charges and fees\nis speculative, a key unknown is how these revenue sources are presently regulated in law and or\nother legal or regulatory instruments. In considering this framework, it could be possible for the\ncentral government to set rate ceilings or ensure that there is some guiding process to avoid\novercharging of residents.\n\nRecommendation 1.13 - 3-8 MONTH HORIZON\n\n - During the process of identification of competencies, the joint Ministry – MEF – MAEFP\nteams should identify what service fees, charges or other non-tax revenue may be\nassociated with the competencies to be transferred\n\n - Identify the legal framework for the levying and collection of those fees and whether\namendments will be required to enable transfer of the revenue source to the authority of\nthe province\n\n - Identify as well if any personnel, assets or equipment are associated with the respective\ncharges and fees to be transferred\n\nH. Transitional Approach for Fiscal Decentralization Law\n\nDecentralized Provinces – Kick off – January 1st, 2020\n\n63. The fiscal decentralization law should include transitional provisions given the\nshort time left until the elections, scheduled to take place in October 2019. The available\ntimeframe is not sufficient to properly plan and build consensus on all competencies, resources,\nstaffing and asset/equipment to be transferred to Provinces. In some matters, time consuming\nsurvey/census processes will be necessary to identify the specific personnel and assets to be\ntransferred. Furthermore, the mission noticed some confusion between the notions of\ndeconcentration and decentralization among government officials taking the lead in the process\nwithin the MEF and relevant sectors. Therefore, very specific transitional provisions are essential\nto make decentralized provinces operational beginning January 1 [st], 2020.\n\n64. Such provisions should focus on the budget cycle for the coming years, in\nparticular, during the first provincial autonomous mandate 2020-2024. In accordance with\nthe current legal calendar, the state budget proposal should be submitted by September 30 [th]\nand approved by December 15 [th], which means that, as per the law, the provincial elected\nGovernors would execute in 2020 a budget formulated in 2019; therefore, not deliberated by the\nincoming elected provincial legislature. The mission was informed that, although not provided\nfor in the PFM legislation, it is common practice, in electoral years, to postpone budget\nformulation to the beginning of the following year. Therefore, it is expected the 2020 budget to\nbe submitted to parliament by March and approved by April/May 2020. The legal frameworks\n\n36", "text_characters": 2387}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "provide the rule of twelfths [8] to be put in place whenever the budget law is not approved by the\nbeginning of a fiscal year.\n\n\n**65.** **The mission recommends a two-phase approach.** For the first phase to take place in\n2020, transitional provisions should set up budget allocations for all provincial SU based on the\nrule of twelfths, for a maximum of six months, to allow for the budget law to be approved by the\nincoming provincial legislatures. The approved 2020 budget law should allocate budget ceilings\nfor operational expenditures of provinces following the same approach currently in use.\nFurthermore, the same current resource envelope rule (see paragraph 13) regarding acquisition\nof goods and services and capital expenditures (investments) should be in place. Continuity of\nongoing investment projects should be mandatory.\n\n\n**66.** **The second phase to commence in 2021 should provide for more aggregate budget**\n**ceilings for provinces, by sector, based on their competences which were decided in the**\n**previous year as a result of decentralization** . Going forward, the changes in the budget cycle\nwill evolve progressively over the first provincial mandate as PFM capacities at the local level are\nbuilt and decentralization decisions are taken. Decentralization of responsibilities and resources\nshould follow the principles described in previous sections.\n\n\n**67.** **Analyzing the activities already under provincial administration and the**\n**corresponding SU’s budget structure would be helpful for deciding on decentralized**\n**provincial responsibilities and resources.** For example:\n\n\n- **Health Sector:** Provincial governments already administer large provincial hospitals, rural\nhospitals and health centers dispersed all over the country, including running procurement\nprocesses, the payroll and operating expenses. The provincial hospitals are SUs in the state\nbudget while the other health units are financed by the health provincial directorates;\ndirectorates being SUs in the state budget. All these health institutions carry out programs\nand activities to provide health services, mainly primary health care, which is subject to\ndecentralization. Therefore, the decentralization of competencies to Provinces can be linked\nto existing primary health care units.\n\n\n- **Education Sector:** Provincial governments execute the major part of investments in the\neducation sector through the provincial directorates for education and human development.\nSuch directorates are SUs in the state budget running investment projects in primary and\nsecondary education, mainly construction and renewal of schools. The decentralization of\ncompetencies to Provinces in education can be linked to those directorates.\n\n\n- **Road Sector:** Provincial directorates for public works are responsible for maintaining the\n18,000 km long regional highway system under desirable conditions, while the national\nagency for roads takes responsibility over the 12,000 km long national highway system. Both\n\n\n8 Article 27 of Sistafe law. The rule of twelfths authorizes monthly spending ceilings of one twelfth of the budget\nappropriations for the preceding fiscal year.\n\n\n37", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "provide the rule of twelfths [8] to be put in place whenever the budget law is not approved by the\nbeginning of a fiscal year.\n\n65. The mission recommends a two-phase approach. For the first phase to take place in\n2020, transitional provisions should set up budget allocations for all provincial SU based on the\nrule of twelfths, for a maximum of six months, to allow for the budget law to be approved by the\nincoming provincial legislatures. The approved 2020 budget law should allocate budget ceilings\nfor operational expenditures of provinces following the same approach currently in use.\nFurthermore, the same current resource envelope rule (see paragraph 13) regarding acquisition\nof goods and services and capital expenditures (investments) should be in place. Continuity of\nongoing investment projects should be mandatory.\n\n66. The second phase to commence in 2021 should provide for more aggregate budget\nceilings for provinces, by sector, based on their competences which were decided in the\nprevious year as a result of decentralization . Going forward, the changes in the budget cycle\nwill evolve progressively over the first provincial mandate as PFM capacities at the local level are\nbuilt and decentralization decisions are taken. Decentralization of responsibilities and resources\nshould follow the principles described in previous sections.\n\n67. Analyzing the activities already under provincial administration and the\ncorresponding SU’s budget structure would be helpful for deciding on decentralized\nprovincial responsibilities and resources. For example:\n\n- Health Sector: Provincial governments already administer large provincial hospitals, rural\nhospitals and health centers dispersed all over the country, including running procurement\nprocesses, the payroll and operating expenses. The provincial hospitals are SUs in the state\nbudget while the other health units are financed by the health provincial directorates;\ndirectorates being SUs in the state budget. All these health institutions carry out programs\nand activities to provide health services, mainly primary health care, which is subject to\ndecentralization. Therefore, the decentralization of competencies to Provinces can be linked\nto existing primary health care units.\n\n- Education Sector: Provincial governments execute the major part of investments in the\neducation sector through the provincial directorates for education and human development.\nSuch directorates are SUs in the state budget running investment projects in primary and\nsecondary education, mainly construction and renewal of schools. The decentralization of\ncompetencies to Provinces in education can be linked to those directorates.\n\n- Road Sector: Provincial directorates for public works are responsible for maintaining the\n18,000 km long regional highway system under desirable conditions, while the national\nagency for roads takes responsibility over the 12,000 km long national highway system. Both\n\n8 Article 27 of Sistafe law. The rule of twelfths authorizes monthly spending ceilings of one twelfth of the budget\nappropriations for the preceding fiscal year.\n\n37", "text_characters": 2661}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "systems are integrated in the so-called “classified” highways network, funded by earmarked\nrevenues through the road fund. 80% of the fund resources, collected in the form of excise\ntax on fuel, is devoted to the network. All directorates and the agency are SUs, allowing for\nanchoring the decentralization in the road sector on those directorates.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.14.** Include transitional provisions to the fiscal decentralization law focused\non the budget cycle for the coming years, in particular, the first autonomous provincial mandate\n2020-2024.\n\n\n**Recommendation 1.15.** Transitional provisions to be designed on a two-phase approach to take\nplace over the first autonomous provincial mandate (2020-2024).\n###### **II. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT** **AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL**\n\n\n**A. Introduction**\n\n\n**68.** **The Government of Mozambique has received substantial technical assistance in**\n**recent years – from the IMF and other partners – on budget execution and cash**\n**management.** This has been primarily diagnostic and has discussed issues arising from a lack of\nbudget credibility, ineffective budget execution processes, and poor cash management. [9] These\nproblems are evidenced by the existence of a large stock of expenditure arrears and the\nimposition of strict cash rationing when responding to requests for payment of budget\nexpenditures by SUs. With support from the IMF, the government has prepared a strategy to\nclear the arrears accumulated by end 2017 and take measures to prevent emergence of new\narrears.\n\n\n**69.** **The current mission has, at the express request of the authorities, concentrated on**\n**determining and discussing various actions to resolve the issues found during previous**\n**diagnostic TA and implement the strategy mentioned above.** The mission has looked at the\nbudget execution process and how it could be reformed to deal appropriately with the effects of\nnon-credible budgeting and the avoidance of expenditure arrears. The government has not yet\nstarted to implement effective cash management. The mission provided guidance on the steps\nneeded to build capacity in the MEF and the SUs for effective use of commitment controls,\nproducing the required cash flow forecasts, and active cash management operations.\n\n\n9 In particular, see FAD-AFRITAC South ‘ _Strategy for Restoring the Expenditure Chain and Improving Financial_\n_Programming_ ’ Helis _et al,_ June 2018.\n\n\n38", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "systems are integrated in the so-called “classified” highways network, funded by earmarked\nrevenues through the road fund. 80% of the fund resources, collected in the form of excise\ntax on fuel, is devoted to the network. All directorates and the agency are SUs, allowing for\nanchoring the decentralization in the road sector on those directorates.\n\nRecommendation 1.14. Include transitional provisions to the fiscal decentralization law focused\non the budget cycle for the coming years, in particular, the first autonomous provincial mandate\n2020-2024.\n\nRecommendation 1.15. Transitional provisions to be designed on a two-phase approach to take\nplace over the first autonomous provincial mandate (2020-2024).\nII. STRENGTHENING CASH MANAGEMENT AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL\n\nA. Introduction\n\n68. The Government of Mozambique has received substantial technical assistance in\nrecent years – from the IMF and other partners – on budget execution and cash\nmanagement. This has been primarily diagnostic and has discussed issues arising from a lack of\nbudget credibility, ineffective budget execution processes, and poor cash management. [9] These\nproblems are evidenced by the existence of a large stock of expenditure arrears and the\nimposition of strict cash rationing when responding to requests for payment of budget\nexpenditures by SUs. With support from the IMF, the government has prepared a strategy to\nclear the arrears accumulated by end 2017 and take measures to prevent emergence of new\narrears.\n\n69. The current mission has, at the express request of the authorities, concentrated on\ndetermining and discussing various actions to resolve the issues found during previous\ndiagnostic TA and implement the strategy mentioned above. The mission has looked at the\nbudget execution process and how it could be reformed to deal appropriately with the effects of\nnon-credible budgeting and the avoidance of expenditure arrears. The government has not yet\nstarted to implement effective cash management. The mission provided guidance on the steps\nneeded to build capacity in the MEF and the SUs for effective use of commitment controls,\nproducing the required cash flow forecasts, and active cash management operations.\n\n9 In particular, see FAD-AFRITAC South ‘ _Strategy for Restoring the Expenditure Chain and Improving Financial_\n_Programming_ ’ Helis _et al,_ June 2018.\n\n38", "text_characters": 2010}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**B. Budget Execution Reform**\n\n\n**70.** **Despite a comprehensive expenditure arrears clearance program put in place since**\n**an inventory was determined by end 2017, further arrears continue to arise.** It is clear that\nattempts to execute a non-credible budget lead to the inability to make payments on all\ngovernment budget obligations during the fiscal year. Such obligations, having already been\ncommitted by SUs – mostly under their legally appropriated budgets [10] - for the delivery of\nrequired goods and services, add to the existing stock of expenditure arrears and continue to\nadversely affect the reputation of the government and the cost of the goods and services it\nneeds. At the time of this mission, the Ministries of Education and Health indicated that they\nwere likely to accumulate significant amounts of additional arrears; the total amount of\naccumulated unpaid invoices in these ministries during 2018 were MT 2 billion (US$ 32 million)\nand MT 40 million (US$ 0.64 million) respectively.\n\n\n**71.** **The budget has lacked credibility in past years in the estimates of all elements**\n**making up its composition – revenues; expenditures; and deficit financing.** Overestimation\nof revenues coupled with unanticipated increases in payrolls have contributed to recent\nshortages of cash resources during budget execution. In addition, previous large expenditure\narrears were caused by sudden withdrawal of budget support from donors.\n\n\n**72.** **Little or no control to adjust budget expenditures has occurred during times of**\n**cash shortages.** Strict cash rationing has caused payments to be reduced at such times even\nthough government obligations continue to be incurred. The recommended method of\nmanaging execution of the budget during periods when cash shortages are anticipated is to\ncontrol commitments of budget expenditures. This means that the level of obligations is reduced\nrather than deferring payments for previously incurred obligations. This process of budget\nmanagement is used by many countries in the region and across the world where there is a\nreasonably high possibility that revenues may fall short of budget estimates.\n\n\n**Initiating Active Use of Commitment Controls**\n\n\n**73.** **The e-SISTAFE system and the SISTAFE law are already designed to handle**\n**commitment controls** **[11]** **.** However, the business processes have not been implemented. SUs do\nnot enter commitments as they are made and the system does not check proposed\ncommitments against the remaining level of budget appropriation or commitment ceiling. As\ndescribed in previous reports, SUs sign contracts to obtain goods and services and wait until they\nreceive these before informing the system of these obligations. The system does, however,\nrequire recording a commitment but this is only performed after the Treasury provides a cash\n\n\n10 Issues concerning expenditures in excess of appropriations – particularly payrolls – are considered in the\nsection on expenditure controls.\n\n11 June 2108 report – _Ibid._\n\n\n39", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Budget Execution Reform\n\n70. Despite a comprehensive expenditure arrears clearance program put in place since\nan inventory was determined by end 2017, further arrears continue to arise. It is clear that\nattempts to execute a non-credible budget lead to the inability to make payments on all\ngovernment budget obligations during the fiscal year. Such obligations, having already been\ncommitted by SUs – mostly under their legally appropriated budgets [10] - for the delivery of\nrequired goods and services, add to the existing stock of expenditure arrears and continue to\nadversely affect the reputation of the government and the cost of the goods and services it\nneeds. At the time of this mission, the Ministries of Education and Health indicated that they\nwere likely to accumulate significant amounts of additional arrears; the total amount of\naccumulated unpaid invoices in these ministries during 2018 were MT 2 billion (US$ 32 million)\nand MT 40 million (US$ 0.64 million) respectively.\n\n71. The budget has lacked credibility in past years in the estimates of all elements\nmaking up its composition – revenues; expenditures; and deficit financing. Overestimation\nof revenues coupled with unanticipated increases in payrolls have contributed to recent\nshortages of cash resources during budget execution. In addition, previous large expenditure\narrears were caused by sudden withdrawal of budget support from donors.\n\n72. Little or no control to adjust budget expenditures has occurred during times of\ncash shortages. Strict cash rationing has caused payments to be reduced at such times even\nthough government obligations continue to be incurred. The recommended method of\nmanaging execution of the budget during periods when cash shortages are anticipated is to\ncontrol commitments of budget expenditures. This means that the level of obligations is reduced\nrather than deferring payments for previously incurred obligations. This process of budget\nmanagement is used by many countries in the region and across the world where there is a\nreasonably high possibility that revenues may fall short of budget estimates.\n\nInitiating Active Use of Commitment Controls\n\n73. The e-SISTAFE system and the SISTAFE law are already designed to handle\ncommitment controls [11] . However, the business processes have not been implemented. SUs do\nnot enter commitments as they are made and the system does not check proposed\ncommitments against the remaining level of budget appropriation or commitment ceiling. As\ndescribed in previous reports, SUs sign contracts to obtain goods and services and wait until they\nreceive these before informing the system of these obligations. The system does, however,\nrequire recording a commitment but this is only performed after the Treasury provides a cash\n\n10 Issues concerning expenditures in excess of appropriations – particularly payrolls – are considered in the\nsection on expenditure controls.\n\n11 June 2108 report – _Ibid._\n\n39", "text_characters": 2506}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "ceiling to the SUs based on their requests for paying the associated invoices. This process occurs\non a weekly basis with the Treasury providing cash releases against requests determined by the\navailable cash resources.\n\n\n_**First stage of implementing commitment control (through e-SISTAFE MEX module)**_\n\n\n**74.** **To reform these processes, it is necessary to implement a step-by-step approach**\n**which starts with making correct use of the commitment methodology.** Initially, the MEF\nmust configure the e-SISTAFE to accept commitment proposals as they are made by the SUs\nagainst an authorized commitment ceiling. The system, at this stage, needs to be able to accept\ncommitment ceilings for SUs for a longer time horizon at a high-level of economic classification –\npayrolls; recurrent expenditures; capital expenditures. Only at a later stage, will a more detailed\nlevel of classification be needed for control purposes. The MEF should be able to change these\nceilings at any point in the fiscal year.\n\n\n**75.** **When a commitment proposal is entered by an SU in real time, the system will**\n**check to see if the available commitment ceiling is adequate to allow it to proceed.** If not, it\nwill be rejected. If it is allowed, a commitment note (CN) is produced by the system for printing.\nThe CN will have a unique code number which identifies that particular contract. At the same\ntime, the commitment ceiling will be provisionally reduced by the contractual amount. For\ncontracts covering a multi-year period, the reduction amount will be the value expected to be\npaid in the current fiscal year only.\n\n\n**76.** **Once the system has accepted the commitment and the CN has been produced, the**\n**contract should be signed in conjunction with its lawful approval by the Administrative**\n**Tribunal.** Following the legal finalization of the contract, the commitment must be formally\nentered into the e-SISTAFE where the appropriate commitment ceiling reduction is confirmed in\nreal time for the contracted financial value. If the contract does not come to fruition, the SU\nshould enter this fact into the system where the CN will be cancelled, and the commitment\nceiling returned to its pre-proposal value. If the SU fails to return to the system for a formal\nconfirmation or cancellation of the proposal, its commitment ceiling will remain at the reduced\nlevel and a reminder sent after a fixed time to demand a conclusion to the commitment\nproposal.\n\n\n**77.** **This use of the CN is designed to provide a strict incentive to the SUs to adhere to**\n**this business process for entering all commitments into the system at the point of**\n**contracting.** An official circular is required to specify the new process and its commencement\ndate. In addition, the MEF must use outreach methods to indicate to all government suppliers\nthat, from the date of implementation, no contract entered into with a government entity will be\nvalid for subsequent payment unless it is attached to a unique, and verifiable, CN. If this outreach\nis successful, no contracts will be signed which have not been passed by the commitment control\nfunctionality of the e-SISTAFE and recorded in the system.\n\n\n40", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ceiling to the SUs based on their requests for paying the associated invoices. This process occurs\non a weekly basis with the Treasury providing cash releases against requests determined by the\navailable cash resources.\n\n_First stage of implementing commitment control (through e-SISTAFE MEX module)_\n\n74. To reform these processes, it is necessary to implement a step-by-step approach\nwhich starts with making correct use of the commitment methodology. Initially, the MEF\nmust configure the e-SISTAFE to accept commitment proposals as they are made by the SUs\nagainst an authorized commitment ceiling. The system, at this stage, needs to be able to accept\ncommitment ceilings for SUs for a longer time horizon at a high-level of economic classification –\npayrolls; recurrent expenditures; capital expenditures. Only at a later stage, will a more detailed\nlevel of classification be needed for control purposes. The MEF should be able to change these\nceilings at any point in the fiscal year.\n\n75. When a commitment proposal is entered by an SU in real time, the system will\ncheck to see if the available commitment ceiling is adequate to allow it to proceed. If not, it\nwill be rejected. If it is allowed, a commitment note (CN) is produced by the system for printing.\nThe CN will have a unique code number which identifies that particular contract. At the same\ntime, the commitment ceiling will be provisionally reduced by the contractual amount. For\ncontracts covering a multi-year period, the reduction amount will be the value expected to be\npaid in the current fiscal year only.\n\n76. Once the system has accepted the commitment and the CN has been produced, the\ncontract should be signed in conjunction with its lawful approval by the Administrative\nTribunal. Following the legal finalization of the contract, the commitment must be formally\nentered into the e-SISTAFE where the appropriate commitment ceiling reduction is confirmed in\nreal time for the contracted financial value. If the contract does not come to fruition, the SU\nshould enter this fact into the system where the CN will be cancelled, and the commitment\nceiling returned to its pre-proposal value. If the SU fails to return to the system for a formal\nconfirmation or cancellation of the proposal, its commitment ceiling will remain at the reduced\nlevel and a reminder sent after a fixed time to demand a conclusion to the commitment\nproposal.\n\n77. This use of the CN is designed to provide a strict incentive to the SUs to adhere to\nthis business process for entering all commitments into the system at the point of\ncontracting. An official circular is required to specify the new process and its commencement\ndate. In addition, the MEF must use outreach methods to indicate to all government suppliers\nthat, from the date of implementation, no contract entered into with a government entity will be\nvalid for subsequent payment unless it is attached to a unique, and verifiable, CN. If this outreach\nis successful, no contracts will be signed which have not been passed by the commitment control\nfunctionality of the e-SISTAFE and recorded in the system.\n\n40", "text_characters": 2613}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**78.** **For this first stage of commitment control, it is recommended that the budget is**\n**managed in the same way as at present.** Currently, the MEF uses its authority to reduce the\navailable budget allocations on expenditure classification heads by withholding ten to fifteen\npercent of their value. This constraint is applied in a broad manner across the SUs and should be\nformally used to operate as a commitment ceiling. With the new automated commitment control\nprocess, the same constraint can be set through the commitment ceilings entered into the\nsystem. In this manner, the SUs will initially see no difference in their budget execution other\nthan the requirement to undergo a commitment ceiling check by the system before signing a\ncontract.\n\n\n_**Second stage of implementing commitment control (through the MPE module)**_\n\n\n**79.** **While the first stage of commitment control described above will be a good start to**\n**capture all commitments in real time, it should be followed by further measures during the**\n**second stage to fully resolve the problem of over-execution of a non-credible budget.**\nUnless the broad budget withholding factor is equal to, or greater than, the overall budget\nresource shortfall, it will not be capable of avoiding unpaid expenditure obligations. Moreover,\nthe blanket reduction envisaged will be unsuitable for certain expenditure lines. These could\ninclude non-discretionary items such as debt service, salaries, continuous contracts such as\nutilities and medicines, and other vital government services.\n\n\n**80.** **As described in the June 2018 TA report,** **[12]** **the most appropriate method of**\n**ensuring that expenditure arrears are unlikely to occur is through active budget**\n**management.** This entails deciding, at certain points during the year, what level of commitments\nare to be permitted. The cash flow forecasts for the period ahead should provide suitable\ninformation to show whether commitment levels need to be reduced. If revenues are projected\nto fall short of the budget estimate, and assuming the fiscal deficit target is fixed, expenditures\nmust be reduced accordingly before they have been committed.\n\n\n**81.** **Decisions restricting permission to make appropriated expenditures must be taken**\n**with sufficient authority** . The establishment of a high-level cash management committee\n(CMC) at the MEF should normally command this level of seniority. For this purpose, it should be\nchaired by the Minister of Finance with delegation, as necessary, to the Permanent Secretary. [13]\nThe committee should consist of senior management officials of the MEF including those\nresponsible for budget, Treasury (including the cash management unit (CMU) – see below),\nmacrofiscal unit (see below), revenue authority, and senior officials of the BoM. The committee\nshould have the authority to invite senior management officials from large sector ministries to\nattend its meetings as necessary. Sample terms-of-reference for the CMC is provided in Annex II.\n\n\n12 _Ibid._\n\n13 The CMC would be more strategic than the current Ministerial Consultative Council which meets weekly to\ndetermine cash availability and urgent needs.\n\n\n41", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "78. For this first stage of commitment control, it is recommended that the budget is\nmanaged in the same way as at present. Currently, the MEF uses its authority to reduce the\navailable budget allocations on expenditure classification heads by withholding ten to fifteen\npercent of their value. This constraint is applied in a broad manner across the SUs and should be\nformally used to operate as a commitment ceiling. With the new automated commitment control\nprocess, the same constraint can be set through the commitment ceilings entered into the\nsystem. In this manner, the SUs will initially see no difference in their budget execution other\nthan the requirement to undergo a commitment ceiling check by the system before signing a\ncontract.\n\n_Second stage of implementing commitment control (through the MPE module)_\n\n79. While the first stage of commitment control described above will be a good start to\ncapture all commitments in real time, it should be followed by further measures during the\nsecond stage to fully resolve the problem of over-execution of a non-credible budget.\nUnless the broad budget withholding factor is equal to, or greater than, the overall budget\nresource shortfall, it will not be capable of avoiding unpaid expenditure obligations. Moreover,\nthe blanket reduction envisaged will be unsuitable for certain expenditure lines. These could\ninclude non-discretionary items such as debt service, salaries, continuous contracts such as\nutilities and medicines, and other vital government services.\n\n80. As described in the June 2018 TA report, [12] the most appropriate method of\nensuring that expenditure arrears are unlikely to occur is through active budget\nmanagement. This entails deciding, at certain points during the year, what level of commitments\nare to be permitted. The cash flow forecasts for the period ahead should provide suitable\ninformation to show whether commitment levels need to be reduced. If revenues are projected\nto fall short of the budget estimate, and assuming the fiscal deficit target is fixed, expenditures\nmust be reduced accordingly before they have been committed.\n\n81. Decisions restricting permission to make appropriated expenditures must be taken\nwith sufficient authority . The establishment of a high-level cash management committee\n(CMC) at the MEF should normally command this level of seniority. For this purpose, it should be\nchaired by the Minister of Finance with delegation, as necessary, to the Permanent Secretary. [13]\nThe committee should consist of senior management officials of the MEF including those\nresponsible for budget, Treasury (including the cash management unit (CMU) – see below),\nmacrofiscal unit (see below), revenue authority, and senior officials of the BoM. The committee\nshould have the authority to invite senior management officials from large sector ministries to\nattend its meetings as necessary. Sample terms-of-reference for the CMC is provided in Annex II.\n\n12 _Ibid._\n\n13 The CMC would be more strategic than the current Ministerial Consultative Council which meets weekly to\ndetermine cash availability and urgent needs.\n\n41", "text_characters": 2645}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**82.** **A regular senior MEF management decision is required to issue commitment**\n**ceilings through quarterly budget releases to SUs.** Using information provided by its\nmembers – particularly the CMU cash flow forecasts (see below) – the CMC would decide the\noverall commitment envelope suitable for the forthcoming quarter of the fiscal year. It would\ninstruct the Directorate of National Budget (DNB) to issue the necessary commitment ceilings to\nthe SUs. The ceilings would then be entered into the e-SISTAFE for automatic control in the same\nmanner as described above.\n\n\n**83.** **Quarterly budget releases have been found to be the most suitable in countries**\n**which use this method of budget management** . Many governments have moved gradually\nfrom strict cash rationing to monthly budget releases and then to quarterly releases. During this\nprocess, it is often found that monthly releases do not provide sufficient time for control of the\none-off, large, volatile expenditure items usually targeted. These items normally have significant\ncontractual lead times and they need to be committed early in the fiscal year. Effective control of\ncommitments is often performed later in the year when revenue shortfalls become more evident.\n\n\n**84.** **The DNB should be responsible for allocating the requisite commitment ceilings to**\n**those SU expenditure lines which are discretionary in nature and would not adversely**\n**affect government business.** Given its close relationships with SU budget managers, the DNB\nshould have the experience to decide where commitment cuts could be most effective for\ndealing with an expected drop in available cash resources in the coming three months. Those\nexpenditures planned to be committed during the coming period would be carefully analyzed\nand one-off items which least affect the provision of government policy would be selected for\nreduction or delay. These would normally be related to new or continuing project\nimplementation. Depending on the size of the required cuts to committed spending, further\ndiscretionary lines would be reduced.\n\n\n**85.** **For this budget management process to be effective, the MEF needs to be able to**\n**forecast future government cash flows with reasonable accuracy.** This entails understanding\nthe procurement plans of the SUs; debt servicing flows; payrolls and emoluments; and recurrent\nexpenditures. These would need to be modelled as projected outflows from the treasury single\naccount (CUT). Relevant projected inflows would be projected revenues, debt issuance, and aid\nreceipts. Consequently, it is unlikely that this stage can be implemented before the MPE module\nof e-SISTAFE is configured for the provision of such data and rolled out to those SUs which have\na significant impact on the overall government cash resource envelope.\n\n\n**86.** **The same commitment control process through the e-SISTAFE system set up in the**\n**first stage would be used to control budget execution.** The quarterly budget releases would\nact as commitment ceilings within the system but would need to be highly flexible and subject to\nchange. It should be planned to control budget releases quarterly, but the associated\ncommitment ceilings should be capable of amendment as soon as significant new information\non future cash resources (higher or lower) was available.\n\n\n42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "82. A regular senior MEF management decision is required to issue commitment\nceilings through quarterly budget releases to SUs. Using information provided by its\nmembers – particularly the CMU cash flow forecasts (see below) – the CMC would decide the\noverall commitment envelope suitable for the forthcoming quarter of the fiscal year. It would\ninstruct the Directorate of National Budget (DNB) to issue the necessary commitment ceilings to\nthe SUs. The ceilings would then be entered into the e-SISTAFE for automatic control in the same\nmanner as described above.\n\n83. Quarterly budget releases have been found to be the most suitable in countries\nwhich use this method of budget management . Many governments have moved gradually\nfrom strict cash rationing to monthly budget releases and then to quarterly releases. During this\nprocess, it is often found that monthly releases do not provide sufficient time for control of the\none-off, large, volatile expenditure items usually targeted. These items normally have significant\ncontractual lead times and they need to be committed early in the fiscal year. Effective control of\ncommitments is often performed later in the year when revenue shortfalls become more evident.\n\n84. The DNB should be responsible for allocating the requisite commitment ceilings to\nthose SU expenditure lines which are discretionary in nature and would not adversely\naffect government business. Given its close relationships with SU budget managers, the DNB\nshould have the experience to decide where commitment cuts could be most effective for\ndealing with an expected drop in available cash resources in the coming three months. Those\nexpenditures planned to be committed during the coming period would be carefully analyzed\nand one-off items which least affect the provision of government policy would be selected for\nreduction or delay. These would normally be related to new or continuing project\nimplementation. Depending on the size of the required cuts to committed spending, further\ndiscretionary lines would be reduced.\n\n85. For this budget management process to be effective, the MEF needs to be able to\nforecast future government cash flows with reasonable accuracy. This entails understanding\nthe procurement plans of the SUs; debt servicing flows; payrolls and emoluments; and recurrent\nexpenditures. These would need to be modelled as projected outflows from the treasury single\naccount (CUT). Relevant projected inflows would be projected revenues, debt issuance, and aid\nreceipts. Consequently, it is unlikely that this stage can be implemented before the MPE module\nof e-SISTAFE is configured for the provision of such data and rolled out to those SUs which have\na significant impact on the overall government cash resource envelope.\n\n86. The same commitment control process through the e-SISTAFE system set up in the\nfirst stage would be used to control budget execution. The quarterly budget releases would\nact as commitment ceilings within the system but would need to be highly flexible and subject to\nchange. It should be planned to control budget releases quarterly, but the associated\ncommitment ceilings should be capable of amendment as soon as significant new information\non future cash resources (higher or lower) was available.\n\n42", "text_characters": 2775}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Establishing a macrofiscal unit for improving the credibility of revenue forecasts**\n\n\n**87.** **The cash flow forecasts leading to flexible budget management are critically**\n**dependent on accurate, realistic revenue forecasts** . For this purpose, a macrofiscal unit should\nbe established with experienced macroeconomists responsible for forecasting the effects of\nchanging economic variables and conditions on the budget revenue estimates. Instead of\ncreating a new unit, one of the existing units analyzing macrofiscal related issues—Either the\nMacro studies unit or Fiscal Risks Management Unit—could be assigned this task of preparing\nand updating revenue forecasts. This is a specialized task and will require some technical\nassistance to implement.\n\n\n**88.** **It should be noted that, although information from the revenue authorities is a**\n**necessary input, it should not be the sole basis for forecasting future revenue flows.**\nRevenue authorities have collection targets to meet and their forecasts will often not be realistic.\nIf revenue collection amounts are showing a shortfall during the year, the revenue authorities will\nbe tempted to predict that they will raise enough revenue during the remainder of the year to\nmeet the budget target. Even though they may understand that this is unlikely due to\nmacroeconomic developments, they are not likely to admit this in their projections. Once a\nmacrofiscal unit is established, its projections should be used by the cash flow forecasters since\nthese should incorporate all realistic factors.\n\n\n**Establishing a cash management unit in the Treasury**\n\n\n**89.** **A cash management unit (CMU) should be established in the Directorate of**\n**National Treasury (DNT) to perform suitable cash flow forecasting for CMC decision-**\n**making.** This unit should comprise four to six operational staff who should be proficient in\nspreadsheet data operations. The spreadsheet data should be provided by various parts of the\ngovernment and it will be important for these staff to be able to establish good working\nrelationships with their counterparties. The process of compiling and aggregating this\ninformation within a comprehensive spreadsheet is not complex and the required staff would not\nneed to be highly skilled since no mathematical calculations are involved. Templates for the\nrequired cash flow information spreadsheets themselves have already been provided through\nother TA. The format of these spreadsheets and the responsibilities for populating them at\nspecified intervals, including the reporting obligations of the SUs to the CMU, should be backed\nup by legally-binding provisions such as Regulations.\n\n\n**90.** **The objective of the spreadsheet analysis is to produce a profile across the fiscal**\n**year of the expected balance in the CUT.** This would show the aggregate cash resources\navailable to the government at each point in time and would highlight the periods where it is\npredicted that cash shortages would arise. It should be emphasized that this profile is a forecast\nand does not need to be of accounting accuracy. Therefore, much of the input data can be\nderived from historical understanding of expenditure patterns. For example, salaries should\nfollow the same pattern each year and would be expected to be reasonably smooth in profile\n\n\n43", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Establishing a macrofiscal unit for improving the credibility of revenue forecasts\n\n87. The cash flow forecasts leading to flexible budget management are critically\ndependent on accurate, realistic revenue forecasts . For this purpose, a macrofiscal unit should\nbe established with experienced macroeconomists responsible for forecasting the effects of\nchanging economic variables and conditions on the budget revenue estimates. Instead of\ncreating a new unit, one of the existing units analyzing macrofiscal related issues—Either the\nMacro studies unit or Fiscal Risks Management Unit—could be assigned this task of preparing\nand updating revenue forecasts. This is a specialized task and will require some technical\nassistance to implement.\n\n88. It should be noted that, although information from the revenue authorities is a\nnecessary input, it should not be the sole basis for forecasting future revenue flows.\nRevenue authorities have collection targets to meet and their forecasts will often not be realistic.\nIf revenue collection amounts are showing a shortfall during the year, the revenue authorities will\nbe tempted to predict that they will raise enough revenue during the remainder of the year to\nmeet the budget target. Even though they may understand that this is unlikely due to\nmacroeconomic developments, they are not likely to admit this in their projections. Once a\nmacrofiscal unit is established, its projections should be used by the cash flow forecasters since\nthese should incorporate all realistic factors.\n\nEstablishing a cash management unit in the Treasury\n\n89. A cash management unit (CMU) should be established in the Directorate of\nNational Treasury (DNT) to perform suitable cash flow forecasting for CMC decision-\nmaking. This unit should comprise four to six operational staff who should be proficient in\nspreadsheet data operations. The spreadsheet data should be provided by various parts of the\ngovernment and it will be important for these staff to be able to establish good working\nrelationships with their counterparties. The process of compiling and aggregating this\ninformation within a comprehensive spreadsheet is not complex and the required staff would not\nneed to be highly skilled since no mathematical calculations are involved. Templates for the\nrequired cash flow information spreadsheets themselves have already been provided through\nother TA. The format of these spreadsheets and the responsibilities for populating them at\nspecified intervals, including the reporting obligations of the SUs to the CMU, should be backed\nup by legally-binding provisions such as Regulations.\n\n90. The objective of the spreadsheet analysis is to produce a profile across the fiscal\nyear of the expected balance in the CUT. This would show the aggregate cash resources\navailable to the government at each point in time and would highlight the periods where it is\npredicted that cash shortages would arise. It should be emphasized that this profile is a forecast\nand does not need to be of accounting accuracy. Therefore, much of the input data can be\nderived from historical understanding of expenditure patterns. For example, salaries should\nfollow the same pattern each year and would be expected to be reasonably smooth in profile\n\n43", "text_characters": 2765}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "across the year unless certain special payments and bonuses exist which could be incorporated\nfrom their regular pattern. Goods and service expenditures are also likely to follow similar\npatterns to those in preceding years and can therefore be extrapolated in the model.\n\n\n**91.** **The expenditure projections which need to be obtained directly from individual SUs**\n**are those which are likely to be significantly large and volatile.** That is, they cannot\nreasonably be assumed to follow previous patterns. The overall objective of this work is an\naggregate of a large amount of individual expected payments. This means that the relevance of\nsmall items can be low and only those items which are large in comparison to the aggregate\ntotals have to be reasonably accurate. Effort should be concentrated on such items and\nrelationships should be established by CMU staff with those SUs where they are likely to exist.\nSuch expenditures are likely to be related to reasonably large projects.\n\n\n**92.** **The cash flow forecast model should be maintained continuously which implies that**\n**all information which changes projections significantly should be incorporated as soon as**\n**it becomes available.** The model is a dynamic projection of government cash resources and will\nalso need to be updated as budget releases are decided and implemented. It will also need to\nincorporate details of large commitments which are entered into the e-SISTAFE system since\nthese should provide accurate information on forthcoming contract payments as they are\nagreed.\n\n\n**93.** **Modeling government cash flow forecasts takes a long time to come to fruition.**\nThe model is large and contains many variable amounts at any one time. The accuracy of the\nmodeling will vary a great deal but should rapidly improve once it has begun. It is of the greatest\nimportance, therefore, that this work is commenced as soon as possible. Even if the information\nis, at first, not particularly useful due to its inherent inaccuracy, it can never be improved until it is\nstarted. The cash flow forecasting work of a CMU is described in Box 2.1.\n\n\n44", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "across the year unless certain special payments and bonuses exist which could be incorporated\nfrom their regular pattern. Goods and service expenditures are also likely to follow similar\npatterns to those in preceding years and can therefore be extrapolated in the model.\n\n91. The expenditure projections which need to be obtained directly from individual SUs\nare those which are likely to be significantly large and volatile. That is, they cannot\nreasonably be assumed to follow previous patterns. The overall objective of this work is an\naggregate of a large amount of individual expected payments. This means that the relevance of\nsmall items can be low and only those items which are large in comparison to the aggregate\ntotals have to be reasonably accurate. Effort should be concentrated on such items and\nrelationships should be established by CMU staff with those SUs where they are likely to exist.\nSuch expenditures are likely to be related to reasonably large projects.\n\n92. The cash flow forecast model should be maintained continuously which implies that\nall information which changes projections significantly should be incorporated as soon as\nit becomes available. The model is a dynamic projection of government cash resources and will\nalso need to be updated as budget releases are decided and implemented. It will also need to\nincorporate details of large commitments which are entered into the e-SISTAFE system since\nthese should provide accurate information on forthcoming contract payments as they are\nagreed.\n\n93. Modeling government cash flow forecasts takes a long time to come to fruition.\nThe model is large and contains many variable amounts at any one time. The accuracy of the\nmodeling will vary a great deal but should rapidly improve once it has begun. It is of the greatest\nimportance, therefore, that this work is commenced as soon as possible. Even if the information\nis, at first, not particularly useful due to its inherent inaccuracy, it can never be improved until it is\nstarted. The cash flow forecasting work of a CMU is described in Box 2.1.\n\n44", "text_characters": 1743}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0047-001"], "markdown": "\n\n45", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 2.1. Building Cash Flow Forecasts\n\nBuilding reliable cash flow forecasts is clearly a prerequisite for a successful budget and cash management\nstrategy. The forecast period should extend for at least six months, although should ideally be at least twelve\nmonths (some governments, e.g., France, Australia project daily flows for the rolling period of one year\nahead). This relates to the time period within which offsetting action may usefully be taken, e.g., by budget\nreleases, adjustment to the bond issuance program, or by the issue of T-bills. The design of an effective\nforecasting and monitoring capability is likely to be built around the following elements:\n\n A database of actual daily cash flows, as a means of identifying patterns for monitoring. Actual cash\n flows should be closely tracked against departments’ profiles and major divergences investigated, as\n part of improving the forecasting processes.\n Information flow to the cash managers from revenue and spending departments. The preparation of\n short-term cash flow forecasts cannot effectively be done only at the centre, i.e., ignoring the\n knowledge of those budget agencies that are closer to the interface between government and other\n sectors. Budget agencies are also best placed to supply information when actual flows are diverging\n from the budget.\n A network of contacts, voice and electronic, with the main spending and revenue departments, which\n would be used both to develop forecasts and monitor current flows.\n\nThe cash managers should ideally know precisely the timing of some major cash flows, e.g., debt servicing\nand redemptions, for which data should be available directly. Some payments will have a regular monthly\npattern (e.g., payment of salaries or some transfers to individuals or to lower levels of government), and for\nothers there may be an historical pattern.\n\nIn an ideal world, efficient cash management systems enable daily forecasts of cash flows across the TSA,\ntogether with the monitoring of actual changes close to real time. There is no simple technical short cut that\nfacilitates this. In general, it has been found that econometric techniques are not useful for daily or monthly\nprojections—their main role is to help forecast annual or quarterly aggregates, which are used to act as a\nbudget management constraint or release. Daily/monthly cash flow forecasts are built up from a mixture of\nknowledge about specific flows, historical experience of patterns, and judgments about the impact of any\nrecent changes in policy or application of administrative rules. There is often a difference between the\ncompilation of “above the line” (i.e., revenue and expenditure) forecasts, which may fall to those monitoring\nbudget execution or receipts, and those “below the line” (debt and other financial transactions), where the\ncash and debt managers take responsibility.\n\nTypically, country experience dictates starting with rough monthly projections and gradually building up\nthese rough projections towards weekly and finally daily forecasts. This type of process does not need\nsophisticated modelling techniques. The patterns in cash flows can be examined, e.g., by plotting individual\ntime series on a year-over-year basis to reveal annual seasonality. Many government expenditure and\nreceipt data, and movements of cash balances, may exhibit strong and predictable seasonal variations.\n\n\n\n\n\n 45", "text_characters": 2877}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Equally important is to:\n\n- Identify the key people at the working level in the selected revenue and spending departments, who\nwill be able to supply the relevant information.\n\n- Set up formal requirements to ensure that profiles are supplied and updated.\n\n- Back the latter by informal arrangements, whereby the cash managers are given early notice of any\nmajor changes. In many countries these changes will need to be communicated not only in advance of\nthe day being studied but also on the day itself, to ensure that any offsetting action can be taken by\nthe cash managers.\n\n- The focus should be on those sums that are large in size, most variable and most unpredictable. In the\nU.K., for example, the more detailed information is collected from just 15 departments who together\naccount for over 80 percent of government spending.\n\n**Outcome of effective budget management**\n\n\n**94.** **Once the process of budget releases is established and operational, it should have a**\n**significant effect on the operation of budget execution.** If cash flow forecasts are reasonably\naccurate for the quarter ahead – in particular the revenue forecast – controls on commitments\nshould automatically mean that sufficient cash is available for their payment obligations. By\nunderstanding the payment dates and amounts of committed items in advance, and by\nrestricting these to the projected cash resources, there should be no further need for cash\nreleases to be made at the time of payment. Since all commitments will be entered into the\nsystem, no ‘surprise’ invoices should arise for which there is no available cash.\n\n\n**95.** **The current budget execution process comprises a deconcentrated payments**\n**system.** This means that payment instructions for invoices are given by the responsible SUs\nusing the e-SISTAFE system. SUs request cash releases for amounts which have been invoiced or\nexpect to be invoiced during the following four weeks. Weekly cash releases are then issued by\nthe Treasury. Once the cash release amount is known, the SU selects the invoices to be paid and\nenters these into the e-SISTAFE. The system compiles an electronic payment instruction file which\nis sent to the BoM. The BoM makes the required payments from the CUT account to suppliers\ndetailed on the file.\n\n\n**96.** **The current deconcentrated payments system is sub-optimal because the Treasury**\n**does not have full information on invoices which need to be paid.** In a cash rationing\nenvironment, SUs select invoices for payment at their discretion. This can lead to corrupt\npractices and also avoidance of payments. When an invoice is not selected for payment because\nthe cash release cannot cover it, the invoice may be put out of sight along with other similar\ninvoices. These invoices become unpaid expenditure arrears which are non-transparent to the\nTreasury or other authorities.\n\n\n**97.** **However, once the budget release process is operational through commitment**\n**controls, the payments system can effectively be centralized.** Without the need for cash\nrequests and cash releases, there should be no obstacle to SUs entering all their invoices directly\n\n\n46", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 48, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Equally important is to:\n\n- Identify the key people at the working level in the selected revenue and spending departments, who\nwill be able to supply the relevant information.\n\n- Set up formal requirements to ensure that profiles are supplied and updated.\n\n- Back the latter by informal arrangements, whereby the cash managers are given early notice of any\nmajor changes. In many countries these changes will need to be communicated not only in advance of\nthe day being studied but also on the day itself, to ensure that any offsetting action can be taken by\nthe cash managers.\n\n- The focus should be on those sums that are large in size, most variable and most unpredictable. In the\nU.K., for example, the more detailed information is collected from just 15 departments who together\naccount for over 80 percent of government spending.\n\nOutcome of effective budget management\n\n94. Once the process of budget releases is established and operational, it should have a\nsignificant effect on the operation of budget execution. If cash flow forecasts are reasonably\naccurate for the quarter ahead – in particular the revenue forecast – controls on commitments\nshould automatically mean that sufficient cash is available for their payment obligations. By\nunderstanding the payment dates and amounts of committed items in advance, and by\nrestricting these to the projected cash resources, there should be no further need for cash\nreleases to be made at the time of payment. Since all commitments will be entered into the\nsystem, no ‘surprise’ invoices should arise for which there is no available cash.\n\n95. The current budget execution process comprises a deconcentrated payments\nsystem. This means that payment instructions for invoices are given by the responsible SUs\nusing the e-SISTAFE system. SUs request cash releases for amounts which have been invoiced or\nexpect to be invoiced during the following four weeks. Weekly cash releases are then issued by\nthe Treasury. Once the cash release amount is known, the SU selects the invoices to be paid and\nenters these into the e-SISTAFE. The system compiles an electronic payment instruction file which\nis sent to the BoM. The BoM makes the required payments from the CUT account to suppliers\ndetailed on the file.\n\n96. The current deconcentrated payments system is sub-optimal because the Treasury\ndoes not have full information on invoices which need to be paid. In a cash rationing\nenvironment, SUs select invoices for payment at their discretion. This can lead to corrupt\npractices and also avoidance of payments. When an invoice is not selected for payment because\nthe cash release cannot cover it, the invoice may be put out of sight along with other similar\ninvoices. These invoices become unpaid expenditure arrears which are non-transparent to the\nTreasury or other authorities.\n\n97. However, once the budget release process is operational through commitment\ncontrols, the payments system can effectively be centralized. Without the need for cash\nrequests and cash releases, there should be no obstacle to SUs entering all their invoices directly\n\n46", "text_characters": 2594}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "into the system. The system would be configured so that the payment instruction file would be\nproduced automatically. This file would then need to be verified to ensure that sufficient cash is\navailable in the CUT. This verification process could be automated in the system based on some\nclear criteria to prioritize payments; in the interim, the Treasury could verify to ensure that\npayment instructions sent to the bank are within the available cash balance in the CUT.\n\n\n**98.** **If a continuing unanticipated cash shortfall was experienced, these withheld**\n**invoices would again build up a stock of expenditure arrears.** This would indicate poor cash\nflow forecasts and that the budget management process was operating ineffectively. However,\nthe major benefits of the centralized payments system at this point would be (i) that the arrears\nwould be fully transparent; and (ii) that a clear, decision-free automated system could be devised\nto select delayed invoices for payment when cash was available. This could be, for example, on a\nfirst-in – first-out basis. It is recommended that the Treasury should actively consider moving to a\ncentralized payments system when feasible during the second stage of commitment control and\nquarterly budget release system.\n\n\n**C. Active Cash Management Operations**\n\n\n**99.** **A primary task of the CMU is to provide the CMC with monthly and quarterly cash**\n**flow forecasts to inform decisions on budget management and releases.** Once the budget is\nmanaged in an effective manner through this process, budget execution should become\nreasonably credible. This implies that annual committed expenditures will approximately equal\navailable revenues plus budget deficit financing. In other words, the starting balance of the CUT\nwill be the same as the balance at the end of the fiscal year. At that point, temporary periods of\ncash shortages and surpluses will only occur during the year as timing mismatches between\nrevenue collections and expenditure payments arise.\n\n\n**100. It is the task of active cash management operations by the CMU to manage these**\n**temporary mismatch periods efficiently** . The CMU should investigate whether the timing of\nrevenues, expenditures, or debt transactions can be moved to reduce these periods since this is\nthe most cost-effective way of handling mismatches. Any such movement must be agreed to by\nthe parties concerned so that the process does not lead to a return of enforced cash rationing.\n\n\n**101. Alternatively, periods of cash shortage need to be filled by short-term borrowings**\n**and periods of surplus are used to repay the borrowings and invest excess cash efficiently.**\nIn this way, it can be assured that expenditure payments will be made as and when necessary\nwithout abnormal delays. This enhances the credibility of the government and generally reduces\nits costs.\n\n\n**102. As described in Box 2.1, cash flow forecasting for cash management purposes**\n**needs to be finer in detail than for budget management purposes.** The CMU will need to\nbecome more proficient in producing these forecasts when deciding to embark on active cash\nmanagement operations. It is necessary to have sufficient confidence in the cash flow forecast\n\n\n47", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 49, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "into the system. The system would be configured so that the payment instruction file would be\nproduced automatically. This file would then need to be verified to ensure that sufficient cash is\navailable in the CUT. This verification process could be automated in the system based on some\nclear criteria to prioritize payments; in the interim, the Treasury could verify to ensure that\npayment instructions sent to the bank are within the available cash balance in the CUT.\n\n98. If a continuing unanticipated cash shortfall was experienced, these withheld\ninvoices would again build up a stock of expenditure arrears. This would indicate poor cash\nflow forecasts and that the budget management process was operating ineffectively. However,\nthe major benefits of the centralized payments system at this point would be (i) that the arrears\nwould be fully transparent; and (ii) that a clear, decision-free automated system could be devised\nto select delayed invoices for payment when cash was available. This could be, for example, on a\nfirst-in – first-out basis. It is recommended that the Treasury should actively consider moving to a\ncentralized payments system when feasible during the second stage of commitment control and\nquarterly budget release system.\n\nC. Active Cash Management Operations\n\n99. A primary task of the CMU is to provide the CMC with monthly and quarterly cash\nflow forecasts to inform decisions on budget management and releases. Once the budget is\nmanaged in an effective manner through this process, budget execution should become\nreasonably credible. This implies that annual committed expenditures will approximately equal\navailable revenues plus budget deficit financing. In other words, the starting balance of the CUT\nwill be the same as the balance at the end of the fiscal year. At that point, temporary periods of\ncash shortages and surpluses will only occur during the year as timing mismatches between\nrevenue collections and expenditure payments arise.\n\n100. It is the task of active cash management operations by the CMU to manage these\ntemporary mismatch periods efficiently . The CMU should investigate whether the timing of\nrevenues, expenditures, or debt transactions can be moved to reduce these periods since this is\nthe most cost-effective way of handling mismatches. Any such movement must be agreed to by\nthe parties concerned so that the process does not lead to a return of enforced cash rationing.\n\n101. Alternatively, periods of cash shortage need to be filled by short-term borrowings\nand periods of surplus are used to repay the borrowings and invest excess cash efficiently.\nIn this way, it can be assured that expenditure payments will be made as and when necessary\nwithout abnormal delays. This enhances the credibility of the government and generally reduces\nits costs.\n\n102. As described in Box 2.1, cash flow forecasting for cash management purposes\nneeds to be finer in detail than for budget management purposes. The CMU will need to\nbecome more proficient in producing these forecasts when deciding to embark on active cash\nmanagement operations. It is necessary to have sufficient confidence in the cash flow forecast\n\n47", "text_characters": 2669}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "accuracy to ensure that financial transactions are appropriate to the coming cash situation and\nwill not be an additional cost.\n\n\n**Using suppliers’ standard terms of payment**\n\n\n**103. The current payments system does not utilize cash efficiently and provides little**\n**assistance to the task of cash flow forecasting.** The existing system, in common with many\nother countries in the region, creates a payment instruction file from selected invoices which is\nthen transmitted to the central bank for immediate payment. The government payments system\ncan become more effective by using invoicing practices which are commonplace in the private\nsector.\n\n\n**104. Private sector businesses usually provide their main clients with standard payment**\n**terms.** These normally include a provision that the payment is not due until a specified period\nfollowing issuance of the invoice – very often 30 days but possibly up to 90 days – following\nwhich the client is considered to be in default. The government should commence a program to\nrequest similar terms from all its major suppliers. The e-SISTAFE should then include the payment\nperiod allowed by each supplier in its file of suppliers’ details.\n\n\n**105. The e-SISTAFE would be configured to ensure that invoices were put on the**\n**payment instruction file only at the latest date of payment – 30 days after the invoice date.**\nThe government would hold its cash resources for longer than at present which is more costefficient. Additionally, a major benefit would be that the e-SISTAFE can then be programmed to\nproduce the payments scheduled for the following 25 days, or so. If all suppliers were on 30-day\npayment terms, this payment schedule would be a precise projection of all payments due by the\nTreasury for almost the whole coming month. Such accurate cash flow projections would greatly\nassist in active short-term cash management operations.\n\n\n**Developing the use and depth of the Treasury bill market**\n\n\n**106. The need to incur short-term borrowing to counteract timing mismatches between**\n**revenues and expenditures is usually managed by issuing Treasury bills (T bills).** The T bill\nmarket is normally the most liquid and cheapest way for a government to borrow for a shortterm. In Mozambique, this market will need to be developed substantially before it can be used\nfor active cash management operations.\n\n\n**107. At present, the government uses an informal and convoluted method of access to**\n**the T bill market for fiscal purposes** . When necessary, the government requests the BoM to\nborrow on behalf of the Treasury in the T bill market when it performs open market operations\nfor monetary policy purposes. The BoM lends the proceeds to the government which takes\nresponsibility for the repayment of the T bills when they mature. This methodology is\ncumbersome and confuses the operations of monetary policy and fiscal policy which is inefficient\nfor market liquidity and pricing. It is recommended that the Treasury, the debt managers, and the\n\n\n48", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 50, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "accuracy to ensure that financial transactions are appropriate to the coming cash situation and\nwill not be an additional cost.\n\nUsing suppliers’ standard terms of payment\n\n103. The current payments system does not utilize cash efficiently and provides little\nassistance to the task of cash flow forecasting. The existing system, in common with many\nother countries in the region, creates a payment instruction file from selected invoices which is\nthen transmitted to the central bank for immediate payment. The government payments system\ncan become more effective by using invoicing practices which are commonplace in the private\nsector.\n\n104. Private sector businesses usually provide their main clients with standard payment\nterms. These normally include a provision that the payment is not due until a specified period\nfollowing issuance of the invoice – very often 30 days but possibly up to 90 days – following\nwhich the client is considered to be in default. The government should commence a program to\nrequest similar terms from all its major suppliers. The e-SISTAFE should then include the payment\nperiod allowed by each supplier in its file of suppliers’ details.\n\n105. The e-SISTAFE would be configured to ensure that invoices were put on the\npayment instruction file only at the latest date of payment – 30 days after the invoice date.\nThe government would hold its cash resources for longer than at present which is more costefficient. Additionally, a major benefit would be that the e-SISTAFE can then be programmed to\nproduce the payments scheduled for the following 25 days, or so. If all suppliers were on 30-day\npayment terms, this payment schedule would be a precise projection of all payments due by the\nTreasury for almost the whole coming month. Such accurate cash flow projections would greatly\nassist in active short-term cash management operations.\n\nDeveloping the use and depth of the Treasury bill market\n\n106. The need to incur short-term borrowing to counteract timing mismatches between\nrevenues and expenditures is usually managed by issuing Treasury bills (T bills). The T bill\nmarket is normally the most liquid and cheapest way for a government to borrow for a shortterm. In Mozambique, this market will need to be developed substantially before it can be used\nfor active cash management operations.\n\n107. At present, the government uses an informal and convoluted method of access to\nthe T bill market for fiscal purposes . When necessary, the government requests the BoM to\nborrow on behalf of the Treasury in the T bill market when it performs open market operations\nfor monetary policy purposes. The BoM lends the proceeds to the government which takes\nresponsibility for the repayment of the T bills when they mature. This methodology is\ncumbersome and confuses the operations of monetary policy and fiscal policy which is inefficient\nfor market liquidity and pricing. It is recommended that the Treasury, the debt managers, and the\n\n48", "text_characters": 2489}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BoM coordinate a market development program once active cash management operations can\nbe implemented feasibly.\n\n\n**D. Summary of Required Activities**\n\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to produce commitment notes and enforce commitment ceilings\n\n - Inform private sector on commitment note rules\n\n - Ensure e-SISTAFE has commitment controls/ceilings in place\n\n - Set up CMC\n\n - Terms of reference\n\n - Composition\n\n - Meeting schedule\n\n - Training for DNB to select and enforce commitment ceilings\n\n - Refresh rules for compliance with entering commitments into the e-SISTAFE system as\nsoon as they are made\n\n - Set up CMU\n\n - Staffing\n\n - Spreadsheet model\n\n - Training\n\n - Capacity building for large SUs\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE (MPE Module) to report committed payment schedules to CMU\n\n - Set up MFU\n\n - Training\n\n - Refresh rules for producing, updating, and distributing procurement plans\n\n - Consider benefits of moving to centralized payments system\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to handle invoices directly\n\n - Determine rules for payment prioritization and train Treasury\n\n - Rules disseminated to SUs\n\n - Discuss and implement rules to implement suppliers’ standard payment terms\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to determine correct payment dates for approved invoices\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to report near-term payment schedule to CMU\n\n - Coordinate with BoM and debt management to develop short-term T bill market for cash\nmanagement\n\n**E. Summary of Recommendations**\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.1.** Configure e-SISTAFE to control commitments through commitment\nceilings and the issuance of commitment notes.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.2.** Conduct outreach to all sector ministries and government suppliers on\nthe appropriate use of commitment notes.\n\n\n49", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 51, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BoM coordinate a market development program once active cash management operations can\nbe implemented feasibly.\n\nD. Summary of Required Activities\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to produce commitment notes and enforce commitment ceilings\n\n - Inform private sector on commitment note rules\n\n - Ensure e-SISTAFE has commitment controls/ceilings in place\n\n - Set up CMC\n\n - Terms of reference\n\n - Composition\n\n - Meeting schedule\n\n - Training for DNB to select and enforce commitment ceilings\n\n - Refresh rules for compliance with entering commitments into the e-SISTAFE system as\nsoon as they are made\n\n - Set up CMU\n\n - Staffing\n\n - Spreadsheet model\n\n - Training\n\n - Capacity building for large SUs\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE (MPE Module) to report committed payment schedules to CMU\n\n - Set up MFU\n\n - Training\n\n - Refresh rules for producing, updating, and distributing procurement plans\n\n - Consider benefits of moving to centralized payments system\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to handle invoices directly\n\n - Determine rules for payment prioritization and train Treasury\n\n - Rules disseminated to SUs\n\n - Discuss and implement rules to implement suppliers’ standard payment terms\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to determine correct payment dates for approved invoices\n\n - Configure e-SISTAFE to report near-term payment schedule to CMU\n\n - Coordinate with BoM and debt management to develop short-term T bill market for cash\nmanagement\n\nE. Summary of Recommendations\n\nRecommendation 2.1. Configure e-SISTAFE to control commitments through commitment\nceilings and the issuance of commitment notes.\n\nRecommendation 2.2. Conduct outreach to all sector ministries and government suppliers on\nthe appropriate use of commitment notes.\n\n49", "text_characters": 1409}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Recommendation 2.3.** Use the current budget withholding methodology to set commitment\nceilings for enforcing commitment controls, and prepare and issue a circular to SUs specifying\nthe new commitment control process.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.4.** Establish a Cash Management Unit (CMU) within the National Directorate\nof the Treasury to perform government cash flow forecasting and active cash management\noperations.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.5.** Establish a skilled macrofiscal unit in the MEF tasked with producing\nrealistic revenue forecasts both for multiannual fiscal policy and in-year budget management\npurposes.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.6.** Establish a high-level Cash Management Committee (CMC) chaired by\nthe Minister or PS to decide the quarterly commitment control envelope for implementation by\nthe NDB.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.7.** Develop a capacity building program for CMU cash flow forecast\nmodelling and the production of expenditure plans at large Sus.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.8.** Investigate the need for regulations on the provision and updating of\nprocurement plan information, expenditure plans, revenue projections, and anticipated debt and\naid flows to the CMU under the authority of the CMC.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.9.** Consider the advantages of centralizing the payments process within the\ne-SISTAFE once commitment controls are effective.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.10.** Consider standardizing suppliers’ payment terms within the e-SISTAFE\nsystem and using these to develop more accurate short-term payment forecasts.\n\n\n**Recommendation 2.11.** In coordination with the BoM and the debt managers, commence plans\nto develop the Treasury bill market specifically for cash management purposes.\n\n###### **III. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL** **AND MANAGING ARREARS**\n\n\n**A. Controlling Wage Bill Expenditure**\n\n\n**108. The authorities have successfully implemented an initiative to minimize the number**\n**of ghost workers on its payrolls** . A proof of life exercise conducted by the Inspectorate of\nFinance (IGF) covering the period from 2015 to 2017, identified 30,000 ghost employees, costing\ngovernment USD 250 million. The proof of life initiative has been institutionalized. Specifically,\nthe e-payroll has an inbuilt control to prompt SUs to notify civil servants of their month of birth.\nThe onus is on each civil servant to physically prove continued employment every year during\nhis/her month of birth. A failure to do so leads to the immediate suspension of a non-compliant\ncivil servant’s salary on e-payroll.\n\n\n50", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 52, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Recommendation 2.3. Use the current budget withholding methodology to set commitment\nceilings for enforcing commitment controls, and prepare and issue a circular to SUs specifying\nthe new commitment control process.\n\nRecommendation 2.4. Establish a Cash Management Unit (CMU) within the National Directorate\nof the Treasury to perform government cash flow forecasting and active cash management\noperations.\n\nRecommendation 2.5. Establish a skilled macrofiscal unit in the MEF tasked with producing\nrealistic revenue forecasts both for multiannual fiscal policy and in-year budget management\npurposes.\n\nRecommendation 2.6. Establish a high-level Cash Management Committee (CMC) chaired by\nthe Minister or PS to decide the quarterly commitment control envelope for implementation by\nthe NDB.\n\nRecommendation 2.7. Develop a capacity building program for CMU cash flow forecast\nmodelling and the production of expenditure plans at large Sus.\n\nRecommendation 2.8. Investigate the need for regulations on the provision and updating of\nprocurement plan information, expenditure plans, revenue projections, and anticipated debt and\naid flows to the CMU under the authority of the CMC.\n\nRecommendation 2.9. Consider the advantages of centralizing the payments process within the\ne-SISTAFE once commitment controls are effective.\n\nRecommendation 2.10. Consider standardizing suppliers’ payment terms within the e-SISTAFE\nsystem and using these to develop more accurate short-term payment forecasts.\n\nRecommendation 2.11. In coordination with the BoM and the debt managers, commence plans\nto develop the Treasury bill market specifically for cash management purposes.\nIII. STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF WAGEBILL AND MANAGING ARREARS\n\nA. Controlling Wage Bill Expenditure\n\n108. The authorities have successfully implemented an initiative to minimize the number\nof ghost workers on its payrolls . A proof of life exercise conducted by the Inspectorate of\nFinance (IGF) covering the period from 2015 to 2017, identified 30,000 ghost employees, costing\ngovernment USD 250 million. The proof of life initiative has been institutionalized. Specifically,\nthe e-payroll has an inbuilt control to prompt SUs to notify civil servants of their month of birth.\nThe onus is on each civil servant to physically prove continued employment every year during\nhis/her month of birth. A failure to do so leads to the immediate suspension of a non-compliant\ncivil servant’s salary on e-payroll.\n\n50", "text_characters": 2098}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-026-fig-p0053-001"], "markdown": "**109. However, control of wage bill expenditure remains an area of major concern** .\nMozambique’s wage bill as a percentage of GDP is one of the highest among low income\ncountries in the region (see 3.1). The estimates and projections of Mozambican authorities and\nIMF staff indicate that employee compensation in 2019 could be as high as 11.3 percent of GDP,\nand may grow to 12.2 percent of GDP by 2022. [14] Two key areas undermining government’s\nability to control wage bill expenditure relate to: weak establishment controls (particularly in the\nhealth and education sectors); and bonuses and overtime payments arising from double shift\nteaching and the long hours worked by medical staff.\n\n\n**Figure 3.1. Mozambique’s Estimated Wage Bill in 2019 Compared to Other Low-Income**\n\n**Countries in the Region**\n\n\n**110. A 2017 study of wage bill and civil service reform identified that, in 2016, bonuses**\n**and overtime payments comprised 26.2 percent and 1.5 percent respectively of the total**\n**wage bill** . [15] The report estimated that by eliminating bonuses and overtime by 25 percent per\nannum over a four-year period, government could reduce the wage bill by one percentage point\nof GDP. It does not appear that the authorities have factored this recommendation to reduce the\nwage bill. At the time of this mission, the authorities indicated that there were pending arrears on\novertime estimated at MT 3 billion.\n\n\n**111. Staff establishment controls remain weak** . Although Statutory Decree No 1 of 2018\ndelegates oversight of this function to the Ministry of State Administration and Public Function\n(MAEFP), procedural guidelines to implement this oversight process have yet to be developed. At\npresent, the authorities mainly rely upon the Administrative Tribunal (AT) to approve new\n\n\n14 IMF (2018) Republic of Mozambique: 2017 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement\nby the Executive Director for the Republic of Mozambique. Report No. 18/65.\n\n15 Xiao, Y., Abdullah, C., Bender, C. and Martins, R. (2017) Republic of Mozambique: Wage Bill and Civil Service\nReform. IMF. Technical Assistance Report.\n\n\n51\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1338, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 53, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(143.0399932861328, 237.36000061035156, 486.96002197265625, 426.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,Adobe RGB (1998))", "has-mask": false, "height": 786, "number": 11, "size": 89557, "transform": [343.9200134277344, 0.0, -0.0, 188.63999938964844, 143.0399932861328, 237.36000061035156], "width": 1433, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "109. However, control of wage bill expenditure remains an area of major concern .\nMozambique’s wage bill as a percentage of GDP is one of the highest among low income\ncountries in the region (see 3.1). The estimates and projections of Mozambican authorities and\nIMF staff indicate that employee compensation in 2019 could be as high as 11.3 percent of GDP,\nand may grow to 12.2 percent of GDP by 2022. [14] Two key areas undermining government’s\nability to control wage bill expenditure relate to: weak establishment controls (particularly in the\nhealth and education sectors); and bonuses and overtime payments arising from double shift\nteaching and the long hours worked by medical staff.\n\nFigure 3.1. Mozambique’s Estimated Wage Bill in 2019 Compared to Other Low-Income\n\nCountries in the Region\n\n110. A 2017 study of wage bill and civil service reform identified that, in 2016, bonuses\nand overtime payments comprised 26.2 percent and 1.5 percent respectively of the total\nwage bill . [15] The report estimated that by eliminating bonuses and overtime by 25 percent per\nannum over a four-year period, government could reduce the wage bill by one percentage point\nof GDP. It does not appear that the authorities have factored this recommendation to reduce the\nwage bill. At the time of this mission, the authorities indicated that there were pending arrears on\novertime estimated at MT 3 billion.\n\n111. Staff establishment controls remain weak . Although Statutory Decree No 1 of 2018\ndelegates oversight of this function to the Ministry of State Administration and Public Function\n(MAEFP), procedural guidelines to implement this oversight process have yet to be developed. At\npresent, the authorities mainly rely upon the Administrative Tribunal (AT) to approve new\n\n14 IMF (2018) Republic of Mozambique: 2017 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement\nby the Executive Director for the Republic of Mozambique. Report No. 18/65.\n\n15 Xiao, Y., Abdullah, C., Bender, C. and Martins, R. (2017) Republic of Mozambique: Wage Bill and Civil Service\nReform. IMF. Technical Assistance Report.\n\n51", "text_characters": 1775}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "recruits. However, the scope of AT’s verification is limited to ensuring that all the supporting\npaperwork has been completed for a new recruit. Once the AT approves a new recruit, it issues\nan approval number. A new recruit’s personnel details can only be entered onto the payroll when\nan AT approval number has been issued. No overall check is undertaken to ensure that\nrecruitments are made within the approved establishment.\n\n\n**112. The MAEFP only identifies cases where establishment ceilings have been exceeded**\n**after the event** . As new recruits are already on the e-payroll, the MEF is obliged to request for\nadditional budgetary allocations to absorb the additional wage bill costs. No action appears to\nbe taken to recover any resulting over-expenditure and/or to sanction this practice. There is,\ntherefore, a need for the MAEFP, in collaboration with the MEF, to issue a decree to SUs\nreiterating the steps to be taken to strengthen ex-ante controls over their staff establishments,\nand sanctions to be enforced when establishment ceilings are flouted.\n\n\n**113. Going forward, the monitoring of establishment ceilings would be easier in an**\n**automated environment** . The authorities anticipate that the ongoing development of a national\nhuman resources management information system (SNGRH) will enable the MAEFP, MEF and the\nAT to monitor whether new recruitments are within the establishment ceilings, and link/integrate\nthe three personnel control functions—establishment control, payroll administration and the\nwage bill—through concurrent updates of the personnel database in SNGRH and the e-payroll.\nThe MEF would thus be in a position to incorporate establishment ceilings in the budget law and\nenforce them properly.\n\n\n**114. However, in the short-term, the following measures could usefully be undertaken.**\nThe IGF could be requested to undertake a targeted audit of the process in the agriculture,\neducation and health sectors with a view to assessing compliance with regulations and\nascertaining the effectiveness of internal controls for payroll. In addition, the SUs should be\nrequired to maintain up to date records of actual staff numbers against the approved\nestablishment, and the impact that any new recruitment will have on the establishment. These\nestablishment records, which could be maintained on a spreadsheet by each SU, should be\nprovided to the MAEFP to carry out checks prior to submission to the AT to approve a new\nrecruit.\n\n\n**B. Managing Historical and New Arrears**\n\n\n**115. Following a stock-take of arrears for the two-year period ending December 31,**\n**2017, the authorities computed the total amount owed to suppliers at MT 19.3 billion**\n**(USD 308.8 million).** A subsequent verification exercise undertaken by the IGF validated MT 13.4\nbillion (USD 214.4 million) of the total stock of arrears as bona fide. In 2018, the government\nliquidated MT 4.2 billion (USD 67.2 million) of the validated claims using resources from capital\ngains tax received from the sales of natural resource assets. In 2019, the authorities indicated that\nthey will liquidate another MT 2.7 billion (US$ 43.2 million) through securitization.\n\n\n52", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 54, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "recruits. However, the scope of AT’s verification is limited to ensuring that all the supporting\npaperwork has been completed for a new recruit. Once the AT approves a new recruit, it issues\nan approval number. A new recruit’s personnel details can only be entered onto the payroll when\nan AT approval number has been issued. No overall check is undertaken to ensure that\nrecruitments are made within the approved establishment.\n\n112. The MAEFP only identifies cases where establishment ceilings have been exceeded\nafter the event . As new recruits are already on the e-payroll, the MEF is obliged to request for\nadditional budgetary allocations to absorb the additional wage bill costs. No action appears to\nbe taken to recover any resulting over-expenditure and/or to sanction this practice. There is,\ntherefore, a need for the MAEFP, in collaboration with the MEF, to issue a decree to SUs\nreiterating the steps to be taken to strengthen ex-ante controls over their staff establishments,\nand sanctions to be enforced when establishment ceilings are flouted.\n\n113. Going forward, the monitoring of establishment ceilings would be easier in an\nautomated environment . The authorities anticipate that the ongoing development of a national\nhuman resources management information system (SNGRH) will enable the MAEFP, MEF and the\nAT to monitor whether new recruitments are within the establishment ceilings, and link/integrate\nthe three personnel control functions—establishment control, payroll administration and the\nwage bill—through concurrent updates of the personnel database in SNGRH and the e-payroll.\nThe MEF would thus be in a position to incorporate establishment ceilings in the budget law and\nenforce them properly.\n\n114. However, in the short-term, the following measures could usefully be undertaken.\nThe IGF could be requested to undertake a targeted audit of the process in the agriculture,\neducation and health sectors with a view to assessing compliance with regulations and\nascertaining the effectiveness of internal controls for payroll. In addition, the SUs should be\nrequired to maintain up to date records of actual staff numbers against the approved\nestablishment, and the impact that any new recruitment will have on the establishment. These\nestablishment records, which could be maintained on a spreadsheet by each SU, should be\nprovided to the MAEFP to carry out checks prior to submission to the AT to approve a new\nrecruit.\n\nB. Managing Historical and New Arrears\n\n115. Following a stock-take of arrears for the two-year period ending December 31,\n2017, the authorities computed the total amount owed to suppliers at MT 19.3 billion\n(USD 308.8 million). A subsequent verification exercise undertaken by the IGF validated MT 13.4\nbillion (USD 214.4 million) of the total stock of arrears as bona fide. In 2018, the government\nliquidated MT 4.2 billion (USD 67.2 million) of the validated claims using resources from capital\ngains tax received from the sales of natural resource assets. In 2019, the authorities indicated that\nthey will liquidate another MT 2.7 billion (US$ 43.2 million) through securitization.\n\n52", "text_characters": 2648}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**116. It will be necessary to undertake a second stock-take of further arrears that have**\n**accumulated from January 1, 2018.** The stock take could be partly informed by a report from\nMEX (as at December 31, 2018) on the amounts requested by SUs to settle invoices from\nsuppliers but not allocated by Treasury. This information would need to be supplemented by\ndata from SUs on unpaid invoices, which have not been posted on MEX. To guide the process,\nthe MEF should issue a decree to guide SUs on the process and timetable. Once the stock-take is\ncomplete, as before, the IGF should validate the claims for their accuracy and credibility. The\nvalidation process is intended to verify the documentation and transactions supporting the\nclaims, and ensure that costs are bona fide and have not been inflated, fraudulently claimed or\npreviously settled. The validation process could also help verify whether transactions complied\nwith the regulatory framework for procurement.\n\n\n**Arrears on VAT refunds and related weaknesses**\n\n\n**117. Until recently the VAT refund process was cumbersome and undermined the**\n**government’s ability to repay taxpayers promptly** . The Decree 17 of 2017, which became\neffective on January 1, 2018, seeks to simplify the process. For example: (i) taxpayers with a credit\nbalance of more than a specified threshold (domestic MT 500,000 and exporters MT 20,000) can\napply for a refund after 4 months as opposed to the previous 12 months; and (ii) an earmarked\nfund account number 1598 operated by the Treasury has been opened at the BoM with a fixed\npercentage of VAT revenue to finance refunds.\n\n\n**118. As at November 2018, the potential maximum accumulated amount of VAT refund**\n**arrears stood at MT 22.8 billion (representing about 2.6 percent of GDP)** . The authorities are\nstill in the process of validating most of these refund requests, but would not have the funds at\nhand to clear them in one go. A strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears has yet to be developed.\nFurthermore, the authorities should amend, as soon as possible, the VAT law to set a time limit\nfor claiming VAT refunds.\n\n\n**Maintaining an arrears monitoring system**\n\n\n**119. Currently, SUs’ payables and payment arrears are not systematically recorded,**\n**monitored or reported** . Going forward, it will be important for the authorities to institutionalize\nregular monitoring and reporting on arrears. This could be done through e-SISTAFE (MEX\nmodule), for example, by requiring SUs to register all invoices in the system as and when they are\nreceived, including their respective amounts and due dates for payment. The system could\nprofile arrears by their size, maturity and composition. A close monitoring of arrears will enable\nmore effective management of the existing stock of payment arrears and provide an early\nwarning signal of any risks of emerging arrears.\n\n\n53", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 55, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "116. It will be necessary to undertake a second stock-take of further arrears that have\naccumulated from January 1, 2018. The stock take could be partly informed by a report from\nMEX (as at December 31, 2018) on the amounts requested by SUs to settle invoices from\nsuppliers but not allocated by Treasury. This information would need to be supplemented by\ndata from SUs on unpaid invoices, which have not been posted on MEX. To guide the process,\nthe MEF should issue a decree to guide SUs on the process and timetable. Once the stock-take is\ncomplete, as before, the IGF should validate the claims for their accuracy and credibility. The\nvalidation process is intended to verify the documentation and transactions supporting the\nclaims, and ensure that costs are bona fide and have not been inflated, fraudulently claimed or\npreviously settled. The validation process could also help verify whether transactions complied\nwith the regulatory framework for procurement.\n\nArrears on VAT refunds and related weaknesses\n\n117. Until recently the VAT refund process was cumbersome and undermined the\ngovernment’s ability to repay taxpayers promptly . The Decree 17 of 2017, which became\neffective on January 1, 2018, seeks to simplify the process. For example: (i) taxpayers with a credit\nbalance of more than a specified threshold (domestic MT 500,000 and exporters MT 20,000) can\napply for a refund after 4 months as opposed to the previous 12 months; and (ii) an earmarked\nfund account number 1598 operated by the Treasury has been opened at the BoM with a fixed\npercentage of VAT revenue to finance refunds.\n\n118. As at November 2018, the potential maximum accumulated amount of VAT refund\narrears stood at MT 22.8 billion (representing about 2.6 percent of GDP) . The authorities are\nstill in the process of validating most of these refund requests, but would not have the funds at\nhand to clear them in one go. A strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears has yet to be developed.\nFurthermore, the authorities should amend, as soon as possible, the VAT law to set a time limit\nfor claiming VAT refunds.\n\nMaintaining an arrears monitoring system\n\n119. Currently, SUs’ payables and payment arrears are not systematically recorded,\nmonitored or reported . Going forward, it will be important for the authorities to institutionalize\nregular monitoring and reporting on arrears. This could be done through e-SISTAFE (MEX\nmodule), for example, by requiring SUs to register all invoices in the system as and when they are\nreceived, including their respective amounts and due dates for payment. The system could\nprofile arrears by their size, maturity and composition. A close monitoring of arrears will enable\nmore effective management of the existing stock of payment arrears and provide an early\nwarning signal of any risks of emerging arrears.\n\n53", "text_characters": 2372}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**D. Summary of Recommendations**\n\n\n**Recommendation 3.1.** The IGF should undertake targeted audit of the processes and controls\nrelated to establishment and payroll for sectors where the problem is most prevalent (agriculture,\neducation and health sectors).\n\n**Recommendation 3.2.** The MAEFP should verify information against the approved\nestablishment with each request to approve a new recruit, prior to submission to the\nAdministrative Tribunal. Furthermore, once the SNGRH is operational, the MEF should\nincorporate the staff establishment ceilings in the budget law.\n\n**Recommendation 3.3.** Stock-take and validate the arrears accumulated during 2018 and\nprovide for their clearance in the arrears clearance strategy.\n\n**Recommendation 3.4.** The MEF should prepare a strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears.\n\n**Recommendation 3.5.** Regularly monitor and report on arrears in in-year and year-end fiscal\nreports.\n\n**Recommendation 3.6.** The MAEFP should issue a decree to SUs reiterating the steps to be\ntaken, including sanctions to be enforced, when establishment ceilings are flouted.\n\n\n54", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 56, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. Summary of Recommendations\n\nRecommendation 3.1. The IGF should undertake targeted audit of the processes and controls\nrelated to establishment and payroll for sectors where the problem is most prevalent (agriculture,\neducation and health sectors).\n\nRecommendation 3.2. The MAEFP should verify information against the approved\nestablishment with each request to approve a new recruit, prior to submission to the\nAdministrative Tribunal. Furthermore, once the SNGRH is operational, the MEF should\nincorporate the staff establishment ceilings in the budget law.\n\nRecommendation 3.3. Stock-take and validate the arrears accumulated during 2018 and\nprovide for their clearance in the arrears clearance strategy.\n\nRecommendation 3.4. The MEF should prepare a strategy for clearing VAT refund arrears.\n\nRecommendation 3.5. Regularly monitor and report on arrears in in-year and year-end fiscal\nreports.\n\nRecommendation 3.6. The MAEFP should issue a decree to SUs reiterating the steps to be\ntaken, including sanctions to be enforced, when establishment ceilings are flouted.\n\n54", "text_characters": 915}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex I. Example of Types of Expenditure Functions for**\n\n**Regional/Provincial Level of Decentralized Governance**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|COUNTRY|ANGOLA|SOUTH AFRICA|PHILIPPINES|CROATIA|CZECH
REPUBLIC|DENMARK|FRANCE|ITALY|NETHERLANDS|NORWAY|POLAND|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|INTERMEDIATE ‐ TYPE|Provinces|Provinces|Provinces|Counties|Regions|Regions|Regions|Regions|Provinces|Counties|Regions|\n|INTERMEDIATE ‐ NO.|18|9|81|21|14|5|18|20|12|18|16|\n|||||||||||||\n|**RESPONSIBILITIES**||||||||||||\n|Regional planning|X|||X|X|X||X|X|X||\n|Economic Development|X|||X|X||X|X|X||X|\n|Education (Secondary)|X|X||X|X|||X||X||\n|Health Care (Tertiary)|X|X|X|X|X|X||X|||X|\n|Social Welfare|X|X|X|X|X|||X|X||X|\n|Social Housing||X|X|X||||||||\n|Environment|X|||||X|X|X|X|X|X|\n|Roads / Transport||X||X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|\n|Solid waste management||||X||||||||\n|Wastewater||||X||||||||\n|Culture||||||||X|X|X||\n|Agriculture||X||||||X||||\n\n\n55", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 57, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.09000396728516, 131.42999267578125, 598.971435546875, 457.57000732421875], "columns": 12, "rows": 17}], "text": "Annex I. Example of Types of Expenditure Functions for\n\nRegional/Provincial Level of Decentralized Governance\n\n COUNTRY ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICA PHILIPPINES CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS NORWAY POLAND \n\n INTERMEDIATE ‐ TYPE Provinces Provinces Provinces Counties Regions Regions Regions Regions Provinces Counties Regions \n INTERMEDIATE ‐ NO. 18 9 81 21 14 5 18 20 12 18 16 \n \n RESPONSIBILITIES \n Regional planning X X X X X X X \n Economic Development X X X X X X X \n Education (Secondary) X X X X X X \n Health Care (Tertiary) X X X X X X X X \n Social Welfare X X X X X X X X \n Social Housing X X X \n Environment X X X X X X X \n Roads / Transport X X X X X X X X X \n Solid waste management X \n Wastewater X \n Culture X X X \n Agriculture X X \n\n55", "text_characters": 586}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex II. Sample Terms of Reference for a Cash Management**\n\n**Committee**\n\n**The Cash Management Committee (CMC)**\nThe CMC is a high-level decision-making committee for commitment and cash prioritization and\nallocation purposes. It provides high-level support and authority for the work of the CMU. A\nbroad framework of the CMC is described below.\n\n**Objectives of the CMC**\n\n - The CMC shall advise the Minister on the processes for optimum management of the\n\nbudget and government cash resources;\n\n - It shall provide the government and BoM revenue and expenditure forecasts, and its\n\nanalysis based on these forecasts. It shall project the financing gap between government\n\ninflows and outflows for each quarter, or with such periodicity as may be asked for by the\n\nMEF;\n\n - It shall advise the government and BoM on the best modality for financing the gap;\n\n - It shall direct the Head of the Budget Directorate regarding any commitment ceilings\n\ndecided at each meeting for the specified period ahead;\n\n - The CMC shall work under the overall guidance of the Minister of Finance and shall take\n\ndirections from the Minister on its mandate and objectives;\n\n - The CMC shall issue directives as necessary to SUs, revenue projection officials, and the\n\ndebt managers to improve the accuracy of their forecasts;\n\n - The CMC shall decide when the cashflow forecasts are sufficiently accurate that the CMU\n\nshould commence active cash management operations;\n\n - The CMC shall supervise and approve in advance, as necessary, all active cash\n\nmanagement transactions and instruments undertaken by the CMU.\n\n - Membership\n\nThe membership of the CMC shall comprise of the following.\na. The Minister of Finance—Chair (Alternate – Permanent Secretary)\n\nb. The Permanent Secretary\n\nc. The Head of Budget Directorate\n\nd. The Head of the Treasury\n\ne. The Head of the macrofiscal unit\n\nf. The Heads of other MEF Directorates as necessary\n\ng. A nominee of the BoM\n\nh. A nominee of revenue authority\n\ni. A minimum of two nominees of high-spending ministries\n\nj. CMC may invite any nominee as a temporary member or an observer\n\n - The secretariat of the CMC shall be the CMU\n\n\n56", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 58, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex II. Sample Terms of Reference for a Cash Management\n\nCommittee\n\nThe Cash Management Committee (CMC)\nThe CMC is a high-level decision-making committee for commitment and cash prioritization and\nallocation purposes. It provides high-level support and authority for the work of the CMU. A\nbroad framework of the CMC is described below.\n\nObjectives of the CMC\n\n - The CMC shall advise the Minister on the processes for optimum management of the\n\nbudget and government cash resources;\n\n - It shall provide the government and BoM revenue and expenditure forecasts, and its\n\nanalysis based on these forecasts. It shall project the financing gap between government\n\ninflows and outflows for each quarter, or with such periodicity as may be asked for by the\n\nMEF;\n\n - It shall advise the government and BoM on the best modality for financing the gap;\n\n - It shall direct the Head of the Budget Directorate regarding any commitment ceilings\n\ndecided at each meeting for the specified period ahead;\n\n - The CMC shall work under the overall guidance of the Minister of Finance and shall take\n\ndirections from the Minister on its mandate and objectives;\n\n - The CMC shall issue directives as necessary to SUs, revenue projection officials, and the\n\ndebt managers to improve the accuracy of their forecasts;\n\n - The CMC shall decide when the cashflow forecasts are sufficiently accurate that the CMU\n\nshould commence active cash management operations;\n\n - The CMC shall supervise and approve in advance, as necessary, all active cash\n\nmanagement transactions and instruments undertaken by the CMU.\n\n - Membership\n\nThe membership of the CMC shall comprise of the following.\na. The Minister of Finance—Chair (Alternate – Permanent Secretary)\n\nb. The Permanent Secretary\n\nc. The Head of Budget Directorate\n\nd. The Head of the Treasury\n\ne. The Head of the macrofiscal unit\n\nf. The Heads of other MEF Directorates as necessary\n\ng. A nominee of the BoM\n\nh. A nominee of revenue authority\n\ni. A minimum of two nominees of high-spending ministries\n\nj. CMC may invite any nominee as a temporary member or an observer\n\n - The secretariat of the CMC shall be the CMU\n\n56", "text_characters": 1758}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Meetings\n\na. The CMC shall meet monthly unless otherwise determined\n\nb. The agenda for the meeting shall be prepared and all information provided to the\n\nmembers at least three work days prior to the meeting\nc. Any member of the CMC may call for such additional information as may be\n\nneeded.\n\n\n57", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 59, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Meetings\n\na. The CMC shall meet monthly unless otherwise determined\n\nb. The agenda for the meeting shall be prepared and all information provided to the\n\nmembers at least three work days prior to the meeting\nc. Any member of the CMC may call for such additional information as may be\n\nneeded.\n\n57", "text_characters": 241}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Fiscal Affairs Department**\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\n[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 60, "report_id": "cr-2023-026", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Fiscal Affairs Department\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\nhttp://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment", "text_characters": 122}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55f76af5702fbc2b31a09f0c2503a9f0b7eae736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb
+size 33384
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0004-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0004-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08b16fc0390d4279bd4af6cca223a934c0e6908d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0004-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a5e4d251dcf87c0feaeb1137086aef76b9ce900ff8b7ea1f1b1531e328f185d9
+size 2529
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0014-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0014-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d7c1714bb0b8dfade2afc4f8dcbd24a8c8a565c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0014-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3ba8295c8ad6d1f1e2c0d9c9212520ee8aa4a18904d699c0a84e984a487bd990
+size 33927
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6ef2ba92e38a7acc3651420b52d6e3d1b6e7dedd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:67fd7a7af761fee47cee5c64d2792bb9d514f868f2b3fe17ba56a7f548b4a042
+size 20964
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b348ec8051bd4c468264934c8fc2a2ba0f6f44f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:17b3a5cb9d46f062a31a05346affbbd02b57d047246c103c8c0f6fd2a571d9dc
+size 33997
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..05de0aefff60f42eb3df7b0e24f43f4d4cb567d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b4e9e942bea3fd62abaaa3df40e86a78eb1c0dff49e85b2b9f0c8e58caca0cc1
+size 17779
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fc270243cca7d10dfa177049ca9da0b00170e892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:73782508c38b889bde46b82d1963fbc57f52e83088253fbd57688c927fe07b5f
+size 73326
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1e6c1f4ca42a46772102eeaf70d19f6fdf23850b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:369b01b717695258642e3e9713f71bd1d7c09fd0fd8e344ce3b067fc691f0208
+size 33060
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..762a177f3a26c18ed8a03104fa521eaa6eb21b5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b6ed845951075de8de07a7d15d9dd0ad2295227cabfa71f7fcc7b50b3a21d202
+size 29086
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..33457f1cc8f142db85ff371533c040a34263abde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ae0e0f00d2c0a295de24e2cc0eb0e6c24203f533adf7bf2cf7f498f51900c209
+size 14796
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0025-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0025-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..53977229e1f5c2f17f6e8d6fd184bdab814b63c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0025-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3b3d10f40c242f964bf1bd2e1c5fd96b26bc11e88d29edd3878a71f207b16d73
+size 26048
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0026-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0026-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..989d49a80200c79f450e0dffb3d3559c10781248
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0026-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1235a3e34ad1568134a244b0251641baea6f6de7e0eae447fe9fecc45ca36fe3
+size 45439
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0027-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0027-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a640603839694960fac02e263a520dba3a52e7ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0027-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ebccbb9c04b33a9f8093b07d48f3ed991cb12bca9ab6e716d3dcb81347bef0b5
+size 119467
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0028-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0028-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..deb9c661e6b0ca5c5f069facf012d71b96c48d4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0028-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d90e94aab6cae2ba5486c84201c27273e9dfe595ad4e572fe740c7853c94abd2
+size 23181
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0036-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0036-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a6768831650db256d42f50153afa07f7e33dae11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0036-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6592416ff118ce24976d18b8e9624e29ebac712a3e78f780a4b699e466ae8fcd
+size 32151
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0037-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0037-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2052782fde13b7398a646cbdf5ac7094f9653bca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0037-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d7a7feb7d17fa3886c88d5930c4fcfe7a82b1e3dfcb302fbb8e7fe12d6517a49
+size 21795
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0038-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0038-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5efc185a1477cd451daede170f385ab9825260b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0038-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f8f63cb2879c458c132c747bd184f9b9dfd7214841c8e1efa8f484333e894f4c
+size 27842
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..45729573150fdfb048a584a5cde4e44cce55e108
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3956f61bd7ed238477801229bbd75eb4eb2b2f269c4be24e98e7f119197407e5
+size 17539
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2f209f0a9e55565c3966123caf4805e31bdabcbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ae75852e144a1d29c6ea2dc3b4ce6ed703da17a6e3b592e77eb64ac35ce139ca
+size 42532
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..db9f70b49f35effec6b443fe9fa0d60cd29a2208
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:404df8d4a7353cc964255aad42566f3da6630a7ba561aaacf3123b11a3926360
+size 40604
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0041-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0041-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5c4d41a2f8b6acb9dade34658ec4fa83dcaa7f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0041-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b3c0adad01f24a75966c5980fa7d163e11087935f494c5d40b11aa2588fe1254
+size 26931
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0042-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0042-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f3de027a725f9f049cbae5cf9b30832000bf7578
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0042-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:52f688060113bc92028e31462e37d030178685f233e1963445c940cb508b7a68
+size 30675
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0043-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0043-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..63828d03c06ac3b944656fbaad92708321a032a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0043-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:22c1a6b267cfe2acefc363707d11d53b855c3e5f8c6884b496a2f2c287dda94d
+size 19523
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c4c5a7cb29c630f3a4d1f29d1162022ef21e560c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:116a87c1b1712968512b5c4bd9d8008233536b2a06d9548ff11a107a28cf9d6d
+size 9788
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81444162e61bf06322258422f7dca70bcee05e63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:36a253c919a8acaab1fd207cdfcc22f8ace24acec89486a93ee34922319bccb9
+size 18969
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4a6114eda404254f9dcbf279e3d37dc10c52ee98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a41780d60d24a6d63fd5a6192567e76cb3122b6a8c9cc33116fc566174dd118d
+size 17179
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..91c5cd419d72a1264938bdb0975fca4d5deb2846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b2f1bf36e132ef119a8db91fb3bf20c8efc8c30873a84c4fac3f124f8fb9102f
+size 15008
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..58190b909f319d5035584a035f79ab490b85058a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8fead6d57e033828d276aca11adfed063453dc80594709037977a4eb6dcd93fa
+size 21065
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..49719f2523bdf633838581854f5ae38852f97c5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-035",
+ "title": "Chile: Technical Assistance Report-An Evaluation of Improved Tax Options",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-035.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "1c1fb8c6d67dd48dc47fb5f122133e77c5398f1625c851e2595aff6a7d8f410a",
+ "source_bytes": 702933,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/19/chile-technical-assistance-report-an-evaluation-of-improved-tax-options-528348",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:42+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 22.601,
+ "page_count": 49,
+ "text_characters": 106518,
+ "table_count": 6,
+ "figure_count": 29,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "CHILE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT – AN EVALUATION OF IMPROVED GREEN TAX OPTIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C."
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "Chile An Evaluation of Improved Green Tax Options"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Diego Mesa Puyo and Karlygash Zhunussova Technical Report November 2022"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "PREFACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 12,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "I. INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "II. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND TARGETS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "A. Global Context"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 16,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "B. Emissions in Chile"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 18,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "C. Energy Prices in Chile"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 20,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "D. Emissions Targets in Chile"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 22,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "III. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 22,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "A. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 24,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "B. Revenue Performance"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 25,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "C. Selected Issues"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 30,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "D. Recommendations"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 32,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "IV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 32,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "A. Principles and Conceptual Issues"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 35,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "B. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 45,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "V. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 47,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "REFERENCES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 49,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Appendix 1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Chile: Technical Assistance Report-An Evaluation of Improved Tax Options; IMF Country Report No. 23/35; November, 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Climate, mitigation policy, carbon pricing, carbon taxation, climate change, emissions, energy \r\n",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230118162515-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230119125028-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e37049b36c91953c08be9894d47d5eac551f722f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2366 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/35**
+# **CHILE**
+#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT – AN EVALUATION** **OF IMPROVED GREEN TAX OPTIONS**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance Report on Chile was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in November 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+###### **International Monetary Fund** **Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+##### F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+## **Chile** **An Evaluation of Improved Green Tax Options**
+
+###### Diego Mesa Puyo and Karlygash Zhunussova **Technical Report** **November 2022**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by
+the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities
+of Chile (the "TA recipient") in response to their request for technical
+assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may
+be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of
+their staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities of the TA
+recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff and other
+technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest,
+unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see
+Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance
+Information—
+[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).](http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf)
+Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof
+to parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities
+of the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance
+providers and donors with legitimate interest shall require the
+explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs
+Department.
+
+
+--
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS ___________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+
+**PREFACE _________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 7**
+
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________________ 11**
+
+
+**II. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND TARGETS ______________________________________ 13**
+A. Global Context ________________________________________________________________________________ 13
+B. Emissions in Chile _____________________________________________________________________________ 15
+C. Energy Prices in Chile _________________________________________________________________________ 17
+D. Emissions Targets in Chile _____________________________________________________________________ 19
+
+
+**III. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE _________________________________________________ 21**
+A. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework ______________________________________________ 21
+B. Revenue Performance _________________________________________________________________________ 23
+C. Selected Issues ________________________________________________________________________________ 24
+D. Recommendations ____________________________________________________________________________ 29
+
+
+**IV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING _______________________________________________ 31**
+A. Principles and Conceptual Issues ______________________________________________________________ 31
+B. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options ____________________________________________ 34
+
+
+**V. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS____________________________________________________________ 44**
+
+
+**REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________________________________ 46**
+
+**FIGURES**
+1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways ___________________________________________________________ 13
+2. GHG Emissions in 2020 by Source _____________________________________________________________ 16
+3. Historical GHG Emissions, 2000-2018 _________________________________________________________ 16
+4. Electricity Generation by Source, 1990-2020 __________________________________________________ 17
+5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD ________________________________ 18
+6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price __________________________ 19
+7. GHG Emissions vs Paris Pledge (NDC) and Net Zero Emissions Pathway ______________________ 19
+8. Average NDC Pledges in LAC6 Countries ______________________________________________________ 20
+9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020 ______________________________________ 24
+10. Cross Subsidies from Utilities to Power Plants ________________________________________________ 25
+11. Carbon Prices around the World _____________________________________________________________ 26
+12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6 _________________________________________________ 27
+13. The Impact on Total GHG Emissions excl. LULUCF by Scenario _______________________________ 35
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030 ________________________________________ 36
+15. Additional Revenues Raised from Fossil Fuels by Scenario, Percent of GDP __________________ 37
+16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030 ______________________________________________________________ 38
+17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %) ____________ 39
+18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline ________________ 40
+19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline __________________ 41
+20. Economic Costs and Domestic Environmental Co-benefits in 2030 (% of GDP) ______________ 42
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020 __________________________________________________________ 17
+2. Energy Prices by Scenario in 2030 _____________________________________________________________ 39
+3. Summary Table ________________________________________________________________________________ 42
+4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue ____________________________________________ 45
+
+**APPENDICES**
+1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use __________________________________________________________ 48
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS**
+
+
+
+BAU
+BBL
+CO2
+COP26
+CPAT
+
+
+
+BAU Business As Usual
+BBL Barrel
+CO2 Carbon Dioxide
+COP26 Glasgow Climate Conference
+CPAT Climate Policy Assessment Tool
+
+EITE Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed
+ENAP Empresa Nacional del Petróleo
+ETS Emissions Trading System
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+GDP Gross Domestic Product
+GJ Gigajoule
+GHG Greenhouse Gas
+IEA International Energy Agency
+ICPF International Carbon Price Floor
+IPCC
+KW Kilowatt
+kW/h Kilowatt hour
+LIT Liter
+LULUCF
+MEPCO
+MtCO2eq Million Tons of CO2 equivalent
+MW Megawatts
+NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
+NOx Nitrogen Oxide
+OECD
+PM2.5
+PPAs Power Purchase Agreements
+SII Servicio Interno de Impuestos
+
+
+
+EITE Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed
+ENAP Empresa Nacional del Petróleo
+ETS Emissions Trading System
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+GDP Gross Domestic Product
+GJ Gigajoule
+GHG Greenhouse Gas
+IEA International Energy Agency
+ICPF International Carbon Price Floor
+IPCC UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
+KW Kilowatt
+kW/h Kilowatt hour
+LIT Liter
+LULUCF Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry
+MEPCO Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precio de Combustibles
+MtCO2eq Million Tons of CO2 equivalent
+MW Megawatts
+NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
+NOx Nitrogen Oxide
+OECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
+PM2.5 Particulate Matter that a diameter less than 2.5 micrometers
+PPAs Power Purchase Agreements
+SII Servicio Interno de Impuestos
+
+SMA Superintendency of the Environment
+SO2 Sulphur Dioxide
+SCC Social Cost of Carbon
+TGR General Treasury
+UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
+
+
+
+SMA Superintendency of the Environment
+SO2 Sulphur Dioxide
+SCC Social Cost of Carbon
+TGR General Treasury
+UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
+
+WHD Western Hemisphere Department
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+### **PREFACE**
+
+At the request of the Chilean Minister of Finance, a team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department
+(FAD) visited Santiago between October 3-7, 2022, to evaluate options to expand the existing
+direct carbon tax in Chile. The mission comprised Diego Mesa Puyo (head) and Karlygash
+Zhunussova, both from FAD’s Climate Policy Division.
+
+The mission met with the Minister of Finance, Hon. Mario Marcel Cullell, the Minister of
+Environment, Hon. María Heloisa Rojas Corradi, and the Minister of Energy, Hon. Diego Pardow
+Lorenzo. The team also had fruitful discussions with a range of government officials. In the
+Ministry of Finance, the mission met with Mrs. Claudia Sanhueza Riveros, Deputy Minister, Mr.
+Nicolas Bohme, Tax Policy Coordinator, and Mrs. Camila Schmidlin and Mr. Jose Alvarado from
+the Tax Policy Group; in the Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII) meetings were held with Carolina
+Saravia, Deputy Director of Enforcement; in the Ministry of Environment discussions were held
+with Mr. Rodrigo Barragan and Mrs. Isabel Rojas from the Environmental Economy Division; in
+the Ministry of Energy, the mission met with Mr. Juan Pedro Searle, Chief of the Climate Change
+Division; in the National Commission of Energy, the mission met with Mr. Marco Antonio
+Mancilla Ayancán and technical staff; in the Environmental Superintendency, the mission met
+with Mr. Emanuel Ibarra Soto, Superintendent, and technical staff. In the private sector, the
+mission had meetings with Mr. Camilo Charme, General Manager, and Mr. Claudio Muñoz, Head
+of Studies, at Generadoras de Chile (the main power sector business group); and with Mr. Jorge
+Cáceres, Director of the Centre of Environment and Energy at Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
+(Association of Industrial Promotion). The mission also met with Mr. Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Senior
+Economist of the Climate Change and Sustainability Division of the Inter-American Development
+Bank, Chile Office; and with Mr. Luis Gonzales, head of Climate Change, Energy and
+Environmental Economics at Universidad Católica de Chile.
+
+The mission held a workshop to present the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) to more than
+15 staff from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Environment, SMA, SII and
+the Central Bank of Chile.
+
+The mission acknowledges the excellent interpretation services provided by Mrs. Gina Cabach,
+Mrs. Claudia Goet and Mr. Pedro Velloso during meetings and the workshop.
+
+Finally, the mission would like to express its gratitude for the outstanding support and hospitality
+received from the Ministry of Finance staff, in particular Mr. Nicolas Bohme, Mrs. Camila
+Schmidlin and Mrs. Vanessa Paluba.
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+Chile is committed to climate action and is recognized as a regional leader in the fight against
+global warming. Over the past eight years, Chile has made important climate commitments, such
+as updating its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2)
+emissions by 30 to 45 percent in 2030 from 2016 levels and reach carbon neutrality before 2050.
+
+Consistent with its emission reduction ambitions, Chile has developed multiple climate policies.
+In 2014, it became the first Latin-American country to introduce green taxes on CO2 emissions
+and local pollutants, as well as on new passenger cars based on fuel efficiency and emissions. In
+2019, Chile also became the first country in the region to issue green bonds, publish a financial
+strategy for climate change, and announce the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants by
+2040. In June 2022, Congress approved the Framework Law on Climate Change, making carbon
+neutrality legally binding, and introducing new mitigation tools and institutional arrangements.
+
+While Chile has made important progress to align policies with climate commitments, additional
+mitigation efforts are required to reach emission reduction targets in 2030 and by midcentury.
+The Ministry of Finance announced that improvements to green taxes will be included in the
+general tax reform presented to parliament in July 2022. Moreover, since the country has five
+years of experience administering green taxes, further carbon pricing enhancements should
+leverage existing institutional capacity without adding significant administrative burden.
+
+This report evaluates existing green taxes in the country, including revenue performance,
+coverage, and selected design issues. It also discusses changes that will take effect in 2023, as
+well as new mitigation tools introduced in the Framework Law on Climate Change. The report
+uses the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) to evaluate different scenarios to improve
+carbon pricing and bring the country closer to or in line with its climate targets. Results are
+presented in terms of emissions reduction, revenue raising potential, effects on GDP and energy
+prices, distributional impacts across households and firms, abatement costs and co-benefits. The
+report also offers different options to recycle revenue from higher carbon pricing to help the
+government prepare a well-thought-out reform communication strategy.
+
+At $5 per ton of CO2, the green tax on carbon emission from stationary sources is low by
+international standards and significantly lower than the $32.5 per ton of CO2 social cost of
+carbon estimated by the government. [1] Moreover, simulations done by the mission show that the
+tax coverage needs to be broadened and the rate increased to achieve the country climate goals.
+Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially considering the
+global increase in energy prices observed in 2021 and the first half of 2022. The recent fall in
+
+
+1 The recent RFF estimate on social cost of carbon is $185 per ton of CO2. See Rennert and others (2022)
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+fossil fuel prices, [2] however, may give the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher carbon
+tax without increasing energy prices relative to recently observed levels. As for local emissions,
+Chile is a pioneer in levying taxes on local air pollutants such as particular matter (PM2.5),
+nitrogen oxide (NOx), and sulphur dioxide (SO2), which directly affect communities in areas
+where emitter industries are located.
+
+Before increasing the tax rate and coverage, design issues that create economic distortions in the
+power sector should be corrected. First, the full amount of the carbon tax should be included in
+the variable cost of all generation plants considered for the economic dispatch. This change
+would allow the economic dispatch to effectively differentiate between plants with higher
+emissions and higher costs due to the carbon tax, and more competitive power plants with lower
+or zero emissions. Moreover, once that correction is made, the cross subsidy from utilities to
+marginal or inframarginal fossil fuel-based power plants should automatically disappear.
+
+The green tax on mobile sources has a very narrow coverage and includes multiple exemptions.
+This is problematic because the transport sector is one of the main emitters in the country.
+Moreover, excises and other fuel taxes in Chile have multiple distortions and have been found to
+be highly inefficient. For example, taxes on diesel have a complex set of credits and exemptions,
+and much lower rates than on gasoline. As a result, Chile consumes almost double the amount of
+diesel than the regional average on a per capita basis. This distortion could be corrected either
+by gradually bringing the excise rate on diesel on par with the one on gasoline, or by including
+the transport sector in the improved carbon pricing options modeled in this analysis. A feebate
+(not discussed in detail in this report) can also be considered to promote decarbonization of the
+vehicle fleet in case higher fuel taxes becomes too contentious.
+
+Based on discussions with the authorities regarding the feasibility of carbon pricing
+improvements within the current tax reform proposal, the mission presents four different
+scenarios that would bring Chile closer or in line with its Nationally Determined Contribution
+(NDC) for 2030, and the legally binding net-zero pledge for 2050. Under the base and social cost
+of carbon (SCC) cases, Chile would achieve is NDC target by 2030 and be on track to reach netzero by 2050. Under the moderate and hybrid scenarios, the county will be within 11 and 12
+percent of achieving its NDC. It is important to note, however, that additional measures under all
+scenarios considered here, such as improved energy efficiency policies, introduction of feebates
+schemes or faster adoption of low and zero emission sources for transport, power, and industry,
+would further contribute to achieve climate goals. Below are the main assumptions under each
+scenario.
+
+- **Moderate** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2025, increasing linearly to $50 per
+ton of CO2 in 2035 but exempting the road transportation sector.
+
+
+2 Expressed in USD. The prices are still relatively high in local currency due to depreciation of the exchange rate.
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+- **Base case** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2024, increasing linearly to $60 per ton
+of CO2 in 2030. The carbon tax excludes gasoline and diesel, but the excise on diesel is
+increased to bring the effective carbon rate equal to that of gasoline (starts from $0.05/liter
+in 2024 and increases linearly to $0.37/liter in 2030).
+
+
+- **Hybrid** : consists of two parts.
+
+
+ - Carbon tax applies only to the power sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2 (current
+level) in 2024 and increases at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of CO2 in
+2027. It then increases with a steeper slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.
+
+
+ - Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the industrial sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2
+(current level) in 2024, increasing at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of
+CO2 in 2027. It then increases with a higher slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.
+
+
+- **Social cost of carbon (SCC)** : economy-wide carbon tax starting from $35 per ton of CO2 in
+2024 and increasing linearly to $75 per ton of CO2 in 2030.
+
+
+The following table summarizes the results for each scenario in 2030 in terms of emissions
+reduction, revenue raising potential, GDP and energy prices, distributional impacts among
+households, abetment costs and co-benefits.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Scenario|Base|Moderate|SCC|Hybrid|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Energy-related CO2 emissions**
**reduction in 2030,**% to a BAU|17%|7%|16%|6%|
+|**Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions**
**in 2024-2030,**MtCO2|51|20|59|17|
+|**Additional fiscal revenues raised in**
**2030,**% of GDP|1.61|0.81|1.55|0.92|
+|**Cumulative additional fiscal revenues**
**raised in 2024-2030,**bn USD|25.3|7.4|29.1|12.3|
+|**Impact on GDP growth in 2030,**
percentage points deviation from the
BAU growth|-0.09%|-0.08%|-0.06%|-0.08%|
+|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the BAU price|24%|22%|25%|22%|
+|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the current price|-4%|-6%|-3%|-5%|
+|**Industrial electricity price increase in**
**2030,**percent from the BAU price|27%|24%|28%|24%|
+|**Industrial electricity price increase in**
**2030,**percent from the current price|-19%|-20%|-17%|-20%|
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+|Relative mean consumption effect on
the poorest after revenue recycling3,
% of BAU consumption|11.9|5.9|11.7|4.5|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Pure abatement costs**, % of GDP|0.35|0.07|0.32|0.06|
+|**Domestic co-benefits**(transport, air
pollution, climate), % of GDP|0.62|0.24|0.57|0.15|
+
+
+
+3 Using 30 percent of revenues to compensate four bottom income deciles overcompensates the poorest
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+### **I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+**1.** **The Chilean authorities requested the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) to**
+**evaluate options for improving green taxes and in particular the direct tax on carbon**
+**dioxide (CO2) emissions.** This report assesses different scenarios to gradually increase the
+existing carbon tax and bring the country closer to or in line with its Nationally Determined
+Contribution (NDC) for 2030, and the legally binding net-zero pledge for 2050. The authorities
+expect the carbon tax to continue to be a central piece of Chile’s green taxes package introduced
+in 2014, even if reviews are done periodically to ensure the country’s climate objectives are met.
+
+
+**2.** **A higher carbon tax is part of a broader tax reform the government is currently**
+**debating in Congress.** The proposed reform is ambitious, targeting net gains of 3.5 percent of
+GDP by 2026 to finance additional social spending. The reform also aims to make the tax system
+more progressive, simplify and lower compliance costs, and promote a greener economy. The
+authorities have not published an official revenue target for the carbon tax, but they informed
+the mission that corrective taxes, which combine green, health and territorial taxes, could raise,
+according to preliminary estimates, up to 0.5 percent of GDP.
+
+
+**3.** **While Chile is committed to climate action, including a comprehensive institutional**
+**framework, multiple policy tools and setting specific emission reduction targets, the**
+**carbon tax needs to be strengthened to meet climate objectives.** In 2014, Chile became the
+first Latin-American country to introduce green taxes on both carbon emissions and local
+pollutants, as well as on sales of new light-duty vehicles based on fuel efficiency and nitrogen
+oxides (NOx) emissions. In 2019, Chile was also the first country in Latin America to issue green
+bonds and to announce the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants by 2040. In addition, the
+financial strategy for climate change published in December 2019 aims to develop a framework
+for measuring green components in the budget and capacity building for green finance in the
+private sector. Moreover, in April 2020 Chile presented an updated NDC to the United Nations
+Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with emissions peaking in 2025 and
+reaching 95 million tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq) by 2030 (i.e., a 30 to 45 percent reduction
+from 2016 levels). Finally, in June 2022 the country published the Framework Law on Climate
+Change, which, makes carbon neutrality legally binding by 2050. However, at $5 per ton of
+CO2eq, the existing carbon tax remains low and needs to be significantly increased to achieve the
+country climate and fiscal goals.
+
+
+**4.** **Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially**
+**considering the global increase in energy prices observed in 2021 and first half of 2022.**
+Fossil fuel prices increased sharply during 2021 and the first half of 2022, largely as a result of the
+war in Ukraine, resulting in higher prices of electricity and refined products for households and
+firms in many jurisdictions. Although prices have retreated somewhat recently, energy prices
+continue to be well-above pre-pandemic levels. The expected fall in fossil fuel prices may give
+the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher carbon tax without increasing energy prices
+relative to recently observed levels. In any case, well targeted assistance to low-income
+households and energy-intensive or trade exposed sectors may be needed.
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+**5.** **This report builds on ongoing work done by FAD and the Western Hemisphere**
+**Department (WHD) and uses the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) developed jointly**
+**by IMF and World Bank staff.** CPAT projects fuel use and CO2 emissions by major energy
+sectors in Chile, including a model of investment and dispatch in the power sector, and
+assumptions about the price responsiveness of electricity demand and fuel use in other sectors
+that are representative of the broader climate modelling literature. The analysis also discusses
+international mitigation practices, while assessing different scenarios to gradually strengthen the
+existing carbon tax. Each scenario includes the tax effects on GDP and fiscal revenue, energy
+consumption and emissions reduction, distributional impact and incidence on households and
+firms, as well as other domestic environmental co-benefits. The scenarios are intended to bring
+emissions in Chile close to or in line with its NDC by 2030 and the carbon neutrality commitment
+by midcentury. Separately, the mission also discusses other alternative mitigation instruments
+and revenue recycling options that could be used to complement green taxes.
+
+
+**6.** **The report is structured as follows:** Chapter II provides an overview of the current state
+of emissions globally, as well as energy prices, and emissions trends and targets in Chile; Chapter
+III reviews existing green taxes and evaluates their performance and selected design issues;
+Chapter IV presents different scenarios to expand the carbon tax in Chile using the CPAT
+methodology; Finally, Chapter V discusses options for revenue recycling.
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+### **II. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND** **TARGETS**
+
+##### **A. Global Context**
+
+**7.** **Maintaining the 1.5** **[o]** **C target alive—the main goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement—**
+**requires additional efforts as the world battles an energy price crisis in the wake of the**
+**post COVID-19 economic recovery.** Global CO2 projections and pathways to achieve climate
+targets suggest that CO2 and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must be cut by 50 to 25
+percent, respectively, below 2019 levels by 2030. This reduction should be followed by a
+transition to net zero emissions or negative net emissions to limit global warning to 1.5 – 2.0 [o] C.
+With existing policies, however, the base case projections imply that global CO2 emissions will
+rise from 30 billion tons in 2020 to about 37 billion by 2030, while containing global warming to
+1.5 – 2.0°C above pre-industrial levels requires CO2 emissions to be limited to about 15 to 25
+billion tons in 2030 (see Figure 1). If action is not taken soon at a global scale, the window of
+opportunity for containing global warming will close. In addition, the global energy crisis may
+exert additional pressure on emission reduction efforts in the near-term, as some countries have
+reverted to fossil fuel power generation to guarantee energy supply.
+
+
+**Figure 1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**8.** **The number of countries pledging to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 has**
+**continued to increase in recent years.** Leading up to the Glasgow climate conference (COP26)
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+in November 2021, several countries updated their NDCs as part of the first five-yearly iteration
+of the Paris Agreement’s “ratchet mechanism”. According to the UNFCCC, as of October 12, 2021,
+there were 116 new or updated NDCs, and a total of 165 NDCs representing all 192 parties to the
+Agreement and covering 94.1 per cent of total global emissions in 2019. These emissions are
+estimated at 52.4 Gt CO2 eq excluding land use and land use change and forestry (LULUCF). [4]
+More than 70 countries, which account for 76 percent of global emissions, have committed to
+net-zero emissions by midcentury [5], including most of the largest emitters such as Canada, the
+European Union, Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States (all 2050), and China
+(2060).
+
+
+**9.** **At an aggregate level, however, updated commitments remain insufficient and**
+**more ambitious near-term targets and policy action are needed to limit global warming** .
+According to the UN, current national climate plans – for all 193 Parties to the Paris Agreement
+taken together – would lead to a sizable increase of almost 14% in global GHG by 2030,
+compared to 2010 levels. [6] There is an urgent need to match near-term ambition with credible
+policy action, as the updated NDCs remain insufficient to meet the Paris target of limiting global
+warming to “well below 2°C”. Moreover, many countries have stated their 2030 emission goals in
+terms of percentage reductions or absolute emissions targets by 2030 but few have provided
+details on how to achieve those objectives. In addition, even if countries further tighten their
+2030 pledges, there is no automatic mechanism ensuring commitments are achieved.
+
+
+**10.** **A 2021 report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)** **[7]**
+**stated that global warming of 1.2** **[o]** **C is caused by man-made factors and warming is**
+**happening faster than previously projected.** The raise in temperatures is also causing a wide
+range of disruptive climate-related impacts, including heatwaves, droughts, floods, hurricanes,
+and higher sea levels. The frequency and severity of these phenomena are likely to intensify as
+temperatures continue to raise. Moreover, a 2018 IPCC report [8] had already warned that the risk
+of tipping points in the global climate system (e.g., runaway warming from release of
+underground methane, collapse of major ice sheets, shutting down of ocean circulatory systems,
+destruction of the natural world) is likely to increase exponentially with warming above 1.5 [o] C.
+
+
+**11.** **Against this background, the IMF has proposed an international carbon price floor**
+**(ICPF) with a realistic prospect of catalyzing the needed global action in the next decade.** **[9]**
+
+
+4 See “ _Update of the Key Findings of the NDC Synthesis Report - published 25 October 2021”_
+[https://unfccc.int/documents/307628](https://unfccc.int/documents/307628)
+
+[5 See https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition)
+
+6 Ibid
+
+7 IPCC, 2021. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
+[Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1](http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1)
+
+8 IPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland.
+
+9 See _“Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor among Large Emitters IMF Staff Climate Notes 2021/001”_
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+The ICPF has four key components: (i) it would be negotiated between a small number of key
+large emitting countries, (ii) negotiation would focus on the minimum carbon price that each
+must put on their CO2 emissions, (iii) it would address equity concerns through differentiated
+price floors and transfers, and (iv) accommodate other policies with equivalent emissions impacts
+as minimum price floor requirements. Ratcheting up ambition among a smaller group of
+countries, especially the large emitters, would be more straightforward than a global agreement,
+and regional carbon price floors would also be a possibility. For example, several countries in
+Latin American have implemented carbon taxes at modest levels (e.g., Argentina, Chile,
+Colombia, Mexico) and several countries in Asia and Pacific have implemented or are considering
+carbon pricing (e.g., China, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam). Regional carbon price
+floor arrangements could facilitate a scaling up of these country level initiatives and provide
+valuable experience for developing a global price floor arrangement. Moreover, the prospect of a
+regional agreement may also encourage individual countries to align their carbon pricing
+mechanism with the regional or ICPF level.
+
+
+**12.** **IMF analytical work also suggests that additional measures equivalent to a global**
+**carbon price exceeding $75 per ton by 2030 are needed to limit global warming below**
+**2C.** **[10]** This is especially true for large emitters. G20 countries should adopt measures equivalent
+to a carbon price of over $75 per ton by 2030, on top of existing policies, to cut emissions at
+least 30 percent below business as usual (BAU) levels.
+
+##### **B. Emissions in Chile**
+
+
+**13.** **Energy-related emissions accounted for 71 percent of Chile’s 120 MtCO2 GHG**
+**emissions in 2020, excluding LULUCF emissions.** The largest polluting sector in Chile is power
+generation (27%), followed by industry (20%), transport (19%), waste (11%), agriculture and
+industrial processes (each 9%), and buildings (5%). LULUCF emissions were estimated at negative
+58 MtCO2eq, although measurement is less accurate and more contentious than for energyrelated ones.
+
+
+10 See _“Not Yet on Track to Net Zero: The Urgent Need for Greater Ambition and Policy Action to Achieve Paris_
+_Temperature Goals”_
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+**Figure 2. GHG Emissions in 2020 by Source**
+
+
+Source: IMF/EDGAR/FAO/UNFCCC
+**14.** **GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in Chile grew 50 percent between 2000 and 2018.**
+Most of the emissions growth comes from the power generation, which grew by 122 percent
+between 2000 and 2018 period, and transport which grew by 66 percent in the period. Industry
+and industrial processes emissions together increased by 29 percent in the same period, while
+agricultural emissions decreased by 14 percent.
+
+
+**Figure 3. Historical GHG Emissions, 2000-2018**
+
+
+**15.** **In the power sector, fossil fuels accounted for 53 percent of electricity generation**
+**in 2020, decreasing from 60 percent in 2010.** However, in absolute terms, generation from
+fossil fuels increased by 20 percent, from 36 TWh to 43 TWh. Generation shares for coal, gas, and
+oil were 31, 18, and 4 percent respectively in 2020. Hydro power accounted for a quarter of
+electricity output, and solar and wind power reached 9 and 7 percent, respectively. Chile has
+successfully promoted an expansion of the power generating capacity with the incorporation of
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+variable renewable energy over the past 10 years, increasing the share of solar and wind energy
+from zero to 16 percent.
+
+
+**Figure 4. Electricity Generation by Source, 1990-2020**
+
+##### **C. Energy Prices in Chile**
+
+
+**16.** **Effective carbon pricing via excises in Chile does apply to transport sector fuels,**
+**albeit at comparative low levels and with multiple distortions.** While Table 1 shows that the
+effective tax rate [11] in the transport sector is higher than in other sectors, there is a significant
+difference between the tax rates for gasoline and diesel. Gasoline’s effective rate is $200 per ton
+of CO2, while diesel’s effective rate is more than three times lower.
+
+
+**Table 1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector/fuel type|Power
Other
Natural fossil
Coal gas fuels|Industry
Other
Natural fossil
Coal gas fuels|Transport
Other
Gasoline Diesel products|Buildings
Other
fossil
fuels|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Share in CO2**
**emissions, %**
**Effective fuel tax,**
**$/tCO2**|32%
7%
2%
5.2
5.2
21.8|3%
5%
12%
5.2
5.2
46.4|11%
16%
3%
200.7
58.9
9.0
|9%
53.3|
+
+
+Source: IMF staff calculations
+
+**17.** **Gasoline and diesel’s effective carbon tax rates are among the lowest in the OECD**
+**(see Figure 5).** The effective carbon tax rate for gasoline in Chile is higher only than a handful of
+countries, remaining as one of the lowest in the OECD. The effective carbon tax rate on diesel is
+even lower, just ahead of Costa-Rica and Colombia.
+
+
+11 The coverage of the existing carbon tax is 29.4% and is expected to increase to 40% after recent changes in
+legislation
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+**Figure 5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**18.** **The Fuel Price Stabilization Mechanism (MEPCO) limits domestic price fluctuations**
+**on gasoline and diesel despite changes in international fuel prices.** Effectively, the taxation
+on diesel and gasoline changes depending on international oil prices and the exchange rate, and
+in some cases, it can turn into a negative tax (subsidy). Since 2014, the year when MEPCO started
+to operate in its actual form, changes in retail gasoline and diesel prices have deviated from
+changes in international oil price (see Figure 6).
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+**Figure 6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+##### **D. Emissions Targets in Chile**
+
+**19.** **As a contribution to the Paris Agreement, Chile has pledged to reduce GHG**
+**emissions to 95 MtCO2eq by 2030 in its updated NDC.** This is a significant increase in
+ambition compared to the first NDC submission, which pledged a reduction of emissions to 123
+MtCO2eq. The updated NDC commits to GHG budget not exceeding 1100 MtCO2eq in 20202030 with a peak in 2025. Additionally, Chile committed to reduce black carbon emissions by 25
+percent in 2030 vs. 2016 levels. According to IMF staff projections, the 2015 NDC target would be
+reached in the baseline (i.e., it is unambitious), while the updated NDC target will require an 18
+percent reduction in GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in 2030, relative to the baseline.
+
+
+**Figure 7. GHG Emissions vs Paris Pledge (NDC) and Net Zero Emissions Pathway**
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**20.** **Compared to other LAC6 countries, Chile’s new NDC is on par with other countries**
+**when expressed as a reduction to current levels, but less ambitious when shown as a**
+**reduction against the baseline.** Chile’s NDC implies an 18 percent reduction against the
+baseline in 2030. Reductions in other countries in the region vary from 17 percent in Argentina to
+43 percent in Colombia. However, expressed as a reduction to current levels, the NDC implies 23
+percent reduction from 2021 GHG emissions, which is in line with other LAC6 countries (variation
+from 3 percent in Peru to 35 percent in Colombia).
+
+
+**Figure 8. Average NDC Pledges in LAC6 Countries**
+
+
+**21.** **Chile also has pledged to net-zero emissions by 2050, making this a legally binding**
+**commitment in the recently approved Framework Law on Climate Change.** Chile was the
+first country in Latin America to pledge net-zero emissions in 2020. The target covers all sectors
+and gases and proposes separate emissions reduction and removal targets. The net-zero target
+became legally binding in the Framework Law on Climate Change (June 2022).
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### **III. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE**
+
+##### **A. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework**
+
+**22.** **Chile passed a general tax law in 2014 that introduced green taxes on annual CO2**
+**emissions and local pollutants from stationary sources, as well as a tax on mobile**
+**sources.** **[12]** The tax on stationary sources, as it is applied currently, has two components: a levy of
+US$5 per ton of CO2 (i.e., a standard carbon tax) and a local pollution charge, which taxes air
+pollutants such as particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and Sulphur dioxide (SO2)
+based on population and local pollution conditions. In the case mobile sources, the tax is a
+function of the vehicle’s fuel economy, NOx and the vehicle price.
+
+
+**23.** **The direct carbon tax is currently levied on CO2 emissions from stationary sources**
+**with a thermal capacity of 50 megawatts (MW) or higher.** These include thermal plants for
+power generation, as well as emissions from boilers used in industrial processes in pulp and
+paper, fisheries, mining and other sectors. In the case of local pollutants, the tax is levied on the
+same entities subject to the direct carbon tax and is based on a formula that seeks to
+compensate environmental externalities borne by local communities. The tax on mobile sources
+only applies to light-duty vehicles and includes multiple exemptions.
+
+
+**24.** **Several institutions are involved in administering green taxes, including entities**
+**from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Transport and**
+**Telecommunications.** in the case of the tax on stationary sources, the Superintendency of the
+Environment (SMA) oversees the methodologies and the systems to monitor, verify and report
+the emissions subject to the tax. In the case of the tax on mobile sources, fuel economy and NOx
+are determined by the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications according to the technical
+characteristics of each vehicle. The Ministry then provide the tax values for each vehicle to the
+Internal Revenue Service (SII). For both taxes, the SII receives the tax declaration of the
+companies or private agents subject to the tax, while the General Treasury (TGR) collects the
+payments. The institutional framework for both taxes and its operation are contained in Law
+20,780/2014 and regulations, a measurement protocol published by SMA, a notification system
+managed by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Transport, and both a registry and
+monitoring, reporting and verification system operated by SMA.
+
+
+**25.** **The tax on stationary sources were first implemented in 2017.** According to the SII, in
+its first year of implementation the tax on stationary sources covered 58 taxpayers and raised
+$191 million, covering about 39 percent of total CO2eq emissions in Chile. Most of the revenue
+came from CO2 emissions (88 percent) followed by PM2.5 (8.2 percent), NOx (3.1 percent), and
+
+
+12 See section 8 of Law 20.780 of 2014
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+SO2 (0.9 percent). [13] In terms of sectors, power generation accounted for 53 percent of the
+revenue, followed by trade with 21 percent and construction with 12 percent. Five years since its
+introduction, revenue has decreased modestly although the composition has varied as a result of
+a cleaner power sector. In 2021, the tax collected $186 million from 56 taxpayers. Power
+generation accounted for 45.8 percent of the revenue, followed by trade with 31 percent,
+construction with 13.1 percent and transport with 4.7 percent.
+
+
+**26.** **In February 2020, the Congress passed a Tax Modernization Law** **[14]** **that will expand**
+**the tax base for green taxes on stationary sources.** As of January 1 [st], 2023, the tax will no
+longer be levied based on installed thermal capacity, but on a threshold of emissions partially or
+totally released in combustion [15] processes. The tax will now apply to all stationary sources that
+annually emit 100 or more tons of PM2.5, or 25,000 or more tons of CO2. Emissions from hot
+water boilers for personal use and generation units with a capacity of less than 500 kilowatts (kw)
+are exempted from the tax, as well emissions released from raw materials used in the production
+processes (i.e., process emissions). Independent studies done in the country estimate that these
+changes will expand the tax coverage from 39 to 45 percent of CO2eq emissions [16] .
+
+
+**27.** **The Tax Modernization Law introduced a carbon offset mechanism that would**
+**allow companies to lower their carbon tax burden.** Starting on February 24, 2023, carbon
+emissions may be offset through emission reduction projects developed in Chile (or in the
+municipality in the case of local pollutants) and following standards to be defined and published
+by the Ministry of the Environment. The law establishes three general criteria for the projects to
+be eligible for offsets. First, emission reductions must be additional to any environmental or
+sector regulation that the taxpayer is subject to. Second, the reduction in emissions should be
+measurable and verifiable by the Ministry of Environment. Finally, emission reductions projects
+should operate throughout the time that the taxpayer is liable to the green tax. At the time of the
+mission, however, the Ministry of Environment has not issued the regulation for the offset
+mechanism.
+
+
+**28.** **The Framework Law for Climate Change approved in June 2022 introduced**
+**emission standards and tradable carbon credits (i.e., the basis for an Emissions Trading**
+**System (ETS)).** The Law provides for the Ministry of Environment to establish the maximum
+
+
+13 According to recent IMF estimates (Vernon and others, 2021), implicit subsidies – i.e., prices below externalities
+costs - in Chile were about 8.2 bn USD in 2021, which is much higher than current collected revenues from the
+green taxes.
+
+14 Law N°21.210 of 2020
+
+15 Combustion is defined in the Law as a process of oxidation of solid, liquid, or gaseous substances or materials
+that produce heat and in which energy is released to generate electricity, steam, or heat, except for raw materials
+used in the production processes.
+
+16 The Center for Climate Change, Energy and Environment of Universidad Católica estimate total emissions in
+Chile are around 112 CO2eq million tons. The actual coverage of the tax is around 43 CO2eq million tons (38
+percent). The estimations with US$ 5/ton and the expansion of the base will add around $56 million or around 7
+CO2eq millions of tons more, which is around 45 percent.
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+amount of annual greenhouse gases, in CO2eq, that an emitting source or establishment may
+emit. These caps should be based on a reference emission standard by technology, sector and/or
+activity in line with the national long-term climate strategy and the country NDC. Moreover, the
+Law states that agents may comply, partially or wholly, with emission standards through carbon
+credits from carbon reduction or absorption projects developed in Chile (or in the municipality in
+the case of local pollutants). The Ministry of the Environment must also create, manage, and
+maintain a public registry containing approved reduction or absorption projects, as well as
+certificates of carbon credits which may be traded between agents. All transfers, purchases and
+values of these certificates must be recorded in this registry. While these regulations should be
+prepared within one year of the publication of the Law, at the time of the mission the Ministry of
+Environment was still working on them.
+
+
+**29.** **The Framework Law for Climate Change set the basis for GHG,** **as well as water use**
+**voluntary certification systems to avoid water waste.** In the case of GHG, the Ministry of the
+Environment is responsible for granting certificates regarding the measurement, management
+and reporting of GHG and local pollutants. The Ministry is also responsible for issuing reduction
+and absorption certificates, which are voluntarily requested and meet the criteria, methodologies
+and requirements established by regulation. Violations will be sanctioned in accordance with the
+provisions of organic law of the SMA, including revoking certificates.
+
+##### **B. Revenue Performance**
+
+
+**30.** **Revenue from the green tax on stationary sources have slightly decreased over**
+**time and its composition has also changed.** Total annual revenue collected has not exceeded
+$200 million or about 0.06 percent of GDP and has declined by 1 percent per year since 2017. In
+2020, tax revenue recorded a sharp drop due to COVID19 pandemic, when the annual decline
+rate was at 6 percent. In 2021, revenues recovered by 6.5 percent but remained below 2017
+levels.
+
+
+**31.** **Most of the revenues come from the power sector and CO2 emissions.** Electricity,
+gas, and water sector accounts for almost half of the collected revenues, while trade,
+construction and transportation make 26, 12, 5 percent of total collected revenues, respectively.
+Other sectors include forestry, communications, manufacturing, mining, financial and
+administrative services, and personal services. About 89 percent of revenues come from CO2
+emissions (global pollutant), 7 percent – from PM2.5 emissions, and the shares of NOx and SO2
+emissions together are less than 5 percent.
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+**Figure 9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+##### **C. Selected Issues**
+
+**Green tax on carbon emissions**
+
+
+
+**32.** **The direct carbon tax in Chile has design flaws that undermine its effectiveness and**
+**introduce economic inefficiencies to the power sector.** The law establishes that the value of
+the carbon tax should not be considered in the determination of the marginal spot price of
+electricity (i.e., the wholesale market price) when the tax is levied on system’s marginal power
+plant. In other words, in periods in which a fossil fuel-based power generator is the marginal unit,
+the carbon tax levied on such plant is excluded from the calculation of the marginal spot price
+for the economic dispatch. This restriction introduces distortion to the economic dispatch, as the
+system does not differentiate between plants with higher emissions and higher costs due to the
+carbon tax, and more competitive power plants with lower or zero emissions.
+
+
+**33.** **The 2014 Law also included a provision creating a cross subsidy that, contrary to**
+**the carbon tax spirit, benefits fossil fuel-based power generation.** The Law states that for
+generation plants with a total unit cost (i.e., the variable cost considered for the economic
+dispatch plus the carbon tax) greater than or equal to the marginal spot price (i.e., the wholesale
+electricity price), the difference between the two must be covered by all utility companies in
+proportion to the amount of electricity each company retires (i.e., buys) from system. This
+provision switches the tax burden from the source of emission to utility companies buying
+electricity from the system [17] . Moreover, this provision is highly distortive as emitting and
+otherwise less competitive power plants are relieved from paying the carbon tax, which in turn
+offsets the economic incentive to invest in cleaner sources of power intended with the tax.
+
+
+17 This example only applies to plants that participate in the economic dispatch and the spot market. Electricity
+traded in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) may be subject to other contractual arrangements.
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+**34.** **An example of a hypothetical economic dispatch illustrates the cross subsidy from**
+**utility companies to fossil fuel-based power plants.** **[18]** Figure 9 shows three thermal plants that
+are dispatched in the same period. The solid bars represent the variable cost of each plant and
+the bars with striped lines represent the carbon tax that should be paid by each plant. For the
+first plant, the sum of its variable cost plus the carbon tax is below the spot or wholesale
+electricity market price. This means that the plant is able to bear the full cost of the carbon tax by
+itself. However, the spot price of electricity does not cover the carbon tax originally levied on the
+second and third plant. In this example, the second plant is the marginal generator and therefore
+sets the electricity wholesale market price equal to its variable cost (excluding the carbon tax). As
+a result, the carbon tax levied on this plant is prorated among all utilities companies in
+proportion to the electricity each retires from the system. The third plant is an inframarginal
+generator, as its variable cost is below the spot price (excluding the carbon tax). In this case, the
+portion of the tax no covered by the spot price is also prorated among utility companies.
+
+
+**Figure 10. Cross Subsidies from Utilities to Power Plants**
+
+
+Source: Gabriel Díaz, Francisco Muñoz, Rodrigo Moreno. Equilibrium analysis of a tax on carbon emissions
+with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules. The Energy Journal.
+
+
+**35.** **At $5 per ton of CO2eq, the existing carbon tax level is low and needs to be**
+**increased, along with other measures, to achieve the country climate and fiscal goals.** While
+the carbon tax rate in Chile is similar to that in some countries in Latin America (e.g., Argentina
+and Colombia), it is well below other countries in the southern cone and the OECD (see Figure
+11), and the $37.5 per ton of CO2 social cost of carbon calculated by the government. [19] For
+example, Uruguay introduced a carbon tax in January 2022 at a level close to $137 per ton of
+
+
+18 This is example is taken from Gabriel Díaz, Francisco Muñoz, Rodrigo Moreno. _Equilibrium analysis of a tax on_
+_carbon emissions with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules._ The Energy Journal.
+
+19 See Estimación del Precio Social del CO2 2017, Gobierno de Chile, available at:
+[http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf](http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf)
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CO2eq, [20] which the government may increase in addition to the automatic increases linked to the
+Consumer Price Index. Similarly, Canada increased its federal carbon tax in April 2022 to CAD$50
+per ton of CO2eq and will continue to rise it by CAD$15 per year until it reaches $170 by 2030. In
+addition, other measures could include higher incorporation of variable renewable energy for the
+power sector, low and zero emission vehicles, feebates and improved energy efficiency policies.
+
+
+**Figure 11. Carbon Prices around the World**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**36.** **Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially**
+**considering the recent global increase in energy prices.** Fossil fuel increased sharply during
+2021 and the first half of 2022, resulting in higher prices of electricity and refined products for
+households and firms in most jurisdictions (see Figure 12). Although prices have retreated
+somewhat recently, energy prices continue to be above pre-pandemic levels. In the case of Chile,
+the expected fall in fossil fuel prices may give the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher
+
+
+20 The coverage of the carbon tax in Uruguay is rather low at about 10 percent of CO2 emissions, as it only applies
+to all liquid fuels, apart from jet fuel and sales of fuel to manufacturers of gasoline are also exempted.
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+carbon tax without increasing energy prices relative to recently observed levels. In any case, well
+targeted assistance [21] to low-income households may be needed. The next chapter evaluates
+different scenarios for Chile to improve the carbon tax and be on track to meet the country’s
+NDC and net-zero pledge.
+
+
+**Figure 12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Green tax on local pollutants**
+
+
+**37.** **Chile is a pioneer in levying taxes on local air pollutants, such as NOx, MP, and SO2,**
+**which affect communities in areas where emitter industries are located.** The rate for this
+type of Pigouvian tax is calculated based on a formula that includes the social cost of pollutants,
+the population in the municipality where the emitter is located, and an air quality coefficient that
+depends on the level of local population on each municipality. Specifically, the tax rate of
+pollutant “i” in municipality “j” is given by:
+
+
+Tij = 0,1 x CCAj x CSCpci x Pobj, where
+
+
+_CCAj_ is an air quality coefficient equal to 1.2 if the municipality is defined as “saturated”, meaning
+that the measurement of concentration of pollutants in the air, water or soil exceeds the value of
+the respective environmental quality standard; 1.1 if the municipality is defined as “latent”,
+meaning that the concentration of pollutants is between 80 and 100 percent of the
+environmental quality standard; and 1.0 otherwise [22] . _CSCCpcj_ is the per capita social cost of the
+
+
+21 Assistance is needed to limit the fiscal cost and should not undermine energy conservation incentives
+
+22 These classifications are defined in Law 19.300 on General Bases of Environment.
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+contaminant “i” set at $0.9 for MP, $0.01 for SO2 and $0.025 for NOx, and Pobj is the population
+in municipality “j”.
+
+**38.** **A simple example illustrates the impact of the air quality coefficient and the**
+**population variable on tax levels for the same pollutant in different areas.** A hypothetical
+coal-fired power located plant in Puente Alto, a municipality of 625,500 inhabitants and defined
+as saturated with PM2.5, will face an estimated tax rate of $67,560 per ton of PM2.5. In contrast, if
+the same plant is located in Contulmo, an area of 5,500 inhabitants which is neither saturated nor
+latent, it would face a tax rate of $495 per ton of PM2.5. Moreover, if the plant is expected to emit
+100 tons of PM2.5, which is the threshold at which the green tax on stationary sources is
+triggered, the power plant would face an annual tax of $6.7 million in Puente Alto while only
+$49,500 in Contulmo.
+
+
+_**Green tax on mobile sources**_
+
+
+**39.** **The tax on emissions arising from mobile sources is limited in scope and includes**
+**multiple exemptions.** While the tax is levied on the sale of new light-duty vehicles, it exempts
+vehicles with nine seats or more used to transport passengers, vehicles used as taxis, police and
+armored trucks, ambulances, tractors, and pickup trucks with a load capacity of 2,000 kilos or
+more. Moreover, the tax does not apply to taxpayers subject to VAT with respect to the
+acquisition of new pickup trucks (load capacity of up to 2,000 kilos), provided it becomes part of
+the taxpayer’s fixed assets. While the tax on mobile sources was originally intended to improve
+the taxation of emissions from diesel combustion, the broad exemptions weakened its
+performance.
+
+
+**40.** **Chile also levies excises on fossil fuels for road transportation, although these have**
+**multiple distortions and have been found to be inefficient.** **[23]** Excises on fuels in Chile have a
+dual structure, with a fixed and a variable component. The fixed (or base) component is a specific
+charge per quantity of fuel, while the variable component is an adjustment to the base tax, which
+may be positive or negative, depending on whether the international price fluctuation of the fuel
+(in pesos) is above or below a specified range. In practice the variable component operates as
+price stabilization mechanism [24] and set-up weekly by the Ministry of Finance and implemented
+by the Empresa Nacional del Petroleo (ENAP), a state-owned oil refining company. Moreover,
+different excise rates apply based on the type of fuel (much lower for diesel than for gasoline),
+while a system of credits operates for diesel depending on the end use of the fuel. As a result,
+
+
+23 See “International Fuels Tax Assessment: An Application to Chile”, IMF Working Paper 11/168
+
+24 The variable tax is known in Chile as Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precios de los combustibles (MEPCO)
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+Chile consumes almost double the amount of diesel than the regional average on a per capita
+basis [25] .
+
+
+**41.** **While the analysis of fuel excises is beyond the scope of this report,** **[26]** **broader**
+**carbon pricing in the transport sector could correct distortions and achieve climate goals.**
+This could be corrected in various ways. First, the excise rate on diesel could gradually increase to
+be on par with that of gasoline. Alternatively, the same carbon tax applied to stationary sources,
+although at a higher level as proposed in the next chapter, could also apply to the transport
+sector. Other options include an ETS, a hybrid combining a higher carbon tax and an ETS, or a
+pure feebate mechanism (see Box 1). The carbon tax could be incorporated using the existing
+excise or VAT structure for fossil fuel, while the feebate mechanism could leverage institutional
+capacity developed for the green tax on mobile sources.
+
+
+_**Offsets and carbon credits**_
+
+
+**42.** **The proposed offset mechanism introduced in the Tax Modernization Law and the**
+**Framework Law on Climate Change should be carefully implemented.** While offsets would
+allow emitters to purchase and retire credits generated by other entities to compensate for own
+emissions and reduce their carbon tax burden, these schemes remain controversial and various
+countries have banned their use [27] . In theory, entities purchasing credits compensate for their
+emissions and the respective carbon tax by paying for reductions elsewhere. Offsets mechanisms
+are usually difficult to verify and monitor and can distract policy efforts from instruments that
+effectively reduce emissions (e.g., carbon pricing). Moreover, offsets may increase net emissions
+if underlying credits are not additional [28] and can lead to green washing.
+
+
+**43.** **The Law restricts offsets and carbon credits to projects developed in Chile (and the**
+**municipality in the case of local pollutants), which mitigates some of the risks evidenced**
+**by this mechanism in international transactions.** One of the main risks is that offsets would
+lead to abatement in low-cost jurisdictions, when trade is allowed at the international level. This
+will not be the case in Chile if the domestic and local restrictions are maintained. However,
+carbon offsets will lower fiscal revenue, even if limited to domestic projects.
+
+##### **D. Recommendations**
+
+
+ - Include the carbon tax in the variable cost of all generation plants considered for the
+economic dispatch.
+
+
+25 See “Tax Expenditures and Corrective Taxes in Chile”, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC,
+(November 2021)
+
+26 Idem
+
+27 For example, EU banned the use of international offsets in 2021.
+
+28 Additionality means that a reduction in GHG emissions would not have happened without the offset.
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+- Eliminate the cross subsidy from utilities to fossil fuel-based power plants.
+
+
+- Increase the carbon tax and set a path to gradually increase it over time to reach a
+level consistent with the country’s NDC and pledge to net zero.
+
+
+- Complement the tax on mobile sources with higher excises on diesel or by including
+the transport sector in a broader carbon pricing scheme.
+
+
+- Consider increasing the social cost of contaminants for PM2.5, NOx and SO2.
+
+
+- Continue to geographically restrict carbon offsets and credits to emission reduction
+or absorption projects developed in Chile (and in municipalities for local pollutants).
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+### **IV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING**
+
+##### **A. Principles and Conceptual Issues**
+
+**44.** **Ideally carbon pricing would be the centerpiece of a country’s mitigation strategy.**
+**Carbon pricing has several key attractions as it:**
+
+
+- Promotes the full range of opportunities for reducing energy use and shifting to cleaner
+energy sources across all covered sectors by reflecting the cost of carbon emissions in the
+prices of fuels, electricity, and other goods;
+
+
+- Automatically minimizes the costs of these responses by equalizing the cost of the last ton of
+CO2eq reduced across fuels and sectors;
+
+
+- Levels the playfield for clean technology investments by establishing a clear price signal;
+
+
+- Mobilizes a valuable source of revenue which can be used to help meet climate, social, or
+broader fiscal objectives;
+
+
+- Generates domestic environmental co-benefits such as reductions in local air pollution
+deaths; and
+
+
+- Is straightforward to scale-up from an administrative perspective, in Chile’s case building off
+already established capacity for green taxes.
+
+
+**45.** **Carbon pricing can take the form of carbon taxes or an ETS.** Carbon taxes are usually
+implemented through a tax on the carbon content of fossil fuel supply, as is the case with the
+existing tax carbon and local pollutants for stationary sources. ETS require firms to acquire
+allowances for their emissions or the carbon content of their fuel supply, with the government
+controlling the supply of allowances and market trading of allowances establishing the emissions
+price.
+
+
+**46.** **To achieve Chile’s 2030 NDC and legally binding mid-century net-zero pledge,**
+**carbon pricing needs to: (i) cover a wide range of emissions; (ii) establish a rising and**
+**predictable price; and (iii) avoid unnecessary inefficiencies due to exemptions.** These
+principles could be met through the enhancement of the existing carbon tax, developing the ETS
+provided for in the Climate Change Framework Law, or a hybrid approach with taxes and ETS
+covering different emissions sources. The choice between these three approaches, which are
+briefly discussed below, will depend on several factors, including existing and required additional
+institutional capacity, recent experience with green taxes, and which ministry should be primarily
+responsible for mitigation policy (carbon taxes are naturally under the purview of the finance
+ministry and the ETS under the environment ministry).
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+**47.** **The most economically and environmentally effective form of a carbon tax would**
+**price all CO2 emissions at the same level, with the price ramping up predictably each year.**
+This would require removing any existing exemptions so all fossil fuels in all sectors are taxed in
+proportion to their full carbon content. Ideally, the carbon tax rate would ramp up as rapidly as
+possible, subject to acceptability constraints. For example, if the maximum acceptable tax rate in
+2030 is set at US$60 per ton (see quantitatively analysis below), the tax could have a step
+increase to US$15 per ton in 2023 and ramp up by US$6.4 per year thereafter. Acceptable tax
+rates will also depend on progress on carbon pricing in other major trading partners, so some
+future discretion may be needed to adjust planned tax increases.
+
+
+**48.** **The authorities could also choose to rely on a ETS as the principal tool for carbon**
+**pricing in Chile, although this will require to establish additional institutional capacity.** The
+ETS could cover the sectors (e.g., power and industry) where emissions are generally more
+responsive to pricing. Extending the coverage of the ETS to emissions to transportation and
+buildings would require applying it midstream to the suppliers of fuels for those sectors based
+on the carbon content of those fuels. In principle, a trajectory of progressively tighter emissions
+caps could be specified in line with the 2030 NDC, though this might lead to prices that exceed
+acceptable levels. Price increases might be contained through combining the ETS with a ceiling
+price where extra allowances are put into the system at this price to prevent further price
+increases. Prices may also be volatile as they vary with shifts in the demand and supply of fuels
+and this price uncertainty can deter clean technology investments with high upfront costs and
+long-range emissions reductions. Price stability can be promoted through combining the ETS
+with an exogenous price floor—implemented, for example, through a minimum price on
+allowance auctions—where the floor price ramps up predictably over time.
+
+
+**49.** **While an ETS could exploit the fiscal opportunities from carbon pricing, this could**
+**in turn imply higher overall costs for the economy.** If allowances were fully auctioned (with
+revenues transferred to the finance ministry), ETS would raise the same revenue as an
+equivalently scaled carbon tax—these revenues could be used to boost growth and employment,
+for example, by modifying the tax mix and funding socially productive investments (e.g.,
+Sustainable Development Goals). In contrast, freely allocating allowances to firms in a lump sum
+fashion provides windfall profits to them without improving economic efficiency and forgone
+fiscal revenues to the government become larger as ETS prices rise over time. A key motivation
+for free allowance allocations is that they help to address concerns about industrial
+competitiveness, but border carbon adjustment is a potentially more effective instrument for this.
+
+
+**50.** **Under a hybrid approach, the ETS could address emissions from the industry and**
+**building sectors and the carbon tax emissions from the power and transportation sector.**
+These hybrid approaches have been used elsewhere—for example, in the EU power and industry
+emissions are covered by the EU-wide ETS while several member states (e.g., Denmark, Finland,
+France, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden) have applied national carbon taxes to the transportation and
+building sectors. Cost effectiveness would require aligning carbon prices across the tax and ETS,
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+for example by setting a trajectory of price floors under the ETS equal to the trajectory of carbon
+tax rates. Another cost-effective alternative would be to apply feebates (tax-subsidy schemes) in
+certain sectors where acceptability of higher carbon taxes is highly uncertain (see Box 1).
+
+
+**Box 1. Feebates as an Alternative to Carbon Pricing** **[29]**
+
+Feebates apply a revenue-neutral, sliding scale of fees on products or activities with above
+average emission rates and a sliding scale of rebates on products or activities with below
+average emission rates. Feebates can be combined with and complement carbon pricing
+schemes to reduce emissions per unit of production or activity in the transport, industrial,
+building, forestry and agricultural sectors.
+
+
+Feebates: (i) provide a more flexible and cost-effective approach than regulations; (ii) can
+provide strong mitigation incentives; (iii) avoid large tax burdens on the average household or
+firm; (iv) avoid fiscal burdens for the government; and (v) can often build off existing
+administrative capacity. While they would need to be adapted to the specific circumstances in
+Chile (perhaps with changes to green taxes on mobile sources and fossil fuels), feebates are
+attractive for:
+
+
+ - Transportation, where (relative to the current tax system) they provide more fine-tuned
+incentives for lower emission vehicles;
+
+
+ - Industry, where they provide incentives for cleaner production processes with less concern
+about competitive impacts and emissions leakage (compared with carbon pricing);
+
+
+ - Buildings where they can reinforce incentives for transitioning to electric heating and more
+energy efficient appliances;
+
+
+ - Land use, where they provide more comprehensive incentives for carbon storage (in
+forests and peat land) and can be designed to be fiscally neutral (in contrast to
+afforestation subsidies); and
+
+
+ - Agriculture, where they promote shifting to less emissions-intensive practices (indirectly
+taxing emissions is an alternative though, to avoid leakage).
+
+
+Feebates are applied by finance ministries, whereas regulations are the more natural
+instrument when climate policy is delegated to environmental ministries. Feebates can be
+more flexible and cost effective than regulations—the latter are only cost-effective with
+extensive credit trading provisions across firms and time. And feebates can be implemented
+quickly with minimal administrative cost, at least in cases (e.g., transportation, industry,
+residential heating) where they would build off existing administration for taxes and subsidies.
+
+
+29 For a more detailed discussion see Parry, I. (2021). The critical role of feebates in climate mitigation strategies
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+##### **B. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options**
+
+**51.** **This section models three carbon tax enhancement options and one hybrid**
+**approach to meet Chile’s climate goals.**
+
+
+- **Moderate** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2025, increasing linearly to $50 per
+ton of CO2 in 2035. The tax covers power, buildings, industry, rail, and aviation sectors but
+exempts the road transportation sector.
+
+
+- **Base case** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2024, increasing linearly to $60 per ton
+of CO2 in 2030. The carbon tax excludes gasoline and diesel, but the excise on diesel is
+increased to bring the effective carbon rate equal to that of gasoline (starts from $0.05/liter
+in 2024 and increases linearly to $0.37/liter in 2030) [30] . The carbon tax applies to all energy
+sectors.
+
+
+- **Hybrid** : consists of two parts.
+
+
+ - Carbon tax applies only to the power sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2 (current
+level) in 2024 and increases at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of CO2 in
+2027. It then increases with a steeper slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.
+
+
+ - Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the industrial sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2
+(current level) in 2024, increasing at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of
+CO2 in 2027. It then increases with a higher slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.
+
+
+- **Social cost of carbon (SCC)** : economy-wide carbon tax starting from $35 per ton of CO2 in
+2024 and increasing linearly to $75 per ton of CO2 in 2030.
+
+
+**52.** **The report analyzes each of the carbon pricing** **[31]** **scenarios** **in terms of their impact**
+**on emissions, revenues and GDP, their distributional impacts, as well as in terms of**
+**comparing efficiency costs with domestic environmental co-benefits.**
+
+
+**53.** **The analysis was conducted using Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT), a**
+**spreadsheet model developed jointly by the IMF and the World Bank, which is routinely**
+**used for cross-country and individual country assessments of mitigation policies.** CPAT
+provides estimates for over 200 countries of future fuel use and emissions by major energy
+sector as well as the emissions impacts of a diverse range of pricing and non-pricing mitigation
+approaches. Covering over 200 countries, CPAT provides projections of fuel use and CO2
+emissions for the four major energy sectors—power, industry, transport, and buildings.
+
+
+30 Alternatively, the tax rate for diesel could be aligned with that of gasoline in terms of tax monthly units (as
+determined by SII), although in terms of carbon content equivalency diesel would continue to be undertaxed.
+
+31 From now on, carbon pricing refers both to carbon tax and ETS.
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+**CPAT is calibrated to be consistent with modeling literature on the key parameters.** Fuel
+and electricity price responsiveness is parameterized to be broadly consistent with empirical
+evidence and results from energy models (fuel and electricity price elasticities over the longer
+term are generally between -0.5 and -0.8). Carbon emissions factors by fuel product are from
+IIASA (2021), and emissions in 2019 are calibrated to match those of implied by UNFCCC GHG
+and emissions in 2020-1 calibrated to match those of EC-JRC (Crippa and others 2018), Global
+Carbon Budget (Friedlingstein and others 2021), and various sources.
+
+
+**Emissions analysis**
+
+
+**54.** **The base and SCC scenarios bring GHG emissions in line with the NDC target by**
+**2030.** The moderate and hybrid scenarios, however, are halfway between the BAU emissions and
+the NDC target due to not full coverage (moderate excludes transport and hybrid applies only to
+industry and power). Total emissions are reduced by 17, 7, 16, and 6 percent relative to BAU in
+base, moderate, SCC and hybrid scenarios, respectively. Cumulatively over 2024-2030 period,
+carbon pricing would reduce CO2 emissions by 51, 20, 59, and 17 million tons in the base,
+moderate, SCC and hybrid scenarios, respectively. Under all scenarios, the country would benefit
+from implementing other non-carbon pricing measures to reach its NDC.
+
+
+**Figure 13. The Impact on Total GHG Emissions excl. LULUCF by Scenario**
+
+
+**55.** **In all scenarios, most of the reductions in CO2 emissions on a sectoral level come**
+**from the power sector and industry.** Power sector accounts for 36-64 percent of CO2 emissions
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+reductions in 2030 across all scenarios. [32] The second highest reduction comes from the industry
+sector (22-30 percent in 2030). Transport accounts for 8-23 percent of emissions reductions in
+2030, followed by buildings sector with between 2 and 13 percent of the reduction.
+
+
+**Figure 14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**56.** **Coal emissions will decrease significantly while natural gas emissions would**
+**moderately grow.** Even despite the coal phase-out in the power sector in the BAU, from a half
+to four-fifths of emissions reductions in 2030 come from coal in power and other sectors. Diesel
+emissions account for 20-44 percent of total emissions reductions in 2030, while gasoline
+emissions are excluded in one scenario (base) and less responsive in other scenarios, making up
+less than ten percent of total emissions reduction. Natural gas emissions, on the other hand, are
+expected to grow mainly driven by the shift from coal to natural gas in the power sector. [33]
+
+
+**Fiscal and macro implications**
+
+
+**57.** **Carbon pricing might be a significant source of additional revenues,** **[34]** **raising up to**
+**1.6 percent of GDP in 2030 on top of BAU.** Cumulatively over 2024-2030, the revenues
+collected in addition to the baseline revenues vary from $7 billion in the moderate scenario to
+$29 billion in the SCC scenario. In 2030 alone, the moderate scenario would bring additional 0.8
+
+
+32 Under an assumption of no existing bottle necks in the power system. Existence of bottle necks would delay
+the effect of behavioral responses on carbon taxation and must be addressed for the tax to reach its full
+potential.
+
+33 Baseline energy prices were relatively high at the time of the analysis, which could have a positive impact on
+the results of the carbon pricing scenarios chosen.
+
+34 Revenue calculations include the effect of tax base erosion from the carbon tax. The calculations exclude the
+impact of a system of offsets starting in February 2023, which may bias the calculations upwards.
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+percent of GDP in revenues, compared with 1.6 percent from the SCC scenario. The existing
+carbon tax raised no more than 0.06 percent of GDP in 2017-2021.
+
+
+**Figure 15. Additional Revenues Raised from Fossil Fuels by Scenario, Percent of GDP**
+
+
+**58.** **Higher carbon pricing would have a negative on GDP growth, but this could be**
+**partially or totally offset with effective revenue recycling.** **[35]** The potential negative impact on
+GDP growth in 2030 is 1.1, 0.6, 1.0, 1.5 percentage points in the base, moderate, SCC, and hybrid
+scenarios, respectively. However, in an illustrative scenario, where 70 percent of revenues
+collected from the carbon tax are recycled effectively through productive public investment, and
+30 percent are recycled through targeted cash transfers, the negative impact would almost be
+completed offset, reducing it to just 0.1 percentage points. The extent of the reversal of the
+negative impact on GDP growth will depend on the value of the Keynesian fiscal multiplier of the
+policies chosen to recycle revenues from carbon pricing.
+
+
+35 See next chapter for a conceptual discussion on different revenue recycling options.
+
+
+37
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Figure 16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030**
+
+
+
+**Prices analysis**
+
+
+**59.** **Carbon pricing is likely to put upward pressure on energy prices, with the highest**
+**impact on coal, followed by electricity and road fuels.** Weighted average coal prices would
+increase by 98, 47, 126, and 97 percent compared to BAU in the base, moderate, SCC, and hybrid
+scenarios, respectively. Coal, however, is an intermediate input used by firms rather than directly
+consumed by households. Electricity prices would increase about by 3-4 cents per kilowatt hour [36]
+(or 25 percent compared to BAU or baseline in 2030) in each scenario. However, electricity prices
+are projected to decrease in Chile, as more variable renewable capacity comes online between
+now and 2030. For example, electricity prices today are about $0.17 per Kilowatt hour (kWh) for
+residential use, decreasing to $0.15 kWh in the baseline case. Similarly, electricity prices for
+industry are $0.15 kWh, decreasing to $0.10 kWh in the baseline case. Therefore, the impact of
+the carbon prices would only represent a modest increase from current prices. Falling electricity
+prices are good opportunity for the government to lock-in higher carbon prices. Gasoline prices
+would grow by 7-15 percent relative to BAU (excluding the base scenario), while diesel price
+increases would be slightly higher – 10-45 percent relative to BAU.
+
+
+36 This increase will bring electricity prices in Chile on par with electricity prices in other LAC6 countries without
+high carbon tax: weighted average baseline electricity prices in Argentina in 2030 are $0.12/kWh, in Brazil and
+Peru - $0.16/kWh, in Colombia - $0.15/kWh, and $0.13/kWh in Mexico.
+
+
+38
+
+
+
+**Table 2. Energy Prices by Scenario in 2030**
+
+
+Source: IMF staff using CPAT
+
+
+**60.** **Carbon pricing would also lead to slight increases in the cost of industrial**
+**production, which may raise competitiveness concerns,** **[37]** **especially for energy-intensive,**
+**trade-exposed (EITE) industries.** Production cost increases have three components. First,
+industrial firms will incur a direct tax payment, or allowance purchase requirement, for emissions
+they continue to emit directly. Second, firms will incur abatement costs to the extent they cut
+emissions, for example, by switching to cleaner (but costlier) technologies and fuels. Third, they
+incur an indirect payment for carbon charges on emissions embodied in their inputs, especially
+electricity. Overall, carbon pricing in 2030 would increase production costs for non-metallic
+industries (most notably cement), iron and steel, and chemicals by less than 6 percent in the SCC
+and base scenarios (relative to BAU costs in 2030).
+
+
+**Figure 17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+37 While it is not a focus of this study, addressing competitiveness concerns might include policies such as border
+carbon adjustment (BCA) or free allowances allocation for EITE industries in case of ETS.
+
+
+39
+
+
+
+**Distributional impact and co-benefits**
+
+
+**61.** **Civil society and some interest groups may oppose carbon pricing because of the**
+**burden of higher energy prices on households.** Therefore, evaluating the household incidence
+from carbon pricing is important and measures should be taken to counteract these burdens.
+The analysis is based on a two-step approach to assess the distributional impacts of the reforms.
+Firstly, using input-output tables to calculate the effect of carbon pricing on different categories
+of consumer goods; and secondly, mapping price increases to data on budget shares for
+different goods by household income group using household expenditure surveys.
+
+
+**62.** **The results of the distributional analysis show that the impact of the carbon pricing**
+**is revenue-neutral for carbon tax scenarios and regressive for hybrid.** The modelling
+suggests that carbon pricing imposes a burden on an average household of 1.5-3 percent of
+consumption. The burdens are largely driven by direct increases in the price of fossil fuels and
+electricity. However, these estimates overstate the net burden of carbon pricing on households in
+two regards. Firstly, they ignore partially offsetting domestic environmental benefits, especially
+local air pollution mortality. Second, they ignore the benefits from recycling carbon pricing
+revenues.
+
+
+**Figure 18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline**
+
+**Consumption in 2030)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**63.** **Revenue recycling would offset the negative impact of carbon pricing on**
+**households, while targeted recycling could even make the reforms pro-poor.** For example,
+using 30 percent of the revenues for a targeted, unconditional cash transfer aimed at the bottom
+four consumption deciles and using other 70 percent of the revenues to invest in public
+infrastructure, would make the reform both pro-poor and equity enhancing. On net, the bottom
+four deciles are better off from the reform with net benefits amounting to about 4-12 percent of
+consumption. The next three deciles are approximately no better or worse off, while wealthier
+households are worse off on net but by only 2 percent of consumption.
+
+
+40
+
+
+
+**Figure 19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline**
+
+**Consumption in 2030)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**64.** **Carbon pricing imposes a relatively small economic cost in Chile equivalent to**
+**about 0.1-0.4 percent of GDP in 2030 and they are offset by domestic environmental co-**
+**benefits.** Economic costs reflect pure mitigation costs [38], primarily the annualized costs of using
+cleaner but more expensive technologies instead of fossil-based technologies (net of any savings
+in lifetime energy costs). The carbon pricing does not impose a net cost on Chile, before even
+counting the climate benefits. 10-30 percent of the domestic environmental co-benefits reflect
+fewer local air pollution deaths and 70-90 percent reductions in traffic congestion and accident
+externalities. **[39]** Adding the global climate benefits increases environmental benefits from 0.2-0.4
+to 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP, or two-three times the economic efficiency cost.
+
+
+38 Estimation of economic costs is made under specific assumptions on emissions projections and responsiveness
+of emissions to carbon pricing (reflecting marginal abatement cost curves). See Black and others (2022) on
+methodology for estimating the economic costs.
+
+39 See Parry and others (2014) on methodologies for quantifying the broad range of environmental impacts of
+fossil fuel use on a country-by-country basis.
+
+
+41
+
+
+
+**Figure 20. Economic Costs and Domestic Environmental Co-benefits in 2030 (% of GDP)**
+
+
+**65.** **The table below summarizes the main results across different scenarios, which**
+**might be helpful to weigh different trade-offs in the decision-making process.**
+
+
+**Table 3. Summary Table**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Scenario|Base|Moderate|SCC|Hybrid|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Energy-related CO2 emissions**
**reduction in 2030,**% to a BAU|17%|7%|16%|6%|
+|**Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions**
**in 2024-2030,**MtCO2|51|20|59|17|
+|**Additional fiscal revenues raised in**
**2030,**% of GDP|1.61|0.81|1.55|0.92|
+|**Cumulative additional fiscal revenues**
**raised in 2024-2030,**bn USD|25.3|7.4|29.1|12.3|
+|**Impact on GDP growth in 2030,**
percentage points deviation from the
BAU growth|-0.09%|-0.08%|-0.06%|-0.08%|
+|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the BAU price|24%|22%|25%|22%|
+|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the current price|-4%|-6%|-3%|-5%|
+|**Industrial electricity price increase in**
**2030,**percent from the BAU price|27%|24%|28%|24%|
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+**Industrial electricity price increase in**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|2030, percent from the current price|-19%|-20%|-17%|-20%|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Relative mean consumption effect on**
**the poorest after revenue recycling,**
% of BAU consumption|11.9|5.9|11.7|4.5|
+|**Pure abatement costs**, % of GDP|0.35|0.07|0.32|0.06|
+|**Domestic co-benefits**(transport, air
pollution, climate), % of GDP|0.62|0.24|0.57|0.15|
+
+
+43
+
+
+
+### **V. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS**
+
+**66.** **Defining how revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent and explaining it**
+**clearly to the public will be a critical step to receive political support in Congress.** The
+Ministry of Finance informed the mission that the main purpose of the carbon tax reform is not
+to generate additional revenue, but to induce changes in consumption behavior to reduce social
+costs and comply with the country’s climate goals. While earmarking is not allowed in Chile, the
+Ministry is exploring different uses of carbon tax revenue, to offset the impact of a higher carbon
+tax partially or completely on GDP growth, energy prices and income distribution.
+
+
+**67.** **Voters and specific interest groups in Chile, as in many countries, are likely to**
+**oppose carbon tax increases because they fear impacts in energy prices and in the cost of**
+**living.** **[40]** Given the recent increase in energy prices in the country, higher carbon taxes may also
+face public opposition if the reform is perceived as imposing an additional burden on lowincome families. Similarly, energy-intensive and trade-exposed firms, which cannot easily pass on
+higher energy costs in product prices, are also likely to be vocal opponents to higher carbon
+taxation.
+
+
+**68.** **Overcoming this political and public debate will require building a broad and**
+**diverse coalition in favor of the reform.** One way to achieve this is to clearly explain to the
+public how revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent, considering both economic efficiency
+and implications for income distribution. Successfully socializing the carbon tax reform and how
+revenue will be used is likely to garner support from environmental organizations, some business
+groups, and the general public.
+
+
+**69.** **The government should develop a well-planned strategy to communicate how**
+**revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent.** **[41]** Options for revenue use should be assessed
+against impacts on income distribution and economic efficiency, as well as administrative burden
+(see **Error! Reference source not found.** ). Broad categories of possible expenditure choices (see
+Annex for examples of how countries use carbon pricing revenues) include cash transfers,
+environmental or general investment, deficit reduction or lower taxes. For example, universal
+transfer payments (i.e., equal dividends to all households regardless of income) might help with
+political acceptability but would forgo potentially sizable efficiency benefits from productive
+revenue use. Alternatively, the government could offer relief for households through a direct
+transfer or through lower energy bills, although this would not offset the significant indirect
+burden from generally higher consumer prices. Environmental investments (low-carbon
+infrastructure, energy networks, R&D) may also be favored by voters as part of a package.
+
+
+40 Carbon taxes would certainly add to the cost of living for all households, but the burden as a share of total
+household consumption would depend on the share of income spent on energy by different income levels.
+
+41 For a more detailed discussion and country examples on how to use carbon tax revenue see: “Using Carbon
+Revenues”. Note 16. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank.
+
+
+44
+
+
+
+However, these investments would need to be balanced against competing investment priorities
+and scrutinized to ensure high quality, as with other important investments (e.g., healthcare,
+water and sanitation, etc.). While we understand the authorities are currently not considering tax
+cuts for labor or consumption, reducing these taxes could also promote some of these efficiency
+gains and would benefit households roughly in proportion to their income.
+
+
+**Table 4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**General Revenue Uses**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+General investments May disproportionately
+
+benefit low-income
+households (for example, if
+basic education, healthcare,
+
+and infrastructure provided)
+
+
+
+Potentially significant Modest
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Payroll tax Benefits are largely
+proportional across working
+
+households
+
+
+
+Improves incentives for
+
+formal work effort
+
+
+
+Minimal
+
+
+
+
+
+Minimal
+
+
+Minimal
+
+
+Minimal
+
+
+Low, if builds on existing
+capacity, otherwise significant
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Consumption tax Largely proportional to
+households' consumption
+
+
+Corporate income tax Benefits are skewed to
+
+higher-income groups
+
+Deficit reduction Benefits accrue to future
+
+generations
+
+
+**Targeted assistance**
+
+
+
+Means-tested cash, in-kind
+transfers
+
+
+
+Effective in helping lowincome groups if social safety
+
+nets are comprehensive
+
+
+
+Some improvements in
+incentives for formal work
+
+effort
+
+Improves incentives for
+
+investment
+
+Significant (lowers future tax
+burdens and macro-financial
+
+risk)
+
+
+Efficiency impacts unclear but
+
+likely modest
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+45
+
+
+
+### **REFERENCES**
+
+Black, Simon, Ian Parry, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2022. “Carbon Taxes or Emissions Trading
+
+Systems?: Instrument Choice and Design” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/006, International
+Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, available at: [https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-Instrument-Choice-and-Design-519101)
+[climate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-Instrument-Choice-and-Design-519101)
+Instrument-Choice-and-Design-519101
+
+
+Black, Simon, Ian Parry, James Roaf, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2021. “Not Yet on Track to Net
+
+Zero: The Urgent Need for Greater Ambition and Policy Action to Achieve Paris
+Temperature Goals.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/005, International Monetary Fund,
+Washington, DC, available
+
+
+Crippa, Monica, Diego Guizzardi, Marilena Muntean, Edwin Schaaf, Frank Dentener, John A. van
+
+Aardenne, Suvi Monni, et al. 2018. “Gridded Emissions of Air Pollutants for the Period
+1970–2012 within EDGAR v4.3.2.” Earth System Science Data 10 (4): 1987–2013.
+
+
+Díaz, Gabriel, Francisco Muñoz and Rodrigo Moreno. 2020. “Equilibrium analysis of a tax on
+
+carbon emissions with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules.” The Energy
+Journal Volume: 41 Issue: 2, Pages: 93-122, Mar 2020, available at:
+[https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/174487/Equilibrium-Analysis-of-a-](https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/174487/Equilibrium-Analysis-of-a-Tax-on-Carbon-Emissions%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)
+Tax-on-Carbon-Emissions%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
+
+
+Friedlingstein, Pierre, Matthew W. Jones, Michael O’Sullivan, Robbie M. Andrew, Dorothee C. E.
+
+Bakker, Judith Hauck, Corinne Le Quéré, et al. 2021. “Global Carbon Budget 2021.” Earth
+System Science Data Discussions, November, 1–191.
+
+
+IMF, 2019, How to Mitigate Climate Change, Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund,
+
+Washington, DC, (October 2019), available at:
+[https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2019/10/16/Fiscal-Monitor-October-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2019/10/16/Fiscal-Monitor-October-2019-How-to-Mitigate-Climate-Change-47027)
+2019-How-to-Mitigate-Climate-Change-47027
+
+
+IMF, OECD, 2021, Tax Expenditures and Corrective Taxes in Chile, International Monetary Fund,
+
+Washington, DC, (November 2021), available at:
+[https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/11/19/Chile-Technical-Assistance-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/11/19/Chile-Technical-Assistance-Report-Assessment-of-Tax-Expenditures-and-Corrective-Taxes-49906)
+Report-Assessment-of-Tax-Expenditures-and-Corrective-Taxes-49906
+
+
+IPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva,
+
+Switzerland, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
+
+
+IPCC, 2021. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on
+
+Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/
+
+
+46
+
+
+
+Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017, Estimación del Precio Social del CO2 2017, Gobierno de
+
+Chile, available at: http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf
+
+
+Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, 2019, Impuestos Verdes sobre Fuentes Fijas – Reporte Final
+
+Operación 2019, Gobierno de Chile, available at:
+http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf
+
+
+Parry, Ian and Jon Strand, 2011, “International Fuels Tax Assessment: An Application to Chile”,
+
+IMF Working Paper 11/168, (July 2001), available at:
+[https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/International-Fuel-Tax-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/International-Fuel-Tax-Assessment-An-Application-to-Chile-25045)
+Assessment-An-Application-to-Chile-25045
+
+
+Parry, Ian, Simon Black, and James Roaf. 2021. “Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor
+
+among Large Emitters.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/001, International Monetary Fund,
+[Washington, DC, available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-Large-Emitters-460468)
+[notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-Large-Emitters-460468)
+Large-Emitters-460468
+
+
+Parry, Ian (eds), 2021, “No Brainers and Low-Hanging Fruit in National Climate Policy”, CEPR
+
+Press, London, available at [https://cepr.org/chapters/critical-role-feebates-climate-](https://cepr.org/chapters/critical-role-feebates-climate-mitigation-strategies)
+mitigation-strategies
+
+
+Rennert, Kevin, Frank Errickson, Brian C. Prest, Lisa Rennels, Richard G. Newell, William Pizer, Cora
+
+Kingdon et al. "Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2." _Nature_ 610,
+no. 7933 (2022): 687-692.
+
+
+Vernon, Nate, Ian Parry, and Simon Black. "Still not getting energy prices right: A global and
+
+country update of fossil fuel subsidies." (2021).
+
+
+UN. 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations, New York
+
+City, NY.
+
+
+UNCCCF, 2021, Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Revised note by
+
+the secretariat, Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to Paris
+Agreement, Glasgow (October 2021), available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/306848
+
+
+World Bank, 2019, Using Carbon Revenues. Note 16. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank.
+
+https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32247
+
+
+World Bank, 2021, Carbon Pricing Dashboard. World Bank Group, Washington DC. Available at:
+
+https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data
+
+
+47
+
+
+
+#### **Appendix 1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Coverage of Energy Sectors Coverage
Revenue/
Rate, all Price, Point of Tax/
Country/ Year Rent, % Revenue Use
Power Industry Transport Buildings GHGs $/tonne Regulation
Region Introduced GDP
(percent)
Carbon Taxes
Argentina 2018 ✔ ✔ ✔ 20 5 0.070 Midstream General budget
Colombia 2017 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 23 5 0.04 Midstream Environmental spending
Chile 2017 ✔ ✔ 29 5 0.05 Downstream General budget
Indonesia 2022 ✔ 26 2 0.05 Midstream General budget
Singapore 2019 ✔ ✔ 80 4 0.04 Midstream General budget
South Africa 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 80 10 0.04 Midstream General budget
Ukraine 2011 ✔ ✔ ✔ 71 1 0.05 Midstream General budget
Uruguay 2022 ✔ ✔ 11 127 1.15 Midstream General budget, environmental spending
ETSs
EU 2005 ✔ ✔ 41 87 0.26 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Austria 2005 ✔ ✔ 37 87 0.11 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Belgium 2005 ✔ ✔ 38 87 0.19 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria 2005 ✔ ✔ 52 87 1.82 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Croatia 2005 ✔ ✔ 32 87 0.33 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.43 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
China 2013, 2014, ✔
2016, 2021 38 9 0.32 Downstream Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.78 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Germany 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 85 62 0.44 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending
Greece 2005 ✔ ✔ 47 87 0.66 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Hungary 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.39 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Italy 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.18 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan 2013 ✔ ✔ ✔ 46 1 0.10 Downstream General budget
Korea 2015 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 73 19 0.99 Downstream Environmental spending
Lithuania 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.44 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Malta 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.28 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 49 53 0.20 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Romania 2005 ✔ ✔ 33 87 0.89 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia 2005 ✔ ✔ 50 87 0.64 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
US 2009, 2012, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
2018, 2021 7 24 0.05 Up & Midstream General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
Hybrid
Canada 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 38 0.16 Downstream Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark 1992, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 62 52 0.29 Mid & Downstream General budget
Estonia 2000, 2005 ✔ ✔ 63 79 1.26 Mid & Downstream General budget
Finland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 77 0.76 Mid & Downstream General budget, tax cuts
France 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 56 64 0.41 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Iceland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 93 56 0.62 Mid & Downstream General budget
Ireland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 59 62 0.23 Mid & Downstream General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico 2014, 2020 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 61 4 0.02 Midstream General budget
Japan 2010, 2011, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
2012 77 2 0.05 Midstream Environmental spending
Latvia 2004, 2005 ✔ ✔ 25.4 79 0.39 Midstream General budget
Liechtenstein 2005, 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 81 130 0.60 Mid & Downstream General budget
Luxembourg 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 79 38 0.048 Mid & Downstream General budget
Netherlands 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ 46 87 0.270 Mid & Downstream General budget
Norway 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 55 87 0.94 Mid & Downstream General budget
Poland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 51 81 1.45 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending
Portugal 2015, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 70 56 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia 1996, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 89 47 0.48 Mid & Downstream General budget
Spain 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ 37 82 0.25 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Sweden 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 109 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget
UK 2013, 2021 ✔ ✔ 49 67 0.42 Downstream General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 44 114 0.16 Midstream Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|Country/
Region
Year
Introduced
Power
Industry Transport Buildings
**Carbon Taxes**
Argentina
2018
✔
✔
✔
20
5
0.070
Midstream
General budget
Colombia
2017
✔
✔
✔
✔
23
5
0.04
Midstream
Environmental spending
Chile
2017
✔
✔
29
5
0.05
Downstream
General budget
Indonesia
2022
✔
26
2
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Singapore
2019
✔
✔
80
4
0.04
Midstream
General budget
South Africa
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
80
10
0.04
Midstream
General budget
Ukraine
2011
✔
✔
✔
71
1
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Uruguay
2022
✔
✔
11
127
1.15
Midstream
General budget, environmental spending
**ETSs**
EU
2005
✔
✔
41
87
0.26
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Austria
2005
✔
✔
37
87
0.11
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Belgium
2005
✔
✔
38
87
0.19
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria
2005
✔
✔
52
87
1.82
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Croatia
2005
✔
✔
32
87
0.33
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.43
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
China
2013, 2014,
2016, 2021
✔
38
9
0.32
Downstream
Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.78
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Germany
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
85
62
0.44
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Greece
2005
✔
✔
47
87
0.66
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Hungary
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.39
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Italy
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.18
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan
2013
✔
✔
✔
46
1
0.10
Downstream
General budget
Korea
2015
✔
✔
✔
✔
73
19
0.99
Downstream
Environmental spending
Lithuania
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.44
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Malta
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.28
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand
2008
✔
✔
✔
49
53
0.20
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Romania
2005
✔
✔
33
87
0.89
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia
2005
✔
✔
50
87
0.64
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
US
2009, 2012,
2018, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
7
24
0.05
Up & Midstream
General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
**Hybrid**
Canada
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
38
0.16
Downstream
Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark
1992, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
62
52
0.29
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Estonia
2000, 2005
✔
✔
63
79
1.26
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Finland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
77
0.76
Mid & Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
France
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
✔
56
64
0.41
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Iceland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
93
56
0.62
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Ireland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
59
62
0.23
Mid & Downstream
General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico
2014, 2020
✔
✔
✔
✔
61
4
0.02
Midstream
General budget
Japan
2010, 2011,
2012
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
2
0.05
Midstream
Environmental spending
Latvia
2004, 2005
✔
✔
25.4
79
0.39
Midstream
General budget
Liechtenstein
2005, 2008
✔
✔
✔
✔
81
130
0.60
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Luxembourg
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
79
38
0.048
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Netherlands
2005, 2021
✔
✔
46
87
0.270
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Norway
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
55
87
0.94
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Poland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
51
81
1.45
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Portugal
2015, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
70
56
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia
1996, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
89
47
0.48
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Spain
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
37
82
0.25
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Sweden
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
109
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget
UK
2013, 2021
✔
✔
49
67
0.42
Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland
2008
✔
✔
✔
44
114
0.16
Midstream
Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending
Coverage of Energy Sectors
Coverage
Rate, all
GHGs
(percent)
Price,
$/tonne
Revenue/
Rent, %
GDP
Point of Tax/
Regulation
Revenue Use||
+|Country/
Region
Year
Introduced
Power
Industry Transport Buildings
**Carbon Taxes**
Argentina
2018
✔
✔
✔
20
5
0.070
Midstream
General budget
Colombia
2017
✔
✔
✔
✔
23
5
0.04
Midstream
Environmental spending
Chile
2017
✔
✔
29
5
0.05
Downstream
General budget
Indonesia
2022
✔
26
2
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Singapore
2019
✔
✔
80
4
0.04
Midstream
General budget
South Africa
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
80
10
0.04
Midstream
General budget
Ukraine
2011
✔
✔
✔
71
1
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Uruguay
2022
✔
✔
11
127
1.15
Midstream
General budget, environmental spending
**ETSs**
EU
2005
✔
✔
41
87
0.26
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Austria
2005
✔
✔
37
87
0.11
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Belgium
2005
✔
✔
38
87
0.19
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria
2005
✔
✔
52
87
1.82
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Croatia
2005
✔
✔
32
87
0.33
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.43
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
China
2013, 2014,
2016, 2021
✔
38
9
0.32
Downstream
Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.78
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Germany
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
85
62
0.44
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Greece
2005
✔
✔
47
87
0.66
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Hungary
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.39
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Italy
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.18
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan
2013
✔
✔
✔
46
1
0.10
Downstream
General budget
Korea
2015
✔
✔
✔
✔
73
19
0.99
Downstream
Environmental spending
Lithuania
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.44
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Malta
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.28
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand
2008
✔
✔
✔
49
53
0.20
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Romania
2005
✔
✔
33
87
0.89
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia
2005
✔
✔
50
87
0.64
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
US
2009, 2012,
2018, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
7
24
0.05
Up & Midstream
General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
**Hybrid**
Canada
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
38
0.16
Downstream
Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark
1992, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
62
52
0.29
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Estonia
2000, 2005
✔
✔
63
79
1.26
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Finland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
77
0.76
Mid & Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
France
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
✔
56
64
0.41
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Iceland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
93
56
0.62
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Ireland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
59
62
0.23
Mid & Downstream
General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico
2014, 2020
✔
✔
✔
✔
61
4
0.02
Midstream
General budget
Japan
2010, 2011,
2012
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
2
0.05
Midstream
Environmental spending
Latvia
2004, 2005
✔
✔
25.4
79
0.39
Midstream
General budget
Liechtenstein
2005, 2008
✔
✔
✔
✔
81
130
0.60
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Luxembourg
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
79
38
0.048
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Netherlands
2005, 2021
✔
✔
46
87
0.270
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Norway
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
55
87
0.94
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Poland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
51
81
1.45
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Portugal
2015, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
70
56
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia
1996, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
89
47
0.48
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Spain
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
37
82
0.25
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Sweden
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
109
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget
UK
2013, 2021
✔
✔
49
67
0.42
Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland
2008
✔
✔
✔
44
114
0.16
Midstream
Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending
Coverage of Energy Sectors
Coverage
Rate, all
GHGs
(percent)
Price,
$/tonne
Revenue/
Rent, %
GDP
Point of Tax/
Regulation
Revenue Use||
+|Country/
Region
Year
Introduced
Power
Industry Transport Buildings
**Carbon Taxes**
Argentina
2018
✔
✔
✔
20
5
0.070
Midstream
General budget
Colombia
2017
✔
✔
✔
✔
23
5
0.04
Midstream
Environmental spending
Chile
2017
✔
✔
29
5
0.05
Downstream
General budget
Indonesia
2022
✔
26
2
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Singapore
2019
✔
✔
80
4
0.04
Midstream
General budget
South Africa
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
80
10
0.04
Midstream
General budget
Ukraine
2011
✔
✔
✔
71
1
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Uruguay
2022
✔
✔
11
127
1.15
Midstream
General budget, environmental spending
**ETSs**
EU
2005
✔
✔
41
87
0.26
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Austria
2005
✔
✔
37
87
0.11
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Belgium
2005
✔
✔
38
87
0.19
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria
2005
✔
✔
52
87
1.82
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Croatia
2005
✔
✔
32
87
0.33
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.43
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
China
2013, 2014,
2016, 2021
✔
38
9
0.32
Downstream
Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.78
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Germany
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
85
62
0.44
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Greece
2005
✔
✔
47
87
0.66
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Hungary
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.39
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Italy
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.18
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan
2013
✔
✔
✔
46
1
0.10
Downstream
General budget
Korea
2015
✔
✔
✔
✔
73
19
0.99
Downstream
Environmental spending
Lithuania
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.44
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Malta
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.28
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand
2008
✔
✔
✔
49
53
0.20
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Romania
2005
✔
✔
33
87
0.89
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia
2005
✔
✔
50
87
0.64
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
US
2009, 2012,
2018, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
7
24
0.05
Up & Midstream
General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
**Hybrid**
Canada
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
38
0.16
Downstream
Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark
1992, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
62
52
0.29
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Estonia
2000, 2005
✔
✔
63
79
1.26
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Finland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
77
0.76
Mid & Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
France
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
✔
56
64
0.41
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Iceland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
93
56
0.62
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Ireland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
59
62
0.23
Mid & Downstream
General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico
2014, 2020
✔
✔
✔
✔
61
4
0.02
Midstream
General budget
Japan
2010, 2011,
2012
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
2
0.05
Midstream
Environmental spending
Latvia
2004, 2005
✔
✔
25.4
79
0.39
Midstream
General budget
Liechtenstein
2005, 2008
✔
✔
✔
✔
81
130
0.60
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Luxembourg
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
79
38
0.048
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Netherlands
2005, 2021
✔
✔
46
87
0.270
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Norway
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
55
87
0.94
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Poland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
51
81
1.45
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Portugal
2015, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
70
56
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia
1996, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
89
47
0.48
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Spain
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
37
82
0.25
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Sweden
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
109
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget
UK
2013, 2021
✔
✔
49
67
0.42
Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland
2008
✔
✔
✔
44
114
0.16
Midstream
Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending
Coverage of Energy Sectors
Coverage
Rate, all
GHGs
(percent)
Price,
$/tonne
Revenue/
Rent, %
GDP
Point of Tax/
Regulation
Revenue Use||
+
+
+48
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b30fdbbd360db87a6c9d29ba91a843d3c090f3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0002-001", "height": 203, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0004-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0141919191914101", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0004-001", "height": 50, "page": 4, "phash_256": "f00087ff8ffff800f018f078f0008fff8ffff800f000f07ef0308fc78fc3f030", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "a5e4d251dcf87c0feaeb1137086aef76b9ce900ff8b7ea1f1b1531e328f185d9", "width": 764}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0014-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "98a3968ea690942c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0014-001", "height": 430, "page": 14, "phash_256": "a057ef169b38d8cd666df32419b39c982c4467267b33f19916cc96601f338799", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "3ba8295c8ad6d1f1e2c0d9c9212520ee8aa4a18904d699c0a84e984a487bd990", "width": 566}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1019190909191994", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-001", "height": 254, "page": 17, "phash_256": "ba45a0fd84ba1f02c5cceac54e6304fa4b3faf06393dda23359874b834e8ab55", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "67fd7a7af761fee47cee5c64d2792bb9d514f868f2b3fe17ba56a7f548b4a042", "width": 426}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "e0810f31213b3a8c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-002", "height": 390, "page": 17, "phash_256": "faa36aab817f95543ec49555b5483e41617bc37a6b334f36cce4388678c442e4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "17b3a5cb9d46f062a31a05346affbbd02b57d047246c103c8c0f6fd2a571d9dc", "width": 474}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": "Table 1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c941c78f3b27cbc0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0018-001", "height": 330, "page": 18, "phash_256": "ead54af5956abc0b30a0a7fa64962c1779e1c1897b0d0b6fd0662ae16f9ad198", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "b4e9e942bea3fd62abaaa3df40e86a78eb1c0dff49e85b2b9f0c8e58caca0cc1", "width": 489}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": "Figure 5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "33333366666644f8", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0019-001", "height": 589, "page": 19, "phash_256": "ad907869d24bc796d23cd2e985abd02c27c3ec320df82c4368d60ed778d60bdd", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "73782508c38b889bde46b82d1963fbc57f52e83088253fbd57688c927fe07b5f", "width": 733}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": "Figure 6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3c55cbd0593738b0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-001", "height": 350, "page": 20, "phash_256": "bb55639d3c133c8590ee946a6e62e37a61704db1c3909d95c3841b0fcf4e8b4f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "369b01b717695258642e3e9713f71bd1d7c09fd0fd8e344ce3b067fc691f0208", "width": 541}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "342f66202b9f9eb8", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-002", "height": 375, "page": 20, "phash_256": "bd15ce0711e9713ccc4f95ac3fc00ec0c7209b7f687631bd72d13cd8d26191ad", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "b6ed845951075de8de07a7d15d9dd0ad2295227cabfa71f7fcc7b50b3a21d202", "width": 433}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2638343a3a3c4c98", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0021-001", "height": 425, "page": 21, "phash_256": "bc1d3c3ec7c0c64331bbe763cc63d8c071c4718731c6c1cecc41c673c33e371b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "ae0e0f00d2c0a295de24e2cc0eb0e6c24203f533adf7bf2cf7f498f51900c209", "width": 405}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0025-001.png", "caption": "Figure 9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "725351515151b370", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0025-001", "height": 271, "page": 25, "phash_256": "bfb96fb8c446b3193739c466c446c047f0471ae53bd786657b951819e2001fbb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "3b3d10f40c242f964bf1bd2e1c5fd96b26bc11e88d29edd3878a71f207b16d73", "width": 791}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0026-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9094555555555556", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0026-001", "height": 246, "page": 26, "phash_256": "b7cdd03ec1360fc097312ecdc81f043646c24431eec9ee59afed7fc1d1363181", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "1235a3e34ad1568134a244b0251641baea6f6de7e0eae447fe9fecc45ca36fe3", "width": 683}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0027-001.png", "caption": "Figure 11. Carbon Prices around the World", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "39298786332b1761", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0027-001", "height": 653, "page": 27, "phash_256": "ecfde05d1b5a9b3058a124eca4cc23dbc713463ba52d256466ccc39bd8b39c72", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "ebccbb9c04b33a9f8093b07d48f3ed991cb12bca9ab6e716d3dcb81347bef0b5", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0028-001.png", "caption": "Figure 12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "32332333333333b2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0028-001", "height": 363, "page": 28, "phash_256": "ec3430f1d3c36d0f96b46c732d38a6bc69873879d395c38712616d6387ac4a78", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "d90e94aab6cae2ba5486c84201c27273e9dfe595ad4e572fe740c7853c94abd2", "width": 639}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0036-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "186ec7d389c02d32", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0036-001", "height": 392, "page": 36, "phash_256": "a155e73f3700b30019bf49fdc9da6cc064cc84ee66e692466a6d852fe5263e96", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "6592416ff118ce24976d18b8e9624e29ebac712a3e78f780a4b699e466ae8fcd", "width": 490}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0037-001.png", "caption": "Figure 14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ce757525ada52360", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0037-001", "height": 333, "page": 37, "phash_256": "aee86aae910780798259ed871ffc3a48630f44ac0ea79153b359f1131fa73ed8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "d7a7feb7d17fa3886c88d5930c4fcfe7a82b1e3dfcb302fbb8e7fe12d6517a49", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0038-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4c1c2c5c32f3d30", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0038-001", "height": 334, "page": 38, "phash_256": "8bf5c3fc1881764084de3cb5a52f8b4b7a5a84d66b913da6c3751a8d669918b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "f8f63cb2879c458c132c747bd184f9b9dfd7214841c8e1efa8f484333e894f4c", "width": 492}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": "Figure 16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8a75555555751936", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0039-001", "height": 324, "page": 39, "phash_256": "ae9f6e9f9561c5659160d16091657b9a7b9e2c0b2e9f8465846184a77360d3f6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "3956f61bd7ed238477801229bbd75eb4eb2b2f269c4be24e98e7f119197407e5", "width": 497}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-001.png", "caption": "Figure 17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %)", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "aaf2a4acaab4b6b2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-001", "height": 195, "page": 40, "phash_256": "80103ff065a17823703ff003600fff2000ff83ff1ed4fe800fcc87df1fd08fdc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "ae75852e144a1d29c6ea2dc3b4ce6ed703da17a6e3b592e77eb64ac35ce139ca", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-002.png", "caption": "Figure 17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %)", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5456555555557468", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-002", "height": 305, "page": 40, "phash_256": "8f846f86906ff0799079d07860d08b0679c70f8f7da40ea66da60f0e7bd2d13b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "404df8d4a7353cc964255aad42566f3da6630a7ba561aaacf3123b11a3926360", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0041-001.png", "caption": "Figure 18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5454556766997468", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0041-001", "height": 288, "page": 41, "phash_256": "af9f6f9fd020d0608d462fdd72d153a34dae8e4ee050b011f121870f0efe6cf8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "b3c0adad01f24a75966c5980fa7d163e11087935f494c5d40b11aa2588fe1254", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0042-001.png", "caption": "Figure 19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d5aea55556147468", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0042-001", "height": 285, "page": 42, "phash_256": "86dd20eed100f9004f972ed3f079877e6faf1f87f0e082522f7d778f70208066", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "52f688060113bc92028e31462e37d030178685f233e1963445c940cb508b7a68", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0043-001.png", "caption": "Table 3. Summary Table", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "24261535241336b8", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0043-001", "height": 397, "page": 43, "phash_256": "ac9f2c9f9160c16084677b9473f0d3e02c638c9b42f36ad46e9b3c9b65283b1f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "22c1a6b267cfe2acefc363707d11d53b855c3e5f8c6884b496a2f2c287dda94d", "width": 459}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-001.png", "caption": "Table 4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "046988066aea6914", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-001", "height": 79, "page": 46, "phash_256": "df6471c6008f8f317dd364b9609b8f691f24708e027d7d607c82869f855f7c70", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "116a87c1b1712968512b5c4bd9d8008233536b2a06d9548ff11a107a28cf9d6d", "width": 852}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "555796999a989860", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-002", "height": 110, "page": 46, "phash_256": "b9e12ca54eaf1bb39a3adb50e452e446f042d6529372d252c60e39c939ed6d8d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "36a253c919a8acaab1fd207cdfcc22f8ace24acec89486a93ee34922319bccb9", "width": 852}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d4d599999a991414", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-003", "height": 77, "page": 46, "phash_256": "f1e846f887c6ad519a33da02ba31ad47ce1570ce70f846bc05ce2df9f8c65a21", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "a41780d60d24a6d63fd5a6192567e76cb3122b6a8c9cc33116fc566174dd118d", "width": 852}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a9d5d59696569696", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-004", "height": 60, "page": 46, "phash_256": "a4e512b18696fc12fb78ec469b332dcd25ed03bd45869a31f4487966bcb29a31", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "b2f1bf36e132ef119a8db91fb3bf20c8efc8c30873a84c4fac3f124f8fb9102f", "width": 852}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-035/assets/figures/cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "555494941a9a9090", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-005", "height": 80, "page": 46, "phash_256": "b1dbc6bb0e86bb006238c06e4474b9440f06ce6371fbc4bb0f879f923bbae46c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "sha256_normalized_png": "8fead6d57e033828d276aca11adfed063453dc80594709037977a4eb6dcd93fa", "width": 854}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-035/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..022a4731c5cf316333a1874e05a8edd29f6a3f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-035/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/35**\n# **CHILE**\n#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT – AN EVALUATION** **OF IMPROVED GREEN TAX OPTIONS**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Chile was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in November 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n###### **International Monetary Fund** **Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/35\nCHILE\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT – AN EVALUATION OF IMPROVED GREEN TAX OPTIONS\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Chile was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in November 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\nInternational Monetary Fund Washington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 572}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "##### F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n## **Chile** **An Evaluation of Improved Green Tax Options**\n\n###### Diego Mesa Puyo and Karlygash Zhunussova **Technical Report** **November 2022**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.25, 486.1099853515625, 366.0, 607.6099853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 209, "number": 9, "size": 66327, "transform": [120.75, 0.0, -0.0, 121.5, 245.25, 486.1099853515625], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nChile An Evaluation of Improved Green Tax Options\nDiego Mesa Puyo and Karlygash Zhunussova Technical Report November 2022", "text_characters": 127}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Chile (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for technical\nassistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may\nbe disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of\ntheir staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities of the TA\nrecipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff and other\ntechnical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest,\nunless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see\nOperational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance\nInformation—\n[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).](http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf)\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.\n\n\n--", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Chile (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for technical\nassistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may\nbe disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of\ntheir staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities of the TA\nrecipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff and other\ntechnical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest,\nunless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see\nOperational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance\nInformation—\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013.pdf).\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof\nto parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance\nproviders and donors with legitimate interest shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs\nDepartment.\n\n--", "text_characters": 946}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0004-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS ___________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**PREFACE _________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 7**\n\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________________ 11**\n\n\n**II. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND TARGETS ______________________________________ 13**\nA. Global Context ________________________________________________________________________________ 13\nB. Emissions in Chile _____________________________________________________________________________ 15\nC. Energy Prices in Chile _________________________________________________________________________ 17\nD. Emissions Targets in Chile _____________________________________________________________________ 19\n\n\n**III. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE _________________________________________________ 21**\nA. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework ______________________________________________ 21\nB. Revenue Performance _________________________________________________________________________ 23\nC. Selected Issues ________________________________________________________________________________ 24\nD. Recommendations ____________________________________________________________________________ 29\n\n\n**IV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING _______________________________________________ 31**\nA. Principles and Conceptual Issues ______________________________________________________________ 31\nB. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options ____________________________________________ 34\n\n\n**V. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS____________________________________________________________ 44**\n\n\n**REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________________________________ 46**\n\n**FIGURES**\n1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways ___________________________________________________________ 13\n2. GHG Emissions in 2020 by Source _____________________________________________________________ 16\n3. Historical GHG Emissions, 2000-2018 _________________________________________________________ 16\n4. Electricity Generation by Source, 1990-2020 __________________________________________________ 17\n5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD ________________________________ 18\n6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price __________________________ 19\n7. GHG Emissions vs Paris Pledge (NDC) and Net Zero Emissions Pathway ______________________ 19\n8. Average NDC Pledges in LAC6 Countries ______________________________________________________ 20\n9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020 ______________________________________ 24\n10. Cross Subsidies from Utilities to Power Plants ________________________________________________ 25\n11. Carbon Prices around the World _____________________________________________________________ 26\n12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6 _________________________________________________ 27\n13. The Impact on Total GHG Emissions excl. LULUCF by Scenario _______________________________ 35\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS _ 5\n\nPREFACE _ 6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7\n\nI. INTRODUCTION _ 11\n\nII. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND TARGETS 13\nA. Global Context 13\nB. Emissions in Chile _ 15\nC. Energy Prices in Chile _ 17\nD. Emissions Targets in Chile _ 19\n\nIII. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE _ 21\nA. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework 21\nB. Revenue Performance _ 23\nC. Selected Issues 24\nD. Recommendations 29\n\nIV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING _ 31\nA. Principles and Conceptual Issues 31\nB. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options 34\n\nV. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS 44\n\nREFERENCES _ 46\n\nFIGURES\n1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways _ 13\n2. GHG Emissions in 2020 by Source _ 16\n3. Historical GHG Emissions, 2000-2018 _ 16\n4. Electricity Generation by Source, 1990-2020 17\n5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD 18\n6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price 19\n7. GHG Emissions vs Paris Pledge (NDC) and Net Zero Emissions Pathway 19\n8. Average NDC Pledges in LAC6 Countries 20\n9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020 24\n10. Cross Subsidies from Utilities to Power Plants 25\n11. Carbon Prices around the World _ 26\n12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6 _ 27\n13. The Impact on Total GHG Emissions excl. LULUCF by Scenario _ 35\n\n3", "text_characters": 1092}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030 ________________________________________ 36\n15. Additional Revenues Raised from Fossil Fuels by Scenario, Percent of GDP __________________ 37\n16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030 ______________________________________________________________ 38\n17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %) ____________ 39\n18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline ________________ 40\n19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline __________________ 41\n20. Economic Costs and Domestic Environmental Co-benefits in 2030 (% of GDP) ______________ 42\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020 __________________________________________________________ 17\n2. Energy Prices by Scenario in 2030 _____________________________________________________________ 39\n3. Summary Table ________________________________________________________________________________ 42\n4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue ____________________________________________ 45\n\n**APPENDICES**\n1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use __________________________________________________________ 48\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030 36\n15. Additional Revenues Raised from Fossil Fuels by Scenario, Percent of GDP 37\n16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030 38\n17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %) 39\n18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline 40\n19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline 41\n20. Economic Costs and Domestic Environmental Co-benefits in 2030 (% of GDP) 42\n\nTABLES\n1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020 17\n2. Energy Prices by Scenario in 2030 _ 39\n3. Summary Table 42\n4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue 45\n\nAPPENDICES\n1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use 48\n\n4", "text_characters": 595}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS**\n\n\n\nBAU\nBBL\nCO2\nCOP26\nCPAT\n\n\n\nBAU Business As Usual\nBBL Barrel\nCO2 Carbon Dioxide\nCOP26 Glasgow Climate Conference\nCPAT Climate Policy Assessment Tool\n\nEITE Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed\nENAP Empresa Nacional del Petróleo\nETS Emissions Trading System\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGJ Gigajoule\nGHG Greenhouse Gas\nIEA International Energy Agency\nICPF International Carbon Price Floor\nIPCC\nKW Kilowatt\nkW/h Kilowatt hour\nLIT Liter\nLULUCF\nMEPCO\nMtCO2eq Million Tons of CO2 equivalent\nMW Megawatts\nNDC Nationally Determined Contribution\nNOx Nitrogen Oxide\nOECD\nPM2.5\nPPAs Power Purchase Agreements\nSII Servicio Interno de Impuestos\n\n\n\nEITE Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed\nENAP Empresa Nacional del Petróleo\nETS Emissions Trading System\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGJ Gigajoule\nGHG Greenhouse Gas\nIEA International Energy Agency\nICPF International Carbon Price Floor\nIPCC UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change\nKW Kilowatt\nkW/h Kilowatt hour\nLIT Liter\nLULUCF Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry\nMEPCO Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precio de Combustibles\nMtCO2eq Million Tons of CO2 equivalent\nMW Megawatts\nNDC Nationally Determined Contribution\nNOx Nitrogen Oxide\nOECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development\nPM2.5 Particulate Matter that a diameter less than 2.5 micrometers\nPPAs Power Purchase Agreements\nSII Servicio Interno de Impuestos\n\nSMA Superintendency of the Environment\nSO2 Sulphur Dioxide\nSCC Social Cost of Carbon\nTGR General Treasury\nUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change\n\n\n\nSMA Superintendency of the Environment\nSO2 Sulphur Dioxide\nSCC Social Cost of Carbon\nTGR General Treasury\nUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change\n\nWHD Western Hemisphere Department\n\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYNMS\n\nBAU\nBBL\nCO2\nCOP26\nCPAT\n\nBAU Business As Usual\nBBL Barrel\nCO2 Carbon Dioxide\nCOP26 Glasgow Climate Conference\nCPAT Climate Policy Assessment Tool\n\nEITE Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed\nENAP Empresa Nacional del Petróleo\nETS Emissions Trading System\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGJ Gigajoule\nGHG Greenhouse Gas\nIEA International Energy Agency\nICPF International Carbon Price Floor\nIPCC\nKW Kilowatt\nkW/h Kilowatt hour\nLIT Liter\nLULUCF\nMEPCO\nMtCO2eq Million Tons of CO2 equivalent\nMW Megawatts\nNDC Nationally Determined Contribution\nNOx Nitrogen Oxide\nOECD\nPM2.5\nPPAs Power Purchase Agreements\nSII Servicio Interno de Impuestos\n\nEITE Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed\nENAP Empresa Nacional del Petróleo\nETS Emissions Trading System\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGJ Gigajoule\nGHG Greenhouse Gas\nIEA International Energy Agency\nICPF International Carbon Price Floor\nIPCC UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change\nKW Kilowatt\nkW/h Kilowatt hour\nLIT Liter\nLULUCF Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry\nMEPCO Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precio de Combustibles\nMtCO2eq Million Tons of CO2 equivalent\nMW Megawatts\nNDC Nationally Determined Contribution\nNOx Nitrogen Oxide\nOECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development\nPM2.5 Particulate Matter that a diameter less than 2.5 micrometers\nPPAs Power Purchase Agreements\nSII Servicio Interno de Impuestos\n\nSMA Superintendency of the Environment\nSO2 Sulphur Dioxide\nSCC Social Cost of Carbon\nTGR General Treasury\nUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change\n\nSMA Superintendency of the Environment\nSO2 Sulphur Dioxide\nSCC Social Cost of Carbon\nTGR General Treasury\nUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change\n\nWHD Western Hemisphere Department\n\n5", "text_characters": 1554}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **PREFACE**\n\nAt the request of the Chilean Minister of Finance, a team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department\n(FAD) visited Santiago between October 3-7, 2022, to evaluate options to expand the existing\ndirect carbon tax in Chile. The mission comprised Diego Mesa Puyo (head) and Karlygash\nZhunussova, both from FAD’s Climate Policy Division.\n\nThe mission met with the Minister of Finance, Hon. Mario Marcel Cullell, the Minister of\nEnvironment, Hon. María Heloisa Rojas Corradi, and the Minister of Energy, Hon. Diego Pardow\nLorenzo. The team also had fruitful discussions with a range of government officials. In the\nMinistry of Finance, the mission met with Mrs. Claudia Sanhueza Riveros, Deputy Minister, Mr.\nNicolas Bohme, Tax Policy Coordinator, and Mrs. Camila Schmidlin and Mr. Jose Alvarado from\nthe Tax Policy Group; in the Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII) meetings were held with Carolina\nSaravia, Deputy Director of Enforcement; in the Ministry of Environment discussions were held\nwith Mr. Rodrigo Barragan and Mrs. Isabel Rojas from the Environmental Economy Division; in\nthe Ministry of Energy, the mission met with Mr. Juan Pedro Searle, Chief of the Climate Change\nDivision; in the National Commission of Energy, the mission met with Mr. Marco Antonio\nMancilla Ayancán and technical staff; in the Environmental Superintendency, the mission met\nwith Mr. Emanuel Ibarra Soto, Superintendent, and technical staff. In the private sector, the\nmission had meetings with Mr. Camilo Charme, General Manager, and Mr. Claudio Muñoz, Head\nof Studies, at Generadoras de Chile (the main power sector business group); and with Mr. Jorge\nCáceres, Director of the Centre of Environment and Energy at Sociedad de Fomento Fabril\n(Association of Industrial Promotion). The mission also met with Mr. Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Senior\nEconomist of the Climate Change and Sustainability Division of the Inter-American Development\nBank, Chile Office; and with Mr. Luis Gonzales, head of Climate Change, Energy and\nEnvironmental Economics at Universidad Católica de Chile.\n\nThe mission held a workshop to present the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) to more than\n15 staff from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Environment, SMA, SII and\nthe Central Bank of Chile.\n\nThe mission acknowledges the excellent interpretation services provided by Mrs. Gina Cabach,\nMrs. Claudia Goet and Mr. Pedro Velloso during meetings and the workshop.\n\nFinally, the mission would like to express its gratitude for the outstanding support and hospitality\nreceived from the Ministry of Finance staff, in particular Mr. Nicolas Bohme, Mrs. Camila\nSchmidlin and Mrs. Vanessa Paluba.\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nAt the request of the Chilean Minister of Finance, a team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department\n(FAD) visited Santiago between October 3-7, 2022, to evaluate options to expand the existing\ndirect carbon tax in Chile. The mission comprised Diego Mesa Puyo (head) and Karlygash\nZhunussova, both from FAD’s Climate Policy Division.\n\nThe mission met with the Minister of Finance, Hon. Mario Marcel Cullell, the Minister of\nEnvironment, Hon. María Heloisa Rojas Corradi, and the Minister of Energy, Hon. Diego Pardow\nLorenzo. The team also had fruitful discussions with a range of government officials. In the\nMinistry of Finance, the mission met with Mrs. Claudia Sanhueza Riveros, Deputy Minister, Mr.\nNicolas Bohme, Tax Policy Coordinator, and Mrs. Camila Schmidlin and Mr. Jose Alvarado from\nthe Tax Policy Group; in the Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII) meetings were held with Carolina\nSaravia, Deputy Director of Enforcement; in the Ministry of Environment discussions were held\nwith Mr. Rodrigo Barragan and Mrs. Isabel Rojas from the Environmental Economy Division; in\nthe Ministry of Energy, the mission met with Mr. Juan Pedro Searle, Chief of the Climate Change\nDivision; in the National Commission of Energy, the mission met with Mr. Marco Antonio\nMancilla Ayancán and technical staff; in the Environmental Superintendency, the mission met\nwith Mr. Emanuel Ibarra Soto, Superintendent, and technical staff. In the private sector, the\nmission had meetings with Mr. Camilo Charme, General Manager, and Mr. Claudio Muñoz, Head\nof Studies, at Generadoras de Chile (the main power sector business group); and with Mr. Jorge\nCáceres, Director of the Centre of Environment and Energy at Sociedad de Fomento Fabril\n(Association of Industrial Promotion). The mission also met with Mr. Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Senior\nEconomist of the Climate Change and Sustainability Division of the Inter-American Development\nBank, Chile Office; and with Mr. Luis Gonzales, head of Climate Change, Energy and\nEnvironmental Economics at Universidad Católica de Chile.\n\nThe mission held a workshop to present the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) to more than\n15 staff from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Environment, SMA, SII and\nthe Central Bank of Chile.\n\nThe mission acknowledges the excellent interpretation services provided by Mrs. Gina Cabach,\nMrs. Claudia Goet and Mr. Pedro Velloso during meetings and the workshop.\n\nFinally, the mission would like to express its gratitude for the outstanding support and hospitality\nreceived from the Ministry of Finance staff, in particular Mr. Nicolas Bohme, Mrs. Camila\nSchmidlin and Mrs. Vanessa Paluba.\n\n6", "text_characters": 2259}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\nChile is committed to climate action and is recognized as a regional leader in the fight against\nglobal warming. Over the past eight years, Chile has made important climate commitments, such\nas updating its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2)\nemissions by 30 to 45 percent in 2030 from 2016 levels and reach carbon neutrality before 2050.\n\nConsistent with its emission reduction ambitions, Chile has developed multiple climate policies.\nIn 2014, it became the first Latin-American country to introduce green taxes on CO2 emissions\nand local pollutants, as well as on new passenger cars based on fuel efficiency and emissions. In\n2019, Chile also became the first country in the region to issue green bonds, publish a financial\nstrategy for climate change, and announce the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants by\n2040. In June 2022, Congress approved the Framework Law on Climate Change, making carbon\nneutrality legally binding, and introducing new mitigation tools and institutional arrangements.\n\nWhile Chile has made important progress to align policies with climate commitments, additional\nmitigation efforts are required to reach emission reduction targets in 2030 and by midcentury.\nThe Ministry of Finance announced that improvements to green taxes will be included in the\ngeneral tax reform presented to parliament in July 2022. Moreover, since the country has five\nyears of experience administering green taxes, further carbon pricing enhancements should\nleverage existing institutional capacity without adding significant administrative burden.\n\nThis report evaluates existing green taxes in the country, including revenue performance,\ncoverage, and selected design issues. It also discusses changes that will take effect in 2023, as\nwell as new mitigation tools introduced in the Framework Law on Climate Change. The report\nuses the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) to evaluate different scenarios to improve\ncarbon pricing and bring the country closer to or in line with its climate targets. Results are\npresented in terms of emissions reduction, revenue raising potential, effects on GDP and energy\nprices, distributional impacts across households and firms, abatement costs and co-benefits. The\nreport also offers different options to recycle revenue from higher carbon pricing to help the\ngovernment prepare a well-thought-out reform communication strategy.\n\nAt $5 per ton of CO2, the green tax on carbon emission from stationary sources is low by\ninternational standards and significantly lower than the $32.5 per ton of CO2 social cost of\ncarbon estimated by the government. [1] Moreover, simulations done by the mission show that the\ntax coverage needs to be broadened and the rate increased to achieve the country climate goals.\nStrengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially considering the\nglobal increase in energy prices observed in 2021 and the first half of 2022. The recent fall in\n\n\n1 The recent RFF estimate on social cost of carbon is $185 per ton of CO2. See Rennert and others (2022)\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nChile is committed to climate action and is recognized as a regional leader in the fight against\nglobal warming. Over the past eight years, Chile has made important climate commitments, such\nas updating its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2)\nemissions by 30 to 45 percent in 2030 from 2016 levels and reach carbon neutrality before 2050.\n\nConsistent with its emission reduction ambitions, Chile has developed multiple climate policies.\nIn 2014, it became the first Latin-American country to introduce green taxes on CO2 emissions\nand local pollutants, as well as on new passenger cars based on fuel efficiency and emissions. In\n2019, Chile also became the first country in the region to issue green bonds, publish a financial\nstrategy for climate change, and announce the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants by\n2040. In June 2022, Congress approved the Framework Law on Climate Change, making carbon\nneutrality legally binding, and introducing new mitigation tools and institutional arrangements.\n\nWhile Chile has made important progress to align policies with climate commitments, additional\nmitigation efforts are required to reach emission reduction targets in 2030 and by midcentury.\nThe Ministry of Finance announced that improvements to green taxes will be included in the\ngeneral tax reform presented to parliament in July 2022. Moreover, since the country has five\nyears of experience administering green taxes, further carbon pricing enhancements should\nleverage existing institutional capacity without adding significant administrative burden.\n\nThis report evaluates existing green taxes in the country, including revenue performance,\ncoverage, and selected design issues. It also discusses changes that will take effect in 2023, as\nwell as new mitigation tools introduced in the Framework Law on Climate Change. The report\nuses the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) to evaluate different scenarios to improve\ncarbon pricing and bring the country closer to or in line with its climate targets. Results are\npresented in terms of emissions reduction, revenue raising potential, effects on GDP and energy\nprices, distributional impacts across households and firms, abatement costs and co-benefits. The\nreport also offers different options to recycle revenue from higher carbon pricing to help the\ngovernment prepare a well-thought-out reform communication strategy.\n\nAt $5 per ton of CO2, the green tax on carbon emission from stationary sources is low by\ninternational standards and significantly lower than the $32.5 per ton of CO2 social cost of\ncarbon estimated by the government. [1] Moreover, simulations done by the mission show that the\ntax coverage needs to be broadened and the rate increased to achieve the country climate goals.\nStrengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially considering the\nglobal increase in energy prices observed in 2021 and the first half of 2022. The recent fall in\n\n1 The recent RFF estimate on social cost of carbon is $185 per ton of CO2. See Rennert and others (2022)\n\n7", "text_characters": 2632}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "fossil fuel prices, [2] however, may give the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher carbon\ntax without increasing energy prices relative to recently observed levels. As for local emissions,\nChile is a pioneer in levying taxes on local air pollutants such as particular matter (PM2.5),\nnitrogen oxide (NOx), and sulphur dioxide (SO2), which directly affect communities in areas\nwhere emitter industries are located.\n\nBefore increasing the tax rate and coverage, design issues that create economic distortions in the\npower sector should be corrected. First, the full amount of the carbon tax should be included in\nthe variable cost of all generation plants considered for the economic dispatch. This change\nwould allow the economic dispatch to effectively differentiate between plants with higher\nemissions and higher costs due to the carbon tax, and more competitive power plants with lower\nor zero emissions. Moreover, once that correction is made, the cross subsidy from utilities to\nmarginal or inframarginal fossil fuel-based power plants should automatically disappear.\n\nThe green tax on mobile sources has a very narrow coverage and includes multiple exemptions.\nThis is problematic because the transport sector is one of the main emitters in the country.\nMoreover, excises and other fuel taxes in Chile have multiple distortions and have been found to\nbe highly inefficient. For example, taxes on diesel have a complex set of credits and exemptions,\nand much lower rates than on gasoline. As a result, Chile consumes almost double the amount of\ndiesel than the regional average on a per capita basis. This distortion could be corrected either\nby gradually bringing the excise rate on diesel on par with the one on gasoline, or by including\nthe transport sector in the improved carbon pricing options modeled in this analysis. A feebate\n(not discussed in detail in this report) can also be considered to promote decarbonization of the\nvehicle fleet in case higher fuel taxes becomes too contentious.\n\nBased on discussions with the authorities regarding the feasibility of carbon pricing\nimprovements within the current tax reform proposal, the mission presents four different\nscenarios that would bring Chile closer or in line with its Nationally Determined Contribution\n(NDC) for 2030, and the legally binding net-zero pledge for 2050. Under the base and social cost\nof carbon (SCC) cases, Chile would achieve is NDC target by 2030 and be on track to reach netzero by 2050. Under the moderate and hybrid scenarios, the county will be within 11 and 12\npercent of achieving its NDC. It is important to note, however, that additional measures under all\nscenarios considered here, such as improved energy efficiency policies, introduction of feebates\nschemes or faster adoption of low and zero emission sources for transport, power, and industry,\nwould further contribute to achieve climate goals. Below are the main assumptions under each\nscenario.\n\n- **Moderate** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2025, increasing linearly to $50 per\nton of CO2 in 2035 but exempting the road transportation sector.\n\n\n2 Expressed in USD. The prices are still relatively high in local currency due to depreciation of the exchange rate.\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "fossil fuel prices, [2] however, may give the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher carbon\ntax without increasing energy prices relative to recently observed levels. As for local emissions,\nChile is a pioneer in levying taxes on local air pollutants such as particular matter (PM2.5),\nnitrogen oxide (NOx), and sulphur dioxide (SO2), which directly affect communities in areas\nwhere emitter industries are located.\n\nBefore increasing the tax rate and coverage, design issues that create economic distortions in the\npower sector should be corrected. First, the full amount of the carbon tax should be included in\nthe variable cost of all generation plants considered for the economic dispatch. This change\nwould allow the economic dispatch to effectively differentiate between plants with higher\nemissions and higher costs due to the carbon tax, and more competitive power plants with lower\nor zero emissions. Moreover, once that correction is made, the cross subsidy from utilities to\nmarginal or inframarginal fossil fuel-based power plants should automatically disappear.\n\nThe green tax on mobile sources has a very narrow coverage and includes multiple exemptions.\nThis is problematic because the transport sector is one of the main emitters in the country.\nMoreover, excises and other fuel taxes in Chile have multiple distortions and have been found to\nbe highly inefficient. For example, taxes on diesel have a complex set of credits and exemptions,\nand much lower rates than on gasoline. As a result, Chile consumes almost double the amount of\ndiesel than the regional average on a per capita basis. This distortion could be corrected either\nby gradually bringing the excise rate on diesel on par with the one on gasoline, or by including\nthe transport sector in the improved carbon pricing options modeled in this analysis. A feebate\n(not discussed in detail in this report) can also be considered to promote decarbonization of the\nvehicle fleet in case higher fuel taxes becomes too contentious.\n\nBased on discussions with the authorities regarding the feasibility of carbon pricing\nimprovements within the current tax reform proposal, the mission presents four different\nscenarios that would bring Chile closer or in line with its Nationally Determined Contribution\n(NDC) for 2030, and the legally binding net-zero pledge for 2050. Under the base and social cost\nof carbon (SCC) cases, Chile would achieve is NDC target by 2030 and be on track to reach netzero by 2050. Under the moderate and hybrid scenarios, the county will be within 11 and 12\npercent of achieving its NDC. It is important to note, however, that additional measures under all\nscenarios considered here, such as improved energy efficiency policies, introduction of feebates\nschemes or faster adoption of low and zero emission sources for transport, power, and industry,\nwould further contribute to achieve climate goals. Below are the main assumptions under each\nscenario.\n\n- Moderate : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2025, increasing linearly to $50 per\nton of CO2 in 2035 but exempting the road transportation sector.\n\n2 Expressed in USD. The prices are still relatively high in local currency due to depreciation of the exchange rate.\n\n8", "text_characters": 2717}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- **Base case** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2024, increasing linearly to $60 per ton\nof CO2 in 2030. The carbon tax excludes gasoline and diesel, but the excise on diesel is\nincreased to bring the effective carbon rate equal to that of gasoline (starts from $0.05/liter\nin 2024 and increases linearly to $0.37/liter in 2030).\n\n\n- **Hybrid** : consists of two parts.\n\n\n - Carbon tax applies only to the power sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2 (current\nlevel) in 2024 and increases at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of CO2 in\n2027. It then increases with a steeper slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n\n - Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the industrial sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2\n(current level) in 2024, increasing at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of\nCO2 in 2027. It then increases with a higher slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n\n- **Social cost of carbon (SCC)** : economy-wide carbon tax starting from $35 per ton of CO2 in\n2024 and increasing linearly to $75 per ton of CO2 in 2030.\n\n\nThe following table summarizes the results for each scenario in 2030 in terms of emissions\nreduction, revenue raising potential, GDP and energy prices, distributional impacts among\nhouseholds, abetment costs and co-benefits.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Scenario|Base|Moderate|SCC|Hybrid|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Energy-related CO2 emissions**
**reduction in 2030,**% to a BAU|17%|7%|16%|6%|\n|**Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions**
**in 2024-2030,**MtCO2|51|20|59|17|\n|**Additional fiscal revenues raised in**
**2030,**% of GDP|1.61|0.81|1.55|0.92|\n|**Cumulative additional fiscal revenues**
**raised in 2024-2030,**bn USD|25.3|7.4|29.1|12.3|\n|**Impact on GDP growth in 2030,**
percentage points deviation from the
BAU growth|-0.09%|-0.08%|-0.06%|-0.08%|\n|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the BAU price|24%|22%|25%|22%|\n|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the current price|-4%|-6%|-3%|-5%|\n|**Industrial electricity price increase in**
**2030,**percent from the BAU price|27%|24%|28%|24%|\n|**Industrial electricity price increase in**
**2030,**percent from the current price|-19%|-20%|-17%|-20%|\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2421875, 390.010009765625, 539.9017944335938, 717.0159912109375], "columns": 5, "rows": 10}], "text": "- Base case : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2024, increasing linearly to $60 per ton\nof CO2 in 2030. The carbon tax excludes gasoline and diesel, but the excise on diesel is\nincreased to bring the effective carbon rate equal to that of gasoline (starts from $0.05/liter\nin 2024 and increases linearly to $0.37/liter in 2030).\n\n- Hybrid : consists of two parts.\n\n - Carbon tax applies only to the power sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2 (current\nlevel) in 2024 and increases at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of CO2 in\n2027. It then increases with a steeper slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n - Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the industrial sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2\n(current level) in 2024, increasing at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of\nCO2 in 2027. It then increases with a higher slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n- Social cost of carbon (SCC) : economy-wide carbon tax starting from $35 per ton of CO2 in\n2024 and increasing linearly to $75 per ton of CO2 in 2030.\n\nThe following table summarizes the results for each scenario in 2030 in terms of emissions\nreduction, revenue raising potential, GDP and energy prices, distributional impacts among\nhouseholds, abetment costs and co-benefits.\n\n Scenario Base Moderate SCC Hybrid \n\n Energy-related CO2 emissions reduction in 2030,% to a BAU 17% 7% 16% 6% \n Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions in 2024-2030,MtCO2 51 20 59 17 \n Additional fiscal revenues raised in 2030,% of GDP 1.61 0.81 1.55 0.92 \n Cumulative additional fiscal revenues raised in 2024-2030,bn USD 25.3 7.4 29.1 12.3 \n Impact on GDP growth in 2030, percentage points deviation from the BAU growth -0.09% -0.08% -0.06% -0.08% \n Residential electricity price increase in 2030, percent from the BAU price 24% 22% 25% 22% \n Residential electricity price increase in 2030, percent from the current price -4% -6% -3% -5% \n Industrial electricity price increase in 2030,percent from the BAU price 27% 24% 28% 24% \n Industrial electricity price increase in 2030,percent from the current price -19% -20% -17% -20% \n\n9", "text_characters": 1720}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Relative mean consumption effect on
the poorest after revenue recycling3,
% of BAU consumption|11.9|5.9|11.7|4.5|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Pure abatement costs**, % of GDP|0.35|0.07|0.32|0.06|\n|**Domestic co-benefits**(transport, air
pollution, climate), % of GDP|0.62|0.24|0.57|0.15|\n\n\n\n3 Using 30 percent of revenues to compensate four bottom income deciles overcompensates the poorest\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2040023803711, 71.99603271484375, 539.9400024414062, 171.7799835205078], "columns": 5, "rows": 3}], "text": "Relative mean consumption effect on the poorest after revenue recycling3, % of BAU consumption 11.9 5.9 11.7 4.5 \n\n Pure abatement costs, % of GDP 0.35 0.07 0.32 0.06 \n Domestic co-benefits(transport, air pollution, climate), % of GDP 0.62 0.24 0.57 0.15 \n\n3 Using 30 percent of revenues to compensate four bottom income deciles overcompensates the poorest\n\n10", "text_characters": 297}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n**1.** **The Chilean authorities requested the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) to**\n**evaluate options for improving green taxes and in particular the direct tax on carbon**\n**dioxide (CO2) emissions.** This report assesses different scenarios to gradually increase the\nexisting carbon tax and bring the country closer to or in line with its Nationally Determined\nContribution (NDC) for 2030, and the legally binding net-zero pledge for 2050. The authorities\nexpect the carbon tax to continue to be a central piece of Chile’s green taxes package introduced\nin 2014, even if reviews are done periodically to ensure the country’s climate objectives are met.\n\n\n**2.** **A higher carbon tax is part of a broader tax reform the government is currently**\n**debating in Congress.** The proposed reform is ambitious, targeting net gains of 3.5 percent of\nGDP by 2026 to finance additional social spending. The reform also aims to make the tax system\nmore progressive, simplify and lower compliance costs, and promote a greener economy. The\nauthorities have not published an official revenue target for the carbon tax, but they informed\nthe mission that corrective taxes, which combine green, health and territorial taxes, could raise,\naccording to preliminary estimates, up to 0.5 percent of GDP.\n\n\n**3.** **While Chile is committed to climate action, including a comprehensive institutional**\n**framework, multiple policy tools and setting specific emission reduction targets, the**\n**carbon tax needs to be strengthened to meet climate objectives.** In 2014, Chile became the\nfirst Latin-American country to introduce green taxes on both carbon emissions and local\npollutants, as well as on sales of new light-duty vehicles based on fuel efficiency and nitrogen\noxides (NOx) emissions. In 2019, Chile was also the first country in Latin America to issue green\nbonds and to announce the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants by 2040. In addition, the\nfinancial strategy for climate change published in December 2019 aims to develop a framework\nfor measuring green components in the budget and capacity building for green finance in the\nprivate sector. Moreover, in April 2020 Chile presented an updated NDC to the United Nations\nFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with emissions peaking in 2025 and\nreaching 95 million tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq) by 2030 (i.e., a 30 to 45 percent reduction\nfrom 2016 levels). Finally, in June 2022 the country published the Framework Law on Climate\nChange, which, makes carbon neutrality legally binding by 2050. However, at $5 per ton of\nCO2eq, the existing carbon tax remains low and needs to be significantly increased to achieve the\ncountry climate and fiscal goals.\n\n\n**4.** **Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially**\n**considering the global increase in energy prices observed in 2021 and first half of 2022.**\nFossil fuel prices increased sharply during 2021 and the first half of 2022, largely as a result of the\nwar in Ukraine, resulting in higher prices of electricity and refined products for households and\nfirms in many jurisdictions. Although prices have retreated somewhat recently, energy prices\ncontinue to be well-above pre-pandemic levels. The expected fall in fossil fuel prices may give\nthe government an opportunity to lock-in a higher carbon tax without increasing energy prices\nrelative to recently observed levels. In any case, well targeted assistance to low-income\nhouseholds and energy-intensive or trade exposed sectors may be needed.\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. The Chilean authorities requested the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) to\nevaluate options for improving green taxes and in particular the direct tax on carbon\ndioxide (CO2) emissions. This report assesses different scenarios to gradually increase the\nexisting carbon tax and bring the country closer to or in line with its Nationally Determined\nContribution (NDC) for 2030, and the legally binding net-zero pledge for 2050. The authorities\nexpect the carbon tax to continue to be a central piece of Chile’s green taxes package introduced\nin 2014, even if reviews are done periodically to ensure the country’s climate objectives are met.\n\n2. A higher carbon tax is part of a broader tax reform the government is currently\ndebating in Congress. The proposed reform is ambitious, targeting net gains of 3.5 percent of\nGDP by 2026 to finance additional social spending. The reform also aims to make the tax system\nmore progressive, simplify and lower compliance costs, and promote a greener economy. The\nauthorities have not published an official revenue target for the carbon tax, but they informed\nthe mission that corrective taxes, which combine green, health and territorial taxes, could raise,\naccording to preliminary estimates, up to 0.5 percent of GDP.\n\n3. While Chile is committed to climate action, including a comprehensive institutional\nframework, multiple policy tools and setting specific emission reduction targets, the\ncarbon tax needs to be strengthened to meet climate objectives. In 2014, Chile became the\nfirst Latin-American country to introduce green taxes on both carbon emissions and local\npollutants, as well as on sales of new light-duty vehicles based on fuel efficiency and nitrogen\noxides (NOx) emissions. In 2019, Chile was also the first country in Latin America to issue green\nbonds and to announce the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants by 2040. In addition, the\nfinancial strategy for climate change published in December 2019 aims to develop a framework\nfor measuring green components in the budget and capacity building for green finance in the\nprivate sector. Moreover, in April 2020 Chile presented an updated NDC to the United Nations\nFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with emissions peaking in 2025 and\nreaching 95 million tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq) by 2030 (i.e., a 30 to 45 percent reduction\nfrom 2016 levels). Finally, in June 2022 the country published the Framework Law on Climate\nChange, which, makes carbon neutrality legally binding by 2050. However, at $5 per ton of\nCO2eq, the existing carbon tax remains low and needs to be significantly increased to achieve the\ncountry climate and fiscal goals.\n\n4. Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially\nconsidering the global increase in energy prices observed in 2021 and first half of 2022.\nFossil fuel prices increased sharply during 2021 and the first half of 2022, largely as a result of the\nwar in Ukraine, resulting in higher prices of electricity and refined products for households and\nfirms in many jurisdictions. Although prices have retreated somewhat recently, energy prices\ncontinue to be well-above pre-pandemic levels. The expected fall in fossil fuel prices may give\nthe government an opportunity to lock-in a higher carbon tax without increasing energy prices\nrelative to recently observed levels. In any case, well targeted assistance to low-income\nhouseholds and energy-intensive or trade exposed sectors may be needed.\n\n11", "text_characters": 2962}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**5.** **This report builds on ongoing work done by FAD and the Western Hemisphere**\n**Department (WHD) and uses the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) developed jointly**\n**by IMF and World Bank staff.** CPAT projects fuel use and CO2 emissions by major energy\nsectors in Chile, including a model of investment and dispatch in the power sector, and\nassumptions about the price responsiveness of electricity demand and fuel use in other sectors\nthat are representative of the broader climate modelling literature. The analysis also discusses\ninternational mitigation practices, while assessing different scenarios to gradually strengthen the\nexisting carbon tax. Each scenario includes the tax effects on GDP and fiscal revenue, energy\nconsumption and emissions reduction, distributional impact and incidence on households and\nfirms, as well as other domestic environmental co-benefits. The scenarios are intended to bring\nemissions in Chile close to or in line with its NDC by 2030 and the carbon neutrality commitment\nby midcentury. Separately, the mission also discusses other alternative mitigation instruments\nand revenue recycling options that could be used to complement green taxes.\n\n\n**6.** **The report is structured as follows:** Chapter II provides an overview of the current state\nof emissions globally, as well as energy prices, and emissions trends and targets in Chile; Chapter\nIII reviews existing green taxes and evaluates their performance and selected design issues;\nChapter IV presents different scenarios to expand the carbon tax in Chile using the CPAT\nmethodology; Finally, Chapter V discusses options for revenue recycling.\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "5. This report builds on ongoing work done by FAD and the Western Hemisphere\nDepartment (WHD) and uses the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) developed jointly\nby IMF and World Bank staff. CPAT projects fuel use and CO2 emissions by major energy\nsectors in Chile, including a model of investment and dispatch in the power sector, and\nassumptions about the price responsiveness of electricity demand and fuel use in other sectors\nthat are representative of the broader climate modelling literature. The analysis also discusses\ninternational mitigation practices, while assessing different scenarios to gradually strengthen the\nexisting carbon tax. Each scenario includes the tax effects on GDP and fiscal revenue, energy\nconsumption and emissions reduction, distributional impact and incidence on households and\nfirms, as well as other domestic environmental co-benefits. The scenarios are intended to bring\nemissions in Chile close to or in line with its NDC by 2030 and the carbon neutrality commitment\nby midcentury. Separately, the mission also discusses other alternative mitigation instruments\nand revenue recycling options that could be used to complement green taxes.\n\n6. The report is structured as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of the current state\nof emissions globally, as well as energy prices, and emissions trends and targets in Chile; Chapter\nIII reviews existing green taxes and evaluates their performance and selected design issues;\nChapter IV presents different scenarios to expand the carbon tax in Chile using the CPAT\nmethodology; Finally, Chapter V discusses options for revenue recycling.\n\n12", "text_characters": 1383}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0014-001"], "markdown": "### **II. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND** **TARGETS**\n\n##### **A. Global Context**\n\n**7.** **Maintaining the 1.5** **[o]** **C target alive—the main goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement—**\n**requires additional efforts as the world battles an energy price crisis in the wake of the**\n**post COVID-19 economic recovery.** Global CO2 projections and pathways to achieve climate\ntargets suggest that CO2 and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must be cut by 50 to 25\npercent, respectively, below 2019 levels by 2030. This reduction should be followed by a\ntransition to net zero emissions or negative net emissions to limit global warning to 1.5 – 2.0 [o] C.\nWith existing policies, however, the base case projections imply that global CO2 emissions will\nrise from 30 billion tons in 2020 to about 37 billion by 2030, while containing global warming to\n1.5 – 2.0°C above pre-industrial levels requires CO2 emissions to be limited to about 15 to 25\nbillion tons in 2030 (see Figure 1). If action is not taken soon at a global scale, the window of\nopportunity for containing global warming will close. In addition, the global energy crisis may\nexert additional pressure on emission reduction efforts in the near-term, as some countries have\nreverted to fossil fuel power generation to guarantee energy supply.\n\n\n**Figure 1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**8.** **The number of countries pledging to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 has**\n**continued to increase in recent years.** Leading up to the Glasgow climate conference (COP26)\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "II. OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS, TRENDS AND TARGETS\nA. Global Context\n\n7. Maintaining the 1.5 [o] C target alive—the main goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement—\nrequires additional efforts as the world battles an energy price crisis in the wake of the\npost COVID-19 economic recovery. Global CO2 projections and pathways to achieve climate\ntargets suggest that CO2 and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must be cut by 50 to 25\npercent, respectively, below 2019 levels by 2030. This reduction should be followed by a\ntransition to net zero emissions or negative net emissions to limit global warning to 1.5 – 2.0 [o] C.\nWith existing policies, however, the base case projections imply that global CO2 emissions will\nrise from 30 billion tons in 2020 to about 37 billion by 2030, while containing global warming to\n1.5 – 2.0°C above pre-industrial levels requires CO2 emissions to be limited to about 15 to 25\nbillion tons in 2030 (see Figure 1). If action is not taken soon at a global scale, the window of\nopportunity for containing global warming will close. In addition, the global energy crisis may\nexert additional pressure on emission reduction efforts in the near-term, as some countries have\nreverted to fossil fuel power generation to guarantee energy supply.\n\nFigure 1. CO2 Emission and Global Pathways\n\n8. The number of countries pledging to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 has\ncontinued to increase in recent years. Leading up to the Glasgow climate conference (COP26)\n\n13", "text_characters": 1230}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "in November 2021, several countries updated their NDCs as part of the first five-yearly iteration\nof the Paris Agreement’s “ratchet mechanism”. According to the UNFCCC, as of October 12, 2021,\nthere were 116 new or updated NDCs, and a total of 165 NDCs representing all 192 parties to the\nAgreement and covering 94.1 per cent of total global emissions in 2019. These emissions are\nestimated at 52.4 Gt CO2 eq excluding land use and land use change and forestry (LULUCF). [4]\nMore than 70 countries, which account for 76 percent of global emissions, have committed to\nnet-zero emissions by midcentury [5], including most of the largest emitters such as Canada, the\nEuropean Union, Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States (all 2050), and China\n(2060).\n\n\n**9.** **At an aggregate level, however, updated commitments remain insufficient and**\n**more ambitious near-term targets and policy action are needed to limit global warming** .\nAccording to the UN, current national climate plans – for all 193 Parties to the Paris Agreement\ntaken together – would lead to a sizable increase of almost 14% in global GHG by 2030,\ncompared to 2010 levels. [6] There is an urgent need to match near-term ambition with credible\npolicy action, as the updated NDCs remain insufficient to meet the Paris target of limiting global\nwarming to “well below 2°C”. Moreover, many countries have stated their 2030 emission goals in\nterms of percentage reductions or absolute emissions targets by 2030 but few have provided\ndetails on how to achieve those objectives. In addition, even if countries further tighten their\n2030 pledges, there is no automatic mechanism ensuring commitments are achieved.\n\n\n**10.** **A 2021 report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)** **[7]**\n**stated that global warming of 1.2** **[o]** **C is caused by man-made factors and warming is**\n**happening faster than previously projected.** The raise in temperatures is also causing a wide\nrange of disruptive climate-related impacts, including heatwaves, droughts, floods, hurricanes,\nand higher sea levels. The frequency and severity of these phenomena are likely to intensify as\ntemperatures continue to raise. Moreover, a 2018 IPCC report [8] had already warned that the risk\nof tipping points in the global climate system (e.g., runaway warming from release of\nunderground methane, collapse of major ice sheets, shutting down of ocean circulatory systems,\ndestruction of the natural world) is likely to increase exponentially with warming above 1.5 [o] C.\n\n\n**11.** **Against this background, the IMF has proposed an international carbon price floor**\n**(ICPF) with a realistic prospect of catalyzing the needed global action in the next decade.** **[9]**\n\n\n4 See “ _Update of the Key Findings of the NDC Synthesis Report - published 25 October 2021”_\n[https://unfccc.int/documents/307628](https://unfccc.int/documents/307628)\n\n[5 See https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition)\n\n6 Ibid\n\n7 IPCC, 2021. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,\n[Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1](http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1)\n\n8 IPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland.\n\n9 See _“Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor among Large Emitters IMF Staff Climate Notes 2021/001”_\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "in November 2021, several countries updated their NDCs as part of the first five-yearly iteration\nof the Paris Agreement’s “ratchet mechanism”. According to the UNFCCC, as of October 12, 2021,\nthere were 116 new or updated NDCs, and a total of 165 NDCs representing all 192 parties to the\nAgreement and covering 94.1 per cent of total global emissions in 2019. These emissions are\nestimated at 52.4 Gt CO2 eq excluding land use and land use change and forestry (LULUCF). [4]\nMore than 70 countries, which account for 76 percent of global emissions, have committed to\nnet-zero emissions by midcentury [5], including most of the largest emitters such as Canada, the\nEuropean Union, Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States (all 2050), and China\n(2060).\n\n9. At an aggregate level, however, updated commitments remain insufficient and\nmore ambitious near-term targets and policy action are needed to limit global warming .\nAccording to the UN, current national climate plans – for all 193 Parties to the Paris Agreement\ntaken together – would lead to a sizable increase of almost 14% in global GHG by 2030,\ncompared to 2010 levels. [6] There is an urgent need to match near-term ambition with credible\npolicy action, as the updated NDCs remain insufficient to meet the Paris target of limiting global\nwarming to “well below 2°C”. Moreover, many countries have stated their 2030 emission goals in\nterms of percentage reductions or absolute emissions targets by 2030 but few have provided\ndetails on how to achieve those objectives. In addition, even if countries further tighten their\n2030 pledges, there is no automatic mechanism ensuring commitments are achieved.\n\n10. A 2021 report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [7]\nstated that global warming of 1.2 [o] C is caused by man-made factors and warming is\nhappening faster than previously projected. The raise in temperatures is also causing a wide\nrange of disruptive climate-related impacts, including heatwaves, droughts, floods, hurricanes,\nand higher sea levels. The frequency and severity of these phenomena are likely to intensify as\ntemperatures continue to raise. Moreover, a 2018 IPCC report [8] had already warned that the risk\nof tipping points in the global climate system (e.g., runaway warming from release of\nunderground methane, collapse of major ice sheets, shutting down of ocean circulatory systems,\ndestruction of the natural world) is likely to increase exponentially with warming above 1.5 [o] C.\n\n11. Against this background, the IMF has proposed an international carbon price floor\n(ICPF) with a realistic prospect of catalyzing the needed global action in the next decade. [9]\n\n4 See “ _Update of the Key Findings of the NDC Synthesis Report - published 25 October 2021”_\nhttps://unfccc.int/documents/307628\n\n5 See https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition\n\n6 Ibid\n\n7 IPCC, 2021. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,\nGeneva, Switzerland. Available at: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1\n\n8 IPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland.\n\n9 See _“Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor among Large Emitters IMF Staff Climate Notes 2021/001”_\n\n14", "text_characters": 2765}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The ICPF has four key components: (i) it would be negotiated between a small number of key\nlarge emitting countries, (ii) negotiation would focus on the minimum carbon price that each\nmust put on their CO2 emissions, (iii) it would address equity concerns through differentiated\nprice floors and transfers, and (iv) accommodate other policies with equivalent emissions impacts\nas minimum price floor requirements. Ratcheting up ambition among a smaller group of\ncountries, especially the large emitters, would be more straightforward than a global agreement,\nand regional carbon price floors would also be a possibility. For example, several countries in\nLatin American have implemented carbon taxes at modest levels (e.g., Argentina, Chile,\nColombia, Mexico) and several countries in Asia and Pacific have implemented or are considering\ncarbon pricing (e.g., China, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam). Regional carbon price\nfloor arrangements could facilitate a scaling up of these country level initiatives and provide\nvaluable experience for developing a global price floor arrangement. Moreover, the prospect of a\nregional agreement may also encourage individual countries to align their carbon pricing\nmechanism with the regional or ICPF level.\n\n\n**12.** **IMF analytical work also suggests that additional measures equivalent to a global**\n**carbon price exceeding $75 per ton by 2030 are needed to limit global warming below**\n**2C.** **[10]** This is especially true for large emitters. G20 countries should adopt measures equivalent\nto a carbon price of over $75 per ton by 2030, on top of existing policies, to cut emissions at\nleast 30 percent below business as usual (BAU) levels.\n\n##### **B. Emissions in Chile**\n\n\n**13.** **Energy-related emissions accounted for 71 percent of Chile’s 120 MtCO2 GHG**\n**emissions in 2020, excluding LULUCF emissions.** The largest polluting sector in Chile is power\ngeneration (27%), followed by industry (20%), transport (19%), waste (11%), agriculture and\nindustrial processes (each 9%), and buildings (5%). LULUCF emissions were estimated at negative\n58 MtCO2eq, although measurement is less accurate and more contentious than for energyrelated ones.\n\n\n10 See _“Not Yet on Track to Net Zero: The Urgent Need for Greater Ambition and Policy Action to Achieve Paris_\n_Temperature Goals”_\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The ICPF has four key components: (i) it would be negotiated between a small number of key\nlarge emitting countries, (ii) negotiation would focus on the minimum carbon price that each\nmust put on their CO2 emissions, (iii) it would address equity concerns through differentiated\nprice floors and transfers, and (iv) accommodate other policies with equivalent emissions impacts\nas minimum price floor requirements. Ratcheting up ambition among a smaller group of\ncountries, especially the large emitters, would be more straightforward than a global agreement,\nand regional carbon price floors would also be a possibility. For example, several countries in\nLatin American have implemented carbon taxes at modest levels (e.g., Argentina, Chile,\nColombia, Mexico) and several countries in Asia and Pacific have implemented or are considering\ncarbon pricing (e.g., China, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam). Regional carbon price\nfloor arrangements could facilitate a scaling up of these country level initiatives and provide\nvaluable experience for developing a global price floor arrangement. Moreover, the prospect of a\nregional agreement may also encourage individual countries to align their carbon pricing\nmechanism with the regional or ICPF level.\n\n12. IMF analytical work also suggests that additional measures equivalent to a global\ncarbon price exceeding $75 per ton by 2030 are needed to limit global warming below\n2C. [10] This is especially true for large emitters. G20 countries should adopt measures equivalent\nto a carbon price of over $75 per ton by 2030, on top of existing policies, to cut emissions at\nleast 30 percent below business as usual (BAU) levels.\nB. Emissions in Chile\n\n13. Energy-related emissions accounted for 71 percent of Chile’s 120 MtCO2 GHG\nemissions in 2020, excluding LULUCF emissions. The largest polluting sector in Chile is power\ngeneration (27%), followed by industry (20%), transport (19%), waste (11%), agriculture and\nindustrial processes (each 9%), and buildings (5%). LULUCF emissions were estimated at negative\n58 MtCO2eq, although measurement is less accurate and more contentious than for energyrelated ones.\n\n10 See _“Not Yet on Track to Net Zero: The Urgent Need for Greater Ambition and Policy Action to Achieve Paris_\n_Temperature Goals”_\n\n15", "text_characters": 1953}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-001", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0017-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 2. GHG Emissions in 2020 by Source**\n\n\nSource: IMF/EDGAR/FAO/UNFCCC\n**14.** **GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in Chile grew 50 percent between 2000 and 2018.**\nMost of the emissions growth comes from the power generation, which grew by 122 percent\nbetween 2000 and 2018 period, and transport which grew by 66 percent in the period. Industry\nand industrial processes emissions together increased by 29 percent in the same period, while\nagricultural emissions decreased by 14 percent.\n\n\n**Figure 3. Historical GHG Emissions, 2000-2018**\n\n\n**15.** **In the power sector, fossil fuels accounted for 53 percent of electricity generation**\n**in 2020, decreasing from 60 percent in 2010.** However, in absolute terms, generation from\nfossil fuels increased by 20 percent, from 36 TWh to 43 TWh. Generation shares for coal, gas, and\noil were 31, 18, and 4 percent respectively in 2020. Hydro power accounted for a quarter of\nelectricity output, and solar and wind power reached 9 and 7 percent, respectively. Chile has\nsuccessfully promoted an expansion of the power generating capacity with the incorporation of\n\n\n16\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0801, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(187.3000030517578, 86.47000122070312, 442.6600036621094, 238.57000732421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 324, "number": 8, "size": 32796, "transform": [255.36000061035156, 0.0, -0.0, 152.10000610351562, 187.3000030517578, 86.47000122070312], "width": 544, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 2. GHG Emissions in 2020 by Source\n\nSource: IMF/EDGAR/FAO/UNFCCC\n14. GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in Chile grew 50 percent between 2000 and 2018.\nMost of the emissions growth comes from the power generation, which grew by 122 percent\nbetween 2000 and 2018 period, and transport which grew by 66 percent in the period. Industry\nand industrial processes emissions together increased by 29 percent in the same period, while\nagricultural emissions decreased by 14 percent.\n\nFigure 3. Historical GHG Emissions, 2000-2018\n\n15. In the power sector, fossil fuels accounted for 53 percent of electricity generation\nin 2020, decreasing from 60 percent in 2010. However, in absolute terms, generation from\nfossil fuels increased by 20 percent, from 36 TWh to 43 TWh. Generation shares for coal, gas, and\noil were 31, 18, and 4 percent respectively in 2020. Hydro power accounted for a quarter of\nelectricity output, and solar and wind power reached 9 and 7 percent, respectively. Chile has\nsuccessfully promoted an expansion of the power generating capacity with the incorporation of\n\n16", "text_characters": 909}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "variable renewable energy over the past 10 years, increasing the share of solar and wind energy\nfrom zero to 16 percent.\n\n\n**Figure 4. Electricity Generation by Source, 1990-2020**\n\n##### **C. Energy Prices in Chile**\n\n\n**16.** **Effective carbon pricing via excises in Chile does apply to transport sector fuels,**\n**albeit at comparative low levels and with multiple distortions.** While Table 1 shows that the\neffective tax rate [11] in the transport sector is higher than in other sectors, there is a significant\ndifference between the tax rates for gasoline and diesel. Gasoline’s effective rate is $200 per ton\nof CO2, while diesel’s effective rate is more than three times lower.\n\n\n**Table 1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector/fuel type|Power
Other
Natural fossil
Coal gas fuels|Industry
Other
Natural fossil
Coal gas fuels|Transport
Other
Gasoline Diesel products|Buildings
Other
fossil
fuels|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Share in CO2**
**emissions, %**
**Effective fuel tax,**
**$/tCO2**|32%
7%
2%
5.2
5.2
21.8|3%
5%
12%
5.2
5.2
46.4|11%
16%
3%
200.7
58.9
9.0
|9%
53.3|\n\n\nSource: IMF staff calculations\n\n**17.** **Gasoline and diesel’s effective carbon tax rates are among the lowest in the OECD**\n**(see Figure 5).** The effective carbon tax rate for gasoline in Chile is higher only than a handful of\ncountries, remaining as one of the lowest in the OECD. The effective carbon tax rate on diesel is\neven lower, just ahead of Costa-Rica and Colombia.\n\n\n11 The coverage of the existing carbon tax is 29.4% and is expected to increase to 40% after recent changes in\nlegislation\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16085815429688, 488.7196350097656, 539.981689453125, 567.8737182617188], "columns": 5, "rows": 2}], "text": "variable renewable energy over the past 10 years, increasing the share of solar and wind energy\nfrom zero to 16 percent.\n\nFigure 4. Electricity Generation by Source, 1990-2020\nC. Energy Prices in Chile\n\n16. Effective carbon pricing via excises in Chile does apply to transport sector fuels,\nalbeit at comparative low levels and with multiple distortions. While Table 1 shows that the\neffective tax rate [11] in the transport sector is higher than in other sectors, there is a significant\ndifference between the tax rates for gasoline and diesel. Gasoline’s effective rate is $200 per ton\nof CO2, while diesel’s effective rate is more than three times lower.\n\nTable 1. Effective Carbon Rates in Chile, 2020\n\n Sector/fuel type Power Other Natural fossil Coal gas fuels Industry Other Natural fossil Coal gas fuels Transport Other Gasoline Diesel products Buildings Other fossil fuels \n\n Share in CO2 emissions, % Effective fuel tax, $/tCO2 32% 7% 2% 5.2 5.2 21.8 3% 5% 12% 5.2 5.2 46.4 11% 16% 3% 200.7 58.9 9.0 9% 53.3 \n\nSource: IMF staff calculations\n\n17. Gasoline and diesel’s effective carbon tax rates are among the lowest in the OECD\n(see Figure 5). The effective carbon tax rate for gasoline in Chile is higher only than a handful of\ncountries, remaining as one of the lowest in the OECD. The effective carbon tax rate on diesel is\neven lower, just ahead of Costa-Rica and Colombia.\n\n11 The coverage of the existing carbon tax is 29.4% and is expected to increase to 40% after recent changes in\nlegislation\n\n17", "text_characters": 1246}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**18.** **The Fuel Price Stabilization Mechanism (MEPCO) limits domestic price fluctuations**\n**on gasoline and diesel despite changes in international fuel prices.** Effectively, the taxation\non diesel and gasoline changes depending on international oil prices and the exchange rate, and\nin some cases, it can turn into a negative tax (subsidy). Since 2014, the year when MEPCO started\nto operate in its actual form, changes in retail gasoline and diesel prices have deviated from\nchanges in international oil price (see Figure 6).\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 5. Effective Carbon Rates for Gasoline and Diesel in 2020, OECD\n\n18. The Fuel Price Stabilization Mechanism (MEPCO) limits domestic price fluctuations\non gasoline and diesel despite changes in international fuel prices. Effectively, the taxation\non diesel and gasoline changes depending on international oil prices and the exchange rate, and\nin some cases, it can turn into a negative tax (subsidy). Since 2014, the year when MEPCO started\nto operate in its actual form, changes in retail gasoline and diesel prices have deviated from\nchanges in international oil price (see Figure 6).\n\n18", "text_characters": 501}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-001", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0020-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n##### **D. Emissions Targets in Chile**\n\n**19.** **As a contribution to the Paris Agreement, Chile has pledged to reduce GHG**\n**emissions to 95 MtCO2eq by 2030 in its updated NDC.** This is a significant increase in\nambition compared to the first NDC submission, which pledged a reduction of emissions to 123\nMtCO2eq. The updated NDC commits to GHG budget not exceeding 1100 MtCO2eq in 20202030 with a peak in 2025. Additionally, Chile committed to reduce black carbon emissions by 25\npercent in 2030 vs. 2016 levels. According to IMF staff projections, the 2015 NDC target would be\nreached in the baseline (i.e., it is unambitious), while the updated NDC target will require an 18\npercent reduction in GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in 2030, relative to the baseline.\n\n\n**Figure 7. GHG Emissions vs Paris Pledge (NDC) and Net Zero Emissions Pathway**\n\n\n19\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 6. Historical Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices vs International Oil Price\nD. Emissions Targets in Chile\n\n19. As a contribution to the Paris Agreement, Chile has pledged to reduce GHG\nemissions to 95 MtCO2eq by 2030 in its updated NDC. This is a significant increase in\nambition compared to the first NDC submission, which pledged a reduction of emissions to 123\nMtCO2eq. The updated NDC commits to GHG budget not exceeding 1100 MtCO2eq in 20202030 with a peak in 2025. Additionally, Chile committed to reduce black carbon emissions by 25\npercent in 2030 vs. 2016 levels. According to IMF staff projections, the 2015 NDC target would be\nreached in the baseline (i.e., it is unambitious), while the updated NDC target will require an 18\npercent reduction in GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in 2030, relative to the baseline.\n\nFigure 7. GHG Emissions vs Paris Pledge (NDC) and Net Zero Emissions Pathway\n\n19", "text_characters": 757}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0021-001"], "markdown": "**20.** **Compared to other LAC6 countries, Chile’s new NDC is on par with other countries**\n**when expressed as a reduction to current levels, but less ambitious when shown as a**\n**reduction against the baseline.** Chile’s NDC implies an 18 percent reduction against the\nbaseline in 2030. Reductions in other countries in the region vary from 17 percent in Argentina to\n43 percent in Colombia. However, expressed as a reduction to current levels, the NDC implies 23\npercent reduction from 2021 GHG emissions, which is in line with other LAC6 countries (variation\nfrom 3 percent in Peru to 35 percent in Colombia).\n\n\n**Figure 8. Average NDC Pledges in LAC6 Countries**\n\n\n**21.** **Chile also has pledged to net-zero emissions by 2050, making this a legally binding**\n**commitment in the recently approved Framework Law on Climate Change.** Chile was the\nfirst country in Latin America to pledge net-zero emissions in 2020. The target covers all sectors\nand gases and proposes separate emissions reduction and removal targets. The net-zero target\nbecame legally binding in the Framework Law on Climate Change (June 2022).\n\n\n20\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "20. Compared to other LAC6 countries, Chile’s new NDC is on par with other countries\nwhen expressed as a reduction to current levels, but less ambitious when shown as a\nreduction against the baseline. Chile’s NDC implies an 18 percent reduction against the\nbaseline in 2030. Reductions in other countries in the region vary from 17 percent in Argentina to\n43 percent in Colombia. However, expressed as a reduction to current levels, the NDC implies 23\npercent reduction from 2021 GHG emissions, which is in line with other LAC6 countries (variation\nfrom 3 percent in Peru to 35 percent in Colombia).\n\nFigure 8. Average NDC Pledges in LAC6 Countries\n\n21. Chile also has pledged to net-zero emissions by 2050, making this a legally binding\ncommitment in the recently approved Framework Law on Climate Change. Chile was the\nfirst country in Latin America to pledge net-zero emissions in 2020. The target covers all sectors\nand gases and proposes separate emissions reduction and removal targets. The net-zero target\nbecame legally binding in the Framework Law on Climate Change (June 2022).\n\n20", "text_characters": 910}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **III. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE**\n\n##### **A. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework**\n\n**22.** **Chile passed a general tax law in 2014 that introduced green taxes on annual CO2**\n**emissions and local pollutants from stationary sources, as well as a tax on mobile**\n**sources.** **[12]** The tax on stationary sources, as it is applied currently, has two components: a levy of\nUS$5 per ton of CO2 (i.e., a standard carbon tax) and a local pollution charge, which taxes air\npollutants such as particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and Sulphur dioxide (SO2)\nbased on population and local pollution conditions. In the case mobile sources, the tax is a\nfunction of the vehicle’s fuel economy, NOx and the vehicle price.\n\n\n**23.** **The direct carbon tax is currently levied on CO2 emissions from stationary sources**\n**with a thermal capacity of 50 megawatts (MW) or higher.** These include thermal plants for\npower generation, as well as emissions from boilers used in industrial processes in pulp and\npaper, fisheries, mining and other sectors. In the case of local pollutants, the tax is levied on the\nsame entities subject to the direct carbon tax and is based on a formula that seeks to\ncompensate environmental externalities borne by local communities. The tax on mobile sources\nonly applies to light-duty vehicles and includes multiple exemptions.\n\n\n**24.** **Several institutions are involved in administering green taxes, including entities**\n**from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Transport and**\n**Telecommunications.** in the case of the tax on stationary sources, the Superintendency of the\nEnvironment (SMA) oversees the methodologies and the systems to monitor, verify and report\nthe emissions subject to the tax. In the case of the tax on mobile sources, fuel economy and NOx\nare determined by the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications according to the technical\ncharacteristics of each vehicle. The Ministry then provide the tax values for each vehicle to the\nInternal Revenue Service (SII). For both taxes, the SII receives the tax declaration of the\ncompanies or private agents subject to the tax, while the General Treasury (TGR) collects the\npayments. The institutional framework for both taxes and its operation are contained in Law\n20,780/2014 and regulations, a measurement protocol published by SMA, a notification system\nmanaged by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Transport, and both a registry and\nmonitoring, reporting and verification system operated by SMA.\n\n\n**25.** **The tax on stationary sources were first implemented in 2017.** According to the SII, in\nits first year of implementation the tax on stationary sources covered 58 taxpayers and raised\n$191 million, covering about 39 percent of total CO2eq emissions in Chile. Most of the revenue\ncame from CO2 emissions (88 percent) followed by PM2.5 (8.2 percent), NOx (3.1 percent), and\n\n\n12 See section 8 of Law 20.780 of 2014\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. EVALUATION OF GREEN TAXES IN CHILE\nA. Green Taxes, Legal and Institutional Framework\n\n22. Chile passed a general tax law in 2014 that introduced green taxes on annual CO2\nemissions and local pollutants from stationary sources, as well as a tax on mobile\nsources. [12] The tax on stationary sources, as it is applied currently, has two components: a levy of\nUS$5 per ton of CO2 (i.e., a standard carbon tax) and a local pollution charge, which taxes air\npollutants such as particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and Sulphur dioxide (SO2)\nbased on population and local pollution conditions. In the case mobile sources, the tax is a\nfunction of the vehicle’s fuel economy, NOx and the vehicle price.\n\n23. The direct carbon tax is currently levied on CO2 emissions from stationary sources\nwith a thermal capacity of 50 megawatts (MW) or higher. These include thermal plants for\npower generation, as well as emissions from boilers used in industrial processes in pulp and\npaper, fisheries, mining and other sectors. In the case of local pollutants, the tax is levied on the\nsame entities subject to the direct carbon tax and is based on a formula that seeks to\ncompensate environmental externalities borne by local communities. The tax on mobile sources\nonly applies to light-duty vehicles and includes multiple exemptions.\n\n24. Several institutions are involved in administering green taxes, including entities\nfrom the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Transport and\nTelecommunications. in the case of the tax on stationary sources, the Superintendency of the\nEnvironment (SMA) oversees the methodologies and the systems to monitor, verify and report\nthe emissions subject to the tax. In the case of the tax on mobile sources, fuel economy and NOx\nare determined by the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications according to the technical\ncharacteristics of each vehicle. The Ministry then provide the tax values for each vehicle to the\nInternal Revenue Service (SII). For both taxes, the SII receives the tax declaration of the\ncompanies or private agents subject to the tax, while the General Treasury (TGR) collects the\npayments. The institutional framework for both taxes and its operation are contained in Law\n20,780/2014 and regulations, a measurement protocol published by SMA, a notification system\nmanaged by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Transport, and both a registry and\nmonitoring, reporting and verification system operated by SMA.\n\n25. The tax on stationary sources were first implemented in 2017. According to the SII, in\nits first year of implementation the tax on stationary sources covered 58 taxpayers and raised\n$191 million, covering about 39 percent of total CO2eq emissions in Chile. Most of the revenue\ncame from CO2 emissions (88 percent) followed by PM2.5 (8.2 percent), NOx (3.1 percent), and\n\n12 See section 8 of Law 20.780 of 2014\n\n21", "text_characters": 2448}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SO2 (0.9 percent). [13] In terms of sectors, power generation accounted for 53 percent of the\nrevenue, followed by trade with 21 percent and construction with 12 percent. Five years since its\nintroduction, revenue has decreased modestly although the composition has varied as a result of\na cleaner power sector. In 2021, the tax collected $186 million from 56 taxpayers. Power\ngeneration accounted for 45.8 percent of the revenue, followed by trade with 31 percent,\nconstruction with 13.1 percent and transport with 4.7 percent.\n\n\n**26.** **In February 2020, the Congress passed a Tax Modernization Law** **[14]** **that will expand**\n**the tax base for green taxes on stationary sources.** As of January 1 [st], 2023, the tax will no\nlonger be levied based on installed thermal capacity, but on a threshold of emissions partially or\ntotally released in combustion [15] processes. The tax will now apply to all stationary sources that\nannually emit 100 or more tons of PM2.5, or 25,000 or more tons of CO2. Emissions from hot\nwater boilers for personal use and generation units with a capacity of less than 500 kilowatts (kw)\nare exempted from the tax, as well emissions released from raw materials used in the production\nprocesses (i.e., process emissions). Independent studies done in the country estimate that these\nchanges will expand the tax coverage from 39 to 45 percent of CO2eq emissions [16] .\n\n\n**27.** **The Tax Modernization Law introduced a carbon offset mechanism that would**\n**allow companies to lower their carbon tax burden.** Starting on February 24, 2023, carbon\nemissions may be offset through emission reduction projects developed in Chile (or in the\nmunicipality in the case of local pollutants) and following standards to be defined and published\nby the Ministry of the Environment. The law establishes three general criteria for the projects to\nbe eligible for offsets. First, emission reductions must be additional to any environmental or\nsector regulation that the taxpayer is subject to. Second, the reduction in emissions should be\nmeasurable and verifiable by the Ministry of Environment. Finally, emission reductions projects\nshould operate throughout the time that the taxpayer is liable to the green tax. At the time of the\nmission, however, the Ministry of Environment has not issued the regulation for the offset\nmechanism.\n\n\n**28.** **The Framework Law for Climate Change approved in June 2022 introduced**\n**emission standards and tradable carbon credits (i.e., the basis for an Emissions Trading**\n**System (ETS)).** The Law provides for the Ministry of Environment to establish the maximum\n\n\n13 According to recent IMF estimates (Vernon and others, 2021), implicit subsidies – i.e., prices below externalities\ncosts - in Chile were about 8.2 bn USD in 2021, which is much higher than current collected revenues from the\ngreen taxes.\n\n14 Law N°21.210 of 2020\n\n15 Combustion is defined in the Law as a process of oxidation of solid, liquid, or gaseous substances or materials\nthat produce heat and in which energy is released to generate electricity, steam, or heat, except for raw materials\nused in the production processes.\n\n16 The Center for Climate Change, Energy and Environment of Universidad Católica estimate total emissions in\nChile are around 112 CO2eq million tons. The actual coverage of the tax is around 43 CO2eq million tons (38\npercent). The estimations with US$ 5/ton and the expansion of the base will add around $56 million or around 7\nCO2eq millions of tons more, which is around 45 percent.\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SO2 (0.9 percent). [13] In terms of sectors, power generation accounted for 53 percent of the\nrevenue, followed by trade with 21 percent and construction with 12 percent. Five years since its\nintroduction, revenue has decreased modestly although the composition has varied as a result of\na cleaner power sector. In 2021, the tax collected $186 million from 56 taxpayers. Power\ngeneration accounted for 45.8 percent of the revenue, followed by trade with 31 percent,\nconstruction with 13.1 percent and transport with 4.7 percent.\n\n26. In February 2020, the Congress passed a Tax Modernization Law [14] that will expand\nthe tax base for green taxes on stationary sources. As of January 1 [st], 2023, the tax will no\nlonger be levied based on installed thermal capacity, but on a threshold of emissions partially or\ntotally released in combustion [15] processes. The tax will now apply to all stationary sources that\nannually emit 100 or more tons of PM2.5, or 25,000 or more tons of CO2. Emissions from hot\nwater boilers for personal use and generation units with a capacity of less than 500 kilowatts (kw)\nare exempted from the tax, as well emissions released from raw materials used in the production\nprocesses (i.e., process emissions). Independent studies done in the country estimate that these\nchanges will expand the tax coverage from 39 to 45 percent of CO2eq emissions [16] .\n\n27. The Tax Modernization Law introduced a carbon offset mechanism that would\nallow companies to lower their carbon tax burden. Starting on February 24, 2023, carbon\nemissions may be offset through emission reduction projects developed in Chile (or in the\nmunicipality in the case of local pollutants) and following standards to be defined and published\nby the Ministry of the Environment. The law establishes three general criteria for the projects to\nbe eligible for offsets. First, emission reductions must be additional to any environmental or\nsector regulation that the taxpayer is subject to. Second, the reduction in emissions should be\nmeasurable and verifiable by the Ministry of Environment. Finally, emission reductions projects\nshould operate throughout the time that the taxpayer is liable to the green tax. At the time of the\nmission, however, the Ministry of Environment has not issued the regulation for the offset\nmechanism.\n\n28. The Framework Law for Climate Change approved in June 2022 introduced\nemission standards and tradable carbon credits (i.e., the basis for an Emissions Trading\nSystem (ETS)). The Law provides for the Ministry of Environment to establish the maximum\n\n13 According to recent IMF estimates (Vernon and others, 2021), implicit subsidies – i.e., prices below externalities\ncosts - in Chile were about 8.2 bn USD in 2021, which is much higher than current collected revenues from the\ngreen taxes.\n\n14 Law N°21.210 of 2020\n\n15 Combustion is defined in the Law as a process of oxidation of solid, liquid, or gaseous substances or materials\nthat produce heat and in which energy is released to generate electricity, steam, or heat, except for raw materials\nused in the production processes.\n\n16 The Center for Climate Change, Energy and Environment of Universidad Católica estimate total emissions in\nChile are around 112 CO2eq million tons. The actual coverage of the tax is around 43 CO2eq million tons (38\npercent). The estimations with US$ 5/ton and the expansion of the base will add around $56 million or around 7\nCO2eq millions of tons more, which is around 45 percent.\n\n22", "text_characters": 2923}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "amount of annual greenhouse gases, in CO2eq, that an emitting source or establishment may\nemit. These caps should be based on a reference emission standard by technology, sector and/or\nactivity in line with the national long-term climate strategy and the country NDC. Moreover, the\nLaw states that agents may comply, partially or wholly, with emission standards through carbon\ncredits from carbon reduction or absorption projects developed in Chile (or in the municipality in\nthe case of local pollutants). The Ministry of the Environment must also create, manage, and\nmaintain a public registry containing approved reduction or absorption projects, as well as\ncertificates of carbon credits which may be traded between agents. All transfers, purchases and\nvalues of these certificates must be recorded in this registry. While these regulations should be\nprepared within one year of the publication of the Law, at the time of the mission the Ministry of\nEnvironment was still working on them.\n\n\n**29.** **The Framework Law for Climate Change set the basis for GHG,** **as well as water use**\n**voluntary certification systems to avoid water waste.** In the case of GHG, the Ministry of the\nEnvironment is responsible for granting certificates regarding the measurement, management\nand reporting of GHG and local pollutants. The Ministry is also responsible for issuing reduction\nand absorption certificates, which are voluntarily requested and meet the criteria, methodologies\nand requirements established by regulation. Violations will be sanctioned in accordance with the\nprovisions of organic law of the SMA, including revoking certificates.\n\n##### **B. Revenue Performance**\n\n\n**30.** **Revenue from the green tax on stationary sources have slightly decreased over**\n**time and its composition has also changed.** Total annual revenue collected has not exceeded\n$200 million or about 0.06 percent of GDP and has declined by 1 percent per year since 2017. In\n2020, tax revenue recorded a sharp drop due to COVID19 pandemic, when the annual decline\nrate was at 6 percent. In 2021, revenues recovered by 6.5 percent but remained below 2017\nlevels.\n\n\n**31.** **Most of the revenues come from the power sector and CO2 emissions.** Electricity,\ngas, and water sector accounts for almost half of the collected revenues, while trade,\nconstruction and transportation make 26, 12, 5 percent of total collected revenues, respectively.\nOther sectors include forestry, communications, manufacturing, mining, financial and\nadministrative services, and personal services. About 89 percent of revenues come from CO2\nemissions (global pollutant), 7 percent – from PM2.5 emissions, and the shares of NOx and SO2\nemissions together are less than 5 percent.\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "amount of annual greenhouse gases, in CO2eq, that an emitting source or establishment may\nemit. These caps should be based on a reference emission standard by technology, sector and/or\nactivity in line with the national long-term climate strategy and the country NDC. Moreover, the\nLaw states that agents may comply, partially or wholly, with emission standards through carbon\ncredits from carbon reduction or absorption projects developed in Chile (or in the municipality in\nthe case of local pollutants). The Ministry of the Environment must also create, manage, and\nmaintain a public registry containing approved reduction or absorption projects, as well as\ncertificates of carbon credits which may be traded between agents. All transfers, purchases and\nvalues of these certificates must be recorded in this registry. While these regulations should be\nprepared within one year of the publication of the Law, at the time of the mission the Ministry of\nEnvironment was still working on them.\n\n29. The Framework Law for Climate Change set the basis for GHG, as well as water use\nvoluntary certification systems to avoid water waste. In the case of GHG, the Ministry of the\nEnvironment is responsible for granting certificates regarding the measurement, management\nand reporting of GHG and local pollutants. The Ministry is also responsible for issuing reduction\nand absorption certificates, which are voluntarily requested and meet the criteria, methodologies\nand requirements established by regulation. Violations will be sanctioned in accordance with the\nprovisions of organic law of the SMA, including revoking certificates.\nB. Revenue Performance\n\n30. Revenue from the green tax on stationary sources have slightly decreased over\ntime and its composition has also changed. Total annual revenue collected has not exceeded\n$200 million or about 0.06 percent of GDP and has declined by 1 percent per year since 2017. In\n2020, tax revenue recorded a sharp drop due to COVID19 pandemic, when the annual decline\nrate was at 6 percent. In 2021, revenues recovered by 6.5 percent but remained below 2017\nlevels.\n\n31. Most of the revenues come from the power sector and CO2 emissions. Electricity,\ngas, and water sector accounts for almost half of the collected revenues, while trade,\nconstruction and transportation make 26, 12, 5 percent of total collected revenues, respectively.\nOther sectors include forestry, communications, manufacturing, mining, financial and\nadministrative services, and personal services. About 89 percent of revenues come from CO2\nemissions (global pollutant), 7 percent – from PM2.5 emissions, and the shares of NOx and SO2\nemissions together are less than 5 percent.\n\n23", "text_characters": 2276}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0025-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n##### **C. Selected Issues**\n\n**Green tax on carbon emissions**\n\n\n\n**32.** **The direct carbon tax in Chile has design flaws that undermine its effectiveness and**\n**introduce economic inefficiencies to the power sector.** The law establishes that the value of\nthe carbon tax should not be considered in the determination of the marginal spot price of\nelectricity (i.e., the wholesale market price) when the tax is levied on system’s marginal power\nplant. In other words, in periods in which a fossil fuel-based power generator is the marginal unit,\nthe carbon tax levied on such plant is excluded from the calculation of the marginal spot price\nfor the economic dispatch. This restriction introduces distortion to the economic dispatch, as the\nsystem does not differentiate between plants with higher emissions and higher costs due to the\ncarbon tax, and more competitive power plants with lower or zero emissions.\n\n\n**33.** **The 2014 Law also included a provision creating a cross subsidy that, contrary to**\n**the carbon tax spirit, benefits fossil fuel-based power generation.** The Law states that for\ngeneration plants with a total unit cost (i.e., the variable cost considered for the economic\ndispatch plus the carbon tax) greater than or equal to the marginal spot price (i.e., the wholesale\nelectricity price), the difference between the two must be covered by all utility companies in\nproportion to the amount of electricity each company retires (i.e., buys) from system. This\nprovision switches the tax burden from the source of emission to utility companies buying\nelectricity from the system [17] . Moreover, this provision is highly distortive as emitting and\notherwise less competitive power plants are relieved from paying the carbon tax, which in turn\noffsets the economic incentive to invest in cleaner sources of power intended with the tax.\n\n\n17 This example only applies to plants that participate in the economic dispatch and the spot market. Electricity\ntraded in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) may be subject to other contractual arrangements.\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 9. Revenues Raised by the Direct Carbon Tax in 2017-2020\nC. Selected Issues\n\nGreen tax on carbon emissions\n\n32. The direct carbon tax in Chile has design flaws that undermine its effectiveness and\nintroduce economic inefficiencies to the power sector. The law establishes that the value of\nthe carbon tax should not be considered in the determination of the marginal spot price of\nelectricity (i.e., the wholesale market price) when the tax is levied on system’s marginal power\nplant. In other words, in periods in which a fossil fuel-based power generator is the marginal unit,\nthe carbon tax levied on such plant is excluded from the calculation of the marginal spot price\nfor the economic dispatch. This restriction introduces distortion to the economic dispatch, as the\nsystem does not differentiate between plants with higher emissions and higher costs due to the\ncarbon tax, and more competitive power plants with lower or zero emissions.\n\n33. The 2014 Law also included a provision creating a cross subsidy that, contrary to\nthe carbon tax spirit, benefits fossil fuel-based power generation. The Law states that for\ngeneration plants with a total unit cost (i.e., the variable cost considered for the economic\ndispatch plus the carbon tax) greater than or equal to the marginal spot price (i.e., the wholesale\nelectricity price), the difference between the two must be covered by all utility companies in\nproportion to the amount of electricity each company retires (i.e., buys) from system. This\nprovision switches the tax burden from the source of emission to utility companies buying\nelectricity from the system [17] . Moreover, this provision is highly distortive as emitting and\notherwise less competitive power plants are relieved from paying the carbon tax, which in turn\noffsets the economic incentive to invest in cleaner sources of power intended with the tax.\n\n17 This example only applies to plants that participate in the economic dispatch and the spot market. Electricity\ntraded in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) may be subject to other contractual arrangements.\n\n24", "text_characters": 1758}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0026-001"], "markdown": "**34.** **An example of a hypothetical economic dispatch illustrates the cross subsidy from**\n**utility companies to fossil fuel-based power plants.** **[18]** Figure 9 shows three thermal plants that\nare dispatched in the same period. The solid bars represent the variable cost of each plant and\nthe bars with striped lines represent the carbon tax that should be paid by each plant. For the\nfirst plant, the sum of its variable cost plus the carbon tax is below the spot or wholesale\nelectricity market price. This means that the plant is able to bear the full cost of the carbon tax by\nitself. However, the spot price of electricity does not cover the carbon tax originally levied on the\nsecond and third plant. In this example, the second plant is the marginal generator and therefore\nsets the electricity wholesale market price equal to its variable cost (excluding the carbon tax). As\na result, the carbon tax levied on this plant is prorated among all utilities companies in\nproportion to the electricity each retires from the system. The third plant is an inframarginal\ngenerator, as its variable cost is below the spot price (excluding the carbon tax). In this case, the\nportion of the tax no covered by the spot price is also prorated among utility companies.\n\n\n**Figure 10. Cross Subsidies from Utilities to Power Plants**\n\n\nSource: Gabriel Díaz, Francisco Muñoz, Rodrigo Moreno. Equilibrium analysis of a tax on carbon emissions\nwith pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules. The Energy Journal.\n\n\n**35.** **At $5 per ton of CO2eq, the existing carbon tax level is low and needs to be**\n**increased, along with other measures, to achieve the country climate and fiscal goals.** While\nthe carbon tax rate in Chile is similar to that in some countries in Latin America (e.g., Argentina\nand Colombia), it is well below other countries in the southern cone and the OECD (see Figure\n11), and the $37.5 per ton of CO2 social cost of carbon calculated by the government. [19] For\nexample, Uruguay introduced a carbon tax in January 2022 at a level close to $137 per ton of\n\n\n18 This is example is taken from Gabriel Díaz, Francisco Muñoz, Rodrigo Moreno. _Equilibrium analysis of a tax on_\n_carbon emissions with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules._ The Energy Journal.\n\n19 See Estimación del Precio Social del CO2 2017, Gobierno de Chile, available at:\n[http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf](http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf)\n\n\n25\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1242, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(109.9699935913086, 325.5391845703125, 519.5897827148438, 472.51702880859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 333, "number": 12, "size": 94464, "transform": [409.61981201171875, 2.7115707780467346e-05, 6.767862487322418e-06, 146.97779846191406, 109.9699935913086, 325.5391845703125], "width": 975, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "34. An example of a hypothetical economic dispatch illustrates the cross subsidy from\nutility companies to fossil fuel-based power plants. [18] Figure 9 shows three thermal plants that\nare dispatched in the same period. The solid bars represent the variable cost of each plant and\nthe bars with striped lines represent the carbon tax that should be paid by each plant. For the\nfirst plant, the sum of its variable cost plus the carbon tax is below the spot or wholesale\nelectricity market price. This means that the plant is able to bear the full cost of the carbon tax by\nitself. However, the spot price of electricity does not cover the carbon tax originally levied on the\nsecond and third plant. In this example, the second plant is the marginal generator and therefore\nsets the electricity wholesale market price equal to its variable cost (excluding the carbon tax). As\na result, the carbon tax levied on this plant is prorated among all utilities companies in\nproportion to the electricity each retires from the system. The third plant is an inframarginal\ngenerator, as its variable cost is below the spot price (excluding the carbon tax). In this case, the\nportion of the tax no covered by the spot price is also prorated among utility companies.\n\nFigure 10. Cross Subsidies from Utilities to Power Plants\n\nSource: Gabriel Díaz, Francisco Muñoz, Rodrigo Moreno. Equilibrium analysis of a tax on carbon emissions\nwith pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules. The Energy Journal.\n\n35. At $5 per ton of CO2eq, the existing carbon tax level is low and needs to be\nincreased, along with other measures, to achieve the country climate and fiscal goals. While\nthe carbon tax rate in Chile is similar to that in some countries in Latin America (e.g., Argentina\nand Colombia), it is well below other countries in the southern cone and the OECD (see Figure\n11), and the $37.5 per ton of CO2 social cost of carbon calculated by the government. [19] For\nexample, Uruguay introduced a carbon tax in January 2022 at a level close to $137 per ton of\n\n18 This is example is taken from Gabriel Díaz, Francisco Muñoz, Rodrigo Moreno. _Equilibrium analysis of a tax on_\n_carbon emissions with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules._ The Energy Journal.\n\n19 See Estimación del Precio Social del CO2 2017, Gobierno de Chile, available at:\nhttp://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf\n\n25", "text_characters": 2009}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0027-001"], "markdown": "CO2eq, [20] which the government may increase in addition to the automatic increases linked to the\nConsumer Price Index. Similarly, Canada increased its federal carbon tax in April 2022 to CAD$50\nper ton of CO2eq and will continue to rise it by CAD$15 per year until it reaches $170 by 2030. In\naddition, other measures could include higher incorporation of variable renewable energy for the\npower sector, low and zero emission vehicles, feebates and improved energy efficiency policies.\n\n\n**Figure 11. Carbon Prices around the World**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**36.** **Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially**\n**considering the recent global increase in energy prices.** Fossil fuel increased sharply during\n2021 and the first half of 2022, resulting in higher prices of electricity and refined products for\nhouseholds and firms in most jurisdictions (see Figure 12). Although prices have retreated\nsomewhat recently, energy prices continue to be above pre-pandemic levels. In the case of Chile,\nthe expected fall in fossil fuel prices may give the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher\n\n\n20 The coverage of the carbon tax in Uruguay is rather low at about 10 percent of CO2 emissions, as it only applies\nto all liquid fuels, apart from jet fuel and sales of fuel to manufacturers of gasoline are also exempted.\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "CO2eq, [20] which the government may increase in addition to the automatic increases linked to the\nConsumer Price Index. Similarly, Canada increased its federal carbon tax in April 2022 to CAD$50\nper ton of CO2eq and will continue to rise it by CAD$15 per year until it reaches $170 by 2030. In\naddition, other measures could include higher incorporation of variable renewable energy for the\npower sector, low and zero emission vehicles, feebates and improved energy efficiency policies.\n\nFigure 11. Carbon Prices around the World\n\n36. Strengthening the carbon tax should be a gradual process, however, especially\nconsidering the recent global increase in energy prices. Fossil fuel increased sharply during\n2021 and the first half of 2022, resulting in higher prices of electricity and refined products for\nhouseholds and firms in most jurisdictions (see Figure 12). Although prices have retreated\nsomewhat recently, energy prices continue to be above pre-pandemic levels. In the case of Chile,\nthe expected fall in fossil fuel prices may give the government an opportunity to lock-in a higher\n\n20 The coverage of the carbon tax in Uruguay is rather low at about 10 percent of CO2 emissions, as it only applies\nto all liquid fuels, apart from jet fuel and sales of fuel to manufacturers of gasoline are also exempted.\n\n26", "text_characters": 1104}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0028-001"], "markdown": "carbon tax without increasing energy prices relative to recently observed levels. In any case, well\ntargeted assistance [21] to low-income households may be needed. The next chapter evaluates\ndifferent scenarios for Chile to improve the carbon tax and be on track to meet the country’s\nNDC and net-zero pledge.\n\n\n**Figure 12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Green tax on local pollutants**\n\n\n**37.** **Chile is a pioneer in levying taxes on local air pollutants, such as NOx, MP, and SO2,**\n**which affect communities in areas where emitter industries are located.** The rate for this\ntype of Pigouvian tax is calculated based on a formula that includes the social cost of pollutants,\nthe population in the municipality where the emitter is located, and an air quality coefficient that\ndepends on the level of local population on each municipality. Specifically, the tax rate of\npollutant “i” in municipality “j” is given by:\n\n\nTij = 0,1 x CCAj x CSCpci x Pobj, where\n\n\n_CCAj_ is an air quality coefficient equal to 1.2 if the municipality is defined as “saturated”, meaning\nthat the measurement of concentration of pollutants in the air, water or soil exceeds the value of\nthe respective environmental quality standard; 1.1 if the municipality is defined as “latent”,\nmeaning that the concentration of pollutants is between 80 and 100 percent of the\nenvironmental quality standard; and 1.0 otherwise [22] . _CSCCpcj_ is the per capita social cost of the\n\n\n21 Assistance is needed to limit the fiscal cost and should not undermine energy conservation incentives\n\n22 These classifications are defined in Law 19.300 on General Bases of Environment.\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "carbon tax without increasing energy prices relative to recently observed levels. In any case, well\ntargeted assistance [21] to low-income households may be needed. The next chapter evaluates\ndifferent scenarios for Chile to improve the carbon tax and be on track to meet the country’s\nNDC and net-zero pledge.\n\nFigure 12. Gasoline and Diesel Price Increases in LAC-6\n\nGreen tax on local pollutants\n\n37. Chile is a pioneer in levying taxes on local air pollutants, such as NOx, MP, and SO2,\nwhich affect communities in areas where emitter industries are located. The rate for this\ntype of Pigouvian tax is calculated based on a formula that includes the social cost of pollutants,\nthe population in the municipality where the emitter is located, and an air quality coefficient that\ndepends on the level of local population on each municipality. Specifically, the tax rate of\npollutant “i” in municipality “j” is given by:\n\nTij = 0,1 x CCAj x CSCpci x Pobj, where\n\n_CCAj_ is an air quality coefficient equal to 1.2 if the municipality is defined as “saturated”, meaning\nthat the measurement of concentration of pollutants in the air, water or soil exceeds the value of\nthe respective environmental quality standard; 1.1 if the municipality is defined as “latent”,\nmeaning that the concentration of pollutants is between 80 and 100 percent of the\nenvironmental quality standard; and 1.0 otherwise [22] . _CSCCpcj_ is the per capita social cost of the\n\n21 Assistance is needed to limit the fiscal cost and should not undermine energy conservation incentives\n\n22 These classifications are defined in Law 19.300 on General Bases of Environment.\n\n27", "text_characters": 1367}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "contaminant “i” set at $0.9 for MP, $0.01 for SO2 and $0.025 for NOx, and Pobj is the population\nin municipality “j”.\n\n**38.** **A simple example illustrates the impact of the air quality coefficient and the**\n**population variable on tax levels for the same pollutant in different areas.** A hypothetical\ncoal-fired power located plant in Puente Alto, a municipality of 625,500 inhabitants and defined\nas saturated with PM2.5, will face an estimated tax rate of $67,560 per ton of PM2.5. In contrast, if\nthe same plant is located in Contulmo, an area of 5,500 inhabitants which is neither saturated nor\nlatent, it would face a tax rate of $495 per ton of PM2.5. Moreover, if the plant is expected to emit\n100 tons of PM2.5, which is the threshold at which the green tax on stationary sources is\ntriggered, the power plant would face an annual tax of $6.7 million in Puente Alto while only\n$49,500 in Contulmo.\n\n\n_**Green tax on mobile sources**_\n\n\n**39.** **The tax on emissions arising from mobile sources is limited in scope and includes**\n**multiple exemptions.** While the tax is levied on the sale of new light-duty vehicles, it exempts\nvehicles with nine seats or more used to transport passengers, vehicles used as taxis, police and\narmored trucks, ambulances, tractors, and pickup trucks with a load capacity of 2,000 kilos or\nmore. Moreover, the tax does not apply to taxpayers subject to VAT with respect to the\nacquisition of new pickup trucks (load capacity of up to 2,000 kilos), provided it becomes part of\nthe taxpayer’s fixed assets. While the tax on mobile sources was originally intended to improve\nthe taxation of emissions from diesel combustion, the broad exemptions weakened its\nperformance.\n\n\n**40.** **Chile also levies excises on fossil fuels for road transportation, although these have**\n**multiple distortions and have been found to be inefficient.** **[23]** Excises on fuels in Chile have a\ndual structure, with a fixed and a variable component. The fixed (or base) component is a specific\ncharge per quantity of fuel, while the variable component is an adjustment to the base tax, which\nmay be positive or negative, depending on whether the international price fluctuation of the fuel\n(in pesos) is above or below a specified range. In practice the variable component operates as\nprice stabilization mechanism [24] and set-up weekly by the Ministry of Finance and implemented\nby the Empresa Nacional del Petroleo (ENAP), a state-owned oil refining company. Moreover,\ndifferent excise rates apply based on the type of fuel (much lower for diesel than for gasoline),\nwhile a system of credits operates for diesel depending on the end use of the fuel. As a result,\n\n\n23 See “International Fuels Tax Assessment: An Application to Chile”, IMF Working Paper 11/168\n\n24 The variable tax is known in Chile as Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precios de los combustibles (MEPCO)\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "contaminant “i” set at $0.9 for MP, $0.01 for SO2 and $0.025 for NOx, and Pobj is the population\nin municipality “j”.\n\n38. A simple example illustrates the impact of the air quality coefficient and the\npopulation variable on tax levels for the same pollutant in different areas. A hypothetical\ncoal-fired power located plant in Puente Alto, a municipality of 625,500 inhabitants and defined\nas saturated with PM2.5, will face an estimated tax rate of $67,560 per ton of PM2.5. In contrast, if\nthe same plant is located in Contulmo, an area of 5,500 inhabitants which is neither saturated nor\nlatent, it would face a tax rate of $495 per ton of PM2.5. Moreover, if the plant is expected to emit\n100 tons of PM2.5, which is the threshold at which the green tax on stationary sources is\ntriggered, the power plant would face an annual tax of $6.7 million in Puente Alto while only\n$49,500 in Contulmo.\n\n_Green tax on mobile sources_\n\n39. The tax on emissions arising from mobile sources is limited in scope and includes\nmultiple exemptions. While the tax is levied on the sale of new light-duty vehicles, it exempts\nvehicles with nine seats or more used to transport passengers, vehicles used as taxis, police and\narmored trucks, ambulances, tractors, and pickup trucks with a load capacity of 2,000 kilos or\nmore. Moreover, the tax does not apply to taxpayers subject to VAT with respect to the\nacquisition of new pickup trucks (load capacity of up to 2,000 kilos), provided it becomes part of\nthe taxpayer’s fixed assets. While the tax on mobile sources was originally intended to improve\nthe taxation of emissions from diesel combustion, the broad exemptions weakened its\nperformance.\n\n40. Chile also levies excises on fossil fuels for road transportation, although these have\nmultiple distortions and have been found to be inefficient. [23] Excises on fuels in Chile have a\ndual structure, with a fixed and a variable component. The fixed (or base) component is a specific\ncharge per quantity of fuel, while the variable component is an adjustment to the base tax, which\nmay be positive or negative, depending on whether the international price fluctuation of the fuel\n(in pesos) is above or below a specified range. In practice the variable component operates as\nprice stabilization mechanism [24] and set-up weekly by the Ministry of Finance and implemented\nby the Empresa Nacional del Petroleo (ENAP), a state-owned oil refining company. Moreover,\ndifferent excise rates apply based on the type of fuel (much lower for diesel than for gasoline),\nwhile a system of credits operates for diesel depending on the end use of the fuel. As a result,\n\n23 See “International Fuels Tax Assessment: An Application to Chile”, IMF Working Paper 11/168\n\n24 The variable tax is known in Chile as Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precios de los combustibles (MEPCO)\n\n28", "text_characters": 2371}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Chile consumes almost double the amount of diesel than the regional average on a per capita\nbasis [25] .\n\n\n**41.** **While the analysis of fuel excises is beyond the scope of this report,** **[26]** **broader**\n**carbon pricing in the transport sector could correct distortions and achieve climate goals.**\nThis could be corrected in various ways. First, the excise rate on diesel could gradually increase to\nbe on par with that of gasoline. Alternatively, the same carbon tax applied to stationary sources,\nalthough at a higher level as proposed in the next chapter, could also apply to the transport\nsector. Other options include an ETS, a hybrid combining a higher carbon tax and an ETS, or a\npure feebate mechanism (see Box 1). The carbon tax could be incorporated using the existing\nexcise or VAT structure for fossil fuel, while the feebate mechanism could leverage institutional\ncapacity developed for the green tax on mobile sources.\n\n\n_**Offsets and carbon credits**_\n\n\n**42.** **The proposed offset mechanism introduced in the Tax Modernization Law and the**\n**Framework Law on Climate Change should be carefully implemented.** While offsets would\nallow emitters to purchase and retire credits generated by other entities to compensate for own\nemissions and reduce their carbon tax burden, these schemes remain controversial and various\ncountries have banned their use [27] . In theory, entities purchasing credits compensate for their\nemissions and the respective carbon tax by paying for reductions elsewhere. Offsets mechanisms\nare usually difficult to verify and monitor and can distract policy efforts from instruments that\neffectively reduce emissions (e.g., carbon pricing). Moreover, offsets may increase net emissions\nif underlying credits are not additional [28] and can lead to green washing.\n\n\n**43.** **The Law restricts offsets and carbon credits to projects developed in Chile (and the**\n**municipality in the case of local pollutants), which mitigates some of the risks evidenced**\n**by this mechanism in international transactions.** One of the main risks is that offsets would\nlead to abatement in low-cost jurisdictions, when trade is allowed at the international level. This\nwill not be the case in Chile if the domestic and local restrictions are maintained. However,\ncarbon offsets will lower fiscal revenue, even if limited to domestic projects.\n\n##### **D. Recommendations**\n\n\n - Include the carbon tax in the variable cost of all generation plants considered for the\neconomic dispatch.\n\n\n25 See “Tax Expenditures and Corrective Taxes in Chile”, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC,\n(November 2021)\n\n26 Idem\n\n27 For example, EU banned the use of international offsets in 2021.\n\n28 Additionality means that a reduction in GHG emissions would not have happened without the offset.\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Chile consumes almost double the amount of diesel than the regional average on a per capita\nbasis [25] .\n\n41. While the analysis of fuel excises is beyond the scope of this report, [26] broader\ncarbon pricing in the transport sector could correct distortions and achieve climate goals.\nThis could be corrected in various ways. First, the excise rate on diesel could gradually increase to\nbe on par with that of gasoline. Alternatively, the same carbon tax applied to stationary sources,\nalthough at a higher level as proposed in the next chapter, could also apply to the transport\nsector. Other options include an ETS, a hybrid combining a higher carbon tax and an ETS, or a\npure feebate mechanism (see Box 1). The carbon tax could be incorporated using the existing\nexcise or VAT structure for fossil fuel, while the feebate mechanism could leverage institutional\ncapacity developed for the green tax on mobile sources.\n\n_Offsets and carbon credits_\n\n42. The proposed offset mechanism introduced in the Tax Modernization Law and the\nFramework Law on Climate Change should be carefully implemented. While offsets would\nallow emitters to purchase and retire credits generated by other entities to compensate for own\nemissions and reduce their carbon tax burden, these schemes remain controversial and various\ncountries have banned their use [27] . In theory, entities purchasing credits compensate for their\nemissions and the respective carbon tax by paying for reductions elsewhere. Offsets mechanisms\nare usually difficult to verify and monitor and can distract policy efforts from instruments that\neffectively reduce emissions (e.g., carbon pricing). Moreover, offsets may increase net emissions\nif underlying credits are not additional [28] and can lead to green washing.\n\n43. The Law restricts offsets and carbon credits to projects developed in Chile (and the\nmunicipality in the case of local pollutants), which mitigates some of the risks evidenced\nby this mechanism in international transactions. One of the main risks is that offsets would\nlead to abatement in low-cost jurisdictions, when trade is allowed at the international level. This\nwill not be the case in Chile if the domestic and local restrictions are maintained. However,\ncarbon offsets will lower fiscal revenue, even if limited to domestic projects.\nD. Recommendations\n\n - Include the carbon tax in the variable cost of all generation plants considered for the\neconomic dispatch.\n\n25 See “Tax Expenditures and Corrective Taxes in Chile”, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC,\n(November 2021)\n\n26 Idem\n\n27 For example, EU banned the use of international offsets in 2021.\n\n28 Additionality means that a reduction in GHG emissions would not have happened without the offset.\n\n29", "text_characters": 2312}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Eliminate the cross subsidy from utilities to fossil fuel-based power plants.\n\n\n- Increase the carbon tax and set a path to gradually increase it over time to reach a\nlevel consistent with the country’s NDC and pledge to net zero.\n\n\n- Complement the tax on mobile sources with higher excises on diesel or by including\nthe transport sector in a broader carbon pricing scheme.\n\n\n- Consider increasing the social cost of contaminants for PM2.5, NOx and SO2.\n\n\n- Continue to geographically restrict carbon offsets and credits to emission reduction\nor absorption projects developed in Chile (and in municipalities for local pollutants).\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Eliminate the cross subsidy from utilities to fossil fuel-based power plants.\n\n- Increase the carbon tax and set a path to gradually increase it over time to reach a\nlevel consistent with the country’s NDC and pledge to net zero.\n\n- Complement the tax on mobile sources with higher excises on diesel or by including\nthe transport sector in a broader carbon pricing scheme.\n\n- Consider increasing the social cost of contaminants for PM2.5, NOx and SO2.\n\n- Continue to geographically restrict carbon offsets and credits to emission reduction\nor absorption projects developed in Chile (and in municipalities for local pollutants).\n\n30", "text_characters": 526}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **IV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING**\n\n##### **A. Principles and Conceptual Issues**\n\n**44.** **Ideally carbon pricing would be the centerpiece of a country’s mitigation strategy.**\n**Carbon pricing has several key attractions as it:**\n\n\n- Promotes the full range of opportunities for reducing energy use and shifting to cleaner\nenergy sources across all covered sectors by reflecting the cost of carbon emissions in the\nprices of fuels, electricity, and other goods;\n\n\n- Automatically minimizes the costs of these responses by equalizing the cost of the last ton of\nCO2eq reduced across fuels and sectors;\n\n\n- Levels the playfield for clean technology investments by establishing a clear price signal;\n\n\n- Mobilizes a valuable source of revenue which can be used to help meet climate, social, or\nbroader fiscal objectives;\n\n\n- Generates domestic environmental co-benefits such as reductions in local air pollution\ndeaths; and\n\n\n- Is straightforward to scale-up from an administrative perspective, in Chile’s case building off\nalready established capacity for green taxes.\n\n\n**45.** **Carbon pricing can take the form of carbon taxes or an ETS.** Carbon taxes are usually\nimplemented through a tax on the carbon content of fossil fuel supply, as is the case with the\nexisting tax carbon and local pollutants for stationary sources. ETS require firms to acquire\nallowances for their emissions or the carbon content of their fuel supply, with the government\ncontrolling the supply of allowances and market trading of allowances establishing the emissions\nprice.\n\n\n**46.** **To achieve Chile’s 2030 NDC and legally binding mid-century net-zero pledge,**\n**carbon pricing needs to: (i) cover a wide range of emissions; (ii) establish a rising and**\n**predictable price; and (iii) avoid unnecessary inefficiencies due to exemptions.** These\nprinciples could be met through the enhancement of the existing carbon tax, developing the ETS\nprovided for in the Climate Change Framework Law, or a hybrid approach with taxes and ETS\ncovering different emissions sources. The choice between these three approaches, which are\nbriefly discussed below, will depend on several factors, including existing and required additional\ninstitutional capacity, recent experience with green taxes, and which ministry should be primarily\nresponsible for mitigation policy (carbon taxes are naturally under the purview of the finance\nministry and the ETS under the environment ministry).\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "IV. OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CARBON PRICING\nA. Principles and Conceptual Issues\n\n44. Ideally carbon pricing would be the centerpiece of a country’s mitigation strategy.\nCarbon pricing has several key attractions as it:\n\n- Promotes the full range of opportunities for reducing energy use and shifting to cleaner\nenergy sources across all covered sectors by reflecting the cost of carbon emissions in the\nprices of fuels, electricity, and other goods;\n\n- Automatically minimizes the costs of these responses by equalizing the cost of the last ton of\nCO2eq reduced across fuels and sectors;\n\n- Levels the playfield for clean technology investments by establishing a clear price signal;\n\n- Mobilizes a valuable source of revenue which can be used to help meet climate, social, or\nbroader fiscal objectives;\n\n- Generates domestic environmental co-benefits such as reductions in local air pollution\ndeaths; and\n\n- Is straightforward to scale-up from an administrative perspective, in Chile’s case building off\nalready established capacity for green taxes.\n\n45. Carbon pricing can take the form of carbon taxes or an ETS. Carbon taxes are usually\nimplemented through a tax on the carbon content of fossil fuel supply, as is the case with the\nexisting tax carbon and local pollutants for stationary sources. ETS require firms to acquire\nallowances for their emissions or the carbon content of their fuel supply, with the government\ncontrolling the supply of allowances and market trading of allowances establishing the emissions\nprice.\n\n46. To achieve Chile’s 2030 NDC and legally binding mid-century net-zero pledge,\ncarbon pricing needs to: (i) cover a wide range of emissions; (ii) establish a rising and\npredictable price; and (iii) avoid unnecessary inefficiencies due to exemptions. These\nprinciples could be met through the enhancement of the existing carbon tax, developing the ETS\nprovided for in the Climate Change Framework Law, or a hybrid approach with taxes and ETS\ncovering different emissions sources. The choice between these three approaches, which are\nbriefly discussed below, will depend on several factors, including existing and required additional\ninstitutional capacity, recent experience with green taxes, and which ministry should be primarily\nresponsible for mitigation policy (carbon taxes are naturally under the purview of the finance\nministry and the ETS under the environment ministry).\n\n31", "text_characters": 2030}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**47.** **The most economically and environmentally effective form of a carbon tax would**\n**price all CO2 emissions at the same level, with the price ramping up predictably each year.**\nThis would require removing any existing exemptions so all fossil fuels in all sectors are taxed in\nproportion to their full carbon content. Ideally, the carbon tax rate would ramp up as rapidly as\npossible, subject to acceptability constraints. For example, if the maximum acceptable tax rate in\n2030 is set at US$60 per ton (see quantitatively analysis below), the tax could have a step\nincrease to US$15 per ton in 2023 and ramp up by US$6.4 per year thereafter. Acceptable tax\nrates will also depend on progress on carbon pricing in other major trading partners, so some\nfuture discretion may be needed to adjust planned tax increases.\n\n\n**48.** **The authorities could also choose to rely on a ETS as the principal tool for carbon**\n**pricing in Chile, although this will require to establish additional institutional capacity.** The\nETS could cover the sectors (e.g., power and industry) where emissions are generally more\nresponsive to pricing. Extending the coverage of the ETS to emissions to transportation and\nbuildings would require applying it midstream to the suppliers of fuels for those sectors based\non the carbon content of those fuels. In principle, a trajectory of progressively tighter emissions\ncaps could be specified in line with the 2030 NDC, though this might lead to prices that exceed\nacceptable levels. Price increases might be contained through combining the ETS with a ceiling\nprice where extra allowances are put into the system at this price to prevent further price\nincreases. Prices may also be volatile as they vary with shifts in the demand and supply of fuels\nand this price uncertainty can deter clean technology investments with high upfront costs and\nlong-range emissions reductions. Price stability can be promoted through combining the ETS\nwith an exogenous price floor—implemented, for example, through a minimum price on\nallowance auctions—where the floor price ramps up predictably over time.\n\n\n**49.** **While an ETS could exploit the fiscal opportunities from carbon pricing, this could**\n**in turn imply higher overall costs for the economy.** If allowances were fully auctioned (with\nrevenues transferred to the finance ministry), ETS would raise the same revenue as an\nequivalently scaled carbon tax—these revenues could be used to boost growth and employment,\nfor example, by modifying the tax mix and funding socially productive investments (e.g.,\nSustainable Development Goals). In contrast, freely allocating allowances to firms in a lump sum\nfashion provides windfall profits to them without improving economic efficiency and forgone\nfiscal revenues to the government become larger as ETS prices rise over time. A key motivation\nfor free allowance allocations is that they help to address concerns about industrial\ncompetitiveness, but border carbon adjustment is a potentially more effective instrument for this.\n\n\n**50.** **Under a hybrid approach, the ETS could address emissions from the industry and**\n**building sectors and the carbon tax emissions from the power and transportation sector.**\nThese hybrid approaches have been used elsewhere—for example, in the EU power and industry\nemissions are covered by the EU-wide ETS while several member states (e.g., Denmark, Finland,\nFrance, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden) have applied national carbon taxes to the transportation and\nbuilding sectors. Cost effectiveness would require aligning carbon prices across the tax and ETS,\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "47. The most economically and environmentally effective form of a carbon tax would\nprice all CO2 emissions at the same level, with the price ramping up predictably each year.\nThis would require removing any existing exemptions so all fossil fuels in all sectors are taxed in\nproportion to their full carbon content. Ideally, the carbon tax rate would ramp up as rapidly as\npossible, subject to acceptability constraints. For example, if the maximum acceptable tax rate in\n2030 is set at US$60 per ton (see quantitatively analysis below), the tax could have a step\nincrease to US$15 per ton in 2023 and ramp up by US$6.4 per year thereafter. Acceptable tax\nrates will also depend on progress on carbon pricing in other major trading partners, so some\nfuture discretion may be needed to adjust planned tax increases.\n\n48. The authorities could also choose to rely on a ETS as the principal tool for carbon\npricing in Chile, although this will require to establish additional institutional capacity. The\nETS could cover the sectors (e.g., power and industry) where emissions are generally more\nresponsive to pricing. Extending the coverage of the ETS to emissions to transportation and\nbuildings would require applying it midstream to the suppliers of fuels for those sectors based\non the carbon content of those fuels. In principle, a trajectory of progressively tighter emissions\ncaps could be specified in line with the 2030 NDC, though this might lead to prices that exceed\nacceptable levels. Price increases might be contained through combining the ETS with a ceiling\nprice where extra allowances are put into the system at this price to prevent further price\nincreases. Prices may also be volatile as they vary with shifts in the demand and supply of fuels\nand this price uncertainty can deter clean technology investments with high upfront costs and\nlong-range emissions reductions. Price stability can be promoted through combining the ETS\nwith an exogenous price floor—implemented, for example, through a minimum price on\nallowance auctions—where the floor price ramps up predictably over time.\n\n49. While an ETS could exploit the fiscal opportunities from carbon pricing, this could\nin turn imply higher overall costs for the economy. If allowances were fully auctioned (with\nrevenues transferred to the finance ministry), ETS would raise the same revenue as an\nequivalently scaled carbon tax—these revenues could be used to boost growth and employment,\nfor example, by modifying the tax mix and funding socially productive investments (e.g.,\nSustainable Development Goals). In contrast, freely allocating allowances to firms in a lump sum\nfashion provides windfall profits to them without improving economic efficiency and forgone\nfiscal revenues to the government become larger as ETS prices rise over time. A key motivation\nfor free allowance allocations is that they help to address concerns about industrial\ncompetitiveness, but border carbon adjustment is a potentially more effective instrument for this.\n\n50. Under a hybrid approach, the ETS could address emissions from the industry and\nbuilding sectors and the carbon tax emissions from the power and transportation sector.\nThese hybrid approaches have been used elsewhere—for example, in the EU power and industry\nemissions are covered by the EU-wide ETS while several member states (e.g., Denmark, Finland,\nFrance, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden) have applied national carbon taxes to the transportation and\nbuilding sectors. Cost effectiveness would require aligning carbon prices across the tax and ETS,\n\n32", "text_characters": 3011}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "for example by setting a trajectory of price floors under the ETS equal to the trajectory of carbon\ntax rates. Another cost-effective alternative would be to apply feebates (tax-subsidy schemes) in\ncertain sectors where acceptability of higher carbon taxes is highly uncertain (see Box 1).\n\n\n**Box 1. Feebates as an Alternative to Carbon Pricing** **[29]**\n\nFeebates apply a revenue-neutral, sliding scale of fees on products or activities with above\naverage emission rates and a sliding scale of rebates on products or activities with below\naverage emission rates. Feebates can be combined with and complement carbon pricing\nschemes to reduce emissions per unit of production or activity in the transport, industrial,\nbuilding, forestry and agricultural sectors.\n\n\nFeebates: (i) provide a more flexible and cost-effective approach than regulations; (ii) can\nprovide strong mitigation incentives; (iii) avoid large tax burdens on the average household or\nfirm; (iv) avoid fiscal burdens for the government; and (v) can often build off existing\nadministrative capacity. While they would need to be adapted to the specific circumstances in\nChile (perhaps with changes to green taxes on mobile sources and fossil fuels), feebates are\nattractive for:\n\n\n - Transportation, where (relative to the current tax system) they provide more fine-tuned\nincentives for lower emission vehicles;\n\n\n - Industry, where they provide incentives for cleaner production processes with less concern\nabout competitive impacts and emissions leakage (compared with carbon pricing);\n\n\n - Buildings where they can reinforce incentives for transitioning to electric heating and more\nenergy efficient appliances;\n\n\n - Land use, where they provide more comprehensive incentives for carbon storage (in\nforests and peat land) and can be designed to be fiscally neutral (in contrast to\nafforestation subsidies); and\n\n\n - Agriculture, where they promote shifting to less emissions-intensive practices (indirectly\ntaxing emissions is an alternative though, to avoid leakage).\n\n\nFeebates are applied by finance ministries, whereas regulations are the more natural\ninstrument when climate policy is delegated to environmental ministries. Feebates can be\nmore flexible and cost effective than regulations—the latter are only cost-effective with\nextensive credit trading provisions across firms and time. And feebates can be implemented\nquickly with minimal administrative cost, at least in cases (e.g., transportation, industry,\nresidential heating) where they would build off existing administration for taxes and subsidies.\n\n\n29 For a more detailed discussion see Parry, I. (2021). The critical role of feebates in climate mitigation strategies\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "for example by setting a trajectory of price floors under the ETS equal to the trajectory of carbon\ntax rates. Another cost-effective alternative would be to apply feebates (tax-subsidy schemes) in\ncertain sectors where acceptability of higher carbon taxes is highly uncertain (see Box 1).\n\nBox 1. Feebates as an Alternative to Carbon Pricing [29]\n\nFeebates apply a revenue-neutral, sliding scale of fees on products or activities with above\naverage emission rates and a sliding scale of rebates on products or activities with below\naverage emission rates. Feebates can be combined with and complement carbon pricing\nschemes to reduce emissions per unit of production or activity in the transport, industrial,\nbuilding, forestry and agricultural sectors.\n\nFeebates: (i) provide a more flexible and cost-effective approach than regulations; (ii) can\nprovide strong mitigation incentives; (iii) avoid large tax burdens on the average household or\nfirm; (iv) avoid fiscal burdens for the government; and (v) can often build off existing\nadministrative capacity. While they would need to be adapted to the specific circumstances in\nChile (perhaps with changes to green taxes on mobile sources and fossil fuels), feebates are\nattractive for:\n\n - Transportation, where (relative to the current tax system) they provide more fine-tuned\nincentives for lower emission vehicles;\n\n - Industry, where they provide incentives for cleaner production processes with less concern\nabout competitive impacts and emissions leakage (compared with carbon pricing);\n\n - Buildings where they can reinforce incentives for transitioning to electric heating and more\nenergy efficient appliances;\n\n - Land use, where they provide more comprehensive incentives for carbon storage (in\nforests and peat land) and can be designed to be fiscally neutral (in contrast to\nafforestation subsidies); and\n\n - Agriculture, where they promote shifting to less emissions-intensive practices (indirectly\ntaxing emissions is an alternative though, to avoid leakage).\n\nFeebates are applied by finance ministries, whereas regulations are the more natural\ninstrument when climate policy is delegated to environmental ministries. Feebates can be\nmore flexible and cost effective than regulations—the latter are only cost-effective with\nextensive credit trading provisions across firms and time. And feebates can be implemented\nquickly with minimal administrative cost, at least in cases (e.g., transportation, industry,\nresidential heating) where they would build off existing administration for taxes and subsidies.\n\n29 For a more detailed discussion see Parry, I. (2021). The critical role of feebates in climate mitigation strategies\n\n33", "text_characters": 2288}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **B. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options**\n\n**51.** **This section models three carbon tax enhancement options and one hybrid**\n**approach to meet Chile’s climate goals.**\n\n\n- **Moderate** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2025, increasing linearly to $50 per\nton of CO2 in 2035. The tax covers power, buildings, industry, rail, and aviation sectors but\nexempts the road transportation sector.\n\n\n- **Base case** : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2024, increasing linearly to $60 per ton\nof CO2 in 2030. The carbon tax excludes gasoline and diesel, but the excise on diesel is\nincreased to bring the effective carbon rate equal to that of gasoline (starts from $0.05/liter\nin 2024 and increases linearly to $0.37/liter in 2030) [30] . The carbon tax applies to all energy\nsectors.\n\n\n- **Hybrid** : consists of two parts.\n\n\n - Carbon tax applies only to the power sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2 (current\nlevel) in 2024 and increases at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of CO2 in\n2027. It then increases with a steeper slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n\n - Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the industrial sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2\n(current level) in 2024, increasing at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of\nCO2 in 2027. It then increases with a higher slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n\n- **Social cost of carbon (SCC)** : economy-wide carbon tax starting from $35 per ton of CO2 in\n2024 and increasing linearly to $75 per ton of CO2 in 2030.\n\n\n**52.** **The report analyzes each of the carbon pricing** **[31]** **scenarios** **in terms of their impact**\n**on emissions, revenues and GDP, their distributional impacts, as well as in terms of**\n**comparing efficiency costs with domestic environmental co-benefits.**\n\n\n**53.** **The analysis was conducted using Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT), a**\n**spreadsheet model developed jointly by the IMF and the World Bank, which is routinely**\n**used for cross-country and individual country assessments of mitigation policies.** CPAT\nprovides estimates for over 200 countries of future fuel use and emissions by major energy\nsector as well as the emissions impacts of a diverse range of pricing and non-pricing mitigation\napproaches. Covering over 200 countries, CPAT provides projections of fuel use and CO2\nemissions for the four major energy sectors—power, industry, transport, and buildings.\n\n\n30 Alternatively, the tax rate for diesel could be aligned with that of gasoline in terms of tax monthly units (as\ndetermined by SII), although in terms of carbon content equivalency diesel would continue to be undertaxed.\n\n31 From now on, carbon pricing refers both to carbon tax and ETS.\n\n\n34", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Quantitative Evaluation of Carbon Pricing Options\n\n51. This section models three carbon tax enhancement options and one hybrid\napproach to meet Chile’s climate goals.\n\n- Moderate : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2025, increasing linearly to $50 per\nton of CO2 in 2035. The tax covers power, buildings, industry, rail, and aviation sectors but\nexempts the road transportation sector.\n\n- Base case : set the carbon tax at $15 per ton of CO2 in 2024, increasing linearly to $60 per ton\nof CO2 in 2030. The carbon tax excludes gasoline and diesel, but the excise on diesel is\nincreased to bring the effective carbon rate equal to that of gasoline (starts from $0.05/liter\nin 2024 and increases linearly to $0.37/liter in 2030) [30] . The carbon tax applies to all energy\nsectors.\n\n- Hybrid : consists of two parts.\n\n - Carbon tax applies only to the power sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2 (current\nlevel) in 2024 and increases at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of CO2 in\n2027. It then increases with a steeper slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n - Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the industrial sector, starting from $5 per ton of CO2\n(current level) in 2024, increasing at a lower slope at the beginning, up to $11 per ton of\nCO2 in 2027. It then increases with a higher slope up to $60 per ton of CO2 in 2035.\n\n- Social cost of carbon (SCC) : economy-wide carbon tax starting from $35 per ton of CO2 in\n2024 and increasing linearly to $75 per ton of CO2 in 2030.\n\n52. The report analyzes each of the carbon pricing [31] scenarios in terms of their impact\non emissions, revenues and GDP, their distributional impacts, as well as in terms of\ncomparing efficiency costs with domestic environmental co-benefits.\n\n53. The analysis was conducted using Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT), a\nspreadsheet model developed jointly by the IMF and the World Bank, which is routinely\nused for cross-country and individual country assessments of mitigation policies. CPAT\nprovides estimates for over 200 countries of future fuel use and emissions by major energy\nsector as well as the emissions impacts of a diverse range of pricing and non-pricing mitigation\napproaches. Covering over 200 countries, CPAT provides projections of fuel use and CO2\nemissions for the four major energy sectors—power, industry, transport, and buildings.\n\n30 Alternatively, the tax rate for diesel could be aligned with that of gasoline in terms of tax monthly units (as\ndetermined by SII), although in terms of carbon content equivalency diesel would continue to be undertaxed.\n\n31 From now on, carbon pricing refers both to carbon tax and ETS.\n\n34", "text_characters": 2188}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0036-001"], "markdown": "**CPAT is calibrated to be consistent with modeling literature on the key parameters.** Fuel\nand electricity price responsiveness is parameterized to be broadly consistent with empirical\nevidence and results from energy models (fuel and electricity price elasticities over the longer\nterm are generally between -0.5 and -0.8). Carbon emissions factors by fuel product are from\nIIASA (2021), and emissions in 2019 are calibrated to match those of implied by UNFCCC GHG\nand emissions in 2020-1 calibrated to match those of EC-JRC (Crippa and others 2018), Global\nCarbon Budget (Friedlingstein and others 2021), and various sources.\n\n\n**Emissions analysis**\n\n\n**54.** **The base and SCC scenarios bring GHG emissions in line with the NDC target by**\n**2030.** The moderate and hybrid scenarios, however, are halfway between the BAU emissions and\nthe NDC target due to not full coverage (moderate excludes transport and hybrid applies only to\nindustry and power). Total emissions are reduced by 17, 7, 16, and 6 percent relative to BAU in\nbase, moderate, SCC and hybrid scenarios, respectively. Cumulatively over 2024-2030 period,\ncarbon pricing would reduce CO2 emissions by 51, 20, 59, and 17 million tons in the base,\nmoderate, SCC and hybrid scenarios, respectively. Under all scenarios, the country would benefit\nfrom implementing other non-carbon pricing measures to reach its NDC.\n\n\n**Figure 13. The Impact on Total GHG Emissions excl. LULUCF by Scenario**\n\n\n**55.** **In all scenarios, most of the reductions in CO2 emissions on a sectoral level come**\n**from the power sector and industry.** Power sector accounts for 36-64 percent of CO2 emissions\n\n\n35\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "CPAT is calibrated to be consistent with modeling literature on the key parameters. Fuel\nand electricity price responsiveness is parameterized to be broadly consistent with empirical\nevidence and results from energy models (fuel and electricity price elasticities over the longer\nterm are generally between -0.5 and -0.8). Carbon emissions factors by fuel product are from\nIIASA (2021), and emissions in 2019 are calibrated to match those of implied by UNFCCC GHG\nand emissions in 2020-1 calibrated to match those of EC-JRC (Crippa and others 2018), Global\nCarbon Budget (Friedlingstein and others 2021), and various sources.\n\nEmissions analysis\n\n54. The base and SCC scenarios bring GHG emissions in line with the NDC target by\n2030. The moderate and hybrid scenarios, however, are halfway between the BAU emissions and\nthe NDC target due to not full coverage (moderate excludes transport and hybrid applies only to\nindustry and power). Total emissions are reduced by 17, 7, 16, and 6 percent relative to BAU in\nbase, moderate, SCC and hybrid scenarios, respectively. Cumulatively over 2024-2030 period,\ncarbon pricing would reduce CO2 emissions by 51, 20, 59, and 17 million tons in the base,\nmoderate, SCC and hybrid scenarios, respectively. Under all scenarios, the country would benefit\nfrom implementing other non-carbon pricing measures to reach its NDC.\n\nFigure 13. The Impact on Total GHG Emissions excl. LULUCF by Scenario\n\n55. In all scenarios, most of the reductions in CO2 emissions on a sectoral level come\nfrom the power sector and industry. Power sector accounts for 36-64 percent of CO2 emissions\n\n35", "text_characters": 1357}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0037-001"], "markdown": "reductions in 2030 across all scenarios. [32] The second highest reduction comes from the industry\nsector (22-30 percent in 2030). Transport accounts for 8-23 percent of emissions reductions in\n2030, followed by buildings sector with between 2 and 13 percent of the reduction.\n\n\n**Figure 14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**56.** **Coal emissions will decrease significantly while natural gas emissions would**\n**moderately grow.** Even despite the coal phase-out in the power sector in the BAU, from a half\nto four-fifths of emissions reductions in 2030 come from coal in power and other sectors. Diesel\nemissions account for 20-44 percent of total emissions reductions in 2030, while gasoline\nemissions are excluded in one scenario (base) and less responsive in other scenarios, making up\nless than ten percent of total emissions reduction. Natural gas emissions, on the other hand, are\nexpected to grow mainly driven by the shift from coal to natural gas in the power sector. [33]\n\n\n**Fiscal and macro implications**\n\n\n**57.** **Carbon pricing might be a significant source of additional revenues,** **[34]** **raising up to**\n**1.6 percent of GDP in 2030 on top of BAU.** Cumulatively over 2024-2030, the revenues\ncollected in addition to the baseline revenues vary from $7 billion in the moderate scenario to\n$29 billion in the SCC scenario. In 2030 alone, the moderate scenario would bring additional 0.8\n\n\n32 Under an assumption of no existing bottle necks in the power system. Existence of bottle necks would delay\nthe effect of behavioral responses on carbon taxation and must be addressed for the tax to reach its full\npotential.\n\n33 Baseline energy prices were relatively high at the time of the analysis, which could have a positive impact on\nthe results of the carbon pricing scenarios chosen.\n\n34 Revenue calculations include the effect of tax base erosion from the carbon tax. The calculations exclude the\nimpact of a system of offsets starting in February 2023, which may bias the calculations upwards.\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "reductions in 2030 across all scenarios. [32] The second highest reduction comes from the industry\nsector (22-30 percent in 2030). Transport accounts for 8-23 percent of emissions reductions in\n2030, followed by buildings sector with between 2 and 13 percent of the reduction.\n\nFigure 14. CO2 Emissions Reductions from the Baseline in 2030\n\n56. Coal emissions will decrease significantly while natural gas emissions would\nmoderately grow. Even despite the coal phase-out in the power sector in the BAU, from a half\nto four-fifths of emissions reductions in 2030 come from coal in power and other sectors. Diesel\nemissions account for 20-44 percent of total emissions reductions in 2030, while gasoline\nemissions are excluded in one scenario (base) and less responsive in other scenarios, making up\nless than ten percent of total emissions reduction. Natural gas emissions, on the other hand, are\nexpected to grow mainly driven by the shift from coal to natural gas in the power sector. [33]\n\nFiscal and macro implications\n\n57. Carbon pricing might be a significant source of additional revenues, [34] raising up to\n1.6 percent of GDP in 2030 on top of BAU. Cumulatively over 2024-2030, the revenues\ncollected in addition to the baseline revenues vary from $7 billion in the moderate scenario to\n$29 billion in the SCC scenario. In 2030 alone, the moderate scenario would bring additional 0.8\n\n32 Under an assumption of no existing bottle necks in the power system. Existence of bottle necks would delay\nthe effect of behavioral responses on carbon taxation and must be addressed for the tax to reach its full\npotential.\n\n33 Baseline energy prices were relatively high at the time of the analysis, which could have a positive impact on\nthe results of the carbon pricing scenarios chosen.\n\n34 Revenue calculations include the effect of tax base erosion from the carbon tax. The calculations exclude the\nimpact of a system of offsets starting in February 2023, which may bias the calculations upwards.\n\n36", "text_characters": 1668}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0038-001"], "markdown": "percent of GDP in revenues, compared with 1.6 percent from the SCC scenario. The existing\ncarbon tax raised no more than 0.06 percent of GDP in 2017-2021.\n\n\n**Figure 15. Additional Revenues Raised from Fossil Fuels by Scenario, Percent of GDP**\n\n\n**58.** **Higher carbon pricing would have a negative on GDP growth, but this could be**\n**partially or totally offset with effective revenue recycling.** **[35]** The potential negative impact on\nGDP growth in 2030 is 1.1, 0.6, 1.0, 1.5 percentage points in the base, moderate, SCC, and hybrid\nscenarios, respectively. However, in an illustrative scenario, where 70 percent of revenues\ncollected from the carbon tax are recycled effectively through productive public investment, and\n30 percent are recycled through targeted cash transfers, the negative impact would almost be\ncompleted offset, reducing it to just 0.1 percentage points. The extent of the reversal of the\nnegative impact on GDP growth will depend on the value of the Keynesian fiscal multiplier of the\npolicies chosen to recycle revenues from carbon pricing.\n\n\n35 See next chapter for a conceptual discussion on different revenue recycling options.\n\n\n37\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "percent of GDP in revenues, compared with 1.6 percent from the SCC scenario. The existing\ncarbon tax raised no more than 0.06 percent of GDP in 2017-2021.\n\nFigure 15. Additional Revenues Raised from Fossil Fuels by Scenario, Percent of GDP\n\n58. Higher carbon pricing would have a negative on GDP growth, but this could be\npartially or totally offset with effective revenue recycling. [35] The potential negative impact on\nGDP growth in 2030 is 1.1, 0.6, 1.0, 1.5 percentage points in the base, moderate, SCC, and hybrid\nscenarios, respectively. However, in an illustrative scenario, where 70 percent of revenues\ncollected from the carbon tax are recycled effectively through productive public investment, and\n30 percent are recycled through targeted cash transfers, the negative impact would almost be\ncompleted offset, reducing it to just 0.1 percentage points. The extent of the reversal of the\nnegative impact on GDP growth will depend on the value of the Keynesian fiscal multiplier of the\npolicies chosen to recycle revenues from carbon pricing.\n\n35 See next chapter for a conceptual discussion on different revenue recycling options.\n\n37", "text_characters": 959}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0039-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**Figure 16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030**\n\n\n\n**Prices analysis**\n\n\n**59.** **Carbon pricing is likely to put upward pressure on energy prices, with the highest**\n**impact on coal, followed by electricity and road fuels.** Weighted average coal prices would\nincrease by 98, 47, 126, and 97 percent compared to BAU in the base, moderate, SCC, and hybrid\nscenarios, respectively. Coal, however, is an intermediate input used by firms rather than directly\nconsumed by households. Electricity prices would increase about by 3-4 cents per kilowatt hour [36]\n(or 25 percent compared to BAU or baseline in 2030) in each scenario. However, electricity prices\nare projected to decrease in Chile, as more variable renewable capacity comes online between\nnow and 2030. For example, electricity prices today are about $0.17 per Kilowatt hour (kWh) for\nresidential use, decreasing to $0.15 kWh in the baseline case. Similarly, electricity prices for\nindustry are $0.15 kWh, decreasing to $0.10 kWh in the baseline case. Therefore, the impact of\nthe carbon prices would only represent a modest increase from current prices. Falling electricity\nprices are good opportunity for the government to lock-in higher carbon prices. Gasoline prices\nwould grow by 7-15 percent relative to BAU (excluding the base scenario), while diesel price\nincreases would be slightly higher – 10-45 percent relative to BAU.\n\n\n36 This increase will bring electricity prices in Chile on par with electricity prices in other LAC6 countries without\nhigh carbon tax: weighted average baseline electricity prices in Argentina in 2030 are $0.12/kWh, in Brazil and\nPeru - $0.16/kWh, in Colombia - $0.15/kWh, and $0.13/kWh in Mexico.\n\n\n38", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 16. Impact on GDP Growth in 2030\n\nPrices analysis\n\n59. Carbon pricing is likely to put upward pressure on energy prices, with the highest\nimpact on coal, followed by electricity and road fuels. Weighted average coal prices would\nincrease by 98, 47, 126, and 97 percent compared to BAU in the base, moderate, SCC, and hybrid\nscenarios, respectively. Coal, however, is an intermediate input used by firms rather than directly\nconsumed by households. Electricity prices would increase about by 3-4 cents per kilowatt hour [36]\n(or 25 percent compared to BAU or baseline in 2030) in each scenario. However, electricity prices\nare projected to decrease in Chile, as more variable renewable capacity comes online between\nnow and 2030. For example, electricity prices today are about $0.17 per Kilowatt hour (kWh) for\nresidential use, decreasing to $0.15 kWh in the baseline case. Similarly, electricity prices for\nindustry are $0.15 kWh, decreasing to $0.10 kWh in the baseline case. Therefore, the impact of\nthe carbon prices would only represent a modest increase from current prices. Falling electricity\nprices are good opportunity for the government to lock-in higher carbon prices. Gasoline prices\nwould grow by 7-15 percent relative to BAU (excluding the base scenario), while diesel price\nincreases would be slightly higher – 10-45 percent relative to BAU.\n\n36 This increase will bring electricity prices in Chile on par with electricity prices in other LAC6 countries without\nhigh carbon tax: weighted average baseline electricity prices in Argentina in 2030 are $0.12/kWh, in Brazil and\nPeru - $0.16/kWh, in Colombia - $0.15/kWh, and $0.13/kWh in Mexico.\n\n38", "text_characters": 1401}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-001", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0040-002"], "markdown": "**Table 2. Energy Prices by Scenario in 2030**\n\n\nSource: IMF staff using CPAT\n\n\n**60.** **Carbon pricing would also lead to slight increases in the cost of industrial**\n**production, which may raise competitiveness concerns,** **[37]** **especially for energy-intensive,**\n**trade-exposed (EITE) industries.** Production cost increases have three components. First,\nindustrial firms will incur a direct tax payment, or allowance purchase requirement, for emissions\nthey continue to emit directly. Second, firms will incur abatement costs to the extent they cut\nemissions, for example, by switching to cleaner (but costlier) technologies and fuels. Third, they\nincur an indirect payment for carbon charges on emissions embodied in their inputs, especially\nelectricity. Overall, carbon pricing in 2030 would increase production costs for non-metallic\nindustries (most notably cement), iron and steel, and chemicals by less than 6 percent in the SCC\nand base scenarios (relative to BAU costs in 2030).\n\n\n**Figure 17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n37 While it is not a focus of this study, addressing competitiveness concerns might include policies such as border\ncarbon adjustment (BCA) or free allowances allocation for EITE industries in case of ETS.\n\n\n39", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table 2. Energy Prices by Scenario in 2030\n\nSource: IMF staff using CPAT\n\n60. Carbon pricing would also lead to slight increases in the cost of industrial\nproduction, which may raise competitiveness concerns, [37] especially for energy-intensive,\ntrade-exposed (EITE) industries. Production cost increases have three components. First,\nindustrial firms will incur a direct tax payment, or allowance purchase requirement, for emissions\nthey continue to emit directly. Second, firms will incur abatement costs to the extent they cut\nemissions, for example, by switching to cleaner (but costlier) technologies and fuels. Third, they\nincur an indirect payment for carbon charges on emissions embodied in their inputs, especially\nelectricity. Overall, carbon pricing in 2030 would increase production costs for non-metallic\nindustries (most notably cement), iron and steel, and chemicals by less than 6 percent in the SCC\nand base scenarios (relative to BAU costs in 2030).\n\nFigure 17. Percent Change in Output Prices by Scenario in 2030 (Output Price Increase, %)\n\n37 While it is not a focus of this study, addressing competitiveness concerns might include policies such as border\ncarbon adjustment (BCA) or free allowances allocation for EITE industries in case of ETS.\n\n39", "text_characters": 1074}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0041-001"], "markdown": "**Distributional impact and co-benefits**\n\n\n**61.** **Civil society and some interest groups may oppose carbon pricing because of the**\n**burden of higher energy prices on households.** Therefore, evaluating the household incidence\nfrom carbon pricing is important and measures should be taken to counteract these burdens.\nThe analysis is based on a two-step approach to assess the distributional impacts of the reforms.\nFirstly, using input-output tables to calculate the effect of carbon pricing on different categories\nof consumer goods; and secondly, mapping price increases to data on budget shares for\ndifferent goods by household income group using household expenditure surveys.\n\n\n**62.** **The results of the distributional analysis show that the impact of the carbon pricing**\n**is revenue-neutral for carbon tax scenarios and regressive for hybrid.** The modelling\nsuggests that carbon pricing imposes a burden on an average household of 1.5-3 percent of\nconsumption. The burdens are largely driven by direct increases in the price of fossil fuels and\nelectricity. However, these estimates overstate the net burden of carbon pricing on households in\ntwo regards. Firstly, they ignore partially offsetting domestic environmental benefits, especially\nlocal air pollution mortality. Second, they ignore the benefits from recycling carbon pricing\nrevenues.\n\n\n**Figure 18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline**\n\n**Consumption in 2030)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**63.** **Revenue recycling would offset the negative impact of carbon pricing on**\n**households, while targeted recycling could even make the reforms pro-poor.** For example,\nusing 30 percent of the revenues for a targeted, unconditional cash transfer aimed at the bottom\nfour consumption deciles and using other 70 percent of the revenues to invest in public\ninfrastructure, would make the reform both pro-poor and equity enhancing. On net, the bottom\nfour deciles are better off from the reform with net benefits amounting to about 4-12 percent of\nconsumption. The next three deciles are approximately no better or worse off, while wealthier\nhouseholds are worse off on net but by only 2 percent of consumption.\n\n\n40", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Distributional impact and co-benefits\n\n61. Civil society and some interest groups may oppose carbon pricing because of the\nburden of higher energy prices on households. Therefore, evaluating the household incidence\nfrom carbon pricing is important and measures should be taken to counteract these burdens.\nThe analysis is based on a two-step approach to assess the distributional impacts of the reforms.\nFirstly, using input-output tables to calculate the effect of carbon pricing on different categories\nof consumer goods; and secondly, mapping price increases to data on budget shares for\ndifferent goods by household income group using household expenditure surveys.\n\n62. The results of the distributional analysis show that the impact of the carbon pricing\nis revenue-neutral for carbon tax scenarios and regressive for hybrid. The modelling\nsuggests that carbon pricing imposes a burden on an average household of 1.5-3 percent of\nconsumption. The burdens are largely driven by direct increases in the price of fossil fuels and\nelectricity. However, these estimates overstate the net burden of carbon pricing on households in\ntwo regards. Firstly, they ignore partially offsetting domestic environmental benefits, especially\nlocal air pollution mortality. Second, they ignore the benefits from recycling carbon pricing\nrevenues.\n\nFigure 18. Relative Mean Consumption Effect before Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline\n\nConsumption in 2030)\n\n63. Revenue recycling would offset the negative impact of carbon pricing on\nhouseholds, while targeted recycling could even make the reforms pro-poor. For example,\nusing 30 percent of the revenues for a targeted, unconditional cash transfer aimed at the bottom\nfour consumption deciles and using other 70 percent of the revenues to invest in public\ninfrastructure, would make the reform both pro-poor and equity enhancing. On net, the bottom\nfour deciles are better off from the reform with net benefits amounting to about 4-12 percent of\nconsumption. The next three deciles are approximately no better or worse off, while wealthier\nhouseholds are worse off on net but by only 2 percent of consumption.\n\n40", "text_characters": 1819}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0042-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline**\n\n**Consumption in 2030)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**64.** **Carbon pricing imposes a relatively small economic cost in Chile equivalent to**\n**about 0.1-0.4 percent of GDP in 2030 and they are offset by domestic environmental co-**\n**benefits.** Economic costs reflect pure mitigation costs [38], primarily the annualized costs of using\ncleaner but more expensive technologies instead of fossil-based technologies (net of any savings\nin lifetime energy costs). The carbon pricing does not impose a net cost on Chile, before even\ncounting the climate benefits. 10-30 percent of the domestic environmental co-benefits reflect\nfewer local air pollution deaths and 70-90 percent reductions in traffic congestion and accident\nexternalities. **[39]** Adding the global climate benefits increases environmental benefits from 0.2-0.4\nto 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP, or two-three times the economic efficiency cost.\n\n\n38 Estimation of economic costs is made under specific assumptions on emissions projections and responsiveness\nof emissions to carbon pricing (reflecting marginal abatement cost curves). See Black and others (2022) on\nmethodology for estimating the economic costs.\n\n39 See Parry and others (2014) on methodologies for quantifying the broad range of environmental impacts of\nfossil fuel use on a country-by-country basis.\n\n\n41", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 19. Relative Mean Consumption Effect after Revenue Recycling (% of Baseline\n\nConsumption in 2030)\n\n64. Carbon pricing imposes a relatively small economic cost in Chile equivalent to\nabout 0.1-0.4 percent of GDP in 2030 and they are offset by domestic environmental co-\nbenefits. Economic costs reflect pure mitigation costs [38], primarily the annualized costs of using\ncleaner but more expensive technologies instead of fossil-based technologies (net of any savings\nin lifetime energy costs). The carbon pricing does not impose a net cost on Chile, before even\ncounting the climate benefits. 10-30 percent of the domestic environmental co-benefits reflect\nfewer local air pollution deaths and 70-90 percent reductions in traffic congestion and accident\nexternalities. [39] Adding the global climate benefits increases environmental benefits from 0.2-0.4\nto 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP, or two-three times the economic efficiency cost.\n\n38 Estimation of economic costs is made under specific assumptions on emissions projections and responsiveness\nof emissions to carbon pricing (reflecting marginal abatement cost curves). See Black and others (2022) on\nmethodology for estimating the economic costs.\n\n39 See Parry and others (2014) on methodologies for quantifying the broad range of environmental impacts of\nfossil fuel use on a country-by-country basis.\n\n41", "text_characters": 1160}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0043-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 20. Economic Costs and Domestic Environmental Co-benefits in 2030 (% of GDP)**\n\n\n**65.** **The table below summarizes the main results across different scenarios, which**\n**might be helpful to weigh different trade-offs in the decision-making process.**\n\n\n**Table 3. Summary Table**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Scenario|Base|Moderate|SCC|Hybrid|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Energy-related CO2 emissions**
**reduction in 2030,**% to a BAU|17%|7%|16%|6%|\n|**Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions**
**in 2024-2030,**MtCO2|51|20|59|17|\n|**Additional fiscal revenues raised in**
**2030,**% of GDP|1.61|0.81|1.55|0.92|\n|**Cumulative additional fiscal revenues**
**raised in 2024-2030,**bn USD|25.3|7.4|29.1|12.3|\n|**Impact on GDP growth in 2030,**
percentage points deviation from the
BAU growth|-0.09%|-0.08%|-0.06%|-0.08%|\n|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the BAU price|24%|22%|25%|22%|\n|**Residential electricity price increase**
**in 2030,** percent from the current price|-4%|-6%|-3%|-5%|\n|**Industrial electricity price increase in**
**2030,**percent from the BAU price|27%|24%|28%|24%|\n\n\n42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.24000549316406, 407.8900146484375, 539.9039916992188, 700.6959838867188], "columns": 5, "rows": 9}], "text": "Figure 20. Economic Costs and Domestic Environmental Co-benefits in 2030 (% of GDP)\n\n65. The table below summarizes the main results across different scenarios, which\nmight be helpful to weigh different trade-offs in the decision-making process.\n\nTable 3. Summary Table\n\n Scenario Base Moderate SCC Hybrid \n\n Energy-related CO2 emissions reduction in 2030,% to a BAU 17% 7% 16% 6% \n Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions in 2024-2030,MtCO2 51 20 59 17 \n Additional fiscal revenues raised in 2030,% of GDP 1.61 0.81 1.55 0.92 \n Cumulative additional fiscal revenues raised in 2024-2030,bn USD 25.3 7.4 29.1 12.3 \n Impact on GDP growth in 2030, percentage points deviation from the BAU growth -0.09% -0.08% -0.06% -0.08% \n Residential electricity price increase in 2030, percent from the BAU price 24% 22% 25% 22% \n Residential electricity price increase in 2030, percent from the current price -4% -6% -3% -5% \n Industrial electricity price increase in 2030,percent from the BAU price 27% 24% 28% 24% \n\n42", "text_characters": 826}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Industrial electricity price increase in**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|2030, percent from the current price|-19%|-20%|-17%|-20%|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Relative mean consumption effect on**
**the poorest after revenue recycling,**
% of BAU consumption|11.9|5.9|11.7|4.5|\n|**Pure abatement costs**, % of GDP|0.35|0.07|0.32|0.06|\n|**Domestic co-benefits**(transport, air
pollution, climate), % of GDP|0.62|0.24|0.57|0.15|\n\n\n43", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.26400756835938, 88.70573425292969, 539.8800048828125, 205.82000732421875], "columns": 5, "rows": 3}], "text": "Industrial electricity price increase in\n\n 2030, percent from the current price -19% -20% -17% -20% \n\n Relative mean consumption effect on the poorest after revenue recycling, % of BAU consumption 11.9 5.9 11.7 4.5 \n Pure abatement costs, % of GDP 0.35 0.07 0.32 0.06 \n Domestic co-benefits(transport, air pollution, climate), % of GDP 0.62 0.24 0.57 0.15 \n\n43", "text_characters": 294}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **V. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS**\n\n**66.** **Defining how revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent and explaining it**\n**clearly to the public will be a critical step to receive political support in Congress.** The\nMinistry of Finance informed the mission that the main purpose of the carbon tax reform is not\nto generate additional revenue, but to induce changes in consumption behavior to reduce social\ncosts and comply with the country’s climate goals. While earmarking is not allowed in Chile, the\nMinistry is exploring different uses of carbon tax revenue, to offset the impact of a higher carbon\ntax partially or completely on GDP growth, energy prices and income distribution.\n\n\n**67.** **Voters and specific interest groups in Chile, as in many countries, are likely to**\n**oppose carbon tax increases because they fear impacts in energy prices and in the cost of**\n**living.** **[40]** Given the recent increase in energy prices in the country, higher carbon taxes may also\nface public opposition if the reform is perceived as imposing an additional burden on lowincome families. Similarly, energy-intensive and trade-exposed firms, which cannot easily pass on\nhigher energy costs in product prices, are also likely to be vocal opponents to higher carbon\ntaxation.\n\n\n**68.** **Overcoming this political and public debate will require building a broad and**\n**diverse coalition in favor of the reform.** One way to achieve this is to clearly explain to the\npublic how revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent, considering both economic efficiency\nand implications for income distribution. Successfully socializing the carbon tax reform and how\nrevenue will be used is likely to garner support from environmental organizations, some business\ngroups, and the general public.\n\n\n**69.** **The government should develop a well-planned strategy to communicate how**\n**revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent.** **[41]** Options for revenue use should be assessed\nagainst impacts on income distribution and economic efficiency, as well as administrative burden\n(see **Error! Reference source not found.** ). Broad categories of possible expenditure choices (see\nAnnex for examples of how countries use carbon pricing revenues) include cash transfers,\nenvironmental or general investment, deficit reduction or lower taxes. For example, universal\ntransfer payments (i.e., equal dividends to all households regardless of income) might help with\npolitical acceptability but would forgo potentially sizable efficiency benefits from productive\nrevenue use. Alternatively, the government could offer relief for households through a direct\ntransfer or through lower energy bills, although this would not offset the significant indirect\nburden from generally higher consumer prices. Environmental investments (low-carbon\ninfrastructure, energy networks, R&D) may also be favored by voters as part of a package.\n\n\n40 Carbon taxes would certainly add to the cost of living for all households, but the burden as a share of total\nhousehold consumption would depend on the share of income spent on energy by different income levels.\n\n41 For a more detailed discussion and country examples on how to use carbon tax revenue see: “Using Carbon\nRevenues”. Note 16. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank.\n\n\n44", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "V. REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS\n\n66. Defining how revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent and explaining it\nclearly to the public will be a critical step to receive political support in Congress. The\nMinistry of Finance informed the mission that the main purpose of the carbon tax reform is not\nto generate additional revenue, but to induce changes in consumption behavior to reduce social\ncosts and comply with the country’s climate goals. While earmarking is not allowed in Chile, the\nMinistry is exploring different uses of carbon tax revenue, to offset the impact of a higher carbon\ntax partially or completely on GDP growth, energy prices and income distribution.\n\n67. Voters and specific interest groups in Chile, as in many countries, are likely to\noppose carbon tax increases because they fear impacts in energy prices and in the cost of\nliving. [40] Given the recent increase in energy prices in the country, higher carbon taxes may also\nface public opposition if the reform is perceived as imposing an additional burden on lowincome families. Similarly, energy-intensive and trade-exposed firms, which cannot easily pass on\nhigher energy costs in product prices, are also likely to be vocal opponents to higher carbon\ntaxation.\n\n68. Overcoming this political and public debate will require building a broad and\ndiverse coalition in favor of the reform. One way to achieve this is to clearly explain to the\npublic how revenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent, considering both economic efficiency\nand implications for income distribution. Successfully socializing the carbon tax reform and how\nrevenue will be used is likely to garner support from environmental organizations, some business\ngroups, and the general public.\n\n69. The government should develop a well-planned strategy to communicate how\nrevenue from higher carbon taxes will be spent. [41] Options for revenue use should be assessed\nagainst impacts on income distribution and economic efficiency, as well as administrative burden\n(see Error! Reference source not found. ). Broad categories of possible expenditure choices (see\nAnnex for examples of how countries use carbon pricing revenues) include cash transfers,\nenvironmental or general investment, deficit reduction or lower taxes. For example, universal\ntransfer payments (i.e., equal dividends to all households regardless of income) might help with\npolitical acceptability but would forgo potentially sizable efficiency benefits from productive\nrevenue use. Alternatively, the government could offer relief for households through a direct\ntransfer or through lower energy bills, although this would not offset the significant indirect\nburden from generally higher consumer prices. Environmental investments (low-carbon\ninfrastructure, energy networks, R&D) may also be favored by voters as part of a package.\n\n40 Carbon taxes would certainly add to the cost of living for all households, but the burden as a share of total\nhousehold consumption would depend on the share of income spent on energy by different income levels.\n\n41 For a more detailed discussion and country examples on how to use carbon tax revenue see: “Using Carbon\nRevenues”. Note 16. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank.\n\n44", "text_characters": 2731}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-001", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-002", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-003", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-004", "cr-2023-035-fig-p0046-005"], "markdown": "However, these investments would need to be balanced against competing investment priorities\nand scrutinized to ensure high quality, as with other important investments (e.g., healthcare,\nwater and sanitation, etc.). While we understand the authorities are currently not considering tax\ncuts for labor or consumption, reducing these taxes could also promote some of these efficiency\ngains and would benefit households roughly in proportion to their income.\n\n\n**Table 4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**General Revenue Uses**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGeneral investments May disproportionately\n\nbenefit low-income\nhouseholds (for example, if\nbasic education, healthcare,\n\nand infrastructure provided)\n\n\n\nPotentially significant Modest\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPayroll tax Benefits are largely\nproportional across working\n\nhouseholds\n\n\n\nImproves incentives for\n\nformal work effort\n\n\n\nMinimal\n\n\n\n\n\nMinimal\n\n\nMinimal\n\n\nMinimal\n\n\nLow, if builds on existing\ncapacity, otherwise significant\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nConsumption tax Largely proportional to\nhouseholds' consumption\n\n\nCorporate income tax Benefits are skewed to\n\nhigher-income groups\n\nDeficit reduction Benefits accrue to future\n\ngenerations\n\n\n**Targeted assistance**\n\n\n\nMeans-tested cash, in-kind\ntransfers\n\n\n\nEffective in helping lowincome groups if social safety\n\nnets are comprehensive\n\n\n\nSome improvements in\nincentives for formal work\n\neffort\n\nImproves incentives for\n\ninvestment\n\nSignificant (lowers future tax\nburdens and macro-financial\n\nrisk)\n\n\nEfficiency impacts unclear but\n\nlikely modest\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n45", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "However, these investments would need to be balanced against competing investment priorities\nand scrutinized to ensure high quality, as with other important investments (e.g., healthcare,\nwater and sanitation, etc.). While we understand the authorities are currently not considering tax\ncuts for labor or consumption, reducing these taxes could also promote some of these efficiency\ngains and would benefit households roughly in proportion to their income.\n\nTable 4. Options for Recycling Higher Carbon Tax Revenue\n\nGeneral Revenue Uses\n\nGeneral investments May disproportionately\n\nbenefit low-income\nhouseholds (for example, if\nbasic education, healthcare,\n\nand infrastructure provided)\n\nPotentially significant Modest\n\nPayroll tax Benefits are largely\nproportional across working\n\nhouseholds\n\nImproves incentives for\n\nformal work effort\n\nMinimal\n\nMinimal\n\nMinimal\n\nMinimal\n\nLow, if builds on existing\ncapacity, otherwise significant\n\nConsumption tax Largely proportional to\nhouseholds' consumption\n\nCorporate income tax Benefits are skewed to\n\nhigher-income groups\n\nDeficit reduction Benefits accrue to future\n\ngenerations\n\nTargeted assistance\n\nMeans-tested cash, in-kind\ntransfers\n\nEffective in helping lowincome groups if social safety\n\nnets are comprehensive\n\nSome improvements in\nincentives for formal work\n\neffort\n\nImproves incentives for\n\ninvestment\n\nSignificant (lowers future tax\nburdens and macro-financial\n\nrisk)\n\nEfficiency impacts unclear but\n\nlikely modest\n\n45", "text_characters": 1253}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **REFERENCES**\n\nBlack, Simon, Ian Parry, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2022. “Carbon Taxes or Emissions Trading\n\nSystems?: Instrument Choice and Design” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/006, International\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC, available at: [https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-Instrument-Choice-and-Design-519101)\n[climate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-Instrument-Choice-and-Design-519101)\nInstrument-Choice-and-Design-519101\n\n\nBlack, Simon, Ian Parry, James Roaf, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2021. “Not Yet on Track to Net\n\nZero: The Urgent Need for Greater Ambition and Policy Action to Achieve Paris\nTemperature Goals.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/005, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC, available\n\n\nCrippa, Monica, Diego Guizzardi, Marilena Muntean, Edwin Schaaf, Frank Dentener, John A. van\n\nAardenne, Suvi Monni, et al. 2018. “Gridded Emissions of Air Pollutants for the Period\n1970–2012 within EDGAR v4.3.2.” Earth System Science Data 10 (4): 1987–2013.\n\n\nDíaz, Gabriel, Francisco Muñoz and Rodrigo Moreno. 2020. “Equilibrium analysis of a tax on\n\ncarbon emissions with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules.” The Energy\nJournal Volume: 41 Issue: 2, Pages: 93-122, Mar 2020, available at:\n[https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/174487/Equilibrium-Analysis-of-a-](https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/174487/Equilibrium-Analysis-of-a-Tax-on-Carbon-Emissions%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)\nTax-on-Carbon-Emissions%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y\n\n\nFriedlingstein, Pierre, Matthew W. Jones, Michael O’Sullivan, Robbie M. Andrew, Dorothee C. E.\n\nBakker, Judith Hauck, Corinne Le Quéré, et al. 2021. “Global Carbon Budget 2021.” Earth\nSystem Science Data Discussions, November, 1–191.\n\n\nIMF, 2019, How to Mitigate Climate Change, Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund,\n\nWashington, DC, (October 2019), available at:\n[https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2019/10/16/Fiscal-Monitor-October-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2019/10/16/Fiscal-Monitor-October-2019-How-to-Mitigate-Climate-Change-47027)\n2019-How-to-Mitigate-Climate-Change-47027\n\n\nIMF, OECD, 2021, Tax Expenditures and Corrective Taxes in Chile, International Monetary Fund,\n\nWashington, DC, (November 2021), available at:\n[https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/11/19/Chile-Technical-Assistance-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/11/19/Chile-Technical-Assistance-Report-Assessment-of-Tax-Expenditures-and-Corrective-Taxes-49906)\nReport-Assessment-of-Tax-Expenditures-and-Corrective-Taxes-49906\n\n\nIPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva,\n\nSwitzerland, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/\n\n\nIPCC, 2021. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on\n\nClimate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/\n\n\n46", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REFERENCES\n\nBlack, Simon, Ian Parry, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2022. “Carbon Taxes or Emissions Trading\n\nSystems?: Instrument Choice and Design” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/006, International\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC, available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-\nclimate-notes/Issues/2022/07/14/Carbon-Taxes-or-Emissions-Trading-Systems-\nInstrument-Choice-and-Design-519101\n\nBlack, Simon, Ian Parry, James Roaf, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2021. “Not Yet on Track to Net\n\nZero: The Urgent Need for Greater Ambition and Policy Action to Achieve Paris\nTemperature Goals.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/005, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC, available\n\nCrippa, Monica, Diego Guizzardi, Marilena Muntean, Edwin Schaaf, Frank Dentener, John A. van\n\nAardenne, Suvi Monni, et al. 2018. “Gridded Emissions of Air Pollutants for the Period\n1970–2012 within EDGAR v4.3.2.” Earth System Science Data 10 (4): 1987–2013.\n\nDíaz, Gabriel, Francisco Muñoz and Rodrigo Moreno. 2020. “Equilibrium analysis of a tax on\n\ncarbon emissions with pass-through restrictions and side-payment rules.” The Energy\nJournal Volume: 41 Issue: 2, Pages: 93-122, Mar 2020, available at:\nhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/174487/Equilibrium-Analysis-of-a-\nTax-on-Carbon-Emissions%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y\n\nFriedlingstein, Pierre, Matthew W. Jones, Michael O’Sullivan, Robbie M. Andrew, Dorothee C. E.\n\nBakker, Judith Hauck, Corinne Le Quéré, et al. 2021. “Global Carbon Budget 2021.” Earth\nSystem Science Data Discussions, November, 1–191.\n\nIMF, 2019, How to Mitigate Climate Change, Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund,\n\nWashington, DC, (October 2019), available at:\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2019/10/16/Fiscal-Monitor-October-\n2019-How-to-Mitigate-Climate-Change-47027\n\nIMF, OECD, 2021, Tax Expenditures and Corrective Taxes in Chile, International Monetary Fund,\n\nWashington, DC, (November 2021), available at:\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/11/19/Chile-Technical-Assistance-\nReport-Assessment-of-Tax-Expenditures-and-Corrective-Taxes-49906\n\nIPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva,\n\nSwitzerland, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/\n\nIPCC, 2021. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on\n\nClimate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/\n\n46", "text_characters": 2158}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017, Estimación del Precio Social del CO2 2017, Gobierno de\n\nChile, available at: http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf\n\n\nMinisterio de Medio Ambiente, 2019, Impuestos Verdes sobre Fuentes Fijas – Reporte Final\n\nOperación 2019, Gobierno de Chile, available at:\nhttp://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf\n\n\nParry, Ian and Jon Strand, 2011, “International Fuels Tax Assessment: An Application to Chile”,\n\nIMF Working Paper 11/168, (July 2001), available at:\n[https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/International-Fuel-Tax-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/International-Fuel-Tax-Assessment-An-Application-to-Chile-25045)\nAssessment-An-Application-to-Chile-25045\n\n\nParry, Ian, Simon Black, and James Roaf. 2021. “Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor\n\namong Large Emitters.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/001, International Monetary Fund,\n[Washington, DC, available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-Large-Emitters-460468)\n[notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-Large-Emitters-460468)\nLarge-Emitters-460468\n\n\nParry, Ian (eds), 2021, “No Brainers and Low-Hanging Fruit in National Climate Policy”, CEPR\n\nPress, London, available at [https://cepr.org/chapters/critical-role-feebates-climate-](https://cepr.org/chapters/critical-role-feebates-climate-mitigation-strategies)\nmitigation-strategies\n\n\nRennert, Kevin, Frank Errickson, Brian C. Prest, Lisa Rennels, Richard G. Newell, William Pizer, Cora\n\nKingdon et al. \"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2.\" _Nature_ 610,\nno. 7933 (2022): 687-692.\n\n\nVernon, Nate, Ian Parry, and Simon Black. \"Still not getting energy prices right: A global and\n\ncountry update of fossil fuel subsidies.\" (2021).\n\n\nUN. 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations, New York\n\nCity, NY.\n\n\nUNCCCF, 2021, Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Revised note by\n\nthe secretariat, Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to Paris\nAgreement, Glasgow (October 2021), available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/306848\n\n\nWorld Bank, 2019, Using Carbon Revenues. Note 16. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank.\n\nhttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32247\n\n\nWorld Bank, 2021, Carbon Pricing Dashboard. World Bank Group, Washington DC. Available at:\n\nhttps://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data\n\n\n47", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 48, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017, Estimación del Precio Social del CO2 2017, Gobierno de\n\nChile, available at: http://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf\n\nMinisterio de Medio Ambiente, 2019, Impuestos Verdes sobre Fuentes Fijas – Reporte Final\n\nOperación 2019, Gobierno de Chile, available at:\nhttp://sni.gob.cl/storage/docs/Precio%20Social%20del%20CO2.pdf\n\nParry, Ian and Jon Strand, 2011, “International Fuels Tax Assessment: An Application to Chile”,\n\nIMF Working Paper 11/168, (July 2001), available at:\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/International-Fuel-Tax-\nAssessment-An-Application-to-Chile-25045\n\nParry, Ian, Simon Black, and James Roaf. 2021. “Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor\n\namong Large Emitters.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/001, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC, available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-\nnotes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-\nLarge-Emitters-460468\n\nParry, Ian (eds), 2021, “No Brainers and Low-Hanging Fruit in National Climate Policy”, CEPR\n\nPress, London, available at https://cepr.org/chapters/critical-role-feebates-climate-\nmitigation-strategies\n\nRennert, Kevin, Frank Errickson, Brian C. Prest, Lisa Rennels, Richard G. Newell, William Pizer, Cora\n\nKingdon et al. \"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2.\" _Nature_ 610,\nno. 7933 (2022): 687-692.\n\nVernon, Nate, Ian Parry, and Simon Black. \"Still not getting energy prices right: A global and\n\ncountry update of fossil fuel subsidies.\" (2021).\n\nUN. 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations, New York\n\nCity, NY.\n\nUNCCCF, 2021, Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Revised note by\n\nthe secretariat, Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to Paris\nAgreement, Glasgow (October 2021), available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/306848\n\nWorld Bank, 2019, Using Carbon Revenues. Note 16. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank.\n\nhttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32247\n\nWorld Bank, 2021, Carbon Pricing Dashboard. World Bank Group, Washington DC. Available at:\n\nhttps://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data\n\n47", "text_characters": 1990}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Appendix 1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Coverage of Energy Sectors Coverage
Revenue/
Rate, all Price, Point of Tax/
Country/ Year Rent, % Revenue Use
Power Industry Transport Buildings GHGs $/tonne Regulation
Region Introduced GDP
(percent)
Carbon Taxes
Argentina 2018 ✔ ✔ ✔ 20 5 0.070 Midstream General budget
Colombia 2017 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 23 5 0.04 Midstream Environmental spending
Chile 2017 ✔ ✔ 29 5 0.05 Downstream General budget
Indonesia 2022 ✔ 26 2 0.05 Midstream General budget
Singapore 2019 ✔ ✔ 80 4 0.04 Midstream General budget
South Africa 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 80 10 0.04 Midstream General budget
Ukraine 2011 ✔ ✔ ✔ 71 1 0.05 Midstream General budget
Uruguay 2022 ✔ ✔ 11 127 1.15 Midstream General budget, environmental spending
ETSs
EU 2005 ✔ ✔ 41 87 0.26 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Austria 2005 ✔ ✔ 37 87 0.11 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Belgium 2005 ✔ ✔ 38 87 0.19 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria 2005 ✔ ✔ 52 87 1.82 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Croatia 2005 ✔ ✔ 32 87 0.33 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.43 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
China 2013, 2014, ✔
2016, 2021 38 9 0.32 Downstream Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.78 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Germany 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 85 62 0.44 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending
Greece 2005 ✔ ✔ 47 87 0.66 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Hungary 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.39 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Italy 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.18 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan 2013 ✔ ✔ ✔ 46 1 0.10 Downstream General budget
Korea 2015 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 73 19 0.99 Downstream Environmental spending
Lithuania 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.44 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Malta 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.28 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 49 53 0.20 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Romania 2005 ✔ ✔ 33 87 0.89 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia 2005 ✔ ✔ 50 87 0.64 Downstream General budget, environmental spending
US 2009, 2012, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
2018, 2021 7 24 0.05 Up & Midstream General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
Hybrid
Canada 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 38 0.16 Downstream Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark 1992, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 62 52 0.29 Mid & Downstream General budget
Estonia 2000, 2005 ✔ ✔ 63 79 1.26 Mid & Downstream General budget
Finland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 77 0.76 Mid & Downstream General budget, tax cuts
France 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 56 64 0.41 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Iceland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 93 56 0.62 Mid & Downstream General budget
Ireland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 59 62 0.23 Mid & Downstream General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico 2014, 2020 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 61 4 0.02 Midstream General budget
Japan 2010, 2011, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
2012 77 2 0.05 Midstream Environmental spending
Latvia 2004, 2005 ✔ ✔ 25.4 79 0.39 Midstream General budget
Liechtenstein 2005, 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 81 130 0.60 Mid & Downstream General budget
Luxembourg 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 79 38 0.048 Mid & Downstream General budget
Netherlands 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ 46 87 0.270 Mid & Downstream General budget
Norway 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 55 87 0.94 Mid & Downstream General budget
Poland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 51 81 1.45 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending
Portugal 2015, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 70 56 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia 1996, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 89 47 0.48 Mid & Downstream General budget
Spain 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ 37 82 0.25 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending
Sweden 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 109 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget
UK 2013, 2021 ✔ ✔ 49 67 0.42 Downstream General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 44 114 0.16 Midstream Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|Country/
Region
Year
Introduced
Power
Industry Transport Buildings
**Carbon Taxes**
Argentina
2018
✔
✔
✔
20
5
0.070
Midstream
General budget
Colombia
2017
✔
✔
✔
✔
23
5
0.04
Midstream
Environmental spending
Chile
2017
✔
✔
29
5
0.05
Downstream
General budget
Indonesia
2022
✔
26
2
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Singapore
2019
✔
✔
80
4
0.04
Midstream
General budget
South Africa
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
80
10
0.04
Midstream
General budget
Ukraine
2011
✔
✔
✔
71
1
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Uruguay
2022
✔
✔
11
127
1.15
Midstream
General budget, environmental spending
**ETSs**
EU
2005
✔
✔
41
87
0.26
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Austria
2005
✔
✔
37
87
0.11
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Belgium
2005
✔
✔
38
87
0.19
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria
2005
✔
✔
52
87
1.82
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Croatia
2005
✔
✔
32
87
0.33
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.43
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
China
2013, 2014,
2016, 2021
✔
38
9
0.32
Downstream
Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.78
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Germany
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
85
62
0.44
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Greece
2005
✔
✔
47
87
0.66
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Hungary
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.39
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Italy
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.18
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan
2013
✔
✔
✔
46
1
0.10
Downstream
General budget
Korea
2015
✔
✔
✔
✔
73
19
0.99
Downstream
Environmental spending
Lithuania
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.44
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Malta
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.28
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand
2008
✔
✔
✔
49
53
0.20
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Romania
2005
✔
✔
33
87
0.89
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia
2005
✔
✔
50
87
0.64
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
US
2009, 2012,
2018, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
7
24
0.05
Up & Midstream
General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
**Hybrid**
Canada
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
38
0.16
Downstream
Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark
1992, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
62
52
0.29
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Estonia
2000, 2005
✔
✔
63
79
1.26
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Finland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
77
0.76
Mid & Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
France
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
✔
56
64
0.41
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Iceland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
93
56
0.62
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Ireland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
59
62
0.23
Mid & Downstream
General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico
2014, 2020
✔
✔
✔
✔
61
4
0.02
Midstream
General budget
Japan
2010, 2011,
2012
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
2
0.05
Midstream
Environmental spending
Latvia
2004, 2005
✔
✔
25.4
79
0.39
Midstream
General budget
Liechtenstein
2005, 2008
✔
✔
✔
✔
81
130
0.60
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Luxembourg
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
79
38
0.048
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Netherlands
2005, 2021
✔
✔
46
87
0.270
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Norway
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
55
87
0.94
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Poland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
51
81
1.45
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Portugal
2015, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
70
56
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia
1996, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
89
47
0.48
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Spain
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
37
82
0.25
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Sweden
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
109
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget
UK
2013, 2021
✔
✔
49
67
0.42
Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland
2008
✔
✔
✔
44
114
0.16
Midstream
Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending
Coverage of Energy Sectors
Coverage
Rate, all
GHGs
(percent)
Price,
$/tonne
Revenue/
Rent, %
GDP
Point of Tax/
Regulation
Revenue Use||\n|Country/
Region
Year
Introduced
Power
Industry Transport Buildings
**Carbon Taxes**
Argentina
2018
✔
✔
✔
20
5
0.070
Midstream
General budget
Colombia
2017
✔
✔
✔
✔
23
5
0.04
Midstream
Environmental spending
Chile
2017
✔
✔
29
5
0.05
Downstream
General budget
Indonesia
2022
✔
26
2
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Singapore
2019
✔
✔
80
4
0.04
Midstream
General budget
South Africa
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
80
10
0.04
Midstream
General budget
Ukraine
2011
✔
✔
✔
71
1
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Uruguay
2022
✔
✔
11
127
1.15
Midstream
General budget, environmental spending
**ETSs**
EU
2005
✔
✔
41
87
0.26
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Austria
2005
✔
✔
37
87
0.11
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Belgium
2005
✔
✔
38
87
0.19
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria
2005
✔
✔
52
87
1.82
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Croatia
2005
✔
✔
32
87
0.33
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.43
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
China
2013, 2014,
2016, 2021
✔
38
9
0.32
Downstream
Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.78
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Germany
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
85
62
0.44
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Greece
2005
✔
✔
47
87
0.66
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Hungary
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.39
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Italy
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.18
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan
2013
✔
✔
✔
46
1
0.10
Downstream
General budget
Korea
2015
✔
✔
✔
✔
73
19
0.99
Downstream
Environmental spending
Lithuania
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.44
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Malta
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.28
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand
2008
✔
✔
✔
49
53
0.20
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Romania
2005
✔
✔
33
87
0.89
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia
2005
✔
✔
50
87
0.64
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
US
2009, 2012,
2018, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
7
24
0.05
Up & Midstream
General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
**Hybrid**
Canada
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
38
0.16
Downstream
Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark
1992, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
62
52
0.29
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Estonia
2000, 2005
✔
✔
63
79
1.26
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Finland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
77
0.76
Mid & Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
France
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
✔
56
64
0.41
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Iceland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
93
56
0.62
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Ireland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
59
62
0.23
Mid & Downstream
General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico
2014, 2020
✔
✔
✔
✔
61
4
0.02
Midstream
General budget
Japan
2010, 2011,
2012
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
2
0.05
Midstream
Environmental spending
Latvia
2004, 2005
✔
✔
25.4
79
0.39
Midstream
General budget
Liechtenstein
2005, 2008
✔
✔
✔
✔
81
130
0.60
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Luxembourg
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
79
38
0.048
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Netherlands
2005, 2021
✔
✔
46
87
0.270
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Norway
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
55
87
0.94
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Poland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
51
81
1.45
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Portugal
2015, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
70
56
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia
1996, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
89
47
0.48
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Spain
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
37
82
0.25
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Sweden
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
109
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget
UK
2013, 2021
✔
✔
49
67
0.42
Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland
2008
✔
✔
✔
44
114
0.16
Midstream
Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending
Coverage of Energy Sectors
Coverage
Rate, all
GHGs
(percent)
Price,
$/tonne
Revenue/
Rent, %
GDP
Point of Tax/
Regulation
Revenue Use||\n|Country/
Region
Year
Introduced
Power
Industry Transport Buildings
**Carbon Taxes**
Argentina
2018
✔
✔
✔
20
5
0.070
Midstream
General budget
Colombia
2017
✔
✔
✔
✔
23
5
0.04
Midstream
Environmental spending
Chile
2017
✔
✔
29
5
0.05
Downstream
General budget
Indonesia
2022
✔
26
2
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Singapore
2019
✔
✔
80
4
0.04
Midstream
General budget
South Africa
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
80
10
0.04
Midstream
General budget
Ukraine
2011
✔
✔
✔
71
1
0.05
Midstream
General budget
Uruguay
2022
✔
✔
11
127
1.15
Midstream
General budget, environmental spending
**ETSs**
EU
2005
✔
✔
41
87
0.26
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Austria
2005
✔
✔
37
87
0.11
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Belgium
2005
✔
✔
38
87
0.19
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Bulgaria
2005
✔
✔
52
87
1.82
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Croatia
2005
✔
✔
32
87
0.33
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Cyprus
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.43
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
China
2013, 2014,
2016, 2021
✔
38
9
0.32
Downstream
Environmental spending proposal
Czech Republic
2005
✔
✔
51
87
0.78
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Germany
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
85
62
0.44
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Greece
2005
✔
✔
47
87
0.66
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Hungary
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.39
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Italy
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.18
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Kazakhstan
2013
✔
✔
✔
46
1
0.10
Downstream
General budget
Korea
2015
✔
✔
✔
✔
73
19
0.99
Downstream
Environmental spending
Lithuania
2005
✔
✔
30
87
0.44
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Malta
2005
✔
✔
34
87
0.28
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
New Zealand
2008
✔
✔
✔
49
53
0.20
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Romania
2005
✔
✔
33
87
0.89
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovakia
2005
✔
✔
50
87
0.64
Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
US
2009, 2012,
2018, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
7
24
0.05
Up & Midstream
General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin
**Hybrid**
Canada
2019
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
38
0.16
Downstream
Tax cuts, environmental spending
Denmark
1992, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
62
52
0.29
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Estonia
2000, 2005
✔
✔
63
79
1.26
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Finland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
67
77
0.76
Mid & Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
France
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
✔
56
64
0.41
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Iceland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
93
56
0.62
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Ireland
2005, 2010
✔
✔
✔
✔
59
62
0.23
Mid & Downstream
General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin
Mexico
2014, 2020
✔
✔
✔
✔
61
4
0.02
Midstream
General budget
Japan
2010, 2011,
2012
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
2
0.05
Midstream
Environmental spending
Latvia
2004, 2005
✔
✔
25.4
79
0.39
Midstream
General budget
Liechtenstein
2005, 2008
✔
✔
✔
✔
81
130
0.60
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Luxembourg
2005, 2021
✔
✔
✔
✔
79
38
0.048
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Netherlands
2005, 2021
✔
✔
46
87
0.270
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Norway
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
55
87
0.94
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Poland
1990, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
51
81
1.45
Mid & Downstream
Environmental spending
Portugal
2015, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
70
56
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Slovenia
1996, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
89
47
0.48
Mid & Downstream
General budget
Spain
2005, 2014
✔
✔
✔
37
82
0.25
Mid & Downstream
General budget, environmental spending
Sweden
1991, 2005
✔
✔
✔
✔
77
109
0.52
Mid & Downstream
General budget
UK
2013, 2021
✔
✔
49
67
0.42
Downstream
General budget, tax cuts
Switzerland
2008
✔
✔
✔
44
114
0.16
Midstream
Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending
Coverage of Energy Sectors
Coverage
Rate, all
GHGs
(percent)
Price,
$/tonne
Revenue/
Rent, %
GDP
Point of Tax/
Regulation
Revenue Use||\n\n\n48", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 49, "report_id": "cr-2023-035", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.14400482177734, 107.5400390625, 545.086181640625, 582.6699829101562], "columns": 2, "rows": 4}], "text": "Appendix 1. Carbon Taxes, ETS and Revenue Use\n\n Coverage of Energy Sectors Coverage Revenue/ Rate, all Price, Point of Tax/ Country/ Year Rent, % Revenue Use Power Industry Transport Buildings GHGs $/tonne Regulation Region Introduced GDP (percent) Carbon Taxes Argentina 2018 ✔ ✔ ✔ 20 5 0.070 Midstream General budget Colombia 2017 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 23 5 0.04 Midstream Environmental spending Chile 2017 ✔ ✔ 29 5 0.05 Downstream General budget Indonesia 2022 ✔ 26 2 0.05 Midstream General budget Singapore 2019 ✔ ✔ 80 4 0.04 Midstream General budget South Africa 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 80 10 0.04 Midstream General budget Ukraine 2011 ✔ ✔ ✔ 71 1 0.05 Midstream General budget Uruguay 2022 ✔ ✔ 11 127 1.15 Midstream General budget, environmental spending ETSs EU 2005 ✔ ✔ 41 87 0.26 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Austria 2005 ✔ ✔ 37 87 0.11 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Belgium 2005 ✔ ✔ 38 87 0.19 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Bulgaria 2005 ✔ ✔ 52 87 1.82 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Croatia 2005 ✔ ✔ 32 87 0.33 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Cyprus 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.43 Downstream General budget, environmental spending China 2013, 2014, ✔ 2016, 2021 38 9 0.32 Downstream Environmental spending proposal Czech Republic 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.78 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Germany 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 85 62 0.44 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Greece 2005 ✔ ✔ 47 87 0.66 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Hungary 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.39 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Italy 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.18 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Kazakhstan 2013 ✔ ✔ ✔ 46 1 0.10 Downstream General budget Korea 2015 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 73 19 0.99 Downstream Environmental spending Lithuania 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.44 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Malta 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.28 Downstream General budget, environmental spending New Zealand 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 49 53 0.20 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Romania 2005 ✔ ✔ 33 87 0.89 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovakia 2005 ✔ ✔ 50 87 0.64 Downstream General budget, environmental spending US 2009, 2012, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 2018, 2021 7 24 0.05 Up & Midstream General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin Hybrid Canada 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 38 0.16 Downstream Tax cuts, environmental spending Denmark 1992, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 62 52 0.29 Mid & Downstream General budget Estonia 2000, 2005 ✔ ✔ 63 79 1.26 Mid & Downstream General budget Finland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 77 0.76 Mid & Downstream General budget, tax cuts France 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 56 64 0.41 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Iceland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 93 56 0.62 Mid & Downstream General budget Ireland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 59 62 0.23 Mid & Downstream General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin Mexico 2014, 2020 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 61 4 0.02 Midstream General budget Japan 2010, 2011, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 2012 77 2 0.05 Midstream Environmental spending Latvia 2004, 2005 ✔ ✔ 25.4 79 0.39 Midstream General budget Liechtenstein 2005, 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 81 130 0.60 Mid & Downstream General budget Luxembourg 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 79 38 0.048 Mid & Downstream General budget Netherlands 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ 46 87 0.270 Mid & Downstream General budget Norway 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 55 87 0.94 Mid & Downstream General budget Poland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 51 81 1.45 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Portugal 2015, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 70 56 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovenia 1996, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 89 47 0.48 Mid & Downstream General budget Spain 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ 37 82 0.25 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Sweden 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 109 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget UK 2013, 2021 ✔ ✔ 49 67 0.42 Downstream General budget, tax cuts Switzerland 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 44 114 0.16 Midstream Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending Col2 \n\n Country/ Region Year Introduced Power Industry Transport Buildings Carbon Taxes Argentina 2018 ✔ ✔ ✔ 20 5 0.070 Midstream General budget Colombia 2017 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 23 5 0.04 Midstream Environmental spending Chile 2017 ✔ ✔ 29 5 0.05 Downstream General budget Indonesia 2022 ✔ 26 2 0.05 Midstream General budget Singapore 2019 ✔ ✔ 80 4 0.04 Midstream General budget South Africa 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 80 10 0.04 Midstream General budget Ukraine 2011 ✔ ✔ ✔ 71 1 0.05 Midstream General budget Uruguay 2022 ✔ ✔ 11 127 1.15 Midstream General budget, environmental spending ETSs EU 2005 ✔ ✔ 41 87 0.26 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Austria 2005 ✔ ✔ 37 87 0.11 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Belgium 2005 ✔ ✔ 38 87 0.19 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Bulgaria 2005 ✔ ✔ 52 87 1.82 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Croatia 2005 ✔ ✔ 32 87 0.33 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Cyprus 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.43 Downstream General budget, environmental spending China 2013, 2014, 2016, 2021 ✔ 38 9 0.32 Downstream Environmental spending proposal Czech Republic 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.78 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Germany 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 85 62 0.44 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Greece 2005 ✔ ✔ 47 87 0.66 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Hungary 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.39 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Italy 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.18 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Kazakhstan 2013 ✔ ✔ ✔ 46 1 0.10 Downstream General budget Korea 2015 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 73 19 0.99 Downstream Environmental spending Lithuania 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.44 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Malta 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.28 Downstream General budget, environmental spending New Zealand 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 49 53 0.20 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Romania 2005 ✔ ✔ 33 87 0.89 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovakia 2005 ✔ ✔ 50 87 0.64 Downstream General budget, environmental spending US 2009, 2012, 2018, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 7 24 0.05 Up & Midstream General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin Hybrid Canada 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 38 0.16 Downstream Tax cuts, environmental spending Denmark 1992, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 62 52 0.29 Mid & Downstream General budget Estonia 2000, 2005 ✔ ✔ 63 79 1.26 Mid & Downstream General budget Finland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 77 0.76 Mid & Downstream General budget, tax cuts France 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 56 64 0.41 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Iceland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 93 56 0.62 Mid & Downstream General budget Ireland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 59 62 0.23 Mid & Downstream General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin Mexico 2014, 2020 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 61 4 0.02 Midstream General budget Japan 2010, 2011, 2012 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 2 0.05 Midstream Environmental spending Latvia 2004, 2005 ✔ ✔ 25.4 79 0.39 Midstream General budget Liechtenstein 2005, 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 81 130 0.60 Mid & Downstream General budget Luxembourg 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 79 38 0.048 Mid & Downstream General budget Netherlands 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ 46 87 0.270 Mid & Downstream General budget Norway 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 55 87 0.94 Mid & Downstream General budget Poland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 51 81 1.45 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Portugal 2015, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 70 56 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovenia 1996, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 89 47 0.48 Mid & Downstream General budget Spain 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ 37 82 0.25 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Sweden 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 109 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget UK 2013, 2021 ✔ ✔ 49 67 0.42 Downstream General budget, tax cuts Switzerland 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 44 114 0.16 Midstream Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending Coverage of Energy Sectors Coverage Rate, all GHGs (percent) Price, $/tonne Revenue/ Rent, % GDP Point of Tax/ Regulation Revenue Use \n Country/ Region Year Introduced Power Industry Transport Buildings Carbon Taxes Argentina 2018 ✔ ✔ ✔ 20 5 0.070 Midstream General budget Colombia 2017 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 23 5 0.04 Midstream Environmental spending Chile 2017 ✔ ✔ 29 5 0.05 Downstream General budget Indonesia 2022 ✔ 26 2 0.05 Midstream General budget Singapore 2019 ✔ ✔ 80 4 0.04 Midstream General budget South Africa 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 80 10 0.04 Midstream General budget Ukraine 2011 ✔ ✔ ✔ 71 1 0.05 Midstream General budget Uruguay 2022 ✔ ✔ 11 127 1.15 Midstream General budget, environmental spending ETSs EU 2005 ✔ ✔ 41 87 0.26 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Austria 2005 ✔ ✔ 37 87 0.11 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Belgium 2005 ✔ ✔ 38 87 0.19 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Bulgaria 2005 ✔ ✔ 52 87 1.82 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Croatia 2005 ✔ ✔ 32 87 0.33 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Cyprus 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.43 Downstream General budget, environmental spending China 2013, 2014, 2016, 2021 ✔ 38 9 0.32 Downstream Environmental spending proposal Czech Republic 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.78 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Germany 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 85 62 0.44 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Greece 2005 ✔ ✔ 47 87 0.66 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Hungary 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.39 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Italy 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.18 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Kazakhstan 2013 ✔ ✔ ✔ 46 1 0.10 Downstream General budget Korea 2015 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 73 19 0.99 Downstream Environmental spending Lithuania 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.44 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Malta 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.28 Downstream General budget, environmental spending New Zealand 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 49 53 0.20 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Romania 2005 ✔ ✔ 33 87 0.89 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovakia 2005 ✔ ✔ 50 87 0.64 Downstream General budget, environmental spending US 2009, 2012, 2018, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 7 24 0.05 Up & Midstream General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin Hybrid Canada 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 38 0.16 Downstream Tax cuts, environmental spending Denmark 1992, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 62 52 0.29 Mid & Downstream General budget Estonia 2000, 2005 ✔ ✔ 63 79 1.26 Mid & Downstream General budget Finland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 77 0.76 Mid & Downstream General budget, tax cuts France 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 56 64 0.41 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Iceland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 93 56 0.62 Mid & Downstream General budget Ireland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 59 62 0.23 Mid & Downstream General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin Mexico 2014, 2020 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 61 4 0.02 Midstream General budget Japan 2010, 2011, 2012 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 2 0.05 Midstream Environmental spending Latvia 2004, 2005 ✔ ✔ 25.4 79 0.39 Midstream General budget Liechtenstein 2005, 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 81 130 0.60 Mid & Downstream General budget Luxembourg 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 79 38 0.048 Mid & Downstream General budget Netherlands 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ 46 87 0.270 Mid & Downstream General budget Norway 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 55 87 0.94 Mid & Downstream General budget Poland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 51 81 1.45 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Portugal 2015, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 70 56 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovenia 1996, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 89 47 0.48 Mid & Downstream General budget Spain 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ 37 82 0.25 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Sweden 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 109 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget UK 2013, 2021 ✔ ✔ 49 67 0.42 Downstream General budget, tax cuts Switzerland 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 44 114 0.16 Midstream Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending Coverage of Energy Sectors Coverage Rate, all GHGs (percent) Price, $/tonne Revenue/ Rent, % GDP Point of Tax/ Regulation Revenue Use \n Country/ Region Year Introduced Power Industry Transport Buildings Carbon Taxes Argentina 2018 ✔ ✔ ✔ 20 5 0.070 Midstream General budget Colombia 2017 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 23 5 0.04 Midstream Environmental spending Chile 2017 ✔ ✔ 29 5 0.05 Downstream General budget Indonesia 2022 ✔ 26 2 0.05 Midstream General budget Singapore 2019 ✔ ✔ 80 4 0.04 Midstream General budget South Africa 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 80 10 0.04 Midstream General budget Ukraine 2011 ✔ ✔ ✔ 71 1 0.05 Midstream General budget Uruguay 2022 ✔ ✔ 11 127 1.15 Midstream General budget, environmental spending ETSs EU 2005 ✔ ✔ 41 87 0.26 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Austria 2005 ✔ ✔ 37 87 0.11 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Belgium 2005 ✔ ✔ 38 87 0.19 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Bulgaria 2005 ✔ ✔ 52 87 1.82 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Croatia 2005 ✔ ✔ 32 87 0.33 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Cyprus 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.43 Downstream General budget, environmental spending China 2013, 2014, 2016, 2021 ✔ 38 9 0.32 Downstream Environmental spending proposal Czech Republic 2005 ✔ ✔ 51 87 0.78 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Germany 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 85 62 0.44 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Greece 2005 ✔ ✔ 47 87 0.66 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Hungary 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.39 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Italy 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.18 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Kazakhstan 2013 ✔ ✔ ✔ 46 1 0.10 Downstream General budget Korea 2015 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 73 19 0.99 Downstream Environmental spending Lithuania 2005 ✔ ✔ 30 87 0.44 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Malta 2005 ✔ ✔ 34 87 0.28 Downstream General budget, environmental spending New Zealand 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 49 53 0.20 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Romania 2005 ✔ ✔ 33 87 0.89 Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovakia 2005 ✔ ✔ 50 87 0.64 Downstream General budget, environmental spending US 2009, 2012, 2018, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 7 24 0.05 Up & Midstream General budget, direct transfers, environmental spendin Hybrid Canada 2019 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 38 0.16 Downstream Tax cuts, environmental spending Denmark 1992, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 62 52 0.29 Mid & Downstream General budget Estonia 2000, 2005 ✔ ✔ 63 79 1.26 Mid & Downstream General budget Finland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 67 77 0.76 Mid & Downstream General budget, tax cuts France 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 56 64 0.41 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Iceland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 93 56 0.62 Mid & Downstream General budget Ireland 2005, 2010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 59 62 0.23 Mid & Downstream General budget,direct transfers, environmental spendin Mexico 2014, 2020 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 61 4 0.02 Midstream General budget Japan 2010, 2011, 2012 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 2 0.05 Midstream Environmental spending Latvia 2004, 2005 ✔ ✔ 25.4 79 0.39 Midstream General budget Liechtenstein 2005, 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 81 130 0.60 Mid & Downstream General budget Luxembourg 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 79 38 0.048 Mid & Downstream General budget Netherlands 2005, 2021 ✔ ✔ 46 87 0.270 Mid & Downstream General budget Norway 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 55 87 0.94 Mid & Downstream General budget Poland 1990, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 51 81 1.45 Mid & Downstream Environmental spending Portugal 2015, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 70 56 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Slovenia 1996, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 89 47 0.48 Mid & Downstream General budget Spain 2005, 2014 ✔ ✔ ✔ 37 82 0.25 Mid & Downstream General budget, environmental spending Sweden 1991, 2005 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 77 109 0.52 Mid & Downstream General budget UK 2013, 2021 ✔ ✔ 49 67 0.42 Downstream General budget, tax cuts Switzerland 2008 ✔ ✔ ✔ 44 114 0.16 Midstream Tax cuts, direct transfers, environmental spending Coverage of Energy Sectors Coverage Rate, all GHGs (percent) Price, $/tonne Revenue/ Rent, % GDP Point of Tax/ Regulation Revenue Use \n\n48", "text_characters": 12848}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..85af24213e80c165d28f525d98639a9ace90fc2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fa7795dc0fef204f63f073f07eef1336d4c70479ca01044af27c368919aa1e91
+size 31220
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b85e24a08d78a6096dcfbf774d965c923f956e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:81bdb914b52f6dc6474513fd108063e2b0193050c87cbcc1c30e754d81e2304e
+size 171265
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f3d4e75dfa500427aa23874a63847ede631851be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:22ffcb7233a37becc725f8a129b78dfc19e9ca98aabf14445bc6e5adb45c3f27
+size 91711
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..806449b4686d0d392174aaedaa9048a8a1a8e4cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:501597ea663eca62eda70c21708dc044539e4d014201f74ef39159621834f2f8
+size 66221
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b78f83ed0b282a84618ab04940b648bed908d70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-041",
+ "title": "Philippines: Technical Assistance Report-Property Price Index Mission",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-041.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "f64b77a87af36fca688d67c0771b0b3b7703de6c6399e96344ffc0c8973a64c7",
+ "source_bytes": 425257,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/23/philippines-technical-assistance-report-property-price-index-mission-528509",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:24+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 8.945,
+ "page_count": 14,
+ "text_characters": 29588,
+ "table_count": 4,
+ "figure_count": 5,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "PHILIPPINES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—PROPERTY PRICE INDEX MISSION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "PHILIPPINES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "REPORT ON PROPERTY PRICE INDEXES MISSION (MAY 16–JUNE 17, 2022)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Prepared by Barra Casey"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Glossary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Annex I. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the Philippines"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Philippines: Technical Assistance Report-Property Price Index Mission; IMF Country Report No. 23/41; August 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Prices, Property",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230118143954-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230123164841-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..83d62daa8531489b2b095d48c0216e28d6ff6c95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/41**
+# **PHILIPPINES**
+#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—PROPERTY PRICE** **INDEX MISSION**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance report on the Philippines was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed on June 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+**AUGUST 2022**
+
+
+
+
+# **PHILIPPINES**
+
+### **REPORT ON PROPERTY PRICE INDEXES MISSION** **(MAY 16–JUNE 17, 2022)**
+
+###### **Prepared by Barra Casey**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### **CONTENTS**
+
+Glossary __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3
+
+
+**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________ 4**
+
+
+**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________ 6**
+A. Data Sources ___________________________________________________________________________________ 6
+B. Data Cleaning and Processing __________________________________________________________________ 8
+C. Stratification, Weighting and Aggregation _____________________________________________________ 9
+D. Dissemination _________________________________________________________________________________ 11
+E. Resources _____________________________________________________________________________________ 12
+F. Officials Met During the Mission ______________________________________________________________ 12
+
+**TABLE**
+1. Priority Recommendations _____________________________________________________________________ 5
+
+**ANNEX**
+I. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the Philippines __________________________________ 13
+
+
+
+##### **Glossary**
+
+D4D Data for Decisions Fund
+TA Technical Assistance
+RREPPI Residential Real Estate Price Index
+CPPI Commercial Property Price Index
+BSP Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas
+LRA Land Registration Authority
+NCR National Capital Region
+AONCR Areas Outside National Capital Region
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+
+**1.** **A technical assistance (TA) mission was conducted remotely between May 16 and**
+**June 17, 2022, to assist the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) with their property price**
+**statistics** . This was the first mission conducted to the Philippines under the auspices of the Data
+for Decisions Fund (D4D). The mission assisted Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) with the final
+preparations for the introduction of the updated Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) and
+the new Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI). In addition, the mission made
+recommendations for the medium and longer-term development of property price statistics.
+
+
+**2.** **Reliable property price indexes and other indicators of real estate markets are**
+**critical ingredients for financial stability policy analysis** . The indexes are used by
+policymakers as an input into the design of macroprudential policies, i.e., those policies aiming
+to reduce systemic risks arising from excessive financial procyclicality (such as asset bubbles). The
+indexes are also used by policy makers to inform monetary policy and inflation targeting.
+
+
+**3.** **The authorities intend to improve the methods used for the RREPI and publish the**
+**CPPI (land only) for the first time.** The new methodology was evaluated to ensure that it
+adheres to international compilation standards and best practices. Some further improvements
+to the methods should be implemented, including amending the level at which the weights are
+applied in the aggregation process. The BSP decided to delay the launch of the updated RREPI
+and new CPPI to implement these changes. These changes should be fully tested before moving
+forward with dissemination.
+
+
+**4.** **In the medium term, the BSP should continue to develop the statistical**
+**methodology by introducing hedonic regression for quality adjustment within the strata.**
+The information to begin developing hedonic models are available as part of the existing data
+collection from the commercial banks. To progress in this area, the BSP should increase the
+capacity of the team through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical
+assistance on this topic. In parallel, the team should focus on transferring the processing and
+aggregation of data to a statistical software package (e.g., R code, Stata) and stray from MS Excel.
+
+
+**5.** **The authorities are committed to increasing the coverage of the statistics to include**
+**both cash purchases and other forms of non-bank lending.** The existing data source used for
+the property price statistics are quarterly reports from the commercial banks. To negotiate access
+to new data sources, the BSP plans to convene an Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price
+Statistics (IAWGPPS) consisting of members from the BSP, the Philippine Statistical Authority, the
+Land Registry Authority (LRA) and other government agencies. The mission analyzed available
+administrative data sources and recommended some initial steps to assess their suitability for
+use in the production of the RREPI and CPPI. This work will take some time to progress and will
+involve a significant investment in terms of resources.
+
+
+**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+**To support progress in the above work areas, the mission recommended an action plan**
+**with the following priority recommendations:**
+
+
+**Table 1. Priority Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|**August**
**2022**|Implement the recommendations to improve the methodology
for the updated RREPI and new CPPI (land only), ensuring that
the changes are fully tested.|**BSP**|
+|**August**
**2022**|Disseminate the new indexes with accompanying technical notes
and metadata e.g., highlighting the positive improvements in
methods and explaining the reasons and extent of the revisions
to the RREPI.|**BSP**|
+|**Q4 2022**|Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term
research and development work.|**BSP**|
+
+
+**Further details on the priority recommendations and the related actions/milestones can be**
+**found in the updated action plan under** _**Detailed Technical Assessment and**_
+_**Recommendations**_ **.**
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion Date|
+|---|---|---|
+|**_Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_**|**_Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_**|**_Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_**|
+|H|The authorities should fully exploit the weights information
available by applying them at the level of the strata.|August 2022|
+|H|Imputation for a stratum where no transactions are in a quarter.|August 2022|
+|H|Maintain homogeneity to the greatest extent possible when
stratifying the data for commercial property.|August 2022|
+|H|Continue to monitor the number of missing values for key variables
such as acquisition cost and appraised value.|August 2022|
+|H|Regularly assess outliers to ensure the method is not introducing a
bias into the index.|August 2022|
+|H|Ensure that the changes to the methods are fully tested before
moving forward with dissemination.|August 2022|
+|H|Disseminate the new indexes with accompanying technical notes
and metadata e.g., highlighting improvements in methods and
explaining reasons and extent of RREPI revisions.|August 2022|
+|H|Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term
research and development work.|Q4 2022|
+|H|Increase the capacity of the team with hedonic regression methods
through attendance at a training course and/or planning further
technical assistance.|Q2 2023|
+|H|Transfer the processing and aggregation of the data to a statistical
software package e.g., R code, Stata.|Q4 2023|
+|H|Use the Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics
(IAWGPPS) to develop goals, build relationships and negotiate data
access.|2024|
+|H|Initiate a pilot project to test if it is possible to link the LRA data
with data provided by a single local government unit.|2024|
+
+
+**A. Data Sources**
+
+
+**6.** **Coverage of the property price indexes should be broadened to include both cash**
+**purchases and other forms of non-bank lending.** The current data source used for both the
+RREPI and the CPPI are mortgage information collected by BSP from Universal / Commercial
+Banks (U/KBs) and Thrift Banks (TBs). The coverage of the indexes could be significantly increased
+by moving to a new data source. Internal BSP estimates suggest that lending by the commercial
+banking sector accounts for approximately 48 percent of residential property transactions. Cash
+purchases or direct lending by property developers account for about 23 percent of transactions
+while government backed lending for social housing purposes (mainly by the Home
+Development Mutual Fund) account for the remaining 29 percent.
+
+
+**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+**7.** **To identify potential data sources, the mission developed a timeline for the typical**
+**property transaction (see Annex 1).** There are several taxes and charges on property
+transactions collected by various agencies. The seller has 30 days from the date of notarization of
+the deed of sale to settle capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax with the Bureau of
+Internal Revenue (BIR). Capital gains tax is calculated at six percent of the total selling price,
+documentary stamp tax is calculated at 1.5 percent. Once the tax is paid, the transfer of
+ownership is registered with the Land Registry Authority (LRA), where a payment of one percent
+of the declared price is required. Lastly, the local transfer charge required to be paid to the
+Treasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit (LGU) at a rate of between 0.5 percent and
+0.75 percent of the declared price. The mission analyzed these administrative data sources. As
+well as taxes and charges on property transactions, there is a wealth tax on property (real
+property tax) based on property valuations. This is paid to the appropriate local government unit.
+
+
+**8.** **There is an ongoing initiative by the LRA to create an efficient system of land titling**
+**and administration.** [1] One of the goals of the project at the LRA is to digitalize the title
+information, creating a database of property transactions. The BSP are enthusiastic to analyze
+this data source to assess its suitability for use in the production of property price statistics.
+While the LRA capture the declared price and the property location (e.g., XY coordinates), there is
+little information on property characteristics such as floor area, number of bedrooms etc.
+
+
+**9.** **Characteristic information on the properties is held by the Treasurer’s Office of the**
+**Local Government Units (LGU).** The “title number,” which uniquely identifies property
+transactions, is held on the LRA database and is aIso captured by the local government units. In
+principle, datasets could be linked to create a comprehensive dataset of property transactions.
+One difficulty with this is that the data held by the local government units is disaggregated and
+not combined into a central database. Therefore, there will be challenges accessing the data and
+there may be significant differences in structure and quality across local government units.
+
+
+**10.** **The BSP should initiate a pilot project to test whether it is possible to link the LRA**
+**data with data provided by a local government unit.** A small-scale pilot project using data
+from one local government unit would identify opportunities and challenges associated with this
+approach. For example, the project would be able to assess: (i) the quality of information in both
+datasets, (ii) the accuracy of the declared price, (iii) the feasibility of linking the two datasets
+using the title number, (iv) the potential improvements in data coverage and (v) the impact on
+timeliness compared to using the existing data source (i.e., check the time difference between
+the transaction reference date and the date the transaction was registered at the LRA).
+
+
+**11.** **The BSP plan to increase their stakeholder engagement by convening an Inter-**
+**Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS).** The group will consist of
+members from the BSP, the Philippine Statistical Authority, the Land Registry Authority and other
+government agencies. This group will be important for developing shared goals, building
+relationships with other organizations, and negotiating access to data. BSP should consider
+
+
+1 Land Administration and Management Project (LAMP).
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+involving the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) in the working
+group. NAMRIA would have specific expertise in mapping and may be able to provide further
+location information on the property transactions.
+
+
+**12.** **The BSP are in the early stages of researching new data sources for their property**
+**price statistics.** The recommended approach devised during the mission are only initial steps. It
+will take time and resources to realize the goal of moving to new administration data sources.
+
+
+**13.** **In the short-term, the BSP could consider collecting information on residential**
+**property advertisements from real estate websites.** Some examples of websites in the
+Philippines are Lamudi, Zipmatch, Dot Property, Craigslist and Carousell. The BSP have a data
+science unit that may be able to progress the project. While this data source would not replace
+the loan data, the information could be used as an additional data source to inform the research.
+
+
+_**Recommended Actions:**_
+
+
+- Use the Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS) to develop
+shared goals, build relationships and negotiate access to data.
+
+- Initiate a pilot project to test whether it is possible to link the LRA data with data provided by
+a single local government unit.
+
+- Collecting information on residential property advertisements from real estate websites.
+
+
+**B. Data Cleaning and Processing**
+
+
+**14.** **The BSP implemented methods to ensure quality data is received from commercial**
+**banks.** The banks complete separate electronic reports (MS Excel) for residential and commercial
+property. The commercial property report covers properties appraised by banks during the
+reference quarter which are classified as commercial, industrial, and special use. The residential
+property report covers loans granted to households during the reference quarter to purchase
+residential property. The banks must submit the reports within 20 days of the end of the
+reference quarter. There are automatic validation checks on the forms (e.g., missing values,
+duplicates, extreme values, consistency checks) to provide respondents with immediate feedback.
+This ensures an efficient data collection process and clean data for processing.
+
+
+**15.** **The BSP should continue to monitor the number of missing values for key variables**
+**such as acquisition cost and appraised value.** The number of missing values has decreased as
+the validation on the data collection forms has increased. The authorities should continue to
+follow-up on missing values for key variables, like acquisition cost, and other variables that may
+become important in the future if hedonic methods are used for quality adjustment e.g., number
+of bedrooms, age of the structure, lot area.
+
+
+**16.** **A method for outlier detection by strata and period will be implemented for the**
+**launch of the updated RREPI and new CPPI** . This reduces the volatility evident in the existing
+RREPI, particularly in 2020. The BSP completed detailed research on the methods for outlier
+detection. They examined the standard, adjusted, and generalized box plot methods. These
+
+
+**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+methods consider an observation atypical or extreme when it is above the upper whisker or
+below the lower whisker. The chosen outlier detection method, which was the generalized
+approach, considers both skewness and tail heaviness of the price data distribution. For
+residential property, the method excluded 4.8 percent of observations in total over the period
+from 2016 to 2021, with the number split evenly between the upper and lower ends of the
+distribution. For commercial property, the method removed 5.4 percent of total observations,
+with 3.0 percent at the lower end of the distribution and 2.4 percent at the higher end of the
+distribution. The number of outliers identified varied when implemented by strata and period.
+
+
+**17.** **The BSP should regularly assess outliers to ensure that the method does not**
+**introduce a bias into the index.** Removing outliers is often arbitrary and can lead to biased
+results if not implemented correctly. The authorities should monitor the impact of removing the
+outliers to ensure that the price indexes are capturing price trends accurately.
+
+
+_**Recommended Actions:**_
+
+- Monitor number of missing values for key variables like acquisition cost and appraised value.
+
+- Regularly assess outliers to ensure that the method is not introducing a bias into the index.
+
+
+**C. Stratification, Weighting, and Aggregation**
+
+
+**18.** **The use of acquisition costs for residential property more accurately represents**
+**transactions prices.** The authorities will use full acquisition costs (i.e., land and structure) to
+compute the updated RREPI. The existing RREPI uses appraised values (buildings only). Full
+acquisition costs more closely represent the target price for the RREPI.
+
+
+**19.** **Appraised values (land only) will be used to compile the indexes for commercial**
+**property.** It is preferable to use the combined value for land and structure as the basis for
+compilation, the data collection form only collects the appraised value for land. In this situation,
+it was recommended the naming convention for the new CPPI. Alternatives mentioned were the
+Commercial Land Price Index (CLPI) and the Commercial Property Land Price Index (CPLPI).
+
+
+**20.** **More detailed stratification will be used for commercial and residential property** .
+This allows for more homogenous groups for aggregation. The stratification is completed based
+on property type and region. In the existing RREPI, there are two regional strata (NCR and
+AONCR). Yet, with the launch of the new indexes, regional strata are formed using island groups
+(NCR, Balance Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao), and districts (in NCR) or by cities/municipalities (in
+AONCR). This results in 30 strata for residential property and 40 strata for commercial property.
+
+
+**21.** **Maintain homogeneity to the extent possible when stratifying the data for**
+**commercial property** . There are four types of property used for stratification: Office, Retail,
+Mixed-Use and Vacant Lot. While it is desirable to maximize the number of observations in each
+stratum, it is also important to ensure that the properties are as homogenous as possible. For
+example, it was recommended to exclude gas stations from the stratum for Retail.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+**22.** **The use of annually updated fixed weights (three year rolling average) brings the**
+**aggregation methods into line with international standards.** The existing RREPI uses varying
+weights from quarter-to-quarter based on the share of total floor area. The new method will use
+annually updated fixed weights based on the share of total sales.
+
+
+**23.** **Fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the**
+**strata.** The proposed aggregation method uses an unweighted arithmetic mean within strata
+and an unweighted geometric mean to calculate prices for each combination of island group and
+type of property. The elementary indices are calculated at this level. However, there are valuable
+weights information available at the level of the strata (by district within the NCR and by
+city/municipality within island groups in AONCR). Therefore, the BPS should drop the step which
+applies the unweighted geometric mean and directly calculate the elementary aggregate indexes
+at the level of the strata. The weights can then be used to aggregate the elementary indexes to
+higher level indexes. This approach has two main benefits. The accuracy of the resulting indexes
+is improved as the use of available weights information is maximized. In addition, by compiling
+the elementary indexes at the level of the strata, this allows for the possibility to disseminate
+more detailed indexes for users e.g., districts within the NCR.
+
+
+**24.** **Apply imputation for a stratum where there are no transactions in a particular**
+**quarter.** For strata in the NCR, the weighted average price change across the other strata (i.e.,
+districts) can be used for imputation. For example, if there are no transactions for condominiums
+in the second district, the weighted average price change from the other three districts can be
+used to estimate the price change in the second district. For strata in AONCR, there are two subdivisions (i.e., cities and municipalities) for each combination of island group and property type.
+Therefore, the price change in cities can be used to impute for municipalities and vice versa. If
+there are no transactions within the entire island group and property type combination, then the
+price change from the next closest stratum can be used for imputation, based on the judgement
+of the compiler.
+
+
+**25.** **The authorities decided to delay the launch of the updated RREPI and new CPPI to**
+**allow time to implement some of the mission recommendations** . In particular, the BSP will
+implement the recommendation to fully exploit the available information for the weights. The
+changes should be fully tested before moving forward with dissemination.
+
+
+**26.** **In the medium term, the authorities should consider using hedonic regression**
+**methods for quality adjustment within strata.** The existing approach to aggregation uses
+stratification with arithmetic averages to compute the price indexes. This approach controls for
+quality-mix adjustment between strata, but not within strata. The recommended approach
+internationally is to use hedonic methods. The BSP already collects the information required to
+start developing regression models e.g., number of floors, number of bedrooms, age of the
+property and lot size. To make progress in this area, the BSP should increase the capacity of the
+team through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical assistance
+specifically on this topic. These skills will be important for the team regardless of whether the
+data source remains the same or it is decided to move to a new administrative data source.
+
+
+**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+**27.** **The processing and aggregation of the data should be transferred to a statistical**
+**software package e.g., R code, Stata.** The existing compilation is completed in MS Excel.
+Further improvements in the methodology, such as the use of hedonic methods, could be
+achieved more efficiently with statistical software. In addition, the processing of the data would
+be more stable, thereby reducing the risk of processing errors.
+
+
+_**Recommended Actions:**_
+
+- Consider alternative names for the CPPI to clarify that it includes only land values.
+
+- Maintain homogeneity to the greatest extent possible when stratifying the data for
+commercial property.
+
+- Fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the strata.
+
+- Apply imputation for a stratum where there are no transactions in a particular quarter.
+
+- Ensure the changes to the methods are fully tested before moving on with dissemination.
+
+- In the medium term, consider using hedonic regression methods for quality adjustment
+within strata.
+
+- Increase the capacity of the team with hedonic regression methods through attendance at a
+training course and/or planning further technical assistance.
+
+- Transfer processing and aggregation of data to statistical software package (R code, Stata).
+
+
+**D. Dissemination**
+
+
+**28.** **The mission discussed all aspects of the dissemination of the updated RREPI and**
+**new CPPI.** This included the advance notice provided to users, the layout of the statistical
+commentary, the technical (metadata) document, and the press release.
+
+
+**29.** **The authorities should highlight the positive improvements in the compilation**
+**methods for RREPI** . These include the use of acquisition costs instead of appraisal values, the
+introduction of a robust method for outlier detection, the application of more detailed
+stratification, and the use of annually updated fixed weights. When combined, these represent a
+significant improvement in the quality of the RREPI.
+
+
+**30.** **Clear communication is required for users in relation to the revisions to the RREPI.**
+It is proposed to revise the full historical series for the RREPI, beginning in Q1 2016. Users will
+need to transition from using the existing series and will want to understand the reasons for any
+significant differences between the existing series and the updated RREPI. BSP should publish
+graphs with both the existing and updated indexes, highlighting (to the extent possible) why the
+updated RREPI deviates from the existing index. This graphical analysis could be included in the
+technical (metadata) document or published as a separate document. The archived publications
+should also be updated to alert users to the fact that the RREPI has been revised.
+
+
+**31.** **The BPS should include some additional sections in the technical (metadata)**
+**document** . The authorities should specifically note the date that the RREPI was revised and the
+date the CPPI was launched for the first time. Robust methods have been introduced for data
+cleaning, missing values, outlier detection etc. It would provide users with additional assurance
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+
+about the quality of information by including additional detail on this topic in the technical
+document. It would also be helpful to include some information on the calculation of key
+dissemination indicators such as percent price change and the quarterly and annual
+contributions.
+
+
+**32.** **The formula for the calculation of the annual contributions needs to be modified**
+**due to the move to annual updating of weights.** The contributions to percent price change
+help explain the sub-indexes that contribute most to inflation. When expenditure weights are
+annually updated, price indexes spanning more than a year are chain-linked and the formula to
+compute annual contributions to inflation should be modified. The mission presented the new
+formula and suggested allowing sufficient time to update the calculations.
+
+
+_**Recommended Actions:**_
+
+- The authorities should highlight the improvements in the compilation methods for RREPI.
+
+- Clear communication is required for users in relation to the revisions to the RREPI
+
+- Include some additional sections in the technical (metadata) document e.g., methods for
+ensuring high quality data, details on the calculation of key dissemination indicators.
+
+- The formula for the calculation of the annual contributions should be modified due to the
+move to annual updating of weights
+
+
+**E. Resources**
+
+
+**33.** **The BPS should assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term**
+**research and development work** . The work plan includes significant research and development
+in relation to hedonic regression methods for quality adjustment, the transition to a statistical
+software package, building relationships with external organizations and the development of new
+data sources. A dedicated resource would be required to make progress in these areas and
+maintain momentum over time. This should be separate from the resources assigned to the
+quarterly production of the RREPI and CPPI.
+
+
+_**Recommended Action:**_
+
+- Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and long-term research and development work.
+
+
+**F. Officials Met During the Mission**
+
+|Name|Institution|
+|---|---|
+|Ms. Haydee R. Paulino|BSP|
+|Ms. Willa Boots J. Tolo|BSP|
+|Mr. Jeremy L. De Jesus|BSP|
+|Mr. Gian Paolo T. De La Torre|BSP|
+|Mr. Richer King R. Supnet|BSP|
+|Ms. Gloria A. Cubinar|BSP|
+
+
+
+**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+PHILIPPINES
+
+#### **Annex I. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the** **Philippines**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|No.|Activity|Price|Data source/s|Timeline|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|1
|Property is placed in
the market.
|Asking price
|• Real estate brokers associations (e.g., Real
Estate Brokers Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (REBAP), Philippine Association of Real
Estate Boards (PAREB)).
• Websites (e.g., Lamudi, Zipmatch, Dot
Property, Craigslist, Carousell).
• Newspaper classified ads.
• Word-of-mouth.
|4 weeks to 2
years.
|
+|2
|Price is agreed
between buyer and
seller.
|Transaction price
|Contract to sell (public and notarized) – notary
public.
|1 week
(conditional
approval).
|
+|3a.|Mortgage is
approved.|Valuation price|• Banks
• Non-banks (Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF), National Housing Authority
(NHA), National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), Social Housing Finance
Corporation (SHFC))|5 days-3 weeks
after document
requirements
submission.|
+|3a.|Letter of guarantee
issued.|Valuation price|Valuation price|Within days|
+|3b.|In-house financing is
approved.|Transaction price|Developers|12 weeks
|
+|4|Contract is signed
(property paid).|Declared price/
Transaction price.|• Notarized deed of absolute sale
• Unnotarized deed of absolute sale (between
buyers and sellers)||
+|5|Capital gains tax and
documentary stamp
tax are paid (6 and
1.5 percent).|Declared price/
Fair market value/
Zonal value, which
is higher.|Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)|Tax liability must
be paid within 30
days of the sale2|
+|6|Transfer of
ownership registered
(Fee: 1 percent of
price).|Declared price|Land Registration Authority (LRA)|4 weeks
|
+|7|Mortgage is
registered (the
property title is
annotated with
encumbrance).|Declared price|Land Registration Authority (LRA)|1-4 weeks|
+|8|Local transfer tax is
paid (0.5-0.75
percent of price).|Declared price|Treasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit
(LGU).|1 day to 1 week|
+|9|Tax declaration form
(assessment of real
property tax) is filed.|Zonal price|Assessor’s Office / Treasurer’s Office of the
Local Government Unit (LGU).|4 weeks|
+
+
+
+2 [https://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/tax-information/capital-gains-tax.html.](https://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/tax-information/capital-gains-tax.html)
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..26a5ad9a674ff07b16f8965b7cf85f1ff286b6bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-041-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332b3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-001", "height": 141, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538d19e1ec383ce69ce78982d7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "sha256_normalized_png": "fa7795dc0fef204f63f073f07eef1336d4c70479ca01044af27c368919aa1e91", "width": 134}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3b191936711b2e34", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-002", "height": 204, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b8fc3bbef040ef100cba04691270d677eda9ce9a6608302d9c7cdf4aecbaa1cc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "sha256_normalized_png": "81bdb914b52f6dc6474513fd108063e2b0193050c87cbcc1c30e754d81e2304e", "width": 717}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5529312547497543", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-003", "height": 257, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aaabd0abb95777e8e555d4aa2b5cc4c98f28d502eb5195e2e1e2a0559d34ec0a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "sha256_normalized_png": "22ffcb7233a37becc725f8a129b78dfc19e9ca98aabf14445bc6e5adb45c3f27", "width": 789}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-041/assets/figures/cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4c69cd96174d2b4c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-004", "height": 296, "page": 2, "phash_256": "e3f427a5cb0dfe5834b20821b6c2f0cec935cfac4bf48dc3f80f72dc948e0760", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "sha256_normalized_png": "501597ea663eca62eda70c21708dc044539e4d014201f74ef39159621834f2f8", "width": 293}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-041/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..999b5e8e7ca8908d00b03802feccec391a77aaf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-041/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-041-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/41**\n# **PHILIPPINES**\n#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—PROPERTY PRICE** **INDEX MISSION**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance report on the Philippines was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on June 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/41\nPHILIPPINES\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—PROPERTY PRICE INDEX MISSION\n\nThis Technical Assistance report on the Philippines was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on June 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 571}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-041-fig-p0002-004"], "markdown": "\n\n**AUGUST 2022**\n\n\n\n\n# **PHILIPPINES**\n\n### **REPORT ON PROPERTY PRICE INDEXES MISSION** **(MAY 16–JUNE 17, 2022)**\n\n###### **Prepared by Barra Casey**\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1327, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(174.25, -27.75, 604.1799926757812, 121.85000610351562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 337, "number": 3, "size": 77191, "transform": [429.92999267578125, 0.0, -0.0, -149.60000610351562, 174.25, 121.85000610351562], "width": 779, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(227.25, 530.3400268554688, 402.04998779296875, 707.3300170898438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 320, "number": 9, "size": 14569, "transform": [174.8000030517578, 0.0, -0.0, 176.99000549316406, 227.25, 530.3400268554688], "width": 316, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(73.0, 26.499977111816406, 152.93399047851562, 110.8499755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 239, "number": 2, "size": 16047, "transform": [79.93399810791016, 0.0, -0.0, 84.3499984741211, 73.0, 26.499977111816406], "width": 242, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "AUGUST 2022\nPHILIPPINES\nREPORT ON PROPERTY PRICE INDEXES MISSION (MAY 16–JUNE 17, 2022)\nPrepared by Barra Casey", "text_characters": 95}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **CONTENTS**\n\nGlossary __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3\n\n\n**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________ 4**\n\n\n**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________ 6**\nA. Data Sources ___________________________________________________________________________________ 6\nB. Data Cleaning and Processing __________________________________________________________________ 8\nC. Stratification, Weighting and Aggregation _____________________________________________________ 9\nD. Dissemination _________________________________________________________________________________ 11\nE. Resources _____________________________________________________________________________________ 12\nF. Officials Met During the Mission ______________________________________________________________ 12\n\n**TABLE**\n1. Priority Recommendations _____________________________________________________________________ 5\n\n**ANNEX**\nI. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the Philippines __________________________________ 13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "CONTENTS\n\nGlossary 3\n\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _ 4\n\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6\nA. Data Sources _ 6\nB. Data Cleaning and Processing 8\nC. Stratification, Weighting and Aggregation _ 9\nD. Dissemination _ 11\nE. Resources _ 12\nF. Officials Met During the Mission 12\n\nTABLE\n1. Priority Recommendations _ 5\n\nANNEX\nI. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the Philippines 13", "text_characters": 358}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Glossary**\n\nD4D Data for Decisions Fund\nTA Technical Assistance\nRREPPI Residential Real Estate Price Index\nCPPI Commercial Property Price Index\nBSP Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas\nLRA Land Registration Authority\nNCR National Capital Region\nAONCR Areas Outside National Capital Region\n\n\n\nPHILIPPINES\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Glossary\n\nD4D Data for Decisions Fund\nTA Technical Assistance\nRREPPI Residential Real Estate Price Index\nCPPI Commercial Property Price Index\nBSP Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas\nLRA Land Registration Authority\nNCR National Capital Region\nAONCR Areas Outside National Capital Region\n\nPHILIPPINES\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3", "text_characters": 275}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n\n**1.** **A technical assistance (TA) mission was conducted remotely between May 16 and**\n**June 17, 2022, to assist the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) with their property price**\n**statistics** . This was the first mission conducted to the Philippines under the auspices of the Data\nfor Decisions Fund (D4D). The mission assisted Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) with the final\npreparations for the introduction of the updated Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) and\nthe new Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI). In addition, the mission made\nrecommendations for the medium and longer-term development of property price statistics.\n\n\n**2.** **Reliable property price indexes and other indicators of real estate markets are**\n**critical ingredients for financial stability policy analysis** . The indexes are used by\npolicymakers as an input into the design of macroprudential policies, i.e., those policies aiming\nto reduce systemic risks arising from excessive financial procyclicality (such as asset bubbles). The\nindexes are also used by policy makers to inform monetary policy and inflation targeting.\n\n\n**3.** **The authorities intend to improve the methods used for the RREPI and publish the**\n**CPPI (land only) for the first time.** The new methodology was evaluated to ensure that it\nadheres to international compilation standards and best practices. Some further improvements\nto the methods should be implemented, including amending the level at which the weights are\napplied in the aggregation process. The BSP decided to delay the launch of the updated RREPI\nand new CPPI to implement these changes. These changes should be fully tested before moving\nforward with dissemination.\n\n\n**4.** **In the medium term, the BSP should continue to develop the statistical**\n**methodology by introducing hedonic regression for quality adjustment within the strata.**\nThe information to begin developing hedonic models are available as part of the existing data\ncollection from the commercial banks. To progress in this area, the BSP should increase the\ncapacity of the team through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical\nassistance on this topic. In parallel, the team should focus on transferring the processing and\naggregation of data to a statistical software package (e.g., R code, Stata) and stray from MS Excel.\n\n\n**5.** **The authorities are committed to increasing the coverage of the statistics to include**\n**both cash purchases and other forms of non-bank lending.** The existing data source used for\nthe property price statistics are quarterly reports from the commercial banks. To negotiate access\nto new data sources, the BSP plans to convene an Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price\nStatistics (IAWGPPS) consisting of members from the BSP, the Philippine Statistical Authority, the\nLand Registry Authority (LRA) and other government agencies. The mission analyzed available\nadministrative data sources and recommended some initial steps to assess their suitability for\nuse in the production of the RREPI and CPPI. This work will take some time to progress and will\ninvolve a significant investment in terms of resources.\n\n\n**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PHILIPPINES\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n1. A technical assistance (TA) mission was conducted remotely between May 16 and\nJune 17, 2022, to assist the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) with their property price\nstatistics . This was the first mission conducted to the Philippines under the auspices of the Data\nfor Decisions Fund (D4D). The mission assisted Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) with the final\npreparations for the introduction of the updated Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) and\nthe new Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI). In addition, the mission made\nrecommendations for the medium and longer-term development of property price statistics.\n\n2. Reliable property price indexes and other indicators of real estate markets are\ncritical ingredients for financial stability policy analysis . The indexes are used by\npolicymakers as an input into the design of macroprudential policies, i.e., those policies aiming\nto reduce systemic risks arising from excessive financial procyclicality (such as asset bubbles). The\nindexes are also used by policy makers to inform monetary policy and inflation targeting.\n\n3. The authorities intend to improve the methods used for the RREPI and publish the\nCPPI (land only) for the first time. The new methodology was evaluated to ensure that it\nadheres to international compilation standards and best practices. Some further improvements\nto the methods should be implemented, including amending the level at which the weights are\napplied in the aggregation process. The BSP decided to delay the launch of the updated RREPI\nand new CPPI to implement these changes. These changes should be fully tested before moving\nforward with dissemination.\n\n4. In the medium term, the BSP should continue to develop the statistical\nmethodology by introducing hedonic regression for quality adjustment within the strata.\nThe information to begin developing hedonic models are available as part of the existing data\ncollection from the commercial banks. To progress in this area, the BSP should increase the\ncapacity of the team through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical\nassistance on this topic. In parallel, the team should focus on transferring the processing and\naggregation of data to a statistical software package (e.g., R code, Stata) and stray from MS Excel.\n\n5. The authorities are committed to increasing the coverage of the statistics to include\nboth cash purchases and other forms of non-bank lending. The existing data source used for\nthe property price statistics are quarterly reports from the commercial banks. To negotiate access\nto new data sources, the BSP plans to convene an Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price\nStatistics (IAWGPPS) consisting of members from the BSP, the Philippine Statistical Authority, the\nLand Registry Authority (LRA) and other government agencies. The mission analyzed available\nadministrative data sources and recommended some initial steps to assess their suitability for\nuse in the production of the RREPI and CPPI. This work will take some time to progress and will\ninvolve a significant investment in terms of resources.\n\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2719}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\n**To support progress in the above work areas, the mission recommended an action plan**\n**with the following priority recommendations:**\n\n\n**Table 1. Priority Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|**August**
**2022**|Implement the recommendations to improve the methodology
for the updated RREPI and new CPPI (land only), ensuring that
the changes are fully tested.|**BSP**|\n|**August**
**2022**|Disseminate the new indexes with accompanying technical notes
and metadata e.g., highlighting the positive improvements in
methods and explaining the reasons and extent of the revisions
to the RREPI.|**BSP**|\n|**Q4 2022**|Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term
research and development work.|**BSP**|\n\n\n**Further details on the priority recommendations and the related actions/milestones can be**\n**found in the updated action plan under** _**Detailed Technical Assessment and**_\n_**Recommendations**_ **.**\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.26400756835938, 123.260009765625, 539.8599853515625, 292.969970703125], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\nTo support progress in the above work areas, the mission recommended an action plan\nwith the following priority recommendations:\n\nTable 1. Priority Recommendations\n\n Target Date Priority Recommendation Responsible Institutions \n\n August 2022 Implement the recommendations to improve the methodology for the updated RREPI and new CPPI (land only), ensuring that the changes are fully tested. BSP \n August 2022 Disseminate the new indexes with accompanying technical notes and metadata e.g., highlighting the positive improvements in methods and explaining the reasons and extent of the revisions to the RREPI. BSP \n Q4 2022 Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term research and development work. BSP \n\nFurther details on the priority recommendations and the related actions/milestones can be\nfound in the updated action plan under _Detailed Technical Assessment and_\n_Recommendations_ .\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5", "text_characters": 800}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion Date|\n|---|---|---|\n|**_Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_**|**_Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_**|**_Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_**|\n|H|The authorities should fully exploit the weights information
available by applying them at the level of the strata.|August 2022|\n|H|Imputation for a stratum where no transactions are in a quarter.|August 2022|\n|H|Maintain homogeneity to the greatest extent possible when
stratifying the data for commercial property.|August 2022|\n|H|Continue to monitor the number of missing values for key variables
such as acquisition cost and appraised value.|August 2022|\n|H|Regularly assess outliers to ensure the method is not introducing a
bias into the index.|August 2022|\n|H|Ensure that the changes to the methods are fully tested before
moving forward with dissemination.|August 2022|\n|H|Disseminate the new indexes with accompanying technical notes
and metadata e.g., highlighting improvements in methods and
explaining reasons and extent of RREPI revisions.|August 2022|\n|H|Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term
research and development work.|Q4 2022|\n|H|Increase the capacity of the team with hedonic regression methods
through attendance at a training course and/or planning further
technical assistance.|Q2 2023|\n|H|Transfer the processing and aggregation of the data to a statistical
software package e.g., R code, Stata.|Q4 2023|\n|H|Use the Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics
(IAWGPPS) to develop goals, build relationships and negotiate data
access.|2024|\n|H|Initiate a pilot project to test if it is possible to link the LRA data
with data provided by a single local government unit.|2024|\n\n\n**A. Data Sources**\n\n\n**6.** **Coverage of the property price indexes should be broadened to include both cash**\n**purchases and other forms of non-bank lending.** The current data source used for both the\nRREPI and the CPPI are mortgage information collected by BSP from Universal / Commercial\nBanks (U/KBs) and Thrift Banks (TBs). The coverage of the indexes could be significantly increased\nby moving to a new data source. Internal BSP estimates suggest that lending by the commercial\nbanking sector accounts for approximately 48 percent of residential property transactions. Cash\npurchases or direct lending by property developers account for about 23 percent of transactions\nwhile government backed lending for social housing purposes (mainly by the Home\nDevelopment Mutual Fund) account for the remaining 29 percent.\n\n\n**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.24800109863281, 136.1600341796875, 539.8759765625, 533.2899780273438], "columns": 3, "rows": 14}], "text": "PHILIPPINES\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date \n\n _Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_ _Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_ _Outcome: Improved property price statistics for Philippines_ \n H The authorities should fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the strata. August 2022 \n H Imputation for a stratum where no transactions are in a quarter. August 2022 \n H Maintain homogeneity to the greatest extent possible when stratifying the data for commercial property. August 2022 \n H Continue to monitor the number of missing values for key variables such as acquisition cost and appraised value. August 2022 \n H Regularly assess outliers to ensure the method is not introducing a bias into the index. August 2022 \n H Ensure that the changes to the methods are fully tested before moving forward with dissemination. August 2022 \n H Disseminate the new indexes with accompanying technical notes and metadata e.g., highlighting improvements in methods and explaining reasons and extent of RREPI revisions. August 2022 \n H Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term research and development work. Q4 2022 \n H Increase the capacity of the team with hedonic regression methods through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical assistance. Q2 2023 \n H Transfer the processing and aggregation of the data to a statistical software package e.g., R code, Stata. Q4 2023 \n H Use the Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS) to develop goals, build relationships and negotiate data access. 2024 \n H Initiate a pilot project to test if it is possible to link the LRA data with data provided by a single local government unit. 2024 \n\nA. Data Sources\n\n6. Coverage of the property price indexes should be broadened to include both cash\npurchases and other forms of non-bank lending. The current data source used for both the\nRREPI and the CPPI are mortgage information collected by BSP from Universal / Commercial\nBanks (U/KBs) and Thrift Banks (TBs). The coverage of the indexes could be significantly increased\nby moving to a new data source. Internal BSP estimates suggest that lending by the commercial\nbanking sector accounts for approximately 48 percent of residential property transactions. Cash\npurchases or direct lending by property developers account for about 23 percent of transactions\nwhile government backed lending for social housing purposes (mainly by the Home\nDevelopment Mutual Fund) account for the remaining 29 percent.\n\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2242}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\n**7.** **To identify potential data sources, the mission developed a timeline for the typical**\n**property transaction (see Annex 1).** There are several taxes and charges on property\ntransactions collected by various agencies. The seller has 30 days from the date of notarization of\nthe deed of sale to settle capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax with the Bureau of\nInternal Revenue (BIR). Capital gains tax is calculated at six percent of the total selling price,\ndocumentary stamp tax is calculated at 1.5 percent. Once the tax is paid, the transfer of\nownership is registered with the Land Registry Authority (LRA), where a payment of one percent\nof the declared price is required. Lastly, the local transfer charge required to be paid to the\nTreasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit (LGU) at a rate of between 0.5 percent and\n0.75 percent of the declared price. The mission analyzed these administrative data sources. As\nwell as taxes and charges on property transactions, there is a wealth tax on property (real\nproperty tax) based on property valuations. This is paid to the appropriate local government unit.\n\n\n**8.** **There is an ongoing initiative by the LRA to create an efficient system of land titling**\n**and administration.** [1] One of the goals of the project at the LRA is to digitalize the title\ninformation, creating a database of property transactions. The BSP are enthusiastic to analyze\nthis data source to assess its suitability for use in the production of property price statistics.\nWhile the LRA capture the declared price and the property location (e.g., XY coordinates), there is\nlittle information on property characteristics such as floor area, number of bedrooms etc.\n\n\n**9.** **Characteristic information on the properties is held by the Treasurer’s Office of the**\n**Local Government Units (LGU).** The “title number,” which uniquely identifies property\ntransactions, is held on the LRA database and is aIso captured by the local government units. In\nprinciple, datasets could be linked to create a comprehensive dataset of property transactions.\nOne difficulty with this is that the data held by the local government units is disaggregated and\nnot combined into a central database. Therefore, there will be challenges accessing the data and\nthere may be significant differences in structure and quality across local government units.\n\n\n**10.** **The BSP should initiate a pilot project to test whether it is possible to link the LRA**\n**data with data provided by a local government unit.** A small-scale pilot project using data\nfrom one local government unit would identify opportunities and challenges associated with this\napproach. For example, the project would be able to assess: (i) the quality of information in both\ndatasets, (ii) the accuracy of the declared price, (iii) the feasibility of linking the two datasets\nusing the title number, (iv) the potential improvements in data coverage and (v) the impact on\ntimeliness compared to using the existing data source (i.e., check the time difference between\nthe transaction reference date and the date the transaction was registered at the LRA).\n\n\n**11.** **The BSP plan to increase their stakeholder engagement by convening an Inter-**\n**Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS).** The group will consist of\nmembers from the BSP, the Philippine Statistical Authority, the Land Registry Authority and other\ngovernment agencies. This group will be important for developing shared goals, building\nrelationships with other organizations, and negotiating access to data. BSP should consider\n\n\n1 Land Administration and Management Project (LAMP).\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\n7. To identify potential data sources, the mission developed a timeline for the typical\nproperty transaction (see Annex 1). There are several taxes and charges on property\ntransactions collected by various agencies. The seller has 30 days from the date of notarization of\nthe deed of sale to settle capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax with the Bureau of\nInternal Revenue (BIR). Capital gains tax is calculated at six percent of the total selling price,\ndocumentary stamp tax is calculated at 1.5 percent. Once the tax is paid, the transfer of\nownership is registered with the Land Registry Authority (LRA), where a payment of one percent\nof the declared price is required. Lastly, the local transfer charge required to be paid to the\nTreasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit (LGU) at a rate of between 0.5 percent and\n0.75 percent of the declared price. The mission analyzed these administrative data sources. As\nwell as taxes and charges on property transactions, there is a wealth tax on property (real\nproperty tax) based on property valuations. This is paid to the appropriate local government unit.\n\n8. There is an ongoing initiative by the LRA to create an efficient system of land titling\nand administration. [1] One of the goals of the project at the LRA is to digitalize the title\ninformation, creating a database of property transactions. The BSP are enthusiastic to analyze\nthis data source to assess its suitability for use in the production of property price statistics.\nWhile the LRA capture the declared price and the property location (e.g., XY coordinates), there is\nlittle information on property characteristics such as floor area, number of bedrooms etc.\n\n9. Characteristic information on the properties is held by the Treasurer’s Office of the\nLocal Government Units (LGU). The “title number,” which uniquely identifies property\ntransactions, is held on the LRA database and is aIso captured by the local government units. In\nprinciple, datasets could be linked to create a comprehensive dataset of property transactions.\nOne difficulty with this is that the data held by the local government units is disaggregated and\nnot combined into a central database. Therefore, there will be challenges accessing the data and\nthere may be significant differences in structure and quality across local government units.\n\n10. The BSP should initiate a pilot project to test whether it is possible to link the LRA\ndata with data provided by a local government unit. A small-scale pilot project using data\nfrom one local government unit would identify opportunities and challenges associated with this\napproach. For example, the project would be able to assess: (i) the quality of information in both\ndatasets, (ii) the accuracy of the declared price, (iii) the feasibility of linking the two datasets\nusing the title number, (iv) the potential improvements in data coverage and (v) the impact on\ntimeliness compared to using the existing data source (i.e., check the time difference between\nthe transaction reference date and the date the transaction was registered at the LRA).\n\n11. The BSP plan to increase their stakeholder engagement by convening an Inter-\nAgency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS). The group will consist of\nmembers from the BSP, the Philippine Statistical Authority, the Land Registry Authority and other\ngovernment agencies. This group will be important for developing shared goals, building\nrelationships with other organizations, and negotiating access to data. BSP should consider\n\n1 Land Administration and Management Project (LAMP).\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7", "text_characters": 3064}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\ninvolving the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) in the working\ngroup. NAMRIA would have specific expertise in mapping and may be able to provide further\nlocation information on the property transactions.\n\n\n**12.** **The BSP are in the early stages of researching new data sources for their property**\n**price statistics.** The recommended approach devised during the mission are only initial steps. It\nwill take time and resources to realize the goal of moving to new administration data sources.\n\n\n**13.** **In the short-term, the BSP could consider collecting information on residential**\n**property advertisements from real estate websites.** Some examples of websites in the\nPhilippines are Lamudi, Zipmatch, Dot Property, Craigslist and Carousell. The BSP have a data\nscience unit that may be able to progress the project. While this data source would not replace\nthe loan data, the information could be used as an additional data source to inform the research.\n\n\n_**Recommended Actions:**_\n\n\n- Use the Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS) to develop\nshared goals, build relationships and negotiate access to data.\n\n- Initiate a pilot project to test whether it is possible to link the LRA data with data provided by\na single local government unit.\n\n- Collecting information on residential property advertisements from real estate websites.\n\n\n**B. Data Cleaning and Processing**\n\n\n**14.** **The BSP implemented methods to ensure quality data is received from commercial**\n**banks.** The banks complete separate electronic reports (MS Excel) for residential and commercial\nproperty. The commercial property report covers properties appraised by banks during the\nreference quarter which are classified as commercial, industrial, and special use. The residential\nproperty report covers loans granted to households during the reference quarter to purchase\nresidential property. The banks must submit the reports within 20 days of the end of the\nreference quarter. There are automatic validation checks on the forms (e.g., missing values,\nduplicates, extreme values, consistency checks) to provide respondents with immediate feedback.\nThis ensures an efficient data collection process and clean data for processing.\n\n\n**15.** **The BSP should continue to monitor the number of missing values for key variables**\n**such as acquisition cost and appraised value.** The number of missing values has decreased as\nthe validation on the data collection forms has increased. The authorities should continue to\nfollow-up on missing values for key variables, like acquisition cost, and other variables that may\nbecome important in the future if hedonic methods are used for quality adjustment e.g., number\nof bedrooms, age of the structure, lot area.\n\n\n**16.** **A method for outlier detection by strata and period will be implemented for the**\n**launch of the updated RREPI and new CPPI** . This reduces the volatility evident in the existing\nRREPI, particularly in 2020. The BSP completed detailed research on the methods for outlier\ndetection. They examined the standard, adjusted, and generalized box plot methods. These\n\n\n**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\ninvolving the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) in the working\ngroup. NAMRIA would have specific expertise in mapping and may be able to provide further\nlocation information on the property transactions.\n\n12. The BSP are in the early stages of researching new data sources for their property\nprice statistics. The recommended approach devised during the mission are only initial steps. It\nwill take time and resources to realize the goal of moving to new administration data sources.\n\n13. In the short-term, the BSP could consider collecting information on residential\nproperty advertisements from real estate websites. Some examples of websites in the\nPhilippines are Lamudi, Zipmatch, Dot Property, Craigslist and Carousell. The BSP have a data\nscience unit that may be able to progress the project. While this data source would not replace\nthe loan data, the information could be used as an additional data source to inform the research.\n\n_Recommended Actions:_\n\n- Use the Inter-Agency Working Group on Property Price Statistics (IAWGPPS) to develop\nshared goals, build relationships and negotiate access to data.\n\n- Initiate a pilot project to test whether it is possible to link the LRA data with data provided by\na single local government unit.\n\n- Collecting information on residential property advertisements from real estate websites.\n\nB. Data Cleaning and Processing\n\n14. The BSP implemented methods to ensure quality data is received from commercial\nbanks. The banks complete separate electronic reports (MS Excel) for residential and commercial\nproperty. The commercial property report covers properties appraised by banks during the\nreference quarter which are classified as commercial, industrial, and special use. The residential\nproperty report covers loans granted to households during the reference quarter to purchase\nresidential property. The banks must submit the reports within 20 days of the end of the\nreference quarter. There are automatic validation checks on the forms (e.g., missing values,\nduplicates, extreme values, consistency checks) to provide respondents with immediate feedback.\nThis ensures an efficient data collection process and clean data for processing.\n\n15. The BSP should continue to monitor the number of missing values for key variables\nsuch as acquisition cost and appraised value. The number of missing values has decreased as\nthe validation on the data collection forms has increased. The authorities should continue to\nfollow-up on missing values for key variables, like acquisition cost, and other variables that may\nbecome important in the future if hedonic methods are used for quality adjustment e.g., number\nof bedrooms, age of the structure, lot area.\n\n16. A method for outlier detection by strata and period will be implemented for the\nlaunch of the updated RREPI and new CPPI . This reduces the volatility evident in the existing\nRREPI, particularly in 2020. The BSP completed detailed research on the methods for outlier\ndetection. They examined the standard, adjusted, and generalized box plot methods. These\n\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2650}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\nmethods consider an observation atypical or extreme when it is above the upper whisker or\nbelow the lower whisker. The chosen outlier detection method, which was the generalized\napproach, considers both skewness and tail heaviness of the price data distribution. For\nresidential property, the method excluded 4.8 percent of observations in total over the period\nfrom 2016 to 2021, with the number split evenly between the upper and lower ends of the\ndistribution. For commercial property, the method removed 5.4 percent of total observations,\nwith 3.0 percent at the lower end of the distribution and 2.4 percent at the higher end of the\ndistribution. The number of outliers identified varied when implemented by strata and period.\n\n\n**17.** **The BSP should regularly assess outliers to ensure that the method does not**\n**introduce a bias into the index.** Removing outliers is often arbitrary and can lead to biased\nresults if not implemented correctly. The authorities should monitor the impact of removing the\noutliers to ensure that the price indexes are capturing price trends accurately.\n\n\n_**Recommended Actions:**_\n\n- Monitor number of missing values for key variables like acquisition cost and appraised value.\n\n- Regularly assess outliers to ensure that the method is not introducing a bias into the index.\n\n\n**C. Stratification, Weighting, and Aggregation**\n\n\n**18.** **The use of acquisition costs for residential property more accurately represents**\n**transactions prices.** The authorities will use full acquisition costs (i.e., land and structure) to\ncompute the updated RREPI. The existing RREPI uses appraised values (buildings only). Full\nacquisition costs more closely represent the target price for the RREPI.\n\n\n**19.** **Appraised values (land only) will be used to compile the indexes for commercial**\n**property.** It is preferable to use the combined value for land and structure as the basis for\ncompilation, the data collection form only collects the appraised value for land. In this situation,\nit was recommended the naming convention for the new CPPI. Alternatives mentioned were the\nCommercial Land Price Index (CLPI) and the Commercial Property Land Price Index (CPLPI).\n\n\n**20.** **More detailed stratification will be used for commercial and residential property** .\nThis allows for more homogenous groups for aggregation. The stratification is completed based\non property type and region. In the existing RREPI, there are two regional strata (NCR and\nAONCR). Yet, with the launch of the new indexes, regional strata are formed using island groups\n(NCR, Balance Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao), and districts (in NCR) or by cities/municipalities (in\nAONCR). This results in 30 strata for residential property and 40 strata for commercial property.\n\n\n**21.** **Maintain homogeneity to the extent possible when stratifying the data for**\n**commercial property** . There are four types of property used for stratification: Office, Retail,\nMixed-Use and Vacant Lot. While it is desirable to maximize the number of observations in each\nstratum, it is also important to ensure that the properties are as homogenous as possible. For\nexample, it was recommended to exclude gas stations from the stratum for Retail.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\nmethods consider an observation atypical or extreme when it is above the upper whisker or\nbelow the lower whisker. The chosen outlier detection method, which was the generalized\napproach, considers both skewness and tail heaviness of the price data distribution. For\nresidential property, the method excluded 4.8 percent of observations in total over the period\nfrom 2016 to 2021, with the number split evenly between the upper and lower ends of the\ndistribution. For commercial property, the method removed 5.4 percent of total observations,\nwith 3.0 percent at the lower end of the distribution and 2.4 percent at the higher end of the\ndistribution. The number of outliers identified varied when implemented by strata and period.\n\n17. The BSP should regularly assess outliers to ensure that the method does not\nintroduce a bias into the index. Removing outliers is often arbitrary and can lead to biased\nresults if not implemented correctly. The authorities should monitor the impact of removing the\noutliers to ensure that the price indexes are capturing price trends accurately.\n\n_Recommended Actions:_\n\n- Monitor number of missing values for key variables like acquisition cost and appraised value.\n\n- Regularly assess outliers to ensure that the method is not introducing a bias into the index.\n\nC. Stratification, Weighting, and Aggregation\n\n18. The use of acquisition costs for residential property more accurately represents\ntransactions prices. The authorities will use full acquisition costs (i.e., land and structure) to\ncompute the updated RREPI. The existing RREPI uses appraised values (buildings only). Full\nacquisition costs more closely represent the target price for the RREPI.\n\n19. Appraised values (land only) will be used to compile the indexes for commercial\nproperty. It is preferable to use the combined value for land and structure as the basis for\ncompilation, the data collection form only collects the appraised value for land. In this situation,\nit was recommended the naming convention for the new CPPI. Alternatives mentioned were the\nCommercial Land Price Index (CLPI) and the Commercial Property Land Price Index (CPLPI).\n\n20. More detailed stratification will be used for commercial and residential property .\nThis allows for more homogenous groups for aggregation. The stratification is completed based\non property type and region. In the existing RREPI, there are two regional strata (NCR and\nAONCR). Yet, with the launch of the new indexes, regional strata are formed using island groups\n(NCR, Balance Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao), and districts (in NCR) or by cities/municipalities (in\nAONCR). This results in 30 strata for residential property and 40 strata for commercial property.\n\n21. Maintain homogeneity to the extent possible when stratifying the data for\ncommercial property . There are four types of property used for stratification: Office, Retail,\nMixed-Use and Vacant Lot. While it is desirable to maximize the number of observations in each\nstratum, it is also important to ensure that the properties are as homogenous as possible. For\nexample, it was recommended to exclude gas stations from the stratum for Retail.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9", "text_characters": 2703}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\n**22.** **The use of annually updated fixed weights (three year rolling average) brings the**\n**aggregation methods into line with international standards.** The existing RREPI uses varying\nweights from quarter-to-quarter based on the share of total floor area. The new method will use\nannually updated fixed weights based on the share of total sales.\n\n\n**23.** **Fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the**\n**strata.** The proposed aggregation method uses an unweighted arithmetic mean within strata\nand an unweighted geometric mean to calculate prices for each combination of island group and\ntype of property. The elementary indices are calculated at this level. However, there are valuable\nweights information available at the level of the strata (by district within the NCR and by\ncity/municipality within island groups in AONCR). Therefore, the BPS should drop the step which\napplies the unweighted geometric mean and directly calculate the elementary aggregate indexes\nat the level of the strata. The weights can then be used to aggregate the elementary indexes to\nhigher level indexes. This approach has two main benefits. The accuracy of the resulting indexes\nis improved as the use of available weights information is maximized. In addition, by compiling\nthe elementary indexes at the level of the strata, this allows for the possibility to disseminate\nmore detailed indexes for users e.g., districts within the NCR.\n\n\n**24.** **Apply imputation for a stratum where there are no transactions in a particular**\n**quarter.** For strata in the NCR, the weighted average price change across the other strata (i.e.,\ndistricts) can be used for imputation. For example, if there are no transactions for condominiums\nin the second district, the weighted average price change from the other three districts can be\nused to estimate the price change in the second district. For strata in AONCR, there are two subdivisions (i.e., cities and municipalities) for each combination of island group and property type.\nTherefore, the price change in cities can be used to impute for municipalities and vice versa. If\nthere are no transactions within the entire island group and property type combination, then the\nprice change from the next closest stratum can be used for imputation, based on the judgement\nof the compiler.\n\n\n**25.** **The authorities decided to delay the launch of the updated RREPI and new CPPI to**\n**allow time to implement some of the mission recommendations** . In particular, the BSP will\nimplement the recommendation to fully exploit the available information for the weights. The\nchanges should be fully tested before moving forward with dissemination.\n\n\n**26.** **In the medium term, the authorities should consider using hedonic regression**\n**methods for quality adjustment within strata.** The existing approach to aggregation uses\nstratification with arithmetic averages to compute the price indexes. This approach controls for\nquality-mix adjustment between strata, but not within strata. The recommended approach\ninternationally is to use hedonic methods. The BSP already collects the information required to\nstart developing regression models e.g., number of floors, number of bedrooms, age of the\nproperty and lot size. To make progress in this area, the BSP should increase the capacity of the\nteam through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical assistance\nspecifically on this topic. These skills will be important for the team regardless of whether the\ndata source remains the same or it is decided to move to a new administrative data source.\n\n\n**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\n22. The use of annually updated fixed weights (three year rolling average) brings the\naggregation methods into line with international standards. The existing RREPI uses varying\nweights from quarter-to-quarter based on the share of total floor area. The new method will use\nannually updated fixed weights based on the share of total sales.\n\n23. Fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the\nstrata. The proposed aggregation method uses an unweighted arithmetic mean within strata\nand an unweighted geometric mean to calculate prices for each combination of island group and\ntype of property. The elementary indices are calculated at this level. However, there are valuable\nweights information available at the level of the strata (by district within the NCR and by\ncity/municipality within island groups in AONCR). Therefore, the BPS should drop the step which\napplies the unweighted geometric mean and directly calculate the elementary aggregate indexes\nat the level of the strata. The weights can then be used to aggregate the elementary indexes to\nhigher level indexes. This approach has two main benefits. The accuracy of the resulting indexes\nis improved as the use of available weights information is maximized. In addition, by compiling\nthe elementary indexes at the level of the strata, this allows for the possibility to disseminate\nmore detailed indexes for users e.g., districts within the NCR.\n\n24. Apply imputation for a stratum where there are no transactions in a particular\nquarter. For strata in the NCR, the weighted average price change across the other strata (i.e.,\ndistricts) can be used for imputation. For example, if there are no transactions for condominiums\nin the second district, the weighted average price change from the other three districts can be\nused to estimate the price change in the second district. For strata in AONCR, there are two subdivisions (i.e., cities and municipalities) for each combination of island group and property type.\nTherefore, the price change in cities can be used to impute for municipalities and vice versa. If\nthere are no transactions within the entire island group and property type combination, then the\nprice change from the next closest stratum can be used for imputation, based on the judgement\nof the compiler.\n\n25. The authorities decided to delay the launch of the updated RREPI and new CPPI to\nallow time to implement some of the mission recommendations . In particular, the BSP will\nimplement the recommendation to fully exploit the available information for the weights. The\nchanges should be fully tested before moving forward with dissemination.\n\n26. In the medium term, the authorities should consider using hedonic regression\nmethods for quality adjustment within strata. The existing approach to aggregation uses\nstratification with arithmetic averages to compute the price indexes. This approach controls for\nquality-mix adjustment between strata, but not within strata. The recommended approach\ninternationally is to use hedonic methods. The BSP already collects the information required to\nstart developing regression models e.g., number of floors, number of bedrooms, age of the\nproperty and lot size. To make progress in this area, the BSP should increase the capacity of the\nteam through attendance at a training course and/or planning further technical assistance\nspecifically on this topic. These skills will be important for the team regardless of whether the\ndata source remains the same or it is decided to move to a new administrative data source.\n\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 3053}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\n**27.** **The processing and aggregation of the data should be transferred to a statistical**\n**software package e.g., R code, Stata.** The existing compilation is completed in MS Excel.\nFurther improvements in the methodology, such as the use of hedonic methods, could be\nachieved more efficiently with statistical software. In addition, the processing of the data would\nbe more stable, thereby reducing the risk of processing errors.\n\n\n_**Recommended Actions:**_\n\n- Consider alternative names for the CPPI to clarify that it includes only land values.\n\n- Maintain homogeneity to the greatest extent possible when stratifying the data for\ncommercial property.\n\n- Fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the strata.\n\n- Apply imputation for a stratum where there are no transactions in a particular quarter.\n\n- Ensure the changes to the methods are fully tested before moving on with dissemination.\n\n- In the medium term, consider using hedonic regression methods for quality adjustment\nwithin strata.\n\n- Increase the capacity of the team with hedonic regression methods through attendance at a\ntraining course and/or planning further technical assistance.\n\n- Transfer processing and aggregation of data to statistical software package (R code, Stata).\n\n\n**D. Dissemination**\n\n\n**28.** **The mission discussed all aspects of the dissemination of the updated RREPI and**\n**new CPPI.** This included the advance notice provided to users, the layout of the statistical\ncommentary, the technical (metadata) document, and the press release.\n\n\n**29.** **The authorities should highlight the positive improvements in the compilation**\n**methods for RREPI** . These include the use of acquisition costs instead of appraisal values, the\nintroduction of a robust method for outlier detection, the application of more detailed\nstratification, and the use of annually updated fixed weights. When combined, these represent a\nsignificant improvement in the quality of the RREPI.\n\n\n**30.** **Clear communication is required for users in relation to the revisions to the RREPI.**\nIt is proposed to revise the full historical series for the RREPI, beginning in Q1 2016. Users will\nneed to transition from using the existing series and will want to understand the reasons for any\nsignificant differences between the existing series and the updated RREPI. BSP should publish\ngraphs with both the existing and updated indexes, highlighting (to the extent possible) why the\nupdated RREPI deviates from the existing index. This graphical analysis could be included in the\ntechnical (metadata) document or published as a separate document. The archived publications\nshould also be updated to alert users to the fact that the RREPI has been revised.\n\n\n**31.** **The BPS should include some additional sections in the technical (metadata)**\n**document** . The authorities should specifically note the date that the RREPI was revised and the\ndate the CPPI was launched for the first time. Robust methods have been introduced for data\ncleaning, missing values, outlier detection etc. It would provide users with additional assurance\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\n27. The processing and aggregation of the data should be transferred to a statistical\nsoftware package e.g., R code, Stata. The existing compilation is completed in MS Excel.\nFurther improvements in the methodology, such as the use of hedonic methods, could be\nachieved more efficiently with statistical software. In addition, the processing of the data would\nbe more stable, thereby reducing the risk of processing errors.\n\n_Recommended Actions:_\n\n- Consider alternative names for the CPPI to clarify that it includes only land values.\n\n- Maintain homogeneity to the greatest extent possible when stratifying the data for\ncommercial property.\n\n- Fully exploit the weights information available by applying them at the level of the strata.\n\n- Apply imputation for a stratum where there are no transactions in a particular quarter.\n\n- Ensure the changes to the methods are fully tested before moving on with dissemination.\n\n- In the medium term, consider using hedonic regression methods for quality adjustment\nwithin strata.\n\n- Increase the capacity of the team with hedonic regression methods through attendance at a\ntraining course and/or planning further technical assistance.\n\n- Transfer processing and aggregation of data to statistical software package (R code, Stata).\n\nD. Dissemination\n\n28. The mission discussed all aspects of the dissemination of the updated RREPI and\nnew CPPI. This included the advance notice provided to users, the layout of the statistical\ncommentary, the technical (metadata) document, and the press release.\n\n29. The authorities should highlight the positive improvements in the compilation\nmethods for RREPI . These include the use of acquisition costs instead of appraisal values, the\nintroduction of a robust method for outlier detection, the application of more detailed\nstratification, and the use of annually updated fixed weights. When combined, these represent a\nsignificant improvement in the quality of the RREPI.\n\n30. Clear communication is required for users in relation to the revisions to the RREPI.\nIt is proposed to revise the full historical series for the RREPI, beginning in Q1 2016. Users will\nneed to transition from using the existing series and will want to understand the reasons for any\nsignificant differences between the existing series and the updated RREPI. BSP should publish\ngraphs with both the existing and updated indexes, highlighting (to the extent possible) why the\nupdated RREPI deviates from the existing index. This graphical analysis could be included in the\ntechnical (metadata) document or published as a separate document. The archived publications\nshould also be updated to alert users to the fact that the RREPI has been revised.\n\n31. The BPS should include some additional sections in the technical (metadata)\ndocument . The authorities should specifically note the date that the RREPI was revised and the\ndate the CPPI was launched for the first time. Robust methods have been introduced for data\ncleaning, missing values, outlier detection etc. It would provide users with additional assurance\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11", "text_characters": 2625}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n\nabout the quality of information by including additional detail on this topic in the technical\ndocument. It would also be helpful to include some information on the calculation of key\ndissemination indicators such as percent price change and the quarterly and annual\ncontributions.\n\n\n**32.** **The formula for the calculation of the annual contributions needs to be modified**\n**due to the move to annual updating of weights.** The contributions to percent price change\nhelp explain the sub-indexes that contribute most to inflation. When expenditure weights are\nannually updated, price indexes spanning more than a year are chain-linked and the formula to\ncompute annual contributions to inflation should be modified. The mission presented the new\nformula and suggested allowing sufficient time to update the calculations.\n\n\n_**Recommended Actions:**_\n\n- The authorities should highlight the improvements in the compilation methods for RREPI.\n\n- Clear communication is required for users in relation to the revisions to the RREPI\n\n- Include some additional sections in the technical (metadata) document e.g., methods for\nensuring high quality data, details on the calculation of key dissemination indicators.\n\n- The formula for the calculation of the annual contributions should be modified due to the\nmove to annual updating of weights\n\n\n**E. Resources**\n\n\n**33.** **The BPS should assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term**\n**research and development work** . The work plan includes significant research and development\nin relation to hedonic regression methods for quality adjustment, the transition to a statistical\nsoftware package, building relationships with external organizations and the development of new\ndata sources. A dedicated resource would be required to make progress in these areas and\nmaintain momentum over time. This should be separate from the resources assigned to the\nquarterly production of the RREPI and CPPI.\n\n\n_**Recommended Action:**_\n\n- Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and long-term research and development work.\n\n\n**F. Officials Met During the Mission**\n\n|Name|Institution|\n|---|---|\n|Ms. Haydee R. Paulino|BSP|\n|Ms. Willa Boots J. Tolo|BSP|\n|Mr. Jeremy L. De Jesus|BSP|\n|Mr. Gian Paolo T. De La Torre|BSP|\n|Mr. Richer King R. Supnet|BSP|\n|Ms. Gloria A. Cubinar|BSP|\n\n\n\n**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.23400115966797, 574.1900024414062, 539.8900146484375, 671.1000366210938], "columns": 2, "rows": 7}], "text": "PHILIPPINES\n\nabout the quality of information by including additional detail on this topic in the technical\ndocument. It would also be helpful to include some information on the calculation of key\ndissemination indicators such as percent price change and the quarterly and annual\ncontributions.\n\n32. The formula for the calculation of the annual contributions needs to be modified\ndue to the move to annual updating of weights. The contributions to percent price change\nhelp explain the sub-indexes that contribute most to inflation. When expenditure weights are\nannually updated, price indexes spanning more than a year are chain-linked and the formula to\ncompute annual contributions to inflation should be modified. The mission presented the new\nformula and suggested allowing sufficient time to update the calculations.\n\n_Recommended Actions:_\n\n- The authorities should highlight the improvements in the compilation methods for RREPI.\n\n- Clear communication is required for users in relation to the revisions to the RREPI\n\n- Include some additional sections in the technical (metadata) document e.g., methods for\nensuring high quality data, details on the calculation of key dissemination indicators.\n\n- The formula for the calculation of the annual contributions should be modified due to the\nmove to annual updating of weights\n\nE. Resources\n\n33. The BPS should assign a dedicated resource to the medium and longer-term\nresearch and development work . The work plan includes significant research and development\nin relation to hedonic regression methods for quality adjustment, the transition to a statistical\nsoftware package, building relationships with external organizations and the development of new\ndata sources. A dedicated resource would be required to make progress in these areas and\nmaintain momentum over time. This should be separate from the resources assigned to the\nquarterly production of the RREPI and CPPI.\n\n_Recommended Action:_\n\n- Assign a dedicated resource to the medium and long-term research and development work.\n\nF. Officials Met During the Mission\n\n Name Institution \n\n Ms. Haydee R. Paulino BSP \n Ms. Willa Boots J. Tolo BSP \n Mr. Jeremy L. De Jesus BSP \n Mr. Gian Paolo T. De La Torre BSP \n Mr. Richer King R. Supnet BSP \n Ms. Gloria A. Cubinar BSP \n\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1934}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "PHILIPPINES\n\n#### **Annex I. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the** **Philippines**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|No.|Activity|Price|Data source/s|Timeline|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|1
|Property is placed in
the market.
|Asking price
|• Real estate brokers associations (e.g., Real
Estate Brokers Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (REBAP), Philippine Association of Real
Estate Boards (PAREB)).
• Websites (e.g., Lamudi, Zipmatch, Dot
Property, Craigslist, Carousell).
• Newspaper classified ads.
• Word-of-mouth.
|4 weeks to 2
years.
|\n|2
|Price is agreed
between buyer and
seller.
|Transaction price
|Contract to sell (public and notarized) – notary
public.
|1 week
(conditional
approval).
|\n|3a.|Mortgage is
approved.|Valuation price|• Banks
• Non-banks (Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF), National Housing Authority
(NHA), National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), Social Housing Finance
Corporation (SHFC))|5 days-3 weeks
after document
requirements
submission.|\n|3a.|Letter of guarantee
issued.|Valuation price|Valuation price|Within days|\n|3b.|In-house financing is
approved.|Transaction price|Developers|12 weeks
|\n|4|Contract is signed
(property paid).|Declared price/
Transaction price.|• Notarized deed of absolute sale
• Unnotarized deed of absolute sale (between
buyers and sellers)||\n|5|Capital gains tax and
documentary stamp
tax are paid (6 and
1.5 percent).|Declared price/
Fair market value/
Zonal value, which
is higher.|Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)|Tax liability must
be paid within 30
days of the sale2|\n|6|Transfer of
ownership registered
(Fee: 1 percent of
price).|Declared price|Land Registration Authority (LRA)|4 weeks
|\n|7|Mortgage is
registered (the
property title is
annotated with
encumbrance).|Declared price|Land Registration Authority (LRA)|1-4 weeks|\n|8|Local transfer tax is
paid (0.5-0.75
percent of price).|Declared price|Treasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit
(LGU).|1 day to 1 week|\n|9|Tax declaration form
(assessment of real
property tax) is filed.|Zonal price|Assessor’s Office / Treasurer’s Office of the
Local Government Unit (LGU).|4 weeks|\n\n\n\n2 [https://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/tax-information/capital-gains-tax.html.](https://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/tax-information/capital-gains-tax.html)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-041", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.13477325439453, 124.0799789428711, 539.9891967773438, 574.1699829101562], "columns": 5, "rows": 12}], "text": "PHILIPPINES\nAnnex I. Timeline of a Typical Property Transaction in the Philippines\n\n No. Activity Price Data source/s Timeline \n\n 1 Property is placed in the market. Asking price • Real estate brokers associations (e.g., Real Estate Brokers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (REBAP), Philippine Association of Real Estate Boards (PAREB)). • Websites (e.g., Lamudi, Zipmatch, Dot Property, Craigslist, Carousell). • Newspaper classified ads. • Word-of-mouth. 4 weeks to 2 years. \n 2 Price is agreed between buyer and seller. Transaction price Contract to sell (public and notarized) – notary public. 1 week (conditional approval). \n 3a. Mortgage is approved. Valuation price • Banks • Non-banks (Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), National Housing Authority (NHA), National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC)) 5 days-3 weeks after document requirements submission. \n 3a. Letter of guarantee issued. Valuation price Valuation price Within days \n 3b. In-house financing is approved. Transaction price Developers 12 weeks \n 4 Contract is signed (property paid). Declared price/ Transaction price. • Notarized deed of absolute sale • Unnotarized deed of absolute sale (between buyers and sellers) \n 5 Capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax are paid (6 and 1.5 percent). Declared price/ Fair market value/ Zonal value, which is higher. Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Tax liability must be paid within 30 days of the sale2 \n 6 Transfer of ownership registered (Fee: 1 percent of price). Declared price Land Registration Authority (LRA) 4 weeks \n 7 Mortgage is registered (the property title is annotated with encumbrance). Declared price Land Registration Authority (LRA) 1-4 weeks \n 8 Local transfer tax is paid (0.5-0.75 percent of price). Declared price Treasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit (LGU). 1 day to 1 week \n 9 Tax declaration form (assessment of real property tax) is filed. Zonal price Assessor’s Office / Treasurer’s Office of the Local Government Unit (LGU). 4 weeks \n\n2 https://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/tax-information/capital-gains-tax.html.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13", "text_characters": 1818}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9d948a64b8e321cb23e3a54ede855d4ce3f96a7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:05030406fcf9b69544ad07703e29f8da361782723ea3dd92dacda7a6f2837618
+size 28061
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..07306e0d01a1b579afe57787037702cf280bcc91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:526425f3c0295ef11bcd0fa63ff6ca7d4f9cd9cabbd9043fe1e0faef09840b88
+size 159161
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e34d3b5ebf32073d81e2bb8239d7fad7844fb504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f719a78d78d494790e39433ef1f2a3bc246994e2269dee68188ba72d2fe2ed8f
+size 100589
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0014-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0014-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..669fc16132c6fd9f986b445aa79deac53f866436
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0014-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fee7590b7886dd15be2404d0ff955898faecbfe6997a05ffe7546d1ce2d998de
+size 18095
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..45f9746d466bbb4d3379e1571ba726e97aae1614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5455062c2a6de7efd508c6649d9685a23fa8f82c4a2aefcc578f02777428aef0
+size 21617
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c667dffd282aa5b7b0e18124423716ee09f9844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a8b170b0bffa0822eb2353392e7e101199d85f52f620dc9fe98617b40091f864
+size 30714
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7a5503d3036d1a7679406f7c7ddc9d85790751dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:01911706b7fe0ccbb137ec97255e47acad6c6c7a82fe52aa38317c3ba3dc6af7
+size 35365
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1d07af101c791effa040fe5ff1013f260dae23e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8a6d9f6450fc3a5eab976fe931dc4906f20a2b223813a159a095b21b0b847fee
+size 5780
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..035e2c192231c79d5907ce695dc78f1d67cccbe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d8c21f740a68bc4910af051874a86033883afd151932d285f2619516582228f1
+size 64556
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78d21dfb421d4a23a28723bd296835939a5fde0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8fc875330e540689d5f558045e2713b141e98299ea2a03c71ab43d2372341c42
+size 17113
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e2a954edcf70dc9515dc3e067023e3d0ec07564d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5661f3bd311db54a15cd6349693114827cf5bf6a90d8e9752fcdd3db4b6785d3
+size 19681
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5dfc3462b8ef51b417b9e3ae1babc08b7898ad59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-045",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Government Finance Statistics Mission (December 2-13, 2019)",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-045.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "c1d3977fa5fd05146a69f12a7f6c94e4dc9d539f886fff876e5e2611ef6abb19",
+ "source_bytes": 1094576,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/25/republic-of-mozambique-technical-assistance-report-on-government-finance-statistics-mission-528598",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:30:02+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 48.393,
+ "page_count": 45,
+ "text_characters": 102534,
+ "table_count": 37,
+ "figure_count": 12,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION (DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION (DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Prepared by Djaima Da Costa"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Glossary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 10,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 37,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex I. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 38,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex II. Institutional Structure of General Government"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 39,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex III. Detailed Government Revenue - GRM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 40,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex IV. GRM Detailed Government Spending"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 41,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex V. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities - GRM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 42,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex VI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 43,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Annex VII. GRM Fiscal Table - GFSM 1986 vs. GFSM 2014"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Government Finance Statistics (December 2-13, 2019) IMF Country Report No. 23/45; February 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Government Finance Statistics, Public sector debt statistics, Expenditure, Public Sector",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230124202357-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230125152538-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..94867e7120780281d3ae9b7a4cf682b1bb1c108e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2501 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/45**
+
+## **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE** **STATISTICS MISSION (DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)**
+
+
+This report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in February 2020.
+
+**Disclaimer:**
+This report was prepared in 2020 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its
+publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+**FEBRUARY**
+**2020**
+
+
+
+
+# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+#### **REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION** **(DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)**
+
+###### **Prepared by Djaima Da Costa**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+#### **CONTENTS**
+
+Glossary______________________________________________________________________________________________ **3**
+
+**SUMMARY OF MISSIONS OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ________________4**
+**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________10**
+
+
+A. Coordination of the GFS Compilation Process__________________________________________________12
+B. Sectorization and Sources of Fiscal Data________________________________________________________13
+C. Identification of Statistical Discrepancies_______________________________________________________ 14
+D. Compilation of Annual 2016-2018 GFS_________________________________________________________ 29
+
+E. Fiscal Table Revisons____________________________________________________________________________ 32
+
+**FIGURES**
+
+1. Overall Balance vs. Discrepancies_______________________________________________________________ 15
+2. Government Revenue___________________________________________________________________________ 34
+3. Government Expenses___________________________________________________________________________34
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Integrated GRM Financial Balance Sheet_________________________________________________________5
+2. Priority Recommendations_______________________________________________________________________6
+3. Detailed Recommendations/Action Plan_________________________________________________________9
+4. Discrepancies 2016-2018_______________________________________________________________________ 14
+5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets_____________________________________________________________16
+6. Leasing of Government Buildings_______________________________________________________________17
+7. Treatment of Leasing___________________________________________________________________________ 18
+8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS______________________________________________________________ 19
+9. Reconciliation of the 2016-2018 Domestic Debt________________________________________________22
+10. Debts in “Arrears” Recognized, Validated and Paid____________________________________________24
+11. Treatment of “Arrears”_________________________________________________________________________25
+12. Treasury Operations___________________________________________________________________________ 27
+13. Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash /Fiscal Table_________________________________________ 30
+14. Government Spending by Functions of Government – COFOG________________________________31
+15. Stock of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty______________________________________32
+
+**ANNEXES**
+I. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission________________________________________________36
+II. Institutional Structure of General Government__________________________________________________37
+III. Detailed Government Revenue – GRM_________________________________________________________ 38
+IV. GRM Detailed Government Spending__________________________________________________________39
+V. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities – GRM____________________________________________________40
+VI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty_________________________ 41
+VII. GRM Fiscal Table - _GFSM 1986_ vs. _GFSM 2014_ _________________________________________________42
+
+
+**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+#### **Glossary**
+
+AFR IMF African Department
+AT Administrative Tribunal
+BM Bank of Mozambique
+CCGFS Committee for Compiling Public Finance Statistics
+CEDSIF Center for the Development of Financial Information Systems
+CGE Government Financial Report and Statements [Conta Geral do Estado]
+CIs Credit Institutions
+COFOG Classification of the Functions of Government
+CSE Superior Statistical Council
+DEEF Economic and Financial Studies Directorate
+DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development
+DNCP National Directorate of Public Accounting
+DNPO National Directorate of Planning and Budget
+DNT National Treasury Directorate
+e-SISTAFE Electronic Government Financial Administration System
+EBU Extrabudgetary Units
+EDDI 2 Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2
+GCO Central Budgetary Government
+GDP Gross Domestic Product
+GFS Government Finance Statistics
+GFSM 2014 _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_
+GG General Government or Public Administration
+GGR Risk Management Office
+GRM Government of the Republic of Mozambique
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+INE National Statistics Institute
+INSS National Social Security Institute
+LG Local Government
+MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance, Mozambique
+NGC Net Government Credit
+OE Government Budget
+OEF Other Economic Flows
+PSDSG 2011 _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A Guide for Compilers and Users 2011_
+SGIFP Public Finance Management Information System
+STA International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department
+STA Single Treasury Account
+T-Bills Treasury Bills
+T-Bonds Treasury Bonds
+TA Technical Assistance
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+#### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**1.** **Technical Assistance (TA) Mission objective for Public Finance Statistics (GFS).** A TA
+mission visited Maputo in the Republic of Mozambique from December 2–3, 2019, to assist the
+Ministry of Economy and Finance, Mozambique (MEF) to improve the process of compiling and
+disseminating GFS based on internationally accepted best practices that are appropriate for
+managing domestic fiscal policy and for ensuring the necessary support of the International
+Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the final mission in a series of missions funded by the United
+Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) under the GFS Module of the
+Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 (EDDI 2).
+
+**2.** **TA outcome in the DFID.** In the last of this series of TA missions funded by the DFID, the
+Mozambican authorities, which in the last few years released only the revenue of the Central
+Government Budget (GCO), began to compile and disseminate the following GCO annual data:
+(i) detailed public revenue and expenditures; (ii) assets and liabilities transactions;
+(iii) expenditures according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG); (iv) the
+integrated net financial worth balance sheet; and (v) positions of stock and flows of financial assets
+and liabilities by counterpart.
+
+**3.** **Challenges in the process of compiling the GFS of the government of the Republic of**
+**Mozambique (GRM).** Despite the significant progress made in compiling the GFS, challenges
+remain in the compilation process, in particular with regard to data consistency. At the end of
+FY 2017 and FY 2018, the authorities closed the accounts with discrepancies of roughly
+2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore, the mission set out to review the GCO
+accounts, thus continuing the work of eliminating the discrepancies begun by the last mission
+began.
+
+**4.** **Discrepancy in FY 2016-2018.** The mission identified the following key causes of the
+discrepancies: (i) the various sources of data used to produce the Fiscal Table; (ii) the difference in
+institutional coverage of the fiscal and monetary accounts (above and below the line in the
+Financial Statement), and (iii) the lack of periodic reconciliation of the data. The GCO accounts for
+years 2016-2018, presented in accordance with the _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_
+( _GFSM 2014_ ), which includes stocks and flows, is presented in Table 1 below, and it highlights the
+reduction of the discrepancy to levels of less than 1 percent of GDP in the last three years.
+
+
+**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+**Table 1. Integrated GRM Financial Balance Sheet**
+
+
+
+Unit: millions of meticais
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|As of December 31|2016|Col4|Col5|Col6|2017|Col8|Col9|2018|Col11|Col12|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||**Description**|**Opening**
**Balance**|**Fiscal Table**
**(Trans-**
**actions)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|**Fiscal Table**
**(Trans-**
**actions)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|**Fiscal Table**
**(Trans-**
**actions)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|
+|1.
|Revenue||
177,652.48|||
218,072.81|||
226,126.37|||
+|
2.
|
Expenditure||
140,941.60|
||
148,659.00|||
178,012.60|||
+|
**NOB**|
** Net operating balance (1-2)**||
**36,710.98**|
||**69,413.80**|||
** 48,113.70**|||
+|
31.
|
Net nonfinancial assets||
60,171.17|
||57,188.17|||
83,754.16|||
+|2M.
|Total expenditure (2+31)||201,112.80|||205,847.20|||261,766.82|||
+|**NLB**
|**Loan (+) / Debt (–) net**||**(23,460.30)**|||**12,225.60**|||** (35,640.45)**|||
+|
NLBz|
Statistical discrepancy (32-33-NLB)||
(1,325.40)|
||3,001.50|||
690.52|||
+|
|
**Financial net worth:**|**(266,546.28)**|
**(24,785.69)**|
** (225,644.99) **|**(516,976.96)**|**15,225.99**|** 92,255.38 **|**(409,495.59)**|
** (34,949.93) **|
**(23,368.93)**|** (467,814.45)**|
+|
**62.**
|
**Financial assets**|**165,956.51**|
**19,058.20**
|
|
**185,014.71**
|
**67,618.75**
|
**(1.97)**|
** 252,631.49**
|
**17,339.69**
|
**(769.51)**|
** 269,201.67**
|
+|
|
**Domestic**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
6212|
Government deposits|34,767.97|
6,723.27|
|
41,491.24|
29,653.99||
71,145.24|
(17,432.18)||
53,713.06|
+|
6214|
Loans|
57,012.06|
16,361.04|
|
73,373.10|
24,657.67|
|
98,030.78|
13,879.17||
111,909.94|
+|
6215|
Securities and investment funds|
62,157.32|
3,623.95|
|
65,781.27|
(3,497.40)||
62,283.87|
5,286.70|
(770.59)|
66,799.98|
+|
6218|
Other accounts receivable|
12,019.16|
(7,650.06)|
|
4,369.10|
16,804.48|
(1.97)|
21,171.62|
15,606.00|
1.08|
36,778.70|
+|**63.**
|**Liabilities**
|**432,502.80**
|
**43,843.89**
|** 225,644.99**
|**701,991.67**
|
**52,392.76**
|** (92,257.35)**|**662,127.08**
|
**52,289.62**
|
**22,599.42**|** 737,016.12**
|
+|
|
**Domestic**|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
+|
6313
|
Debt securities (T-bills & T-bonds)
|
56,322.02
|
(10,174.79)
|
|
46,147.24
|
18,052.51
|
(145.75)
|
64,054.00
|
13,439.70
|
|77,493.70
|
+|6314
|Loans
|12,910.84
|
29,046.96
|
(395.38)
|41,562.41
|
3,362.43
|
(2,079.23)
|42,845.62
|
19,037.85
|
|61,883.46
|
+|
6318
|
Other accounts payable – FY ended
|
270.01
|
14.11
|
|
284.12|
473.16
|
|
757.28
|
182.96
|
|
940.24
|
+|
|
**External**|
|
|
||
||
|
||
|
+|
6324|
Loans|
362,999.93|
24,957.61|
226,040.37|613,997.91|
30,504.65|(90,032.37)|
554,470.19|
19,629.11|
22,599.42|
596,698.72|
+|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
|
**GDP (Article IV report)**||**689,213.00**|||**804,463.00**|||**859,019.30**|||
+|
**NLBz**|
** Discrepancy (% of GDP) – before the mission**||**0.43 %**|||**2.94%**|||**-1.42%**|||
+|**NLBz**|** Discrepancy (% of GDP) – after the mission**||
**-0.19%**|||**0.37%**|||**0.08%**|||
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**5.** **Key findings for the GFS 2016-2018 data** . The mission found that for net government
+credit (NGC), the Bank of Mozambique (BM) reports a position of central government deposits,
+and that it includes the GCO, extrabudgetary units, and the National Social Security Institute
+(INSS), but that it excludes local governments (autonomous local authorities); while the revenue
+and expenditures in the Fiscal Table are for the GCO only. In terms of domestic debt, the BM
+does not capture debts other than the credit institutions (CIs), such as debts in arrears to
+suppliers. The MEF does not recognize the issuance of Treasury bills used for monetary policy
+management purposes. In addition, there has been no record of public buildings acquired under
+leasing contracts, with only the record of the debt associated with them. The accounts payable
+and receivable, reported by the authorities as treasury operations, explain some of the
+discrepancy in that they represent incoming and outgoing amounts in banks, and they had the
+required counterpart.
+
+**6.** **Action plan for implementing the GFSM 2014.** A greater commitment should be given
+to achieving the set of actions identified to improve the process of compiling GFS. The main
+recommendations the mission left with the authorities are shown in Table 2 below. The complete
+list of recommendations can be found in the action plan presented in the section entitled
+Detailed Technical Assessment and Recommendations in this report.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2020|**Committee for Compiling Public Finance Statistics (CCGFS)**
**or the macroeconomic statistics group in the Superior**
**Statistics Council(CSE). **Establish a committee or group in the
CSE, whose objectives and the responsibilities of the members
and data to be shared will be stipulated in a memorandum of
understanding signed by the members.
|DEEF, DNCP,
DNPO, DNT,
GGR, BM and
INSS|
+|April 2020|
**_Public sector structure and inventory of entities that belong_**
**_to the sector_**_: (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the_
_inventory and classify the entities according to the GFSM 2014_
_for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal,_
_monetary and financial statistics, and external and real-sector_
_statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on the websites of the_
_MEF, BM and National Statistics Institute (INE)._
|MEF, BM and
INE|
+|April 2020|**_Deposits in the GCO fiscal table._**(i) ensure that the position
the BM processes corresponds to the coverage of the fiscal
accounts (above the line); (ii) begin to consider only GCO
deposits and exclude available cash in the INSS and
extrabudgetary units (EBU); (iii) make the required adjustments
to income in deposits and ensure that they have the required
counterpart above the line.
|MEF/DEEF
|
+|April 2020|
**_Domestic and external public debt data for the Fiscal Table._**
_(i)_Use MEF data to ensure consistency between the debt stocks|DEEF and
DNT|
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+||and flows; and (ii) exclude other economic flows (OEF) of
transactions included in the Fiscal Table.
||
+|April 2020|
**_Reconciliation of the domestic and external public debt._**(i)
Finalize the reconciliation work that began during the mission
and document the final result; and (ii) Implement a formal
periodic reconciliation process of the flows and stock (by
instrument, by face and nominal value and by creditor),
including explanations of all the differences identified in the BM
and DNT data. Share the result with the members of the CCGFS.
|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|
+|April 2020|
**_Treasury bills (T-bills)._** (i) Adjust the total Treasury bill debt to
be recognized in the public sector fiscal and monetary accounts.
(ii) The BM should begin to report the total debt of each
subsector in the Mozambican public sector: GG =
GCO+EBU+INSS+LG as well as the business, financial and
nonfinancial sector.
|MEF and BM|
+|April 2020|
**_Treasury Operations._ **Begin to recognize them in the Fiscal
Table, ideally using a modified cash approach (considering
credit and debit balances).
|DEEF|
+|March 2020|
**_2016-2018 Mozambique GFS compiled during the mission:_**
_Validate and submit them to the IMF/STA and the INE._
|DEEF|
+|August 2020|
**_Fiscal Table revision:_** Restructure to ensure alignment with
international standards (GFSM 2014): Declaration I of
government operations.
|DNT and
DEEF|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+#### **INTRODUCTION**
+
+**7.** **GFS TA mission.** A TA mission for GFS visited Maputo, Republic of Mozambique, from
+December 2 to 13, 2019, to assess progress made regarding the recommendations the previous
+mission left in late August and early September 2018. This mission was the last one to be
+conducted for GFS Module of EDDI 2, a five-year initiative financed by the DFID.
+
+**8.** **Objective of the GFS and the EDDI 2 public debt module.** The GFS and public debt
+module focuses on the improvement of GFS in nine selected African countries, including
+Mozambique. This project’s objective is to strengthen GFS in this group of countries in order to
+foster fiscal transparency and curtail fiscal risks. In this context, the Mozambican authorities
+expressed their interest in developing their methods of compiling fiscal statistics in accordance
+with internationally accepted best practices.
+
+**9.** **Mission objective.** Assist the MEF in improving the compilation and dissemination of
+fiscal statistics that are suitable for fiscal policy management and surveillance by the IMF African
+Department (AFR), based on the guidelines of _GFSM 2014_ and _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A_
+_Guide for Compilers and Users 2011 (PSDSG 2011)._ AFR was consulted and stressed the necessity
+of improving the quality of fiscal data and reducing statistical discrepancy to enhance the
+production of efficient projections.
+
+**10.** **Mission tasks.** The mission’s terms of reference were as follows: (i) continue the work of
+identifying the causes of the statistical discrepancies in the 2016-2018 GCO accounts;
+(ii) evaluate progress made in carrying out the recommendations of the previous mission in the
+context of the action plan that the _GFSM 2014_ aims to implement; and (iii) compile quarterly GFS
+for the last three years (2016-2018). However, this last point was pending due to a lack of data in
+Excel format. The authorities were placed in charge of compiling them and submitting them to
+the IMF by end-January 2020.
+
+**11.** **Mission report structure.** Following the executive summary and this introduction, this
+report presents the key topics addressed and the mission’s recommendations for improving the
+process of compiling the GFS, and for issues of coordinating the resources that affect the
+exercise of compiling the GFS in the Republic of Mozambique. The list of officials contacted
+during the mission is found at the end of the report, followed by complementary information in
+the annexes.
+
+**12.** **Acknowledgments.** The mission thanks the authorities, and in particular Dr. Enilde
+Sarmento, Dr. Chamila Aly and Dr. Domingos Fumo and their respective teams for facilitating this
+mission. Moreover, the mission also thanks the local IMF office, and in particular Dr. Esther
+Palacio, IMF Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator in Mozambique, for the unwavering
+technical support provided to the mission.
+
+
+**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+#### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**13.** **Progress in compiling GFS according to the GFSM 2014.** No progress was made in
+terms of actions the last mission left, because the workload has increased at the Economic and
+Financial Studies Directorate (DEEF) and human resources are insufficient. Accordingly, the action
+plan left by the last mission is still in effect, and the only steps taken have been to review the
+texts required to ensure a better understanding of the actions and target dates for completing
+them.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|
+|
H|
1.1** CCGFS or CSE macroeconomic statistics group.**
Establish a committee or group in the CSE whose
goals and the responsibilities of the members and
data to be shared will be specified in a memorandum
of understanding signed by the members.
|DEEF, DNCP,
DNPO, DNT,
GGR, BM and
INSS|
April 2020|
+|L
|
1.2**_Mozambique GFS manual_**_:_ Document the step-
by-step process of compiling the annual and quarterly
GFS and ensure the consistency of the process and
institutional memory.
|DEEF
|December
2020|
+|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
+|
H
|
2.1**_Public sector structure and inventory of entities_**
**_that belong to the sector_**_: (i) validate the sector’s_
_structure; (ii) complete the inventory and classify the_
_entities according to the GFSM 2014 [for Mozambique_
_GG, GCO, EBU, LG, INSS and public enterprises] for_
_compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary_
_and financial statistics, and external and real-sector_
_statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on the MEF,_
_BM and INE websites._
|
MEF, BM and
INE
|April 2020
|
+|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
+|
L|
3.1 **_Development of_SGIFP:**(i) Create standardized
tables to aggregate and extract in Excel the balances
of all the items in the revenue and annual, quarterly
and monthly expenditures classifiers; and (ii)
Incorporate the GFSM 2014 codes so that the SGIFP
will be able to manage GFS automatically.|
DEEF and
CEDSIF
|
December
2020|
+|H|
3.2**_ Financial data of the EBUs, INSS and local_**
**_authorities:_** Collect the reports and accounts of all
the entities in the budgetary system that comprise the
government in Mozambique.|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|August 2020|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**4. COMPILATION **
|**4. COMPILATION **
|**4. COMPILATION **
|**4. COMPILATION **
|
+|
M|
4.1 **_Nonfinancial assets:_**Evaluate the possibility of
whether the inventory of government property could
be used to ascertain the value of the stock and
change in nonfinancial assets in compiling the GFS.
|
DNCP, DNPE
DNPO, DEEF|
December
2020|
+|M|4.2**_Treatment of leasing:_** Begin to record them as
follows: (i) record of loan disbursements in the leasing
contract as an increase in deposits against the
increase in the domestic debt; (ii) recognize the
property as a decrease in banks by paying the
contractor. The increase in investments in nonfinancial
assets is the counterpart.
|DNT, DNCP
and DNPE|August 2020
|
+|M|
4.3**_ Coverage of government deposits._** (i) Include the
available cash of the local authorities to complete the
government; and (ii) begin reporting the totals of
each government subsector in Mozambique: GG =
GCO+EBU+INSS+LG
|BM|August 2020|
+|M|4.4**_ Composition of deposits._** Assess the content of
the deposits and record all government financial
assets and income recognized of the monetary
accounts in the fiscal accounts.
|DNCP, DNT
and DEEF|August 2020|
+|H|
4.5** Periodic reconciliation of deposits****_._ **Implement a
formal process of periodic reconciliation of stock and
flows (by currency and public sector beneficiary),
including explanations of all the differences identified
between the BM and DNT, and share the result with
the other CCGFS members.
|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|April 2020|
+|H|
4.6**_ Deposits in the GCO Fiscal Table._**(i) ensure that
the position the BM ascertained corresponds to the
coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the line); (ii)
begin considering only GCO deposits (exclude
available cash of the INSS and EBUs); (iii) make the
required adjustments to the income included in
deposits and ensure that they have the proper above-
the-line counterpart.
|MEF|April 2020|
+|H
|
4.7**_ Data on the domestic and external public debt_**
**_for the Fiscal Table_.** (i) Use MEF data to ensure
consistency between debt stocks and flows; (ii)
Exclude the OEFs from the transactions in the Fiscal
Table.
|DEEF and DNT
|April 2020|
+|H|
4.8**_ Reconciliation of the domestic and external_**
**_public debt._**(i) Finalize the reconciliation work begun
during the mission and document the final result; and
(ii) Implement a formal process for the periodic|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|April 2020|
+
+
+
+**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+||reconciliation of flows and stock (by instrument, face
and nominal value, and by creditor), including
explanations of all the differences identified in the BM
data (NGC and balance of payments) and DNT
(detailed tables of the debt),and share the result with
the members of the CCGFS.
|||
+|H|
4.9**_ Treasury bills._** (i) Adjust the total T-bill debt to be
recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts of the
public sector; and (ii) the BM should begin to report
the total debt of each of the subsectors in the public
sector of Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG
and the business, financial and nonfinancial sector.
|MEF and BM|April 2020|
+|H|
4.10**_ Treasury bonds (T-bonds)_**. Present a
disaggregated total of treasury securities: (i) detail of
T-Bill issuances and (ii) detail of T-bonds.
|BM|April 2020|
+|H|
4.11**_ Commercial bank loans_. **Present the details of
total commercial bank loans.
|BM|April 2020|
+|M|
4.13**_ Expenditures associated with BM credits._**
_Validate and begin to record expenditures associated_
_with domestic credit published in the monetary_
_accounts._
|MEF|August 2020|
+|M|
4.14**_ Debt in arrears._**_ In the domestic debt table,_
_recognize the amount of5,817.8 million meticais of debt in_
_arrears, recognized and validated by the GRM in end-2019._
|DNT|April 2020|
+|H|
4.15**_ Treasury Operations._ **In the Fiscal Table, begin
recognizing, ideally using a modified/commitment
cash approach (considering credit and debit
balances).
|MEF|April 2020|
+|H|
4.16**_ Fiscal years ended._ **In the Fiscal Table, begin
recognizing them in accounts payable below the line,
and for the record that is kept on expenditures, above
the line.
|MEF|April 2020|
+|M|
_4.17_**_Data from the e-SISTAFE trial balance:_** extract
the primary fiscal data to begin compiling the GFS.
|DEEF|August 2020|
+|H|
4.18**_ Mozambique GFS from 2016-2018 and_**
**_compiled during the mission:_**_ Validate and submit_
_them to the IMF/STA and INE._
|DEEF|February
2020|
+|L|
4.19**_ GFS annual and quarterly series 2010-2018_**_: _
_Compile tables 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8A and 8B of the GFSM_
_2014 and submit them to the IMF._
|DEEF|December
2020|
+|H
|4.20**_ Fiscal Table revision:_** Restructure it to ensure
that it is aligned with international standards (GFSM
2014): Declaration I of government operations.
|DNT and DEEF
|August 2020
|
+|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|M|5.1**_ Annual and quarterly GFS:_**Begin publishing
them on the MEF website.
||August 2020|
+|M
|
5.2**_ Dissemination of the domestic and external_**
**_public debt._**Begin disseminating debt data by
maturity, residual value, currency and creditor based
on World Bank and IMF data, and on the MEF website.|DEEF|August 2020|
+|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
+
+
+
+**A. Coordination of the GFS Compilation Process**
+
+**14.** **GFS Compilation Committee (CCGFS).** The GFS compilation process must be organized
+with various entities. In this regard, the mission reiterates the recommendation made by previous
+missions: create a committee (the CCGFS), led by the DEEF, to facilitate the process of compiling
+GFS. In this committee’s structure, for the entities that will be part of it (DEEF, DNCP, DNPO, DNT,
+
+GGR and BM), their respective responsibilities and the data to be shared, the mission
+recommends listing them in a memorandum of understanding signed by the members.
+
+**15.** **Macroeconomic statistics group in the Superior Statistics Council (CSE).** Once the
+GFS comprise a subsystem in the national accounts system, _another alternative_ would be to
+create in the CSE a structure that already exists in Mozambique: a group for macroeconomic
+statistics with the same structure and objectives suggested for the CCGFS. Here it should be
+noted that today the DEEF is already sharing details of GFS with the INE to provide input for the
+national accounts, and hence this would be a forum for discussions of the four macroeconomic
+sectors to ensure the consistency of Mozambican data.
+
+**16.** **Mozambique GFS Manual.** The mission repeats the recommendation to develop a GFS
+compilation manual (a guide) that represents a living set of working instructions used in the
+process of compiling the GFS, which will be useful for the team’s understanding in order to
+ensure sustainability (create an institutional memory) and consistency in the compilation process.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2020|**CCGFS or macroeconomic statistics group in theCSE. **
Establish a committee or group in the CSE whose members’
objectives and responsibilities and data will be shared and
listed in a memorandum of understanding signed by the
members.|DEEF, DNCP,
DNPO, DNT, GGR,
BM and INSS|
+
+
+
+**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**B. Sectorization and Sources of Fiscal Data**
+
+**17.** **This is ongoing pending the validation of the public sector structure, as well as the**
+**inventory and classification of the units in the sector.** Consequently, data were not collected
+from the extrabudgetary units, the local authorities, or social security. This is the starting point in
+the process of compiling any type of statistic. The mission recommends performing this work in
+cooperation with all public institutions responsible for compiling macroeconomic statistics in
+Mozambique to ensure their consistency. The preliminary survey that was conducted in the
+Mozambique public sector is in Annex I. A structure proposal and preliminary listings of the
+entities and their respective classifications are found in the annex to the report of the AugustSeptember 2018 GFS mission.
+
+**18.** **Obtaining data through the Public Finance Management Information System**
+**(SGIFP).** As the entity in charge of the process of compiling the GFS, the DEEF already has access
+to e-SISTAFE to extract primary data on the budget, although there are challenges in extracting
+from the report trial balances that incorporate the balances of all the accounts that are part of
+the revenue and expenditure budgetary classifications, which correspond to the position
+reported in the Government Financial Report and Statement (CGE). The CEDSIF developed the
+SGIFP, a _Business Intelligence_ (BI) platform that creates system reports automatically. In the
+current development of the above-mentioned platform, the mission recommends creating
+standardized tables based on revenue and expenditure to facilitate the compilation of the GFS in
+a first phase and in the future, perhaps to standardize the GFS codes and generate the GFS
+automatically in SGIFP.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|
April 2020|**_Public sector structure and inventory of entities that belong to_**
**_the sector_**_: (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the inventory_
_and classify the entities according to the GFSM 2014 [for Mozambique_
_GG, GCO, EBU, LG, INSS and public enterprises] for compiling_
_macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial statistics, and_
_external and real-sector statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on_
_the MEF, BM and the INE websites._
|MEF, BM and
INE|
+|December
2020|**_Development of_SGIFP:**(i) Create standardized tables to aggregate
and extract in Excel the balances of all the items in the revenue and
annual, quarterly and monthly expenditures classifiers; and (ii)
Incorporate the GFSM 2014 codes so that the SGIFP will be able to
manage the GFS automatically.|DEEF and
CEDSIF|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**C. Identification of Statistical Discrepancies**
+
+**19.** **Revision of the 2016-2018 fiscal accounts.** Given the necessity of improving the
+quality of fiscal data, the mission revised the GCO 2016-2018 data to identify causes of statistical
+discrepancies and recommend processes for producing fiscal statistics in accordance with more
+up-to-date international standards. The information below shows the key findings and the
+results the mission identified.
+
+**20.** **Key causes of discrepancies** . (i) The various sources of data used to produce the fiscal
+table; (ii) the difference in institutional coverage of the fiscal and monetary accounts – above and
+below the line of the Fiscal Table respectively; and (iii) the lack of periodic reconciliation of the
+data. These are the key causes of the discrepancies. The discrepancies are primarily in
+transactions for government assets and liabilities. The listing of the transactions that are used to
+identify the discrepancies is in Table 4 below, and the detail of each transaction is reported in the
+rest of this section.
+
+**21.** **Discrepancies before and after adjusting the Fiscal Table** . Figure 1 below
+demonstrates the magnitudes in the variations of discrepancies identified in accordance with
+international standards, before and after adjustments are made in the Fiscal Table with the
+transactions listed in Table 4. As Table 1 shows, Figure 1 reports adjustments in the accounts of
+about 8.6 billion meticais in 2016, 15.3 billion in 2017 and 21.9 billion in 2018, representing
+reductions in discrepancies to levels below 1 percent of GDP in the last three years. Moreover,
+the adjustments that were made in the GFS in accordance with the GFSM 2014 identified a
+greater overall total compared to the GFS that were compiled according to the GFSM 1986, due
+to the reclassification of investment revenue and expenditures as part of financial or nonfinancial
+assets.
+
+**22.** **Integrity of the GFS** . The identification of the discrepancies certifies only that the fiscal
+data used are duly classified according to the GFSM 2014. It is the responsibility of the
+authorities to ensure the integrity of the accounts so that the Fiscal Table captures all GCO
+transactions that are to be incorporated into the above-mentioned table in accordance with the
+double-entry accounting rule. The mission believes that there must be periodic and fundamental
+reconciliation to ensure that the Fiscal Table is capturing most if not all GCO transactions.
+
+
+
+**Table 4. Discrepancies 2016-2018**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Fiscal Table|Description|Record|Col5|Col6|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
i|
Investment in
nonfinancial
assets|
Investment expenditure financed
with external funds
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
|
|
5,207.8
|
+|
i|
Investment in
nonfinancial
assets|
|1|1|1|||
|
+||||||||||
+
+
+
+**14** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Leasing of public buildings|Col4|54.3|15.2|11,279.5|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|Ii
|GCO deposits
|
National Social Security Institute
(INSS)|0
|
(4,361.6)|
(2,899.6)|
(8,691.2)|
+|Ii
|GCO deposits
|
T-bills used for monetary policy
(including interest received)
|0
|
(13,659.4)
|
(64,199.8)
|
(24,527.7)
|
+|Ii
|GCO deposits
|
Other regularizations
|0|
(152.0)|
(117.3)|
(1,230.1)|
+|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Treasury Securities (T-bills used
for monetary policy including
interest paid and
T-bonds)|1
0
|
(10,274.0)
|
(72,724.4)
|
(14,052.3)
|
+|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Commercial bank loans
|0
|
(6,673.7)
|
(165.8)
|
(1,518.8)
|
+|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Portuguese line of credit
|0
|
(18,434.4)|
(16,164.6)|
(12,680.3)
|
+|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Arrears|
|
|
|
6,764.1
|
+|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Other regularizations
|
0
|
(1,490.0)
|
(103.7)
|
3,048.5
|
+|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Other economic flows|1
|
403.4
|
4,688.2
|
(489.4)
|
+|iv|Other
accounts
payable and
receivable|
“Treasury Operations”|0
|
7,396.8
|
(16,987.1)
|
(15,604.4)|
+|iv|Other
accounts
payable and
receivable|
Fiscal years ended||
14.1|
472.2|
183.0|
+
+
+
+Source: MEF and BM
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**i.** **Investment in Nonfinancial Assets**
+
+**1.1** **Investment expenditure financed with external funds**
+
+
+**23.** **Government investment projects financed with external funds.** The mission believes
+that some of the inexplicable discrepancy may be in investments in nonfinancial assets. Currently
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **15**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+the authorities assume for investment expenditure that 100 percent of disbursements must be
+external financing (common funds and other funds via/outside the Single Treasury Account
+(STA)) and 100 percent of grants. Therefore, determining the amount of disbursements actually
+used has been a challenge due to the lack of timely information on investment projects. This
+generates potential discrepancies that not all disbursements have been used and remain
+available in banks. Hence, we have an increase in expenditure with no counterpart in banks.
+
+**24.** **Analysis of this item’s consistency in the 2014-2018 Fiscal Table** . The mission
+observed that the above-mentioned requirement is applied only in the Fiscal Tables for the years
+2017 and 2018 (see Table 5), prepared by the authorities. Even though the mission agrees with
+the methodology, it is important to ensure that the methodology that is used is consistent, and
+first and foremost, that efforts are made to obtain actual investment expenditures.
+
+**Table 5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**1.2** **Leasing of government buildings**
+
+
+**25.** **Leasing of government buildings** _**.**_ In 2018 the authorities assumed the amount of 11.3
+billion meticais (see Table 6 below) with reference to bank financing for leasing public buildings,
+the value of which was reconciled with financial institutions and the amount of the BM debt was
+updated. According to the authorities, disbursement associated with this debt has been recorded
+in the domestic debt stock, but there has been no recognition of government buildings in
+government financial worth. This is a source of discrepancy in the Fiscal Table.
+
+
+**16** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**Table 6. Leasing** **of Government Buildings**
+
+
+
+|Leasing|2016|Col3|2017|Col5|2018|Col7|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
|
**Issue**|
**Stock**|
**Issue**|
**Stock**|
**Issue**|
**Stock**|
+|**Total**|
** 54.3**|
**6,385.8**|
**15.2**|
**6,110.8**|
** 11,279.5**|
**17,038.5**|
+|Leasing (M.A.E.F.Pub)|
-|
15.4|
-|
7.8|
-|
-|
+|
Leasing (MITUR)|
-|
15.4|
-|
7.9|
-|
-|
+|
Leasing TA|
-|
287.5|
-|
159.4|
-|
27.5|
+|
Leasing Min. of Energy|
9.5|
346.4|
15.2|
288.5|
-|
190.5|
+|
Leasing Admin. Tribunal
|
44.7|
967.6|
-|
900.7
|
-
|
804.5|
+|
CNAQ –
Cons. Nac. Aval. Q. En. Sup|
-|
87.2|
-|
80.1|
-|
70.1|
+|
Leasing Multi-Serviços|
-|
4,579.6|
-|
4,579.6|
-|
4,579.6|
+|
Leasing Ministry of Justice
|
-|
86.8|
-|
86.8|
-|
86.8|
+|
Leasing Min. of Ag. and Food
Security|
-|
-|
-|
-|
6,590.3|
6,590.3|
+|
Leasing MEF|
-|
-|
-|
-|
4,689.2|
4,689.2|
+
+
+Source: DNT (Detailed statements of the domestic debt)
+
+**26.** **Treatment of leasing of government buildings.** The entry of leasing of government
+buildings requires two records. Since the mission did not have access to the lease contracts and
+did not know the contract terms (including payment of interest and commissions), for the sake
+of simplicity, but assuming that the ownership of the buildings at the end of the contract is the
+government, according to the GFSM 2014, using the cash approach, the authorities should
+prepare the following records: public debt contracted via leasing contracts and recognition of
+government buildings in government property. As Table 7 below illustrates: (i) the government
+contracts loans under leasing contracts, which assumes an increase in the domestic debt – loans,
+against an increase in deposits; (ii) the second record is for the property, which represents the
+payment to the contractor, and thus this requires an increase in the acquisition of nonfinancial
+assets (31) against a reduction in deposits (32).
+
+**27.** **Suitable record of buildings in government property.** In paying contractors, if there is
+only a reduction in deposits without a counterpart, as the second record above suggests, this
+record may create an imbalance in the accounts. Even though the GCO has no equity
+accounting, the record of transactions at the financial and budget level should be duly captured
+and recorded in the accounting. However, the authorities now have an inventory of government
+property that can be used to ascertain the value of the stock and the change in nonfinancial
+
+
+
+assets for the GFS. Therefore, the record of government buildings in leasing contracts would require
+
+
+
+the record of buildings in the inventory of government property.
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **17**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+**Table 7. Treatment of Leasing**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|From the Financial Balance
Sheet in the GRM
( December 31)|2017|Col3|Col4|Col5|2018|Col7|Col8|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**From the Financial Balance**
**Sheet in the GRM**
(December 31)
|**Opening**
**Balance**|**Transactions**
**(Fiscal**
**Table)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|**Transactions**
**(Fiscal**
**Table)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|
+|1. Revenue|
|
|
|
|
|||
+|2. Expenditure
|2. Expenditure
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|**NOB. Net operating balance**
**(1-2)**
|**NOB. Net operating balance**
**(1-2)**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
31. Net nonfinancial assets –
Property revenue|
31. Net nonfinancial assets –
Property revenue|
15.2|
15.2|
15.2|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|
+|
2M. Total expenditure (2+31)|
2M. Total expenditure (2+31)|
15.2|
15.2|
15.2|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|
+|**NLB. Loan (+) / Debt (–) net**|**NLB. Loan (+) / Debt (–) net**|
** (15.2)**
|
** (15.2)**
|
** (15.2)**
|
** (11,279.5)**|
** (11,279.5)**|
** (11,279.5)**|
+|**Net financial assets:**|
**(6,385.8)**|
** (15.2)**||
** (6,401.1)**|
** (11,279.5)**||
** (17,680.6)**|
+|**32. Financial assets**
|
|
**(290.3)**|
|
**(290.3)**|
**(351.8)**|
|
** (642.1)**|
+|Government deposits –
Amortization
|
|
(290.3)|
|
(290.3)|
(351.8)|
|
(642.1)|
+|
Government deposits –
Amortization
|
|
15.2|
|
15.2|
11,279.5|
|
11,294.7|
+|
Government deposits –
Amortization|
|
(15.2)|
|
(15.2)|
(11,279.5)|
|
(11,294.7)|
+|
**33. Liabilities**|
6,385.8|
**(275.1)**|
|
**6,110.8**|
** 10,927.7**|
|
** 17,038.5**|
+|Leasing – Amortization
|
6,385.8|
(290.3)|
|
6,095.5|
(351.8)|
|
5,743.7|
+|Leasing – Revenue from
debt|
|
15.2|
|
15.2|
11,279.5|
|
11,294.7|
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|December
2020|**_Nonfinancial assets:_**Evaluate the possibility of using the inventory
of government property to determine the value of the stock and the
change in nonfinancial assets in compiling the GFS.
|DNCP, DNPE
DNPO, DEEF|
+|August
2020
|
**_Treatment of leasing:_**Begin recording as follows: (i) record the
disbursement of loans under the lease contract as an increase in
deposits against an increase in the domestic debt; (ii) recognize the
building by the reduction in banks, by payment of the contractor.
(This is the counterpart to the increase in investments in
nonfinancial assets.
|DNT, DNCP
and DNPE|
+
+
+
+**28.** **GCO deposits in the Fiscal Table.** The position of deposits in the last four years,
+reported by the BM, is in the following table. The mission attempted to understand: (i) the
+composition of deposits reported by the BM; and (ii) the institutional coverage of the deposits.
+
+
+**18** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+**Table 8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Source: BM (NGC)
+
+
+**29.** **Composition of deposits.** Deposits are more common financial assets. According to
+paragraph 7.15 of the GFSM 2014, “financial assets are resources that normally provide the right
+for the owner of the asset (the creditor) to receive funds or other resources from another unit as
+a liability.” In this regard, government financial assets are all demand or term deposits,
+regardless of purpose (earmarking,) or origin of funds (payment of taxes, income, issuance of Tbills used or not used, others). However, in the case of Mozambique:
+
+a) **Treasury bills:** The authorities maintain that deposits from issuances of T-bills for
+
+monetary policy should not be part of total deposits since they constitute a debt only
+after they are used (greater detail on the treatment of this debt instrument is presented
+later in this report). However, the MEF considers the interest from these deposits.
+Assuming that the unused securities are not government domestic debt, the deposits
+from these issues should not be considered a government financial asset, nor should the
+interest on the T-bills that these deposits generate.
+
+b) **Earmarked resources:** Another adjustment made in deposits to compile the fiscal
+
+accounts with which the mission disagrees is the exclusion from earmarked resources
+except for fiscal year 2017, the only year in the last four when the above-mentioned
+adjustment was not made.
+
+c) **Other regularizations:** These are government earnings recorded in the monetary
+
+accounts generated by the commitment approach the BM uses. Since these
+regularizations impact the financial asset, they generate a discrepancy in the Fiscal Table
+because there is no counterpart in the record above the line in income. This issue is also
+observed for interest, which according to paragraph 5.107 of the GFSM 2014, is a
+category of income (revenue that the owners of some types of financial assets received,
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **19**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+including deposits), because they are not duly recorded. The mission highly recommends
+adopting this modified cash on hand approach to capture this type of government
+income, which the MEF is unable to capture on a pure cash basis.
+
+**30.** **Institutional coverage of deposits.** The BM presents as available government cash the
+total of central government deposits (GCO and extrabudgetary units) and the INSS, excluding
+local government. According to paragraph 2.58 of the GFSM 2014, the central government
+includes all resident public entities that perform government functions as their principal activity.
+Thus, public entities that are part of the central government are: (i) entities that are part of GCO,
+(ii) extrabudgetary units; (iv) regional government; (iv) local government; and (v) social security.
+To be considered central government deposits as a whole, the BM should begin including
+available cash of the local authorities as well. In addition, the mission recommends reporting the
+totals of each government subsector as the international standards recommend.
+
+**31.** **Difference in institutional coverages in the monetary and fiscal accounts.** Just as the
+BM reports deposits, the MEF presents it as part of financing in Fiscal Table, but the Fiscal Table
+covers the central budgetary government. This difference in coverage of the monetary and fiscal
+accounts generates a discrepancy since “above the line” revenue and expenditure have less
+coverage than “below the line” transactions in banks. Therefore, the mission sought to identify
+the amount of corresponding deposits in the INSS and EBUs. The authorities supply the annual
+INSS balances, and the listing of the EBU is pending, in order to ascertain the amount in this
+subsector of the government.
+
+**32.** **Discrepancies generated by the amount of deposits in the fiscal accounts.** (i)
+differences in the institutional coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts; (ii) differences in
+the record of monetary and fiscal accounts, which results in not recognizing income generated in
+the monetary sector; (iii) the nonrecognition of some T-bill liabilities in the BM by the MEF are
+the factor that creates a discrepancy in deposits. The mission recommends work to conduct a
+detailed analysis of the content of deposits the BM reports in order to ensure the proper
+treatment of the financial asset in MEF government accounting.
+
+**33.** **Amount of deposits assumed in the 2016-2018 Fiscal Table** . Taking this into account
+according to the approach of available cash in use, the mission considered the entire amount the
+BM reported as deposits, excluding incoming amounts from T-bill issues and interest, since these
+securities are not considered government debt. “Other regularizations” were also excluded
+which, using a commitment approach, should be considered government income. Moreover,
+regarding the matter of coverage, the amount of INSS deposits were not considered in order to
+maintain consistency with the above the line.
+
+
+**20** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|
August
2020|**_Coverage of government deposits_**. (i) Include available cash of the
local authorities to complete the government; and (ii) begin reporting
the totals of each government subsector in Mozambique: GG =
GCO+EBU+INSS+LG.
|
BM|
+|August
2020|**_Composition of deposits._** Evaluate the content of deposits and record
all government financial assets and income recognized in the monetary
accounts in fiscal accounts.
|DNCP, DNT
and DEEF|
+|April
2020|
**Periodic reconciliation of deposits****_._ **Implement a formal periodic
reconciliation process of stocks and flows (by currency and by public
sector beneficiary), including explanations of all the differences
identified between the BM and DNT, and share the result with the other
CCGFS members.
|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|
+|April
2020
|
**_Deposits in the GCO Fiscal Table._**(i) ensure that the position the BM
ascertained matches the coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the
line); (ii) begin considering only GCO deposits (exclude available cash of
the INSS and EBUs); and (iii) make the required adjustment to the
income included in deposits and ensure that they have the proper
above-the-line counterpart entry.|MEF|
+
+
+
+**iii.** **Domestic Debt**
+
+
+**34.** **Domestic debt.** During the mission the work began of reconciling the 2018 domestic
+debt the BM and MEF reported with the support of senior managers from both public
+institutions. The provisional result of this work is presented in the following table. The authorities
+are still responsible for continuing the work included in reconciliations of previous years. The
+mission recommended preparing a reconciliation report to ensure an institutional memory.
+
+**3.1** **Treasury Bonds**
+
+
+**35.** **Treasury bonds (T-bonds).** There is a significant difference in the positions reported by
+the MEF and BM. The BM presents an aggregated total of Treasury securities that includes (Tbills and T-bonds). The information as reported fails to facilitate the reconciliation with the
+position the MEF presented. However, the MEF obtains data from the Mozambique Stock
+Exchange. The BM ascertains its data from the national banking system, and it remains
+responsible for reporting the T-bond position separately from T-bills. In this context, the mission
+considered the MEF data as more reliable for the purpose of compiling the Fiscal Table and
+recommended reconciliation work between the BM and MEF.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **21**
+
+
+
+|Col1|Domestic debt – Stocks|MEF|BM|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
|
|
**2015**
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
|
**2015**
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
|
+|
**a **
|
**Total**
**Securities**
T-bonds (BM and CIs)
T-bills
**Loans**
**Central Bank**
Local currency (LC)
Foreign currency (FC)
**Commercial banks**
LC – Loans (leasings+Reest.)
LC – Supplier arrears
FC –Portuguese line of credit
**Other accounts payable**
Interest on loans
Other Regularizations – CIs
|
**69,232.9**
**87,709.6**
**106,899.6**
**139,377.2**
**56,322.0**
**46,147.2**
**64,199.7**
**74,943.1**
32,847.0
34,334.9
42,565.7
53,985.9
23,475.0
11,812.3
21,634.1
20,957.2
**12,910.8**
**41,562.4**
**42,699.9**
**64,434.1**
**0.0**
**30,028.1**
**29,882.3**
**33,812.8**
0.0
15,766.1
15,620.4
19,550.8
0.0
14,261.9
14,261.9
14,261.9
**12,910.8**
**11,534.3**
**12,817.6**
**30,621.3**
12,910.8
11,534.3
12,817.6
23,857.2
6,764.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
|
**85,154.5**
**127,947.6**
**215,398.4**
**250,639.6**
**65,992.2**
**65,274.4**
**152,047.1**
**176,469.3**
30,665.0
30,796.0
39,566.0
54,606.0
35,327.2
34,478.4
112,481.1
121,863.3
**17,255.4**
**58,459.2**
**55,029.4**
**68,523.5**
**0.0**
**29,976.1**
**27,693.4**
**31,876.0**
0.0
15,722.1
15,902.7
19,595.8
0.0
14,254.0
11,790.7
12,280.2
**17,255.4**
**28,483.1**
**27,336.0**
**36,647.5**
4,707.5
10,048.7
11,171.4
23,967.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12,547.9
18,434.4
16,164.6
12,680.3
**1,906.9**
**4,214.0**
**8,321.9**
**5,646.8**
452.0
1,269.2
5,273.4
5,646.8
1,454.8
2,944.8
3,048.5
0.0
|
+|
**b **
**(i)**
**(ii)**
**(iii)**
**(iv)**
**(v)**
|
**Differences – (Total of adjustments):**
**Securities**
T-bonds (BM and CIs)
T-bills
** Loans –Central Bank**
LC
FC (Exchange rate)
** Loans – Commercial banks**
LC – Loans (leasings+Reest.)
LC – Supplier arrears
Portuguese line of credit
**Other accounts payable**
Interest on loans
Other Regularizations – CIs
**Other Econ. Flows –**
(Cancelations/exchange)
|
**50.2**
**445.6**
**2,670.6**
**2,670.6**
50.2
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|
**-15,921.7**
**-40,238.0**
**-108,498.8**
**-111,262.4**
2,182.0
3,538.9
2,999.7
-620.1
-11,852.2
-22,666.0
-90,847.0
-100,906.1
0.0
44.0
-282.3
-45.0
0.0
8.0
2,471.2
1,981.8
8,203.3
1,485.6
1,646.1
-110.0
6,764.1
-12,547.9
-18,434.4
-16,164.6
-12,680.3
-452.0
-1,269.2
-5,273.4
-5,646.8
-1,454.8
-2,944.8
-3,048.5
0.0
50.2
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|
+|
**c = a+b**
|
**Adjusted domestic debt**
|
**69,283.0**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
|
**69,283.0**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
|
+|
**d **|
**Flows – Transactions**|
**18,872.2**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.6**|
**18,872.1**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.5**|
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**3.2** **Treasury bills (T-bills)**
+
+
+**36.** **Amount of T-bills recognized in the fiscal accounts** . The domestic debt stock reported
+by the MEF recognizes only as T-bills the amount of the issue that was actually used by the
+National Treasury, and this is used for fiscal policy purposes. The amount of T-bills issued for
+monetary policy purposes is not considered part of the government debt stock at the MEF level.
+However, it is the BM’s responsibility to produce reports including informaiton on the position of
+the amount of “T-bills used.” This concept is not recognized for the purpose of disseminating
+Mozambique’s monetary accounts. The position of government deposits and credits, reported by
+the BM, includes all the flows that generate the issuance of T-bills during the year. According to
+the BM: (i) there is no debt service associated with the portion of T-bills not used by the
+government; (ii) there have been no guidelines from the MEF nor is there any agreement
+between the MEF and the BM for issuing T-bills used for monetary policy purposes; and (iii) the
+MEF is unaware at this time that the above-mentioned issues of T-bills are done by the BM.
+However, the deposits from these issues generate interest for the government. In addition, the
+position of the NGC in the Fiscal Table prepared by the MEF has taken the total of T-bills issued
+into account.
+
+**37.** **Characteristics of T-bills in Mozambique.** T-bills are government financing and
+monetary intervention instruments issued by the BM as part of monetary policy measures to
+finance temporary government Treasury cash shortfalls. They originate with the seasonality of
+fiscal revenue or potential delayed disbursements from cooperation partners. The legal regime
+for T-bills is established by Decree No. 22/2004 of July 7, which delegates to the MEF the
+authority to set by ministerial order the maximum amount of T-bills to be used during the fiscal
+year. The amounts of T-bills recognized by the MEF as a T-bill debt in the last three years is
+within the maximum limits set by budget law. Thus, as such the BM presents the T-bill debt,
+implying that part of the T-bill issue was done without statutory support.
+
+**38.** **Recognition of T-bill debt** . The GFSM 2014 defines as debt all liabilities that require
+payment of interest and/or principal by the debtor to a creditor at future dates. The manual does
+not differentiate the treatment of securities, whether their maturity is short or long term, used or
+not used, for fiscal or monetary purposes. In addition, the legislation allows the authorities to
+issue T-bills for fiscal and monetary purposes, but it is not clear how this debt will be assumed by
+the government or the rest of the public sector (in this case the BM).
+
+**39.** **T-bills that the MEF does not use do not constitute GCO debt** . As the Mozambican
+authorities currently report the data, the recognition of the amount of T-bills used for monetary
+policy purposes is unclear. Since there is no debt service from the issue of these T-bills, and given
+the terms under which they are issued and the definition established in the GFSM 2014, it is
+believed that this obligation should not be presented as a part of GCO debt; however, there is no
+doubt that this amount represents public sector debt. Given this fact, the mission recommends
+reaching a consensus as to how this debt should be recognized in the public sector monetary
+and fiscal accounts by the MEF and the BM.
+
+
+**23** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**3.2** **Loans**
+
+
+**40.** **Loans** . In the BM loan positions that are reconciled, there are only insignificant
+differences generated by the exchange rates that are used. For commercial bank loans there are
+significant differences in the positions of both institutions, especially in 2015. BM recognition of
+the Portuguese line of credit explains some of the difference. This line is not GCO debt, so that
+the difference is due to the coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts. For the rest of the
+difference in loans, it is suspected that it is also a problem of institutional coverage. The mission
+used the MEF position to produce the Fiscal Table, and it presents the detail of loans and
+analyzes consistency between stocks and flows. The BM recommends presenting the detail of
+commercial bank loans in order to recognize it with the MEF position and present the debt
+according to each subsector in the public sector.
+
+**3.3** **Arrears**
+
+
+**41.** **Debts not captured by the NGC** . Debts of suppliers in arrears are debts recognized in
+the domestic debt stock reported by the MEF but not captured by the BM, naturally because they
+are not national bank debts. In 2017 the Mozambican authorities conducted a survey of the
+debts of government institutions with various suppliers in the period from 2007 to 2016. The
+amount of about 29.8 billion meticais was identified, 19.8 billion meticais of which were
+approved by the Administrative Tribunal (AT), while 9.9 billion meticais were not approved by the
+AT.
+
+**Table 10. Debts in “Arrears” Recognized, Validated and Paid**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Debt Recognized vs. Validated|Col3|Col4|Debt Paid|Col6|Col7|Debt to
be Paid|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||With AT
approval
|Without
AT
approval
|**Total**
|Cash
|Securities
|**Total**
|**Total**
|
+||[a]|
[b]|**[c=(a+b]**|[d]|[e]|**[f=(d+e)]**|**[g=(f-c)]**|
+|**Recognized:**||||||||
+|
2007-2016|
19,826.1|
9,939.7|
**29,765.8**|
|
|
|
|
+|** Validated:**|||
|||
|
|
+|
2018|
7,441.0|
5,678.1|
**13,119.0**|
6,623.5|
|
**6,623.5**|
**6,495.6**|
+|
2019|
|
|
|
1,823.9*|
3,602.1|
**5,426.0**|
**1,069.6**|
+|
2019
|
|
|
**5,817.8**|
|||
**6,887.3**|
+|
** Not**
**validated:**
|
|
|
** 10,829.0**
|
|
|
|
|
+
+
+on the actual payment of the above-mentioned amount.
+Source: DNT
+
+**42.** **Process of regularizing arrears.** According to the Strategy for Paying the Government
+Debt to Suppliers, launched by the authorities in July 2018, the regularization process assumes
+that there are three points at which the government accounts are adjusted: (i) when the debt is
+
+
+
+**24** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+recognized and validated, which thus updates the debt stock; (ii) the associated record of
+expenditure by processing extrabudgetary expenditure; and (iii) the record of payments
+(automatic mode in e-SISTAFE). There are provisions of various types of regularizing arrears in
+the Government Budget (OE), including issuances of government debt securities.
+
+**43.** **Payment of arrears.** Notwithstanding the determination up to 2016, the abovementioned regularization strategy began to be implemented in 2018, when 13.119 billion
+meticais were validated for payment. As of end-2019, the GRM validated an additional 5.82
+billion meticais. Table 10 presents the amounts paid up to the date of the mission.
+
+**Treatment of arrears.** The government’s relations with its suppliers generates a public
+expenditure based on a commitment: (i) when the authorities validate the arrears, the
+expenditure must be recognized according to its type (operating or investment expense),and a
+debt in “accounts payable” is the counterpart; (ii) at the time of payment, a reduction in deposits
+is recorded against a reduction in “accounts payable.” For the securitized debt, the mission
+recommends increasing securities against a decrease in “accounts payable” (see Table 11 below).
+
+**44.** **Recognition of the debt of arrears prior to payment.** According to the CEDSIF, there
+is a functionality in e-SISTAFE that enters expenses to be paid and checks arrears. However, since
+this is considered an extrabudgetary expense, it does not observe the double-entry rule and the
+debt record remains pending; thus the payment of this debt generates a discrepancy in the
+accounts. The following table presents the treatment recommended for the 13.119 billion
+meticais, a debt that was recognized and validated in 2018, as well as their respective payments.
+The recording of this debt as an expense in 2018 has an impact on the year’s overall balance, and
+payments made in 2018 and 2019 should be recorded as transactions at the financial level with
+an impact on government financial worth.
+
+**45.** **The mission recommends recording arrears on the commitment basis** .
+Notwithstanding the fact that the authorities use cash basis, [1] the mission recommends recording
+arrears as is done using a commitment approach to ensure greater control over this debt. The
+Fiscal Table that was prepared during the mission considers that the arrears expense that is paid
+by September is recorded as the strategy requires. The information is confirmed by the
+authorities and thus the remainder to be paid is recorded as part of the liabilities at end-2018.
+
+
+**Table 11. Treatment of “Arrears”**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Figures in millions of meticais/
December 31|2018|Col3|Col4|Col5|2019|Col7|Col8|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Figures in millions of meticais/**
**December 31 **
|**Opening**
**Balance**
|**Transactions**
|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**
|**Transactions**
|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**
|
+|1. Revenue|
||
|
||
|
|
+
+
+
+1 On the cash basis, expenses are recognized only when paid and revenue when it is received, regardless of when this was done
+
+or collected or of the existence of a payment or reception commitment respectively. Thus, this regime does not include
+
+“accounts payable or receivable.”
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **25**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|2. Expense|Col2|13,119.0|Col4|Col5|5,817.8|Col7|Col8|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**NOB. Net operating balance (1-**
**2)**
|**NOB. Net operating balance (1-**
**2)**
|
(13,119.0)
|
(13,119.0)
|
(13,119.0)
|
(5,817.8)|
(5,817.8)|
(5,817.8)|
+|
31. Net nonfinancial assets|
31. Net nonfinancial assets|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|2M. Total expenditure (2+31)
|2M. Total expenditure (2+31)
|
13,119.0|
13,119.0|
13,119.0|
5,817.8|
5,817.8|
5,817.8|
+|**NLB. Lending (+) / Net**
**borrowing (–)**
|**NLB. Lending (+) / Net**
**borrowing (–)**
|
** (13,119.0)**
|
** (13,119.0)**
|
** (13,119.0)**
|
**(5,817.8)**
|
**(5,817.8)**
|
**(5,817.8)**
|
+|
**Net financial worth:**||
**(13,119.0)**||**(13,119.0)**|
**(5,817.8)**|
|**(18,936.8)**|
+|
**32. Financial assets**|
|
**(6,623.5)**|
|
**(6,623.5)**|
**(1,823.9)**|
|
**(8,447.3)**|
+|Government deposits|
|
(6,623.5)|
|
(6,623.5)|
(1,823.9)|
|
(8,447.3)|
+|**33. Liabilities**|
|
**6,495.6**|
|
**6,495.6**|
**3,993.9**|
|
** 10,489.5**|
+|Suppliers payable|
|
13,119.0|
|
13,119.0|
2,215.7|
|
15,334.73|
+|Suppliers to be paid (_Cash_)|
|
(6,623.5)|
|
(6,623.5)|
(1,823.9)|
|
(8,447.3)|
+|Debt securities (Issue)|
|
|
|
|
3,602.1|
|
3,602.1|
+
+
+
+**3.4** **Other regularizations of the domestic debt**
+
+
+**46.** **Other regularizations in credits reported by the BM** . The credits reported in the
+monetary accounts present other regularizations that the MEF is to validate as mentioned in the
+case of deposits. Therefore, these regularizations require a counterpart in expenditure; otherwise
+they generate discrepancies.
+
+
+**3.5** **Other Economic Flows**
+
+
+**47.** **Other Economic Flows (OEF).** These are changes in the volume or value of assets or
+liabilities that are not generated by transactions (paragraph 3.31 of the GFSM 2014). These OEFs
+are not transactions because they do not meet one or more features of transactions. For
+example, when the amount of an asset is expressed in foreign currency, the currency may change
+as a result of alterations in the exchange rate, or the value of an asset may change with the
+passage of time. There are two main categories of OEFs, described as “gains and losses” and
+“other changes in the volume of assets and liabilities.” If the transactions in NGC credits have
+been ascertained by measuring the difference in the stock from one year to the next, it is
+important to ensure that the OEFs, i.e. the cancelations of certain debts and adjustments
+attributable to exchange losses and gains, have been properly adjusted in accordance with the
+positions for the transactions in the Fiscal Table.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|April
2020|**_Domestic and external public debt data for the Fiscal Table._**_ (i)_Use
MEF data to ensure consistency between the debt stock and flows;
(ii) Exclude the OEFs from the transactions in the Fiscal Table.|DEEF and DNT|
+
+
+
+**26** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|April
2020|Reconciliation of the domestic and external public debt. (i) Finalize
the reconciliation work begun during the mission and document the
final result; and (ii) Implement a formal periodic reconciliation process
of flows and stock (by instrument, face and nominal value, and by
creditor) including explanations of all the differences identified in the
BM data (NGC and balance of payments) and DNT (detailed debt
statements), and share the result.|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)|
+|---|---|---|
+|April
2020
|
**_Treasury bills._** (i) Reach a consensus on the total Treasury-bill debt to
be recognized in the public sector fiscal and monetary accounts; and
(ii) The BM should begin to report the total debt of the subsectors in
the public sector of Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG, as well as
the business, financial and nonfinancial sector.
|MEF and BM|
+|April
2020
|
**_Treasury bonds (T-bonds)_**. Present a disaggregated total of treasury
securities: (i) detail of T-BILL issuances and (ii) detail of T-bonds.
|BM|
+|
April
2020|
**_Commercial bank loans_. **Present the details of total commercial bank
loans.
|BM|
+|
August
2020|
**_Expenditures associated with BM credits._**_Validate and begin to record_
_expenditures associated with domestic credit published in the monetary_
_accounts._
|MEF|
+|April
2020|
**_Debt of arrears._**_In the domestic map statement, recognize the amount_
_of5,817.8 million meticais of debt of arrears, recognized and validated by the_
_GRM in end-2019._
|DNT|
+|August
2020
|**_Dissemination of the domestic and external public debt._**Begin
disseminating debt data by maturity, residual value, currency and
creditor based on World Bank and IMF data, and on the MEF website.|DEEF|
+
+
+
+**iv.** **Other Accounts Payable and Receivable**
+
+**4.1 Treasury Operations**
+
+
+**48.** **Suspense accounts and regularization of transactions** . Revenue items such as taxes,
+grants, social contributions, sales of goods and services; and on the expenditure side,
+remunerations, goods and services, interest, transfers, subsidies and other expenses, normally
+have a counterpart in available cash, and thus the Mozambican authorities have a set of
+transactions that do not have definitive accounting entries. They are pending due to various
+factors such as: lack of available cash in banks; lack of a budget in the system; or unknown details
+of transactions in banks. The above-mentioned set of transactions is named “Treasury
+Operations,” and the totals in 2015-2018 are presented in the following table.
+
+|Stock|2015|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
Debit/Revenue|
(8,018.7)|
(621.8)|
(17,608.9)|
(33,213.3)|
+|
Of which: Fiscal years ended|
270.0|
270.0|
270.0|
270.0|
+|
Credit/Expense|
5,376.7|
8,284.3|
6,523.4|
6,093.3|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **27**
+
+
+
+|REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**Total**|**(13,395.3)**|**(8,906.2)**|**(24,132.4)**|**(39,306.6)**|
+|
**Flows**
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Debit/Revenue|
|
7,396.8|
(16,987.1)|
(15,604.4)|
+|
Credit/Expense|
|
2,907.7|
(1,760.9)|
(430.1)|
+|
**Total**|
|
**10,304.5**|
**(18,748.0)**|
**(16,034.5)**|
+
+
+Source: I-4 Statements of CGEs
+
+
+**49.** **Definition of Treasury Operations** . As provided in subparagraphs f) of article 47 and h)
+of article 48, both Law No. 9/2002 of February 12, which creates the Government Financial
+Administration System (SISTAFE), Treasury Operations are “advances and their regularizations.”
+According to article 2 of the MEF Regulation on Treasury Operations, approved by Ministerial
+Order No. 124/2008 of December 30, Treasury Operations are incoming and outcoming funds of
+the Single Treasury Account (STA) that cannot be charged to the Government Budget (OE), and
+they refer to movements of funds of third parties for which the Treasury is responsible (T-Bills), as
+well as the transfer of funds for the decentralized execution of the Government Budget and Tbills. Included in Treasury Operations are movements of funds charged to the Government
+Budget that, when realized, cannot be recorded in the Government Budget immediately using
+budgetary classifiers.
+
+**50.** **Incoming funds – Treasury Operations.** As established in No. 1 of article 3 of the
+above-mentioned regulation, entries of funds in the STA by this avenue are made in the DNT and
+the Provincial Economy and Finance Directorates through the BM and/or commercial banks with
+government cash functions to address the following situations: (i) revenue collected from third
+parties where the Treasury is responsible for paying expenditures not posted in the Government
+Budget; (ii) collection of balances ascertained at the end of each fiscal year; (iii) accounting record
+of counterpart of advances made for Treasury Operations to pay expenses charged to the
+Government Budget. Therefore, this entry is intended to receive suspense deposits of amounts
+not chargeable to the Government Budget whose payments are contingent on the revenue
+arriving beforehand.
+
+**51.** **Outgoing Funds – Treasury Operations.** According to No. 1 of article 4 of the same
+regulation, the purpose is to deal with: (i) expenses not chargeable to the Government Budget,
+the payment of which is contingent on the revenue arriving beforehand; and (ii) urgent expenses
+that are exceptional in nature, with substantiated grounds and that can be charged to the
+Government Budget. According to the authorities, in this item extrabudgetary expenses are
+recorded that have not been yet recorded as an expense, but that have not been paid either. For
+these cases, under the cash approach the government currently uses, these extrabudgetary
+expenses should not be included in the Fiscal Table to avoid creating a discrepancy. Using a
+commitment approach, the accounting system should have the ability to recognize these
+transactions in expenses and revenue, even if they do not yet merit their due treatment in the
+financial balance sheet, so that they are awaiting payment in items of accounts payable and
+receivable.
+
+**52.** **Discrepancies created by Treasury Operations.** Based on the provisions of the law, the
+recording and control in e-SISTAFE, the mission believes that: (i) Treasury Operations are
+
+
+**28** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+anticipated to record an expense or revenue in the budgetary balance sheet until the financial
+balance sheet is prepared to record the transactions and vice versa; (ii) these operations
+represent accounts payable and/or receivable that the Fiscal Table does not include below the
+line. Thus, based on the dual-entry accounting rule, accounts such as fiscal years ended or
+entered in banks for which the transaction details are unknown so that the proper entry above
+the line cannot be made and there is no counterpart below the line, which generates
+discrepancies.
+
+**53.** **Record of Treasury Operations.** In a cash approach, which the authorities use, all
+transactions that generate activity in banks, in the case of Mozambique incoming funds (debit
+balance) in Treasury Operations should be considered below the line in the Fiscal Table as
+accounts receivable; otherwise they generate discrepancies. In a commitment system or even in a
+modified cash system, both incoming and outgoing funds in Treasury Operations should be
+included in the Fiscal Table.
+
+**4.2** **Fiscal years ended**
+
+
+**54.** **Fiscal years ended.** They have been recorded as part of expense, but they represent
+credits recognized by the GCO, the payment of which is pending. As we reported in the Treasury
+Operations, the fiscal years ended do not have a below-the-line counterpart either, and thus they
+generate discrepancies. The mission recommends reclassifying them according to the nature of
+the expense above the line, and add the total amount as part of accounts payable below the line.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|April
2020|**_Treasury Operations._ **Begin to recognize them in the Fiscal Table,
ideally using a modified cash approach (considering credit and
debit balances).
|MEF|
+|April
2020
|
**_Fiscal years ended._ **Begin recognition in the Fiscal Table as part of
accounts payable below the line and in the record kept for expenses
above the line.|MEF|
+
+
+
+**D. Compilation of Annual 2016-2018 GFS**
+
+**55.** **Result of the compilation of annual 2016-2018 GFS** . Based on the detailed analysis of
+the accounts, the exercise of compiling the 2016-2018 GFS was repeated, and the results are
+summarized in Table 1 above, which presents the 2016-2018 GRM Integrated Financial Balance
+Sheet. More detailed information for the compilation exercise is illustrated in the other tables
+that follow and in Annexes III-VII of this report. In this regard, the mission recommends: (i) formal
+validation by the authorities and submission to the IMF to be included in the GFS database;
+(ii) submission to the Mozambique National Statistics Institute (INE) which, according to the
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **29**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+DEEF, is waiting for the data to compile 2018 GDP; and (iii) replication of the GFS compilation
+exercise on a quarterly basis.
+
+**56.** **Fiscal data used to compile GFS extracted from the CGE** . The data for compiling the
+GFS are obtained from the CGE, which reports the information in summary form, taken from PDF
+format documents and converted to Excel manually. This method of compiling GFS carries risks
+because the compilation exercise is subject to repeating possible errors made in the CGE
+compilation process. Moreover, a more detailed reclassification of some of the items is not
+possible. For compiling the GFS, the mission recommends using primary data extracted from the
+integrated systems trial balances (for Mozambique, from the e-SISTAFE).
+
+
+
+**Table 13. Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash /Fiscal Table**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|1|Government revenue|
177,652.5|
218,072.8|
226,126.4|
+|
2|
Government expenses|
140,941.6|
148,659.0|
178,012.6|
+|
**NOB**|
**Net Operating Balance (1-2)**|
** 36,710.9**|
**69,143.8**|
**48,113.7**|
+|
31|
Nonfinancial assets (NFAs)|
60,171.2|
57,188.2|
83,754.2|
+|
2M|
Government expenses (2+31)|
201,112.8|
205,847.2|
261,766.8|
+|
**NLB**|
**Net Lending (+) / Borrowing (–) (NOB-31)**|
**(23,460.3)**|
**12,225.6**|
**(35,640.4)**|
+|
32|
Acquisition of financial assets|
19,058.2|
67,618.9|
17,339.7|
+|
33|
Net incurrence of liabilities|
43,843.9|
52,391.8|
52,289.6|
+|
**NLBz**
|
**Statistical discrepancy (32-33-NLB)**
|
**1,325.4**
|
**-3,001.6**
|
** -690.5**
|
+|
|
GDP (Data source: Article IV Report)
|
689,213.0|
804,463.0|
859,019.3|
+|
**NLBz**
|
**Statistical discrepancy (percent of GDP) – After the**
**mission**|
**0.19%**|
**-0.37%**|
**-0.08%**|
+
+
+**57.** **Government revenue transactions 2016-2018** . In general, revenue has been stable
+over the last three years, at roughly 26 percent of GDP. Therefore, some findings about revenue
+follow:
+
+
+
+
+
+**a)** “ **Other taxes** ” account for 5 percent of total revenue. This high amount can be explained
+
+or reclassified correctly if the details of the revenue are available;
+
+
+
+**b)** Although there are **social security contributions** in revenue, the level of government
+
+expenditures on social security benefits is unclear. Therefore, the mission believes that
+some social contributions were classified incorrectly or the social benefits are classified
+incorrectly, so that these items must be revisited;
+
+
+
+**c)** The high amount of **dividends** in 2017 needs to be explained to ensure that it is not
+
+considered a “super dividend;” if it is, it should be reclassified below the line in “securities
+and holdings in investment funds;”
+
+
+
+**d)** There is no record of **interest received**, yet the amount of loans granted in financial
+
+assets is significant.
+
+
+
+**30** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**58.** **Transactions in government spending** **2016-2018** . Like revenue, government spending
+in the last three years was stable at about 20 percent of GDP. The mission believes that the social
+contribution and social benefit items need to be revised. Moreover, subsidies as they are
+reported cannot be classified as paid to the public and private or other sectors of the economy.
+The item “fiscal years ended” needs to be properly detailed to make correct classification
+possible. The COFOG the authorities adopted is aligned with international standards, and the
+data compiled during the mission are presented in Table 14 below. However, there are some
+inconsistencies in interest reported in expenditures of an economic type compared to those
+reported in the expenses by functions, as well as investment expenses (nonfinancial assets). For
+consistency’s sake, the mission used the data reported in expenditures by type.
+
+
+
+**Table 14. Government Spending by Functions of Government – COFOG**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**7 **
|
**GRAND TOTAL**
|
**201,112.8**
|
**205,3847.2**
|
**261,766.8**|
+|
701
|
General public services
|
59,333.7
|
65,578.7
|
81,241.4|
+|702
|Defense
|7,825.9
|8,304.1
|
11,855.2|
+|703
|Security and public safety
|18,698.4
|25,342.3
|
24,830.1|
+|704
|Economic matters
|31,395.5
|24,870.1
|
47,576.9|
+|705
|Environmental protection
|1,296.7
|2,237.3
|
3,724.1|
+|706
|Housing and community services
|9,256.9
|9,086.49
|
9,520.7|
+|
707
|Health
|19,466.6
|19,498.5
|
23,073.2|
+|708
|Recreation, culture and religion
|1,410.2
|1,229.7
|
1,284.5|
+|709
|Education
|44,146.3
|49,091.8
|
52,042.2|
+|710
|Social protection|8,282.6|4,413.6|
6,618.4|
+
+
+**59.** **Transactions in nonfinancial assets.** Available fiscal data report only acquisitions of
+buildings and infrastructure, and insignificant amounts in other fixed assets. The mission believes
+that it is highly unlikely that over the last three years the authorities did not acquire any
+machinery or equipment, that there were no transactions that affected the stock of inventories,
+or that Mozambique has no nonproduced assets. The CGE presents the inventory of government
+property and hence the mission recommends examining the possibility of bringing value to the
+stock, or at least the changes in this asset to the GFS.
+
+**60.** **Stock and transactions in financial assets and liabilities.** As mentioned earlier in this
+report, the main concerns are government deposits, completing the reconciliation work that is
+now pending, and a methodology to be determined for the process of compiling the GFS or the
+Fiscal Table. Capital holdings of businesses and disposals in 2017 need to be reviewed for a
+better understanding of what took place that year. In general, the liability data is consistent, so
+that the main concerns are in the amounts of debt securities and external lending.
+
+**61.** **Financial assets and liabilities by counterparty** . The stock of assets and liabilities by
+counterparty is in the table below. More detailed information about the holders of securities and
+loans would show greater transparency of asset and liability transactions by counterparty. In
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **31**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+addition, the data received for these purposes do not separate the assets and liabilities of
+financial and nonfinancial corporations.
+
+**Table 15. Stock of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty**
+
+
+|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**682**|**Financial assets [=62]**|**185,014.7**|**252,631.5**|**269,201.7**|
+|
**6821**
68212
68213
68215
68216
**6822**|
**Domestic debtors [=621]**
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
Families and nonprofit institutions
**External debtors [=622]**|
**185,014.7**
28,092.5
14,803.3
139,424.4
2,694.6
**0.0**|
**252,631.5**
58,336.1
14,857.7
178,193.6
1,244.2
**0.0**|
**269,201.7**
35,730.7
19,231.5
212,193.2
2,046.2
**0.0**|
+|
**683**|
**Liabilities [=63]**|
**701,991,7**|
**662,127.1**|
**737,016.1**|
+|
**6831**
68312
68313
68315
**6832**
68327
68328
68329
|
**Domestic creditors [=631]**
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
**External creditors [=632]**
International organizations
Financial corporations that are not international
organizations
Other nonresidents|
**87,993.8**
34,528.1
52,525.5
940.2
**613,997.9**
270,080.0
90,089.0
253,828.9|
**107,655.9**
34,528.1
72,371.5
756.3
**554,470.2**
244,267.8
80,920.7
229,281.7|
**140,317.4**
38,458.5
101,574.8
284.1
**596,698.7**
263,060.6
85,626.5
248,011.6|
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|August
2020
|**_Data from the e-SISTAFE trial balance:_** extract the primary
fiscal data to begin compiling the GFS.
|DEEF|
+|February
2020|**_Mozambique GFS from 2016-2018 compiled during the_**
**_mission:_**_ Validate and submit to the IMF/STA and INE._
|DEEF|
+|
December
2020
|**_GFS annual and quarterly series 2010-2018_**_: Compile tables 1,_
_2, 3, 6, 7, 8A and 8B of the GFSM 2014 and submit them to the_
_IMF._
|DEEF|
+|August
2020
|**_Annual and quarterly GFS:_**Begin publishing them on the MEF
website.|DEEF|
+
+
+
+**E. Fiscal Table Revisions**
+
+**62.** **Align the Fiscal Table with the most up-to-date international standards** . The
+Mozambican authorities use the Fiscal Table compiled using the GFSM 1986 as a main fiscal
+instrument. Annex VII reports the data in the various methodologies (GFSM 1984 vs. GFSM 2014)
+for a better understanding of the difference in methodologies. The mission reiterated that the
+Fiscal Table format recommended by the most up-to-date international methodology (GFSM
+
+
+**32** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+2014) reports greater revenue, fewer expenditures, and consequently a more favorable overall
+balance for the authorities. In addition, it differentiates financing transactions related to the other
+transactions more easily, which thus facilitates policy decisions for debt, as well as decisions for
+strengthening collection for financing a certain type of expenditures (for example, operating or
+investment expenditures). This also provides for a rapid comparison of fiscal policies adopted in
+Mozambique compared to the other countries in the region and the rest of the world.
+
+**i.** **Government revenue**
+
+
+**63.** **Government revenue in the Fiscal Table.** The authorities consider disposals of
+government property and holdings as revenue; according to the GFSM 2014, they are part of
+“ _investment in nonfinancial assets_ ” and “ _acquisition in financial assets_ ” respectively (see
+paragraphs 8.28 and 9.47-9.49 of the GFSM 2014). Furthermore, the authorities record grants
+separately from revenue. A grant is a type of government revenue according to the GFSM 2014
+that does not constitute a discrepancy in the Fiscal Table, but reclassifying it according to the
+GFSM 2014 results in revenue greater than that presented in the Fiscal Table produced by the
+authorities (see Figure 2 below). Hence, the mission reiterates its past recommendation to revise
+this in the Fiscal Table.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **33**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**ii.** **Government expenses**
+
+
+**64.** **Government expenses in the Fiscal Table.** The mission recommends reclassifying
+“capital expense” which the authorities currently present as being part of total expenses in the
+“investment in nonfinancial assets” or “investment expense” item. This reclassification is
+conducive to identifying a lower expense and considering the increased revenue (as we saw in
+the previous paragraph) it leads to a current and overall balance that is more favorable for the
+government. The following figure shows that the expenses for the years 2016-2018, compiled
+according to the 2014, are slightly below those in the Fiscal Table according to the GFSM 1986
+methodology.
+
+**Figure 3. Government Expenses**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**34** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**iii.** **Acquisition of nonfinancial assets**
+
+
+**65.** **There is currently no item entitled acquisition of nonfinancial assets in the Fiscal**
+
+**Table of the Mozambican authorities, even though the components are part of it.** The mission
+recommends adding to this item all investment expenditures, the disposal of government
+property, and capital spending recorded as part of current expenditures.
+
+
+**iv.** **Financial assets and liabilities**
+
+
+
+**66.** **Nor are there financial assets as an aggregate currently in the Fiscal Table adopted by**
+
+**the Mozambican authorities.** However, some components are above and below the line. Thus, the
+
+
+
+mission recommends beginning to report this item that should include government deposits
+
+
+
+currently recorded as part of the NGC. Moreover, add to this aggregate other assets reported above
+
+
+
+the line such as: onlending agreements, holdings in the capital of government-owned corporations
+
+
+
+and investee companies, Treasury loans, financial investments of the Institute for the Management of
+
+Government Holdings (IGEPE), and other accounts receivable. The mission suggests presenting these
+
+
+
+items before liabilities and just after the overall balance.
+
+
+
+**67.** **For liabilities, the mission recommends presenting net obligations in accordance with**
+
+
+
+**the debt instruments.** Detail in terms of disbursement and amortization may be useful
+
+
+
+supplementary information presented as a memorandum item.
+
+
+
+**68.** **Add the items of other accounts payable and receivable to the Fiscal Table.** The fiscal
+
+
+
+years ended and Treasury Operations are items that would be classified in this aggregate reported as
+
+
+
+part of financial assets and/or liabilities.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|August
2020
|**_Fiscal Table restructuring:_** Restructure it to ensure that it is in line
with international standards: Declaration I —Government
Operations, in the GFSM 2014_._|DNT and DEEF|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **35**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Annex I. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Name|Institution|Title|
+|---|---|---|
+|Domingos Lambo
|MEF
|Permanent Secretary
|
+|
Enilde Sarmento
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Chamila Aly
|
MEF/DNT
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Domingos Fumo
|
BM/DER
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Sebastião Dimene
|
MEF/DNPO
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Paulo Vilanculos
|
MEF/DNCP
|
Department Head
|
+|
Sebastião Dimene
|
MEF/DNPO
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Aquino Chilundo
|
BM/DER
|
Technician
|
+|
Ângelo Ferreira
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Technician
|
+|
Isidora Nhauche
|
BM/DER
|
Technician
|
+|
José Chalufo
|
CEDSIF
|
Technician
|
+|
Marcos A. Cossa
|
CEDSIF
|
Technician
|
+|
Pradipa Aunvattal
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Technician
|
+|
Rosário Betho
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Technician
|
+|
Yasmien Ribeiro
|
MEF/DNPO
|
Technician
|
+|
Ari Aisen
|
IMF Mozambique
|
Resident Representative
|
+|
Esther Palacio
|
IMF Mozambique
|
Advisor and Coordinator of Technical
Assistance|
+
+
+
+**36** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Annex II. Institutional Structure of General Government**
+
+
+
+**Mozambique (688)**
+
+
+
+**Units of the General Government of Mozambique**
+
+
+
+(The preliminary lists of public institutions are available in the report of the last mission)
+
+**Subsector 1.** **Budgetary central government**
+**1.1** Five sovereign bodies: President of the Republic, Assembly of the Republic, Government
+(21 ministries and about 70 entities, agencies, commissions and public services, the courts
+and the Constitutional Council).
+
+**Subsector 2.** **Extrabudgetary units/entities**
+**2.1** 80 public institutes
+**2.2** 12 public funds
+
+**Subsector 3.** **Social Security**
+**3.1** National Social Security Institute of Mozambique (INSS)
+
+**Subsector 4.** **State government**
+Not applicable
+
+**Subsector 5.** **Local government**
+**5.1** 11 Provinces
+**5.2** 10 Districts
+**5.3** 53 Autonomous local authorities/municipalities (corresponding to cities and towns)
+
+**Data Coverage**
+
+Data in the central government tables cover the operations of subsector 1 and part of the
+data on budgetary execution for subsectors 2 and 5. Social security data is not available
+at present. Data on local governments pertaining to self-generated resources and the
+execution thereof are not available. A provisional time series for GFS covering 2009 to
+2018 is available.
+
+**Accounting Practices**
+
+
+
+**F1.** **Bases of recording:** The data are reported on a modified cash basis and are obtained
+from budgetary execution.
+**F2.** **Validation or complementary period:** Not applicable
+**F3.** **Valuation of assets and liabilities:** Nonfinancial assets are evaluated at historic cost and
+other financial assets and liabilities at nominal value.
+
+**Plan for Implementation of the** _**GFSM 2001/2014**_ _Complete_ the GFS Module of the Project EDDI 2
+financed by the DFID of the United Kingdom. However, there are still many challenges in the process of
+compiling GFS in Mozambique. Another result of TA from the DFID is that the authorities have an action
+plan that serves as a guide in the process of implementing the GFSM 2014.
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **37**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Annex III. Detailed Government Revenue - GRM**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**1 **
|**Revenue**
|**177,652.5**
|**218,072.8**
|**226,126.4**
|
+|**11**
**111**
1111
1112
**113**
**114**
1141
1142
1144
1145
1146
**115**
**116**
**12**
**121**
**122**
**13**
**132**
1321
1322
**14**
**141**
1412
1415
**142**
**144**
|**Taxes**
**Taxes on income, profit and capital gains**
Individuals
Businesses
**Taxes on property**
**Taxes on goods and services**
Taxes on aggregated value
Special consumption taxes
Taxes on specific services
Taxes on the use of merchandise and
permission to use it or carrying out activities
Other taxes on goods and services
**Taxes on commerce and international**
**transactions (customs and other import**
**duties)**
**Other taxes**
**Social contributions**
**Contributions to social security (contributions**
**from civil servants)**
**Other social contributions**
**(contributions from civil servants)**
**Grants**
**From international organizations**
Current
Capital
**Other Revenue**
**Property income**
Dividend
Rental income
**Sales of goods and services**
**Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current)**|**152,789.0**
63,547.9
26,822.3
36,725.6
9.5
65,735.6
48,300.9
15,181.4
482.5
154.9
1,615.9
12,663.5
10,833.5
**3,332.9**
605.0
2,728.0
**14,839.8**
14,839.8
1,047.5
13,792.3
**6,689.8**
4,484.9
1,914.6
2,570.3
2,083.4
121.5|**186,498.5**
96,597.0
29,668.2
66,928.8
9.8
65,431.2
45,485.5
14,620.0
527.9
384.9
4,412.9
12,031.8
12,428.6
**5,493.7**
473.2
5,020.4
**16,302.1**
16,302.1
20.0
16,282.1
**9,778.5**
6,361.2
4,133.3
2,227.8
3,161.3
256.0|**191,992.6**
89,988.5
33,052.0
56,936.5
121.1
75,681.5
55,449.8
14,704.1
632.8
1,103.1
3,791.7
14,927.4
11,274.1
**7,278.8**
61.1
7,217.7
**17,671.7**
17,671.7
1.1
17,670.6
**9,183.2**
5,308.2
228.0
5,080.1
3,694.9
180.2|
+
+
+
+**38** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Annex IV. GRM Detailed Government Spending**
+
+|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**2 **
**Expenditure**|**2 **
**Expenditure**|**140,941.6**|**148,659.0**|**178,012.6**|
+|
**21**
**Remuneration of employees**
211
Wages
212
Social contributions
**22**
**Goods and service**
**23**
**Consumption of fixed capital**
**24**
**Interest**
241
Nonresidents
242
Residents not in the central government
**25**
**Subsidies (Private companies)**
**26**
**Grants**
262
International organizations (Current)
263
Other central government units (Current)
**27**
**Social benefits**
272
Social assistance benefits
273
Social benefits from employers
**282**
**Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current)**
|
**21**
**Remuneration of employees**
211
Wages
212
Social contributions
**22**
**Goods and service**
**23**
**Consumption of fixed capital**
**24**
**Interest**
241
Nonresidents
242
Residents not in the central government
**25**
**Subsidies (Private companies)**
**26**
**Grants**
262
International organizations (Current)
263
Other central government units (Current)
**27**
**Social benefits**
272
Social assistance benefits
273
Social benefits from employers
**282**
**Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current)**
|
**77,842.6**
77,842.6
0.0
**22,969.0**
**N/A**
**16,308.9**
8,589.8
7,719.1
**2,011.4**
**5,915.1**
2,257.1
3,658.1
**15,161.5**
5,056.5
10,105.0
**733.0**|
**85,088.8**
85,088.8
0.0
**22,015.2**
**N/A**
**18,109.1**
9,340.0
8,769.0
**2,049.6**
**4,910.6**
734.8
4,175.8
**15,003.3**
4,482.5
10,520.8
**1,482.5**|
**96,464.8**
96,464.8
0.0
**28,702.9**
**N/A**
**27,250.4**
10,314.0
16,936.4
**913.9**
**6,244.3**
1,009.9
5,234.4
**17,302.6**
6,404.3
10,898.3
**1,133.8**|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **39**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Annex V. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities - GRM**
+
+|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**31**
**311**
3111
3112
3113
**312**
**313**
**314**|**Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets**|**60,171.2**|**57,188.2**|**83,754.2**|
+|**31**
**311**
3111
3112
3113
**312**
**313**
**314**|
**Fixed assets**
Buildings and infrastructure(acquisitions)
Machinery and equipment
Other fixed assets
**Inventories**
**Valuables**
**Nonproduced assets**|
**60,171.2**
60,097.2
0.0
73.9
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**|
**57,188.2**
57,131.7
0.0
56.4
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**|
**83,754.2**
83,638.0
0.0
116.1
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**|
+|
**32**
**321**
3212
3213
3214
3215
3218
**322**|
**Net acquisition of financial assets**|
**19,058.2**|
**67,618.7**|
**17,339.7**|
+|
**32**
**321**
3212
3213
3214
3215
3218
**322**|
**Domestic debtors**
Currency and deposits
Debt securities
Loans
Securities and holdings in investment funds
Other accounts receivable
**External debtors**|
**19,058.2**
6,723.3
0.0
16,361.0
3,624.0
-7,650.1
**0.0**|
**67,618.7**
29,654.0
0.0
24,657.8
-3,497.4
16,804.5
**0.0**|
**17,339.7**
-17,432.2
0.0
13,879.2
5,286.7
15,606.0
**0.0**|
+|
**33**
**331**
3312
3313
3314
3318
**332**
3322
3323
3324|
**Net liabilities**|
**43,843.9**|
**52,392.7**|
**52,289.6**|
+|
**33**
**331**
3312
3313
3314
3318
**332**
3322
3323
3324|
**Domestic creditors**
Currency and deposits
Debt securities
Loans
Other accounts payable
**External creditors**
Currency and deposits
Debt securities
Loans
|
**18,886.3**
0.0
-10,174.8
29,047.0
14.1
**24,957.6**
0.0
0.0
24,957.6|
**21,887.1**
0.0
18,052.5
3,362.4
472.2
**30,504.7**
0.0
0.0
30,504.7|
**32,660.5**
0.0
13,439.7
19,037.8
183.0
**19,629.1**
0.0
0.0
19,629.1|
+
+
+
+**40** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Annex VI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities** **by Counterparty**
+
+|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**82**|**Acquisition net of financial assets (=32)**|**19,058.2**|**67,618.9**|**17,339.7**|
+|
**821**
8212
8213
8215
8216
**822**|
**Domestic debtors**(=321)
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
Families and nonprofit institutions
**External debtors**(=322)|
**19,058.2**
4,047.5
2,962.7
12,085.3
-37.3
**0.0**|
**67,618.9**
30,302.7
-806.1
38,145.4
-24.2
**0.0**|
**17,339.7**
-20,648.5
3,221.3
34,770.2
-3.4
**0.0**|
+|
**83**|
**Net liabilities (=33)**|
**43,843.9**|
**52,391.8**|
**52,289.6**|
+|
**831**
8312
8313
8315
**832**
8327
8328
8329
|
**Domestic creditors**(=331)
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
**External creditors**(=332)
International organizations
Financial corporations that are not international
organizations
Other nonresidents|
**18,886.3**
31,528.1
-12,641.8
14.1
**24,957.6**
11,643.1
3,677.9
9,636.6|
**21,887.1**
0.0
21,415.0
472.2
**30,504.7**
8,084.4
3,988.3
18,431.9|
**32,660.5**
3,930.5
28,547.1
183.0
**19,629.1**
10,663.3
1,108.5
7,857.3|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **41**
+
+
+
+##### **Annex VII. GRM Fiscal Table - GFSM 1986 vs. GFSM 2014**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|EFP|Col2|2016|2017|2018|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|2018
213,032.2
252,292.0
178,187.3
72,358.5
13,924.3
-12,178.1
17,671.7
-21,588.1
19,629.1
34,821.3
-15,192.2
26,595.6
-24,636.6
-13,357.1
-11,279.5
859,019.0
-1.42%|2017|2016|Mapa Fiscal|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|1|**Receita Total e Donativos**|**177,652.5**|**218,072.7**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**||||
+||
**Receita do Estado**|166,285.0|213,222.8|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|**213,222.8**|**165,595.3**|** Receita do Estado**|
+||
Excluido "Alienação do Património do Estado" e considerado em investimento (31)|-71.3|-98.4|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5||||
+||
Excluido "Participações do Estado" incluido em ativos financeiros (32)|-3,401.1|-11,353.9|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|**255,384.6**|**219,522.9**|** Despesa Total e Empréstimos Líquidos**|
+||
**Donativos**|**14,839.8**|**16,302.1**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**||||
+||
**Donativos**|**14,839.8**|**16,302.1**|**17,671.7**||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||148,724.7|142,420.0|**1. Despesa Corrente**|
+|**2M**|**Despesa Total**|**201,112.8**|**205,847.2**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**||
|
|
+||||||||||||||||57,136.5|60,645.3|**2. Despesa de Investimento**|
+|2|**Despesa Corrente**|**140,941.6**|**148,659.0**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**||||
+||
Total da Despesa na CGE|141,086.8|148,813.8|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|25,834.6|13,467.4|**3. Empréstimos Líquidos**|
+||
Total da Despesa na CGE|141,086.8|148,813.8|178,187.3||||||||||||||
+||
Excluido "Despesas de capital" e considerado em investimento (31)|-145.2|-154.8|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7||||
+||
||||||||||||||23,688.8|2,990.2|**4. Outras Despesas (+) / Receitas (-) »» Discrepância Estatística**|
+|**31**|**Ativos não financeiros líquidos**|**60,171.2**|**57,188.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**||||
+||
Assume 100% uso do financiamento externo (Fundos Comuns e Outros Fundos via/fora CUT)|59,900.5|56,919.8|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|16,302.1|14,842.8|** Donativos**|
+||
Assume 100% uso do financiamento externo (Fundos Comuns e Outros Fundos via/fora CUT)|59,900.5|56,919.8|72,241.5||||||||||||||
+||
_Leasings_de edifícios públicos|54.2|15.2|11,279.5|11,279.5|11,279.5|11,279.5|11,279.5||||||||||
+||
Despesa de Capital|145.2|154.8|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7||||
+||
Alienação do Património do Estado|71.3|98.4|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5||||
+|||||||||||||||||||
+|**NLB **|**Saldo Global**|**-23,460.3**|**12,225.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-25,859.7**|**-39,084.8**|** Saldo Global após donativos**|
+|**NLB **|**Saldo Global**|**-23,460.3**|**12,225.4**|**-35,640.4**||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||||||
+|**32**|**Ativos Financeiros**
|**19,058.2**
|**67,618.8**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**35,399.3**
|**25,584.8**
|** Financiamento Externo**
|
+|**32**|**Ativos Financeiros**
|**19,058.2**
|**67,618.8**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|||||||||
+||Depósitos Contas monetárias - Exclui INSS e BT|6,723.3|29,654.0|-17,432.2|||||||||||43,359.7|36,937.9|**Empréstimos**|
+||
Acordos de Retrocessão|16,361.0|9,572.6|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|-7,960.5|
-11,353.1|
**Amortização**|
+||
Participações no Capital de Empresas Públicas: Mapa I-2 da CGE|222.9|233.8|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7||||
+||
Participações do Estado|3,401.1|11,353.9|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|**-9,539.5**|**13,500.0**|** Crédito Interno Líquido**|
+||
Contas a pagar (+)/receber(-): Mapa I-4 da CGE: Operações de Tesouraria|-7,396.8|16,987.1|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4||||
+||
Contas a pagar (+)/receber(-) - Créditos do Tesouro & Aplicações Financeiras do IGEPE : Mapa I-2|-253.3|-182.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|**0.0**|**0.0**|** Outras Operações**|
+||||||||||||||||0.0|
0.0|
Fornecedores|
+|**33**|**Passivos**|**43,843.9**|**52,391.8**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|0.0|
0.0|
_Leasings_ de edifícios públicos|
+||
**Dívida Interna Líquida**|**18,872.2**|**21,415.0**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**||||
+||
**Exercícios Findos**|**14.1**|**472.2**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**||||
+||
**Dívida Externa Líquida**|**24,957.6**|**30,504.7**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**||||
+||
Desembolso - Inclui "_onlending_"|36,310.7|38,465.1|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3||||
+||
Amortização|11,353.1|7,960.5|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2||||
+|||||||||||||||||||
+|**NLBz**|** Discrepância Estatística**|**1,325.4**|**-3,001.6**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**||||
+|||||||||||||||||||
+||**PIB nominal (milhões de Meticais)**|**689,213.0**|**804,463.0**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**804,463.0**|**689,213.0**|** PIB nominal (milhões de Meticais)**|
+||
**Discrepância % PIB**|**0.19%**|**-0.37%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**2.94%**|
**0.43%**|
** Discrepância % PIB**|
+||
**Discrepância % PIB**|**0.19%**|**-0.37%**|**-0.08%**||||||||||||||
+
+
+
+Fonte: Cálculos da missão Fonte: MEF
+
+
+
+|Notes - Fiscal Table|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**Items**
|**Current Fiscal Table**
|Proposed change
|
+|
**Government revenue**
|
Fiscal revenue, nonfiscal revenue, earmarked revenue
and own revenue.
|
Maintain the current classification.
|
+|
**Government revenue**
|
Capital revenue includes disposals of government
property and government holdings.
|
(i) “Disposals of government property.” Reclassify as “investment in
nonfinancial assets” and (ii) “government holdings” as acquisition of financial
assets.”|
+|**Total expenditure and net**
**lending; & Total expenditure**
**without net lending**
|
This
is
total
current
expenditure,
investment
expenditure and other expenditures (+) / revenue (-);
with/without net lending added.
|
According to international standards, financing should be presented separately
from expenses and revenue. When “net lending” is taken below the line, as part
of financial assets, the “Total expenditure and net loans” aggregate is no longer
necessary. “Total expenditure without net loans” is presented as the sum of
“current expenditure” plus “investment expenditure.”
|
+|
**1. Current expenditure**
|
Staff expenditure, social contribution, goods and
services. Interest, current transfers, subsidies and other
current expenditure.
|
Maintain the current classification.
|
+|
**1. Current expenditure**
|
Fiscal years ended.
|
Reclassify according to type of above-the-line and below-the-line expenditure
and add the amount as part of accounts payable.
|
+|
**1. Current expenditure**
|
Capital expenditure.
|
Exclude this from current expenditure and reclassify as part of investment in
nonfinancial assets or investment expenditure.
|
+|**Current balance**
|
This is total government revenue, which includes part
of the investment, minus current expenses, that
currently include part of capital expenditure.
|
Maintain the presentation of this balance, but the mission suggests naming it
“Net Operational Result” after revenue and expenditures are adjusted to
exclude investments.
|
+|
**2. Investment expense**
|
This is total government investment made with
domestic and external funds, including external grants
for this purpose.
|
Add the disposal of government property and capital expenditures recorded
as part of current expenses and begin naming this item acquisition of
nonfinancial assets.|
+|
**3. Net lending**
|
This is the total of onlending loans and financial
stabilization operations and holdings.
|
Onlending loans are financial assets and are part of financing, so they should
be presented below the line and should not impact the “overall balance.”|
+|**4. Other expenses (+) /**
**Revenue (-)**
|
This item is the residual – commonly known as the
“closing
line”
or
“statistical
discrepancies.”
As
presented, it has an impact on government spending
that thus affects the overall balance, even when the
discrepancy is caused by items in financing (below the
line).
|
The mission recommends taking it below the line since this line probably
incorporates transactions that represent government credits or debits, so that
it makes more sense to classify them below the line in financing.
|
+|
**Overall balance before grants**|
This is the difference between total revenue and
spending, excluding grants.|
Maintain the presentation of this balance, but the mission suggests presenting
it as a memorandum item.|
+
+
+
+|Notes - Fiscal Table|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**Items**|**Current Fiscal Table**|Proposed change|
+|
**Grants**
|
Total grants received in the year.
|
Include them as part of government revenue.
|
+|
**Overall balance after grants**
|
This is the difference between total revenue and
expenses, including grants.
|
Maintain the presentation of this balance. However, the GFSM 2014 calls this
just overall balance, which will make sense if the overall balance is not
considered before grants.
|
+|
**External financing**
|
This is the difference between disbursements and the
amortization of external loans.
|
Maintain the current classification, but add total domestic financing
incorporated into the NGC and begin using the term “liabilities.” It is
considered the net total of the debt (loans minus amortizations) in accordance
with debt instruments. Total disbursements and amortizations can be
presented as a memorandum item.
|
+|
**Other operations**
|
Suppliers, leasing, net privatizations and other
expenses.|
The mission recommends presenting this above the line according to its type:
expenses or investment in nonfinancial assets.|
+|
**Net**
**Government**
**Credit**
**(NGC)**
|
NGC = Government deposits – Domestic debt.
|
For greater transparency, we recommend presenting government deposits in
disaggregated form (financial assets, plus other assets reported above the line)
and domestic debt (as part of liabilities, also including external financing).
|
+|
**Financial assets**
|
This aggregate does not exist currently in the Fiscal
Table
the
Mozambican
authorities
submitted.
However, the subitems are part of the Fiscal Table,
some above and some below the line.
|
Aggregate in this item government deposits which are currently recorded as
part of the NGC. To this aggregate also add other assets reported above the
line such as: onlending agreements, government holdings and other accounts
receivable. The mission suggests presenting this item before liabilities and just
after the overall balance.
|
+|
**Accounts**
**payable**
**(+)/receivable(-)**
|
This item is not currently in the Fiscal Table the
Mozambican authorities presented.
|
The cash system does not envisage “accounts payable and receivable.”
Considering the assumption of compiling the Fiscal Table using the modified
cash approach, the mission recommends taking all amounts of “accounts
payable and receivable” of which the authorities are aware. In this item the
mission recommends adding “treasury operations” and “arrears” to the total of
“fiscal years ended.” When they are accounts receivable, present them as part
of financial assets; when they are accounts payable, present them as part of
liabilities.
|
+|
**Primary balance**
|
This balance is the result of government accounts
excluding interest.|
Maintain the presentation of this balance; however, the mission suggests
presenting it as a memorandum item.|
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d9d080cdd1b870aff61b00921a1cc08a7a6c6f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332b3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-001", "height": 131, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538d19e1ec383ce69ce78982d7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "05030406fcf9b69544ad07703e29f8da361782723ea3dd92dacda7a6f2837618", "width": 128}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "183a1b1d37392b34", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-002", "height": 232, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b8ee9187c0404f8a10eff365ff162c8b0078d276efb9ce1a224c11a7d9f2e3c3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "526425f3c0295ef11bcd0fa63ff6ca7d4f9cd9cabbd9043fe1e0faef09840b88", "width": 705}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0b0d551119251b18", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-003", "height": 304, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aaae6eaa95552a75db2a5cabd54715e8c63b9588e62898dcc48aa595ab55d0a3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "f719a78d78d494790e39433ef1f2a3bc246994e2269dee68188ba72d2fe2ed8f", "width": 789}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0014-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3e3ef72c3cc12c2e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0014-001", "height": 75, "page": 14, "phash_256": "be9b1cc63d40d9e142a1c378c17c36997e883e0e3e0e3d8f3cd3c36642e7f0e0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "fee7590b7886dd15be2404d0ff955898faecbfe6997a05ffe7546d1ce2d998de", "width": 749}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4a36a62a32c02414", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0015-001", "height": 77, "page": 15, "phash_256": "bcab6d253690c35b4b4882db827f7c8a7c083ca53ca76dee3c13c2fc03f1f310", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "5455062c2a6de7efd508c6649d9685a23fa8f82c4a2aefcc578f02777428aef0", "width": 749}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4a6adb1e19fa606", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0016-001", "height": 313, "page": 16, "phash_256": "a4fd46cfb4c9815a8926992453a67e36975b2569cdcdd08472bc6638bc5335c3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "a8b170b0bffa0822eb2353392e7e101199d85f52f620dc9fe98617b40091f864", "width": 683}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": "Table 5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d9c5e4268430b6c6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0017-001", "height": 164, "page": 17, "phash_256": "c4e64398339a500263183dcf1fffe21048e6af791df5cc66ff00b9997c019679", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "01911706b7fe0ccbb137ec97255e47acad6c6c7a82fe52aa38317c3ba3dc6af7", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "808068608060d0c0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0019-001", "height": 52, "page": 19, "phash_256": "877cfc1e61e0f1c3780f07ff3e1c03f07080f1c70787be1f00fec1ff1c301e30", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "8a6d9f6450fc3a5eab976fe931dc4906f20a2b223813a159a095b21b0b847fee", "width": 752}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": "Table 8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "64d8d3d35be8dae3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0020-001", "height": 357, "page": 20, "phash_256": "83f2788706391e0c6e1410bc2e1c9f8663f21e1d60f387f51f8fe1f28e1de07b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "d8c21f740a68bc4910af051874a86033883afd151932d285f2619516582228f1", "width": 747}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "e38798c0c0d22d37", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-001", "height": 367, "page": 35, "phash_256": "a8fd63776c40c707cc899e2499a998b031ab33bc670b663e6e7eec40ec4079cb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "8fc875330e540689d5f558045e2713b141e98299ea2a03c71ab43d2372341c42", "width": 742}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-045/assets/figures/cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-002.png", "caption": "Figure 3. Government Expenses", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c39f99c0c1d02d37", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-002", "height": 346, "page": 35, "phash_256": "a07f01ff7c40cbd7c90bce14838b9a5492c330f936f435a9369465a9c7876dac", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "sha256_normalized_png": "5661f3bd311db54a15cd6349693114827cf5bf6a90d8e9752fcdd3db4b6785d3", "width": 741}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-045/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3970628336aee3e3ca80a542b85a135678155123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-045/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/45**\n\n## **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE** **STATISTICS MISSION (DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)**\n\n\nThis report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2020.\n\n**Disclaimer:**\nThis report was prepared in 2020 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its\npublication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/45\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION (DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)\n\nThis report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2020.\n\nDisclaimer:\nThis report was prepared in 2020 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its\npublication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 748}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-045-fig-p0002-003"], "markdown": "\n\n**FEBRUARY**\n**2020**\n\n\n\n\n# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n#### **REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION** **(DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)**\n\n###### **Prepared by Djaima Da Costa**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1213, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(129.21005249023438, 6.64990234375, 551.9099731445312, 145.74990844726562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 337, "number": 4, "size": 94810, "transform": [422.6999206542969, 0.0, -0.0, -139.10000610351562, 129.21005249023438, 145.74990844726562], "width": 779, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(36.000003814697266, 34.39988708496094, 112.56756591796875, 112.7498779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 239, "number": 3, "size": 22450, "transform": [76.56755828857422, 0.0, -0.0, 78.34999084472656, 36.000003814697266, 34.39988708496094], "width": 242, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "FEBRUARY\n2020\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nREPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION (DECEMBER 2–13, 2019)\nPrepared by Djaima Da Costa", "text_characters": 116}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n#### **CONTENTS**\n\nGlossary______________________________________________________________________________________________ **3**\n\n**SUMMARY OF MISSIONS OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ________________4**\n**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________10**\n\n\nA. Coordination of the GFS Compilation Process__________________________________________________12\nB. Sectorization and Sources of Fiscal Data________________________________________________________13\nC. Identification of Statistical Discrepancies_______________________________________________________ 14\nD. Compilation of Annual 2016-2018 GFS_________________________________________________________ 29\n\nE. Fiscal Table Revisons____________________________________________________________________________ 32\n\n**FIGURES**\n\n1. Overall Balance vs. Discrepancies_______________________________________________________________ 15\n2. Government Revenue___________________________________________________________________________ 34\n3. Government Expenses___________________________________________________________________________34\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Integrated GRM Financial Balance Sheet_________________________________________________________5\n2. Priority Recommendations_______________________________________________________________________6\n3. Detailed Recommendations/Action Plan_________________________________________________________9\n4. Discrepancies 2016-2018_______________________________________________________________________ 14\n5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets_____________________________________________________________16\n6. Leasing of Government Buildings_______________________________________________________________17\n7. Treatment of Leasing___________________________________________________________________________ 18\n8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS______________________________________________________________ 19\n9. Reconciliation of the 2016-2018 Domestic Debt________________________________________________22\n10. Debts in “Arrears” Recognized, Validated and Paid____________________________________________24\n11. Treatment of “Arrears”_________________________________________________________________________25\n12. Treasury Operations___________________________________________________________________________ 27\n13. Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash /Fiscal Table_________________________________________ 30\n14. Government Spending by Functions of Government – COFOG________________________________31\n15. Stock of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty______________________________________32\n\n**ANNEXES**\nI. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission________________________________________________36\nII. Institutional Structure of General Government__________________________________________________37\nIII. Detailed Government Revenue – GRM_________________________________________________________ 38\nIV. GRM Detailed Government Spending__________________________________________________________39\nV. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities – GRM____________________________________________________40\nVI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty_________________________ 41\nVII. GRM Fiscal Table - _GFSM 1986_ vs. _GFSM 2014_ _________________________________________________42\n\n\n**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nCONTENTS\n\nGlossary 3\n\nSUMMARY OF MISSIONS OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS 4\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10\n\nA. Coordination of the GFS Compilation Process12\nB. Sectorization and Sources of Fiscal Data13\nC. Identification of Statistical Discrepancies_ 14\nD. Compilation of Annual 2016-2018 GFS_ 29\n\nE. Fiscal Table Revisons 32\n\nFIGURES\n\n1. Overall Balance vs. Discrepancies_ 15\n2. Government Revenue_ 34\n3. Government Expenses_34\n\nTABLES\n1. Integrated GRM Financial Balance Sheet_5\n2. Priority Recommendations_6\n3. Detailed Recommendations/Action Plan_9\n4. Discrepancies 2016-2018_ 14\n5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets_16\n6. Leasing of Government Buildings_17\n7. Treatment of Leasing_ 18\n8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS 19\n9. Reconciliation of the 2016-2018 Domestic Debt22\n10. Debts in “Arrears” Recognized, Validated and Paid24\n11. Treatment of “Arrears”_25\n12. Treasury Operations_ 27\n13. Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash /Fiscal Table_ 30\n14. Government Spending by Functions of Government – COFOG31\n15. Stock of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty32\n\nANNEXES\nI. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission36\nII. Institutional Structure of General Government37\nIII. Detailed Government Revenue – GRM_ 38\nIV. GRM Detailed Government Spending39\nV. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities – GRM40\nVI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty_ 41\nVII. GRM Fiscal Table - _GFSM 1986_ vs. _GFSM 2014_ _42\n\n2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1311}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n#### **Glossary**\n\nAFR IMF African Department\nAT Administrative Tribunal\nBM Bank of Mozambique\nCCGFS Committee for Compiling Public Finance Statistics\nCEDSIF Center for the Development of Financial Information Systems\nCGE Government Financial Report and Statements [Conta Geral do Estado]\nCIs Credit Institutions\nCOFOG Classification of the Functions of Government\nCSE Superior Statistical Council\nDEEF Economic and Financial Studies Directorate\nDFID United Kingdom Department for International Development\nDNCP National Directorate of Public Accounting\nDNPO National Directorate of Planning and Budget\nDNT National Treasury Directorate\ne-SISTAFE Electronic Government Financial Administration System\nEBU Extrabudgetary Units\nEDDI 2 Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2\nGCO Central Budgetary Government\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGFS Government Finance Statistics\nGFSM 2014 _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\nGG General Government or Public Administration\nGGR Risk Management Office\nGRM Government of the Republic of Mozambique\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nINE National Statistics Institute\nINSS National Social Security Institute\nLG Local Government\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance, Mozambique\nNGC Net Government Credit\nOE Government Budget\nOEF Other Economic Flows\nPSDSG 2011 _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A Guide for Compilers and Users 2011_\nSGIFP Public Finance Management Information System\nSTA International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department\nSTA Single Treasury Account\nT-Bills Treasury Bills\nT-Bonds Treasury Bonds\nTA Technical Assistance\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nGlossary\n\nAFR IMF African Department\nAT Administrative Tribunal\nBM Bank of Mozambique\nCCGFS Committee for Compiling Public Finance Statistics\nCEDSIF Center for the Development of Financial Information Systems\nCGE Government Financial Report and Statements [Conta Geral do Estado]\nCIs Credit Institutions\nCOFOG Classification of the Functions of Government\nCSE Superior Statistical Council\nDEEF Economic and Financial Studies Directorate\nDFID United Kingdom Department for International Development\nDNCP National Directorate of Public Accounting\nDNPO National Directorate of Planning and Budget\nDNT National Treasury Directorate\ne-SISTAFE Electronic Government Financial Administration System\nEBU Extrabudgetary Units\nEDDI 2 Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2\nGCO Central Budgetary Government\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGFS Government Finance Statistics\nGFSM 2014 _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\nGG General Government or Public Administration\nGGR Risk Management Office\nGRM Government of the Republic of Mozambique\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nINE National Statistics Institute\nINSS National Social Security Institute\nLG Local Government\nMEF Ministry of Economy and Finance, Mozambique\nNGC Net Government Credit\nOE Government Budget\nOEF Other Economic Flows\nPSDSG 2011 _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A Guide for Compilers and Users 2011_\nSGIFP Public Finance Management Information System\nSTA International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department\nSTA Single Treasury Account\nT-Bills Treasury Bills\nT-Bonds Treasury Bonds\nTA Technical Assistance\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3", "text_characters": 1402}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n#### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**1.** **Technical Assistance (TA) Mission objective for Public Finance Statistics (GFS).** A TA\nmission visited Maputo in the Republic of Mozambique from December 2–3, 2019, to assist the\nMinistry of Economy and Finance, Mozambique (MEF) to improve the process of compiling and\ndisseminating GFS based on internationally accepted best practices that are appropriate for\nmanaging domestic fiscal policy and for ensuring the necessary support of the International\nMonetary Fund (IMF). This was the final mission in a series of missions funded by the United\nKingdom Department for International Development (DFID) under the GFS Module of the\nEnhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 (EDDI 2).\n\n**2.** **TA outcome in the DFID.** In the last of this series of TA missions funded by the DFID, the\nMozambican authorities, which in the last few years released only the revenue of the Central\nGovernment Budget (GCO), began to compile and disseminate the following GCO annual data:\n(i) detailed public revenue and expenditures; (ii) assets and liabilities transactions;\n(iii) expenditures according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG); (iv) the\nintegrated net financial worth balance sheet; and (v) positions of stock and flows of financial assets\nand liabilities by counterpart.\n\n**3.** **Challenges in the process of compiling the GFS of the government of the Republic of**\n**Mozambique (GRM).** Despite the significant progress made in compiling the GFS, challenges\nremain in the compilation process, in particular with regard to data consistency. At the end of\nFY 2017 and FY 2018, the authorities closed the accounts with discrepancies of roughly\n2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore, the mission set out to review the GCO\naccounts, thus continuing the work of eliminating the discrepancies begun by the last mission\nbegan.\n\n**4.** **Discrepancy in FY 2016-2018.** The mission identified the following key causes of the\ndiscrepancies: (i) the various sources of data used to produce the Fiscal Table; (ii) the difference in\ninstitutional coverage of the fiscal and monetary accounts (above and below the line in the\nFinancial Statement), and (iii) the lack of periodic reconciliation of the data. The GCO accounts for\nyears 2016-2018, presented in accordance with the _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n( _GFSM 2014_ ), which includes stocks and flows, is presented in Table 1 below, and it highlights the\nreduction of the discrepancy to levels of less than 1 percent of GDP in the last three years.\n\n\n**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n1. Technical Assistance (TA) Mission objective for Public Finance Statistics (GFS). A TA\nmission visited Maputo in the Republic of Mozambique from December 2–3, 2019, to assist the\nMinistry of Economy and Finance, Mozambique (MEF) to improve the process of compiling and\ndisseminating GFS based on internationally accepted best practices that are appropriate for\nmanaging domestic fiscal policy and for ensuring the necessary support of the International\nMonetary Fund (IMF). This was the final mission in a series of missions funded by the United\nKingdom Department for International Development (DFID) under the GFS Module of the\nEnhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 (EDDI 2).\n\n2. TA outcome in the DFID. In the last of this series of TA missions funded by the DFID, the\nMozambican authorities, which in the last few years released only the revenue of the Central\nGovernment Budget (GCO), began to compile and disseminate the following GCO annual data:\n(i) detailed public revenue and expenditures; (ii) assets and liabilities transactions;\n(iii) expenditures according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG); (iv) the\nintegrated net financial worth balance sheet; and (v) positions of stock and flows of financial assets\nand liabilities by counterpart.\n\n3. Challenges in the process of compiling the GFS of the government of the Republic of\nMozambique (GRM). Despite the significant progress made in compiling the GFS, challenges\nremain in the compilation process, in particular with regard to data consistency. At the end of\nFY 2017 and FY 2018, the authorities closed the accounts with discrepancies of roughly\n2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore, the mission set out to review the GCO\naccounts, thus continuing the work of eliminating the discrepancies begun by the last mission\nbegan.\n\n4. Discrepancy in FY 2016-2018. The mission identified the following key causes of the\ndiscrepancies: (i) the various sources of data used to produce the Fiscal Table; (ii) the difference in\ninstitutional coverage of the fiscal and monetary accounts (above and below the line in the\nFinancial Statement), and (iii) the lack of periodic reconciliation of the data. The GCO accounts for\nyears 2016-2018, presented in accordance with the _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n( _GFSM 2014_ ), which includes stocks and flows, is presented in Table 1 below, and it highlights the\nreduction of the discrepancy to levels of less than 1 percent of GDP in the last three years.\n\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2211}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 1. Integrated GRM Financial Balance Sheet**\n\n\n\nUnit: millions of meticais\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|As of December 31|2016|Col4|Col5|Col6|2017|Col8|Col9|2018|Col11|Col12|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||**Description**|**Opening**
**Balance**|**Fiscal Table**
**(Trans-**
**actions)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|**Fiscal Table**
**(Trans-**
**actions)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|**Fiscal Table**
**(Trans-**
**actions)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|\n|1.
|Revenue||
177,652.48|||
218,072.81|||
226,126.37|||\n|
2.
|
Expenditure||
140,941.60|
||
148,659.00|||
178,012.60|||\n|
**NOB**|
** Net operating balance (1-2)**||
**36,710.98**|
||**69,413.80**|||
** 48,113.70**|||\n|
31.
|
Net nonfinancial assets||
60,171.17|
||57,188.17|||
83,754.16|||\n|2M.
|Total expenditure (2+31)||201,112.80|||205,847.20|||261,766.82|||\n|**NLB**
|**Loan (+) / Debt (–) net**||**(23,460.30)**|||**12,225.60**|||** (35,640.45)**|||\n|
NLBz|
Statistical discrepancy (32-33-NLB)||
(1,325.40)|
||3,001.50|||
690.52|||\n|
|
**Financial net worth:**|**(266,546.28)**|
**(24,785.69)**|
** (225,644.99) **|**(516,976.96)**|**15,225.99**|** 92,255.38 **|**(409,495.59)**|
** (34,949.93) **|
**(23,368.93)**|** (467,814.45)**|\n|
**62.**
|
**Financial assets**|**165,956.51**|
**19,058.20**
|
|
**185,014.71**
|
**67,618.75**
|
**(1.97)**|
** 252,631.49**
|
**17,339.69**
|
**(769.51)**|
** 269,201.67**
|\n|
|
**Domestic**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
6212|
Government deposits|34,767.97|
6,723.27|
|
41,491.24|
29,653.99||
71,145.24|
(17,432.18)||
53,713.06|\n|
6214|
Loans|
57,012.06|
16,361.04|
|
73,373.10|
24,657.67|
|
98,030.78|
13,879.17||
111,909.94|\n|
6215|
Securities and investment funds|
62,157.32|
3,623.95|
|
65,781.27|
(3,497.40)||
62,283.87|
5,286.70|
(770.59)|
66,799.98|\n|
6218|
Other accounts receivable|
12,019.16|
(7,650.06)|
|
4,369.10|
16,804.48|
(1.97)|
21,171.62|
15,606.00|
1.08|
36,778.70|\n|**63.**
|**Liabilities**
|**432,502.80**
|
**43,843.89**
|** 225,644.99**
|**701,991.67**
|
**52,392.76**
|** (92,257.35)**|**662,127.08**
|
**52,289.62**
|
**22,599.42**|** 737,016.12**
|\n|
|
**Domestic**|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|\n|
6313
|
Debt securities (T-bills & T-bonds)
|
56,322.02
|
(10,174.79)
|
|
46,147.24
|
18,052.51
|
(145.75)
|
64,054.00
|
13,439.70
|
|77,493.70
|\n|6314
|Loans
|12,910.84
|
29,046.96
|
(395.38)
|41,562.41
|
3,362.43
|
(2,079.23)
|42,845.62
|
19,037.85
|
|61,883.46
|\n|
6318
|
Other accounts payable – FY ended
|
270.01
|
14.11
|
|
284.12|
473.16
|
|
757.28
|
182.96
|
|
940.24
|\n|
|
**External**|
|
|
||
||
|
||
|\n|
6324|
Loans|
362,999.93|
24,957.61|
226,040.37|613,997.91|
30,504.65|(90,032.37)|
554,470.19|
19,629.11|
22,599.42|
596,698.72|\n|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
|
**GDP (Article IV report)**||**689,213.00**|||**804,463.00**|||**859,019.30**|||\n|
**NLBz**|
** Discrepancy (% of GDP) – before the mission**||**0.43 %**|||**2.94%**|||**-1.42%**|||\n|**NLBz**|** Discrepancy (% of GDP) – after the mission**||
**-0.19%**|||**0.37%**|||**0.08%**|||", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [56.871910095214844, 120.21546936035156, 736.9290771484375, 537.2584228515625], "columns": 12, "rows": 27}], "text": "Table 1. Integrated GRM Financial Balance Sheet\n\nUnit: millions of meticais\n\n Col1 As of December 31 2016 Col4 Col5 Col6 2017 Col8 Col9 2018 Col11 Col12 \n\n Description Opening Balance Fiscal Table (Trans- actions) OEF Closing Balance Fiscal Table (Trans- actions) OEF Closing Balance Fiscal Table (Trans- actions) OEF Closing Balance \n 1. Revenue 177,652.48 218,072.81 226,126.37 \n 2. Expenditure 140,941.60 148,659.00 178,012.60 \n NOB Net operating balance (1-2) 36,710.98 69,413.80 48,113.70 \n 31. Net nonfinancial assets 60,171.17 57,188.17 83,754.16 \n 2M. Total expenditure (2+31) 201,112.80 205,847.20 261,766.82 \n NLB Loan (+) / Debt (–) net (23,460.30) 12,225.60 (35,640.45) \n NLBz Statistical discrepancy (32-33-NLB) (1,325.40) 3,001.50 690.52 \n Financial net worth: (266,546.28) (24,785.69) (225,644.99) (516,976.96) 15,225.99 92,255.38 (409,495.59) (34,949.93) (23,368.93) (467,814.45) \n 62. Financial assets 165,956.51 19,058.20 185,014.71 67,618.75 (1.97) 252,631.49 17,339.69 (769.51) 269,201.67 \n Domestic \n 6212 Government deposits 34,767.97 6,723.27 41,491.24 29,653.99 71,145.24 (17,432.18) 53,713.06 \n 6214 Loans 57,012.06 16,361.04 73,373.10 24,657.67 98,030.78 13,879.17 111,909.94 \n 6215 Securities and investment funds 62,157.32 3,623.95 65,781.27 (3,497.40) 62,283.87 5,286.70 (770.59) 66,799.98 \n 6218 Other accounts receivable 12,019.16 (7,650.06) 4,369.10 16,804.48 (1.97) 21,171.62 15,606.00 1.08 36,778.70 \n 63. Liabilities 432,502.80 43,843.89 225,644.99 701,991.67 52,392.76 (92,257.35) 662,127.08 52,289.62 22,599.42 737,016.12 \n Domestic \n 6313 Debt securities (T-bills & T-bonds) 56,322.02 (10,174.79) 46,147.24 18,052.51 (145.75) 64,054.00 13,439.70 77,493.70 \n 6314 Loans 12,910.84 29,046.96 (395.38) 41,562.41 3,362.43 (2,079.23) 42,845.62 19,037.85 61,883.46 \n 6318 Other accounts payable – FY ended 270.01 14.11 284.12 473.16 757.28 182.96 940.24 \n External \n 6324 Loans 362,999.93 24,957.61 226,040.37 613,997.91 30,504.65 (90,032.37) 554,470.19 19,629.11 22,599.42 596,698.72 \n \n GDP (Article IV report) 689,213.00 804,463.00 859,019.30 \n NLBz Discrepancy (% of GDP) – before the mission 0.43 % 2.94% -1.42% \n NLBz Discrepancy (% of GDP) – after the mission -0.19% 0.37% 0.08%", "text_characters": 1894}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**5.** **Key findings for the GFS 2016-2018 data** . The mission found that for net government\ncredit (NGC), the Bank of Mozambique (BM) reports a position of central government deposits,\nand that it includes the GCO, extrabudgetary units, and the National Social Security Institute\n(INSS), but that it excludes local governments (autonomous local authorities); while the revenue\nand expenditures in the Fiscal Table are for the GCO only. In terms of domestic debt, the BM\ndoes not capture debts other than the credit institutions (CIs), such as debts in arrears to\nsuppliers. The MEF does not recognize the issuance of Treasury bills used for monetary policy\nmanagement purposes. In addition, there has been no record of public buildings acquired under\nleasing contracts, with only the record of the debt associated with them. The accounts payable\nand receivable, reported by the authorities as treasury operations, explain some of the\ndiscrepancy in that they represent incoming and outgoing amounts in banks, and they had the\nrequired counterpart.\n\n**6.** **Action plan for implementing the GFSM 2014.** A greater commitment should be given\nto achieving the set of actions identified to improve the process of compiling GFS. The main\nrecommendations the mission left with the authorities are shown in Table 2 below. The complete\nlist of recommendations can be found in the action plan presented in the section entitled\nDetailed Technical Assessment and Recommendations in this report.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2020|**Committee for Compiling Public Finance Statistics (CCGFS)**
**or the macroeconomic statistics group in the Superior**
**Statistics Council(CSE). **Establish a committee or group in the
CSE, whose objectives and the responsibilities of the members
and data to be shared will be stipulated in a memorandum of
understanding signed by the members.
|DEEF, DNCP,
DNPO, DNT,
GGR, BM and
INSS|\n|April 2020|
**_Public sector structure and inventory of entities that belong_**
**_to the sector_**_: (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the_
_inventory and classify the entities according to the GFSM 2014_
_for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal,_
_monetary and financial statistics, and external and real-sector_
_statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on the websites of the_
_MEF, BM and National Statistics Institute (INE)._
|MEF, BM and
INE|\n|April 2020|**_Deposits in the GCO fiscal table._**(i) ensure that the position
the BM processes corresponds to the coverage of the fiscal
accounts (above the line); (ii) begin to consider only GCO
deposits and exclude available cash in the INSS and
extrabudgetary units (EBU); (iii) make the required adjustments
to income in deposits and ensure that they have the required
counterpart above the line.
|MEF/DEEF
|\n|April 2020|
**_Domestic and external public debt data for the Fiscal Table._**
_(i)_Use MEF data to ensure consistency between the debt stocks|DEEF and
DNT|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 365.0999755859375, 522.6399536132812, 727.8599853515625], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n5. Key findings for the GFS 2016-2018 data . The mission found that for net government\ncredit (NGC), the Bank of Mozambique (BM) reports a position of central government deposits,\nand that it includes the GCO, extrabudgetary units, and the National Social Security Institute\n(INSS), but that it excludes local governments (autonomous local authorities); while the revenue\nand expenditures in the Fiscal Table are for the GCO only. In terms of domestic debt, the BM\ndoes not capture debts other than the credit institutions (CIs), such as debts in arrears to\nsuppliers. The MEF does not recognize the issuance of Treasury bills used for monetary policy\nmanagement purposes. In addition, there has been no record of public buildings acquired under\nleasing contracts, with only the record of the debt associated with them. The accounts payable\nand receivable, reported by the authorities as treasury operations, explain some of the\ndiscrepancy in that they represent incoming and outgoing amounts in banks, and they had the\nrequired counterpart.\n\n6. Action plan for implementing the GFSM 2014. A greater commitment should be given\nto achieving the set of actions identified to improve the process of compiling GFS. The main\nrecommendations the mission left with the authorities are shown in Table 2 below. The complete\nlist of recommendations can be found in the action plan presented in the section entitled\nDetailed Technical Assessment and Recommendations in this report.\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n April 2020 Committee for Compiling Public Finance Statistics (CCGFS) or the macroeconomic statistics group in the Superior Statistics Council(CSE). Establish a committee or group in the CSE, whose objectives and the responsibilities of the members and data to be shared will be stipulated in a memorandum of understanding signed by the members. DEEF, DNCP, DNPO, DNT, GGR, BM and INSS \n April 2020 _Public sector structure and inventory of entities that belong_ _to the sector__: (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the_ _inventory and classify the entities according to the GFSM 2014_ _for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal,_ _monetary and financial statistics, and external and real-sector_ _statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on the websites of the_ _MEF, BM and National Statistics Institute (INE)._ MEF, BM and INE \n April 2020 _Deposits in the GCO fiscal table._(i) ensure that the position the BM processes corresponds to the coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the line); (ii) begin to consider only GCO deposits and exclude available cash in the INSS and extrabudgetary units (EBU); (iii) make the required adjustments to income in deposits and ensure that they have the required counterpart above the line. MEF/DEEF \n April 2020 _Domestic and external public debt data for the Fiscal Table._ _(i)_Use MEF data to ensure consistency between the debt stocks DEEF and DNT", "text_characters": 2512}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n||and flows; and (ii) exclude other economic flows (OEF) of
transactions included in the Fiscal Table.
||\n|April 2020|
**_Reconciliation of the domestic and external public debt._**(i)
Finalize the reconciliation work that began during the mission
and document the final result; and (ii) Implement a formal
periodic reconciliation process of the flows and stock (by
instrument, by face and nominal value and by creditor),
including explanations of all the differences identified in the BM
and DNT data. Share the result with the members of the CCGFS.
|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|\n|April 2020|
**_Treasury bills (T-bills)._** (i) Adjust the total Treasury bill debt to
be recognized in the public sector fiscal and monetary accounts.
(ii) The BM should begin to report the total debt of each
subsector in the Mozambican public sector: GG =
GCO+EBU+INSS+LG as well as the business, financial and
nonfinancial sector.
|MEF and BM|\n|April 2020|
**_Treasury Operations._ **Begin to recognize them in the Fiscal
Table, ideally using a modified cash approach (considering
credit and debit balances).
|DEEF|\n|March 2020|
**_2016-2018 Mozambique GFS compiled during the mission:_**
_Validate and submit them to the IMF/STA and the INE._
|DEEF|\n|August 2020|
**_Fiscal Table revision:_** Restructure to ensure alignment with
international standards (GFSM 2014): Declaration I of
government operations.
|DNT and
DEEF|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 72.17999267578125, 522.6300048828125, 430.3800048828125], "columns": 3, "rows": 7}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n and flows; and (ii) exclude other economic flows (OEF) of transactions included in the Fiscal Table. \n April 2020 _Reconciliation of the domestic and external public debt._(i) Finalize the reconciliation work that began during the mission and document the final result; and (ii) Implement a formal periodic reconciliation process of the flows and stock (by instrument, by face and nominal value and by creditor), including explanations of all the differences identified in the BM and DNT data. Share the result with the members of the CCGFS. BM and MEF (DNT and DEEF) \n April 2020 _Treasury bills (T-bills)._ (i) Adjust the total Treasury bill debt to be recognized in the public sector fiscal and monetary accounts. (ii) The BM should begin to report the total debt of each subsector in the Mozambican public sector: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG as well as the business, financial and nonfinancial sector. MEF and BM \n April 2020 _Treasury Operations._ Begin to recognize them in the Fiscal Table, ideally using a modified cash approach (considering credit and debit balances). DEEF \n March 2020 _2016-2018 Mozambique GFS compiled during the mission:_ _Validate and submit them to the IMF/STA and the INE._ DEEF \n August 2020 _Fiscal Table revision:_ Restructure to ensure alignment with international standards (GFSM 2014): Declaration I of government operations. DNT and DEEF \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7", "text_characters": 1242}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n**7.** **GFS TA mission.** A TA mission for GFS visited Maputo, Republic of Mozambique, from\nDecember 2 to 13, 2019, to assess progress made regarding the recommendations the previous\nmission left in late August and early September 2018. This mission was the last one to be\nconducted for GFS Module of EDDI 2, a five-year initiative financed by the DFID.\n\n**8.** **Objective of the GFS and the EDDI 2 public debt module.** The GFS and public debt\nmodule focuses on the improvement of GFS in nine selected African countries, including\nMozambique. This project’s objective is to strengthen GFS in this group of countries in order to\nfoster fiscal transparency and curtail fiscal risks. In this context, the Mozambican authorities\nexpressed their interest in developing their methods of compiling fiscal statistics in accordance\nwith internationally accepted best practices.\n\n**9.** **Mission objective.** Assist the MEF in improving the compilation and dissemination of\nfiscal statistics that are suitable for fiscal policy management and surveillance by the IMF African\nDepartment (AFR), based on the guidelines of _GFSM 2014_ and _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A_\n_Guide for Compilers and Users 2011 (PSDSG 2011)._ AFR was consulted and stressed the necessity\nof improving the quality of fiscal data and reducing statistical discrepancy to enhance the\nproduction of efficient projections.\n\n**10.** **Mission tasks.** The mission’s terms of reference were as follows: (i) continue the work of\nidentifying the causes of the statistical discrepancies in the 2016-2018 GCO accounts;\n(ii) evaluate progress made in carrying out the recommendations of the previous mission in the\ncontext of the action plan that the _GFSM 2014_ aims to implement; and (iii) compile quarterly GFS\nfor the last three years (2016-2018). However, this last point was pending due to a lack of data in\nExcel format. The authorities were placed in charge of compiling them and submitting them to\nthe IMF by end-January 2020.\n\n**11.** **Mission report structure.** Following the executive summary and this introduction, this\nreport presents the key topics addressed and the mission’s recommendations for improving the\nprocess of compiling the GFS, and for issues of coordinating the resources that affect the\nexercise of compiling the GFS in the Republic of Mozambique. The list of officials contacted\nduring the mission is found at the end of the report, followed by complementary information in\nthe annexes.\n\n**12.** **Acknowledgments.** The mission thanks the authorities, and in particular Dr. Enilde\nSarmento, Dr. Chamila Aly and Dr. Domingos Fumo and their respective teams for facilitating this\nmission. Moreover, the mission also thanks the local IMF office, and in particular Dr. Esther\nPalacio, IMF Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator in Mozambique, for the unwavering\ntechnical support provided to the mission.\n\n\n**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nINTRODUCTION\n\n7. GFS TA mission. A TA mission for GFS visited Maputo, Republic of Mozambique, from\nDecember 2 to 13, 2019, to assess progress made regarding the recommendations the previous\nmission left in late August and early September 2018. This mission was the last one to be\nconducted for GFS Module of EDDI 2, a five-year initiative financed by the DFID.\n\n8. Objective of the GFS and the EDDI 2 public debt module. The GFS and public debt\nmodule focuses on the improvement of GFS in nine selected African countries, including\nMozambique. This project’s objective is to strengthen GFS in this group of countries in order to\nfoster fiscal transparency and curtail fiscal risks. In this context, the Mozambican authorities\nexpressed their interest in developing their methods of compiling fiscal statistics in accordance\nwith internationally accepted best practices.\n\n9. Mission objective. Assist the MEF in improving the compilation and dissemination of\nfiscal statistics that are suitable for fiscal policy management and surveillance by the IMF African\nDepartment (AFR), based on the guidelines of _GFSM 2014_ and _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A_\n_Guide for Compilers and Users 2011 (PSDSG 2011)._ AFR was consulted and stressed the necessity\nof improving the quality of fiscal data and reducing statistical discrepancy to enhance the\nproduction of efficient projections.\n\n10. Mission tasks. The mission’s terms of reference were as follows: (i) continue the work of\nidentifying the causes of the statistical discrepancies in the 2016-2018 GCO accounts;\n(ii) evaluate progress made in carrying out the recommendations of the previous mission in the\ncontext of the action plan that the _GFSM 2014_ aims to implement; and (iii) compile quarterly GFS\nfor the last three years (2016-2018). However, this last point was pending due to a lack of data in\nExcel format. The authorities were placed in charge of compiling them and submitting them to\nthe IMF by end-January 2020.\n\n11. Mission report structure. Following the executive summary and this introduction, this\nreport presents the key topics addressed and the mission’s recommendations for improving the\nprocess of compiling the GFS, and for issues of coordinating the resources that affect the\nexercise of compiling the GFS in the Republic of Mozambique. The list of officials contacted\nduring the mission is found at the end of the report, followed by complementary information in\nthe annexes.\n\n12. Acknowledgments. The mission thanks the authorities, and in particular Dr. Enilde\nSarmento, Dr. Chamila Aly and Dr. Domingos Fumo and their respective teams for facilitating this\nmission. Moreover, the mission also thanks the local IMF office, and in particular Dr. Esther\nPalacio, IMF Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator in Mozambique, for the unwavering\ntechnical support provided to the mission.\n\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2461}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n#### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**13.** **Progress in compiling GFS according to the GFSM 2014.** No progress was made in\nterms of actions the last mission left, because the workload has increased at the Economic and\nFinancial Studies Directorate (DEEF) and human resources are insufficient. Accordingly, the action\nplan left by the last mission is still in effect, and the only steps taken have been to review the\ntexts required to ensure a better understanding of the actions and target dates for completing\nthem.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS**
|\n|
H|
1.1** CCGFS or CSE macroeconomic statistics group.**
Establish a committee or group in the CSE whose
goals and the responsibilities of the members and
data to be shared will be specified in a memorandum
of understanding signed by the members.
|DEEF, DNCP,
DNPO, DNT,
GGR, BM and
INSS|
April 2020|\n|L
|
1.2**_Mozambique GFS manual_**_:_ Document the step-
by-step process of compiling the annual and quarterly
GFS and ensure the consistency of the process and
institutional memory.
|DEEF
|December
2020|\n|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|\n|
H
|
2.1**_Public sector structure and inventory of entities_**
**_that belong to the sector_**_: (i) validate the sector’s_
_structure; (ii) complete the inventory and classify the_
_entities according to the GFSM 2014 [for Mozambique_
_GG, GCO, EBU, LG, INSS and public enterprises] for_
_compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary_
_and financial statistics, and external and real-sector_
_statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on the MEF,_
_BM and INE websites._
|
MEF, BM and
INE
|April 2020
|\n|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|
**3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
|\n|
L|
3.1 **_Development of_SGIFP:**(i) Create standardized
tables to aggregate and extract in Excel the balances
of all the items in the revenue and annual, quarterly
and monthly expenditures classifiers; and (ii)
Incorporate the GFSM 2014 codes so that the SGIFP
will be able to manage GFS automatically.|
DEEF and
CEDSIF
|
December
2020|\n|H|
3.2**_ Financial data of the EBUs, INSS and local_**
**_authorities:_** Collect the reports and accounts of all
the entities in the budgetary system that comprise the
government in Mozambique.|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|August 2020|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21600341796875, 240.19198608398438, 538.343994140625, 720.7676391601562], "columns": 4, "rows": 9}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n13. Progress in compiling GFS according to the GFSM 2014. No progress was made in\nterms of actions the last mission left, because the workload has increased at the Economic and\nFinancial Studies Directorate (DEEF) and human resources are insufficient. Accordingly, the action\nplan left by the last mission is still in effect, and the only steps taken have been to review the\ntexts required to ensure a better understanding of the actions and target dates for completing\nthem.\n\n Priority Action Responsible institutions Target Completion Date \n\n 1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS 1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS 1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS 1. COORDINATION OF THE COMPILATION PROCESS \n H 1.1 CCGFS or CSE macroeconomic statistics group. Establish a committee or group in the CSE whose goals and the responsibilities of the members and data to be shared will be specified in a memorandum of understanding signed by the members. DEEF, DNCP, DNPO, DNT, GGR, BM and INSS April 2020 \n L 1.2_Mozambique GFS manual__:_ Document the step- by-step process of compiling the annual and quarterly GFS and ensure the consistency of the process and institutional memory. DEEF December 2020 \n 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE – PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE \n H 2.1_Public sector structure and inventory of entities_ _that belong to the sector__: (i) validate the sector’s_ _structure; (ii) complete the inventory and classify the_ _entities according to the GFSM 2014 [for Mozambique_ _GG, GCO, EBU, LG, INSS and public enterprises] for_ _compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary_ _and financial statistics, and external and real-sector_ _statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on the MEF,_ _BM and INE websites._ MEF, BM and INE April 2020 \n 3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3. DATA SOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE \n L 3.1 _Development of_SGIFP:(i) Create standardized tables to aggregate and extract in Excel the balances of all the items in the revenue and annual, quarterly and monthly expenditures classifiers; and (ii) Incorporate the GFSM 2014 codes so that the SGIFP will be able to manage GFS automatically. DEEF and CEDSIF December 2020 \n H 3.2_ Financial data of the EBUs, INSS and local_ _authorities:_ Collect the reports and accounts of all the entities in the budgetary system that comprise the government in Mozambique. BM and MEF (DNT and DEEF) August 2020 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9", "text_characters": 2305}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**4. COMPILATION **
|**4. COMPILATION **
|**4. COMPILATION **
|**4. COMPILATION **
|\n|
M|
4.1 **_Nonfinancial assets:_**Evaluate the possibility of
whether the inventory of government property could
be used to ascertain the value of the stock and
change in nonfinancial assets in compiling the GFS.
|
DNCP, DNPE
DNPO, DEEF|
December
2020|\n|M|4.2**_Treatment of leasing:_** Begin to record them as
follows: (i) record of loan disbursements in the leasing
contract as an increase in deposits against the
increase in the domestic debt; (ii) recognize the
property as a decrease in banks by paying the
contractor. The increase in investments in nonfinancial
assets is the counterpart.
|DNT, DNCP
and DNPE|August 2020
|\n|M|
4.3**_ Coverage of government deposits._** (i) Include the
available cash of the local authorities to complete the
government; and (ii) begin reporting the totals of
each government subsector in Mozambique: GG =
GCO+EBU+INSS+LG
|BM|August 2020|\n|M|4.4**_ Composition of deposits._** Assess the content of
the deposits and record all government financial
assets and income recognized of the monetary
accounts in the fiscal accounts.
|DNCP, DNT
and DEEF|August 2020|\n|H|
4.5** Periodic reconciliation of deposits****_._ **Implement a
formal process of periodic reconciliation of stock and
flows (by currency and public sector beneficiary),
including explanations of all the differences identified
between the BM and DNT, and share the result with
the other CCGFS members.
|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|April 2020|\n|H|
4.6**_ Deposits in the GCO Fiscal Table._**(i) ensure that
the position the BM ascertained corresponds to the
coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the line); (ii)
begin considering only GCO deposits (exclude
available cash of the INSS and EBUs); (iii) make the
required adjustments to the income included in
deposits and ensure that they have the proper above-
the-line counterpart.
|MEF|April 2020|\n|H
|
4.7**_ Data on the domestic and external public debt_**
**_for the Fiscal Table_.** (i) Use MEF data to ensure
consistency between debt stocks and flows; (ii)
Exclude the OEFs from the transactions in the Fiscal
Table.
|DEEF and DNT
|April 2020|\n|H|
4.8**_ Reconciliation of the domestic and external_**
**_public debt._**(i) Finalize the reconciliation work begun
during the mission and document the final result; and
(ii) Implement a formal process for the periodic|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|April 2020|\n\n\n\n**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21818542480469, 72.1919937133789, 538.341796875, 724.0076293945312], "columns": 4, "rows": 10}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institutions Target Completion Date \n\n 4. COMPILATION 4. COMPILATION 4. COMPILATION 4. COMPILATION \n M 4.1 _Nonfinancial assets:_Evaluate the possibility of whether the inventory of government property could be used to ascertain the value of the stock and change in nonfinancial assets in compiling the GFS. DNCP, DNPE DNPO, DEEF December 2020 \n M 4.2_Treatment of leasing:_ Begin to record them as follows: (i) record of loan disbursements in the leasing contract as an increase in deposits against the increase in the domestic debt; (ii) recognize the property as a decrease in banks by paying the contractor. The increase in investments in nonfinancial assets is the counterpart. DNT, DNCP and DNPE August 2020 \n M 4.3_ Coverage of government deposits._ (i) Include the available cash of the local authorities to complete the government; and (ii) begin reporting the totals of each government subsector in Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG BM August 2020 \n M 4.4_ Composition of deposits._ Assess the content of the deposits and record all government financial assets and income recognized of the monetary accounts in the fiscal accounts. DNCP, DNT and DEEF August 2020 \n H 4.5 Periodic reconciliation of deposits_._ Implement a formal process of periodic reconciliation of stock and flows (by currency and public sector beneficiary), including explanations of all the differences identified between the BM and DNT, and share the result with the other CCGFS members. BM and MEF (DNT and DEEF) April 2020 \n H 4.6_ Deposits in the GCO Fiscal Table._(i) ensure that the position the BM ascertained corresponds to the coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the line); (ii) begin considering only GCO deposits (exclude available cash of the INSS and EBUs); (iii) make the required adjustments to the income included in deposits and ensure that they have the proper above- the-line counterpart. MEF April 2020 \n H 4.7_ Data on the domestic and external public debt_ _for the Fiscal Table_. (i) Use MEF data to ensure consistency between debt stocks and flows; (ii) Exclude the OEFs from the transactions in the Fiscal Table. DEEF and DNT April 2020 \n H 4.8_ Reconciliation of the domestic and external_ _public debt._(i) Finalize the reconciliation work begun during the mission and document the final result; and (ii) Implement a formal process for the periodic BM and MEF (DNT and DEEF) April 2020 \n\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2070}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n||reconciliation of flows and stock (by instrument, face
and nominal value, and by creditor), including
explanations of all the differences identified in the BM
data (NGC and balance of payments) and DNT
(detailed tables of the debt),and share the result with
the members of the CCGFS.
|||\n|H|
4.9**_ Treasury bills._** (i) Adjust the total T-bill debt to be
recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts of the
public sector; and (ii) the BM should begin to report
the total debt of each of the subsectors in the public
sector of Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG
and the business, financial and nonfinancial sector.
|MEF and BM|April 2020|\n|H|
4.10**_ Treasury bonds (T-bonds)_**. Present a
disaggregated total of treasury securities: (i) detail of
T-Bill issuances and (ii) detail of T-bonds.
|BM|April 2020|\n|H|
4.11**_ Commercial bank loans_. **Present the details of
total commercial bank loans.
|BM|April 2020|\n|M|
4.13**_ Expenditures associated with BM credits._**
_Validate and begin to record expenditures associated_
_with domestic credit published in the monetary_
_accounts._
|MEF|August 2020|\n|M|
4.14**_ Debt in arrears._**_ In the domestic debt table,_
_recognize the amount of5,817.8 million meticais of debt in_
_arrears, recognized and validated by the GRM in end-2019._
|DNT|April 2020|\n|H|
4.15**_ Treasury Operations._ **In the Fiscal Table, begin
recognizing, ideally using a modified/commitment
cash approach (considering credit and debit
balances).
|MEF|April 2020|\n|H|
4.16**_ Fiscal years ended._ **In the Fiscal Table, begin
recognizing them in accounts payable below the line,
and for the record that is kept on expenditures, above
the line.
|MEF|April 2020|\n|M|
_4.17_**_Data from the e-SISTAFE trial balance:_** extract
the primary fiscal data to begin compiling the GFS.
|DEEF|August 2020|\n|H|
4.18**_ Mozambique GFS from 2016-2018 and_**
**_compiled during the mission:_**_ Validate and submit_
_them to the IMF/STA and INE._
|DEEF|February
2020|\n|L|
4.19**_ GFS annual and quarterly series 2010-2018_**_: _
_Compile tables 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8A and 8B of the GFSM_
_2014 and submit them to the IMF._
|DEEF|December
2020|\n|H
|4.20**_ Fiscal Table revision:_** Restructure it to ensure
that it is aligned with international standards (GFSM
2014): Declaration I of government operations.
|DNT and DEEF
|August 2020
|\n|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|
**5. DISSEMINATION**
|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2239990234375, 72.1919937133789, 538.3359985351562, 721.3800048828125], "columns": 4, "rows": 14}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institutions Target Completion Date \n\n reconciliation of flows and stock (by instrument, face and nominal value, and by creditor), including explanations of all the differences identified in the BM data (NGC and balance of payments) and DNT (detailed tables of the debt),and share the result with the members of the CCGFS. \n H 4.9_ Treasury bills._ (i) Adjust the total T-bill debt to be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts of the public sector; and (ii) the BM should begin to report the total debt of each of the subsectors in the public sector of Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG and the business, financial and nonfinancial sector. MEF and BM April 2020 \n H 4.10_ Treasury bonds (T-bonds)_. Present a disaggregated total of treasury securities: (i) detail of T-Bill issuances and (ii) detail of T-bonds. BM April 2020 \n H 4.11_ Commercial bank loans_. Present the details of total commercial bank loans. BM April 2020 \n M 4.13_ Expenditures associated with BM credits._ _Validate and begin to record expenditures associated_ _with domestic credit published in the monetary_ _accounts._ MEF August 2020 \n M 4.14_ Debt in arrears.__ In the domestic debt table,_ _recognize the amount of5,817.8 million meticais of debt in_ _arrears, recognized and validated by the GRM in end-2019._ DNT April 2020 \n H 4.15_ Treasury Operations._ In the Fiscal Table, begin recognizing, ideally using a modified/commitment cash approach (considering credit and debit balances). MEF April 2020 \n H 4.16_ Fiscal years ended._ In the Fiscal Table, begin recognizing them in accounts payable below the line, and for the record that is kept on expenditures, above the line. MEF April 2020 \n M _4.17__Data from the e-SISTAFE trial balance:_ extract the primary fiscal data to begin compiling the GFS. DEEF August 2020 \n H 4.18_ Mozambique GFS from 2016-2018 and_ _compiled during the mission:__ Validate and submit_ _them to the IMF/STA and INE._ DEEF February 2020 \n L 4.19_ GFS annual and quarterly series 2010-2018__: _ _Compile tables 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8A and 8B of the GFSM_ _2014 and submit them to the IMF._ DEEF December 2020 \n H 4.20_ Fiscal Table revision:_ Restructure it to ensure that it is aligned with international standards (GFSM 2014): Declaration I of government operations. DNT and DEEF August 2020 \n 5. DISSEMINATION 5. DISSEMINATION 5. DISSEMINATION 5. DISSEMINATION \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11", "text_characters": 2046}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institutions|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|M|5.1**_ Annual and quarterly GFS:_**Begin publishing
them on the MEF website.
||August 2020|\n|M
|
5.2**_ Dissemination of the domestic and external_**
**_public debt._**Begin disseminating debt data by
maturity, residual value, currency and creditor based
on World Bank and IMF data, and on the MEF website.|DEEF|August 2020|\n|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|
**Key:**
High = H
Medium = M
Low = L
|\n\n\n\n**A. Coordination of the GFS Compilation Process**\n\n**14.** **GFS Compilation Committee (CCGFS).** The GFS compilation process must be organized\nwith various entities. In this regard, the mission reiterates the recommendation made by previous\nmissions: create a committee (the CCGFS), led by the DEEF, to facilitate the process of compiling\nGFS. In this committee’s structure, for the entities that will be part of it (DEEF, DNCP, DNPO, DNT,\n\nGGR and BM), their respective responsibilities and the data to be shared, the mission\nrecommends listing them in a memorandum of understanding signed by the members.\n\n**15.** **Macroeconomic statistics group in the Superior Statistics Council (CSE).** Once the\nGFS comprise a subsystem in the national accounts system, _another alternative_ would be to\ncreate in the CSE a structure that already exists in Mozambique: a group for macroeconomic\nstatistics with the same structure and objectives suggested for the CCGFS. Here it should be\nnoted that today the DEEF is already sharing details of GFS with the INE to provide input for the\nnational accounts, and hence this would be a forum for discussions of the four macroeconomic\nsectors to ensure the consistency of Mozambican data.\n\n**16.** **Mozambique GFS Manual.** The mission repeats the recommendation to develop a GFS\ncompilation manual (a guide) that represents a living set of working instructions used in the\nprocess of compiling the GFS, which will be useful for the team’s understanding in order to\nensure sustainability (create an institutional memory) and consistency in the compilation process.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2020|**CCGFS or macroeconomic statistics group in theCSE. **
Establish a committee or group in the CSE whose members’
objectives and responsibilities and data will be shared and
listed in a memorandum of understanding signed by the
members.|DEEF, DNCP,
DNPO, DNT, GGR,
BM and INSS|\n\n\n\n**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.09012603759766, 72.1919937133789, 538.3800048828125, 264.2995910644531], "columns": 4, "rows": 4}, {"bbox": [90.09012603759766, 609.6599731445312, 538.3800048828125, 726.6599731445312], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institutions Target Completion Date \n\n M 5.1_ Annual and quarterly GFS:_Begin publishing them on the MEF website. August 2020 \n M 5.2_ Dissemination of the domestic and external_ _public debt._Begin disseminating debt data by maturity, residual value, currency and creditor based on World Bank and IMF data, and on the MEF website. DEEF August 2020 \n Key: High = H Medium = M Low = L Key: High = H Medium = M Low = L Key: High = H Medium = M Low = L Key: High = H Medium = M Low = L \n\nA. Coordination of the GFS Compilation Process\n\n14. GFS Compilation Committee (CCGFS). The GFS compilation process must be organized\nwith various entities. In this regard, the mission reiterates the recommendation made by previous\nmissions: create a committee (the CCGFS), led by the DEEF, to facilitate the process of compiling\nGFS. In this committee’s structure, for the entities that will be part of it (DEEF, DNCP, DNPO, DNT,\n\nGGR and BM), their respective responsibilities and the data to be shared, the mission\nrecommends listing them in a memorandum of understanding signed by the members.\n\n15. Macroeconomic statistics group in the Superior Statistics Council (CSE). Once the\nGFS comprise a subsystem in the national accounts system, _another alternative_ would be to\ncreate in the CSE a structure that already exists in Mozambique: a group for macroeconomic\nstatistics with the same structure and objectives suggested for the CCGFS. Here it should be\nnoted that today the DEEF is already sharing details of GFS with the INE to provide input for the\nnational accounts, and hence this would be a forum for discussions of the four macroeconomic\nsectors to ensure the consistency of Mozambican data.\n\n16. Mozambique GFS Manual. The mission repeats the recommendation to develop a GFS\ncompilation manual (a guide) that represents a living set of working instructions used in the\nprocess of compiling the GFS, which will be useful for the team’s understanding in order to\nensure sustainability (create an institutional memory) and consistency in the compilation process.\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n April 2020 CCGFS or macroeconomic statistics group in theCSE. Establish a committee or group in the CSE whose members’ objectives and responsibilities and data will be shared and listed in a memorandum of understanding signed by the members. DEEF, DNCP, DNPO, DNT, GGR, BM and INSS \n\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2062}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0014-001"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**B. Sectorization and Sources of Fiscal Data**\n\n**17.** **This is ongoing pending the validation of the public sector structure, as well as the**\n**inventory and classification of the units in the sector.** Consequently, data were not collected\nfrom the extrabudgetary units, the local authorities, or social security. This is the starting point in\nthe process of compiling any type of statistic. The mission recommends performing this work in\ncooperation with all public institutions responsible for compiling macroeconomic statistics in\nMozambique to ensure their consistency. The preliminary survey that was conducted in the\nMozambique public sector is in Annex I. A structure proposal and preliminary listings of the\nentities and their respective classifications are found in the annex to the report of the AugustSeptember 2018 GFS mission.\n\n**18.** **Obtaining data through the Public Finance Management Information System**\n**(SGIFP).** As the entity in charge of the process of compiling the GFS, the DEEF already has access\nto e-SISTAFE to extract primary data on the budget, although there are challenges in extracting\nfrom the report trial balances that incorporate the balances of all the accounts that are part of\nthe revenue and expenditure budgetary classifications, which correspond to the position\nreported in the Government Financial Report and Statement (CGE). The CEDSIF developed the\nSGIFP, a _Business Intelligence_ (BI) platform that creates system reports automatically. In the\ncurrent development of the above-mentioned platform, the mission recommends creating\nstandardized tables based on revenue and expenditure to facilitate the compilation of the GFS in\na first phase and in the future, perhaps to standardize the GFS codes and generate the GFS\nautomatically in SGIFP.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|
April 2020|**_Public sector structure and inventory of entities that belong to_**
**_the sector_**_: (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the inventory_
_and classify the entities according to the GFSM 2014 [for Mozambique_
_GG, GCO, EBU, LG, INSS and public enterprises] for compiling_
_macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial statistics, and_
_external and real-sector statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on_
_the MEF, BM and the INE websites._
|MEF, BM and
INE|\n|December
2020|**_Development of_SGIFP:**(i) Create standardized tables to aggregate
and extract in Excel the balances of all the items in the revenue and
annual, quarterly and monthly expenditures classifiers; and (ii)
Incorporate the GFSM 2014 codes so that the SGIFP will be able to
manage the GFS automatically.|DEEF and
CEDSIF|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.92033386230469, 495.0599670410156, 538.4000244140625, 714.2996215820312], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nB. Sectorization and Sources of Fiscal Data\n\n17. This is ongoing pending the validation of the public sector structure, as well as the\ninventory and classification of the units in the sector. Consequently, data were not collected\nfrom the extrabudgetary units, the local authorities, or social security. This is the starting point in\nthe process of compiling any type of statistic. The mission recommends performing this work in\ncooperation with all public institutions responsible for compiling macroeconomic statistics in\nMozambique to ensure their consistency. The preliminary survey that was conducted in the\nMozambique public sector is in Annex I. A structure proposal and preliminary listings of the\nentities and their respective classifications are found in the annex to the report of the AugustSeptember 2018 GFS mission.\n\n18. Obtaining data through the Public Finance Management Information System\n(SGIFP). As the entity in charge of the process of compiling the GFS, the DEEF already has access\nto e-SISTAFE to extract primary data on the budget, although there are challenges in extracting\nfrom the report trial balances that incorporate the balances of all the accounts that are part of\nthe revenue and expenditure budgetary classifications, which correspond to the position\nreported in the Government Financial Report and Statement (CGE). The CEDSIF developed the\nSGIFP, a _Business Intelligence_ (BI) platform that creates system reports automatically. In the\ncurrent development of the above-mentioned platform, the mission recommends creating\nstandardized tables based on revenue and expenditure to facilitate the compilation of the GFS in\na first phase and in the future, perhaps to standardize the GFS codes and generate the GFS\nautomatically in SGIFP.\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n April 2020 _Public sector structure and inventory of entities that belong to_ _the sector__: (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the inventory_ _and classify the entities according to the GFSM 2014 [for Mozambique_ _GG, GCO, EBU, LG, INSS and public enterprises] for compiling_ _macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial statistics, and_ _external and real-sector statistics); and (iii) ratify and publish them on_ _the MEF, BM and the INE websites._ MEF, BM and INE \n December 2020 _Development of_SGIFP:(i) Create standardized tables to aggregate and extract in Excel the balances of all the items in the revenue and annual, quarterly and monthly expenditures classifiers; and (ii) Incorporate the GFSM 2014 codes so that the SGIFP will be able to manage the GFS automatically. DEEF and CEDSIF \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13", "text_characters": 2295}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**C. Identification of Statistical Discrepancies**\n\n**19.** **Revision of the 2016-2018 fiscal accounts.** Given the necessity of improving the\nquality of fiscal data, the mission revised the GCO 2016-2018 data to identify causes of statistical\ndiscrepancies and recommend processes for producing fiscal statistics in accordance with more\nup-to-date international standards. The information below shows the key findings and the\nresults the mission identified.\n\n**20.** **Key causes of discrepancies** . (i) The various sources of data used to produce the fiscal\ntable; (ii) the difference in institutional coverage of the fiscal and monetary accounts – above and\nbelow the line of the Fiscal Table respectively; and (iii) the lack of periodic reconciliation of the\ndata. These are the key causes of the discrepancies. The discrepancies are primarily in\ntransactions for government assets and liabilities. The listing of the transactions that are used to\nidentify the discrepancies is in Table 4 below, and the detail of each transaction is reported in the\nrest of this section.\n\n**21.** **Discrepancies before and after adjusting the Fiscal Table** . Figure 1 below\ndemonstrates the magnitudes in the variations of discrepancies identified in accordance with\ninternational standards, before and after adjustments are made in the Fiscal Table with the\ntransactions listed in Table 4. As Table 1 shows, Figure 1 reports adjustments in the accounts of\nabout 8.6 billion meticais in 2016, 15.3 billion in 2017 and 21.9 billion in 2018, representing\nreductions in discrepancies to levels below 1 percent of GDP in the last three years. Moreover,\nthe adjustments that were made in the GFS in accordance with the GFSM 2014 identified a\ngreater overall total compared to the GFS that were compiled according to the GFSM 1986, due\nto the reclassification of investment revenue and expenditures as part of financial or nonfinancial\nassets.\n\n**22.** **Integrity of the GFS** . The identification of the discrepancies certifies only that the fiscal\ndata used are duly classified according to the GFSM 2014. It is the responsibility of the\nauthorities to ensure the integrity of the accounts so that the Fiscal Table captures all GCO\ntransactions that are to be incorporated into the above-mentioned table in accordance with the\ndouble-entry accounting rule. The mission believes that there must be periodic and fundamental\nreconciliation to ensure that the Fiscal Table is capturing most if not all GCO transactions.\n\n\n\n**Table 4. Discrepancies 2016-2018**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Fiscal Table|Description|Record|Col5|Col6|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
i|
Investment in
nonfinancial
assets|
Investment expenditure financed
with external funds
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
|
|
5,207.8
|\n|
i|
Investment in
nonfinancial
assets|
|1|1|1|||
|\n||||||||||\n\n\n\n**14** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.92033386230469, 672.449462890625, 543.1799926757812, 734.1884765625], "columns": 9, "rows": 4}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nC. Identification of Statistical Discrepancies\n\n19. Revision of the 2016-2018 fiscal accounts. Given the necessity of improving the\nquality of fiscal data, the mission revised the GCO 2016-2018 data to identify causes of statistical\ndiscrepancies and recommend processes for producing fiscal statistics in accordance with more\nup-to-date international standards. The information below shows the key findings and the\nresults the mission identified.\n\n20. Key causes of discrepancies . (i) The various sources of data used to produce the fiscal\ntable; (ii) the difference in institutional coverage of the fiscal and monetary accounts – above and\nbelow the line of the Fiscal Table respectively; and (iii) the lack of periodic reconciliation of the\ndata. These are the key causes of the discrepancies. The discrepancies are primarily in\ntransactions for government assets and liabilities. The listing of the transactions that are used to\nidentify the discrepancies is in Table 4 below, and the detail of each transaction is reported in the\nrest of this section.\n\n21. Discrepancies before and after adjusting the Fiscal Table . Figure 1 below\ndemonstrates the magnitudes in the variations of discrepancies identified in accordance with\ninternational standards, before and after adjustments are made in the Fiscal Table with the\ntransactions listed in Table 4. As Table 1 shows, Figure 1 reports adjustments in the accounts of\nabout 8.6 billion meticais in 2016, 15.3 billion in 2017 and 21.9 billion in 2018, representing\nreductions in discrepancies to levels below 1 percent of GDP in the last three years. Moreover,\nthe adjustments that were made in the GFS in accordance with the GFSM 2014 identified a\ngreater overall total compared to the GFS that were compiled according to the GFSM 1986, due\nto the reclassification of investment revenue and expenditures as part of financial or nonfinancial\nassets.\n\n22. Integrity of the GFS . The identification of the discrepancies certifies only that the fiscal\ndata used are duly classified according to the GFSM 2014. It is the responsibility of the\nauthorities to ensure the integrity of the accounts so that the Fiscal Table captures all GCO\ntransactions that are to be incorporated into the above-mentioned table in accordance with the\ndouble-entry accounting rule. The mission believes that there must be periodic and fundamental\nreconciliation to ensure that the Fiscal Table is capturing most if not all GCO transactions.\n\nTable 4. Discrepancies 2016-2018\n\n Col1 Fiscal Table Description Record Col5 Col6 2016 2017 2018 \n\n i Investment in nonfinancial assets Investment expenditure financed with external funds 1 1 1 5,207.8 \n i Investment in nonfinancial assets 1 1 1 \n \n\n14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2326}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0016-001"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Leasing of public buildings|Col4|54.3|15.2|11,279.5|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|Ii
|GCO deposits
|
National Social Security Institute
(INSS)|0
|
(4,361.6)|
(2,899.6)|
(8,691.2)|\n|Ii
|GCO deposits
|
T-bills used for monetary policy
(including interest received)
|0
|
(13,659.4)
|
(64,199.8)
|
(24,527.7)
|\n|Ii
|GCO deposits
|
Other regularizations
|0|
(152.0)|
(117.3)|
(1,230.1)|\n|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Treasury Securities (T-bills used
for monetary policy including
interest paid and
T-bonds)|1
0
|
(10,274.0)
|
(72,724.4)
|
(14,052.3)
|\n|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Commercial bank loans
|0
|
(6,673.7)
|
(165.8)
|
(1,518.8)
|\n|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Portuguese line of credit
|0
|
(18,434.4)|
(16,164.6)|
(12,680.3)
|\n|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Arrears|
|
|
|
6,764.1
|\n|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Other regularizations
|
0
|
(1,490.0)
|
(103.7)
|
3,048.5
|\n|iii
|Net domestic
debt
|
Other economic flows|1
|
403.4
|
4,688.2
|
(489.4)
|\n|iv|Other
accounts
payable and
receivable|
“Treasury Operations”|0
|
7,396.8
|
(16,987.1)
|
(15,604.4)|\n|iv|Other
accounts
payable and
receivable|
Fiscal years ended||
14.1|
472.2|
183.0|\n\n\n\nSource: MEF and BM\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**i.** **Investment in Nonfinancial Assets**\n\n**1.1** **Investment expenditure financed with external funds**\n\n\n**23.** **Government investment projects financed with external funds.** The mission believes\nthat some of the inexplicable discrepancy may be in investments in nonfinancial assets. Currently\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **15**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98200225830078, 72.19998931884766, 543.138427734375, 407.7712097167969], "columns": 7, "rows": 12}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Col1 Col2 Leasing of public buildings Col4 54.3 15.2 11,279.5 \n\n Ii GCO deposits National Social Security Institute (INSS) 0 (4,361.6) (2,899.6) (8,691.2) \n Ii GCO deposits T-bills used for monetary policy (including interest received) 0 (13,659.4) (64,199.8) (24,527.7) \n Ii GCO deposits Other regularizations 0 (152.0) (117.3) (1,230.1) \n iii Net domestic debt Treasury Securities (T-bills used for monetary policy including interest paid and T-bonds) 1 0 (10,274.0) (72,724.4) (14,052.3) \n iii Net domestic debt Commercial bank loans 0 (6,673.7) (165.8) (1,518.8) \n iii Net domestic debt Portuguese line of credit 0 (18,434.4) (16,164.6) (12,680.3) \n iii Net domestic debt Arrears 6,764.1 \n iii Net domestic debt Other regularizations 0 (1,490.0) (103.7) 3,048.5 \n iii Net domestic debt Other economic flows 1 403.4 4,688.2 (489.4) \n iv Other accounts payable and receivable “Treasury Operations” 0 7,396.8 (16,987.1) (15,604.4) \n iv Other accounts payable and receivable Fiscal years ended 14.1 472.2 183.0 \n\nSource: MEF and BM\n\ni. Investment in Nonfinancial Assets\n\n1.1 Investment expenditure financed with external funds\n\n23. Government investment projects financed with external funds. The mission believes\nthat some of the inexplicable discrepancy may be in investments in nonfinancial assets. Currently\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 15", "text_characters": 1149}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nthe authorities assume for investment expenditure that 100 percent of disbursements must be\nexternal financing (common funds and other funds via/outside the Single Treasury Account\n(STA)) and 100 percent of grants. Therefore, determining the amount of disbursements actually\nused has been a challenge due to the lack of timely information on investment projects. This\ngenerates potential discrepancies that not all disbursements have been used and remain\navailable in banks. Hence, we have an increase in expenditure with no counterpart in banks.\n\n**24.** **Analysis of this item’s consistency in the 2014-2018 Fiscal Table** . The mission\nobserved that the above-mentioned requirement is applied only in the Fiscal Tables for the years\n2017 and 2018 (see Table 5), prepared by the authorities. Even though the mission agrees with\nthe methodology, it is important to ensure that the methodology that is used is consistent, and\nfirst and foremost, that efforts are made to obtain actual investment expenditures.\n\n**Table 5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**1.2** **Leasing of government buildings**\n\n\n**25.** **Leasing of government buildings** _**.**_ In 2018 the authorities assumed the amount of 11.3\nbillion meticais (see Table 6 below) with reference to bank financing for leasing public buildings,\nthe value of which was reconciled with financial institutions and the amount of the BM debt was\nupdated. According to the authorities, disbursement associated with this debt has been recorded\nin the domestic debt stock, but there has been no recognition of government buildings in\ngovernment financial worth. This is a source of discrepancy in the Fiscal Table.\n\n\n**16** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nthe authorities assume for investment expenditure that 100 percent of disbursements must be\nexternal financing (common funds and other funds via/outside the Single Treasury Account\n(STA)) and 100 percent of grants. Therefore, determining the amount of disbursements actually\nused has been a challenge due to the lack of timely information on investment projects. This\ngenerates potential discrepancies that not all disbursements have been used and remain\navailable in banks. Hence, we have an increase in expenditure with no counterpart in banks.\n\n24. Analysis of this item’s consistency in the 2014-2018 Fiscal Table . The mission\nobserved that the above-mentioned requirement is applied only in the Fiscal Tables for the years\n2017 and 2018 (see Table 5), prepared by the authorities. Even though the mission agrees with\nthe methodology, it is important to ensure that the methodology that is used is consistent, and\nfirst and foremost, that efforts are made to obtain actual investment expenditures.\n\nTable 5. Investments in Nonfinancial Assets\n\n1.2 Leasing of government buildings\n\n25. Leasing of government buildings _._ In 2018 the authorities assumed the amount of 11.3\nbillion meticais (see Table 6 below) with reference to bank financing for leasing public buildings,\nthe value of which was reconciled with financial institutions and the amount of the BM debt was\nupdated. According to the authorities, disbursement associated with this debt has been recorded\nin the domestic debt stock, but there has been no recognition of government buildings in\ngovernment financial worth. This is a source of discrepancy in the Fiscal Table.\n\n16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1429}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**Table 6. Leasing** **of Government Buildings**\n\n\n\n|Leasing|2016|Col3|2017|Col5|2018|Col7|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
|
**Issue**|
**Stock**|
**Issue**|
**Stock**|
**Issue**|
**Stock**|\n|**Total**|
** 54.3**|
**6,385.8**|
**15.2**|
**6,110.8**|
** 11,279.5**|
**17,038.5**|\n|Leasing (M.A.E.F.Pub)|
-|
15.4|
-|
7.8|
-|
-|\n|
Leasing (MITUR)|
-|
15.4|
-|
7.9|
-|
-|\n|
Leasing TA|
-|
287.5|
-|
159.4|
-|
27.5|\n|
Leasing Min. of Energy|
9.5|
346.4|
15.2|
288.5|
-|
190.5|\n|
Leasing Admin. Tribunal
|
44.7|
967.6|
-|
900.7
|
-
|
804.5|\n|
CNAQ –
Cons. Nac. Aval. Q. En. Sup|
-|
87.2|
-|
80.1|
-|
70.1|\n|
Leasing Multi-Serviços|
-|
4,579.6|
-|
4,579.6|
-|
4,579.6|\n|
Leasing Ministry of Justice
|
-|
86.8|
-|
86.8|
-|
86.8|\n|
Leasing Min. of Ag. and Food
Security|
-|
-|
-|
-|
6,590.3|
6,590.3|\n|
Leasing MEF|
-|
-|
-|
-|
4,689.2|
4,689.2|\n\n\nSource: DNT (Detailed statements of the domestic debt)\n\n**26.** **Treatment of leasing of government buildings.** The entry of leasing of government\nbuildings requires two records. Since the mission did not have access to the lease contracts and\ndid not know the contract terms (including payment of interest and commissions), for the sake\nof simplicity, but assuming that the ownership of the buildings at the end of the contract is the\ngovernment, according to the GFSM 2014, using the cash approach, the authorities should\nprepare the following records: public debt contracted via leasing contracts and recognition of\ngovernment buildings in government property. As Table 7 below illustrates: (i) the government\ncontracts loans under leasing contracts, which assumes an increase in the domestic debt – loans,\nagainst an increase in deposits; (ii) the second record is for the property, which represents the\npayment to the contractor, and thus this requires an increase in the acquisition of nonfinancial\nassets (31) against a reduction in deposits (32).\n\n**27.** **Suitable record of buildings in government property.** In paying contractors, if there is\nonly a reduction in deposits without a counterpart, as the second record above suggests, this\nrecord may create an imbalance in the accounts. Even though the GCO has no equity\naccounting, the record of transactions at the financial and budget level should be duly captured\nand recorded in the accounting. However, the authorities now have an inventory of government\nproperty that can be used to ascertain the value of the stock and the change in nonfinancial\n\n\n\nassets for the GFS. Therefore, the record of government buildings in leasing contracts would require\n\n\n\nthe record of buildings in the inventory of government property.\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **17**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98332214355469, 100.64570617675781, 540.0177001953125, 320.069580078125], "columns": 7, "rows": 13}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTable 6. Leasing of Government Buildings\n\n Leasing 2016 Col3 2017 Col5 2018 Col7 \n\n Issue Stock Issue Stock Issue Stock \n Total 54.3 6,385.8 15.2 6,110.8 11,279.5 17,038.5 \n Leasing (M.A.E.F.Pub) - 15.4 - 7.8 - - \n Leasing (MITUR) - 15.4 - 7.9 - - \n Leasing TA - 287.5 - 159.4 - 27.5 \n Leasing Min. of Energy 9.5 346.4 15.2 288.5 - 190.5 \n Leasing Admin. Tribunal 44.7 967.6 - 900.7 - 804.5 \n CNAQ – Cons. Nac. Aval. Q. En. Sup - 87.2 - 80.1 - 70.1 \n Leasing Multi-Serviços - 4,579.6 - 4,579.6 - 4,579.6 \n Leasing Ministry of Justice - 86.8 - 86.8 - 86.8 \n Leasing Min. of Ag. and Food Security - - - - 6,590.3 6,590.3 \n Leasing MEF - - - - 4,689.2 4,689.2 \n\nSource: DNT (Detailed statements of the domestic debt)\n\n26. Treatment of leasing of government buildings. The entry of leasing of government\nbuildings requires two records. Since the mission did not have access to the lease contracts and\ndid not know the contract terms (including payment of interest and commissions), for the sake\nof simplicity, but assuming that the ownership of the buildings at the end of the contract is the\ngovernment, according to the GFSM 2014, using the cash approach, the authorities should\nprepare the following records: public debt contracted via leasing contracts and recognition of\ngovernment buildings in government property. As Table 7 below illustrates: (i) the government\ncontracts loans under leasing contracts, which assumes an increase in the domestic debt – loans,\nagainst an increase in deposits; (ii) the second record is for the property, which represents the\npayment to the contractor, and thus this requires an increase in the acquisition of nonfinancial\nassets (31) against a reduction in deposits (32).\n\n27. Suitable record of buildings in government property. In paying contractors, if there is\nonly a reduction in deposits without a counterpart, as the second record above suggests, this\nrecord may create an imbalance in the accounts. Even though the GCO has no equity\naccounting, the record of transactions at the financial and budget level should be duly captured\nand recorded in the accounting. However, the authorities now have an inventory of government\nproperty that can be used to ascertain the value of the stock and the change in nonfinancial\n\nassets for the GFS. Therefore, the record of government buildings in leasing contracts would require\n\nthe record of buildings in the inventory of government property.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17", "text_characters": 2042}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n**Table 7. Treatment of Leasing**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|From the Financial Balance
Sheet in the GRM
( December 31)|2017|Col3|Col4|Col5|2018|Col7|Col8|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**From the Financial Balance**
**Sheet in the GRM**
(December 31)
|**Opening**
**Balance**|**Transactions**
**(Fiscal**
**Table)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|**Transactions**
**(Fiscal**
**Table)**|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**|\n|1. Revenue|
|
|
|
|
|||\n|2. Expenditure
|2. Expenditure
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|**NOB. Net operating balance**
**(1-2)**
|**NOB. Net operating balance**
**(1-2)**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
31. Net nonfinancial assets –
Property revenue|
31. Net nonfinancial assets –
Property revenue|
15.2|
15.2|
15.2|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|\n|
2M. Total expenditure (2+31)|
2M. Total expenditure (2+31)|
15.2|
15.2|
15.2|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|
11,279.5|\n|**NLB. Loan (+) / Debt (–) net**|**NLB. Loan (+) / Debt (–) net**|
** (15.2)**
|
** (15.2)**
|
** (15.2)**
|
** (11,279.5)**|
** (11,279.5)**|
** (11,279.5)**|\n|**Net financial assets:**|
**(6,385.8)**|
** (15.2)**||
** (6,401.1)**|
** (11,279.5)**||
** (17,680.6)**|\n|**32. Financial assets**
|
|
**(290.3)**|
|
**(290.3)**|
**(351.8)**|
|
** (642.1)**|\n|Government deposits –
Amortization
|
|
(290.3)|
|
(290.3)|
(351.8)|
|
(642.1)|\n|
Government deposits –
Amortization
|
|
15.2|
|
15.2|
11,279.5|
|
11,294.7|\n|
Government deposits –
Amortization|
|
(15.2)|
|
(15.2)|
(11,279.5)|
|
(11,294.7)|\n|
**33. Liabilities**|
6,385.8|
**(275.1)**|
|
**6,110.8**|
** 10,927.7**|
|
** 17,038.5**|\n|Leasing – Amortization
|
6,385.8|
(290.3)|
|
6,095.5|
(351.8)|
|
5,743.7|\n|Leasing – Revenue from
debt|
|
15.2|
|
15.2|
11,279.5|
|
11,294.7|\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|December
2020|**_Nonfinancial assets:_**Evaluate the possibility of using the inventory
of government property to determine the value of the stock and the
change in nonfinancial assets in compiling the GFS.
|DNCP, DNPE
DNPO, DEEF|\n|August
2020
|
**_Treatment of leasing:_**Begin recording as follows: (i) record the
disbursement of loans under the lease contract as an increase in
deposits against an increase in the domestic debt; (ii) recognize the
building by the reduction in banks, by payment of the contractor.
(This is the counterpart to the increase in investments in
nonfinancial assets.
|DNT, DNCP
and DNPE|\n\n\n\n**28.** **GCO deposits in the Fiscal Table.** The position of deposits in the last four years,\nreported by the BM, is in the following table. The mission attempted to understand: (i) the\ncomposition of deposits reported by the BM; and (ii) the institutional coverage of the deposits.\n\n\n**18** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.97044372558594, 100.6199951171875, 539.75048828125, 405.62664794921875], "columns": 8, "rows": 16}, {"bbox": [89.97044372558594, 472.0199890136719, 539.75048828125, 647.3396606445312], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTable 7. Treatment of Leasing\n\n From the Financial Balance Sheet in the GRM ( December 31) 2017 Col3 Col4 Col5 2018 Col7 Col8 \n\n From the Financial Balance Sheet in the GRM (December 31) Opening Balance Transactions (Fiscal Table) OEF Closing Balance Transactions (Fiscal Table) OEF Closing Balance \n 1. Revenue \n 2. Expenditure 2. Expenditure \n NOB. Net operating balance (1-2) NOB. Net operating balance (1-2) \n 31. Net nonfinancial assets – Property revenue 31. Net nonfinancial assets – Property revenue 15.2 15.2 15.2 11,279.5 11,279.5 11,279.5 \n 2M. Total expenditure (2+31) 2M. Total expenditure (2+31) 15.2 15.2 15.2 11,279.5 11,279.5 11,279.5 \n NLB. Loan (+) / Debt (–) net NLB. Loan (+) / Debt (–) net (15.2) (15.2) (15.2) (11,279.5) (11,279.5) (11,279.5) \n Net financial assets: (6,385.8) (15.2) (6,401.1) (11,279.5) (17,680.6) \n 32. Financial assets (290.3) (290.3) (351.8) (642.1) \n Government deposits – Amortization (290.3) (290.3) (351.8) (642.1) \n Government deposits – Amortization 15.2 15.2 11,279.5 11,294.7 \n Government deposits – Amortization (15.2) (15.2) (11,279.5) (11,294.7) \n 33. Liabilities 6,385.8 (275.1) 6,110.8 10,927.7 17,038.5 \n Leasing – Amortization 6,385.8 (290.3) 6,095.5 (351.8) 5,743.7 \n Leasing – Revenue from debt 15.2 15.2 11,279.5 11,294.7 \n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n December 2020 _Nonfinancial assets:_Evaluate the possibility of using the inventory of government property to determine the value of the stock and the change in nonfinancial assets in compiling the GFS. DNCP, DNPE DNPO, DEEF \n August 2020 _Treatment of leasing:_Begin recording as follows: (i) record the disbursement of loans under the lease contract as an increase in deposits against an increase in the domestic debt; (ii) recognize the building by the reduction in banks, by payment of the contractor. (This is the counterpart to the increase in investments in nonfinancial assets. DNT, DNCP and DNPE \n\n28. GCO deposits in the Fiscal Table. The position of deposits in the last four years,\nreported by the BM, is in the following table. The mission attempted to understand: (i) the\ncomposition of deposits reported by the BM; and (ii) the institutional coverage of the deposits.\n\n18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1904}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0020-001"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n**Table 8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSource: BM (NGC)\n\n\n**29.** **Composition of deposits.** Deposits are more common financial assets. According to\nparagraph 7.15 of the GFSM 2014, “financial assets are resources that normally provide the right\nfor the owner of the asset (the creditor) to receive funds or other resources from another unit as\na liability.” In this regard, government financial assets are all demand or term deposits,\nregardless of purpose (earmarking,) or origin of funds (payment of taxes, income, issuance of Tbills used or not used, others). However, in the case of Mozambique:\n\na) **Treasury bills:** The authorities maintain that deposits from issuances of T-bills for\n\nmonetary policy should not be part of total deposits since they constitute a debt only\nafter they are used (greater detail on the treatment of this debt instrument is presented\nlater in this report). However, the MEF considers the interest from these deposits.\nAssuming that the unused securities are not government domestic debt, the deposits\nfrom these issues should not be considered a government financial asset, nor should the\ninterest on the T-bills that these deposits generate.\n\nb) **Earmarked resources:** Another adjustment made in deposits to compile the fiscal\n\naccounts with which the mission disagrees is the exclusion from earmarked resources\nexcept for fiscal year 2017, the only year in the last four when the above-mentioned\nadjustment was not made.\n\nc) **Other regularizations:** These are government earnings recorded in the monetary\n\naccounts generated by the commitment approach the BM uses. Since these\nregularizations impact the financial asset, they generate a discrepancy in the Fiscal Table\nbecause there is no counterpart in the record above the line in income. This issue is also\nobserved for interest, which according to paragraph 5.107 of the GFSM 2014, is a\ncategory of income (revenue that the owners of some types of financial assets received,\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **19**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTable 8. GCO Deposits Excluding the INSS\n\nSource: BM (NGC)\n\n29. Composition of deposits. Deposits are more common financial assets. According to\nparagraph 7.15 of the GFSM 2014, “financial assets are resources that normally provide the right\nfor the owner of the asset (the creditor) to receive funds or other resources from another unit as\na liability.” In this regard, government financial assets are all demand or term deposits,\nregardless of purpose (earmarking,) or origin of funds (payment of taxes, income, issuance of Tbills used or not used, others). However, in the case of Mozambique:\n\na) Treasury bills: The authorities maintain that deposits from issuances of T-bills for\n\nmonetary policy should not be part of total deposits since they constitute a debt only\nafter they are used (greater detail on the treatment of this debt instrument is presented\nlater in this report). However, the MEF considers the interest from these deposits.\nAssuming that the unused securities are not government domestic debt, the deposits\nfrom these issues should not be considered a government financial asset, nor should the\ninterest on the T-bills that these deposits generate.\n\nb) Earmarked resources: Another adjustment made in deposits to compile the fiscal\n\naccounts with which the mission disagrees is the exclusion from earmarked resources\nexcept for fiscal year 2017, the only year in the last four when the above-mentioned\nadjustment was not made.\n\nc) Other regularizations: These are government earnings recorded in the monetary\n\naccounts generated by the commitment approach the BM uses. Since these\nregularizations impact the financial asset, they generate a discrepancy in the Fiscal Table\nbecause there is no counterpart in the record above the line in income. This issue is also\nobserved for interest, which according to paragraph 5.107 of the GFSM 2014, is a\ncategory of income (revenue that the owners of some types of financial assets received,\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 19", "text_characters": 1687}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nincluding deposits), because they are not duly recorded. The mission highly recommends\nadopting this modified cash on hand approach to capture this type of government\nincome, which the MEF is unable to capture on a pure cash basis.\n\n**30.** **Institutional coverage of deposits.** The BM presents as available government cash the\ntotal of central government deposits (GCO and extrabudgetary units) and the INSS, excluding\nlocal government. According to paragraph 2.58 of the GFSM 2014, the central government\nincludes all resident public entities that perform government functions as their principal activity.\nThus, public entities that are part of the central government are: (i) entities that are part of GCO,\n(ii) extrabudgetary units; (iv) regional government; (iv) local government; and (v) social security.\nTo be considered central government deposits as a whole, the BM should begin including\navailable cash of the local authorities as well. In addition, the mission recommends reporting the\ntotals of each government subsector as the international standards recommend.\n\n**31.** **Difference in institutional coverages in the monetary and fiscal accounts.** Just as the\nBM reports deposits, the MEF presents it as part of financing in Fiscal Table, but the Fiscal Table\ncovers the central budgetary government. This difference in coverage of the monetary and fiscal\naccounts generates a discrepancy since “above the line” revenue and expenditure have less\ncoverage than “below the line” transactions in banks. Therefore, the mission sought to identify\nthe amount of corresponding deposits in the INSS and EBUs. The authorities supply the annual\nINSS balances, and the listing of the EBU is pending, in order to ascertain the amount in this\nsubsector of the government.\n\n**32.** **Discrepancies generated by the amount of deposits in the fiscal accounts.** (i)\ndifferences in the institutional coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts; (ii) differences in\nthe record of monetary and fiscal accounts, which results in not recognizing income generated in\nthe monetary sector; (iii) the nonrecognition of some T-bill liabilities in the BM by the MEF are\nthe factor that creates a discrepancy in deposits. The mission recommends work to conduct a\ndetailed analysis of the content of deposits the BM reports in order to ensure the proper\ntreatment of the financial asset in MEF government accounting.\n\n**33.** **Amount of deposits assumed in the 2016-2018 Fiscal Table** . Taking this into account\naccording to the approach of available cash in use, the mission considered the entire amount the\nBM reported as deposits, excluding incoming amounts from T-bill issues and interest, since these\nsecurities are not considered government debt. “Other regularizations” were also excluded\nwhich, using a commitment approach, should be considered government income. Moreover,\nregarding the matter of coverage, the amount of INSS deposits were not considered in order to\nmaintain consistency with the above the line.\n\n\n**20** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nincluding deposits), because they are not duly recorded. The mission highly recommends\nadopting this modified cash on hand approach to capture this type of government\nincome, which the MEF is unable to capture on a pure cash basis.\n\n30. Institutional coverage of deposits. The BM presents as available government cash the\ntotal of central government deposits (GCO and extrabudgetary units) and the INSS, excluding\nlocal government. According to paragraph 2.58 of the GFSM 2014, the central government\nincludes all resident public entities that perform government functions as their principal activity.\nThus, public entities that are part of the central government are: (i) entities that are part of GCO,\n(ii) extrabudgetary units; (iv) regional government; (iv) local government; and (v) social security.\nTo be considered central government deposits as a whole, the BM should begin including\navailable cash of the local authorities as well. In addition, the mission recommends reporting the\ntotals of each government subsector as the international standards recommend.\n\n31. Difference in institutional coverages in the monetary and fiscal accounts. Just as the\nBM reports deposits, the MEF presents it as part of financing in Fiscal Table, but the Fiscal Table\ncovers the central budgetary government. This difference in coverage of the monetary and fiscal\naccounts generates a discrepancy since “above the line” revenue and expenditure have less\ncoverage than “below the line” transactions in banks. Therefore, the mission sought to identify\nthe amount of corresponding deposits in the INSS and EBUs. The authorities supply the annual\nINSS balances, and the listing of the EBU is pending, in order to ascertain the amount in this\nsubsector of the government.\n\n32. Discrepancies generated by the amount of deposits in the fiscal accounts. (i)\ndifferences in the institutional coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts; (ii) differences in\nthe record of monetary and fiscal accounts, which results in not recognizing income generated in\nthe monetary sector; (iii) the nonrecognition of some T-bill liabilities in the BM by the MEF are\nthe factor that creates a discrepancy in deposits. The mission recommends work to conduct a\ndetailed analysis of the content of deposits the BM reports in order to ensure the proper\ntreatment of the financial asset in MEF government accounting.\n\n33. Amount of deposits assumed in the 2016-2018 Fiscal Table . Taking this into account\naccording to the approach of available cash in use, the mission considered the entire amount the\nBM reported as deposits, excluding incoming amounts from T-bill issues and interest, since these\nsecurities are not considered government debt. “Other regularizations” were also excluded\nwhich, using a commitment approach, should be considered government income. Moreover,\nregarding the matter of coverage, the amount of INSS deposits were not considered in order to\nmaintain consistency with the above the line.\n\n20 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2565}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|
August
2020|**_Coverage of government deposits_**. (i) Include available cash of the
local authorities to complete the government; and (ii) begin reporting
the totals of each government subsector in Mozambique: GG =
GCO+EBU+INSS+LG.
|
BM|\n|August
2020|**_Composition of deposits._** Evaluate the content of deposits and record
all government financial assets and income recognized in the monetary
accounts in fiscal accounts.
|DNCP, DNT
and DEEF|\n|April
2020|
**Periodic reconciliation of deposits****_._ **Implement a formal periodic
reconciliation process of stocks and flows (by currency and by public
sector beneficiary), including explanations of all the differences
identified between the BM and DNT, and share the result with the other
CCGFS members.
|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)
|\n|April
2020
|
**_Deposits in the GCO Fiscal Table._**(i) ensure that the position the BM
ascertained matches the coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the
line); (ii) begin considering only GCO deposits (exclude available cash of
the INSS and EBUs); and (iii) make the required adjustment to the
income included in deposits and ensure that they have the proper
above-the-line counterpart entry.|MEF|\n\n\n\n**iii.** **Domestic Debt**\n\n\n**34.** **Domestic debt.** During the mission the work began of reconciling the 2018 domestic\ndebt the BM and MEF reported with the support of senior managers from both public\ninstitutions. The provisional result of this work is presented in the following table. The authorities\nare still responsible for continuing the work included in reconciliations of previous years. The\nmission recommended preparing a reconciliation report to ensure an institutional memory.\n\n**3.1** **Treasury Bonds**\n\n\n**35.** **Treasury bonds (T-bonds).** There is a significant difference in the positions reported by\nthe MEF and BM. The BM presents an aggregated total of Treasury securities that includes (Tbills and T-bonds). The information as reported fails to facilitate the reconciliation with the\nposition the MEF presented. However, the MEF obtains data from the Mozambique Stock\nExchange. The BM ascertains its data from the national banking system, and it remains\nresponsible for reporting the T-bond position separately from T-bills. In this context, the mission\nconsidered the MEF data as more reliable for the purpose of compiling the Fiscal Table and\nrecommended reconciliation work between the BM and MEF.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **21**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.96041870117188, 72.17999267578125, 538.3599853515625, 367.3800048828125], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n August 2020 _Coverage of government deposits_. (i) Include available cash of the local authorities to complete the government; and (ii) begin reporting the totals of each government subsector in Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG. BM \n August 2020 _Composition of deposits._ Evaluate the content of deposits and record all government financial assets and income recognized in the monetary accounts in fiscal accounts. DNCP, DNT and DEEF \n April 2020 Periodic reconciliation of deposits_._ Implement a formal periodic reconciliation process of stocks and flows (by currency and by public sector beneficiary), including explanations of all the differences identified between the BM and DNT, and share the result with the other CCGFS members. BM and MEF (DNT and DEEF) \n April 2020 _Deposits in the GCO Fiscal Table._(i) ensure that the position the BM ascertained matches the coverage of the fiscal accounts (above the line); (ii) begin considering only GCO deposits (exclude available cash of the INSS and EBUs); and (iii) make the required adjustment to the income included in deposits and ensure that they have the proper above-the-line counterpart entry. MEF \n\niii. Domestic Debt\n\n34. Domestic debt. During the mission the work began of reconciling the 2018 domestic\ndebt the BM and MEF reported with the support of senior managers from both public\ninstitutions. The provisional result of this work is presented in the following table. The authorities\nare still responsible for continuing the work included in reconciliations of previous years. The\nmission recommended preparing a reconciliation report to ensure an institutional memory.\n\n3.1 Treasury Bonds\n\n35. Treasury bonds (T-bonds). There is a significant difference in the positions reported by\nthe MEF and BM. The BM presents an aggregated total of Treasury securities that includes (Tbills and T-bonds). The information as reported fails to facilitate the reconciliation with the\nposition the MEF presented. However, the MEF obtains data from the Mozambique Stock\nExchange. The BM ascertains its data from the national banking system, and it remains\nresponsible for reporting the T-bond position separately from T-bills. In this context, the mission\nconsidered the MEF data as more reliable for the purpose of compiling the Fiscal Table and\nrecommended reconciliation work between the BM and MEF.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 21", "text_characters": 2081}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Col1|Domestic debt – Stocks|MEF|BM|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
|
|
**2015**
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
|
**2015**
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
|\n|
**a **
|
**Total**
**Securities**
T-bonds (BM and CIs)
T-bills
**Loans**
**Central Bank**
Local currency (LC)
Foreign currency (FC)
**Commercial banks**
LC – Loans (leasings+Reest.)
LC – Supplier arrears
FC –Portuguese line of credit
**Other accounts payable**
Interest on loans
Other Regularizations – CIs
|
**69,232.9**
**87,709.6**
**106,899.6**
**139,377.2**
**56,322.0**
**46,147.2**
**64,199.7**
**74,943.1**
32,847.0
34,334.9
42,565.7
53,985.9
23,475.0
11,812.3
21,634.1
20,957.2
**12,910.8**
**41,562.4**
**42,699.9**
**64,434.1**
**0.0**
**30,028.1**
**29,882.3**
**33,812.8**
0.0
15,766.1
15,620.4
19,550.8
0.0
14,261.9
14,261.9
14,261.9
**12,910.8**
**11,534.3**
**12,817.6**
**30,621.3**
12,910.8
11,534.3
12,817.6
23,857.2
6,764.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
|
**85,154.5**
**127,947.6**
**215,398.4**
**250,639.6**
**65,992.2**
**65,274.4**
**152,047.1**
**176,469.3**
30,665.0
30,796.0
39,566.0
54,606.0
35,327.2
34,478.4
112,481.1
121,863.3
**17,255.4**
**58,459.2**
**55,029.4**
**68,523.5**
**0.0**
**29,976.1**
**27,693.4**
**31,876.0**
0.0
15,722.1
15,902.7
19,595.8
0.0
14,254.0
11,790.7
12,280.2
**17,255.4**
**28,483.1**
**27,336.0**
**36,647.5**
4,707.5
10,048.7
11,171.4
23,967.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12,547.9
18,434.4
16,164.6
12,680.3
**1,906.9**
**4,214.0**
**8,321.9**
**5,646.8**
452.0
1,269.2
5,273.4
5,646.8
1,454.8
2,944.8
3,048.5
0.0
|\n|
**b **
**(i)**
**(ii)**
**(iii)**
**(iv)**
**(v)**
|
**Differences – (Total of adjustments):**
**Securities**
T-bonds (BM and CIs)
T-bills
** Loans –Central Bank**
LC
FC (Exchange rate)
** Loans – Commercial banks**
LC – Loans (leasings+Reest.)
LC – Supplier arrears
Portuguese line of credit
**Other accounts payable**
Interest on loans
Other Regularizations – CIs
**Other Econ. Flows –**
(Cancelations/exchange)
|
**50.2**
**445.6**
**2,670.6**
**2,670.6**
50.2
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|
**-15,921.7**
**-40,238.0**
**-108,498.8**
**-111,262.4**
2,182.0
3,538.9
2,999.7
-620.1
-11,852.2
-22,666.0
-90,847.0
-100,906.1
0.0
44.0
-282.3
-45.0
0.0
8.0
2,471.2
1,981.8
8,203.3
1,485.6
1,646.1
-110.0
6,764.1
-12,547.9
-18,434.4
-16,164.6
-12,680.3
-452.0
-1,269.2
-5,273.4
-5,646.8
-1,454.8
-2,944.8
-3,048.5
0.0
50.2
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|\n|
**c = a+b**
|
**Adjusted domestic debt**
|
**69,283.0**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
|
**69,283.0**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
|\n|
**d **|
**Flows – Transactions**|
**18,872.2**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.6**|
**18,872.1**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.5**|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.11314392089844, 104.11198425292969, 719.766845703125, 526.581787109375], "columns": 4, "rows": 6}], "text": "Col1 Domestic debt – Stocks MEF BM \n\n 2015 2016 2017 2018 2015 2016 2017 2018 \n a Total Securities T-bonds (BM and CIs) T-bills Loans Central Bank Local currency (LC) Foreign currency (FC) Commercial banks LC – Loans (leasings+Reest.) LC – Supplier arrears FC –Portuguese line of credit Other accounts payable Interest on loans Other Regularizations – CIs 69,232.9 87,709.6 106,899.6 139,377.2 56,322.0 46,147.2 64,199.7 74,943.1 32,847.0 34,334.9 42,565.7 53,985.9 23,475.0 11,812.3 21,634.1 20,957.2 12,910.8 41,562.4 42,699.9 64,434.1 0.0 30,028.1 29,882.3 33,812.8 0.0 15,766.1 15,620.4 19,550.8 0.0 14,261.9 14,261.9 14,261.9 12,910.8 11,534.3 12,817.6 30,621.3 12,910.8 11,534.3 12,817.6 23,857.2 6,764.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85,154.5 127,947.6 215,398.4 250,639.6 65,992.2 65,274.4 152,047.1 176,469.3 30,665.0 30,796.0 39,566.0 54,606.0 35,327.2 34,478.4 112,481.1 121,863.3 17,255.4 58,459.2 55,029.4 68,523.5 0.0 29,976.1 27,693.4 31,876.0 0.0 15,722.1 15,902.7 19,595.8 0.0 14,254.0 11,790.7 12,280.2 17,255.4 28,483.1 27,336.0 36,647.5 4,707.5 10,048.7 11,171.4 23,967.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12,547.9 18,434.4 16,164.6 12,680.3 1,906.9 4,214.0 8,321.9 5,646.8 452.0 1,269.2 5,273.4 5,646.8 1,454.8 2,944.8 3,048.5 0.0 \n b (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Differences – (Total of adjustments): Securities T-bonds (BM and CIs) T-bills Loans –Central Bank LC FC (Exchange rate) Loans – Commercial banks LC – Loans (leasings+Reest.) LC – Supplier arrears Portuguese line of credit Other accounts payable Interest on loans Other Regularizations – CIs Other Econ. Flows – (Cancelations/exchange) 50.2 445.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 50.2 445.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 -15,921.7 -40,238.0 -108,498.8 -111,262.4 2,182.0 3,538.9 2,999.7 -620.1 -11,852.2 -22,666.0 -90,847.0 -100,906.1 0.0 44.0 -282.3 -45.0 0.0 8.0 2,471.2 1,981.8 8,203.3 1,485.6 1,646.1 -110.0 6,764.1 -12,547.9 -18,434.4 -16,164.6 -12,680.3 -452.0 -1,269.2 -5,273.4 -5,646.8 -1,454.8 -2,944.8 -3,048.5 0.0 50.2 445.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 \n c = a+b Adjusted domestic debt 69,283.0 88,155.2 109,570.2 142,047.7 69,283.0 88,155.2 109,570.2 142,047.7 \n d Flows – Transactions 18,872.2 21,415.0 32,477.6 18,872.1 21,415.0 32,477.5", "text_characters": 1879}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**3.2** **Treasury bills (T-bills)**\n\n\n**36.** **Amount of T-bills recognized in the fiscal accounts** . The domestic debt stock reported\nby the MEF recognizes only as T-bills the amount of the issue that was actually used by the\nNational Treasury, and this is used for fiscal policy purposes. The amount of T-bills issued for\nmonetary policy purposes is not considered part of the government debt stock at the MEF level.\nHowever, it is the BM’s responsibility to produce reports including informaiton on the position of\nthe amount of “T-bills used.” This concept is not recognized for the purpose of disseminating\nMozambique’s monetary accounts. The position of government deposits and credits, reported by\nthe BM, includes all the flows that generate the issuance of T-bills during the year. According to\nthe BM: (i) there is no debt service associated with the portion of T-bills not used by the\ngovernment; (ii) there have been no guidelines from the MEF nor is there any agreement\nbetween the MEF and the BM for issuing T-bills used for monetary policy purposes; and (iii) the\nMEF is unaware at this time that the above-mentioned issues of T-bills are done by the BM.\nHowever, the deposits from these issues generate interest for the government. In addition, the\nposition of the NGC in the Fiscal Table prepared by the MEF has taken the total of T-bills issued\ninto account.\n\n**37.** **Characteristics of T-bills in Mozambique.** T-bills are government financing and\nmonetary intervention instruments issued by the BM as part of monetary policy measures to\nfinance temporary government Treasury cash shortfalls. They originate with the seasonality of\nfiscal revenue or potential delayed disbursements from cooperation partners. The legal regime\nfor T-bills is established by Decree No. 22/2004 of July 7, which delegates to the MEF the\nauthority to set by ministerial order the maximum amount of T-bills to be used during the fiscal\nyear. The amounts of T-bills recognized by the MEF as a T-bill debt in the last three years is\nwithin the maximum limits set by budget law. Thus, as such the BM presents the T-bill debt,\nimplying that part of the T-bill issue was done without statutory support.\n\n**38.** **Recognition of T-bill debt** . The GFSM 2014 defines as debt all liabilities that require\npayment of interest and/or principal by the debtor to a creditor at future dates. The manual does\nnot differentiate the treatment of securities, whether their maturity is short or long term, used or\nnot used, for fiscal or monetary purposes. In addition, the legislation allows the authorities to\nissue T-bills for fiscal and monetary purposes, but it is not clear how this debt will be assumed by\nthe government or the rest of the public sector (in this case the BM).\n\n**39.** **T-bills that the MEF does not use do not constitute GCO debt** . As the Mozambican\nauthorities currently report the data, the recognition of the amount of T-bills used for monetary\npolicy purposes is unclear. Since there is no debt service from the issue of these T-bills, and given\nthe terms under which they are issued and the definition established in the GFSM 2014, it is\nbelieved that this obligation should not be presented as a part of GCO debt; however, there is no\ndoubt that this amount represents public sector debt. Given this fact, the mission recommends\nreaching a consensus as to how this debt should be recognized in the public sector monetary\nand fiscal accounts by the MEF and the BM.\n\n\n**23** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n3.2 Treasury bills (T-bills)\n\n36. Amount of T-bills recognized in the fiscal accounts . The domestic debt stock reported\nby the MEF recognizes only as T-bills the amount of the issue that was actually used by the\nNational Treasury, and this is used for fiscal policy purposes. The amount of T-bills issued for\nmonetary policy purposes is not considered part of the government debt stock at the MEF level.\nHowever, it is the BM’s responsibility to produce reports including informaiton on the position of\nthe amount of “T-bills used.” This concept is not recognized for the purpose of disseminating\nMozambique’s monetary accounts. The position of government deposits and credits, reported by\nthe BM, includes all the flows that generate the issuance of T-bills during the year. According to\nthe BM: (i) there is no debt service associated with the portion of T-bills not used by the\ngovernment; (ii) there have been no guidelines from the MEF nor is there any agreement\nbetween the MEF and the BM for issuing T-bills used for monetary policy purposes; and (iii) the\nMEF is unaware at this time that the above-mentioned issues of T-bills are done by the BM.\nHowever, the deposits from these issues generate interest for the government. In addition, the\nposition of the NGC in the Fiscal Table prepared by the MEF has taken the total of T-bills issued\ninto account.\n\n37. Characteristics of T-bills in Mozambique. T-bills are government financing and\nmonetary intervention instruments issued by the BM as part of monetary policy measures to\nfinance temporary government Treasury cash shortfalls. They originate with the seasonality of\nfiscal revenue or potential delayed disbursements from cooperation partners. The legal regime\nfor T-bills is established by Decree No. 22/2004 of July 7, which delegates to the MEF the\nauthority to set by ministerial order the maximum amount of T-bills to be used during the fiscal\nyear. The amounts of T-bills recognized by the MEF as a T-bill debt in the last three years is\nwithin the maximum limits set by budget law. Thus, as such the BM presents the T-bill debt,\nimplying that part of the T-bill issue was done without statutory support.\n\n38. Recognition of T-bill debt . The GFSM 2014 defines as debt all liabilities that require\npayment of interest and/or principal by the debtor to a creditor at future dates. The manual does\nnot differentiate the treatment of securities, whether their maturity is short or long term, used or\nnot used, for fiscal or monetary purposes. In addition, the legislation allows the authorities to\nissue T-bills for fiscal and monetary purposes, but it is not clear how this debt will be assumed by\nthe government or the rest of the public sector (in this case the BM).\n\n39. T-bills that the MEF does not use do not constitute GCO debt . As the Mozambican\nauthorities currently report the data, the recognition of the amount of T-bills used for monetary\npolicy purposes is unclear. Since there is no debt service from the issue of these T-bills, and given\nthe terms under which they are issued and the definition established in the GFSM 2014, it is\nbelieved that this obligation should not be presented as a part of GCO debt; however, there is no\ndoubt that this amount represents public sector debt. Given this fact, the mission recommends\nreaching a consensus as to how this debt should be recognized in the public sector monetary\nand fiscal accounts by the MEF and the BM.\n\n23 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2904}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**3.2** **Loans**\n\n\n**40.** **Loans** . In the BM loan positions that are reconciled, there are only insignificant\ndifferences generated by the exchange rates that are used. For commercial bank loans there are\nsignificant differences in the positions of both institutions, especially in 2015. BM recognition of\nthe Portuguese line of credit explains some of the difference. This line is not GCO debt, so that\nthe difference is due to the coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts. For the rest of the\ndifference in loans, it is suspected that it is also a problem of institutional coverage. The mission\nused the MEF position to produce the Fiscal Table, and it presents the detail of loans and\nanalyzes consistency between stocks and flows. The BM recommends presenting the detail of\ncommercial bank loans in order to recognize it with the MEF position and present the debt\naccording to each subsector in the public sector.\n\n**3.3** **Arrears**\n\n\n**41.** **Debts not captured by the NGC** . Debts of suppliers in arrears are debts recognized in\nthe domestic debt stock reported by the MEF but not captured by the BM, naturally because they\nare not national bank debts. In 2017 the Mozambican authorities conducted a survey of the\ndebts of government institutions with various suppliers in the period from 2007 to 2016. The\namount of about 29.8 billion meticais was identified, 19.8 billion meticais of which were\napproved by the Administrative Tribunal (AT), while 9.9 billion meticais were not approved by the\nAT.\n\n**Table 10. Debts in “Arrears” Recognized, Validated and Paid**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Debt Recognized vs. Validated|Col3|Col4|Debt Paid|Col6|Col7|Debt to
be Paid|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||With AT
approval
|Without
AT
approval
|**Total**
|Cash
|Securities
|**Total**
|**Total**
|\n||[a]|
[b]|**[c=(a+b]**|[d]|[e]|**[f=(d+e)]**|**[g=(f-c)]**|\n|**Recognized:**||||||||\n|
2007-2016|
19,826.1|
9,939.7|
**29,765.8**|
|
|
|
|\n|** Validated:**|||
|||
|
|\n|
2018|
7,441.0|
5,678.1|
**13,119.0**|
6,623.5|
|
**6,623.5**|
**6,495.6**|\n|
2019|
|
|
|
1,823.9*|
3,602.1|
**5,426.0**|
**1,069.6**|\n|
2019
|
|
|
**5,817.8**|
|||
**6,887.3**|\n|
** Not**
**validated:**
|
|
|
** 10,829.0**
|
|
|
|
|\n\n\non the actual payment of the above-mentioned amount.\nSource: DNT\n\n**42.** **Process of regularizing arrears.** According to the Strategy for Paying the Government\nDebt to Suppliers, launched by the authorities in July 2018, the regularization process assumes\nthat there are three points at which the government accounts are adjusted: (i) when the debt is\n\n\n\n**24** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98200225830078, 437.11199951171875, 540.01904296875, 639.9866333007812], "columns": 8, "rows": 10}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n3.2 Loans\n\n40. Loans . In the BM loan positions that are reconciled, there are only insignificant\ndifferences generated by the exchange rates that are used. For commercial bank loans there are\nsignificant differences in the positions of both institutions, especially in 2015. BM recognition of\nthe Portuguese line of credit explains some of the difference. This line is not GCO debt, so that\nthe difference is due to the coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts. For the rest of the\ndifference in loans, it is suspected that it is also a problem of institutional coverage. The mission\nused the MEF position to produce the Fiscal Table, and it presents the detail of loans and\nanalyzes consistency between stocks and flows. The BM recommends presenting the detail of\ncommercial bank loans in order to recognize it with the MEF position and present the debt\naccording to each subsector in the public sector.\n\n3.3 Arrears\n\n41. Debts not captured by the NGC . Debts of suppliers in arrears are debts recognized in\nthe domestic debt stock reported by the MEF but not captured by the BM, naturally because they\nare not national bank debts. In 2017 the Mozambican authorities conducted a survey of the\ndebts of government institutions with various suppliers in the period from 2007 to 2016. The\namount of about 29.8 billion meticais was identified, 19.8 billion meticais of which were\napproved by the Administrative Tribunal (AT), while 9.9 billion meticais were not approved by the\nAT.\n\nTable 10. Debts in “Arrears” Recognized, Validated and Paid\n\n Col1 Debt Recognized vs. Validated Col3 Col4 Debt Paid Col6 Col7 Debt to be Paid \n\n With AT approval Without AT approval Total Cash Securities Total Total \n [a] [b] [c=(a+b] [d] [e] [f=(d+e)] [g=(f-c)] \n Recognized: \n 2007-2016 19,826.1 9,939.7 29,765.8 \n Validated: \n 2018 7,441.0 5,678.1 13,119.0 6,623.5 6,623.5 6,495.6 \n 2019 1,823.9* 3,602.1 5,426.0 1,069.6 \n 2019 5,817.8 6,887.3 \n Not validated: 10,829.0 \n\non the actual payment of the above-mentioned amount.\nSource: DNT\n\n42. Process of regularizing arrears. According to the Strategy for Paying the Government\nDebt to Suppliers, launched by the authorities in July 2018, the regularization process assumes\nthat there are three points at which the government accounts are adjusted: (i) when the debt is\n\n24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1958}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nrecognized and validated, which thus updates the debt stock; (ii) the associated record of\nexpenditure by processing extrabudgetary expenditure; and (iii) the record of payments\n(automatic mode in e-SISTAFE). There are provisions of various types of regularizing arrears in\nthe Government Budget (OE), including issuances of government debt securities.\n\n**43.** **Payment of arrears.** Notwithstanding the determination up to 2016, the abovementioned regularization strategy began to be implemented in 2018, when 13.119 billion\nmeticais were validated for payment. As of end-2019, the GRM validated an additional 5.82\nbillion meticais. Table 10 presents the amounts paid up to the date of the mission.\n\n**Treatment of arrears.** The government’s relations with its suppliers generates a public\nexpenditure based on a commitment: (i) when the authorities validate the arrears, the\nexpenditure must be recognized according to its type (operating or investment expense),and a\ndebt in “accounts payable” is the counterpart; (ii) at the time of payment, a reduction in deposits\nis recorded against a reduction in “accounts payable.” For the securitized debt, the mission\nrecommends increasing securities against a decrease in “accounts payable” (see Table 11 below).\n\n**44.** **Recognition of the debt of arrears prior to payment.** According to the CEDSIF, there\nis a functionality in e-SISTAFE that enters expenses to be paid and checks arrears. However, since\nthis is considered an extrabudgetary expense, it does not observe the double-entry rule and the\ndebt record remains pending; thus the payment of this debt generates a discrepancy in the\naccounts. The following table presents the treatment recommended for the 13.119 billion\nmeticais, a debt that was recognized and validated in 2018, as well as their respective payments.\nThe recording of this debt as an expense in 2018 has an impact on the year’s overall balance, and\npayments made in 2018 and 2019 should be recorded as transactions at the financial level with\nan impact on government financial worth.\n\n**45.** **The mission recommends recording arrears on the commitment basis** .\nNotwithstanding the fact that the authorities use cash basis, [1] the mission recommends recording\narrears as is done using a commitment approach to ensure greater control over this debt. The\nFiscal Table that was prepared during the mission considers that the arrears expense that is paid\nby September is recorded as the strategy requires. The information is confirmed by the\nauthorities and thus the remainder to be paid is recorded as part of the liabilities at end-2018.\n\n\n**Table 11. Treatment of “Arrears”**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Figures in millions of meticais/
December 31|2018|Col3|Col4|Col5|2019|Col7|Col8|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Figures in millions of meticais/**
**December 31 **
|**Opening**
**Balance**
|**Transactions**
|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**
|**Transactions**
|**OEF**|**Closing**
**Balance**
|\n|1. Revenue|
||
|
||
|
|\n\n\n\n1 On the cash basis, expenses are recognized only when paid and revenue when it is received, regardless of when this was done\n\nor collected or of the existence of a payment or reception commitment respectively. Thus, this regime does not include\n\n“accounts payable or receivable.”\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **25**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.94037628173828, 579.6599731445312, 555.2999877929688, 627.8738403320312], "columns": 8, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nrecognized and validated, which thus updates the debt stock; (ii) the associated record of\nexpenditure by processing extrabudgetary expenditure; and (iii) the record of payments\n(automatic mode in e-SISTAFE). There are provisions of various types of regularizing arrears in\nthe Government Budget (OE), including issuances of government debt securities.\n\n43. Payment of arrears. Notwithstanding the determination up to 2016, the abovementioned regularization strategy began to be implemented in 2018, when 13.119 billion\nmeticais were validated for payment. As of end-2019, the GRM validated an additional 5.82\nbillion meticais. Table 10 presents the amounts paid up to the date of the mission.\n\nTreatment of arrears. The government’s relations with its suppliers generates a public\nexpenditure based on a commitment: (i) when the authorities validate the arrears, the\nexpenditure must be recognized according to its type (operating or investment expense),and a\ndebt in “accounts payable” is the counterpart; (ii) at the time of payment, a reduction in deposits\nis recorded against a reduction in “accounts payable.” For the securitized debt, the mission\nrecommends increasing securities against a decrease in “accounts payable” (see Table 11 below).\n\n44. Recognition of the debt of arrears prior to payment. According to the CEDSIF, there\nis a functionality in e-SISTAFE that enters expenses to be paid and checks arrears. However, since\nthis is considered an extrabudgetary expense, it does not observe the double-entry rule and the\ndebt record remains pending; thus the payment of this debt generates a discrepancy in the\naccounts. The following table presents the treatment recommended for the 13.119 billion\nmeticais, a debt that was recognized and validated in 2018, as well as their respective payments.\nThe recording of this debt as an expense in 2018 has an impact on the year’s overall balance, and\npayments made in 2018 and 2019 should be recorded as transactions at the financial level with\nan impact on government financial worth.\n\n45. The mission recommends recording arrears on the commitment basis .\nNotwithstanding the fact that the authorities use cash basis, [1] the mission recommends recording\narrears as is done using a commitment approach to ensure greater control over this debt. The\nFiscal Table that was prepared during the mission considers that the arrears expense that is paid\nby September is recorded as the strategy requires. The information is confirmed by the\nauthorities and thus the remainder to be paid is recorded as part of the liabilities at end-2018.\n\nTable 11. Treatment of “Arrears”\n\n Figures in millions of meticais/ December 31 2018 Col3 Col4 Col5 2019 Col7 Col8 \n\n Figures in millions of meticais/ December 31 Opening Balance Transactions OEF Closing Balance Transactions OEF Closing Balance \n 1. Revenue \n\n1 On the cash basis, expenses are recognized only when paid and revenue when it is received, regardless of when this was done\n\nor collected or of the existence of a payment or reception commitment respectively. Thus, this regime does not include\n\n“accounts payable or receivable.”\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25", "text_characters": 2678}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|2. Expense|Col2|13,119.0|Col4|Col5|5,817.8|Col7|Col8|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**NOB. Net operating balance (1-**
**2)**
|**NOB. Net operating balance (1-**
**2)**
|
(13,119.0)
|
(13,119.0)
|
(13,119.0)
|
(5,817.8)|
(5,817.8)|
(5,817.8)|\n|
31. Net nonfinancial assets|
31. Net nonfinancial assets|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|2M. Total expenditure (2+31)
|2M. Total expenditure (2+31)
|
13,119.0|
13,119.0|
13,119.0|
5,817.8|
5,817.8|
5,817.8|\n|**NLB. Lending (+) / Net**
**borrowing (–)**
|**NLB. Lending (+) / Net**
**borrowing (–)**
|
** (13,119.0)**
|
** (13,119.0)**
|
** (13,119.0)**
|
**(5,817.8)**
|
**(5,817.8)**
|
**(5,817.8)**
|\n|
**Net financial worth:**||
**(13,119.0)**||**(13,119.0)**|
**(5,817.8)**|
|**(18,936.8)**|\n|
**32. Financial assets**|
|
**(6,623.5)**|
|
**(6,623.5)**|
**(1,823.9)**|
|
**(8,447.3)**|\n|Government deposits|
|
(6,623.5)|
|
(6,623.5)|
(1,823.9)|
|
(8,447.3)|\n|**33. Liabilities**|
|
**6,495.6**|
|
**6,495.6**|
**3,993.9**|
|
** 10,489.5**|\n|Suppliers payable|
|
13,119.0|
|
13,119.0|
2,215.7|
|
15,334.73|\n|Suppliers to be paid (_Cash_)|
|
(6,623.5)|
|
(6,623.5)|
(1,823.9)|
|
(8,447.3)|\n|Debt securities (Issue)|
|
|
|
|
3,602.1|
|
3,602.1|\n\n\n\n**3.4** **Other regularizations of the domestic debt**\n\n\n**46.** **Other regularizations in credits reported by the BM** . The credits reported in the\nmonetary accounts present other regularizations that the MEF is to validate as mentioned in the\ncase of deposits. Therefore, these regularizations require a counterpart in expenditure; otherwise\nthey generate discrepancies.\n\n\n**3.5** **Other Economic Flows**\n\n\n**47.** **Other Economic Flows (OEF).** These are changes in the volume or value of assets or\nliabilities that are not generated by transactions (paragraph 3.31 of the GFSM 2014). These OEFs\nare not transactions because they do not meet one or more features of transactions. For\nexample, when the amount of an asset is expressed in foreign currency, the currency may change\nas a result of alterations in the exchange rate, or the value of an asset may change with the\npassage of time. There are two main categories of OEFs, described as “gains and losses” and\n“other changes in the volume of assets and liabilities.” If the transactions in NGC credits have\nbeen ascertained by measuring the difference in the stock from one year to the next, it is\nimportant to ensure that the OEFs, i.e. the cancelations of certain debts and adjustments\nattributable to exchange losses and gains, have been properly adjusted in accordance with the\npositions for the transactions in the Fiscal Table.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|April
2020|**_Domestic and external public debt data for the Fiscal Table._**_ (i)_Use
MEF data to ensure consistency between the debt stock and flows;
(ii) Exclude the OEFs from the transactions in the Fiscal Table.|DEEF and DNT|\n\n\n\n**26** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.9737777709961, 64.55999755859375, 555.2584228515625, 251.42669677734375], "columns": 8, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [89.9737777709961, 628.6199951171875, 539.8400268554688, 715.6199951171875], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n 2. Expense Col2 13,119.0 Col4 Col5 5,817.8 Col7 Col8 \n\n NOB. Net operating balance (1- 2) NOB. Net operating balance (1- 2) (13,119.0) (13,119.0) (13,119.0) (5,817.8) (5,817.8) (5,817.8) \n 31. Net nonfinancial assets 31. Net nonfinancial assets \n 2M. Total expenditure (2+31) 2M. Total expenditure (2+31) 13,119.0 13,119.0 13,119.0 5,817.8 5,817.8 5,817.8 \n NLB. Lending (+) / Net borrowing (–) NLB. Lending (+) / Net borrowing (–) (13,119.0) (13,119.0) (13,119.0) (5,817.8) (5,817.8) (5,817.8) \n Net financial worth: (13,119.0) (13,119.0) (5,817.8) (18,936.8) \n 32. Financial assets (6,623.5) (6,623.5) (1,823.9) (8,447.3) \n Government deposits (6,623.5) (6,623.5) (1,823.9) (8,447.3) \n 33. Liabilities 6,495.6 6,495.6 3,993.9 10,489.5 \n Suppliers payable 13,119.0 13,119.0 2,215.7 15,334.73 \n Suppliers to be paid (_Cash_) (6,623.5) (6,623.5) (1,823.9) (8,447.3) \n Debt securities (Issue) 3,602.1 3,602.1 \n\n3.4 Other regularizations of the domestic debt\n\n46. Other regularizations in credits reported by the BM . The credits reported in the\nmonetary accounts present other regularizations that the MEF is to validate as mentioned in the\ncase of deposits. Therefore, these regularizations require a counterpart in expenditure; otherwise\nthey generate discrepancies.\n\n3.5 Other Economic Flows\n\n47. Other Economic Flows (OEF). These are changes in the volume or value of assets or\nliabilities that are not generated by transactions (paragraph 3.31 of the GFSM 2014). These OEFs\nare not transactions because they do not meet one or more features of transactions. For\nexample, when the amount of an asset is expressed in foreign currency, the currency may change\nas a result of alterations in the exchange rate, or the value of an asset may change with the\npassage of time. There are two main categories of OEFs, described as “gains and losses” and\n“other changes in the volume of assets and liabilities.” If the transactions in NGC credits have\nbeen ascertained by measuring the difference in the stock from one year to the next, it is\nimportant to ensure that the OEFs, i.e. the cancelations of certain debts and adjustments\nattributable to exchange losses and gains, have been properly adjusted in accordance with the\npositions for the transactions in the Fiscal Table.\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n April 2020 _Domestic and external public debt data for the Fiscal Table.__ (i)_Use MEF data to ensure consistency between the debt stock and flows; (ii) Exclude the OEFs from the transactions in the Fiscal Table. DEEF and DNT \n\n26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2188}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|April
2020|Reconciliation of the domestic and external public debt. (i) Finalize
the reconciliation work begun during the mission and document the
final result; and (ii) Implement a formal periodic reconciliation process
of flows and stock (by instrument, face and nominal value, and by
creditor) including explanations of all the differences identified in the
BM data (NGC and balance of payments) and DNT (detailed debt
statements), and share the result.|BM and MEF
(DNT and
DEEF)|\n|---|---|---|\n|April
2020
|
**_Treasury bills._** (i) Reach a consensus on the total Treasury-bill debt to
be recognized in the public sector fiscal and monetary accounts; and
(ii) The BM should begin to report the total debt of the subsectors in
the public sector of Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG, as well as
the business, financial and nonfinancial sector.
|MEF and BM|\n|April
2020
|
**_Treasury bonds (T-bonds)_**. Present a disaggregated total of treasury
securities: (i) detail of T-BILL issuances and (ii) detail of T-bonds.
|BM|\n|
April
2020|
**_Commercial bank loans_. **Present the details of total commercial bank
loans.
|BM|\n|
August
2020|
**_Expenditures associated with BM credits._**_Validate and begin to record_
_expenditures associated with domestic credit published in the monetary_
_accounts._
|MEF|\n|April
2020|
**_Debt of arrears._**_In the domestic map statement, recognize the amount_
_of5,817.8 million meticais of debt of arrears, recognized and validated by the_
_GRM in end-2019._
|DNT|\n|August
2020
|**_Dissemination of the domestic and external public debt._**Begin
disseminating debt data by maturity, residual value, currency and
creditor based on World Bank and IMF data, and on the MEF website.|DEEF|\n\n\n\n**iv.** **Other Accounts Payable and Receivable**\n\n**4.1 Treasury Operations**\n\n\n**48.** **Suspense accounts and regularization of transactions** . Revenue items such as taxes,\ngrants, social contributions, sales of goods and services; and on the expenditure side,\nremunerations, goods and services, interest, transfers, subsidies and other expenses, normally\nhave a counterpart in available cash, and thus the Mozambican authorities have a set of\ntransactions that do not have definitive accounting entries. They are pending due to various\nfactors such as: lack of available cash in banks; lack of a budget in the system; or unknown details\nof transactions in banks. The above-mentioned set of transactions is named “Treasury\nOperations,” and the totals in 2015-2018 are presented in the following table.\n\n|Stock|2015|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
Debit/Revenue|
(8,018.7)|
(621.8)|
(17,608.9)|
(33,213.3)|\n|
Of which: Fiscal years ended|
270.0|
270.0|
270.0|
270.0|\n|
Credit/Expense|
5,376.7|
8,284.3|
6,523.4|
6,093.3|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **27**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.05565643310547, 64.73934173583984, 539.8894653320312, 432.6600036621094], "columns": 3, "rows": 7}, {"bbox": [90.05565643310547, 664.280029296875, 539.8894653320312, 726.2799682617188], "columns": 5, "rows": 4}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n April 2020 Reconciliation of the domestic and external public debt. (i) Finalize the reconciliation work begun during the mission and document the final result; and (ii) Implement a formal periodic reconciliation process of flows and stock (by instrument, face and nominal value, and by creditor) including explanations of all the differences identified in the BM data (NGC and balance of payments) and DNT (detailed debt statements), and share the result. BM and MEF (DNT and DEEF) \n\n April 2020 _Treasury bills._ (i) Reach a consensus on the total Treasury-bill debt to be recognized in the public sector fiscal and monetary accounts; and (ii) The BM should begin to report the total debt of the subsectors in the public sector of Mozambique: GG = GCO+EBU+INSS+LG, as well as the business, financial and nonfinancial sector. MEF and BM \n April 2020 _Treasury bonds (T-bonds)_. Present a disaggregated total of treasury securities: (i) detail of T-BILL issuances and (ii) detail of T-bonds. BM \n April 2020 _Commercial bank loans_. Present the details of total commercial bank loans. BM \n August 2020 _Expenditures associated with BM credits.__Validate and begin to record_ _expenditures associated with domestic credit published in the monetary_ _accounts._ MEF \n April 2020 _Debt of arrears.__In the domestic map statement, recognize the amount_ _of5,817.8 million meticais of debt of arrears, recognized and validated by the_ _GRM in end-2019._ DNT \n August 2020 _Dissemination of the domestic and external public debt._Begin disseminating debt data by maturity, residual value, currency and creditor based on World Bank and IMF data, and on the MEF website. DEEF \n\niv. Other Accounts Payable and Receivable\n\n4.1 Treasury Operations\n\n48. Suspense accounts and regularization of transactions . Revenue items such as taxes,\ngrants, social contributions, sales of goods and services; and on the expenditure side,\nremunerations, goods and services, interest, transfers, subsidies and other expenses, normally\nhave a counterpart in available cash, and thus the Mozambican authorities have a set of\ntransactions that do not have definitive accounting entries. They are pending due to various\nfactors such as: lack of available cash in banks; lack of a budget in the system; or unknown details\nof transactions in banks. The above-mentioned set of transactions is named “Treasury\nOperations,” and the totals in 2015-2018 are presented in the following table.\n\n Stock 2015 2016 2017 2018 \n\n Debit/Revenue (8,018.7) (621.8) (17,608.9) (33,213.3) \n Of which: Fiscal years ended 270.0 270.0 270.0 270.0 \n Credit/Expense 5,376.7 8,284.3 6,523.4 6,093.3 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 27", "text_characters": 2268}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**Total**|**(13,395.3)**|**(8,906.2)**|**(24,132.4)**|**(39,306.6)**|\n|
**Flows**
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Debit/Revenue|
|
7,396.8|
(16,987.1)|
(15,604.4)|\n|
Credit/Expense|
|
2,907.7|
(1,760.9)|
(430.1)|\n|
**Total**|
|
**10,304.5**|
**(18,748.0)**|
**(16,034.5)**|\n\n\nSource: I-4 Statements of CGEs\n\n\n**49.** **Definition of Treasury Operations** . As provided in subparagraphs f) of article 47 and h)\nof article 48, both Law No. 9/2002 of February 12, which creates the Government Financial\nAdministration System (SISTAFE), Treasury Operations are “advances and their regularizations.”\nAccording to article 2 of the MEF Regulation on Treasury Operations, approved by Ministerial\nOrder No. 124/2008 of December 30, Treasury Operations are incoming and outcoming funds of\nthe Single Treasury Account (STA) that cannot be charged to the Government Budget (OE), and\nthey refer to movements of funds of third parties for which the Treasury is responsible (T-Bills), as\nwell as the transfer of funds for the decentralized execution of the Government Budget and Tbills. Included in Treasury Operations are movements of funds charged to the Government\nBudget that, when realized, cannot be recorded in the Government Budget immediately using\nbudgetary classifiers.\n\n**50.** **Incoming funds – Treasury Operations.** As established in No. 1 of article 3 of the\nabove-mentioned regulation, entries of funds in the STA by this avenue are made in the DNT and\nthe Provincial Economy and Finance Directorates through the BM and/or commercial banks with\ngovernment cash functions to address the following situations: (i) revenue collected from third\nparties where the Treasury is responsible for paying expenditures not posted in the Government\nBudget; (ii) collection of balances ascertained at the end of each fiscal year; (iii) accounting record\nof counterpart of advances made for Treasury Operations to pay expenses charged to the\nGovernment Budget. Therefore, this entry is intended to receive suspense deposits of amounts\nnot chargeable to the Government Budget whose payments are contingent on the revenue\narriving beforehand.\n\n**51.** **Outgoing Funds – Treasury Operations.** According to No. 1 of article 4 of the same\nregulation, the purpose is to deal with: (i) expenses not chargeable to the Government Budget,\nthe payment of which is contingent on the revenue arriving beforehand; and (ii) urgent expenses\nthat are exceptional in nature, with substantiated grounds and that can be charged to the\nGovernment Budget. According to the authorities, in this item extrabudgetary expenses are\nrecorded that have not been yet recorded as an expense, but that have not been paid either. For\nthese cases, under the cash approach the government currently uses, these extrabudgetary\nexpenses should not be included in the Fiscal Table to avoid creating a discrepancy. Using a\ncommitment approach, the accounting system should have the ability to recognize these\ntransactions in expenses and revenue, even if they do not yet merit their due treatment in the\nfinancial balance sheet, so that they are awaiting payment in items of accounts payable and\nreceivable.\n\n**52.** **Discrepancies created by Treasury Operations.** Based on the provisions of the law, the\nrecording and control in e-SISTAFE, the mission believes that: (i) Treasury Operations are\n\n\n**28** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 34.03797149658203, 540.0405883789062, 138.27955627441406], "columns": 5, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 \n\n Total (13,395.3) (8,906.2) (24,132.4) (39,306.6) \n Flows \n Debit/Revenue 7,396.8 (16,987.1) (15,604.4) \n Credit/Expense 2,907.7 (1,760.9) (430.1) \n Total 10,304.5 (18,748.0) (16,034.5) \n\nSource: I-4 Statements of CGEs\n\n49. Definition of Treasury Operations . As provided in subparagraphs f) of article 47 and h)\nof article 48, both Law No. 9/2002 of February 12, which creates the Government Financial\nAdministration System (SISTAFE), Treasury Operations are “advances and their regularizations.”\nAccording to article 2 of the MEF Regulation on Treasury Operations, approved by Ministerial\nOrder No. 124/2008 of December 30, Treasury Operations are incoming and outcoming funds of\nthe Single Treasury Account (STA) that cannot be charged to the Government Budget (OE), and\nthey refer to movements of funds of third parties for which the Treasury is responsible (T-Bills), as\nwell as the transfer of funds for the decentralized execution of the Government Budget and Tbills. Included in Treasury Operations are movements of funds charged to the Government\nBudget that, when realized, cannot be recorded in the Government Budget immediately using\nbudgetary classifiers.\n\n50. Incoming funds – Treasury Operations. As established in No. 1 of article 3 of the\nabove-mentioned regulation, entries of funds in the STA by this avenue are made in the DNT and\nthe Provincial Economy and Finance Directorates through the BM and/or commercial banks with\ngovernment cash functions to address the following situations: (i) revenue collected from third\nparties where the Treasury is responsible for paying expenditures not posted in the Government\nBudget; (ii) collection of balances ascertained at the end of each fiscal year; (iii) accounting record\nof counterpart of advances made for Treasury Operations to pay expenses charged to the\nGovernment Budget. Therefore, this entry is intended to receive suspense deposits of amounts\nnot chargeable to the Government Budget whose payments are contingent on the revenue\narriving beforehand.\n\n51. Outgoing Funds – Treasury Operations. According to No. 1 of article 4 of the same\nregulation, the purpose is to deal with: (i) expenses not chargeable to the Government Budget,\nthe payment of which is contingent on the revenue arriving beforehand; and (ii) urgent expenses\nthat are exceptional in nature, with substantiated grounds and that can be charged to the\nGovernment Budget. According to the authorities, in this item extrabudgetary expenses are\nrecorded that have not been yet recorded as an expense, but that have not been paid either. For\nthese cases, under the cash approach the government currently uses, these extrabudgetary\nexpenses should not be included in the Fiscal Table to avoid creating a discrepancy. Using a\ncommitment approach, the accounting system should have the ability to recognize these\ntransactions in expenses and revenue, even if they do not yet merit their due treatment in the\nfinancial balance sheet, so that they are awaiting payment in items of accounts payable and\nreceivable.\n\n52. Discrepancies created by Treasury Operations. Based on the provisions of the law, the\nrecording and control in e-SISTAFE, the mission believes that: (i) Treasury Operations are\n\n28 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2786}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nanticipated to record an expense or revenue in the budgetary balance sheet until the financial\nbalance sheet is prepared to record the transactions and vice versa; (ii) these operations\nrepresent accounts payable and/or receivable that the Fiscal Table does not include below the\nline. Thus, based on the dual-entry accounting rule, accounts such as fiscal years ended or\nentered in banks for which the transaction details are unknown so that the proper entry above\nthe line cannot be made and there is no counterpart below the line, which generates\ndiscrepancies.\n\n**53.** **Record of Treasury Operations.** In a cash approach, which the authorities use, all\ntransactions that generate activity in banks, in the case of Mozambique incoming funds (debit\nbalance) in Treasury Operations should be considered below the line in the Fiscal Table as\naccounts receivable; otherwise they generate discrepancies. In a commitment system or even in a\nmodified cash system, both incoming and outgoing funds in Treasury Operations should be\nincluded in the Fiscal Table.\n\n**4.2** **Fiscal years ended**\n\n\n**54.** **Fiscal years ended.** They have been recorded as part of expense, but they represent\ncredits recognized by the GCO, the payment of which is pending. As we reported in the Treasury\nOperations, the fiscal years ended do not have a below-the-line counterpart either, and thus they\ngenerate discrepancies. The mission recommends reclassifying them according to the nature of\nthe expense above the line, and add the total amount as part of accounts payable below the line.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|April
2020|**_Treasury Operations._ **Begin to recognize them in the Fiscal Table,
ideally using a modified cash approach (considering credit and
debit balances).
|MEF|\n|April
2020
|
**_Fiscal years ended._ **Begin recognition in the Fiscal Table as part of
accounts payable below the line and in the record kept for expenses
above the line.|MEF|\n\n\n\n**D. Compilation of Annual 2016-2018 GFS**\n\n**55.** **Result of the compilation of annual 2016-2018 GFS** . Based on the detailed analysis of\nthe accounts, the exercise of compiling the 2016-2018 GFS was repeated, and the results are\nsummarized in Table 1 above, which presents the 2016-2018 GRM Integrated Financial Balance\nSheet. More detailed information for the compilation exercise is illustrated in the other tables\nthat follow and in Annexes III-VII of this report. In this regard, the mission recommends: (i) formal\nvalidation by the authorities and submission to the IMF to be included in the GFS database;\n(ii) submission to the Mozambique National Statistics Institute (INE) which, according to the\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **29**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.94037628173828, 405.77996826171875, 539.8200073242188, 538.739990234375], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nanticipated to record an expense or revenue in the budgetary balance sheet until the financial\nbalance sheet is prepared to record the transactions and vice versa; (ii) these operations\nrepresent accounts payable and/or receivable that the Fiscal Table does not include below the\nline. Thus, based on the dual-entry accounting rule, accounts such as fiscal years ended or\nentered in banks for which the transaction details are unknown so that the proper entry above\nthe line cannot be made and there is no counterpart below the line, which generates\ndiscrepancies.\n\n53. Record of Treasury Operations. In a cash approach, which the authorities use, all\ntransactions that generate activity in banks, in the case of Mozambique incoming funds (debit\nbalance) in Treasury Operations should be considered below the line in the Fiscal Table as\naccounts receivable; otherwise they generate discrepancies. In a commitment system or even in a\nmodified cash system, both incoming and outgoing funds in Treasury Operations should be\nincluded in the Fiscal Table.\n\n4.2 Fiscal years ended\n\n54. Fiscal years ended. They have been recorded as part of expense, but they represent\ncredits recognized by the GCO, the payment of which is pending. As we reported in the Treasury\nOperations, the fiscal years ended do not have a below-the-line counterpart either, and thus they\ngenerate discrepancies. The mission recommends reclassifying them according to the nature of\nthe expense above the line, and add the total amount as part of accounts payable below the line.\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n April 2020 _Treasury Operations._ Begin to recognize them in the Fiscal Table, ideally using a modified cash approach (considering credit and debit balances). MEF \n April 2020 _Fiscal years ended._ Begin recognition in the Fiscal Table as part of accounts payable below the line and in the record kept for expenses above the line. MEF \n\nD. Compilation of Annual 2016-2018 GFS\n\n55. Result of the compilation of annual 2016-2018 GFS . Based on the detailed analysis of\nthe accounts, the exercise of compiling the 2016-2018 GFS was repeated, and the results are\nsummarized in Table 1 above, which presents the 2016-2018 GRM Integrated Financial Balance\nSheet. More detailed information for the compilation exercise is illustrated in the other tables\nthat follow and in Annexes III-VII of this report. In this regard, the mission recommends: (i) formal\nvalidation by the authorities and submission to the IMF to be included in the GFS database;\n(ii) submission to the Mozambique National Statistics Institute (INE) which, according to the\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 29", "text_characters": 2258}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nDEEF, is waiting for the data to compile 2018 GDP; and (iii) replication of the GFS compilation\nexercise on a quarterly basis.\n\n**56.** **Fiscal data used to compile GFS extracted from the CGE** . The data for compiling the\nGFS are obtained from the CGE, which reports the information in summary form, taken from PDF\nformat documents and converted to Excel manually. This method of compiling GFS carries risks\nbecause the compilation exercise is subject to repeating possible errors made in the CGE\ncompilation process. Moreover, a more detailed reclassification of some of the items is not\npossible. For compiling the GFS, the mission recommends using primary data extracted from the\nintegrated systems trial balances (for Mozambique, from the e-SISTAFE).\n\n\n\n**Table 13. Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash /Fiscal Table**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|1|Government revenue|
177,652.5|
218,072.8|
226,126.4|\n|
2|
Government expenses|
140,941.6|
148,659.0|
178,012.6|\n|
**NOB**|
**Net Operating Balance (1-2)**|
** 36,710.9**|
**69,143.8**|
**48,113.7**|\n|
31|
Nonfinancial assets (NFAs)|
60,171.2|
57,188.2|
83,754.2|\n|
2M|
Government expenses (2+31)|
201,112.8|
205,847.2|
261,766.8|\n|
**NLB**|
**Net Lending (+) / Borrowing (–) (NOB-31)**|
**(23,460.3)**|
**12,225.6**|
**(35,640.4)**|\n|
32|
Acquisition of financial assets|
19,058.2|
67,618.9|
17,339.7|\n|
33|
Net incurrence of liabilities|
43,843.9|
52,391.8|
52,289.6|\n|
**NLBz**
|
**Statistical discrepancy (32-33-NLB)**
|
**1,325.4**
|
**-3,001.6**
|
** -690.5**
|\n|
|
GDP (Data source: Article IV Report)
|
689,213.0|
804,463.0|
859,019.3|\n|
**NLBz**
|
**Statistical discrepancy (percent of GDP) – After the**
**mission**|
**0.19%**|
**-0.37%**|
**-0.08%**|\n\n\n**57.** **Government revenue transactions 2016-2018** . In general, revenue has been stable\nover the last three years, at roughly 26 percent of GDP. Therefore, some findings about revenue\nfollow:\n\n\n\n\n\n**a)** “ **Other taxes** ” account for 5 percent of total revenue. This high amount can be explained\n\nor reclassified correctly if the details of the revenue are available;\n\n\n\n**b)** Although there are **social security contributions** in revenue, the level of government\n\nexpenditures on social security benefits is unclear. Therefore, the mission believes that\nsome social contributions were classified incorrectly or the social benefits are classified\nincorrectly, so that these items must be revisited;\n\n\n\n**c)** The high amount of **dividends** in 2017 needs to be explained to ensure that it is not\n\nconsidered a “super dividend;” if it is, it should be reclassified below the line in “securities\nand holdings in investment funds;”\n\n\n\n**d)** There is no record of **interest received**, yet the amount of loans granted in financial\n\nassets is significant.\n\n\n\n**30** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98200225830078, 252.1999969482422, 545.0590209960938, 438.03997802734375], "columns": 5, "rows": 12}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nDEEF, is waiting for the data to compile 2018 GDP; and (iii) replication of the GFS compilation\nexercise on a quarterly basis.\n\n56. Fiscal data used to compile GFS extracted from the CGE . The data for compiling the\nGFS are obtained from the CGE, which reports the information in summary form, taken from PDF\nformat documents and converted to Excel manually. This method of compiling GFS carries risks\nbecause the compilation exercise is subject to repeating possible errors made in the CGE\ncompilation process. Moreover, a more detailed reclassification of some of the items is not\npossible. For compiling the GFS, the mission recommends using primary data extracted from the\nintegrated systems trial balances (for Mozambique, from the e-SISTAFE).\n\nTable 13. Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash /Fiscal Table\n\n Col1 Col2 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 1 Government revenue 177,652.5 218,072.8 226,126.4 \n 2 Government expenses 140,941.6 148,659.0 178,012.6 \n NOB Net Operating Balance (1-2) 36,710.9 69,143.8 48,113.7 \n 31 Nonfinancial assets (NFAs) 60,171.2 57,188.2 83,754.2 \n 2M Government expenses (2+31) 201,112.8 205,847.2 261,766.8 \n NLB Net Lending (+) / Borrowing (–) (NOB-31) (23,460.3) 12,225.6 (35,640.4) \n 32 Acquisition of financial assets 19,058.2 67,618.9 17,339.7 \n 33 Net incurrence of liabilities 43,843.9 52,391.8 52,289.6 \n NLBz Statistical discrepancy (32-33-NLB) 1,325.4 -3,001.6 -690.5 \n GDP (Data source: Article IV Report) 689,213.0 804,463.0 859,019.3 \n NLBz Statistical discrepancy (percent of GDP) – After the mission 0.19% -0.37% -0.08% \n\n57. Government revenue transactions 2016-2018 . In general, revenue has been stable\nover the last three years, at roughly 26 percent of GDP. Therefore, some findings about revenue\nfollow:\n\na) “ Other taxes ” account for 5 percent of total revenue. This high amount can be explained\n\nor reclassified correctly if the details of the revenue are available;\n\nb) Although there are social security contributions in revenue, the level of government\n\nexpenditures on social security benefits is unclear. Therefore, the mission believes that\nsome social contributions were classified incorrectly or the social benefits are classified\nincorrectly, so that these items must be revisited;\n\nc) The high amount of dividends in 2017 needs to be explained to ensure that it is not\n\nconsidered a “super dividend;” if it is, it should be reclassified below the line in “securities\nand holdings in investment funds;”\n\nd) There is no record of interest received, yet the amount of loans granted in financial\n\nassets is significant.\n\n30 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2195}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**58.** **Transactions in government spending** **2016-2018** . Like revenue, government spending\nin the last three years was stable at about 20 percent of GDP. The mission believes that the social\ncontribution and social benefit items need to be revised. Moreover, subsidies as they are\nreported cannot be classified as paid to the public and private or other sectors of the economy.\nThe item “fiscal years ended” needs to be properly detailed to make correct classification\npossible. The COFOG the authorities adopted is aligned with international standards, and the\ndata compiled during the mission are presented in Table 14 below. However, there are some\ninconsistencies in interest reported in expenditures of an economic type compared to those\nreported in the expenses by functions, as well as investment expenses (nonfinancial assets). For\nconsistency’s sake, the mission used the data reported in expenditures by type.\n\n\n\n**Table 14. Government Spending by Functions of Government – COFOG**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**7 **
|
**GRAND TOTAL**
|
**201,112.8**
|
**205,3847.2**
|
**261,766.8**|\n|
701
|
General public services
|
59,333.7
|
65,578.7
|
81,241.4|\n|702
|Defense
|7,825.9
|8,304.1
|
11,855.2|\n|703
|Security and public safety
|18,698.4
|25,342.3
|
24,830.1|\n|704
|Economic matters
|31,395.5
|24,870.1
|
47,576.9|\n|705
|Environmental protection
|1,296.7
|2,237.3
|
3,724.1|\n|706
|Housing and community services
|9,256.9
|9,086.49
|
9,520.7|\n|
707
|Health
|19,466.6
|19,498.5
|
23,073.2|\n|708
|Recreation, culture and religion
|1,410.2
|1,229.7
|
1,284.5|\n|709
|Education
|44,146.3
|49,091.8
|
52,042.2|\n|710
|Social protection|8,282.6|4,413.6|
6,618.4|\n\n\n**59.** **Transactions in nonfinancial assets.** Available fiscal data report only acquisitions of\nbuildings and infrastructure, and insignificant amounts in other fixed assets. The mission believes\nthat it is highly unlikely that over the last three years the authorities did not acquire any\nmachinery or equipment, that there were no transactions that affected the stock of inventories,\nor that Mozambique has no nonproduced assets. The CGE presents the inventory of government\nproperty and hence the mission recommends examining the possibility of bringing value to the\nstock, or at least the changes in this asset to the GFS.\n\n**60.** **Stock and transactions in financial assets and liabilities.** As mentioned earlier in this\nreport, the main concerns are government deposits, completing the reconciliation work that is\nnow pending, and a methodology to be determined for the process of compiling the GFS or the\nFiscal Table. Capital holdings of businesses and disposals in 2017 need to be reviewed for a\nbetter understanding of what took place that year. In general, the liability data is consistent, so\nthat the main concerns are in the amounts of debt securities and external lending.\n\n**61.** **Financial assets and liabilities by counterparty** . The stock of assets and liabilities by\ncounterparty is in the table below. More detailed information about the holders of securities and\nloans would show greater transparency of asset and liability transactions by counterparty. In\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **31**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98200225830078, 256.2794189453125, 545.0590209960938, 435.7599792480469], "columns": 5, "rows": 12}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n58. Transactions in government spending 2016-2018 . Like revenue, government spending\nin the last three years was stable at about 20 percent of GDP. The mission believes that the social\ncontribution and social benefit items need to be revised. Moreover, subsidies as they are\nreported cannot be classified as paid to the public and private or other sectors of the economy.\nThe item “fiscal years ended” needs to be properly detailed to make correct classification\npossible. The COFOG the authorities adopted is aligned with international standards, and the\ndata compiled during the mission are presented in Table 14 below. However, there are some\ninconsistencies in interest reported in expenditures of an economic type compared to those\nreported in the expenses by functions, as well as investment expenses (nonfinancial assets). For\nconsistency’s sake, the mission used the data reported in expenditures by type.\n\nTable 14. Government Spending by Functions of Government – COFOG\n\n Col1 Col2 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 7 GRAND TOTAL 201,112.8 205,3847.2 261,766.8 \n 701 General public services 59,333.7 65,578.7 81,241.4 \n 702 Defense 7,825.9 8,304.1 11,855.2 \n 703 Security and public safety 18,698.4 25,342.3 24,830.1 \n 704 Economic matters 31,395.5 24,870.1 47,576.9 \n 705 Environmental protection 1,296.7 2,237.3 3,724.1 \n 706 Housing and community services 9,256.9 9,086.49 9,520.7 \n 707 Health 19,466.6 19,498.5 23,073.2 \n 708 Recreation, culture and religion 1,410.2 1,229.7 1,284.5 \n 709 Education 44,146.3 49,091.8 52,042.2 \n 710 Social protection 8,282.6 4,413.6 6,618.4 \n\n59. Transactions in nonfinancial assets. Available fiscal data report only acquisitions of\nbuildings and infrastructure, and insignificant amounts in other fixed assets. The mission believes\nthat it is highly unlikely that over the last three years the authorities did not acquire any\nmachinery or equipment, that there were no transactions that affected the stock of inventories,\nor that Mozambique has no nonproduced assets. The CGE presents the inventory of government\nproperty and hence the mission recommends examining the possibility of bringing value to the\nstock, or at least the changes in this asset to the GFS.\n\n60. Stock and transactions in financial assets and liabilities. As mentioned earlier in this\nreport, the main concerns are government deposits, completing the reconciliation work that is\nnow pending, and a methodology to be determined for the process of compiling the GFS or the\nFiscal Table. Capital holdings of businesses and disposals in 2017 need to be reviewed for a\nbetter understanding of what took place that year. In general, the liability data is consistent, so\nthat the main concerns are in the amounts of debt securities and external lending.\n\n61. Financial assets and liabilities by counterparty . The stock of assets and liabilities by\ncounterparty is in the table below. More detailed information about the holders of securities and\nloans would show greater transparency of asset and liability transactions by counterparty. In\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 31", "text_characters": 2601}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\naddition, the data received for these purposes do not separate the assets and liabilities of\nfinancial and nonfinancial corporations.\n\n**Table 15. Stock of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty**\n\n\n|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**682**|**Financial assets [=62]**|**185,014.7**|**252,631.5**|**269,201.7**|\n|
**6821**
68212
68213
68215
68216
**6822**|
**Domestic debtors [=621]**
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
Families and nonprofit institutions
**External debtors [=622]**|
**185,014.7**
28,092.5
14,803.3
139,424.4
2,694.6
**0.0**|
**252,631.5**
58,336.1
14,857.7
178,193.6
1,244.2
**0.0**|
**269,201.7**
35,730.7
19,231.5
212,193.2
2,046.2
**0.0**|\n|
**683**|
**Liabilities [=63]**|
**701,991,7**|
**662,127.1**|
**737,016.1**|\n|
**6831**
68312
68313
68315
**6832**
68327
68328
68329
|
**Domestic creditors [=631]**
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
**External creditors [=632]**
International organizations
Financial corporations that are not international
organizations
Other nonresidents|
**87,993.8**
34,528.1
52,525.5
940.2
**613,997.9**
270,080.0
90,089.0
253,828.9|
**107,655.9**
34,528.1
72,371.5
756.3
**554,470.2**
244,267.8
80,920.7
229,281.7|
**140,317.4**
38,458.5
101,574.8
284.1
**596,698.7**
263,060.6
85,626.5
248,011.6|\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|August
2020
|**_Data from the e-SISTAFE trial balance:_** extract the primary
fiscal data to begin compiling the GFS.
|DEEF|\n|February
2020|**_Mozambique GFS from 2016-2018 compiled during the_**
**_mission:_**_ Validate and submit to the IMF/STA and INE._
|DEEF|\n|
December
2020
|**_GFS annual and quarterly series 2010-2018_**_: Compile tables 1,_
_2, 3, 6, 7, 8A and 8B of the GFSM 2014 and submit them to the_
_IMF._
|DEEF|\n|August
2020
|**_Annual and quarterly GFS:_**Begin publishing them on the MEF
website.|DEEF|\n\n\n\n**E. Fiscal Table Revisions**\n\n**62.** **Align the Fiscal Table with the most up-to-date international standards** . The\nMozambican authorities use the Fiscal Table compiled using the GFSM 1986 as a main fiscal\ninstrument. Annex VII reports the data in the various methodologies (GFSM 1984 vs. GFSM 2014)\nfor a better understanding of the difference in methodologies. The mission reiterated that the\nFiscal Table format recommended by the most up-to-date international methodology (GFSM\n\n\n**32** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98046112060547, 136.75938415527344, 539.9603881835938, 400.5999755859375], "columns": 5, "rows": 5}, {"bbox": [89.98046112060547, 422.2193603515625, 539.9603881835938, 611.3396606445312], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\naddition, the data received for these purposes do not separate the assets and liabilities of\nfinancial and nonfinancial corporations.\n\nTable 15. Stock of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty\n\n Col1 December 31 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 682 Financial assets [=62] 185,014.7 252,631.5 269,201.7 \n 6821 68212 68213 68215 68216 6822 Domestic debtors [=621] Central Bank Depository corporations, except the Central Bank Nonfinancial corporations Families and nonprofit institutions External debtors [=622] 185,014.7 28,092.5 14,803.3 139,424.4 2,694.6 0.0 252,631.5 58,336.1 14,857.7 178,193.6 1,244.2 0.0 269,201.7 35,730.7 19,231.5 212,193.2 2,046.2 0.0 \n 683 Liabilities [=63] 701,991,7 662,127.1 737,016.1 \n 6831 68312 68313 68315 6832 68327 68328 68329 Domestic creditors [=631] Central Bank Depository corporations, except the Central Bank Nonfinancial corporations External creditors [=632] International organizations Financial corporations that are not international organizations Other nonresidents 87,993.8 34,528.1 52,525.5 940.2 613,997.9 270,080.0 90,089.0 253,828.9 107,655.9 34,528.1 72,371.5 756.3 554,470.2 244,267.8 80,920.7 229,281.7 140,317.4 38,458.5 101,574.8 284.1 596,698.7 263,060.6 85,626.5 248,011.6 \n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n August 2020 _Data from the e-SISTAFE trial balance:_ extract the primary fiscal data to begin compiling the GFS. DEEF \n February 2020 _Mozambique GFS from 2016-2018 compiled during the_ _mission:__ Validate and submit to the IMF/STA and INE._ DEEF \n December 2020 _GFS annual and quarterly series 2010-2018__: Compile tables 1,_ _2, 3, 6, 7, 8A and 8B of the GFSM 2014 and submit them to the_ _IMF._ DEEF \n August 2020 _Annual and quarterly GFS:_Begin publishing them on the MEF website. DEEF \n\nE. Fiscal Table Revisions\n\n62. Align the Fiscal Table with the most up-to-date international standards . The\nMozambican authorities use the Fiscal Table compiled using the GFSM 1986 as a main fiscal\ninstrument. Annex VII reports the data in the various methodologies (GFSM 1984 vs. GFSM 2014)\nfor a better understanding of the difference in methodologies. The mission reiterated that the\nFiscal Table format recommended by the most up-to-date international methodology (GFSM\n\n32 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1968}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n2014) reports greater revenue, fewer expenditures, and consequently a more favorable overall\nbalance for the authorities. In addition, it differentiates financing transactions related to the other\ntransactions more easily, which thus facilitates policy decisions for debt, as well as decisions for\nstrengthening collection for financing a certain type of expenditures (for example, operating or\ninvestment expenditures). This also provides for a rapid comparison of fiscal policies adopted in\nMozambique compared to the other countries in the region and the rest of the world.\n\n**i.** **Government revenue**\n\n\n**63.** **Government revenue in the Fiscal Table.** The authorities consider disposals of\ngovernment property and holdings as revenue; according to the GFSM 2014, they are part of\n“ _investment in nonfinancial assets_ ” and “ _acquisition in financial assets_ ” respectively (see\nparagraphs 8.28 and 9.47-9.49 of the GFSM 2014). Furthermore, the authorities record grants\nseparately from revenue. A grant is a type of government revenue according to the GFSM 2014\nthat does not constitute a discrepancy in the Fiscal Table, but reclassifying it according to the\nGFSM 2014 results in revenue greater than that presented in the Fiscal Table produced by the\nauthorities (see Figure 2 below). Hence, the mission reiterates its past recommendation to revise\nthis in the Fiscal Table.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **33**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n2014) reports greater revenue, fewer expenditures, and consequently a more favorable overall\nbalance for the authorities. In addition, it differentiates financing transactions related to the other\ntransactions more easily, which thus facilitates policy decisions for debt, as well as decisions for\nstrengthening collection for financing a certain type of expenditures (for example, operating or\ninvestment expenditures). This also provides for a rapid comparison of fiscal policies adopted in\nMozambique compared to the other countries in the region and the rest of the world.\n\ni. Government revenue\n\n63. Government revenue in the Fiscal Table. The authorities consider disposals of\ngovernment property and holdings as revenue; according to the GFSM 2014, they are part of\n“ _investment in nonfinancial assets_ ” and “ _acquisition in financial assets_ ” respectively (see\nparagraphs 8.28 and 9.47-9.49 of the GFSM 2014). Furthermore, the authorities record grants\nseparately from revenue. A grant is a type of government revenue according to the GFSM 2014\nthat does not constitute a discrepancy in the Fiscal Table, but reclassifying it according to the\nGFSM 2014 results in revenue greater than that presented in the Fiscal Table produced by the\nauthorities (see Figure 2 below). Hence, the mission reiterates its past recommendation to revise\nthis in the Fiscal Table.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 33", "text_characters": 1209}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-001", "cr-2023-045-fig-p0035-002"], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**ii.** **Government expenses**\n\n\n**64.** **Government expenses in the Fiscal Table.** The mission recommends reclassifying\n“capital expense” which the authorities currently present as being part of total expenses in the\n“investment in nonfinancial assets” or “investment expense” item. This reclassification is\nconducive to identifying a lower expense and considering the increased revenue (as we saw in\nthe previous paragraph) it leads to a current and overall balance that is more favorable for the\ngovernment. The following figure shows that the expenses for the years 2016-2018, compiled\naccording to the 2014, are slightly below those in the Fiscal Table according to the GFSM 1986\nmethodology.\n\n**Figure 3. Government Expenses**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**34** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nii. Government expenses\n\n64. Government expenses in the Fiscal Table. The mission recommends reclassifying\n“capital expense” which the authorities currently present as being part of total expenses in the\n“investment in nonfinancial assets” or “investment expense” item. This reclassification is\nconducive to identifying a lower expense and considering the increased revenue (as we saw in\nthe previous paragraph) it leads to a current and overall balance that is more favorable for the\ngovernment. The following figure shows that the expenses for the years 2016-2018, compiled\naccording to the 2014, are slightly below those in the Fiscal Table according to the GFSM 1986\nmethodology.\n\nFigure 3. Government Expenses\n\n34 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 653}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**iii.** **Acquisition of nonfinancial assets**\n\n\n**65.** **There is currently no item entitled acquisition of nonfinancial assets in the Fiscal**\n\n**Table of the Mozambican authorities, even though the components are part of it.** The mission\nrecommends adding to this item all investment expenditures, the disposal of government\nproperty, and capital spending recorded as part of current expenditures.\n\n\n**iv.** **Financial assets and liabilities**\n\n\n\n**66.** **Nor are there financial assets as an aggregate currently in the Fiscal Table adopted by**\n\n**the Mozambican authorities.** However, some components are above and below the line. Thus, the\n\n\n\nmission recommends beginning to report this item that should include government deposits\n\n\n\ncurrently recorded as part of the NGC. Moreover, add to this aggregate other assets reported above\n\n\n\nthe line such as: onlending agreements, holdings in the capital of government-owned corporations\n\n\n\nand investee companies, Treasury loans, financial investments of the Institute for the Management of\n\nGovernment Holdings (IGEPE), and other accounts receivable. The mission suggests presenting these\n\n\n\nitems before liabilities and just after the overall balance.\n\n\n\n**67.** **For liabilities, the mission recommends presenting net obligations in accordance with**\n\n\n\n**the debt instruments.** Detail in terms of disbursement and amortization may be useful\n\n\n\nsupplementary information presented as a memorandum item.\n\n\n\n**68.** **Add the items of other accounts payable and receivable to the Fiscal Table.** The fiscal\n\n\n\nyears ended and Treasury Operations are items that would be classified in this aggregate reported as\n\n\n\npart of financial assets and/or liabilities.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target
Date|Recommendations|Responsible
institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|August
2020
|**_Fiscal Table restructuring:_** Restructure it to ensure that it is in line
with international standards: Declaration I —Government
Operations, in the GFSM 2014_._|DNT and DEEF|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **35**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.92033386230469, 478.0193786621094, 538.4000244140625, 565.02001953125], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\niii. Acquisition of nonfinancial assets\n\n65. There is currently no item entitled acquisition of nonfinancial assets in the Fiscal\n\nTable of the Mozambican authorities, even though the components are part of it. The mission\nrecommends adding to this item all investment expenditures, the disposal of government\nproperty, and capital spending recorded as part of current expenditures.\n\niv. Financial assets and liabilities\n\n66. Nor are there financial assets as an aggregate currently in the Fiscal Table adopted by\n\nthe Mozambican authorities. However, some components are above and below the line. Thus, the\n\nmission recommends beginning to report this item that should include government deposits\n\ncurrently recorded as part of the NGC. Moreover, add to this aggregate other assets reported above\n\nthe line such as: onlending agreements, holdings in the capital of government-owned corporations\n\nand investee companies, Treasury loans, financial investments of the Institute for the Management of\n\nGovernment Holdings (IGEPE), and other accounts receivable. The mission suggests presenting these\n\nitems before liabilities and just after the overall balance.\n\n67. For liabilities, the mission recommends presenting net obligations in accordance with\n\nthe debt instruments. Detail in terms of disbursement and amortization may be useful\n\nsupplementary information presented as a memorandum item.\n\n68. Add the items of other accounts payable and receivable to the Fiscal Table. The fiscal\n\nyears ended and Treasury Operations are items that would be classified in this aggregate reported as\n\npart of financial assets and/or liabilities.\n\n Target Date Recommendations Responsible institutions \n\n August 2020 _Fiscal Table restructuring:_ Restructure it to ensure that it is in line with international standards: Declaration I —Government Operations, in the GFSM 2014_._ DNT and DEEF \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35", "text_characters": 1635}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Annex I. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Name|Institution|Title|\n|---|---|---|\n|Domingos Lambo
|MEF
|Permanent Secretary
|\n|
Enilde Sarmento
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Chamila Aly
|
MEF/DNT
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Domingos Fumo
|
BM/DER
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Sebastião Dimene
|
MEF/DNPO
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Paulo Vilanculos
|
MEF/DNCP
|
Department Head
|\n|
Sebastião Dimene
|
MEF/DNPO
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Aquino Chilundo
|
BM/DER
|
Technician
|\n|
Ângelo Ferreira
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Technician
|\n|
Isidora Nhauche
|
BM/DER
|
Technician
|\n|
José Chalufo
|
CEDSIF
|
Technician
|\n|
Marcos A. Cossa
|
CEDSIF
|
Technician
|\n|
Pradipa Aunvattal
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Technician
|\n|
Rosário Betho
|
MEF/DEEF
|
Technician
|\n|
Yasmien Ribeiro
|
MEF/DNPO
|
Technician
|\n|
Ari Aisen
|
IMF Mozambique
|
Resident Representative
|\n|
Esther Palacio
|
IMF Mozambique
|
Advisor and Coordinator of Technical
Assistance|\n\n\n\n**36** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [101.98737335205078, 104.46002197265625, 538.3326416015625, 410.58001708984375], "columns": 3, "rows": 18}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nAnnex I. Officials and Employees Met During the Mission\n\n Name Institution Title \n\n Domingos Lambo MEF Permanent Secretary \n Enilde Sarmento MEF/DEEF Deputy Director \n Chamila Aly MEF/DNT Deputy Director \n Domingos Fumo BM/DER Deputy Director \n Sebastião Dimene MEF/DNPO Deputy Director \n Paulo Vilanculos MEF/DNCP Department Head \n Sebastião Dimene MEF/DNPO Deputy Director \n Aquino Chilundo BM/DER Technician \n Ângelo Ferreira MEF/DEEF Technician \n Isidora Nhauche BM/DER Technician \n José Chalufo CEDSIF Technician \n Marcos A. Cossa CEDSIF Technician \n Pradipa Aunvattal MEF/DEEF Technician \n Rosário Betho MEF/DEEF Technician \n Yasmien Ribeiro MEF/DNPO Technician \n Ari Aisen IMF Mozambique Resident Representative \n Esther Palacio IMF Mozambique Advisor and Coordinator of Technical Assistance \n\n36 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 713}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Annex II. Institutional Structure of General Government**\n\n\n\n**Mozambique (688)**\n\n\n\n**Units of the General Government of Mozambique**\n\n\n\n(The preliminary lists of public institutions are available in the report of the last mission)\n\n**Subsector 1.** **Budgetary central government**\n**1.1** Five sovereign bodies: President of the Republic, Assembly of the Republic, Government\n(21 ministries and about 70 entities, agencies, commissions and public services, the courts\nand the Constitutional Council).\n\n**Subsector 2.** **Extrabudgetary units/entities**\n**2.1** 80 public institutes\n**2.2** 12 public funds\n\n**Subsector 3.** **Social Security**\n**3.1** National Social Security Institute of Mozambique (INSS)\n\n**Subsector 4.** **State government**\nNot applicable\n\n**Subsector 5.** **Local government**\n**5.1** 11 Provinces\n**5.2** 10 Districts\n**5.3** 53 Autonomous local authorities/municipalities (corresponding to cities and towns)\n\n**Data Coverage**\n\nData in the central government tables cover the operations of subsector 1 and part of the\ndata on budgetary execution for subsectors 2 and 5. Social security data is not available\nat present. Data on local governments pertaining to self-generated resources and the\nexecution thereof are not available. A provisional time series for GFS covering 2009 to\n2018 is available.\n\n**Accounting Practices**\n\n\n\n**F1.** **Bases of recording:** The data are reported on a modified cash basis and are obtained\nfrom budgetary execution.\n**F2.** **Validation or complementary period:** Not applicable\n**F3.** **Valuation of assets and liabilities:** Nonfinancial assets are evaluated at historic cost and\nother financial assets and liabilities at nominal value.\n\n**Plan for Implementation of the** _**GFSM 2001/2014**_ _Complete_ the GFS Module of the Project EDDI 2\nfinanced by the DFID of the United Kingdom. However, there are still many challenges in the process of\ncompiling GFS in Mozambique. Another result of TA from the DFID is that the authorities have an action\nplan that serves as a guide in the process of implementing the GFSM 2014.\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **37**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nAnnex II. Institutional Structure of General Government\n\nMozambique (688)\n\nUnits of the General Government of Mozambique\n\n(The preliminary lists of public institutions are available in the report of the last mission)\n\nSubsector 1. Budgetary central government\n1.1 Five sovereign bodies: President of the Republic, Assembly of the Republic, Government\n(21 ministries and about 70 entities, agencies, commissions and public services, the courts\nand the Constitutional Council).\n\nSubsector 2. Extrabudgetary units/entities\n2.1 80 public institutes\n2.2 12 public funds\n\nSubsector 3. Social Security\n3.1 National Social Security Institute of Mozambique (INSS)\n\nSubsector 4. State government\nNot applicable\n\nSubsector 5. Local government\n5.1 11 Provinces\n5.2 10 Districts\n5.3 53 Autonomous local authorities/municipalities (corresponding to cities and towns)\n\nData Coverage\n\nData in the central government tables cover the operations of subsector 1 and part of the\ndata on budgetary execution for subsectors 2 and 5. Social security data is not available\nat present. Data on local governments pertaining to self-generated resources and the\nexecution thereof are not available. A provisional time series for GFS covering 2009 to\n2018 is available.\n\nAccounting Practices\n\nF1. Bases of recording: The data are reported on a modified cash basis and are obtained\nfrom budgetary execution.\nF2. Validation or complementary period: Not applicable\nF3. Valuation of assets and liabilities: Nonfinancial assets are evaluated at historic cost and\nother financial assets and liabilities at nominal value.\n\nPlan for Implementation of the _GFSM 2001/2014_ _Complete_ the GFS Module of the Project EDDI 2\nfinanced by the DFID of the United Kingdom. However, there are still many challenges in the process of\ncompiling GFS in Mozambique. Another result of TA from the DFID is that the authorities have an action\nplan that serves as a guide in the process of implementing the GFSM 2014.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 37", "text_characters": 1703}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Annex III. Detailed Government Revenue - GRM**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**1 **
|**Revenue**
|**177,652.5**
|**218,072.8**
|**226,126.4**
|\n|**11**
**111**
1111
1112
**113**
**114**
1141
1142
1144
1145
1146
**115**
**116**
**12**
**121**
**122**
**13**
**132**
1321
1322
**14**
**141**
1412
1415
**142**
**144**
|**Taxes**
**Taxes on income, profit and capital gains**
Individuals
Businesses
**Taxes on property**
**Taxes on goods and services**
Taxes on aggregated value
Special consumption taxes
Taxes on specific services
Taxes on the use of merchandise and
permission to use it or carrying out activities
Other taxes on goods and services
**Taxes on commerce and international**
**transactions (customs and other import**
**duties)**
**Other taxes**
**Social contributions**
**Contributions to social security (contributions**
**from civil servants)**
**Other social contributions**
**(contributions from civil servants)**
**Grants**
**From international organizations**
Current
Capital
**Other Revenue**
**Property income**
Dividend
Rental income
**Sales of goods and services**
**Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current)**|**152,789.0**
63,547.9
26,822.3
36,725.6
9.5
65,735.6
48,300.9
15,181.4
482.5
154.9
1,615.9
12,663.5
10,833.5
**3,332.9**
605.0
2,728.0
**14,839.8**
14,839.8
1,047.5
13,792.3
**6,689.8**
4,484.9
1,914.6
2,570.3
2,083.4
121.5|**186,498.5**
96,597.0
29,668.2
66,928.8
9.8
65,431.2
45,485.5
14,620.0
527.9
384.9
4,412.9
12,031.8
12,428.6
**5,493.7**
473.2
5,020.4
**16,302.1**
16,302.1
20.0
16,282.1
**9,778.5**
6,361.2
4,133.3
2,227.8
3,161.3
256.0|**191,992.6**
89,988.5
33,052.0
56,936.5
121.1
75,681.5
55,449.8
14,704.1
632.8
1,103.1
3,791.7
14,927.4
11,274.1
**7,278.8**
61.1
7,217.7
**17,671.7**
17,671.7
1.1
17,670.6
**9,183.2**
5,308.2
228.0
5,080.1
3,694.9
180.2|\n\n\n\n**38** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.9922103881836, 119.24002838134766, 547.2088012695312, 608.2000122070312], "columns": 5, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nAnnex III. Detailed Government Revenue - GRM\n\n Col1 December 31 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 1 Revenue 177,652.5 218,072.8 226,126.4 \n 11 111 1111 1112 113 114 1141 1142 1144 1145 1146 115 116 12 121 122 13 132 1321 1322 14 141 1412 1415 142 144 Taxes Taxes on income, profit and capital gains Individuals Businesses Taxes on property Taxes on goods and services Taxes on aggregated value Special consumption taxes Taxes on specific services Taxes on the use of merchandise and permission to use it or carrying out activities Other taxes on goods and services Taxes on commerce and international transactions (customs and other import duties) Other taxes Social contributions Contributions to social security (contributions from civil servants) Other social contributions (contributions from civil servants) Grants From international organizations Current Capital Other Revenue Property income Dividend Rental income Sales of goods and services Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current) 152,789.0 63,547.9 26,822.3 36,725.6 9.5 65,735.6 48,300.9 15,181.4 482.5 154.9 1,615.9 12,663.5 10,833.5 3,332.9 605.0 2,728.0 14,839.8 14,839.8 1,047.5 13,792.3 6,689.8 4,484.9 1,914.6 2,570.3 2,083.4 121.5 186,498.5 96,597.0 29,668.2 66,928.8 9.8 65,431.2 45,485.5 14,620.0 527.9 384.9 4,412.9 12,031.8 12,428.6 5,493.7 473.2 5,020.4 16,302.1 16,302.1 20.0 16,282.1 9,778.5 6,361.2 4,133.3 2,227.8 3,161.3 256.0 191,992.6 89,988.5 33,052.0 56,936.5 121.1 75,681.5 55,449.8 14,704.1 632.8 1,103.1 3,791.7 14,927.4 11,274.1 7,278.8 61.1 7,217.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 1.1 17,670.6 9,183.2 5,308.2 228.0 5,080.1 3,694.9 180.2 \n\n38 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1415}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Annex IV. GRM Detailed Government Spending**\n\n|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**2 **
**Expenditure**|**2 **
**Expenditure**|**140,941.6**|**148,659.0**|**178,012.6**|\n|
**21**
**Remuneration of employees**
211
Wages
212
Social contributions
**22**
**Goods and service**
**23**
**Consumption of fixed capital**
**24**
**Interest**
241
Nonresidents
242
Residents not in the central government
**25**
**Subsidies (Private companies)**
**26**
**Grants**
262
International organizations (Current)
263
Other central government units (Current)
**27**
**Social benefits**
272
Social assistance benefits
273
Social benefits from employers
**282**
**Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current)**
|
**21**
**Remuneration of employees**
211
Wages
212
Social contributions
**22**
**Goods and service**
**23**
**Consumption of fixed capital**
**24**
**Interest**
241
Nonresidents
242
Residents not in the central government
**25**
**Subsidies (Private companies)**
**26**
**Grants**
262
International organizations (Current)
263
Other central government units (Current)
**27**
**Social benefits**
272
Social assistance benefits
273
Social benefits from employers
**282**
**Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current)**
|
**77,842.6**
77,842.6
0.0
**22,969.0**
**N/A**
**16,308.9**
8,589.8
7,719.1
**2,011.4**
**5,915.1**
2,257.1
3,658.1
**15,161.5**
5,056.5
10,105.0
**733.0**|
**85,088.8**
85,088.8
0.0
**22,015.2**
**N/A**
**18,109.1**
9,340.0
8,769.0
**2,049.6**
**4,910.6**
734.8
4,175.8
**15,003.3**
4,482.5
10,520.8
**1,482.5**|
**96,464.8**
96,464.8
0.0
**28,702.9**
**N/A**
**27,250.4**
10,314.0
16,936.4
**913.9**
**6,244.3**
1,009.9
5,234.4
**17,302.6**
6,404.3
10,898.3
**1,133.8**|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **39**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.00050354003906, 119.280029296875, 549.00048828125, 390.719970703125], "columns": 5, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nAnnex IV. GRM Detailed Government Spending\n\n Col1 December 31 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 2 Expenditure 2 Expenditure 140,941.6 148,659.0 178,012.6 \n 21 Remuneration of employees 211 Wages 212 Social contributions 22 Goods and service 23 Consumption of fixed capital 24 Interest 241 Nonresidents 242 Residents not in the central government 25 Subsidies (Private companies) 26 Grants 262 International organizations (Current) 263 Other central government units (Current) 27 Social benefits 272 Social assistance benefits 273 Social benefits from employers 282 Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current) 21 Remuneration of employees 211 Wages 212 Social contributions 22 Goods and service 23 Consumption of fixed capital 24 Interest 241 Nonresidents 242 Residents not in the central government 25 Subsidies (Private companies) 26 Grants 262 International organizations (Current) 263 Other central government units (Current) 27 Social benefits 272 Social assistance benefits 273 Social benefits from employers 282 Transfers not classified elsewhere (Current) 77,842.6 77,842.6 0.0 22,969.0 N/A 16,308.9 8,589.8 7,719.1 2,011.4 5,915.1 2,257.1 3,658.1 15,161.5 5,056.5 10,105.0 733.0 85,088.8 85,088.8 0.0 22,015.2 N/A 18,109.1 9,340.0 8,769.0 2,049.6 4,910.6 734.8 4,175.8 15,003.3 4,482.5 10,520.8 1,482.5 96,464.8 96,464.8 0.0 28,702.9 N/A 27,250.4 10,314.0 16,936.4 913.9 6,244.3 1,009.9 5,234.4 17,302.6 6,404.3 10,898.3 1,133.8 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 39", "text_characters": 1269}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Annex V. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities - GRM**\n\n|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**31**
**311**
3111
3112
3113
**312**
**313**
**314**|**Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets**|**60,171.2**|**57,188.2**|**83,754.2**|\n|**31**
**311**
3111
3112
3113
**312**
**313**
**314**|
**Fixed assets**
Buildings and infrastructure(acquisitions)
Machinery and equipment
Other fixed assets
**Inventories**
**Valuables**
**Nonproduced assets**|
**60,171.2**
60,097.2
0.0
73.9
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**|
**57,188.2**
57,131.7
0.0
56.4
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**|
**83,754.2**
83,638.0
0.0
116.1
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**|\n|
**32**
**321**
3212
3213
3214
3215
3218
**322**|
**Net acquisition of financial assets**|
**19,058.2**|
**67,618.7**|
**17,339.7**|\n|
**32**
**321**
3212
3213
3214
3215
3218
**322**|
**Domestic debtors**
Currency and deposits
Debt securities
Loans
Securities and holdings in investment funds
Other accounts receivable
**External debtors**|
**19,058.2**
6,723.3
0.0
16,361.0
3,624.0
-7,650.1
**0.0**|
**67,618.7**
29,654.0
0.0
24,657.8
-3,497.4
16,804.5
**0.0**|
**17,339.7**
-17,432.2
0.0
13,879.2
5,286.7
15,606.0
**0.0**|\n|
**33**
**331**
3312
3313
3314
3318
**332**
3322
3323
3324|
**Net liabilities**|
**43,843.9**|
**52,392.7**|
**52,289.6**|\n|
**33**
**331**
3312
3313
3314
3318
**332**
3322
3323
3324|
**Domestic creditors**
Currency and deposits
Debt securities
Loans
Other accounts payable
**External creditors**
Currency and deposits
Debt securities
Loans
|
**18,886.3**
0.0
-10,174.8
29,047.0
14.1
**24,957.6**
0.0
0.0
24,957.6|
**21,887.1**
0.0
18,052.5
3,362.4
472.2
**30,504.7**
0.0
0.0
30,504.7|
**32,660.5**
0.0
13,439.7
19,037.8
183.0
**19,629.1**
0.0
0.0
19,629.1|\n\n\n\n**40** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.99191284179688, 119.24002838134766, 554.2885131835938, 527.7996215820312], "columns": 5, "rows": 7}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nAnnex V. Transactions in Assets and Liabilities - GRM\n\n Col1 December 31 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 31 311 3111 3112 3113 312 313 314 Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 60,171.2 57,188.2 83,754.2 \n 31 311 3111 3112 3113 312 313 314 Fixed assets Buildings and infrastructure(acquisitions) Machinery and equipment Other fixed assets Inventories Valuables Nonproduced assets 60,171.2 60,097.2 0.0 73.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 57,188.2 57,131.7 0.0 56.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 83,754.2 83,638.0 0.0 116.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n 32 321 3212 3213 3214 3215 3218 322 Net acquisition of financial assets 19,058.2 67,618.7 17,339.7 \n 32 321 3212 3213 3214 3215 3218 322 Domestic debtors Currency and deposits Debt securities Loans Securities and holdings in investment funds Other accounts receivable External debtors 19,058.2 6,723.3 0.0 16,361.0 3,624.0 -7,650.1 0.0 67,618.7 29,654.0 0.0 24,657.8 -3,497.4 16,804.5 0.0 17,339.7 -17,432.2 0.0 13,879.2 5,286.7 15,606.0 0.0 \n 33 331 3312 3313 3314 3318 332 3322 3323 3324 Net liabilities 43,843.9 52,392.7 52,289.6 \n 33 331 3312 3313 3314 3318 332 3322 3323 3324 Domestic creditors Currency and deposits Debt securities Loans Other accounts payable External creditors Currency and deposits Debt securities Loans 18,886.3 0.0 -10,174.8 29,047.0 14.1 24,957.6 0.0 0.0 24,957.6 21,887.1 0.0 18,052.5 3,362.4 472.2 30,504.7 0.0 0.0 30,504.7 32,660.5 0.0 13,439.7 19,037.8 183.0 19,629.1 0.0 0.0 19,629.1 \n\n40 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1227}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Annex VI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities** **by Counterparty**\n\n|Col1|December 31|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**82**|**Acquisition net of financial assets (=32)**|**19,058.2**|**67,618.9**|**17,339.7**|\n|
**821**
8212
8213
8215
8216
**822**|
**Domestic debtors**(=321)
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
Families and nonprofit institutions
**External debtors**(=322)|
**19,058.2**
4,047.5
2,962.7
12,085.3
-37.3
**0.0**|
**67,618.9**
30,302.7
-806.1
38,145.4
-24.2
**0.0**|
**17,339.7**
-20,648.5
3,221.3
34,770.2
-3.4
**0.0**|\n|
**83**|
**Net liabilities (=33)**|
**43,843.9**|
**52,391.8**|
**52,289.6**|\n|
**831**
8312
8313
8315
**832**
8327
8328
8329
|
**Domestic creditors**(=331)
Central Bank
Depository corporations, except the Central Bank
Nonfinancial corporations
**External creditors**(=332)
International organizations
Financial corporations that are not international
organizations
Other nonresidents|
**18,886.3**
31,528.1
-12,641.8
14.1
**24,957.6**
11,643.1
3,677.9
9,636.6|
**21,887.1**
0.0
21,415.0
472.2
**30,504.7**
8,084.4
3,988.3
18,431.9|
**32,660.5**
3,930.5
28,547.1
183.0
**19,629.1**
10,663.3
1,108.5
7,857.3|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **41**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.98714447021484, 139.16001892089844, 551.2932739257812, 405.75958251953125], "columns": 5, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nAnnex VI. Transactions in GRM Financial Assets and Liabilities by Counterparty\n\n Col1 December 31 2016 2017 2018 \n\n 82 Acquisition net of financial assets (=32) 19,058.2 67,618.9 17,339.7 \n 821 8212 8213 8215 8216 822 Domestic debtors(=321) Central Bank Depository corporations, except the Central Bank Nonfinancial corporations Families and nonprofit institutions External debtors(=322) 19,058.2 4,047.5 2,962.7 12,085.3 -37.3 0.0 67,618.9 30,302.7 -806.1 38,145.4 -24.2 0.0 17,339.7 -20,648.5 3,221.3 34,770.2 -3.4 0.0 \n 83 Net liabilities (=33) 43,843.9 52,391.8 52,289.6 \n 831 8312 8313 8315 832 8327 8328 8329 Domestic creditors(=331) Central Bank Depository corporations, except the Central Bank Nonfinancial corporations External creditors(=332) International organizations Financial corporations that are not international organizations Other nonresidents 18,886.3 31,528.1 -12,641.8 14.1 24,957.6 11,643.1 3,677.9 9,636.6 21,887.1 0.0 21,415.0 472.2 30,504.7 8,084.4 3,988.3 18,431.9 32,660.5 3,930.5 28,547.1 183.0 19,629.1 10,663.3 1,108.5 7,857.3 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 41", "text_characters": 962}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Annex VII. GRM Fiscal Table - GFSM 1986 vs. GFSM 2014**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|EFP|Col2|2016|2017|2018|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|2018
213,032.2
252,292.0
178,187.3
72,358.5
13,924.3
-12,178.1
17,671.7
-21,588.1
19,629.1
34,821.3
-15,192.2
26,595.6
-24,636.6
-13,357.1
-11,279.5
859,019.0
-1.42%|2017|2016|Mapa Fiscal|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|1|**Receita Total e Donativos**|**177,652.5**|**218,072.7**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**|**226,126.4**||||\n||
**Receita do Estado**|166,285.0|213,222.8|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|213,032.2|**213,222.8**|**165,595.3**|** Receita do Estado**|\n||
Excluido \"Alienação do Património do Estado\" e considerado em investimento (31)|-71.3|-98.4|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5|-58.5||||\n||
Excluido \"Participações do Estado\" incluido em ativos financeiros (32)|-3,401.1|-11,353.9|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|-4,519.0|**255,384.6**|**219,522.9**|** Despesa Total e Empréstimos Líquidos**|\n||
**Donativos**|**14,839.8**|**16,302.1**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**|**17,671.7**||||\n||
**Donativos**|**14,839.8**|**16,302.1**|**17,671.7**||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||148,724.7|142,420.0|**1. Despesa Corrente**|\n|**2M**|**Despesa Total**|**201,112.8**|**205,847.2**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**|**261,766.8**||
|
|\n||||||||||||||||57,136.5|60,645.3|**2. Despesa de Investimento**|\n|2|**Despesa Corrente**|**140,941.6**|**148,659.0**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**|**178,012.6**||||\n||
Total da Despesa na CGE|141,086.8|148,813.8|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|178,187.3|25,834.6|13,467.4|**3. Empréstimos Líquidos**|\n||
Total da Despesa na CGE|141,086.8|148,813.8|178,187.3||||||||||||||\n||
Excluido \"Despesas de capital\" e considerado em investimento (31)|-145.2|-154.8|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7|-174.7||||\n||
||||||||||||||23,688.8|2,990.2|**4. Outras Despesas (+) / Receitas (-) »» Discrepância Estatística**|\n|**31**|**Ativos não financeiros líquidos**|**60,171.2**|**57,188.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**|**83,754.2**||||\n||
Assume 100% uso do financiamento externo (Fundos Comuns e Outros Fundos via/fora CUT)|59,900.5|56,919.8|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|72,241.5|16,302.1|14,842.8|** Donativos**|\n||
Assume 100% uso do financiamento externo (Fundos Comuns e Outros Fundos via/fora CUT)|59,900.5|56,919.8|72,241.5||||||||||||||\n||
_Leasings_de edifícios públicos|54.2|15.2|11,279.5|11,279.5|11,279.5|11,279.5|11,279.5||||||||||\n||
Despesa de Capital|145.2|154.8|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7|174.7||||\n||
Alienação do Património do Estado|71.3|98.4|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5|58.5||||\n|||||||||||||||||||\n|**NLB **|**Saldo Global**|**-23,460.3**|**12,225.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-35,640.4**|**-25,859.7**|**-39,084.8**|** Saldo Global após donativos**|\n|**NLB **|**Saldo Global**|**-23,460.3**|**12,225.4**|**-35,640.4**||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||||||\n|**32**|**Ativos Financeiros**
|**19,058.2**
|**67,618.8**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**35,399.3**
|**25,584.8**
|** Financiamento Externo**
|\n|**32**|**Ativos Financeiros**
|**19,058.2**
|**67,618.8**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|**17,339.7**
|||||||||\n||Depósitos Contas monetárias - Exclui INSS e BT|6,723.3|29,654.0|-17,432.2|||||||||||43,359.7|36,937.9|**Empréstimos**|\n||
Acordos de Retrocessão|16,361.0|9,572.6|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|13,879.2|-7,960.5|
-11,353.1|
**Amortização**|\n||
Participações no Capital de Empresas Públicas: Mapa I-2 da CGE|222.9|233.8|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7|767.7||||\n||
Participações do Estado|3,401.1|11,353.9|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|4,519.0|**-9,539.5**|**13,500.0**|** Crédito Interno Líquido**|\n||
Contas a pagar (+)/receber(-): Mapa I-4 da CGE: Operações de Tesouraria|-7,396.8|16,987.1|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4|15,604.4||||\n||
Contas a pagar (+)/receber(-) - Créditos do Tesouro & Aplicações Financeiras do IGEPE : Mapa I-2|-253.3|-182.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|1.6|**0.0**|**0.0**|** Outras Operações**|\n||||||||||||||||0.0|
0.0|
Fornecedores|\n|**33**|**Passivos**|**43,843.9**|**52,391.8**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|**52,289.6**|0.0|
0.0|
_Leasings_ de edifícios públicos|\n||
**Dívida Interna Líquida**|**18,872.2**|**21,415.0**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**|**32,477.6**||||\n||
**Exercícios Findos**|**14.1**|**472.2**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**|**183.0**||||\n||
**Dívida Externa Líquida**|**24,957.6**|**30,504.7**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**|**19,629.1**||||\n||
Desembolso - Inclui \"_onlending_\"|36,310.7|38,465.1|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3|34,821.3||||\n||
Amortização|11,353.1|7,960.5|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2|15,192.2||||\n|||||||||||||||||||\n|**NLBz**|** Discrepância Estatística**|**1,325.4**|**-3,001.6**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**|**-690.5**||||\n|||||||||||||||||||\n||**PIB nominal (milhões de Meticais)**|**689,213.0**|**804,463.0**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**859,019.3**|**804,463.0**|**689,213.0**|** PIB nominal (milhões de Meticais)**|\n||
**Discrepância % PIB**|**0.19%**|**-0.37%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**-0.08%**|**2.94%**|
**0.43%**|
** Discrepância % PIB**|\n||
**Discrepância % PIB**|**0.19%**|**-0.37%**|**-0.08%**||||||||||||||\n\n\n\nFonte: Cálculos da missão Fonte: MEF", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [60.323333740234375, 131.84852600097656, 730.073486328125, 521.9864501953125], "columns": 18, "rows": 46}], "text": "Annex VII. GRM Fiscal Table - GFSM 1986 vs. GFSM 2014\n\n EFP Col2 2016 2017 2018 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 Col14 2018 213,032.2 252,292.0 178,187.3 72,358.5 13,924.3 -12,178.1 17,671.7 -21,588.1 19,629.1 34,821.3 -15,192.2 26,595.6 -24,636.6 -13,357.1 -11,279.5 859,019.0 -1.42% 2017 2016 Mapa Fiscal \n\n 1 Receita Total e Donativos 177,652.5 218,072.7 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 226,126.4 \n Receita do Estado 166,285.0 213,222.8 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,032.2 213,222.8 165,595.3 Receita do Estado \n Excluido \"Alienação do Património do Estado\" e considerado em investimento (31) -71.3 -98.4 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 -58.5 \n Excluido \"Participações do Estado\" incluido em ativos financeiros (32) -3,401.1 -11,353.9 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 -4,519.0 255,384.6 219,522.9 Despesa Total e Empréstimos Líquidos \n Donativos 14,839.8 16,302.1 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 17,671.7 \n Donativos 14,839.8 16,302.1 17,671.7 \n 148,724.7 142,420.0 1. Despesa Corrente \n 2M Despesa Total 201,112.8 205,847.2 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 261,766.8 \n 57,136.5 60,645.3 2. Despesa de Investimento \n 2 Despesa Corrente 140,941.6 148,659.0 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 178,012.6 \n Total da Despesa na CGE 141,086.8 148,813.8 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 178,187.3 25,834.6 13,467.4 3. Empréstimos Líquidos \n Total da Despesa na CGE 141,086.8 148,813.8 178,187.3 \n Excluido \"Despesas de capital\" e considerado em investimento (31) -145.2 -154.8 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 -174.7 \n 23,688.8 2,990.2 4. Outras Despesas (+) / Receitas (-) »» Discrepância Estatística \n 31 Ativos não financeiros líquidos 60,171.2 57,188.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 83,754.2 \n Assume 100% uso do financiamento externo (Fundos Comuns e Outros Fundos via/fora CUT) 59,900.5 56,919.8 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 72,241.5 16,302.1 14,842.8 Donativos \n Assume 100% uso do financiamento externo (Fundos Comuns e Outros Fundos via/fora CUT) 59,900.5 56,919.8 72,241.5 \n _Leasings_de edifícios públicos 54.2 15.2 11,279.5 11,279.5 11,279.5 11,279.5 11,279.5 \n Despesa de Capital 145.2 154.8 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 \n Alienação do Património do Estado 71.3 98.4 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 \n \n NLB Saldo Global -23,460.3 12,225.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -35,640.4 -25,859.7 -39,084.8 Saldo Global após donativos \n NLB Saldo Global -23,460.3 12,225.4 -35,640.4 \n \n 32 Ativos Financeiros 19,058.2 67,618.8 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 35,399.3 25,584.8 Financiamento Externo \n 32 Ativos Financeiros 19,058.2 67,618.8 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 17,339.7 \n Depósitos Contas monetárias - Exclui INSS e BT 6,723.3 29,654.0 -17,432.2 43,359.7 36,937.9 Empréstimos \n Acordos de Retrocessão 16,361.0 9,572.6 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 13,879.2 -7,960.5 -11,353.1 Amortização \n Participações no Capital de Empresas Públicas: Mapa I-2 da CGE 222.9 233.8 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 767.7 \n Participações do Estado 3,401.1 11,353.9 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 4,519.0 -9,539.5 13,500.0 Crédito Interno Líquido \n Contas a pagar (+)/receber(-): Mapa I-4 da CGE: Operações de Tesouraria -7,396.8 16,987.1 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 15,604.4 \n Contas a pagar (+)/receber(-) - Créditos do Tesouro & Aplicações Financeiras do IGEPE : Mapa I-2 -253.3 -182.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 Outras Operações \n 0.0 0.0 Fornecedores \n 33 Passivos 43,843.9 52,391.8 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 52,289.6 0.0 0.0 _Leasings_ de edifícios públicos \n Dívida Interna Líquida 18,872.2 21,415.0 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 32,477.6 \n Exercícios Findos 14.1 472.2 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 \n Dívida Externa Líquida 24,957.6 30,504.7 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 19,629.1 \n Desembolso - Inclui \"_onlending_\" 36,310.7 38,465.1 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 34,821.3 \n Amortização 11,353.1 7,960.5 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 15,192.2 \n \n NLBz Discrepância Estatística 1,325.4 -3,001.6 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 -690.5 \n \n PIB nominal (milhões de Meticais) 689,213.0 804,463.0 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 859,019.3 804,463.0 689,213.0 PIB nominal (milhões de Meticais) \n Discrepância % PIB 0.19% -0.37% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% 2.94% 0.43% Discrepância % PIB \n Discrepância % PIB 0.19% -0.37% -0.08% \n\nFonte: Cálculos da missão Fonte: MEF", "text_characters": 5008}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Notes - Fiscal Table|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**Items**
|**Current Fiscal Table**
|Proposed change
|\n|
**Government revenue**
|
Fiscal revenue, nonfiscal revenue, earmarked revenue
and own revenue.
|
Maintain the current classification.
|\n|
**Government revenue**
|
Capital revenue includes disposals of government
property and government holdings.
|
(i) “Disposals of government property.” Reclassify as “investment in
nonfinancial assets” and (ii) “government holdings” as acquisition of financial
assets.”|\n|**Total expenditure and net**
**lending; & Total expenditure**
**without net lending**
|
This
is
total
current
expenditure,
investment
expenditure and other expenditures (+) / revenue (-);
with/without net lending added.
|
According to international standards, financing should be presented separately
from expenses and revenue. When “net lending” is taken below the line, as part
of financial assets, the “Total expenditure and net loans” aggregate is no longer
necessary. “Total expenditure without net loans” is presented as the sum of
“current expenditure” plus “investment expenditure.”
|\n|
**1. Current expenditure**
|
Staff expenditure, social contribution, goods and
services. Interest, current transfers, subsidies and other
current expenditure.
|
Maintain the current classification.
|\n|
**1. Current expenditure**
|
Fiscal years ended.
|
Reclassify according to type of above-the-line and below-the-line expenditure
and add the amount as part of accounts payable.
|\n|
**1. Current expenditure**
|
Capital expenditure.
|
Exclude this from current expenditure and reclassify as part of investment in
nonfinancial assets or investment expenditure.
|\n|**Current balance**
|
This is total government revenue, which includes part
of the investment, minus current expenses, that
currently include part of capital expenditure.
|
Maintain the presentation of this balance, but the mission suggests naming it
“Net Operational Result” after revenue and expenditures are adjusted to
exclude investments.
|\n|
**2. Investment expense**
|
This is total government investment made with
domestic and external funds, including external grants
for this purpose.
|
Add the disposal of government property and capital expenditures recorded
as part of current expenses and begin naming this item acquisition of
nonfinancial assets.|\n|
**3. Net lending**
|
This is the total of onlending loans and financial
stabilization operations and holdings.
|
Onlending loans are financial assets and are part of financing, so they should
be presented below the line and should not impact the “overall balance.”|\n|**4. Other expenses (+) /**
**Revenue (-)**
|
This item is the residual – commonly known as the
“closing
line”
or
“statistical
discrepancies.”
As
presented, it has an impact on government spending
that thus affects the overall balance, even when the
discrepancy is caused by items in financing (below the
line).
|
The mission recommends taking it below the line since this line probably
incorporates transactions that represent government credits or debits, so that
it makes more sense to classify them below the line in financing.
|\n|
**Overall balance before grants**|
This is the difference between total revenue and
spending, excluding grants.|
Maintain the presentation of this balance, but the mission suggests presenting
it as a memorandum item.|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.10285949707031, 90.1199951171875, 736.4571533203125, 559.739990234375], "columns": 3, "rows": 13}], "text": "Notes - Fiscal Table Col2 Col3 \n\n Items Current Fiscal Table Proposed change \n Government revenue Fiscal revenue, nonfiscal revenue, earmarked revenue and own revenue. Maintain the current classification. \n Government revenue Capital revenue includes disposals of government property and government holdings. (i) “Disposals of government property.” Reclassify as “investment in nonfinancial assets” and (ii) “government holdings” as acquisition of financial assets.” \n Total expenditure and net lending; & Total expenditure without net lending This is total current expenditure, investment expenditure and other expenditures (+) / revenue (-); with/without net lending added. According to international standards, financing should be presented separately from expenses and revenue. When “net lending” is taken below the line, as part of financial assets, the “Total expenditure and net loans” aggregate is no longer necessary. “Total expenditure without net loans” is presented as the sum of “current expenditure” plus “investment expenditure.” \n 1. Current expenditure Staff expenditure, social contribution, goods and services. Interest, current transfers, subsidies and other current expenditure. Maintain the current classification. \n 1. Current expenditure Fiscal years ended. Reclassify according to type of above-the-line and below-the-line expenditure and add the amount as part of accounts payable. \n 1. Current expenditure Capital expenditure. Exclude this from current expenditure and reclassify as part of investment in nonfinancial assets or investment expenditure. \n Current balance This is total government revenue, which includes part of the investment, minus current expenses, that currently include part of capital expenditure. Maintain the presentation of this balance, but the mission suggests naming it “Net Operational Result” after revenue and expenditures are adjusted to exclude investments. \n 2. Investment expense This is total government investment made with domestic and external funds, including external grants for this purpose. Add the disposal of government property and capital expenditures recorded as part of current expenses and begin naming this item acquisition of nonfinancial assets. \n 3. Net lending This is the total of onlending loans and financial stabilization operations and holdings. Onlending loans are financial assets and are part of financing, so they should be presented below the line and should not impact the “overall balance.” \n 4. Other expenses (+) / Revenue (-) This item is the residual – commonly known as the “closing line” or “statistical discrepancies.” As presented, it has an impact on government spending that thus affects the overall balance, even when the discrepancy is caused by items in financing (below the line). The mission recommends taking it below the line since this line probably incorporates transactions that represent government credits or debits, so that it makes more sense to classify them below the line in financing. \n Overall balance before grants This is the difference between total revenue and spending, excluding grants. Maintain the presentation of this balance, but the mission suggests presenting it as a memorandum item.", "text_characters": 2738}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Notes - Fiscal Table|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**Items**|**Current Fiscal Table**|Proposed change|\n|
**Grants**
|
Total grants received in the year.
|
Include them as part of government revenue.
|\n|
**Overall balance after grants**
|
This is the difference between total revenue and
expenses, including grants.
|
Maintain the presentation of this balance. However, the GFSM 2014 calls this
just overall balance, which will make sense if the overall balance is not
considered before grants.
|\n|
**External financing**
|
This is the difference between disbursements and the
amortization of external loans.
|
Maintain the current classification, but add total domestic financing
incorporated into the NGC and begin using the term “liabilities.” It is
considered the net total of the debt (loans minus amortizations) in accordance
with debt instruments. Total disbursements and amortizations can be
presented as a memorandum item.
|\n|
**Other operations**
|
Suppliers, leasing, net privatizations and other
expenses.|
The mission recommends presenting this above the line according to its type:
expenses or investment in nonfinancial assets.|\n|
**Net**
**Government**
**Credit**
**(NGC)**
|
NGC = Government deposits – Domestic debt.
|
For greater transparency, we recommend presenting government deposits in
disaggregated form (financial assets, plus other assets reported above the line)
and domestic debt (as part of liabilities, also including external financing).
|\n|
**Financial assets**
|
This aggregate does not exist currently in the Fiscal
Table
the
Mozambican
authorities
submitted.
However, the subitems are part of the Fiscal Table,
some above and some below the line.
|
Aggregate in this item government deposits which are currently recorded as
part of the NGC. To this aggregate also add other assets reported above the
line such as: onlending agreements, government holdings and other accounts
receivable. The mission suggests presenting this item before liabilities and just
after the overall balance.
|\n|
**Accounts**
**payable**
**(+)/receivable(-)**
|
This item is not currently in the Fiscal Table the
Mozambican authorities presented.
|
The cash system does not envisage “accounts payable and receivable.”
Considering the assumption of compiling the Fiscal Table using the modified
cash approach, the mission recommends taking all amounts of “accounts
payable and receivable” of which the authorities are aware. In this item the
mission recommends adding “treasury operations” and “arrears” to the total of
“fiscal years ended.” When they are accounts receivable, present them as part
of financial assets; when they are accounts payable, present them as part of
liabilities.
|\n|
**Primary balance**
|
This balance is the result of government accounts
excluding interest.|
Maintain the presentation of this balance; however, the mission suggests
presenting it as a memorandum item.|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-045", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.098182678222656, 90.1199951171875, 736.4617919921875, 500.94000244140625], "columns": 3, "rows": 10}], "text": "Notes - Fiscal Table Col2 Col3 \n\n Items Current Fiscal Table Proposed change \n Grants Total grants received in the year. Include them as part of government revenue. \n Overall balance after grants This is the difference between total revenue and expenses, including grants. Maintain the presentation of this balance. However, the GFSM 2014 calls this just overall balance, which will make sense if the overall balance is not considered before grants. \n External financing This is the difference between disbursements and the amortization of external loans. Maintain the current classification, but add total domestic financing incorporated into the NGC and begin using the term “liabilities.” It is considered the net total of the debt (loans minus amortizations) in accordance with debt instruments. Total disbursements and amortizations can be presented as a memorandum item. \n Other operations Suppliers, leasing, net privatizations and other expenses. The mission recommends presenting this above the line according to its type: expenses or investment in nonfinancial assets. \n Net Government Credit (NGC) NGC = Government deposits – Domestic debt. For greater transparency, we recommend presenting government deposits in disaggregated form (financial assets, plus other assets reported above the line) and domestic debt (as part of liabilities, also including external financing). \n Financial assets This aggregate does not exist currently in the Fiscal Table the Mozambican authorities submitted. However, the subitems are part of the Fiscal Table, some above and some below the line. Aggregate in this item government deposits which are currently recorded as part of the NGC. To this aggregate also add other assets reported above the line such as: onlending agreements, government holdings and other accounts receivable. The mission suggests presenting this item before liabilities and just after the overall balance. \n Accounts payable (+)/receivable(-) This item is not currently in the Fiscal Table the Mozambican authorities presented. The cash system does not envisage “accounts payable and receivable.” Considering the assumption of compiling the Fiscal Table using the modified cash approach, the mission recommends taking all amounts of “accounts payable and receivable” of which the authorities are aware. In this item the mission recommends adding “treasury operations” and “arrears” to the total of “fiscal years ended.” When they are accounts receivable, present them as part of financial assets; when they are accounts payable, present them as part of liabilities. \n Primary balance This balance is the result of government accounts excluding interest. Maintain the presentation of this balance; however, the mission suggests presenting it as a memorandum item.", "text_characters": 2357}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8583221a7bf958232d52213b3f30c67d3cb52481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ceb31bba7beb3871ffddecf69aea9ea8658d342e95ac3c91af74fa275abf4fae
+size 28362
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c1f8d25b8f19d9f8ed4d9eed0ef285f221de86a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ac3eb7b121cc4b71b1d02518421c39f303e840158efb2a049c27bb33da1c335b
+size 159377
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81aa49ba33e1ea48265a13f2e1b50710ef1243b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f83542fd6b8d1201762bd708b077bf379203219e24364529fbfaf5ac53c68b86
+size 96443
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c82b4e6fb35728a7dd2611891ca8a9447e461f97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:04101b7875c6d12728b900cc46305e3ca3c729ff8b631d5a44fe0756d16e4002
+size 34464
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b3b335ac7d5c6fdc5e014c1f23848d170dee9b34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:470e8c4a36b4d2b6fa623ba2276fdd3589749765fb953f7fbe0a5195f56cd427
+size 74009
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d4bb63add6ff989259d60c7526885c78a1937544
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:16fdbeb9676c230c48d3dc96c0e23a8ebd7bdcfc6c6703694b10e2b2f7c72beb
+size 3337
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6efa2a52804681f45073c0748abc79e920f1cece
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-046",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Public Sector Debt Statistics Mission (October 19-30, 2020)",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-046.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "ffd5296cfdf7bd665dec9972fda4b8059102bb8426707f9ed4379161f655160f",
+ "source_bytes": 1074721,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/25/republic-of-mozambique-technical-assistance-report-on-public-sector-debt-statistics-mission-528603",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:27:30+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 35.648,
+ "page_count": 59,
+ "text_characters": 136455,
+ "table_count": 26,
+ "figure_count": 7,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "REPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS (OCTOBER 19–30, 2020)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Glossary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "SUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Public Sector Debt Statistics Mission (October 19-30, 2020) IMF Country Report No. 23/46; February 2021",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Government Finance Statistics, Public sector debt statistics, Expenditure, Public Sector",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230124185806-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230125153408-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4a6128c56ee04ab7038e32c7c6fcd6ac39e211ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3685 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/46**
+## **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT**
+**STATISTICS MISSION (OCTOBER 19-30, 2020)**
+
+
+This report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in February 2021.
+
+**Disclaimer:**
+This report was prepared in 2021 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its
+publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+**FEBRUARY**
+
+**2021**
+
+
+
+
+# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+#### **REPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS** **(OCTOBER 19–30, 2020)**
+
+**Prepared by Djaima Da Costa and Filipe Morais**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**CONTENTS**
+
+
+**Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 3**
+
+**SUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 4**
+
+**INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. 7**
+
+**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ 8**
+A. Coordination of the PSDS compilation process ............................................................................................ 12
+B. Institutional Coverage.............................................................................................................................................. 13
+C. Data and respective sources ................................................................................................................................. 15
+
+i. Reconciliation of domestic debt ............................................................................................................. 18
+ii. Reconciliation of external debt ............................................................................................................... 21
+iii. Reconciliation of central government deposits ................................................................................ 23
+D. PSDS Concepts and Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 26
+E. Compilation of annual and quarterly PSDS 2016-2019 .............................................................................. 27
+F. Resources, training, and technical assistance ................................................................................................. 32
+
+**FIGURES**
+1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique...................................................................... 14
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Priority Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 6
+2. Detailed Recommendations / Plan of Action .................................................................................................... 8
+3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and Respective Sources ...................................................................... 16
+4. 2016-2019 Domestic Debt Reconciliation ....................................................................................................... 20
+5, Differences in External Debt 2016-2019 - Debt vs. IIP Report ................................................................. 22
+6. Detail of Central Government Deposits Reported in the Monetary Survey ....................................... 23
+7. Gross Public Sector Debt Stock by Sub-sector - Preliminary ................................................................... 29
+8. Central Government Gross Debt Stock per holder/instrument - Preliminary .................................... 29
+9. Quarterly Central Government Gross Debt Stock - Preliminary .............................................................. 30
+10. Central Government Net Debt Stock - Preliminary.................................................................................... 31
+
+**APPENDICES**
+I. Senior Staff and Technicians Contacted During the Mission ..................................................................... 34
+II. Protocol for institutional cooperation on government statistics ............................................................ 35
+III. Institutional Structure of General Government ............................................................................................ 41
+IV. List of public sector entities ................................................................................................................................. 43
+
+
+**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+##### **Glossary**
+
+AFR African Department of the IMF
+BCG Budgetary Central Government
+BM Bank of Mozambique
+BVM Mozambique Stock Exchange
+CGE Annual Public Financial Report
+CSE Higher Council of Statistics
+D4D Data for Decisions (Multidonor trust fund)
+DNCP National Directorate of Public Accounting
+DNGDP National Directorate of Public Debt Management
+DNPE National Directorate Public Assets
+DNPED National Directorate for Economic and Development Policies
+DNPO National Directorate of Planning and Budget
+DNTCEF National Directorate of Treasury, and Economic and Financial Cooperation
+DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis
+e-SISTAFE State Electronic Financial Management System
+GDP Gross Domestic Product
+GFS Government Finance Statistics
+GFSCC Government Finance Statistics Compilation Committee
+_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_
+GG General Government
+GGR Risk Management Office
+IGEPE State Shareholdings Management Institute
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+INE National Institute of Statistics
+INSS National Social Security Institute
+_PSDSG_ _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A Guide for Compilers and Users 2011_
+QPSDS Quarterly Public Sector Debt Statistics
+STA Statistics Department of the IMF
+TA Technical assistance
+EBU Extrabudgetary Units
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+#### **SUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**1.** **Availability of comprehensive and reliable public sector debt data, compiled based**
+**on international definitions and concepts, is essential for informed policy decisions and**
+**cross-country comparability.** In particular, the debt coverage should include all debt instruments
+and, to the extent possible, cover the broader perimeter of government, including debt of public
+corporations. It is in this context, that the Mozambican authorities requested a technical assistance
+(TA) mission from the IMF Statistics Department (STA) to assist in improving the compilation of
+public sector debt statistics (PSDS). The mission was conducted remotely during October 19–30,
+2020. It was financed by the Data for Decision Trust Fund (D4D).
+
+**2.** **The mission's main objective was to assist the authorities in strengthening the**
+**compilation and dissemination of PSDS in accordance with the** _**Public sector debt statistics:**_
+_Guide for compilers and users of 2011_ (PSDSG 2011). The mission focused on: (i) identifying data
+sources; (ii) understanding the coordination between public entities in the PSDS compilation
+process: (iii) analyzing the sectorization and scope of PSDS; (iv) reconciling the information on the
+net credit to the Government and the external debt compiled by the Ministry of Economy and
+Finance (MEF) and by the Bank of Mozambique (BM); (v) compiling debt stock for the entire public
+sector; and (vi) encouraging the authorities to enhance debt transparency by disseminating
+comprehensive public sector debt statistics.
+
+**3.** **The mission noted that the authorities compile a good debt statistic for the**
+**Budgetary Central Government (BCG).** However, there is room for improvement especially in the
+areas of data reconciliation and consistency given the various sources of data, and on application
+of the concepts and definitions established in the _PSDSG 2011_ . For the BCG debt data, the MEF is
+currently publishing stock and flow (debt service) of internal and external debt by maturity, by
+instruments, by type of creditor, by currency. Non-consolidated information on part of the
+corporate sector's debt is presented in a separate table of the referred publication. The main
+challenge is to expand and consolidate all the public sector subsectors.
+
+**4.** **The authorities were encouraged to complete the list of public entities as an essential**
+**step towards compiling public sector debt of the broader perimeter of government.** A
+complete list of public entities and their respective classification according to the Government
+Finance Statistics Manual 2014 ( _GFSM 2014_ ) has been pending since 2018. The mission noted that
+obtaining basic information on units that are outside the budget is a challenge. In particular it is
+difficult to obtain debt data from the Extra-Budgetary Units (EBU), the local government
+(municipalities) and the public sector corporations (SOE). The mission encouraged the authorities
+to use the database of the State Holdings Management Institute (IGEPE) as an interim measure
+because it contains financial statement of State-Owned enterprises which includes debt data.
+
+**5.** **The mission found that the Ministry of Economy and Finance does not recognize the**
+**issuance of Treasury Bills (BT) used for monetary policy as domestic debt.** The Bank of
+
+
+**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+Mozambique (BM) on the other hand, captures all BT issues both for monetary and fiscal purposes,
+but does not capture domestic debt outside the banking system (including arrears). MEF and the
+BM should agree on how BT should be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts based on
+international statistical standards.
+
+**6.** **Regarding external debt, the mission noted that there is a significant difference in**
+**the stock position reported by the MEF and the BM (as shown in the International**
+**Investment Position).** The mission recommended that both MEF and BM establish an appropriate
+mechanism for reconciling public debt both external and domestic debt.
+
+**7.** **Deposit positions differ between the BM and the MEF, mainly due to differences in**
+**BT classification, coverage and the accounting basis.** The variation of government deposits held
+in the BM has been affected by the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits. The
+increase in the deposits identified in the monetary survey was attributable to the imputation of
+deposits as a result of the BT issuances, irrespective of whether these were for fiscal or for
+monetary policy purposes. However, the National Treasury is not aware of the assets imputed to its
+deposit account when the BM issues BT for monetary policy purposes, so this amount generates a
+difference in the positions reported by the two institutions. Furthermore, while BM reports on
+accrual basis, MEF reports on cash basis, creating significant differences in the positions reported
+by both institutions. In addition, BM reports General Government deposits position that includes
+Social security funds and excludes local government which makes difficult to reconciliate with
+Central Government position reported by MEF.
+
+**8.** **Cooperation between public institutions must be improved. In view of the weak**
+**cooperation between the various compilers of macroeconomic statistics**, the mission
+reiterated the need to establish a Committee responsible for dealing with PSDS and GFS issues
+related to obtaining reliable / reconcilable and timely data. This recommendation was included in
+previous missions.
+
+**9.** **The mission undertook a preliminary debt consolidation exercise using available data**
+**on public sector debt, including the debt of the BCG, the municipalities, the National Social**
+**Security Institute (INSS) and the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s).** Preliminary results indicate
+that Mozambique's public sector debt in 2018 amounted to around 136 percent of GDP.
+Nonfinancial public sector debt, excluding units of general government, amounted to Mt 130.248
+billion at the end of 2019, an increase of Mt 15.179 billion over the previous year. Mission
+requested further investigation of the debt position of the SOE, as MEF reports figures for
+Petromoc, one of the most important SOE in the country, that differs significantly than what is
+reported in the company’s financial report. The authorities were encouraged to undertake periodic
+reconciliation and compilation exercises as they progress in implementing of the recommendations
+of the mission.
+
+**10.** **The priority recommendations that a mission transmitted to the authorities are**
+**illustrated in Table 1 below.** The full list of recommendations can be found in the action plan
+presented in the Detailed Technical Evaluation and Recommendations section of this report.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+**Table 1. Priority Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Priority Recommendations|Responsible
Institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2021|**Structure of the Public sector and inventory of public entities.**
(i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the inventory and
classify the entities according to_GFSM 2014_ (BCG, EBU, LG, INSS and
public corporations] for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic
statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial statistics, external, and the
real sector); and (iii) ratify and publish the structure and the inventory
on the websites of MEF, BM and INE.
|MEF, BM and
INE
|
+|April 2021|
**Collect the missing data to complete PSDS compilation**. (i) Collect
EBU debt data; (ii) Collect debt of the municipalities and reconcile
with BM; (iii) Confirm that the social security debt collected during
the mission is complete; (iv) Ensure that debt position for SOE’s is
the most comprehensive to the extent possible.
|BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|
+|April 2021|
**Domestic public debt.** (i) Collect treasury bonds data by the
residency of the investors; (ii) Finalize the reconciliation work started
during the mission and document the results.
|BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|
+|April 2021|
**Treasury Bills (BT).** MEF and the BM should agree on how BT should
be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts based on
international statistical standards.
|
BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|
+|April 2021|
**External public debt**. (i) Finalize the reconciliation work between the
MEF position and the International Investment Position (IIP) reported
by the BM, started during the mission and document the results.
|
BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|
+|December
2020|
**Deposits.** (i) finalize the reconciliation work initiated during the
mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to provide Central
Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG and EBU; (iii) the
BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring consistency
with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports; (iv) the BM
to publish information on government deposits with the separation
by subsector of public administrations; (v) adjust inflows resulting
from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits
according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for
fiscal and monetary purpose; (vi) The BM and MEF to implement a
formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including
explanations of all the differences identified.
|
BM
e
MEF
(DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF)
|
+|Immediately|
**Debt of Public Corporations.** (i) Petromoc: the source of
discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt
report and the loan amounts present in the company's report and
accounts; (ii) The same reconciliation work should be extended to
other SOE, in order to assess the existence of similar situations in
other corporations.
|IGEPE / MEF|
+|December
2020
|
**BCG annual and quarterly debt statistics.** Start publishing these
statistics on the website of the MEF and in the joint World Bank and
IMF database.|DNGDP|
+
+
+
+**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+#### **INTRODUCTION**
+
+**1.** **Mozambique’s public debt is described as being in distress but sustainable for**
+**surveillance on a forward-looking basis.** According to the country’s 2019 Article IV Consultation
+report, at the end of 2018, the total stock of public and publicly guaranteed debt reached about
+110.5 percent of GDP and the stock of arrears on public and publicly guaranteed external debt
+reached about US$1.2 billion at end-2018. The key current policy recommendations of the African
+Department (AFR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) include debt restructuring and
+definition of a strategy for reducing the potential for a public debt crisis. [1]
+
+**2.** **A TA mission on PSDS to the Republic of Mozambique took place remotely from**
+**19 to 30 October 2020,** in the context of module 1 of the D4D fund on fiscal data. This aims to
+provide decision-makers with more and better-quality data to support the achievement of the
+Sustainable Development Goals. It also aims to strengthen state-of-the-art national statistical
+systems, in a more challenging domestic and international political environment, to promote
+transparency and accountability, and provide efficient solutions for skills development.
+
+**3.** **The mission’s main objective was to assist the Mozambican authorities** in the
+compilation of PSDS in accordance with the _PSDSG_ guidelines, to ensure that the concepts and
+definitions, coverage, scope, and classification of the data compiled and disseminated are
+adequate for decision making; and also for the purpose of IMF surveillance in the framework of the
+Article IV Consultations, in particular within the debt sustainability analysis (DSA). In consultation
+with AFR, the mission stressed the need to focus on the following: (i) expansion of the coverage of
+debt data; (ii) timely data compilation; (iii) reconciliation between data on stocks and flows of net
+and gross debt; and (iv) loan transactions and the monitoring of local government and state
+enterprise sector (SEE) debt; as well as reconciliation of government deposits, which are the
+government’s main financial asset.
+
+**4.** **Concern regarding the PSDS among the Mozambican authorities.** In the work plan
+prepared by the Mozambican authorities during the GFS and PSDS workshop held in Lisbon in
+April 2019, attended thirty participants from five Portuguese-speaking African low- and
+middle-income-countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and
+Príncipe), along with Timor Leste, the Mozambique authorities identified the following as their
+main areas of concern: (i) the coverage of debt instruments, particularly in the case of other
+accounts payable and arrears; (ii) entity sectorization; and (iii) inconsistencies between the fiscal
+and public debt statistics.
+
+**5.** **In this context, the mission’s main tasks were to:** (i) conduct an analysis of the
+sectorization and coverage of the PSDS; (ii) identify data sources and gain an understanding of
+
+
+1 Republic of Mozambique: Technical Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+how public entities coordinate in the process of compiling statistics; (iii) compile the PSDS tables
+for the last three years; (iv) monitor the reconciliation of central government budget deposits
+between the MEF and the BM, with a view to identifying the real stock of deposits and their
+distribution between those that are freely available to finance the deficit and frozen deposits
+( _depósitos caucionados_ ) or other deposits that are not available; (v) provide support to the process
+of consolidating public-sector-wide debt statistics; (vi) support the regular PSDS publication work;
+(vii) identify and discuss areas for improvements and document the nature of the statistics
+compiled, including potential shortcomings in source data (expansion of coverage and more
+frequent dissemination of statistics).
+
+**6.** **Following the executive summary and this introduction, the report describes the**
+**main issues addressed and the recommendations made by the mission,** including the main
+concerns about coordination of the PSDS compilation process; the sectorization and institutional
+scope, concepts, and definitions of the PSDS; the data and their sources; the compilation process
+and consistency analysis; as well as resource issues that impact the PSDS compilation exercise. The
+list of civil servants who worked with the mission is provided at the end of the report, followed by
+additional information reported in appendices.
+
+**7.** **The mission thanks the authorities**, in particular Enilde Sarmento, Ester José, Chamila Aly,
+and Domingos Fumo, and their respective teams, for facilitating the work of this mission. The
+mission also thanks the staff of the IMF Office in Mozambique, in particular Esther Palacio, IMF
+Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator in Mozambique, for the technical support provided
+to this mission.
+
+#### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**8.** **The following table sets out the actions to be implemented by the authorities in the**
+**next two years.** It includes the complete list of all the recommendations made by the mission.
+
+**Table 2. Detailed Recommendations / Plan of Action**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|
+|H|1.1
**Government Finance Statistics Compilation Committee**
**(GFSCC) or macroeconomic statistics group within the Higher**
**Council of Statistics (CSE).**Establish a committee or group within the
CSE, governed by a cooperation protocol signed by the members,|DNPED,
DNGDP,
DNCP,
DNPO,|April 2021|
+
+
+**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+||specifying its objectives, the members’ responsibilities, and the
information to be shared.|DNTCEF,
GGR,
BM
and INSS*||
+|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
+|H|**2.1 Public sector structure and list of entities belonging to the**
**sector**. Complete the inventory and classify the entities according to
_GFSM 2014_[BCG, EBU, local government (LG), SSF and public
companies].
|MEF, BM and
INE|April 2021|
+|M|
**2.2 Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging**
**to the sector**. _(_i) Validate the structure of the sector; (ii) Ratify the list
of entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics
(fiscal, monetary and financial, external, and real sector statistics);
(iii) Evaluate the classification of public companies and EBU,
considering the market test; and this should be performed regularly
and, on an entity, -by-entity basis.
|MEF, BM and
INE|August 2021|
+|L|
**2.3 Public sector structure and list of entities belonging to the**
**sector classified according to****_GFSM 2014_**. Publish a unified and
structured list of the sector of each institutional unit on the MEP, BM
and INE websites.|MEF, BM and
INE|December 2021|
+|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
+|
H
|**3.1 Reconciliation of the domestic debt.**(i) Complete the
reconciliation work started during the mission and document the
final result; (ii) Implement a formal regular reconciliation process for
flows and stocks (by instrument, face and nominal value, and
creditor); (iii) Prepare a report on the reconciliation results, including
explanations of all differences identified in the BM data (net lending
to the government) and DNGDP (detailed debt charts), for
institutional memory purposes.
|BM and MEF
(DNGDP,
DNTCEF and
DNPED)
|April 2021|
+|H|
**3.2 Treasury Bills.**Reconciliation of the total treasury bills debt to
be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts - preparation of a
methodological analysis on the statistical treatment of BTs issued for
government financing purposes.|MEF
(DNGDP and
DNTCEF)
and BM|April 2021|
+
+
+
+
+*** Note:**
+
+DNPED – National Directorate for Economic and Development Policies;
+
+DNGDP – National Directorate of Public Debt Management;
+
+DNCP – National Directorate of Public Accounting;
+
+DNPO – National Directorate of Planning and Budgeting;
+
+DNTCEF – National Directorate of Treasury and Economic and Financial Cooperation;
+
+GGR – Risk Management Office.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|M|**3.3 Debt securities.** Present a total breakdown of Treasury securities:
(i) details of treasury bills issues and (ii) details of treasury bonds.
|BM|April 2021|
+|M|
**3.4 Treasury Bonds.**The MEF should regularly request data on debt
held in OTs, issued through the stock exchange (_Bolsa de Valores de_
_Moçambique_–BVM), by holding sector, identifying the portion of
treasury bonds held by each of the resident sectors (individuals,
nonfinancial corporations, BM, and other financial institutions) and
the nonresident sector. The MEF should also indicate how the debt is
valued and clarify whether the data is currently reported at face value
or market value.
|MEF
and
BVM|April 2021|
+|M|
**3.5 Commercial bank loans.**Provide details of total loans from
commercial banks.
|BM|April 2021|
+|H|
**3.6**
**International**
**Investment**
**Position**
**(IIP)**
**of**
**general**
**government).**Complete the reconciliation of the external debt
position between the MEF and the BM: (i) external loans; (ii) debt
securities and possible differences in the treatment of the MOZAM
2032 bond; (iii) the treatment of other liabilities included in the IIP but
not included in external debt reported by the MEF. The result of this
work should be recorded in a methodological note for future use;
(iv) the BM should now report the total debt of each of Mozambique’s
public-sector subsectors: GG = BCG+EBU+INSS+LG. and also the SEE.
|
MEF and BM|April 2021|
+|M|
**3.7 Debt of EBU.**Launch a process of systematized collection of the
debt of these entities, since they may be playing a significant role in
central government debt.
|MEF|April 2021|
+|M|
**3.8 INSS debt.**Request INSS debt data on a regular basis and
compare it with the position reported in the financial reports, and also
with the position reported by the BM.
|MEF
and
INSS|April 2021|
+|M|
**3.9 Local government debt.**Collect and compile the information on
a regular basis.
|MEF
|April 2021|
+|M|
**3.10 Debt of the Financial and nonfinancial public sector**
**corporations.**Collect and compile the information on a regular basis.
|MEF
and
IGEPE
|April 2021|
+|H|
**3.11 Reconciliation of deposits.**(i) finalize the reconciliation work
initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to
provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG
and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring
consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports;
(iv) The authorities should also ratify the classification of the INSS in
the Social Security Funds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced
accordingly; (v) the BM to publish information on government
deposits with the separation by subsector of public administrations;
(vi) ) adjust inflows resulting from the issuance of BT channeled into
government deposits according to the decision on the statistical
treatment of BT issued for fiscal and monetary purpose; (vii) The BM|
BM e MEF
(DNGDP,
DNPED and
DNTCEF)
|Immediately|
+
+
+
+**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+||and MEF to implement a formal process of reconciling flows and stock
regularly, including explanations of all the differences identified.|||
+|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
+|L|**_4.1 GFS and PSDS Manual for Mozambique_**_. _Document the annual
and quarterly GFS compilation process for institutional memory
purposes and to ensure the consistency of the process, including
concepts and definitions used in the PSDS compilation process.|DNPED and
DNGDP|December 2021|
+|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
+|H|**5.1 PSDS of Mozambique for the years 2016-2019 compiled**
**during the mission.**(i) validate and complete the missing
information, namely at the subsector level of the public sector;
(ii) extend the exercise to other years; (iii) publish in the joint World
Bank/IMF database, as well as on the MEF website_._
|DNGDP|April 2021|
+|H|
**5.2 Quarterly PSDS of Mozambique compiled during the**
**mission.**(i) validate the dada compiled during the mission;
(ii) extend the exercise to other years; and (iii) publish in the joint
World Bank and IMF database and on the MEF website_._
|DNGDP|December 2020|
+|M|
**5.3 Budgetary central government debt.**Present information
systematically by instrument and counterpart sector, and in a time
series format, to make it easier to transpose the compiled data into
the IMF reporting templates_._
|MEF|December 2021|
+|H|
**5.4 Debt of public companies.** (i) Petromoc: the source of
discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt
report and the values recorded in the company’s financial report
should be clarified by the IGEPE; (ii) the same reconciliation work
should be extended to other companies, to see whether identical
situations exist.
|IGEPE
and
MEF|Immediately|
+|M|
**5.5 Coverage of instruments in the PSDS.**Extend the instrument
coverage of the PSDS to cover most of the instruments listed in the
IMF’s PSDS compilation guide (loans, debt securities, SDRs, cash and
deposits, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes,
and other accounts payable).
|MEF|December 2021|
+|M
|
**5.6 Financial assets.** The Mozambican authorities should start to
compile the financial assets of the general public sector, with a view
to compiling public debt net of financial assets (net debt).
|MEF|December 2021|
+|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
+|
M|
6.1**_Training of technical staff_**_. _Provide staff training by having
them participate in the various GFS and PSDS courses sponsored by
the IMF.
|DNPED and
DNGDP|Continuous|
+|L|
6.2**_Development of the new debt system._**(i) Make sure the new
system allows for automated management of the domestic debt;
(ii) Facilitates the management of debt data and automated creation|DNGDP|December 2022|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+||of PSDS tables; (iii) Inter linkages of the domestic and external debt
management systems with e-SISTAFE.
|||
+|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
+
+
+
+**A. Coordination of the PSDS Compilation Process**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**9.** **The DNGDP is responsible for the compiling the PSDS.** Given that PSDS and GFS data
+overlap, the mission believes it is crucial for the DNGDP to collaborate closely with the DNPED,
+which is responsible for compiling the GFS, to ensure that the information below the line in the
+fiscal map reflects the amounts reported as flows in the PSDS. The same applies to the stock data
+used in the Balance Sheet.
+
+**10.** **Cooperation between public institutions needs to be improved.** As in previous
+missions, this mission noted that one of the main problems in compiling statistics in general in
+Mozambique is the lack of reconciliation of statistical data between different public institutions.
+Accordingly, this mission reiterates the need to set up a committee—GFSCC, headed by the DNPED
+—to facilitate the PSDS and GFS compilation process.
+
+**11.** **The mission prepared and provided the authorities with a cooperation protocol**
+**proposal that could be established for this GFSCC.** The protocol defines the structure of the
+committee, the entities that will be part of it (DNPED, DNGDP, DNCP, DNPO, DNTCEF, GGR and
+BM), their respective responsibilities, and the data to be shared. The proposed protocol is included
+in Appendix II of this report.
+
+**12.** **A macroeconomic statistics group exists in the CSE.** Since the GFS is a subsystem of the
+System of National Accounts, another alternative would be to create a macroeconomic statistics
+group in the CSE, a structure that already exists in Mozambique, with the same structure and
+objectives as suggested for the GFSCC. It should be noted that currently the DNPED shares the
+details of GFS with the INE as an input to the national accounts; so this would serve as a forum _par_
+_excellence_ for discussing the four macroeconomic sectors, and thus ensure the consistency of the
+country’s data.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|April
2021|**GFSCC or macroeconomic statistics group in the CSE.**Set up
a committee or group in the CSE, governed by a cooperation
protocol signed by the members, specifying its objectives, its
members’ responsibilities, and the data to be shared.|DNPED,
DNGDP,
DNCP,
DNPO,
DNTCEF, GGR, BM and
INSS
|
+
+
+
+**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**B. Institutional Coverage**
+
+**13.** **The General government (GG) in Mozambique consists of central government, local**
+**government, and social security.** According to the information obtained, central administration is
+part of the central government and consists of 20 ministries, 11 executive management units,
+which oversee about 100 beneficiary management units, and Extrabudgetary Units (EBU). Local
+administration encompasses 11 provinces, 10 districts and 53 municipalities. There are also 93
+entities belonging to the central and local government sector, that encompass the Mozambique’s
+autonomous services and funds (80 public institutes and 12 public funds) and nonprofit
+institutions, including the Malonda Foundation, among others. Social security consists exclusively
+of the National Social Security Institute (INSS).
+
+**14.** **Mozambique’s financial public enterprise sector,** comprising the BM, two commercial
+banks and an insurance company; and the nonfinancial public enterprise sector comprises of public
+enterprises and affiliated companies.
+
+**15.** **The mission sought to obtain information on developments that have occurred in the**
+**public sector structure in Mozambique over the past three years.** Following the work done by
+the 2018 GFS technical assistance mission, this mission sought to inform the authorities of the
+need, firstly, to regularly update the list of public sector entities and, secondly, to classify public
+entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics. The mission discussed in a general
+way, how the process is done in Portugal, and also presented examples of tables, published in
+Portugal (see, for example, the lists of entities published by the Bank of Portugal at
+[https://www.bportugal.pt/page/lista-de-entidades-para-fins-estatisticos?mlid=821). The most](https://www.bportugal.pt/page/lista-de-entidades-para-fins-estatisticos?mlid=821)
+up-to-date public sector structure, according to the information provided by the Mozambican
+authorities, is shown in Figure 1 below. The most up-to-date institutional structure and preliminary
+listing of public entities are presented, respectively, in Appendix III - Institutional Structure of
+General Government and in Appendix IV - List of Public Sector Entities of this report.
+
+**16.** **The GG does not include nonmarket public enterprises.** An analysis of all SEE entities
+was requested to the Mozambican authorities, for the purpose of evaluating their role as market
+producers. There seems to be evidence of public companies that have accumulated negative equity
+values over several years, which is a relevant indicator when conducting the market test. The
+market test should be carried out regularly, on an entity by entity basis.
+
+**17.** **Periodic updating of the list of public sector entities is of the utmost importance.** The
+authorities have been asked to compile an exhaustive list of entities belonging to the public sector,
+including the state enterprise sector, as presented in Appendix IV. This list should form the basis
+for a better identification of entities within the GFS and PSDS compilation; and it should also be
+used by the other entities that produce statistics in Mozambique, namely the BM and the INSS, to
+ensure harmonization of the sectoral classification of the statistics produced.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**
+
+
+
+**Figure 1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Source:** MEF
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
Institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2021|**Structure of the public sector and list of sector entities**:
Complete the inventory and classify the entities according to_GFSM_
_2014_[BCG, EBU, LG, SSF and public companies].
|DNPED|
+|August
2021|
**Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to**
**the sector**. _(_i) Validate the structure of the sector; (ii) Ratify the list
of entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics
(fiscal, monetary and financial, external, and real sector statistics);
(iii) Evaluate the classification of public companies and EBU,
considering the market test; and this should be performed regularly
and on an entity-by-entity basis.
|MEF, BM and
INE|
+|December
2021
|
**Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to**
**the sector with the respective classification according to****_GFSM_**
**_2014_**: Publish on the MEP, BM and INE websites a unified and
structured list, identifying the sector to which each institutional unit
belongs.|MEF, BM and
INE|
+
+
+
+**C. Data and respective sources**
+
+**18.** **The mission conducted a data source survey that can be used in the process of**
+**compiling the PSDS** . The results are shown in Table 3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and
+Respective Sources.
+
+**19.** **In general, the primary sources of gross domestic debt of the Budgetary Central**
+**Government (BCG) are the DNGDP itself.** This information must be reconciled with data
+obtained from the BVM, BM and DNTCEF. The BVM supports the DNGDP in the process of
+issuing Treasury bonds (OTs), since it is the platform designated by the government for this
+purpose. BVM has detailed information on the holders of treasury bonds, and thus relevant
+information for allocation between the domestic and external sectors and for the consolidation
+of positions between holders of OT issued by other sectors of general government. The BM
+supports the treasury bills issuance process, so it should have information on potential overdrafts
+(debt in deposits and currency) in the case of the National Treasury, and loans from the national
+banking system. The BM also provides information on general government external debt in the
+[International Investment Position (IIP), compiled according to the 6th edition of the Balance of](http://www.bancomoc.mz/fm_pgLink.aspx?id=222)
+Payments and International Investment Position Manual.
+
+**20.** **The compilation of the debt of EBU should consider data reported by the DNCP and**
+**DNTCEF, together with data obtained directly from the EBU themselves.** This report does
+not include the debt of these units because the information sources requested in advance were
+not available. Moreover, the public information available on the internet did not make it possible
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **15**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+to obtain reliable data. However, given the size of the sector, it is suggested that PSDS also
+includes EBU debt.
+
+**21.** **The data used to prepare the INSS debt should be compiled directly from the**
+**institution in question.** The data that will be presented in this report were obtained from the
+Institute’s financial reports, since the mission did not have access to other INSS data, as had
+previously been requested. However, it is suggested that detailed information obtained directly
+from the INSS should be used in the future.
+
+**Table 3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and Respective Sources**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|#|Republic of Mozambique|Col3|Public administration (general government)|Col5|Col6|Public
companie
s|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**# **
|
**PSDS data**
|**Type of**
**data**|
**Central**
**government**
**(budgetary**
**and**
**extrabudgetary**
**units)**|
**Social**
**securit**
**y **|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|
+|1
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.1.5
1.3
1.3.1
1.3.2
|**Financial**
**assets**
**by**
**instrument**
**Domestic**
**and**
**external**
Currency
and
deposits
Debt
Securities
(BT/OT)
Loans
Insurance,
pensions,
and
standardized
guarantee schemes
Other
accounts
receivable
**Financial**
**assets**
**per**
**debtor**
Domestic
External
|
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows|
BM and DNTCEF
DNTCEF,
DNCP,
and BM
DNGDP,
DNTCEF
and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNTCEF
and
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
BM
BM
|
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
|
BM and DNTCEF
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
BM, and BVM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
BM
BM
|
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
|
+|
**4 **
**4.1**
**4.1.1**
4.1.1.
1
4.1.1.
2
4.1.1.
3
4.1.1.
4
|
**Debt at face value**
**By instrument**
** Domestic**
Special
Drawing
Rights – SDRs
Currencies
and
deposits
Debt
Securities
(BT/OT)
Loans|
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows|
N/A
BM and DNTCEF
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
BM and BVM
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
and BM|
N/A
INSS
INSS
INSS|
N/A
DNCEF,
DNGDP,
and BM
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
BM and BVM
DNGDP and BM|
BM
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE|
+
+
+
+**16** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|#|Republic of Mozambique|Col3|Public administration (general government)|Col5|Col6|Public
companie
s|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**# **|
**PSDS data**
|**Type of**
**data**|
**Central**
**government**
**(budgetary**
**and**
**extrabudgetary**
**units)**
|
**Social**
**securit**
**y **|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**
|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**
|
+|4.1.1.
5
4.1.1.
6
**4.1.2**
|~~Insurance, pensions,~~
and
standardized
guarantee schemes
Other
accounts
payable
** External**
|Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
|
~~DNGDP and BM~~
DNTCEF
and
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
|INSS
INSS
|
~~DNGDP and BM~~
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
|~~DNTCEF~~
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
|
+|
4.1.2.
1
4.1.2.
2
4.1.2.
3
4.1.2.
4
4.1.2.
5
**4.2**
4.2.1
4.2.2
**4.3**
4.3.1
4.3.2
**4.4**
4.4.1
4.4.2
**4.5**
4.5.1
4.5.2
**4.6**
4.6.1
4.6.2
|
Currencies
and
deposits
Debt
Securities
(BT/OT)
Loans
Insurance, pensions,
and
standardized
guarantee schemes
Other
accounts
payable
**By currency of**
**denomination**
National currency
Foreign currency
**By maturity**
Long term
Short term
**At face value**
Domestic
External
**At market value**
Domestic
External
**By creditor**
Domestic
External
|Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
|
BM and DNTCEF
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNTCEF
and
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
|
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
|
DNTCEF,
DNGDP
and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
|
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
|
+|
i.
|
Central
government
(budgetary
and
extrabudgetary units)
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
+|ii.|
Social security|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **17**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|#|Republic of Mozambique|Col3|Public administration (general government)|Col5|Col6|Public
companie
s|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**# **
|
**PSDS data**
|**Type of**
**data**
|
**Central**
**government**
**(budgetary**
**and**
**extrabudgetary**
**units)**|
**Social**
**securit**
**y **|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|
+|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
iii.
|
Local
governments
-
provinces,
districts,
and
municipalities
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
+|iv.
|Public companies
|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
+
+
+
+**22.** **For local government, the assets and liabilities reported by the national banking**
+**system, as reported by the BM, were used,** since the mission did not have access to other
+information from local government, as had previously been requested. It is suggested that this
+information be checked against the information provided by the local authorities.
+
+**23.** **Data from the state-owned enterprise sector (SEE) may be obtained from the IGEPE**
+**database, from the DNTCEF and from BM.** However, the mission had access to limited data
+from the SEE, although previously requested. The mission used information published by the
+MEF in the annual public debt report for nonfinancial public enterprise debt. For the public
+financial enterprises, mission considered only data from BM available in its financial reports. It
+should be noted that information from the BM’s 2019 financial report has not yet been
+published, so it was impossible to compile the BM’s 2019 debt. However, it is suggested that
+information obtained directly from IGEPE, DNCEF and the BM be used in the future.
+
+**24.** **The mission continued the process of reconciliation of net credit to the government**
+**(NCG), that started in the previous mission** . Considering the differences found in the NCG
+positions reported by the MEF and BM during the previous mission, the present mission
+reviewed the asset positions in BCG deposits and the domestic debt with the BM and MEF. Since
+this was a PSDS mission, the mission also performed the external debt reconciliation, the results
+of which are reported below. The authorities were asked to perform this reconciliation on a
+regular basis, and to complete the reconciliation of previous years, and thus guarantee
+consistency and transparency in the data compiled. The mission recommends a report be
+prepared on the results of this reconciliation for institutional memory purposes.
+
+**i.** **Reconciliation of Domestic Debt**
+
+**25.** **The main reason for the differences in the BCG’s domestic debt positions, as**
+**reported by the MEF and the BM, is their treatment of treasury bills (BT) issued by the BM**
+**but not fully recognized by the MEF.** The result of this reconciliation is set out in the following
+table.
+
+
+**18** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**26.** **Differential treatment of BTs used for monetary policy purposes versus BT used for**
+**fiscal policy purposes.** The stock of domestic debt reported by the MEF only includes the
+amount of BT that were actually used by the National Treasury, i.e. for fiscal policy purposes. The
+MEF does not recognize, as part of the BCG debt stock, the amount of BT issued for monetary
+policy purposes. In a separate publication, the BM also reports the amount of BT used, although
+this concept is not recognized in the country’s monetary accounts. In addition, the BM reported
+that it imputes the amount associated with these BT issues to government deposits on behalf of
+the State. According to the BM: (i) there is no debt service associated with the portion of the BT
+not used by the Government, (ii) MEF does not request this issuance, nor there is any agreement
+between MEF and the BM on the issuance of BTs used for monetary policy purposes; and
+(iii) MEF does not know when such BT are issued by the BM.
+
+**27.** **BT are government financing and monetary intervention instruments, which are**
+**issued by the BM for monetary policy measures. They are used to finance temporary**
+**government cash shortages, caused by the seasonal nature of fiscal revenues or possible**
+**delays in disbursements by cooperation partners.** The legal framework governing BT is
+established by Decree No. 22/2004, of July 7, which delegates to the MEF the power to issue a
+ministerial decree setting the maximum amount of BT to be used during the financial year.
+
+**28.** _**GFSM 2014**_ **defines as debt all liabilities that require payment(s) of interest and/or**
+**principal by the debtor to a creditor at a date, or dates, in the future.** It does not distinguish
+between the treatment of securities according to whether they have short- or long-term
+maturities, or whether they have been used for fiscal or monetary policy purposes. On the other
+hand, the legislation allows authorities to issue BT for fiscal and monetary policy purposes; but it
+is unclear how this debt should be recognized by the government or the rest of the public sector
+(in this case the BM).
+
+**29.** **The way the BM records BT issuance is confusing and could lead to an incorrect**
+**interpretation of the BCG’s domestic debt.** Based on the BM’s financial reports, it appears that
+the total liability resulting from the issuance of BT is recorded as part of the BM’s liabilities. In the
+monetary survey, the total issuance of BT is considered as liability of the BCG, which is offset on
+the asset side by an amount notionally imputed to BCG deposits in the BM. The reconciliation of
+each item of the NCG shows that the domestic debt and the BCG’s deposits seem to go beyond
+what effectively constitutes Government debt and the BCG’s assets. The mission therefore
+recommends that the BM reanalyze the methodological treatment of the BT issued in the
+monetary survey and perform a methodological analysis in conjunction with the MEF.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **19**
+
+
+
+**Table 4: 2016-2019 Domestic Debt Reconciliation**
+
+
+
+
+|Domestic Debt - Stocks
(unit: Mt million)|Col2|MEF|BM|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Domestic Debt - Stock****_s_ **
(unit: Mt million)|**Domestic Debt - Stock****_s_ **
(unit: Mt million)|
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
**2019**|
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
**2019**|
+|**a **|
**Total (Authorities)**|
**87,709.6**
**106,899.6**
**139,377.2**
**154,595.2**|
**127,947.6**
**215,398.4**
**250,639.6**
**271,171.3**|
+|
|
**Debt Securities**
Treasury Bonds (BM & credit institutions)
Treasury Bills
**Loans**
**Central bank**
National currency
Foreign currency
**Commercial banks**
National currency - Loans (_Leasing +_
_Restructuring activities_)
National currency - Supplier arrears
Foreign currency - Portuguese credit line
**Accounts payable**
Interest on credits
Other adjustments – Credit institutions
|
**46,147.2**
**64,199.7**
**74,943.1**
**94,492.4**
34,334.9
42,565.7
53,985.9
64,820.4
11,812.3
21,634.1
20,957.2
29,672.0
**41,562.4**
**42,699.9**
**64,434.1**
**60,102.8**
**30,028.1**
**29,882.3**
**33,812.8**
**37,812.8**
15,766.1
15,620.4
19,550.8
23,550.8
14,261.9
14,261.9
14,261.9
14,261.9
**11,534.3**
**12,817.6**
**30,621.3**
**22,290.0**
11,534.3
12,817.6
23,857.2
22,143.1
6,764.1
147.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
|
**65,274.4**
**152,047.1**
**176,469.3**
**193,802.8**
30,796.0
39,566.0
54,606.0
52,517.4
34,478.4
112,481.1
121,863.3
141,285.4
**58,459.2**
**55,029.4**
**68,523.5**
**71,168.5**
**29,976.1**
**27,693.4**
**31,876.0**
**36,858.4**
15,722.1
15,902.7
19,595.8
24,578.2
14,254.0
11,790.7
12,280.2
12,280.2
**28,483.1**
**27,336.0**
**36,647.5**
**34,310.0**
10,048.7
11,171.4
23,967.2
23,704.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18,434.4
16,164.6
12,680.3
10,605.1
**4,214.0**
**8,321.9**
**5,646.8**
**6,200.0**
1,269.2
5,273.4
5,646.8
6,200.0
2,944.8
3,048.5
0.0
0.0
|
+|
**b **
|
**Differences - (Total adjustments):**
|
**445.6**
**2,670.6**
**2,670.6**
**2,670.6**
|
**-40,238.0**
**-108,498.8**
**-111,262.4**
**-116,576.1**
|
+|
**(i)**
** (ii)**
**(iii)**
**(iv)**
**(v)**
|
**Securities**
Treasury Bonds (BM & credit institutions)
Treasury Bills
**Loans - Central bank**
National currency
Foreign currency (Exchange Rate)
** Loans - Commercial banks**
National currency - Loans (_Leasing +_
_Restructuring activities_)
National currency - Supplier arrears
Foreign currency - Portuguese credit line
**Accounts payable**
Interest on credits
Other adjustments - credit institutions
**Other economic flows - (Canc. / Exchange)**
|
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|
3,538.9
2,999.7
-620.1
12,303.0
-22,666.0
-90,847.0
-100,906.1
-111,613.4
44.0
-282.3
-45.0
-1,027.4
8.0
2,471.2
1,981.8
1,981.8
1,485.6
1,646.1
-110.0
-1,561.9
6,764.1
147.0
-18,434.4
-16,164.6
-12,680.3
-10,605.1
-1,269.2
-5,273.4
-5,646.8
-6,200.0
-2,944.8
-3,048.5
0.0
0.0
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|
+|
**c = a+ b**
|
**Adjusted domestic debt**
|
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
|
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
|
+|
**d **|
**Flows – Transactions**|
**18,872.2**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.6**
**15,218.0**
**18,872.1**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.5**
**15,218.0**|
**18,872.2**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.6**
**15,218.0**
**18,872.1**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.5**
**15,218.0**|
+
+
+
+**Source:** MEF, IMF (June 2019 Article IV Report), and authors’ calculations. The data shown in red need to be confirmed by the Mozambican authorities.
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**30.** **BT not used by MEF do not constitute BCG debt.** As the data are currently reported by
+the Mozambican authorities, there is a misunderstanding over the recognition of BT used for
+monetary policy purposes. As there is no debt service on the issue of these BT, considering the
+terms on which they are issued and the definition of debt established in _GFSM 2014_, this liability
+should not be presented as part of BCG debt.
+
+**31.** **Treasury bonds (OT) as reported by MEF and by the BM differ significantly** . BM
+reports an aggregate total of securities issued by the Treasury, including both BT and OT, and the
+way the information is reported, does not allow for reconciliation with the position presented by
+the MEF. However, the MEF obtains this information from the BVM, and BM calculates the
+amount through information reported by the national banking system. It was also found that the
+amounts calculated by the BM only consider OT held by commercial banks. According to the
+BVM, OT may be held by other entities, besides resident commercial banks, such as individuals or
+external investors. Nonetheless, the BM was requested to report OT position separately from BT.
+
+**32.** **Loan positions with the BM are consistent, having only minor differences resulting**
+**from the exchange rates used.** In the case of commercial bank loans, there are significant
+differences in the positions calculated by the two institutions, especially in 2015. The BM’s
+recognition of the Portuguese credit line explains part of the difference. This credit line is not
+BCG debt, so the difference results from the coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts. The
+remaining difference in loans also seems to stem from a problem of institutional sector coverage.
+The mission asked the BM to provide details on government loans with commercial banks to
+facilitate reconciliation with the MEF position and make it possible to report the debt of each
+subsector of the public sector.
+
+**33.** **Arrears and other BCG accounts payable are not captured by the NCG position, as**
+**reported by the BM.** Debt representing arrears with suppliers are debts recognized in the stock
+of domestic debt reported by the MEF; but they are not captured by the BM, since they are not
+debts contracted with the national banks. In 2018, the Mozambican authorities compiled all of
+the debts that public institutions had with various suppliers in the period 2007–2016. The total
+amount was approximately 29.8 billion meticais (Mt), of which Mt 19.8 billion was approved by
+the Office of the Audit General, and Mt 9.9 billion was not.
+
+**34.** **The credits reported in the monetary accounts show amounts associated with other**
+**adjustments, resulting from the methodology of recording the debt on accrual basis.** The
+MEF does not capture these adjustments, since it records debt on a cash basis. These
+adjustments require a counterpart in BCG expenditure so as not to generate discrepancies in the
+statistics.
+
+**ii.** **Reconciliation of External Debt**
+
+**35.** **The government’s external debt, as calculated by the MEF, was compared with the**
+**external debt reported by the BM in the** **[International Investment Position (IIP), compiled](http://www.bancomoc.mz/fm_pgLink.aspx?id=222)**
+**according to BPM6.** Mission started reconciling the government’s external debt as published by
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **21**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+the MEF with the amounts compiled by the BM in the IIP, and according to the following table,
+the differences round approximately US$3 billion for the period 2016–2019.
+
+**36.** **Mozambican authorities were tasked with completing the reconciliation between**
+**the two positions.** The sectoral coverage could explain a small portion of the discrepancies
+presented, since, in the case of the IIP, they are loans and debt securities which are liabilities of
+GG to nonresidents, whereas the external debt reported by the MEF only considers the external
+debt of BCG. Nonetheless, the Mozambican authorities indicated that the difference could be
+due to the treatment of guarantees granted by the government on external loans obtained by
+public companies, which are not being recognized in the data compiled by the MEF. This
+difference in treatment may justify part of the difference in the reporting of loans. The BM was
+tasked with finishing the reconciliation for the purposes of compiling the PSDS.
+
+**37.** **As part of its debt management, the government acquired and restructured the**
+**securitized debt (guaranteed by the State) of the Mozambican Tuna Company (** _**Empresa**_
+_**Moçambicana de Atum**_ **– EMATUM, SA) in 2016.** The MEF confirmed that within the external
+debt, only the amount of this debt that is referred as MOZAM 2023 or MOZAM 2032, should be
+recorded as debt securities. The IIP reports less than this amount, so the authorities need to
+check whether the treatment of this operation is consistent in both reports.
+
+**38.** **Other liabilities included in the IIP not considered by MEF.** Line 9 of the table below
+identifies the total of other GG liabilities that do not seem to be included in the external debt as
+compiled by the MEF. The BM was tasked with identifying these amounts and informing the MEF
+of the origin of these other liabilities.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Table 5. Differences in External Debt 2016–2019 - Debt vs. IIP Report|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|
+|
||**2016**|**2017**|**2018**|**2019**|
+|
**Liabilities identified in IIP**|
1 = 2 + 3|
**11,717.8**
**9 **|
**12,340.1**
**5 **|
**12,391.1**
**0 **|
**12,681.0**
**9 **|
+|
Debt securities - general government|
2|
546.72|
495.90|
495.90|
495.90|
+|
Loans - general government|
3|
11,171.17|
11,844.25|
11,895.20|
12,185.19|
+|
**MEF Public debt report**||||||
+|
External debt cf. Table 2: Public debt stock|4|8,626.32|9,487.85|9,804.45|9,850.18|
+|
**Difference**|
**6 = 4 - 1**|
** -3,091.57**|
** -2,852.30**|
** -2,586.65**|
** -2,830.91**
|
+|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|**Memorandum items**|||||
|
+|
MOZAM 2023 / MOZAM 2032 securities (MEF report)|
7|
726.52
|
726.52
|
726.52
|
900
|
+|
**Difference - external securitized debt**
|
**8 = 7 - 2**
|
**179.80**
|
**230.62**
|
**230.62**
|
**404.10**
|
+|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
**Other liabilities identified in IIP**|
**9 **|
256.55|
688.20|
1,119.85|
1,021.95|
+
+
+**Source:** BM, MEF.
+
+
+**22** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**iii.** **Reconciliation of Central Government Deposits**
+
+**39.** **BCG deposits held by BM include all flows resulting from the issuance of BT**
+**whether for monetary or for fiscal policy purposes.** The following table shows the distribution
+of the position of government deposits, considering the accounts of the BCG, EBU and INSS, in
+the monetary survey.
+
+**40.** **The variation in deposits held with the BM has been affected by the issuance of BT**
+**channeled into government deposits.** The increase in government deposits identified in the
+monetary survey was attributable to the imputation of deposits as a result of the BT issuances,
+irrespective of whether these were for fiscal or for monetary policy purposes. As noted above, the
+National Treasury is not aware of the assets imputed to its deposit account when the BM issues
+BT for monetary policy purposes, so this amount generates a difference in the positions reported
+by the two institutions.
+
+**41.** **Government deposits identified in the monetary surveys include Social Security**
+**deposits.** The mission suggests the use of a single list of entities, classified according with the
+international manuals; so, the authorities should ratify the INSS classification in the social security
+funds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced accordingly.
+
+**42.** **While BM reports on accrual basis, MEF reports on cash basis.** This differences in the
+accounting basis of reporting has also proven significant as BM make adjustment of the date to
+reflect the commitments, and the MEF does not make, creating significant differences in the
+positions held by both public institutions.
+
+**43.** **The MEF should report separately the portion of deposits that the BCG holds, and**
+**the portion of deposits held by extrabudgetary units.** This separation has proven
+fundamental for completing the work of deposits reconciliation, since the National Treasury does
+not recognize all the foreign and local currency amounts deposited with commercial banks as
+reported in the monetary survey.
+
+**Table 6. Detail of Central Government Deposits Reported in the Monetary Survey**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Bank of Mozambique|Col4|Col5|Col6|Commercial banks|Col8|Col9|Monetary
survey|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
|
|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|BT|Interest
and
other|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|Other
adjustments|
**Total deposits**|
+|
**December**
**2015**|**BCG**|19|5|13|1|9|3|3|** 53**|
+|
|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
9|
0|
0|
**9 **|
+|
|
**Total**|
**19**|
**5 **|
**13**|
**1 **|
**18**|
**3 **|
**3 **|
**62**|
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **23**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|BCG
December
INSS
2016
Total|Col2|Bank of Mozambique|Col4|Col5|Col6|Commercial banks|Col8|Col9|Monetary
survey|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|BT|Interest
and
other|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|Other
adjustments|
**Total deposits**|
+|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|**BCG**|15|13|27|1|8|5|3|** 72**|
+|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
14|
0|
0|
** 14**|
+|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|
**Total**|
**15**|
**13**|
**27**|
**1 **|
**22**|
**5 **|
**3 **|
**86**|
+|**December**
**2017**|
**BCG**|
26|
33|
84|
7|
10|
3|
3|
** 166**|
+|**December**
**2017**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
17|
0|
0|
** 17**|
+|**December**
**2017**|
**Total**|
**26**|
**33**|
**84**|
**7 **|
**27**|
**3 **|
**3 **|
**183**|
+|**December**
**2018**|
**BCG**|
26|
12|
108|
8|
16|
3|
2|
** 175**|
+|**December**
**2018**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
23|
0|
0|
** 23**|
+|**December**
**2018**|
**Total**|
**26**|
**12**|
**108**|
**8 **|
**39**|
**3 **|
**2 **|
**198**|
+|**December**
**2019**|
**BCG**|
57|
11|
123|
7|
15|
4|
1|
** 218**|
+|**December**
**2019**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
24|
0|
0|
** 24**|
+|**December**
**2019**|
**Total**|
**57**|
**11**|
**123**|
**7 **|
**39**|
**4 **|
**1 **|
**242**|
+|**August 2020**|
**BCG**|
68|
19|
147|
7|
18|
6|
4|
** 269**|
+|**August 2020**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
26|
0|
0|
**26**|
+|**August 2020**|
**Total**|
**68**|
**19**|
**147**|
**7 **|
**44**|
**6 **|
**4 **|
**295**|
+|
**Variation in year**
**December 2019–**
**August 2020**|
**Variation in year**
**December 2019–**
**August 2020**|
**11**|
**8 **|
**24**|
**0 **|
**5 **|
**2 **|
**3 **|
**53**|
+
+
+
+**Note:**
+The separation between BCG and EBU deposit should be provided by MEF.
+
+
+
+Source: BM and MEF
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2021|**Reconciliation of domestic debt.**(i) Complete the reconciliation
work started during the mission and document the final outcome; (ii)
Implement a formal process for regular reconciliation of flows and
stock (by instrument, face value, and creditor); (iii) Prepare a report
on the reconciliation results, including explanations of all differences
identified in the BM (net credit to the government and balance of
payments) and DNTCEF (detailed debt charts) data, for institutional
memory purposes.
|BM and MEF
(DNGDP and
DNPED)
|
+|April 2021|
**Treasury bills.**Agree on the total amount of BT debt to be
recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts – prepare a
methodological analysis on the statistical treatment of BT issued for
government financing.|MEF and BM|
+
+
+
+**24** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2021|**Debt Securities.** Present a total breakdown of treasury bonds:
(i) details of issuance of BT and (ii) details of OT.
|BM|
+|April 2021|
**Treasury Bonds.**The MEF should regularly request information on
the OT debt issued through the BVM, identifying the share of OT held
by each of the residents (individuals, nonfinancial corporations, BM,
and other financial institutions) and by the nonresident. In addition,
the MEF should indicate how the debt is valued in public information,
indicating whether at face value or market value.
|MEF and BVM|
+|April 2021|
**Loans from commercial banks.**Provide details of total loans with
commercial banks.
|BM|
+|April 2021|
**GG International Investment Position.**Complete the reconciliation
of the external debt between the MEF and the BM: (i) external loans;
(ii) debt securities and possible differences in the treatment of
MOZAM 2032; (iii) treatment of other liabilities included in the IIP
and not included in the MEF external debt position. The result of this
work should be transcribed in a methodological note for institutional
memory purposes; and (iv) the BM should report the total debt of
each of Mozambique’s public sector subsectors: GG = BCG + EBU +
INSS + LG, also the corporate financial and nonfinancial sector.
|MEF / BM|
+|April 2021|
**Debt of EBU.**Launch the process of systematized collection of the
debt of these entities, since they may represent a material share of
central government debt.
|MEF|
+|April 2021|
**INSS debt.**Request INSS detailed debt data on a regular basis and
compare it with the position reported in its financial reports.
|MEF/INSS|
+|April 2021|
**Local government debt.**Collect and compile the information on a
regular basis.
|MEF|
+|April 2021|
**Financial and nonfinancial public sector debt.**Collect and compile
the information on a regular basis.
|MEF/IGEPE|
+|Immediately
|
**Reconciliation of deposits.**(i) finalize the reconciliation work
initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to
provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG
and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS,
ensuring consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’
Financial reports; (iv) The authorities should also ratify the
classification of the INSS in the Social Security Funds subsector, and
adjust all statistics produced accordingly; (v) the BM to publish
information on government deposits with the separation by
subsector of public administrations; (vi) ) adjust inflows resulting
from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits
according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for
fiscal and monetary purpose; (vii) The BM and MEF to implement a
formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including
explanations of all the differences identified.|BM
e
MEF
(DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF)|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **25**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**D. PSDS Concepts and Definitions**
+
+**44.** **The compilation of BCG debt statistics in Mozambique uses some concepts and**
+**definitions that are not established in** _**PSDSG 2011**_ **.** As the BCG issuance of BT does not
+converge to the debt concept (the sum of all liabilities requiring payment(s) of interest and/or
+principal by the debtor to the creditor at a given date, or dates, in the future), the mission sought
+to clarify the definition of debt, given the need for the authorities to coordinate the recording of
+BT — between the BM and the MEF.
+
+**45.** **The importance of the PSDS in policy analysis and formulation was explained,** since
+PSDS make it possible to: (i) understand and record the role of government and the public sector
+in an economy; (ii) evaluate a country’s fiscal position and policy orientation, as well as the
+macroeconomic impact of government policies; (iii) assess fiscal vulnerabilities and risks;
+(iv) improve debt sustainability analysis; (v) foster government accountability and transparency;
+(vi) increase international comparability (for purposes of comparison and learning across
+countries, but also to underpin fiscal surveillance mechanisms for regional integration).
+
+**46.** **Debt was presented as a subset of liabilities,** and the debt instruments were reviewed
+(including all liability instruments, excluding shares and units in investment funds, financial
+derivatives, and employee stock options).
+
+**47.** **The concepts of gross debt and net debt were introduced, since the DSA should not**
+**be based on the gross debt position alone.** While gross debt represents financial claims that
+require the payment(s) of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date, or
+dates, in the future, net debt is calculated as the gross debt minus the financial assets
+corresponding to the individual debt instruments.
+
+**48.** **The mission noted that the compilation of BCG debt statistics should include all**
+**debt liabilities owed by resident public sector units to other residents and nonresidents.**
+However, the report of domestic and external debt does not fulfill the residence accounting
+principle, since total issues, at least of OT, are not broken down between amounts invested in by
+residents and by nonresidents. This information is useful for analysis purposes DSA and to make
+the link with external sector statistics (balance of payments, IIP, etc.).
+
+**49.** **The BCG debt shown in the Public Financial statements (** _**Conta Geral do Estado**_ **–**
+**CGE) makes it possible to link the evolution of the debt stock and the transactions and**
+**other economic flows.** However, information on debt cancellation/debt forgiveness, and
+changes resulting from gains and losses of currency exchange, are reported in a single total.
+While debt cancellation or forgiveness should be considered as transactions, the gains and losses
+from currency exchange should be recorded as other economic flows.
+
+**50.** **In general, public debt is reported at face value.** However, other consistent
+recognition and valuation criteria (market value, fair value, and nominal value) have been shown
+to the authorities to remind them that the methodology has an impact on the DSA.
+
+
+**26** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**51.** **Another issue reviewed during the mission was the debt cross-analysis, through the**
+**public sector debt matrix.** This matrix should make it possible to evaluate Mozambique’s public
+debt by instrument held by each subsector of the public sector.
+
+**52.** **The treatment of contingent liabilities was also analyzed.** According to _GFSM 2014_,
+these liabilities should not be recorded as part of the total liability in macroeconomic statistics,
+unless certain specific conditions are met (e.g. a loan guarantee is called). It is recommended that
+contingent liabilities are recorded as memorandum items in the balance sheet.
+
+**53.** **Lastly, the debt sustainability framework was presented in the context of**
+**determining the external risk of over-indebtedness.** Public debt can be considered
+sustainable when the primary balance needed to stabilize the debt (at least), both in the base
+case and in the realistic scenario, is economically and politically viable. In that case the debt level
+is consistent with an acceptably low rollover risk while maintaining potential growth at a
+satisfactory level.
+
+**54.** **Creation of a Mozambique PSDS Manual that describes all concepts and definitions**
+**and reports the process of compiling PSDS.** The mission reiterates the recommendation to
+develop a GFS and PSDS compilation manual (a guide) that presents a living set of working
+instructions used in the GFS and PSDP compilation process, and which will aid understanding
+among the team compiling this information. These instructions ensure the sustainability
+(institutional memory creation) and consistency of the compilation process. The manual should
+include the concepts, definitions, valuation criteria and all other accounting principles used in the
+PSDS compilation process. In addition, the instructions needed for the execution of PSDS tasks
+should also be described to ensure consistency in the process.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|December
2021
|**_Mozambique GFS and PSDS Manual_**_: _Document the annual and
quarterly GFS compilation process, for institutional memory
purposes, and to ensure consistency in the compilation process,
including the concepts and definitions used.|DNPED
and
DNGDP|
+
+
+
+**E. Compilation of Annual and Quarterly PSDS 2016-2019**
+
+**55.** **The PSDS compilation work done by the mission excluded liabilities that do not**
+**require the payment of interest and/or principal,** such as equity and investment fund units,
+along with financial derivatives, as defined in the _GFSM 2014_ . This compilation work took account
+of debt instruments and loans and debt securities of Mozambican public sector.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **27**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**56.** **The mission carried out a preliminary PSDS compilation exercise in Excel.** An Excel
+file was created to compile detailed annual PSDS data by subsector. In addition, quarterly data
+from the first quarter of 2019 was also compiled for total BCG debt.
+
+**57.** **The preliminary PSDS compilation exercise could approximate to Mozambique’s**
+**total public sector debt.** The PSDS work compiled during the mission considered the domestic
+and external debt data of the BCG, data on loans of the municipalities and the INSS, and
+liabilities reported by SEE, including those of the BM. According to the authorities, this exercise
+could cover the majority of public sector debt. However, the exercise does not include the
+amounts of the EBU debt and was calculated on a best-effort basis.
+
+**58.** **Currently, and as far as government debt is concerned, the MEF only compiles the**
+**debt of the BCG.** During the mission, the MEF sought additional information on the debt of the
+other general government subsectors. These efforts were unfruitful; but the mission’s work made
+it possible to collect data on local government debt and social security funds, based on
+published information. It was not possible to obtain information from the EBU.
+
+**59.** **The debt of nonfinancial public sector was calculated from information published**
+**in the MEF public debt report.** The figures for financial sector public debt incorporate BM data
+only.
+
+**60.** **According to the preliminary PSDS compilation exercise, as reported in the**
+**following table, total public sector debt at end-2018 amounted to Mt 1.213 trillion, or**
+**135.5 percent of GDP. The unconsolidated general government debt amounted to Mt**
+**756.421 billion in 2019,** which represents an increase of Mt 18.823 billion compared to end2018. In 2019 general government debt represented 79 percent of GDP, compared to 82.4
+percent of GDP at end-2018.
+
+**61.** **Nonfinancial public sector debt, excluding units of general government, amounted**
+**to Mt 130.248 billion at the end of 2019, an increase of Mt 15.179 billion over the previous**
+**year.** As a percentage of GDP, in 2019 the debt of the nonfinancial public sector was 13.6
+percent, up from 12.8 percent at the end of 2018. During the mission, differences were found in
+the figures for some companies between the debt report published by MEF and the figures
+shown in the financial reports of the companies themselves. For example, the debt of Petromoc
+reported by MEF in 2019 was Mt 10.305 billion, whereas, in the company’s financial report,
+current and noncurrent loans amounted to Mt 11.570 billion, thus leaving an amount of Mt 1.266
+billion unexplained. The mission asked the national authorities, in particular IGEPE, to investigate
+these differences.
+
+**62.** **BM debt represented about 40 percent of GDP in 2017 and 2018.** Data for late 2019
+are not yet available to the central bank.
+
+
+**28** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**Table 5. Gross Public Sector Debt Stock** **by Sub-sector - Preliminary**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|By subsector
General government|2016
702,782|2017
663,030|2018
737,598|2019
756,421|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**_% of GDP_**
|
**_93.4_**
|
**_78.9_**
|
**_82.4_**
|
**_79.1_**
|
+|Central government
|701,708
|661,370
|736,076
|
754,077
|
+|
Extrabudgetary units
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|
+|
Local government
|
1,074
|
1,658
|1,520
|
2,271
|
+|
Social security
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
73
|
+|
**Nonfinancial public enterprises**
|
_n.a._
|
**58,864**
|
**115,068**
|
**130,248**
|
+|
**_% of GDP_**
|_n.a._
|
**_7.0_**
|
**_12.8_**
|
**_13.6_**
|
+|**Financial public enterprises (BM)**
|**205,857**
|**336,261**
|**361,224**
|
_n.a._
|
+|
**_% of GDP_**
|
**_27.3_**
|
**_40.0_**
|
**_40.3_**
|
_n.a._
|
+|**Total public sector**
|_n.a._
|**1,058,155**
|**1,213,891**
|
_n.a._
|
+|
**_ % of GDP_**
|_n.a._
|
**_125.9_**
|
**_135.5_**
|
_n.a._
|
+|**Memorandum item: GDP**
|**752,702**|**840,526**|**895,567**|
**956,786**|
+
+
+**Table 6. Central Government Gross Debt Stock per holder/instrument - Preliminary**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Central government debt|2016|2017|2018|2019|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
+|**Total**
|**702 782**
|
**663 030**
|**737 598**
|**754 077**
|
+|
**_% of GDP_**
|
**_93.4_**
|
**_78.9_**
|
**_82.4_**
|
**_78.8_**
|
+|Debt securities
|86 294
|
97 649
|111 881
|144 766
|
+|
Loans
|
616 487
|
565 381
|
625 717
|
609 311
|
+|
**External**
|
**613 998**
|
**554 470**
|
**596 699**
|
**599 482**
|
+|
Debt securities
|
52 818
|
43 424
|
44 216
|
54 774
|
+|
Loans
|
561 180
|
511 046
|
552 483
|
544 708
|
+|
**Domestic**
|
**88 784**
|
**108 560**
|
**140 899**
|
**154 595**
|
+|
Debt securities
|
33 476
|
54 225
|
67 665
|
89 992
|
+|
Loans
|
55 307|
54 334|
73 234|
64 603|
+
+
+**63.** **In relation to debt by instrument, over 80 percent of the BCG debt is represented**
+**by loans.** The external debt also represents about 80 percent of the total debt, as can be seen in
+the above table.
+
+
+
+**64.** **The available data made it possible to compile the quarterly central government**
+**gross debt information.** Data from the fourth quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2020 are
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **29**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+shown in the following table. It should be noted that in 2020, the central government debt
+accumulated an increase of Mt 108.264 billion, i.e. an increase of 14 percent compared to the
+end of 2019.
+
+**Table 7. Quarterly Central Government Gross Debt Stock** **- Preliminary**
+
+
+
+|Quarterly Central Government debt|Total|External|Domestic|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|2018 Q4
|736,076
|596,699
|139,377
|
+|
2019 Q1
|
732,873
|
613,396
|
119,477
|
+|
2019 Q2
|
787,102
|
626,662
|
160,440
|
+|
2019 Q3
|
797,027
|
625,533
|
171,494
|
+|
2019 Q4
|
754,077
|
599,482
|
154,595
|
+|
2020 Q1
|
806,832
|
636,032
|
170,800
|
+|
2020 Q2
|
862,341
|
679,597
|
182,744
|
+|
Change in 2020
|
108,264|
80,115|
28,149|
+
+
+**65.** **The quarterly BCG debt data compiled according to the** _**PSDSG**_ **could be included in**
+**the debt reports and should be submitted to the joint World Bank and IMF database.** In
+addition to the already existing publication of quarterly public debt reports, the mission suggests
+that this information could be included in the PSDS reporting template, and creation of long time
+series.
+
+**66.** **The BCG’s net debt amounted to Mt 466.874 billion in 2018.** In the case of the BCG
+and using the financial assets data compiled under the previous mission, it appears that the
+central government debt net of total financial assets represented **52 percent of GDP in 2018**, as
+shown in the following table. Updating the details of financial assets and liabilities for the most
+recent periods will make it possible to keep this indicator up to date; so, the suggestion is that it
+be compiled on a regular basis. It was impossible to calculate the net debt balance of the entire
+public sector, owing to the lack of data on financial assets. It is therefore recommended that
+efforts be made to obtain this information, since net debt can be a more accurate indicator of a
+country’s solvency/sustainability, especially in circumstances where government financial assets
+are more liquid (such as deposits) and can be easily used in the short term, making it possible to
+pay debts on maturity. Financial assets may also be used for economic or political reasons to
+reduce unsustainable debts.
+
+
+**30** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**Table 8. Central Government Net Debt Stock** **- Preliminary**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|2016|2017|2018|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
**Central government debt net of total financial assets**
|
**516,693**
|
**408,738**
|
**466,874**
|
+|
**_% of GDP_**|
**_68.6_**|
**_48.6_**|
**_52.1_**|
+
+
+
+Memorandum item: BCG financial assets 185,015 252,632 269,202
+
+
+**67.** **Currently, Mozambican authorities do not transmit the PSDS through the joint**
+**World Bank / IMF PSDS program.** In view of the PSDS compilation exercise carried out during
+the mission, it is recommended that the authorities complete the missing information and review
+the figures to ensure that the PSDS compilation work reflects the reality of the public sector. The
+mission provided guidance on completing the quarterly public sector debt (QPSDS) form,
+together with instructions on how to transmit the information. It also filled out the information
+on a preliminary basis, which could be sent to international institutions once validated. The
+submission of data to the of the World Bank / IMF quarterly database is highly recommended, to
+promote fiscal transparency.
+
+**68.** **Mozambique will have to start publishing PSDS including the SEE.** According to the
+implementation of the Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP), which is part of the
+International Development Association (IDA) comprehensive policy toolkit to address debt
+vulnerabilities, as from May 2021, the Mozambican government will have to publish the 2020 and
+subsequent annual debt reports with a coverage that includes the State-owned enterprises (SEE)
+and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) debt. The mission’s meeting with the World Bank’s country
+office team concluded that the country has now another incentive to organize to compile and
+disseminate the PSDS according to international standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|April 2021|**Mozambique’s PSDS for the years 2016-2019 compiled during**
**the mission.**(i) validate and complete the missing information, for
subsectors of the public sector; (ii) extend the exercise to other
years; (iii) publish in the joint database of the World Bank and the
IMF, as well as on the MEF website_._
|DNGDP|
+|December
2020|
**Quarterly PSDS of Mozambique compiled during the mission.**
(i) validate the dada compiled during the mission; (ii) extend the
exercise to other years; and (iii) publish in the joint World Bank
and IMF database and on the MEF website_._|DNGDP|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **31**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|December
2021|**Budgetary central government debt.**Present information
systematically by instrument and counterpart sector, and in a time
series format, to make it easier to transpose the compiled data
into the IMF reporting templates_._
|MEF|
+|Immediately|
**Debt of public companies.** (i) Petromoc: the source of
discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt
report and the values recorded in the company’s financial report
should be clarified by the IGEPE; (ii) the same reconciliation work
should be extended to other companies, to see whether identical
situations exist.
|IGEPE / MEF|
+|December
2021|
**Coverage of instruments in the PSDS.**Extend the instrument
coverage of the PSDS to cover most of the instruments listed in
the IMF’s PSDS compilation guide (loans, debt securities, SDRs,
cash and deposits, insurance, pensions and standardized
guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable).
|MEF|
+|December
2021
|
**Financial assets.** The Mozambican authorities should start to
compile the financial assets of the general public sector, with a
view to compiling public debt net of financial assets (net debt).|MEF|
+
+
+
+**F. Resources, training, and technical assistance**
+
+**69.** **MEF staff has limited knowledge of the PSDS.** Following the approval of the new MEF
+law _(estatuto orgânico)_ and the creation of the new directorate in charge of managing and
+compiling the public debt, new teams of technical staff were formed with little or no experience
+in compiling the PSDS. The mission understands that there is a need for capacity building among
+the staff on the methodological requirements of _GFSM 2014_ and _PSDSG_ (scope, content of
+operations, relationship between flows and stocks, etc.) for better application to the reality of
+Mozambique. It is recommended that the teams participate actively on courses organized by the
+IMF and the World Bank. It should also be noted that the supply of online courses has increased,
+in response to the current COVID-19 pandemic restrictions; and these could be a very good
+alternative to face-to-face courses.
+
+**70.** **The authorities requested PSDS manuals in Portuguese** . The authorities mentioned
+that the methodological literature for compiling the PSDS is in English, which creates a barrier
+when training teams do not have strong English skills. The authorities asked for manuals and
+other relevant materials, as well as PSDS training, to be provided in Portuguese.
+
+**71.** **Debt management system needs to be updated.** One of the authorities’ major
+concerns related to the debt is the debt management system. According to information obtained
+from the debt team, external debt is managed through the CS-DRMS 2000+ system developed
+by Commonwealth. This system has recently been reorganized, with support from AFRITAC
+
+
+**32** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+South. Domestic debt is managed through Excel files, which the mission considers to be a risk for
+the calculation of robust PSDS, since it involves a lot of human intervention.
+
+**72.** **The new debt management system is at an embryonic stage of development.** The
+mission learned that a new debt management system tailored to Mozambique’s needs is to be
+implemented. The system will be financed by the European Union and the process is currently
+being put out to tender to contract a company to develop the system within eight-month
+timeline. It is recommended that this system includes automation of the domestic debt
+management process, and the creation of a public debt database that will make it possible to
+compile the PSDSs without the need for major human intervention. Synchronization between this
+new system and e-SISTAFE is desirable to ensure consistency between PSDS data and those of
+the GFS. In addition, automatic generation of the PSDS would guarantee efficiency and
+effectiveness in the process of compiling PSDS data and would enable the teams to concentrate
+on analyzing the debt data.
+
+**73.** **The provision of technical assistance is highly desirable, to support the continuity**
+**of the PSDS** **compilation according to international best practices** . The IMF/STA Government
+Finance Division is always available to support the authorities with the specific GFS and PSDS
+compilation issues; while more comprehensive technical assistance can be provided at the
+request of the Mozambican authorities.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|
+|---|---|---|
+|Continuous|**_Staff training_**_: _Provide training for staff, including through
participation in the various GFS and PSDS courses run by the IMF.
|DNPED
and
DNGDP|
+|December
2022
|
**_Development of the new debt system:_**(i) Make sure the new
system allows the management of domestic debt in an automated
way; (ii) Ensure system allows the archive of debt data and automatic
generation of EDSP tables; (iii) Interconnect the domestic and
external debt management systems with e-SISTAFE.|
DNGDP|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **33**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**Appendix I. Senior Staff and Technicians Contacted During the Mission**
+
+|Name|Institution|Position|
+|---|---|---|
+|Enilde Sarmento
|MEF/DNPED
|Director
|
+|
Isabel Sumar
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Director
|
+|
Ester José
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Angelo Nhalidele
|
MEF/DNPED
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Chamila Aly
|
MEF/DNTCEF
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Domingos Fumo
|
BM/DER
|
Deputy Director
|
+|
Augusto Zopene
|
MEF/DNTCEF
|
Head of Department
|
+|
Bento Ranchol
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Head of Department
|
+|
Glória Janeiro
|
BVM
|
Director
|
+|
Amorim Pery
|
BVM
|
Operations Director
|
+|
Aquino Chilundo
|
BM/DER
|
Technician
|
+|
Ângelo Ferreira
|
MEF/DNPED
|
Technician
|
+|
Assissy Aly
|
MEF/DNPED
|
Technician
|
+|
Breatriz Tovela
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|
+|
Orlando Penicela
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|
+|
Candido Jeque
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|
+|
Lauzeta Cossa
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|
+|
Roberto Sousa
|
IGEPE
|
Technician
|
+|
Ailton Jose
|
IGEPE
|
Technician
|
+|
Pradipa Aunvattal
|
MEF/GGR
|
Technician
|
+|
Esther Palácio|
IMF Mozambique|
Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator|
+
+
+
+**34** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**Appendix II. Protocol for institutional cooperation on Government**
+
+**Finance Statistics**
+
+
+**PROTOCOL** **FOR** **INSTITUTIONAL** **COOPERATION** **IN** **THE** **FIELD**
+
+
+**OF** **GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS**
+
+
+**MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE,**
+
+**BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE,**
+
+
+**AND**
+
+**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS**
+
+
+**I.** **SCOPE**
+
+
+
+1. In view of the need to organize the process of compiling Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
+
+
+
+and Public Sector Debt Statistics (PSDS) among the different actors, the Ministry of Economy
+
+
+
+and Finance of Mozambique (MEF) proposes to create a Government Finance Statistics
+
+
+
+Compilation Committee (hereinafter GFSCC);
+
+
+
+2. Mindful of the responsibilities and autonomy of the signatory entities, this Protocol specifies
+
+
+
+the objectives of the GFSCC, its members and their responsibilities, and the main results to be
+
+
+
+achieved; and it aims to foster cooperation on GFS and PSDS among the signatory entities,
+
+
+
+focusing on the following activities:
+
+
+
+(a) Definition and updating of the universe of institutional units in the general government
+
+sector and the extended public sector;
+
+(b) Preparation of GFS;
+
+(c) Preparation of PSDS.
+
+**II.** **OBJECTIVES**
+
+1. Institutional cooperation on Government Finance statistics has the following objectives:
+
+(a) Contribute to the compilation of quality GFS and PSDS by developing institutional
+
+cooperation mechanisms between the signatory entities, to uphold demanding standards
+
+in terms of the reliability and consistency of basic information, based on best practices in
+
+this field.
+
+(b) Contribute to the timely dissemination of GFS and PSDS;
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **35**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+(c) Contribute to the definition of more efficient mechanisms for sharing basic information
+
+on GFS;
+
+(d) Facilitate the comparison of the various data sources and identification of the main
+
+differences, with a view to obtaining more robust results.
+
+(e) Coordinate the planning of activities to fulfill the official statistics production schedules.
+
+
+**III.** **COMMITTEE MEMBERS**
+
+1. For the purpose of implementing this Protocol, a GFSCC is created, which should include
+
+representatives of the MEF – National Directorate Economic Policies and Development
+
+(DNPED), National Directorate of Public Debt Management (DNGDP), National Directorate of
+
+the Treasury and Economic and Financial Cooperation (DNTCEF), National Directorate of
+
+Public Accounts (DNCP), National Directorate of Planning and Budget (DNPO), National
+
+Directorate of Public Assets (DNPE), Risk Management Office (GGR), the Bank of Mozambique
+
+(BM), and the National Institute of Statistics (INE).
+
+2. The GFSCC will be coordinated by the Director of the MEF DNPED.
+
+3. The GFSCC has the following main duties:
+
+(a) Establish the detailed indicative timetable for the compilation of general government
+
+statistics, taking into account, inter alia, the deadlines for reporting to international
+
+institutions, such as IMF;
+
+(b) Contribute to the preparation and updating of the Government Finance Statistics Manual
+
+and Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide for Compilers and Users.
+
+(c) Contribute to the identification of required basic information and implementation of
+
+solutions to access it;
+
+(d) Contribute to the preparation of, and participation in, the visits of delegations of
+
+international institutions in this field, based on a sharing of responsibilities among the
+
+signatory entities;
+
+(e) Cooperate in clarifying doubts and discussing methodological options in the compilation
+
+of GFS and PSDS, including those related to the clarification of relevant issues concerning
+
+the statistical treatment of operations with a significant impact on financing
+
+capacity/need and public sector debt;
+
+(f) Analyze the consistency of the statistical results obtained.
+
+4. Participation in the GFSCC may also be extended to the following entities, through occasional
+
+invitation depending on the issues to be dealt with:
+
+
+**36** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+(a) Mozambique Stock Exchange;
+
+(b) State Shareholdings Management Institute - IGEPE;
+
+(c) Extrabudgetary Units;
+
+(d) National Social Security Institute of Mozambique;
+
+(e) Municipalities; and
+
+(f) Office of the Audit General.
+
+
+**IV.** **RESPONSIBILITIES**
+
+1. According to their respective fields of competency, the signatory entities will:
+
+(a) Provide all documentation considered relevant within the various lines of action
+
+considered in this Protocol, in a timely manner and fulfilling the respective legal
+
+obligations;
+
+(b) Provide timely access to basic information, as exhaustive as necessary, as relevant to the
+
+compilation of GFS and PSDS
+
+(c) Cooperate actively to meet strict reporting and publication deadlines and satisfy national
+
+and international statistical quality standards.
+
+(d) Cooperate in the definition of schedules for releasing information to the public, whenever
+
+relevant and possible and without jeopardizing its autonomy.
+
+**V.** **DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY**
+
+1. The signatory entities undertake to keep any information to which they have access in the
+
+execution of this Protocol totally confidential.
+
+**VI.** **DATA SHARING**
+
+1. Within the scope of this Protocol, the following information will be shared, as well as any
+
+other information that may prove important:
+
+(a) List of general government entities and other public-sector entities, by subsector: units of
+
+general government (central government and extrabudgetary units, local government,
+
+social security) and financial and nonfinancial public enterprises;
+
+(b) Government deposits by beneficiary, government sector (central government and
+
+extrabudgetary units, local government, social security) and currency of denomination;
+
+(c) Domestic debt, with a breakdown between Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds;
+
+(d) External debt, broken down by counterparty, maturity, and currency of denomination;
+
+(e) Gross domestic product;
+
+(f) Government finance statistics;
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **37**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+(g) Public sector debt statistics.
+
+**VII.** **PURPOSE OF THE DATA**
+
+1. The data shared under this agreement will have several purposes, including:
+
+(a) Compilation of GFS and PSDS, as well as for fiscal policy purposes;
+
+(b) Compilation of monetary and financial statistics, as well as for monetary policy purposes.
+
+(c) Preparation of national accounts including Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
+
+**VIII.** **ORGANIZATION**
+
+1. To facilitate the implementation of this Protocol, the GFSCC may convene meetings between
+
+the signatory entities, which may be extended to the other institutions mentioned above
+
+according to the items on the agenda and within their respective competencies.
+
+2. The GFSCC coordinator, in conjunction with the other members and in accordance with the
+
+various lines of action, will draw up the annual schedule of regular meetings, with at least one
+
+meeting per semester, without prejudice to extraordinary meetings justifiably requested by
+
+any of the signatory entities.
+
+3. For each meeting, the GFSCC coordinator, in conjunction with the other members, will draw
+
+up the respective agenda and send it to the signatory entities together with the notice
+
+convening the meeting.
+
+4. The summary of each meeting will be prepared by the members of GFSCC on a rotation
+
+schedule and made available to the other entities participating in the meeting.
+
+5. In addition to GFSCC meetings, seminars may be held to present information publicly and to
+
+collect information from national and international experts.
+
+**IX.** **CONTACTS**
+
+1. Ministry of Economy and Finance of Mozambique:
+
+(a) DNPED
+
+(b) DNGDP
+
+(c) DNTCEF
+
+(d) DNCP
+
+(e) DNPO
+
+(f) DNPE
+
+(g) DGR
+
+2. Bank of Mozambique
+
+3. National Institute of Statistics
+
+
+**38** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**2.** **FINAL PROVISIONS**
+
+1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature by all parties.
+
+2. The contents of this Protocol may be amended at the suggestion of any of the signatory
+
+entities, provided that all other signatory entities agree.
+
+3. Any of the signatory entities may terminate their participation in this protocol at any time, by
+
+giving formal notice thereof to the others.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **39**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**X.** **SIGNATURES**
+
+Maputo, October xx, 2020
+
+For the Ministry of Economy and Finance
+
+Name: Signature:
+
+For the Bank of Mozambique
+
+Name: Signature:
+
+For the National Institute of Statistics
+
+Name: Signature:
+
+
+**40** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+**Appendix III. Institutional Structure of General Government**
+
+
+**Units of Mozambique General Government**
+
+(The exhaustive inventory of public institutions is available in Appendix III)
+
+**CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION**
+
+**Subsector 1.** **Central government**
+
+(1.1) Five (5) Sovereignty bodies: President of the Republic, Assembly of the Republic, the
+
+Government, the Courts, and the Constitutional Council.
+
+(1.2) Twenty (20) Ministries.
+
+(1.3) Public commissions, services, and agencies.
+
+**Subsector 2. Extrabudgetary units / entities**
+
+(2.1) Public institutes
+
+(2.2) Public funds
+
+**SOCIAL SECURITY**
+
+**Subsector 3.** **Social security funds**
+
+(3.1) National Social Security Institute (INSS)
+
+**STATE GOVERNMENT**
+
+**Subsector 4.** **Not applicable**
+
+**LOCAL GOVERNMENT**
+
+**Subsector 5.** **Local governments**
+
+(5.1) Eleven (11) provinces
+
+(5.2) Ten (10) districts
+
+(5.3) Municipalities
+
+**ACCOUNTING PRACTICES**
+
+f1 Valuation of assets and liabilities:
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **41**
+
+
+
+REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
+
+
+ - Debt securities and other debt instruments: Face value
+
+ - Financial assets (deposits): Nominal
+
+
+**42** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+**Appendix IV. List of Public Sector Entities**
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+1 Office of the President of the Republic Central administration Executive management unit - -
+2 Assembly of the Republic Central administration Executive management unit - -
+3 Constitutional Council Central administration Executive management unit - -
+4 Supreme Court Central administration Executive management unit - -
+5 Office of the Audit General Central administration Executive management unit - -
+6 Office of the Prime Minister Central administration Executive management unit - -
+7 Office of the Attorney General Central administration Executive management unit - -
+8 Council of State Central administration Executive management unit - -
+9 Superior Council of the Administrative Judiciary Central administration Executive management unit - -
+10 General State expenses Central administration Executive management unit - -
+11 Ombudsman’s Office Central administration Executive management unit - -
+12 Ministry of National Defense Central administration Ministry - -
+13 Ministry of the Interior Central administration Ministry - -
+14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Central administration Ministry - -
+15 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional and Religious Affairs Central administration Ministry - -
+16 Ministry of State administration and Civil Service Central administration Ministry - -
+17 Ministry of Economy and Finance Central administration Ministry - -
+18 Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security Central administration Ministry - -
+19 Ministry of the Sea, Inland Waterways, and Fisheries Central administration Ministry - -
+20 Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy Central administration Ministry - -
+21 Ministry of Industry and Trade Central administration Ministry - -
+22 Ministry of Culture and Tourism Central administration Ministry - -
+23 Ministry of Transportation and Communications Central administration Ministry - -
+24 Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Water Resources Central administration Ministry - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+25 Ministry of Education and Human Development Central administration Ministry - -
+Ministry of Science and Technology, Higher Education,
+26 and Technical-Vocational Education Central administration Ministry - -
+27 Ministry of Health Central administration Ministry - -
+28 Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action Central administration Ministry - -
+29 Ministry of Land Environment Central administration Ministry - -
+30 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Central administration Ministry - -
+31 Ministry of Combatants Central administration Ministry - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+32 Military Headquarters Central administration
+
+
+33 Zambezi Valley Development Agency Central administration
+
+
+34 Mozambique Information Agency Central administration
+
+
+35 National Atomic Energy Agency - Regulatory Body Central administration
+
+
+36 Mediation and Labor Arbitration Committee Central administration
+
+
+37 Interministerial Committee for Major Events Central administration
+
+
+38 National Commission of the [Tr.: text missing] Central administration
+
+
+39 National Human Rights Commission Central administration
+
+
+40 Employment Advisory Committee Central administration
+
+
+41 National Commission for UNESCO Central administration
+
+
+42 National Election Commission Central administration
+
+
+
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+43 Water Regulation Board Central administration
+
+
+44 National Council for Higher Education Quality Assessment Central administration
+
+
+45 National Electricity Board Central administration
+
+
+46 Superior Council of the Public Prosecution Department Central administration
+
+
+47 National Council to Combat HIV/AIDS Central administration
+
+
+48 National Defense and Security Council Central administration
+
+
+49 Higher Council of Social Communication Central administration
+
+
+50 Central Office for Combating Corruption Central administration
+
+
+51 Central Office for the Prevention and Fight against Drugs Central administration
+
+
+52 Office of Accelerated Development Economic Zones Central administration
+
+
+53 Mozambique Financial Information Office Central administration
+
+Office of Assistance to Former Presidents of the Republic
+54 and Senior State Office-holders Central administration
+
+
+
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+Public body, agency, commission,
+or service - -
+
+
+55 Technical Secretariat for Electoral administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+56 Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+57 State Information and Security Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+58 Mozambique Engineering Laboratory Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+59 Fisheries Museum Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+
+
+60 National Geology Museum Central administration Public body, agency, or service -
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+61 Refugee Support Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+62 Machava Special Maximum Security Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+63 National Prison Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+64 National Criminal Investigation Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+65 National Migration Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+66 National Public Rescue Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+67 Mozambique Police Social Services Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+68 Civic Service of Mozambique Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+69 Water and Sanitation Infrastructure administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+70 National Conservation Areas administration (ANAC) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+71 National Fisheries administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+72 State Real Estate administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+73 Águas do Sul - Ara Sul Regional administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+74 Historical Archive Of Mozambique Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+75 Public Information Bureau Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+76 Maputo Central Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+77 Maputo Civil Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+78 Documentation and Photographic Training Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+Mozambique Documentation and Information Center
+79 (CEDIMO) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+80 Central Deposit of Medicines and Medical Articles Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+81 Legal and Judiciary Training Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+82 Ethnobotany Research and Development Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+Community Development Research and Technology
+83 Transfer Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+84 National Liberation Struggle Historical Research Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+85 Agriculture Promotion Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+86 National Cartography and Teledata Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+87 Maputo Center for Regional Health Development Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+88 Investment Promotion Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+89 General Police Command Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+90 National Song and Dance Company Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+General Directorate of Tax administration - (Includes
+91 personal and corporate income tax –IRPS and IRPC) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+92 National Civil Identification Office Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+93 Delegation of the Ministry of Labor – South Africa Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+94 Embassies and Other Diplomatic Representations Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+95 Special Women’s Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+96 Rapid Intervention Force Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+97 Mozambique Armed Defense Forces Central administration Public body, agency, or service - -
+98 Maputo Military Hospital Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+99 Maputo Central Hospital Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+100 Police Science Academy (ACIPOL) Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+101 Marechal Samora Machel Military Academy Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+102 Mozambique Academy of Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+103 School of Journalism Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+104 Fisheries School Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+105 National School of Aeronautics Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+106 National School of Visual Arts Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+107 National School of Dance Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+108 National School of Music Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+109 Maputo Central Prison Secondary School Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+110 Medio Institute of Documentary Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+111 Institute of Physical and Environmental Planning Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+112 School of Nautical Sciences (ESCN) Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+113 School of Journalism Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+114 Faculty of Engineering Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+115 Mozambique Tax Authority Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+116 Mozambique Commodity Exchange Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+117 Mozambique Stock Exchange Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+118 General Inspectorate of Finance Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+119 General Inspectorate of Gambling Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+120 General Labor Inspectorate Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+121 National Inspectorate of Economic Activities Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+122 Civil Aviation Institute of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+123 Scholarship Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+124 Maputo Institute of Health Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+125 Institute of Social Communication Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+126 Cashew Development Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+127 Land Management and Cartography Training Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+128 State Shareholdings Management Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+129 Mozambique Agrarian Research Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+130 Sociocultural Research Institute (arpac) Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+131 Institute of Language (IL) Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+132 Institute of Geographic Names of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+133 Mozambique Institute of Insurance Supervision Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+134 Mozambique Cotton Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+135 Institute of Sponsorship and Legal Assistance Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+“Dr Alberto” Vocational Training and Labour Studies
+136 Institute Central administration
+
+
+
+UEO - Public institute
+
+
+
+
+- -
+
+
+137 Institute of Geology and Mining Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+138 National Audiovisual and Film Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+139 National Social Action Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+140 National Youth Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+141 National Navy Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+142 National Communications Institute of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+143 National De-mining Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+National Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture
+144 Development Central administration
+
+
+
+UEO - Public institute
+
+
+
+
+- -
+
+
+145 National Institute of Distance Education Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+146 National Institute of Employment Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+147 National Institute of Statistics Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+148 National Institute of Disaster Management Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+149 National Institute of Hydrography and Navigation Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+150 National Fishery Inspection Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+151 National Institute of Fisheries Research Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+152 National Irrigation Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+153 National Institute of Meteorology Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+154 National Institute of Standardization and Quality Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+155 National Petroleum Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+156 National Social Security Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+157 National Institute of Health Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+158 National Social Security Institute of (INSS) Social security funds UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+National Institute of Information and Communication
+159 Technologies Central administration
+
+
+
+UEO - Public institute
+
+
+
+
+- -
+
+
+160 National Roads Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+161 National Sports Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+162 National Book and Disc Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+163 National Sea and Borders Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+164 National Tourism Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+165 Institute Export Promotion Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+Institute for the Promotion of Small and Medium
+166 Enterprises Central administration
+
+
+
+UEO - Public institute
+
+
+
+
+- -
+
+
+167 Higher Institute of Arts and Culture Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+168 Higher Institute of Health Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+169 Mozambique Higher Institute of Accounting and Auditing Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+170 Higher Institute of Public Administration Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+
+
+“Lieutenant General Armando Emílio Guebuza” Higher
+171 Institute of Defense Studies Central administration
+
+
+
+UEO - Public institute
+
+
+
+
+- -
+
+
+172 Higher Institute of International Relations Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+173 Higher Polytechnic Institute of Songo Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+174 University of Lury Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+175 University of Zambezi Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+176 Eduardo Mondlane University Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+177 Pedagogical University Central administration UEO - Public institute - -
+178 Portuguese Language Bibliographic Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+179 Economic Rehabilitation Support Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+180 Peace and National Reconciliation Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+181 Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+182 Transport and Communications Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+183 National Sustainable Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+184 National Research Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+185 Agrarian Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+186 Fishery Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+187 Sports Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+188 National Energy Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+189 Housing Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+190 Road and Bridge Maintenance Fund, Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+191 Water Supply Investment and Assets Fund – FIPAG Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+192 Environment Fund – FUNAB Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+193 Mozambique Cereals Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+194 Artistic and Cultural Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+195 Marketing Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+196 Small Industry Promotion Fund, Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+197 Mining Promotion Fund - FFM Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+198 National Tourism Fund – FUTUR Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+199 Artistic and Cultural Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+200 Agricultural Hydraulics Development Fund – FDHA Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+201 Road Fund – FE Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+202 National Dredging Fund – FND Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+203 Universal Access Service Fund - FSAU Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+204 Municipal Compensation Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+205 District Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+206 Municipal Initiative Investment Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -
+207 Niassa Local administration District - -
+208 Cabo Delgado Local administration District - -
+209 Nampula Local administration District - -
+210 Zambézia Local administration District - -
+211 Tete Local administration District - -
+212 Manica Local administration District - -
+213 Sofala Local administration District - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+214 Inhambane Local administration District - -
+215 Gaza Local administration District - -
+216 Maputo Local administration District - -
+217 Niassa Local administration Province - -
+218 Cabo Delgado Local administration Province - -
+219 Nampula Local administration Province - -
+220 Zambézia Local administration Province - -
+221 Tete Local administration Province - -
+222 Manica Local administration Province - -
+223 Sofala Local administration Province - -
+224 Inhambane Local administration Province - -
+225 Gaza Local administration Provinces - -
+226 Maputo Local administration Provinces - -
+227 Maputo (City) Local administration Provinces - -
+228 Lichinga City - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+229 Cuamba City - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+230 Town of Marrupa - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+231 Town of Mandimba - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+232 Town of Metangula - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+233 Pemba City - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+234 Montepuez City - Province of Cabo Delgado Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+235 Town of Mocímba da Praia - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+236 Town of Mueda - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+237 Town of Chiúre - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+238 Nampula City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+239 Angoche City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+240 Town of De Ribaué - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+241 Town of Malema - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+242 Island of Mozambique - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+243 Nacala City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+244 Town of Monapo - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+245 Quelimane City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+246 Gúrue City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+247 Mocuba City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+248 Town of Alto Molocue - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+249 Town of Maganja Da Costa - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+250 Town of Milange - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+251 Tete City - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+252 Town of Ulongué - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+253 Town of Nhamnayábuè - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+254 Vila Moatize - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+255 City of Chimoio - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+256 Manica City - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+257 Town of Gondola - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+258 Vila De Sussundenga - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+259 Vila da Catandica - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+260 Beira City - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+261 Dondo City - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+262 Town of Gorongosa - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+263 Town of Nhamatanda - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+264 Village of Marromeu - Province of Sofala Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+265 Inhambane City - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+266 Maxixe City - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+267 Town of Massinga - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+268 Town of Quissico - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+269 Town of Vilankulos - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+270 Xai-Xai City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+271 Chibuto City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+272 Chókwè City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+273 Town of Mandlacaze - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+274 Town of Macia - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+275 Town of Bilene - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+276 Matola City - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+277 Town of Namaacha - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+278 Town of Boane - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+279 Town of Manhiça - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+280 Maputo City - Maputo Province (City) Local administration Municipality/Local authority - -
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+281 ADM - AEROPORTOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 4,347,050.00 4,347,050.00 100
+
+282 C.F.M - CAMINHOS DE FERRO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 1,242,981.02 1,242,981.02 100
+
+283 CORREIOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 5,717.62 5,717.62 100
+
+284 EDM - ELECTRICIDADE DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 6,197,199.57 6,197,199.57 100
+
+
+
+EMODRAGA - EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE
+285 DRAGAGENS, E.P
+
+EMPRESA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO MAPUTO SUL 286 MAPUTO SUL, E.P
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Public/State-owned enterprise 2,448,692.60 2,448,692.60 100
+
+
+Public/State-owned enterprise 60,000.00 60,000.00 100
+
+
+
+287 ENH - EMPRESA NACIONAL DE HIDROCARBONETOS, E.P [SEE - nonfinancial ] Public/State-owned enterprise 749,001.00 749,001.00 100
+
+288 HICEP - HIDRÁULICA DE CHÒkWE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 12,022.00 12,022.00 100
+
+289 IMPRENSA NACIONAL DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 25,000.00 25,000.00 100
+
+290 PARQUE DE CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA EM MALUANA, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 441,600.00 441,600.00 100
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+291 REGADIO DE BAIXO LIMPOPO - RBL, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 15,000.00 15,000.00 100
+
+292 RM - RÁDIO MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 121,999.38 121,999.38 100
+
+293 TVM - TELEVISÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 14,908.19 14,908.19 100
+
+294 Banco de Moçambique SEE - financial Public/State-owned enterprise 2,361,314.00 2,361,314.00 100
+
+295 FARMAC, E.E. SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 24.17 24.17 100
+
+296 DINAME - DISTRIBUIDORA NACIONAL DE MATERIAL E.E. [SEE - nonfinancial ] Public/State-owned enterprise 18,977.63 18,977.63 100
+
+297 TRANSMARÍTIMA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 120,000.00 120,000.00 100
+
+
+
+STEMA - SILOS E TERMINAL GRANELEIRO DA MATOLA,
+298 S.A
+
+SMM - SOCIEDADE MOÇAMBICANA DE
+299 MEDICAMENTOS, S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 245,935.00 245,935.00 100
+
+
+Subsidiary company 800,000.00 800,000.00 100
+
+
+
+300 SEMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 34,611.00 34,611.00 100
+
+301 MONTE BINGA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 250.00 250.00 100
+
+302 BANCO NACIONAL DE INVESTIMENTOS - BNI, S.A SEE - financial Subsidiary company 2,240,000.00 2,240,000.00 100
+
+303 SOCIEDADE NOTÍCIAS, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 436,069.78 435,066.82 100
+
+304 DOMUS - SOCIEDADE DE GESTÃO IMOBILIÁRIA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,270.00 1,193.80 94
+
+305 LAM - LINHAS AÉREAS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 708,175.96 645,502.00 91
+
+306 TDM - TELECOMUNICAÇÕES DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 2,800,000.00 2,520,000.00 90
+
+307 CAIC - COMPLEXO AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DE CHOCKWE, SA [SEE - nonfinancial ] Subsidiary company 500.00 450.00 90
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company
+
+
+
+308 HCB - HIDROELÉCTRICA DE CAHORA BASSA, S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+23 558 20 024
+108.58 392.29 85
+
+
+
+309 PETROMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,800,000.00 1,440,000.00 80
+
+310 EMOPESCA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 29,500.00 23,600.00 80
+
+311 EMOSE - EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE SEGUROS, S.A SEE - financial Subsidiary company 157,000.00 109,900.00 70
+
+312 EMATUM - EMPRESA MOCAMBICANA DE ATUM, SA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 15,000.00 9,900.00 66
+
+313 MEDIMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 59,262.00 38,354.37 65
+
+314 COMPANHIA PIPELINE MOÇ./ZIMBA., LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 80,000.00 40,000.00 50
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+315 MOZAÍCO DO ÍNDICO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60,000.00 29,400.00 49
+
+
+
+TECNAUTO - EMPRESA DE ASSISTÊNCIA TÉCNICA AUTO,
+316 LDA
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 3,446.00 1,636.85 48
+
+
+
+317 DIÁRIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 2,550.00 1,020.00 40
+
+
+
+EMEM – EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE EXPLORAÇÃO
+318 MINEIRA, S.A
+
+MOGAS, SOCIEDADE MOCAMBICANA DE GASES
+319 COMPRIMIDOS, SA
+
+GAPI - SOC. PARA APOIO A PEQUENOS PROJ.DE
+320 INVESTIMENTO, S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 1,500,000.00 525,000.00 35
+
+
+Subsidiary company 40,000.00 13,500.00 34
+
+
+Subsidiary company 120,000.00 36,000.00 30
+
+
+
+321 CARTEIRA MÓVEL, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 125,000.00 37,500.00 30
+
+322 MCEL - MOÇAMBIQUE CELULAR, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,000,000.00 780,000.00 26
+
+323 HOTEL CARDOSO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 9,363.20 2,411.96 26
+
+324 MEXTUR, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60.00 15.00 25
+
+325 TEXTÁFRICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 300.00 68.10 23
+
+326 AUTO - GÁS, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 40,604.00 8,932.88 22
+
+327 TECNOMECÂNICA, LDA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 130.00 26.00 20
+
+
+
+STEIA 2000 - SOC.TÉCNICA DE EQUIP.IND.E AGRÍCOLA,
+328 S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 24,800.00 4,960.00 20
+
+
+
+329 SOMEC - SOC. MINEIRA DE CUAMBA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 16.00 3.20 20
+
+
+
+SOGERE - FÁBRICA DE REFRIGERANTES DE GAZA, (INAR)
+330 S.A
+
+MOZRE - MOÇAMBIQUE RESSEGUROS, S.A (EX ZIMRE,
+331 S.A)
+
+MOÇAMBIQUE, PREVIDENTE - SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE
+332 FUNDO DE PENSÕES, S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 1,000.00 200.00 20
+
+
+Subsidiary company 33,000.00 6,600.00 20
+
+
+Subsidiary company 24,000.00 4,800.00 20
+
+
+
+333 MÁRMORES DE MONTEPUEZ - MARMONTE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60,000.00 12,000.00 20
+
+334 IFLOMA - INDÚSTRIAS FLORESTAIS DE MANICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 39,062.50 7,812.50 20
+
+335 IBC - INDÚSTRIA DE BORRACHA E CALÇADO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 5,000.00 1,000.00 20
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+HIDROMOC - BEIRA, S.A (EX-HIDROMOC,E.E.DELG. R.
+336 CENTRO )
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 5,801.86 1,160.37 20
+
+
+
+337 GERALCO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 6,500.00 1,300.00 20
+
+338 GEOMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 8,952.00 1,790.40 20
+
+
+
+COMPANHIA MOÇAMBICANA DE HIDROCARBONETOS339 CMH, S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 593,411.50 118,682.30 20
+
+
+
+340 COMPANHIA MOÇAMBICANA DE GASODUTO-CMG, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 70,000.00 14,000.00 20
+
+341 CHÁ NAMAE, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,500.00 300.00 20
+
+342 AUTOVISA - SERVIÇOS AUTO, S.A. (EX-EMOCAT,E.E-U I) SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 12,000.00 2,400.00 20
+
+343 AGRO-ALFA - FUNDIÇÃO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 5,658.00 1,131.60 20
+
+344 MILLENNIUM BIM, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 4,500,000.00 770,400.00 17
+
+345 AÇUCAREIRA DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,506,471.41 225,970.71 15
+
+
+
+CELMOQUE - CABOS DE ENERGIA E
+346 TELECOMUNICAÇOES DE MOÇ., S.A
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 23,500.00 3,480.35 15
+
+
+
+347 AÇUCAREIRA DE XINAVANE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,204,500.00 384,540.00 12
+
+348 CIMENTOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,000,000.00 118,900.00 12
+
+349 MOBEIRA - MOAGEM DA BEIRA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 193,088.00 19,308.80 10
+
+350 CEGRAF - SOCIEDADE GRÁFICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 28,881.38 2,449.14 8
+
+351 CIM - COMPANHIA INDUSTRIAL DA MATOLA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 638,651.58 46,046.78 7
+
+352 GRAPHIC - COMÉRCIO E INDÚSTRIA, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 7,346.02 500.26 7
+
+353 GRUPO MADAL, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 15,286.65 764.33 5
+
+354 COCA - COLA SABCO (MOÇAMBIQUE), S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,286,476.00 64,323.80 5
+
+355 COMPANHIA DE SENA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,134,177.50 156,167.00 5
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company 11,526.00 345.78 3
+
+
+
+356 MOZAL, S.A.
+
+
+
+10 253
+585.00 394,763.02 4
+
+
+
+SOCIEDADE MALONDA, S.A (EX. SOC. DE
+357 DESENVOLVIMENTO MOSÁGRIUS)
+
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+SEE - nonfinancial
+
+
+
+Subsidiary company
+
+
+
+358 NORSAD, SA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 4,809,741.00 144,292.23 3
+
+
+
+**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+Latest update: October 2020
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(value)**
+
+
+
+**State share**
+
+
+
+**(%)**
+
+
+
+**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**Stock**
+
+
+
+359 CERVEJAS DE MOÇAMBIQUE (EX-MAC-MAHON), S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 224,178.03 3,990.37 2
+
+
+
+360 FUNDAÇÃO MALONDA Central administration Nonprofit institutions 25,000.00 25,000.00 100
+Extrabudgetary Units (EBU) - Public institutes (includes hospitals and universities)
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e770b062f240324d82a0befcad8be06218510a0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332b332b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-001", "height": 132, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb3a4c1ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466fce4438d19e1ec383ce6dc67c982d7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "ceb31bba7beb3871ffddecf69aea9ea8658d342e95ac3c91af74fa275abf4fae", "width": 128}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "183a1b1d37392b34", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-002", "height": 233, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b8ee9187c0404f8a10eff365ff162c890078d276efb9ce1a226d11a5d9f2e3c3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "ac3eb7b121cc4b71b1d02518421c39f303e840158efb2a049c27bb33da1c335b", "width": 705}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4e2931254f720786", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-003", "height": 281, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aebb5a4fb4a44febe4ca3496d91b24dad958ac96da24e2f09bc781e5a025ca05", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "f83542fd6b8d1201762bd708b077bf379203219e24364529fbfaf5ac53c68b86", "width": 789}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8e3f4b515973378e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-004", "height": 165, "page": 2, "phash_256": "abff3326f4003c91d2ffc02ecbd483f0cf403c07cd0f0e18cd3dd1f18c362e0f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "04101b7875c6d12728b900cc46305e3ca3c729ff8b631d5a44fe0756d16e4002", "width": 197}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "861bc424d0d87070", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-001", "height": 640, "page": 15, "phash_256": "a4b266f62e70e01ee6b264b324b726f2e6766b50605e3f6264f225d381d5ce25", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "470e8c4a36b4d2b6fa623ba2276fdd3589749765fb953f7fbe0a5195f56cd427", "width": 1093}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-046/assets/figures/cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0e0e000000000000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-002", "height": 872, "page": 15, "phash_256": "e6536653665366538ccc99cc99cc99cc998cc99e6613667366739966996699a4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "sha256_normalized_png": "16fdbeb9676c230c48d3dc96c0e23a8ebd7bdcfc6c6703694b10e2b2f7c72beb", "width": 52}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-046/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c7a87aaaa83d6ddd9f7e9247a86ef1251034e015
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-046/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-046-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/46**\n## **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n\n**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT**\n**STATISTICS MISSION (OCTOBER 19-30, 2020)**\n\n\nThis report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2021.\n\n**Disclaimer:**\nThis report was prepared in 2021 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its\npublication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/46\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT\nSTATISTICS MISSION (OCTOBER 19-30, 2020)\n\nThis report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2021.\n\nDisclaimer:\nThis report was prepared in 2021 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its\npublication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 747}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-046-fig-p0002-004"], "markdown": "\n\n**FEBRUARY**\n\n**2021**\n\n\n\n\n# **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n#### **REPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS** **(OCTOBER 19–30, 2020)**\n\n**Prepared by Djaima Da Costa and Filipe Morais**\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1213, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(129.2099151611328, 6.89990234375, 551.9090576171875, 145.99990844726562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 337, "number": 4, "size": 94810, "transform": [422.6991271972656, 0.0, -0.0, -139.10000610351562, 129.2099151611328, 145.99990844726562], "width": 779, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(255.75, 563.1896362304688, 373.5, 661.4396362304688)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 408, "number": 13, "size": 25524, "transform": [117.74999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 98.24999237060547, 255.75, 563.1896362304688], "width": 424, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(35.999996185302734, 34.64994812011719, 112.56747436523438, 112.99993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 239, "number": 3, "size": 22450, "transform": [76.56747436523438, 0.0, -0.0, 78.34999084472656, 35.999996185302734, 34.64994812011719], "width": 242, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "FEBRUARY\n\n2021\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nREPORT ON PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS (OCTOBER 19–30, 2020)\n\nPrepared by Djaima Da Costa and Filipe Morais", "text_characters": 123}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**CONTENTS**\n\n\n**Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 3**\n\n**SUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 4**\n\n**INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. 7**\n\n**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ 8**\nA. Coordination of the PSDS compilation process ............................................................................................ 12\nB. Institutional Coverage.............................................................................................................................................. 13\nC. Data and respective sources ................................................................................................................................. 15\n\ni. Reconciliation of domestic debt ............................................................................................................. 18\nii. Reconciliation of external debt ............................................................................................................... 21\niii. Reconciliation of central government deposits ................................................................................ 23\nD. PSDS Concepts and Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 26\nE. Compilation of annual and quarterly PSDS 2016-2019 .............................................................................. 27\nF. Resources, training, and technical assistance ................................................................................................. 32\n\n**FIGURES**\n1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique...................................................................... 14\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Priority Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 6\n2. Detailed Recommendations / Plan of Action .................................................................................................... 8\n3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and Respective Sources ...................................................................... 16\n4. 2016-2019 Domestic Debt Reconciliation ....................................................................................................... 20\n5, Differences in External Debt 2016-2019 - Debt vs. IIP Report ................................................................. 22\n6. Detail of Central Government Deposits Reported in the Monetary Survey ....................................... 23\n7. Gross Public Sector Debt Stock by Sub-sector - Preliminary ................................................................... 29\n8. Central Government Gross Debt Stock per holder/instrument - Preliminary .................................... 29\n9. Quarterly Central Government Gross Debt Stock - Preliminary .............................................................. 30\n10. Central Government Net Debt Stock - Preliminary.................................................................................... 31\n\n**APPENDICES**\nI. Senior Staff and Technicians Contacted During the Mission ..................................................................... 34\nII. Protocol for institutional cooperation on government statistics ............................................................ 35\nIII. Institutional Structure of General Government ............................................................................................ 41\nIV. List of public sector entities ................................................................................................................................. 43\n\n\n**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nCONTENTS\n\nGlossary ......................................................................................................................... 3\n\nSUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 4\n\nINTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. 7\n\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ 8\nA. Coordination of the PSDS compilation process ............................................................................................ 12\nB. Institutional Coverage.............................................................................................................................................. 13\nC. Data and respective sources ................................................................................................................................. 15\n\ni. Reconciliation of domestic debt ............................................................................................................. 18\nii. Reconciliation of external debt ............................................................................................................... 21\niii. Reconciliation of central government deposits ................................................................................ 23\nD. PSDS Concepts and Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 26\nE. Compilation of annual and quarterly PSDS 2016-2019 .............................................................................. 27\nF. Resources, training, and technical assistance ................................................................................................. 32\n\nFIGURES\n1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique...................................................................... 14\n\nTABLES\n1. Priority Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 6\n2. Detailed Recommendations / Plan of Action .................................................................................................... 8\n3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and Respective Sources ...................................................................... 16\n4. 2016-2019 Domestic Debt Reconciliation ....................................................................................................... 20\n5, Differences in External Debt 2016-2019 - Debt vs. IIP Report ................................................................. 22\n6. Detail of Central Government Deposits Reported in the Monetary Survey ....................................... 23\n7. Gross Public Sector Debt Stock by Sub-sector - Preliminary ................................................................... 29\n8. Central Government Gross Debt Stock per holder/instrument - Preliminary .................................... 29\n9. Quarterly Central Government Gross Debt Stock - Preliminary .............................................................. 30\n10. Central Government Net Debt Stock - Preliminary.................................................................................... 31\n\nAPPENDICES\nI. Senior Staff and Technicians Contacted During the Mission ..................................................................... 34\nII. Protocol for institutional cooperation on government statistics ............................................................ 35\nIII. Institutional Structure of General Government ............................................................................................ 41\nIV. List of public sector entities ................................................................................................................................. 43\n\n2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 3723}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n##### **Glossary**\n\nAFR African Department of the IMF\nBCG Budgetary Central Government\nBM Bank of Mozambique\nBVM Mozambique Stock Exchange\nCGE Annual Public Financial Report\nCSE Higher Council of Statistics\nD4D Data for Decisions (Multidonor trust fund)\nDNCP National Directorate of Public Accounting\nDNGDP National Directorate of Public Debt Management\nDNPE National Directorate Public Assets\nDNPED National Directorate for Economic and Development Policies\nDNPO National Directorate of Planning and Budget\nDNTCEF National Directorate of Treasury, and Economic and Financial Cooperation\nDSA Debt Sustainability Analysis\ne-SISTAFE State Electronic Financial Management System\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGFS Government Finance Statistics\nGFSCC Government Finance Statistics Compilation Committee\n_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\nGG General Government\nGGR Risk Management Office\nIGEPE State Shareholdings Management Institute\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nINE National Institute of Statistics\nINSS National Social Security Institute\n_PSDSG_ _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A Guide for Compilers and Users 2011_\nQPSDS Quarterly Public Sector Debt Statistics\nSTA Statistics Department of the IMF\nTA Technical assistance\nEBU Extrabudgetary Units\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nGlossary\n\nAFR African Department of the IMF\nBCG Budgetary Central Government\nBM Bank of Mozambique\nBVM Mozambique Stock Exchange\nCGE Annual Public Financial Report\nCSE Higher Council of Statistics\nD4D Data for Decisions (Multidonor trust fund)\nDNCP National Directorate of Public Accounting\nDNGDP National Directorate of Public Debt Management\nDNPE National Directorate Public Assets\nDNPED National Directorate for Economic and Development Policies\nDNPO National Directorate of Planning and Budget\nDNTCEF National Directorate of Treasury, and Economic and Financial Cooperation\nDSA Debt Sustainability Analysis\ne-SISTAFE State Electronic Financial Management System\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nGFS Government Finance Statistics\nGFSCC Government Finance Statistics Compilation Committee\n_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\nGG General Government\nGGR Risk Management Office\nIGEPE State Shareholdings Management Institute\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nINE National Institute of Statistics\nINSS National Social Security Institute\n_PSDSG_ _Public Sector Debt Statistics: A Guide for Compilers and Users 2011_\nQPSDS Quarterly Public Sector Debt Statistics\nSTA Statistics Department of the IMF\nTA Technical assistance\nEBU Extrabudgetary Units\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3", "text_characters": 1135}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n#### **SUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**1.** **Availability of comprehensive and reliable public sector debt data, compiled based**\n**on international definitions and concepts, is essential for informed policy decisions and**\n**cross-country comparability.** In particular, the debt coverage should include all debt instruments\nand, to the extent possible, cover the broader perimeter of government, including debt of public\ncorporations. It is in this context, that the Mozambican authorities requested a technical assistance\n(TA) mission from the IMF Statistics Department (STA) to assist in improving the compilation of\npublic sector debt statistics (PSDS). The mission was conducted remotely during October 19–30,\n2020. It was financed by the Data for Decision Trust Fund (D4D).\n\n**2.** **The mission's main objective was to assist the authorities in strengthening the**\n**compilation and dissemination of PSDS in accordance with the** _**Public sector debt statistics:**_\n_Guide for compilers and users of 2011_ (PSDSG 2011). The mission focused on: (i) identifying data\nsources; (ii) understanding the coordination between public entities in the PSDS compilation\nprocess: (iii) analyzing the sectorization and scope of PSDS; (iv) reconciling the information on the\nnet credit to the Government and the external debt compiled by the Ministry of Economy and\nFinance (MEF) and by the Bank of Mozambique (BM); (v) compiling debt stock for the entire public\nsector; and (vi) encouraging the authorities to enhance debt transparency by disseminating\ncomprehensive public sector debt statistics.\n\n**3.** **The mission noted that the authorities compile a good debt statistic for the**\n**Budgetary Central Government (BCG).** However, there is room for improvement especially in the\nareas of data reconciliation and consistency given the various sources of data, and on application\nof the concepts and definitions established in the _PSDSG 2011_ . For the BCG debt data, the MEF is\ncurrently publishing stock and flow (debt service) of internal and external debt by maturity, by\ninstruments, by type of creditor, by currency. Non-consolidated information on part of the\ncorporate sector's debt is presented in a separate table of the referred publication. The main\nchallenge is to expand and consolidate all the public sector subsectors.\n\n**4.** **The authorities were encouraged to complete the list of public entities as an essential**\n**step towards compiling public sector debt of the broader perimeter of government.** A\ncomplete list of public entities and their respective classification according to the Government\nFinance Statistics Manual 2014 ( _GFSM 2014_ ) has been pending since 2018. The mission noted that\nobtaining basic information on units that are outside the budget is a challenge. In particular it is\ndifficult to obtain debt data from the Extra-Budgetary Units (EBU), the local government\n(municipalities) and the public sector corporations (SOE). The mission encouraged the authorities\nto use the database of the State Holdings Management Institute (IGEPE) as an interim measure\nbecause it contains financial statement of State-Owned enterprises which includes debt data.\n\n**5.** **The mission found that the Ministry of Economy and Finance does not recognize the**\n**issuance of Treasury Bills (BT) used for monetary policy as domestic debt.** The Bank of\n\n\n**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nSUMMARY OF MISSION RESULTS AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n1. Availability of comprehensive and reliable public sector debt data, compiled based\non international definitions and concepts, is essential for informed policy decisions and\ncross-country comparability. In particular, the debt coverage should include all debt instruments\nand, to the extent possible, cover the broader perimeter of government, including debt of public\ncorporations. It is in this context, that the Mozambican authorities requested a technical assistance\n(TA) mission from the IMF Statistics Department (STA) to assist in improving the compilation of\npublic sector debt statistics (PSDS). The mission was conducted remotely during October 19–30,\n2020. It was financed by the Data for Decision Trust Fund (D4D).\n\n2. The mission's main objective was to assist the authorities in strengthening the\ncompilation and dissemination of PSDS in accordance with the _Public sector debt statistics:_\n_Guide for compilers and users of 2011_ (PSDSG 2011). The mission focused on: (i) identifying data\nsources; (ii) understanding the coordination between public entities in the PSDS compilation\nprocess: (iii) analyzing the sectorization and scope of PSDS; (iv) reconciling the information on the\nnet credit to the Government and the external debt compiled by the Ministry of Economy and\nFinance (MEF) and by the Bank of Mozambique (BM); (v) compiling debt stock for the entire public\nsector; and (vi) encouraging the authorities to enhance debt transparency by disseminating\ncomprehensive public sector debt statistics.\n\n3. The mission noted that the authorities compile a good debt statistic for the\nBudgetary Central Government (BCG). However, there is room for improvement especially in the\nareas of data reconciliation and consistency given the various sources of data, and on application\nof the concepts and definitions established in the _PSDSG 2011_ . For the BCG debt data, the MEF is\ncurrently publishing stock and flow (debt service) of internal and external debt by maturity, by\ninstruments, by type of creditor, by currency. Non-consolidated information on part of the\ncorporate sector's debt is presented in a separate table of the referred publication. The main\nchallenge is to expand and consolidate all the public sector subsectors.\n\n4. The authorities were encouraged to complete the list of public entities as an essential\nstep towards compiling public sector debt of the broader perimeter of government. A\ncomplete list of public entities and their respective classification according to the Government\nFinance Statistics Manual 2014 ( _GFSM 2014_ ) has been pending since 2018. The mission noted that\nobtaining basic information on units that are outside the budget is a challenge. In particular it is\ndifficult to obtain debt data from the Extra-Budgetary Units (EBU), the local government\n(municipalities) and the public sector corporations (SOE). The mission encouraged the authorities\nto use the database of the State Holdings Management Institute (IGEPE) as an interim measure\nbecause it contains financial statement of State-Owned enterprises which includes debt data.\n\n5. The mission found that the Ministry of Economy and Finance does not recognize the\nissuance of Treasury Bills (BT) used for monetary policy as domestic debt. The Bank of\n\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2868}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nMozambique (BM) on the other hand, captures all BT issues both for monetary and fiscal purposes,\nbut does not capture domestic debt outside the banking system (including arrears). MEF and the\nBM should agree on how BT should be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts based on\ninternational statistical standards.\n\n**6.** **Regarding external debt, the mission noted that there is a significant difference in**\n**the stock position reported by the MEF and the BM (as shown in the International**\n**Investment Position).** The mission recommended that both MEF and BM establish an appropriate\nmechanism for reconciling public debt both external and domestic debt.\n\n**7.** **Deposit positions differ between the BM and the MEF, mainly due to differences in**\n**BT classification, coverage and the accounting basis.** The variation of government deposits held\nin the BM has been affected by the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits. The\nincrease in the deposits identified in the monetary survey was attributable to the imputation of\ndeposits as a result of the BT issuances, irrespective of whether these were for fiscal or for\nmonetary policy purposes. However, the National Treasury is not aware of the assets imputed to its\ndeposit account when the BM issues BT for monetary policy purposes, so this amount generates a\ndifference in the positions reported by the two institutions. Furthermore, while BM reports on\naccrual basis, MEF reports on cash basis, creating significant differences in the positions reported\nby both institutions. In addition, BM reports General Government deposits position that includes\nSocial security funds and excludes local government which makes difficult to reconciliate with\nCentral Government position reported by MEF.\n\n**8.** **Cooperation between public institutions must be improved. In view of the weak**\n**cooperation between the various compilers of macroeconomic statistics**, the mission\nreiterated the need to establish a Committee responsible for dealing with PSDS and GFS issues\nrelated to obtaining reliable / reconcilable and timely data. This recommendation was included in\nprevious missions.\n\n**9.** **The mission undertook a preliminary debt consolidation exercise using available data**\n**on public sector debt, including the debt of the BCG, the municipalities, the National Social**\n**Security Institute (INSS) and the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s).** Preliminary results indicate\nthat Mozambique's public sector debt in 2018 amounted to around 136 percent of GDP.\nNonfinancial public sector debt, excluding units of general government, amounted to Mt 130.248\nbillion at the end of 2019, an increase of Mt 15.179 billion over the previous year. Mission\nrequested further investigation of the debt position of the SOE, as MEF reports figures for\nPetromoc, one of the most important SOE in the country, that differs significantly than what is\nreported in the company’s financial report. The authorities were encouraged to undertake periodic\nreconciliation and compilation exercises as they progress in implementing of the recommendations\nof the mission.\n\n**10.** **The priority recommendations that a mission transmitted to the authorities are**\n**illustrated in Table 1 below.** The full list of recommendations can be found in the action plan\npresented in the Detailed Technical Evaluation and Recommendations section of this report.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nMozambique (BM) on the other hand, captures all BT issues both for monetary and fiscal purposes,\nbut does not capture domestic debt outside the banking system (including arrears). MEF and the\nBM should agree on how BT should be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts based on\ninternational statistical standards.\n\n6. Regarding external debt, the mission noted that there is a significant difference in\nthe stock position reported by the MEF and the BM (as shown in the International\nInvestment Position). The mission recommended that both MEF and BM establish an appropriate\nmechanism for reconciling public debt both external and domestic debt.\n\n7. Deposit positions differ between the BM and the MEF, mainly due to differences in\nBT classification, coverage and the accounting basis. The variation of government deposits held\nin the BM has been affected by the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits. The\nincrease in the deposits identified in the monetary survey was attributable to the imputation of\ndeposits as a result of the BT issuances, irrespective of whether these were for fiscal or for\nmonetary policy purposes. However, the National Treasury is not aware of the assets imputed to its\ndeposit account when the BM issues BT for monetary policy purposes, so this amount generates a\ndifference in the positions reported by the two institutions. Furthermore, while BM reports on\naccrual basis, MEF reports on cash basis, creating significant differences in the positions reported\nby both institutions. In addition, BM reports General Government deposits position that includes\nSocial security funds and excludes local government which makes difficult to reconciliate with\nCentral Government position reported by MEF.\n\n8. Cooperation between public institutions must be improved. In view of the weak\ncooperation between the various compilers of macroeconomic statistics, the mission\nreiterated the need to establish a Committee responsible for dealing with PSDS and GFS issues\nrelated to obtaining reliable / reconcilable and timely data. This recommendation was included in\nprevious missions.\n\n9. The mission undertook a preliminary debt consolidation exercise using available data\non public sector debt, including the debt of the BCG, the municipalities, the National Social\nSecurity Institute (INSS) and the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s). Preliminary results indicate\nthat Mozambique's public sector debt in 2018 amounted to around 136 percent of GDP.\nNonfinancial public sector debt, excluding units of general government, amounted to Mt 130.248\nbillion at the end of 2019, an increase of Mt 15.179 billion over the previous year. Mission\nrequested further investigation of the debt position of the SOE, as MEF reports figures for\nPetromoc, one of the most important SOE in the country, that differs significantly than what is\nreported in the company’s financial report. The authorities were encouraged to undertake periodic\nreconciliation and compilation exercises as they progress in implementing of the recommendations\nof the mission.\n\n10. The priority recommendations that a mission transmitted to the authorities are\nillustrated in Table 1 below. The full list of recommendations can be found in the action plan\npresented in the Detailed Technical Evaluation and Recommendations section of this report.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5", "text_characters": 2875}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n**Table 1. Priority Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Priority Recommendations|Responsible
Institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2021|**Structure of the Public sector and inventory of public entities.**
(i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the inventory and
classify the entities according to_GFSM 2014_ (BCG, EBU, LG, INSS and
public corporations] for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic
statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial statistics, external, and the
real sector); and (iii) ratify and publish the structure and the inventory
on the websites of MEF, BM and INE.
|MEF, BM and
INE
|\n|April 2021|
**Collect the missing data to complete PSDS compilation**. (i) Collect
EBU debt data; (ii) Collect debt of the municipalities and reconcile
with BM; (iii) Confirm that the social security debt collected during
the mission is complete; (iv) Ensure that debt position for SOE’s is
the most comprehensive to the extent possible.
|BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|\n|April 2021|
**Domestic public debt.** (i) Collect treasury bonds data by the
residency of the investors; (ii) Finalize the reconciliation work started
during the mission and document the results.
|BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|\n|April 2021|
**Treasury Bills (BT).** MEF and the BM should agree on how BT should
be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts based on
international statistical standards.
|
BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|\n|April 2021|
**External public debt**. (i) Finalize the reconciliation work between the
MEF position and the International Investment Position (IIP) reported
by the BM, started during the mission and document the results.
|
BM, DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF
|\n|December
2020|
**Deposits.** (i) finalize the reconciliation work initiated during the
mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to provide Central
Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG and EBU; (iii) the
BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring consistency
with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports; (iv) the BM
to publish information on government deposits with the separation
by subsector of public administrations; (v) adjust inflows resulting
from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits
according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for
fiscal and monetary purpose; (vi) The BM and MEF to implement a
formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including
explanations of all the differences identified.
|
BM
e
MEF
(DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF)
|\n|Immediately|
**Debt of Public Corporations.** (i) Petromoc: the source of
discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt
report and the loan amounts present in the company's report and
accounts; (ii) The same reconciliation work should be extended to
other SOE, in order to assess the existence of similar situations in
other corporations.
|IGEPE / MEF|\n|December
2020
|
**BCG annual and quarterly debt statistics.** Start publishing these
statistics on the website of the MEF and in the joint World Bank and
IMF database.|DNGDP|\n\n\n\n**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [81.21600341796875, 99.17999267578125, 539.7839965820312, 704.4600219726562], "columns": 3, "rows": 9}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTable 1. Priority Recommendations\n\n Deadline Priority Recommendations Responsible Institution \n\n April 2021 Structure of the Public sector and inventory of public entities. (i) validate the sector’s structure; (ii) complete the inventory and classify the entities according to_GFSM 2014_ (BCG, EBU, LG, INSS and public corporations] for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial statistics, external, and the real sector); and (iii) ratify and publish the structure and the inventory on the websites of MEF, BM and INE. MEF, BM and INE \n April 2021 Collect the missing data to complete PSDS compilation. (i) Collect EBU debt data; (ii) Collect debt of the municipalities and reconcile with BM; (iii) Confirm that the social security debt collected during the mission is complete; (iv) Ensure that debt position for SOE’s is the most comprehensive to the extent possible. BM, DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF \n April 2021 Domestic public debt. (i) Collect treasury bonds data by the residency of the investors; (ii) Finalize the reconciliation work started during the mission and document the results. BM, DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF \n April 2021 Treasury Bills (BT). MEF and the BM should agree on how BT should be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts based on international statistical standards. BM, DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF \n April 2021 External public debt. (i) Finalize the reconciliation work between the MEF position and the International Investment Position (IIP) reported by the BM, started during the mission and document the results. BM, DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF \n December 2020 Deposits. (i) finalize the reconciliation work initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports; (iv) the BM to publish information on government deposits with the separation by subsector of public administrations; (v) adjust inflows resulting from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for fiscal and monetary purpose; (vi) The BM and MEF to implement a formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including explanations of all the differences identified. BM e MEF (DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF) \n Immediately Debt of Public Corporations. (i) Petromoc: the source of discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt report and the loan amounts present in the company's report and accounts; (ii) The same reconciliation work should be extended to other SOE, in order to assess the existence of similar situations in other corporations. IGEPE / MEF \n December 2020 BCG annual and quarterly debt statistics. Start publishing these statistics on the website of the MEF and in the joint World Bank and IMF database. DNGDP \n\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2542}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n**1.** **Mozambique’s public debt is described as being in distress but sustainable for**\n**surveillance on a forward-looking basis.** According to the country’s 2019 Article IV Consultation\nreport, at the end of 2018, the total stock of public and publicly guaranteed debt reached about\n110.5 percent of GDP and the stock of arrears on public and publicly guaranteed external debt\nreached about US$1.2 billion at end-2018. The key current policy recommendations of the African\nDepartment (AFR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) include debt restructuring and\ndefinition of a strategy for reducing the potential for a public debt crisis. [1]\n\n**2.** **A TA mission on PSDS to the Republic of Mozambique took place remotely from**\n**19 to 30 October 2020,** in the context of module 1 of the D4D fund on fiscal data. This aims to\nprovide decision-makers with more and better-quality data to support the achievement of the\nSustainable Development Goals. It also aims to strengthen state-of-the-art national statistical\nsystems, in a more challenging domestic and international political environment, to promote\ntransparency and accountability, and provide efficient solutions for skills development.\n\n**3.** **The mission’s main objective was to assist the Mozambican authorities** in the\ncompilation of PSDS in accordance with the _PSDSG_ guidelines, to ensure that the concepts and\ndefinitions, coverage, scope, and classification of the data compiled and disseminated are\nadequate for decision making; and also for the purpose of IMF surveillance in the framework of the\nArticle IV Consultations, in particular within the debt sustainability analysis (DSA). In consultation\nwith AFR, the mission stressed the need to focus on the following: (i) expansion of the coverage of\ndebt data; (ii) timely data compilation; (iii) reconciliation between data on stocks and flows of net\nand gross debt; and (iv) loan transactions and the monitoring of local government and state\nenterprise sector (SEE) debt; as well as reconciliation of government deposits, which are the\ngovernment’s main financial asset.\n\n**4.** **Concern regarding the PSDS among the Mozambican authorities.** In the work plan\nprepared by the Mozambican authorities during the GFS and PSDS workshop held in Lisbon in\nApril 2019, attended thirty participants from five Portuguese-speaking African low- and\nmiddle-income-countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and\nPríncipe), along with Timor Leste, the Mozambique authorities identified the following as their\nmain areas of concern: (i) the coverage of debt instruments, particularly in the case of other\naccounts payable and arrears; (ii) entity sectorization; and (iii) inconsistencies between the fiscal\nand public debt statistics.\n\n**5.** **In this context, the mission’s main tasks were to:** (i) conduct an analysis of the\nsectorization and coverage of the PSDS; (ii) identify data sources and gain an understanding of\n\n\n1 Republic of Mozambique: Technical Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nINTRODUCTION\n\n1. Mozambique’s public debt is described as being in distress but sustainable for\nsurveillance on a forward-looking basis. According to the country’s 2019 Article IV Consultation\nreport, at the end of 2018, the total stock of public and publicly guaranteed debt reached about\n110.5 percent of GDP and the stock of arrears on public and publicly guaranteed external debt\nreached about US$1.2 billion at end-2018. The key current policy recommendations of the African\nDepartment (AFR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) include debt restructuring and\ndefinition of a strategy for reducing the potential for a public debt crisis. [1]\n\n2. A TA mission on PSDS to the Republic of Mozambique took place remotely from\n19 to 30 October 2020, in the context of module 1 of the D4D fund on fiscal data. This aims to\nprovide decision-makers with more and better-quality data to support the achievement of the\nSustainable Development Goals. It also aims to strengthen state-of-the-art national statistical\nsystems, in a more challenging domestic and international political environment, to promote\ntransparency and accountability, and provide efficient solutions for skills development.\n\n3. The mission’s main objective was to assist the Mozambican authorities in the\ncompilation of PSDS in accordance with the _PSDSG_ guidelines, to ensure that the concepts and\ndefinitions, coverage, scope, and classification of the data compiled and disseminated are\nadequate for decision making; and also for the purpose of IMF surveillance in the framework of the\nArticle IV Consultations, in particular within the debt sustainability analysis (DSA). In consultation\nwith AFR, the mission stressed the need to focus on the following: (i) expansion of the coverage of\ndebt data; (ii) timely data compilation; (iii) reconciliation between data on stocks and flows of net\nand gross debt; and (iv) loan transactions and the monitoring of local government and state\nenterprise sector (SEE) debt; as well as reconciliation of government deposits, which are the\ngovernment’s main financial asset.\n\n4. Concern regarding the PSDS among the Mozambican authorities. In the work plan\nprepared by the Mozambican authorities during the GFS and PSDS workshop held in Lisbon in\nApril 2019, attended thirty participants from five Portuguese-speaking African low- and\nmiddle-income-countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and\nPríncipe), along with Timor Leste, the Mozambique authorities identified the following as their\nmain areas of concern: (i) the coverage of debt instruments, particularly in the case of other\naccounts payable and arrears; (ii) entity sectorization; and (iii) inconsistencies between the fiscal\nand public debt statistics.\n\n5. In this context, the mission’s main tasks were to: (i) conduct an analysis of the\nsectorization and coverage of the PSDS; (ii) identify data sources and gain an understanding of\n\n1 Republic of Mozambique: Technical Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7", "text_characters": 2607}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nhow public entities coordinate in the process of compiling statistics; (iii) compile the PSDS tables\nfor the last three years; (iv) monitor the reconciliation of central government budget deposits\nbetween the MEF and the BM, with a view to identifying the real stock of deposits and their\ndistribution between those that are freely available to finance the deficit and frozen deposits\n( _depósitos caucionados_ ) or other deposits that are not available; (v) provide support to the process\nof consolidating public-sector-wide debt statistics; (vi) support the regular PSDS publication work;\n(vii) identify and discuss areas for improvements and document the nature of the statistics\ncompiled, including potential shortcomings in source data (expansion of coverage and more\nfrequent dissemination of statistics).\n\n**6.** **Following the executive summary and this introduction, the report describes the**\n**main issues addressed and the recommendations made by the mission,** including the main\nconcerns about coordination of the PSDS compilation process; the sectorization and institutional\nscope, concepts, and definitions of the PSDS; the data and their sources; the compilation process\nand consistency analysis; as well as resource issues that impact the PSDS compilation exercise. The\nlist of civil servants who worked with the mission is provided at the end of the report, followed by\nadditional information reported in appendices.\n\n**7.** **The mission thanks the authorities**, in particular Enilde Sarmento, Ester José, Chamila Aly,\nand Domingos Fumo, and their respective teams, for facilitating the work of this mission. The\nmission also thanks the staff of the IMF Office in Mozambique, in particular Esther Palacio, IMF\nTechnical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator in Mozambique, for the technical support provided\nto this mission.\n\n#### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**8.** **The following table sets out the actions to be implemented by the authorities in the**\n**next two years.** It includes the complete list of all the recommendations made by the mission.\n\n**Table 2. Detailed Recommendations / Plan of Action**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|**1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS**
|\n|H|1.1
**Government Finance Statistics Compilation Committee**
**(GFSCC) or macroeconomic statistics group within the Higher**
**Council of Statistics (CSE).**Establish a committee or group within the
CSE, governed by a cooperation protocol signed by the members,|DNPED,
DNGDP,
DNCP,
DNPO,|April 2021|\n\n\n**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [53.940372467041016, 583.1513671875, 571.6199951171875, 719.6876220703125], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nhow public entities coordinate in the process of compiling statistics; (iii) compile the PSDS tables\nfor the last three years; (iv) monitor the reconciliation of central government budget deposits\nbetween the MEF and the BM, with a view to identifying the real stock of deposits and their\ndistribution between those that are freely available to finance the deficit and frozen deposits\n( _depósitos caucionados_ ) or other deposits that are not available; (v) provide support to the process\nof consolidating public-sector-wide debt statistics; (vi) support the regular PSDS publication work;\n(vii) identify and discuss areas for improvements and document the nature of the statistics\ncompiled, including potential shortcomings in source data (expansion of coverage and more\nfrequent dissemination of statistics).\n\n6. Following the executive summary and this introduction, the report describes the\nmain issues addressed and the recommendations made by the mission, including the main\nconcerns about coordination of the PSDS compilation process; the sectorization and institutional\nscope, concepts, and definitions of the PSDS; the data and their sources; the compilation process\nand consistency analysis; as well as resource issues that impact the PSDS compilation exercise. The\nlist of civil servants who worked with the mission is provided at the end of the report, followed by\nadditional information reported in appendices.\n\n7. The mission thanks the authorities, in particular Enilde Sarmento, Ester José, Chamila Aly,\nand Domingos Fumo, and their respective teams, for facilitating the work of this mission. The\nmission also thanks the staff of the IMF Office in Mozambique, in particular Esther Palacio, IMF\nTechnical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator in Mozambique, for the technical support provided\nto this mission.\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n8. The following table sets out the actions to be implemented by the authorities in the\nnext two years. It includes the complete list of all the recommendations made by the mission.\n\nTable 2. Detailed Recommendations / Plan of Action\n\n Priority Action Responsible institution Expected completion date \n\n 1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS 1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS 1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS 1. COORDINATION OF THE PSDS COMPILATION PROCESS \n H 1.1 Government Finance Statistics Compilation Committee (GFSCC) or macroeconomic statistics group within the Higher Council of Statistics (CSE).Establish a committee or group within the CSE, governed by a cooperation protocol signed by the members, DNPED, DNGDP, DNCP, DNPO, April 2021 \n\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2304}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n||specifying its objectives, the members’ responsibilities, and the
information to be shared.|DNTCEF,
GGR,
BM
and INSS*||\n|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|
**2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE**
|\n|H|**2.1 Public sector structure and list of entities belonging to the**
**sector**. Complete the inventory and classify the entities according to
_GFSM 2014_[BCG, EBU, local government (LG), SSF and public
companies].
|MEF, BM and
INE|April 2021|\n|M|
**2.2 Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging**
**to the sector**. _(_i) Validate the structure of the sector; (ii) Ratify the list
of entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics
(fiscal, monetary and financial, external, and real sector statistics);
(iii) Evaluate the classification of public companies and EBU,
considering the market test; and this should be performed regularly
and, on an entity, -by-entity basis.
|MEF, BM and
INE|August 2021|\n|L|
**2.3 Public sector structure and list of entities belonging to the**
**sector classified according to****_GFSM 2014_**. Publish a unified and
structured list of the sector of each institutional unit on the MEP, BM
and INE websites.|MEF, BM and
INE|December 2021|\n|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|
**3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES**
|\n|
H
|**3.1 Reconciliation of the domestic debt.**(i) Complete the
reconciliation work started during the mission and document the
final result; (ii) Implement a formal regular reconciliation process for
flows and stocks (by instrument, face and nominal value, and
creditor); (iii) Prepare a report on the reconciliation results, including
explanations of all differences identified in the BM data (net lending
to the government) and DNGDP (detailed debt charts), for
institutional memory purposes.
|BM and MEF
(DNGDP,
DNTCEF and
DNPED)
|April 2021|\n|H|
**3.2 Treasury Bills.**Reconciliation of the total treasury bills debt to
be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts - preparation of a
methodological analysis on the statistical treatment of BTs issued for
government financing purposes.|MEF
(DNGDP and
DNTCEF)
and BM|April 2021|\n\n\n\n\n*** Note:**\n\nDNPED – National Directorate for Economic and Development Policies;\n\nDNGDP – National Directorate of Public Debt Management;\n\nDNCP – National Directorate of Public Accounting;\n\nDNPO – National Directorate of Planning and Budgeting;\n\nDNTCEF – National Directorate of Treasury and Economic and Financial Cooperation;\n\nGGR – Risk Management Office.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [53.97644805908203, 72.1919937133789, 571.583984375, 573.2879638671875], "columns": 4, "rows": 9}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institution Expected completion date \n\n specifying its objectives, the members’ responsibilities, and the information to be shared. DNTCEF, GGR, BM and INSS* \n 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 2. INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE - PUBLIC SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE \n H 2.1 Public sector structure and list of entities belonging to the sector. Complete the inventory and classify the entities according to _GFSM 2014_[BCG, EBU, local government (LG), SSF and public companies]. MEF, BM and INE April 2021 \n M 2.2 Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to the sector. _(_i) Validate the structure of the sector; (ii) Ratify the list of entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial, external, and real sector statistics); (iii) Evaluate the classification of public companies and EBU, considering the market test; and this should be performed regularly and, on an entity, -by-entity basis. MEF, BM and INE August 2021 \n L 2.3 Public sector structure and list of entities belonging to the sector classified according to_GFSM 2014_. Publish a unified and structured list of the sector of each institutional unit on the MEP, BM and INE websites. MEF, BM and INE December 2021 \n 3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES 3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES 3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES 3. DATA AND ITS SOURCES \n H 3.1 Reconciliation of the domestic debt.(i) Complete the reconciliation work started during the mission and document the final result; (ii) Implement a formal regular reconciliation process for flows and stocks (by instrument, face and nominal value, and creditor); (iii) Prepare a report on the reconciliation results, including explanations of all differences identified in the BM data (net lending to the government) and DNGDP (detailed debt charts), for institutional memory purposes. BM and MEF (DNGDP, DNTCEF and DNPED) April 2021 \n H 3.2 Treasury Bills.Reconciliation of the total treasury bills debt to be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts - preparation of a methodological analysis on the statistical treatment of BTs issued for government financing purposes. MEF (DNGDP and DNTCEF) and BM April 2021 \n\n* Note:\n\nDNPED – National Directorate for Economic and Development Policies;\n\nDNGDP – National Directorate of Public Debt Management;\n\nDNCP – National Directorate of Public Accounting;\n\nDNPO – National Directorate of Planning and Budgeting;\n\nDNTCEF – National Directorate of Treasury and Economic and Financial Cooperation;\n\nGGR – Risk Management Office.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9", "text_characters": 2287}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|M|**3.3 Debt securities.** Present a total breakdown of Treasury securities:
(i) details of treasury bills issues and (ii) details of treasury bonds.
|BM|April 2021|\n|M|
**3.4 Treasury Bonds.**The MEF should regularly request data on debt
held in OTs, issued through the stock exchange (_Bolsa de Valores de_
_Moçambique_–BVM), by holding sector, identifying the portion of
treasury bonds held by each of the resident sectors (individuals,
nonfinancial corporations, BM, and other financial institutions) and
the nonresident sector. The MEF should also indicate how the debt is
valued and clarify whether the data is currently reported at face value
or market value.
|MEF
and
BVM|April 2021|\n|M|
**3.5 Commercial bank loans.**Provide details of total loans from
commercial banks.
|BM|April 2021|\n|H|
**3.6**
**International**
**Investment**
**Position**
**(IIP)**
**of**
**general**
**government).**Complete the reconciliation of the external debt
position between the MEF and the BM: (i) external loans; (ii) debt
securities and possible differences in the treatment of the MOZAM
2032 bond; (iii) the treatment of other liabilities included in the IIP but
not included in external debt reported by the MEF. The result of this
work should be recorded in a methodological note for future use;
(iv) the BM should now report the total debt of each of Mozambique’s
public-sector subsectors: GG = BCG+EBU+INSS+LG. and also the SEE.
|
MEF and BM|April 2021|\n|M|
**3.7 Debt of EBU.**Launch a process of systematized collection of the
debt of these entities, since they may be playing a significant role in
central government debt.
|MEF|April 2021|\n|M|
**3.8 INSS debt.**Request INSS debt data on a regular basis and
compare it with the position reported in the financial reports, and also
with the position reported by the BM.
|MEF
and
INSS|April 2021|\n|M|
**3.9 Local government debt.**Collect and compile the information on
a regular basis.
|MEF
|April 2021|\n|M|
**3.10 Debt of the Financial and nonfinancial public sector**
**corporations.**Collect and compile the information on a regular basis.
|MEF
and
IGEPE
|April 2021|\n|H|
**3.11 Reconciliation of deposits.**(i) finalize the reconciliation work
initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to
provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG
and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring
consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports;
(iv) The authorities should also ratify the classification of the INSS in
the Social Security Funds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced
accordingly; (v) the BM to publish information on government
deposits with the separation by subsector of public administrations;
(vi) ) adjust inflows resulting from the issuance of BT channeled into
government deposits according to the decision on the statistical
treatment of BT issued for fiscal and monetary purpose; (vii) The BM|
BM e MEF
(DNGDP,
DNPED and
DNTCEF)
|Immediately|\n\n\n\n**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [53.978633880615234, 72.1919937133789, 571.581787109375, 707.4476318359375], "columns": 4, "rows": 10}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institution Expected completion date \n\n M 3.3 Debt securities. Present a total breakdown of Treasury securities: (i) details of treasury bills issues and (ii) details of treasury bonds. BM April 2021 \n M 3.4 Treasury Bonds.The MEF should regularly request data on debt held in OTs, issued through the stock exchange (_Bolsa de Valores de_ _Moçambique_–BVM), by holding sector, identifying the portion of treasury bonds held by each of the resident sectors (individuals, nonfinancial corporations, BM, and other financial institutions) and the nonresident sector. The MEF should also indicate how the debt is valued and clarify whether the data is currently reported at face value or market value. MEF and BVM April 2021 \n M 3.5 Commercial bank loans.Provide details of total loans from commercial banks. BM April 2021 \n H 3.6 International Investment Position (IIP) of general government).Complete the reconciliation of the external debt position between the MEF and the BM: (i) external loans; (ii) debt securities and possible differences in the treatment of the MOZAM 2032 bond; (iii) the treatment of other liabilities included in the IIP but not included in external debt reported by the MEF. The result of this work should be recorded in a methodological note for future use; (iv) the BM should now report the total debt of each of Mozambique’s public-sector subsectors: GG = BCG+EBU+INSS+LG. and also the SEE. MEF and BM April 2021 \n M 3.7 Debt of EBU.Launch a process of systematized collection of the debt of these entities, since they may be playing a significant role in central government debt. MEF April 2021 \n M 3.8 INSS debt.Request INSS debt data on a regular basis and compare it with the position reported in the financial reports, and also with the position reported by the BM. MEF and INSS April 2021 \n M 3.9 Local government debt.Collect and compile the information on a regular basis. MEF April 2021 \n M 3.10 Debt of the Financial and nonfinancial public sector corporations.Collect and compile the information on a regular basis. MEF and IGEPE April 2021 \n H 3.11 Reconciliation of deposits.(i) finalize the reconciliation work initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports; (iv) The authorities should also ratify the classification of the INSS in the Social Security Funds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced accordingly; (v) the BM to publish information on government deposits with the separation by subsector of public administrations; (vi) ) adjust inflows resulting from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for fiscal and monetary purpose; (vii) The BM BM e MEF (DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF) Immediately \n\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2541}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n||and MEF to implement a formal process of reconciling flows and stock
regularly, including explanations of all the differences identified.|||\n|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|
**4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS**
|\n|L|**_4.1 GFS and PSDS Manual for Mozambique_**_. _Document the annual
and quarterly GFS compilation process for institutional memory
purposes and to ensure the consistency of the process, including
concepts and definitions used in the PSDS compilation process.|DNPED and
DNGDP|December 2021|\n|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|
**5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019**
|\n|H|**5.1 PSDS of Mozambique for the years 2016-2019 compiled**
**during the mission.**(i) validate and complete the missing
information, namely at the subsector level of the public sector;
(ii) extend the exercise to other years; (iii) publish in the joint World
Bank/IMF database, as well as on the MEF website_._
|DNGDP|April 2021|\n|H|
**5.2 Quarterly PSDS of Mozambique compiled during the**
**mission.**(i) validate the dada compiled during the mission;
(ii) extend the exercise to other years; and (iii) publish in the joint
World Bank and IMF database and on the MEF website_._
|DNGDP|December 2020|\n|M|
**5.3 Budgetary central government debt.**Present information
systematically by instrument and counterpart sector, and in a time
series format, to make it easier to transpose the compiled data into
the IMF reporting templates_._
|MEF|December 2021|\n|H|
**5.4 Debt of public companies.** (i) Petromoc: the source of
discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt
report and the values recorded in the company’s financial report
should be clarified by the IGEPE; (ii) the same reconciliation work
should be extended to other companies, to see whether identical
situations exist.
|IGEPE
and
MEF|Immediately|\n|M|
**5.5 Coverage of instruments in the PSDS.**Extend the instrument
coverage of the PSDS to cover most of the instruments listed in the
IMF’s PSDS compilation guide (loans, debt securities, SDRs, cash and
deposits, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes,
and other accounts payable).
|MEF|December 2021|\n|M
|
**5.6 Financial assets.** The Mozambican authorities should start to
compile the financial assets of the general public sector, with a view
to compiling public debt net of financial assets (net debt).
|MEF|December 2021|\n|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|
**6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**
|\n|
M|
6.1**_Training of technical staff_**_. _Provide staff training by having
them participate in the various GFS and PSDS courses sponsored by
the IMF.
|DNPED and
DNGDP|Continuous|\n|L|
6.2**_Development of the new debt system._**(i) Make sure the new
system allows for automated management of the domestic debt;
(ii) Facilitates the management of debt data and automated creation|DNGDP|December 2022|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [53.98446273803711, 72.1919937133789, 571.5759887695312, 712.0079956054688], "columns": 4, "rows": 14}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institution Expected completion date \n\n and MEF to implement a formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including explanations of all the differences identified. \n 4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 4. PSDS CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS \n L _4.1 GFS and PSDS Manual for Mozambique__. _Document the annual and quarterly GFS compilation process for institutional memory purposes and to ensure the consistency of the process, including concepts and definitions used in the PSDS compilation process. DNPED and DNGDP December 2021 \n 5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019 5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019 5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019 5. COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY PSDS 2016-2019 \n H 5.1 PSDS of Mozambique for the years 2016-2019 compiled during the mission.(i) validate and complete the missing information, namely at the subsector level of the public sector; (ii) extend the exercise to other years; (iii) publish in the joint World Bank/IMF database, as well as on the MEF website_._ DNGDP April 2021 \n H 5.2 Quarterly PSDS of Mozambique compiled during the mission.(i) validate the dada compiled during the mission; (ii) extend the exercise to other years; and (iii) publish in the joint World Bank and IMF database and on the MEF website_._ DNGDP December 2020 \n M 5.3 Budgetary central government debt.Present information systematically by instrument and counterpart sector, and in a time series format, to make it easier to transpose the compiled data into the IMF reporting templates_._ MEF December 2021 \n H 5.4 Debt of public companies. (i) Petromoc: the source of discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt report and the values recorded in the company’s financial report should be clarified by the IGEPE; (ii) the same reconciliation work should be extended to other companies, to see whether identical situations exist. IGEPE and MEF Immediately \n M 5.5 Coverage of instruments in the PSDS.Extend the instrument coverage of the PSDS to cover most of the instruments listed in the IMF’s PSDS compilation guide (loans, debt securities, SDRs, cash and deposits, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable). MEF December 2021 \n M 5.6 Financial assets. The Mozambican authorities should start to compile the financial assets of the general public sector, with a view to compiling public debt net of financial assets (net debt). MEF December 2021 \n 6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 6. RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE \n M 6.1_Training of technical staff__. _Provide staff training by having them participate in the various GFS and PSDS courses sponsored by the IMF. DNPED and DNGDP Continuous \n L 6.2_Development of the new debt system._(i) Make sure the new system allows for automated management of the domestic debt; (ii) Facilitates the management of debt data and automated creation DNGDP December 2022 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11", "text_characters": 2710}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n|Priority|Action|Responsible
institution|Expected
completion
date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n||of PSDS tables; (iii) Inter linkages of the domestic and external debt
management systems with e-SISTAFE.
|||\n|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|
**Legend:**High = H, Medium = M, Low = L
|\n\n\n\n**A. Coordination of the PSDS Compilation Process**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**9.** **The DNGDP is responsible for the compiling the PSDS.** Given that PSDS and GFS data\noverlap, the mission believes it is crucial for the DNGDP to collaborate closely with the DNPED,\nwhich is responsible for compiling the GFS, to ensure that the information below the line in the\nfiscal map reflects the amounts reported as flows in the PSDS. The same applies to the stock data\nused in the Balance Sheet.\n\n**10.** **Cooperation between public institutions needs to be improved.** As in previous\nmissions, this mission noted that one of the main problems in compiling statistics in general in\nMozambique is the lack of reconciliation of statistical data between different public institutions.\nAccordingly, this mission reiterates the need to set up a committee—GFSCC, headed by the DNPED\n—to facilitate the PSDS and GFS compilation process.\n\n**11.** **The mission prepared and provided the authorities with a cooperation protocol**\n**proposal that could be established for this GFSCC.** The protocol defines the structure of the\ncommittee, the entities that will be part of it (DNPED, DNGDP, DNCP, DNPO, DNTCEF, GGR and\nBM), their respective responsibilities, and the data to be shared. The proposed protocol is included\nin Appendix II of this report.\n\n**12.** **A macroeconomic statistics group exists in the CSE.** Since the GFS is a subsystem of the\nSystem of National Accounts, another alternative would be to create a macroeconomic statistics\ngroup in the CSE, a structure that already exists in Mozambique, with the same structure and\nobjectives as suggested for the GFSCC. It should be noted that currently the DNPED shares the\ndetails of GFS with the INE as an input to the national accounts; so this would serve as a forum _par_\n_excellence_ for discussing the four macroeconomic sectors, and thus ensure the consistency of the\ncountry’s data.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|April
2021|**GFSCC or macroeconomic statistics group in the CSE.**Set up
a committee or group in the CSE, governed by a cooperation
protocol signed by the members, specifying its objectives, its
members’ responsibilities, and the data to be shared.|DNPED,
DNGDP,
DNCP,
DNPO,
DNTCEF, GGR, BM and
INSS
|\n\n\n\n**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [53.940372467041016, 72.1919937133789, 571.6199951171875, 170.69961547851562], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}, {"bbox": [81.16000366210938, 601.3800048828125, 539.8400268554688, 711.0596313476562], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Priority Action Responsible institution Expected completion date \n\n of PSDS tables; (iii) Inter linkages of the domestic and external debt management systems with e-SISTAFE. \n Legend:High = H, Medium = M, Low = L Legend:High = H, Medium = M, Low = L Legend:High = H, Medium = M, Low = L Legend:High = H, Medium = M, Low = L \n\nA. Coordination of the PSDS Compilation Process\n\n9. The DNGDP is responsible for the compiling the PSDS. Given that PSDS and GFS data\noverlap, the mission believes it is crucial for the DNGDP to collaborate closely with the DNPED,\nwhich is responsible for compiling the GFS, to ensure that the information below the line in the\nfiscal map reflects the amounts reported as flows in the PSDS. The same applies to the stock data\nused in the Balance Sheet.\n\n10. Cooperation between public institutions needs to be improved. As in previous\nmissions, this mission noted that one of the main problems in compiling statistics in general in\nMozambique is the lack of reconciliation of statistical data between different public institutions.\nAccordingly, this mission reiterates the need to set up a committee—GFSCC, headed by the DNPED\n—to facilitate the PSDS and GFS compilation process.\n\n11. The mission prepared and provided the authorities with a cooperation protocol\nproposal that could be established for this GFSCC. The protocol defines the structure of the\ncommittee, the entities that will be part of it (DNPED, DNGDP, DNCP, DNPO, DNTCEF, GGR and\nBM), their respective responsibilities, and the data to be shared. The proposed protocol is included\nin Appendix II of this report.\n\n12. A macroeconomic statistics group exists in the CSE. Since the GFS is a subsystem of the\nSystem of National Accounts, another alternative would be to create a macroeconomic statistics\ngroup in the CSE, a structure that already exists in Mozambique, with the same structure and\nobjectives as suggested for the GFSCC. It should be noted that currently the DNPED shares the\ndetails of GFS with the INE as an input to the national accounts; so this would serve as a forum _par_\n_excellence_ for discussing the four macroeconomic sectors, and thus ensure the consistency of the\ncountry’s data.\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n April 2021 GFSCC or macroeconomic statistics group in the CSE.Set up a committee or group in the CSE, governed by a cooperation protocol signed by the members, specifying its objectives, its members’ responsibilities, and the data to be shared. DNPED, DNGDP, DNCP, DNPO, DNTCEF, GGR, BM and INSS \n\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2162}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**B. Institutional Coverage**\n\n**13.** **The General government (GG) in Mozambique consists of central government, local**\n**government, and social security.** According to the information obtained, central administration is\npart of the central government and consists of 20 ministries, 11 executive management units,\nwhich oversee about 100 beneficiary management units, and Extrabudgetary Units (EBU). Local\nadministration encompasses 11 provinces, 10 districts and 53 municipalities. There are also 93\nentities belonging to the central and local government sector, that encompass the Mozambique’s\nautonomous services and funds (80 public institutes and 12 public funds) and nonprofit\ninstitutions, including the Malonda Foundation, among others. Social security consists exclusively\nof the National Social Security Institute (INSS).\n\n**14.** **Mozambique’s financial public enterprise sector,** comprising the BM, two commercial\nbanks and an insurance company; and the nonfinancial public enterprise sector comprises of public\nenterprises and affiliated companies.\n\n**15.** **The mission sought to obtain information on developments that have occurred in the**\n**public sector structure in Mozambique over the past three years.** Following the work done by\nthe 2018 GFS technical assistance mission, this mission sought to inform the authorities of the\nneed, firstly, to regularly update the list of public sector entities and, secondly, to classify public\nentities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics. The mission discussed in a general\nway, how the process is done in Portugal, and also presented examples of tables, published in\nPortugal (see, for example, the lists of entities published by the Bank of Portugal at\n[https://www.bportugal.pt/page/lista-de-entidades-para-fins-estatisticos?mlid=821). The most](https://www.bportugal.pt/page/lista-de-entidades-para-fins-estatisticos?mlid=821)\nup-to-date public sector structure, according to the information provided by the Mozambican\nauthorities, is shown in Figure 1 below. The most up-to-date institutional structure and preliminary\nlisting of public entities are presented, respectively, in Appendix III - Institutional Structure of\nGeneral Government and in Appendix IV - List of Public Sector Entities of this report.\n\n**16.** **The GG does not include nonmarket public enterprises.** An analysis of all SEE entities\nwas requested to the Mozambican authorities, for the purpose of evaluating their role as market\nproducers. There seems to be evidence of public companies that have accumulated negative equity\nvalues over several years, which is a relevant indicator when conducting the market test. The\nmarket test should be carried out regularly, on an entity by entity basis.\n\n**17.** **Periodic updating of the list of public sector entities is of the utmost importance.** The\nauthorities have been asked to compile an exhaustive list of entities belonging to the public sector,\nincluding the state enterprise sector, as presented in Appendix IV. This list should form the basis\nfor a better identification of entities within the GFS and PSDS compilation; and it should also be\nused by the other entities that produce statistics in Mozambique, namely the BM and the INSS, to\nensure harmonization of the sectoral classification of the statistics produced.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nB. Institutional Coverage\n\n13. The General government (GG) in Mozambique consists of central government, local\ngovernment, and social security. According to the information obtained, central administration is\npart of the central government and consists of 20 ministries, 11 executive management units,\nwhich oversee about 100 beneficiary management units, and Extrabudgetary Units (EBU). Local\nadministration encompasses 11 provinces, 10 districts and 53 municipalities. There are also 93\nentities belonging to the central and local government sector, that encompass the Mozambique’s\nautonomous services and funds (80 public institutes and 12 public funds) and nonprofit\ninstitutions, including the Malonda Foundation, among others. Social security consists exclusively\nof the National Social Security Institute (INSS).\n\n14. Mozambique’s financial public enterprise sector, comprising the BM, two commercial\nbanks and an insurance company; and the nonfinancial public enterprise sector comprises of public\nenterprises and affiliated companies.\n\n15. The mission sought to obtain information on developments that have occurred in the\npublic sector structure in Mozambique over the past three years. Following the work done by\nthe 2018 GFS technical assistance mission, this mission sought to inform the authorities of the\nneed, firstly, to regularly update the list of public sector entities and, secondly, to classify public\nentities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics. The mission discussed in a general\nway, how the process is done in Portugal, and also presented examples of tables, published in\nPortugal (see, for example, the lists of entities published by the Bank of Portugal at\nhttps://www.bportugal.pt/page/lista-de-entidades-para-fins-estatisticos?mlid=821). The most\nup-to-date public sector structure, according to the information provided by the Mozambican\nauthorities, is shown in Figure 1 below. The most up-to-date institutional structure and preliminary\nlisting of public entities are presented, respectively, in Appendix III - Institutional Structure of\nGeneral Government and in Appendix IV - List of Public Sector Entities of this report.\n\n16. The GG does not include nonmarket public enterprises. An analysis of all SEE entities\nwas requested to the Mozambican authorities, for the purpose of evaluating their role as market\nproducers. There seems to be evidence of public companies that have accumulated negative equity\nvalues over several years, which is a relevant indicator when conducting the market test. The\nmarket test should be carried out regularly, on an entity by entity basis.\n\n17. Periodic updating of the list of public sector entities is of the utmost importance. The\nauthorities have been asked to compile an exhaustive list of entities belonging to the public sector,\nincluding the state enterprise sector, as presented in Appendix IV. This list should form the basis\nfor a better identification of entities within the GFS and PSDS compilation; and it should also be\nused by the other entities that produce statistics in Mozambique, namely the BM and the INSS, to\nensure harmonization of the sectoral classification of the statistics produced.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13", "text_characters": 2777}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-001", "cr-2023-046-fig-p0015-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Source:** MEF\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 1. Public Sector of the Republic of Mozambique\n\nSource: MEF", "text_characters": 55}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
Institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2021|**Structure of the public sector and list of sector entities**:
Complete the inventory and classify the entities according to_GFSM_
_2014_[BCG, EBU, LG, SSF and public companies].
|DNPED|\n|August
2021|
**Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to**
**the sector**. _(_i) Validate the structure of the sector; (ii) Ratify the list
of entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics
(fiscal, monetary and financial, external, and real sector statistics);
(iii) Evaluate the classification of public companies and EBU,
considering the market test; and this should be performed regularly
and on an entity-by-entity basis.
|MEF, BM and
INE|\n|December
2021
|
**Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to**
**the sector with the respective classification according to****_GFSM_**
**_2014_**: Publish on the MEP, BM and INE websites a unified and
structured list, identifying the sector to which each institutional unit
belongs.|MEF, BM and
INE|\n\n\n\n**C. Data and respective sources**\n\n**18.** **The mission conducted a data source survey that can be used in the process of**\n**compiling the PSDS** . The results are shown in Table 3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and\nRespective Sources.\n\n**19.** **In general, the primary sources of gross domestic debt of the Budgetary Central**\n**Government (BCG) are the DNGDP itself.** This information must be reconciled with data\nobtained from the BVM, BM and DNTCEF. The BVM supports the DNGDP in the process of\nissuing Treasury bonds (OTs), since it is the platform designated by the government for this\npurpose. BVM has detailed information on the holders of treasury bonds, and thus relevant\ninformation for allocation between the domestic and external sectors and for the consolidation\nof positions between holders of OT issued by other sectors of general government. The BM\nsupports the treasury bills issuance process, so it should have information on potential overdrafts\n(debt in deposits and currency) in the case of the National Treasury, and loans from the national\nbanking system. The BM also provides information on general government external debt in the\n[International Investment Position (IIP), compiled according to the 6th edition of the Balance of](http://www.bancomoc.mz/fm_pgLink.aspx?id=222)\nPayments and International Investment Position Manual.\n\n**20.** **The compilation of the debt of EBU should consider data reported by the DNCP and**\n**DNTCEF, together with data obtained directly from the EBU themselves.** This report does\nnot include the debt of these units because the information sources requested in advance were\nnot available. Moreover, the public information available on the internet did not make it possible\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **15**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.95240020751953, 87.5400390625, 539.8079833984375, 331.1400146484375], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible Institution \n\n April 2021 Structure of the public sector and list of sector entities: Complete the inventory and classify the entities according to_GFSM_ _2014_[BCG, EBU, LG, SSF and public companies]. DNPED \n August 2021 Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to the sector. _(_i) Validate the structure of the sector; (ii) Ratify the list of entities for the purpose of compiling macroeconomic statistics (fiscal, monetary and financial, external, and real sector statistics); (iii) Evaluate the classification of public companies and EBU, considering the market test; and this should be performed regularly and on an entity-by-entity basis. MEF, BM and INE \n December 2021 Structure of the public sector and list of entities belonging to the sector with the respective classification according to_GFSM_ _2014_: Publish on the MEP, BM and INE websites a unified and structured list, identifying the sector to which each institutional unit belongs. MEF, BM and INE \n\nC. Data and respective sources\n\n18. The mission conducted a data source survey that can be used in the process of\ncompiling the PSDS . The results are shown in Table 3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and\nRespective Sources.\n\n19. In general, the primary sources of gross domestic debt of the Budgetary Central\nGovernment (BCG) are the DNGDP itself. This information must be reconciled with data\nobtained from the BVM, BM and DNTCEF. The BVM supports the DNGDP in the process of\nissuing Treasury bonds (OTs), since it is the platform designated by the government for this\npurpose. BVM has detailed information on the holders of treasury bonds, and thus relevant\ninformation for allocation between the domestic and external sectors and for the consolidation\nof positions between holders of OT issued by other sectors of general government. The BM\nsupports the treasury bills issuance process, so it should have information on potential overdrafts\n(debt in deposits and currency) in the case of the National Treasury, and loans from the national\nbanking system. The BM also provides information on general government external debt in the\nInternational Investment Position (IIP), compiled according to the 6th edition of the Balance of\nPayments and International Investment Position Manual.\n\n20. The compilation of the debt of EBU should consider data reported by the DNCP and\nDNTCEF, together with data obtained directly from the EBU themselves. This report does\nnot include the debt of these units because the information sources requested in advance were\nnot available. Moreover, the public information available on the internet did not make it possible\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 15", "text_characters": 2299}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nto obtain reliable data. However, given the size of the sector, it is suggested that PSDS also\nincludes EBU debt.\n\n**21.** **The data used to prepare the INSS debt should be compiled directly from the**\n**institution in question.** The data that will be presented in this report were obtained from the\nInstitute’s financial reports, since the mission did not have access to other INSS data, as had\npreviously been requested. However, it is suggested that detailed information obtained directly\nfrom the INSS should be used in the future.\n\n**Table 3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and Respective Sources**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|#|Republic of Mozambique|Col3|Public administration (general government)|Col5|Col6|Public
companie
s|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**# **
|
**PSDS data**
|**Type of**
**data**|
**Central**
**government**
**(budgetary**
**and**
**extrabudgetary**
**units)**|
**Social**
**securit**
**y **|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|\n|1
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.1.5
1.3
1.3.1
1.3.2
|**Financial**
**assets**
**by**
**instrument**
**Domestic**
**and**
**external**
Currency
and
deposits
Debt
Securities
(BT/OT)
Loans
Insurance,
pensions,
and
standardized
guarantee schemes
Other
accounts
receivable
**Financial**
**assets**
**per**
**debtor**
Domestic
External
|
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows|
BM and DNTCEF
DNTCEF,
DNCP,
and BM
DNGDP,
DNTCEF
and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNTCEF
and
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
BM
BM
|
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
|
BM and DNTCEF
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
BM, and BVM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
BM
BM
|
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
|\n|
**4 **
**4.1**
**4.1.1**
4.1.1.
1
4.1.1.
2
4.1.1.
3
4.1.1.
4
|
**Debt at face value**
**By instrument**
** Domestic**
Special
Drawing
Rights – SDRs
Currencies
and
deposits
Debt
Securities
(BT/OT)
Loans|
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows|
N/A
BM and DNTCEF
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
BM and BVM
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
and BM|
N/A
INSS
INSS
INSS|
N/A
DNCEF,
DNGDP,
and BM
DNGDP,
DNTCEF,
BM and BVM
DNGDP and BM|
BM
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE|\n\n\n\n**16** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22909545898438, 228.19137573242188, 539.7709350585938, 688.7095336914062], "columns": 7, "rows": 4}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nto obtain reliable data. However, given the size of the sector, it is suggested that PSDS also\nincludes EBU debt.\n\n21. The data used to prepare the INSS debt should be compiled directly from the\ninstitution in question. The data that will be presented in this report were obtained from the\nInstitute’s financial reports, since the mission did not have access to other INSS data, as had\npreviously been requested. However, it is suggested that detailed information obtained directly\nfrom the INSS should be used in the future.\n\nTable 3. PSDS Compilation Process - Data and Respective Sources\n\n # Republic of Mozambique Col3 Public administration (general government) Col5 Col6 Public companie s \n\n # PSDS data Type of data Central government (budgetary and extrabudgetary units) Social securit y Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities \n 1 1.1 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.1.5 1.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 Financial assets by instrument Domestic and external Currency and deposits Debt Securities (BT/OT) Loans Insurance, pensions, and standardized guarantee schemes Other accounts receivable Financial assets per debtor Domestic External Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows BM and DNTCEF DNTCEF, DNCP, and BM DNGDP, DNTCEF and BM DNGDP and BM DNTCEF and DNCP/e-SISTAFE BM BM INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS BM and DNTCEF DNGDP, DNTCEF, BM, and BVM DNGDP and BM DNGDP and BM DNCP/e-SISTAFE BM BM DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE \n 4 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.1. 1 4.1.1. 2 4.1.1. 3 4.1.1. 4 Debt at face value By instrument Domestic Special Drawing Rights – SDRs Currencies and deposits Debt Securities (BT/OT) Loans Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows N/A BM and DNTCEF DNGDP, DNTCEF, BM and BVM DNGDP, DNTCEF, and BM N/A INSS INSS INSS N/A DNCEF, DNGDP, and BM DNGDP, DNTCEF, BM and BVM DNGDP and BM BM DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE \n\n16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1805}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|#|Republic of Mozambique|Col3|Public administration (general government)|Col5|Col6|Public
companie
s|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**# **|
**PSDS data**
|**Type of**
**data**|
**Central**
**government**
**(budgetary**
**and**
**extrabudgetary**
**units)**
|
**Social**
**securit**
**y **|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**
|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**
|\n|4.1.1.
5
4.1.1.
6
**4.1.2**
|~~Insurance, pensions,~~
and
standardized
guarantee schemes
Other
accounts
payable
** External**
|Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
|
~~DNGDP and BM~~
DNTCEF
and
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
|INSS
INSS
|
~~DNGDP and BM~~
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
|~~DNTCEF~~
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
|\n|
4.1.2.
1
4.1.2.
2
4.1.2.
3
4.1.2.
4
4.1.2.
5
**4.2**
4.2.1
4.2.2
**4.3**
4.3.1
4.3.2
**4.4**
4.4.1
4.4.2
**4.5**
4.5.1
4.5.2
**4.6**
4.6.1
4.6.2
|
Currencies
and
deposits
Debt
Securities
(BT/OT)
Loans
Insurance, pensions,
and
standardized
guarantee schemes
Other
accounts
payable
**By currency of**
**denomination**
National currency
Foreign currency
**By maturity**
Long term
Short term
**At face value**
Domestic
External
**At market value**
Domestic
External
**By creditor**
Domestic
External
|Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
and flows
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
Stock
|
BM and DNTCEF
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNTCEF
and
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
|
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
INSS
|
DNTCEF,
DNGDP
and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNGDP and BM
DNCP/e-SISTAFE
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
DNGDP
|
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
DNTCEF
and IGEPE
|\n|
i.
|
Central
government
(budgetary
and
extrabudgetary units)
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|
Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the
BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be
collected from the EBU.
|\n|ii.|
Social security|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|
Data from INSS from its financial reports.|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **17**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.23200225830078, 72.1919937133789, 539.7685546875, 711.0596313476562], "columns": 7, "rows": 6}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n # Republic of Mozambique Col3 Public administration (general government) Col5 Col6 Public companie s \n\n # PSDS data Type of data Central government (budgetary and extrabudgetary units) Social securit y Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities \n 4.1.1. 5 4.1.1. 6 4.1.2 ~~Insurance, pensions,~~ and standardized guarantee schemes Other accounts payable External Stock and flows Stock and flows ~~DNGDP and BM~~ DNTCEF and DNCP/e-SISTAFE INSS INSS ~~DNGDP and BM~~ DNCP/e-SISTAFE ~~DNTCEF~~ and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE \n 4.1.2. 1 4.1.2. 2 4.1.2. 3 4.1.2. 4 4.1.2. 5 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.5 4.5.1 4.5.2 4.6 4.6.1 4.6.2 Currencies and deposits Debt Securities (BT/OT) Loans Insurance, pensions, and standardized guarantee schemes Other accounts payable By currency of denomination National currency Foreign currency By maturity Long term Short term At face value Domestic External At market value Domestic External By creditor Domestic External Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock and flows Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock BM and DNTCEF DNGDP and BM DNGDP and BM DNGDP and BM DNTCEF and DNCP/e-SISTAFE DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS INSS DNTCEF, DNGDP and BM DNGDP and BM DNGDP and BM DNGDP and BM DNCP/e-SISTAFE DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNGDP DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE DNTCEF and IGEPE \n i. Central government (budgetary and extrabudgetary units) Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be collected from the EBU. Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be collected from the EBU. Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be collected from the EBU. Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be collected from the EBU. Financial assets, domestic and external debt should be reconciled with the BM. Data from the EBU that are not included in the budget should be collected from the EBU. \n ii. Social security Data from INSS from its financial reports. Data from INSS from its financial reports. Data from INSS from its financial reports. Data from INSS from its financial reports. Data from INSS from its financial reports. \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17", "text_characters": 2487}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|#|Republic of Mozambique|Col3|Public administration (general government)|Col5|Col6|Public
companie
s|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**# **
|
**PSDS data**
|**Type of**
**data**
|
**Central**
**government**
**(budgetary**
**and**
**extrabudgetary**
**units)**|
**Social**
**securit**
**y **|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|
**Local**
**governments**
**- **
**provinces,**
**districts,**
**and**
**municipalities**|\n|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
iii.
|
Local
governments
-
provinces,
districts,
and
municipalities
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|
Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts,
and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with
the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and
their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered
the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration.
|\n|iv.
|Public companies
|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|
Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The
mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report.|\n\n\n\n**22.** **For local government, the assets and liabilities reported by the national banking**\n**system, as reported by the BM, were used,** since the mission did not have access to other\ninformation from local government, as had previously been requested. It is suggested that this\ninformation be checked against the information provided by the local authorities.\n\n**23.** **Data from the state-owned enterprise sector (SEE) may be obtained from the IGEPE**\n**database, from the DNTCEF and from BM.** However, the mission had access to limited data\nfrom the SEE, although previously requested. The mission used information published by the\nMEF in the annual public debt report for nonfinancial public enterprise debt. For the public\nfinancial enterprises, mission considered only data from BM available in its financial reports. It\nshould be noted that information from the BM’s 2019 financial report has not yet been\npublished, so it was impossible to compile the BM’s 2019 debt. However, it is suggested that\ninformation obtained directly from IGEPE, DNCEF and the BM be used in the future.\n\n**24.** **The mission continued the process of reconciliation of net credit to the government**\n**(NCG), that started in the previous mission** . Considering the differences found in the NCG\npositions reported by the MEF and BM during the previous mission, the present mission\nreviewed the asset positions in BCG deposits and the domestic debt with the BM and MEF. Since\nthis was a PSDS mission, the mission also performed the external debt reconciliation, the results\nof which are reported below. The authorities were asked to perform this reconciliation on a\nregular basis, and to complete the reconciliation of previous years, and thus guarantee\nconsistency and transparency in the data compiled. The mission recommends a report be\nprepared on the results of this reconciliation for institutional memory purposes.\n\n**i.** **Reconciliation of Domestic Debt**\n\n**25.** **The main reason for the differences in the BCG’s domestic debt positions, as**\n**reported by the MEF and the BM, is their treatment of treasury bills (BT) issued by the BM**\n**but not fully recognized by the MEF.** The result of this reconciliation is set out in the following\ntable.\n\n\n**18** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 72.1919937133789, 539.7900390625, 244.13961791992188], "columns": 7, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n # Republic of Mozambique Col3 Public administration (general government) Col5 Col6 Public companie s \n\n # PSDS data Type of data Central government (budgetary and extrabudgetary units) Social securit y Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities \n \n iii. Local governments - provinces, districts, and municipalities Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts, and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration. Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts, and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration. Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts, and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration. Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts, and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration. Some of the local government debt and financial assets (provinces, districts, and municipalities) are available in e-SISTAFE and should be reconciled with the BM. The portion of the municipalities that refer to own resources and their execution should be obtained from the DNCP. The mission considered the credit granted by financial institutions to the local administration. \n iv. Public companies Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report. Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report. Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report. Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report. Data from the financial reports of public companies or IGEPE database. The mission used the figures presented in the MEF public debt report. \n\n22. For local government, the assets and liabilities reported by the national banking\nsystem, as reported by the BM, were used, since the mission did not have access to other\ninformation from local government, as had previously been requested. It is suggested that this\ninformation be checked against the information provided by the local authorities.\n\n23. Data from the state-owned enterprise sector (SEE) may be obtained from the IGEPE\ndatabase, from the DNTCEF and from BM. However, the mission had access to limited data\nfrom the SEE, although previously requested. The mission used information published by the\nMEF in the annual public debt report for nonfinancial public enterprise debt. For the public\nfinancial enterprises, mission considered only data from BM available in its financial reports. It\nshould be noted that information from the BM’s 2019 financial report has not yet been\npublished, so it was impossible to compile the BM’s 2019 debt. However, it is suggested that\ninformation obtained directly from IGEPE, DNCEF and the BM be used in the future.\n\n24. The mission continued the process of reconciliation of net credit to the government\n(NCG), that started in the previous mission . Considering the differences found in the NCG\npositions reported by the MEF and BM during the previous mission, the present mission\nreviewed the asset positions in BCG deposits and the domestic debt with the BM and MEF. Since\nthis was a PSDS mission, the mission also performed the external debt reconciliation, the results\nof which are reported below. The authorities were asked to perform this reconciliation on a\nregular basis, and to complete the reconciliation of previous years, and thus guarantee\nconsistency and transparency in the data compiled. The mission recommends a report be\nprepared on the results of this reconciliation for institutional memory purposes.\n\ni. Reconciliation of Domestic Debt\n\n25. The main reason for the differences in the BCG’s domestic debt positions, as\nreported by the MEF and the BM, is their treatment of treasury bills (BT) issued by the BM\nbut not fully recognized by the MEF. The result of this reconciliation is set out in the following\ntable.\n\n18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 4423}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**26.** **Differential treatment of BTs used for monetary policy purposes versus BT used for**\n**fiscal policy purposes.** The stock of domestic debt reported by the MEF only includes the\namount of BT that were actually used by the National Treasury, i.e. for fiscal policy purposes. The\nMEF does not recognize, as part of the BCG debt stock, the amount of BT issued for monetary\npolicy purposes. In a separate publication, the BM also reports the amount of BT used, although\nthis concept is not recognized in the country’s monetary accounts. In addition, the BM reported\nthat it imputes the amount associated with these BT issues to government deposits on behalf of\nthe State. According to the BM: (i) there is no debt service associated with the portion of the BT\nnot used by the Government, (ii) MEF does not request this issuance, nor there is any agreement\nbetween MEF and the BM on the issuance of BTs used for monetary policy purposes; and\n(iii) MEF does not know when such BT are issued by the BM.\n\n**27.** **BT are government financing and monetary intervention instruments, which are**\n**issued by the BM for monetary policy measures. They are used to finance temporary**\n**government cash shortages, caused by the seasonal nature of fiscal revenues or possible**\n**delays in disbursements by cooperation partners.** The legal framework governing BT is\nestablished by Decree No. 22/2004, of July 7, which delegates to the MEF the power to issue a\nministerial decree setting the maximum amount of BT to be used during the financial year.\n\n**28.** _**GFSM 2014**_ **defines as debt all liabilities that require payment(s) of interest and/or**\n**principal by the debtor to a creditor at a date, or dates, in the future.** It does not distinguish\nbetween the treatment of securities according to whether they have short- or long-term\nmaturities, or whether they have been used for fiscal or monetary policy purposes. On the other\nhand, the legislation allows authorities to issue BT for fiscal and monetary policy purposes; but it\nis unclear how this debt should be recognized by the government or the rest of the public sector\n(in this case the BM).\n\n**29.** **The way the BM records BT issuance is confusing and could lead to an incorrect**\n**interpretation of the BCG’s domestic debt.** Based on the BM’s financial reports, it appears that\nthe total liability resulting from the issuance of BT is recorded as part of the BM’s liabilities. In the\nmonetary survey, the total issuance of BT is considered as liability of the BCG, which is offset on\nthe asset side by an amount notionally imputed to BCG deposits in the BM. The reconciliation of\neach item of the NCG shows that the domestic debt and the BCG’s deposits seem to go beyond\nwhat effectively constitutes Government debt and the BCG’s assets. The mission therefore\nrecommends that the BM reanalyze the methodological treatment of the BT issued in the\nmonetary survey and perform a methodological analysis in conjunction with the MEF.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **19**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n26. Differential treatment of BTs used for monetary policy purposes versus BT used for\nfiscal policy purposes. The stock of domestic debt reported by the MEF only includes the\namount of BT that were actually used by the National Treasury, i.e. for fiscal policy purposes. The\nMEF does not recognize, as part of the BCG debt stock, the amount of BT issued for monetary\npolicy purposes. In a separate publication, the BM also reports the amount of BT used, although\nthis concept is not recognized in the country’s monetary accounts. In addition, the BM reported\nthat it imputes the amount associated with these BT issues to government deposits on behalf of\nthe State. According to the BM: (i) there is no debt service associated with the portion of the BT\nnot used by the Government, (ii) MEF does not request this issuance, nor there is any agreement\nbetween MEF and the BM on the issuance of BTs used for monetary policy purposes; and\n(iii) MEF does not know when such BT are issued by the BM.\n\n27. BT are government financing and monetary intervention instruments, which are\nissued by the BM for monetary policy measures. They are used to finance temporary\ngovernment cash shortages, caused by the seasonal nature of fiscal revenues or possible\ndelays in disbursements by cooperation partners. The legal framework governing BT is\nestablished by Decree No. 22/2004, of July 7, which delegates to the MEF the power to issue a\nministerial decree setting the maximum amount of BT to be used during the financial year.\n\n28. _GFSM 2014_ defines as debt all liabilities that require payment(s) of interest and/or\nprincipal by the debtor to a creditor at a date, or dates, in the future. It does not distinguish\nbetween the treatment of securities according to whether they have short- or long-term\nmaturities, or whether they have been used for fiscal or monetary policy purposes. On the other\nhand, the legislation allows authorities to issue BT for fiscal and monetary policy purposes; but it\nis unclear how this debt should be recognized by the government or the rest of the public sector\n(in this case the BM).\n\n29. The way the BM records BT issuance is confusing and could lead to an incorrect\ninterpretation of the BCG’s domestic debt. Based on the BM’s financial reports, it appears that\nthe total liability resulting from the issuance of BT is recorded as part of the BM’s liabilities. In the\nmonetary survey, the total issuance of BT is considered as liability of the BCG, which is offset on\nthe asset side by an amount notionally imputed to BCG deposits in the BM. The reconciliation of\neach item of the NCG shows that the domestic debt and the BCG’s deposits seem to go beyond\nwhat effectively constitutes Government debt and the BCG’s assets. The mission therefore\nrecommends that the BM reanalyze the methodological treatment of the BT issued in the\nmonetary survey and perform a methodological analysis in conjunction with the MEF.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 19", "text_characters": 2483}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 4: 2016-2019 Domestic Debt Reconciliation**\n\n\n\n\n|Domestic Debt - Stocks
(unit: Mt million)|Col2|MEF|BM|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Domestic Debt - Stock****_s_ **
(unit: Mt million)|**Domestic Debt - Stock****_s_ **
(unit: Mt million)|
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
**2019**|
**2016**
**2017**
**2018**
**2019**|\n|**a **|
**Total (Authorities)**|
**87,709.6**
**106,899.6**
**139,377.2**
**154,595.2**|
**127,947.6**
**215,398.4**
**250,639.6**
**271,171.3**|\n|
|
**Debt Securities**
Treasury Bonds (BM & credit institutions)
Treasury Bills
**Loans**
**Central bank**
National currency
Foreign currency
**Commercial banks**
National currency - Loans (_Leasing +_
_Restructuring activities_)
National currency - Supplier arrears
Foreign currency - Portuguese credit line
**Accounts payable**
Interest on credits
Other adjustments – Credit institutions
|
**46,147.2**
**64,199.7**
**74,943.1**
**94,492.4**
34,334.9
42,565.7
53,985.9
64,820.4
11,812.3
21,634.1
20,957.2
29,672.0
**41,562.4**
**42,699.9**
**64,434.1**
**60,102.8**
**30,028.1**
**29,882.3**
**33,812.8**
**37,812.8**
15,766.1
15,620.4
19,550.8
23,550.8
14,261.9
14,261.9
14,261.9
14,261.9
**11,534.3**
**12,817.6**
**30,621.3**
**22,290.0**
11,534.3
12,817.6
23,857.2
22,143.1
6,764.1
147.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
**0.0**
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
|
**65,274.4**
**152,047.1**
**176,469.3**
**193,802.8**
30,796.0
39,566.0
54,606.0
52,517.4
34,478.4
112,481.1
121,863.3
141,285.4
**58,459.2**
**55,029.4**
**68,523.5**
**71,168.5**
**29,976.1**
**27,693.4**
**31,876.0**
**36,858.4**
15,722.1
15,902.7
19,595.8
24,578.2
14,254.0
11,790.7
12,280.2
12,280.2
**28,483.1**
**27,336.0**
**36,647.5**
**34,310.0**
10,048.7
11,171.4
23,967.2
23,704.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18,434.4
16,164.6
12,680.3
10,605.1
**4,214.0**
**8,321.9**
**5,646.8**
**6,200.0**
1,269.2
5,273.4
5,646.8
6,200.0
2,944.8
3,048.5
0.0
0.0
|\n|
**b **
|
**Differences - (Total adjustments):**
|
**445.6**
**2,670.6**
**2,670.6**
**2,670.6**
|
**-40,238.0**
**-108,498.8**
**-111,262.4**
**-116,576.1**
|\n|
**(i)**
** (ii)**
**(iii)**
**(iv)**
**(v)**
|
**Securities**
Treasury Bonds (BM & credit institutions)
Treasury Bills
**Loans - Central bank**
National currency
Foreign currency (Exchange Rate)
** Loans - Commercial banks**
National currency - Loans (_Leasing +_
_Restructuring activities_)
National currency - Supplier arrears
Foreign currency - Portuguese credit line
**Accounts payable**
Interest on credits
Other adjustments - credit institutions
**Other economic flows - (Canc. / Exchange)**
|
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|
3,538.9
2,999.7
-620.1
12,303.0
-22,666.0
-90,847.0
-100,906.1
-111,613.4
44.0
-282.3
-45.0
-1,027.4
8.0
2,471.2
1,981.8
1,981.8
1,485.6
1,646.1
-110.0
-1,561.9
6,764.1
147.0
-18,434.4
-16,164.6
-12,680.3
-10,605.1
-1,269.2
-5,273.4
-5,646.8
-6,200.0
-2,944.8
-3,048.5
0.0
0.0
445.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
2,670.6
|\n|
**c = a+ b**
|
**Adjusted domestic debt**
|
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
|
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
**88,155.2**
**109,570.2**
**142,047.7**
**157,265.7**
|\n|
**d **|
**Flows – Transactions**|
**18,872.2**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.6**
**15,218.0**
**18,872.1**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.5**
**15,218.0**|
**18,872.2**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.6**
**15,218.0**
**18,872.1**
**21,415.0**
**32,477.5**
**15,218.0**|\n\n\n\n**Source:** MEF, IMF (June 2019 Article IV Report), and authors’ calculations. The data shown in red need to be confirmed by the Mozambican authorities.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.23314666748047, 81.1919937133789, 742.5668334960938, 495.5018005371094], "columns": 4, "rows": 8}], "text": "Table 4: 2016-2019 Domestic Debt Reconciliation\n\n Domestic Debt - Stocks (unit: Mt million) Col2 MEF BM \n\n Domestic Debt - Stock_s_ (unit: Mt million) Domestic Debt - Stock_s_ (unit: Mt million) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2016 2017 2018 2019 \n a Total (Authorities) 87,709.6 106,899.6 139,377.2 154,595.2 127,947.6 215,398.4 250,639.6 271,171.3 \n Debt Securities Treasury Bonds (BM & credit institutions) Treasury Bills Loans Central bank National currency Foreign currency Commercial banks National currency - Loans (_Leasing +_ _Restructuring activities_) National currency - Supplier arrears Foreign currency - Portuguese credit line Accounts payable Interest on credits Other adjustments – Credit institutions 46,147.2 64,199.7 74,943.1 94,492.4 34,334.9 42,565.7 53,985.9 64,820.4 11,812.3 21,634.1 20,957.2 29,672.0 41,562.4 42,699.9 64,434.1 60,102.8 30,028.1 29,882.3 33,812.8 37,812.8 15,766.1 15,620.4 19,550.8 23,550.8 14,261.9 14,261.9 14,261.9 14,261.9 11,534.3 12,817.6 30,621.3 22,290.0 11,534.3 12,817.6 23,857.2 22,143.1 6,764.1 147.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65,274.4 152,047.1 176,469.3 193,802.8 30,796.0 39,566.0 54,606.0 52,517.4 34,478.4 112,481.1 121,863.3 141,285.4 58,459.2 55,029.4 68,523.5 71,168.5 29,976.1 27,693.4 31,876.0 36,858.4 15,722.1 15,902.7 19,595.8 24,578.2 14,254.0 11,790.7 12,280.2 12,280.2 28,483.1 27,336.0 36,647.5 34,310.0 10,048.7 11,171.4 23,967.2 23,704.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18,434.4 16,164.6 12,680.3 10,605.1 4,214.0 8,321.9 5,646.8 6,200.0 1,269.2 5,273.4 5,646.8 6,200.0 2,944.8 3,048.5 0.0 0.0 \n b Differences - (Total adjustments): 445.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 -40,238.0 -108,498.8 -111,262.4 -116,576.1 \n (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Securities Treasury Bonds (BM & credit institutions) Treasury Bills Loans - Central bank National currency Foreign currency (Exchange Rate) Loans - Commercial banks National currency - Loans (_Leasing +_ _Restructuring activities_) National currency - Supplier arrears Foreign currency - Portuguese credit line Accounts payable Interest on credits Other adjustments - credit institutions Other economic flows - (Canc. / Exchange) 445.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 3,538.9 2,999.7 -620.1 12,303.0 -22,666.0 -90,847.0 -100,906.1 -111,613.4 44.0 -282.3 -45.0 -1,027.4 8.0 2,471.2 1,981.8 1,981.8 1,485.6 1,646.1 -110.0 -1,561.9 6,764.1 147.0 -18,434.4 -16,164.6 -12,680.3 -10,605.1 -1,269.2 -5,273.4 -5,646.8 -6,200.0 -2,944.8 -3,048.5 0.0 0.0 445.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 2,670.6 \n c = a+ b Adjusted domestic debt 88,155.2 109,570.2 142,047.7 157,265.7 88,155.2 109,570.2 142,047.7 157,265.7 88,155.2 109,570.2 142,047.7 157,265.7 88,155.2 109,570.2 142,047.7 157,265.7 \n d Flows – Transactions 18,872.2 21,415.0 32,477.6 15,218.0 18,872.1 21,415.0 32,477.5 15,218.0 18,872.2 21,415.0 32,477.6 15,218.0 18,872.1 21,415.0 32,477.5 15,218.0 \n\nSource: MEF, IMF (June 2019 Article IV Report), and authors’ calculations. The data shown in red need to be confirmed by the Mozambican authorities.", "text_characters": 2582}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**30.** **BT not used by MEF do not constitute BCG debt.** As the data are currently reported by\nthe Mozambican authorities, there is a misunderstanding over the recognition of BT used for\nmonetary policy purposes. As there is no debt service on the issue of these BT, considering the\nterms on which they are issued and the definition of debt established in _GFSM 2014_, this liability\nshould not be presented as part of BCG debt.\n\n**31.** **Treasury bonds (OT) as reported by MEF and by the BM differ significantly** . BM\nreports an aggregate total of securities issued by the Treasury, including both BT and OT, and the\nway the information is reported, does not allow for reconciliation with the position presented by\nthe MEF. However, the MEF obtains this information from the BVM, and BM calculates the\namount through information reported by the national banking system. It was also found that the\namounts calculated by the BM only consider OT held by commercial banks. According to the\nBVM, OT may be held by other entities, besides resident commercial banks, such as individuals or\nexternal investors. Nonetheless, the BM was requested to report OT position separately from BT.\n\n**32.** **Loan positions with the BM are consistent, having only minor differences resulting**\n**from the exchange rates used.** In the case of commercial bank loans, there are significant\ndifferences in the positions calculated by the two institutions, especially in 2015. The BM’s\nrecognition of the Portuguese credit line explains part of the difference. This credit line is not\nBCG debt, so the difference results from the coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts. The\nremaining difference in loans also seems to stem from a problem of institutional sector coverage.\nThe mission asked the BM to provide details on government loans with commercial banks to\nfacilitate reconciliation with the MEF position and make it possible to report the debt of each\nsubsector of the public sector.\n\n**33.** **Arrears and other BCG accounts payable are not captured by the NCG position, as**\n**reported by the BM.** Debt representing arrears with suppliers are debts recognized in the stock\nof domestic debt reported by the MEF; but they are not captured by the BM, since they are not\ndebts contracted with the national banks. In 2018, the Mozambican authorities compiled all of\nthe debts that public institutions had with various suppliers in the period 2007–2016. The total\namount was approximately 29.8 billion meticais (Mt), of which Mt 19.8 billion was approved by\nthe Office of the Audit General, and Mt 9.9 billion was not.\n\n**34.** **The credits reported in the monetary accounts show amounts associated with other**\n**adjustments, resulting from the methodology of recording the debt on accrual basis.** The\nMEF does not capture these adjustments, since it records debt on a cash basis. These\nadjustments require a counterpart in BCG expenditure so as not to generate discrepancies in the\nstatistics.\n\n**ii.** **Reconciliation of External Debt**\n\n**35.** **The government’s external debt, as calculated by the MEF, was compared with the**\n**external debt reported by the BM in the** **[International Investment Position (IIP), compiled](http://www.bancomoc.mz/fm_pgLink.aspx?id=222)**\n**according to BPM6.** Mission started reconciling the government’s external debt as published by\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **21**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n30. BT not used by MEF do not constitute BCG debt. As the data are currently reported by\nthe Mozambican authorities, there is a misunderstanding over the recognition of BT used for\nmonetary policy purposes. As there is no debt service on the issue of these BT, considering the\nterms on which they are issued and the definition of debt established in _GFSM 2014_, this liability\nshould not be presented as part of BCG debt.\n\n31. Treasury bonds (OT) as reported by MEF and by the BM differ significantly . BM\nreports an aggregate total of securities issued by the Treasury, including both BT and OT, and the\nway the information is reported, does not allow for reconciliation with the position presented by\nthe MEF. However, the MEF obtains this information from the BVM, and BM calculates the\namount through information reported by the national banking system. It was also found that the\namounts calculated by the BM only consider OT held by commercial banks. According to the\nBVM, OT may be held by other entities, besides resident commercial banks, such as individuals or\nexternal investors. Nonetheless, the BM was requested to report OT position separately from BT.\n\n32. Loan positions with the BM are consistent, having only minor differences resulting\nfrom the exchange rates used. In the case of commercial bank loans, there are significant\ndifferences in the positions calculated by the two institutions, especially in 2015. The BM’s\nrecognition of the Portuguese credit line explains part of the difference. This credit line is not\nBCG debt, so the difference results from the coverage of the monetary and fiscal accounts. The\nremaining difference in loans also seems to stem from a problem of institutional sector coverage.\nThe mission asked the BM to provide details on government loans with commercial banks to\nfacilitate reconciliation with the MEF position and make it possible to report the debt of each\nsubsector of the public sector.\n\n33. Arrears and other BCG accounts payable are not captured by the NCG position, as\nreported by the BM. Debt representing arrears with suppliers are debts recognized in the stock\nof domestic debt reported by the MEF; but they are not captured by the BM, since they are not\ndebts contracted with the national banks. In 2018, the Mozambican authorities compiled all of\nthe debts that public institutions had with various suppliers in the period 2007–2016. The total\namount was approximately 29.8 billion meticais (Mt), of which Mt 19.8 billion was approved by\nthe Office of the Audit General, and Mt 9.9 billion was not.\n\n34. The credits reported in the monetary accounts show amounts associated with other\nadjustments, resulting from the methodology of recording the debt on accrual basis. The\nMEF does not capture these adjustments, since it records debt on a cash basis. These\nadjustments require a counterpart in BCG expenditure so as not to generate discrepancies in the\nstatistics.\n\nii. Reconciliation of External Debt\n\n35. The government’s external debt, as calculated by the MEF, was compared with the\nexternal debt reported by the BM in the International Investment Position (IIP), compiled\naccording to BPM6. Mission started reconciling the government’s external debt as published by\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 21", "text_characters": 2753}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nthe MEF with the amounts compiled by the BM in the IIP, and according to the following table,\nthe differences round approximately US$3 billion for the period 2016–2019.\n\n**36.** **Mozambican authorities were tasked with completing the reconciliation between**\n**the two positions.** The sectoral coverage could explain a small portion of the discrepancies\npresented, since, in the case of the IIP, they are loans and debt securities which are liabilities of\nGG to nonresidents, whereas the external debt reported by the MEF only considers the external\ndebt of BCG. Nonetheless, the Mozambican authorities indicated that the difference could be\ndue to the treatment of guarantees granted by the government on external loans obtained by\npublic companies, which are not being recognized in the data compiled by the MEF. This\ndifference in treatment may justify part of the difference in the reporting of loans. The BM was\ntasked with finishing the reconciliation for the purposes of compiling the PSDS.\n\n**37.** **As part of its debt management, the government acquired and restructured the**\n**securitized debt (guaranteed by the State) of the Mozambican Tuna Company (** _**Empresa**_\n_**Moçambicana de Atum**_ **– EMATUM, SA) in 2016.** The MEF confirmed that within the external\ndebt, only the amount of this debt that is referred as MOZAM 2023 or MOZAM 2032, should be\nrecorded as debt securities. The IIP reports less than this amount, so the authorities need to\ncheck whether the treatment of this operation is consistent in both reports.\n\n**38.** **Other liabilities included in the IIP not considered by MEF.** Line 9 of the table below\nidentifies the total of other GG liabilities that do not seem to be included in the external debt as\ncompiled by the MEF. The BM was tasked with identifying these amounts and informing the MEF\nof the origin of these other liabilities.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Table 5. Differences in External Debt 2016–2019 - Debt vs. IIP Report|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|US$ million|\n|
||**2016**|**2017**|**2018**|**2019**|\n|
**Liabilities identified in IIP**|
1 = 2 + 3|
**11,717.8**
**9 **|
**12,340.1**
**5 **|
**12,391.1**
**0 **|
**12,681.0**
**9 **|\n|
Debt securities - general government|
2|
546.72|
495.90|
495.90|
495.90|\n|
Loans - general government|
3|
11,171.17|
11,844.25|
11,895.20|
12,185.19|\n|
**MEF Public debt report**||||||\n|
External debt cf. Table 2: Public debt stock|4|8,626.32|9,487.85|9,804.45|9,850.18|\n|
**Difference**|
**6 = 4 - 1**|
** -3,091.57**|
** -2,852.30**|
** -2,586.65**|
** -2,830.91**
|\n|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|**Memorandum items**|||||
|\n|
MOZAM 2023 / MOZAM 2032 securities (MEF report)|
7|
726.52
|
726.52
|
726.52
|
900
|\n|
**Difference - external securitized debt**
|
**8 = 7 - 2**
|
**179.80**
|
**230.62**
|
**230.62**
|
**404.10**
|\n|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
**Other liabilities identified in IIP**|
**9 **|
256.55|
688.20|
1,119.85|
1,021.95|\n\n\n**Source:** BM, MEF.\n\n\n**22** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2239990234375, 433.2190246582031, 539.7760009765625, 681.0343017578125], "columns": 6, "rows": 14}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nthe MEF with the amounts compiled by the BM in the IIP, and according to the following table,\nthe differences round approximately US$3 billion for the period 2016–2019.\n\n36. Mozambican authorities were tasked with completing the reconciliation between\nthe two positions. The sectoral coverage could explain a small portion of the discrepancies\npresented, since, in the case of the IIP, they are loans and debt securities which are liabilities of\nGG to nonresidents, whereas the external debt reported by the MEF only considers the external\ndebt of BCG. Nonetheless, the Mozambican authorities indicated that the difference could be\ndue to the treatment of guarantees granted by the government on external loans obtained by\npublic companies, which are not being recognized in the data compiled by the MEF. This\ndifference in treatment may justify part of the difference in the reporting of loans. The BM was\ntasked with finishing the reconciliation for the purposes of compiling the PSDS.\n\n37. As part of its debt management, the government acquired and restructured the\nsecuritized debt (guaranteed by the State) of the Mozambican Tuna Company ( _Empresa_\n_Moçambicana de Atum_ – EMATUM, SA) in 2016. The MEF confirmed that within the external\ndebt, only the amount of this debt that is referred as MOZAM 2023 or MOZAM 2032, should be\nrecorded as debt securities. The IIP reports less than this amount, so the authorities need to\ncheck whether the treatment of this operation is consistent in both reports.\n\n38. Other liabilities included in the IIP not considered by MEF. Line 9 of the table below\nidentifies the total of other GG liabilities that do not seem to be included in the external debt as\ncompiled by the MEF. The BM was tasked with identifying these amounts and informing the MEF\nof the origin of these other liabilities.\n\n Table 5. Differences in External Debt 2016–2019 - Debt vs. IIP Report Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 \n\n US$ million US$ million US$ million US$ million US$ million US$ million \n 2016 2017 2018 2019 \n Liabilities identified in IIP 1 = 2 + 3 11,717.8 9 12,340.1 5 12,391.1 0 12,681.0 9 \n Debt securities - general government 2 546.72 495.90 495.90 495.90 \n Loans - general government 3 11,171.17 11,844.25 11,895.20 12,185.19 \n MEF Public debt report \n External debt cf. Table 2: Public debt stock 4 8,626.32 9,487.85 9,804.45 9,850.18 \n Difference 6 = 4 - 1 -3,091.57 -2,852.30 -2,586.65 -2,830.91 \n \n Memorandum items \n MOZAM 2023 / MOZAM 2032 securities (MEF report) 7 726.52 726.52 726.52 900 \n Difference - external securitized debt 8 = 7 - 2 179.80 230.62 230.62 404.10 \n \n Other liabilities identified in IIP 9 256.55 688.20 1,119.85 1,021.95 \n\nSource: BM, MEF.\n\n22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2267}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**iii.** **Reconciliation of Central Government Deposits**\n\n**39.** **BCG deposits held by BM include all flows resulting from the issuance of BT**\n**whether for monetary or for fiscal policy purposes.** The following table shows the distribution\nof the position of government deposits, considering the accounts of the BCG, EBU and INSS, in\nthe monetary survey.\n\n**40.** **The variation in deposits held with the BM has been affected by the issuance of BT**\n**channeled into government deposits.** The increase in government deposits identified in the\nmonetary survey was attributable to the imputation of deposits as a result of the BT issuances,\nirrespective of whether these were for fiscal or for monetary policy purposes. As noted above, the\nNational Treasury is not aware of the assets imputed to its deposit account when the BM issues\nBT for monetary policy purposes, so this amount generates a difference in the positions reported\nby the two institutions.\n\n**41.** **Government deposits identified in the monetary surveys include Social Security**\n**deposits.** The mission suggests the use of a single list of entities, classified according with the\ninternational manuals; so, the authorities should ratify the INSS classification in the social security\nfunds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced accordingly.\n\n**42.** **While BM reports on accrual basis, MEF reports on cash basis.** This differences in the\naccounting basis of reporting has also proven significant as BM make adjustment of the date to\nreflect the commitments, and the MEF does not make, creating significant differences in the\npositions held by both public institutions.\n\n**43.** **The MEF should report separately the portion of deposits that the BCG holds, and**\n**the portion of deposits held by extrabudgetary units.** This separation has proven\nfundamental for completing the work of deposits reconciliation, since the National Treasury does\nnot recognize all the foreign and local currency amounts deposited with commercial banks as\nreported in the monetary survey.\n\n**Table 6. Detail of Central Government Deposits Reported in the Monetary Survey**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Bank of Mozambique|Col4|Col5|Col6|Commercial banks|Col8|Col9|Monetary
survey|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
|
|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|BT|Interest
and
other|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|Other
adjustments|
**Total deposits**|\n|
**December**
**2015**|**BCG**|19|5|13|1|9|3|3|** 53**|\n|
|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
9|
0|
0|
**9 **|\n|
|
**Total**|
**19**|
**5 **|
**13**|
**1 **|
**18**|
**3 **|
**3 **|
**62**|\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **23**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.96041870117188, 559.391357421875, 531.0405883789062, 712.2218017578125], "columns": 10, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\niii. Reconciliation of Central Government Deposits\n\n39. BCG deposits held by BM include all flows resulting from the issuance of BT\nwhether for monetary or for fiscal policy purposes. The following table shows the distribution\nof the position of government deposits, considering the accounts of the BCG, EBU and INSS, in\nthe monetary survey.\n\n40. The variation in deposits held with the BM has been affected by the issuance of BT\nchanneled into government deposits. The increase in government deposits identified in the\nmonetary survey was attributable to the imputation of deposits as a result of the BT issuances,\nirrespective of whether these were for fiscal or for monetary policy purposes. As noted above, the\nNational Treasury is not aware of the assets imputed to its deposit account when the BM issues\nBT for monetary policy purposes, so this amount generates a difference in the positions reported\nby the two institutions.\n\n41. Government deposits identified in the monetary surveys include Social Security\ndeposits. The mission suggests the use of a single list of entities, classified according with the\ninternational manuals; so, the authorities should ratify the INSS classification in the social security\nfunds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced accordingly.\n\n42. While BM reports on accrual basis, MEF reports on cash basis. This differences in the\naccounting basis of reporting has also proven significant as BM make adjustment of the date to\nreflect the commitments, and the MEF does not make, creating significant differences in the\npositions held by both public institutions.\n\n43. The MEF should report separately the portion of deposits that the BCG holds, and\nthe portion of deposits held by extrabudgetary units. This separation has proven\nfundamental for completing the work of deposits reconciliation, since the National Treasury does\nnot recognize all the foreign and local currency amounts deposited with commercial banks as\nreported in the monetary survey.\n\nTable 6. Detail of Central Government Deposits Reported in the Monetary Survey\n\n Col1 Col2 Bank of Mozambique Col4 Col5 Col6 Commercial banks Col8 Col9 Monetary survey \n\n Local currency & deposits Foreign currency deposits BT Interest and other Local currency & deposits Foreign currency deposits Other adjustments Total deposits \n December 2015 BCG 19 5 13 1 9 3 3 53 \n INSS 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 9 \n Total 19 5 13 1 18 3 3 62 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 23", "text_characters": 2058}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|BCG
December
INSS
2016
Total|Col2|Bank of Mozambique|Col4|Col5|Col6|Commercial banks|Col8|Col9|Monetary
survey|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|BT|Interest
and
other|Local currency
& deposits|
Foreign
currency
deposits|Other
adjustments|
**Total deposits**|\n|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|**BCG**|15|13|27|1|8|5|3|** 72**|\n|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
14|
0|
0|
** 14**|\n|
**December**
**2016**
**BCG**
**INSS**
**Total**|
**Total**|
**15**|
**13**|
**27**|
**1 **|
**22**|
**5 **|
**3 **|
**86**|\n|**December**
**2017**|
**BCG**|
26|
33|
84|
7|
10|
3|
3|
** 166**|\n|**December**
**2017**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
17|
0|
0|
** 17**|\n|**December**
**2017**|
**Total**|
**26**|
**33**|
**84**|
**7 **|
**27**|
**3 **|
**3 **|
**183**|\n|**December**
**2018**|
**BCG**|
26|
12|
108|
8|
16|
3|
2|
** 175**|\n|**December**
**2018**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
23|
0|
0|
** 23**|\n|**December**
**2018**|
**Total**|
**26**|
**12**|
**108**|
**8 **|
**39**|
**3 **|
**2 **|
**198**|\n|**December**
**2019**|
**BCG**|
57|
11|
123|
7|
15|
4|
1|
** 218**|\n|**December**
**2019**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
24|
0|
0|
** 24**|\n|**December**
**2019**|
**Total**|
**57**|
**11**|
**123**|
**7 **|
**39**|
**4 **|
**1 **|
**242**|\n|**August 2020**|
**BCG**|
68|
19|
147|
7|
18|
6|
4|
** 269**|\n|**August 2020**|
**INSS**|
0|
0|
0|
0|
26|
0|
0|
**26**|\n|**August 2020**|
**Total**|
**68**|
**19**|
**147**|
**7 **|
**44**|
**6 **|
**4 **|
**295**|\n|
**Variation in year**
**December 2019–**
**August 2020**|
**Variation in year**
**December 2019–**
**August 2020**|
**11**|
**8 **|
**24**|
**0 **|
**5 **|
**2 **|
**3 **|
**53**|\n\n\n\n**Note:**\nThe separation between BCG and EBU deposit should be provided by MEF.\n\n\n\nSource: BM and MEF\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2021|**Reconciliation of domestic debt.**(i) Complete the reconciliation
work started during the mission and document the final outcome; (ii)
Implement a formal process for regular reconciliation of flows and
stock (by instrument, face value, and creditor); (iii) Prepare a report
on the reconciliation results, including explanations of all differences
identified in the BM (net credit to the government and balance of
payments) and DNTCEF (detailed debt charts) data, for institutional
memory purposes.
|BM and MEF
(DNGDP and
DNPED)
|\n|April 2021|
**Treasury bills.**Agree on the total amount of BT debt to be
recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts – prepare a
methodological analysis on the statistical treatment of BT issued for
government financing.|MEF and BM|\n\n\n\n**24** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.0212631225586, 85.39200592041016, 531.01318359375, 455.423583984375], "columns": 10, "rows": 18}, {"bbox": [90.0212631225586, 506.8193664550781, 539.8200073242188, 706.6199951171875], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n BCG December INSS 2016 Total Col2 Bank of Mozambique Col4 Col5 Col6 Commercial banks Col8 Col9 Monetary survey \n\n December 2016 BCG INSS Total December 2016 BCG INSS Total Local currency & deposits Foreign currency deposits BT Interest and other Local currency & deposits Foreign currency deposits Other adjustments Total deposits \n December 2016 BCG INSS Total BCG 15 13 27 1 8 5 3 72 \n December 2016 BCG INSS Total INSS 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 14 \n December 2016 BCG INSS Total Total 15 13 27 1 22 5 3 86 \n December 2017 BCG 26 33 84 7 10 3 3 166 \n December 2017 INSS 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 17 \n December 2017 Total 26 33 84 7 27 3 3 183 \n December 2018 BCG 26 12 108 8 16 3 2 175 \n December 2018 INSS 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 23 \n December 2018 Total 26 12 108 8 39 3 2 198 \n December 2019 BCG 57 11 123 7 15 4 1 218 \n December 2019 INSS 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 24 \n December 2019 Total 57 11 123 7 39 4 1 242 \n August 2020 BCG 68 19 147 7 18 6 4 269 \n August 2020 INSS 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 26 \n August 2020 Total 68 19 147 7 44 6 4 295 \n Variation in year December 2019– August 2020 Variation in year December 2019– August 2020 11 8 24 0 5 2 3 53 \n\nNote:\nThe separation between BCG and EBU deposit should be provided by MEF.\n\nSource: BM and MEF\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n April 2021 Reconciliation of domestic debt.(i) Complete the reconciliation work started during the mission and document the final outcome; (ii) Implement a formal process for regular reconciliation of flows and stock (by instrument, face value, and creditor); (iii) Prepare a report on the reconciliation results, including explanations of all differences identified in the BM (net credit to the government and balance of payments) and DNTCEF (detailed debt charts) data, for institutional memory purposes. BM and MEF (DNGDP and DNPED) \n April 2021 Treasury bills.Agree on the total amount of BT debt to be recognized in the monetary and fiscal accounts – prepare a methodological analysis on the statistical treatment of BT issued for government financing. MEF and BM \n\n24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1648}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2021|**Debt Securities.** Present a total breakdown of treasury bonds:
(i) details of issuance of BT and (ii) details of OT.
|BM|\n|April 2021|
**Treasury Bonds.**The MEF should regularly request information on
the OT debt issued through the BVM, identifying the share of OT held
by each of the residents (individuals, nonfinancial corporations, BM,
and other financial institutions) and by the nonresident. In addition,
the MEF should indicate how the debt is valued in public information,
indicating whether at face value or market value.
|MEF and BVM|\n|April 2021|
**Loans from commercial banks.**Provide details of total loans with
commercial banks.
|BM|\n|April 2021|
**GG International Investment Position.**Complete the reconciliation
of the external debt between the MEF and the BM: (i) external loans;
(ii) debt securities and possible differences in the treatment of
MOZAM 2032; (iii) treatment of other liabilities included in the IIP
and not included in the MEF external debt position. The result of this
work should be transcribed in a methodological note for institutional
memory purposes; and (iv) the BM should report the total debt of
each of Mozambique’s public sector subsectors: GG = BCG + EBU +
INSS + LG, also the corporate financial and nonfinancial sector.
|MEF / BM|\n|April 2021|
**Debt of EBU.**Launch the process of systematized collection of the
debt of these entities, since they may represent a material share of
central government debt.
|MEF|\n|April 2021|
**INSS debt.**Request INSS detailed debt data on a regular basis and
compare it with the position reported in its financial reports.
|MEF/INSS|\n|April 2021|
**Local government debt.**Collect and compile the information on a
regular basis.
|MEF|\n|April 2021|
**Financial and nonfinancial public sector debt.**Collect and compile
the information on a regular basis.
|MEF/IGEPE|\n|Immediately
|
**Reconciliation of deposits.**(i) finalize the reconciliation work
initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to
provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG
and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS,
ensuring consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’
Financial reports; (iv) The authorities should also ratify the
classification of the INSS in the Social Security Funds subsector, and
adjust all statistics produced accordingly; (v) the BM to publish
information on government deposits with the separation by
subsector of public administrations; (vi) ) adjust inflows resulting
from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits
according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for
fiscal and monetary purpose; (vii) The BM and MEF to implement a
formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including
explanations of all the differences identified.|BM
e
MEF
(DNGDP,
DNPED
and
DNTCEF)|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **25**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21818542480469, 72.17999267578125, 539.7817993164062, 692.5800170898438], "columns": 3, "rows": 10}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n April 2021 Debt Securities. Present a total breakdown of treasury bonds: (i) details of issuance of BT and (ii) details of OT. BM \n April 2021 Treasury Bonds.The MEF should regularly request information on the OT debt issued through the BVM, identifying the share of OT held by each of the residents (individuals, nonfinancial corporations, BM, and other financial institutions) and by the nonresident. In addition, the MEF should indicate how the debt is valued in public information, indicating whether at face value or market value. MEF and BVM \n April 2021 Loans from commercial banks.Provide details of total loans with commercial banks. BM \n April 2021 GG International Investment Position.Complete the reconciliation of the external debt between the MEF and the BM: (i) external loans; (ii) debt securities and possible differences in the treatment of MOZAM 2032; (iii) treatment of other liabilities included in the IIP and not included in the MEF external debt position. The result of this work should be transcribed in a methodological note for institutional memory purposes; and (iv) the BM should report the total debt of each of Mozambique’s public sector subsectors: GG = BCG + EBU + INSS + LG, also the corporate financial and nonfinancial sector. MEF / BM \n April 2021 Debt of EBU.Launch the process of systematized collection of the debt of these entities, since they may represent a material share of central government debt. MEF \n April 2021 INSS debt.Request INSS detailed debt data on a regular basis and compare it with the position reported in its financial reports. MEF/INSS \n April 2021 Local government debt.Collect and compile the information on a regular basis. MEF \n April 2021 Financial and nonfinancial public sector debt.Collect and compile the information on a regular basis. MEF/IGEPE \n Immediately Reconciliation of deposits.(i) finalize the reconciliation work initiated during the mission and document the results; (ii) MEF to provide Central Government deposit position with subtotal of BCG and EBU; (iii) the BM to identify outstanding deposits of INSS, ensuring consistency with the amounts reported in the INSS’ Financial reports; (iv) The authorities should also ratify the classification of the INSS in the Social Security Funds subsector, and adjust all statistics produced accordingly; (v) the BM to publish information on government deposits with the separation by subsector of public administrations; (vi) ) adjust inflows resulting from the issuance of BT channeled into government deposits according to the decision on the statistical treatment of BT issued for fiscal and monetary purpose; (vii) The BM and MEF to implement a formal process of reconciling flows and stock regularly, including explanations of all the differences identified. BM e MEF (DNGDP, DNPED and DNTCEF) \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25", "text_characters": 2465}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**D. PSDS Concepts and Definitions**\n\n**44.** **The compilation of BCG debt statistics in Mozambique uses some concepts and**\n**definitions that are not established in** _**PSDSG 2011**_ **.** As the BCG issuance of BT does not\nconverge to the debt concept (the sum of all liabilities requiring payment(s) of interest and/or\nprincipal by the debtor to the creditor at a given date, or dates, in the future), the mission sought\nto clarify the definition of debt, given the need for the authorities to coordinate the recording of\nBT — between the BM and the MEF.\n\n**45.** **The importance of the PSDS in policy analysis and formulation was explained,** since\nPSDS make it possible to: (i) understand and record the role of government and the public sector\nin an economy; (ii) evaluate a country’s fiscal position and policy orientation, as well as the\nmacroeconomic impact of government policies; (iii) assess fiscal vulnerabilities and risks;\n(iv) improve debt sustainability analysis; (v) foster government accountability and transparency;\n(vi) increase international comparability (for purposes of comparison and learning across\ncountries, but also to underpin fiscal surveillance mechanisms for regional integration).\n\n**46.** **Debt was presented as a subset of liabilities,** and the debt instruments were reviewed\n(including all liability instruments, excluding shares and units in investment funds, financial\nderivatives, and employee stock options).\n\n**47.** **The concepts of gross debt and net debt were introduced, since the DSA should not**\n**be based on the gross debt position alone.** While gross debt represents financial claims that\nrequire the payment(s) of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date, or\ndates, in the future, net debt is calculated as the gross debt minus the financial assets\ncorresponding to the individual debt instruments.\n\n**48.** **The mission noted that the compilation of BCG debt statistics should include all**\n**debt liabilities owed by resident public sector units to other residents and nonresidents.**\nHowever, the report of domestic and external debt does not fulfill the residence accounting\nprinciple, since total issues, at least of OT, are not broken down between amounts invested in by\nresidents and by nonresidents. This information is useful for analysis purposes DSA and to make\nthe link with external sector statistics (balance of payments, IIP, etc.).\n\n**49.** **The BCG debt shown in the Public Financial statements (** _**Conta Geral do Estado**_ **–**\n**CGE) makes it possible to link the evolution of the debt stock and the transactions and**\n**other economic flows.** However, information on debt cancellation/debt forgiveness, and\nchanges resulting from gains and losses of currency exchange, are reported in a single total.\nWhile debt cancellation or forgiveness should be considered as transactions, the gains and losses\nfrom currency exchange should be recorded as other economic flows.\n\n**50.** **In general, public debt is reported at face value.** However, other consistent\nrecognition and valuation criteria (market value, fair value, and nominal value) have been shown\nto the authorities to remind them that the methodology has an impact on the DSA.\n\n\n**26** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nD. PSDS Concepts and Definitions\n\n44. The compilation of BCG debt statistics in Mozambique uses some concepts and\ndefinitions that are not established in _PSDSG 2011_ . As the BCG issuance of BT does not\nconverge to the debt concept (the sum of all liabilities requiring payment(s) of interest and/or\nprincipal by the debtor to the creditor at a given date, or dates, in the future), the mission sought\nto clarify the definition of debt, given the need for the authorities to coordinate the recording of\nBT — between the BM and the MEF.\n\n45. The importance of the PSDS in policy analysis and formulation was explained, since\nPSDS make it possible to: (i) understand and record the role of government and the public sector\nin an economy; (ii) evaluate a country’s fiscal position and policy orientation, as well as the\nmacroeconomic impact of government policies; (iii) assess fiscal vulnerabilities and risks;\n(iv) improve debt sustainability analysis; (v) foster government accountability and transparency;\n(vi) increase international comparability (for purposes of comparison and learning across\ncountries, but also to underpin fiscal surveillance mechanisms for regional integration).\n\n46. Debt was presented as a subset of liabilities, and the debt instruments were reviewed\n(including all liability instruments, excluding shares and units in investment funds, financial\nderivatives, and employee stock options).\n\n47. The concepts of gross debt and net debt were introduced, since the DSA should not\nbe based on the gross debt position alone. While gross debt represents financial claims that\nrequire the payment(s) of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date, or\ndates, in the future, net debt is calculated as the gross debt minus the financial assets\ncorresponding to the individual debt instruments.\n\n48. The mission noted that the compilation of BCG debt statistics should include all\ndebt liabilities owed by resident public sector units to other residents and nonresidents.\nHowever, the report of domestic and external debt does not fulfill the residence accounting\nprinciple, since total issues, at least of OT, are not broken down between amounts invested in by\nresidents and by nonresidents. This information is useful for analysis purposes DSA and to make\nthe link with external sector statistics (balance of payments, IIP, etc.).\n\n49. The BCG debt shown in the Public Financial statements ( _Conta Geral do Estado_ –\nCGE) makes it possible to link the evolution of the debt stock and the transactions and\nother economic flows. However, information on debt cancellation/debt forgiveness, and\nchanges resulting from gains and losses of currency exchange, are reported in a single total.\nWhile debt cancellation or forgiveness should be considered as transactions, the gains and losses\nfrom currency exchange should be recorded as other economic flows.\n\n50. In general, public debt is reported at face value. However, other consistent\nrecognition and valuation criteria (market value, fair value, and nominal value) have been shown\nto the authorities to remind them that the methodology has an impact on the DSA.\n\n26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2697}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**51.** **Another issue reviewed during the mission was the debt cross-analysis, through the**\n**public sector debt matrix.** This matrix should make it possible to evaluate Mozambique’s public\ndebt by instrument held by each subsector of the public sector.\n\n**52.** **The treatment of contingent liabilities was also analyzed.** According to _GFSM 2014_,\nthese liabilities should not be recorded as part of the total liability in macroeconomic statistics,\nunless certain specific conditions are met (e.g. a loan guarantee is called). It is recommended that\ncontingent liabilities are recorded as memorandum items in the balance sheet.\n\n**53.** **Lastly, the debt sustainability framework was presented in the context of**\n**determining the external risk of over-indebtedness.** Public debt can be considered\nsustainable when the primary balance needed to stabilize the debt (at least), both in the base\ncase and in the realistic scenario, is economically and politically viable. In that case the debt level\nis consistent with an acceptably low rollover risk while maintaining potential growth at a\nsatisfactory level.\n\n**54.** **Creation of a Mozambique PSDS Manual that describes all concepts and definitions**\n**and reports the process of compiling PSDS.** The mission reiterates the recommendation to\ndevelop a GFS and PSDS compilation manual (a guide) that presents a living set of working\ninstructions used in the GFS and PSDP compilation process, and which will aid understanding\namong the team compiling this information. These instructions ensure the sustainability\n(institutional memory creation) and consistency of the compilation process. The manual should\ninclude the concepts, definitions, valuation criteria and all other accounting principles used in the\nPSDS compilation process. In addition, the instructions needed for the execution of PSDS tasks\nshould also be described to ensure consistency in the process.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|December
2021
|**_Mozambique GFS and PSDS Manual_**_: _Document the annual and
quarterly GFS compilation process, for institutional memory
purposes, and to ensure consistency in the compilation process,
including the concepts and definitions used.|DNPED
and
DNGDP|\n\n\n\n**E. Compilation of Annual and Quarterly PSDS 2016-2019**\n\n**55.** **The PSDS compilation work done by the mission excluded liabilities that do not**\n**require the payment of interest and/or principal,** such as equity and investment fund units,\nalong with financial derivatives, as defined in the _GFSM 2014_ . This compilation work took account\nof debt instruments and loans and debt securities of Mozambican public sector.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **27**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16000366210938, 450.17999267578125, 539.8400268554688, 546.5396118164062], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n51. Another issue reviewed during the mission was the debt cross-analysis, through the\npublic sector debt matrix. This matrix should make it possible to evaluate Mozambique’s public\ndebt by instrument held by each subsector of the public sector.\n\n52. The treatment of contingent liabilities was also analyzed. According to _GFSM 2014_,\nthese liabilities should not be recorded as part of the total liability in macroeconomic statistics,\nunless certain specific conditions are met (e.g. a loan guarantee is called). It is recommended that\ncontingent liabilities are recorded as memorandum items in the balance sheet.\n\n53. Lastly, the debt sustainability framework was presented in the context of\ndetermining the external risk of over-indebtedness. Public debt can be considered\nsustainable when the primary balance needed to stabilize the debt (at least), both in the base\ncase and in the realistic scenario, is economically and politically viable. In that case the debt level\nis consistent with an acceptably low rollover risk while maintaining potential growth at a\nsatisfactory level.\n\n54. Creation of a Mozambique PSDS Manual that describes all concepts and definitions\nand reports the process of compiling PSDS. The mission reiterates the recommendation to\ndevelop a GFS and PSDS compilation manual (a guide) that presents a living set of working\ninstructions used in the GFS and PSDP compilation process, and which will aid understanding\namong the team compiling this information. These instructions ensure the sustainability\n(institutional memory creation) and consistency of the compilation process. The manual should\ninclude the concepts, definitions, valuation criteria and all other accounting principles used in the\nPSDS compilation process. In addition, the instructions needed for the execution of PSDS tasks\nshould also be described to ensure consistency in the process.\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n December 2021 _Mozambique GFS and PSDS Manual__: _Document the annual and quarterly GFS compilation process, for institutional memory purposes, and to ensure consistency in the compilation process, including the concepts and definitions used. DNPED and DNGDP \n\nE. Compilation of Annual and Quarterly PSDS 2016-2019\n\n55. The PSDS compilation work done by the mission excluded liabilities that do not\nrequire the payment of interest and/or principal, such as equity and investment fund units,\nalong with financial derivatives, as defined in the _GFSM 2014_ . This compilation work took account\nof debt instruments and loans and debt securities of Mozambican public sector.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 27", "text_characters": 2260}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**56.** **The mission carried out a preliminary PSDS compilation exercise in Excel.** An Excel\nfile was created to compile detailed annual PSDS data by subsector. In addition, quarterly data\nfrom the first quarter of 2019 was also compiled for total BCG debt.\n\n**57.** **The preliminary PSDS compilation exercise could approximate to Mozambique’s**\n**total public sector debt.** The PSDS work compiled during the mission considered the domestic\nand external debt data of the BCG, data on loans of the municipalities and the INSS, and\nliabilities reported by SEE, including those of the BM. According to the authorities, this exercise\ncould cover the majority of public sector debt. However, the exercise does not include the\namounts of the EBU debt and was calculated on a best-effort basis.\n\n**58.** **Currently, and as far as government debt is concerned, the MEF only compiles the**\n**debt of the BCG.** During the mission, the MEF sought additional information on the debt of the\nother general government subsectors. These efforts were unfruitful; but the mission’s work made\nit possible to collect data on local government debt and social security funds, based on\npublished information. It was not possible to obtain information from the EBU.\n\n**59.** **The debt of nonfinancial public sector was calculated from information published**\n**in the MEF public debt report.** The figures for financial sector public debt incorporate BM data\nonly.\n\n**60.** **According to the preliminary PSDS compilation exercise, as reported in the**\n**following table, total public sector debt at end-2018 amounted to Mt 1.213 trillion, or**\n**135.5 percent of GDP. The unconsolidated general government debt amounted to Mt**\n**756.421 billion in 2019,** which represents an increase of Mt 18.823 billion compared to end2018. In 2019 general government debt represented 79 percent of GDP, compared to 82.4\npercent of GDP at end-2018.\n\n**61.** **Nonfinancial public sector debt, excluding units of general government, amounted**\n**to Mt 130.248 billion at the end of 2019, an increase of Mt 15.179 billion over the previous**\n**year.** As a percentage of GDP, in 2019 the debt of the nonfinancial public sector was 13.6\npercent, up from 12.8 percent at the end of 2018. During the mission, differences were found in\nthe figures for some companies between the debt report published by MEF and the figures\nshown in the financial reports of the companies themselves. For example, the debt of Petromoc\nreported by MEF in 2019 was Mt 10.305 billion, whereas, in the company’s financial report,\ncurrent and noncurrent loans amounted to Mt 11.570 billion, thus leaving an amount of Mt 1.266\nbillion unexplained. The mission asked the national authorities, in particular IGEPE, to investigate\nthese differences.\n\n**62.** **BM debt represented about 40 percent of GDP in 2017 and 2018.** Data for late 2019\nare not yet available to the central bank.\n\n\n**28** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n56. The mission carried out a preliminary PSDS compilation exercise in Excel. An Excel\nfile was created to compile detailed annual PSDS data by subsector. In addition, quarterly data\nfrom the first quarter of 2019 was also compiled for total BCG debt.\n\n57. The preliminary PSDS compilation exercise could approximate to Mozambique’s\ntotal public sector debt. The PSDS work compiled during the mission considered the domestic\nand external debt data of the BCG, data on loans of the municipalities and the INSS, and\nliabilities reported by SEE, including those of the BM. According to the authorities, this exercise\ncould cover the majority of public sector debt. However, the exercise does not include the\namounts of the EBU debt and was calculated on a best-effort basis.\n\n58. Currently, and as far as government debt is concerned, the MEF only compiles the\ndebt of the BCG. During the mission, the MEF sought additional information on the debt of the\nother general government subsectors. These efforts were unfruitful; but the mission’s work made\nit possible to collect data on local government debt and social security funds, based on\npublished information. It was not possible to obtain information from the EBU.\n\n59. The debt of nonfinancial public sector was calculated from information published\nin the MEF public debt report. The figures for financial sector public debt incorporate BM data\nonly.\n\n60. According to the preliminary PSDS compilation exercise, as reported in the\nfollowing table, total public sector debt at end-2018 amounted to Mt 1.213 trillion, or\n135.5 percent of GDP. The unconsolidated general government debt amounted to Mt\n756.421 billion in 2019, which represents an increase of Mt 18.823 billion compared to end2018. In 2019 general government debt represented 79 percent of GDP, compared to 82.4\npercent of GDP at end-2018.\n\n61. Nonfinancial public sector debt, excluding units of general government, amounted\nto Mt 130.248 billion at the end of 2019, an increase of Mt 15.179 billion over the previous\nyear. As a percentage of GDP, in 2019 the debt of the nonfinancial public sector was 13.6\npercent, up from 12.8 percent at the end of 2018. During the mission, differences were found in\nthe figures for some companies between the debt report published by MEF and the figures\nshown in the financial reports of the companies themselves. For example, the debt of Petromoc\nreported by MEF in 2019 was Mt 10.305 billion, whereas, in the company’s financial report,\ncurrent and noncurrent loans amounted to Mt 11.570 billion, thus leaving an amount of Mt 1.266\nbillion unexplained. The mission asked the national authorities, in particular IGEPE, to investigate\nthese differences.\n\n62. BM debt represented about 40 percent of GDP in 2017 and 2018. Data for late 2019\nare not yet available to the central bank.\n\n28 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2418}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**Table 5. Gross Public Sector Debt Stock** **by Sub-sector - Preliminary**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|By subsector
General government|2016
702,782|2017
663,030|2018
737,598|2019
756,421|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**_% of GDP_**
|
**_93.4_**
|
**_78.9_**
|
**_82.4_**
|
**_79.1_**
|\n|Central government
|701,708
|661,370
|736,076
|
754,077
|\n|
Extrabudgetary units
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|\n|
Local government
|
1,074
|
1,658
|1,520
|
2,271
|\n|
Social security
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
73
|\n|
**Nonfinancial public enterprises**
|
_n.a._
|
**58,864**
|
**115,068**
|
**130,248**
|\n|
**_% of GDP_**
|_n.a._
|
**_7.0_**
|
**_12.8_**
|
**_13.6_**
|\n|**Financial public enterprises (BM)**
|**205,857**
|**336,261**
|**361,224**
|
_n.a._
|\n|
**_% of GDP_**
|
**_27.3_**
|
**_40.0_**
|
**_40.3_**
|
_n.a._
|\n|**Total public sector**
|_n.a._
|**1,058,155**
|**1,213,891**
|
_n.a._
|\n|
**_ % of GDP_**
|_n.a._
|
**_125.9_**
|
**_135.5_**
|
_n.a._
|\n|**Memorandum item: GDP**
|**752,702**|**840,526**|**895,567**|
**956,786**|\n\n\n**Table 6. Central Government Gross Debt Stock per holder/instrument - Preliminary**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Central government debt|2016|2017|2018|2019|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|
**_By holder / instrument_**
|\n|**Total**
|**702 782**
|
**663 030**
|**737 598**
|**754 077**
|\n|
**_% of GDP_**
|
**_93.4_**
|
**_78.9_**
|
**_82.4_**
|
**_78.8_**
|\n|Debt securities
|86 294
|
97 649
|111 881
|144 766
|\n|
Loans
|
616 487
|
565 381
|
625 717
|
609 311
|\n|
**External**
|
**613 998**
|
**554 470**
|
**596 699**
|
**599 482**
|\n|
Debt securities
|
52 818
|
43 424
|
44 216
|
54 774
|\n|
Loans
|
561 180
|
511 046
|
552 483
|
544 708
|\n|
**Domestic**
|
**88 784**
|
**108 560**
|
**140 899**
|
**154 595**
|\n|
Debt securities
|
33 476
|
54 225
|
67 665
|
89 992
|\n|
Loans
|
55 307|
54 334|
73 234|
64 603|\n\n\n**63.** **In relation to debt by instrument, over 80 percent of the BCG debt is represented**\n**by loans.** The external debt also represents about 80 percent of the total debt, as can be seen in\nthe above table.\n\n\n\n**64.** **The available data made it possible to compile the quarterly central government**\n**gross debt information.** Data from the fourth quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2020 are\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **29**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.96524810791016, 114.4006118774414, 540.0337524414062, 332.2400207519531], "columns": 5, "rows": 13}, {"bbox": [89.96524810791016, 416.4516906738281, 540.0337524414062, 602.1199951171875], "columns": 5, "rows": 12}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTable 5. Gross Public Sector Debt Stock by Sub-sector - Preliminary\n\n By subsector General government 2016 702,782 2017 663,030 2018 737,598 2019 756,421 \n\n _% of GDP_ _93.4_ _78.9_ _82.4_ _79.1_ \n Central government 701,708 661,370 736,076 754,077 \n Extrabudgetary units n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. \n Local government 1,074 1,658 1,520 2,271 \n Social security 1 2 2 73 \n Nonfinancial public enterprises _n.a._ 58,864 115,068 130,248 \n _% of GDP_ _n.a._ _7.0_ _12.8_ _13.6_ \n Financial public enterprises (BM) 205,857 336,261 361,224 _n.a._ \n _% of GDP_ _27.3_ _40.0_ _40.3_ _n.a._ \n Total public sector _n.a._ 1,058,155 1,213,891 _n.a._ \n _ % of GDP_ _n.a._ _125.9_ _135.5_ _n.a._ \n Memorandum item: GDP 752,702 840,526 895,567 956,786 \n\nTable 6. Central Government Gross Debt Stock per holder/instrument - Preliminary\n\n Central government debt 2016 2017 2018 2019 \n\n _By holder / instrument_ _By holder / instrument_ _By holder / instrument_ _By holder / instrument_ _By holder / instrument_ \n Total 702 782 663 030 737 598 754 077 \n _% of GDP_ _93.4_ _78.9_ _82.4_ _78.8_ \n Debt securities 86 294 97 649 111 881 144 766 \n Loans 616 487 565 381 625 717 609 311 \n External 613 998 554 470 596 699 599 482 \n Debt securities 52 818 43 424 44 216 54 774 \n Loans 561 180 511 046 552 483 544 708 \n Domestic 88 784 108 560 140 899 154 595 \n Debt securities 33 476 54 225 67 665 89 992 \n Loans 55 307 54 334 73 234 64 603 \n\n63. In relation to debt by instrument, over 80 percent of the BCG debt is represented\nby loans. The external debt also represents about 80 percent of the total debt, as can be seen in\nthe above table.\n\n64. The available data made it possible to compile the quarterly central government\ngross debt information. Data from the fourth quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2020 are\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 29", "text_characters": 1479}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nshown in the following table. It should be noted that in 2020, the central government debt\naccumulated an increase of Mt 108.264 billion, i.e. an increase of 14 percent compared to the\nend of 2019.\n\n**Table 7. Quarterly Central Government Gross Debt Stock** **- Preliminary**\n\n\n\n|Quarterly Central Government debt|Total|External|Domestic|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|2018 Q4
|736,076
|596,699
|139,377
|\n|
2019 Q1
|
732,873
|
613,396
|
119,477
|\n|
2019 Q2
|
787,102
|
626,662
|
160,440
|\n|
2019 Q3
|
797,027
|
625,533
|
171,494
|\n|
2019 Q4
|
754,077
|
599,482
|
154,595
|\n|
2020 Q1
|
806,832
|
636,032
|
170,800
|\n|
2020 Q2
|
862,341
|
679,597
|
182,744
|\n|
Change in 2020
|
108,264|
80,115|
28,149|\n\n\n**65.** **The quarterly BCG debt data compiled according to the** _**PSDSG**_ **could be included in**\n**the debt reports and should be submitted to the joint World Bank and IMF database.** In\naddition to the already existing publication of quarterly public debt reports, the mission suggests\nthat this information could be included in the PSDS reporting template, and creation of long time\nseries.\n\n**66.** **The BCG’s net debt amounted to Mt 466.874 billion in 2018.** In the case of the BCG\nand using the financial assets data compiled under the previous mission, it appears that the\ncentral government debt net of total financial assets represented **52 percent of GDP in 2018**, as\nshown in the following table. Updating the details of financial assets and liabilities for the most\nrecent periods will make it possible to keep this indicator up to date; so, the suggestion is that it\nbe compiled on a regular basis. It was impossible to calculate the net debt balance of the entire\npublic sector, owing to the lack of data on financial assets. It is therefore recommended that\nefforts be made to obtain this information, since net debt can be a more accurate indicator of a\ncountry’s solvency/sustainability, especially in circumstances where government financial assets\nare more liquid (such as deposits) and can be easily used in the short term, making it possible to\npay debts on maturity. Financial assets may also be used for economic or political reasons to\nreduce unsustainable debts.\n\n\n**30** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [92.95199584960938, 171.38400268554688, 537.0480346679688, 320.9759826660156], "columns": 4, "rows": 9}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nshown in the following table. It should be noted that in 2020, the central government debt\naccumulated an increase of Mt 108.264 billion, i.e. an increase of 14 percent compared to the\nend of 2019.\n\nTable 7. Quarterly Central Government Gross Debt Stock - Preliminary\n\n Quarterly Central Government debt Total External Domestic \n\n 2018 Q4 736,076 596,699 139,377 \n 2019 Q1 732,873 613,396 119,477 \n 2019 Q2 787,102 626,662 160,440 \n 2019 Q3 797,027 625,533 171,494 \n 2019 Q4 754,077 599,482 154,595 \n 2020 Q1 806,832 636,032 170,800 \n 2020 Q2 862,341 679,597 182,744 \n Change in 2020 108,264 80,115 28,149 \n\n65. The quarterly BCG debt data compiled according to the _PSDSG_ could be included in\nthe debt reports and should be submitted to the joint World Bank and IMF database. In\naddition to the already existing publication of quarterly public debt reports, the mission suggests\nthat this information could be included in the PSDS reporting template, and creation of long time\nseries.\n\n66. The BCG’s net debt amounted to Mt 466.874 billion in 2018. In the case of the BCG\nand using the financial assets data compiled under the previous mission, it appears that the\ncentral government debt net of total financial assets represented 52 percent of GDP in 2018, as\nshown in the following table. Updating the details of financial assets and liabilities for the most\nrecent periods will make it possible to keep this indicator up to date; so, the suggestion is that it\nbe compiled on a regular basis. It was impossible to calculate the net debt balance of the entire\npublic sector, owing to the lack of data on financial assets. It is therefore recommended that\nefforts be made to obtain this information, since net debt can be a more accurate indicator of a\ncountry’s solvency/sustainability, especially in circumstances where government financial assets\nare more liquid (such as deposits) and can be easily used in the short term, making it possible to\npay debts on maturity. Financial assets may also be used for economic or political reasons to\nreduce unsustainable debts.\n\n30 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1759}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**Table 8. Central Government Net Debt Stock** **- Preliminary**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|2016|2017|2018|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
**Central government debt net of total financial assets**
|
**516,693**
|
**408,738**
|
**466,874**
|\n|
**_% of GDP_**|
**_68.6_**|
**_48.6_**|
**_52.1_**|\n\n\n\nMemorandum item: BCG financial assets 185,015 252,632 269,202\n\n\n**67.** **Currently, Mozambican authorities do not transmit the PSDS through the joint**\n**World Bank / IMF PSDS program.** In view of the PSDS compilation exercise carried out during\nthe mission, it is recommended that the authorities complete the missing information and review\nthe figures to ensure that the PSDS compilation work reflects the reality of the public sector. The\nmission provided guidance on completing the quarterly public sector debt (QPSDS) form,\ntogether with instructions on how to transmit the information. It also filled out the information\non a preliminary basis, which could be sent to international institutions once validated. The\nsubmission of data to the of the World Bank / IMF quarterly database is highly recommended, to\npromote fiscal transparency.\n\n**68.** **Mozambique will have to start publishing PSDS including the SEE.** According to the\nimplementation of the Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP), which is part of the\nInternational Development Association (IDA) comprehensive policy toolkit to address debt\nvulnerabilities, as from May 2021, the Mozambican government will have to publish the 2020 and\nsubsequent annual debt reports with a coverage that includes the State-owned enterprises (SEE)\nand Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) debt. The mission’s meeting with the World Bank’s country\noffice team concluded that the country has now another incentive to organize to compile and\ndisseminate the PSDS according to international standards.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|April 2021|**Mozambique’s PSDS for the years 2016-2019 compiled during**
**the mission.**(i) validate and complete the missing information, for
subsectors of the public sector; (ii) extend the exercise to other
years; (iii) publish in the joint database of the World Bank and the
IMF, as well as on the MEF website_._
|DNGDP|\n|December
2020|
**Quarterly PSDS of Mozambique compiled during the mission.**
(i) validate the dada compiled during the mission; (ii) extend the
exercise to other years; and (iii) publish in the joint World Bank
and IMF database and on the MEF website_._|DNGDP|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **31**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.45350646972656, 150.38462829589844, 539.4400024414062, 197.3764190673828], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}, {"bbox": [90.45350646972656, 535.9793701171875, 539.4400024414062, 701.8200073242188], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nTable 8. Central Government Net Debt Stock - Preliminary\n\n Col1 2016 2017 2018 \n\n Central government debt net of total financial assets 516,693 408,738 466,874 \n _% of GDP_ _68.6_ _48.6_ _52.1_ \n\nMemorandum item: BCG financial assets 185,015 252,632 269,202\n\n67. Currently, Mozambican authorities do not transmit the PSDS through the joint\nWorld Bank / IMF PSDS program. In view of the PSDS compilation exercise carried out during\nthe mission, it is recommended that the authorities complete the missing information and review\nthe figures to ensure that the PSDS compilation work reflects the reality of the public sector. The\nmission provided guidance on completing the quarterly public sector debt (QPSDS) form,\ntogether with instructions on how to transmit the information. It also filled out the information\non a preliminary basis, which could be sent to international institutions once validated. The\nsubmission of data to the of the World Bank / IMF quarterly database is highly recommended, to\npromote fiscal transparency.\n\n68. Mozambique will have to start publishing PSDS including the SEE. According to the\nimplementation of the Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP), which is part of the\nInternational Development Association (IDA) comprehensive policy toolkit to address debt\nvulnerabilities, as from May 2021, the Mozambican government will have to publish the 2020 and\nsubsequent annual debt reports with a coverage that includes the State-owned enterprises (SEE)\nand Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) debt. The mission’s meeting with the World Bank’s country\noffice team concluded that the country has now another incentive to organize to compile and\ndisseminate the PSDS according to international standards.\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n April 2021 Mozambique’s PSDS for the years 2016-2019 compiled during the mission.(i) validate and complete the missing information, for subsectors of the public sector; (ii) extend the exercise to other years; (iii) publish in the joint database of the World Bank and the IMF, as well as on the MEF website_._ DNGDP \n December 2020 Quarterly PSDS of Mozambique compiled during the mission. (i) validate the dada compiled during the mission; (ii) extend the exercise to other years; and (iii) publish in the joint World Bank and IMF database and on the MEF website_._ DNGDP \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 31", "text_characters": 2026}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|December
2021|**Budgetary central government debt.**Present information
systematically by instrument and counterpart sector, and in a time
series format, to make it easier to transpose the compiled data
into the IMF reporting templates_._
|MEF|\n|Immediately|
**Debt of public companies.** (i) Petromoc: the source of
discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt
report and the values recorded in the company’s financial report
should be clarified by the IGEPE; (ii) the same reconciliation work
should be extended to other companies, to see whether identical
situations exist.
|IGEPE / MEF|\n|December
2021|
**Coverage of instruments in the PSDS.**Extend the instrument
coverage of the PSDS to cover most of the instruments listed in
the IMF’s PSDS compilation guide (loans, debt securities, SDRs,
cash and deposits, insurance, pensions and standardized
guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable).
|MEF|\n|December
2021
|
**Financial assets.** The Mozambican authorities should start to
compile the financial assets of the general public sector, with a
view to compiling public debt net of financial assets (net debt).|MEF|\n\n\n\n**F. Resources, training, and technical assistance**\n\n**69.** **MEF staff has limited knowledge of the PSDS.** Following the approval of the new MEF\nlaw _(estatuto orgânico)_ and the creation of the new directorate in charge of managing and\ncompiling the public debt, new teams of technical staff were formed with little or no experience\nin compiling the PSDS. The mission understands that there is a need for capacity building among\nthe staff on the methodological requirements of _GFSM 2014_ and _PSDSG_ (scope, content of\noperations, relationship between flows and stocks, etc.) for better application to the reality of\nMozambique. It is recommended that the teams participate actively on courses organized by the\nIMF and the World Bank. It should also be noted that the supply of online courses has increased,\nin response to the current COVID-19 pandemic restrictions; and these could be a very good\nalternative to face-to-face courses.\n\n**70.** **The authorities requested PSDS manuals in Portuguese** . The authorities mentioned\nthat the methodological literature for compiling the PSDS is in English, which creates a barrier\nwhen training teams do not have strong English skills. The authorities asked for manuals and\nother relevant materials, as well as PSDS training, to be provided in Portuguese.\n\n**71.** **Debt management system needs to be updated.** One of the authorities’ major\nconcerns related to the debt is the debt management system. According to information obtained\nfrom the debt team, external debt is managed through the CS-DRMS 2000+ system developed\nby Commonwealth. This system has recently been reorganized, with support from AFRITAC\n\n\n**32** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.96041870117188, 72.17999267578125, 539.7999877929688, 358.7400207519531], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n December 2021 Budgetary central government debt.Present information systematically by instrument and counterpart sector, and in a time series format, to make it easier to transpose the compiled data into the IMF reporting templates_._ MEF \n Immediately Debt of public companies. (i) Petromoc: the source of discrepancies between the amounts presented in the MEF debt report and the values recorded in the company’s financial report should be clarified by the IGEPE; (ii) the same reconciliation work should be extended to other companies, to see whether identical situations exist. IGEPE / MEF \n December 2021 Coverage of instruments in the PSDS.Extend the instrument coverage of the PSDS to cover most of the instruments listed in the IMF’s PSDS compilation guide (loans, debt securities, SDRs, cash and deposits, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable). MEF \n December 2021 Financial assets. The Mozambican authorities should start to compile the financial assets of the general public sector, with a view to compiling public debt net of financial assets (net debt). MEF \n\nF. Resources, training, and technical assistance\n\n69. MEF staff has limited knowledge of the PSDS. Following the approval of the new MEF\nlaw _(estatuto orgânico)_ and the creation of the new directorate in charge of managing and\ncompiling the public debt, new teams of technical staff were formed with little or no experience\nin compiling the PSDS. The mission understands that there is a need for capacity building among\nthe staff on the methodological requirements of _GFSM 2014_ and _PSDSG_ (scope, content of\noperations, relationship between flows and stocks, etc.) for better application to the reality of\nMozambique. It is recommended that the teams participate actively on courses organized by the\nIMF and the World Bank. It should also be noted that the supply of online courses has increased,\nin response to the current COVID-19 pandemic restrictions; and these could be a very good\nalternative to face-to-face courses.\n\n70. The authorities requested PSDS manuals in Portuguese . The authorities mentioned\nthat the methodological literature for compiling the PSDS is in English, which creates a barrier\nwhen training teams do not have strong English skills. The authorities asked for manuals and\nother relevant materials, as well as PSDS training, to be provided in Portuguese.\n\n71. Debt management system needs to be updated. One of the authorities’ major\nconcerns related to the debt is the debt management system. According to information obtained\nfrom the debt team, external debt is managed through the CS-DRMS 2000+ system developed\nby Commonwealth. This system has recently been reorganized, with support from AFRITAC\n\n32 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2411}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\nSouth. Domestic debt is managed through Excel files, which the mission considers to be a risk for\nthe calculation of robust PSDS, since it involves a lot of human intervention.\n\n**72.** **The new debt management system is at an embryonic stage of development.** The\nmission learned that a new debt management system tailored to Mozambique’s needs is to be\nimplemented. The system will be financed by the European Union and the process is currently\nbeing put out to tender to contract a company to develop the system within eight-month\ntimeline. It is recommended that this system includes automation of the domestic debt\nmanagement process, and the creation of a public debt database that will make it possible to\ncompile the PSDSs without the need for major human intervention. Synchronization between this\nnew system and e-SISTAFE is desirable to ensure consistency between PSDS data and those of\nthe GFS. In addition, automatic generation of the PSDS would guarantee efficiency and\neffectiveness in the process of compiling PSDS data and would enable the teams to concentrate\non analyzing the debt data.\n\n**73.** **The provision of technical assistance is highly desirable, to support the continuity**\n**of the PSDS** **compilation according to international best practices** . The IMF/STA Government\nFinance Division is always available to support the authorities with the specific GFS and PSDS\ncompilation issues; while more comprehensive technical assistance can be provided at the\nrequest of the Mozambican authorities.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Deadline|Recommendations|Responsible
institution|\n|---|---|---|\n|Continuous|**_Staff training_**_: _Provide training for staff, including through
participation in the various GFS and PSDS courses run by the IMF.
|DNPED
and
DNGDP|\n|December
2022
|
**_Development of the new debt system:_**(i) Make sure the new
system allows the management of domestic debt in an automated
way; (ii) Ensure system allows the archive of debt data and automatic
generation of EDSP tables; (iii) Interconnect the domestic and
external debt management systems with e-SISTAFE.|
DNGDP|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **33**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.18000030517578, 378.17999267578125, 539.8200073242188, 515.8200073242188], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nSouth. Domestic debt is managed through Excel files, which the mission considers to be a risk for\nthe calculation of robust PSDS, since it involves a lot of human intervention.\n\n72. The new debt management system is at an embryonic stage of development. The\nmission learned that a new debt management system tailored to Mozambique’s needs is to be\nimplemented. The system will be financed by the European Union and the process is currently\nbeing put out to tender to contract a company to develop the system within eight-month\ntimeline. It is recommended that this system includes automation of the domestic debt\nmanagement process, and the creation of a public debt database that will make it possible to\ncompile the PSDSs without the need for major human intervention. Synchronization between this\nnew system and e-SISTAFE is desirable to ensure consistency between PSDS data and those of\nthe GFS. In addition, automatic generation of the PSDS would guarantee efficiency and\neffectiveness in the process of compiling PSDS data and would enable the teams to concentrate\non analyzing the debt data.\n\n73. The provision of technical assistance is highly desirable, to support the continuity\nof the PSDS compilation according to international best practices . The IMF/STA Government\nFinance Division is always available to support the authorities with the specific GFS and PSDS\ncompilation issues; while more comprehensive technical assistance can be provided at the\nrequest of the Mozambican authorities.\n\n Deadline Recommendations Responsible institution \n\n Continuous _Staff training__: _Provide training for staff, including through participation in the various GFS and PSDS courses run by the IMF. DNPED and DNGDP \n December 2022 _Development of the new debt system:_(i) Make sure the new system allows the management of domestic debt in an automated way; (ii) Ensure system allows the archive of debt data and automatic generation of EDSP tables; (iii) Interconnect the domestic and external debt management systems with e-SISTAFE. DNGDP \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 33", "text_characters": 1764}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**Appendix I. Senior Staff and Technicians Contacted During the Mission**\n\n|Name|Institution|Position|\n|---|---|---|\n|Enilde Sarmento
|MEF/DNPED
|Director
|\n|
Isabel Sumar
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Director
|\n|
Ester José
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Angelo Nhalidele
|
MEF/DNPED
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Chamila Aly
|
MEF/DNTCEF
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Domingos Fumo
|
BM/DER
|
Deputy Director
|\n|
Augusto Zopene
|
MEF/DNTCEF
|
Head of Department
|\n|
Bento Ranchol
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Head of Department
|\n|
Glória Janeiro
|
BVM
|
Director
|\n|
Amorim Pery
|
BVM
|
Operations Director
|\n|
Aquino Chilundo
|
BM/DER
|
Technician
|\n|
Ângelo Ferreira
|
MEF/DNPED
|
Technician
|\n|
Assissy Aly
|
MEF/DNPED
|
Technician
|\n|
Breatriz Tovela
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|\n|
Orlando Penicela
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|\n|
Candido Jeque
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|\n|
Lauzeta Cossa
|
MEF/DNGDP
|
Technician
|\n|
Roberto Sousa
|
IGEPE
|
Technician
|\n|
Ailton Jose
|
IGEPE
|
Technician
|\n|
Pradipa Aunvattal
|
MEF/GGR
|
Technician
|\n|
Esther Palácio|
IMF Mozambique|
Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator|\n\n\n\n**34** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22956848144531, 123.4193344116211, 539.7704467773438, 440.94000244140625], "columns": 3, "rows": 22}], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nAppendix I. Senior Staff and Technicians Contacted During the Mission\n\n Name Institution Position \n\n Enilde Sarmento MEF/DNPED Director \n Isabel Sumar MEF/DNGDP Director \n Ester José MEF/DNGDP Deputy Director \n Angelo Nhalidele MEF/DNPED Deputy Director \n Chamila Aly MEF/DNTCEF Deputy Director \n Domingos Fumo BM/DER Deputy Director \n Augusto Zopene MEF/DNTCEF Head of Department \n Bento Ranchol MEF/DNGDP Head of Department \n Glória Janeiro BVM Director \n Amorim Pery BVM Operations Director \n Aquino Chilundo BM/DER Technician \n Ângelo Ferreira MEF/DNPED Technician \n Assissy Aly MEF/DNPED Technician \n Breatriz Tovela MEF/DNGDP Technician \n Orlando Penicela MEF/DNGDP Technician \n Candido Jeque MEF/DNGDP Technician \n Lauzeta Cossa MEF/DNGDP Technician \n Roberto Sousa IGEPE Technician \n Ailton Jose IGEPE Technician \n Pradipa Aunvattal MEF/GGR Technician \n Esther Palácio IMF Mozambique Technical Assistance Advisor and Coordinator \n\n34 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 828}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**Appendix II. Protocol for institutional cooperation on Government**\n\n**Finance Statistics**\n\n\n**PROTOCOL** **FOR** **INSTITUTIONAL** **COOPERATION** **IN** **THE** **FIELD**\n\n\n**OF** **GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS**\n\n\n**MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE,**\n\n**BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE,**\n\n\n**AND**\n\n**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS**\n\n\n**I.** **SCOPE**\n\n\n\n1. In view of the need to organize the process of compiling Government Finance Statistics (GFS)\n\n\n\nand Public Sector Debt Statistics (PSDS) among the different actors, the Ministry of Economy\n\n\n\nand Finance of Mozambique (MEF) proposes to create a Government Finance Statistics\n\n\n\nCompilation Committee (hereinafter GFSCC);\n\n\n\n2. Mindful of the responsibilities and autonomy of the signatory entities, this Protocol specifies\n\n\n\nthe objectives of the GFSCC, its members and their responsibilities, and the main results to be\n\n\n\nachieved; and it aims to foster cooperation on GFS and PSDS among the signatory entities,\n\n\n\nfocusing on the following activities:\n\n\n\n(a) Definition and updating of the universe of institutional units in the general government\n\nsector and the extended public sector;\n\n(b) Preparation of GFS;\n\n(c) Preparation of PSDS.\n\n**II.** **OBJECTIVES**\n\n1. Institutional cooperation on Government Finance statistics has the following objectives:\n\n(a) Contribute to the compilation of quality GFS and PSDS by developing institutional\n\ncooperation mechanisms between the signatory entities, to uphold demanding standards\n\nin terms of the reliability and consistency of basic information, based on best practices in\n\nthis field.\n\n(b) Contribute to the timely dissemination of GFS and PSDS;\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **35**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nAppendix II. Protocol for institutional cooperation on Government\n\nFinance Statistics\n\nPROTOCOL FOR INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD\n\nOF GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS\n\nMINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE,\n\nBANK OF MOZAMBIQUE,\n\nAND\n\nNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS\n\nI. SCOPE\n\n1. In view of the need to organize the process of compiling Government Finance Statistics (GFS)\n\nand Public Sector Debt Statistics (PSDS) among the different actors, the Ministry of Economy\n\nand Finance of Mozambique (MEF) proposes to create a Government Finance Statistics\n\nCompilation Committee (hereinafter GFSCC);\n\n2. Mindful of the responsibilities and autonomy of the signatory entities, this Protocol specifies\n\nthe objectives of the GFSCC, its members and their responsibilities, and the main results to be\n\nachieved; and it aims to foster cooperation on GFS and PSDS among the signatory entities,\n\nfocusing on the following activities:\n\n(a) Definition and updating of the universe of institutional units in the general government\n\nsector and the extended public sector;\n\n(b) Preparation of GFS;\n\n(c) Preparation of PSDS.\n\nII. OBJECTIVES\n\n1. Institutional cooperation on Government Finance statistics has the following objectives:\n\n(a) Contribute to the compilation of quality GFS and PSDS by developing institutional\n\ncooperation mechanisms between the signatory entities, to uphold demanding standards\n\nin terms of the reliability and consistency of basic information, based on best practices in\n\nthis field.\n\n(b) Contribute to the timely dissemination of GFS and PSDS;\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35", "text_characters": 1355}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n(c) Contribute to the definition of more efficient mechanisms for sharing basic information\n\non GFS;\n\n(d) Facilitate the comparison of the various data sources and identification of the main\n\ndifferences, with a view to obtaining more robust results.\n\n(e) Coordinate the planning of activities to fulfill the official statistics production schedules.\n\n\n**III.** **COMMITTEE MEMBERS**\n\n1. For the purpose of implementing this Protocol, a GFSCC is created, which should include\n\nrepresentatives of the MEF – National Directorate Economic Policies and Development\n\n(DNPED), National Directorate of Public Debt Management (DNGDP), National Directorate of\n\nthe Treasury and Economic and Financial Cooperation (DNTCEF), National Directorate of\n\nPublic Accounts (DNCP), National Directorate of Planning and Budget (DNPO), National\n\nDirectorate of Public Assets (DNPE), Risk Management Office (GGR), the Bank of Mozambique\n\n(BM), and the National Institute of Statistics (INE).\n\n2. The GFSCC will be coordinated by the Director of the MEF DNPED.\n\n3. The GFSCC has the following main duties:\n\n(a) Establish the detailed indicative timetable for the compilation of general government\n\nstatistics, taking into account, inter alia, the deadlines for reporting to international\n\ninstitutions, such as IMF;\n\n(b) Contribute to the preparation and updating of the Government Finance Statistics Manual\n\nand Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide for Compilers and Users.\n\n(c) Contribute to the identification of required basic information and implementation of\n\nsolutions to access it;\n\n(d) Contribute to the preparation of, and participation in, the visits of delegations of\n\ninternational institutions in this field, based on a sharing of responsibilities among the\n\nsignatory entities;\n\n(e) Cooperate in clarifying doubts and discussing methodological options in the compilation\n\nof GFS and PSDS, including those related to the clarification of relevant issues concerning\n\nthe statistical treatment of operations with a significant impact on financing\n\ncapacity/need and public sector debt;\n\n(f) Analyze the consistency of the statistical results obtained.\n\n4. Participation in the GFSCC may also be extended to the following entities, through occasional\n\ninvitation depending on the issues to be dealt with:\n\n\n**36** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n(c) Contribute to the definition of more efficient mechanisms for sharing basic information\n\non GFS;\n\n(d) Facilitate the comparison of the various data sources and identification of the main\n\ndifferences, with a view to obtaining more robust results.\n\n(e) Coordinate the planning of activities to fulfill the official statistics production schedules.\n\nIII. COMMITTEE MEMBERS\n\n1. For the purpose of implementing this Protocol, a GFSCC is created, which should include\n\nrepresentatives of the MEF – National Directorate Economic Policies and Development\n\n(DNPED), National Directorate of Public Debt Management (DNGDP), National Directorate of\n\nthe Treasury and Economic and Financial Cooperation (DNTCEF), National Directorate of\n\nPublic Accounts (DNCP), National Directorate of Planning and Budget (DNPO), National\n\nDirectorate of Public Assets (DNPE), Risk Management Office (GGR), the Bank of Mozambique\n\n(BM), and the National Institute of Statistics (INE).\n\n2. The GFSCC will be coordinated by the Director of the MEF DNPED.\n\n3. The GFSCC has the following main duties:\n\n(a) Establish the detailed indicative timetable for the compilation of general government\n\nstatistics, taking into account, inter alia, the deadlines for reporting to international\n\ninstitutions, such as IMF;\n\n(b) Contribute to the preparation and updating of the Government Finance Statistics Manual\n\nand Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide for Compilers and Users.\n\n(c) Contribute to the identification of required basic information and implementation of\n\nsolutions to access it;\n\n(d) Contribute to the preparation of, and participation in, the visits of delegations of\n\ninternational institutions in this field, based on a sharing of responsibilities among the\n\nsignatory entities;\n\n(e) Cooperate in clarifying doubts and discussing methodological options in the compilation\n\nof GFS and PSDS, including those related to the clarification of relevant issues concerning\n\nthe statistical treatment of operations with a significant impact on financing\n\ncapacity/need and public sector debt;\n\n(f) Analyze the consistency of the statistical results obtained.\n\n4. Participation in the GFSCC may also be extended to the following entities, through occasional\n\ninvitation depending on the issues to be dealt with:\n\n36 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1973}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n(a) Mozambique Stock Exchange;\n\n(b) State Shareholdings Management Institute - IGEPE;\n\n(c) Extrabudgetary Units;\n\n(d) National Social Security Institute of Mozambique;\n\n(e) Municipalities; and\n\n(f) Office of the Audit General.\n\n\n**IV.** **RESPONSIBILITIES**\n\n1. According to their respective fields of competency, the signatory entities will:\n\n(a) Provide all documentation considered relevant within the various lines of action\n\nconsidered in this Protocol, in a timely manner and fulfilling the respective legal\n\nobligations;\n\n(b) Provide timely access to basic information, as exhaustive as necessary, as relevant to the\n\ncompilation of GFS and PSDS\n\n(c) Cooperate actively to meet strict reporting and publication deadlines and satisfy national\n\nand international statistical quality standards.\n\n(d) Cooperate in the definition of schedules for releasing information to the public, whenever\n\nrelevant and possible and without jeopardizing its autonomy.\n\n**V.** **DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY**\n\n1. The signatory entities undertake to keep any information to which they have access in the\n\nexecution of this Protocol totally confidential.\n\n**VI.** **DATA SHARING**\n\n1. Within the scope of this Protocol, the following information will be shared, as well as any\n\nother information that may prove important:\n\n(a) List of general government entities and other public-sector entities, by subsector: units of\n\ngeneral government (central government and extrabudgetary units, local government,\n\nsocial security) and financial and nonfinancial public enterprises;\n\n(b) Government deposits by beneficiary, government sector (central government and\n\nextrabudgetary units, local government, social security) and currency of denomination;\n\n(c) Domestic debt, with a breakdown between Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds;\n\n(d) External debt, broken down by counterparty, maturity, and currency of denomination;\n\n(e) Gross domestic product;\n\n(f) Government finance statistics;\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **37**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n(a) Mozambique Stock Exchange;\n\n(b) State Shareholdings Management Institute - IGEPE;\n\n(c) Extrabudgetary Units;\n\n(d) National Social Security Institute of Mozambique;\n\n(e) Municipalities; and\n\n(f) Office of the Audit General.\n\nIV. RESPONSIBILITIES\n\n1. According to their respective fields of competency, the signatory entities will:\n\n(a) Provide all documentation considered relevant within the various lines of action\n\nconsidered in this Protocol, in a timely manner and fulfilling the respective legal\n\nobligations;\n\n(b) Provide timely access to basic information, as exhaustive as necessary, as relevant to the\n\ncompilation of GFS and PSDS\n\n(c) Cooperate actively to meet strict reporting and publication deadlines and satisfy national\n\nand international statistical quality standards.\n\n(d) Cooperate in the definition of schedules for releasing information to the public, whenever\n\nrelevant and possible and without jeopardizing its autonomy.\n\nV. DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY\n\n1. The signatory entities undertake to keep any information to which they have access in the\n\nexecution of this Protocol totally confidential.\n\nVI. DATA SHARING\n\n1. Within the scope of this Protocol, the following information will be shared, as well as any\n\nother information that may prove important:\n\n(a) List of general government entities and other public-sector entities, by subsector: units of\n\ngeneral government (central government and extrabudgetary units, local government,\n\nsocial security) and financial and nonfinancial public enterprises;\n\n(b) Government deposits by beneficiary, government sector (central government and\n\nextrabudgetary units, local government, social security) and currency of denomination;\n\n(c) Domestic debt, with a breakdown between Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds;\n\n(d) External debt, broken down by counterparty, maturity, and currency of denomination;\n\n(e) Gross domestic product;\n\n(f) Government finance statistics;\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 37", "text_characters": 1686}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n(g) Public sector debt statistics.\n\n**VII.** **PURPOSE OF THE DATA**\n\n1. The data shared under this agreement will have several purposes, including:\n\n(a) Compilation of GFS and PSDS, as well as for fiscal policy purposes;\n\n(b) Compilation of monetary and financial statistics, as well as for monetary policy purposes.\n\n(c) Preparation of national accounts including Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\n\n**VIII.** **ORGANIZATION**\n\n1. To facilitate the implementation of this Protocol, the GFSCC may convene meetings between\n\nthe signatory entities, which may be extended to the other institutions mentioned above\n\naccording to the items on the agenda and within their respective competencies.\n\n2. The GFSCC coordinator, in conjunction with the other members and in accordance with the\n\nvarious lines of action, will draw up the annual schedule of regular meetings, with at least one\n\nmeeting per semester, without prejudice to extraordinary meetings justifiably requested by\n\nany of the signatory entities.\n\n3. For each meeting, the GFSCC coordinator, in conjunction with the other members, will draw\n\nup the respective agenda and send it to the signatory entities together with the notice\n\nconvening the meeting.\n\n4. The summary of each meeting will be prepared by the members of GFSCC on a rotation\n\nschedule and made available to the other entities participating in the meeting.\n\n5. In addition to GFSCC meetings, seminars may be held to present information publicly and to\n\ncollect information from national and international experts.\n\n**IX.** **CONTACTS**\n\n1. Ministry of Economy and Finance of Mozambique:\n\n(a) DNPED\n\n(b) DNGDP\n\n(c) DNTCEF\n\n(d) DNCP\n\n(e) DNPO\n\n(f) DNPE\n\n(g) DGR\n\n2. Bank of Mozambique\n\n3. National Institute of Statistics\n\n\n**38** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n(g) Public sector debt statistics.\n\nVII. PURPOSE OF THE DATA\n\n1. The data shared under this agreement will have several purposes, including:\n\n(a) Compilation of GFS and PSDS, as well as for fiscal policy purposes;\n\n(b) Compilation of monetary and financial statistics, as well as for monetary policy purposes.\n\n(c) Preparation of national accounts including Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\n\nVIII. ORGANIZATION\n\n1. To facilitate the implementation of this Protocol, the GFSCC may convene meetings between\n\nthe signatory entities, which may be extended to the other institutions mentioned above\n\naccording to the items on the agenda and within their respective competencies.\n\n2. The GFSCC coordinator, in conjunction with the other members and in accordance with the\n\nvarious lines of action, will draw up the annual schedule of regular meetings, with at least one\n\nmeeting per semester, without prejudice to extraordinary meetings justifiably requested by\n\nany of the signatory entities.\n\n3. For each meeting, the GFSCC coordinator, in conjunction with the other members, will draw\n\nup the respective agenda and send it to the signatory entities together with the notice\n\nconvening the meeting.\n\n4. The summary of each meeting will be prepared by the members of GFSCC on a rotation\n\nschedule and made available to the other entities participating in the meeting.\n\n5. In addition to GFSCC meetings, seminars may be held to present information publicly and to\n\ncollect information from national and international experts.\n\nIX. CONTACTS\n\n1. Ministry of Economy and Finance of Mozambique:\n\n(a) DNPED\n\n(b) DNGDP\n\n(c) DNTCEF\n\n(d) DNCP\n\n(e) DNPO\n\n(f) DNPE\n\n(g) DGR\n\n2. Bank of Mozambique\n\n3. National Institute of Statistics\n\n38 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1465}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**2.** **FINAL PROVISIONS**\n\n1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature by all parties.\n\n2. The contents of this Protocol may be amended at the suggestion of any of the signatory\n\nentities, provided that all other signatory entities agree.\n\n3. Any of the signatory entities may terminate their participation in this protocol at any time, by\n\ngiving formal notice thereof to the others.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **39**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n2. FINAL PROVISIONS\n\n1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature by all parties.\n\n2. The contents of this Protocol may be amended at the suggestion of any of the signatory\n\nentities, provided that all other signatory entities agree.\n\n3. Any of the signatory entities may terminate their participation in this protocol at any time, by\n\ngiving formal notice thereof to the others.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 39", "text_characters": 378}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**X.** **SIGNATURES**\n\nMaputo, October xx, 2020\n\nFor the Ministry of Economy and Finance\n\nName: Signature:\n\nFor the Bank of Mozambique\n\nName: Signature:\n\nFor the National Institute of Statistics\n\nName: Signature:\n\n\n**40** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nX. SIGNATURES\n\nMaputo, October xx, 2020\n\nFor the Ministry of Economy and Finance\n\nName: Signature:\n\nFor the Bank of Mozambique\n\nName: Signature:\n\nFor the National Institute of Statistics\n\nName: Signature:\n\n40 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 215}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n**Appendix III. Institutional Structure of General Government**\n\n\n**Units of Mozambique General Government**\n\n(The exhaustive inventory of public institutions is available in Appendix III)\n\n**CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION**\n\n**Subsector 1.** **Central government**\n\n(1.1) Five (5) Sovereignty bodies: President of the Republic, Assembly of the Republic, the\n\nGovernment, the Courts, and the Constitutional Council.\n\n(1.2) Twenty (20) Ministries.\n\n(1.3) Public commissions, services, and agencies.\n\n**Subsector 2. Extrabudgetary units / entities**\n\n(2.1) Public institutes\n\n(2.2) Public funds\n\n**SOCIAL SECURITY**\n\n**Subsector 3.** **Social security funds**\n\n(3.1) National Social Security Institute (INSS)\n\n**STATE GOVERNMENT**\n\n**Subsector 4.** **Not applicable**\n\n**LOCAL GOVERNMENT**\n\n**Subsector 5.** **Local governments**\n\n(5.1) Eleven (11) provinces\n\n(5.2) Ten (10) districts\n\n(5.3) Municipalities\n\n**ACCOUNTING PRACTICES**\n\nf1 Valuation of assets and liabilities:\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **41**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\nAppendix III. Institutional Structure of General Government\n\nUnits of Mozambique General Government\n\n(The exhaustive inventory of public institutions is available in Appendix III)\n\nCENTRAL ADMINISTRATION\n\nSubsector 1. Central government\n\n(1.1) Five (5) Sovereignty bodies: President of the Republic, Assembly of the Republic, the\n\nGovernment, the Courts, and the Constitutional Council.\n\n(1.2) Twenty (20) Ministries.\n\n(1.3) Public commissions, services, and agencies.\n\nSubsector 2. Extrabudgetary units / entities\n\n(2.1) Public institutes\n\n(2.2) Public funds\n\nSOCIAL SECURITY\n\nSubsector 3. Social security funds\n\n(3.1) National Social Security Institute (INSS)\n\nSTATE GOVERNMENT\n\nSubsector 4. Not applicable\n\nLOCAL GOVERNMENT\n\nSubsector 5. Local governments\n\n(5.1) Eleven (11) provinces\n\n(5.2) Ten (10) districts\n\n(5.3) Municipalities\n\nACCOUNTING PRACTICES\n\nf1 Valuation of assets and liabilities:\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 41", "text_characters": 808}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n\n - Debt securities and other debt instruments: Face value\n\n - Financial assets (deposits): Nominal\n\n\n**42** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\n\n - Debt securities and other debt instruments: Face value\n\n - Financial assets (deposits): Nominal\n\n42 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 129}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Appendix IV. List of Public Sector Entities**\n\n\n**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n1 Office of the President of the Republic Central administration Executive management unit - - \n2 Assembly of the Republic Central administration Executive management unit - - \n3 Constitutional Council Central administration Executive management unit - - \n4 Supreme Court Central administration Executive management unit - - \n5 Office of the Audit General Central administration Executive management unit - - \n6 Office of the Prime Minister Central administration Executive management unit - - \n7 Office of the Attorney General Central administration Executive management unit - - \n8 Council of State Central administration Executive management unit - - \n9 Superior Council of the Administrative Judiciary Central administration Executive management unit - - \n10 General State expenses Central administration Executive management unit - - \n11 Ombudsman’s Office Central administration Executive management unit - - \n12 Ministry of National Defense Central administration Ministry - - \n13 Ministry of the Interior Central administration Ministry - - \n14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Central administration Ministry - - \n15 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional and Religious Affairs Central administration Ministry - - \n16 Ministry of State administration and Civil Service Central administration Ministry - - \n17 Ministry of Economy and Finance Central administration Ministry - - \n18 Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security Central administration Ministry - - \n19 Ministry of the Sea, Inland Waterways, and Fisheries Central administration Ministry - - \n20 Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy Central administration Ministry - - \n21 Ministry of Industry and Trade Central administration Ministry - - \n22 Ministry of Culture and Tourism Central administration Ministry - - \n23 Ministry of Transportation and Communications Central administration Ministry - - \n24 Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Water Resources Central administration Ministry - - \n\n\n**(%)**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix IV. List of Public Sector Entities\n\nLIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n1 Office of the President of the Republic Central administration Executive management unit - - \n2 Assembly of the Republic Central administration Executive management unit - - \n3 Constitutional Council Central administration Executive management unit - - \n4 Supreme Court Central administration Executive management unit - - \n5 Office of the Audit General Central administration Executive management unit - - \n6 Office of the Prime Minister Central administration Executive management unit - - \n7 Office of the Attorney General Central administration Executive management unit - - \n8 Council of State Central administration Executive management unit - - \n9 Superior Council of the Administrative Judiciary Central administration Executive management unit - - \n10 General State expenses Central administration Executive management unit - - \n11 Ombudsman’s Office Central administration Executive management unit - - \n12 Ministry of National Defense Central administration Ministry - - \n13 Ministry of the Interior Central administration Ministry - - \n14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Central administration Ministry - - \n15 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional and Religious Affairs Central administration Ministry - - \n16 Ministry of State administration and Civil Service Central administration Ministry - - \n17 Ministry of Economy and Finance Central administration Ministry - - \n18 Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security Central administration Ministry - - \n19 Ministry of the Sea, Inland Waterways, and Fisheries Central administration Ministry - - \n20 Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy Central administration Ministry - - \n21 Ministry of Industry and Trade Central administration Ministry - - \n22 Ministry of Culture and Tourism Central administration Ministry - - \n23 Ministry of Transportation and Communications Central administration Ministry - - \n24 Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Water Resources Central administration Ministry - - \n\n(%)", "text_characters": 1846}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n25 Ministry of Education and Human Development Central administration Ministry - - \nMinistry of Science and Technology, Higher Education,\n26 and Technical-Vocational Education Central administration Ministry - - \n27 Ministry of Health Central administration Ministry - - \n28 Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action Central administration Ministry - - \n29 Ministry of Land Environment Central administration Ministry - - \n30 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Central administration Ministry - - \n31 Ministry of Combatants Central administration Ministry - - \n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n32 Military Headquarters Central administration\n\n\n33 Zambezi Valley Development Agency Central administration\n\n\n34 Mozambique Information Agency Central administration\n\n\n35 National Atomic Energy Agency - Regulatory Body Central administration\n\n\n36 Mediation and Labor Arbitration Committee Central administration\n\n\n37 Interministerial Committee for Major Events Central administration\n\n\n38 National Commission of the [Tr.: text missing] Central administration\n\n\n39 National Human Rights Commission Central administration\n\n\n40 Employment Advisory Committee Central administration\n\n\n41 National Commission for UNESCO Central administration\n\n\n42 National Election Commission Central administration\n\n\n\nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - -", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n25 Ministry of Education and Human Development Central administration Ministry - - \nMinistry of Science and Technology, Higher Education,\n26 and Technical-Vocational Education Central administration Ministry - - \n27 Ministry of Health Central administration Ministry - - \n28 Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action Central administration Ministry - - \n29 Ministry of Land Environment Central administration Ministry - - \n30 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Central administration Ministry - - \n31 Ministry of Combatants Central administration Ministry - - \n\n(%)\n\n32 Military Headquarters Central administration\n\n33 Zambezi Valley Development Agency Central administration\n\n34 Mozambique Information Agency Central administration\n\n35 National Atomic Energy Agency - Regulatory Body Central administration\n\n36 Mediation and Labor Arbitration Committee Central administration\n\n37 Interministerial Committee for Major Events Central administration\n\n38 National Commission of the [Tr.: text missing] Central administration\n\n39 National Human Rights Commission Central administration\n\n40 Employment Advisory Committee Central administration\n\n41 National Commission for UNESCO Central administration\n\n42 National Election Commission Central administration\n\nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - -", "text_characters": 1660}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n43 Water Regulation Board Central administration\n\n\n44 National Council for Higher Education Quality Assessment Central administration\n\n\n45 National Electricity Board Central administration\n\n\n46 Superior Council of the Public Prosecution Department Central administration\n\n\n47 National Council to Combat HIV/AIDS Central administration\n\n\n48 National Defense and Security Council Central administration\n\n\n49 Higher Council of Social Communication Central administration\n\n\n50 Central Office for Combating Corruption Central administration\n\n\n51 Central Office for the Prevention and Fight against Drugs Central administration\n\n\n52 Office of Accelerated Development Economic Zones Central administration\n\n\n53 Mozambique Financial Information Office Central administration\n\nOffice of Assistance to Former Presidents of the Republic\n54 and Senior State Office-holders Central administration\n\n\n\nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \n\n\n55 Technical Secretariat for Electoral administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n56 Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n57 State Information and Security Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n58 Mozambique Engineering Laboratory Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n59 Fisheries Museum Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n\n\n60 National Geology Museum Central administration Public body, agency, or service -", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n(%)\n\n43 Water Regulation Board Central administration\n\n44 National Council for Higher Education Quality Assessment Central administration\n\n45 National Electricity Board Central administration\n\n46 Superior Council of the Public Prosecution Department Central administration\n\n47 National Council to Combat HIV/AIDS Central administration\n\n48 National Defense and Security Council Central administration\n\n49 Higher Council of Social Communication Central administration\n\n50 Central Office for Combating Corruption Central administration\n\n51 Central Office for the Prevention and Fight against Drugs Central administration\n\n52 Office of Accelerated Development Economic Zones Central administration\n\n53 Mozambique Financial Information Office Central administration\n\nOffice of Assistance to Former Presidents of the Republic\n54 and Senior State Office-holders Central administration\n\nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \nPublic body, agency, commission,\nor service - - \n\n55 Technical Secretariat for Electoral administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n56 Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n57 State Information and Security Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n58 Mozambique Engineering Laboratory Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n59 Fisheries Museum Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n\n60 National Geology Museum Central administration Public body, agency, or service -", "text_characters": 1876}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n61 Refugee Support Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n62 Machava Special Maximum Security Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n63 National Prison Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n64 National Criminal Investigation Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n65 National Migration Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n66 National Public Rescue Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n67 Mozambique Police Social Services Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n68 Civic Service of Mozambique Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n69 Water and Sanitation Infrastructure administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n70 National Conservation Areas administration (ANAC) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n71 National Fisheries administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n72 State Real Estate administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n73 Águas do Sul - Ara Sul Regional administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n74 Historical Archive Of Mozambique Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n75 Public Information Bureau Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n76 Maputo Central Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n77 Maputo Civil Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n78 Documentation and Photographic Training Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \nMozambique Documentation and Information Center\n79 (CEDIMO) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n80 Central Deposit of Medicines and Medical Articles Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n81 Legal and Judiciary Training Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n82 Ethnobotany Research and Development Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \nCommunity Development Research and Technology\n83 Transfer Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n84 National Liberation Struggle Historical Research Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n85 Agriculture Promotion Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n\n\n**(%)**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n61 Refugee Support Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n62 Machava Special Maximum Security Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n63 National Prison Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n64 National Criminal Investigation Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n65 National Migration Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n66 National Public Rescue Service Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n67 Mozambique Police Social Services Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n68 Civic Service of Mozambique Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n69 Water and Sanitation Infrastructure administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n70 National Conservation Areas administration (ANAC) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n71 National Fisheries administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n72 State Real Estate administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n73 Águas do Sul - Ara Sul Regional administration Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n74 Historical Archive Of Mozambique Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n75 Public Information Bureau Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n76 Maputo Central Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n77 Maputo Civil Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n78 Documentation and Photographic Training Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \nMozambique Documentation and Information Center\n79 (CEDIMO) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n80 Central Deposit of Medicines and Medical Articles Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n81 Legal and Judiciary Training Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n82 Ethnobotany Research and Development Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \nCommunity Development Research and Technology\n83 Transfer Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n84 National Liberation Struggle Historical Research Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n85 Agriculture Promotion Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n\n(%)", "text_characters": 2266}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n86 National Cartography and Teledata Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n87 Maputo Center for Regional Health Development Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n88 Investment Promotion Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n89 General Police Command Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n90 National Song and Dance Company Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \nGeneral Directorate of Tax administration - (Includes\n91 personal and corporate income tax –IRPS and IRPC) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n92 National Civil Identification Office Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n93 Delegation of the Ministry of Labor – South Africa Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n94 Embassies and Other Diplomatic Representations Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n95 Special Women’s Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n96 Rapid Intervention Force Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n97 Mozambique Armed Defense Forces Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n98 Maputo Military Hospital Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n99 Maputo Central Hospital Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n100 Police Science Academy (ACIPOL) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n101 Marechal Samora Machel Military Academy Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n102 Mozambique Academy of Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n103 School of Journalism Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n104 Fisheries School Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n105 National School of Aeronautics Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n106 National School of Visual Arts Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n107 National School of Dance Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n108 National School of Music Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n109 Maputo Central Prison Secondary School Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n110 Medio Institute of Documentary Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n111 Institute of Physical and Environmental Planning Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n\n**(%)**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 48, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n86 National Cartography and Teledata Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n87 Maputo Center for Regional Health Development Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n88 Investment Promotion Center Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n89 General Police Command Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n90 National Song and Dance Company Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \nGeneral Directorate of Tax administration - (Includes\n91 personal and corporate income tax –IRPS and IRPC) Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n92 National Civil Identification Office Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n93 Delegation of the Ministry of Labor – South Africa Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n94 Embassies and Other Diplomatic Representations Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n95 Special Women’s Prison Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n96 Rapid Intervention Force Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n97 Mozambique Armed Defense Forces Central administration Public body, agency, or service - - \n98 Maputo Military Hospital Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n99 Maputo Central Hospital Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n100 Police Science Academy (ACIPOL) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n101 Marechal Samora Machel Military Academy Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n102 Mozambique Academy of Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n103 School of Journalism Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n104 Fisheries School Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n105 National School of Aeronautics Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n106 National School of Visual Arts Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n107 National School of Dance Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n108 National School of Music Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n109 Maputo Central Prison Secondary School Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n110 Medio Institute of Documentary Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n111 Institute of Physical and Environmental Planning Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n(%)", "text_characters": 2183}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n112 School of Nautical Sciences (ESCN) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n113 School of Journalism Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n114 Faculty of Engineering Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n115 Mozambique Tax Authority Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n116 Mozambique Commodity Exchange Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n117 Mozambique Stock Exchange Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n118 General Inspectorate of Finance Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n119 General Inspectorate of Gambling Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n120 General Labor Inspectorate Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n121 National Inspectorate of Economic Activities Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n122 Civil Aviation Institute of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n123 Scholarship Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n124 Maputo Institute of Health Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n125 Institute of Social Communication Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n126 Cashew Development Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n127 Land Management and Cartography Training Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n128 State Shareholdings Management Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n129 Mozambique Agrarian Research Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n130 Sociocultural Research Institute (arpac) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n131 Institute of Language (IL) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n132 Institute of Geographic Names of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n133 Mozambique Institute of Insurance Supervision Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n134 Mozambique Cotton Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n135 Institute of Sponsorship and Legal Assistance Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n“Dr Alberto” Vocational Training and Labour Studies\n136 Institute Central administration\n\n\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n\n\n\n- - \n\n\n137 Institute of Geology and Mining Central administration UEO - Public institute - -", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 49, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n112 School of Nautical Sciences (ESCN) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n113 School of Journalism Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n114 Faculty of Engineering Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n115 Mozambique Tax Authority Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n116 Mozambique Commodity Exchange Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n117 Mozambique Stock Exchange Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n118 General Inspectorate of Finance Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n119 General Inspectorate of Gambling Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n120 General Labor Inspectorate Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n121 National Inspectorate of Economic Activities Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n122 Civil Aviation Institute of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n123 Scholarship Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n124 Maputo Institute of Health Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n125 Institute of Social Communication Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n126 Cashew Development Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n127 Land Management and Cartography Training Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n128 State Shareholdings Management Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n129 Mozambique Agrarian Research Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n130 Sociocultural Research Institute (arpac) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n131 Institute of Language (IL) Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n132 Institute of Geographic Names of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n133 Mozambique Institute of Insurance Supervision Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n134 Mozambique Cotton Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n135 Institute of Sponsorship and Legal Assistance Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n(%)\n\n“Dr Alberto” Vocational Training and Labour Studies\n136 Institute Central administration\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n- - \n\n137 Institute of Geology and Mining Central administration UEO - Public institute - -", "text_characters": 2108}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n138 National Audiovisual and Film Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n139 National Social Action Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n140 National Youth Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n141 National Navy Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n142 National Communications Institute of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n143 National De-mining Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\nNational Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture\n144 Development Central administration\n\n\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n\n\n\n- - \n\n\n145 National Institute of Distance Education Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n146 National Institute of Employment Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n147 National Institute of Statistics Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n148 National Institute of Disaster Management Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n149 National Institute of Hydrography and Navigation Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n150 National Fishery Inspection Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n151 National Institute of Fisheries Research Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n152 National Irrigation Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n153 National Institute of Meteorology Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n154 National Institute of Standardization and Quality Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n155 National Petroleum Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n156 National Social Security Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n157 National Institute of Health Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n158 National Social Security Institute of (INSS) Social security funds UEO - Public institute - - \n\n\nNational Institute of Information and Communication\n159 Technologies Central administration\n\n\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n\n\n\n- - \n\n\n160 National Roads Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n161 National Sports Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n162 National Book and Disc Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 50, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n138 National Audiovisual and Film Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n139 National Social Action Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n140 National Youth Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n141 National Navy Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n142 National Communications Institute of Mozambique Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n143 National De-mining Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n(%)\n\nNational Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture\n144 Development Central administration\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n- - \n\n145 National Institute of Distance Education Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n146 National Institute of Employment Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n147 National Institute of Statistics Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n148 National Institute of Disaster Management Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n149 National Institute of Hydrography and Navigation Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n150 National Fishery Inspection Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n151 National Institute of Fisheries Research Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n152 National Irrigation Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n153 National Institute of Meteorology Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n154 National Institute of Standardization and Quality Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n155 National Petroleum Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n156 National Social Security Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n157 National Institute of Health Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n158 National Social Security Institute of (INSS) Social security funds UEO - Public institute - - \n\nNational Institute of Information and Communication\n159 Technologies Central administration\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n- - \n\n160 National Roads Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n161 National Sports Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n162 National Book and Disc Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - -", "text_characters": 2083}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n163 National Sea and Borders Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n164 National Tourism Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n165 Institute Export Promotion Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\nInstitute for the Promotion of Small and Medium\n166 Enterprises Central administration\n\n\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n\n\n\n- - \n\n\n167 Higher Institute of Arts and Culture Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n168 Higher Institute of Health Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n169 Mozambique Higher Institute of Accounting and Auditing Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n170 Higher Institute of Public Administration Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n\n“Lieutenant General Armando Emílio Guebuza” Higher\n171 Institute of Defense Studies Central administration\n\n\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n\n\n\n- - \n\n\n172 Higher Institute of International Relations Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n173 Higher Polytechnic Institute of Songo Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n174 University of Lury Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n175 University of Zambezi Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n176 Eduardo Mondlane University Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n177 Pedagogical University Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n178 Portuguese Language Bibliographic Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n179 Economic Rehabilitation Support Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n180 Peace and National Reconciliation Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n181 Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n182 Transport and Communications Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n183 National Sustainable Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n184 National Research Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n185 Agrarian Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n186 Fishery Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n187 Sports Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 51, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n163 National Sea and Borders Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n164 National Tourism Institute Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n165 Institute Export Promotion Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n(%)\n\nInstitute for the Promotion of Small and Medium\n166 Enterprises Central administration\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n- - \n\n167 Higher Institute of Arts and Culture Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n168 Higher Institute of Health Sciences Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n169 Mozambique Higher Institute of Accounting and Auditing Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n170 Higher Institute of Public Administration Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n\n“Lieutenant General Armando Emílio Guebuza” Higher\n171 Institute of Defense Studies Central administration\n\nUEO - Public institute\n\n- - \n\n172 Higher Institute of International Relations Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n173 Higher Polytechnic Institute of Songo Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n174 University of Lury Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n175 University of Zambezi Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n176 Eduardo Mondlane University Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n177 Pedagogical University Central administration UEO - Public institute - - \n178 Portuguese Language Bibliographic Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n179 Economic Rehabilitation Support Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n180 Peace and National Reconciliation Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n181 Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n182 Transport and Communications Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n183 National Sustainable Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n184 National Research Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n185 Agrarian Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n186 Fishery Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n187 Sports Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - -", "text_characters": 1980}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n188 National Energy Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n189 Housing Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n190 Road and Bridge Maintenance Fund, Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n191 Water Supply Investment and Assets Fund – FIPAG Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n192 Environment Fund – FUNAB Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n193 Mozambique Cereals Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n194 Artistic and Cultural Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n195 Marketing Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n196 Small Industry Promotion Fund, Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n197 Mining Promotion Fund - FFM Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n198 National Tourism Fund – FUTUR Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n199 Artistic and Cultural Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n200 Agricultural Hydraulics Development Fund – FDHA Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n201 Road Fund – FE Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n202 National Dredging Fund – FND Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n203 Universal Access Service Fund - FSAU Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n204 Municipal Compensation Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n205 District Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n206 Municipal Initiative Investment Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n207 Niassa Local administration District - - \n208 Cabo Delgado Local administration District - - \n209 Nampula Local administration District - - \n210 Zambézia Local administration District - - \n211 Tete Local administration District - - \n212 Manica Local administration District - - \n213 Sofala Local administration District - - \n\n\n**(%)**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 52, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n188 National Energy Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n189 Housing Promotion Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n190 Road and Bridge Maintenance Fund, Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n191 Water Supply Investment and Assets Fund – FIPAG Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n192 Environment Fund – FUNAB Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n193 Mozambique Cereals Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n194 Artistic and Cultural Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n195 Marketing Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n196 Small Industry Promotion Fund, Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n197 Mining Promotion Fund - FFM Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n198 National Tourism Fund – FUTUR Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n199 Artistic and Cultural Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n200 Agricultural Hydraulics Development Fund – FDHA Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n201 Road Fund – FE Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n202 National Dredging Fund – FND Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n203 Universal Access Service Fund - FSAU Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n204 Municipal Compensation Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n205 District Development Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n206 Municipal Initiative Investment Fund Central administration UEO - Public fund - - \n207 Niassa Local administration District - - \n208 Cabo Delgado Local administration District - - \n209 Nampula Local administration District - - \n210 Zambézia Local administration District - - \n211 Tete Local administration District - - \n212 Manica Local administration District - - \n213 Sofala Local administration District - - \n\n(%)", "text_characters": 1660}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n214 Inhambane Local administration District - - \n215 Gaza Local administration District - - \n216 Maputo Local administration District - - \n217 Niassa Local administration Province - - \n218 Cabo Delgado Local administration Province - - \n219 Nampula Local administration Province - - \n220 Zambézia Local administration Province - - \n221 Tete Local administration Province - - \n222 Manica Local administration Province - - \n223 Sofala Local administration Province - - \n224 Inhambane Local administration Province - - \n225 Gaza Local administration Provinces - - \n226 Maputo Local administration Provinces - - \n227 Maputo (City) Local administration Provinces - - \n228 Lichinga City - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n229 Cuamba City - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n230 Town of Marrupa - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n231 Town of Mandimba - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n232 Town of Metangula - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n233 Pemba City - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n234 Montepuez City - Province of Cabo Delgado Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n235 Town of Mocímba da Praia - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n236 Town of Mueda - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n237 Town of Chiúre - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n238 Nampula City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n239 Angoche City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n\n\n**(%)**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 53, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n214 Inhambane Local administration District - - \n215 Gaza Local administration District - - \n216 Maputo Local administration District - - \n217 Niassa Local administration Province - - \n218 Cabo Delgado Local administration Province - - \n219 Nampula Local administration Province - - \n220 Zambézia Local administration Province - - \n221 Tete Local administration Province - - \n222 Manica Local administration Province - - \n223 Sofala Local administration Province - - \n224 Inhambane Local administration Province - - \n225 Gaza Local administration Provinces - - \n226 Maputo Local administration Provinces - - \n227 Maputo (City) Local administration Provinces - - \n228 Lichinga City - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n229 Cuamba City - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n230 Town of Marrupa - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n231 Town of Mandimba - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n232 Town of Metangula - Niassa Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n233 Pemba City - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n234 Montepuez City - Province of Cabo Delgado Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n235 Town of Mocímba da Praia - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n236 Town of Mueda - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n237 Town of Chiúre - Cabo Delgado Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n238 Nampula City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n239 Angoche City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n\n(%)", "text_characters": 1655}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n240 Town of De Ribaué - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n241 Town of Malema - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n242 Island of Mozambique - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n243 Nacala City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n244 Town of Monapo - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n245 Quelimane City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n246 Gúrue City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n247 Mocuba City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n248 Town of Alto Molocue - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n249 Town of Maganja Da Costa - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n250 Town of Milange - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n251 Tete City - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n252 Town of Ulongué - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n253 Town of Nhamnayábuè - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n254 Vila Moatize - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n255 City of Chimoio - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n256 Manica City - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n257 Town of Gondola - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n258 Vila De Sussundenga - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n259 Vila da Catandica - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n260 Beira City - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n261 Dondo City - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n262 Town of Gorongosa - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n263 Town of Nhamatanda - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n264 Village of Marromeu - Province of Sofala Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n265 Inhambane City - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n\n\n**(%)**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 54, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n240 Town of De Ribaué - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n241 Town of Malema - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n242 Island of Mozambique - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n243 Nacala City - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n244 Town of Monapo - Nampula Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n245 Quelimane City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n246 Gúrue City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n247 Mocuba City - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n248 Town of Alto Molocue - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n249 Town of Maganja Da Costa - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n250 Town of Milange - Zambézia Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n251 Tete City - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n252 Town of Ulongué - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n253 Town of Nhamnayábuè - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n254 Vila Moatize - Tete Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n255 City of Chimoio - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n256 Manica City - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n257 Town of Gondola - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n258 Vila De Sussundenga - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n259 Vila da Catandica - Manica Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n260 Beira City - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n261 Dondo City - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n262 Town of Gorongosa - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n263 Town of Nhamatanda - Sofala Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n264 Village of Marromeu - Province of Sofala Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n265 Inhambane City - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n\n(%)", "text_characters": 2208}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n266 Maxixe City - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n267 Town of Massinga - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n268 Town of Quissico - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n269 Town of Vilankulos - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n270 Xai-Xai City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n271 Chibuto City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n272 Chókwè City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n273 Town of Mandlacaze - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n274 Town of Macia - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n275 Town of Bilene - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n276 Matola City - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n277 Town of Namaacha - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n278 Town of Boane - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n279 Town of Manhiça - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n280 Maputo City - Maputo Province (City) Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n281 ADM - AEROPORTOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 4,347,050.00 4,347,050.00 100\n\n282 C.F.M - CAMINHOS DE FERRO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 1,242,981.02 1,242,981.02 100\n\n283 CORREIOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 5,717.62 5,717.62 100\n\n284 EDM - ELECTRICIDADE DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 6,197,199.57 6,197,199.57 100\n\n\n\nEMODRAGA - EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE\n285 DRAGAGENS, E.P\n\nEMPRESA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO MAPUTO SUL 286 MAPUTO SUL, E.P\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nPublic/State-owned enterprise 2,448,692.60 2,448,692.60 100\n\n\nPublic/State-owned enterprise 60,000.00 60,000.00 100\n\n\n\n287 ENH - EMPRESA NACIONAL DE HIDROCARBONETOS, E.P [SEE - nonfinancial ] Public/State-owned enterprise 749,001.00 749,001.00 100\n\n288 HICEP - HIDRÁULICA DE CHÒkWE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 12,022.00 12,022.00 100\n\n289 IMPRENSA NACIONAL DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 25,000.00 25,000.00 100\n\n290 PARQUE DE CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA EM MALUANA, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 441,600.00 441,600.00 100", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 55, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n266 Maxixe City - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n267 Town of Massinga - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n268 Town of Quissico - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n269 Town of Vilankulos - Inhambane Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n270 Xai-Xai City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n271 Chibuto City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n272 Chókwè City - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n273 Town of Mandlacaze - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n274 Town of Macia - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n275 Town of Bilene - Gaza Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n276 Matola City - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n277 Town of Namaacha - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n278 Town of Boane - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n279 Town of Manhiça - Maputo Province Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n280 Maputo City - Maputo Province (City) Local administration Municipality/Local authority - - \n\n(%)\n\n281 ADM - AEROPORTOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 4,347,050.00 4,347,050.00 100\n\n282 C.F.M - CAMINHOS DE FERRO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 1,242,981.02 1,242,981.02 100\n\n283 CORREIOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 5,717.62 5,717.62 100\n\n284 EDM - ELECTRICIDADE DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 6,197,199.57 6,197,199.57 100\n\nEMODRAGA - EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE\n285 DRAGAGENS, E.P\n\nEMPRESA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO MAPUTO SUL 286 MAPUTO SUL, E.P\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nPublic/State-owned enterprise 2,448,692.60 2,448,692.60 100\n\nPublic/State-owned enterprise 60,000.00 60,000.00 100\n\n287 ENH - EMPRESA NACIONAL DE HIDROCARBONETOS, E.P [SEE - nonfinancial ] Public/State-owned enterprise 749,001.00 749,001.00 100\n\n288 HICEP - HIDRÁULICA DE CHÒkWE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 12,022.00 12,022.00 100\n\n289 IMPRENSA NACIONAL DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 25,000.00 25,000.00 100\n\n290 PARQUE DE CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA EM MALUANA, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 441,600.00 441,600.00 100", "text_characters": 2372}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n291 REGADIO DE BAIXO LIMPOPO - RBL, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 15,000.00 15,000.00 100\n\n292 RM - RÁDIO MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 121,999.38 121,999.38 100\n\n293 TVM - TELEVISÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 14,908.19 14,908.19 100\n\n294 Banco de Moçambique SEE - financial Public/State-owned enterprise 2,361,314.00 2,361,314.00 100\n\n295 FARMAC, E.E. SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 24.17 24.17 100\n\n296 DINAME - DISTRIBUIDORA NACIONAL DE MATERIAL E.E. [SEE - nonfinancial ] Public/State-owned enterprise 18,977.63 18,977.63 100\n\n297 TRANSMARÍTIMA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 120,000.00 120,000.00 100\n\n\n\nSTEMA - SILOS E TERMINAL GRANELEIRO DA MATOLA,\n298 S.A\n\nSMM - SOCIEDADE MOÇAMBICANA DE\n299 MEDICAMENTOS, S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 245,935.00 245,935.00 100\n\n\nSubsidiary company 800,000.00 800,000.00 100\n\n\n\n300 SEMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 34,611.00 34,611.00 100\n\n301 MONTE BINGA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 250.00 250.00 100\n\n302 BANCO NACIONAL DE INVESTIMENTOS - BNI, S.A SEE - financial Subsidiary company 2,240,000.00 2,240,000.00 100\n\n303 SOCIEDADE NOTÍCIAS, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 436,069.78 435,066.82 100\n\n304 DOMUS - SOCIEDADE DE GESTÃO IMOBILIÁRIA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,270.00 1,193.80 94\n\n305 LAM - LINHAS AÉREAS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 708,175.96 645,502.00 91\n\n306 TDM - TELECOMUNICAÇÕES DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 2,800,000.00 2,520,000.00 90\n\n307 CAIC - COMPLEXO AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DE CHOCKWE, SA [SEE - nonfinancial ] Subsidiary company 500.00 450.00 90\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company\n\n\n\n308 HCB - HIDROELÉCTRICA DE CAHORA BASSA, S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\n23 558 20 024\n108.58 392.29 85\n\n\n\n309 PETROMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,800,000.00 1,440,000.00 80\n\n310 EMOPESCA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 29,500.00 23,600.00 80\n\n311 EMOSE - EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE SEGUROS, S.A SEE - financial Subsidiary company 157,000.00 109,900.00 70\n\n312 EMATUM - EMPRESA MOCAMBICANA DE ATUM, SA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 15,000.00 9,900.00 66\n\n313 MEDIMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 59,262.00 38,354.37 65\n\n314 COMPANHIA PIPELINE MOÇ./ZIMBA., LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 80,000.00 40,000.00 50", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 56, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n(%)\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n291 REGADIO DE BAIXO LIMPOPO - RBL, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 15,000.00 15,000.00 100\n\n292 RM - RÁDIO MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 121,999.38 121,999.38 100\n\n293 TVM - TELEVISÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 14,908.19 14,908.19 100\n\n294 Banco de Moçambique SEE - financial Public/State-owned enterprise 2,361,314.00 2,361,314.00 100\n\n295 FARMAC, E.E. SEE - nonfinancial Public/State-owned enterprise 24.17 24.17 100\n\n296 DINAME - DISTRIBUIDORA NACIONAL DE MATERIAL E.E. [SEE - nonfinancial ] Public/State-owned enterprise 18,977.63 18,977.63 100\n\n297 TRANSMARÍTIMA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 120,000.00 120,000.00 100\n\nSTEMA - SILOS E TERMINAL GRANELEIRO DA MATOLA,\n298 S.A\n\nSMM - SOCIEDADE MOÇAMBICANA DE\n299 MEDICAMENTOS, S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 245,935.00 245,935.00 100\n\nSubsidiary company 800,000.00 800,000.00 100\n\n300 SEMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 34,611.00 34,611.00 100\n\n301 MONTE BINGA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 250.00 250.00 100\n\n302 BANCO NACIONAL DE INVESTIMENTOS - BNI, S.A SEE - financial Subsidiary company 2,240,000.00 2,240,000.00 100\n\n303 SOCIEDADE NOTÍCIAS, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 436,069.78 435,066.82 100\n\n304 DOMUS - SOCIEDADE DE GESTÃO IMOBILIÁRIA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,270.00 1,193.80 94\n\n305 LAM - LINHAS AÉREAS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 708,175.96 645,502.00 91\n\n306 TDM - TELECOMUNICAÇÕES DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 2,800,000.00 2,520,000.00 90\n\n307 CAIC - COMPLEXO AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DE CHOCKWE, SA [SEE - nonfinancial ] Subsidiary company 500.00 450.00 90\n\nSubsidiary company\n\n308 HCB - HIDROELÉCTRICA DE CAHORA BASSA, S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n23 558 20 024\n108.58 392.29 85\n\n309 PETROMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,800,000.00 1,440,000.00 80\n\n310 EMOPESCA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 29,500.00 23,600.00 80\n\n311 EMOSE - EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE SEGUROS, S.A SEE - financial Subsidiary company 157,000.00 109,900.00 70\n\n312 EMATUM - EMPRESA MOCAMBICANA DE ATUM, SA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 15,000.00 9,900.00 66\n\n313 MEDIMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 59,262.00 38,354.37 65\n\n314 COMPANHIA PIPELINE MOÇ./ZIMBA., LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 80,000.00 40,000.00 50", "text_characters": 2222}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n315 MOZAÍCO DO ÍNDICO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60,000.00 29,400.00 49\n\n\n\nTECNAUTO - EMPRESA DE ASSISTÊNCIA TÉCNICA AUTO,\n316 LDA\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 3,446.00 1,636.85 48\n\n\n\n317 DIÁRIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 2,550.00 1,020.00 40\n\n\n\nEMEM – EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE EXPLORAÇÃO\n318 MINEIRA, S.A\n\nMOGAS, SOCIEDADE MOCAMBICANA DE GASES\n319 COMPRIMIDOS, SA\n\nGAPI - SOC. PARA APOIO A PEQUENOS PROJ.DE\n320 INVESTIMENTO, S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 1,500,000.00 525,000.00 35\n\n\nSubsidiary company 40,000.00 13,500.00 34\n\n\nSubsidiary company 120,000.00 36,000.00 30\n\n\n\n321 CARTEIRA MÓVEL, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 125,000.00 37,500.00 30\n\n322 MCEL - MOÇAMBIQUE CELULAR, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,000,000.00 780,000.00 26\n\n323 HOTEL CARDOSO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 9,363.20 2,411.96 26\n\n324 MEXTUR, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60.00 15.00 25\n\n325 TEXTÁFRICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 300.00 68.10 23\n\n326 AUTO - GÁS, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 40,604.00 8,932.88 22\n\n327 TECNOMECÂNICA, LDA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 130.00 26.00 20\n\n\n\nSTEIA 2000 - SOC.TÉCNICA DE EQUIP.IND.E AGRÍCOLA,\n328 S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 24,800.00 4,960.00 20\n\n\n\n329 SOMEC - SOC. MINEIRA DE CUAMBA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 16.00 3.20 20\n\n\n\nSOGERE - FÁBRICA DE REFRIGERANTES DE GAZA, (INAR)\n330 S.A\n\nMOZRE - MOÇAMBIQUE RESSEGUROS, S.A (EX ZIMRE,\n331 S.A)\n\nMOÇAMBIQUE, PREVIDENTE - SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE\n332 FUNDO DE PENSÕES, S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 1,000.00 200.00 20\n\n\nSubsidiary company 33,000.00 6,600.00 20\n\n\nSubsidiary company 24,000.00 4,800.00 20\n\n\n\n333 MÁRMORES DE MONTEPUEZ - MARMONTE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60,000.00 12,000.00 20\n\n334 IFLOMA - INDÚSTRIAS FLORESTAIS DE MANICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 39,062.50 7,812.50 20\n\n335 IBC - INDÚSTRIA DE BORRACHA E CALÇADO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 5,000.00 1,000.00 20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 57, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n(%)\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n315 MOZAÍCO DO ÍNDICO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60,000.00 29,400.00 49\n\nTECNAUTO - EMPRESA DE ASSISTÊNCIA TÉCNICA AUTO,\n316 LDA\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 3,446.00 1,636.85 48\n\n317 DIÁRIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 2,550.00 1,020.00 40\n\nEMEM – EMPRESA MOÇAMBICANA DE EXPLORAÇÃO\n318 MINEIRA, S.A\n\nMOGAS, SOCIEDADE MOCAMBICANA DE GASES\n319 COMPRIMIDOS, SA\n\nGAPI - SOC. PARA APOIO A PEQUENOS PROJ.DE\n320 INVESTIMENTO, S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 1,500,000.00 525,000.00 35\n\nSubsidiary company 40,000.00 13,500.00 34\n\nSubsidiary company 120,000.00 36,000.00 30\n\n321 CARTEIRA MÓVEL, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 125,000.00 37,500.00 30\n\n322 MCEL - MOÇAMBIQUE CELULAR, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,000,000.00 780,000.00 26\n\n323 HOTEL CARDOSO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 9,363.20 2,411.96 26\n\n324 MEXTUR, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60.00 15.00 25\n\n325 TEXTÁFRICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 300.00 68.10 23\n\n326 AUTO - GÁS, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 40,604.00 8,932.88 22\n\n327 TECNOMECÂNICA, LDA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 130.00 26.00 20\n\nSTEIA 2000 - SOC.TÉCNICA DE EQUIP.IND.E AGRÍCOLA,\n328 S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 24,800.00 4,960.00 20\n\n329 SOMEC - SOC. MINEIRA DE CUAMBA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 16.00 3.20 20\n\nSOGERE - FÁBRICA DE REFRIGERANTES DE GAZA, (INAR)\n330 S.A\n\nMOZRE - MOÇAMBIQUE RESSEGUROS, S.A (EX ZIMRE,\n331 S.A)\n\nMOÇAMBIQUE, PREVIDENTE - SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE\n332 FUNDO DE PENSÕES, S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 1,000.00 200.00 20\n\nSubsidiary company 33,000.00 6,600.00 20\n\nSubsidiary company 24,000.00 4,800.00 20\n\n333 MÁRMORES DE MONTEPUEZ - MARMONTE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 60,000.00 12,000.00 20\n\n334 IFLOMA - INDÚSTRIAS FLORESTAIS DE MANICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 39,062.50 7,812.50 20\n\n335 IBC - INDÚSTRIA DE BORRACHA E CALÇADO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 5,000.00 1,000.00 20", "text_characters": 1940}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\nHIDROMOC - BEIRA, S.A (EX-HIDROMOC,E.E.DELG. R.\n336 CENTRO )\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 5,801.86 1,160.37 20\n\n\n\n337 GERALCO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 6,500.00 1,300.00 20\n\n338 GEOMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 8,952.00 1,790.40 20\n\n\n\nCOMPANHIA MOÇAMBICANA DE HIDROCARBONETOS339 CMH, S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 593,411.50 118,682.30 20\n\n\n\n340 COMPANHIA MOÇAMBICANA DE GASODUTO-CMG, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 70,000.00 14,000.00 20\n\n341 CHÁ NAMAE, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,500.00 300.00 20\n\n342 AUTOVISA - SERVIÇOS AUTO, S.A. (EX-EMOCAT,E.E-U I) SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 12,000.00 2,400.00 20\n\n343 AGRO-ALFA - FUNDIÇÃO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 5,658.00 1,131.60 20\n\n344 MILLENNIUM BIM, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 4,500,000.00 770,400.00 17\n\n345 AÇUCAREIRA DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,506,471.41 225,970.71 15\n\n\n\nCELMOQUE - CABOS DE ENERGIA E\n346 TELECOMUNICAÇOES DE MOÇ., S.A\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 23,500.00 3,480.35 15\n\n\n\n347 AÇUCAREIRA DE XINAVANE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,204,500.00 384,540.00 12\n\n348 CIMENTOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,000,000.00 118,900.00 12\n\n349 MOBEIRA - MOAGEM DA BEIRA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 193,088.00 19,308.80 10\n\n350 CEGRAF - SOCIEDADE GRÁFICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 28,881.38 2,449.14 8\n\n351 CIM - COMPANHIA INDUSTRIAL DA MATOLA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 638,651.58 46,046.78 7\n\n352 GRAPHIC - COMÉRCIO E INDÚSTRIA, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 7,346.02 500.26 7\n\n353 GRUPO MADAL, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 15,286.65 764.33 5\n\n354 COCA - COLA SABCO (MOÇAMBIQUE), S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,286,476.00 64,323.80 5\n\n355 COMPANHIA DE SENA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,134,177.50 156,167.00 5\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company 11,526.00 345.78 3\n\n\n\n356 MOZAL, S.A.\n\n\n\n10 253\n585.00 394,763.02 4\n\n\n\nSOCIEDADE MALONDA, S.A (EX. SOC. DE\n357 DESENVOLVIMENTO MOSÁGRIUS)\n\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\n\n\nSubsidiary company\n\n\n\n358 NORSAD, SA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 4,809,741.00 144,292.23 3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 58, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n(%)\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\nHIDROMOC - BEIRA, S.A (EX-HIDROMOC,E.E.DELG. R.\n336 CENTRO )\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 5,801.86 1,160.37 20\n\n337 GERALCO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 6,500.00 1,300.00 20\n\n338 GEOMOC, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 8,952.00 1,790.40 20\n\nCOMPANHIA MOÇAMBICANA DE HIDROCARBONETOS339 CMH, S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 593,411.50 118,682.30 20\n\n340 COMPANHIA MOÇAMBICANA DE GASODUTO-CMG, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 70,000.00 14,000.00 20\n\n341 CHÁ NAMAE, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,500.00 300.00 20\n\n342 AUTOVISA - SERVIÇOS AUTO, S.A. (EX-EMOCAT,E.E-U I) SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 12,000.00 2,400.00 20\n\n343 AGRO-ALFA - FUNDIÇÃO, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 5,658.00 1,131.60 20\n\n344 MILLENNIUM BIM, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 4,500,000.00 770,400.00 17\n\n345 AÇUCAREIRA DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,506,471.41 225,970.71 15\n\nCELMOQUE - CABOS DE ENERGIA E\n346 TELECOMUNICAÇOES DE MOÇ., S.A\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company 23,500.00 3,480.35 15\n\n347 AÇUCAREIRA DE XINAVANE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,204,500.00 384,540.00 12\n\n348 CIMENTOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,000,000.00 118,900.00 12\n\n349 MOBEIRA - MOAGEM DA BEIRA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 193,088.00 19,308.80 10\n\n350 CEGRAF - SOCIEDADE GRÁFICA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 28,881.38 2,449.14 8\n\n351 CIM - COMPANHIA INDUSTRIAL DA MATOLA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 638,651.58 46,046.78 7\n\n352 GRAPHIC - COMÉRCIO E INDÚSTRIA, LDA. SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 7,346.02 500.26 7\n\n353 GRUPO MADAL, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 15,286.65 764.33 5\n\n354 COCA - COLA SABCO (MOÇAMBIQUE), S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 1,286,476.00 64,323.80 5\n\n355 COMPANHIA DE SENA, S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 3,134,177.50 156,167.00 5\n\nSubsidiary company 11,526.00 345.78 3\n\n356 MOZAL, S.A.\n\n10 253\n585.00 394,763.02 4\n\nSOCIEDADE MALONDA, S.A (EX. SOC. DE\n357 DESENVOLVIMENTO MOSÁGRIUS)\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSEE - nonfinancial\n\nSubsidiary company\n\n358 NORSAD, SA SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 4,809,741.00 144,292.23 3", "text_characters": 2049}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE**\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(value)**\n\n\n\n**State share**\n\n\n\n**(%)**\n\n\n\n**#** **Public Entity** **Sector** **Type of entity**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**Stock**\n\n\n\n359 CERVEJAS DE MOÇAMBIQUE (EX-MAC-MAHON), S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 224,178.03 3,990.37 2\n\n\n\n360 FUNDAÇÃO MALONDA Central administration Nonprofit institutions 25,000.00 25,000.00 100\nExtrabudgetary Units (EBU) - Public institutes (includes hospitals and universities)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 59, "report_id": "cr-2023-046", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES – MOZAMBIQUE\n\nLatest update: October 2020\n\nState share\n\n(value)\n\nState share\n\n(%)\n\n# Public Entity Sector Type of entity\n\nCapital\n\nStock\n\n359 CERVEJAS DE MOÇAMBIQUE (EX-MAC-MAHON), S.A SEE - nonfinancial Subsidiary company 224,178.03 3,990.37 2\n\n360 FUNDAÇÃO MALONDA Central administration Nonprofit institutions 25,000.00 25,000.00 100\nExtrabudgetary Units (EBU) - Public institutes (includes hospitals and universities)", "text_characters": 383}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9bfc774eeafa3cf3ae4e6e55d0c0b8fcbc50e050
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:170310d43bcf8e2211120a13e7363a3d3ec90c029814b9ff4f082dc6ac3104bc
+size 27668
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0032-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0032-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e32d5bf5002ea02978e6ceeb6bcdc1c8d70ec9a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0032-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6c4c63e06ed6d88179576679a4715fc4699dfb8cf939ca8ef650e5cf5274e211
+size 139933
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..525a5fa9bab347610168118a862783029fe83966
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8ed5c806ae7b7c5ca190bfe9689e23d1105f8d7e30b097c99b9130e0ceb12afa
+size 100063
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0043-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0043-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..25f8193b06f562ffdac4cb1226f7e84a6dbb49a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0043-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:598d07bed688d7e5765add928b6146d9f424fe4f97abae482d99fcb8bf28e886
+size 133169
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b49cc420abfa2c91448dfb30f230908846d1ba0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-047",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Government Finance Statistics Mission (April 18-29, 2016)",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-047.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "f1113f44197d741352a731fd606ebe09e2204c47fd02ddfc80d63728b87412ea",
+ "source_bytes": 936735,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/25/republic-of-mozambique-technical-assistance-report-on-government-finance-statistics-mission-528608",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:37:02+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 20.412,
+ "page_count": 43,
+ "text_characters": 85196,
+ "table_count": 28,
+ "figure_count": 5,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION (APRIL 18-29, 2016)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C."
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "AFRITAC South, Fiscal Affairs Department, and Statistics Department"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON IMPROVING FISCAL REPORTING AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS (April 18–29, 2016)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Prepared by Mariana Sabatés, Fernando de Almeida, and Merle Wilkinson August 2016"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 37,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "METHODOLOGICAL GUIDE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 37,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "FOR"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 37,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "THE DEVELOPMENT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 37,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "OF THE MAPA FISCAL PRELIMINARY DRAFT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 40,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "STEP 1: DATA COLLECTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 41,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Step 2: Integration of the Data"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 41,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Step 3: Analysis of the Mapa Fiscal Draft"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 41,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Step 4: Dissemination of the Mapa Fiscal"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Mozambique: Technical Assistance Report on Government Finance Statistics Mission (April 18-29, 2016) IMF Country Report No. 23/47; August 2016",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Government Finance Statistics, Public sector debt statistics, Expenditure, Public Sector",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.39",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230123122322-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230125153014-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5f3491ab7ebf4cefbc61e8310836961352466083
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2259 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/47**
+
+## **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE** **STATISTICS MISSION (APRIL 18-29, 2016)**
+
+
+This report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in August 2016.
+
+**Disclaimer:**
+This report was prepared in 2016 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its
+publication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+###### **International Monetary Fund** **Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+#### **INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND**
+
+##### AFRITAC South, Fiscal Affairs Department, and Statistics Department
+
+#### **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**
+
+##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON IMPROVING FISCAL** **REPORTING AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS** (April 18–29, 2016)
+
+###### **Prepared by Mariana Sabatés, Fernando de Almeida, and Merle Wilkinson** **August 2016**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+2
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice and
+recommendations given by the staff of the International Monetary
+Fund (IMF) to the authorities of the Republic of Mozambique in
+response to their request for technical assistance. With the written
+authorization of the recipient country's authorities, this report
+(in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed to
+IMF Executive Directors and their staff, and to technical
+assistance providers and donors outside the IMF. Consent will be
+deemed obtained unless the recipient country's authorities object
+to such dissemination within 60 days of the transmittal of the
+report. Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries
+thereof to parties outside the IMF other than technical assistance
+providers and donors shall require the explicit authorization of the
+recipient country's authorities and the IMF.
+
+
+
+3
+
+
+**Contents** **Page**
+
+
+Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................5
+
+
+Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................6
+
+
+I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................8
+
+
+II. Possible Adjustments to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ....................................................................9
+
+A. Recording of Specific Extrabudgetary Operations .................................................10
+B. Recording Net VAT Income ...................................................................................14
+C. Recording Leasing Transactions .............................................................................17
+D. Issues Related to Reconciliations ............................................................................21
+E. Other Issues .............................................................................................................24
+F. Summary of Suggested Adjustments .......................................................................25
+
+
+III. Issues Related to the Preparation of the Mapa Fiscal and the Reconciliation of Financial
+Data ..........................................................................................................................................26
+
+A. Procedures ...............................................................................................................26
+B. Debt Management ...................................................................................................29
+C. Cash Management ...................................................................................................30
+
+
+IV. Government Finance Statistics Developed into the _GFSM_ 2014 ......................................32
+
+A. Findings ...................................................................................................................32
+
+**Tables**
+1. _Other Operations_ in _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ...............................................................................10
+2. Schedule of Debt Service Payments to Credit Suisse in Respect of EMATUM Liabilities
+in 2015 .................................................................................................................................11
+3. Reconciliation of External Debt Service in 2015 to _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ..............................12
+4. Suggested Adjustments to External Debt Interest and Amortization of External Debt .......12
+5. Suggested Treatment for the Guarantee Payment Reported as _Other Operations_ ..............13
+6. Suggested treatment for Fuel Subsidy Expenditure Reported as _Other Operations_ ...........14
+7. VAT Refund Claims for 2015..............................................................................................15
+8. Suggested Adjustment to VAT Refund Claims ...................................................................15
+9. Suggested adjustment to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ..................................................................15
+10. Actual VAT Refund Cash Payments in 2015 ....................................................................16
+11. Calculation of an Adjustment to the NCG 2015 ................................................................16
+12. Suggested Adjustment to the NCG ....................................................................................16
+13. Three Options for Quantifying the Amount of Debt Obligation from VAT
+Refund Claims ...................................................................................................................17
+14. Reconciliation of Government Domestic Leases and Loans to the NCG as at end-2015 .19
+15. Recording Financial Leases based on different _GFSM_ Principles.....................................20
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+16. Suggested Treatment for Leases Currently Reported as _Othe_ r _Operations_ ( _GFSM 1986_ )
+..................................................................................................................................................20
+17. Reconciliation of Government Domestic Securities to the NCG as of end-2014 and
+end-2015 ............................................................................................................................22
+18. Calculation of Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of Changes in Other Investor Holdings
+of T-Bonds .........................................................................................................................23
+19. Suggested Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of Changes in Other Investor Holdings of
+T-Bonds..............................................................................................................................23
+20. Suggested Treatment for VAT Securitization Currently Reported as _Other_ _Operations_ ..24
+21. Summary of Suggested Amendments to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015........................................25
+22. Differences between _Mapa Fiscal_ and Quarterly Report ..................................................27
+23. Differences between Data from the DNT and _Mapa Fiscal_ ..............................................27
+24. Amount of Investment Expenditure Financed by External Funds, Executed through the
+CUT and Outside the CUT ................................................................................................28
+
+**Figure**
+1. Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process ................................................................31
+
+**Box**
+1. French Experience on TSA Reconciliation ..........................................................................32
+
+**Appendices**
+I. List of Officials Interviewed................................................................................................35
+II. Methodological Guide for the Development of the _Mapa Fiscal_ .......................................36
+III. Fiscal Statistics Source Data ..............................................................................................41
+IV. _Mapa Fiscal_ into the _GFSM 2014_ Format .........................................................................42
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+**ACRONYMS**
+
+
+
+BM Bank of Mozambique
+CEDSIF
+_CGE_ Government annual report (
+
+
+
+CEDSIF Center for Development of Financial Information Systems
+_CGE_ Government annual report ( _Conta Geral do Estado_ )
+
+CS-DRMS Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System
+CUT/TSA Treasury single account ( _Conta Única do tesouro_ )
+DNCP National Government Accounting Directorate
+DNO National Directorate of Budget
+DNT National Treasury Directorate
+e-SISTAFE IT Government Financial Administration System
+EMATUM Tuna Mozambican Company ( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ )
+
+
+
+e-SISTAFE IT Government Financial Administration System
+EMATUM Tuna Mozambican Company ( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ )
+
+_GFSM 1986_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986_
+_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_
+
+
+
+_GFSM 1986_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986_
+_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_
+
+MEFP Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies
+MT Mozambican metical
+NCG Net Credit to the Central Government
+REO Budget execution report (
+SOE State-owned enterprise
+
+
+
+REO Budget execution report ( _Relatório de Execução Orçamentaria_ )
+SOE State-owned enterprise
+
+T-bills Treasury bills
+T-bonds Treasury bonds
+TMU Technical Memorandum of Understanding
+VAT Value-added tax
+
+
+
+6
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+
+A technical assistance mission, jointly organized by the IMF’s Statistics Department and the
+AFRITAC South Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFS) visited Maputo, Mozambique
+during April 18–29, 2016. It was led by Ms. Mariana Sabatés (IMF’s Statistics Department
+expert) and composed of Ms. Merle Wilkinson and Mr. Fernando de Almeida (IMF’s Fiscal
+Affairs Department experts). The mission’s statistics component was part of the government
+finance statistics module of the United Kingdom’s Department for International
+Development-funded Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 project.
+
+
+**The main objectives of the mission were to:** (i) identify the key discrepancies between data
+on the operations of government and financing of the central government, including net
+credit of the banking sector; (ii) assess the origins of the discrepancies; (iii) propose a set of
+actions and tools to foster the consistency of fiscal reporting; and (iv) assess the current state
+of compiled fiscal statistics using the _Government Finance Statistics Manual_ _2014_
+( _GFSM 2014)_ framework.
+
+
+**Main findings and recommendations** are as follows:
+
+
+The Mapa Fiscal report is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the
+IMF according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). [1] It is therefore very
+important to ensure accuracy of the report and appropriate recording of specific transactions.
+
+
+Various entities are involved in the preparation of the _Mapa Fiscal_ . The National
+Government Accounting Directorate (DNCP) is currently accountable for the overall process
+but needs support from the National Directorate of Budget (DNO) and the National Treasury
+Directorate (DNT), as they produce a part of the source data. Similarly, various systems are
+used to generate the source data. This lack of an integrated system for the source data has led
+to discrepancies that were identified by the mission. The problem was further aggravated by
+the lack of regular full reconciliations of the data.
+
+
+The majority of the business operations are executed through the treasury single account
+(CUT/TSA), but about 30 percent are still executed outside, through accounts open at the
+Bank of Mozambique (BM) or through commercial bank accounts. Regular bank
+reconciliation is crucial to ensuring accurate and comprehensive fiscal reporting.
+
+
+There has been very limited progress on compiling fiscal statistics in accordance with the
+_GFSM 2014_ . Progress was hampered by the frequent changes of the responsible team and
+because the lack of a formal agreement among source data compilers for the timely delivery
+of the data. Therefore, most of the time, the gathering of information depends on the
+goodwill of the different parties involved.
+
+
+1 TMU, paragraph 24, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+7
+
+
+Consider amending the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 based on the suggested amendments as in Table
+21, and start calculating the ‘net internal financing’ line based on the government’s own
+fiscal data and introduce a formal reconciliation between the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the net credit
+to government figure calculated by the BM.
+
+
+Consider recording outstanding value-added tax (VAT) refund claims as debt obligations as
+of end-2015.
+
+
+**Regarding preparation of** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and the reconciliation of financial data:** Consider
+the creation of a technical committee involving the DNCP, DNT, DNO, to discuss problems
+faced during the ongoing process and address discrepancies that could not have been solved
+otherwise.
+
+
+Develop a guidance document (or reference paper) which presents in a concrete way, the
+main features of the _Mapa Fiscal_ 's production process.
+
+
+Implement a system of supervision (quality assurance) to ensure reliability of the _Mapa_
+_Fiscal_ data, including an effective reconciliation of the overall position of the CUT between
+the DNT and the BM.
+
+Consider more intensive use of e-SISTAFE, including data available in other systems.
+
+**Regarding the use of the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **framework:** Design a formal agreement between the
+people in charge of the compilation and the data providers that establishes the form,
+frequency, and delay of the fiscal information that should be sent. It is necessary that this
+agreement be validated by the corresponding authorities to ensure its implementation.
+
+
+Centralize the request for information mainly with the DNCP, in order to achieve internal
+consistency in the data until the formal agreement becomes established.
+
+Reconcile data compiled with the information of flows included in the _Mapa Fiscal_, and also
+with Chart 2 of the budget execution report (Relatório de Execução Orçamentaria, REO) and
+Chart 7 of the government’s annual report (Conta Geral do Estado, CGE).
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+
+1. A technical assistance mission, jointly organized by the IMF’s Statistics Department
+and the AFRITAC South Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFS) visited Maputo,
+Mozambique during April 18–29, 2016. It was led by Ms. Mariana Sabatés (IMF’s Statistics
+Department expert) and composed of Ms. Merle Wilkinson and Mr. Fernando de Almeida
+(IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department experts). Its statistics component was part of the
+government finance statistics module of the United Kingdom’s Department for International
+Development-funded Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 project.
+
+
+2. The mission met with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Economy and
+Finance, the General Directors of the Treasury, Public Accounting, the Center for
+Development of Financial Information Systems (CEDSIF), the National Directorate of
+Economic and Financial Studies, and staff of the Bank of Mozambique (BM). For the
+complete list of officials, see Appendix I.
+
+
+3. The mission would like to thank the Mozambican authorities for their cooperation and
+hospitality and for facilitating open and constructive discussions. Also, for her support of the
+mission, we would like to thank Ms. Esther Palacio, IMF’s Technical Assistance Coordinator
+in Mozambique.
+
+
+**A. Mission Objectives and Tasks**
+
+
+4. The main objectives of the mission were to: (1) identify the key discrepancies
+between data on the operations of government and financing of the central government,
+including net credit of the banking sector; (2) assess the origins of the discrepancies; and
+(3) propose a set of actions and tools to foster the consistency of fiscal reporting. The mission
+also assessed the current state of compiling fiscal statistics using the _Government Finance_
+_Statistics Manual_ _2014_ ( _GFSM 2014)_ framework.
+
+
+**B. Structure of the Report**
+
+
+5. The remainder of this report consists of three sections. In the first section (section II),
+the problems and the proposed solution for the consistency of the Mapa Fiscal are presented;
+the second section (section III) presents issues related to the process and reconciliation issues
+as well as management of cash; and the last section (section IV) describes progress with the
+migration of fiscal statistics into the _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_
+( _GFSM 2014_ ) framework.
+
+
+6. The Appendices to the report display Appendix I as a list of the officials met during
+the mission; in Appendix II as the Methodological Guide for the Development of the Mapa
+Fiscal; Appendix III as the fiscal statistics sources of data and in Appendix IV, restructure of
+the data of the _Mapa Fiscal_ using the _GFSM 2014_ framework.
+
+
+
+9
+
+
+**II. POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE** _**MAPA FISCAL**_ **2015**
+
+
+7. The _Mapa Fiscal_ is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the
+IMF according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). [2] The two main
+challenges in compiling the _Mapa Fiscal_ are the following: (i) ensuring accuracy of the
+report; and (ii) recording specific transactions appropriately. This section deals with issues
+related to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, [3] while suggestions to strengthen the compilation process are
+discussed in Section III.
+
+
+8. **The** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015 is prepared based on** _**the Government Finance Statistics**_
+_**Manual 1986**_ **(** _**GFSM 1986**_ **)** . All suggested adjustments in this section are made in the
+context of the _GFSM 1986_ . The most up-to-date statistics manual is _GFSM 2014_ and, where
+noteworthy, differences in the treatment of items between _GFSM 1986_ and _GFSM 2014_ are
+highlighted.
+
+
+9. **The** _**Net internal financing**_ **line in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **is equal to the net credit to the**
+**central government (NCG) figure that is calculated by the Bank of Mozambique (BM)**
+**according to the definition, coverage, and adjustments agreed in the TMU** . [4] The NCG
+from the banking system is defined as the difference between the outstanding amount of bank
+credits to the central government and the central government’s deposits within the banking
+system. The change in the NCG from the banking system is relative to the NCG as at the end
+of December of the previous year.
+
+
+10. **A change in the basis for recording value-added tax (VAT) refunds relating to**
+**claims in respect of 2015 and later years has been made based on IMF advice** . [5] From
+2015, VAT receipts have been accounted for on a net basis, for example, the amount of
+revenue recorded equals gross VAT receipts for 2015 and less VAT refund claims in respect
+of 2015, net of rejections. [6] Any VAT refunds paid relating to 2014 and previous years,
+whether those funded by the securitization [7] or in respect of claims that have arisen in 2015,
+have been recorded as a liability that does not affect the current year’s budget revenue and
+expenditure. Accordingly, the government securities issued to companies with VAT refund
+claims—the “VAT securitization” in April 2015—are not recorded within revenue and
+expenditure (“above-the-line”) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015. The size of the VAT securitization
+issue was Mozambican metical (Mt) 8,171 million and the securities are listed on the Stock
+
+
+2 TMU, paragraph 24, December 2, 2015.
+
+3 The mission worked with a version of _Mapa Fiscal_ dated April 19, 2016.
+
+4 TMU paragraphs 2–4 and 20, December 2, 2015.
+
+5 “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique”, IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, November 2015.
+
+6 Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), paragraph 23, December 2, 2015.
+
+7 The government paid VAT refund arrears of Mt8,171 million that had accumulated up to end of 2014, by
+‘securitizing’ the debt through a placement of government bonds to the companies in April 2015.
+
+
+
+10
+
+
+Exchange of Mozambique. As of end-2015, commercial banks had bought Mt5,949 million
+of the issue in the secondary market and this amount has been included in the NCG by the
+BM.
+
+
+11. **Four key issues should be addressed to finalize the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015** :
+
+- Extrabudgetary expenditure and net on-lending operations incurred in 2015;
+
+- Recording of net VAT revenue, including the impact of cash VAT refunds;
+
+- Recording of leasing transactions; and
+
+- Reconciliation of stocks and flows reported in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG reported
+by the BM (including issues created by the VAT securitization).
+
+
+12. **These four issues have an impact on the** _**Other Operations**_ **line and the** _**Other**_
+_**Income/Expenditure**_ **lines in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015** . The _Other Operations_ line is reported
+“below-the-line” (i.e., as part of financing) and currently comprises five entries, amounting to
+Mt14,384 million (Table 1). The _Other Expenditure_ (+)/ _Revenue_ (-) line is reported
+“above-the-line” (i.e., as part of the operations of government) and amounts to Mt852 million
+(or around 0.4 percent of total expenditure plus net lending). This amount is derived as a
+residual item so that the _Mapa Fiscal_ is balanced, representing revenue or expenditure flows
+that are not identified and not supported by administrative records of any actual transactions.
+
+|Col1|Other Operations (below-the-line)|In millions of
Mozambican
meticais|
+|---|---|---|
+|1.
|VAT securitization
|
5 949
|
+|
2.
|
Fuel subsidy payment to companies financed by commercial loan
|
3 800
|
+|
3.
|
Leasing for public buildings
|
4 128
|
+|
4.
|
VAT refund payments postponed to 2016
|
-765
|
+|
5.
|
Payment of commercial debt of the Tuna Mozambican Company (EMATUM)
|
1 272
|
+|
**6.**|
**Total of other operations**|
**14 384**|
+
+
+
+_Source: National Government Accounting Directorate_ ( _DNCP_ ).
+
+
+**A. Recording of Specific Extrabudgetary Operations**
+
+
+13. **In 2015, two large extrabudgetary transactions triggered actual cash payments** :
+(i) a subsidy payment of Mt3,800 million to fuel companies that were financed by a
+commercial loan; and (ii) a guarantee payment to the Tuna Mozambican Company
+( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ ) (EMATUM) bondholders. As these transactions were not
+included in the 2015 budget, the authorities recorded the whole subsidy payment and part of
+the guarantee payment as _Other Operations_, falling ‘below-the-line’ (Table 1, Rows 2 and 5).
+
+
+14. **The rationale for recording the guarantee payment partly within** _**Other**_
+_**Operations**_ **and partly elsewhere in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **is unclear** . Table 2 presents the
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+Schedule of debt service payments to Credit Suisse [8] in respect of the EMATUM liabilities [9]
+in 2015. Table 3 presents the reconciliation of external debt payments in 2015 between the
+information provided by the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) and the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015,
+identifying a difference of Mt532 million (Table 3, Row 9). Mission analysis revealed that,
+of the total guarantee payment to the EMATUM bondholders of Mt1,805 million, an amount
+of Mt1,272 million (Table 1; Row 5) had been adjusted out of the _External debt interest_
+(‘above-the-line’) and _Amortization of external debt_ (‘below-the-line’) lines in the _Mapa_
+_Fiscal_ into _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’). The difference of Mt532 million remained
+within _Amortization of external debt_ (Mt394 million) and _External debt interest_
+(Mt138 million) (Table 3, Row 9). Suggested adjustments to the _External debt interest_ and
+_Amortization of external debt_ in order to give a consistent presentation of the guarantee
+payment are presented in Table 4.
+
+
+
+**Table 2. Mozambique: Schedule of Debt Service Payments to Credit Suisse in**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Date|Description|Repayment|Interest|Total|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
March 2015
|
‘Non-commercial part’ of
EMATUM liabilities
|
-
|
398
|
398
|
+|September 2015
|‘Non-commercial part’ of
EMATUM liabilities
|1 753
|614
|2 367
|
+|September 2015
|Guarantee call on
‘commercial part’ of EMATUM
liabilities
|1 337
|468
|1 805
|
+|
|**Total payments to Credit**
**Suisse**(Table 3, Row 3)|**3 090**|**1 480**|**4 570**|
+
+
+
+8 Debt obligations of EMATUM were arranged by Credit Suisse.
+
+9 The government guaranteed the US$850 million bond issued in 2013 by the state-owned enterprise (SOE) EMATUM.
+This borrowing financed the purchase of tuna fishing boats and maritime security equipment. Subsequently, US$500 million
+out of the total US$850 million was incorporated into the budget and became public debt under the responsibility of the
+treasury (‘non-commercial part’). The remaining amount (US$350 million) remains on EMATUM’s balance sheet
+(‘commercial part’) (IMF Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, December 3, 2015.)
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+**Table 3. Mozambique: Reconciliation of External Debt Service in 2015 to** _**Mapa**_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Creditor
(millions of Mozambican meticais)|Repayment|Interest|Total|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
|
**External debt service in 2015**
|
|
|
|
+|
1.
|
Multilateral
|
2 098
|
1 091
|
3 189
|
+|
2.
|
Bilateral (excl. Credit Suisse)
|
1 842
|
1 784
|
3 626
|
+|
3.
|
Total payments to Credit Suisse (incl. debt service
payments on a call on guarantee)
|
3 090
|
1 480
|
4 570
|
+|**4.**
|
**Total external debt service payments including**
**guarantee payments**
|**7 030**
|**4 355**
|**11 385**
|
+|5.
|
_Less_ guarantee payment on ‘commercial part’ of
EMATUM liabilities (Table 2)
|-1 337
|-468
|-1 805
|
+|**6.**
|
**Total external debt service excluding guarantee**
**payments**
|**5 693**
|**3 887**
|**9 580**
|
+|7.
|
**Reconciliation of external debt service with****_Mapa_**
**_Fiscal_2015**
|
|
|
|
+|8.
|
_Mapa Fiscal_ 2015
|6 087
|4 025
|10 112
|
+|**9.**
|**Difference**(Row 6_less_ Row 8)
|**-394**
|**-138**|**-532**|
+
+
+
+**Table 4. Mozambique: Suggested Adjustments to External Debt Interest and**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested adjustment|Comment, explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|External debt
interest
|
-138
|An adjustment from External
debt interest (-138) to Other
Operations (+138)
|To give consistent treatment of all
the EMATUM guarantee-related
payments.|
+|Amortization
of external
debt
|-394|An adjustment from
Amortization
of external debt (-394) to Other
Operations (+394)|An adjustment from
Amortization
of external debt (-394) to Other
Operations (+394)|
+
+
+
+15. **According to the** _**GFSM 1986**_ **, the government’s guarantee payment should be**
+**recorded as an on-lending transaction (‘above-the-line’) in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **rather than**
+**within** _**Other Operations**_ **(‘below-the-line’)** . In September 2015, the government paid a total
+of Mt1,805 million as interest and repayment of principal to the EMATUM bondholders after
+a call on the government’s guarantee of the so-called ‘commercial part’ of the EMATUM
+liabilities. According to _GFSM 1986_, any government payment, as guarantor or surety, of
+interest or amortization on the defaulted debts of others is classified as lending (‘above-theline’), since it gives rise to an equivalent government claim against the defaulting debtor.
+Government receipts constituting recoveries on the consequent claims against defaulting
+debtors are classified as repayment of government lending. [10] When government payment to
+
+
+10 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 4: Classification, Section V. Lending Minus Repayments, page 185.
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+third parties of interest or amortization on debt of others generates no corresponding
+government claim against the debtor, it is classified as a transfer (‘above-the-line’). [11]
+However, in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, payment of the commercial part of the EMATUM’s
+liabilities have been recorded in the _Other operations_ line (‘below-the-line’), apparently
+because the guarantee payment was not foreseen and budgeted for 2015. Table 5 summarizes
+the suggested treatment of the EMATUM guarantee payment.
+
+
+
+**Table 5. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for the Guarantee Payment**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
amendment|Comment/Explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|The
EMATUM
guarantee
payment
|
1 805|Adjustment from
Other Operations
(-1 805) to an
increase in Net
lending (+1 805)
|Debt service payments on behalf of the
EMATUM to bondholders made after the call
on the government’s guarantee was
reclassified as an increase in on-lending,
according to the_GFSM 1986_.
|
+
+
+
+16. **The classification of the guarantee payment may be different under** _**GFSM 2014**_ .
+According to _GFSM 2014_, the statistical treatment of the assumption of debt, including
+payments when a guarantee is called, depends on (i) whether the government as a debtor
+acquires an effective financial claim against the original debtor; and (ii) if there is no
+effective financial claim, the relationship between the government as a debtor and the
+original debtor, and whether the original debtor is bankrupt or no longer a going concern. [12]
+The mission did not analyze the appropriate _GFSM 2014_ classification, which would turn on
+an assessment of the EMATUM’s long-term financial prospects and could result in the
+guarantee payment being classified as a capital transfer (above-the-line) rather than as
+on-lending (below-the-line in _GFSM 2014_ but above-the-line in _GFSM 1986_ ).
+
+
+17. **The fuel subsidy paid to companies should be recorded as a subsidy**
+**(‘above-the-line’) in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015 rather than within** _**Other Operations**_
+**(‘below-the-line’** ). The authorities recorded the fuel subsidy payment of Mt3,800 million in
+the _Other Operations_ line (‘below-the-line’), as it was not included in the budget. The loan of
+Mt3,800 million to finance the fuel subsidy payment is recorded as part of the internal debt
+stock for 2015. Regardless of whether the payment of an expense item was budgeted or not,
+it should be treated as a 2015 ‘above-the-line’ expenditure item. Table 6 details how payment
+for the fuel subsidy should be treated.
+
+
+11 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 3: Analytical Framework, Section III.E. Lending Minus Repayments, page 105.
+12 _GFSM 2014_, A3.26–29.
+
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+**Table 6. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for Fuel Subsidy Expenditure**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
Amendment|Comment/Explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Fuel subsidy
to companies
|
3 800|Reduce Other
Operations (-3 800)
and increase
Subsidies (+3 800)|Fuel subsidy reclassified to subsidies as it
represents a 2015 expense.|
+
+
+
+18. **Going forward, it would be useful for the authorities to clarify their approach,**
+**should further material extrabudgetary expenditures arise in future years.** By its nature,
+a call on a guarantee is difficult to foresee and budget for. Equally, the fuel subsidy payment
+also fell outside the budget in 2015. However, whether an item is budgeted or not is less
+relevant than the year in which the actual payment arose. It is important for policy
+formulation and performance analysis to classify expenditures correctly, rather than show
+unbudgeted expenditure ‘below-the-line’; the correct way would be to show the expenditure
+‘above-the-line’ but with an explanation added giving the reason for deviating from the
+budgeted amount.
+
+
+**B. Recording Net VAT Income**
+
+
+19. **It may be appropriate to revise the calculation of VAT refund claims included in**
+**net VAT revenue** . VAT refund claims included in net VAT revenue in the _Mapa Fiscal_
+2015 amounted to Mt6,455 million, of which Mt524 million were rejected (Table 7). This
+represented the total amount of VAT refund claims submitted to the Tax Authority in 2015,
+but excluding VAT refund claims in respect of 2014 and earlier years. According to the
+Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), [13] claims that have been rejected
+should be excluded from the amount of VAT refund claims in the _Mapa Fiscal_ (Table 8). It
+should be noted that this approach for recording of net VAT revenue specified in the MEFP
+differs from the standard statistical treatment for cash-based accounting, whereby the amount
+of VAT refunds to be netted against VAT receipts is the amount of cash paid out as VAT
+refunds.
+
+
+13 MEFP, paragraph 23, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais))|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|6 455
|Total of submitted VAT refund claims related to 2015
|
+|-524
|Irregularities, rejected and canceled (_Irregularidades, Indeferidos, Anulados_)
|
+|**5 931**
|**Total of VAT refund claims for 2015 for the net VAT revenue in****_Mapa Fiscal_ **
|
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
Amendment|Col4|Comment/Explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|VAT
refund
claims of
6455
million|
-524|Adjustment to Other
Expenditure/Revenue
(+524) from VAT
refund claims (-524)
||Rejected VAT refund
claims adjusted out of
VAT refund claims as per
the MEFP.|
+
+
+
+20. **The item in the amount of Mt765 million within** _**Other Operations**_ **as an**
+**adjustment in respect of VAT refund payments has been postponed to 2016.**
+**(Table 1 row 4) is not appropriate** . This item represents amounts payable but not yet paid
+by the government. However, since the _Mapa Fiscal_ is prepared on a cash basis, this item
+should not be included. The suggested adjustment to _Other Operations_ is detailed in Table 9.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais))|Suggested
Amendment|Comment/Explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|VAT refund
payments
postponed to
2016
|
-765|Adjustment from
Other Operations
(+765) to Other
Expenditure/Revenue
(-765)|Adjustment of an item representing
payables out of_Other Operations_ as it is
not a 2015 cash transaction.|
+
+
+
+21. **An adjustment to the NCG is required in respect of VAT refund claims, being**
+**the difference between VAT refund claims and VAT refund cash payments** . The
+treatment of VAT refunds in the _Mapa Fiscal_, which follows from the MEFP and TMU,
+should be consistent with the calculation of the NCG. Since non-rejected VAT refund claims
+do not directly represent cash payments while the NCG is cash-based, the need for an
+adjustment to the NCG arises. Actual VAT refund cash payments in 2015 totaled Mt5,797
+
+
+
+16
+
+
+million (Table 10), while VAT refund claims totaled Mt5,931 million (Table 7), giving rise
+to a difference of Mt134 million (Table 11). The suggested adjustment to the NCG is detailed
+in Table 12.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais))|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|2 713
|Payments of VAT refund claims for 2015
|
+|982
|Payments of VAT refund claims for 2014 and earlier
|
+|2 048
|Payments of VAT refund claims for 2014 and earlier, these claims were
submitted to the AT in 2014 and earlier
|
+|54
|VAT refund payments to diplomats
|
+|**5 797**
|**Total cash paid for VAT refunds during 2015**
|
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|VAT Refund Claims for 2015
(1)
(Table 7)|Cash Paid for VAT Refunds
During 2015 (2)
(Table 10)|Difference (1) – (2)|
+|---|---|---|
+|
5 931
|
5 797
|134|
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
Amendment|Comment/Explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|VAT refund
adjustment to
the NCG
|
134|Adjustment from the
Other
Expenditure/Revenue
(-134) to the NCG
(+134)|Adjustment to the NCG of the difference
between non-rejected VAT refund claims
and cash payments for VAT refunds in
2015 (Table 11).|
+
+
+
+22. **Approved but unpaid VAT refund claims should be recorded as debt obligations**
+**in line with the TMU** . [14] According to the Tax Authority, at the end of 2015, the total
+amount of VAT refund claims submitted to the Tax Authority was Mt9,036 million, of which
+Mt3,764 million has been approved for payment and Mt5,272 million were still in the
+analysis stage (Table 13). The approved VAT refund claims of Mt3,764 million represent
+arrears of the government, which are defined as debt obligation in the TMU.
+
+
+23. **Since a large part of the VAT refund claims under analysis are likely to be paid,**
+**it may also be appropriate to treat a proportion of these claims as debt obligations** .
+Historically, the Tax Authority has approved 84 percent of submitted VAT refund claims for
+
+
+14 TMU, F. Debt, Definition of debt, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+payment in the first round of analysis and only 6.4 percent are finally rejected. [15] This
+suggests that around 93.6 percent of the Mt5,272 billion worth of claims under investigation
+are likely to be approved ultimately—an amount of Mt4,935 million.
+
+
+24. **The mission suggests that both approved but unpaid VAT claims and the**
+**amount of VAT claims under investigation that are expected to be paid should be**
+**recorded as debt obligations in order for the amount of debt obligations to be closest to**
+**economic reality** . There are three options to quantify the amount of outstanding VAT refund
+claims to be recorded as a government internal debt obligation (Table 13). Option 2 is based
+on macro-economic statistics, while Options 1 and 3 take into account, expected liabilities
+from claims under analysis. Taking into account that, historically, during the lengthy analysis
+process, a very high proportion of non-rejected claims, but not all, are finally accepted for
+payment. **The mission recommends Option 3 as the preferred basis for quantifying the**
+**amount of debt obligation, since it provides the best sense of economic reality.**
+
+|Table 13. Mo|ozambique: Three Options for Quantifying the Amount of Debt Obligation from VAT Refund Claims VAT Refund Claims as of end-2015 in millions|
+|---|---|
+|
|
VAT Refund Claims as of end-2015 in millions
|
+|**_OPTION 1_**
|
|
+|
382
|Outstanding VAT refund claims from 2014
|
+|8 654
|Outstanding VAT refund claims submitted in 2015, including both claims
approved for payment and claims in the analyses phase
|
+|**9 036**
|**Outstanding VAT refund claims including potential liabilities**
|
+|
**_OPTION 2_ **
|
|
+|
382
|
Outstanding VAT refund claims from 2014
|
+|8 654
|Outstanding VAT refund claims submitted in 2015, including both claims
approved for payment and claims in the analysis phase
|
+|-5 272
|Outstanding VAT refund claims in the analysis phase
|
+|**3 764**
|**Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment**
|
+|
**_OPTION 3_**
|
|
+|
|_Option 2 plus expected amount of valid claims currently under analysis_
_(based on historical statistics)_
|
+|3 764
|Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment
|
+|4 935
|Expected amount of valid claims currently under analysis. Historically
93.6 percent of claims analyzed have been accepted for payment.
(5272*93.6 percent)
|
+|**8 699**
|**Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment and probable for**
**payment**
|
+
+
+
+**C. Recording Leasing Transactions**
+
+
+25. **Financial leases for public buildings are recorded as** _**Other Operations**_ **in the**
+_**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and as part of the internal debt stock by the DNT** . The authorities have been
+actively using leasing as a source of funding for building and renovating government
+
+
+15 Aide memoire: “Reforming VAT Refunds Management,” IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, September 2014.
+
+
+
+18
+
+
+buildings. As of end-2015, the stock of leasing contracts signed totaled Mt10.6 billion
+(1.8 percent of GDP), of which the outstanding balance of lease obligations, Mt7,638 million,
+was recorded in the internal debt stock by the DNT (Table 14). The leasing contracts are
+typically signed with domestic commercial banks with a maturity of seven years. The
+mission’s understanding of the repayment terms of the leases is that they are financial leases,
+based on discussions with officials and the one leasing contract template inspected by the
+mission. In the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, an amount of Mt221 million has been recorded within the
+interest expenditure line (‘above-the-line’) relating to leases, and a further amount of
+Mt4,128 million has been recorded within _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’). The mission
+was not able to obtain information regarding the detailed breakdown of the amount of
+Mt4,128 million (Table 1, Row 3).
+
+
+26. **Further analysis is needed to substantiate the amounts in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_
+**relating to financial leases** . In 2015, the authorities signed four new lease contracts in the
+amount of Mt8,448 million. According to the DNT, drawings under lease contracts totaled
+Mt5,703 million in 2015, of which Mt5,571 million were drawings under the new lease
+contracts and Mt132 million was drawings under a leasing contract signed in 2013. The
+mission was not able to obtain a detailed breakdown regarding actual drawdowns under the
+new lease contracts. A reconciliation (Table 14) between the stock of loans and leases held
+by commercial banks as at end-2015, as per the NCG figure provided by the BM, and the
+internal debt service table for 2015 provided by the DNT shows that the stock of domestic
+leases and loans as per the DNT is Mt4,354 million larger than the stock recorded by
+domestic commercial banks as per the BM (Table 14). Further analysis is needed to identify
+the causes for this difference. A similar reconciliation should be carried out for end-2014 to
+ensure that financing flows in 2015 (and not just the stock at end-2015) are captured
+accurately.
+
+
+27. **Amounts relating to leases should be recorded in** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015 based on**
+**actual drawings from the leases during 2015 as increases in capital expenditure**
+**(‘above-the-line’)** . According to the _GFSM 1986_, [16] a purchase paid for by the government in
+the form of a fixed-term contractual obligation should be shown as both expenditure and a
+borrowing transaction at the time the terms of the credit contract for creation of the debt are
+fulfilled. Drawings should be shown in an amount equal to the amount of funds received by
+the government or, under the terms of a credit contract, the debt created.
+
+
+28. **It should be noted that the treatment of leases may be different under the**
+_**GFSM 1986**_ **compared to** _**GFSM 2001**_ **and** _**GFSM 2014**_ . Table 15 summarizes the three
+treatments for recording financial leases based on the different _GFSM_ principles. Table 16
+sets out the suggested recording of leases as currently reported as “other operations” in the
+_Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 according to the _GFSM 1986_ .
+
+
+16 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 4 : Classification, Section IV.C.2. Financing by Type of Debt Instrument, 3. Long-term
+loans not elsewhere classified, 3.1. Drawings, page 214.
+
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+**Table 14. Mozambique: Reconciliation of Government Domestic Leases and**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|2015
In millions|NCG|Central
government|Difference|Comment|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
Total credits of leases
and loans
|21 302
|
12 911
|
|
|
+|
_Of which leases_
|
|_7 638_
|
|
|
+|
_Of which loans_
|
|
_13 444_
|
|
|
+|
_Of which VAT_
_securitization_
|
|
_-8 171_
|
|
Adjustment for different
classifications of VAT
securitization in the NCG
and by central government.
VAT securitization is shown
as a loan in central
government internal debt
and as treasury bonds
(T-bonds) in the NCG figure
reported by the BM.
|
+|_Adjustments:_
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Portuguese credit line
|
-12 746
|
|
|
Excluded from the NCG as it
is not covered under the
definition of central
government. 17
|
+|**Total leases and loans**
**as of end-2015**
**(adjusted)**
|**8 557**
|**12 911**
|**4 354**|
Debt per the DNT is larger
than banking sector leases
and loans granted to central
government per the BM.|
+
+
+
+17 TMU paragraph 4, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+20
+
+
+**Table 15. Mozambique: Recording Financial Leases based on different** _**GFSM**_
+
+
+|GFSM 1986|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|
**Recording**
|Any payments for a financial lease will be recorded as capital expenditure at the
time the payment for the financial lease is made, i.e., it is recorded as if every
payment acquires a small portion of the asset.
Due to this premise for the recording, the liability (debt) related to the financial
lease are not recognized in the environment, because it was argued that when the
debt was incurred no cash flows occurred. In total, it could lead to a whole lot of
underestimations not only of the stock of nonfinancial assets that government has
ownership over, but also of the liabilities that the government has incurred.
|
+|**_GFSM 2001 (_cash environment)**
|**_GFSM 2001 (_cash environment)**
|
+|
**Recording**
|
A leasing transaction is divided into parts to record all the economic events as if a
financial flow did occur.
It is argued that the government has obtained a loan from a bank (i.e., entities cash
increased, and a liability toward the bank is recognized), with which the entity is
then deemed to have purchased a nonfinancial asset (cash decreased and
nonfinancial asset of equal value is acquired), in subsequent periods when the
financial lease payments are made, these payments are recorded as repayments
on the loan with banks.
|
+|**_GFSM 2014_ (accrual based)**
|**_GFSM 2014_ (accrual based)**
|
+|
**Recording**
|
The treatment of financial leases is designed to capture the economic reality of
such arrangements, by treating assets under a financial lease as if they were
purchased and owned by the user. The lessee (economic owner) records the
acquisition of the asset that is financed by an imputed loan. The loan is redeemed
through payments during the contract.18
|
+
+
+
+**Table 16. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for Leases Currently Reported**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
amendment|Comment, explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Leasing for
public
buildings|
4 128|Reclassification from
Other Operations (-4
128) to capital
expenditure (+4 128)
|On the basis that all lease contracts are
financial leases and that the amount of
Mt4,128 is correct (Note: the mission has not
been able to confirm this amount, further work
needs to be done to verify the figure of
Mt4,128 million), the amount can be
considered as the purchase of nonfinancial
assets (i.e., the public buildings that are the
subject of the leases) according the_GFSM_
_1986._|
+
+
+
+18 _GFSM 2014_, A4.13.
+
+
+
+21
+
+
+**D. Issues Related to Reconciliations**
+
+
+29. **It would be worthwhile for the authorities to carry out regular formal**
+**reconciliations between the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and the NCG** . The NCG calculated by the BM is
+used in the _Mapa Fiscal_ for the line ‘ _Net internal financing_ ’. Although the Ministry of
+Economy and Finance and the BM meet monthly to discuss and identify the causes of any
+changes in the NCG, there is no formal reconciliation between the government’s fiscal data
+and the BM-calculated NCG. Such a reconciliation would be valuable in ensuring the
+accuracy of government records and would potentially identify reconciling items to be
+adjusted, thereby reducing the amount of unallocated expenditure/revenue, which is a
+balancing item in the _Mapa Fiscal._
+
+
+30. **Any such reconciliation would best be carried out on a product-line basis** . Net
+internal financing is the difference between transactions involving financial assets
+(e.g., the central government bank accounts’ balances) and financing transactions
+(e.g., treasury bills (T-bills), treasury bonds (T-bonds), financial leases, other loans). To
+facilitate identifying differences and associated reconciling items, it would be most efficient
+to compare government data with the BM data at an individual product level (i.e., bank
+accounts in the BM and commercial banks; T-bills; T-bonds; financial leases; other loans).
+Discrepancies between the fiscal data and the monetary data can arise for various reasons,
+including differences between those bank accounts included by DNT in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and
+those bank accounts recorded by commercial banks in the monetary survey and included by
+the BM in the NCG by commercial banks, use of different foreign exchange rates, and other
+differences in valuation bases.
+
+
+31. **The NCG should be adjusted for changes in non-commercial bank holdings of**
+**T-bonds** . In its monetary survey for the NCG calculation, the BM includes the stock of
+T-bonds owned by commercial banks purchased in the primary and secondary markets but
+excludes the stock of T-bonds owned by other investors. Any secondary market T-bond
+transactions (or non-monetary transaction in T-bills, which we understand to be negligible in
+amount) between banks and other investors will impact the NCG figure, and indeed the TMU
+provides that the NCG should be adjusted downward (upward) for any increase (decrease) in
+domestic financing from the non-financial private sector. [19] Table 17 reconciles the NCG to
+the balance of government domestic securities and Table 18 shows that commercial banks
+have been net purchasers of T-bonds (excluding VAT securities) in the amount of Mt1,025
+million from other investors in the secondary market in 2015. If the NCG is not adjusted for
+this amount, this leads to an increase in the NCG without any actual transaction by the
+government (Table 18). (It should be noted that where T-bills are issued for monetary
+purposes, an offsetting cash balance is included by the BM in the NCG calculation.) Table 19
+details the suggested adjustment to the NCG for 2015, excluding the impact of VAT
+securitization bonds as these are discussed in the following paragraph.
+
+
+19 TMU paragraph 20, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+**Table 17. Mozambique: Reconciliation of Government Domestic Securities to**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|2014
In millions|NCG|Central
Government|Difference|Explanation for
Difference|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|1.
|
T-bills
|37 551
|
8 400
|29 151
|
The central government
reports a smaller amount
of T-bills than the
amount owned by banks.
The difference is T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes.
|
+|2.
|T-bonds
|16 839
|20 940
|-4 101
|
Banks own a smaller
amount of T-bonds than
issued by the central
government. The
difference is T-bonds
held by other investors.
|
+|
|_Adjustments:_
|
|
|
|
|
+|
3.
|
BM recapitalization
bonds
|
-4 500
|
-4 500
|
-
|
An adjustment according
to the TMU.1
|
+|4.
|
Adjustment for the T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes
|-
|29 151
|-29 151
|
An adjustment to the
central government debt
stock that is offset by an
equivalent cash balance
in the NCG
|
+|**5.**
|**Total securities as of**
**end-2014 (adjusted)**
|**49 890**
|**53 991**
|**-4 101**
|
The difference is
explained by T-bonds
held by other investors.
|
+|
|**2015**
|
|
|
|
|
+|
6.
|
T-bills
|
36 303
|
23 475
|
12 828
|
Central government
reports a smaller amount
of T-bills than the
amount owned by banks.
The difference is T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes.
|
+|7.
|T-bonds
|21 600
|24 676
|-3 076
|
Banks own a smaller
amount of T-bonds than
issued by the central
government. The
difference is T-bonds
held by other investors.
|
+|8.
|VAT securitization bonds
issued in April 2015
|5 949
|8 171
|-2 222
|
The difference
represents VAT
securities held by
non-bank investors.
|
+|
|_Adjustments:_
|
|
|
|
|
+|
9.
|
BM recapitalization
bonds
|
-4 500
|
-4 500
|
0
|
An adjustment according
to the TMU.
|
+|10.
|
Adjustment for the T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes.
|
|12 828
|-12 828
|
An adjustment to the
central government debt
stock that is offset by an
equivalent cash balance
in the NCG.
|
+|**11.**|**Total securities as of**
**end-2015 (adjusted)**|**59 352**|**64 650**|**-5 298**|
The difference
represents T-bonds and|
+
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|2014
In millions|NCG|Central
Government|Difference|Explanation for
Difference|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||
||
||
VAT securitization bonds
held by other investors.|
+
+
+1TMU paragraph 2, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+**Table 18. Mozambique: Calculation of Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Other investor holdings of T-bonds (excl. VAT securitization
bonds)|Col2|Adjustment to the NCG|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**2014**(1)
(Table 17, Row 2)
|
**2015**(2)
(Table 17, Row 7)
|**Change**(2) - (1)
|
+|
4 101|
3 076
|-1 025|
+
+
+**Table 19. Mozambique: Suggested Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
amendment|Comment, explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Increase in banks
holdings of T-bonds due
to purchases from other
investors in 2015|
-1 025|Adjustment from
other
expenditure/revenue
(-1 025) to the NCG
(-1 025)
|Adjustment according to the
TMU. The NCG is decreased by
the net amount of T-bonds
purchases by banks from other
investors (Table 18).|
+
+
+
+32. **The amount of bonds issued in the VAT securitization and currently held by**
+**domestic banks should be presented as an adjustment to the NCG according to the**
+**TMU,** **[20]** **rather than shown within** _**Other Operations**_ . As discussed in paragraph 5 of this
+section, the Mt8,171 million VAT securitization was reported as an increase in the
+government’s debt stock for 2015 but not included in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015. All the
+securities were issued to nonbank investors. Banks have purchased Mt5,949 million out of
+Mt8, 171 million issue of these securities in the secondary market and their stock of holdings
+has been captured in the NCG. As secondary market transactions of government bonds do
+not represent cash transactions by the government, an adjustment should be made to the NCG
+as provided in the TMU, rather than recording the amount of bank holdings within _Other_
+_Operations_ (Table 1, Row 1) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ (Table 20).
+
+
+20 TMU paragraph 20, December 2, 2015.
+
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+**Table 20. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for VAT Securitization Currently**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested Amendment|Comment/Explanation|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|1|VAT
securitization|
5 949|Reclassification from
Other Operations (-5 949)
to the NCG (-5 949)
|Domestic banks have bought Mt5,949
million of VAT securitization bonds in the
secondary market.
According to the TMU, the NCG should be
adjusted downward for any increase in the
amount of these bonds owned by domestic
banks.|
+
+
+
+33. **The impact of changes in foreign exchange rates in the calculation of the NCG**
+**by BM should be analyzed** . The government has entered borrowing transactions in foreign
+currencies with local commercial banks and also has bank accounts denominated in foreign
+currencies in BM and local commercial banks. According to the BM, the balance of bank
+accounts and deposits denominated in foreign currency amounted to Mt10,220 million
+(or 12 percent of the total deposits) as of end-2014 and Mt7,930 million (or 13 percent of the
+total deposits) as of end-2015. Where there is a change in the foreign exchange rate, a change
+in the NCG arises without any corresponding new transaction by the government. This would
+suggest the need for an adjustment to the NCG. However, it appears that this issue has not
+been addressed.
+
+
+**E. Other Issues**
+
+
+34. **Debt repayments in respect of the government’s own direct obligations should be**
+**recorded in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **separately from debt repayments made by the government**
+**on behalf of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)** . During 2015, the government made debt
+repayments on behalf of two state-owned companies, Sogir and Maputo Sul, in the amount of
+Mt202 million, of which interest cost was Mt175 million and repayment of principal
+Mt27 million. The mission learned that the government payments to the banks on behalf of
+its SOEs were one-off transactions and that the government has not assumed the debt of these
+SOEs. In the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, the interest cost paid by the government on behalf of the
+SOEs has been recorded as debt service charges (interest). However, the repayment of
+principal has not been recorded in the _Mapa Fiscal_ but only in the NCG. According to the
+_GFSM 1986_, [21] government payments for the amortization of the debts of others, so long as
+the government has not assumed the debt or acquired a corresponding claim against the
+debtor, should be recorded as capital transfers.
+
+
+35. **There is a small discrepancy of Mt9 million between the line ‘Net internal**
+**financing’ shown in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and the NCG provided by the BM** . It is
+
+
+21 _GFSM_ _1986_, Chapter 4: Classification, Section IV.B.2 Economic classification, 7. Capital transfers,
+page 184.
+
+
+
+25
+
+
+recommended to update the line ‘Net internal financing’ from Mt29,232 million in the _Mapa_
+_Fiscal_ 2015 to the NCG number of Mt29, 241 million.
+
+
+**F. Summary of Suggested Adjustments**
+
+
+36. **Were the suggested adjustments to be made in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **, the amount of**
+**unallocated expenditure/revenue would move from** _**Other Expenditure**_ **in the amount of**
+**Mt852.4 million to** _**Other Revenue**_ **in the amount of Mt298 million** . A summary of the
+suggested adjustments is presented in Table 21, with the mission being unable to reconcile
+the Mt298 million amount further. Section II provides recommendations as how to strengthen
+the processes for financial reporting, including the _Mapa Fiscal_ for 2016 and future years.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|In millions|Mapa Fiscal
2015|Suggested
Amendment|Adjusted
Amount|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Revenue**
|
|
|
|
+|
Non-rejected VAT refund claims
|
-6 455
|
524
|
-5 931
|
+|
**Expenditure and net lending**
|
|
|
|
+|
Interest on external debt
|
4 025
|
-138
|
3 887
|
+|
Subsidy, prices: fuel subsidy for companies
|
866
|
3 800
|
4 666
|
+|
Investments, internal financing: leasing for public
buildings
|
42 562
|
4 128
|
46 690
|
+|
Net lending, loans to enterprises: guarantee
payment for EMATUM debt
|2 507
|1 805
|4 312
|
+|
Capital transfers: financial restructuring and
participation
|817
|27
|843
|
+|
**Other expenditure (+) / revenue (-)**
|**852**
|
|**-298**
|
+|
Amortization
|
-6 087
|
394
|
-5 693
|
+|
**Other operations (adjustments)**
|
**14 384**
|
**-14 384**
|
**0 **
|
+|
VAT securitization
|
5 949
|
-5 949
|
0
|
+|
Fuel subsidy payment to companies financed by
loan
|
3 800
|
-3 800
|
0
|
+|
Leasing for public buildings
|4 127
|-4 127
|0
|
+|
VAT refund payments postponed to 2016
|
-765
|
765
|
0
|
+|
Payment of commercial debt of EMATUM
|
1 272
|
-1 272
|
0
|
+|
**Net internal financing**
|
**29 232**
|
**-6 831**
|
**22 401**
|
+|
**Adjustments to the NCG/Net internal financing**
|
**6 831**
|
|
|
+|
Adjustment for VAT securitization bonds owned
by domestic banks
|
5 949
|
5 949
|
5 949
|
+|
Adjustment for VAT refund cash payments
|-134
|-134
|-134
|
+|
Difference between Net internal financing as per
the_Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG figure provided by
the BM
|
-9
|
-9
|
-9
|
+|
Adjustment for secondary market transactions in
T-bonds between commercial banks and other
investors
|1 025|1 025|1 025|
+
+
+
+
+- _Consider amending the Mapa Fiscal 2015 based on the suggested amendments._
+
+
+
+26
+
+
+- _Start calculating the ‘Net internal financing’ line based on the government’s own_
+_fiscal data and introduce a formal reconciliation between the Mapa Fiscal and the_
+_NCG figure calculated by the BM._
+
+- _Consider recording outstanding VAT refund claims as debt obligations as of end-_
+_2015 based on the three options described above._
+
+
+**III. ISSUES RELATED TO THE PREPARATION OF THE MAPA FISCAL AND THE**
+
+**RECONCILIATION OF FINANCIAL DATA**
+
+
+**A. Procedures**
+
+
+**Findings**
+
+37. **Various entities are involved in the preparation of the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ . The DNCP is
+currently accountable for the overall process but needs support from the National Directorate
+of Budget (DNO) and the DNT, as they produce a part of the source data. Thus, an effective
+and common understanding is necessary to ensure relevant data are produced, transmitted in
+a timely manner, and correctly used. Discrepancies identified by the mission show that this
+“common understanding” is not fully ensured yet. Various versions of some dataset have
+been submitted to the mission. Their sources were not always clearly identified
+(information on financial leasing, for example). Different definitions of some data are used
+(“budget support”, “expenditure payable”).
+
+
+38. **Moreover, significant differences were found between** _**Mapa Fiscal's**_ **data and**
+**the budget execution report (** _**Relatório de Execução,**_ **REO) established as of**
+**December 31, 2015.** Some amendments were made by the National Directorate of Budget
+(DNO) or DNT to the first version of the _Mapa Fiscal_ developed by the DNCP, and
+identified by the latter during the mission. As shown in Table 22, these adjustments are
+financially significant.
+
+
+39. **Likewise, unexplained differences have been identified between the data**
+**provided by the DNT on revenue collections** [22] and those contained in the _Mapa Fiscal_
+(Table 23).
+
+
+40. **Most of the data used to elaborate the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **are produced manually** . This
+issue is directly linked with a greater general weakness, [23] which has been highlighted in
+
+
+22 These data are reconciled on a daily basis with data automatically integrated within e-SISTAFE.
+23 e-SISTAFE does not cover all the financial transaction fields: modules related to revenue management and
+book value of the state’s shareholdings in public enterprises are not implemented yet. Therefore, fiscal reports
+are established manually by the DNCP, which is heavily burdened by these manual tasks.
+
+
+
+27
+
+
+previous reports and impairs the availability of complete, reliable, and timely financial
+reporting.
+
+
+41. **Information related to Revenue Collection is not extracted from the e-SISTAFE**
+**(IT Government Financial Administration System)** even though it is integrated
+automatically on a daily basis and at the most granular level of the economic classification.
+However, the DNCP does not use it for its fiscal reporting considering it is not sufficiently
+reliable. Thus, quarterly reports received from the tax administration are manually processed
+in order to produce the REO and the _Mapa Fiscal_ .
+
+
+42. **Information about grants and external financing is not captured in e-SISTAFE** .
+Tables are transmitted (“ _tabelas_ ” 8A and 8B) by the DNT to provide relevant information to
+the DNCP.
+
+
+
+**Table 22. Mozambique: Differences between** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and Quarterly Report**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Data|Mapa Fiscal|Quarterly
Report|Difference|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Goods and services
|26 871
|22 452
|4 419
|
+|Grants
|25 173
|20 172
|5 001
|
+|External Financing|24 227|27 409|- 3182|
+
+
+
+**Table 23. Mozambique: Differences between Data from DNT and** _**Mapa Fiscal**_
+
+**as of December 2015**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Data from DNT
(« tabela
Mensualizado »)|Mapa Fiscal|Difference|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Total revenue|144 578|
149 058|
- 4 480|
+|Current revenue|141 845|
145 928|
- 4 083|
+|Fiscal revenue|127 758|
122 816|
4 942|
+|Capital revenue|2 734|
3 131|
- 397|
+
+
+43. **Some expenditures are still processed outside the treasury single account (CUT)** .
+Thus, integration of data related to these expenditures within e-SISTAFE must be processed
+manually by the DNCP. For that purpose, public entities have to transmit information on a
+monthly basis to the DNCP. Supporting documents (essentially bank statements) are joined in
+consideration of control. [24] Everything is received in paper format despite the fact that data
+seems to have been prepared in an electronic format. In fact, it appears that a part of it is
+transmitted late: the percentage of data “to be incorporated” at the end of the year confirms
+that situation. In that context, the comprehensiveness of fiscal reports cannot be ensured.
+
+
+24 Controls which are necessary to ensure reliability of data incorporated within e-SISTAFE.
+
+
+
+28
+
+
+According to the “fiscal execution report” for 2015, these expenditures represent a huge part
+of investment expenditures financed by external funds (Table 24).
+
+
+
+**Table 24. Mozambique: Amount of Investment Expenditure Financed by**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|31/12/2015
(103 MT)|Amount|Percentage|
+|---|---|---|
+|
Through the CUT
|9 558 718|60|
+|**Out of CUT - yet**
**incorporated**
|**3 050 472**|**40**
|
+|
**Out of CUT - to be**
**incorporated**
|**3 480 252**
|**3 480 252**
|
+|
Total
|16 089 442
|100
|
+
+
+
+44. **Even though segregation of duties within the** _**Mapa Fiscal’s**_ **preparation process**
+**seems to be well designed, its effectiveness and efficiency could be improved** . Reliability
+of financial information is a key issue. Therefore, its production process must include
+controls to ensure quality requirements are fulfilled. Within the DNCP, a team is in charge of
+entering data in the _Mapa Fiscal._ The head of the accounts department supervises their work.
+Exchanges are organized between departments involved in the elaboration of the _Mapa_
+_Fiscal_ to address the identified differences and finalize the document. The mission, however,
+has noticed a great proliferation of different versions for certain data that could make it
+difficult to identify the source or date of their production.
+
+
+_**Recommendations:**_
+
+- _Consider the opportunity to directly use revenue collection data from the e-SISTAFE._
+_A quarterly reconciliation between the e-SISTAFE and tax administration data could_
+_be done to ensure reliability._
+
+- _Consider reviewing the internal control system requirements in order to integrate_
+_more units, and especially more little units, within the e-SISTAFE. To this effect, an_
+_official could be allowed to ensure simultaneously several functions. A segregation of_
+_duties would be nevertheless maintained: considering, for example, expenditures_
+_processes, an official could assume accountability and internal control functions to_
+_the exclusion of all others (and vice versa). Thus, a relaxing of internal control_
+_system principles and mechanism should be decided: it implies a modification of the_
+_40_ _[th]_ _article of financial administration manual and an adjustment of management of_
+_user profiles in e-SISTAFE._
+
+- _Incorporate available data on other systems into e-SISTAFE through automated_
+_routines created for this purpose. Much of the information communicated to the_
+_DNCP is composed of Excel files which can be structured in order to allow a sound_
+_and fast integration in the IT system. The availability of such routines will decrease_
+_the administrative work consumed in preparing the data. Data regarding outside_
+
+
+
+29
+
+
+_CUT expenditures, the public debt provided by DNT and, if any other possibility, the_
+_revenue collection are some examples of information that may be incorporated into_
+_e-SISTAFE through this process until the new modules are developed._
+
+- _Develop a guidance document (or reference paper) which presents, in a concrete_
+_way, the main features of the Mapa Fiscal's production process: tasks to be done,_
+_data to be used (nature, source), controls to be performed, and calendar of the_
+_overall operations to be completed. The mission suggests a general pattern_
+_(Appendix II)._
+
+- _Implement a system of supervision (quality assurance) to ensure reliability of the_
+_Mapa Fiscal data. For this purpose, all the data and supporting documents should be_
+_gathered in a “revision file” in electronic format, if possible. In addition, a_
+_segregation of duty could be organized within the DNCP: some staff responsible but_
+_not involved directly in the “business process” may verify the comprehensiveness of_
+_the file and the consistency of the overall information._
+
+- _Finally, a technical committee involving the DNCP, DNT, DNO, could be created to_
+_discuss problems faced during the ongoing process and address discrepancies that_
+_could not have been otherwise solved._
+
+
+**B. Debt Management**
+
+
+**Findings**
+
+45. **Borrowing and on-lending transactions are recorded on a stand-alone IT**
+**system: The Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System**
+( **CS-DRMS)** . The CS-DRMS is deployed for recording both debt management transactions
+in different currencies and on-lending transactions. Leases and on-lending contracts were
+recorded in CS-DRMS in 2015. According to the DNT, currently about 90 percent of
+on-lending contracts are recorded in CS-DRMS. Previously, leases and on-lending contracts
+were recorded in Excel worksheets.
+
+
+46. **The CS-DRMS system is not currently linked to either e-SITAFE or the BM** . The
+authorities are considering creating an interface between the debt management system,
+e-SISTAFE and the BM in order to facilitate automated bank reconciliations. In addition, the
+launch of a payment alert function has been considered in order to give automated notices of
+payments two to four days before the due date. Currently, the authorities carry out daily
+manual controls of debt payments falling due, using the report of daily payments for the next
+month provided by the CS-DRMS.
+
+
+47. **There are formal debt reconciliation processes in place for external borrowings**
+**with multilateral and bilateral creditors** . Annual reconciliation letters are sent in
+November and December to counterparties to verify the balances of external debt. Some
+creditors carry out their reconciliations quarterly and semi-annually. Also, certain creditors
+
+
+
+30
+
+
+send their payment advice before the debt interest and repayment of principal to confirm the
+payment details. The authorities reconcile the information received with their records in the
+CS-DRMS. External loans from multilaterals mainly have fixed interest rates, while loans
+from bilateral creditors mainly have variable interest rates. The authorities reconcile fixings
+of variable rates with the creditors.
+
+
+48. **Debt service payments for external debt are made through dedicated bank**
+**accounts at the BM.** External debt service payments are registered in the CS-DRMS when a
+SWIFT message of the payment is received from the BM. Creditors anyway often confirm
+the receipt of the payment in writing. Internal debt service payments are made through
+e-SISTAFE.
+
+
+49. **On an annual basis, the authorities reconcile internal debt obligations with**
+**domestic counterparties, but not with the NCG figure from BM.** The reconciliation of
+T-bonds is done with the stock exchange where the T-bonds are listed. The BM also issues
+T-bills on behalf of the government and the reconciliation for T-bills is carried out with the
+BM. Other loans and leases are annually reconciled with domestic banks. However, the
+authorities do not reconcile the stock of the government’s internal debt with the NCG figure
+provided by the BM (as discussed in previous section on _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015). It is
+recommended, to carry out the reconciliation of internal debt stock to the NCG at least
+annually.
+
+
+50. **There is no formal reconciliation of on-lending contracts.** The reconciliation of
+on-lending contracts is only carried out with larger SOEs as part of the SOEs’ annual
+external audits. The authorities do not reconcile the outstanding balances of on-lending
+contracts with smaller borrowers. There are currently around 130 on-lending contracts.
+
+
+_**Recommendation:**_
+
+- _Consider introducing a formal reconciliation of on-lending contracts with all_
+_counterparties_ .
+
+
+**C. Cash Management**
+
+
+**Findings**
+
+51. **Most of the business operations are executed through the CUT** . Nevertheless,
+according to the Center for Development of Financial Information Systems (CEDSIF), about
+30 percent are still executed outside the CUT. These are executed through accounts open at
+the BM or through commercial bank accounts.
+
+
+52. **Regular bank reconciliation is crucial to ensuring accurate and comprehensive**
+**fiscal reporting** . A daily reconciliation of transactions occurred through the CUT is made
+
+
+
+31
+
+
+between the CEDSIF and the BM. This operation is carried out automatically as described in
+Figure 1.
+
+
+53. **Even though this approximation of the daily flow is useful, it cannot serve as a**
+**substitute of comprehensive reconciliation at end of the year, which is not performed at**
+**this time** . Moreover, it is also important to make sure reconciliation is done between tax unit
+bank accounts and their books. The DNT and the DNCP consider this issue as being the
+responsibility of the tax administration and, thus, cannot be assured that everything is done to
+regularize outstanding transactions.
+
+
+_**Recommendations:**_
+
+- _The DNT should request supporting documents to ensure that all bank account_
+_reconciliations are made by tax units. An explanation of any discrepancies should be_
+_provided at the same time._
+
+- _An effective reconciliation of the overall position of the CUT between the DNT and_
+_the BM should be established (Box 1)._
+
+
+**Figure 1. Mozambique: Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+32
+
+
+**Box 1. French Experience on TSA Reconciliation**
+
+In France, all transactions are executed, whatever their nature (expenditures or revenues),
+directly through the TSA.
+For this purpose, a subaccount is created within the TSA for each public accountant. Public
+accountants are the only officials authorized to make payments or collect revenue.
+At the end of the fiscal year, in order to consolidate the TSA, public accountants have to
+reconcile their “subaccount” with their general ledger. They have also to send a supporting
+document of this reconciliation to the General Directorate of Public Finances.
+The General Directorate of Public Finances could then perform reconciliation with the Bank
+of France to justify the position of the TSA.
+This reconciliation is formalized in a co-signed document from the central bank and the
+General Directorate of Public Finance authorities, confirming the balance of the TSA in the
+general ledger and in the central bank books on December 31.
+This document and supporting work papers are available for control by the court of accounts.
+
+**IV. GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS DEVELOPED INTO THE** _**GFSM**_ **2014**
+
+
+**A. Findings**
+
+
+54. **The compilation of fiscal statistics in accordance with the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **was**
+**initiated in 2011** . Nevertheless, frequent changes in the team in charge of this project,
+especially during the past year, [25] have affected the team’s skills development and limited the
+progress.
+
+
+55. **It is** **necessary that the team responsible for the compilation of fiscal data is**
+**trained in the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **, but it is also recommended that it has basic accounting**
+**knowledge and advanced handling of Excel** . During the mission, officials were trained
+with basic knowledge about the framework of the _GFSM 2014_ and the manual’s most
+important concepts.
+
+
+56. **The mission focused on improving the format of the current database** with a view
+to making it easier to manage, update, and reconcile with the calculated data for the program
+control ( _Mapa Fiscal_ ). The work should be continued if it is to be fruitful.
+
+
+57. **The** _**GFSM 2014**_ **provides the opportunity to have the information about stocks**
+**and flows, balances between expenditure and revenue, as well as the financing for one**
+**period all in one chart** . Furthermore, thanks to this format, it is also possible to obtain the
+information with a historical series format of revenue as well as expenditure and, at the same
+time, the transactions in assets and liabilities and their corresponding stocks.
+
+
+58. **Today the information is contained in quarterly REOs** with a publication delay of
+45 days after the ending of the quarter, where only the flow data accumulated up to the end
+
+
+25 The new Department of Studies and Planning depending on the Direction of Studies and Economic Analysis
+was created in June 2015 with the restructuring of the Finance Ministry.
+
+
+
+33
+
+
+of each corresponding quarter is published, not including stock data. This publication is done
+in paper and in a pdf file.
+
+
+59. **The stocks and flows cumulative data are published annually in the**
+**government’s annual report (** _**Conta Geral do Estado,**_ _**CGE**_ **)**, a publication that is done in
+paper and pdf within five months after the end of the fiscal year. It includes information on
+the budgetary central government’s cash position debt and financial assets. There are
+currently no publications with series of data available. The exception was a report published
+once in the year 2013, with annual data regarding budgetary execution since 1999.
+
+
+60. **The necessary data for the fiscal statistics compilation are supplied by different**
+**organizational units** within the government, but until now, there is no a formal agreement of
+information delivery. Therefore, the gathering of information depends most of the time on
+the goodwill of the different parties involved. A chart with each kind of information is
+required with the delays and regularity (Appendix III).
+
+
+61. **It is important and necessary to devise a protocol of information delivery** where
+the periodicity and timeliness of the information is specified, as well as the support of that
+information, and the maximum deadline to receive it.
+
+
+62. While this protocol is not designed nor institutionalized, it is advisable to **designate**
+**the DNCP as the central supplier of the quarterly information contained in the REO**
+**and the annual information contained in the** _**CGE**_ . This will allow for information on
+flows to be obtained on a quarterly basis, and for information on stocks to be obtained on an
+annual basis, with a delay of at least five months. But this assures the consistency of data.
+The support in which the information can be received could be in Excel files, which is what
+is being used to compile statistics data. This would considerably lessen the mistakes that are
+made in the transfer of information from pdf or paper to Excel files.
+
+
+63. To ensure the efficiency of the requirement of information, it is necessary to **carry**
+**out a selection of charts that are needed for compilation and then submit a request to**
+**the DNCP** . This was discussed during the mission with those responsible for this information
+and they agreed to coordinate the necessary work.
+
+
+64. It is necessary to achieve **improvement in the quality and consistency of the fiscal**
+**figures** to make a closing of the compiled information contained in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and/or
+with the summarized information in Chart 2 “Budgetary Balance of REO for the Quarterly
+Data” and Chart 7 “Budgetary Balance for the _CGE_ for the Annual Data”.
+
+
+65. The mission worked with the data accumulated during 2015, which are presented in
+the _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and displayed this data in the format of the** _**GFSM 2014**_ (Appendix IV).
+
+
+66. **It would be desirable that the template used to control the program with the**
+**IMF and the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **be derived from the statistics tables of fiscal data**, after making
+the necessary adjustments to these charts and taking into account the commitments and
+agreements outlined in the TMU.
+
+
+
+34
+
+
+_**Recommendations:**_
+
+- _Design a formal agreement between the people in charge of the compilation and the_
+_data providers that establishes the form, frequency, and delay of the fiscal_
+_information that should be sent. It is necessary that this agreement be validated by_
+_the corresponding authorities to ensure its implementation._
+
+- _Centralize the request for information mainly with the DNCP, in order to achieve_
+_internal consistency in the data until the formal agreement recommended in the_
+_previous paragraph has been established._
+
+- _Reconcile data compiled with information of flows included in the Mapa Fiscal, and_
+_also with the Chart 2 of the REO and Chart 7 of the CGE._
+
+
+
+35
+
+
+**Appendix I. Mozambique: List of Officials Interviewed**
+
+**Center for Development of Financial Information Systems**
+Ketm Mahanague Matavele, Director of Organization and Modernization Services
+
+**Bank of Mozambique**
+Domingo Fumo, Economist Assistant Manager of Research and Statistics Department.
+Pedro José Nhampule, Head of Service of Maputo Branch
+
+**Directorate of Economic and Finances Studies**
+Vasco Correia Nhabinde, National Director
+
+**National Directorate of Treasury**
+Adriano Ubisse, National Director of Treasury
+Mastalino Mastala, Deputy National Director of Treasury for Economic Area
+
+**National Directorate of Public Accounting**
+Tomas Dimande, National Director
+
+
+
+36
+
+
+**Appendix II. Mozambique: Methodological Guide for the Development of the**
+
+_**Mapa Fiscal**_
+
+
+# METHODOLOGICAL GUIDE
+
+
+### FOR
+
+
+### THE DEVELOPMENT
+
+
+# OF THE MAPA FISCAL PRELIMINARY DRAFT
+
+
+
+**TABLE OF CONTENTS**
+
+
+I- Purpose of the document
+
+
+II- What _Mapa Fiscal_ is
+
+
+III- The stake holders
+
+
+IV- Figure of the overall process
+
+
+V- Activities to be perform at the different steps
+
+
+VI- Appendix
+
+
+Document template
+
+List of acronyms
+
+Lexicon
+
+
+
+37
+
+
+**I-** **PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT**
+
+This guide is intended for all stakeholders involved in the development or use of the "Mapa
+Fiscal".
+
+It describes operationally tasks that have to be performed at different stages of the procedure,
+from data collection to dissemination of the " _Mapa Fiscal_ ".
+
+**II- What** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **is**
+
+The _Mapa Fiscal_ is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the IMF
+according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).
+
+More generally, the _Mapa Fiscal_ is a statistical document that describes the main changes in
+the central government's assets and liabilities during a given period. These changes are
+presented following an economic classification that respects requirements of the _Government_
+_Finance Statistics Manual_ from the IMF.
+
+Thus, it provides a comprehensive framework suitable for analyzing and evaluating fiscal
+policy.
+
+_**[Key concepts or components (expenditures, revenues, net lending...) could be also defined**_
+_**here]**_
+
+**III-** **THE STAKEHOLDERS**
+
+Three stakeholders are involved in the process:
+
+ - The one who is accountable of the overall process. This responsibility covers
+validation and dissemination of the _Mapa Fiscal_ but also of its monitoring system
+(calendar, data production requirements...).
+
+Given the current organization of the process, the DNT could assume this responsibility.
+
+This choice does not imply that the DNT must be in charge of the document preparation
+tasks. This function (“integrator”) could be carried out, as is currently, by the DNCP who
+holds an important part of the information. Its role must also be to ensure the reliability of the
+data.
+
+ - The one who provides the data: several directions or departments are involved in the
+production of data needed to prepare the _Mapa Fiscal_ (the DNT, the DNO, the
+DNCP, tax administration, the CEDSIF...).
+
+They have to provide timely data in the expected format but also justify the checks
+(reconciliation...) carried out to ensure reliability.
+
+
+ - The recipient(s) of the _Mapa Fiscal._
+
+
+
+38
+
+
+**IV-** **MOZAMBIQUE:** **FIGURE OF THE OVERALL PROCESS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+39
+
+
+**V-** **ACTIVITIES TO BE PERFORMED AT THE DIFFERENT STEPS**
+
+This part is dedicated to the description of tasks that have to be performed at each step of the
+process.
+
+##### **STEP 1: DATA COLLECTION**
+
+All the relevant data must be precisely identified and defined. At the same time, all the controls
+needed to ensure reliability of these data have to be described.
+
+These requirements should be regularly reminded to the data providers. For this purpose, the
+department responsible of the overall process should focus on these issues, each time the
+process is launched.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Issuer|Data|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
**Data features**
|**Source**
|
**Format**
|**Frequency**
|
+|
**Data features**
|
|
|
|
+|
**Data features**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|
+|
**Data features**
|
|
|
|
+|**Control activities**
|
|
|
|
+|
**Supporting**
**documents**
|
|
|
|
+
+
+
+**For example:**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|DNCP|Revenue collection|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
**Data features**
|**Source**
|
**Format**
|**Frequency**
|
+|
**Data features**
|
e-SISTAFE|
Spread sheet
|
Quarterly|
+|
**Data features**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|
+|
**Data features**
|
Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account.
Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically
identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues.
|
Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account.
Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically
identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues.
|
Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account.
Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically
identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues.
|
+|**Control activities**
|
These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax
authority.
It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts
reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out.
|
These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax
authority.
It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts
reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out.
|
These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax
authority.
It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts
reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out.
|
+|**Supporting**
**documents**
|
Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking
reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.|
Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking
reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.|
Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking
reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.|
+
+
+
+40
+
+##### **Step 2: Integration of the Data**
+
+
+In accordance with the requirements reminded in the message from the authority accountable
+of the overall process, the department in charge of integration of data into the _mapa fiscal_
+spreadsheet:
+
+checks that all the data were delivered in accordance with the definite calendar;
+if not, a recall is sent to the issuer (cc to the authority accountable of the process);
+checks coherence between the transmitted data and the supporting documents;
+if discrepancies are identified, asks for explanation and, if necessary, corrections;
+integrates data into the _mapa fiscal_ spreadsheet;
+produce the _mapa fiscal_ and send it to the authority accountable of the process. If
+
+necessary, a note setting difficulties encountered is joined;
+stores the supporting documents into a supporting file.
+
+##### **Step 3: Analysis of the Mapa Fiscal Draft**
+
+The authority in charge of the overall process received the _mapa fiscal_ draft from the
+department in charge of integration of data.
+
+
+The authority analyses the draft in order to:
+
+verify the comprehensiveness of the document;
+address issues reported by the department in charge of integration of data;
+make sure that there are no discrepancies;
+
+otherwise, decide whether it’s appropriate to plan a meeting of a technical committee,
+
+involving DNCP, DNT, DNO and other parties involved in the process.
+
+
+Minutes of this meeting are prepared and sent to the department in charge of the integration
+of data, in order to be joined to supporting file.
+
+
+In accordance with the decisions taken by the committee, the authority accountable of the
+overall process produces the final version of the _mapa fiscal_ . Changes are documented and
+communicated to all parties involved, including the department in charge of integration of
+data.
+##### **Step 4: Dissemination of the Mapa Fiscal**
+
+
+The authority in charge of the overall process carries out the dissemination of the final
+version.
+
+
+
+41
+
+
+**Appendix III. Mozambique: Fiscal Statistics Source Data**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Source
Data/Data
media|FLOWS|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|STOCKS|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||Source
Data/Data
media|1
Revenue|2
Expense|3.1
Financial
Assets|3.2
Financial
Assets|3.3
Liabilities|6.1
Non Financial
Assets|6.2
Financial
Assets|6.3
Liabilities|Information
lag|Frequency|
+|Revenues|Tax
Authority/excel
|X||X||||||1 month|Monthly|
+|Budget
expenditure|NDPA E-
sistafe/pdf,
excel||X
|X|X|X
||||
2,5 months|Quarterly|
+|Debt data
|NDT /excel||X|||X|||X|
1 month|Monthly|
+|
Accounts
balances:
CUT and
others|
paper||||X|||X||
1 month|Monthly|
+|Shares|By phone|||||||||
??|Annual|
+|
Grants|
REO paper||||||X|||2,5 months|Quarterly|
+|||||||||||||
+|CGE|paper/pdf|X|X|X|X|X||X||5 months|Annual|
+
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+**Appendix IV. Mozambique:** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **into the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **Format**
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01e1c37d038ef27f9574ce621012bdeef6d4f4f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-047-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96231f372b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-047-fig-p0002-001", "height": 261, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b9396c1ae642c5e4d03db0cb229c672fcf4238f0931bc3c3cf25c72d8c377338", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "sha256_normalized_png": "170310d43bcf8e2211120a13e7363a3d3ec90c029814b9ff4f082dc6ac3104bc", "width": 257}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0032-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. Mozambique: Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "174840c44ce5a51f", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-047-fig-p0032-001", "height": 536, "page": 32, "phash_256": "c6a8d7abb9568854b0db2ccd693f59224eaa74d20ef036e8a14db915c70a6cdb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "sha256_normalized_png": "6c4c63e06ed6d88179576679a4715fc4699dfb8cf939ca8ef650e5cf5274e211", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "abb5cd858fd19797", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-047-fig-p0039-001", "height": 958, "page": 39, "phash_256": "800012523d7f484947ff690543ff250d53de2d8d5fd756907df740d03d9d53d0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "sha256_normalized_png": "8ed5c806ae7b7c5ca190bfe9689e23d1105f8d7e30b097c99b9130e0ceb12afa", "width": 780}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-047/assets/figures/cr-2023-047-fig-p0043-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6f6f4b6f6e6bcf07", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-047-fig-p0043-001", "height": 642, "page": 43, "phash_256": "e7731375ecc01f3f5c0c38904946c56c03dcfd0e960415397c6e9337b8c6e4ee", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "sha256_normalized_png": "598d07bed688d7e5765add928b6146d9f424fe4f97abae482d99fcb8bf28e886", "width": 778}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-047/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a563012391c33fe74e18cf0f7aa932645c383f43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-047/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-047-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/47**\n\n## **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE** **STATISTICS MISSION (APRIL 18-29, 2016)**\n\n\nThis report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in August 2016.\n\n**Disclaimer:**\nThis report was prepared in 2016 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its\npublication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n###### **International Monetary Fund** **Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/47\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MISSION (APRIL 18-29, 2016)\n\nThis report on the Republic of Mozambique was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in August 2016.\n\nDisclaimer:\nThis report was prepared in 2016 and the Republic of Mozambique consented to its\npublication in 2023. The report is being published as it was written at the time.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\nInternational Monetary Fund Washington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 744}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-047-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "#### **INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND**\n\n##### AFRITAC South, Fiscal Affairs Department, and Statistics Department\n\n#### **REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**\n\n##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON IMPROVING FISCAL** **REPORTING AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS** (April 18–29, 2016)\n\n###### **Prepared by Mariana Sabatés, Fernando de Almeida, and Merle Wilkinson** **August 2016**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0495, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(244.2998504638672, 203.30078125, 398.399658203125, 359.10076904296875)", "bpc": 1, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 350, "number": 9, "size": 2229, "transform": [154.09982299804688, 0.0, -0.0, 155.79998779296875, 244.2998504638672, 203.30078125], "width": 346, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nAFRITAC South, Fiscal Affairs Department, and Statistics Department\nREPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON IMPROVING FISCAL REPORTING AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS (April 18–29, 2016)\nPrepared by Mariana Sabatés, Fernando de Almeida, and Merle Wilkinson August 2016", "text_characters": 273}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "2\n\n\nThe contents of this report constitute technical advice and\nrecommendations given by the staff of the International Monetary\nFund (IMF) to the authorities of the Republic of Mozambique in\nresponse to their request for technical assistance. With the written\nauthorization of the recipient country's authorities, this report\n(in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed to\nIMF Executive Directors and their staff, and to technical\nassistance providers and donors outside the IMF. Consent will be\ndeemed obtained unless the recipient country's authorities object\nto such dissemination within 60 days of the transmittal of the\nreport. Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof to parties outside the IMF other than technical assistance\nproviders and donors shall require the explicit authorization of the\nrecipient country's authorities and the IMF.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "2\n\nThe contents of this report constitute technical advice and\nrecommendations given by the staff of the International Monetary\nFund (IMF) to the authorities of the Republic of Mozambique in\nresponse to their request for technical assistance. With the written\nauthorization of the recipient country's authorities, this report\n(in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed to\nIMF Executive Directors and their staff, and to technical\nassistance providers and donors outside the IMF. Consent will be\ndeemed obtained unless the recipient country's authorities object\nto such dissemination within 60 days of the transmittal of the\nreport. Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof to parties outside the IMF other than technical assistance\nproviders and donors shall require the explicit authorization of the\nrecipient country's authorities and the IMF.", "text_characters": 754}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "3\n\n\n**Contents** **Page**\n\n\nAcronyms ...................................................................................................................................5\n\n\nExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................................6\n\n\nI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................8\n\n\nII. Possible Adjustments to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ....................................................................9\n\nA. Recording of Specific Extrabudgetary Operations .................................................10\nB. Recording Net VAT Income ...................................................................................14\nC. Recording Leasing Transactions .............................................................................17\nD. Issues Related to Reconciliations ............................................................................21\nE. Other Issues .............................................................................................................24\nF. Summary of Suggested Adjustments .......................................................................25\n\n\nIII. Issues Related to the Preparation of the Mapa Fiscal and the Reconciliation of Financial\nData ..........................................................................................................................................26\n\nA. Procedures ...............................................................................................................26\nB. Debt Management ...................................................................................................29\nC. Cash Management ...................................................................................................30\n\n\nIV. Government Finance Statistics Developed into the _GFSM_ 2014 ......................................32\n\nA. Findings ...................................................................................................................32\n\n**Tables**\n1. _Other Operations_ in _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ...............................................................................10\n2. Schedule of Debt Service Payments to Credit Suisse in Respect of EMATUM Liabilities\nin 2015 .................................................................................................................................11\n3. Reconciliation of External Debt Service in 2015 to _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ..............................12\n4. Suggested Adjustments to External Debt Interest and Amortization of External Debt .......12\n5. Suggested Treatment for the Guarantee Payment Reported as _Other Operations_ ..............13\n6. Suggested treatment for Fuel Subsidy Expenditure Reported as _Other Operations_ ...........14\n7. VAT Refund Claims for 2015..............................................................................................15\n8. Suggested Adjustment to VAT Refund Claims ...................................................................15\n9. Suggested adjustment to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ..................................................................15\n10. Actual VAT Refund Cash Payments in 2015 ....................................................................16\n11. Calculation of an Adjustment to the NCG 2015 ................................................................16\n12. Suggested Adjustment to the NCG ....................................................................................16\n13. Three Options for Quantifying the Amount of Debt Obligation from VAT\nRefund Claims ...................................................................................................................17\n14. Reconciliation of Government Domestic Leases and Loans to the NCG as at end-2015 .19\n15. Recording Financial Leases based on different _GFSM_ Principles.....................................20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3\n\nContents Page\n\nAcronyms ...................................................................................................................................5\n\nExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................................6\n\nI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................8\n\nII. Possible Adjustments to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ....................................................................9\n\nA. Recording of Specific Extrabudgetary Operations .................................................10\nB. Recording Net VAT Income ...................................................................................14\nC. Recording Leasing Transactions .............................................................................17\nD. Issues Related to Reconciliations ............................................................................21\nE. Other Issues .............................................................................................................24\nF. Summary of Suggested Adjustments .......................................................................25\n\nIII. Issues Related to the Preparation of the Mapa Fiscal and the Reconciliation of Financial\nData ..........................................................................................................................................26\n\nA. Procedures ...............................................................................................................26\nB. Debt Management ...................................................................................................29\nC. Cash Management ...................................................................................................30\n\nIV. Government Finance Statistics Developed into the _GFSM_ 2014 ......................................32\n\nA. Findings ...................................................................................................................32\n\nTables\n1. _Other Operations_ in _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ...............................................................................10\n2. Schedule of Debt Service Payments to Credit Suisse in Respect of EMATUM Liabilities\nin 2015 .................................................................................................................................11\n3. Reconciliation of External Debt Service in 2015 to _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ..............................12\n4. Suggested Adjustments to External Debt Interest and Amortization of External Debt .......12\n5. Suggested Treatment for the Guarantee Payment Reported as _Other Operations_ ..............13\n6. Suggested treatment for Fuel Subsidy Expenditure Reported as _Other Operations_ ...........14\n7. VAT Refund Claims for 2015..............................................................................................15\n8. Suggested Adjustment to VAT Refund Claims ...................................................................15\n9. Suggested adjustment to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 ..................................................................15\n10. Actual VAT Refund Cash Payments in 2015 ....................................................................16\n11. Calculation of an Adjustment to the NCG 2015 ................................................................16\n12. Suggested Adjustment to the NCG ....................................................................................16\n13. Three Options for Quantifying the Amount of Debt Obligation from VAT\nRefund Claims ...................................................................................................................17\n14. Reconciliation of Government Domestic Leases and Loans to the NCG as at end-2015 .19\n15. Recording Financial Leases based on different _GFSM_ Principles.....................................20", "text_characters": 3698}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "4\n\n\n16. Suggested Treatment for Leases Currently Reported as _Othe_ r _Operations_ ( _GFSM 1986_ )\n..................................................................................................................................................20\n17. Reconciliation of Government Domestic Securities to the NCG as of end-2014 and\nend-2015 ............................................................................................................................22\n18. Calculation of Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of Changes in Other Investor Holdings\nof T-Bonds .........................................................................................................................23\n19. Suggested Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of Changes in Other Investor Holdings of\nT-Bonds..............................................................................................................................23\n20. Suggested Treatment for VAT Securitization Currently Reported as _Other_ _Operations_ ..24\n21. Summary of Suggested Amendments to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015........................................25\n22. Differences between _Mapa Fiscal_ and Quarterly Report ..................................................27\n23. Differences between Data from the DNT and _Mapa Fiscal_ ..............................................27\n24. Amount of Investment Expenditure Financed by External Funds, Executed through the\nCUT and Outside the CUT ................................................................................................28\n\n**Figure**\n1. Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process ................................................................31\n\n**Box**\n1. French Experience on TSA Reconciliation ..........................................................................32\n\n**Appendices**\nI. List of Officials Interviewed................................................................................................35\nII. Methodological Guide for the Development of the _Mapa Fiscal_ .......................................36\nIII. Fiscal Statistics Source Data ..............................................................................................41\nIV. _Mapa Fiscal_ into the _GFSM 2014_ Format .........................................................................42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "4\n\n16. Suggested Treatment for Leases Currently Reported as _Othe_ r _Operations_ ( _GFSM 1986_ )\n..................................................................................................................................................20\n17. Reconciliation of Government Domestic Securities to the NCG as of end-2014 and\nend-2015 ............................................................................................................................22\n18. Calculation of Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of Changes in Other Investor Holdings\nof T-Bonds .........................................................................................................................23\n19. Suggested Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of Changes in Other Investor Holdings of\nT-Bonds..............................................................................................................................23\n20. Suggested Treatment for VAT Securitization Currently Reported as _Other_ _Operations_ ..24\n21. Summary of Suggested Amendments to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015........................................25\n22. Differences between _Mapa Fiscal_ and Quarterly Report ..................................................27\n23. Differences between Data from the DNT and _Mapa Fiscal_ ..............................................27\n24. Amount of Investment Expenditure Financed by External Funds, Executed through the\nCUT and Outside the CUT ................................................................................................28\n\nFigure\n1. Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process ................................................................31\n\nBox\n1. French Experience on TSA Reconciliation ..........................................................................32\n\nAppendices\nI. List of Officials Interviewed................................................................................................35\nII. Methodological Guide for the Development of the _Mapa Fiscal_ .......................................36\nIII. Fiscal Statistics Source Data ..............................................................................................41\nIV. _Mapa Fiscal_ into the _GFSM 2014_ Format .........................................................................42", "text_characters": 2121}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "5\n\n\n**ACRONYMS**\n\n\n\nBM Bank of Mozambique\nCEDSIF\n_CGE_ Government annual report (\n\n\n\nCEDSIF Center for Development of Financial Information Systems\n_CGE_ Government annual report ( _Conta Geral do Estado_ )\n\nCS-DRMS Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System\nCUT/TSA Treasury single account ( _Conta Única do tesouro_ )\nDNCP National Government Accounting Directorate\nDNO National Directorate of Budget\nDNT National Treasury Directorate\ne-SISTAFE IT Government Financial Administration System\nEMATUM Tuna Mozambican Company ( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ )\n\n\n\ne-SISTAFE IT Government Financial Administration System\nEMATUM Tuna Mozambican Company ( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ )\n\n_GFSM 1986_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986_\n_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n\n\n\n_GFSM 1986_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986_\n_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n\nMEFP Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies\nMT Mozambican metical\nNCG Net Credit to the Central Government\nREO Budget execution report (\nSOE State-owned enterprise\n\n\n\nREO Budget execution report ( _Relatório de Execução Orçamentaria_ )\nSOE State-owned enterprise\n\nT-bills Treasury bills\nT-bonds Treasury bonds\nTMU Technical Memorandum of Understanding\nVAT Value-added tax", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "5\n\nACRONYMS\n\nBM Bank of Mozambique\nCEDSIF\n_CGE_ Government annual report (\n\nCEDSIF Center for Development of Financial Information Systems\n_CGE_ Government annual report ( _Conta Geral do Estado_ )\n\nCS-DRMS Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System\nCUT/TSA Treasury single account ( _Conta Única do tesouro_ )\nDNCP National Government Accounting Directorate\nDNO National Directorate of Budget\nDNT National Treasury Directorate\ne-SISTAFE IT Government Financial Administration System\nEMATUM Tuna Mozambican Company ( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ )\n\ne-SISTAFE IT Government Financial Administration System\nEMATUM Tuna Mozambican Company ( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ )\n\n_GFSM 1986_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986_\n_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n\n_GFSM 1986_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986_\n_GFSM 2014_ _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n\nMEFP Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies\nMT Mozambican metical\nNCG Net Credit to the Central Government\nREO Budget execution report (\nSOE State-owned enterprise\n\nREO Budget execution report ( _Relatório de Execução Orçamentaria_ )\nSOE State-owned enterprise\n\nT-bills Treasury bills\nT-bonds Treasury bonds\nTMU Technical Memorandum of Understanding\nVAT Value-added tax", "text_characters": 1110}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "6\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n\nA technical assistance mission, jointly organized by the IMF’s Statistics Department and the\nAFRITAC South Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFS) visited Maputo, Mozambique\nduring April 18–29, 2016. It was led by Ms. Mariana Sabatés (IMF’s Statistics Department\nexpert) and composed of Ms. Merle Wilkinson and Mr. Fernando de Almeida (IMF’s Fiscal\nAffairs Department experts). The mission’s statistics component was part of the government\nfinance statistics module of the United Kingdom’s Department for International\nDevelopment-funded Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 project.\n\n\n**The main objectives of the mission were to:** (i) identify the key discrepancies between data\non the operations of government and financing of the central government, including net\ncredit of the banking sector; (ii) assess the origins of the discrepancies; (iii) propose a set of\nactions and tools to foster the consistency of fiscal reporting; and (iv) assess the current state\nof compiled fiscal statistics using the _Government Finance Statistics Manual_ _2014_\n( _GFSM 2014)_ framework.\n\n\n**Main findings and recommendations** are as follows:\n\n\nThe Mapa Fiscal report is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the\nIMF according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). [1] It is therefore very\nimportant to ensure accuracy of the report and appropriate recording of specific transactions.\n\n\nVarious entities are involved in the preparation of the _Mapa Fiscal_ . The National\nGovernment Accounting Directorate (DNCP) is currently accountable for the overall process\nbut needs support from the National Directorate of Budget (DNO) and the National Treasury\nDirectorate (DNT), as they produce a part of the source data. Similarly, various systems are\nused to generate the source data. This lack of an integrated system for the source data has led\nto discrepancies that were identified by the mission. The problem was further aggravated by\nthe lack of regular full reconciliations of the data.\n\n\nThe majority of the business operations are executed through the treasury single account\n(CUT/TSA), but about 30 percent are still executed outside, through accounts open at the\nBank of Mozambique (BM) or through commercial bank accounts. Regular bank\nreconciliation is crucial to ensuring accurate and comprehensive fiscal reporting.\n\n\nThere has been very limited progress on compiling fiscal statistics in accordance with the\n_GFSM 2014_ . Progress was hampered by the frequent changes of the responsible team and\nbecause the lack of a formal agreement among source data compilers for the timely delivery\nof the data. Therefore, most of the time, the gathering of information depends on the\ngoodwill of the different parties involved.\n\n\n1 TMU, paragraph 24, December 2, 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nA technical assistance mission, jointly organized by the IMF’s Statistics Department and the\nAFRITAC South Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFS) visited Maputo, Mozambique\nduring April 18–29, 2016. It was led by Ms. Mariana Sabatés (IMF’s Statistics Department\nexpert) and composed of Ms. Merle Wilkinson and Mr. Fernando de Almeida (IMF’s Fiscal\nAffairs Department experts). The mission’s statistics component was part of the government\nfinance statistics module of the United Kingdom’s Department for International\nDevelopment-funded Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 project.\n\nThe main objectives of the mission were to: (i) identify the key discrepancies between data\non the operations of government and financing of the central government, including net\ncredit of the banking sector; (ii) assess the origins of the discrepancies; (iii) propose a set of\nactions and tools to foster the consistency of fiscal reporting; and (iv) assess the current state\nof compiled fiscal statistics using the _Government Finance Statistics Manual_ _2014_\n( _GFSM 2014)_ framework.\n\nMain findings and recommendations are as follows:\n\nThe Mapa Fiscal report is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the\nIMF according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). [1] It is therefore very\nimportant to ensure accuracy of the report and appropriate recording of specific transactions.\n\nVarious entities are involved in the preparation of the _Mapa Fiscal_ . The National\nGovernment Accounting Directorate (DNCP) is currently accountable for the overall process\nbut needs support from the National Directorate of Budget (DNO) and the National Treasury\nDirectorate (DNT), as they produce a part of the source data. Similarly, various systems are\nused to generate the source data. This lack of an integrated system for the source data has led\nto discrepancies that were identified by the mission. The problem was further aggravated by\nthe lack of regular full reconciliations of the data.\n\nThe majority of the business operations are executed through the treasury single account\n(CUT/TSA), but about 30 percent are still executed outside, through accounts open at the\nBank of Mozambique (BM) or through commercial bank accounts. Regular bank\nreconciliation is crucial to ensuring accurate and comprehensive fiscal reporting.\n\nThere has been very limited progress on compiling fiscal statistics in accordance with the\n_GFSM 2014_ . Progress was hampered by the frequent changes of the responsible team and\nbecause the lack of a formal agreement among source data compilers for the timely delivery\nof the data. Therefore, most of the time, the gathering of information depends on the\ngoodwill of the different parties involved.\n\n1 TMU, paragraph 24, December 2, 2015.", "text_characters": 2378}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "7\n\n\nConsider amending the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 based on the suggested amendments as in Table\n21, and start calculating the ‘net internal financing’ line based on the government’s own\nfiscal data and introduce a formal reconciliation between the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the net credit\nto government figure calculated by the BM.\n\n\nConsider recording outstanding value-added tax (VAT) refund claims as debt obligations as\nof end-2015.\n\n\n**Regarding preparation of** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and the reconciliation of financial data:** Consider\nthe creation of a technical committee involving the DNCP, DNT, DNO, to discuss problems\nfaced during the ongoing process and address discrepancies that could not have been solved\notherwise.\n\n\nDevelop a guidance document (or reference paper) which presents in a concrete way, the\nmain features of the _Mapa Fiscal_ 's production process.\n\n\nImplement a system of supervision (quality assurance) to ensure reliability of the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ data, including an effective reconciliation of the overall position of the CUT between\nthe DNT and the BM.\n\nConsider more intensive use of e-SISTAFE, including data available in other systems.\n\n**Regarding the use of the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **framework:** Design a formal agreement between the\npeople in charge of the compilation and the data providers that establishes the form,\nfrequency, and delay of the fiscal information that should be sent. It is necessary that this\nagreement be validated by the corresponding authorities to ensure its implementation.\n\n\nCentralize the request for information mainly with the DNCP, in order to achieve internal\nconsistency in the data until the formal agreement becomes established.\n\nReconcile data compiled with the information of flows included in the _Mapa Fiscal_, and also\nwith Chart 2 of the budget execution report (Relatório de Execução Orçamentaria, REO) and\nChart 7 of the government’s annual report (Conta Geral do Estado, CGE).", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "7\n\nConsider amending the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 based on the suggested amendments as in Table\n21, and start calculating the ‘net internal financing’ line based on the government’s own\nfiscal data and introduce a formal reconciliation between the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the net credit\nto government figure calculated by the BM.\n\nConsider recording outstanding value-added tax (VAT) refund claims as debt obligations as\nof end-2015.\n\nRegarding preparation of _Mapa Fiscal_ and the reconciliation of financial data: Consider\nthe creation of a technical committee involving the DNCP, DNT, DNO, to discuss problems\nfaced during the ongoing process and address discrepancies that could not have been solved\notherwise.\n\nDevelop a guidance document (or reference paper) which presents in a concrete way, the\nmain features of the _Mapa Fiscal_ 's production process.\n\nImplement a system of supervision (quality assurance) to ensure reliability of the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ data, including an effective reconciliation of the overall position of the CUT between\nthe DNT and the BM.\n\nConsider more intensive use of e-SISTAFE, including data available in other systems.\n\nRegarding the use of the _GFSM 2014_ framework: Design a formal agreement between the\npeople in charge of the compilation and the data providers that establishes the form,\nfrequency, and delay of the fiscal information that should be sent. It is necessary that this\nagreement be validated by the corresponding authorities to ensure its implementation.\n\nCentralize the request for information mainly with the DNCP, in order to achieve internal\nconsistency in the data until the formal agreement becomes established.\n\nReconcile data compiled with the information of flows included in the _Mapa Fiscal_, and also\nwith Chart 2 of the budget execution report (Relatório de Execução Orçamentaria, REO) and\nChart 7 of the government’s annual report (Conta Geral do Estado, CGE).", "text_characters": 1613}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "8\n\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n\n1. A technical assistance mission, jointly organized by the IMF’s Statistics Department\nand the AFRITAC South Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFS) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during April 18–29, 2016. It was led by Ms. Mariana Sabatés (IMF’s Statistics\nDepartment expert) and composed of Ms. Merle Wilkinson and Mr. Fernando de Almeida\n(IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department experts). Its statistics component was part of the\ngovernment finance statistics module of the United Kingdom’s Department for International\nDevelopment-funded Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 project.\n\n\n2. The mission met with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Economy and\nFinance, the General Directors of the Treasury, Public Accounting, the Center for\nDevelopment of Financial Information Systems (CEDSIF), the National Directorate of\nEconomic and Financial Studies, and staff of the Bank of Mozambique (BM). For the\ncomplete list of officials, see Appendix I.\n\n\n3. The mission would like to thank the Mozambican authorities for their cooperation and\nhospitality and for facilitating open and constructive discussions. Also, for her support of the\nmission, we would like to thank Ms. Esther Palacio, IMF’s Technical Assistance Coordinator\nin Mozambique.\n\n\n**A. Mission Objectives and Tasks**\n\n\n4. The main objectives of the mission were to: (1) identify the key discrepancies\nbetween data on the operations of government and financing of the central government,\nincluding net credit of the banking sector; (2) assess the origins of the discrepancies; and\n(3) propose a set of actions and tools to foster the consistency of fiscal reporting. The mission\nalso assessed the current state of compiling fiscal statistics using the _Government Finance_\n_Statistics Manual_ _2014_ ( _GFSM 2014)_ framework.\n\n\n**B. Structure of the Report**\n\n\n5. The remainder of this report consists of three sections. In the first section (section II),\nthe problems and the proposed solution for the consistency of the Mapa Fiscal are presented;\nthe second section (section III) presents issues related to the process and reconciliation issues\nas well as management of cash; and the last section (section IV) describes progress with the\nmigration of fiscal statistics into the _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n( _GFSM 2014_ ) framework.\n\n\n6. The Appendices to the report display Appendix I as a list of the officials met during\nthe mission; in Appendix II as the Methodological Guide for the Development of the Mapa\nFiscal; Appendix III as the fiscal statistics sources of data and in Appendix IV, restructure of\nthe data of the _Mapa Fiscal_ using the _GFSM 2014_ framework.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "8\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. A technical assistance mission, jointly organized by the IMF’s Statistics Department\nand the AFRITAC South Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFS) visited Maputo,\nMozambique during April 18–29, 2016. It was led by Ms. Mariana Sabatés (IMF’s Statistics\nDepartment expert) and composed of Ms. Merle Wilkinson and Mr. Fernando de Almeida\n(IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department experts). Its statistics component was part of the\ngovernment finance statistics module of the United Kingdom’s Department for International\nDevelopment-funded Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 project.\n\n2. The mission met with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Economy and\nFinance, the General Directors of the Treasury, Public Accounting, the Center for\nDevelopment of Financial Information Systems (CEDSIF), the National Directorate of\nEconomic and Financial Studies, and staff of the Bank of Mozambique (BM). For the\ncomplete list of officials, see Appendix I.\n\n3. The mission would like to thank the Mozambican authorities for their cooperation and\nhospitality and for facilitating open and constructive discussions. Also, for her support of the\nmission, we would like to thank Ms. Esther Palacio, IMF’s Technical Assistance Coordinator\nin Mozambique.\n\nA. Mission Objectives and Tasks\n\n4. The main objectives of the mission were to: (1) identify the key discrepancies\nbetween data on the operations of government and financing of the central government,\nincluding net credit of the banking sector; (2) assess the origins of the discrepancies; and\n(3) propose a set of actions and tools to foster the consistency of fiscal reporting. The mission\nalso assessed the current state of compiling fiscal statistics using the _Government Finance_\n_Statistics Manual_ _2014_ ( _GFSM 2014)_ framework.\n\nB. Structure of the Report\n\n5. The remainder of this report consists of three sections. In the first section (section II),\nthe problems and the proposed solution for the consistency of the Mapa Fiscal are presented;\nthe second section (section III) presents issues related to the process and reconciliation issues\nas well as management of cash; and the last section (section IV) describes progress with the\nmigration of fiscal statistics into the _Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_\n( _GFSM 2014_ ) framework.\n\n6. The Appendices to the report display Appendix I as a list of the officials met during\nthe mission; in Appendix II as the Methodological Guide for the Development of the Mapa\nFiscal; Appendix III as the fiscal statistics sources of data and in Appendix IV, restructure of\nthe data of the _Mapa Fiscal_ using the _GFSM 2014_ framework.", "text_characters": 2247}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "9\n\n\n**II. POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE** _**MAPA FISCAL**_ **2015**\n\n\n7. The _Mapa Fiscal_ is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the\nIMF according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). [2] The two main\nchallenges in compiling the _Mapa Fiscal_ are the following: (i) ensuring accuracy of the\nreport; and (ii) recording specific transactions appropriately. This section deals with issues\nrelated to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, [3] while suggestions to strengthen the compilation process are\ndiscussed in Section III.\n\n\n8. **The** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015 is prepared based on** _**the Government Finance Statistics**_\n_**Manual 1986**_ **(** _**GFSM 1986**_ **)** . All suggested adjustments in this section are made in the\ncontext of the _GFSM 1986_ . The most up-to-date statistics manual is _GFSM 2014_ and, where\nnoteworthy, differences in the treatment of items between _GFSM 1986_ and _GFSM 2014_ are\nhighlighted.\n\n\n9. **The** _**Net internal financing**_ **line in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **is equal to the net credit to the**\n**central government (NCG) figure that is calculated by the Bank of Mozambique (BM)**\n**according to the definition, coverage, and adjustments agreed in the TMU** . [4] The NCG\nfrom the banking system is defined as the difference between the outstanding amount of bank\ncredits to the central government and the central government’s deposits within the banking\nsystem. The change in the NCG from the banking system is relative to the NCG as at the end\nof December of the previous year.\n\n\n10. **A change in the basis for recording value-added tax (VAT) refunds relating to**\n**claims in respect of 2015 and later years has been made based on IMF advice** . [5] From\n2015, VAT receipts have been accounted for on a net basis, for example, the amount of\nrevenue recorded equals gross VAT receipts for 2015 and less VAT refund claims in respect\nof 2015, net of rejections. [6] Any VAT refunds paid relating to 2014 and previous years,\nwhether those funded by the securitization [7] or in respect of claims that have arisen in 2015,\nhave been recorded as a liability that does not affect the current year’s budget revenue and\nexpenditure. Accordingly, the government securities issued to companies with VAT refund\nclaims—the “VAT securitization” in April 2015—are not recorded within revenue and\nexpenditure (“above-the-line”) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015. The size of the VAT securitization\nissue was Mozambican metical (Mt) 8,171 million and the securities are listed on the Stock\n\n\n2 TMU, paragraph 24, December 2, 2015.\n\n3 The mission worked with a version of _Mapa Fiscal_ dated April 19, 2016.\n\n4 TMU paragraphs 2–4 and 20, December 2, 2015.\n\n5 “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique”, IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, November 2015.\n\n6 Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), paragraph 23, December 2, 2015.\n\n7 The government paid VAT refund arrears of Mt8,171 million that had accumulated up to end of 2014, by\n‘securitizing’ the debt through a placement of government bonds to the companies in April 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "9\n\nII. POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE _MAPA FISCAL_ 2015\n\n7. The _Mapa Fiscal_ is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the\nIMF according to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). [2] The two main\nchallenges in compiling the _Mapa Fiscal_ are the following: (i) ensuring accuracy of the\nreport; and (ii) recording specific transactions appropriately. This section deals with issues\nrelated to the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, [3] while suggestions to strengthen the compilation process are\ndiscussed in Section III.\n\n8. The _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 is prepared based on _the Government Finance Statistics_\n_Manual 1986_ ( _GFSM 1986_ ) . All suggested adjustments in this section are made in the\ncontext of the _GFSM 1986_ . The most up-to-date statistics manual is _GFSM 2014_ and, where\nnoteworthy, differences in the treatment of items between _GFSM 1986_ and _GFSM 2014_ are\nhighlighted.\n\n9. The _Net internal financing_ line in the _Mapa Fiscal_ is equal to the net credit to the\ncentral government (NCG) figure that is calculated by the Bank of Mozambique (BM)\naccording to the definition, coverage, and adjustments agreed in the TMU . [4] The NCG\nfrom the banking system is defined as the difference between the outstanding amount of bank\ncredits to the central government and the central government’s deposits within the banking\nsystem. The change in the NCG from the banking system is relative to the NCG as at the end\nof December of the previous year.\n\n10. A change in the basis for recording value-added tax (VAT) refunds relating to\nclaims in respect of 2015 and later years has been made based on IMF advice . [5] From\n2015, VAT receipts have been accounted for on a net basis, for example, the amount of\nrevenue recorded equals gross VAT receipts for 2015 and less VAT refund claims in respect\nof 2015, net of rejections. [6] Any VAT refunds paid relating to 2014 and previous years,\nwhether those funded by the securitization [7] or in respect of claims that have arisen in 2015,\nhave been recorded as a liability that does not affect the current year’s budget revenue and\nexpenditure. Accordingly, the government securities issued to companies with VAT refund\nclaims—the “VAT securitization” in April 2015—are not recorded within revenue and\nexpenditure (“above-the-line”) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015. The size of the VAT securitization\nissue was Mozambican metical (Mt) 8,171 million and the securities are listed on the Stock\n\n2 TMU, paragraph 24, December 2, 2015.\n\n3 The mission worked with a version of _Mapa Fiscal_ dated April 19, 2016.\n\n4 TMU paragraphs 2–4 and 20, December 2, 2015.\n\n5 “Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Mozambique”, IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, November 2015.\n\n6 Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), paragraph 23, December 2, 2015.\n\n7 The government paid VAT refund arrears of Mt8,171 million that had accumulated up to end of 2014, by\n‘securitizing’ the debt through a placement of government bonds to the companies in April 2015.", "text_characters": 2508}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "10\n\n\nExchange of Mozambique. As of end-2015, commercial banks had bought Mt5,949 million\nof the issue in the secondary market and this amount has been included in the NCG by the\nBM.\n\n\n11. **Four key issues should be addressed to finalize the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015** :\n\n- Extrabudgetary expenditure and net on-lending operations incurred in 2015;\n\n- Recording of net VAT revenue, including the impact of cash VAT refunds;\n\n- Recording of leasing transactions; and\n\n- Reconciliation of stocks and flows reported in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG reported\nby the BM (including issues created by the VAT securitization).\n\n\n12. **These four issues have an impact on the** _**Other Operations**_ **line and the** _**Other**_\n_**Income/Expenditure**_ **lines in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015** . The _Other Operations_ line is reported\n“below-the-line” (i.e., as part of financing) and currently comprises five entries, amounting to\nMt14,384 million (Table 1). The _Other Expenditure_ (+)/ _Revenue_ (-) line is reported\n“above-the-line” (i.e., as part of the operations of government) and amounts to Mt852 million\n(or around 0.4 percent of total expenditure plus net lending). This amount is derived as a\nresidual item so that the _Mapa Fiscal_ is balanced, representing revenue or expenditure flows\nthat are not identified and not supported by administrative records of any actual transactions.\n\n|Col1|Other Operations (below-the-line)|In millions of
Mozambican
meticais|\n|---|---|---|\n|1.
|VAT securitization
|
5 949
|\n|
2.
|
Fuel subsidy payment to companies financed by commercial loan
|
3 800
|\n|
3.
|
Leasing for public buildings
|
4 128
|\n|
4.
|
VAT refund payments postponed to 2016
|
-765
|\n|
5.
|
Payment of commercial debt of the Tuna Mozambican Company (EMATUM)
|
1 272
|\n|
**6.**|
**Total of other operations**|
**14 384**|\n\n\n\n_Source: National Government Accounting Directorate_ ( _DNCP_ ).\n\n\n**A. Recording of Specific Extrabudgetary Operations**\n\n\n13. **In 2015, two large extrabudgetary transactions triggered actual cash payments** :\n(i) a subsidy payment of Mt3,800 million to fuel companies that were financed by a\ncommercial loan; and (ii) a guarantee payment to the Tuna Mozambican Company\n( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ ) (EMATUM) bondholders. As these transactions were not\nincluded in the 2015 budget, the authorities recorded the whole subsidy payment and part of\nthe guarantee payment as _Other Operations_, falling ‘below-the-line’ (Table 1, Rows 2 and 5).\n\n\n14. **The rationale for recording the guarantee payment partly within** _**Other**_\n_**Operations**_ **and partly elsewhere in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **is unclear** . Table 2 presents the", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 408.8993835449219, 548.7900390625, 515.9396362304688], "columns": 3, "rows": 7}], "text": "10\n\nExchange of Mozambique. As of end-2015, commercial banks had bought Mt5,949 million\nof the issue in the secondary market and this amount has been included in the NCG by the\nBM.\n\n11. Four key issues should be addressed to finalize the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 :\n\n- Extrabudgetary expenditure and net on-lending operations incurred in 2015;\n\n- Recording of net VAT revenue, including the impact of cash VAT refunds;\n\n- Recording of leasing transactions; and\n\n- Reconciliation of stocks and flows reported in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG reported\nby the BM (including issues created by the VAT securitization).\n\n12. These four issues have an impact on the _Other Operations_ line and the _Other_\n_Income/Expenditure_ lines in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 . The _Other Operations_ line is reported\n“below-the-line” (i.e., as part of financing) and currently comprises five entries, amounting to\nMt14,384 million (Table 1). The _Other Expenditure_ (+)/ _Revenue_ (-) line is reported\n“above-the-line” (i.e., as part of the operations of government) and amounts to Mt852 million\n(or around 0.4 percent of total expenditure plus net lending). This amount is derived as a\nresidual item so that the _Mapa Fiscal_ is balanced, representing revenue or expenditure flows\nthat are not identified and not supported by administrative records of any actual transactions.\n\n Col1 Other Operations (below-the-line) In millions of Mozambican meticais \n\n 1. VAT securitization 5 949 \n 2. Fuel subsidy payment to companies financed by commercial loan 3 800 \n 3. Leasing for public buildings 4 128 \n 4. VAT refund payments postponed to 2016 -765 \n 5. Payment of commercial debt of the Tuna Mozambican Company (EMATUM) 1 272 \n 6. Total of other operations 14 384 \n\n_Source: National Government Accounting Directorate_ ( _DNCP_ ).\n\nA. Recording of Specific Extrabudgetary Operations\n\n13. In 2015, two large extrabudgetary transactions triggered actual cash payments :\n(i) a subsidy payment of Mt3,800 million to fuel companies that were financed by a\ncommercial loan; and (ii) a guarantee payment to the Tuna Mozambican Company\n( _Empresa Moçambicana de Atum_ ) (EMATUM) bondholders. As these transactions were not\nincluded in the 2015 budget, the authorities recorded the whole subsidy payment and part of\nthe guarantee payment as _Other Operations_, falling ‘below-the-line’ (Table 1, Rows 2 and 5).\n\n14. The rationale for recording the guarantee payment partly within _Other_\n_Operations_ and partly elsewhere in the _Mapa Fiscal_ is unclear . Table 2 presents the", "text_characters": 2114}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "11\n\n\nSchedule of debt service payments to Credit Suisse [8] in respect of the EMATUM liabilities [9]\nin 2015. Table 3 presents the reconciliation of external debt payments in 2015 between the\ninformation provided by the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) and the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015,\nidentifying a difference of Mt532 million (Table 3, Row 9). Mission analysis revealed that,\nof the total guarantee payment to the EMATUM bondholders of Mt1,805 million, an amount\nof Mt1,272 million (Table 1; Row 5) had been adjusted out of the _External debt interest_\n(‘above-the-line’) and _Amortization of external debt_ (‘below-the-line’) lines in the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ into _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’). The difference of Mt532 million remained\nwithin _Amortization of external debt_ (Mt394 million) and _External debt interest_\n(Mt138 million) (Table 3, Row 9). Suggested adjustments to the _External debt interest_ and\n_Amortization of external debt_ in order to give a consistent presentation of the guarantee\npayment are presented in Table 4.\n\n\n\n**Table 2. Mozambique: Schedule of Debt Service Payments to Credit Suisse in**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Date|Description|Repayment|Interest|Total|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
March 2015
|
‘Non-commercial part’ of
EMATUM liabilities
|
-
|
398
|
398
|\n|September 2015
|‘Non-commercial part’ of
EMATUM liabilities
|1 753
|614
|2 367
|\n|September 2015
|Guarantee call on
‘commercial part’ of EMATUM
liabilities
|1 337
|468
|1 805
|\n|
|**Total payments to Credit**
**Suisse**(Table 3, Row 3)|**3 090**|**1 480**|**4 570**|\n\n\n\n8 Debt obligations of EMATUM were arranged by Credit Suisse.\n\n9 The government guaranteed the US$850 million bond issued in 2013 by the state-owned enterprise (SOE) EMATUM.\nThis borrowing financed the purchase of tuna fishing boats and maritime security equipment. Subsequently, US$500 million\nout of the total US$850 million was incorporated into the budget and became public debt under the responsibility of the\ntreasury (‘non-commercial part’). The remaining amount (US$350 million) remains on EMATUM’s balance sheet\n(‘commercial part’) (IMF Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, December 3, 2015.)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 296.7200012207031, 539.7999877929688, 425.79998779296875], "columns": 5, "rows": 5}], "text": "11\n\nSchedule of debt service payments to Credit Suisse [8] in respect of the EMATUM liabilities [9]\nin 2015. Table 3 presents the reconciliation of external debt payments in 2015 between the\ninformation provided by the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) and the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015,\nidentifying a difference of Mt532 million (Table 3, Row 9). Mission analysis revealed that,\nof the total guarantee payment to the EMATUM bondholders of Mt1,805 million, an amount\nof Mt1,272 million (Table 1; Row 5) had been adjusted out of the _External debt interest_\n(‘above-the-line’) and _Amortization of external debt_ (‘below-the-line’) lines in the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ into _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’). The difference of Mt532 million remained\nwithin _Amortization of external debt_ (Mt394 million) and _External debt interest_\n(Mt138 million) (Table 3, Row 9). Suggested adjustments to the _External debt interest_ and\n_Amortization of external debt_ in order to give a consistent presentation of the guarantee\npayment are presented in Table 4.\n\nTable 2. Mozambique: Schedule of Debt Service Payments to Credit Suisse in\n\n Date Description Repayment Interest Total \n\n March 2015 ‘Non-commercial part’ of EMATUM liabilities - 398 398 \n September 2015 ‘Non-commercial part’ of EMATUM liabilities 1 753 614 2 367 \n September 2015 Guarantee call on ‘commercial part’ of EMATUM liabilities 1 337 468 1 805 \n Total payments to Credit Suisse(Table 3, Row 3) 3 090 1 480 4 570 \n\n8 Debt obligations of EMATUM were arranged by Credit Suisse.\n\n9 The government guaranteed the US$850 million bond issued in 2013 by the state-owned enterprise (SOE) EMATUM.\nThis borrowing financed the purchase of tuna fishing boats and maritime security equipment. Subsequently, US$500 million\nout of the total US$850 million was incorporated into the budget and became public debt under the responsibility of the\ntreasury (‘non-commercial part’). The remaining amount (US$350 million) remains on EMATUM’s balance sheet\n(‘commercial part’) (IMF Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, December 3, 2015.)", "text_characters": 1753}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "12\n\n\n\n**Table 3. Mozambique: Reconciliation of External Debt Service in 2015 to** _**Mapa**_\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Creditor
(millions of Mozambican meticais)|Repayment|Interest|Total|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
|
**External debt service in 2015**
|
|
|
|\n|
1.
|
Multilateral
|
2 098
|
1 091
|
3 189
|\n|
2.
|
Bilateral (excl. Credit Suisse)
|
1 842
|
1 784
|
3 626
|\n|
3.
|
Total payments to Credit Suisse (incl. debt service
payments on a call on guarantee)
|
3 090
|
1 480
|
4 570
|\n|**4.**
|
**Total external debt service payments including**
**guarantee payments**
|**7 030**
|**4 355**
|**11 385**
|\n|5.
|
_Less_ guarantee payment on ‘commercial part’ of
EMATUM liabilities (Table 2)
|-1 337
|-468
|-1 805
|\n|**6.**
|
**Total external debt service excluding guarantee**
**payments**
|**5 693**
|**3 887**
|**9 580**
|\n|7.
|
**Reconciliation of external debt service with****_Mapa_**
**_Fiscal_2015**
|
|
|
|\n|8.
|
_Mapa Fiscal_ 2015
|6 087
|4 025
|10 112
|\n|**9.**
|**Difference**(Row 6_less_ Row 8)
|**-394**
|**-138**|**-532**|\n\n\n\n**Table 4. Mozambique: Suggested Adjustments to External Debt Interest and**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested adjustment|Comment, explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|External debt
interest
|
-138
|An adjustment from External
debt interest (-138) to Other
Operations (+138)
|To give consistent treatment of all
the EMATUM guarantee-related
payments.|\n|Amortization
of external
debt
|-394|An adjustment from
Amortization
of external debt (-394) to Other
Operations (+394)|An adjustment from
Amortization
of external debt (-394) to Other
Operations (+394)|\n\n\n\n15. **According to the** _**GFSM 1986**_ **, the government’s guarantee payment should be**\n**recorded as an on-lending transaction (‘above-the-line’) in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **rather than**\n**within** _**Other Operations**_ **(‘below-the-line’)** . In September 2015, the government paid a total\nof Mt1,805 million as interest and repayment of principal to the EMATUM bondholders after\na call on the government’s guarantee of the so-called ‘commercial part’ of the EMATUM\nliabilities. According to _GFSM 1986_, any government payment, as guarantor or surety, of\ninterest or amortization on the defaulted debts of others is classified as lending (‘above-theline’), since it gives rise to an equivalent government claim against the defaulting debtor.\nGovernment receipts constituting recoveries on the consequent claims against defaulting\ndebtors are classified as repayment of government lending. [10] When government payment to\n\n\n10 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 4: Classification, Section V. Lending Minus Repayments, page 185.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 102.55943298339844, 539.780029296875, 312.3999938964844], "columns": 5, "rows": 11}, {"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 367.75201416015625, 558.0606689453125, 508.48797607421875], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}], "text": "12\n\nTable 3. Mozambique: Reconciliation of External Debt Service in 2015 to _Mapa_\n\n Col1 Creditor (millions of Mozambican meticais) Repayment Interest Total \n\n External debt service in 2015 \n 1. Multilateral 2 098 1 091 3 189 \n 2. Bilateral (excl. Credit Suisse) 1 842 1 784 3 626 \n 3. Total payments to Credit Suisse (incl. debt service payments on a call on guarantee) 3 090 1 480 4 570 \n 4. Total external debt service payments including guarantee payments 7 030 4 355 11 385 \n 5. _Less_ guarantee payment on ‘commercial part’ of EMATUM liabilities (Table 2) -1 337 -468 -1 805 \n 6. Total external debt service excluding guarantee payments 5 693 3 887 9 580 \n 7. Reconciliation of external debt service with_Mapa_ _Fiscal_2015 \n 8. _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 6 087 4 025 10 112 \n 9. Difference(Row 6_less_ Row 8) -394 -138 -532 \n\nTable 4. Mozambique: Suggested Adjustments to External Debt Interest and\n\n Col1 Amount (millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested adjustment Comment, explanation \n\n External debt interest -138 An adjustment from External debt interest (-138) to Other Operations (+138) To give consistent treatment of all the EMATUM guarantee-related payments. \n Amortization of external debt -394 An adjustment from Amortization of external debt (-394) to Other Operations (+394) An adjustment from Amortization of external debt (-394) to Other Operations (+394) \n\n15. According to the _GFSM 1986_ , the government’s guarantee payment should be\nrecorded as an on-lending transaction (‘above-the-line’) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ rather than\nwithin _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’) . In September 2015, the government paid a total\nof Mt1,805 million as interest and repayment of principal to the EMATUM bondholders after\na call on the government’s guarantee of the so-called ‘commercial part’ of the EMATUM\nliabilities. According to _GFSM 1986_, any government payment, as guarantor or surety, of\ninterest or amortization on the defaulted debts of others is classified as lending (‘above-theline’), since it gives rise to an equivalent government claim against the defaulting debtor.\nGovernment receipts constituting recoveries on the consequent claims against defaulting\ndebtors are classified as repayment of government lending. [10] When government payment to\n\n10 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 4: Classification, Section V. Lending Minus Repayments, page 185.", "text_characters": 1972}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "13\n\n\nthird parties of interest or amortization on debt of others generates no corresponding\ngovernment claim against the debtor, it is classified as a transfer (‘above-the-line’). [11]\nHowever, in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, payment of the commercial part of the EMATUM’s\nliabilities have been recorded in the _Other operations_ line (‘below-the-line’), apparently\nbecause the guarantee payment was not foreseen and budgeted for 2015. Table 5 summarizes\nthe suggested treatment of the EMATUM guarantee payment.\n\n\n\n**Table 5. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for the Guarantee Payment**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
amendment|Comment/Explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|The
EMATUM
guarantee
payment
|
1 805|Adjustment from
Other Operations
(-1 805) to an
increase in Net
lending (+1 805)
|Debt service payments on behalf of the
EMATUM to bondholders made after the call
on the government’s guarantee was
reclassified as an increase in on-lending,
according to the_GFSM 1986_.
|\n\n\n\n16. **The classification of the guarantee payment may be different under** _**GFSM 2014**_ .\nAccording to _GFSM 2014_, the statistical treatment of the assumption of debt, including\npayments when a guarantee is called, depends on (i) whether the government as a debtor\nacquires an effective financial claim against the original debtor; and (ii) if there is no\neffective financial claim, the relationship between the government as a debtor and the\noriginal debtor, and whether the original debtor is bankrupt or no longer a going concern. [12]\nThe mission did not analyze the appropriate _GFSM 2014_ classification, which would turn on\nan assessment of the EMATUM’s long-term financial prospects and could result in the\nguarantee payment being classified as a capital transfer (above-the-line) rather than as\non-lending (below-the-line in _GFSM 2014_ but above-the-line in _GFSM 1986_ ).\n\n\n17. **The fuel subsidy paid to companies should be recorded as a subsidy**\n**(‘above-the-line’) in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015 rather than within** _**Other Operations**_\n**(‘below-the-line’** ). The authorities recorded the fuel subsidy payment of Mt3,800 million in\nthe _Other Operations_ line (‘below-the-line’), as it was not included in the budget. The loan of\nMt3,800 million to finance the fuel subsidy payment is recorded as part of the internal debt\nstock for 2015. Regardless of whether the payment of an expense item was budgeted or not,\nit should be treated as a 2015 ‘above-the-line’ expenditure item. Table 6 details how payment\nfor the fuel subsidy should be treated.\n\n\n11 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 3: Analytical Framework, Section III.E. Lending Minus Repayments, page 105.\n12 _GFSM 2014_, A3.26–29.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16000366210938, 205.63198852539062, 539.8400268554688, 333.16796875], "columns": 4, "rows": 2}], "text": "13\n\nthird parties of interest or amortization on debt of others generates no corresponding\ngovernment claim against the debtor, it is classified as a transfer (‘above-the-line’). [11]\nHowever, in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, payment of the commercial part of the EMATUM’s\nliabilities have been recorded in the _Other operations_ line (‘below-the-line’), apparently\nbecause the guarantee payment was not foreseen and budgeted for 2015. Table 5 summarizes\nthe suggested treatment of the EMATUM guarantee payment.\n\nTable 5. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for the Guarantee Payment\n\n Col1 Amount (millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested amendment Comment/Explanation \n\n The EMATUM guarantee payment 1 805 Adjustment from Other Operations (-1 805) to an increase in Net lending (+1 805) Debt service payments on behalf of the EMATUM to bondholders made after the call on the government’s guarantee was reclassified as an increase in on-lending, according to the_GFSM 1986_. \n\n16. The classification of the guarantee payment may be different under _GFSM 2014_ .\nAccording to _GFSM 2014_, the statistical treatment of the assumption of debt, including\npayments when a guarantee is called, depends on (i) whether the government as a debtor\nacquires an effective financial claim against the original debtor; and (ii) if there is no\neffective financial claim, the relationship between the government as a debtor and the\noriginal debtor, and whether the original debtor is bankrupt or no longer a going concern. [12]\nThe mission did not analyze the appropriate _GFSM 2014_ classification, which would turn on\nan assessment of the EMATUM’s long-term financial prospects and could result in the\nguarantee payment being classified as a capital transfer (above-the-line) rather than as\non-lending (below-the-line in _GFSM 2014_ but above-the-line in _GFSM 1986_ ).\n\n17. The fuel subsidy paid to companies should be recorded as a subsidy\n(‘above-the-line’) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 rather than within _Other Operations_\n(‘below-the-line’ ). The authorities recorded the fuel subsidy payment of Mt3,800 million in\nthe _Other Operations_ line (‘below-the-line’), as it was not included in the budget. The loan of\nMt3,800 million to finance the fuel subsidy payment is recorded as part of the internal debt\nstock for 2015. Regardless of whether the payment of an expense item was budgeted or not,\nit should be treated as a 2015 ‘above-the-line’ expenditure item. Table 6 details how payment\nfor the fuel subsidy should be treated.\n\n11 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 3: Analytical Framework, Section III.E. Lending Minus Repayments, page 105.\n12 _GFSM 2014_, A3.26–29.", "text_characters": 2226}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "14\n\n\n\n**Table 6. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for Fuel Subsidy Expenditure**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
Amendment|Comment/Explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Fuel subsidy
to companies
|
3 800|Reduce Other
Operations (-3 800)
and increase
Subsidies (+3 800)|Fuel subsidy reclassified to subsidies as it
represents a 2015 expense.|\n\n\n\n18. **Going forward, it would be useful for the authorities to clarify their approach,**\n**should further material extrabudgetary expenditures arise in future years.** By its nature,\na call on a guarantee is difficult to foresee and budget for. Equally, the fuel subsidy payment\nalso fell outside the budget in 2015. However, whether an item is budgeted or not is less\nrelevant than the year in which the actual payment arose. It is important for policy\nformulation and performance analysis to classify expenditures correctly, rather than show\nunbudgeted expenditure ‘below-the-line’; the correct way would be to show the expenditure\n‘above-the-line’ but with an explanation added giving the reason for deviating from the\nbudgeted amount.\n\n\n**B. Recording Net VAT Income**\n\n\n19. **It may be appropriate to revise the calculation of VAT refund claims included in**\n**net VAT revenue** . VAT refund claims included in net VAT revenue in the _Mapa Fiscal_\n2015 amounted to Mt6,455 million, of which Mt524 million were rejected (Table 7). This\nrepresented the total amount of VAT refund claims submitted to the Tax Authority in 2015,\nbut excluding VAT refund claims in respect of 2014 and earlier years. According to the\nMemorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), [13] claims that have been rejected\nshould be excluded from the amount of VAT refund claims in the _Mapa Fiscal_ (Table 8). It\nshould be noted that this approach for recording of net VAT revenue specified in the MEFP\ndiffers from the standard statistical treatment for cash-based accounting, whereby the amount\nof VAT refunds to be netted against VAT receipts is the amount of cash paid out as VAT\nrefunds.\n\n\n13 MEFP, paragraph 23, December 2, 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.24000549316406, 102.59951782226562, 550.08056640625, 204.83950805664062], "columns": 4, "rows": 2}], "text": "14\n\nTable 6. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for Fuel Subsidy Expenditure\n\n Col1 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested Amendment Comment/Explanation \n\n Fuel subsidy to companies 3 800 Reduce Other Operations (-3 800) and increase Subsidies (+3 800) Fuel subsidy reclassified to subsidies as it represents a 2015 expense. \n\n18. Going forward, it would be useful for the authorities to clarify their approach,\nshould further material extrabudgetary expenditures arise in future years. By its nature,\na call on a guarantee is difficult to foresee and budget for. Equally, the fuel subsidy payment\nalso fell outside the budget in 2015. However, whether an item is budgeted or not is less\nrelevant than the year in which the actual payment arose. It is important for policy\nformulation and performance analysis to classify expenditures correctly, rather than show\nunbudgeted expenditure ‘below-the-line’; the correct way would be to show the expenditure\n‘above-the-line’ but with an explanation added giving the reason for deviating from the\nbudgeted amount.\n\nB. Recording Net VAT Income\n\n19. It may be appropriate to revise the calculation of VAT refund claims included in\nnet VAT revenue . VAT refund claims included in net VAT revenue in the _Mapa Fiscal_\n2015 amounted to Mt6,455 million, of which Mt524 million were rejected (Table 7). This\nrepresented the total amount of VAT refund claims submitted to the Tax Authority in 2015,\nbut excluding VAT refund claims in respect of 2014 and earlier years. According to the\nMemorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), [13] claims that have been rejected\nshould be excluded from the amount of VAT refund claims in the _Mapa Fiscal_ (Table 8). It\nshould be noted that this approach for recording of net VAT revenue specified in the MEFP\ndiffers from the standard statistical treatment for cash-based accounting, whereby the amount\nof VAT refunds to be netted against VAT receipts is the amount of cash paid out as VAT\nrefunds.\n\n13 MEFP, paragraph 23, December 2, 2015.", "text_characters": 1702}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "15\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais))|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|6 455
|Total of submitted VAT refund claims related to 2015
|\n|-524
|Irregularities, rejected and canceled (_Irregularidades, Indeferidos, Anulados_)
|\n|**5 931**
|**Total of VAT refund claims for 2015 for the net VAT revenue in****_Mapa Fiscal_ **
|\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
Amendment|Col4|Comment/Explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|VAT
refund
claims of
6455
million|
-524|Adjustment to Other
Expenditure/Revenue
(+524) from VAT
refund claims (-524)
||Rejected VAT refund
claims adjusted out of
VAT refund claims as per
the MEFP.|\n\n\n\n20. **The item in the amount of Mt765 million within** _**Other Operations**_ **as an**\n**adjustment in respect of VAT refund payments has been postponed to 2016.**\n**(Table 1 row 4) is not appropriate** . This item represents amounts payable but not yet paid\nby the government. However, since the _Mapa Fiscal_ is prepared on a cash basis, this item\nshould not be included. The suggested adjustment to _Other Operations_ is detailed in Table 9.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais))|Suggested
Amendment|Comment/Explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|VAT refund
payments
postponed to
2016
|
-765|Adjustment from
Other Operations
(+765) to Other
Expenditure/Revenue
(-765)|Adjustment of an item representing
payables out of_Other Operations_ as it is
not a 2015 cash transaction.|\n\n\n\n21. **An adjustment to the NCG is required in respect of VAT refund claims, being**\n**the difference between VAT refund claims and VAT refund cash payments** . The\ntreatment of VAT refunds in the _Mapa Fiscal_, which follows from the MEFP and TMU,\nshould be consistent with the calculation of the NCG. Since non-rejected VAT refund claims\ndo not directly represent cash payments while the NCG is cash-based, the need for an\nadjustment to the NCG arises. Actual VAT refund cash payments in 2015 totaled Mt5,797", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.17454528808594, 87.27999114990234, 539.8079833984375, 178.04002380371094], "columns": 2, "rows": 4}, {"bbox": [90.17454528808594, 234.67942810058594, 544.400634765625, 349.5995788574219], "columns": 5, "rows": 2}, {"bbox": [90.17454528808594, 483.431396484375, 544.400634765625, 598.3676147460938], "columns": 4, "rows": 2}], "text": "15\n\n Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais)) Col2 \n\n 6 455 Total of submitted VAT refund claims related to 2015 \n -524 Irregularities, rejected and canceled (_Irregularidades, Indeferidos, Anulados_) \n 5 931 Total of VAT refund claims for 2015 for the net VAT revenue in_Mapa Fiscal_ \n\n Col1 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested Amendment Col4 Comment/Explanation \n\n VAT refund claims of 6455 million -524 Adjustment to Other Expenditure/Revenue (+524) from VAT refund claims (-524) Rejected VAT refund claims adjusted out of VAT refund claims as per the MEFP. \n\n20. The item in the amount of Mt765 million within _Other Operations_ as an\nadjustment in respect of VAT refund payments has been postponed to 2016.\n(Table 1 row 4) is not appropriate . This item represents amounts payable but not yet paid\nby the government. However, since the _Mapa Fiscal_ is prepared on a cash basis, this item\nshould not be included. The suggested adjustment to _Other Operations_ is detailed in Table 9.\n\n Col1 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais)) Suggested Amendment Comment/Explanation \n\n VAT refund payments postponed to 2016 -765 Adjustment from Other Operations (+765) to Other Expenditure/Revenue (-765) Adjustment of an item representing payables out of_Other Operations_ as it is not a 2015 cash transaction. \n\n21. An adjustment to the NCG is required in respect of VAT refund claims, being\nthe difference between VAT refund claims and VAT refund cash payments . The\ntreatment of VAT refunds in the _Mapa Fiscal_, which follows from the MEFP and TMU,\nshould be consistent with the calculation of the NCG. Since non-rejected VAT refund claims\ndo not directly represent cash payments while the NCG is cash-based, the need for an\nadjustment to the NCG arises. Actual VAT refund cash payments in 2015 totaled Mt5,797", "text_characters": 1524}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "16\n\n\nmillion (Table 10), while VAT refund claims totaled Mt5,931 million (Table 7), giving rise\nto a difference of Mt134 million (Table 11). The suggested adjustment to the NCG is detailed\nin Table 12.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais))|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|2 713
|Payments of VAT refund claims for 2015
|\n|982
|Payments of VAT refund claims for 2014 and earlier
|\n|2 048
|Payments of VAT refund claims for 2014 and earlier, these claims were
submitted to the AT in 2014 and earlier
|\n|54
|VAT refund payments to diplomats
|\n|**5 797**
|**Total cash paid for VAT refunds during 2015**
|\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|VAT Refund Claims for 2015
(1)
(Table 7)|Cash Paid for VAT Refunds
During 2015 (2)
(Table 10)|Difference (1) – (2)|\n|---|---|---|\n|
5 931
|
5 797
|134|\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
Amendment|Comment/Explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|VAT refund
adjustment to
the NCG
|
134|Adjustment from the
Other
Expenditure/Revenue
(-134) to the NCG
(+134)|Adjustment to the NCG of the difference
between non-rejected VAT refund claims
and cash payments for VAT refunds in
2015 (Table 11).|\n\n\n\n22. **Approved but unpaid VAT refund claims should be recorded as debt obligations**\n**in line with the TMU** . [14] According to the Tax Authority, at the end of 2015, the total\namount of VAT refund claims submitted to the Tax Authority was Mt9,036 million, of which\nMt3,764 million has been approved for payment and Mt5,272 million were still in the\nanalysis stage (Table 13). The approved VAT refund claims of Mt3,764 million represent\narrears of the government, which are defined as debt obligation in the TMU.\n\n\n23. **Since a large part of the VAT refund claims under analysis are likely to be paid,**\n**it may also be appropriate to treat a proportion of these claims as debt obligations** .\nHistorically, the Tax Authority has approved 84 percent of submitted VAT refund claims for\n\n\n14 TMU, F. Debt, Definition of debt, December 2, 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.18461608886719, 144.88002014160156, 539.8079833984375, 274.5199890136719], "columns": 2, "rows": 6}, {"bbox": [90.18461608886719, 314.6999816894531, 539.8079833984375, 366.4200134277344], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}, {"bbox": [90.18461608886719, 409.87200927734375, 544.0406494140625, 524.8079833984375], "columns": 4, "rows": 2}], "text": "16\n\nmillion (Table 10), while VAT refund claims totaled Mt5,931 million (Table 7), giving rise\nto a difference of Mt134 million (Table 11). The suggested adjustment to the NCG is detailed\nin Table 12.\n\n Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais)) Col2 \n\n 2 713 Payments of VAT refund claims for 2015 \n 982 Payments of VAT refund claims for 2014 and earlier \n 2 048 Payments of VAT refund claims for 2014 and earlier, these claims were submitted to the AT in 2014 and earlier \n 54 VAT refund payments to diplomats \n 5 797 Total cash paid for VAT refunds during 2015 \n\n VAT Refund Claims for 2015 (1) (Table 7) Cash Paid for VAT Refunds During 2015 (2) (Table 10) Difference (1) – (2) \n\n 5 931 5 797 134 \n\n Col1 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested Amendment Comment/Explanation \n\n VAT refund adjustment to the NCG 134 Adjustment from the Other Expenditure/Revenue (-134) to the NCG (+134) Adjustment to the NCG of the difference between non-rejected VAT refund claims and cash payments for VAT refunds in 2015 (Table 11). \n\n22. Approved but unpaid VAT refund claims should be recorded as debt obligations\nin line with the TMU . [14] According to the Tax Authority, at the end of 2015, the total\namount of VAT refund claims submitted to the Tax Authority was Mt9,036 million, of which\nMt3,764 million has been approved for payment and Mt5,272 million were still in the\nanalysis stage (Table 13). The approved VAT refund claims of Mt3,764 million represent\narrears of the government, which are defined as debt obligation in the TMU.\n\n23. Since a large part of the VAT refund claims under analysis are likely to be paid,\nit may also be appropriate to treat a proportion of these claims as debt obligations .\nHistorically, the Tax Authority has approved 84 percent of submitted VAT refund claims for\n\n14 TMU, F. Debt, Definition of debt, December 2, 2015.", "text_characters": 1521}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "17\n\n\npayment in the first round of analysis and only 6.4 percent are finally rejected. [15] This\nsuggests that around 93.6 percent of the Mt5,272 billion worth of claims under investigation\nare likely to be approved ultimately—an amount of Mt4,935 million.\n\n\n24. **The mission suggests that both approved but unpaid VAT claims and the**\n**amount of VAT claims under investigation that are expected to be paid should be**\n**recorded as debt obligations in order for the amount of debt obligations to be closest to**\n**economic reality** . There are three options to quantify the amount of outstanding VAT refund\nclaims to be recorded as a government internal debt obligation (Table 13). Option 2 is based\non macro-economic statistics, while Options 1 and 3 take into account, expected liabilities\nfrom claims under analysis. Taking into account that, historically, during the lengthy analysis\nprocess, a very high proportion of non-rejected claims, but not all, are finally accepted for\npayment. **The mission recommends Option 3 as the preferred basis for quantifying the**\n**amount of debt obligation, since it provides the best sense of economic reality.**\n\n|Table 13. Mo|ozambique: Three Options for Quantifying the Amount of Debt Obligation from VAT Refund Claims VAT Refund Claims as of end-2015 in millions|\n|---|---|\n|
|
VAT Refund Claims as of end-2015 in millions
|\n|**_OPTION 1_**
|
|\n|
382
|Outstanding VAT refund claims from 2014
|\n|8 654
|Outstanding VAT refund claims submitted in 2015, including both claims
approved for payment and claims in the analyses phase
|\n|**9 036**
|**Outstanding VAT refund claims including potential liabilities**
|\n|
**_OPTION 2_ **
|
|\n|
382
|
Outstanding VAT refund claims from 2014
|\n|8 654
|Outstanding VAT refund claims submitted in 2015, including both claims
approved for payment and claims in the analysis phase
|\n|-5 272
|Outstanding VAT refund claims in the analysis phase
|\n|**3 764**
|**Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment**
|\n|
**_OPTION 3_**
|
|\n|
|_Option 2 plus expected amount of valid claims currently under analysis_
_(based on historical statistics)_
|\n|3 764
|Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment
|\n|4 935
|Expected amount of valid claims currently under analysis. Historically
93.6 percent of claims analyzed have been accepted for payment.
(5272*93.6 percent)
|\n|**8 699**
|**Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment and probable for**
**payment**
|\n\n\n\n**C. Recording Leasing Transactions**\n\n\n25. **Financial leases for public buildings are recorded as** _**Other Operations**_ **in the**\n_**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and as part of the internal debt stock by the DNT** . The authorities have been\nactively using leasing as a source of funding for building and renovating government\n\n\n15 Aide memoire: “Reforming VAT Refunds Management,” IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, September 2014.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2249984741211, 307.12786865234375, 539.7750244140625, 597.2000122070312], "columns": 2, "rows": 15}], "text": "17\n\npayment in the first round of analysis and only 6.4 percent are finally rejected. [15] This\nsuggests that around 93.6 percent of the Mt5,272 billion worth of claims under investigation\nare likely to be approved ultimately—an amount of Mt4,935 million.\n\n24. The mission suggests that both approved but unpaid VAT claims and the\namount of VAT claims under investigation that are expected to be paid should be\nrecorded as debt obligations in order for the amount of debt obligations to be closest to\neconomic reality . There are three options to quantify the amount of outstanding VAT refund\nclaims to be recorded as a government internal debt obligation (Table 13). Option 2 is based\non macro-economic statistics, while Options 1 and 3 take into account, expected liabilities\nfrom claims under analysis. Taking into account that, historically, during the lengthy analysis\nprocess, a very high proportion of non-rejected claims, but not all, are finally accepted for\npayment. The mission recommends Option 3 as the preferred basis for quantifying the\namount of debt obligation, since it provides the best sense of economic reality.\n\n Table 13. Mo ozambique: Three Options for Quantifying the Amount of Debt Obligation from VAT Refund Claims VAT Refund Claims as of end-2015 in millions \n\n VAT Refund Claims as of end-2015 in millions \n _OPTION 1_ \n 382 Outstanding VAT refund claims from 2014 \n 8 654 Outstanding VAT refund claims submitted in 2015, including both claims approved for payment and claims in the analyses phase \n 9 036 Outstanding VAT refund claims including potential liabilities \n _OPTION 2_ \n 382 Outstanding VAT refund claims from 2014 \n 8 654 Outstanding VAT refund claims submitted in 2015, including both claims approved for payment and claims in the analysis phase \n -5 272 Outstanding VAT refund claims in the analysis phase \n 3 764 Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment \n _OPTION 3_ \n _Option 2 plus expected amount of valid claims currently under analysis_ _(based on historical statistics)_ \n 3 764 Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment \n 4 935 Expected amount of valid claims currently under analysis. Historically 93.6 percent of claims analyzed have been accepted for payment. (5272*93.6 percent) \n 8 699 Outstanding VAT refund claims approved for payment and probable for payment \n\nC. Recording Leasing Transactions\n\n25. Financial leases for public buildings are recorded as _Other Operations_ in the\n_Mapa Fiscal_ and as part of the internal debt stock by the DNT . The authorities have been\nactively using leasing as a source of funding for building and renovating government\n\n15 Aide memoire: “Reforming VAT Refunds Management,” IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, September 2014.", "text_characters": 2274}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "18\n\n\nbuildings. As of end-2015, the stock of leasing contracts signed totaled Mt10.6 billion\n(1.8 percent of GDP), of which the outstanding balance of lease obligations, Mt7,638 million,\nwas recorded in the internal debt stock by the DNT (Table 14). The leasing contracts are\ntypically signed with domestic commercial banks with a maturity of seven years. The\nmission’s understanding of the repayment terms of the leases is that they are financial leases,\nbased on discussions with officials and the one leasing contract template inspected by the\nmission. In the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, an amount of Mt221 million has been recorded within the\ninterest expenditure line (‘above-the-line’) relating to leases, and a further amount of\nMt4,128 million has been recorded within _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’). The mission\nwas not able to obtain information regarding the detailed breakdown of the amount of\nMt4,128 million (Table 1, Row 3).\n\n\n26. **Further analysis is needed to substantiate the amounts in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_\n**relating to financial leases** . In 2015, the authorities signed four new lease contracts in the\namount of Mt8,448 million. According to the DNT, drawings under lease contracts totaled\nMt5,703 million in 2015, of which Mt5,571 million were drawings under the new lease\ncontracts and Mt132 million was drawings under a leasing contract signed in 2013. The\nmission was not able to obtain a detailed breakdown regarding actual drawdowns under the\nnew lease contracts. A reconciliation (Table 14) between the stock of loans and leases held\nby commercial banks as at end-2015, as per the NCG figure provided by the BM, and the\ninternal debt service table for 2015 provided by the DNT shows that the stock of domestic\nleases and loans as per the DNT is Mt4,354 million larger than the stock recorded by\ndomestic commercial banks as per the BM (Table 14). Further analysis is needed to identify\nthe causes for this difference. A similar reconciliation should be carried out for end-2014 to\nensure that financing flows in 2015 (and not just the stock at end-2015) are captured\naccurately.\n\n\n27. **Amounts relating to leases should be recorded in** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **2015 based on**\n**actual drawings from the leases during 2015 as increases in capital expenditure**\n**(‘above-the-line’)** . According to the _GFSM 1986_, [16] a purchase paid for by the government in\nthe form of a fixed-term contractual obligation should be shown as both expenditure and a\nborrowing transaction at the time the terms of the credit contract for creation of the debt are\nfulfilled. Drawings should be shown in an amount equal to the amount of funds received by\nthe government or, under the terms of a credit contract, the debt created.\n\n\n28. **It should be noted that the treatment of leases may be different under the**\n_**GFSM 1986**_ **compared to** _**GFSM 2001**_ **and** _**GFSM 2014**_ . Table 15 summarizes the three\ntreatments for recording financial leases based on the different _GFSM_ principles. Table 16\nsets out the suggested recording of leases as currently reported as “other operations” in the\n_Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 according to the _GFSM 1986_ .\n\n\n16 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 4 : Classification, Section IV.C.2. Financing by Type of Debt Instrument, 3. Long-term\nloans not elsewhere classified, 3.1. Drawings, page 214.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "18\n\nbuildings. As of end-2015, the stock of leasing contracts signed totaled Mt10.6 billion\n(1.8 percent of GDP), of which the outstanding balance of lease obligations, Mt7,638 million,\nwas recorded in the internal debt stock by the DNT (Table 14). The leasing contracts are\ntypically signed with domestic commercial banks with a maturity of seven years. The\nmission’s understanding of the repayment terms of the leases is that they are financial leases,\nbased on discussions with officials and the one leasing contract template inspected by the\nmission. In the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, an amount of Mt221 million has been recorded within the\ninterest expenditure line (‘above-the-line’) relating to leases, and a further amount of\nMt4,128 million has been recorded within _Other Operations_ (‘below-the-line’). The mission\nwas not able to obtain information regarding the detailed breakdown of the amount of\nMt4,128 million (Table 1, Row 3).\n\n26. Further analysis is needed to substantiate the amounts in the _Mapa Fiscal_\nrelating to financial leases . In 2015, the authorities signed four new lease contracts in the\namount of Mt8,448 million. According to the DNT, drawings under lease contracts totaled\nMt5,703 million in 2015, of which Mt5,571 million were drawings under the new lease\ncontracts and Mt132 million was drawings under a leasing contract signed in 2013. The\nmission was not able to obtain a detailed breakdown regarding actual drawdowns under the\nnew lease contracts. A reconciliation (Table 14) between the stock of loans and leases held\nby commercial banks as at end-2015, as per the NCG figure provided by the BM, and the\ninternal debt service table for 2015 provided by the DNT shows that the stock of domestic\nleases and loans as per the DNT is Mt4,354 million larger than the stock recorded by\ndomestic commercial banks as per the BM (Table 14). Further analysis is needed to identify\nthe causes for this difference. A similar reconciliation should be carried out for end-2014 to\nensure that financing flows in 2015 (and not just the stock at end-2015) are captured\naccurately.\n\n27. Amounts relating to leases should be recorded in _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 based on\nactual drawings from the leases during 2015 as increases in capital expenditure\n(‘above-the-line’) . According to the _GFSM 1986_, [16] a purchase paid for by the government in\nthe form of a fixed-term contractual obligation should be shown as both expenditure and a\nborrowing transaction at the time the terms of the credit contract for creation of the debt are\nfulfilled. Drawings should be shown in an amount equal to the amount of funds received by\nthe government or, under the terms of a credit contract, the debt created.\n\n28. It should be noted that the treatment of leases may be different under the\n_GFSM 1986_ compared to _GFSM 2001_ and _GFSM 2014_ . Table 15 summarizes the three\ntreatments for recording financial leases based on the different _GFSM_ principles. Table 16\nsets out the suggested recording of leases as currently reported as “other operations” in the\n_Mapa Fiscal_ 2015 according to the _GFSM 1986_ .\n\n16 _GFSM 1986_, Chapter 4 : Classification, Section IV.C.2. Financing by Type of Debt Instrument, 3. Long-term\nloans not elsewhere classified, 3.1. Drawings, page 214.", "text_characters": 2739}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "19\n\n\n\n**Table 14. Mozambique: Reconciliation of Government Domestic Leases and**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|2015
In millions|NCG|Central
government|Difference|Comment|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
Total credits of leases
and loans
|21 302
|
12 911
|
|
|\n|
_Of which leases_
|
|_7 638_
|
|
|\n|
_Of which loans_
|
|
_13 444_
|
|
|\n|
_Of which VAT_
_securitization_
|
|
_-8 171_
|
|
Adjustment for different
classifications of VAT
securitization in the NCG
and by central government.
VAT securitization is shown
as a loan in central
government internal debt
and as treasury bonds
(T-bonds) in the NCG figure
reported by the BM.
|\n|_Adjustments:_
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Portuguese credit line
|
-12 746
|
|
|
Excluded from the NCG as it
is not covered under the
definition of central
government. 17
|\n|**Total leases and loans**
**as of end-2015**
**(adjusted)**
|**8 557**
|**12 911**
|**4 354**|
Debt per the DNT is larger
than banking sector leases
and loans granted to central
government per the BM.|\n\n\n\n17 TMU paragraph 4, December 2, 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21333312988281, 102.55943298339844, 539.7866821289062, 394.1199951171875], "columns": 5, "rows": 8}], "text": "19\n\nTable 14. Mozambique: Reconciliation of Government Domestic Leases and\n\n 2015 In millions NCG Central government Difference Comment \n\n Total credits of leases and loans 21 302 12 911 \n _Of which leases_ _7 638_ \n _Of which loans_ _13 444_ \n _Of which VAT_ _securitization_ _-8 171_ Adjustment for different classifications of VAT securitization in the NCG and by central government. VAT securitization is shown as a loan in central government internal debt and as treasury bonds (T-bonds) in the NCG figure reported by the BM. \n _Adjustments:_ \n Portuguese credit line -12 746 Excluded from the NCG as it is not covered under the definition of central government. 17 \n Total leases and loans as of end-2015 (adjusted) 8 557 12 911 4 354 Debt per the DNT is larger than banking sector leases and loans granted to central government per the BM. \n\n17 TMU paragraph 4, December 2, 2015.", "text_characters": 722}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "20\n\n\n**Table 15. Mozambique: Recording Financial Leases based on different** _**GFSM**_\n\n\n|GFSM 1986|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|
**Recording**
|Any payments for a financial lease will be recorded as capital expenditure at the
time the payment for the financial lease is made, i.e., it is recorded as if every
payment acquires a small portion of the asset.
Due to this premise for the recording, the liability (debt) related to the financial
lease are not recognized in the environment, because it was argued that when the
debt was incurred no cash flows occurred. In total, it could lead to a whole lot of
underestimations not only of the stock of nonfinancial assets that government has
ownership over, but also of the liabilities that the government has incurred.
|\n|**_GFSM 2001 (_cash environment)**
|**_GFSM 2001 (_cash environment)**
|\n|
**Recording**
|
A leasing transaction is divided into parts to record all the economic events as if a
financial flow did occur.
It is argued that the government has obtained a loan from a bank (i.e., entities cash
increased, and a liability toward the bank is recognized), with which the entity is
then deemed to have purchased a nonfinancial asset (cash decreased and
nonfinancial asset of equal value is acquired), in subsequent periods when the
financial lease payments are made, these payments are recorded as repayments
on the loan with banks.
|\n|**_GFSM 2014_ (accrual based)**
|**_GFSM 2014_ (accrual based)**
|\n|
**Recording**
|
The treatment of financial leases is designed to capture the economic reality of
such arrangements, by treating assets under a financial lease as if they were
purchased and owned by the user. The lessee (economic owner) records the
acquisition of the asset that is financed by an imputed loan. The loan is redeemed
through payments during the contract.18
|\n\n\n\n**Table 16. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for Leases Currently Reported**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
amendment|Comment, explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Leasing for
public
buildings|
4 128|Reclassification from
Other Operations (-4
128) to capital
expenditure (+4 128)
|On the basis that all lease contracts are
financial leases and that the amount of
Mt4,128 is correct (Note: the mission has not
been able to confirm this amount, further work
needs to be done to verify the figure of
Mt4,128 million), the amount can be
considered as the purchase of nonfinancial
assets (i.e., the public buildings that are the
subject of the leases) according the_GFSM_
_1986._|\n\n\n\n18 _GFSM 2014_, A4.13.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.19200134277344, 102.47926330566406, 539.7943115234375, 445.7596740722656], "columns": 2, "rows": 6}, {"bbox": [90.19200134277344, 501.1920166015625, 552.7999877929688, 679.3676147460938], "columns": 4, "rows": 2}], "text": "20\n\nTable 15. Mozambique: Recording Financial Leases based on different _GFSM_\n\n GFSM 1986 Col2 \n\n Recording Any payments for a financial lease will be recorded as capital expenditure at the time the payment for the financial lease is made, i.e., it is recorded as if every payment acquires a small portion of the asset. Due to this premise for the recording, the liability (debt) related to the financial lease are not recognized in the environment, because it was argued that when the debt was incurred no cash flows occurred. In total, it could lead to a whole lot of underestimations not only of the stock of nonfinancial assets that government has ownership over, but also of the liabilities that the government has incurred. \n _GFSM 2001 (_cash environment) _GFSM 2001 (_cash environment) \n Recording A leasing transaction is divided into parts to record all the economic events as if a financial flow did occur. It is argued that the government has obtained a loan from a bank (i.e., entities cash increased, and a liability toward the bank is recognized), with which the entity is then deemed to have purchased a nonfinancial asset (cash decreased and nonfinancial asset of equal value is acquired), in subsequent periods when the financial lease payments are made, these payments are recorded as repayments on the loan with banks. \n _GFSM 2014_ (accrual based) _GFSM 2014_ (accrual based) \n Recording The treatment of financial leases is designed to capture the economic reality of such arrangements, by treating assets under a financial lease as if they were purchased and owned by the user. The lessee (economic owner) records the acquisition of the asset that is financed by an imputed loan. The loan is redeemed through payments during the contract.18 \n\nTable 16. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for Leases Currently Reported\n\n Col1 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested amendment Comment, explanation \n\n Leasing for public buildings 4 128 Reclassification from Other Operations (-4 128) to capital expenditure (+4 128) On the basis that all lease contracts are financial leases and that the amount of Mt4,128 is correct (Note: the mission has not been able to confirm this amount, further work needs to be done to verify the figure of Mt4,128 million), the amount can be considered as the purchase of nonfinancial assets (i.e., the public buildings that are the subject of the leases) according the_GFSM_ _1986._ \n\n18 _GFSM 2014_, A4.13.", "text_characters": 2050}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "21\n\n\n**D. Issues Related to Reconciliations**\n\n\n29. **It would be worthwhile for the authorities to carry out regular formal**\n**reconciliations between the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and the NCG** . The NCG calculated by the BM is\nused in the _Mapa Fiscal_ for the line ‘ _Net internal financing_ ’. Although the Ministry of\nEconomy and Finance and the BM meet monthly to discuss and identify the causes of any\nchanges in the NCG, there is no formal reconciliation between the government’s fiscal data\nand the BM-calculated NCG. Such a reconciliation would be valuable in ensuring the\naccuracy of government records and would potentially identify reconciling items to be\nadjusted, thereby reducing the amount of unallocated expenditure/revenue, which is a\nbalancing item in the _Mapa Fiscal._\n\n\n30. **Any such reconciliation would best be carried out on a product-line basis** . Net\ninternal financing is the difference between transactions involving financial assets\n(e.g., the central government bank accounts’ balances) and financing transactions\n(e.g., treasury bills (T-bills), treasury bonds (T-bonds), financial leases, other loans). To\nfacilitate identifying differences and associated reconciling items, it would be most efficient\nto compare government data with the BM data at an individual product level (i.e., bank\naccounts in the BM and commercial banks; T-bills; T-bonds; financial leases; other loans).\nDiscrepancies between the fiscal data and the monetary data can arise for various reasons,\nincluding differences between those bank accounts included by DNT in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and\nthose bank accounts recorded by commercial banks in the monetary survey and included by\nthe BM in the NCG by commercial banks, use of different foreign exchange rates, and other\ndifferences in valuation bases.\n\n\n31. **The NCG should be adjusted for changes in non-commercial bank holdings of**\n**T-bonds** . In its monetary survey for the NCG calculation, the BM includes the stock of\nT-bonds owned by commercial banks purchased in the primary and secondary markets but\nexcludes the stock of T-bonds owned by other investors. Any secondary market T-bond\ntransactions (or non-monetary transaction in T-bills, which we understand to be negligible in\namount) between banks and other investors will impact the NCG figure, and indeed the TMU\nprovides that the NCG should be adjusted downward (upward) for any increase (decrease) in\ndomestic financing from the non-financial private sector. [19] Table 17 reconciles the NCG to\nthe balance of government domestic securities and Table 18 shows that commercial banks\nhave been net purchasers of T-bonds (excluding VAT securities) in the amount of Mt1,025\nmillion from other investors in the secondary market in 2015. If the NCG is not adjusted for\nthis amount, this leads to an increase in the NCG without any actual transaction by the\ngovernment (Table 18). (It should be noted that where T-bills are issued for monetary\npurposes, an offsetting cash balance is included by the BM in the NCG calculation.) Table 19\ndetails the suggested adjustment to the NCG for 2015, excluding the impact of VAT\nsecuritization bonds as these are discussed in the following paragraph.\n\n\n19 TMU paragraph 20, December 2, 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "21\n\nD. Issues Related to Reconciliations\n\n29. It would be worthwhile for the authorities to carry out regular formal\nreconciliations between the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG . The NCG calculated by the BM is\nused in the _Mapa Fiscal_ for the line ‘ _Net internal financing_ ’. Although the Ministry of\nEconomy and Finance and the BM meet monthly to discuss and identify the causes of any\nchanges in the NCG, there is no formal reconciliation between the government’s fiscal data\nand the BM-calculated NCG. Such a reconciliation would be valuable in ensuring the\naccuracy of government records and would potentially identify reconciling items to be\nadjusted, thereby reducing the amount of unallocated expenditure/revenue, which is a\nbalancing item in the _Mapa Fiscal._\n\n30. Any such reconciliation would best be carried out on a product-line basis . Net\ninternal financing is the difference between transactions involving financial assets\n(e.g., the central government bank accounts’ balances) and financing transactions\n(e.g., treasury bills (T-bills), treasury bonds (T-bonds), financial leases, other loans). To\nfacilitate identifying differences and associated reconciling items, it would be most efficient\nto compare government data with the BM data at an individual product level (i.e., bank\naccounts in the BM and commercial banks; T-bills; T-bonds; financial leases; other loans).\nDiscrepancies between the fiscal data and the monetary data can arise for various reasons,\nincluding differences between those bank accounts included by DNT in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and\nthose bank accounts recorded by commercial banks in the monetary survey and included by\nthe BM in the NCG by commercial banks, use of different foreign exchange rates, and other\ndifferences in valuation bases.\n\n31. The NCG should be adjusted for changes in non-commercial bank holdings of\nT-bonds . In its monetary survey for the NCG calculation, the BM includes the stock of\nT-bonds owned by commercial banks purchased in the primary and secondary markets but\nexcludes the stock of T-bonds owned by other investors. Any secondary market T-bond\ntransactions (or non-monetary transaction in T-bills, which we understand to be negligible in\namount) between banks and other investors will impact the NCG figure, and indeed the TMU\nprovides that the NCG should be adjusted downward (upward) for any increase (decrease) in\ndomestic financing from the non-financial private sector. [19] Table 17 reconciles the NCG to\nthe balance of government domestic securities and Table 18 shows that commercial banks\nhave been net purchasers of T-bonds (excluding VAT securities) in the amount of Mt1,025\nmillion from other investors in the secondary market in 2015. If the NCG is not adjusted for\nthis amount, this leads to an increase in the NCG without any actual transaction by the\ngovernment (Table 18). (It should be noted that where T-bills are issued for monetary\npurposes, an offsetting cash balance is included by the BM in the NCG calculation.) Table 19\ndetails the suggested adjustment to the NCG for 2015, excluding the impact of VAT\nsecuritization bonds as these are discussed in the following paragraph.\n\n19 TMU paragraph 20, December 2, 2015.", "text_characters": 2700}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "22\n\n\n\n**Table 17. Mozambique: Reconciliation of Government Domestic Securities to**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|2014
In millions|NCG|Central
Government|Difference|Explanation for
Difference|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|1.
|
T-bills
|37 551
|
8 400
|29 151
|
The central government
reports a smaller amount
of T-bills than the
amount owned by banks.
The difference is T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes.
|\n|2.
|T-bonds
|16 839
|20 940
|-4 101
|
Banks own a smaller
amount of T-bonds than
issued by the central
government. The
difference is T-bonds
held by other investors.
|\n|
|_Adjustments:_
|
|
|
|
|\n|
3.
|
BM recapitalization
bonds
|
-4 500
|
-4 500
|
-
|
An adjustment according
to the TMU.1
|\n|4.
|
Adjustment for the T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes
|-
|29 151
|-29 151
|
An adjustment to the
central government debt
stock that is offset by an
equivalent cash balance
in the NCG
|\n|**5.**
|**Total securities as of**
**end-2014 (adjusted)**
|**49 890**
|**53 991**
|**-4 101**
|
The difference is
explained by T-bonds
held by other investors.
|\n|
|**2015**
|
|
|
|
|\n|
6.
|
T-bills
|
36 303
|
23 475
|
12 828
|
Central government
reports a smaller amount
of T-bills than the
amount owned by banks.
The difference is T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes.
|\n|7.
|T-bonds
|21 600
|24 676
|-3 076
|
Banks own a smaller
amount of T-bonds than
issued by the central
government. The
difference is T-bonds
held by other investors.
|\n|8.
|VAT securitization bonds
issued in April 2015
|5 949
|8 171
|-2 222
|
The difference
represents VAT
securities held by
non-bank investors.
|\n|
|_Adjustments:_
|
|
|
|
|\n|
9.
|
BM recapitalization
bonds
|
-4 500
|
-4 500
|
0
|
An adjustment according
to the TMU.
|\n|10.
|
Adjustment for the T-bills
issued for monetary
purposes.
|
|12 828
|-12 828
|
An adjustment to the
central government debt
stock that is offset by an
equivalent cash balance
in the NCG.
|\n|**11.**|**Total securities as of**
**end-2015 (adjusted)**|**59 352**|**64 650**|**-5 298**|
The difference
represents T-bonds and|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2249984741211, 99.80574035644531, 539.7750244140625, 728.3138427734375], "columns": 6, "rows": 15}], "text": "22\n\nTable 17. Mozambique: Reconciliation of Government Domestic Securities to\n\n Col1 2014 In millions NCG Central Government Difference Explanation for Difference \n\n 1. T-bills 37 551 8 400 29 151 The central government reports a smaller amount of T-bills than the amount owned by banks. The difference is T-bills issued for monetary purposes. \n 2. T-bonds 16 839 20 940 -4 101 Banks own a smaller amount of T-bonds than issued by the central government. The difference is T-bonds held by other investors. \n _Adjustments:_ \n 3. BM recapitalization bonds -4 500 -4 500 - An adjustment according to the TMU.1 \n 4. Adjustment for the T-bills issued for monetary purposes - 29 151 -29 151 An adjustment to the central government debt stock that is offset by an equivalent cash balance in the NCG \n 5. Total securities as of end-2014 (adjusted) 49 890 53 991 -4 101 The difference is explained by T-bonds held by other investors. \n 2015 \n 6. T-bills 36 303 23 475 12 828 Central government reports a smaller amount of T-bills than the amount owned by banks. The difference is T-bills issued for monetary purposes. \n 7. T-bonds 21 600 24 676 -3 076 Banks own a smaller amount of T-bonds than issued by the central government. The difference is T-bonds held by other investors. \n 8. VAT securitization bonds issued in April 2015 5 949 8 171 -2 222 The difference represents VAT securities held by non-bank investors. \n _Adjustments:_ \n 9. BM recapitalization bonds -4 500 -4 500 0 An adjustment according to the TMU. \n 10. Adjustment for the T-bills issued for monetary purposes. 12 828 -12 828 An adjustment to the central government debt stock that is offset by an equivalent cash balance in the NCG. \n 11. Total securities as of end-2015 (adjusted) 59 352 64 650 -5 298 The difference represents T-bonds and", "text_characters": 1470}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "23\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|2014
In millions|NCG|Central
Government|Difference|Explanation for
Difference|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||
||
||
VAT securitization bonds
held by other investors.|\n\n\n1TMU paragraph 2, December 2, 2015.\n\n\n\n**Table 18. Mozambique: Calculation of Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Other investor holdings of T-bonds (excl. VAT securitization
bonds)|Col2|Adjustment to the NCG|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**2014**(1)
(Table 17, Row 2)
|
**2015**(2)
(Table 17, Row 7)
|**Change**(2) - (1)
|\n|
4 101|
3 076
|-1 025|\n\n\n**Table 19. Mozambique: Suggested Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested
amendment|Comment, explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Increase in banks
holdings of T-bonds due
to purchases from other
investors in 2015|
-1 025|Adjustment from
other
expenditure/revenue
(-1 025) to the NCG
(-1 025)
|Adjustment according to the
TMU. The NCG is decreased by
the net amount of T-bonds
purchases by banks from other
investors (Table 18).|\n\n\n\n32. **The amount of bonds issued in the VAT securitization and currently held by**\n**domestic banks should be presented as an adjustment to the NCG according to the**\n**TMU,** **[20]** **rather than shown within** _**Other Operations**_ . As discussed in paragraph 5 of this\nsection, the Mt8,171 million VAT securitization was reported as an increase in the\ngovernment’s debt stock for 2015 but not included in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015. All the\nsecurities were issued to nonbank investors. Banks have purchased Mt5,949 million out of\nMt8, 171 million issue of these securities in the secondary market and their stock of holdings\nhas been captured in the NCG. As secondary market transactions of government bonds do\nnot represent cash transactions by the government, an adjustment should be made to the NCG\nas provided in the TMU, rather than recording the amount of bank holdings within _Other_\n_Operations_ (Table 1, Row 1) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ (Table 20).\n\n\n20 TMU paragraph 20, December 2, 2015.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16799926757812, 72.20570373535156, 539.8285522460938, 119.31431579589844], "columns": 6, "rows": 2}, {"bbox": [90.16799926757812, 196.71998596191406, 539.8285522460938, 255.9000244140625], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}, {"bbox": [90.16799926757812, 316.99200439453125, 545.1206665039062, 444.5279846191406], "columns": 4, "rows": 2}], "text": "23\n\n Col1 2014 In millions NCG Central Government Difference Explanation for Difference \n\n VAT securitization bonds held by other investors. \n\n1TMU paragraph 2, December 2, 2015.\n\nTable 18. Mozambique: Calculation of Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of\n\n Other investor holdings of T-bonds (excl. VAT securitization bonds) Col2 Adjustment to the NCG \n\n 2014(1) (Table 17, Row 2) 2015(2) (Table 17, Row 7) Change(2) - (1) \n 4 101 3 076 -1 025 \n\nTable 19. Mozambique: Suggested Adjustment in the NCG in Respect of\n\n Col1 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested amendment Comment, explanation \n\n Increase in banks holdings of T-bonds due to purchases from other investors in 2015 -1 025 Adjustment from other expenditure/revenue (-1 025) to the NCG (-1 025) Adjustment according to the TMU. The NCG is decreased by the net amount of T-bonds purchases by banks from other investors (Table 18). \n\n32. The amount of bonds issued in the VAT securitization and currently held by\ndomestic banks should be presented as an adjustment to the NCG according to the\nTMU, [20] rather than shown within _Other Operations_ . As discussed in paragraph 5 of this\nsection, the Mt8,171 million VAT securitization was reported as an increase in the\ngovernment’s debt stock for 2015 but not included in the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015. All the\nsecurities were issued to nonbank investors. Banks have purchased Mt5,949 million out of\nMt8, 171 million issue of these securities in the secondary market and their stock of holdings\nhas been captured in the NCG. As secondary market transactions of government bonds do\nnot represent cash transactions by the government, an adjustment should be made to the NCG\nas provided in the TMU, rather than recording the amount of bank holdings within _Other_\n_Operations_ (Table 1, Row 1) in the _Mapa Fiscal_ (Table 20).\n\n20 TMU paragraph 20, December 2, 2015.", "text_characters": 1548}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "24\n\n\n\n**Table 20. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for VAT Securitization Currently**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Amount
(In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Suggested Amendment|Comment/Explanation|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|1|VAT
securitization|
5 949|Reclassification from
Other Operations (-5 949)
to the NCG (-5 949)
|Domestic banks have bought Mt5,949
million of VAT securitization bonds in the
secondary market.
According to the TMU, the NCG should be
adjusted downward for any increase in the
amount of these bonds owned by domestic
banks.|\n\n\n\n33. **The impact of changes in foreign exchange rates in the calculation of the NCG**\n**by BM should be analyzed** . The government has entered borrowing transactions in foreign\ncurrencies with local commercial banks and also has bank accounts denominated in foreign\ncurrencies in BM and local commercial banks. According to the BM, the balance of bank\naccounts and deposits denominated in foreign currency amounted to Mt10,220 million\n(or 12 percent of the total deposits) as of end-2014 and Mt7,930 million (or 13 percent of the\ntotal deposits) as of end-2015. Where there is a change in the foreign exchange rate, a change\nin the NCG arises without any corresponding new transaction by the government. This would\nsuggest the need for an adjustment to the NCG. However, it appears that this issue has not\nbeen addressed.\n\n\n**E. Other Issues**\n\n\n34. **Debt repayments in respect of the government’s own direct obligations should be**\n**recorded in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **separately from debt repayments made by the government**\n**on behalf of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)** . During 2015, the government made debt\nrepayments on behalf of two state-owned companies, Sogir and Maputo Sul, in the amount of\nMt202 million, of which interest cost was Mt175 million and repayment of principal\nMt27 million. The mission learned that the government payments to the banks on behalf of\nits SOEs were one-off transactions and that the government has not assumed the debt of these\nSOEs. In the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, the interest cost paid by the government on behalf of the\nSOEs has been recorded as debt service charges (interest). However, the repayment of\nprincipal has not been recorded in the _Mapa Fiscal_ but only in the NCG. According to the\n_GFSM 1986_, [21] government payments for the amortization of the debts of others, so long as\nthe government has not assumed the debt or acquired a corresponding claim against the\ndebtor, should be recorded as capital transfers.\n\n\n35. **There is a small discrepancy of Mt9 million between the line ‘Net internal**\n**financing’ shown in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and the NCG provided by the BM** . It is\n\n\n21 _GFSM_ _1986_, Chapter 4: Classification, Section IV.B.2 Economic classification, 7. Capital transfers,\npage 184.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [80.92033386230469, 102.55943298339844, 577.5206909179688, 242.8000030517578], "columns": 5, "rows": 2}], "text": "24\n\nTable 20. Mozambique: Suggested Treatment for VAT Securitization Currently\n\n Col1 Col2 Amount (In millions of Mozambican meticais) Suggested Amendment Comment/Explanation \n\n 1 VAT securitization 5 949 Reclassification from Other Operations (-5 949) to the NCG (-5 949) Domestic banks have bought Mt5,949 million of VAT securitization bonds in the secondary market. According to the TMU, the NCG should be adjusted downward for any increase in the amount of these bonds owned by domestic banks. \n\n33. The impact of changes in foreign exchange rates in the calculation of the NCG\nby BM should be analyzed . The government has entered borrowing transactions in foreign\ncurrencies with local commercial banks and also has bank accounts denominated in foreign\ncurrencies in BM and local commercial banks. According to the BM, the balance of bank\naccounts and deposits denominated in foreign currency amounted to Mt10,220 million\n(or 12 percent of the total deposits) as of end-2014 and Mt7,930 million (or 13 percent of the\ntotal deposits) as of end-2015. Where there is a change in the foreign exchange rate, a change\nin the NCG arises without any corresponding new transaction by the government. This would\nsuggest the need for an adjustment to the NCG. However, it appears that this issue has not\nbeen addressed.\n\nE. Other Issues\n\n34. Debt repayments in respect of the government’s own direct obligations should be\nrecorded in the _Mapa Fiscal_ separately from debt repayments made by the government\non behalf of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) . During 2015, the government made debt\nrepayments on behalf of two state-owned companies, Sogir and Maputo Sul, in the amount of\nMt202 million, of which interest cost was Mt175 million and repayment of principal\nMt27 million. The mission learned that the government payments to the banks on behalf of\nits SOEs were one-off transactions and that the government has not assumed the debt of these\nSOEs. In the _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015, the interest cost paid by the government on behalf of the\nSOEs has been recorded as debt service charges (interest). However, the repayment of\nprincipal has not been recorded in the _Mapa Fiscal_ but only in the NCG. According to the\n_GFSM 1986_, [21] government payments for the amortization of the debts of others, so long as\nthe government has not assumed the debt or acquired a corresponding claim against the\ndebtor, should be recorded as capital transfers.\n\n35. There is a small discrepancy of Mt9 million between the line ‘Net internal\nfinancing’ shown in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG provided by the BM . It is\n\n21 _GFSM_ _1986_, Chapter 4: Classification, Section IV.B.2 Economic classification, 7. Capital transfers,\npage 184.", "text_characters": 2260}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "25\n\n\nrecommended to update the line ‘Net internal financing’ from Mt29,232 million in the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ 2015 to the NCG number of Mt29, 241 million.\n\n\n**F. Summary of Suggested Adjustments**\n\n\n36. **Were the suggested adjustments to be made in the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **, the amount of**\n**unallocated expenditure/revenue would move from** _**Other Expenditure**_ **in the amount of**\n**Mt852.4 million to** _**Other Revenue**_ **in the amount of Mt298 million** . A summary of the\nsuggested adjustments is presented in Table 21, with the mission being unable to reconcile\nthe Mt298 million amount further. Section II provides recommendations as how to strengthen\nthe processes for financial reporting, including the _Mapa Fiscal_ for 2016 and future years.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|In millions|Mapa Fiscal
2015|Suggested
Amendment|Adjusted
Amount|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Revenue**
|
|
|
|\n|
Non-rejected VAT refund claims
|
-6 455
|
524
|
-5 931
|\n|
**Expenditure and net lending**
|
|
|
|\n|
Interest on external debt
|
4 025
|
-138
|
3 887
|\n|
Subsidy, prices: fuel subsidy for companies
|
866
|
3 800
|
4 666
|\n|
Investments, internal financing: leasing for public
buildings
|
42 562
|
4 128
|
46 690
|\n|
Net lending, loans to enterprises: guarantee
payment for EMATUM debt
|2 507
|1 805
|4 312
|\n|
Capital transfers: financial restructuring and
participation
|817
|27
|843
|\n|
**Other expenditure (+) / revenue (-)**
|**852**
|
|**-298**
|\n|
Amortization
|
-6 087
|
394
|
-5 693
|\n|
**Other operations (adjustments)**
|
**14 384**
|
**-14 384**
|
**0 **
|\n|
VAT securitization
|
5 949
|
-5 949
|
0
|\n|
Fuel subsidy payment to companies financed by
loan
|
3 800
|
-3 800
|
0
|\n|
Leasing for public buildings
|4 127
|-4 127
|0
|\n|
VAT refund payments postponed to 2016
|
-765
|
765
|
0
|\n|
Payment of commercial debt of EMATUM
|
1 272
|
-1 272
|
0
|\n|
**Net internal financing**
|
**29 232**
|
**-6 831**
|
**22 401**
|\n|
**Adjustments to the NCG/Net internal financing**
|
**6 831**
|
|
|\n|
Adjustment for VAT securitization bonds owned
by domestic banks
|
5 949
|
5 949
|
5 949
|\n|
Adjustment for VAT refund cash payments
|-134
|-134
|-134
|\n|
Difference between Net internal financing as per
the_Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG figure provided by
the BM
|
-9
|
-9
|
-9
|\n|
Adjustment for secondary market transactions in
T-bonds between commercial banks and other
investors
|1 025|1 025|1 025|\n\n\n\n\n- _Consider amending the Mapa Fiscal 2015 based on the suggested amendments._", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2300033569336, 252.67141723632812, 539.7726440429688, 643.8800048828125], "columns": 4, "rows": 23}], "text": "25\n\nrecommended to update the line ‘Net internal financing’ from Mt29,232 million in the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ 2015 to the NCG number of Mt29, 241 million.\n\nF. Summary of Suggested Adjustments\n\n36. Were the suggested adjustments to be made in the _Mapa Fiscal_ , the amount of\nunallocated expenditure/revenue would move from _Other Expenditure_ in the amount of\nMt852.4 million to _Other Revenue_ in the amount of Mt298 million . A summary of the\nsuggested adjustments is presented in Table 21, with the mission being unable to reconcile\nthe Mt298 million amount further. Section II provides recommendations as how to strengthen\nthe processes for financial reporting, including the _Mapa Fiscal_ for 2016 and future years.\n\n In millions Mapa Fiscal 2015 Suggested Amendment Adjusted Amount \n\n Revenue \n Non-rejected VAT refund claims -6 455 524 -5 931 \n Expenditure and net lending \n Interest on external debt 4 025 -138 3 887 \n Subsidy, prices: fuel subsidy for companies 866 3 800 4 666 \n Investments, internal financing: leasing for public buildings 42 562 4 128 46 690 \n Net lending, loans to enterprises: guarantee payment for EMATUM debt 2 507 1 805 4 312 \n Capital transfers: financial restructuring and participation 817 27 843 \n Other expenditure (+) / revenue (-) 852 -298 \n Amortization -6 087 394 -5 693 \n Other operations (adjustments) 14 384 -14 384 0 \n VAT securitization 5 949 -5 949 0 \n Fuel subsidy payment to companies financed by loan 3 800 -3 800 0 \n Leasing for public buildings 4 127 -4 127 0 \n VAT refund payments postponed to 2016 -765 765 0 \n Payment of commercial debt of EMATUM 1 272 -1 272 0 \n Net internal financing 29 232 -6 831 22 401 \n Adjustments to the NCG/Net internal financing 6 831 \n Adjustment for VAT securitization bonds owned by domestic banks 5 949 5 949 5 949 \n Adjustment for VAT refund cash payments -134 -134 -134 \n Difference between Net internal financing as per the_Mapa Fiscal_ and the NCG figure provided by the BM -9 -9 -9 \n Adjustment for secondary market transactions in T-bonds between commercial banks and other investors 1 025 1 025 1 025 \n\n- _Consider amending the Mapa Fiscal 2015 based on the suggested amendments._", "text_characters": 1762}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "26\n\n\n- _Start calculating the ‘Net internal financing’ line based on the government’s own_\n_fiscal data and introduce a formal reconciliation between the Mapa Fiscal and the_\n_NCG figure calculated by the BM._\n\n- _Consider recording outstanding VAT refund claims as debt obligations as of end-_\n_2015 based on the three options described above._\n\n\n**III. ISSUES RELATED TO THE PREPARATION OF THE MAPA FISCAL AND THE**\n\n**RECONCILIATION OF FINANCIAL DATA**\n\n\n**A. Procedures**\n\n\n**Findings**\n\n37. **Various entities are involved in the preparation of the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ . The DNCP is\ncurrently accountable for the overall process but needs support from the National Directorate\nof Budget (DNO) and the DNT, as they produce a part of the source data. Thus, an effective\nand common understanding is necessary to ensure relevant data are produced, transmitted in\na timely manner, and correctly used. Discrepancies identified by the mission show that this\n“common understanding” is not fully ensured yet. Various versions of some dataset have\nbeen submitted to the mission. Their sources were not always clearly identified\n(information on financial leasing, for example). Different definitions of some data are used\n(“budget support”, “expenditure payable”).\n\n\n38. **Moreover, significant differences were found between** _**Mapa Fiscal's**_ **data and**\n**the budget execution report (** _**Relatório de Execução,**_ **REO) established as of**\n**December 31, 2015.** Some amendments were made by the National Directorate of Budget\n(DNO) or DNT to the first version of the _Mapa Fiscal_ developed by the DNCP, and\nidentified by the latter during the mission. As shown in Table 22, these adjustments are\nfinancially significant.\n\n\n39. **Likewise, unexplained differences have been identified between the data**\n**provided by the DNT on revenue collections** [22] and those contained in the _Mapa Fiscal_\n(Table 23).\n\n\n40. **Most of the data used to elaborate the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **are produced manually** . This\nissue is directly linked with a greater general weakness, [23] which has been highlighted in\n\n\n22 These data are reconciled on a daily basis with data automatically integrated within e-SISTAFE.\n23 e-SISTAFE does not cover all the financial transaction fields: modules related to revenue management and\nbook value of the state’s shareholdings in public enterprises are not implemented yet. Therefore, fiscal reports\nare established manually by the DNCP, which is heavily burdened by these manual tasks.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "26\n\n- _Start calculating the ‘Net internal financing’ line based on the government’s own_\n_fiscal data and introduce a formal reconciliation between the Mapa Fiscal and the_\n_NCG figure calculated by the BM._\n\n- _Consider recording outstanding VAT refund claims as debt obligations as of end-_\n_2015 based on the three options described above._\n\nIII. ISSUES RELATED TO THE PREPARATION OF THE MAPA FISCAL AND THE\n\nRECONCILIATION OF FINANCIAL DATA\n\nA. Procedures\n\nFindings\n\n37. Various entities are involved in the preparation of the _Mapa Fiscal_ . The DNCP is\ncurrently accountable for the overall process but needs support from the National Directorate\nof Budget (DNO) and the DNT, as they produce a part of the source data. Thus, an effective\nand common understanding is necessary to ensure relevant data are produced, transmitted in\na timely manner, and correctly used. Discrepancies identified by the mission show that this\n“common understanding” is not fully ensured yet. Various versions of some dataset have\nbeen submitted to the mission. Their sources were not always clearly identified\n(information on financial leasing, for example). Different definitions of some data are used\n(“budget support”, “expenditure payable”).\n\n38. Moreover, significant differences were found between _Mapa Fiscal's_ data and\nthe budget execution report ( _Relatório de Execução,_ REO) established as of\nDecember 31, 2015. Some amendments were made by the National Directorate of Budget\n(DNO) or DNT to the first version of the _Mapa Fiscal_ developed by the DNCP, and\nidentified by the latter during the mission. As shown in Table 22, these adjustments are\nfinancially significant.\n\n39. Likewise, unexplained differences have been identified between the data\nprovided by the DNT on revenue collections [22] and those contained in the _Mapa Fiscal_\n(Table 23).\n\n40. Most of the data used to elaborate the _Mapa Fiscal_ are produced manually . This\nissue is directly linked with a greater general weakness, [23] which has been highlighted in\n\n22 These data are reconciled on a daily basis with data automatically integrated within e-SISTAFE.\n23 e-SISTAFE does not cover all the financial transaction fields: modules related to revenue management and\nbook value of the state’s shareholdings in public enterprises are not implemented yet. Therefore, fiscal reports\nare established manually by the DNCP, which is heavily burdened by these manual tasks.", "text_characters": 2049}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "27\n\n\nprevious reports and impairs the availability of complete, reliable, and timely financial\nreporting.\n\n\n41. **Information related to Revenue Collection is not extracted from the e-SISTAFE**\n**(IT Government Financial Administration System)** even though it is integrated\nautomatically on a daily basis and at the most granular level of the economic classification.\nHowever, the DNCP does not use it for its fiscal reporting considering it is not sufficiently\nreliable. Thus, quarterly reports received from the tax administration are manually processed\nin order to produce the REO and the _Mapa Fiscal_ .\n\n\n42. **Information about grants and external financing is not captured in e-SISTAFE** .\nTables are transmitted (“ _tabelas_ ” 8A and 8B) by the DNT to provide relevant information to\nthe DNCP.\n\n\n\n**Table 22. Mozambique: Differences between** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and Quarterly Report**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Data|Mapa Fiscal|Quarterly
Report|Difference|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Goods and services
|26 871
|22 452
|4 419
|\n|Grants
|25 173
|20 172
|5 001
|\n|External Financing|24 227|27 409|- 3182|\n\n\n\n**Table 23. Mozambique: Differences between Data from DNT and** _**Mapa Fiscal**_\n\n**as of December 2015**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|In millions of
Mozambican
meticais)|Data from DNT
(« tabela
Mensualizado »)|Mapa Fiscal|Difference|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Total revenue|144 578|
149 058|
- 4 480|\n|Current revenue|141 845|
145 928|
- 4 083|\n|Fiscal revenue|127 758|
122 816|
4 942|\n|Capital revenue|2 734|
3 131|
- 397|\n\n\n43. **Some expenditures are still processed outside the treasury single account (CUT)** .\nThus, integration of data related to these expenditures within e-SISTAFE must be processed\nmanually by the DNCP. For that purpose, public entities have to transmit information on a\nmonthly basis to the DNCP. Supporting documents (essentially bank statements) are joined in\nconsideration of control. [24] Everything is received in paper format despite the fact that data\nseems to have been prepared in an electronic format. In fact, it appears that a part of it is\ntransmitted late: the percentage of data “to be incorporated” at the end of the year confirms\nthat situation. In that context, the comprehensiveness of fiscal reports cannot be ensured.\n\n\n24 Controls which are necessary to ensure reliability of data incorporated within e-SISTAFE.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [120.45600128173828, 305.3760070800781, 509.6639709472656, 369.744384765625], "columns": 4, "rows": 4}, {"bbox": [147.2286376953125, 428.09332275390625, 482.8908996582031, 544.3885498046875], "columns": 4, "rows": 5}], "text": "27\n\nprevious reports and impairs the availability of complete, reliable, and timely financial\nreporting.\n\n41. Information related to Revenue Collection is not extracted from the e-SISTAFE\n(IT Government Financial Administration System) even though it is integrated\nautomatically on a daily basis and at the most granular level of the economic classification.\nHowever, the DNCP does not use it for its fiscal reporting considering it is not sufficiently\nreliable. Thus, quarterly reports received from the tax administration are manually processed\nin order to produce the REO and the _Mapa Fiscal_ .\n\n42. Information about grants and external financing is not captured in e-SISTAFE .\nTables are transmitted (“ _tabelas_ ” 8A and 8B) by the DNT to provide relevant information to\nthe DNCP.\n\nTable 22. Mozambique: Differences between _Mapa Fiscal_ and Quarterly Report\n\n Data Mapa Fiscal Quarterly Report Difference \n\n Goods and services 26 871 22 452 4 419 \n Grants 25 173 20 172 5 001 \n External Financing 24 227 27 409 - 3182 \n\nTable 23. Mozambique: Differences between Data from DNT and _Mapa Fiscal_\n\nas of December 2015\n\n In millions of Mozambican meticais) Data from DNT (« tabela Mensualizado ») Mapa Fiscal Difference \n\n Total revenue 144 578 149 058 - 4 480 \n Current revenue 141 845 145 928 - 4 083 \n Fiscal revenue 127 758 122 816 4 942 \n Capital revenue 2 734 3 131 - 397 \n\n43. Some expenditures are still processed outside the treasury single account (CUT) .\nThus, integration of data related to these expenditures within e-SISTAFE must be processed\nmanually by the DNCP. For that purpose, public entities have to transmit information on a\nmonthly basis to the DNCP. Supporting documents (essentially bank statements) are joined in\nconsideration of control. [24] Everything is received in paper format despite the fact that data\nseems to have been prepared in an electronic format. In fact, it appears that a part of it is\ntransmitted late: the percentage of data “to be incorporated” at the end of the year confirms\nthat situation. In that context, the comprehensiveness of fiscal reports cannot be ensured.\n\n24 Controls which are necessary to ensure reliability of data incorporated within e-SISTAFE.", "text_characters": 1828}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "28\n\n\nAccording to the “fiscal execution report” for 2015, these expenditures represent a huge part\nof investment expenditures financed by external funds (Table 24).\n\n\n\n**Table 24. Mozambique: Amount of Investment Expenditure Financed by**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|31/12/2015
(103 MT)|Amount|Percentage|\n|---|---|---|\n|
Through the CUT
|9 558 718|60|\n|**Out of CUT - yet**
**incorporated**
|**3 050 472**|**40**
|\n|
**Out of CUT - to be**
**incorporated**
|**3 480 252**
|**3 480 252**
|\n|
Total
|16 089 442
|100
|\n\n\n\n44. **Even though segregation of duties within the** _**Mapa Fiscal’s**_ **preparation process**\n**seems to be well designed, its effectiveness and efficiency could be improved** . Reliability\nof financial information is a key issue. Therefore, its production process must include\ncontrols to ensure quality requirements are fulfilled. Within the DNCP, a team is in charge of\nentering data in the _Mapa Fiscal._ The head of the accounts department supervises their work.\nExchanges are organized between departments involved in the elaboration of the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ to address the identified differences and finalize the document. The mission, however,\nhas noticed a great proliferation of different versions for certain data that could make it\ndifficult to identify the source or date of their production.\n\n\n_**Recommendations:**_\n\n- _Consider the opportunity to directly use revenue collection data from the e-SISTAFE._\n_A quarterly reconciliation between the e-SISTAFE and tax administration data could_\n_be done to ensure reliability._\n\n- _Consider reviewing the internal control system requirements in order to integrate_\n_more units, and especially more little units, within the e-SISTAFE. To this effect, an_\n_official could be allowed to ensure simultaneously several functions. A segregation of_\n_duties would be nevertheless maintained: considering, for example, expenditures_\n_processes, an official could assume accountability and internal control functions to_\n_the exclusion of all others (and vice versa). Thus, a relaxing of internal control_\n_system principles and mechanism should be decided: it implies a modification of the_\n_40_ _[th]_ _article of financial administration manual and an adjustment of management of_\n_user profiles in e-SISTAFE._\n\n- _Incorporate available data on other systems into e-SISTAFE through automated_\n_routines created for this purpose. Much of the information communicated to the_\n_DNCP is composed of Excel files which can be structured in order to allow a sound_\n_and fast integration in the IT system. The availability of such routines will decrease_\n_the administrative work consumed in preparing the data. Data regarding outside_", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [96.20000457763672, 144.9000244140625, 533.6799926757812, 248.70001220703125], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "28\n\nAccording to the “fiscal execution report” for 2015, these expenditures represent a huge part\nof investment expenditures financed by external funds (Table 24).\n\nTable 24. Mozambique: Amount of Investment Expenditure Financed by\n\n 31/12/2015 (103 MT) Amount Percentage \n\n Through the CUT 9 558 718 60 \n Out of CUT - yet incorporated 3 050 472 40 \n Out of CUT - to be incorporated 3 480 252 3 480 252 \n Total 16 089 442 100 \n\n44. Even though segregation of duties within the _Mapa Fiscal’s_ preparation process\nseems to be well designed, its effectiveness and efficiency could be improved . Reliability\nof financial information is a key issue. Therefore, its production process must include\ncontrols to ensure quality requirements are fulfilled. Within the DNCP, a team is in charge of\nentering data in the _Mapa Fiscal._ The head of the accounts department supervises their work.\nExchanges are organized between departments involved in the elaboration of the _Mapa_\n_Fiscal_ to address the identified differences and finalize the document. The mission, however,\nhas noticed a great proliferation of different versions for certain data that could make it\ndifficult to identify the source or date of their production.\n\n_Recommendations:_\n\n- _Consider the opportunity to directly use revenue collection data from the e-SISTAFE._\n_A quarterly reconciliation between the e-SISTAFE and tax administration data could_\n_be done to ensure reliability._\n\n- _Consider reviewing the internal control system requirements in order to integrate_\n_more units, and especially more little units, within the e-SISTAFE. To this effect, an_\n_official could be allowed to ensure simultaneously several functions. A segregation of_\n_duties would be nevertheless maintained: considering, for example, expenditures_\n_processes, an official could assume accountability and internal control functions to_\n_the exclusion of all others (and vice versa). Thus, a relaxing of internal control_\n_system principles and mechanism should be decided: it implies a modification of the_\n_40_ _[th]_ _article of financial administration manual and an adjustment of management of_\n_user profiles in e-SISTAFE._\n\n- _Incorporate available data on other systems into e-SISTAFE through automated_\n_routines created for this purpose. Much of the information communicated to the_\n_DNCP is composed of Excel files which can be structured in order to allow a sound_\n_and fast integration in the IT system. The availability of such routines will decrease_\n_the administrative work consumed in preparing the data. Data regarding outside_", "text_characters": 2183}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "29\n\n\n_CUT expenditures, the public debt provided by DNT and, if any other possibility, the_\n_revenue collection are some examples of information that may be incorporated into_\n_e-SISTAFE through this process until the new modules are developed._\n\n- _Develop a guidance document (or reference paper) which presents, in a concrete_\n_way, the main features of the Mapa Fiscal's production process: tasks to be done,_\n_data to be used (nature, source), controls to be performed, and calendar of the_\n_overall operations to be completed. The mission suggests a general pattern_\n_(Appendix II)._\n\n- _Implement a system of supervision (quality assurance) to ensure reliability of the_\n_Mapa Fiscal data. For this purpose, all the data and supporting documents should be_\n_gathered in a “revision file” in electronic format, if possible. In addition, a_\n_segregation of duty could be organized within the DNCP: some staff responsible but_\n_not involved directly in the “business process” may verify the comprehensiveness of_\n_the file and the consistency of the overall information._\n\n- _Finally, a technical committee involving the DNCP, DNT, DNO, could be created to_\n_discuss problems faced during the ongoing process and address discrepancies that_\n_could not have been otherwise solved._\n\n\n**B. Debt Management**\n\n\n**Findings**\n\n45. **Borrowing and on-lending transactions are recorded on a stand-alone IT**\n**system: The Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System**\n( **CS-DRMS)** . The CS-DRMS is deployed for recording both debt management transactions\nin different currencies and on-lending transactions. Leases and on-lending contracts were\nrecorded in CS-DRMS in 2015. According to the DNT, currently about 90 percent of\non-lending contracts are recorded in CS-DRMS. Previously, leases and on-lending contracts\nwere recorded in Excel worksheets.\n\n\n46. **The CS-DRMS system is not currently linked to either e-SITAFE or the BM** . The\nauthorities are considering creating an interface between the debt management system,\ne-SISTAFE and the BM in order to facilitate automated bank reconciliations. In addition, the\nlaunch of a payment alert function has been considered in order to give automated notices of\npayments two to four days before the due date. Currently, the authorities carry out daily\nmanual controls of debt payments falling due, using the report of daily payments for the next\nmonth provided by the CS-DRMS.\n\n\n47. **There are formal debt reconciliation processes in place for external borrowings**\n**with multilateral and bilateral creditors** . Annual reconciliation letters are sent in\nNovember and December to counterparties to verify the balances of external debt. Some\ncreditors carry out their reconciliations quarterly and semi-annually. Also, certain creditors", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "29\n\n_CUT expenditures, the public debt provided by DNT and, if any other possibility, the_\n_revenue collection are some examples of information that may be incorporated into_\n_e-SISTAFE through this process until the new modules are developed._\n\n- _Develop a guidance document (or reference paper) which presents, in a concrete_\n_way, the main features of the Mapa Fiscal's production process: tasks to be done,_\n_data to be used (nature, source), controls to be performed, and calendar of the_\n_overall operations to be completed. The mission suggests a general pattern_\n_(Appendix II)._\n\n- _Implement a system of supervision (quality assurance) to ensure reliability of the_\n_Mapa Fiscal data. For this purpose, all the data and supporting documents should be_\n_gathered in a “revision file” in electronic format, if possible. In addition, a_\n_segregation of duty could be organized within the DNCP: some staff responsible but_\n_not involved directly in the “business process” may verify the comprehensiveness of_\n_the file and the consistency of the overall information._\n\n- _Finally, a technical committee involving the DNCP, DNT, DNO, could be created to_\n_discuss problems faced during the ongoing process and address discrepancies that_\n_could not have been otherwise solved._\n\nB. Debt Management\n\nFindings\n\n45. Borrowing and on-lending transactions are recorded on a stand-alone IT\nsystem: The Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System\n( CS-DRMS) . The CS-DRMS is deployed for recording both debt management transactions\nin different currencies and on-lending transactions. Leases and on-lending contracts were\nrecorded in CS-DRMS in 2015. According to the DNT, currently about 90 percent of\non-lending contracts are recorded in CS-DRMS. Previously, leases and on-lending contracts\nwere recorded in Excel worksheets.\n\n46. The CS-DRMS system is not currently linked to either e-SITAFE or the BM . The\nauthorities are considering creating an interface between the debt management system,\ne-SISTAFE and the BM in order to facilitate automated bank reconciliations. In addition, the\nlaunch of a payment alert function has been considered in order to give automated notices of\npayments two to four days before the due date. Currently, the authorities carry out daily\nmanual controls of debt payments falling due, using the report of daily payments for the next\nmonth provided by the CS-DRMS.\n\n47. There are formal debt reconciliation processes in place for external borrowings\nwith multilateral and bilateral creditors . Annual reconciliation letters are sent in\nNovember and December to counterparties to verify the balances of external debt. Some\ncreditors carry out their reconciliations quarterly and semi-annually. Also, certain creditors", "text_characters": 2343}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "30\n\n\nsend their payment advice before the debt interest and repayment of principal to confirm the\npayment details. The authorities reconcile the information received with their records in the\nCS-DRMS. External loans from multilaterals mainly have fixed interest rates, while loans\nfrom bilateral creditors mainly have variable interest rates. The authorities reconcile fixings\nof variable rates with the creditors.\n\n\n48. **Debt service payments for external debt are made through dedicated bank**\n**accounts at the BM.** External debt service payments are registered in the CS-DRMS when a\nSWIFT message of the payment is received from the BM. Creditors anyway often confirm\nthe receipt of the payment in writing. Internal debt service payments are made through\ne-SISTAFE.\n\n\n49. **On an annual basis, the authorities reconcile internal debt obligations with**\n**domestic counterparties, but not with the NCG figure from BM.** The reconciliation of\nT-bonds is done with the stock exchange where the T-bonds are listed. The BM also issues\nT-bills on behalf of the government and the reconciliation for T-bills is carried out with the\nBM. Other loans and leases are annually reconciled with domestic banks. However, the\nauthorities do not reconcile the stock of the government’s internal debt with the NCG figure\nprovided by the BM (as discussed in previous section on _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015). It is\nrecommended, to carry out the reconciliation of internal debt stock to the NCG at least\nannually.\n\n\n50. **There is no formal reconciliation of on-lending contracts.** The reconciliation of\non-lending contracts is only carried out with larger SOEs as part of the SOEs’ annual\nexternal audits. The authorities do not reconcile the outstanding balances of on-lending\ncontracts with smaller borrowers. There are currently around 130 on-lending contracts.\n\n\n_**Recommendation:**_\n\n- _Consider introducing a formal reconciliation of on-lending contracts with all_\n_counterparties_ .\n\n\n**C. Cash Management**\n\n\n**Findings**\n\n51. **Most of the business operations are executed through the CUT** . Nevertheless,\naccording to the Center for Development of Financial Information Systems (CEDSIF), about\n30 percent are still executed outside the CUT. These are executed through accounts open at\nthe BM or through commercial bank accounts.\n\n\n52. **Regular bank reconciliation is crucial to ensuring accurate and comprehensive**\n**fiscal reporting** . A daily reconciliation of transactions occurred through the CUT is made", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "30\n\nsend their payment advice before the debt interest and repayment of principal to confirm the\npayment details. The authorities reconcile the information received with their records in the\nCS-DRMS. External loans from multilaterals mainly have fixed interest rates, while loans\nfrom bilateral creditors mainly have variable interest rates. The authorities reconcile fixings\nof variable rates with the creditors.\n\n48. Debt service payments for external debt are made through dedicated bank\naccounts at the BM. External debt service payments are registered in the CS-DRMS when a\nSWIFT message of the payment is received from the BM. Creditors anyway often confirm\nthe receipt of the payment in writing. Internal debt service payments are made through\ne-SISTAFE.\n\n49. On an annual basis, the authorities reconcile internal debt obligations with\ndomestic counterparties, but not with the NCG figure from BM. The reconciliation of\nT-bonds is done with the stock exchange where the T-bonds are listed. The BM also issues\nT-bills on behalf of the government and the reconciliation for T-bills is carried out with the\nBM. Other loans and leases are annually reconciled with domestic banks. However, the\nauthorities do not reconcile the stock of the government’s internal debt with the NCG figure\nprovided by the BM (as discussed in previous section on _Mapa Fiscal_ 2015). It is\nrecommended, to carry out the reconciliation of internal debt stock to the NCG at least\nannually.\n\n50. There is no formal reconciliation of on-lending contracts. The reconciliation of\non-lending contracts is only carried out with larger SOEs as part of the SOEs’ annual\nexternal audits. The authorities do not reconcile the outstanding balances of on-lending\ncontracts with smaller borrowers. There are currently around 130 on-lending contracts.\n\n_Recommendation:_\n\n- _Consider introducing a formal reconciliation of on-lending contracts with all_\n_counterparties_ .\n\nC. Cash Management\n\nFindings\n\n51. Most of the business operations are executed through the CUT . Nevertheless,\naccording to the Center for Development of Financial Information Systems (CEDSIF), about\n30 percent are still executed outside the CUT. These are executed through accounts open at\nthe BM or through commercial bank accounts.\n\n52. Regular bank reconciliation is crucial to ensuring accurate and comprehensive\nfiscal reporting . A daily reconciliation of transactions occurred through the CUT is made", "text_characters": 2069}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-047-fig-p0032-001"], "markdown": "31\n\n\nbetween the CEDSIF and the BM. This operation is carried out automatically as described in\nFigure 1.\n\n\n53. **Even though this approximation of the daily flow is useful, it cannot serve as a**\n**substitute of comprehensive reconciliation at end of the year, which is not performed at**\n**this time** . Moreover, it is also important to make sure reconciliation is done between tax unit\nbank accounts and their books. The DNT and the DNCP consider this issue as being the\nresponsibility of the tax administration and, thus, cannot be assured that everything is done to\nregularize outstanding transactions.\n\n\n_**Recommendations:**_\n\n- _The DNT should request supporting documents to ensure that all bank account_\n_reconciliations are made by tax units. An explanation of any discrepancies should be_\n_provided at the same time._\n\n- _An effective reconciliation of the overall position of the CUT between the DNT and_\n_the BM should be established (Box 1)._\n\n\n**Figure 1. Mozambique: Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.3099, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(68.24999237060547, 378.0820007324219, 536.2499389648438, 699.0819702148438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 1077, "number": 10, "size": 444051, "transform": [467.99993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 320.9999694824219, 68.24999237060547, 378.0820007324219], "width": 1571, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "31\n\nbetween the CEDSIF and the BM. This operation is carried out automatically as described in\nFigure 1.\n\n53. Even though this approximation of the daily flow is useful, it cannot serve as a\nsubstitute of comprehensive reconciliation at end of the year, which is not performed at\nthis time . Moreover, it is also important to make sure reconciliation is done between tax unit\nbank accounts and their books. The DNT and the DNCP consider this issue as being the\nresponsibility of the tax administration and, thus, cannot be assured that everything is done to\nregularize outstanding transactions.\n\n_Recommendations:_\n\n- _The DNT should request supporting documents to ensure that all bank account_\n_reconciliations are made by tax units. An explanation of any discrepancies should be_\n_provided at the same time._\n\n- _An effective reconciliation of the overall position of the CUT between the DNT and_\n_the BM should be established (Box 1)._\n\nFigure 1. Mozambique: Treasury Single Account Reconciliation Process", "text_characters": 843}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "32\n\n\n**Box 1. French Experience on TSA Reconciliation**\n\nIn France, all transactions are executed, whatever their nature (expenditures or revenues),\ndirectly through the TSA.\nFor this purpose, a subaccount is created within the TSA for each public accountant. Public\naccountants are the only officials authorized to make payments or collect revenue.\nAt the end of the fiscal year, in order to consolidate the TSA, public accountants have to\nreconcile their “subaccount” with their general ledger. They have also to send a supporting\ndocument of this reconciliation to the General Directorate of Public Finances.\nThe General Directorate of Public Finances could then perform reconciliation with the Bank\nof France to justify the position of the TSA.\nThis reconciliation is formalized in a co-signed document from the central bank and the\nGeneral Directorate of Public Finance authorities, confirming the balance of the TSA in the\ngeneral ledger and in the central bank books on December 31.\nThis document and supporting work papers are available for control by the court of accounts.\n\n**IV. GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS DEVELOPED INTO THE** _**GFSM**_ **2014**\n\n\n**A. Findings**\n\n\n54. **The compilation of fiscal statistics in accordance with the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **was**\n**initiated in 2011** . Nevertheless, frequent changes in the team in charge of this project,\nespecially during the past year, [25] have affected the team’s skills development and limited the\nprogress.\n\n\n55. **It is** **necessary that the team responsible for the compilation of fiscal data is**\n**trained in the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **, but it is also recommended that it has basic accounting**\n**knowledge and advanced handling of Excel** . During the mission, officials were trained\nwith basic knowledge about the framework of the _GFSM 2014_ and the manual’s most\nimportant concepts.\n\n\n56. **The mission focused on improving the format of the current database** with a view\nto making it easier to manage, update, and reconcile with the calculated data for the program\ncontrol ( _Mapa Fiscal_ ). The work should be continued if it is to be fruitful.\n\n\n57. **The** _**GFSM 2014**_ **provides the opportunity to have the information about stocks**\n**and flows, balances between expenditure and revenue, as well as the financing for one**\n**period all in one chart** . Furthermore, thanks to this format, it is also possible to obtain the\ninformation with a historical series format of revenue as well as expenditure and, at the same\ntime, the transactions in assets and liabilities and their corresponding stocks.\n\n\n58. **Today the information is contained in quarterly REOs** with a publication delay of\n45 days after the ending of the quarter, where only the flow data accumulated up to the end\n\n\n25 The new Department of Studies and Planning depending on the Direction of Studies and Economic Analysis\nwas created in June 2015 with the restructuring of the Finance Ministry.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "32\n\nBox 1. French Experience on TSA Reconciliation\n\nIn France, all transactions are executed, whatever their nature (expenditures or revenues),\ndirectly through the TSA.\nFor this purpose, a subaccount is created within the TSA for each public accountant. Public\naccountants are the only officials authorized to make payments or collect revenue.\nAt the end of the fiscal year, in order to consolidate the TSA, public accountants have to\nreconcile their “subaccount” with their general ledger. They have also to send a supporting\ndocument of this reconciliation to the General Directorate of Public Finances.\nThe General Directorate of Public Finances could then perform reconciliation with the Bank\nof France to justify the position of the TSA.\nThis reconciliation is formalized in a co-signed document from the central bank and the\nGeneral Directorate of Public Finance authorities, confirming the balance of the TSA in the\ngeneral ledger and in the central bank books on December 31.\nThis document and supporting work papers are available for control by the court of accounts.\n\nIV. GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS DEVELOPED INTO THE _GFSM_ 2014\n\nA. Findings\n\n54. The compilation of fiscal statistics in accordance with the _GFSM 2014_ was\ninitiated in 2011 . Nevertheless, frequent changes in the team in charge of this project,\nespecially during the past year, [25] have affected the team’s skills development and limited the\nprogress.\n\n55. It is necessary that the team responsible for the compilation of fiscal data is\ntrained in the _GFSM 2014_ , but it is also recommended that it has basic accounting\nknowledge and advanced handling of Excel . During the mission, officials were trained\nwith basic knowledge about the framework of the _GFSM 2014_ and the manual’s most\nimportant concepts.\n\n56. The mission focused on improving the format of the current database with a view\nto making it easier to manage, update, and reconcile with the calculated data for the program\ncontrol ( _Mapa Fiscal_ ). The work should be continued if it is to be fruitful.\n\n57. The _GFSM 2014_ provides the opportunity to have the information about stocks\nand flows, balances between expenditure and revenue, as well as the financing for one\nperiod all in one chart . Furthermore, thanks to this format, it is also possible to obtain the\ninformation with a historical series format of revenue as well as expenditure and, at the same\ntime, the transactions in assets and liabilities and their corresponding stocks.\n\n58. Today the information is contained in quarterly REOs with a publication delay of\n45 days after the ending of the quarter, where only the flow data accumulated up to the end\n\n25 The new Department of Studies and Planning depending on the Direction of Studies and Economic Analysis\nwas created in June 2015 with the restructuring of the Finance Ministry.", "text_characters": 2379}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "33\n\n\nof each corresponding quarter is published, not including stock data. This publication is done\nin paper and in a pdf file.\n\n\n59. **The stocks and flows cumulative data are published annually in the**\n**government’s annual report (** _**Conta Geral do Estado,**_ _**CGE**_ **)**, a publication that is done in\npaper and pdf within five months after the end of the fiscal year. It includes information on\nthe budgetary central government’s cash position debt and financial assets. There are\ncurrently no publications with series of data available. The exception was a report published\nonce in the year 2013, with annual data regarding budgetary execution since 1999.\n\n\n60. **The necessary data for the fiscal statistics compilation are supplied by different**\n**organizational units** within the government, but until now, there is no a formal agreement of\ninformation delivery. Therefore, the gathering of information depends most of the time on\nthe goodwill of the different parties involved. A chart with each kind of information is\nrequired with the delays and regularity (Appendix III).\n\n\n61. **It is important and necessary to devise a protocol of information delivery** where\nthe periodicity and timeliness of the information is specified, as well as the support of that\ninformation, and the maximum deadline to receive it.\n\n\n62. While this protocol is not designed nor institutionalized, it is advisable to **designate**\n**the DNCP as the central supplier of the quarterly information contained in the REO**\n**and the annual information contained in the** _**CGE**_ . This will allow for information on\nflows to be obtained on a quarterly basis, and for information on stocks to be obtained on an\nannual basis, with a delay of at least five months. But this assures the consistency of data.\nThe support in which the information can be received could be in Excel files, which is what\nis being used to compile statistics data. This would considerably lessen the mistakes that are\nmade in the transfer of information from pdf or paper to Excel files.\n\n\n63. To ensure the efficiency of the requirement of information, it is necessary to **carry**\n**out a selection of charts that are needed for compilation and then submit a request to**\n**the DNCP** . This was discussed during the mission with those responsible for this information\nand they agreed to coordinate the necessary work.\n\n\n64. It is necessary to achieve **improvement in the quality and consistency of the fiscal**\n**figures** to make a closing of the compiled information contained in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and/or\nwith the summarized information in Chart 2 “Budgetary Balance of REO for the Quarterly\nData” and Chart 7 “Budgetary Balance for the _CGE_ for the Annual Data”.\n\n\n65. The mission worked with the data accumulated during 2015, which are presented in\nthe _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **and displayed this data in the format of the** _**GFSM 2014**_ (Appendix IV).\n\n\n66. **It would be desirable that the template used to control the program with the**\n**IMF and the** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **be derived from the statistics tables of fiscal data**, after making\nthe necessary adjustments to these charts and taking into account the commitments and\nagreements outlined in the TMU.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "33\n\nof each corresponding quarter is published, not including stock data. This publication is done\nin paper and in a pdf file.\n\n59. The stocks and flows cumulative data are published annually in the\ngovernment’s annual report ( _Conta Geral do Estado,_ _CGE_ ), a publication that is done in\npaper and pdf within five months after the end of the fiscal year. It includes information on\nthe budgetary central government’s cash position debt and financial assets. There are\ncurrently no publications with series of data available. The exception was a report published\nonce in the year 2013, with annual data regarding budgetary execution since 1999.\n\n60. The necessary data for the fiscal statistics compilation are supplied by different\norganizational units within the government, but until now, there is no a formal agreement of\ninformation delivery. Therefore, the gathering of information depends most of the time on\nthe goodwill of the different parties involved. A chart with each kind of information is\nrequired with the delays and regularity (Appendix III).\n\n61. It is important and necessary to devise a protocol of information delivery where\nthe periodicity and timeliness of the information is specified, as well as the support of that\ninformation, and the maximum deadline to receive it.\n\n62. While this protocol is not designed nor institutionalized, it is advisable to designate\nthe DNCP as the central supplier of the quarterly information contained in the REO\nand the annual information contained in the _CGE_ . This will allow for information on\nflows to be obtained on a quarterly basis, and for information on stocks to be obtained on an\nannual basis, with a delay of at least five months. But this assures the consistency of data.\nThe support in which the information can be received could be in Excel files, which is what\nis being used to compile statistics data. This would considerably lessen the mistakes that are\nmade in the transfer of information from pdf or paper to Excel files.\n\n63. To ensure the efficiency of the requirement of information, it is necessary to carry\nout a selection of charts that are needed for compilation and then submit a request to\nthe DNCP . This was discussed during the mission with those responsible for this information\nand they agreed to coordinate the necessary work.\n\n64. It is necessary to achieve improvement in the quality and consistency of the fiscal\nfigures to make a closing of the compiled information contained in the _Mapa Fiscal_ and/or\nwith the summarized information in Chart 2 “Budgetary Balance of REO for the Quarterly\nData” and Chart 7 “Budgetary Balance for the _CGE_ for the Annual Data”.\n\n65. The mission worked with the data accumulated during 2015, which are presented in\nthe _Mapa Fiscal_ and displayed this data in the format of the _GFSM 2014_ (Appendix IV).\n\n66. It would be desirable that the template used to control the program with the\nIMF and the _Mapa Fiscal_ be derived from the statistics tables of fiscal data, after making\nthe necessary adjustments to these charts and taking into account the commitments and\nagreements outlined in the TMU.", "text_characters": 2606}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "34\n\n\n_**Recommendations:**_\n\n- _Design a formal agreement between the people in charge of the compilation and the_\n_data providers that establishes the form, frequency, and delay of the fiscal_\n_information that should be sent. It is necessary that this agreement be validated by_\n_the corresponding authorities to ensure its implementation._\n\n- _Centralize the request for information mainly with the DNCP, in order to achieve_\n_internal consistency in the data until the formal agreement recommended in the_\n_previous paragraph has been established._\n\n- _Reconcile data compiled with information of flows included in the Mapa Fiscal, and_\n_also with the Chart 2 of the REO and Chart 7 of the CGE._", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "34\n\n_Recommendations:_\n\n- _Design a formal agreement between the people in charge of the compilation and the_\n_data providers that establishes the form, frequency, and delay of the fiscal_\n_information that should be sent. It is necessary that this agreement be validated by_\n_the corresponding authorities to ensure its implementation._\n\n- _Centralize the request for information mainly with the DNCP, in order to achieve_\n_internal consistency in the data until the formal agreement recommended in the_\n_previous paragraph has been established._\n\n- _Reconcile data compiled with information of flows included in the Mapa Fiscal, and_\n_also with the Chart 2 of the REO and Chart 7 of the CGE._", "text_characters": 582}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "35\n\n\n**Appendix I. Mozambique: List of Officials Interviewed**\n\n**Center for Development of Financial Information Systems**\nKetm Mahanague Matavele, Director of Organization and Modernization Services\n\n**Bank of Mozambique**\nDomingo Fumo, Economist Assistant Manager of Research and Statistics Department.\nPedro José Nhampule, Head of Service of Maputo Branch\n\n**Directorate of Economic and Finances Studies**\nVasco Correia Nhabinde, National Director\n\n**National Directorate of Treasury**\nAdriano Ubisse, National Director of Treasury\nMastalino Mastala, Deputy National Director of Treasury for Economic Area\n\n**National Directorate of Public Accounting**\nTomas Dimande, National Director", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "35\n\nAppendix I. Mozambique: List of Officials Interviewed\n\nCenter for Development of Financial Information Systems\nKetm Mahanague Matavele, Director of Organization and Modernization Services\n\nBank of Mozambique\nDomingo Fumo, Economist Assistant Manager of Research and Statistics Department.\nPedro José Nhampule, Head of Service of Maputo Branch\n\nDirectorate of Economic and Finances Studies\nVasco Correia Nhabinde, National Director\n\nNational Directorate of Treasury\nAdriano Ubisse, National Director of Treasury\nMastalino Mastala, Deputy National Director of Treasury for Economic Area\n\nNational Directorate of Public Accounting\nTomas Dimande, National Director", "text_characters": 573}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "36\n\n\n**Appendix II. Mozambique: Methodological Guide for the Development of the**\n\n_**Mapa Fiscal**_\n\n\n# METHODOLOGICAL GUIDE\n\n\n### FOR\n\n\n### THE DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n# OF THE MAPA FISCAL PRELIMINARY DRAFT\n\n\n\n**TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n\nI- Purpose of the document\n\n\nII- What _Mapa Fiscal_ is\n\n\nIII- The stake holders\n\n\nIV- Figure of the overall process\n\n\nV- Activities to be perform at the different steps\n\n\nVI- Appendix\n\n\nDocument template\n\nList of acronyms\n\nLexicon", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "36\n\nAppendix II. Mozambique: Methodological Guide for the Development of the\n\n_Mapa Fiscal_\nMETHODOLOGICAL GUIDE\nFOR\nTHE DEVELOPMENT\nOF THE MAPA FISCAL PRELIMINARY DRAFT\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nI- Purpose of the document\n\nII- What _Mapa Fiscal_ is\n\nIII- The stake holders\n\nIV- Figure of the overall process\n\nV- Activities to be perform at the different steps\n\nVI- Appendix\n\nDocument template\n\nList of acronyms\n\nLexicon", "text_characters": 339}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "37\n\n\n**I-** **PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT**\n\nThis guide is intended for all stakeholders involved in the development or use of the \"Mapa\nFiscal\".\n\nIt describes operationally tasks that have to be performed at different stages of the procedure,\nfrom data collection to dissemination of the \" _Mapa Fiscal_ \".\n\n**II- What** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **is**\n\nThe _Mapa Fiscal_ is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the IMF\naccording to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).\n\nMore generally, the _Mapa Fiscal_ is a statistical document that describes the main changes in\nthe central government's assets and liabilities during a given period. These changes are\npresented following an economic classification that respects requirements of the _Government_\n_Finance Statistics Manual_ from the IMF.\n\nThus, it provides a comprehensive framework suitable for analyzing and evaluating fiscal\npolicy.\n\n_**[Key concepts or components (expenditures, revenues, net lending...) could be also defined**_\n_**here]**_\n\n**III-** **THE STAKEHOLDERS**\n\nThree stakeholders are involved in the process:\n\n - The one who is accountable of the overall process. This responsibility covers\nvalidation and dissemination of the _Mapa Fiscal_ but also of its monitoring system\n(calendar, data production requirements...).\n\nGiven the current organization of the process, the DNT could assume this responsibility.\n\nThis choice does not imply that the DNT must be in charge of the document preparation\ntasks. This function (“integrator”) could be carried out, as is currently, by the DNCP who\nholds an important part of the information. Its role must also be to ensure the reliability of the\ndata.\n\n - The one who provides the data: several directions or departments are involved in the\nproduction of data needed to prepare the _Mapa Fiscal_ (the DNT, the DNO, the\nDNCP, tax administration, the CEDSIF...).\n\nThey have to provide timely data in the expected format but also justify the checks\n(reconciliation...) carried out to ensure reliability.\n\n\n - The recipient(s) of the _Mapa Fiscal._", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "37\n\nI- PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT\n\nThis guide is intended for all stakeholders involved in the development or use of the \"Mapa\nFiscal\".\n\nIt describes operationally tasks that have to be performed at different stages of the procedure,\nfrom data collection to dissemination of the \" _Mapa Fiscal_ \".\n\nII- What _Mapa Fiscal_ is\n\nThe _Mapa Fiscal_ is one of the main fiscal reports that the authorities provide to the IMF\naccording to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).\n\nMore generally, the _Mapa Fiscal_ is a statistical document that describes the main changes in\nthe central government's assets and liabilities during a given period. These changes are\npresented following an economic classification that respects requirements of the _Government_\n_Finance Statistics Manual_ from the IMF.\n\nThus, it provides a comprehensive framework suitable for analyzing and evaluating fiscal\npolicy.\n\n_[Key concepts or components (expenditures, revenues, net lending...) could be also defined_\n_here]_\n\nIII- THE STAKEHOLDERS\n\nThree stakeholders are involved in the process:\n\n - The one who is accountable of the overall process. This responsibility covers\nvalidation and dissemination of the _Mapa Fiscal_ but also of its monitoring system\n(calendar, data production requirements...).\n\nGiven the current organization of the process, the DNT could assume this responsibility.\n\nThis choice does not imply that the DNT must be in charge of the document preparation\ntasks. This function (“integrator”) could be carried out, as is currently, by the DNCP who\nholds an important part of the information. Its role must also be to ensure the reliability of the\ndata.\n\n - The one who provides the data: several directions or departments are involved in the\nproduction of data needed to prepare the _Mapa Fiscal_ (the DNT, the DNO, the\nDNCP, tax administration, the CEDSIF...).\n\nThey have to provide timely data in the expected format but also justify the checks\n(reconciliation...) carried out to ensure reliability.\n\n - The recipient(s) of the _Mapa Fiscal._", "text_characters": 1713}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-047-fig-p0039-001"], "markdown": "38\n\n\n**IV-** **MOZAMBIQUE:** **FIGURE OF THE OVERALL PROCESS**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.5547, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.00000762939453, 99.84765625, 557.9925537109375, 674.3975830078125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 1155, "number": 4, "size": 197646, "transform": [467.9925537109375, 0.0, -0.0, 574.5499267578125, 90.00000762939453, 99.84765625], "width": 770, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "38\n\nIV- MOZAMBIQUE: FIGURE OF THE OVERALL PROCESS", "text_characters": 41}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "39\n\n\n**V-** **ACTIVITIES TO BE PERFORMED AT THE DIFFERENT STEPS**\n\nThis part is dedicated to the description of tasks that have to be performed at each step of the\nprocess.\n\n##### **STEP 1: DATA COLLECTION**\n\nAll the relevant data must be precisely identified and defined. At the same time, all the controls\nneeded to ensure reliability of these data have to be described.\n\nThese requirements should be regularly reminded to the data providers. For this purpose, the\ndepartment responsible of the overall process should focus on these issues, each time the\nprocess is launched.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Issuer|Data|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
**Data features**
|**Source**
|
**Format**
|**Frequency**
|\n|
**Data features**
|
|
|
|\n|
**Data features**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|\n|
**Data features**
|
|
|
|\n|**Control activities**
|
|
|
|\n|
**Supporting**
**documents**
|
|
|
|\n\n\n\n**For example:**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|DNCP|Revenue collection|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
**Data features**
|**Source**
|
**Format**
|**Frequency**
|\n|
**Data features**
|
e-SISTAFE|
Spread sheet
|
Quarterly|\n|
**Data features**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|
**Additional comments**
|\n|
**Data features**
|
Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account.
Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically
identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues.
|
Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account.
Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically
identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues.
|
Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account.
Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically
identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues.
|\n|**Control activities**
|
These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax
authority.
It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts
reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out.
|
These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax
authority.
It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts
reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out.
|
These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax
authority.
It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts
reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out.
|\n|**Supporting**
**documents**
|
Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking
reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.|
Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking
reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.|
Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking
reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 267.8800354003906, 539.7900390625, 363.55999755859375], "columns": 4, "rows": 7}, {"bbox": [90.20999908447266, 432.8800048828125, 539.7900390625, 590.8396606445312], "columns": 4, "rows": 7}], "text": "39\n\nV- ACTIVITIES TO BE PERFORMED AT THE DIFFERENT STEPS\n\nThis part is dedicated to the description of tasks that have to be performed at each step of the\nprocess.\nSTEP 1: DATA COLLECTION\n\nAll the relevant data must be precisely identified and defined. At the same time, all the controls\nneeded to ensure reliability of these data have to be described.\n\nThese requirements should be regularly reminded to the data providers. For this purpose, the\ndepartment responsible of the overall process should focus on these issues, each time the\nprocess is launched.\n\n Issuer Data Col3 Col4 \n\n Data features Source Format Frequency \n Data features \n Data features Additional comments Additional comments Additional comments \n Data features \n Control activities \n Supporting documents \n\nFor example:\n\n DNCP Revenue collection Col3 Col4 \n\n Data features Source Format Frequency \n Data features e-SISTAFE Spread sheet Quarterly \n Data features Additional comments Additional comments Additional comments \n Data features Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account. Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues. Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account. Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues. Only the revenues received during the period are taken into account. Refunding’s of VAT carried out during this same period are specifically identified and presented as a deduction of these revenues. \n Control activities These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax authority. It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out. These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax authority. It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out. These data must be reconciled with the information provided by the tax authority. It is also advisable to make sure that the expected bank accounts reconciliations expected from tax units were carried out. \n Supporting documents Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”. Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”. Documents justifying reconciliation of the data as well as banking reconciliations must be joined to the “supporting file”.", "text_characters": 2210}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "40\n\n##### **Step 2: Integration of the Data**\n\n\nIn accordance with the requirements reminded in the message from the authority accountable\nof the overall process, the department in charge of integration of data into the _mapa fiscal_\nspreadsheet:\n\nchecks that all the data were delivered in accordance with the definite calendar;\nif not, a recall is sent to the issuer (cc to the authority accountable of the process);\nchecks coherence between the transmitted data and the supporting documents;\nif discrepancies are identified, asks for explanation and, if necessary, corrections;\nintegrates data into the _mapa fiscal_ spreadsheet;\nproduce the _mapa fiscal_ and send it to the authority accountable of the process. If\n\nnecessary, a note setting difficulties encountered is joined;\nstores the supporting documents into a supporting file.\n\n##### **Step 3: Analysis of the Mapa Fiscal Draft**\n\nThe authority in charge of the overall process received the _mapa fiscal_ draft from the\ndepartment in charge of integration of data.\n\n\nThe authority analyses the draft in order to:\n\nverify the comprehensiveness of the document;\naddress issues reported by the department in charge of integration of data;\nmake sure that there are no discrepancies;\n\notherwise, decide whether it’s appropriate to plan a meeting of a technical committee,\n\ninvolving DNCP, DNT, DNO and other parties involved in the process.\n\n\nMinutes of this meeting are prepared and sent to the department in charge of the integration\nof data, in order to be joined to supporting file.\n\n\nIn accordance with the decisions taken by the committee, the authority accountable of the\noverall process produces the final version of the _mapa fiscal_ . Changes are documented and\ncommunicated to all parties involved, including the department in charge of integration of\ndata.\n##### **Step 4: Dissemination of the Mapa Fiscal**\n\n\nThe authority in charge of the overall process carries out the dissemination of the final\nversion.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "40\nStep 2: Integration of the Data\n\nIn accordance with the requirements reminded in the message from the authority accountable\nof the overall process, the department in charge of integration of data into the _mapa fiscal_\nspreadsheet:\n\nchecks that all the data were delivered in accordance with the definite calendar;\nif not, a recall is sent to the issuer (cc to the authority accountable of the process);\nchecks coherence between the transmitted data and the supporting documents;\nif discrepancies are identified, asks for explanation and, if necessary, corrections;\nintegrates data into the _mapa fiscal_ spreadsheet;\nproduce the _mapa fiscal_ and send it to the authority accountable of the process. If\n\nnecessary, a note setting difficulties encountered is joined;\nstores the supporting documents into a supporting file.\nStep 3: Analysis of the Mapa Fiscal Draft\n\nThe authority in charge of the overall process received the _mapa fiscal_ draft from the\ndepartment in charge of integration of data.\n\nThe authority analyses the draft in order to:\n\nverify the comprehensiveness of the document;\naddress issues reported by the department in charge of integration of data;\nmake sure that there are no discrepancies;\n\notherwise, decide whether it’s appropriate to plan a meeting of a technical committee,\n\ninvolving DNCP, DNT, DNO and other parties involved in the process.\n\nMinutes of this meeting are prepared and sent to the department in charge of the integration\nof data, in order to be joined to supporting file.\n\nIn accordance with the decisions taken by the committee, the authority accountable of the\noverall process produces the final version of the _mapa fiscal_ . Changes are documented and\ncommunicated to all parties involved, including the department in charge of integration of\ndata.\nStep 4: Dissemination of the Mapa Fiscal\n\nThe authority in charge of the overall process carries out the dissemination of the final\nversion.", "text_characters": 1624}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "41\n\n\n**Appendix III. Mozambique: Fiscal Statistics Source Data**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Source
Data/Data
media|FLOWS|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|STOCKS|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||Source
Data/Data
media|1
Revenue|2
Expense|3.1
Financial
Assets|3.2
Financial
Assets|3.3
Liabilities|6.1
Non Financial
Assets|6.2
Financial
Assets|6.3
Liabilities|Information
lag|Frequency|\n|Revenues|Tax
Authority/excel
|X||X||||||1 month|Monthly|\n|Budget
expenditure|NDPA E-
sistafe/pdf,
excel||X
|X|X|X
||||
2,5 months|Quarterly|\n|Debt data
|NDT /excel||X|||X|||X|
1 month|Monthly|\n|
Accounts
balances:
CUT and
others|
paper||||X|||X||
1 month|Monthly|\n|Shares|By phone|||||||||
??|Annual|\n|
Grants|
REO paper||||||X|||2,5 months|Quarterly|\n|||||||||||||\n|CGE|paper/pdf|X|X|X|X|X||X||5 months|Annual|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21314239501953, 114.52017211914062, 557.673095703125, 296.42169189453125], "columns": 12, "rows": 10}], "text": "41\n\nAppendix III. Mozambique: Fiscal Statistics Source Data\n\n Col1 Source Data/Data media FLOWS Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 STOCKS Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 \n\n Source Data/Data media 1 Revenue 2 Expense 3.1 Financial Assets 3.2 Financial Assets 3.3 Liabilities 6.1 Non Financial Assets 6.2 Financial Assets 6.3 Liabilities Information lag Frequency \n Revenues Tax Authority/excel X X 1 month Monthly \n Budget expenditure NDPA E- sistafe/pdf, excel X X X X 2,5 months Quarterly \n Debt data NDT /excel X X X 1 month Monthly \n Accounts balances: CUT and others paper X X 1 month Monthly \n Shares By phone ?? Annual \n Grants REO paper X 2,5 months Quarterly \n \n CGE paper/pdf X X X X X X 5 months Annual", "text_characters": 553}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-047-fig-p0043-001"], "markdown": "42\n\n\n\n**Appendix IV. Mozambique:** _**Mapa Fiscal**_ **into the** _**GFSM 2014**_ **Format**\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-047", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "42\n\nAppendix IV. Mozambique: _Mapa Fiscal_ into the _GFSM 2014_ Format", "text_characters": 59}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0504face5fa2be41f8c292d32ceb4b94c2132e40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:68d076643d14214be3d8732b111bd954265be04a270357172fb7e0dde7e5bff6
+size 163184
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01a1b01fdc446e3294f92c5f8834252ac92a6724
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:66eea56790d849edeb38ae6b17d0c137b3b4b7575bda909b81932eeca4d566fe
+size 37096
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d141e95ffe726666522be601e65d0c236ff68412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a57d3571042f16e2c891d9a1bcb3672d34d5230ae01619b2f8eb8dc8d114dcc7
+size 33518
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..257fb3454f510d4c5e849f31e0836d27ef77a7d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9ae9345668ab9e410bc85a2f91f3f1a323a4ac02dd38387bea4a9a17e0ec8971
+size 12883
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b72ac3466fb63df14a378d29753e9a865cd7e49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e24f8204ddea226de0c864fd41a6fd9f639efcdd7ca38408d871079b91b3352d
+size 18003
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..154d0a139aa366e6d3d62eaa2bb88b55d3bb31c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3c8bed4913df2c1c5ee6ec4f48c816477bbbc34a4e75e81a76022a140220ee84
+size 12205
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e63accb92937bce21f1d1aeab80d6867199ed242
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3c188434d0adbb56d67ba6633b7ecfd21ab175a8a6c272a88744631c93ee5120
+size 5262
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a84195ffd76c516657c784f263727d798e0ea19f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:01ac0765f1ebfc66bb7d24529e7e1076ff3e7f4b2f5b093f8da41cdae0e82d93
+size 5493
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bf5a2e3e6b36d730d028ace60cab7bb3afc1dbdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5fe8836e26d3eb86db64868da0c5ce9717c4e06ba9e1fdc52516ef4fbb5757d7
+size 14720
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eca0c32b57c7ce51c28007dd32f5056a262c93b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b1e8281ca73a031bf384e9ed35f7a4342add698528562de50d09f93c44a9c7ca
+size 1248
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48756d2b895d217b4c5d331ddc7fc84c802c8385
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e515334eee9b2d049533ac888917c40d32a643765788cd275a48a808eacf6ef2
+size 2652
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..280d1940c8c553bdf06fb01f76ebab932d59919a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:cdd11ddbd537938584d268bf4ace1368191d8656b03bdc165c94f1442c719b48
+size 3954
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..395c9270e5314d6d81f8e556db8d51103d82aede
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:eceaa3099f86d407d8baf7101d08e9ef8443599b5775ed0305c906e82eb57551
+size 8972
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e1221c06877531119c0124c097e6a6739260ebdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f0a1c4268223ee8d679b5bf98d103324d469daa33d60889bf88814878a6bc7a0
+size 16111
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0024-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0024-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bd44837b15d88d9a0aed260b737d8a5071966587
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0024-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:14ad7228eec0e5f6152890cf34e0fdc33791fe2551984f804db4ffa852e79db2
+size 177044
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d2aaa153942cd74d4b0d7a152742e058fc361816
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:11ed0aec50dd9cc355de4c3798e85accdc9e1deabec980180bd05dbf6ba53672
+size 51312
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fcb0e1884e1e8a3afdefba64fa7b2a8773ae9c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:305e0f07114006f0f45a15a5c608067cf6450f6d5814648c710bbfabe22ab0ca
+size 49881
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0030-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0030-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5c2e40037f00c26a024602e39c6c19a17f360205
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0030-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d83a98e2a15e95027ab1a95d6dd15c01620df98a64940455a34487eb2943943f
+size 54617
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9272bba4b1d13b5a835fccf7e34e99e91a411235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5c41af83742dfef710f5de11c5059a2f7a32d82ff6ccf2a4e9a2fcf44ed67e15
+size 5576
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6eec00cd1ec72e247ec60bb1520949a6f2a1edd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fca324e2f6d15cd3d304f2c7b733a859af97683f43bc09a71e46ff6e7aa1cc84
+size 17026
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0037-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0037-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..281731ae2431e41f8785a6f7b3573105d58d3a9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0037-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7b3b0493a71102691fdc66acd6e4af10d80598aa8f74a4efd4ca75b0cbfd6cf4
+size 30849
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..40a0afd2a10577d129a7e5c7b73abe9f15ec11df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:97835b439abfaadc1f56d1f7eca052360ed2edc7f824b4f7f6a1301545d0151d
+size 32531
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0056-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0056-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82503291495b60410d26a89236af8c7459bcbfa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0056-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d0f656b6cfa51bf557b077bf6914d489a16521410298915531c9cb2351aa93c4
+size 84501
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0080-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0080-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..50e5b7622d26362f692f185fe6f76fbae0e54d88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0080-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ac8d1516ec21f1195bb154f80a2493463961d5181537b6a518ec55b5f71db377
+size 42480
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c5030d4d4b3392c0a90cf440ba3abec2c787a8e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-058",
+ "title": "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Technical Assistance Report on Public Investment Management Assessment - PIMA and Climate PIMA",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-058.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "78c4323b4bbb0c7272755ec542d8a5a173cd29883c9a127631066111e0416510",
+ "source_bytes": 1598903,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/30/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-technical-assistance-report-public-investment-management-528748",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:22:11+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 59.301,
+ "page_count": 81,
+ "text_characters": 295767,
+ "table_count": 21,
+ "figure_count": 25,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT - PIMA AND CLIMATE PIMA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Table of Contents"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Acronyms and Abbreviations"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Executive Summary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 15,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "I. Public investment trends in the DRC"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 20,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "II. Efficiency and impact of public investment in the DRC"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 23,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "III. Public investment management assessment"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 54,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "IV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C- PIMA)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 63,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "V. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Technical Assistance Report-Public Investment Management Assessment - PIMA and Climate PIMA; IMF Country Report No. 23/58; March 2022 ",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Budget planning and preparation, Capital spending, Expenditure, Fiscal Policy, Infrastructure, International Organization, National accounts, Public financial management (PFM), public investment spending.",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.39",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230118080934-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230130094547-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..084df5364d2005dbdd58b2f286ad525a0b5735e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4922 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/58**
+### **DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE** **CONGO**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT** **MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT - PIMA AND CLIMATE PIMA**
+
+
+This paper on the Democratic Republic of the Congo was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed on March 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+##### **Table of Contents**
+
+**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 5**
+
+
+**INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 7**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 9**
+
+
+**I. PUBLIC INVESTMENT TRENDS IN THE DRC ............................................................................... 16**
+
+A. Trends in general government investment and capital stock .................................................... 16
+B. Composition of public sector investment ................................................................................... 19
+
+
+**II. EFFICIENCY AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE DRC .......................................... 21**
+
+
+**III. PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT .............................................................. 24**
+
+A. Overview of the assessment ..................................................................................................... 24
+B. Planning Sustainable Levels of Public Investment .................................................................... 26
+C. Allocating Investments To The Right Sectors And Projects ...................................................... 36
+D. Delivering Productive and Durable Public Assets ..................................................................... 48
+
+
+**IV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C-PIMA) ................................................... 55**
+
+A. Climate change and public investment in the DRC ................................................................... 55
+B. PIMA Climate change module assessment framework ............................................................. 56
+
+
+**V. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 64**
+
+A. Legal Framework ....................................................................................................................... 64
+B. IT support ................................................................................................................................... 65
+C. Staff Capacity ............................................................................................................................ 67
+
+
+**FIGURES**
+0.A. Institutional design (FI) and Effectiveness (EFF) of public investment management in the DRC 10
+0.B. Institutional design (FI) of the institutions of the C-PIMA module in the DRC .............................. 10
+1.A. General government investment: regional comparisons .............................................................. 17
+1.B. Share of general government investment in total investment ...................................................... 17
+1.C. Public capital stock: regional comparisons .................................................................................. 18
+1.D. Public capital stock per capita, 2019 ........................................................................................... 18
+1.E. Sources of financing for central government investment spending .............................................. 19
+1.F. Public investment by function: regional comparisons in 2018 ...................................................... 19
+1.G. PPP Capital stock ......................................................................................................................... 20
+2.A. Indicators of physical access to public infrastructure - 2019 ........................................................ 22
+2.B. Infrastructure quality as perceived by business leaders ............................................................... 23
+2.C. Insufficiencies in access to infrastructure as perceived by private companies ............................ 23
+2.D. Efficiency frontier (physical access to infrastructure) ..................................................................... 24
+3.A. The PIMA assessment framework ................................................................................................ 24
+3.B. DRC: Strength of public investment management institutions ...................................................... 25
+3.C. DRC: Effectiveness (EFF) of public investment management practices ...................................... 25
+3.D. Capital budgets successively planned and voted by parliament (billions of CGF) ....................... 36
+4.A. The C-PIMA assessment framework ............................................................................................ 56
+
+
+**TABLES**
+0.A. PIMA Summary table .................................................................................................................... 12
+0.B. C-PIMA Summary table ................................................................................................................ 12
+0.C. Priority Action Plan to strengthen public investment management .............................................. 14
+3.A. Kinshasa City-Province projects executed using central government transfers, 2020 ................. 31
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and envelopes
+approved by vote in the 2022 budget law ............................................................................................. 37
+3.C. Comparison between the routine maintenance needs and funding available .............................. 44
+5.A. Legal texts underlying the PIM procedures in the DRC ................................................................ 65
+
+
+**BOXES**
+3.A. Gap between investment projects registered in the budget and those executed ......................... 40
+3.B. Country examples for the joint preparation of the capital and current budgets ............................ 42
+3.C. Budgeting in the medium term for the investment projects of the Ministry of Mines .................... 43
+3.D. Example of inclusion of project maintenance costs: South Africa ................................................ 45
+4.A. Climate budget tagging ................................................................................................................. 62
+
+
+**ANNEXES**
+Annex 1. Actions from the draft 2022-24 Priority Action Plan in connection with public investment
+management ......................................................................................................................................... 69
+Annex 2. Detailed PIMA assessment scores ....................................................................................... 75
+Annex 3. Detailed C-PIMA module assessment scores ....................................................................... 76
+Annex 4. Setting up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects ..... 77
+Annex 5. Guiding principles for preparation of a decree on public investment management .............. 79
+Annex 6. Illustration of the list of relevant selection criteria ................................................................. 80
+Annex 7. Principles guiding the establishment of an integrated bank of projects ................................ 81
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+##### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**
+
+ACE Congolese Environment Agency
+ACGT Congolese Agency for Major Works
+AE-CP Commitment Authorization - Payment Appropriation
+AFRITAC Central Central Africa Regional Technical Assistance Center
+ARE Electricity Sector Regulatory Authority
+ARMP Public Contracts Regulatory Authority (ARMP)
+BCECO Central Coordination Office
+C-PIMA PIMA Climate Change Assessment Module
+C2I Ministerial Information Technology Coordination
+CFEF Fragile States Finance Implementation Unit
+CISPIP Commission for identification and selection of public investment projects
+COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
+COREF Public Finance Reform Orientation Committee
+COPIREP Public Corporation Reform Steering Committee
+CPCC Standing Council of Accounting of the Congo
+CPIP Public Investment Programming Conference
+CRD Dispute Settlement Committee
+CRESP Coordination of External Financing and Project Oversight
+CSNGHC National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management
+CSP High Council of the Portfolio
+CSPP Project and Program Oversight Unit
+DCS Supervision and Oversight Directorate
+DEP Research and Planning Directorate
+DGCMP General Directorate for Procurement Supervision
+DGDP General Directorate of Public Debt
+DGPPB General Directorate of Fiscal Policies and Programming
+DGTCP General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting
+DRB Fiscal Risk Statement
+DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
+DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis
+ETD Decentralized Territorial Entity
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+FONER National Road Maintenance Fund
+GCA Government Chart of Accounts
+GDP Gross Domestic Product
+IGF General Inspectorate of Finance
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+LOFIP Law on Public Finance
+M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
+MAAH Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs
+MEDD Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development
+MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
+MTFF Medium-Term Fiscal Framework
+NBE Government Budget Classification
+NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
+OR Highways Office
+OVD Office of Roads and Drainage
+PDL(-145T) Local Development Plan for the 145 territories
+PGAI Investment and Aid Management Platform
+PIMA Public Investment Management Assessment
+PIP Public investment Program
+PIREDD REDD Investment Plan
+PNA National Climate Change Adaptation Plan
+PNDS National Health Care Development Plan
+PNSD National Development Strategy Plan
+POG General Operation Plan
+PPP Public-Private Partnership
+PREPABUD Budget Preparation ( _Préparation du budget_ -software application)
+PTF Technical and Financial Partners
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+REDD Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation
+RGCP General Public Accounting Regulations
+SADC Southern African Development Community
+SIGMAP Integrated Procurement Management System ( _Système intégré de gestion des marchés publics_ software application)
+SNEL Société nationale d’électricité
+TA Technical assistance
+TSA Treasury Single Account
+UC-PPP PPP Advice and Coordination Unit
+UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention
+on Climate Change
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+##### **INTRODUCTION**
+
+In response to a request by Nicolas Kazadi, Minister of Finance of the Democratic Republic of the
+Congo (DRC), a remote mission of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF was held from February
+28 through March 24, 2022 to carry out a public investment management assessment (PIMA). The
+mission, led by Fabien Gonguet (economist, FAD), included Laura Gores (technical assistance
+adviser, FAD), Hoda Selim (senior economist, FAD), Nicolas Hengy and Pierre Roumegas (experts,
+FAD), as well as Ephrem Ghonda Makiadi (public financial management advisor, AFRITAC Central).
+This mission was financed by the Government of Japan and by AFRITAC Central.
+
+
+At the start of the mission, the team was welcomed by the Minister of Finance, accompanied by
+Ginette Nzau Muteta, his Deputy Cabinet Director, and then by the Coordinator of the Public Financial
+Reform Orientation Committee (COREF), Godefroid Misenga, and was given their advice and
+guidance. From March 15 through 18, the mission held score validation meetings together with the
+main contact points of the various committees and agencies met during the mission. The mission
+submitted its findings to the Minister of Finance on Thursday, March 24, and then to the various
+departments during a technical meeting chaired by Mr. Misenga. A meeting with the technical and
+financial partners was also organized on March 24.
+
+
+The mission held working meetings with the representatives of the following committees and
+agencies: at the Ministry of Finance: the COREF, the General Directorate of Public Debt, the General
+Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting, the Directorate for Preparation of the Accounting
+Law, and the Directorate for Accounting Quality and Regulation, the Central Coordination Office, the
+Project and Program Oversight Unit, the Fragile States Finance Implementation Unit; at the Ministry
+of Budget: the General Directorate of Fiscal Policies and Programming, the General Directorate
+responsible for performance oversight and development, the General Directorate for Procurement
+Supervision, the Directorate for Fiscal Supervision, the Directorate of General Administration and
+Centralized Appropriations, and the Interministerial Information Technology (IT) Coordination
+department; at the Ministry of Planning: the General Secretariat, the Directorate of Investment
+Budgeting and Programming, the Directorate of Macroeconomic Research, the Directorate of
+Infrastructure, the Supervision and Oversight Directorate, the Investment Aid Management Platform,
+the National Institute of Statistics, the PPP Coordination Unit, and the National Investment Promotion
+Agency; at the Office of the Prime Minister: the Public Contracts Regulatory Authority; at the Office of
+the President: the General Inspectorate of Finance, the Coordination Unit of External Financing and
+Project Oversight, and the Presidential Council for Strategy Monitoring.
+
+
+The mission also held working meetings with the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior,
+Security, and Customary Affairs; the Ministry of the Portfolio; the Ministry of the Environment and
+Sustainable Development and the Congolese Environment Agency; the Ministry of Infrastructure and
+Public Works and the Infrastructure Unit; the Ministry of Mines; the Ministry of Transport,
+Communication Channels, and Improvement of Access; the Ministry of Rural Development; the
+Ministry of Public Health; the Ministry of Primary, Secondary, and Technical Education; the Ministry of
+Land Management and Planning; the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs; the Electricity
+Regulation Authority; the Post and Telecommunications Regulation Authority. Finally, the mission met
+with representatives of the Court of Accounts and the Provincial Ministry for the Budget of the CityProvince of Kinshasa.
+
+
+The mission would like to express its thanks to the Congolese authorities for making themselves so
+freely available. In particular, it is grateful to the COREF - Mr. Misenga and his team - especially
+Kembé Sassé - for the exceptional support provided to the mission, specifically in organizing remote
+meetings and coordinating the gathering of documents received from the various departments. The
+mission would also like to thank Gabriel Léost, Resident Representative of the IMF, and Emmanuel
+Gbadi, local economist, for helping to progress its work. Finally thanks are due to Ruxandra
+Burdescu, Blandine Wu, and Mamata Tiendrebeogo from the World Bank for their support and
+expertise on the topics covered by the mission.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+##### **Executive Summary**
+
+**Despite some recovery in the 2000s, the levels of public investment in the DRC remain well**
+**below the average for comparator countries.** Investment by general government, financed to a
+large part by external resources, has fluctuated around 4 percent of GDP since 2003, remaining
+almost 50 percent lower than the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and for low-income
+countries. This enabled the rebuilding of part of the stock of public capital (46 percent of GDP
+in 2019), but the stock of capital per capita continues to be among the lowest in the world (≈ US$200
+in 2019). In addition, there are investments carried out by public corporations in the energy and
+mining sectors (≈ 2 percentage points of GDP a year in recent years), as well as by the public-private
+partnerships (PPPs) in the transport sector (stock of at least 4 percent of GDP).
+
+**The access and quality of infrastructure resulting from these investments are very poor, with**
+**major risks of deterioration.** In spite of gains in access to education, access per capita to electricity,
+health services and drinking water have all fallen since the end of the 1990s. The perception of the
+quality of infrastructure provided by the private sector has also deteriorated slightly over the past
+decade. The risk of continued deterioration is high, as the COVID-19 pandemic stalled investment,
+development of infrastructure is struggling to keep up with demographic growth, and, given the lack of
+adequate maintenance efforts, the road, electricity, and water networks are suffering from dilapidation
+and network losses. With the increasing prevalence of natural disasters, climate change is exposing
+infrastructure to increasingly rapid deterioration.
+
+**While it is important to increase investment, that will not be enough; it is also necessary to**
+**invest better, thanks to enhanced public investment management.** In accordance with the IMFsupported program, the government aims to meet part of these needs by creating fiscal space, in
+particular by mobilizing a greater proportion of revenues to invest in the priority sectors. Greater use
+of PPPs is also planned. It will, nevertheless, be essential that the authorities improve the efficiency
+of investment: for every Congo franc spent, the authorities should endeavor to achieve the best
+possible outcomes in terms of improving access to and quality of public services. That should come
+about by strengthening public investment management practices. The IMF’s PIMA evaluation
+framework is designed to help governments in measuring their strengths and weaknesses in this area
+and identifying reform priorities.
+
+**Public investment management in the DRC suffers from weaknesses across the whole project**
+**cycle, both on paper and in practice (Figure 0.A, Table 0.A, Annex 2).** Although the DRC already
+has adopted an advanced legal framework in the area of budget processes (Law on Public Finance
+(LOFIP)), procurement and public accounting, it lacks clear laws and regulations in the area of
+appraisal, selection, and monitoring of investment projects. The effectiveness of practices is weak,
+particularly with regard to the budgeting and implementation phases. The most notable weaknesses
+are: the lack of information on investment needs in the national and sectoral strategies, the absence
+of standard project appraisal methodologies, the partial nature of the information on investment
+projects in the budget documentation, the absence of clear project selection criteria, the large share
+of direct agreements in public procurement, the lack of credibility of commitment ceilings
+communicated to line ministries, and the scarcity of reports on the physical and financial execution of
+projects.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Figure 0.A. Institutional design (ID) and Effectiveness**
+
+
+
+**Figure 0.B. Institutional design (ID) of the institutions of the**
+
+**C-PIMA module in the DRC**
+
+
+
+**(EFF) of public investment management in the DRC**
+
+
+
+**15. Monitoring of**
+
+
+
+**1. Fiscal targets and rules**
+
+
+
+
+
+**15. Monitoring of** **PLANNING**
+
+**IMPLEMENTATION**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**C4. Budgeting**
+
+**and Portfolio**
+**Management**
+
+
+
+**C5. Risk**
+**Management**
+
+
+
+
+
+**13. Portfolio**
+
+
+**Oversight**
+
+
+**12. Availability of**
+**Funding**
+
+
+**11.**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Entities**
+
+
+**4. Project**
+**Appraisal**
+
+
+**5. Alternative**
+**Infrastructure**
+
+**Financing**
+
+
+
+**C5a. Disaster risk**
+
+
+**C4c. Asset management**
+
+**including climate risks**
+
+
+**projects**
+
+
+
+
+
+**C3b. PPP framework**
+**including climate risks**
+
+
+**C3. Project**
+**Appraisal and**
+
+**Selection**
+
+
+
+**C2.**
+**Coordination**
+**between Entities**
+
+
+
+**consideration in project**
+
+**selection**
+
+
+
+**Funding**
+
+
+
+**8. Budgeting for** **Unity**
+**Investment**
+
+**ALLOCATION**
+
+
+
+Source: Mission Source: Mission
+
+
+
+**Administrative and legal fragmentation leads to lack of clarity with regard to project**
+**management responsibilities and to dilution of capacity.** The legal uncertainty, both in law and in
+regulations, on the role of the various parties involved, their multiplicity, the lack of coordination, and
+the absence of comprehensive and consistent information sharing processes constitute critical limits
+to the efficiency of public investment management. The cumulation of _ad hoc_ committees and
+agencies for the management and oversight of project portfolios of variable sizes, often created to
+circumvent ineffective procedures, sometimes at the behest of donors, weakens the technical
+capacity for sound management of projects, in particular those with external financing. Moreover,
+information flows are fragmented and/or redundant, leading to suboptimal use of human and
+information technology (IT) resources.
+
+**The DRC’s commitments in the fight against climate change are only just starting to feed into**
+**public investment management practices (see Figure 0.B, Table 0.B, Annex 3 for C-PIMA**
+**scores).** It is worth noting among emerging good practices, albeit still in the process of
+operationalization, the role of the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development in
+providing inter-ministerial coordination of investment decisions, the emergence of an institutional and
+financial framework for natural disaster risk management, and the legal obligation, recognized by all,
+of conducting environmental and social impact assessments. The main weaknesses lie in the lack of
+alignment and cross-cutting recognition of climate considerations in the national and sectoral
+strategies, the absence of a legal framework and of a land management and planning strategy, and
+the lack of methodologies supporting the assessment of climate risks and impacts on infrastructure.
+
+**Strengthening budget credibility is a key condition for the success of public investment**
+**management reforms in the DRC.** The lack of credibility of budget laws leads the authorities to
+circumvent the traditional expenditure chain and to implement projects on the basis of the available
+cash resources, without ensuring compliance with the priorities expressed at the time of budgeting.
+Budget execution rates are very low, which discourages all participants involved in the processes of
+project budgeting and implementation. It is crucial to ensure that the investment envelopes voted by
+parliament are realistic in order to reestablish the budget law as a reference for project
+implementation.
+
+**Based on the PIMA evaluation, this report puts forward seven high-priority recommendations**
+**that could greatly improve public investment management in the DRC in the short to medium**
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**term.** Table 0.C presents an action plan for 2022-2024, which includes the following priority
+recommendations:
+
+- **Adopt a decree on public investment management** covering all stages of the project cycle and
+structuring the institutional framework for project management (Annex 5);
+
+- **Set up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects**, which
+could be a public institution under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, with the aim of
+streamlining these functions, pooling skills and knowledge, and centralizing information
+(Annex 4);
+
+- **Improve the oversight over PPPs and associated fiscal risks**, in particular by ensuring the full
+implementation of the legal framework, dealing with conflicting norms as quickly as possible, and
+building capacity for fiscal risk analysis, specifically within the General Directorate of Public Debt
+at the Ministry of Finance;
+
+- **Include quantified investment needs and envisaged investment costs in strategic planning**
+**documents** (National Development Strategy Plan, sectoral strategies) and align them in a crosscutting way with the country’s climate objectives;
+
+- **Systematize preliminary appraisal of projects**, by developing standard methodologies,
+including with regard to climate impact assessment, and by setting up a central support agency at
+the Ministry of Planning;
+
+- **Produce, maintain, and publish a comprehensive, realistic three-year Public Investment**
+**Program, supporting a more transparent project selection process** (Annex 6) and serving as
+the main vehicle for reporting to the parliament on current and future projects;
+
+- **Take steps to develop an integrated bank of projects**, supported by an IT system to monitor
+projects, to be identified by a single code lasting the whole of their life-cycle (Annex 7).
+
+**The report proposes three medium-priority recommendations as well, also set out in**
+**Table 0.C:** (i) strengthen budget unity by improving integration of capital and current budget
+preparation; (ii) ensure better coverage of maintenance needs by the adoption of standard
+methodologies and the evaluation of additional maintenance needs linked to climate change; and (iii)
+coordinate capital spending between central government and the provinces, in accordance with the
+decentralization process.
+
+**Finally, other significant efforts to reform public finance management undertaken by the**
+**Government will contribute to enhancing public investment management.** This relates
+particularly to the shift to a double budget appropriation system ( _autorisations d’engagement_ et
+_crédits de paiement_ ), to the transition to program-based budgeting, and to the strengthening of
+transparency and competition in public procurement. Annex 1 provides the relevant actions in these
+areas, drawing from the draft 2022-2024 Priority Action Plan supporting the implementation of the
+Government’s 2022-28 Strategic Public Finance Reform Program.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|Stage/ Institution|Col2|Col3|Institutional design|Effectiveness|Priority|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**A. Planning**|**1.**|**Fiscal Targets**
**and Rules**|**Medium** A golden rule is included in the LOFIP, but
there is no rule on debt. A three-year MTFF is prepared
every year, distinguishing current expenditure from
investment spending.
|**Medium** The program with the IMF instills_de facto_
discipline on debt levels. The investment envelopes set
out in the MTFF guide the expenditure ceilings adopted in
the budget.
|**Low**|
+|**A. Planning**|**2.**|**National and**
**Sectoral**
**Planning**|**Medium**The PNSD and a number of sectoral strategies
are published, but provide little information on
investment projects and costs. A few sectoral strategies
include targets on outputs.
|**Weak** The absence of a list of projects in the strategies
and lack of information on their costs hinder the
measurement of their effectiveness. Monitoring and
evaluation of the various strategies have been limited.
|**High**|
+|**A. Planning**|**3.**|**Coordination**
**between**
**Entities**|
**Weak** Coordination of projects between provinces and
the central government is planned on paper. Calculation
of the transfer amounts is not transparent. The analysis
of contingent liabilities remains to be institutionalized.
|
**Weak** Harmonization conferences are no longer held.
Transfers deviate considerably from forecasts. The first
fiscal risk statement (2021) provides analyses of some
contingent liabilities.
|**Medium**|
+|**A. Planning**|**4.**|**Project**
**Appraisal**|
**Weak** The legal framework does not compel to subject
projects to rigorous appraisal, according to a standard
methodology, with the support of a central committee or
agency and including risk analysis.
|
**Weak** Apart from external financing, appraisal is rare, the
absence of a standard methodology and a central
committee or agency compromises the capacity for
selection, and risk analysis is too limited.
|**High**|
+|**A. Planning**|**5.**|**Alternative**
**Investment**
**Financing**|
**Medium** The majority of infrastructure sectors are
competitive on paper. There is a law on PPPs, but not
yet any policy. The legal framework does not require the
authorities to review SOE investment plans.|
**Weak** Only the telecommunications sector is subject to
effective competition. The oversight of PPPs is not yet
centralized. There is no consolidated report on the
financial statements or the investment plans of SOEs.
|**High**
**(PPP)**|
+|**B. Allocation**|**6.**|**Multiyear**
**Budgeting**|
**Medium** The three-year capital expenditure projections,
broken down by ministry, are published, and indicative
three-year ceilings are applied. The three-year Public
Investment Program (PIP) is not published.
|
**Weak** There are significant discrepancies between
capital expenditure projections and expenditure ceilings,
on the one hand, and the budget laws, on the other. The
PIP does not cover all projects and is not regularly
updated.
|**High**|
+|**B. Allocation**|**7.**|**Budget**
**Comprehensive**
**ness and Unity**|**Weak** Considerable investment spending is allowed
without parliamentary authorization or information in the
budget law. The capital and current budgets are
presented in a single document.|
**Weak** The investments of extrabudgetary entities and
PPPs are partially included in the budget. The Ministry of
Budget has no procedure to verify the consistency of the
current and capital budgets.|**High**|
+|**B. Allocation**|**8.**|**Budgeting for**
**Investment**|
**Medium** The LOFIP provides for budgeting in AE-CP
but does not protect ongoing projects up to completion.
Transfers from capital to current appropriations are
possible.
|
**Medium** Budgeting in AE-CP is not effective and ongoing
projects are often supplanted by new ones. Nevertheless,
transfers of capital appropriations to current expenditure
are effectively prevented in the system.
|**Medium**|
+|**B. Allocation**|**9.**|**Maintenance**
**Funding**|**Medium** Standard rules for forecasts of current
maintenance or renovation of nonfinancial assets only
exist in the road sector. The budget nomenclature
clearly identifies such maintenance activities.
|**Weak**The financing required to deal with maintenance
needs, whether current or for renovation, is clearly too
low to preserve the value and ensure the durability of
infrastructure assets.
|**Medium**|
+|**B. Allocation**|**10.**|**Project**
**Selection**|
**Medium** The legal framework provides for the review of
appraisals, but does not provide for standard selection
criteria. The Plan has a list of projects that have been
appraised, but there is no formal obligation to use it.
|
**Weak** The review is only applied to project fiches, the
selection criteria used for budgeting are not relevant and
many projects seem to be selected from outside the list of
appraised projects.
|**High**|
+|**C. Implementation**|**11.**|**Procurement**|
**High** The public procurement law is in line with best
practice in terms of competition, transparency, and
handling of complaints, but public procurement
oversight is deficient in several ways.
|
**Medium** Significant exemptions distort the rules of
competition and transparency, while the system for
handling complaints is satisfactory in terms of time limits
and fairness.
|**High**|
+|**C. Implementation**|**12.**|**Availability of**
**Funding**|
**Medium**Annual month-by-month cash flow forecasts
are prepared, but the commitment plan is quarterly. The
law stipulates that donor funds should be deposited at
the Central Bank in the TSA.
|
**Weak** Quarterly commitment ceilings are overall not
consistent with the cash flow forecasts. Donor funds are
placed in accounts at commercial banks unrelated to the
TSA.
|**High**|
+|**C. Implementation**|**13.**|**Portfolio**
**Management**
**and Oversight**|
**Weak**The legal framework does not require systematic
_ex post_review of projects, but does allow reallocations
between projects, without, however, providing for
systematic oversight and transparent procedures.
|
**Weak** The reports do not systematically provide
information on delays and cost overruns, there are no
reallocations between projects, and_ex post_ reviews by
the Government are rare.
|**High**|
+|**C. Implementation**|**14.**|**Management of**
**Project**
**Implementation**|
**Medium**The arrangements for project management are
not set in a robust framework, and there are no standard
rules about project adjustments. The Court of Accounts
has the mandate to audit projects.
|
**Weak**Staff responsible for implementing projects have
been appointed, but there is no information on
adjustments made to projects. The Court of Accounts
does not audit large-scale projects.|**Medium**|
+|**C. Implementation**|**15.**|**Monitoring of**
**Public Assets**|**Medium**The Government does not have any
comprehensive, up-to-date asset registers. The legal
framework provides for asset and inventory accounting
rules in line with international standards.|**Weak** Asset and inventory accounting are not performed.
Asset inventories are not implemented. Depreciations are
not applied.|**Low**|
+
+
+
+**Table 0.B. C-PIMA Summary table**
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|Stage/ Institution|Col2|Col3|Institutional design|Priority|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**C-PIMA**|**C1**|**Climate-aware**
**Planning**|**Weak** Public investment planning and the central and provincial
regulations relating to land management and construction do not take
climate change into account.|**High**|
+|**C-PIMA**|**C2**|**Coordination**
**across Public**
**Sector**|**Weak** Public investment decisions relating to climate change are not
coordinated over the whole of the public sphere despite the existence
of thematic groups.|**Medium**|
+|**C-PIMA**|**C3**|**Project**
**Appraisal and**
**Selection**|**Weak**The legal framework does not explicitly take into account
climate change in environmental impact studies, in the PPPs, or in
the criteria used by the Government to select projects for the budget.|**High**|
+|**C-PIMA**|**C4**|**Budgeting and**
**Portfolio**
**Management**|**Weak** There are no specific practices in terms of budgeting, audits/
_ex post_ reviews, or management of assets, which would help take
into account climate change risks and objectives.|**Medium**|
+|**C-PIMA**|**C5**|**Risk**
**Management**|**Medium** The risks associated with the exposure of infrastructure to
climate change are not covered in any publication or analysis of their
budget implications. There are, however,_ex ante_ financing
mechanisms for such risks.
|**Low**|
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Table 0.C. Priority Action Plan to strengthen public investment management**
+
+
+
+**Note:** This table follows the format and numbering of the three-year 2022-2024 Priority Action Plan
+prepared by the authorities to implement the updated 2022-28 Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan.
+It presents the ten recommendations (“actions” as referred to in the Priority Action Plan) of the PIMA
+and C-PIMA reports. Annex 1 sets forth the actions relating to the PIMA and C-PIMA already included
+in the draft three-year Priority Action Plan, to which the mission made some amendments based on
+its conclusions. Action 1.2.3 below is, exceptionally, a modified version that was included in the initial
+draft of the Priority Action Plan.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED
OUTCOME(S)|202
2|202
3|202
4|202
5
202
8|OUTCOME
INDICATO
R(S)|REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS|IMPL
EME
NTA
TION
STA
TUS|RESPON
SIBLE
ENTITIES|PRIORIT
Y|TA
NEE
DS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|
+|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
+|
**Action 1.2.3: Improve**
**oversight of PPPs and**
**associated fiscal risks**
|
The
Government
has an
overview of
the fiscal risks
associated
with the
PPPs.
The credibility
of the budget
is improved.
|
X
|
X|
|
|
PIMA 3c
, 4c,
5b
C-PIMA
C3b|
1. Signature of all implementing decrees of the
PPP law and clarification of the roles and
responsibilities of the ARMP, UC-PPP,
DGCMP, and Ministry of Finance (2022).
2. Establishment of a register of guarantees at
the Ministry of Finance - DGDP (2022).
3. Establishment and updating of a
comprehensive register of PPPs by the ARMP
and the UC-PPP and drafting of a procedures
manual for the law and a guide to project
appraisal, including the assessment of risks
relating to climate change (2022-23).
4. Signature of the decree on the procedures
manual for the law on PPPs (2023).
5. Operationalization of the Standing
Committee on Project Validation with the
Ministry of Finance having a veto power over
the financial viability of projects (2023).
6. Adoption of a national policy relating to
PPPs (2023)||ARMP
MINPLAN
MINFIN
MINBUD
UC-PPP|**High**|Yes|
+|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
+|
**Action 3.7.1: Adopt a decree**
**on public investment**
**management covering all**
**stages of the project cycle**|
The
management of
public
investments is
set in the legal
framework.|
X|
X|
X||
PIMA 4,
6, 7, 8,
10, 11,
13, 14
C-PIMA
C3|
1. Adoption of the decree on public investment
management (2022).
2. Preparation of the implementing regulations
of the decree, establishing the procedures
manuals and guides on public investment
management (2023-24).
||
MINPLAN
MINBUD
MINFIN|
**High**|Yes|
+|**Action 3.7.2: Set up a single**
**office for coordination and**
**oversight of externally**
**financed projects**|Steering of
externally
financed
projects is
improved.
Oversight of
externally
financed
projects is
centralized.|X|X|||
PIMA 7
a, 7b, 1
3a|1. Definition of the institutional form of the
single office with emphasis on efficiency and
performance in the management of the
portfolio of externally financed projects.
2. Creation of the single office replacing the
current committees and agencies (2022).
3. Preparation of templates for agreement
between the single office and the sectoral
ministries dealing with externally financed
projects.
4. Preparation of regulations formalizing the
relationships between the office and the
institutional users of the data on externally
financed projects (2022-23).
||MINFIN
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries|**High**|
|
+|**Action 3.7.3: Include**
**quantified investment needs**
**and envisaged investment**
**costs in strategic planning**
**documents including those**
**in relation to climate**
**change.**|The link
between
planning and
budgeting is
strengthened.
The consistency
across the|X|X|X||PIMA 2
a, 2b, 2
c
C-PIMA
C1a|1. Addition to the reframed PNSD of an
estimate of the investment needs, a list of
major projects, with their total costs and by
year, and target indicators for the outputs and
outcomes (2022).
2. Alignment of the reframed PNSD with the
climate objectives of the contribution set at the
DRC national level (2022).||MINPLAN
Sectoral
ministries
MEDD
ACE|**High**||
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED
OUTCOME(S)|202
2|202
3|202
4|202
5
202
8|OUTCOME
INDICATO
R(S)|REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS|IMPL
EME
NTA
TION
STA
TUS|RESPON
SIBLE
ENTITIES|PRIORIT
Y|TA
NEE
DS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|
+||various
planning tools is
enhanced.||||||3. Adoption of the new law on land
management and planning (2022).
4. Publication of (i) sectoral strategies in the
economic infrastructure sectors, integrating
the climate objectives in a cross-cutting way
(transport, energy, water), and (ii) a land
management and planning strategy (2023-24).
5. Alignment of each sectoral pillar of
the 2024-28 PNSD with the climate objectives
of DRC’s nationally determined contribution
(2024).
|||||
+|**Action 3.7.4: Strengthen the**
**process of preliminary**
**appraisal of projects,**
**including assessment of the**
**impacts relating to climate**
**change.**|Comparative
analysis of the
projects is
improved.
The completion
and financing of
appraisals are
assured.|
X|X|||PIMA 4
a, 4b, 4
c
C-PIMA
C3a|1. Following a survey of the existing
methodologies, including the one currently in
the process of validation (BCECO),
preparation of standard appraisal
methodologies (2022).
2. Following preliminary analysis of the rate of
execution of the appropriations allocated to the
preinvestment fund, optimization and, if
necessary, increase of allocations to the
required level (2022).
3. Establishment within the Ministry of
Planning of a central support structure for
project appraisal (2023)
4. Adoption of a standard methodology for
environmental and social impact studies,
including the systematic assessment of
climate change impacts (2023).
||MINPLAN
MINBUD
BCECO
Sectoral
ministries
ACE|**High**||
+|**Action 3.7.5: Strengthen**
**budget unity by improving**
**integration of capital and**
**current budget preparation**
**processes.**|A consistent
and
complementary
relationship
between capital
and current
budgets is
assured|X|X|X|X|PIMA 7c|1. Introduction of mechanisms for
communication between the parties
responsible for preparation of current budgets
and the DEPs (2022).
2. Establishment of procedures for verifying
the consistency of the two budgets by the
DGPPB during the budget formulation period
(2022).
3. Presentation of the operational classification
crosschecked against the financial
classification (capital / current expenditure) in
the LFI for 2023 (2022)
4. Unification of the procedures for preparing
the capital and current budgets (2029).
||MINPLAN
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries|**Mediu**
**m **|Yes|
+|**Action 3.7.6:** **Produce,**
**maintain, and publish a**
**comprehensive, realistic**
**three-year Public**
**Investment Program,**
**supporting a more**
**transparent project**
**selection process.**|The link
between
planning and
budgeting is
strengthened.
The PIP
supports the
programming,
selection, and
multiyear
budgeting of
projects.
A rigorously
assessed
project pipeline
is available.
|X|X|X||PIMA 6
a, 6b, 6
c, 9c, 10
a,
10b, 10
c
C-PIMA
C3c|
1. Establishment of a list of selection criteria
and publication in advance in the annual
circular of the Ministry of Planning (MP) on the
preparation of the PIP and in the annual
budget circular of the Ministry of the Budget
(MB) (2022).
2. Following a preliminary analysis, clean-up of
the MP’s database of projects to be financed
(2022).
3. Establishment of systematic, frequent
feedback mechanisms of information on the
cost of projects underway to the MP, and
automated sharing of the project database
with the MB and the Ministry of Finance (MF)
(2022).
4. Incorporation of the review of the PIP in the
budget formulation process, and publication of
a PIP aligned with the budget as an annex to
the 2023 LFI (2022).
5. Inclusion of selection criteria aiming to
provide (i) priority to projects contributing to|
|MINPLAN
MINBUDI
N
BCECO
Sectoral
ministries
ACE N|**High**|Yes|
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED
OUTCOME(S)|202
2|202
3|202
4|202
5
202
8|OUTCOME
INDICATO
R(S)|REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS|IMPL
EME
NTA
TION
STA
TUS|RESPON
SIBLE
ENTITIES|PRIORIT
Y|TA
NEE
DS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|
+||||||||combating climate change and (ii) priority to
asset rehabilitation projects (2023).
|||||
+|**Action 3.7.7: Ensure better**
**coverage of the needs for**
**ongoing maintenance and**
**renovation of infrastructure**
|The
sustainability of
financial assets
is assured.
|
|X
|
||PIMA 9
a, 9b, 9
c
C-PIMA
C4c|1. Preparation of standard methodologies for
forecasting maintenance and renovation
needs for all categories of nonfinancial assets
(2023).
2. Completion of an assessment of the
additional asset maintenance requirements
arising from climate change (2023).
3. Formal request in the budget circular for
identification and prioritization of maintenance
needs by the sectoral ministries (2023).
||MINBUD
MITPR
(Ministry
for
Infrastruct
ure,
Public
Works
and
Reconstru
ction)
MINPLAN|**Mediu**
**m**|Yes|
+|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
+|
**Action 6.3.2: Improve**
**coordination of capital**
**spending between central**
**government and the**
**provinces.**
|
Provincial
investment
budgets are
more credible.
The overview
of provincial
project
portfolios is
available.
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
PIMA 3
a, 3b
C-PIMA
C2b
|
1. Reestablishment of annual capital spending
harmonization conferences between the
provinces and central government, covering all
sources of financing and the aspect of climate
change (2022).
2. Notification of the preliminary envelopes to
provinces in June or July after the compilation
of the MTFF (2022).
3. Operationalize the coordination mechanisms
provided for in the PDL-145T, the REDD+
program, and the sectoral thematic groups to
integrate the climate change aspect in
planning at the provincial level (2022-23)||MINPLAN
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries
Provinces
Sectoral
thematic
groups
MEDD|**Mediu**
**m**||
+|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
+|
**Action 8.3.1: Develop an**
**integrated IT system (bank)**
**of investment projects**
|
Oversight of the
physical and
financial
execution of
projects is
enhanced.
The steering,
monitoring, and
reporting of the
project portfolio
is
comprehensive,
frequent, and
pooled.|
X|
X|
X|
X|
PIMA 4,
6, 7, 10
, 13, 14
|
1. Establishment of a consultation framework
between the Ministry of Planning and the
Interministerial Information Technology
Coordination unit of the Finance and the
Budget Ministries (2022)
2. Inclusion in the project fiches of information
on the physical and financial monitoring of
domestically-funded projects, consolidation of
this information in the database of the Ministry
of Planning and pooling of this information with
all those involved (2022).
3. Formalization with the PTFs of a simplified
structure with a standard form enabling
periodic feedback to be provided of
information on physical and financial
implementation of externally financed projects
(2022).
4. Validation of the functional specification
schedule of the information system for
monitoring projects and mobilization of
financing sought (2023).
5. Development of software applications and
tests of the IT system for monitoring projects
throughout their life-cycle (2023)||
MINPLAN
MINBUD
(C2I)
MINFIN
Sectoral
ministries
Implement
ing
agencies
CRESP|
**High**|Yes|
+
+
+##### **I. Public investment trends in the DRC**
+
+**A. TRENDS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL STOCK**
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**1.** **Despite a recovery since the 2000s, the level of general government investment in the**
+**DRC has been systematically lower than the averages for low-income countries and sub-**
+**Saharan African countries (Figure 1.A).** The DRC suffered a period of conflict and political
+instability in the 1990s with major humanitarian and social consequences, as well as a collapse in
+public services. Accordingly, investment by general government did not exceed 0.2 percent of GDP
+between 1990 and 2001. With the relative abatement of the conflict, the recovery of growth, and the
+rise in commodity prices, the beginnings of an effort toward reconstruction and rehabilitation got
+underway in 2002. This led overall, in spite of some volatility, to a recovery in levels of general
+government investment to an average of 3.6 percent of GDP between 2002 and 2019, peaking
+at 6.6 percent in 2014. [1] These levels of investment have been more or less maintained despite efforts
+toward budget rationalization in 2009-2011 as part of a program with the IMF and also in spite of the
+collapse of commodity prices after 2014. These two factors mainly affected the level of current
+expenditure. [2] Nevertheless, the average of 4.1 percent of GDP noted in the DRC between 2015
+and 2019 remains well below the average of 7.8 percent of low-income countries and the average
+of 7.1 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. General government investment fell sharply due to the COVID19 pandemic; according to budget execution statements, central government capital spending was
+only 0.3 percent of GDP in 2020 and 1.2 percent in 2021.
+
+
+**2.** **General government investment only represented a small proportion of total**
+**investment, however.** Investment by general government only represented on average one fifth of
+the total investment in the DRC between 2002 and 2019 (Figure 1.B). In contrast, the other sources
+of investment - private sector, public corporations - tripled between 2002 and 2019
+exceeding 20 percent of GDP. Private investment, in particular, increased substantially between 2010
+and 2014 when the DRC launched a series of reforms aimed at improving the business environment
+to protect property rights, strengthen governance, and develop financial and labor markets. In spite of
+these efforts, total investment nevertheless remains lower than the averages of 23.2 percent
+and 24.7 percent of GDP for sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries, respectively.
+
+
+**3.** **Despite two decades of reconstruction efforts, public capital stock in the DRC remains**
+**one of the lowest in the region.** The 1990s conflict saw significant destruction of physical capital.
+Thanks to the reconstruction efforts from 2003 onward, the stock of public capital has increased step
+by step to reach 46 percent of GDP in 2019 (Figure 1.C). Although the gap has been partially
+reduced, the stock of public capital remains far below the averages of other low-income countries or
+that of sub-Saharan African countries; both of these groups are over 100 percent of GDP. The gap is
+even greater in terms of public capital stock per capita, remaining at a level well below that of other
+resource-rich countries in the region (Figure 1.D).
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.A. General government investment:**
+
+**regional comparisons** (nominal, % of GDP)
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.B. Share of general government**
+
+**investment in total investment** (%)
+
+
+
+1 The DRC also reached the completion point of the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
+in 2010, enabling it to benefit from debt relief and, thus, an easing of the debt-servicing cost burden.
+
+2 Despite the fall in commodity prices, public investment in the DRC remained at 4.6 percent of GDP
+in 2015-2016 In other resource-rich countries, the drop in prices often leads to abrupt, significant cuts
+in public investment.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+10.0
+
+9.0
+
+8.0
+
+7.0
+
+6.0
+
+5.0
+
+4.0
+
+3.0
+
+2.0
+
+1.0
+
+0.0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.C. Public capital stock: regional**
+
+**comparisons** (nominal, % of GDP)
+
+140.0
+
+120.0
+
+100.0
+
+
+
+35
+
+30
+
+25
+
+20
+
+15
+
+10
+
+5
+
+0
+
+
+including general government
+Total investment
+investment
+
+
+**Figure 1.D. Public capital stock per**
+**capita, 2019** (adjusted at purchasing power
+
+parity in 2017 dollars, thousands)
+
+
+
+
+
+Nigeria
+
+
+
+Botswana
+
+
+
+Angola
+
+
+
+
+
+South Africa
+
+Congo Rep.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+80.0
+
+60.0
+
+40.0
+
+20.0
+
+0.0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Rwanda
+
+
+
+Zambia
+
+
+
+CAR
+
+
+
+
+
+Tanzania
+
+
+
+Ghana
+
+Liberia
+
+
+
+Mali
+
+DRC
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Sierra Leone
+
+
+
+thousands of US$, 2017 PPP-adjusted
+
+
+
+Source: IMF staff calculations
+
+
+**4.** **To fulfill the objectives of the 2019-2023 National Development Strategy Plan (PNSD) it**
+**is necessary to contain public debt while creating the fiscal space to invest in the priority**
+**sectors.** The IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) found that, despite fairly low external debt, the
+DRC is at moderate risk of overindebtedness and that its capacity to service its debt remains weak.
+This level of risk is basically caused by poor mobilization of tax revenues, which restricts the country’s
+scope to enter into new loans without a deterioration of its risk level underlying the DSA. The debt is
+particularly vulnerable to external shocks, leading to a fall in export revenues or in foreign exchange
+reserves; this, in turn, could provoke a sharp and rapid deterioration in credit rating. As part of the
+current program supported by the IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the authorities have
+undertaken to hold the risk of external overindebtedness at a moderate level. That will rely on a more
+prudent debt policy with, in particular, a ceiling on non-concessional external loans until 2023 and
+efforts to mobilize more in the way of tax revenues, thereby enabling an increase in investments in
+the priority sectors identified in the five pillars of the PNSD. Furthermore, in accordance with the
+objectives of the program with the IMF, the Government decided to devote part of its allocation of
+special drawing rights to public investment projects in the provinces. Taken as a whole, general
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+government investment should thus reach 6 percent of GDP in 2026. An increase in use of publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) is also planned (see Paragraph 9).
+
+
+**5.** **For these investment efforts to come to fruition, measures to improve budget**
+**execution capacity will, however, be indispensable.** The DRC has weak rates of investment
+budget execution, in the order of 50-70 percent (for the years 2018 -2019). This is particularly due to
+the lack of credibility of the budget approved by the legislature, which considerably increases the level
+of expected revenues during budget debates in order to inflate spending to optimistic levels. Budget
+execution is also weakened by cumbersome internal control procedures which incentivizes the use of
+emergency procedures, and by inconsistencies between the management of commitments and of
+cash available. In order to resolve these weaknesses and to improve public financial management,
+in 2021, the authorities adopted a new Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) for 2022-2028.
+Based on eight pillars, it aims, among other things, to provide the country with a modern, credible
+budget framework that supports government policy priorities and ensures the efficiency of public
+spending.
+
+
+**B. COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT**
+
+
+**6.** **General government investment in the DRC is largely externally financed by external**
+**funding and favors economic infrastructure.** Over the past five years, almost two thirds of general
+government investment has been externally-financed (Figure 1.E). The government’s aim is to
+reverse this trend progressively, to reach a level of 70 percent of domestic financing in 2026. In
+addition, in 2018 (before the pandemic), investment spending in social sectors (including education,
+health, housing, and social welfare) represented about 28 percent of capital spending, while
+economic infrastructure construction represented 42 percent of the total. This breakdown is in line
+with the average of comparator groups (Figure 1.F). The share of investment spending in social
+infrastructure did however increase temporarily in 2020-2021, in response to the COVID-19
+pandemic.
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.E. Sources of financing for central**
+**government investment spending** (% of GDP)
+
+2.5
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.F. Public investment by function:**
+
+**regional comparisons in 2018***
+
+
+
+100%
+
+
+80%
+
+
+60%
+
+
+40%
+
+
+20%
+
+
+0%
+
+
+|Col1|17%|Col3|23%|Col5|17%|Col7|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||**13%**|**13%**|**13%**|**13%**|**6%**|**6%**|
+||**13%**|**13%**|**5%**|**5%**|**26%**
|**26%**
|
+||**28%**|**28%**|**20%**
|**20%**
|**20%**
|**20%**
|
+||**28%**|**28%**|**52%**|**52%**|**51%**|**51%**|
+||**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|
+
+
+
+DRC Low-income
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+2.0
+
+
+1.5
+
+
+1.0
+
+
+0.5
+
+
+0.0
+
+
+
+
+
+2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
+
+Externally-financed
+
+Domestically financed
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Subsaharan Africa
+
+
+
+countries
+
+
+
+Source: Data from the authorities and calculations by the mission.
+
+ - The amounts of investment by function for the DRC were not available. The mission calculated a proxy using data from
+budget execution reports, by aggregating capital expenditure and construction outlays by ministry.
+
+
+**7.** **Provinces and decentralized territorial entities (ETDs) contribute moderately to the**
+**public investment effort.** Provincial governments carry out investment projects using their own
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+resources, fiscal transfers, and funding from donors. [3] They may use debt to finance their investments,
+as allowed by the LOFIP, and they may enter into PPP arrangements (see paragraph 9). The
+amounts of transfers actually executed are very low - less than 0.1 percent of GDP. Apart from these
+fiscal transfers, reliable information on investment by provinces and ETDs is lacking. The 2022-24
+Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) report nevertheless estimates 2021 capital spending by
+provinces and ETDs at 0.8 percent of GDP.
+
+
+**8.** **Investment by public corporations in the DRC is substantial.** The Government portfolio
+includes some forty public corporations. [4] Although the mission was not able to obtain consolidated
+data on investment executed by all public corporations, planned investment by all public corporations
+over recent years is considered to have been in the order of 2 percent of GDP a year, according to
+the Ministry of the Portfolio. Investment is basically carried out by the few large public corporations in
+the portfolio, with, first and foremost, _Société Nationale d’Electricité_ (SNEL) - the national electricity
+company - whose investments represented one third of public corporations’ investment in 2021
+according to the Ministry of the Portfolio. [5] _Générale des Carrières et des Mines_ - mining exploration
+and production company - is also a significant player, which has invested, in particular, in operation of
+mines and other assets in the past few years. The remainder of investment by public corporations is
+limited, and concentrated in the public transportation sector.
+
+
+
+**Figure 1.G. PPP capital stock** (nominal, % of
+GDP)
+
+
+
+7.0
+
+
+6.0
+
+
+5.0
+
+
+4.0
+
+
+3.0
+
+
+2.0
+
+
+1.0
+
+
+0.0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
+database and IMF staff calculations
+
+**9.** **The stock** **of PPP capital**
+**stock in the DRC is significant and growing.** According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in
+Infrastructure (PPI) database, the PPP capital stock never exceeded 0.5 percent of GDP in the past
+two decades; this is well below the average stocks observed in low-income countries or Sub-Saharan
+
+
+3 For example, the province of Kinshasa told the mission that its 2022 investment budget was broken
+down as follows: CGF 630 billion for investments using transfers from central government, CGF 180
+billion for investments using the province’s own funding, and CGF 299 billion for the Kin Elenda
+project financed by the World Bank.
+
+4 The Government holds all of the shares in 22 enterprises that have become commercial companies,
+as well as 25 to 50 percent in joint ventures with a blocking minority in 19 companies (2022-2024
+MTFF).
+
+5 The most recent financial report of SNEL found on-line is that for financial year 2016. The
+enterprise’s investments at that time had risen to US$284 million (0.8 percent of GDP).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+Africa (Figure 1.G). Nevertheless, according to the latest statement on government fiscal risks, the
+Congolese Agency for Major Works (ACGT, _Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux_ ) currently
+manages at least seven roads as concessions granted to the private sector, for a total contract
+amount of over US$2 billion (about 4 percent of GDP); and several new contracts have been signed
+since the adoption of the new legal framework applicable to PPPs in 2018. The Banana deep-water
+port project will consist in the construction, within two years, of a 600-meter long quay and a logistics
+area with a storage capacity of approximately 1.3 million metric tons of goods. The central
+government signed a concession agreement in 2021 with DP World for the financing, construction,
+operation, and maintenance of the port, at a cost of US$1.3 billion. The works should get underway
+in 2022 and the length of the concession is initially set at 30 years. Finally, during the technical
+meetings held with the mission, the existence of PPP projects involving provincial governments was
+confirmed. However, the absence of a consolidated database is an obstacle to obtaining a
+comprehensive overview of the stock. This stock is planned to increase in the next few years; the use
+of PPPs was identified in the 2021-2023 _Programme du Gouvernement_ as a key method for financing
+major projects.
+
+##### **II. Efficiency and impact of public investment in the DRC**
+
+
+**10. Despite recent efforts, access to most types of basic infrastructure remains limited.**
+Access to basic infrastructure, in particular to primary school, fell in the 1990s as a result of the civil
+war. Despite the period of relative calm that followed, access to electricity, health services, and
+drinking water are still very limited and have even reduced since the end of the 1990s due to faster
+growth in the population than in the infrastructure (Figure 2.A).
+
+- _Electricity_ production per capita has stagnated over the last 20 years despite huge hydroelectrical
+potential in the country. According to the World Bank’s worldwide development indicators,
+although there has been a modest increase in access to electricity since 2000, only 20 percent of
+the population was connected in 2018. Access to electricity is not at all uniformly available across
+the whole of the country, with even some urban areas having no access, and often very limited
+access in the provinces, even to supply strategic infrastructure. According to the health map of
+the DRC developed with the support of USAID, [6] only 32 percent of health centers thus had
+access to electricity in 2019. In addition, line losses are significant; at a rate of 40 percent, the
+World Bank [7] considers them to be twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan Africa.
+
+- In the _health sector_, the number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants, which was already low
+during the 1990s, fell by one third over the past two decades and was less than 1 in 2019. The
+health map mentioned above confirms that access to health services is very poor in the
+provinces: in 2019, only 40 percent of provincial health divisions had at least one specialist doctor
+and 47 percent had a general practitioner.
+
+- The percentage of the population with access to _drinking water_ is estimated at 45 percent as
+against 70 percent for comparator groups. The network also suffers from lack of continuity in
+distribution. Realized production by REGIDESO (the dominant public corporation in drinking
+
+
+6 Survey conducted between July and September 2019 in nine provinces. Results available at
+https://dev.cartesanitairerdc.org/data#section-info
+
+7 _République Démocratique du Congo Revue de la Gestion des Dépenses Publiques et de la Responsabilisation_
+_Financière Accroître l’Efficacité et l’Efficience du Secteur Public pour Promouvoir la Croissance et le_
+_Développement._ (DRC: review of public expenditure management and financial accountability - Increasing
+efficacy and efficiency of the public sector to promote growth and development), World Bank Report 2017 Volume II.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+water distribution) decreased by 21 percent between 2006 and 2013, meaning that production
+capacity per inhabitant fell by 7 percent over the same period, accordingly.
+
+- Meanwhile, the road network (not included in Figure 2.A due to lack of comparative data) is
+confronted with problems of dilapidation and lack of maintenance. According to the 2019-2023
+PNSD, paved roads only accounted for 2.3 percent of the total network at the beginning of the
+period, often leading to high transport costs as well as to delivery delays both for people and for
+goods.
+
+
+**11. In contrast, access to public education infrastructure has shown positive development**
+**since the 1990s.** The number of secondary teachers per 1000 inhabitants nearly tripled in 20 years
+to 4.2 in 2019, exceeding the ratio for comparator groups. However, other indicators reveal
+weaknesses in relation to outputs and outcomes of education. The World Bank’s worldwide
+development indicators show that in 2016, only 27 percent of the population (aged at least 25 years)
+had completed secondary education, and 63 percent had completed primary education; and the rate
+of illiteracy in those over the age of 15 was 20 percent.
+
+**Figure 2.A. Indicators of physical access to public infrastructure - 2019**
+
+
+DRC Low-income countries Subsaharan Africa
+
+
+
+
+
+People using at least basic
+
+drinking water services
+
+
+
+4.5
+
+
+4.0
+
+
+3.5
+
+
+3.0
+
+
+2.5
+
+
+2.0
+
+
+1.5
+
+
+1.0
+
+
+0.5
+
+
+0.0
+
+
+
+
+
+Public education
+
+infrastructure
+
+
+
+Electricity production per
+
+capita
+
+
+
+Public health
+infrastructure
+
+
+
+100%
+
+90%
+
+80%
+
+70%
+
+60%
+
+50%
+
+40%
+
+30%
+
+20%
+
+10%
+
+0%
+
+
+
+Source: World Bank Worldwide Development Indicators and IMF staff calculations
+Note: The education infrastructure is measured by number of secondary level teachers per 1000 people; production of
+electricity per inhabitant is in thousands of kWh per person; public health infrastructure is estimated using the number of
+hospital beds per 1000 people.
+
+
+**12. Perception of the quality of infrastructure has deteriorated slightly since 2010 and**
+**remains below that of comparators.** According to the surveys conducted by the World Economic
+Forum among business leaders, the perception of quality of infrastructure in the DRC in 2017 (score
+of 2 on a scale of 1 to 7) was worse than that of comparator countries (average score of 3,
+Figure 2.B). The World Bank’s logistical performance indicators reflect the same trend, even showing
+a deterioration in perceived quality of trade-related and transport infrastructure since 2010. Finally,
+although they are almost ten years old, the surveys conducted in 2013-2014 by the World Bank
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+among private enterprises [8] showed the impact of these weaknesses on the private sector. Almost all
+of the enterprises surveyed stated, in fact, that they had suffered electricity outages, and over half
+identified electricity as a major constraint on the business climate (Figure 2.C).
+
+
+
+**Figure 2.B. Infrastructure quality as**
+**perceived by business leaders** (scale 1
+7)
+
+
+
+**Figure 2.C. Insufficiencies in access to infrastructure**
+
+
+
+companies)
+
+
+
+**as perceived by private companies** (2013-14, % of
+
+
+
+
+
+Subject to
+electrical outages
+
+
+
+7.0
+
+
+6.0
+
+
+5.0
+
+
+4.0
+
+
+3.0
+
+
+2.0
+
+
+1.0
+
+
+
+
+
+2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+100
+
+90
+
+80
+
+70
+
+60
+
+50
+
+40
+
+30
+
+20
+
+10
+
+0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Subject to water
+
+isufficiencies
+
+
+
+Perceiving
+transport as a
+major constraint
+
+
+
+Perceiving
+electricity as a
+major constraint
+
+
+
+Source: World Economic Forum, IMF staff calculations
+
+
+
+Source: World Bank, 2013 Sample of 529 private enterprises
+
+
+
+**13. The very low levels of public capital stock per capita in the DRC only allowed to**
+**achieve limited results in terms of access to and quality of infrastructure.** The gap between the
+DRC and its comparators in terms of public capital stock per capita is considerably more significant
+than in terms of physical access to infrastructure. At first sight, this therefore reflects a high level of
+efficiency of public investment compared with other countries, as calculated by IMF staff, with the
+DRC even situated on the efficiency frontier (Figure 2.D). However, this result is not satisfactory in
+itself and should be interpreted with great caution. Public capital stock per capita does not include the
+infrastructure constructed through PPPs or by public corporations. The indicators for access to
+infrastructure hide serious disparities between regions. The quality of infrastructure, low in the DRC
+(see previous paragraph), is not taken into account in this figure. Also, the risk of regression is high;
+infrastructure development struggles to follow demographic growth, and without regular maintenance
+efforts, the electricity and/or water networks suffer from dilapidation and line losses, leading to a
+progressive deterioration in the service. In sum, the DRC is still well below the standards of
+development of the region. Meeting these needs will require considerable investments, while fiscal
+space is limited. It will therefore be absolutely crucial to invest efficiently in order to obtain the best
+possible outcomes in terms of improving access to and quality of public services.
+
+
+8 A World Bank survey was conducted between August 2013 and May 2014 among 529 enterprises.
+The survey results are available at
+https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2013/congo-dem-rep
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Figure 2.D. Efficiency frontier (physical access to infrastructure)**
+
+
+Subsaharan Africa Other countries Frontier
+
+160
+
+
+
+140
+
+120
+
+100
+
+80
+
+60
+
+40
+
+20
+
+0
+
+
+
+
+
+Public capital stock per capita (input)
+
+
+
+
+
+Source: IMF data and IMF staff calculations. The graph highlights the amounts of public capital stock per capita (x-axis) and a synthetic
+index that aggregates the data for physical access to infrastructure presented in Figure 2.A. When a country is located on the frontier, this means
+that it has maximized physical access relative to other countries, given the level of investment. However, the efficiency frontier loses its relevance
+for countries with very low levels of capital stock.
+
+##### **III. Public investment management assessment**
+
+
+**A. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT**
+
+
+**14. This section assesses the institutional design and effectiveness of the 15 public**
+**investment management institutions in the DRC using the PIMA methodology (Figure 3.A).** The
+institutions are spread across three stages of the public investment management cycle. (I) ensuring
+sustainable levels of public investment through a sound planning process; (ii) allocating resources to
+the right sectors and projects; and (iii) implementing the investment projects within the specified
+periods so as to deliver productive and sustainable assets. The following sections aim to assess the
+institutional design (“on paper”) of each institution, based on the laws, regulations, and
+manuals/guides, as well as its effectiveness (“in practice”) based on the study of actual practices in
+the DRC. The assessment is based on meetings with the main parties involved and on the data and
+documents gathered during the mission. The assessment is focused on the central government’s
+practices in terms of planning, allocation of resources, monitoring of projects, and coordination with
+the other public sector entities, such as the subnational governments - SNGs (provinces and ETDs)
+and the public corporations.
+
+
+**Figure 3.A. The PIMA assessment framework**
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+
+
+Source: IMF staff
+
+
+**15. There are significant deficiencies in the public investment management institutions in**
+**the DRC, both on paper and in practice.**
+
+
+- Institutional design in the DRC is better in the project implementation stage than in the planning
+and allocation stages (Figure 3.B). That is also true relative to regional averages and countries
+with the same level of income, with the strengths lying in public procurement (institution 11), cash
+management and asset management (institutions 12 and 15), while the main weaknesses are in
+national and sectoral planning (institution 2), coordination between public sector entities
+(institution 3), project appraisal (institution 4), and budget comprehensiveness (institution 7).
+
+
+- In practice (Figure 3.C), the _effectiveness_ of public investment management institutions in the
+DRC is often lower than the legal framework suggests; this is particularly true in the areas of
+public procurement (institution 11), cash management and asset management (institutions 12
+and 15). Effectiveness is slightly higher than institutional design in some cases, thanks to
+practices for the appraisal and oversight of externally-financed projects (institutions 4 and 13) and
+to budget transparency initiatives going above and beyond legal obligations (institutions 3 and 7).
+Finally, the effectiveness of public investment management practices in the DRC is, more often
+than not, far below that of its comparator groups
+
+
+
+**Figure 3.B. DRC: Strength of public investment**
+**management institutions and comparison with**
+**regional averages and countries of similar income level**
+
+
+
+**Figure 3.C. DRC: Effectiveness of public investment**
+**management practices and comparison with regional**
+
+**averages and countries of similar income level**
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Oversight**
+
+
+
+**Funding**
+
+
+**11.**
+
+
+
+
+
+**Oversight**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**12. Availability of**
+**Funding**
+
+
+**11.**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Investment**
+
+
+**ALLOCATION**
+
+
+
+**Funding**
+
+
+
+**Investment**
+
+
+
+**Funding**
+
+
+
+**ALLOCATION**
+
+Source: Mission Source: Mission
+
+
+**B. PLANNING SUSTAINABLE LEVELS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT**
+
+
+
+**1. Fiscal Targets and Rules** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of reform:_
+_Low)_
+**16. The purpose of this institution is to ascertain the existence of fiscal targets or rules to**
+**facilitate medium-term planning of public investment spending and to ensure long-term public**
+**debt sustainability.** Excessive volatility in investment spending undermines the efficiency of public
+investment. The assessment focuses on the existence of fiscal objectives; it does not emphasize a
+preference for any specific fiscal policy or the share of spending that public investment should
+occupy. This first institution aims to ensure that (i) a target or limit is set to enable the Government to
+ensure long-term debt sustainability, (ii) fiscal policy is framed by one or more fiscal rules, and (iii) a
+medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is in place to align fiscal policy and preparation of the annual
+budget.
+
+
+**17. The government has no permanent quantitative target or limit for public debt that**
+**would help ensure its sustainability, even though it is** _**de facto**_ **constrained by commitments**
+**made under the program with the IMF** . As part of its membership in the Southern African
+Development Community (SADC), one of the objectives of which is to ensure macroeconomic
+convergence among its member countries, the DRC must formally avoid having a high percentage of
+government debt to GDP. [9] High-level macroeconomic convergence criteria, including a public debt
+limit of 60 percent, were adopted by the member countries in 2003 in a regional indicative strategic
+plan. In the absence of an explicit reference to this limit in the documents produced by the
+government, this criterion does not, however, constitute a formal constraint on DRC’s debt
+sustainability. In practice, the General Directorate of Public Debt (DGDP) of the Ministry of Finance
+attends to debt sustainability by setting a medium-term debt strategy, which provides annual debt
+targets set in accordance with investment needs, while taking into account refinancing and foreign
+exchange risks. However, the DGDP has not completed a debt sustainability analysis since 2017. As
+things stand, the government’s financial and economic program established with the support of the
+
+
+9 Articles 2 and 7 of the memorandum of understanding of 2011 and Articles 2 and 7 of the Annex on
+Finance and Investment of 2006.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+IMF’s Extended Credit Facility since 2021, instills effective discipline with regard to debt by
+committing the country to maintaining a moderate level of risk of external debt distress, and setting
+ceilings on non-concessional external borrowing entered into or guaranteed by the public sector, as
+well as ceilings on total borrowing.
+
+
+**18. The law on public finance (LOFIP) sets a fiscal rule on the current deficit of the central**
+**and local government, from which the authorities have deviated somewhat in recent years.**
+The only fiscal rule currently in force in the DRC, according to the IMF definition, [10] is described in
+Article 15 of the LOFIP. This article requires the central government, and each province and ETD to
+implement their budgets while balancing their current expenditure with domestic resources. [11] In other
+words, this “golden rule” enables borrowing solely to finance investment. [12] However, this rule was not
+complied with in 2019 and 2020 with a current balance deviating from equilibrium by 0.5 percentage
+point of GDP, according to the mission’s calculations.
+
+
+**19. A multiyear macro-fiscal framework is prepared every year, enabling distinctions**
+**between current and capital spending.** As set forth in the LOFIP (Article 13), the Ministry of Budget
+sets a three-year MTFF (including the ongoing year and the two following years) covering the whole
+general government. It is based on macroeconomic assumptions supplied by the Ministry of Planning.
+The MTFF provides aggregate projections for revenues, expenditure, balance, and debt. It
+distinguishes between current and capital spending but does not distinguish expenditure on ongoing
+projects from expenditure on new projects. In practice, the MTFF has helped to delineate the overall
+amount of investment spending which gets approved in the budget. In the past three years, capital
+appropriations approved in the budget laws have been on average 4 percent higher than the amounts
+projected a few months earlier in the MTFFs. This gap was only 1 percent for the 2022 budget,
+suggesting that the MTFF investment envelopes have served as effective ceilings for the budget.
+
+
+**20. Strengthened oversight of medium-term public debt is important, but is a low reform**
+**priority.** The discipline in practical terms imposed by the program with the IMF in force until end-2023
+means that actions in this area are less urgent than other reforms covered by the PIMA framework.
+Nevertheless, several actions could allow the authorities to ensure that planning and budgeting for
+investment are consistent with the objective of public debt sustainability: (i) carrying out an public debt
+sustainability analysis with a broad perimeter including the debt of public corporations, as well as
+alternative scenarios incorporating all the debt instruments, the natural resource operating profiles,
+the demographic projections, and contingent liabilities [13] ; (ii) the explicit verification, in the MTFF and
+the budget execution reports, of compliance of the projections with the fiscal rule set by Article 15 of
+
+
+10 A fiscal rule is a long-lasting formal constraint on public finances through predetermined numerical
+limits to broad fiscal aggregates. The convergence criteria of the SADC and of the Common Market
+for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which are indicative in nature, are not considered as
+fiscal rules.
+
+11 The rule excludes internal borrowing, grants, and repayment of loans and advances.
+
+12 The experience of golden rules has shown that they have not always been able to maintain public
+investments at high levels (see IMF paper, 2020. _[Well Spent](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Books/Issues/2020/09/03/Well-Spent-How-Strong-Infrastructure-Governance-Can-End-Waste-in-Public-Investment-48603)_, Chapter 7). Moreover, in the absence of
+an explicit limit to the debt, such rules have often encouraged excessive indebtedness to finance
+investment projects, frequently leading to unsustainable levels of debt and potentially requiring
+significant reductions in public investments to support a fiscal adjustment that has become inevitable.
+
+13Such an analysis, carried out by the DGDP in cooperation with the Ministries of the Portfolio,
+Budget, and Planning, could also be conducted when debt is planned for major infrastructure
+projects, in order to ensure sustainability.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+the LOFIP; and (iii) the provision in the MTFF of the overall distinction between investment spending
+on ongoing projects and on new projects.
+
+
+**2. National and Sectoral Planning** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_
+_reform: High)_
+
+**21. Public investment should be guided by national or sectoral strategies or plans with**
+**clear, realistic priorities, cost estimates and precise sectoral objectives** . This institution looks,
+first and foremost, into whether national and sectoral investment strategies covering all public
+investment projects, whatever their source of funding, are prepared and published. It underlines the
+importance of quantification of the costs of public investment plans and assesses whether sectoral
+strategies identify measurable targets for public investment outputs and outcomes.
+
+
+**22. The National Development Strategy Plan (PNSD) and the various existing sectoral**
+**strategies contain little precise information about major projects in their published versions.**
+The 2019-2023 PNSD (prepared in 2019 and in the process of being reframed) constitutes the main
+development strategy of the DRC and is published. The PNSD was prepared by integrating the
+priorities of each sector, broken down into strategic pillars, programs, subprograms, and actions to be
+implemented, and retaining the strategic objectives set forth in the sectoral strategies when these are
+available. [14] Among the major sectors of economic and social infrastructure usually taken into account
+in the assessment, only two sectoral strategies - the 2019-2022 National Health Care Development
+Plan (PNDS); and the 2016-2025 sectoral strategy for education and training - have been published
+recently. There is no recent strategy relating to the economic infrastructure sectors. [15] Although the
+published versions of the PNSD and the sectoral strategies considered here describe the actions by
+major pillar or strategic objective, they do not identify clearly a portfolio of investment projects to be
+implemented. The 2019-2023 Priority Action Program underlying the PNSD does indeed identify
+investment projects in some sectors (for example, transport, electricity, housing, etc.), but it is not
+published. By contrast, the 2021-2023 Government Program identifies a list of priority infrastructure
+projects, in particular in the sectors of transport, electricity, and water. In practice, some major
+projects identified in the Government Program or the PAP may be found in the 2022 budget law; the
+absence of a comprehensive list of projects annexed to the strategies prevents more in-depth
+checking. However, the standard project fiche that monitors every investment project from its
+identification to its implementation (see institution 4) requires a relationship with the PNSD and the
+sectoral strategies to be established, suggesting the existence of a link between the initiation of a
+project and its inclusion in planning.
+
+
+**23. The majority of the national and sectoral strategies do not present information on**
+**underlying costs of investments, whether in total or at individual project level.** The PNSD
+estimates that the total cost of the strategy over five years would be US$47.6 billion, taking all
+sources of funding combined (including funding to be identified). Nevertheless, neither the PNSD, nor
+
+
+14 The PNSD is also supported by sectoral thematic groups created by a decree in 2013, which
+serves as a framework for consultation and harmonization of sectoral actions among the
+Government, donors, civil society, and the private sector. These groups also aim to ensure ownership
+of the sectoral strategies by the various parties involved as well as to mobilize the necessary
+financing for their implementation.
+
+15 The authorities have also pointed out strategies that have not been updated in the transport and
+energy sectors. In addition, some subsectors less directly linked to public infrastructure (industrial
+development plan, 2025 national digital technology plan) are covered by a strategy.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+its underlying PAP, [16] although it is more detailed, present the total cost of investments attached to the
+strategy. The Government Program does not provide any information on the costs of investment,
+either at the total or the individual project level. The 2016-2025 sectoral strategy for education and
+training is the only one to present annual costs of investment by education cycle, but without
+providing any information on the costs of individual projects. For these various reasons, it is not
+possible to appraise the overall consistency between the total amounts of investment spending in the
+strategies and those recorded in the successive budget laws.
+
+
+**24. The sectoral strategies taken into consideration include measurable targets for their**
+**outputs and outcomes, but the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of these**
+**targets seems weak.** The sectoral strategies for health and education mentioned above are
+associated with M&E frameworks specifying the monitoring indicators, their data sources, and annual
+target values. Accordingly, the two strategies propose measurable indicators that allow progress in
+terms of access, fairness, and efficiency to be measured relative to target values. [17] The system of
+assessment also provides for the completion of surveys enabling the ongoing collection of data and
+results by the departments and ministries involved. For these two strategies, interim reviews are
+planned to measure progress achieved and to assess the relevance of the actions carried out, as well
+as, if necessary, to review the value of the targets set out at the start of the strategy. It is worth noting
+that within its sectoral pillars, the 2019-2023 PNSD indicates objectives, outcomes, and indicators for
+the monitoring process, making the link with the various objectives of sustainable development, but it
+does not present any quantified target. The efforts to reframe the PNSD already underway aim to
+strengthen M&E by including quantified targets.
+
+
+**25. Improving information on the nature, costs, outputs, and outcomes of the investment**
+**projects underlying planning is a high priority for reform.** The main planning documents - PNSD
+and sectoral strategies - should therefore also include the total and annual amounts of investment
+needed to achieve these strategies. When it is reframed, and for the next cycles, the PNSD should
+include a list of major investment projects, regardless of their sources of funding, as well as their
+expected costs. This will require sectoral ministries to carry out an exercise to identify their needs for
+major projects, using their sectoral planning mechanisms. The formulation and publication of sectoral
+strategies in the major economic infrastructure sectors (transport, water, energy) would be helpful in
+this regard. Finally, the PNSD should attach quantified targets to its indicators to enable its
+performance to be monitored. The transition to program-based budgeting will provide the opportunity
+to strengthen the links between planning and budgeting, for example by having some performance
+indicators in common.
+
+
+**3. Coordination Between Entities (** _Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_
+_reform: Medium)_
+
+**26. The various levels of government and agencies should coordinate their public**
+**investment actions with a view to achieving consistent planning and implementation.** First this
+institution assesses the level of coordination between the Government and the provinces and ETDs,
+and whether the Government uses a transparent, rules-based system to make capital transfers to the
+regional, provincial and local authorities. It also analyzes the framework set up to monitor and publish
+
+
+16 Costs are associated with the investment projects identified in the PAP, but not according to an
+economic classification that would distinguish operating from capital expenditure.
+
+17 As an example, for education: gross school enrollment rates, average scores in standardized tests,
+and school dropout rates; for health: maternal and neonatal mortality rates, and rates of tuberculosis
+or malaria.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+the Government’s exposure to major fiscal risks relating to public investment projects carried out by
+other government agencies (public corporations and PPPs).
+
+
+**27. The harmonization conferences between the central government and the provinces**
+**planned in the legal framework are no longer organized in practice, and there is no joint**
+**publication of investment plans.** The memorandum of understanding of March 29, 2013 sets forth
+the practical arrangements for joint management of capital appropriations in five sectors under the
+exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. [18] According to Articles 8 and 10 of the memorandum,
+investment spending funded by transfers to the provinces and ETDs are planned in accordance with
+all the programs and projects of the country as whole, in the context of annual project harmonization
+meetings coordinated by the Ministry of Planning. Transfer-funded capital spending is budgeted in the
+budget law, but no multiyear provincial investment plans are published. Further, in practice, the
+coordination mechanisms are only partially functioning. The investment harmonization meetings in
+advance of budget formulation have not been held since 2018, as there has been a lack of financing
+for organizing them. [19] New practices emerged in 2021 as part of preparation of the local development
+plan in the 145 territories (PDL-145T), with planning meetings being held focusing, however, only on
+the PDL projects. The effectiveness of the coordination is, in the final analysis, called into question by
+the significant gap between capital transfers approved by vote in the budget and those actually
+executed, both in terms of projects and amounts (Table 3.A).
+
+
+**28. The calculation formula used to determine the transfers is not known to provincial**
+**governments, and effective transfers deviate significantly from the amounts planned.** The
+basic rules for establishing the transfers to the provinces and the amounts allocated to the National
+equalization fund ( _Caisse nationale de péréquation_ ) do exist, [20] but the calculation formula used by
+the Ministry of the Budget to establish the base, the horizontal distribution among the provinces and
+the ETDs, and among the three categories of transfer, [21] is not known by the provinces. According to
+the fiscal calendar, the provisional transfer envelopes are communicated in September of year n-1,
+which is six months before the start of fiscal year n. In practice according to the authorities, this
+communication is made in November, after the vote on the budget law. The amounts transferred for
+investment differ significantly from those planned, with an average execution rate of 5.3 percent
+in 2016-2021. [22] In 2020, according to the accounting law and the Court of Accounts, transfers to the
+provinces had been budgeted for 858 projects, only 13 of which made use of their funds during the
+year. In that same year, for the province of Kinshasa, four projects were executed with amounts on
+
+
+18 Health, education, rural development, infrastructure, and other sectors under the exclusive
+jurisdiction of the provinces (memorandum of understanding dated March 29, 2013 on the procedures
+for the application of investment appropriations in the sectors under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
+provinces.)
+
+19 In practice, according to the Ministry of Planning, planning is carried out to a large extent by
+redirecting unexecuted appropriations to the following year, and on the basis of written
+communication with various provinces.
+
+20 The LOFIP sets the main principles for the base of transfers to the provinces and ETDs. It is
+expected that they will receive 40 percent of the total amount of national revenues. These revenues
+are distributed among the provinces according to their contribution capacity and their demographic
+weight, and potentially the need to compensate for environmental damage related to extractive
+industry. In addition to this transfer the Constitution set up a National equalization fund, receiving
+10 percent of national revenues.
+
+21 Investments, remunerations, operation.
+
+22 Calculation by the mission based on the data provided by the DGPPB of the Ministry of the Budget.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+average 20 times higher than budgeted (Table 3.A). [23] Finally, although the respective sums have
+been budgeted, in actual fact, the Caisse nationale de péréquation has never been supplied with
+funds.
+
+
+**Table 3.A. Kinshasa City-Province projects executed using central government**
+
+
+Accounting Law.
+**29. The analysis and publication of the contingent liabilities arising from major projects of**
+**the provinces, public corporations, and PPPs still need to be institutionalized.** The legal
+framework does not ensure for either the provinces, [24] the public corporations, [25] or the PPPs that their
+contingent liabilities are systematically reported to the Ministries of the Budget and Finance. For the
+PPPs in particular, a decree providing a framework for granting the guarantees provided by the 2018
+law on PPPs is still not available. [26] Despite these obstacles, in 2021 the General Directorate of Fiscal
+Policies and Programming (DGPPB) of the Ministry of the Budget prepared, with the help of FAD, and
+published an initial fiscal risks statement ( _Déclaration sur les Risques Budgétaires_, DRB).
+Specifically, it covers the fiscal risks linked to public corporations and PPPs, but not those related to
+the provinces. In light of the conversations with the various entities holding information, the analysis
+remains at an embryonic level, in particular because the information is often only partial. For public
+corporations, for example, the DRB does not state the contingent liabilities arising from their major
+investment projects. For the PPPs, the DRB prepares a partial list of the PPPs in progress, without
+any analysis of the fiscal risks associated with the guarantees granted to these projects.
+
+
+**30. Improved coordination of capital spending between the provinces and central**
+**government and analysis of fiscal risks are medium priorities for reform.**
+
+- _The reestablishment of annual harmonization conferences on investment spending between the_
+_provinces and the central government should provide a more realistic estimate of the projects to_
+_be financed,_ and enable coordination that takes into account all sources of financing. This should
+ultimately contribute to a more precise estimate of the expected expenditure for the fiscal year. In
+
+
+23 Coordination problems between central government and the provinces, limited capacities of the
+provinces to follow the procedure for the execution of transfers, and cumbersome administrative
+processes all contribute to the weakness of execution rates. In particular, the provinces do not have
+public procurement units; they depend on the central ministries to carry out the procurement
+procedures and management of the expenditure chain.
+
+24 The provinces’ debt is governed by Article 15 of the LOFIP, which sets forth rules for the amounts
+and nature of the borrowing. However, there is no implementing regulation or formal mechanism
+establishing that the DGDP of the Ministry of Finance supervises compliance with these rules.
+
+25 The DGDP has information on the loans onlent to the public corporations that it supervises.
+Nevertheless, neither the DGDP, nor the Ministry of the Budget has an overview of the financial
+health of the enterprises or their investment projects. This is a result of there being a single authority
+of financial supervision, specifically the Ministry of the Portfolio, without setting up any channel of
+communication with the Ministries of the Budget and Finance.
+
+26 The 2018 law on PPPs provides for a broad range of guarantees, likely to generate considerable
+fiscal risks. Article 15 provides for sovereign guarantees for the effective execution of contracts,
+whereby the terms for granting them must be established by decree. Moreover, the PPPs are eligible
+for balancing subsidies without their calculation or verification methods being set out.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+addition, preliminary notification of the envelopes to the provinces, more in advance of the fiscal
+year, for example after the preparation of the MTFF planned in June, would be preferable to
+enable the provinces to plan ahead for the preparation of their investment budgets.
+
+- _Managing fiscal risks arising from the PPPs assumes particular significance in light of the_
+_substantial guarantees that may be attached to them_ . That requires the urgent adoption of the
+decree operationalizing Article 15 of the law on PPPs. It would also be advisable for the Ministry
+of Finance, through the DGDP, to play a strong role in the system for validating all guarantees
+before they are issued. A veto power should be given to the Ministry so that it could oppose any
+PPPs considered to be too risky during their review by the new Standing Committee on Project
+Validation. It will also be important to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry in terms of analysis
+of the risks attached to projects.
+
+- _The first DRB of 2021 is a significant step forward, and the underlying fiscal risk analyses should_
+_be expanded and deepened in the future_, in particular to include a review of contingent liabilities
+arising from major investment projects and public corporations, as well as an analysis of the
+guarantees granted to the whole portfolio of ongoing PPPs. Challenging actions include the
+establishment of mechanisms to transmit information on risks from the various entities to the
+DGPPB, and the strengthening of the tools for analysis and supervision of risks.
+
+
+**4. Project Appraisal** _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak:_ _Priority of reform_ _**:**_ _High)_
+
+**31. Good practice in the area of appraisal aims to ensure that projects are analyzed using**
+**a rigorous methodology before being selected and budgeted.** The PIMA methodology requires
+that major investment projects be subjected to rigorous financial, economic, and technical analysis
+using a standard methodology with the support of a central authority and incorporating a risk analysis.
+
+
+**32. Besides donor-funded projects, in the absence of a legal framework imposing limits**
+**and with the lack of resources, rigorous preliminary appraisal of public investment projects is**
+**rare.** There is no legal, [27] or even documentary [28] framework setting as principles the systematic
+submission of large-scale investment projects to rigorous financial, economic, and technical analysis,
+and the publication of the results of the analysis. In practice, even though externally financed projects
+are generally assessed, [29] those using their own funds are rarely subjected to rigorous appraisal due
+to the lack of resources. The existence of a preinvestment fund, [30] with the purpose of financing
+feasibility studies for major projects using own funds, is a good practice. According to the Ministry of
+Planning, the amount allocated to the fund would enable it to finance 10 appraisals a year. However,
+the budget data analyzed by the mission for the 2018-2022 period, while not comprehensive, suggest
+a very low level of execution (or even zero, depending on the year) of the appropriations allocated to
+this fund. Overall, the ministries with which the mission met stated the frequent absence of appraisals
+for domestically funded projects. According to the IGF, the poor quality of analyses, or absence
+
+
+27 The order dated July 19, 2019 establishing the Commission for identification and selection of public
+investment projects (CISPIP) lays down that technical subcommittees analyze and assess the project
+feasibility studies without stipulating that they be systematic.
+
+28 The public investment selection manual of the Directorate of Planning and Budgeting of the Ministry
+of Planning (June 2018) specifies the process for feasibility studies, without mentioning anything
+about it being a systematic process, or referring to their publication. The former procedures manual
+on preparation, execution, and M&E of the PIP of November 2002 is obsolete.
+
+29 The procedures of donors, especially multilateral, systematically include mandatory preliminary
+appraisals and publication of their main results.
+
+30 Interministerial order of May 20, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of the
+preinvestment fund.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+thereof, explains in part the delays and cost overruns found during implementation. Lastly, very few
+appraisals are published on line and there is no single entry point for appraisals of externally financed
+projects. The Central Coordination Office (BCECO) does expect for the future, however, to publish
+the studies about its projects on its website.
+
+
+**33. The absence of standard methodology and of a central support structure for appraisal**
+**compromises the capacity of the authorities to select the most mature projects.** There is no
+standard methodology or central support structure for the appraisal of major investment projects that
+would ensure a consistent basis of the analytical process. The procedures of donors provide for their
+own appraisal methodologies and are, thus, by definition, not standardized. The BCECO has a
+methodology, which is, however, only applied to its own project portfolio; the mission was informed
+that the Congolese Agency for Major Works (ACGT), which manages significant road infrastructure
+projects does not have a standard appraisal methodology. The regulatory framework specifying the
+powers of the technical secretariat of the Commission for identification and selection of public
+investment projects (CISPIP) or of the BCECO does not explicitly task them with providing technical
+advice about appraisals and cannot therefore be considered as central support agencies for appraisal
+of major projects.
+
+
+**34. The absence of an institutional framework for risk assessment in the preliminary**
+**studies has a negative impact on risk management during the implementation stage.** There is
+no legal framework requiring a systematic risk assessment during the appraisal of projects. In actual
+fact, risk analysis remains too limited at the appraisal stage to enable active management of risks
+during the implementation stage. Outside the externally financed projects, [31] according to the
+ministries met during the mission, appraisal of domestically funded projects and PPPs does not
+systematically measure the associated risks. The grid used during identification of projects (see §63)
+provides a summary appraisal of whether the risks and the mitigation measures have been properly
+identified, without, however, entering into an extensive analysis. According to the IGF, the risks
+inherent to the projects mentioned by the ministerial departments, such as those in connection with
+securing of land, provision of funds within specified periods, delays in execution, and cost overruns,
+very often arise at the time of project implementation.
+
+
+**35. The strengthening of the preliminary project appraisal process is a high priority of**
+**reform to support the selection of the best projects.** The future decree on public investment
+management will have to lay down the basic principles (i) of systematic submission of all major
+investment projects, regardless of their method of funding, to a rigorous environmental, financial,
+economic and technical appraisal using a standard methodology; (ii) of the publication of the results
+of the analyses; and (iii) of the consideration of the risks in the appraisal and the need to provide for
+mitigation measures. Standard appraisal methodologies will have to be prepared in the short term,
+based on what is already available and on the various initiatives currently in progress. The financial
+resources allocated to the prefinancing fund will have to be rationalized, and a central support
+committee or agency for project appraisal should be set up, ideally at the Ministry of Planning, tasked
+with producing advice to those responsible for projects and to the appraisers on the required analysis.
+
+
+**5. Alternative Infrastructure Financing** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority_
+_of reform: High (PPP)_
+
+**36. This institution aims to assess the regulatory framework for mobilization of private**
+**investments on economic infrastructure markets, PPPs, and investments by public**
+
+
+31 In December 2021 the BCECO prepared a draft project management manual incorporating risk
+management, which has to be validated at a workshop at a later date.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**corporations.** The assessment focuses on the existence of a legal and regulatory framework that
+facilitates the participation to investment of the private sector, public corporations, and autonomous
+organizations. It aims to ascertain that (i) a regulatory framework supports competition on the
+contestable markets for economic infrastructure; (ii) a strategic and legislative framework guides the
+preparation, selection, and management of PPP projects; and (iii) there is a framework for the
+oversight of investment plans of public corporations and autonomous organizations, as well as of their
+financial results.
+
+
+**37. The majority of major infrastructure sectors have been deregulated in law, but there is**
+**only effective competition in the telecommunications market.** The regulatory frameworks of the
+electricity, telecommunications, and water sectors opened these markets to competition and
+participation of the private sector. [32] Two regulatory authorities, the Electricity Sector Regulatory
+Authority (ARE) and the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, have been set up and
+given administrative and financial autonomy to oversee, among other things, the promotion of
+competition. In practice, only the telecommunications market experiences effective competition
+between several private operators. In the other two sectors, [33] the public corporations responsible for
+the production, transport, and distribution of electricity and water - SNEL and REGIDESO - continue
+to be _de facto_ monopolies; the private operators are mainly present in the areas that are poorly
+served by these two companies, such as the east of the country, or are used to overcome limits in
+production capacity. [34] The role of the economic regulators also remains limited. For example,
+according to the World Bank, the ARE is not able to maintain price competition, as the SNEL offers its
+customers subsidized rates (below cost), which makes it difficult for the private operators to market
+their electricity at reasonable prices. Transport, in particular road transport, is dominated by private
+operators working in the informal sector.
+
+
+**38. As they are governed by a new legal framework that is in the process of consolidation,**
+**the PPPs are still not covered by a clear national policy, although the PPP project portfolio is**
+**already expanding.** Law 18/016 of July 9, 2018 sets forth the procedures for identification, selection,
+validation, and oversight of the PPPs. The law provides for strict separation between the functions of
+management, regulation, approval, and oversight, and sets forth in particular the key role of the
+Public Contracts Regulatory Authority (ARMP), which is responsible for the selection and appraisal of
+PPP projects as well as their oversight both _ex ante_ _[35]_ and _ex post_ . In application of the law,
+Decree 21/04 of October 2, 2021 creates the PPP Advice and Coordination Unit (UC-PPP) as a new
+public establishment under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning. Among other tasks, the UCPPP is responsible for implementing the national policy relating to PPPs, maintaining a PPP
+database, assisting with the preparation of projects, and reporting to the Government on the PPP
+
+
+32 For electricity: Law 14/11 of June 17, 2014 on the electricity sector, which does not apply to power
+stations with power of less than or equal to 50KW, and Decree 16/013 of April 12, 2016 on the
+creation, organization, and operation of the Electricity Sector Regulatory Authority. For water:
+Law 15/026 of December 31, 2015 concerning water For telecommunications: Framework
+Law 013/2002 of October 16, 2002 on telecommunications and Law 014/2002 of October 16, 2002
+establishing the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.
+
+33 Several World Bank reports are used to support effectiveness in this dimension: _Increasing Access to Electricity_
+_in the DRC: Opportunities and Challenges_ . 2020; _Democratic Republic of Congo Systematic Country Diagnostic:_
+_Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State_ 2018.
+
+34 In the electricity sector the mining companies have built their own electric power stations to
+overcome SNEL’s production capacity limits.
+
+35 By conferring oversight before the fact to the ARMP, the law on PPPs complicates the regulator’s
+role, as it would be better for oversight before the fact to be the responsibility of the DGCMP, as
+provided in the law on procurement and the decree on that directorate’s powers.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+projects implemented every year. The UC-PPP also takes care of the technical secretariat of the
+Standing Committee on Project Validation tasked with the technical approval and analysis of the
+appraisals, requests for bids, and contracts. In this way this decree redistributes the functions that
+were the responsibility of the ARMP in the 2018 law; in practice the decree is in the process of
+operationalization. In addition, other implementing regulations are still needed for the full
+implementation of the legal framework. [36] The DRC has no national policy to guide the use of PPPs [37]
+that the UC-PPP is responsible for applying. Until full application of the law on PPPs, the institutional
+procedures underlying PPPs suffer from fragmentation among various agencies (in particular the
+ARMP and the ACGT), and there is no centralized, consolidated oversight of the whole portfolio of
+ongoing projects.
+
+
+**39. The legal framework for the oversight of public corporations does not require review of**
+**their investment plans by the government, even if this is done in practice.** The Ministry of the
+Portfolio is responsible for financial oversight of public corporations, which includes monitoring their
+financial performance (in cooperation with the ministries in charge of the technical oversight). [38] The
+public corporations are required to submit their annual financial statements to the financial oversight
+authority and to publish them, in accordance with the rules of the Organization for Harmonization of
+Business Law in Africa (OHADA). The purpose of the High Council of the Portfolio (CSP), positioned
+under the direct authority of the Minister of Portfolio, is to carry out the tasks of monitoring, oversight,
+and assessment of the enterprises in the portfolio, as well as to put forward, if necessary, financial
+recovery or restructuring plans proposed by the Public Corporation Reform Steering Committee
+(COPIREP). [39] It is also responsible for preparing the consolidated financial statements of the
+government’s portfolio and producing the activity reports, albeit without any explicit requirement to
+publish them, and to advise the Minister on the investment and financing programs of the
+corporations, in cooperation with relevant line ministries. Nevertheless, there is no explicit legal
+obligation for the public corporations to submit their investment plans to the Ministry of the Portfolio
+for review. In practice, according to the CSP, the public corporations submit their investment plans to
+the CSP, however. By contrast, no consolidated report on these plans or on their financial statements
+is published. The 2022 statement of fiscal risks does, however, contain information on the level of
+debt and the financial performance of the corporations in the portfolio.
+
+
+**40. The clarification of the legal framework for PPPs is a high priority for reform.** Given the
+political will of the authorities to make significant use of PPPs to develop infrastructure, it is urgent to
+finalize the implementing decrees of the PPP law, and to settle conflicts between the various legal
+
+
+36 The other implementing regulations must specify, among other things, the model project fiche, the approval
+procedures, and the various categories of approval authorities and the procedures for granting this Government
+guarantee. An order is also expected setting forth the approval authorities and establishing the approval
+thresholds for PPP procurement, as well as a regulation establishing the response period of the contracting
+authority to requests for clarification by candidates.
+
+37 A PPP policy is an official document, often adopted by the government, which aims to explain and
+delineate the conditions for the use of this method of financing and which indicates the infrastructure
+markets open to PPPs, the principles for risk-sharing, the PPP financing objectives to be achieved,
+the type of contract, a list of viable projects able to be completed with a PPP, as well as information
+on the project selection, oversight, and reporting criteria, among other things.
+
+38 Law 08/010 of July 7, 2008 establishing the rules on the organization and management of the Government
+portfolio.
+
+39 Decree 13/036 of September 3, 2013 on the creation, organization, and operation of the High
+Council of the Portfolio and Decree 9/15 of April 24, 2009 on the creation, organization, and operation
+of the COPIREP.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+texts by clarifying the distribution of roles [40] among the various committees and agencies (in particular
+the ARMP, UC-PPP, and DGCMP). The Ministry of Finance (DGDP) must also play a key role as
+guarantor of the financial viability of the projects, in particular at the stage of their appraisal and
+adoption. A national PPP policy should be set up, specifying the infrastructure markets open to PPPs,
+the risk-sharing principles, the PPP financing objectives to be achieved, a list of viable projects that
+could be implemented as PPPs, information on the project selection criteria, their oversight, and the
+role of the public authorities throughout the process. An effort should also be made to enable the
+ARMP and the UC-PPP to keep an up-to-date register of the whole PPP portfolio, including PPPs
+currently managed by other agencies (such as the ACGT). Further, in light of the significance of
+public corporations in the provision of basic public services, the transparency of their financial
+relationships with the government, as well as their good governance and efficient oversight by the
+government are critical, Although it may be a lower priority in terms of the PIMA, the authorities
+should publish a consolidated annual report on the financial position of the public corporations, which
+would include information on the amounts they are investing. The preparation and publication of
+documents providing a portfolio strategy, covering the aims of the public shareholders and the
+investment and performance targets of the corporations, would also be helpful.
+
+
+**C. ALLOCATING INVESTMENTS TO THE RIGHT SECTORS AND PROJECTS**
+
+
+**6. Multiyear Budgeting** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform: High)_
+
+
+**41. Major public investment projects have a fiscal impact spread over the medium term.** it
+is important to know the total costs and the forecast schedule of payment obligations relating to
+execution, in order to ensure, at any time, the sustainability of the investment expenditures in relation
+to the macro-fiscal framework. The amount of expenditures required for ongoing projects and new
+projects must comply with the expenditure ceilings imposed by the macro-fiscal framework. Multiyear
+forecasts of investment spending should appear in the budget documentation, even though the
+budget system is annual. The three dimensions of this institution aim to check that the multiyear
+perspective is taken into account in public investment planning. The first dimension reviews whether
+there are any multiyear projections of investment spending and the degree of detail of such
+projections. The second dimension assesses whether the ministries are notified of the multiyear
+investment spending ceilings to enable them to prioritize their projects effectively. The third dimension
+identifies whether the total costs estimated for each project and the expenditures required for each
+year in this total are known and accessible by the public.
+
+
+**Figure 3.D. Capital budgets successively planned and voted by parliament (billions of CGF)**
+
+
+40 As expressed in the 2021 FAD report on the emergence of a fiscal risk management function,
+under an ideal system, the Ministry of Planning would be involved in the identification of projects and
+their selection in accordance with the development plan; the sectoral ministries would be in charge of
+steering contract negotiations and entering into contracts under the regulation of the ARMP, which
+would be advised by the technical unit attached to the Ministry of Planning, and with the active
+involvement of the Ministries of Finance and the Budget for the financial approval of projects after
+their appraisal, including the analysis of fiscal risks. _The approval of contracts would be submitted to_
+_the approval units that would be created by decree, with the Ministry of Finance having to play a key_
+_role as guarantor of the financial sustainability of the projects._ Oversight of contracts would be carried
+out by the ARMP, the sectoral authorities, and the Ministry of Finance for fiscal risks.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+billion CF
+
+14,000
+
+
+12,000
+
+
+10,000
+
+
+8,000
+
+
+6,000
+
+
+4,000
+
+
+2,000
+
+
+0
+
+
+
+2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
+
+
+
+0
+
+
+
+
+
+2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
+
+
+MTBF 2022-2024 Approved budget laws
+
+Actual expenditure
+
+
+Source: MTFF 2020-2022, 2021-2023, 2022-2024, LFI (Titles VII and VIII) of 2020, 2021, 2022, Cour des Comptes: 2020
+report on the accounting law, DGPPB: Fiscal Oversight Statement (ESB) of expenditure by heading as at December 31, 2021
+
+
+**42. The multiyear capital spending projections broken down by ministry are published, but**
+**the appropriations in the approved budget differ significantly from them.** The MTFF prepared
+each year by the Government in accordance with Article 76 of the LOFIP contains the projection of
+the capital spending envelopes for the next three years (see Institution 1). The Medium-Term
+Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF), flowing from the MTFF, break down the capital expenditures over
+three years by section (ministry) and heading. [41] Nevertheless, there are significant gaps between
+these multiyear capital spending projections and the initial budget laws (LFIs) approved by vote,
+which reduce the usefulness of the exercise for planning. The investment budgets of the last three
+LFIs thus differ significantly (by up to nearly 40 percent) from the forecasts for n+1 and n+2,
+contained in the MTFFs published previously (Figure 3.D).
+
+**43. Three-year capital spending ceilings are applied to each ministry on an indicative**
+**basis, but they diverge strongly from the approved budget laws.** The budget circular
+communicated in June provides these indicative capital spending ceilings, broken down by ministry
+and heading in the MTEF. [42] There are nonetheless significant gaps between these ministerial ceilings
+and the approved budget laws, just as there are gaps between the MTEFs associated with the
+MTFFs and the budget laws. The comparison of ceilings for four infrastructure-intensive ministries
+(budget circular of 2022) with the amounts approved by vote in the 2022 LFI show significant
+overshoots, with gaps in both directions, of over 15 percent (Table 3.B).
+
+
+
+**Table 3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+41 There are three headings relating to investment: externally financed investments, investments
+financed from own funds, and investments funded by transfer to the provinces and ETDs.
+
+42 According to the 2022 budget preparation circular, the determination of the needs of each sector
+should take into account the budget constraint, in particular the sectoral envelopes as notified in the
+annex to the circular (presenting the MTEFs).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+
+
+(July 2020)
+
+**44. The projections for total construction costs for major investment projects are neither**
+**published, consolidated, nor kept up to date comprehensively, even internally.** The Ministry of
+Planning manages the Public Investment Program (PIP), the purpose of which is to ensure the
+linkage over a rolling three-year time horizon between planning and budgeting. [43] The PIP [44] is broken
+down by ministry and includes the total costs of the projects as well as the annual expenditures
+planned for the next three years. The PIP seems, however, no longer to have been published with the
+budget documentation since the 1990s. [45] The version kept internally does not comprehensively
+encompass all the projects, thus totaling overall amounts that are well below those budgeted each
+year. Moreover, it is not kept up to date regularly. In practice, the link between the PIP, a tool
+managed by the Ministry of Planning, and the budget formulation process is weak. The Ministry of the
+Budget only has access to the PIP on request, and the PIP is not currently used in the budget
+formulation process.
+
+
+**45. The use of the PIP as a central tool linking planning with budgeting is a high priority**
+**for reform.** The role of the PIP as a basis for planning, multiyear budgeting, and selection of projects
+should be included in the future decree on public investment management. The publication of a
+multiyear PIP in the budget documentation showing total project costs over a multiyear horizon is
+considered to be international good practice. This would imply introducing a more systematic and
+more frequent provision of information on total costs (and their development) of planned and current
+projects by line ministries to the Ministry of Planning. Accordingly, it is important to ensure automated
+sharing of this information with the Ministries of the Budget and Finance, the incorporation of the
+review of the PIP in the budget formulation process, and its publication with the budget
+documentation alongside the budget law. In the short term, a PIP, in which the total amount is aligned
+with the budget and the MTFF, could be produced and published with the 2023 LFI. An update of the
+current PIP will be necessary to ensure that it encompasses all ongoing projects and those about to
+start.
+
+
+**7. Budget Comprehensiveness and Unity** _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak: Priority_
+_of reform: High)_
+
+**46. The purpose of this institution is to assess the comprehensiveness and unity of the**
+**investment budget.** Only a presentation of all capital spending in the context of the budget and the
+coordination of capital spending with the corresponding current expenditures enable optimal budget
+decisions to be made. Accordingly, the following must be ensured: (i) capital spending is carried out
+for the main part within the budget framework, (ii) all investment projects, regardless of source of
+
+
+43 The 2009 PIP manual details the procedures for preparation, execution, and follow-up assessment
+of the PIP The manual is not formally covered at present by any legal text, but it draws its origins from
+Law 86/001 of March 7, 1986 on the approval of the first five-year plan of 1986-1990.
+
+44 The analysis here is mainly based on the most recent version of the PIP submitted to the mission,
+covering the period 2021-2023.
+
+45Source: Ministry of Planning, Public Investment Programming Conference report 2020-2022
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+funding, are presented in the budget documentation, and (iii) the capital and current budgets are
+prepared and presented together in the budget documentation.
+
+
+**47. While the legal framework allows significant capital expenditures to be made by means**
+**of extrabudgetary entities and without parliamentary authorization, a large part of their**
+**expenditure using Treasury financing is included in the budget.** [46] Extrabudgetary entities
+supporting investment projects exist in the form of public establishments, such as the Highways
+Office (OR) and the Office of Roads and Drainage (OVD), and public services, such as the ACGT.
+They are not under the obligation to obtain parliamentary authorization for their investment spending
+financed by the Treasury or to register them in the general budget. The authorization of their budgets
+and their oversight are the responsibility of their oversight ministry (the Ministry of Infrastructure and
+Public Works in all three cases). [47] Nor does the LOFIP provide for their expenditures to be included in
+the LFI, even for information purposes. The mission was not able to verify the annual investment
+budgets of these entities, but it is likely that they are significant. [48] In practice, the capital expenditures
+of the OR and the OVD are at least partially included in the budget documentation, but not the
+expenditures of the ACGT. [49] According to the mission’s estimates, over 75 percent of the
+extrabudgetary entities’ domestically-funded capital expenditures are presented in the budget. [50]
+Despite this positive practice for some, it is worth noting that the failure to register projects in the
+budget law is a frequent occurrence for all types of projects, including those of budgetary entities,
+which hence poses a problem of credibility of the budget (Box 3.A).
+
+
+**48. There is no obligation to include the investment projects of public corporations or**
+**PPPs in the budget documentation, even though some do appear in it.** The LOFIP sets forth
+externally financed capital expenditure as a heading in the budget law, even though donor-funded
+projects are often executed by extrabudgetary entities that are exempt from registering their budgets
+in the budget law (such as the ACGT or the BCECO). For PPPs and for public corporations’
+investment projects, the LOFIP only provides for their inclusion in the budget documentation for
+information. The analysis of the 2022 LFI nevertheless shows that in practice the budget
+documentation covers projects in all three categories. It is not possible, however, to ascertain that the
+majority of the projects are included, as there is no consolidated list of projects in any of the three
+categories.
+
+
+46 This paragraph (dimension 7a of the assessment) focuses on the extrabudgetary entities that
+execute expenditures using Treasury financing. The externally funded projects and PPPs are covered
+by the following paragraph (dimension 7b). Even though the ACGT was created first and foremost to
+manage externally financed projects, its role has changed to also manage Treasury-financed
+projects.
+
+47 Law 08/009 on public establishments does not provide for their budgets to be included or annexed
+to the LFI, or authorized by the National Assembly. Public services, in turn, enjoy financial and
+administrative autonomy pursuant to the decrees that established them (see Decree 08/17 of
+August 26, 2008 on the creation, organization, and operation of the ACGT). Here, too, the oversight
+ministry approves the budget, without a mandatory parliamentary authorization or inclusion in the
+budget law.
+
+48 The ACGT states that it manages a budget of US$2.3 billion (website). By comparison the capital
+expenditures of the annual budget of the DRC in the 2022 LF total US$3.6 billion.
+
+49 Some capital expenditures of the OR and the OVD are registered in the annual budget of the 2022
+LF under investment by the MITP (Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works). As for the ACGT,
+although its budget appears in the budget law, the investment projects that it manages are outside
+the general budget.
+
+50 Very approximate estimate, based on the 2022 LF (figures for the OVD and the OR), and the 2017
+annual report of the ACGT.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+- _Externally financed projects are included in the LF, in principle_, even though some - in particular
+the projects of the ACGT financed by Chinese partners and some other projects executed by the
+BCECO [51] - do not appear in the LF. Also, it is often the case that projects are executed without
+being registered in the budget in advance (Box 3.A).
+
+- _Some PPP projects have appeared in the budget documentation since the 2022 LFI._ The DRB in
+effect includes a list of the ACGT’s PPPs, but omits other PPPs, such as those supported by the
+OVD or the Banana deep water port. [52]
+
+- _Some projects supported by public corporations are also included_ . The respective oversight
+ministries supervise the capital expenditures and their potential recording in the LFI.
+
+
+**Box 3.A. Gap between investment projects registered in the budget and those executed**
+
+The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability report estimates that only 31.6 percent of the projects
+executed in 2018 had been registered in advance in the budget. The latest accounting law for fiscal year 2020
+highlights a similar finding:
+
+- Overruns of budgetary investment appropriations are significant (with an execution rate of
+over 120 percent).
+
+- A significant number of projects not initially registered in the LF are executed, above all externally financed
+projects (292 projects executed, whereas 153 had been registered).
+
+- Conversely, a large number of projects registered in the LF are not executed, particularly projects financed by
+own funds (41 projects executed as opposed to 708 registered).
+
+
+Source: Court of Accounts: Report on fiscal year 2020, Section 3.2.1.2. N.B.: execution rate comparing execution
+with the supplementary budget.
+
+
+**49. The capital and current budgets are presented together in the LFI, but prepared**
+**relatively separately.** According to Article 77 of the LOFIP, the Ministry of the Budget prepares the
+draft budget law for the year (covering both the capital and the current budget), which is submitted in
+the form of a consolidated document to the National Assembly. The transition toward program-based
+budgeting is underway and should be completed in 2024. The budget contains a presentation by
+
+
+51 According to the BCECO, it only acts as an agency executing such projects, in the capacity of
+delegated contracting authority. The responsibility for registering such projects in the LF lies with the
+project manager.
+
+
+52 The 2022 LFI includes appropriations for the deep-water port of Banana for the Société congolaise
+des transports publics (Congolese public transport company). However, it appears that there has
+been a mistake in the registration, given that this entity was removed from the management of the
+PPP.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+functional classification, but, as it is not crossed with the economic classification, it is not possible to
+know how the capital and current budgets complement each other. In fact, there is significant duality
+in the preparation of budgets. The preparation of the capital budget is coordinated by the Ministry of
+Planning, which gives specific instructions to the sectoral ministries. [53] The result of this process is
+presented to the Ministry of the Budget at the budget conferences. Although the project fiches shared
+by the sectoral ministries include information on the needs for current appropriations flowing from
+capital projects, the Ministry of the Budget has no procedure to check that the estimates are reliable
+or that the concomitant appropriations are registered in the current budgets. Furthermore,
+classification by chapter ( _titre_ ) is not fully adhered to; Chapters VII and VIII, which normally constitute
+capital expenditures, comprise some current expenditure in practice. [54]
+
+
+**50. The inclusion in the budget law of all capital expenditure is a high priority for reform**
+**and the strengthening of the integration between capital and current budgets is a medium**
+**priority.**
+
+
+- _The inclusion in the budget documentation of all capital expenditure, all types of management,_
+_and sources of financing combined, is a high priority for reform._ Significant work is necessary to
+strengthen the credibility of the budget, and this work is provided for under the Priority Action Plan
+for the implementation of the updated Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan. As things stand, a
+significant portion of the capital spending comes under exceptional management rules, often
+managed by extrabudgetary entities. The rules will have to be strengthened to make sure projects
+are systematically included in the budget documentation, thus ensuring transparency and
+creating the basis for appropriate fiscal reporting. The future decree on public investment
+management should contain the principle that all public investment projects should be included in
+the budget.
+
+
+- _A second reform priority, of medium importance, is to better integrate the preparation processes_
+_for capital and current budgets (Box 3.B)._ The coordination could be strengthened, in the first
+instance, in the sectoral ministries, through mechanisms for communication between the
+Directorates for Research and Programming (DEPs) and the staff responsible for preparation of
+the current budgets, and, in the second instance, through procedures for checking the
+consistency of the two budgets by the Ministry of the Budget ahead of and during the budget
+conferences. The transition to program-based budgeting should help to better integrate the
+capital and current budgets. A commented version of the Government Chart of Accounts would
+be helpful to effectively ensure the appropriate economic coding of expenditures. Over the sevenyear horizon of the Public Financial Management Reform Program, more advanced unification of
+the capital and current budget preparation procedures should be sought, so as to align the DRC
+
+
+53 The Ministry of Planning has organized investment planning conferences, with the participation of
+the sectoral ministries and the Directorate of Preparation and Monitoring of the Budget (DPSB) of the
+MB (Ministry of the Budget) until 2018.
+
+54 The presentation of the investment projects in the budget law does not include any coding that
+would break down project expenditures by economic type. The totality of the amounts associated with
+the projects is considered as investment, while the annual budgeted work plans (PTBAs) of the
+projects do contain a description of expenditure of all types (goods and services, operation of project
+units, etc.). Other projects, judging by their name, only seem to cover current expenditures
+(consultants’ fees, etc.) The DRC should move toward having a coding of projects by type of
+expenditure, so as to isolate, within each project’s expenditure, the part representing gross fixed
+capital formation from operating expenditure.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+with international best practice and to ensure optimal coordination of the various categories of
+spending.
+
+
+**Box 3.B. Country examples for the joint preparation of the capital and current budgets**
+**Indonesia**
+
+- Recent reforms of the budget planning and formulation process promote allocation of resources based on
+outcomes, regardless of whether it is a matter of capital or current appropriations. To ensure integration of
+capital and current spending, many sectoral ministries have created integrated planning and budgeting
+divisions within their directorates. For example, within the Ministry of Education, the General Directorate of
+Schools has five divisions, each of which has a planning and budgeting division covering both infrastructure
+and current expenditure. This organizational structure promotes communication and coordination.
+
+- The capital and current spending proposals are presented under one and the same activity program and
+function, and are discussed jointly when annual work programs and budgets are formulated. In addition to
+this integration of the budget formulation and planning processes, harmonized budget classifications are
+used in the information systems.
+
+**Jordan**
+
+- The capital and current budgets are formulated by the General Directorate of the Budget and are presented
+in the same document. The Ministry of Planning plays a key role, in particular, in the selection of public
+investment projects, but does not participate in the process of preparing the consolidated budget.
+
+**Mauritius**
+
+- The process for preparing the public sector investment plan (PSIP), the annual budget, and the MTFF are
+well coordinated and closely integrated. The budget includes information on capital and current spending
+classified according to a program structure (with over 200 programs). Details on the investment projects are
+provided in the PSIP, presented each year with the budget documentation to the Parliament.
+
+- Sector Ministry Support Teams, (SMSTs) at the Ministries of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED)
+carry out reviews of the sectoral plans of the ministries and their budget proposals. The MOFED is also
+involved in the process of appraisal and selection of public investment projects.
+
+Source: Mission, information from previous PIMA missions
+
+
+**8. Budgeting for Investment** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of_
+_reform: Medium)_
+
+**51. Budget procedures should aim to facilitate the availability of appropriations over the**
+**multiyear construction cycle of projects.** The three dimensions under this institution are focused
+on three procedures. The first dimension assesses whether future commitments linked to the
+investment projects are reflected in the budget documents. Decision makers should always be aware
+of the total cost of a project and the amount that has to be allocated in the future. The second
+dimension relates to the possibility of reallocating funds from capital expenditures during the fiscal
+year. The capital budget may be reduced if the investment appropriations can be transferred to the
+current budget, which can make the implementation of the capital budget more difficult. Finally, the
+third dimension relates to the prioritization of ongoing projects over new ones. If ongoing projects do
+not receive sufficient funding to cover the expenses planned in the budget year, these projects will
+suffer from implementation delays that lead to inefficiencies and cost overruns.
+
+
+**52. Budgeting based on commitment authorizations (** _**autorisations d’engagement**_ **AEs)**
+**and payment appropriations (** _**crédits de paiement**_ **CPs), which allows to monitor future**
+**payments associated with investment projects, is not yet applied.** Articles 42 and 78 of the
+LOFIP provide for budgeting based on AE-CP, as well as the production of an annex to the draft
+budget law presenting the AEs and their consumption, in order to produce information on total costs
+of projects, the amounts committed, and the amounts disbursed. In practice, this reform is underway,
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+which means that at this stage, the budget documents only contain the payment appropriations
+associated with the projects for the first year. The PIP prepared internally by the Ministry of Planning
+shows the total cost of the investment projects, as well as a projection of the payment appropriations
+for the next three years. However, the PIP is not fully comprehensive and is not part of the budget
+documentation submitted to the parliament (see Institution 6). In all, the budget documentation sent to
+the parliament does not contain information on the total or multiyear costs of investment projects.
+
+
+**53. Transfers of appropriations from capital to current expenditure are possible by way of**
+**ministerial order; this is however not done in practice.** Article 47 of the LOFIP provides that
+transfers of appropriations may be made between chapters ( _titres_ ) by order of the Minister in charge
+of the budget; that indicates therefore that the Minister of the Budget may allow transfers of capital
+appropriations to current appropriations. The LOFIP does not provide any ceilings on the amount of
+such transfers. In practice, however, no transfers of capital appropriations to current appropriations
+have been applied in recent years. [55] This is related, among other things, to the fact that a module for
+managing movements of appropriations was developed by the Interministerial Information
+Technology Coordination department (C2I) in the PREPABUD software to apply a “lock” on transfers
+of appropriations.
+
+
+**Ongoing projects are not prioritized in the allocation of budget resources to guarantee their**
+**completion in due time.** The annual circular on the preparation of the budget and the letters from
+the Minister of Planning, which frame the preparation of the capital budget, recommend that the
+sectoral ministries prioritize ongoing projects in their requests for appropriations. However, there is no
+other more stringent mechanism to prioritize the allocation of appropriations to the execution of
+ongoing projects. Consequently, some projects that are in the process of implementation are
+sidelined from one year to the next in favor of new projects; then they eventually reappear in the
+budget for subsequent fiscal years, depending on the choices and decisions of the sectoral ministries,
+with no oversight by the Ministry of Planning, or the Ministry of the Budget (see the case of the
+Ministry of Mines in Box 3.C). This situation prolongs the duration of projects and actually increases
+their final cost of completion due to the interruptions in implementation, in the absence of budget
+appropriations.
+
+
+**Box 3.B. Budgeting in the medium term for the investment projects of the Ministry of**
+
+**Mines**
+
+From 2019 to 2022, there was a discontinued decrease from six to three in the number of projects budgeted for
+the Ministry of Mines; this shows that inclusion in the budget is no guarantee that the project will stay in the
+subsequent budgets until full completion.
+
+- Three of the six projects budgeted in 2019 were not budgeted in 2020.
+
+- Two of the three projects budgeted in 2020 were not budgeted in 2021.
+
+- One project budgeted in 2019 that was not budgeted in 2020 was revived in 2021.
+
+- In 2022, three new projects were budgeted and all the other projects underway were put on hold, one of
+which was revived in the end with a different coding, with a total cost significantly revised upward, which
+classified it as a new project.
+
+Source: Mission, using the database of the Ministry of Mines.
+
+
+55 This was said by the ministries met by the mission and verified by the mission on the basis of an
+extract from the appropriation transfers produced for the 2021 supplementary budget.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**54. The reform on safeguarding capital appropriations is of medium priority and should be**
+**included in the transition to program-based budgeting.** The scope for improvement lies above all
+in the full implementation of AE-CP budgeting by 2024 and in communicating the PIP to parliament,
+which would enable better knowledge and monitoring of the total cost and the multiyear commitments
+relating to each project (Institution 6). The procedures guide to AE-CP budgeting should, in particular,
+specify that reports on the consumption of AEs should contain a breakdown by project. This
+information would also help to enable ongoing projects to be prioritized before financing new ones, a
+general principle that could be formally established in the future decree on public investment
+management.
+
+
+**9. Maintenance Funding** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform:_
+_Medium)_
+
+**55. An infrastructure asset cannot offer the benefits promised at the time of its design if it**
+**is not maintained correctly** . This institution focuses on whether maintenance needs are known, and
+how these maintenance needs are reflected in the budget and in planning. The first dimension relates
+to the existence of a methodology enabling the determination of the need for routine maintenance.
+Barring exceptions, routine maintenance is financed by the current budget. The second dimension
+covers the existence of a methodology enabling the determination of the need for capital
+maintenance (major improvements, restoration, and reconstruction). In principle, expenditures linked
+to this type of maintenance are included in the capital budget. The third dimension relates to the
+availability of information to establish the amount of maintenance funding included in the national or
+sectoral plans, and allocated in the budget.
+
+
+**56. The estimation of routine maintenance needs is hindered by the lack of standard**
+**methodologies to assess them, except in the road sector** . According to the ACGT, a standard
+methodology is used to support road maintenance; however, the mission did not have access to this
+methodology. There is no methodology in other sectors, including maintenance of buildings. In the
+road sector, the maintenance processes are well established; they are taken care of by the road
+management agencies (OR, OVD, and the Office for Farm Roads) and funded by the National Road
+Maintenance Fund (FONER). Despite this institutionalization, the needs are greater than the financing
+available. The financial needs to cover routine maintenance of the DRC's road network are estimated
+by the FONER at US$340 million a year. [56] By contrast, the Annual Road Maintenance Program
+for 2020, formulated on the basis of the needs expressed by the road management agencies, was
+only US$108 million, or 32 percent of the actual needs; and only 73 percent of these amounts were
+effectively allocated to routine maintenance (Table 3.C).
+
+|Table 3.C. Comparison between the ro Road management agencies|outine maintena U.S. dollars) Actual needs|ance needs and fu Needs expressed|unding available (in Resources allocated|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Road management agencies**
|
**Actual needs**
|**Needs expressed**
|**Resources allocated**
|
+|
Highways Office
|
-
|
64,109,631
|
27,507,280
|
+|
Office of Roads and Drainage
|
-
|
33,323,492
|
42,322,209
|
+|
Office for Farm Roads
|
-
|
11,416,034
|
3,000,000
|
+|
Infrastructure unit
|
-
|
-
|
4,673,456
|
+|
Protection of road assets
|
-
|
-
|
500,000
|
+|
Other FONER activities
|
-
|
-
|
1,000,000
|
+|
**Total**
|
**340,000,000**
|
**108,849,157**
|
**79,002,945**|
+
+
+
+56 FONER, 2020 Annual activity report
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**57. The estimation of financing requirements for renovation and restoration is not based**
+**on standard methodologies, except for the road sector.** According to the ACGT, as in the case of
+routine maintenance, a standard methodology is used to support the assessment of needs for
+restoration and renovation of roads; however, the mission did not have access to this methodology. In
+practice, several restoration and renovation projects can be found, in particular in the road sector,
+mentioned and included in the PNSD and the Government Program, as well as in the budget laws.
+Nevertheless, it is not clear whether that is enough to meet infrastructure restoration needs. The
+mission was not able to verify the financial coverage of needs relating to renovation work registered in
+the Government budget, as it did not receive an account of the budget requests discussed in planning
+and budgeting conferences.
+
+
+**58. Routine maintenance and major improvement expenditures can be distinguished**
+**precisely from each other, but there is no such distinction in the budget documentation.** The
+DRC’s Government Budget Classification (2015) allows routine maintenance to be distinguished from
+maintenance which increases the value of assets. [57] The central government budget is based on this
+classification, which codifies routine maintenance work as current expenditure and renovation and
+restoration work as capital expenditure, accordingly. The information system is able to provide this
+data with all the details by government department and economic type, in terms of both forecast and
+execution. Nevertheless, the budget documentation submitted to the parliament does not provide this
+distinction, thus preventing the parliament from holding more in-depth discussions on the consistency
+of the policy for the preservation of the value of government assets.
+
+
+**59. The reforms needed to maintain the assets in good condition and to improve their**
+**durability and value are of medium priority.** First, infrastructure asset managing authorities should
+be provided with standard methodologies for the estimation of routine maintenance, renovation, and
+restoration needs; then, sufficient resources should be allocated in the budget, for example by
+requesting that the sectoral ministries identify and prioritize their requirements for routine
+maintenance and restoration in their budget proposals (Box 3.D). The future decree on public
+investment management will have to express the principle of systematic inclusion of project
+maintenance at the time of project design, budgeting, and implementation.
+
+
+**10. Project Selection** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak_ _**:**_ _Priority of reform: High)_
+
+**60. Project selection based on objective, transparent criteria and procedures is a key**
+**factor in the efficient management of public investment.** The selection of projects consists in
+choosing public investment projects, taking into account the financing constraints, based on a plan or
+a set of projects, appraised against the relevant political, environmental, social and economic
+conditions, to ensure perfect coordination between stages of the investment cycle. The PIMA
+methodology takes into account (i) the existence of a review of the appraisal of major projects before
+including them in the budget; (ii) the publication of standard selection criteria and processes and
+compliance with them; and (iii) the existence of a list of appraised projects, pending inclusion in the
+annual budget.
+
+
+**Box 3.D. Example of inclusion of project maintenance costs: South Africa**
+
+
+57 Current maintenance is recorded in Title 5 (expenditure on services), categories 5-615
+(maintenance and repair of materials and equipment) and 5-617 (maintenance, decoration, and repair
+of works and buildings). Capital maintenance works are included in Title 8 (construction, repair,
+restoration, addition of works and buildings, purchase of real estate), categories 8-233 (restoration,
+repair, addition of works and buildings).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+In **South Africa**, procedures for annual estimation of maintenance costs by type of infrastructure have been
+established, as well as those relating to the needs for renovation or replacement, with a view to effective
+budgeting to ensure the durability of nonfinancial government assets.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Type of
infrastructure|Average Annual
Maintenance
Budget as % of
Replacement Cost|Key Assumptions|Replacement or Major
Rehabilitation over and
above the Annual
Maintenance Budget
requiring specific capital
budget|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Bulk water storage
|4-8%|Mostly for periodic repair of electrical and mechanical works, storm damage repair, routine
maintenance and periodic maintenance|
every 30 to 50 years|
+|Water treatment
works|4-8%|Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment|every 20 to 30 years|
+|
Water reservoirs|2-3%|Generally low maintenance mostly of telemetry and electrical equipment, storm damage
repair, pipe work repair, safety and security, routine maintenance and periodic maintenance
|
every 20 to 30 years|
+|Water reticulation
|4-8%|Mostly for telemetry and pumping equipment, emergency leak repair and ongoing leak
repair due to degradation, storm damage repair|every 20 to 30 years|
+|Sewage treatment
works|4-8%|
Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment, storm damage and periodic maintenance.
|every 20 to 30 years|
+|
Sewer reticulation
|4-8%|Mostly for pumping equipment, emergency leak repair and ongoing leak repair due to
degradation, blockage removal, storm damage repair,
|every 20 to 30 years|
+|Roads and storm
water|5-10%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (resurfacing
every 7 to 10 years).
|every 20 to 30 years|
+|
Public buildings|4-6%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g.
repainting and cosmetic upgrades every 5 to 10 years).|every 30 to 50 years|
+|Hospitals|5-8%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g.
repainting every 3 to 5 years, and cosmetic and operational upgrades every 7 to 10 years).
|every 20 to 30 years|
+|Schools|4-6%|Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g.
repainting every 5 to 7 years, ).
|every 30 to 50 years|
+|Electricity generation|5-8%|
Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment and dependent on age and technology of
works|every 30 to 50 years|
+|Electricity reticulation|10-15%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, safety and security, routine maintenance
and periodic maintenance (e.g. every 7 to 10 years).|
every 20 to 30 years|
+
+
+Source: Mission
+**61. The regulations confer upon the CISPIP the responsibility for reviewing preliminary**
+**appraisals, but the CISPIP does not meet in practice, and the review of project fiches remains**
+**superficial.** The 2019 order on the CISPIP [58] gives it the role of analyzing and assessing the
+feasibility studies of projects before their potential selection for inclusion in the PIP and the budget.
+Within the CISPIP, four technical subcommittees relating to the four sectors of planning are in charge
+of the work of analysis and assessment of the feasibility studies of projects using own funding and the
+counterparties of projects that are externally funded. [59] Nonetheless, the regulatory framework does
+not provide for the review of all major projects with the contribution of independent experts or an
+independent organization. In practice, the CISPIP is not in operation. Although projects are reviewed
+by the Ministry of Planning, this review only looks into whether project fiches have been filled in. This
+review is carried out during the CPIP, which meets annually in June [60] under the auspices of the
+Ministry of Planning. According to the various departments consulted during the mission, there is no
+review of externally financed projects, given the difficulties in obtaining comprehensive information
+
+
+58 Order of the Minister of Planning dated July 19, 2019: many DEPs of the ministries spoke of their
+lack of knowledge of this order, which has not really entered into force.
+
+59 Article 4 of the order provides for the presence within the CISPIP of the director of coordination of
+external funding, the director or a representative of the PGAI, and the adviser in charge of the CSPP
+to gather information on financing conventions and agreements entered into with donors for
+cofinanced projects.
+
+60 As part of the CPIP, domestically funded projects are reviewed by the DPB and the sectoral
+directorates, with the experts from the DEPs of the sectoral ministries.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+from the Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI), [61] in the absence of a framework for
+consultation between the government and donors. During the budget conferences, the Ministry of
+Budget relies on the information contained in the project fiches, validated by the Ministry of Planning,
+without undertaking any review of the assessments. With regard to the review of appraisals of PPP
+projects, the Standing Committee on Project Validation provided for in the laws and regulations (see
+Institution 5) is not yet in operation.
+
+
+**62. There are no published specific criteria for the selection of appraised projects to be**
+**included in the budget, and the criteria used in practice are not appropriate.** The budget circular
+mentions superficially some standard criteria to assist the sectoral ministries with submitting their
+capital budget proposals, but it does not say anything about the criteria used by the Ministries of
+Planning or the Budget to guide the decisions made at the CPIP or at the budget conferences. The
+(unpublished) 2018 project selection manual of the Ministry of Planning proposes a grid of criteria and
+a scoring template to ensure objective selection and transparency, but the mission had no evidence
+that this grid was used in practice. It emerged from meetings held by the mission that project
+selection does not systematically pay attention to the benefits of the project and the realism of the
+implementation plans. In practice, at the time of budgeting, the Ministry of Budget prioritizes ongoing
+projects and those with a nonobjection opinion from the DGCMP. [62]
+
+
+**63. The Ministry of Planning can draw up a list of appraised projects, but, in the absence**
+**of a formal obligation to use this pipeline, many projects seem to be selected from outside the**
+**list.** The Ministry of Planning has a project database, stored in Access, which includes the information
+mentioned in the project fiches. Although the mission did not have access to this database, the
+Ministry of Planning indicated that it was possible to draw up a list of appraised projects from it.
+Nevertheless, there is no formalized requirement to select projects from this pipeline of appraised
+projects. [63] In practice, many projects seem to be selected from outside the list. Indeed, this finding
+was articulated by several sectoral ministries, [64] as well as by the IGF.
+
+
+**64. The development of a more transparent process for the selection of projects prior to**
+**their inclusion in the budget is a high priority for reform.** The future decree on public investment
+management should incorporate the basic principles guiding project selection, that is, selection based
+on objective, transparent criteria, and only among projects that have been appraised and are ready to
+be budgeted. The criteria should be published in the annual circular of the Ministry of Planning on the
+preparation of the PIP, and in the annual budget circular of the Ministry of Budget. Annex 6 presents
+an illustration of a list of relevant selection criteria, including specific criteria relating to climate
+change. Finally, the effectiveness of the selection process would benefit from the gradual creation of
+a bank of projects, supported by an integrated information system, which could follow the projects
+throughout their life-cycle.
+
+
+61 As provided in Article 2 of Ministerial Order°002/CAB/MIN/PL/2011 of February 7, 2011
+establishing the PGAI.
+
+
+62 The mission is of the view that these criteria are not appropriate, as, logically, the request for a
+statement of nonobjection can only be made at the end of the budgeting process. This means,
+therefore, that, in principle, only ongoing projects are covered by these criteria, and not new projects,
+
+63 The Ministry of Planning indicated that the budgeting process was derived strictly from the
+decisions made at the budget conferences and that its role stopped before that, thereby highlighting a
+certain degree of compartmentalization of the committees and agencies, whereas, in essence, public
+investment management should be a cycle jointly engaged in by several participants.
+
+64 In this regard, the ministerial departments specifically mentioned the existence of projects attributed
+to their appropriations, but which do not come from their portfolio.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**D. DELIVERING PRODUCTIVE AND DURABLE PUBLIC ASSETS**
+
+
+**11. Procurement** _(Institutional design: High: Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of reform: High)_
+
+**65. This institution aims to assess the degree to which the national procurement**
+**management system promotes and implements good practice.** The procurement system is
+assessed in relation to the implementation (i) of open, competitive, transparent procedures; (ii) of an
+appropriate system for monitoring the contracts awarded; and (iii) of a fair and diligent mechanism for
+the review of claims made by procurement bidders.
+
+
+**66. The law on procurement and its implementing regulations lay down principles of**
+**competition and publication within a reasonable timeframe, but significant exemptions reduce**
+**their significance in practice** . [65] Article 17 of Law 10/010 of April 27, 2010 on procurement
+establishes tendering as the basic procedure for awarding public contracts; direct awards are an
+exception subject to strict conditions laid down in Articles 42 and 43. As for publication, Article 34 of
+said law stipulates the publication of all tenders, subject to the penalty of being declared void, where
+the amount is greater than or equal to the tendering thresholds; Articles 35 and 36 set the publication
+deadlines, as supplemented by Article 88 of Decree 10/22 of June 2, 2010 on the procedures manual
+of the law. The minimum deadline for bidding is 30 days, subject to a reduction to 15 days in duly
+substantiated urgent cases, with special authorization by the DGCMP. Tenders are published on the
+ARMP website. In practice, according to the assessment carried out by the World Bank in 2020, [66] just
+under half of the processes (48 percent) are conducted in compliance with the law. Almost all public
+service contract awards involving a high financial value found in the ACGT portfolio were directly
+awarded, based on special authorizations given to avoid entering into competition. As for the
+publication principle, albeit well established in the legal framework, it is only partially applied, as it is
+not fully complete, and, in particular, because of the piecemeal communication by the contracting
+authorities of the initiatives taken by them and the lack of publicity about the cases dealt with in the
+office of the Minister in charge of the budget.
+
+
+**67. Monitoring of procurement remains patchy, relying on partially complete databases**
+**and analysis that is still largely conducted manually.** The data entry and management tools
+currently employed by the ARMP and the DGCMP do not cover all of the contracts and do not enable
+automated analytical monitoring reports to be produced. The analytical reports are said to be
+produced manually, but the mission did not obtain any examples of these reports and was thus not
+able to verify their periodicity and timely production. To remedy these weaknesses, the authorities
+have developed an Integrated Procurement Management System (SIGMAP) with the support of the
+PROFIT Congo project financed by the World Bank), but this has not yet been brought into operation,
+even in the pilot ministries. Development of the e-Procurement process is planned, with the support of
+the World Bank’s ENCORE project, in order to improve further the efficiency of the procurement
+management system.
+
+
+65 According to the laws and regulations, those involved in the management, awarding, and
+monitoring of procurement contracts are the contracting authorities, the authorities granting approval,
+the agency conducting _ex ante_ controls (DGCMP), and the agency for regulation and _ex post_ control
+(ARMP).
+
+
+66 Assessment of the Public Procurement System in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - MAPS II,
+June 2020, p. 14
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**68. The legal framework provides for a swift and fair process of investigation of**
+**procurement-related complaints, which is largely applied in practice.** The laws and regulations [67]
+organize the handling of disputes and nonjudicial appeals about procurement that come under the
+jurisdiction of the contracting authorities and the ARMP. Within the ARMP, these functions are the
+responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Committee (CRD), which issues its decisions either in a
+disputes commission or in a disciplinary board. [ 68] To ensure the fairness of its decisions, the CRD
+jointly represents the government, the private sector, and civil society. Article 158 of the procurement
+law orders the CRD to issue its decisions within 15 days or, in exceptional cases, within 30 days of a
+complaint being filed. In practice, these deadlines are respected, to the satisfaction of the private
+sector operators met by the World Bank during its assessment of the public procurement system
+in 2020. [69]
+
+
+**69. Procurement reforms are a high priority.** It will be a matter of reducing the number of
+special authorizations, which open the way to direct awards, encouraging competition for major
+investment projects, in order to improve the price and quality of acquisition of nonfinancial assets, and
+developing a unified, comprehensive database that enables analytical reports to be produced
+automatically. Access by the DGCMP to the budget information system should ensure that
+appropriations are available during the approval process and reserved until completion to meet the
+expenditures. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public finance reforms
+(Annex 1).
+
+
+**12. Availability of Funding** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform:_
+_High)_
+
+**70. The purpose of this institution is to verify whether the systems, procedures, and tools**
+**are in place to ensure the availability of cash for timely payments for investment expenditure.**
+Payments to firms during the construction phase are often significant and the dates of payment may
+be difficult to estimate accurately, as they will depend on the completion of intermediate tasks. These
+aspects increase the risk that liquidity will not be available when the payment authorizations are made
+based on invoices received from the contractor. Payments not made on time generate arrears,
+accumulation of which leads to an increase in government debt. This institution aims to ensure that (i)
+ministries and agencies are able to plan and commit expenditure for investment projects in advance,
+based on reliable cash flow forecasts; (ii) the funds allocated to financing project expenditure are
+disbursed on time; and (iii) external financing (from donors) for investment projects is fully integrated
+in the main structure of the government bank accounts.
+
+
+**71. Inconsistencies between the cash flow forecasts, which are regularly updated, and**
+**commitment plans produced on a quarterly basis, prevent ministries from planning their**
+
+
+67 Article 73 of the 2020 law on procurement and Articles 4 and 49 of Decree 10/21 of June 2, 2010
+on the organization and operation of the ARMP.
+
+68 Litigation on allocation and execution of contracts is the responsibility of the contracting authorities
+and instructed in the second instance by the CRD, in the event of appeal. Further, the ARMP is
+responsible for imposing administrative sanctions for regulatory noncompliance in procurement.
+
+
+69 According to the MAPS II report, the majority of private sector operators recognize that the process
+works well, but that it must be more widely popularized, as it is not well known. 57 percent of the
+decisions were decided in favor of the plaintiff, while 43 percent of the decisions went in favor of the
+contracting authorities. In 2016, out of 13 claims, 13 decisions were issued and all were made
+enforceable. The private sector estimates that the CRD performs its role well and states that it is
+satisfied with the CRD's actions, but is disappointed that the contracting authorities do not always
+comply with the enforceable decisions.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**investment expenditure in advance.** The cash flow planning committee [70] prepares cash flow
+forecasts on an annual basis adjusted to a monthly rate and updated monthly, or even weekly, during
+the course of the year. By contrast, the commitment plan does not provide at the start of the year a
+full commitment outlook for the whole of the year. The commitment plan is prepared on a quarterly
+basis and is aligned with the levels of appropriations voted in budget laws, which have suffered in the
+past from a lack of credibility after submission to parliament (see Section 5). At the beginning of the
+year, only the ceilings for the first quarter are known and quarterly updates are not made until the
+start of each quarter. As a result, there is insufficient consistency with the cash flow forecasts. In
+addition, the commitment plan only partially incorporates the provisional procurement plans; the
+plans, as well as nonobjection notices are not issued sufficiently early to be taken into account in
+planning.
+
+
+**72. Investment project expenditure files are subject to rationing according to the**
+**availability of cash, and are not treated as a priority.** The cash flow planning committee sets the
+priorities for settlement of the expenditure files, but without taking into account the payment deadlines
+established in the project contract letters. The document providing details on the priorities for
+settlement does not include enough information on the expenditure files relating to investment
+projects for them to be taken into account in the cash flow forecasts. The expenditures are thus
+subject to rationing and may fall into arrears, or indeed be sent back at year-end for recommitment by
+originating ministries. Accordingly, the cumulative position of domestic debt from budget outlays as at
+end-2021 includes substantial amounts of arrears, totaling US$187 million for procurement of works
+(0.3 percent of GDP).
+
+
+**73. The legal framework stipulates that funds for donors’ projects be placed into the**
+**Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank, but in practice these funds are held at**
+**commercial banks.** Articles 110 and 124 to 126 of the LOFIP, as well as Articles 156 and 157 of the
+General Public Accounting Regulation (RGCP) provide for the deposit of all government liquid assets
+in the TSA at the Central Bank. Accordingly, this rule applies all the more to funds for donor-financed
+investment projects - in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005.
+However, the effectiveness of this legal framework is flawed in two respects. First, the TSA is not fully
+effective given the scattering of government resources and the formation of pockets of “idle money” in
+the financial system. Second, under the terms of the agreements signed with the various donors,
+there is an obligation for them to open accounts at the commercial banks. That damages the
+Treasury’s ability to follow the movement of funds related to externally financed projects, and thus to
+track budget execution and the financial operations of the Government on a frequent and
+comprehensive basis.
+
+
+**74. The reforms relating to improvement of the availability of funds to cover investment**
+**project expenditures are of medium priority.** An effort should be made to adopt the methodological
+guides for the preparation of cash flow plans and commitment plans to strengthen the consistency
+between the two tools, as well as taking into account the provisional procurement plans. In addition, it
+is important that the commitment plan be prepared before the start of the fiscal year on an annual
+basis with a quarterly sequence and that the commitment ceilings be communicated in advance to the
+sectoral ministries. In light of the parliament’s constant upward revision of revenues without
+supporting new measures, it would also be advisable to strengthen fiscal regulation by having the
+commitment plan at the beginning of the year based on the draft budget law appropriations, as
+
+
+70 Ministerial Order 053/CAB/MIN/FINANCES/2011 of September 25, 2011 establishing the
+organization and operation of the CPT.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+presented by the Government. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public
+finance reforms (Annex 1).
+
+
+**13. Portfolio Management and Oversight** _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak_ _**:**_ _Priority_
+_of reform: High)_
+
+**75. This institution aims to assess how well management and oversight of the entire**
+**public investment portfolio are conducted in satisfactory fashion.** This assessment is carried out
+using: (i) the system for monitoring the physical and financial implementation of major projects; (ii) the
+mechanisms for transferring funds from one project to another during the process of implementation;
+and (iii) the procedures for _ex post_ review of projects that have reached the end of the implementation
+stage.
+
+
+**76. The legal framework does not provide for any systematic, consolidated oversight of**
+**the project portfolio and the reports that are produced do not provide any information on**
+**delays and cost overruns.** The Ordinance of March 27, 2020 establishing the powers of the Ministry
+of Planning gives it an automatic role in the oversight of inter-ministerial projects, without specifying
+that it should be systematic. This responsibility of the Ministry of Planning in terms of oversight of
+investment plans or execution is specified as part of the implementation of the PNSD. The legal
+framework governing the BCECO, [71] the CSPP, [72] and the Coordination of External Financing and
+Project Oversight (CRESP) unit of the Office of the President [73] also set forth the powers in terms of
+oversight of their respective externally financed project portfolios. In all, no framework specifically
+stipulates the preparation of a consolidated information report on the state of progress of projects,
+regardless of their source of funding. In practice, the reports produced do not provide systematic data
+on delays and cost overruns of the project portfolio [74] given the fragmentation of the parties involved,
+the weakness of the information systems, and the lack of resources to conduct implementation
+oversight missions. Oversight of externally financed project implementation follows the procedures
+set by donors, but there are still problems with the periodic collection and the centralization of
+information by the PGAI, the technical entity tasked with monitoring and evaluation of these projects
+(see Paragraphs 62 and 125). The Control and Oversight Directorate (DCS) of the Ministry of
+Planning, the BCECO, the CFEF, the CSPP, the DGDP, and the Directorate for Preparation of the
+Accounts Settlement Law of the Ministry of Finance produce reports at varying periodicities,
+sometimes with delays, [75] basically focusing on the financial and sometimes the physical
+implementation of projects. The information is not consolidated. The few reports consulted by the
+mission show significant gaps between physical and financial implementation of projects, as well as
+cases of financial over-execution, which are not sufficiently well explained or justified.
+
+
+71 Article 3 of the Decree of August 8, 2001, establishing the organization and operation of the
+aforementioned BCECO.
+
+
+72 Article 5 of the Ministerial Order of December 5, 2011, establishing the organization and operation
+of the CSPP.
+
+
+73 Article 2 of the Ordinance of July 25, 2019, establishing the organization and operation of the
+CRESP.
+
+
+74 Specifically due to the lack of information that the DEPs are supposed to provide. Even so, the
+DEPs are still dependent on the resources allocated to them and suffer from a lack of capacity and
+poor sharing of information from the donors.
+
+
+75 This finding relates particularly to the DCS.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**77. The reallocation of funds across projects, which is possible under the legal**
+**arrangements, is not carried out in practice.** The LOFIP provides that appropriations may be
+transferred from one project to another during the implementation stage, across the expenditure
+chapters ( _titres_ ) within any given program (Article 47), across programs of any given ministry /
+institution (Article 48), and across programs of different ministries / institutions (Article 49). However,
+the legal framework does not explicitly stipulate a systematic monitoring process or formalized
+transparent procedures, which would enable such transfers to be assessed and justified. In practice,
+funds are not reallocated from one public investment project to another during implementation. The
+implementation of program-based budgeting is part of the reforms underway. As part of the
+conversations held, the IGF stated that it could “occur that funds were transferred from one
+investment project to another without any monitoring and hidden from sight more or less across the
+board”.
+
+
+**78. The systematic** _**ex post**_ **review of major projects is not formally required and, in**
+**practice, the government’s reviews cover very few large-scale projects.** The legal framework [76]
+gives automatic power to the IGF to conduct such _ex post_ reviews without any formal requirement to
+carry them out. There is no formal rule in the legal framework covering the obligation to produce a
+completion report and to adjust project implementation policies and procedures accordingly. In
+practice, _ex post_ reviews by the government are neither systematically required, nor frequently
+carried out, given the little resources available and the absence of technical expertise in the relevant
+ministries. According to the IGF, the Ministry of Budget limits itself to conducting financial evaluations
+based on budget execution reports without, however, adopting a comprehensive approach. The
+mission was only able to analyze a single externally financed project completion report, submitted by
+the CFEF, which was of notably high quality.
+
+
+**79. Strengthening the project portfolio management and oversight capacities to support**
+**decision-making for subsequent budgets is a high priority of reform.** The principles of periodic
+monitoring of implementation of all major projects, of centralization of information, and of systematic
+_ex post_ review should be incorporated in the future decree on public investment management. In the
+longer term, the practical procedures for these processes should be revised and streamlined with the
+establishment of an integrated bank of projects, supported by a project monitoring information
+system, whereby projects would be identified by a unique code lasting the whole of their life-cycle.
+Annex 7 presents the major principles guiding the establishment of this integrated project bank. In the
+short term, project fiches should include information on the physical and financial monitoring of
+domestically-financed projects; they should be consolidated in the database of the Ministry of
+Planning and pooled; additionally, a simplified structure of liaison form (“ _fiche-navette_ ”) could be
+formalized with donors to gather information on externally financed projects. In order to prepare the
+future information system, a consultation framework between the Ministry of Planning and the C2I
+should be set up and operational specifications should be drawn up and validated before developing
+any software.
+
+
+**14. Management of Project Implementation** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak:_
+_Priority of reform: Medium)_
+
+**80. This dimension focuses on the management and control of public investment**
+**programs during implementation.** It is assessed by way of the following: (i) the existence of an
+
+
+76 Article 121 of the Law of 2011, on government finance mentioned above, and Articles 138 to140 of
+the General Public Accounting Regulation.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+efficient project management system; (ii) the enactment and application of rules, procedures, and
+guidelines on project adjustments; and (iii) the completion of _ex post_ external audits.
+
+
+**81. Although the framework for project management arrangements is weak, neither**
+**providing for the appointment of senior responsible officers nor for the preparation of**
+**implementation plans, responsible officers are appointed in practice.** There is no legal or
+regulatory basis, including in the texts establishing the powers of the Directorates for Research and
+Programming (DEPs) of the sectoral ministries or those of the procurement and project management
+units, stipulating that the implementing ministries and entities should systematically appoint senior
+responsible officers to manage major investment projects. [77] In practice, the ministries and entities
+tasked with project implementation met during the mission stated that they do appoint project officers,
+mostly reflecting good practice set up by donors. The preparation of implementation plans before the
+start of projects is, however, not institutionalized. According to the IGF, the patchy definition of
+outputs and activities of projects is a factor that helps to explain the difficulties in completing projects
+on time and on budget. [78] The BCECO has a draft project management manual which prescribes the
+preparation of project payment schedules.
+
+
+**82. There are no standard rules on adjustments to projects during their implementation,**
+**and adjustments are consequently not documented.** There is no manual setting standard
+procedures and rules for the adjustment of costs, implementation deadlines, or outputs of projects,
+according to the Ministry of Planning. This finding is reflected in practice; the mission was not able to
+identify any specific practices to adjust projects and document the adjustments. According to the IGF,
+these adjustments are frequent, however. The estimation of costs at the time of a project’s start-up is
+considered often not to be based on sound analyses, and significant adjustments to projects take
+place during implementation - these factors are thought to be among the key factors that explain the
+observed budget overruns.
+
+
+**83. The Court of Accounts has the mandate to audit investment projects, but it does not**
+**perform this task due to its limited financial independence.** Under Organic Law 18/024 of
+November 13, 2018, the Court of Accounts is given the mandate to audit any and all investment
+projects carried out with government funds. [79] In practice, specifically due to the limited financial
+independence of the Court of Accounts, these audits – meaning an in-depth investigation of a major
+investment project - are not performed. However, some audits by the Court of Accounts do relate to
+public investments. For example, it is currently in the process of auditing the procurement procedures
+within several national and provincial entities. It also performs spot inspections on projects that are
+
+
+77 The DEPs’ task is to coordinate and ensure the follow-up assessment of the government projects
+and programs developed (Decree 15/043 of December 28, 2015) The procurement and project
+management units have responsibilities primarily in connection with public contracts without clarifying
+whether they are systematically responsible for the operational implementation of the projects
+(Decree 10/32 of December 28, 2010).
+
+78 According to the IGF the weakness in initial project planning, often without any stable element
+covering total cost, deadline, or expected outputs, is an aspect that contributes to this finding.
+
+79 The Court of Accounts is empowered to inspect major investment projects using various types of
+audit: judicial review (of the accounts), budget inspection (of the general budget, annex, and special
+accounts), and management audit (of finances to assess their performance). The specific reports of
+management inspections are published, as well as an annual report, and the audit reports are sent to
+the National Assembly (Article 84 of the LOFIP).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+unfinished, and provides in its annual report [80] a list of projects without physical execution that
+however have received payments. These findings have not been followed up by any in-depth audits.
+
+
+**84. The strengthening of the management of project implementation is a medium priority**
+**reform** In particular, the future decree on public investment management will have to lay down a
+framework for project management arrangements and provide for the appointment of project officers,
+the systematic preparation of project implementation plans, and the adjustment of projects during
+implementation. A guide issued by the Ministry of Planning could establish a procedure for
+adjustment of projects during implementation. Greater financial autonomy of the Court of Accounts
+should be provided under the general reforms covered by the Priority Action Plan for public finance
+reforms (Annex 1).
+
+
+**15. Monitoring of Public Assets** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_
+_reform: Low)_
+
+**85. This institution checks whether government assets are well monitored and their value**
+**properly accounted for and reported in financial statements.** This is assessed looking at (i) the
+regular updating of asset registers based on an analysis of the stock, their value, and their state; (ii)
+the recording of the value of these nonfinancial assets in government financial accounts; and (iii) the
+recognition in the government’s income statement of depreciation of the fixed assets.
+
+
+**86. For lack of comprehensive registers, the government does not have detailed**
+**information on its nonfinancial assets.** The formats for government asset registers were
+established in the General Public Accounting Regulations (RGCP) of 1952, but these structures have
+not been updated since then, even to support the establishment of inventory accounting required by
+the LOFIP. In summary these registers are no longer kept, let alone updated. A small number of
+administrative entities [81] have registers of their assets, but their format does not enable to document
+relevant information, such as the identification of the asset, its location and the organization
+responsible for it, the date of acquisition, the historic cost, and the current value. Furthermore, these
+registers are not regularly updated, due to the fact that no inventories are carried out. Finally, there is
+no consolidation process that could provide government with inventory accounts.
+
+
+**87. Despite a very specific legal obligation to register nonfinancial assets in the financial**
+**statements, neither the asset accounting, nor the inventory accounting are effectively carried**
+**out.** Articles 98 to 100 of the LOFIP, as well as Articles 118 and 119 of Decree 13/51 of
+November 8, 2013 on the Government Chart of Accounts (PCE) require the production of the
+financial statements (balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows, and attached notes)
+in accordance with international rules and standards. Ordinance Law 89/017 of February 18, 1989 on
+the revaluation of fixed assets also applies to nonfinancial assets of the government based on
+coefficients issued each year by the Minister of finance, based on a proposal of the Standing Council
+of Accounting of the Congo (CPCC). However, general accounting as prescribed by the provisions
+mentioned above is not effectively carried out.
+
+
+**88. The regulatory framework sets forth rules relating to accounting for depreciation of**
+**nonfinancial assets, but these rules are not actually applied.** Articles 33 and 38 to 44 of the
+
+
+80 Public report on fiscal year 2019, section 1.3.1. Results of investigations into projects financed
+using own funds and not implemented in 20?5-2016 [ _sic_ ].
+
+81 This refers to the case of the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, which updates the registers
+of the real estate assets of the Government’s private estate and government institutions, which carry
+out asset-based accounting.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+decree on the PCE require depreciation to be recorded, broken down by type of asset, and booked to
+the income statement in the form of a depreciation charge. However, depreciation is not calculated,
+as the income statement has not yet been set up.
+
+
+**89. The reforms relating to monitoring nonfinancial assets of the government are not a**
+**priority relative to the other public investment management reforms in the DRC.** These are
+large-scale reforms that will take time. They should start with the production of a full inventory, which
+should be carried out using a gradual approach based on a clear asset valuation methodology. The
+development of an information system is also necessary to enable inventory accounting to feed into
+general accounting and ensure that the accounting of fixed assets and stocks is of good quality. It
+would be advisable to establish the institutional framework of inventory accounting and to develop its
+regulatory framework. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public finance
+reforms (Annex 1).
+
+##### **IV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C-** **PIMA)**
+
+
+**A. CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE DRC**
+
+
+**90. The DRC is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to its specific geographical**
+**characteristics.** The annual average temperature has increased by 0.2 degree per decade over the
+last thirty years and is expected to continue to increase by 1 to 2 degrees by 2050 with a potential
+rise of 5 degrees by 2100. [82] Although the DRC has exceptional natural resources (river system,
+arable land, biodiversity, tropical forest, and minerals), it is vulnerable to a very large variety of
+climate risks, particularly due to its huge land mass (2.4 million km [2] ) and the fact that it spans three
+climate zones (equatorial, tropical, and high-altitude). The main risks attached to climate change are
+torrential rain, coastal erosion, earthquakes, flooding, heatwaves, and also seasonal drought. The
+scale of deforestation, combined with periods of heavy rain and with urbanization, also leads to
+particularly frequent landslides, especially in the Kivu region. The ranking of the DRC (177 [th] out
+of 181 countries) in relation to the Notre Dame University index, [83] which measures both vulnerability
+to climate change (degree of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptation ability) for six key sectors [84] and the
+degree of preparation (economic, institutional, and social), illustrates the magnitude of the challenges
+ahead. Natural disasters linked to climate change will become more and more frequent in the coming
+years due to the rise in temperature and precipitation, which will have automatic consequences for
+health, biodiversity, access to water, agriculture, and employment.
+
+
+**91. The quality and resilience of infrastructure in the DRC are crucial to mitigate the socio-**
+**economic cost of climate change and the risk stemming from natural disasters.** Floods and
+drought are the natural disasters with the heaviest impact on the Congolese people and economy.
+Indeed, agriculture is the most vulnerable sector, as it represents a very large part of GDP
+(40 percent) and employs almost three out of every four people within the DRC’s labor force.
+Transport infrastructure is also considered to be an essential asset to be adapted given its
+
+
+82 WBG Climate Knowledge Portal (CCKP, 2021). DRC Projected Future Climate.
+
+83 University of Notre Dame (2020). Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.
+
+84 These sectors are: food supply, water, health, ecosystem protection, housing and infrastructure.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+vulnerability to flooding (roads, bridges, and ports [85] ). The energy sector will also be heavily impacted
+by the rise in extreme weather events, due to the fact that national energy production is almost
+exclusively from hydroelectricity (thanks to two dams) and is thus sensitive to disruptions to river
+flow. [86] Finally, the water sector is of prime importance to the DRC, which has one of the largest fresh
+water basins in Africa (62 percent of the Congo basin) and where, at the same time, access to
+drinking water and sanitation is limited (50 million people lack drinking water out of a total Congolese
+population of nearly 90 million). Investing in the infrastructure related to water quality and access
+(water supply infrastructure, in particular) will thus be a major challenge for the next few decades in
+the DRC; this challenge will be made more complicated to address by the impact of climate change.
+Investment carried out in this sector will also have multiple impacts on other sectors, such as health,
+food security, and agriculture.
+
+
+**92. The government has committed to ambitious low-carbon emission development**
+**targets with, in particular, more resilient and greener infrastructure.** Following the ratifications of
+the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in1997, the Kyoto Protocol
+in 2005, and the Paris Agreement in 2017, the DRC has committed to participating in limiting the
+increase in global temperature with an emissions reduction target of 21 percent by 2030. Accordingly,
+the DRC presented a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2017 relating to mitigation and
+adaptation which was revised at end-2021. The NDC relies on the full set of information available, in
+particular the Third National Communication on Climate Change (2015), the sectoral policies
+available, such as the national framework strategy REDD+ (2012), [87] the PNSD 2019-2023, and the
+National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (NAP) 2022-2026. The NAP has nine priority objectives
+in terms of adaptation: manage forest ecosystems and biodiversity; strengthen resilience of the
+agriculture sector, manage climate risks in small-scale farming, reduce the risk of disasters; provide
+management of water resources and environmental sanitation; strengthen the resilience of the health
+sector; guarantee access by the populations to energy; protect energy production infrastructure; and
+improve energy efficiency.
+
+
+**B. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE MODULE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**
+
+
+**93. The PIMA climate change module (C-PIMA) assesses five key dimensions of public**
+**investment management from the climate change perspective and constitutes an extension of**
+**the existing PIMA framework.** The C-PIMA institutions strongly resemble the corresponding
+institutions of the PIMA, although some of the C-PIMA institutions combine several dimensions
+appearing in separate PIMA institutions, and Institution 5 of the C-PIMA (risk management) has no
+equivalent in the PIMA. Figure 4.A describes the main elements of the C-PIMA and illustrates the
+relationship between the PIMA and C-PIMA frameworks. However, unlike the PIMA, the C-PIMA
+framework only formally assesses institutional design, given the lack of historical hindsight on
+effective practices, as this is such a new topic.
+
+
+**Figure 4.A. The C-PIMA assessment framework**
+
+
+85 Plan organisation de la réponse de la sécurité civile (ORSEC) en RDC (2012) - Civil security
+response organization plan (ORSEC) in the DRC (2012)
+
+86 Climate Risk Country Profile, DRC, World Bank (2021)
+
+87 The REDD+ program will support projects in the forest areas located in the provinces, and plans
+consultation forums bringing together the Government, local authorities, and civil society.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+
+
+**C1. Climate-aware Planning** _(Institutional design: Weak; Priority of reform: High)_
+
+**94. The first C-PIMA institution assesses the extent to which public investment is planned**
+**while taking into account climate change.** Accordingly, the first dimension of this institution
+assesses whether the national public investment plans and strategies are consistent with the
+objectives of the authorities and the expected outcomes. The second dimension considers whether
+the Government or the provinces require that the rules regarding land use and construction take
+climate risk into account. Finally, the third dimension covers the existence of centralized guidance
+promoting climate-aware public investment planning.
+
+
+**95. The national and sectoral strategies are not aligned with the climate targets and**
+**objectives described in the NDC, except for the forestry sector strategy.** The PNSD and
+the 2021-2023 Government Program include pillars that focus on protection of the environment and
+combating climate change, but they do not allow for easy cross-referencing with the targets and
+objectives of the NDC. Although climate change awareness in the national planning documents is a
+good practice in itself, climate targets and objectives are not reflected in a cross-cutting way in the
+other areas of the PNSD and in the other sectoral documents. As for sectoral strategies, the great
+majority of the documents reviewed (health, education, and mines, in particular) make no reference to
+climate change. The Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) strategy and its
+investment plan (PIREDD) are an exception, with consistency between the detail of the actions (draft,
+preliminary budget, and impact / effect indicators) and the DRC’s commitments on sustainable forest
+management with the aim of participation in combating climate change. The NAP was also prepared
+with UNDP support, covering the 2022-2026 period and focused on four sectors: forest, agriculture.,
+coastal areas, and health. The forthcoming update of the PNSD will provide an opportunity to
+incorporate climate issues more closely in national public investment planning.
+
+
+**96. The central and provincial regulations relating to spatial planning and construction do**
+**not reflect the risks linked to climate change.** Current national regulations on land management
+and construction standards are obsolete. The most recent law specifically concerning spatial and
+urban planning and construction dates from 1973 [88] and therefore does not include any climate
+change consideration. The DRC’s body of legislation on land management is, however, in the
+process of renewal, thanks to the initiative of the Ministry of Land Management, with the completion
+
+
+88 Law 73-021 of July 20, 1973 establishing the general regulations for assets, land and real estate
+regulations, and regulations on guarantees, known as the “loi foncière” (land law).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+of a draft national law on land management due to be submitted in the very near future to the
+parliament; this represents an opportunity to incorporate climate change concerns. In addition, a land
+management strategy and a land use strategy are currently being finalized and include references to
+the risks associated with climate change, including with a dedicated strategic pillar. Finally, even
+though the mission was not able to find any examples of provincial regulations on spatial planning
+and construction taking climate risks into account, a notable good practice is the production in
+April 2021 of a methodological guide for the completion of participatory zoning of village land and
+regional entities as part of the PIREDD, which refers to environmental constraints.
+
+
+**97. So far, there is no centralized support for the preparation and costing of climate-aware**
+**investment strategies.** In effect, there is no dedicated unit to support the sectoral ministries, which
+could provide technical support to take into account climate issues when they prepare and assess the
+costs of public investment strategies. The Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development
+(MEDD) and the Congolese Environment Agency (ACE) concentrate the expertise on environmental
+and climate issues within the government and are in charge of the preparation, oversight, and
+assessment of the national plans for sustainable environmental management. [89] However, the MEDD
+has no explicit mandate to provide technical support for the preparation and costing of sectoral
+planning strategies taking climate issues into account. The involvement of local participants will also
+be necessary at the sectoral ministries, in particular in relation to land management (soil and subsoil).
+
+
+**98.** **The reflection of climate change impacts in public investment planning is a high-**
+**priority reform.** To that end, it is important to align the PNSD and the sectoral strategies with the
+NDC’s climate objectives, in order to provide a sectoral breakdown of climate-related objectives,
+targets, and outcomes. Training for the sectoral ministries could be provided by the MEDD and the
+ACE to promote the integration of climate issues in investment strategies. A national strategy for
+combating climate change would be helpful in the medium term. Moreover, the adoption as soon as
+possible of the new law on land management and the publication of its dedicated strategy are
+necessary prerequisites for climate-sensitive planning.
+
+
+**C2. Coordination across Public Sector** _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_
+
+**99. This institution targets the coordination of climate-related public investment decision-**
+**making across the entire public sector.** The emphasis is placed on the need to adopt a
+comprehensive approach to climate change. Alongside the government, both provinces / ETDs and
+public corporations effectively play a significant role in carrying out public investment in response to
+climate change. This is the reason why the three dimensions of this institution assess in turn whether
+climate-related investment decisions are coordinated across (i) central government, (ii) general
+government (including local authorities), and (iii) the public sector in its entirety, including public
+corporations.
+
+
+**100. Sectoral thematic groups have promoted the coordination of public investment**
+**decisions across central government in connection with climate issues.** These sectoral
+groups, [90] created to support the operationalization of the PNSD, consist of technical committees and
+policy steering committees, chaired by the various sectoral ministries concerned. Their composition,
+specified in an operational framework, [91] promotes a cross-cutting approach to sectoral topics,
+involving ministries, technical and financial partners, civil society organizations, and the private
+
+
+89 Order 20/017 of March 27, 2020 establishing the powers of the ministries.
+
+90 Decree 13/011 of April 9, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of sectoral thematic
+groups.
+
+91 New operational framework of sectoral thematic groups (October 2020).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+sector. One thematic group is specifically dedicated to climate matters, the environment, water and
+sanitation, and biodiversity; its membership includes the MEDD (chair) and the Ministries of Water
+resources, of Planning, of Agriculture and of Mines. These thematic groups enable coordinated
+choices to be made, including in relation to public investment, at the central government level. These
+committees do not yet, however, include extrabudgetary entities and PPPs.
+
+
+**101. Mechanisms coordinating project investment relating to climate change between the**
+**central government and the provinces are emerging, but the information on these projects is**
+**not consolidated.** The 2011 environmental law (Article 48) gives the provinces and ETDs, in the
+same way as the central government, the power to adopt climate change adaptation measures. The
+legal framework does not explicitly provide, however, for the provinces’ investment spending on
+combating climate change to be planned and implemented in coordination with central government. [92]
+The supporting structures for such consultation are nevertheless starting to emerge. For example, the
+NAP emphasizes the significance of decentralization in the operationalization of adaptation strategies
+and lays the foundations for coordination in this area. [93] In addition, the local development plan for
+the 145 territories (PDL-145T) [94] and the REDD+ strategy provide for consultation and coordination
+mechanisms between the central government and the provinces on climate change issues, which are
+not yet operational. Further, the thematic groups mentioned above are also provided for at the
+provincial level as a space for dialog between the center and the provinces. However, finally,
+provincial investment plans are not published (see Institution 3) in general or for climate changerelated investments.
+
+
+**102. According to the current legal framework, public corporations are not encouraged or**
+**required to make their climate-related investments compliant with national climate policies.**
+There is no mention of climate change in the legal framework on the oversight of public corporations
+and their investment plans. There is also no formal incentive by the central government for public
+corporations to take climate change into account in their investment projects, in the absence of a
+portfolio strategy or guidelines on governance. It is worth noting that the 2011 environmental law
+requires all private and public entities, and thus all public corporations, to carry out social and
+environmental impact studies for their investment projects, to be subsequently validated by the ACE,
+but the effects of climate change are not explicitly part of such studies (see Institution C3).
+
+
+**103. Strengthening the formal coordination of investment decisions relating to climate**
+**change is a medium reform priority.** The existence of sectoral thematic groups is a sound basis for
+improving cross-cutting awareness of climate change in public investment decisions. An amendment
+to the decree relating to these groups could help extend them to include public corporations. The
+frameworks for consultation between the central government and the provinces provided under
+the 2013 memorandum could be expanded to take the climate change dimension into account. The
+mechanisms planned under the PDL-145T relating to the REDD+ and the provincial sectoral thematic
+groups could be operationalized. Finally, the Government as shareholder could insist on the
+
+
+92 Specifically, the 2013 memorandum establishing investment planning coordination mechanisms
+between the central government and the provinces (see dimension 3a of the PIMA) remains silent on
+climate change issues.
+
+93 A guide for the inclusion of adaptation in provincial development plans was prepared in 2019. The
+NAP also proposes the formation of provincial committees on climate change to monitor
+implementation. These groups are not yet operational.
+
+94 The PDL-145T specifically considers climate change adaptation and mitigation as dimensions
+cross cutting its implementation and provides for coordination mechanisms between central
+government and the provinces.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+importance of public corporations taking climate change into account in their investment projects in a
+future portfolio strategy.
+
+
+**C3. Project Appraisal** **and Selection** _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_
+
+**104. The C-PIMA methodology assesses whether the appraisal and selection of projects**
+**include climate-related analyses and criteria.** The first dimension checks the existence of a
+climate-related analysis using a standard methodology. The second dimension assesses whether
+climate-related challenges are taken into account in PPPs. The third dimension measures whether
+climate-related factors are included in the project selection criteria.
+
+
+**105. The legal framework requires environmental impact studies to be carried out and**
+**reviewed by the ACE, but without explicitly stipulating coverage of climate change.** Article 19 of
+the 2011 environmental law provides that any policy, plan, or program prepared by the central
+government, provinces, ETDs, or public institutions, where their implementation is likely to have
+significant effects on the environment, must be subject to a prior environmental assessment following
+the procedure laid down in an implementing decree. [95] The bylaws of the ACE [96] stipulate that it is
+responsible for assessing and approving all such assessments carried out by authorized research
+agencies as well for monitoring their implementation. However, there is no reference at all to climate
+change in this legal framework on environmental assessments. There is no standard methodology
+established for these assessments or any instructions guiding the review of assessments carried out
+by the ACE. Nevertheless, in December 2021, as part of its accreditation process with the Green
+Climate Fund, the BCECO prepared a draft environmental and social procedures manual, including a
+climate change vulnerability analysis procedure, which shall be validated at a forthcoming workshop.
+In practice, major infrastructure projects are often submitted to a climate impact analysis. In all, the
+ACE conducted over 300 reviews of environmental impact assessments in 2021, and publishes the
+assessments on its website. [97]
+
+
+**106. The legal framework covering PPPs does not address climate change challenges, but**
+**the law on water does address the climate dimension in the granting of concessions.** Beyond
+the requirements of the private partners, the 2018 law on PPPs does not explicitly take into
+consideration climate change in terms of risk allocation or contract management. Nevertheless,
+Article 30 of the 2015 law on water specifically requires climate data to be taken into account in the
+environmental and social impact studies relating to the granting of operating concessions in the public
+domain of water. In practice, the mission was not able to analyze any contracts underlying PPP
+projects so as to appraise whether climate change was explicitly taken into account in terms of risk
+allocation or contract management.
+
+
+**107. The central government does not use any criteria relating to climate change to guide**
+**the selection of projects that have been appraised.** As described in the assessment under
+Institution 10, there is no specific published criterion, either linked to climate or not, for the selection of
+
+
+95 Decree of August 2, 2014, establishing the operating rules for environmental protection procedural
+mechanisms.
+
+96 Article 3 of the decree of November 18, 2014, establishing the bylaws of a public institution under
+the name of ACE.
+
+97 As an example of good practice, the mission was, in particular, able to analyze the final report,
+submitted by the ACE, on the environmental and social impact study of August 2019 for the
+construction project of feeder roads linking with the road-rail bridge over the Congo River, supported
+by the infrastructure unit of the Ministry in charge of infrastructure, public works, and reconstruction.
+This study includes a specific point on climate change forecasts and the associated problems.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+projects that have been appraised for inclusion in the budget. The project appraisal schedule
+presented in the project selection manual of the Ministry of Planning includes environmental criteria
+that make it possible, albeit in very summary fashion, to assess whether the project is mindful of the
+environment, whether the impact on the environment is correctly identified, and whether mitigation
+actions are provided for and appropriate, but without making any explicit reference to climate change.
+
+
+_**108.**_ **The inclusion of climate considerations in the project appraisal and selection process**
+**is a medium priority reform.** In the future decree on public investment management, as in practice,
+preliminary appraisal of major infrastructure projects should systematically include a climate-related
+analysis following a standard methodology supported by the MEDD. That would make it possible to
+assess whether the potential impacts of projects on greenhouse gas emissions, and the exposure of
+projects to damage caused by climate-related disasters have been identified and analyzed, before the
+projects are included in the project bank and in the next PIP, or before they are selected for financing
+in the budget. The legal framework for PPP projects should reflect climate-related risks appropriately.
+Given that PPPs commit the government over the whole term of the contract, which is generally 20
+to 30 years or more, climate change adaptation or mitigation risks are likely to arise at any time during
+the term of the contract. Lastly, at the key moment of project selection, factors linked to the climate
+should be explicitly included in the list of decision-making criteria used by the government.
+
+
+**C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management** _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_
+
+**109. This institution relates to the ability of the budgeting and project portfolio management**
+**frameworks to take climate change into account.** The C-PIMA methodology checks the capacity
+to guide climate-related efficacy and efficiency in budget choices made, in particular, by: (I) identifying
+in the budget and budget documentation the specific expenditures and funding in favor of climaterelated investments; (ii) carrying out _ex post_ external audits to measure the impact of projects in
+terms of climate change adaptation and mitigation; and (iii) taking climate risks into account in asset
+management policies.
+
+
+**110. To date, there is no identification of public investment spending relating to climate**
+**change within the budget.** Among the various nomenclatures, the budget uses a COFOG functional
+classification, which, once it has been crossed with the classification by type, makes it possible to
+assess investment spending relating to environmental protection, but not spending relating to climate
+change. Another practice worth noting, more specifically in connection with the climate, is the
+existence of indicators focused on climate change in the provisional annual performance project
+( _projet annuel de performance_ ), in particular for the forestry, water, and the environmental sectors; at
+this stage, they are not reported because of lack of available data and because the transition to
+program-based budgeting is not complete. These practices are, however, not sufficient to identify
+climate-related investment spending in a cross-cutting fashion and across the various sectors.
+
+
+**111. There is no explicit legal basis for carrying out** _**ex post**_ **reviews or audits on the**
+**outcomes of investment projects in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation.** There
+is no legal basis providing a framework for carrying out internal audits and reviews of major
+investment projects (see Institution 13), let alone for the assessment of the contribution of projects to
+climate objectives. With regard to external auditing, in its 2021-2025 strategic plan the Court of
+Accounts aims to conduct one audit report on the environment each year, without any explicit link with
+public investment. Moreover, _ex post_ reviews of major projects financed by donors are supposedly
+carried out, but they were not able to be consulted by the mission. Interesting initiatives aimed at
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+strengthening the monitoring of the climate performance of projects are underway, for example the
+implementation of the Measuring, Reporting and Verification system [98] for the REDD+ strategy.
+
+
+**112. The asset management and maintenance policies do not take climate risks into**
+**account.** According to the road management agencies met by the mission, the standard road
+maintenance methodologies (the only maintenance methodologies available, see Institution 9) do not
+take climate aspects into consideration. The legal framework on asset management and monitoring
+(see Institution 15) also fails to reflect the effects of climate risks on the valuation of assets or their
+depreciation. The MEDD told the mission that it plans to work in the near future with the sectoral
+ministries on specific studies to assess these impacts on the assets concerned.
+
+
+**113. Taking climate change issues into account in budgeting and in the management of the**
+**project portfolio is a medium priority.** The future decree on public investment management could
+lay the legal foundations for monitoring and _ex post_ assessment of the impacts of investment projects
+on climate change, but that would necessitate setting measurable monitoring targets, starting from
+the planning stage. The full transition of the DRC to program-based budgeting will be an opportunity
+to establish appropriate monitoring indicators. In addition, the authorities should assess the impact of
+climate change on the maintenance needs of projects, in order to allow for the allocation of the
+necessary resources. Finally, setting up a tagging system for climate-related investment spending
+requires the preparation of nomenclature and information systems, but could be envisaged in the
+medium term (Box 4.A).
+
+
+**Box 4.A. Climate budget tagging**
+
+**Tagging expenditures according to their impact on the climate when budgets are being prepared,**
+**is a practice that is relatively new internationally.** This practice, which has developed in the past
+decade, provides an overall picture of budget spending and tax expenditure relating to climate; it
+emphasizes the significance of climate change concerns in the allocation of resources, and enables their
+development over time to be monitored. Tagging allows each component of the budget to be assessed
+based on its climate-related (and/or environmental) impact by giving it a “label” according to whether it
+is helpful or harmful to green objectives. Thanks to the intensive technical support of several
+development partners, climate budget tagging has gained ground in developing and low-income
+countries (for example, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines). It is also increasingly
+recognized as a significant tool within the OECD countries and the European Union (for example in
+France and Ireland), despite the methodological limits relating to the lack, at this stage, of a generally
+accepted classification of expenditure.
+
+**Three significant issues must be addressed at the time of defining tagging methodologies within**
+**the climate expenditure budget.**
+
+ - First of all, it is necessary to **define the relevant climate-related expenditures in terms of both**
+**mitigation and adaptation.** This definition may be based on the expected impact of expenditures
+( _objective-based definition_ ) or based on their identification relying on national documents relating to
+climate change ( _policy-based definition_ ).
+
+ - Next, it is necessary to draw up **a level of coverage for these expenditures within the public**
+**sphere.** Almost all the methodologies used to date cover both current and capital budgets of
+
+
+98 This system is a set of procedures to enable the gathering of factual information (mainly data), and
+the assessment and verification of the achievement of climate change objectives.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+central governments. Some countries have expanded their identification to local government, to
+transfers to public corporations, and sometimes even to fiscal spending.
+
+ - Finally, the issue of **how to estimate the amounts of climate-related spending** remains to be
+decided. Three approaches are generally used. The first is limited to the identification of programs
+that have climate change as their main objective. The second also estimates spending associated
+with all climate-related activities. The third applies weightings to estimate the portion of spending of
+the program or project that is related to climate.
+
+Sources: “ _Climate change budget tagging: a review of international experience_ ” World Bank
+(February 2021) and “ _Climate-sensitive management of public finances – green PFM”_ IMF (August 2021)
+
+
+**C5. Risk Management** _(Institutional design: Medium; Priority of reform: Low)_
+
+**114. This institution assesses how fiscal risks related to climate change affecting**
+**infrastructure are identified and managed.** Natural disasters are persistent sources of macro-fiscal
+risk and therefore require significant attention. Fiscal risks arise just as much from climate change
+adaptation as from climate change mitigation. The first dimension of this institution assesses whether
+the authorities publish a national disaster risk management strategy incorporating the exposure of
+public infrastructure to climate-related disasters. The second dimension considers whether the
+government has set up financing mechanisms to deal with the costs of climate-related damage to
+public infrastructure. Last, the third dimension focuses on the existence of fiscal risk analysis that
+includes climate risks to public infrastructure.
+
+
+**115. In addition to the civil security response organization plan (ORSEC) produced in 2012,**
+**there is a draft national natural disaster risk management strategy, but it has not yet been**
+**endorsed by the Government.** The implementation of the ORSEC plan is applicable to the climate
+disaster response, as it aims to mobilize and coordinate the parties involved in civil security.
+However, it does not satisfy this dimension of the C-PIMA assessment, as the plan does not identify
+the specific risks to infrastructure from climate change (data on location of the risk, exposure of
+assets, or emergency procurement procedures). This essential information is typically integrated in a
+national natural disaster management strategy. A draft national risk management strategy over a
+period of four years has reportedly been produced by the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs
+(MAAH) and apparently is in the process of being updated again for publication by end-2022. Finally,
+the recent creation [99] of a National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management
+attached to the MAAH, which is both a new institutional structure and a funding mechanism (see next
+paragraph), is aimed at mobilizing and channeling all financial flows and equipment necessary to
+cover humanitarian crises, to take efficient emergency care for victims of disaster and other
+catastrophic events, and to provide coordination of humanitarian actions and interventions.
+
+
+**116. There are two mechanisms for** _**ex ante**_ **funding - one budgetary and one**
+**extrabudgetary – of infrastructure exposure to climate risks.** The MAAH budget, within the
+budget law, includes a specific budget allocation to disaster risks entitled “reserve for accidents and
+disasters” and is executed each year according to the occurrence of unforeseen events, including
+disasters related to climate change. This represented CGF 65 million in the 2021 LFI and CGF 90
+million in the 2022 draft budget law. At the same time, the CSNGHC aims to enhance coverage for
+the costs of damage related to natural disasters, principally due to a strategic resource mobilization
+plan which is currently being finalized. The mission did not have access to this document, but it
+should contain a survey of the planned resources for this public institution, which could be assembled
+
+
+99 Decree 21-05 establishing the organization and operation of a public institution under the name of
+the National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management in the DRC (CSNGHC).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+from budget allocations, national and international donations, parafiscal charges, and contributions
+from donors.
+
+
+**117. The fiscal risk statement does indeed mention climate change-related risks, but not the**
+**specific impact on public infrastructure.** The fiscal risk statement, published for the first time in
+September 2021, categorizes the main risks for public finances (macroeconomic, public debt, public
+sector other than central government, financial sector, and other risks). Although some of these risks
+are quantified, those relating to natural disasters are presented only briefly and qualitatively, and the
+impacts on infrastructure are not assessed. Elsewhere, the MAAH keeping a summary table of
+natural disasters and their financial impacts over a long period is a good practice, but the table is not
+published and was not forwarded to the mission.
+
+
+**118. Providing better coverage of climate-related risks that affect public infrastructure is a**
+**low priority for reform, in relation to the other reforms proposed in this report.** The foundations
+for sound climate-related risk management have recently been laid - the creation of the CSNGHC - or
+are about to be put in place - the draft disaster management strategy and the strategic resource
+mobilization plan for the national fund. It is therefore important to operationalize these various
+processes in the next few months and years. Supplementary efforts could also be made to analyze
+and publish the climate change risks that affect infrastructure, in particular to feed into the fiscal risk
+statement.
+
+##### **V. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**
+
+
+**119. The following section presents the main issues relating to IT support, the legal and**
+**regulatory framework, and staff capacity, which are relevant to all areas of public investment**
+**management.** They are addressed in the PIMA and C-PIMA institutions presented above, but it is
+nevertheless sensible to also address them separately and from a cross-cutting point of view in order
+to assess their strengths and weaknesses. They aim to appraise (i) consistency and
+comprehensiveness of the legal and regulatory framework for the purposes of effective public
+investment management; (ii) the existence of a comprehensive digital information system covering
+projects, supporting decision-making and monitoring; and (iii) staff capacity.
+
+
+**A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK**
+
+
+**120. The legal framework for public investment management (PIM) is fragmented**
+**(Table 5.A).** Key aspects of PIM are covered by the legal framework for government finance
+management in the broad sense. The 2011 LOFIP, revised in 2018, covers investment spending by
+the Government, the provinces, and the ETDs, issuing basic rules for its budgeting and execution.
+The 2010 law on procurement organizes public procurement in all its aspects, in particular as it
+relates to public works contracts. Moreover, some types of investment are better regulated than
+others by the existing texts. The 2018 law on PPPs laid down the principles of identification, selection,
+validation, and monitoring of PPP projects, but lacks certain implementing decrees to achieve full
+application. Some investment project execution and oversight entities are subject to regulations
+establishing their powers, such as the BCECO, ACGT, CSPP, and CFEF, but these regulations only
+apply to the portfolios each entity manages.
+
+
+**121. In all, there is no high-level law or regulation that encompasses PIM over the whole**
+**project investment cycle.** In particular, the procedures for appraisal, selection, monitoring of
+physical / financial implementation, and _ex post_ assessment of projects are not covered by a clear
+legal framework and are often guided by manuals compiled over many years, generally with the
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+support of donors, the application (and knowledge by staff) of which is often uncertain. Budget
+circulars guide the budgeting of investments without, however, guaranteeing any stability in the
+procedures from one fiscal year to the next. There are several cases of laws and regulations that
+have established project management structures that have, nevertheless, remained inactive, such as
+the 2019 order establishing the CISPIP. Lastly, there are cases of conflicts between standards, such
+as, for example, between the law on PPPs and the law on procurement regarding the jurisdiction of
+the ARMP, and also between these two laws and the decree on the powers of the UC-PPP regarding
+the issuance of nonobjection notices.
+
+
+**Table 5.A. Legal texts underlying the PIM procedures in the DRC**
+
+|Laws|Regulations|
+|---|---|
+|
• Law 11/011 of
July 13, 2011 on
public finance
(LOFIP)
• Law 18/016 of
July 9, 2018 on
public-private
partnerships
• Law 10/010 of
April 27, 2010 on
procurement
• Law 11/009 of
July 9, 2011
establishing
fundamental
principles for
protection of the
environment
|
• Ordinance of July 25, 2019, establishing the organization and operation of the CRESP
• Decree 13/050 of November 6, 2013 establishing the General Public Accounting Regulation.
• Decree 21/04 of October 2, 2021 establishing the organization and operation of the PPP Advice and
Coordination Unit
• Decree 08/017 of August 26, 2008 establishing the organization and operation of the ACGT
• Decree of August 8, 2001 establishing the organization and operation of the BCECO.
• Decree 10/22 of June 2, 2010 establishing the procedures manual for the law on procurement
• Decree 10/21 of June 2, 2010 establishing the organization and operation of the ARMP
• Decree 10/32 of December 28, 2010 establishing the organization and operation of the procurement and project
management units (CGPMP)
• Decree 13/51 of November 8, 2013 establishing the Government Chart of Accounts (PCE)
• Decree of August 2, 2014 establishing the operating rules for environmental protection procedural mechanisms
• Decree of November 18, 2014 establishing the bylaws of a public institution under the name of ACE.
• Ministerial order of December 5, 2011 establishing the organization and operation of the Project and Program
Oversight Unit
• Ministerial order of July 19, 2019 establishing the Commission for identification and selection of public
investment projects (CISPIP)
• Interministerial order of May 20, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of the preinvestment fund
• Ministerial order of February 7, 2011 establishing the Investment and Aid Management Platform
• Memorandum of understanding of March 29, 2013 on the procedures for the application of investment
appropriations in the sectors falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces|
+
+
+
+**122. The legal framework for PIM does not explicitly take climate change into account.**
+The 2011 law on the protection of the environment represented a significant step in awareness of
+environmental issues in project appraisal. The obligation to conduct an environmental impact study
+for every investment project in the DRC is well known by all departments. This law does mention
+climate change in a specific article (Article 48), but it is too general to be operable. An update of
+the 2011 law or the adoption of a new law specifically focusing on climate change are under
+consideration. Finally, the decree on PIM could set the principle of involvement of the MEDD and the
+ACE in all stages of the investment cycle to ensure climate change is considered.
+
+
+**123. The adoption of a decree on PIM is a high priority.** The adoption of such a decree
+covering all stages of the project cycle, would make it possible to define the responsibilities of the
+various parties involved in each of these stages, to structure the institutional framework, and to
+provide guidance for the development of indispensable tools to optimize the management of
+investment projects.
+
+
+**B. IT SUPPORT**
+
+
+**124. The authorities have no effective institutional framework to guide, support, and**
+**implement the computerization of PIM.** The IT functions of the main ministries in charge of
+managing public investments suffer from limited coordination and a lack of staff with the required
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+capacities. There is no IT master plan to provide a consistent, coordinated strategy for development
+and operation of computer software supporting PIM, from planning through to accounting for assets.
+Nevertheless, the inter-ministerial coordination unit is aiming to build its capacity under the auspices
+of the Ministry in charge of Digitization, which has recently been set up. The current picture is as
+follows:
+
+- Within the _Ministry of Planning_, the DPB has an IT division that manages the public investment
+database with a staff composed solely of IT specialists. Additionally, the Aid and Investment
+Management Platform (PGAI) established by Ministerial order on February 7, 2011 is the
+technical agency tasked with strengthening its information system, set up to ensure monitoring
+and evaluation of all stages of management of external funding. In this regard, the PGAI serves
+as a single window and is designated by the government as the official source of information on
+aid flows in the DRC. In practice, the PGAI is having difficulties in gathering reliable information,
+particularly with regard to bilateral partners.
+
+- At the _Ministry of the Budget_, the Interministerial Information Technology Coordination
+department (C2I) (staff of 69) coordinates the IT work of the Ministries of the Budget and Finance.
+The Ministry’s IT function faces many challenges in terms of the financial resources allocated,
+having sufficient, competent staff and of motivation, given, in particular, the lack of a dedicated IT
+career path. There is no formal coordination mechanism between the IT function of the Ministry of
+Planning and the C2I.
+
+- In the absence of a dedicated IT stream and sufficient resources, the IT capacities of the _Ministry_
+_of Finance_ are equally weak. The ministry is in charge of chairing the integrated human resources
+and public finance management system digitization steering committee (the “Committee”), which
+still has to come into operation. The recent updating of the General Operation Plan (POG) for the
+computerization of the system of management of public finance and general government,
+managed by the Public Finance Reform Orientation Committee (COREF), does not cover the
+area of public finance management, and the Ministry of Planning is not involved in the work.
+
+
+**125. There is no comprehensive, computerized information system for public investment**
+**projects to support decision making and oversight.** The Ministry of Planning has a project
+database (in Access format), following the structure of the project fiches, held in Excel. The PGAI
+administers its external resources management information system. The Infrastructure Directorate of
+the Ministry of Planning has developed a mapping [100] of infrastructure projects in the DRC.
+Specifically, the information on projects is presented by type of financing, by sector, by location, and
+by implementation agency, but the data are not comprehensive and do not contain the amounts of
+funding. The Ministry of Planning’s information systems have no interface with the “Expenditure
+chain”, which consists of a number of separate applications _(“Préparation du Budget”_ (PREPABUD budget preparation), “ _Gestion des Dépenses”_ (GESDEPENSE - expenditure management), and
+COMPTA, in particular) that, in some cases, are not fully operational. Further, the _“Système Intégré_
+_de Gestion des Marchés Publics”_ (SIGMAP - integrated procurement management system) is in the
+deployment phase, and the development of an e-procurement (E-GP) project is being prepared with
+the support of the World Bank. Finally, the Ministry of Finance is preparing a data warehouse project.
+
+
+**126. There is no specific information system for monitoring climate change.** The MEDD did
+not mention any system or database in this area beyond the data relating to forests and to weather
+published on its website. However, the need to gather data on climate change and to have IT
+systems to manage such data is growing, both to feed into planning and improve the quality of
+assessment and analysis and to monitor the climate performance of the various investment projects.
+
+
+100 https://www.cartoinfrardc.org/gis/.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+The NAP prepared at end-2021 stipulates that to assess vulnerability to climate change and impact of
+adaptation measures, the DRC should rely on the collection of data from the various national
+institutions, in particular the _Agence nationale de météorologie et télédétection par satellite_ (national
+meteorological and satellite weather monitoring agency), the _Institut national d’études et recherches_
+_agronomiques_ (national institute of agronomic research), the Ministries of Energy, Agriculture, Rural
+and Urban Development, Land Management, Scientific Research, and the universities, as well as
+from international and non-governmental organizations, and other agencies, from both the public and
+private sector.
+
+
+**127. The development of an integrated bank of projects, which follows them throughout**
+**their life-cycle, is a high priority for reform.** Many processes of the PIM cycle must be supported
+by an information system. These systems are often separate from the applications for budgeting,
+public procurement, and accounting, finance and budget execution, hence necessitating a pooling
+and sharing of information among all the parties involved. Depending on the maturity of the
+information systems, this can take place through the establishment of standard data exchange
+procedures, the implementation of software interface plans, or posting in a data warehouse, feeding
+into a decision-making dashboard. The major principles of a project bank are set forth in Annex 7.
+
+
+**C. STAFF CAPACITY**
+
+
+**128. Administrative fragmentation leads to dilution of public investment management**
+**capacities.** Public administration in the DRC is very fragmented and compartmentalized. Institutional
+complexity, legal uncertainty, the multiplicity of parties involved, the unproductive use at times of
+existing capacities, the lack of coordination, and the absence of comprehensive, consistent circulation
+of information blur the roles and responsibilities, and significantly limit the effectiveness of public
+investment management. The cumulation of _ad hoc_ project portfolio management and oversight
+committees and agencies of variable size, often created to circumvent ineffective procedures,
+sometimes at the behest of donors, weakens the technical capacity for sound management of
+projects. The information flows among these parties are often nonexistent, or, at best, fragmented
+and redundant, leading to suboptimal use of human and information technology (IT) resources. The
+pooling of skills and knowledge (and information) of these various committees and agencies could
+make a leap forward possible in terms of analysis and monitoring capacities.
+
+
+**129. The majority of ministries and organizations involved in project management indicate**
+**that they need to build capacity.** Training or technical assistance needs have been pointed out at
+all stages of PIM at both the central and the provincial level: planning, enhancing the appraisal,
+selection, and preparation of projects; budgeting, producing a more reliable financial estimate of the
+spending that the Government must take on; monitoring of project implementation, and _ex post_
+evaluation of projects. For PPPs, capacity building will be crucial to enable the DRC to control the
+fiscal risks associated with that modality of project financing.
+
+
+**130. The authorities also point out the need for capacity building in relation to considering**
+**climate change throughout the entire investment cycle.** As the inclusion of climate change issues
+is an aspect that will gain momentum in coming years, awareness-raising and training of the parties
+involved will be a significant, or even necessary first step. The central and provincial governments
+must be made aware as quickly as possible of the impacts of climate change on public investment
+and infrastructure. The sectoral ministries need technical support to incorporate climate issues in their
+planning and projects, as well as to analyze and assess costs and risks associated with climate
+change. Given their technical competence in environmental and climate-related issues, the MEDD
+and the ACE are best placed to offer this support.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**131. A training and technical assistance plan, with financial backing by technical and**
+**financial partners, will support the authorities’ reform strategies.** As set in the Priority Action
+Plan for the implementation of the Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) for 2022-2028
+(Annex 1), a training plan will be developed, adopted, and implemented to support the authorities’
+capacities. This plan should also strengthen PIM capacity. A training program for PIM could, as a
+priority, enhance the skills and knowledge associated with the planning, monitoring and evaluation of
+projects, as well as risk analysis, including those associated with PPPs and in connection with climate
+change.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Annex 1. Actions from the draft 2022-24 Priority Action Plan in connection with public investment management**
+**Note:** The amendments proposed by the PIMA mission are indicated in red. The actions in yellow are priority actions under the Priority Action
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|
+|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
+|
**Action 1.1.1:** **Strengthen the**
**institutional framework of the**
**macro-fiscal function**
|
CPCM and macro-fiscal unit
operational
The MTFF including the
provisional Government
Flow-of-Funds Table
(TOFE) is consistent with
the macroeconomic
forecasts.
Macro-fiscal analysis in
the budget documents is
improved.
|
X
|X|||Public
Expenditure and
Financial
Accountability
(PEFA) PI-14
and PI-15.
MTFF includes
full, provisional
TOFE
consistent with
the
macroeconomic
forecasts.
PIMA 1|1. Signature of the Interministerial order for the restructuring of the CPCM,
including a TOFE subcommittee (2022).
2. Signature of the Ministerial order establishing the macro-fiscal unit (2022)
3. Adoption of the internal regulations for the functioning of the CPCM (2023).
4. Production of a procedures manual for the preparation of the macro-fiscal
framework.Revision of the presentation of the MTFF to (i) verify explicitly the
compliance of the projections with the fiscal rules (Article 15 LOFIP), (ii)
distinguish between capital expenditure on current projects and capital
expenditure on new projects(2023).|
MINPLAN;
MINBUD.MI
NFIN|**Medium**||
+|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
+|
**Action 1.2.2: Gradually complete**
**the list of fiscal risks of all**
**general government departments**
**and quantify them in the DRB.**
|
The credibility of the
budget is improved.|
X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-10.
PIMA 3c
C-PIMA 5|1. Strengthen the macroeconomic risk analysis tools and methods
2. Complete the list of specific and institutional fiscal risks and classify them
according to impact and probability of occurrence.
3. Quantify the specific and institutional risks and formulate mitigation
measures,after strengthening the tools and capacities for analysis, particularly
relating to the viability of PPP projects, debt levels of the provinces, and
climate-related risks(2024).
4.Progressively expand and deepen the DRB, in particular to cover a review of
risks arising from major investment projects of the provinces and public
corporations, as well as guarantees granted to the PPPs, and scenarios
involving climate change risks (2024).
|
MINBUD
(DGPPB);
MINPLAN;
ST-CPCM;
CCDMT-RB
(GTRB)|**High**||
+|**Action 1.2.4: Improve the**
**oversight of public corporations**
**(EPs) and administrative public**
**entities (établissements publics**
**administratifs - EPAs)**and the
transparency of the financial flows
between the central government
and these organizations to aid the
analysis of fiscal risks.
|The Government has an
overview of the fiscal risks
associated with the EPs
and EPAs.
|
|X
|X|X|PEFA PI-10.
PIMA 3c, 5b.
C-PIMA 2
|
1. Adoption of a portfolio strategy documentcovering the objectives of public
shareholders and the investment and performance objectives of corporations,
including the importance of taking climate change into account in their
investment projects(2023).
2. Signature of a circular from the Prime Minister instructing the EPs and EPAs
to produce financial reports with a standard financial reporting model attached
within six months of the year-end,and to share them with the Ministries of
Finance and the Budget (2023).
3. Attach to the draft budget a consolidated report of the financial position of
the EPs and EPAs,their investments, and the financial flows between the
Government and these organizations (2024).
4. Strengthen the computerization of the EPs (2022-24).|
Ministry of
the
Portfolio/
High
Council of
the
Portfolio;
MINPLAN;
MINBUD|**High**||
+|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|
+|**Action 1.3.4: Gradually increase**
**the number of ministries that**
**have up-to-date strategies and**
**adopt the finalized and updated**
**model of program budgets.**|The targets and indicators
of fiscal programs reflect
government policies.|X|X|X|X|The number of
ministries that
have up-to-date
strategies has
increased.
PIMA 2b, c, 7c
C-PIMA 2, 3|1. Publication of the presidential order to confer powers on the ministries
(2022).
2. Completion of the reclassification and streamlining of government
organizations and signature of the related decree (QIV 2022)
3.Enhance the information on the objectives in the priority action plans, in
particular those relating to climate change. Strengthen the sectoral thematic
groups to ensure greater cross-cutting awareness of climate change in public
investment decisions (2023).
4. Finalize the fiscal program models, includingfor the special accounts,
supplementary budgets and operators, and their adoption by the Council of
Ministers.The models should reinforce the links between planning and
budgeting, for example through the sharing of various performance indicators,
and should establish the indicators for monitoring investments in relation to
climate change(2023).
|
Council of
Ministers;
MINPLAN;
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries|**High**||
+|**Action 1.3.5: Implement the**
**technical and educational tools**
**for the implementation of**
**budgeting in program mode.**|The capacities for
budgeting by program are
strengthened.|X|X|X||Regulatory
framework for
the transition to
program mode
adopted.
PIMA 7c, 8|
1. Identification of new fiscal management actors, within a framework
establishing their respective roles (2022).
2.Validate the following guides: (I) appointment of persons responsible for
programs and procedures for delegation of the payment authority function,
preparation of the program budget, framework for management dialogs (2023);
(ii) budgeting and application through AE/CP (commitment authorizations/
payment appropriations),in particular with the requirement to break down the
status of consumption of the AEs by project (2023); (iii) procedures for
selection, steering, and governance specific to Government operators (2024);
(iv) Audit of programs; practice of management supervision; (v) preparation of
the MTFF, the overall MTEF, and the ministerial MTEFs; (2024).|
COREF ;
MINBUD
(DGPPB ;
DGDSP) ;
Ministères
sectoriels.|**Medium**||
+|**Action 1.3.6: Improve the**
**credibility of the budget.**
|The Government budget
is executed as planned in
accordance with the
preparation of the
expenditures, and the
gaps between forecasts
and outcomes are
reduced.
|X
|X
|X
|X
|PEFA PI-1, PI-
2, and PI-3
PIMA 6, 7, 8, 14
|1. Forecast fiscal resources solely on the basis of technical considerations and
ascertain that the execution of expenditures follows the provision of the LOFIP
and the General Public Accounting Regulations (RGCP) (LF 2023).
2. Execute almost all the expenditures on the basis of normal procedures (2022
and subsequent years).
|
National
Assembly
and Senate;
Council of
Ministers;
MINFIN;
MINBUD;|**High**||
+|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|
+|**Action 1.4.1: Produce all the**
**annexes to the draft budget law**
**as provided in the LOFIP and**
**supplement the documentation to**
**enhance transparency and**
**nourish parliamentary debate.**
|The information provided
by the annexes to the
draft budget law (PLF)
meets the requirements of
the LOFIP and contributes
to greater understanding
of the fiscal issues.
||X|X|X|PEFA PI 5
PIMA 6c, 8, 12|1. Prepare the budget documentation as required by the LOFIP, including the
documents listed under Article 78 (6), (7), and (8) and the last four listed under
Article 79 (5) (2023).
2. Fill in the budget documentation in addition to the requirements of the LOFIP
(specifically, reports on fiscal expenditure, fiscal risk, the general position of
public corporations and institutions, the status of collateral and guarantees
granted by the Government, the annual cash flow plan adjusted to a monthly
rate, the assessment of the stock of debt, and the list of PPPs in progress)and
the Public Investment Program (PIP)(2024).
|
MINBUD
(DGPPB)|**Medium**||
+|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
+|
**Action 3.2.1: Improve the**
**methodology for preparing and**
**updating commitment plans**
|Steering of budget
execution is improved.
|X
|X
|X
|
|PEFA PI-1, PI-2
and PI-3; PEFA
PI-21
Rate of execution
of the PEB
Level of RAPs in
relation to
expenditures
(pending
payments and
arrears)
PIMA 12a, 12b
|1. Take up a text making preparation of the PEB and the PTR mandatory
(Q4 2022).
2. Adopt the guide for the preparation of the PEBs and the PTR,which
increases the consistency between the two tools(Q1 2023).
3.Strengthen in-year budget regulation by having the commitment plan at the
beginning of the year based on the draft budget law appropriations, as
presented by the Government (2023).
4. Establish the top-down and bottom-up approach in the preparation/ updating
of the PEBs (Q2 2024).|
MINBUD/D
CB/
DGTCP|**High**||
+|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|
+|
**Action 3.4.1: Revise the legal and**
**regulatory framework for public**
**contracts using the MAPS II 2021**
**assessment.**
|
The governance of the
procurement system is
strengthened.|
|
X|
X|
X|
PEFA PI-24 (1
to 4)
PIMA 11a, 11b, 1
2a, 12b|1. Revise the laws and regulations pertaining to public procurement on the
basis of the MAPS II recommendations (ARMP, General Directorate for
Procurement Supervision - DGCMP, and procurement and project
management units - CGPMP)and, in particular, further restrict the possibilities
of granting special authorizations, which open the way to private mutual
agreements(Q4 2023).
2. Require the mandatory preparation of provisional plans for procurement
contracts based on the draft budget law adopted in the Council of Ministers
(Q1 2023).
3. Improve the format of the plan for public procurement to be submitted to the
department tasked with the preparation of the commitment plan by
incorporating the budget data in it.|
MINBUD/A
RMP/DGC
MP|**High**||
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|
+||||||||4. Authorize the DGCMP to access the budget information system to ascertain
the availability of appropriations for the files on public contracts submitted to it
for supervision (Q2 2022).
5. Interface the procurement management system with the budget execution
system for embedded checks on the availability of appropriations (Q 4 2024)||||
+|**Action 3.4.2: Make the DGCMP**
**the only entry point at the**
**Ministry of the Budget for**
**requests for nonobjection notices**
**on public procurement files (PPM,**
**DAO, special authorizations, etc.)**
**in accordance with the relevant**
**provisions of the procurement**
**code.**
|The transparency of
public procurement is
improved.
|X|X|X||PEFA PI-24 (1
to 4)
PIMA 11|
1. Draw up a form for transmission of requests for notices to the DGCMP for
files entered at the office of the Ministry of the Budget (MINBUD) (Q1 2022).
2.Gradually reduce the number of special authorizations granted by the
DGCMP (2022).|
MINBUD/A
RMP/DGC
MP|High||
+|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
+|**Action 3.6.2: Keep and regularly**
**update the register of collateral**
**and guarantees granted by the**
**Government.**
|The management of
public debt is
strengthened.
Its viability and
sustainability are regularly
ensured.
||X|X||PEFA PI-13 (1 to 3)
Number of
notices on the
viability and
sustainability of
debt agreements
PIMA 1a|
1. Establish a database of all the agreements with collateral and guarantee
clauses (Q2 2023).
2. Design markers for the collateral and guarantees likely to be called, so that
they can be covered in the budget (Q4 2023).
3.Conduct regular analyses of the viability of the debt, including alternative
scenarios incorporating all debt instruments, natural resource operating
profiles, demographic projections, contingent liabilities, and climate change
(2023).|
MINFIN/DG
DP|**High**||
+|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|
+|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|
+|
**Action 4.4.1: Implement the**
**institutional framework for**
**inventory accounting, as defined**
**in the LOFIP.**|
Inventory accounting
meets the requirements of
accrual and asset
accounting.
|
|
X|X||The institutional
framework is in
place.
PIMA 15|1. Establish a consultation framework between the DGCTP and the agency
tasked with the management of the Government’s movable and immovable
assets in order to strengthen the institutional framework for inventory
bookkeeping (2023).|
MIN
FIN/DGTCP/
CPCC/MIN
Transp/MIN
BUDGET/DI
G-CC|**Medium**||
+|**Action 4.4.2: Develop the**
**regulatory framework for**
**inventory accounting.**
|**Action 4.4.2: Develop the**
**regulatory framework for**
**inventory accounting.**
|
|
|X
|
|PEFA PI-12
PIMA 15
|
1. Adopt the inventory nomenclatureand a clear methodology for asset
valuation (2024).
2. Adopt the procedures manual for managing inventory accounting (2024).
3. Incorporate inventory accounting rules in the book of accounting standards.
4. Carry out gradually a full inventory of nonfinancial assets (2024).
|
MIN
FIN/DGTCP
/CPCC/MIN
Transp
/MIN
BUDGET
/DIG-CC|**Medium**|**Medium**|
+|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|
+|**Action 4.8.1: Strengthen the**
**quality of cash flow forecasts. **|Cash management plan
forecasts are made
reliable.|X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-16 and
PI-21
Gap between
cash flow
forecasts and
outcomes
PIMA 12a, 12b|1. Prepare a procedures manual for drawing up the cash management plan
(2022).
2. Produce the cash management plan on the basis of actual inflows and
disbursements affecting the Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Central
Bank of the Congo (BCC) and the cash shown in the accounting items (2022).|
DGTCP|**High**||
+|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|
+|**Action 4.9.2: Progressively**
**expand the coverage of the TSA**
|The various parties
involved comply with the
reform.
The TSA is operational
and covers all
Government resources.
|X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-21
Number of
accounts that
are included
under the TSA
again.
PIMA 12c|1. Adopt a communication and awareness-raising strategy for the various
parties concerned on the benefits of consolidating resources in the TSA (2022).
2. Limit the procedure of exemption from the principle of mandatory deposit at
the Treasury of all government liquid assets (2022).
3. With the support of the BCC carry out a comprehensive survey of
government accounts open in the financial system (2022-23).
4. After a stress test of the impact on the financial system of returning to the
Treasury the credit balances of public accounts residing in the financial system,
determine an appropriate approach to a process of closing these accounts and
gradually transferring the balances to the TSA (2023).
5. At the same time carry out discussions with the PTFs in order to proceed with
the transfer of donors’ accounts to the General Treasury Account (TSA) (2024).|
MINFIN,
BCC,
project
team,
DGTCP,
PTF|||
+|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
+|
**Action 5.3.1: Strengthen the**
**guarantees of the independence**
**of the Court of Accounts**
|
An independent audit
providing assurance of the
appropriateness and
compliance of the
execution of public
spending is assured.|X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-30.4
PIMA 14c|1. Appointment of the President of the Court of Accounts as of right (2022)
2. Judges take an oath before the President of the Republic, to ratify the
appointment after receiving the opinion of the National Assembly (AN) (2022).
3. Production of the functional organization chart of the Court of Accounts
(2022)
4. Signature of the Decree on the official regulations of the technical and
administrative staff (2023)
5. Signature of an instruction authorizing the automatic transfer of budget
allocations; appoint an accountant to the Court of Accounts who meets the
requirements of independence of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) (2014)
6. Set up an automatic transfer mechanism for budget allocations. (2024)
7. Submit to the National Assembly a proposal to securely establish the
formulation of the budget of the Court of Accounts (2025).|
Court of
Accounts
National
Assembly
(AN)
MINBUD
MINFIN|**High**||
+|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|
+|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|
+|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|
+|**Cross-cutting action 0.2.1:**
**Develop, adopt, and implement a**
**training plan to accompany the**
**implementation of the Strategic**
**Public Finance Reform Plan**
**(PSRFP) 2022-28.**|The capacities of the
various parties involved in
GFP (public financial
management) are
strengthened.|X|X|X|X|Number of annual
training courses|1. Adopt an updated public financial management training plan (2022).
2. Implement the training planthereby strengthening, among other things, the
capacities for public investment management and capacities for analysis of the
fiscal risks arising from PPPs(2022-28).|
COREF,
MINFIN,
MINBUD,
Ministries,
Supervisory
authorities|**High**||
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Annex 2. Detailed PIMA assessment scores**
+The following colors are used to present the scores:
+
+
+|Score|Weak|Medium|Advanced|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Score
|
1|2
|
3|
+|Color|
||
|
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|I. PLANNING|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+||**Institutional**
**design**|**Effectiveness**|
+|1.a.|
||
+|
1.b|||
+|
1.c|||
+|
2.a.|||
+|
2.b|||
+|
2.c|||
+|
3.a.|||
+|
3.b|||
+|
3.c|||
+|
4.a.|||
+|
4.b|||
+|
4.c|||
+|
5.a.|||
+|
5.b
|
|
|
+|
5.c|||
+
+
+|II. ALLOCATION|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+||**Institutional**
**design**|**Effectiveness**|
+|6.a|
||
+|6.b|||
+|6.c|||
+|7.a|||
+|7.b|||
+|7.c|||
+|8.a|||
+|8.b|||
+|8.c|||
+|9.a|||
+|9.b|||
+|9.c|||
+|10.a|||
+|10.b
|
|
|
+|10.c|||
+
+
+|III. IMPLEMENTATION|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+||**Institutional**
**design**|**Effectiveness**|
+|11.a|
||
+|11.b|||
+|11.c|||
+|12.a|||
+|12.b|||
+|12.c|||
+|13.a|||
+|13.b|||
+|13.c|||
+|14.a|||
+|14.b|||
+|14.c|||
+|15.a|||
+|15.b
|
|
|
+|15.c|||
+
+
+
+**Annex 3. Detailed C-PIMA module assessment scores**
+The following colors are used to present the scores:
+
+|C1. Climate-aware Planning|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|**C1.a**|**National and sectoral planning**
|
+|**C1.b**|**Land use and building regulations**
|
+|**C1.c**|**Centralized guidance on planning**|
+|**C2. Coordination between Entities**
|**C2. Coordination between Entities**
|
+|**C2.a**|**Coordination across central government**
|
+|**C2.b**|**Coordination with subnational governments**
|
+|**C2.c**|**Oversight framework for public corporations**|
+|**C3. Project Appraisal and Selection**
|**C3. Project Appraisal and Selection**
|
+|**C.3.a**|**Climate analysis in project appraisal**
|
+|**C3.b**|**PPP framework including climate risks**
|
+|**C3.c**|**Climate consideration in project selection**|
+|**C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management**
|**C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management**
|
+|**C4.a.**|**Climate budget tagging**
|
+|**C4.b**|**Ex post review of projects on climate outcomes**
|
+|**C4.c**|**Asset management**|
+|**C5. Risk Management**|**C5. Risk Management**|
+|**C5.a**|**Disaster risk management strategy**|
+|**C5.b**|**Ex ante financing mechanisms**|
+|**C5.c**|**Fiscal risk analysis including climate risks**|
+
+
+|Score|Weak|Medium|Advanced|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Score
|
1|2
|
3|
+|Color|
||
|
+
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Annex 4. Setting up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects**
+**Management of the externally financed project portfolio in the DRC is fragmented.** Indeed, several
+agencies within the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, and other ministries cover various
+project portfolios, the features of which, in terms of sectors and donors, often depend on the historic
+circumstances of their inception. [101] The legal framework establishing the powers of some of these entities
+is often obsolete, or even no longer valid, as in the case of committees or agencies that had a closing
+date set in the laws and regulations. This poses several problems.
+
+- _This situation complicates the consolidation of information on the projects._ As things stand, the
+authorities are not able to oversee on a regular basis and in real time the financial and physical flows
+relating to these projects. The reporting is either not comprehensive, or irregular or late.
+
+- _This fragmentation tends to disperse management skills and knowledge among the various units,_ in a
+situation where the authorities are lacking human and financial resources.
+
+- _The discussions on the portfolio with the various donors are not optimal due to the lack of coordinated_
+_management._ It is therefore not easy to verify whether, overall, the actions of the various donors are
+well aligned with the DRC’s strategic priorities and whether the various sectors are given balanced
+coverage.
+
+- _The performance of this portfolio is thus mixed, as illustrated by the poor rates of uptake of resources._
+Various reasons underlie the generally slow implementation of externally financed programs and
+projects; these reasons include the complexity and variability of the procedures required by different
+donors, and the use of funds for expenditure that is actually ineligible.
+
+- _To continue to exist even when their portfolio has reached its end-date, the committees and agencies_
+_initially tasked with managing externally financed projects then also go on to implement projects_
+_financed by the central government’s own funds._ This is specifically the case with the BCECO and the
+Infrastructure Unit, while their founding regulations tasked them solely with carrying out externally
+financed projects. That raises issues relating to the application of internal control procedures.
+
+
+**To remedy this situation, it is important to work towards the establishment of a single office (the**
+**“Office”) tasked with coordination and oversight of all externally financed projects.** Such an entity
+would allow to pool resources that are currently scattered among the various units. The Office should
+have the following three core functions:
+
+(i) A front office to organize the pitch for projects to be financed and ensure alignment with the
+strategic development priorities, participate in funding negotiations with the authorities, and
+gather information on banking flows.
+
+(ii) A middle office that would support the sectoral ministries carrying the budget appropriations
+in the preparation and implementation of projects. Tasks that could benefit from that support
+could include the conduction of project feasibility studies, the selection of projects to be
+entered in the PIP, the preparation of files for calls for bids, and the contract allocation
+process. The sectoral ministries could also choose to delegate the role of principal contractor
+to the Office, in return for fair compensation. In all cases an agreement should be entered
+into in advance between the sectoral ministry and the Office, in order to ensure clear
+allocation of responsibilities and strict compliance with the rules for budget management and
+control (in particular, the absolute adherence to recording the projects in the respective
+sectoral ministries’ budgets) and the rules relating to procurement. The management fees
+received by the Office should be reported transparently in the budget law.
+
+
+101 Among these agencies, it is worth noting the Central Coordination Office (BCECO), the Fragile States
+Finance Implementation Unit (CFEF), the Project and Program Oversight Unit (CSPP), the European
+Development Fund payment authority support unit, and the Aid and Investment Management Platform
+(PGAI).
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+(iii) A back office, which would keep a comprehensive, consolidated database of the currently
+managed externally financed projects, draw up the various monitoring reports for each project
+and donor, and supply financial information to the institutional users, in particular the
+Ministries of Finance, Planning, and the Budget. As the sectoral ministries remain responsible
+for the appropriations allocated to their projects, the accounting function would be covered by
+the public accountants assigned to these expenditures under the auspices of the General
+Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting.
+
+
+**The best option in the view of the mission with regard to the institutional form of the Office would**
+**be an** _**établissement public administratif**_ **(administrative public entity) under the financial and**
+**technical oversight of the Ministry of Finance, and which would be the successor to the BCECO.**
+The benefits of such a structure include financial and administrative autonomy and attractiveness for high
+quality experts. The Office would also benefit from the networks of local correspondents set up by the
+BCECO and the CFEF. The Board of Directors of the Office should include representatives of the
+Ministries of Planning and the Budget, as well as the sectoral ministries, in order to ensure good
+coordination and exchange of information. The Office should comply with the law on public institutions
+and be given a framework by a regulation setting forth, in particular, the functional relationships with the
+other authorities - specifically the Ministry of Planning (for the planning of public investment) and the
+professional experts located in the contracting authorities (for example the directorate of hospital, school,
+and roads and bridges infrastructure). As with any public institution, the Office would have an accounting
+section to take care of reporting on the operations relating to its activities.
+**The other options available pose problems in terms of financing and potential effectiveness.** An
+internal entity at a ministry would suffer from a lack of institutional and financial autonomy and would not
+allow proper coordination with the authorities sponsoring the projects. An inter-ministerial committee
+placed under the joint authority of several ministries, with a permanent technical secretariat to deal with
+the work, could perform the tasks described above, but its implementation would be complex and its
+attractiveness for high-quality experts would be limited.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Annex 5. Guiding principles for preparation of a decree on public investment management**
+
+**The adoption of a decree on public investment management is a high priority.** The adoption of such
+a decree covering all stages of the project cycle, would make it possible to define the responsibilities of
+the various parties involved in each of these stages, to structure the institutional framework, and to
+provide guidance for the development of indispensable tools to build optimal investment project
+management. This decree should specifically respond to the following basic elements:
+
+- **Applying to all the projects borne by the public sector regardless of their sources of finance** central government, public services and institutions, provinces and ETDs, public corporations, as well
+as PPPs (in accordance with the existing legal framework). The decree should stipulate the anchoring
+of the development programs and projects within the budget and the relationships between the
+development program and project management units and the budget program managers. It should
+lay down an institutional structure that includes all the relevant parties and provides regulatory
+responses to any potential areas of conflict among the parties. It must give indications on the rules of
+behavior of the parties involved in the various stages of the cycle (planning, allocation, and
+implementation).
+
+- **Setting the framework for planning and budgeting of the projects recorded in the budget** by (i)
+stipulating the rules for the management of the portfolio/bank of projects, in particular the criteria for
+registration, completion, eligibility for the PIP, integration in the budget, and removal from the
+portfolio; (ii) detailing the activities of the planning and budgeting process, as well as the role of the
+parties involved as part of a unified budget process; (iii) specifying the format of the PIP; and (iv)
+requiring the register of guarantees to be kept, in particular for PPP projects. The text could also
+provide for the publication of comprehensive information on the whole of the public investment project
+portfolio, regardless of the source of financing and the management entity.
+
+- **Laying down the main rules for appraisal and selection of projects** by (i) stipulating the approach
+for identification, appraisal, selection, and completion of projects, as well as the approach to eligibility
+for the PIP and inclusion in the budget from the perspective of informing the various guides and
+manuals on their content; (ii) organizing the budgeting and use of study funds to carry out feasibility
+studies. General selection criteria, including those giving explicit priority to projects combating climate
+change, could be set forth in the text.
+
+- **Specifying the rules for monitoring project implementation**, particularly covering project
+management units financed both internally and externally, the heads of major projects, and their
+relationships with the technical and financial supervisors for information reporting.
+
+- **Providing a framework for the process of closing projects and** _**ex post**_ **evaluation** by requiring
+that inventories, completion audits, and _ex post_ evaluations be carried out.
+
+- **Establishing the principle of systematic inclusion of project maintenance** at the time of project
+design, budgeting, and implementation.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Annex 6. Illustration of the list of relevant selection criteria**
+
+**The list of selection criteria presented below includes various good practices used in several**
+**countries, including Benin, and adds specific criteria relating to climate change.** Each evaluation
+criterion and subcriterion may be subject to an order of priority, or potentially weightings, in order to
+attribute overall grades to the various projects.
+
+- **Existence of the project document: (Yes/ No)**
+
+- **Degree of preparation of the project:**
+
+ - _Have all the headings of the project fiche been filled in and are the associated documents_
+_attached?_
+
+- **Relevance of the project:**
+
+ - _Have social, economic, and environmental needs, including the aspect of climate and gender_
+_equity, been clearly identified?_
+
+ - _Have the beneficiaries been qualitatively and quantitatively defined?_
+
+- **Consistency of the project:**
+
+ - _Do the project objectives comply with the strategic guidelines in terms of development?_
+
+ - _Does the project comply with the strategic priorities for the sector?_
+
+ - _Is the internal logic of the project (activities - outcomes - specific targets - general objective)_
+_coherent?_
+
+- **Technical feasibility of the project:**
+
+ - _Have the preliminary conditions for starting project implementation (agreements, procedures,_
+_organization, responsibilities, laws and regulations) been established?_
+
+ - _Is the technical choice optimal, in particular with regard to climate change?_
+
+- **Economic and financial feasibility of the project:**
+
+ - _What is the assessment of internal return?_
+
+- **Appraisal of the cost and financing plan:**
+
+ - _What is the cost estimate for carrying out the project?_
+
+ - _Is the project financing plan sustainable?_
+
+- **Appraisal of risks, impacts and mitigation measures of the project:**
+
+ - _Have the risks of the project, including climate change risk, been assessed, and have plans for_
+_mitigation of these risks been established?_
+
+ - _Have the climate change impacts been assessed?_
+
+- **Project implementation strategy:**
+
+ - _Have the project implementation mechanisms (operating mode) been established and are they_
+_appropriate?_
+
+ - _Has the project implementation plan been established and it is appropriate?_
+
+- **Viability and sustainability of the project:**
+
+ - _Have the recurring costs of the project been correctly identified and appraised?_
+
+- **Monitoring and evaluation of the project: (Scale and grade).**
+
+ - _What is the relevance of the indicators associated with the project?_
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+**Annex 7. Principles guiding the establishment of an integrated bank of projects**
+
+**Most African countries do not yet have fully developed practices in the area of information**
+**systems**, structured around a bank of projects that enables projects to be monitored, identified by a
+unique code, over their entire life-cycle from the initial idea for each project through to its completion.
+
+**In short, however, many important principles remain to be applied with regard to computerization**
+**of the bank of projects, as follows:**
+
+- Making available in advance an effective institutional framework providing steering, coordination,
+support, and implementation of the computerization process;
+
+- Integrating the IT development of the bank of projects in a strategy formalized in an IT master plan;
+
+- Allocating to each project in the bank a unique code following the project through its whole life-cycle
+using a registration system implemented by the Ministry in charge of planning;
+
+- Integrating in the bank of projects functionalities that enable monitoring over the whole life-cycle of
+management, from project ideas to completions, according to the following sequence:
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+- Adopting a comprehensive approach to the bank of projects, including projects financed by own
+funds, external funds, and supported by PPPs, at both national and subnational level;
+
+- Supporting the implementation of the computerized bank of projects with formalized tools, in terms of
+steering (project fiches, appraisal and selection framework, PIP, dashboards), monitoring, and
+transmission of information (standard forms) and reporting (standard reports);
+
+- Identifying and facilitating, using keys (registration of projects, budget nomenclature, and registration
+of contracts and PPPs), charts of accounts (general accounting and inventory accounting), data
+interfaces, and management applications;
+
+- Ensuring the sharing and pooling of information on the bank of projects among all parties involved;
+
+- Promoting development, ownership, proper use, and autonomy among the users of the bank of
+projects.
+
+**In terms of functionality, an information system supporting public investment management**
+**should enable the following:**
+
+- Development of the project pipeline (identification, preparation, design, and presentation);
+
+- Project appraisal and selection;
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
+
+
+
+- An interface with the IT system for budgeting, with the establishment of a key between the coding of
+projects and the budget nomenclature;
+
+- An interface with the IT system for procurement, with the establishment of a key between the coding
+of projects, the budget nomenclature, and the registration of contracts;
+
+- An interface with the budget implementation system(s) and general accounting;
+
+- Project management;
+
+- Periodic monitoring of physical and financial implementation of projects and the centralization of
+information, to steer and monitor the portfolio;
+
+- An interface with the inventory accounting system for management of assets.
+
+
+IMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b3428f8b12ec64ebfe4354dd54b02fb20e2d5c16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "958ccd376e734141", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1239, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aaaa40fe40bfbf50bf403fc4af06470b07ab9f819f404e34685c60fed0bee174", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "68d076643d14214be3d8732b111bd954265be04a270357172fb7e0dde7e5bff6", "width": 952}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6d69613c8c98d4a1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-001", "height": 256, "page": 9, "phash_256": "be390f0dc38ef1f170f0dd1c1f060e07c98399e1cc7cd41eb993b96145cc3671", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "66eea56790d849edeb38ae6b17d0c137b3b4b7575bda909b81932eeca4d566fe", "width": 278}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a08c8c0f0f4f8cd0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-002", "height": 264, "page": 9, "phash_256": "b64c70c6d8760f216d99e2d19b339c1877cc3746f06699e23fc9b43da0f10f0a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "a57d3571042f16e2c891d9a1bcb3672d34d5230ae01619b2f8eb8dc8d114dcc7", "width": 260}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "88626262622641c1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-001", "height": 217, "page": 17, "phash_256": "cf07997c22f8b2c35f7a9115644389ad330b4ca6b3584e74b39774689b97645a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "9ae9345668ab9e410bc85a2f91f3f1a323a4ac02dd38387bea4a9a17e0ec8971", "width": 290}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-002.png", "caption": "Figure 1.C. Public capital stock: regional", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "7933d48982aa89dc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-002", "height": 235, "page": 17, "phash_256": "81123fb51f99cf688e24a65534da959b1d9ecc864e26ea256259e15d19fd19cc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "e24f8204ddea226de0c864fd41a6fd9f639efcdd7ca38408d871079b91b3352d", "width": 285}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c1508e2c1c808fd6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-003", "height": 234, "page": 17, "phash_256": "90005fab49ffc353be45e650c05eb48674223c8c5db31bbf4f45cb4d0a58e373", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "3c8bed4913df2c1c5ee6ec4f48c816477bbbc34a4e75e81a76022a140220ee84", "width": 294}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1b70e2d0c0c0c0c0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-004", "height": 229, "page": 17, "phash_256": "805d3ffc3d08380d616961e961eb67636f036e036e3bcc786c78c0787fd21387", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "3c188434d0adbb56d67ba6633b7ecfd21ab175a8a6c272a88744631c93ee5120", "width": 250}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ccccececacacacaa", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0018-001", "height": 187, "page": 18, "phash_256": "96f2c98c4c89b2536c2198dc2cf15222e79fd98cdc89b95476abbb542d7152ae", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "01ac0765f1ebfc66bb7d24529e7e1076ff3e7f4b2f5b093f8da41cdae0e82d93", "width": 286}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "79328294868e9832", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0019-001", "height": 256, "page": 19, "phash_256": "98009f871a6fa6c94e92a3b66725e161673bc463790fb4727d4e7d2850e3f41c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "5fe8836e26d3eb86db64868da0c5ce9717c4e06ba9e1fdc52516ef4fbb5757d7", "width": 339}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8a800b8b2b2b2b2b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-001", "height": 314, "page": 21, "phash_256": "be3ac3c09cc71c67633863383e2f9ce7c1c0c9c23c37633a6338362d9ce79c83", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "b1e8281ca73a031bf384e9ed35f7a4342add698528562de50d09f93c44a9c7ca", "width": 189}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d06868696a616969", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-002", "height": 315, "page": 21, "phash_256": "8fffa5d16263d094e049d8b6bc087e435e942f439f804ec1b341dcc173698d77", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "e515334eee9b2d049533ac888917c40d32a643765788cd275a48a808eacf6ef2", "width": 446}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d0c343d0d4d1d5d5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-001", "height": 208, "page": 22, "phash_256": "83ffc73e609cb943fc01de10b7087c815a62664c4ab6a06f30ff93bc855999b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "cdd11ddbd537938584d268bf4ace1368191d8656b03bdc165c94f1442c719b48", "width": 385}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "713f0c800f714089", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-002", "height": 229, "page": 22, "phash_256": "de02ad255e522f25425e852cde2ae15aa7c15e9a60f963d5d0bc68fc61f4c2bc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "eceaa3099f86d407d8baf7101d08e9ef8443599b5775ed0305c906e82eb57551", "width": 280}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "823f56db78eac4e4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0023-001", "height": 201, "page": 23, "phash_256": "815effc2e0018fff7b00407fcf9f87c098979f00bb0cb02734f620db67d8c703", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "f0a1c4268223ee8d679b5bf98d103324d469daa33d60889bf88814878a6bc7a0", "width": 328}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0024-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8607453313152b8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0024-001", "height": 443, "page": 24, "phash_256": "e9aeccf9a6593d8891e61e36669871869e6552e1999ea5596279129e9966b125", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "14ad7228eec0e5f6152890cf34e0fdc33791fe2551984f804db4ffa852e79db2", "width": 445}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "69b3191d0d1d9bc3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-001", "height": 272, "page": 25, "phash_256": "bb7ccc34c5b337e13f13f11f3660732072fc5ec4b50384f97303e10760ec27c4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "11ed0aec50dd9cc355de4c3798e85accdc9e1deabec980180bd05dbf6ba53672", "width": 333}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "69d3991919199be3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-002", "height": 280, "page": 25, "phash_256": "b31c4a8ccde93e333e33f3305281de2c738c5ad7be7fb5b0f363020660686931", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "305e0f07114006f0f45a15a5c608067cf6450f6d5814648c710bbfabe22ab0ca", "width": 344}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0030-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1e16b7a7c7f737a7", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0030-001", "height": 90, "page": 30, "phash_256": "8c55393b711a37ea46721c7ac2c6438eaa8c4e230ee7c6e2733b0ec40efdf81d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "d83a98e2a15e95027ab1a95d6dd15c01620df98a64940455a34487eb2943943f", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "020031033e8bb8a0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-001", "height": 182, "page": 36, "phash_256": "b838d7c7d49435612d5ce8d16abd1280febec1ab186a33d2e6560cd511157775", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "5c41af83742dfef710f5de11c5059a2f7a32d82ff6ccf2a4e9a2fcf44ed67e15", "width": 312}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-002.png", "caption": "Table 3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0a32f03332f6340a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-002", "height": 64, "page": 36, "phash_256": "9d46195947a96532ea1d06b623d15a8dda96096ba57b741be95b15569ad46d26", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "fca324e2f6d15cd3d304f2c7b733a859af97683f43bc09a71e46ff6e7aa1cc84", "width": 773}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0037-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b431936860303060", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0037-001", "height": 143, "page": 37, "phash_256": "dd572a8638e69c76d71df1c428a828a9878fc73938e360426f8e1e73e1083f79", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "7b3b0493a71102691fdc66acd6e4af10d80598aa8f74a4efd4ca75b0cbfd6cf4", "width": 773}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8589cacbcb83c2c3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0039-001", "height": 226, "page": 39, "phash_256": "c17670ed669d7ee98f8581f460ed820782077ac961fc8fa478d9f03ef41b8164", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "97835b439abfaadc1f56d1f7eca052360ed2edc7f824b4f7f6a1301545d0151d", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0056-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "393131d25331392e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0056-001", "height": 277, "page": 56, "phash_256": "9be859aca61d9e55e581b553261e9c3ac1eee1acb5a6e3c198096a1e4b2ee1e2", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "d0f656b6cfa51bf557b077bf6914d489a16521410298915531c9cb2351aa93c4", "width": 547}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-058/assets/figures/cr-2023-058-fig-p0080-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "33318ab0b0b02133", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-058-fig-p0080-001", "height": 379, "page": 80, "phash_256": "c8f235cc1fb64c161cafc7635062f2600f9d1c9f403937cd58c8e250b7670fbb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "sha256_normalized_png": "ac8d1516ec21f1195bb154f80a2493463961d5181537b6a518ec55b5f71db377", "width": 627}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-058/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..258177563d408360c5d4744d849d2e3e25b8806d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-058/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/58**\n### **DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE** **CONGO**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT** **MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT - PIMA AND CLIMATE PIMA**\n\n\nThis paper on the Democratic Republic of the Congo was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on March 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/58\nDEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT - PIMA AND CLIMATE PIMA\n\nThis paper on the Democratic Republic of the Congo was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on March 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 617}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\nDEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF\nTHE CONGO\nPublic Investment Management\nAssessment - PIMA and Climate PIMA\nJanuary 2023\n\nPrepared By\nFabien Gonguet, Laura Gores, Nicolas Hengy,\nEphrem Ghonda Makiadi, Pierre Roumegas and\nHoda Selim\n\n\nPrepared By\nFabien Gonguet, Laura Gores, Nicolas Hengy, Ephrem Ghonda Makiadi, Pierre\nRoumegas and Hoda Selim", "text_characters": 307}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Table of Contents**\n\n**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 5**\n\n\n**INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 7**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 9**\n\n\n**I. PUBLIC INVESTMENT TRENDS IN THE DRC ............................................................................... 16**\n\nA. Trends in general government investment and capital stock .................................................... 16\nB. Composition of public sector investment ................................................................................... 19\n\n\n**II. EFFICIENCY AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE DRC .......................................... 21**\n\n\n**III. PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT .............................................................. 24**\n\nA. Overview of the assessment ..................................................................................................... 24\nB. Planning Sustainable Levels of Public Investment .................................................................... 26\nC. Allocating Investments To The Right Sectors And Projects ...................................................... 36\nD. Delivering Productive and Durable Public Assets ..................................................................... 48\n\n\n**IV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C-PIMA) ................................................... 55**\n\nA. Climate change and public investment in the DRC ................................................................... 55\nB. PIMA Climate change module assessment framework ............................................................. 56\n\n\n**V. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 64**\n\nA. Legal Framework ....................................................................................................................... 64\nB. IT support ................................................................................................................................... 65\nC. Staff Capacity ............................................................................................................................ 67\n\n\n**FIGURES**\n0.A. Institutional design (FI) and Effectiveness (EFF) of public investment management in the DRC 10\n0.B. Institutional design (FI) of the institutions of the C-PIMA module in the DRC .............................. 10\n1.A. General government investment: regional comparisons .............................................................. 17\n1.B. Share of general government investment in total investment ...................................................... 17\n1.C. Public capital stock: regional comparisons .................................................................................. 18\n1.D. Public capital stock per capita, 2019 ........................................................................................... 18\n1.E. Sources of financing for central government investment spending .............................................. 19\n1.F. Public investment by function: regional comparisons in 2018 ...................................................... 19\n1.G. PPP Capital stock ......................................................................................................................... 20\n2.A. Indicators of physical access to public infrastructure - 2019 ........................................................ 22\n2.B. Infrastructure quality as perceived by business leaders ............................................................... 23\n2.C. Insufficiencies in access to infrastructure as perceived by private companies ............................ 23\n2.D. Efficiency frontier (physical access to infrastructure) ..................................................................... 24\n3.A. The PIMA assessment framework ................................................................................................ 24\n3.B. DRC: Strength of public investment management institutions ...................................................... 25\n3.C. DRC: Effectiveness (EFF) of public investment management practices ...................................... 25\n3.D. Capital budgets successively planned and voted by parliament (billions of CGF) ....................... 36\n4.A. The C-PIMA assessment framework ............................................................................................ 56\n\n\n**TABLES**\n0.A. PIMA Summary table .................................................................................................................... 12\n0.B. C-PIMA Summary table ................................................................................................................ 12\n0.C. Priority Action Plan to strengthen public investment management .............................................. 14\n3.A. Kinshasa City-Province projects executed using central government transfers, 2020 ................. 31\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table of Contents\n\nACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 5\n\nINTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 7\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 9\n\nI. PUBLIC INVESTMENT TRENDS IN THE DRC ............................................................................... 16\n\nA. Trends in general government investment and capital stock .................................................... 16\nB. Composition of public sector investment ................................................................................... 19\n\nII. EFFICIENCY AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE DRC .......................................... 21\n\nIII. PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT .............................................................. 24\n\nA. Overview of the assessment ..................................................................................................... 24\nB. Planning Sustainable Levels of Public Investment .................................................................... 26\nC. Allocating Investments To The Right Sectors And Projects ...................................................... 36\nD. Delivering Productive and Durable Public Assets ..................................................................... 48\n\nIV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C-PIMA) ................................................... 55\n\nA. Climate change and public investment in the DRC ................................................................... 55\nB. PIMA Climate change module assessment framework ............................................................. 56\n\nV. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 64\n\nA. Legal Framework ....................................................................................................................... 64\nB. IT support ................................................................................................................................... 65\nC. Staff Capacity ............................................................................................................................ 67\n\nFIGURES\n0.A. Institutional design (FI) and Effectiveness (EFF) of public investment management in the DRC 10\n0.B. Institutional design (FI) of the institutions of the C-PIMA module in the DRC .............................. 10\n1.A. General government investment: regional comparisons .............................................................. 17\n1.B. Share of general government investment in total investment ...................................................... 17\n1.C. Public capital stock: regional comparisons .................................................................................. 18\n1.D. Public capital stock per capita, 2019 ........................................................................................... 18\n1.E. Sources of financing for central government investment spending .............................................. 19\n1.F. Public investment by function: regional comparisons in 2018 ...................................................... 19\n1.G. PPP Capital stock ......................................................................................................................... 20\n2.A. Indicators of physical access to public infrastructure - 2019 ........................................................ 22\n2.B. Infrastructure quality as perceived by business leaders ............................................................... 23\n2.C. Insufficiencies in access to infrastructure as perceived by private companies ............................ 23\n2.D. Efficiency frontier (physical access to infrastructure) ..................................................................... 24\n3.A. The PIMA assessment framework ................................................................................................ 24\n3.B. DRC: Strength of public investment management institutions ...................................................... 25\n3.C. DRC: Effectiveness (EFF) of public investment management practices ...................................... 25\n3.D. Capital budgets successively planned and voted by parliament (billions of CGF) ....................... 36\n4.A. The C-PIMA assessment framework ............................................................................................ 56\n\nTABLES\n0.A. PIMA Summary table .................................................................................................................... 12\n0.B. C-PIMA Summary table ................................................................................................................ 12\n0.C. Priority Action Plan to strengthen public investment management .............................................. 14\n3.A. Kinshasa City-Province projects executed using central government transfers, 2020 ................. 31\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 4896}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and envelopes\napproved by vote in the 2022 budget law ............................................................................................. 37\n3.C. Comparison between the routine maintenance needs and funding available .............................. 44\n5.A. Legal texts underlying the PIM procedures in the DRC ................................................................ 65\n\n\n**BOXES**\n3.A. Gap between investment projects registered in the budget and those executed ......................... 40\n3.B. Country examples for the joint preparation of the capital and current budgets ............................ 42\n3.C. Budgeting in the medium term for the investment projects of the Ministry of Mines .................... 43\n3.D. Example of inclusion of project maintenance costs: South Africa ................................................ 45\n4.A. Climate budget tagging ................................................................................................................. 62\n\n\n**ANNEXES**\nAnnex 1. Actions from the draft 2022-24 Priority Action Plan in connection with public investment\nmanagement ......................................................................................................................................... 69\nAnnex 2. Detailed PIMA assessment scores ....................................................................................... 75\nAnnex 3. Detailed C-PIMA module assessment scores ....................................................................... 76\nAnnex 4. Setting up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects ..... 77\nAnnex 5. Guiding principles for preparation of a decree on public investment management .............. 79\nAnnex 6. Illustration of the list of relevant selection criteria ................................................................. 80\nAnnex 7. Principles guiding the establishment of an integrated bank of projects ................................ 81\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and envelopes\napproved by vote in the 2022 budget law ............................................................................................. 37\n3.C. Comparison between the routine maintenance needs and funding available .............................. 44\n5.A. Legal texts underlying the PIM procedures in the DRC ................................................................ 65\n\nBOXES\n3.A. Gap between investment projects registered in the budget and those executed ......................... 40\n3.B. Country examples for the joint preparation of the capital and current budgets ............................ 42\n3.C. Budgeting in the medium term for the investment projects of the Ministry of Mines .................... 43\n3.D. Example of inclusion of project maintenance costs: South Africa ................................................ 45\n4.A. Climate budget tagging ................................................................................................................. 62\n\nANNEXES\nAnnex 1. Actions from the draft 2022-24 Priority Action Plan in connection with public investment\nmanagement ......................................................................................................................................... 69\nAnnex 2. Detailed PIMA assessment scores ....................................................................................... 75\nAnnex 3. Detailed C-PIMA module assessment scores ....................................................................... 76\nAnnex 4. Setting up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects ..... 77\nAnnex 5. Guiding principles for preparation of a decree on public investment management .............. 79\nAnnex 6. Illustration of the list of relevant selection criteria ................................................................. 80\nAnnex 7. Principles guiding the establishment of an integrated bank of projects ................................ 81\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 1908}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**\n\nACE Congolese Environment Agency\nACGT Congolese Agency for Major Works\nAE-CP Commitment Authorization - Payment Appropriation\nAFRITAC Central Central Africa Regional Technical Assistance Center\nARE Electricity Sector Regulatory Authority\nARMP Public Contracts Regulatory Authority (ARMP)\nBCECO Central Coordination Office\nC-PIMA PIMA Climate Change Assessment Module\nC2I Ministerial Information Technology Coordination\nCFEF Fragile States Finance Implementation Unit\nCISPIP Commission for identification and selection of public investment projects\nCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa\nCOREF Public Finance Reform Orientation Committee\nCOPIREP Public Corporation Reform Steering Committee\nCPCC Standing Council of Accounting of the Congo\nCPIP Public Investment Programming Conference\nCRD Dispute Settlement Committee\nCRESP Coordination of External Financing and Project Oversight\nCSNGHC National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management\nCSP High Council of the Portfolio\nCSPP Project and Program Oversight Unit\nDCS Supervision and Oversight Directorate\nDEP Research and Planning Directorate\nDGCMP General Directorate for Procurement Supervision\nDGDP General Directorate of Public Debt\nDGPPB General Directorate of Fiscal Policies and Programming\nDGTCP General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting\nDRB Fiscal Risk Statement\nDRC Democratic Republic of the Congo\nDSA Debt Sustainability Analysis\nETD Decentralized Territorial Entity\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nFONER National Road Maintenance Fund\nGCA Government Chart of Accounts\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nIGF General Inspectorate of Finance\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nLOFIP Law on Public Finance\nM&E Monitoring and Evaluation\nMAAH Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs\nMEDD Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development\nMTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework\nMTFF Medium-Term Fiscal Framework\nNBE Government Budget Classification\nNDC Nationally Determined Contribution\nOR Highways Office\nOVD Office of Roads and Drainage\nPDL(-145T) Local Development Plan for the 145 territories\nPGAI Investment and Aid Management Platform\nPIMA Public Investment Management Assessment\nPIP Public investment Program\nPIREDD REDD Investment Plan\nPNA National Climate Change Adaptation Plan\nPNDS National Health Care Development Plan\nPNSD National Development Strategy Plan\nPOG General Operation Plan\nPPP Public-Private Partnership\nPREPABUD Budget Preparation ( _Préparation du budget_ -software application)\nPTF Technical and Financial Partners\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Acronyms and Abbreviations\n\nACE Congolese Environment Agency\nACGT Congolese Agency for Major Works\nAE-CP Commitment Authorization - Payment Appropriation\nAFRITAC Central Central Africa Regional Technical Assistance Center\nARE Electricity Sector Regulatory Authority\nARMP Public Contracts Regulatory Authority (ARMP)\nBCECO Central Coordination Office\nC-PIMA PIMA Climate Change Assessment Module\nC2I Ministerial Information Technology Coordination\nCFEF Fragile States Finance Implementation Unit\nCISPIP Commission for identification and selection of public investment projects\nCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa\nCOREF Public Finance Reform Orientation Committee\nCOPIREP Public Corporation Reform Steering Committee\nCPCC Standing Council of Accounting of the Congo\nCPIP Public Investment Programming Conference\nCRD Dispute Settlement Committee\nCRESP Coordination of External Financing and Project Oversight\nCSNGHC National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management\nCSP High Council of the Portfolio\nCSPP Project and Program Oversight Unit\nDCS Supervision and Oversight Directorate\nDEP Research and Planning Directorate\nDGCMP General Directorate for Procurement Supervision\nDGDP General Directorate of Public Debt\nDGPPB General Directorate of Fiscal Policies and Programming\nDGTCP General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting\nDRB Fiscal Risk Statement\nDRC Democratic Republic of the Congo\nDSA Debt Sustainability Analysis\nETD Decentralized Territorial Entity\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nFONER National Road Maintenance Fund\nGCA Government Chart of Accounts\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nIGF General Inspectorate of Finance\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nLOFIP Law on Public Finance\nM&E Monitoring and Evaluation\nMAAH Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs\nMEDD Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development\nMTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework\nMTFF Medium-Term Fiscal Framework\nNBE Government Budget Classification\nNDC Nationally Determined Contribution\nOR Highways Office\nOVD Office of Roads and Drainage\nPDL(-145T) Local Development Plan for the 145 territories\nPGAI Investment and Aid Management Platform\nPIMA Public Investment Management Assessment\nPIP Public investment Program\nPIREDD REDD Investment Plan\nPNA National Climate Change Adaptation Plan\nPNDS National Health Care Development Plan\nPNSD National Development Strategy Plan\nPOG General Operation Plan\nPPP Public-Private Partnership\nPREPABUD Budget Preparation ( _Préparation du budget_ -software application)\nPTF Technical and Financial Partners\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2294}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "REDD Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation\nRGCP General Public Accounting Regulations\nSADC Southern African Development Community\nSIGMAP Integrated Procurement Management System ( _Système intégré de gestion des marchés publics_ software application)\nSNEL Société nationale d’électricité\nTA Technical assistance\nTSA Treasury Single Account\nUC-PPP PPP Advice and Coordination Unit\nUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention\non Climate Change\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REDD Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation\nRGCP General Public Accounting Regulations\nSADC Southern African Development Community\nSIGMAP Integrated Procurement Management System ( _Système intégré de gestion des marchés publics_ software application)\nSNEL Société nationale d’électricité\nTA Technical assistance\nTSA Treasury Single Account\nUC-PPP PPP Advice and Coordination Unit\nUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention\non Climate Change\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 453}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **INTRODUCTION**\n\nIn response to a request by Nicolas Kazadi, Minister of Finance of the Democratic Republic of the\nCongo (DRC), a remote mission of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF was held from February\n28 through March 24, 2022 to carry out a public investment management assessment (PIMA). The\nmission, led by Fabien Gonguet (economist, FAD), included Laura Gores (technical assistance\nadviser, FAD), Hoda Selim (senior economist, FAD), Nicolas Hengy and Pierre Roumegas (experts,\nFAD), as well as Ephrem Ghonda Makiadi (public financial management advisor, AFRITAC Central).\nThis mission was financed by the Government of Japan and by AFRITAC Central.\n\n\nAt the start of the mission, the team was welcomed by the Minister of Finance, accompanied by\nGinette Nzau Muteta, his Deputy Cabinet Director, and then by the Coordinator of the Public Financial\nReform Orientation Committee (COREF), Godefroid Misenga, and was given their advice and\nguidance. From March 15 through 18, the mission held score validation meetings together with the\nmain contact points of the various committees and agencies met during the mission. The mission\nsubmitted its findings to the Minister of Finance on Thursday, March 24, and then to the various\ndepartments during a technical meeting chaired by Mr. Misenga. A meeting with the technical and\nfinancial partners was also organized on March 24.\n\n\nThe mission held working meetings with the representatives of the following committees and\nagencies: at the Ministry of Finance: the COREF, the General Directorate of Public Debt, the General\nDirectorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting, the Directorate for Preparation of the Accounting\nLaw, and the Directorate for Accounting Quality and Regulation, the Central Coordination Office, the\nProject and Program Oversight Unit, the Fragile States Finance Implementation Unit; at the Ministry\nof Budget: the General Directorate of Fiscal Policies and Programming, the General Directorate\nresponsible for performance oversight and development, the General Directorate for Procurement\nSupervision, the Directorate for Fiscal Supervision, the Directorate of General Administration and\nCentralized Appropriations, and the Interministerial Information Technology (IT) Coordination\ndepartment; at the Ministry of Planning: the General Secretariat, the Directorate of Investment\nBudgeting and Programming, the Directorate of Macroeconomic Research, the Directorate of\nInfrastructure, the Supervision and Oversight Directorate, the Investment Aid Management Platform,\nthe National Institute of Statistics, the PPP Coordination Unit, and the National Investment Promotion\nAgency; at the Office of the Prime Minister: the Public Contracts Regulatory Authority; at the Office of\nthe President: the General Inspectorate of Finance, the Coordination Unit of External Financing and\nProject Oversight, and the Presidential Council for Strategy Monitoring.\n\n\nThe mission also held working meetings with the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior,\nSecurity, and Customary Affairs; the Ministry of the Portfolio; the Ministry of the Environment and\nSustainable Development and the Congolese Environment Agency; the Ministry of Infrastructure and\nPublic Works and the Infrastructure Unit; the Ministry of Mines; the Ministry of Transport,\nCommunication Channels, and Improvement of Access; the Ministry of Rural Development; the\nMinistry of Public Health; the Ministry of Primary, Secondary, and Technical Education; the Ministry of\nLand Management and Planning; the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs; the Electricity\nRegulation Authority; the Post and Telecommunications Regulation Authority. Finally, the mission met\nwith representatives of the Court of Accounts and the Provincial Ministry for the Budget of the CityProvince of Kinshasa.\n\n\nThe mission would like to express its thanks to the Congolese authorities for making themselves so\nfreely available. In particular, it is grateful to the COREF - Mr. Misenga and his team - especially\nKembé Sassé - for the exceptional support provided to the mission, specifically in organizing remote\nmeetings and coordinating the gathering of documents received from the various departments. The\nmission would also like to thank Gabriel Léost, Resident Representative of the IMF, and Emmanuel\nGbadi, local economist, for helping to progress its work. Finally thanks are due to Ruxandra\nBurdescu, Blandine Wu, and Mamata Tiendrebeogo from the World Bank for their support and\nexpertise on the topics covered by the mission.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INTRODUCTION\n\nIn response to a request by Nicolas Kazadi, Minister of Finance of the Democratic Republic of the\nCongo (DRC), a remote mission of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF was held from February\n28 through March 24, 2022 to carry out a public investment management assessment (PIMA). The\nmission, led by Fabien Gonguet (economist, FAD), included Laura Gores (technical assistance\nadviser, FAD), Hoda Selim (senior economist, FAD), Nicolas Hengy and Pierre Roumegas (experts,\nFAD), as well as Ephrem Ghonda Makiadi (public financial management advisor, AFRITAC Central).\nThis mission was financed by the Government of Japan and by AFRITAC Central.\n\nAt the start of the mission, the team was welcomed by the Minister of Finance, accompanied by\nGinette Nzau Muteta, his Deputy Cabinet Director, and then by the Coordinator of the Public Financial\nReform Orientation Committee (COREF), Godefroid Misenga, and was given their advice and\nguidance. From March 15 through 18, the mission held score validation meetings together with the\nmain contact points of the various committees and agencies met during the mission. The mission\nsubmitted its findings to the Minister of Finance on Thursday, March 24, and then to the various\ndepartments during a technical meeting chaired by Mr. Misenga. A meeting with the technical and\nfinancial partners was also organized on March 24.\n\nThe mission held working meetings with the representatives of the following committees and\nagencies: at the Ministry of Finance: the COREF, the General Directorate of Public Debt, the General\nDirectorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting, the Directorate for Preparation of the Accounting\nLaw, and the Directorate for Accounting Quality and Regulation, the Central Coordination Office, the\nProject and Program Oversight Unit, the Fragile States Finance Implementation Unit; at the Ministry\nof Budget: the General Directorate of Fiscal Policies and Programming, the General Directorate\nresponsible for performance oversight and development, the General Directorate for Procurement\nSupervision, the Directorate for Fiscal Supervision, the Directorate of General Administration and\nCentralized Appropriations, and the Interministerial Information Technology (IT) Coordination\ndepartment; at the Ministry of Planning: the General Secretariat, the Directorate of Investment\nBudgeting and Programming, the Directorate of Macroeconomic Research, the Directorate of\nInfrastructure, the Supervision and Oversight Directorate, the Investment Aid Management Platform,\nthe National Institute of Statistics, the PPP Coordination Unit, and the National Investment Promotion\nAgency; at the Office of the Prime Minister: the Public Contracts Regulatory Authority; at the Office of\nthe President: the General Inspectorate of Finance, the Coordination Unit of External Financing and\nProject Oversight, and the Presidential Council for Strategy Monitoring.\n\nThe mission also held working meetings with the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior,\nSecurity, and Customary Affairs; the Ministry of the Portfolio; the Ministry of the Environment and\nSustainable Development and the Congolese Environment Agency; the Ministry of Infrastructure and\nPublic Works and the Infrastructure Unit; the Ministry of Mines; the Ministry of Transport,\nCommunication Channels, and Improvement of Access; the Ministry of Rural Development; the\nMinistry of Public Health; the Ministry of Primary, Secondary, and Technical Education; the Ministry of\nLand Management and Planning; the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs; the Electricity\nRegulation Authority; the Post and Telecommunications Regulation Authority. Finally, the mission met\nwith representatives of the Court of Accounts and the Provincial Ministry for the Budget of the CityProvince of Kinshasa.\n\nThe mission would like to express its thanks to the Congolese authorities for making themselves so\nfreely available. In particular, it is grateful to the COREF - Mr. Misenga and his team - especially\nKembé Sassé - for the exceptional support provided to the mission, specifically in organizing remote\nmeetings and coordinating the gathering of documents received from the various departments. The\nmission would also like to thank Gabriel Léost, Resident Representative of the IMF, and Emmanuel\nGbadi, local economist, for helping to progress its work. Finally thanks are due to Ruxandra\nBurdescu, Blandine Wu, and Mamata Tiendrebeogo from the World Bank for their support and\nexpertise on the topics covered by the mission.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3940}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Executive Summary**\n\n**Despite some recovery in the 2000s, the levels of public investment in the DRC remain well**\n**below the average for comparator countries.** Investment by general government, financed to a\nlarge part by external resources, has fluctuated around 4 percent of GDP since 2003, remaining\nalmost 50 percent lower than the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and for low-income\ncountries. This enabled the rebuilding of part of the stock of public capital (46 percent of GDP\nin 2019), but the stock of capital per capita continues to be among the lowest in the world (≈ US$200\nin 2019). In addition, there are investments carried out by public corporations in the energy and\nmining sectors (≈ 2 percentage points of GDP a year in recent years), as well as by the public-private\npartnerships (PPPs) in the transport sector (stock of at least 4 percent of GDP).\n\n**The access and quality of infrastructure resulting from these investments are very poor, with**\n**major risks of deterioration.** In spite of gains in access to education, access per capita to electricity,\nhealth services and drinking water have all fallen since the end of the 1990s. The perception of the\nquality of infrastructure provided by the private sector has also deteriorated slightly over the past\ndecade. The risk of continued deterioration is high, as the COVID-19 pandemic stalled investment,\ndevelopment of infrastructure is struggling to keep up with demographic growth, and, given the lack of\nadequate maintenance efforts, the road, electricity, and water networks are suffering from dilapidation\nand network losses. With the increasing prevalence of natural disasters, climate change is exposing\ninfrastructure to increasingly rapid deterioration.\n\n**While it is important to increase investment, that will not be enough; it is also necessary to**\n**invest better, thanks to enhanced public investment management.** In accordance with the IMFsupported program, the government aims to meet part of these needs by creating fiscal space, in\nparticular by mobilizing a greater proportion of revenues to invest in the priority sectors. Greater use\nof PPPs is also planned. It will, nevertheless, be essential that the authorities improve the efficiency\nof investment: for every Congo franc spent, the authorities should endeavor to achieve the best\npossible outcomes in terms of improving access to and quality of public services. That should come\nabout by strengthening public investment management practices. The IMF’s PIMA evaluation\nframework is designed to help governments in measuring their strengths and weaknesses in this area\nand identifying reform priorities.\n\n**Public investment management in the DRC suffers from weaknesses across the whole project**\n**cycle, both on paper and in practice (Figure 0.A, Table 0.A, Annex 2).** Although the DRC already\nhas adopted an advanced legal framework in the area of budget processes (Law on Public Finance\n(LOFIP)), procurement and public accounting, it lacks clear laws and regulations in the area of\nappraisal, selection, and monitoring of investment projects. The effectiveness of practices is weak,\nparticularly with regard to the budgeting and implementation phases. The most notable weaknesses\nare: the lack of information on investment needs in the national and sectoral strategies, the absence\nof standard project appraisal methodologies, the partial nature of the information on investment\nprojects in the budget documentation, the absence of clear project selection criteria, the large share\nof direct agreements in public procurement, the lack of credibility of commitment ceilings\ncommunicated to line ministries, and the scarcity of reports on the physical and financial execution of\nprojects.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Executive Summary\n\nDespite some recovery in the 2000s, the levels of public investment in the DRC remain well\nbelow the average for comparator countries. Investment by general government, financed to a\nlarge part by external resources, has fluctuated around 4 percent of GDP since 2003, remaining\nalmost 50 percent lower than the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and for low-income\ncountries. This enabled the rebuilding of part of the stock of public capital (46 percent of GDP\nin 2019), but the stock of capital per capita continues to be among the lowest in the world (≈ US$200\nin 2019). In addition, there are investments carried out by public corporations in the energy and\nmining sectors (≈ 2 percentage points of GDP a year in recent years), as well as by the public-private\npartnerships (PPPs) in the transport sector (stock of at least 4 percent of GDP).\n\nThe access and quality of infrastructure resulting from these investments are very poor, with\nmajor risks of deterioration. In spite of gains in access to education, access per capita to electricity,\nhealth services and drinking water have all fallen since the end of the 1990s. The perception of the\nquality of infrastructure provided by the private sector has also deteriorated slightly over the past\ndecade. The risk of continued deterioration is high, as the COVID-19 pandemic stalled investment,\ndevelopment of infrastructure is struggling to keep up with demographic growth, and, given the lack of\nadequate maintenance efforts, the road, electricity, and water networks are suffering from dilapidation\nand network losses. With the increasing prevalence of natural disasters, climate change is exposing\ninfrastructure to increasingly rapid deterioration.\n\nWhile it is important to increase investment, that will not be enough; it is also necessary to\ninvest better, thanks to enhanced public investment management. In accordance with the IMFsupported program, the government aims to meet part of these needs by creating fiscal space, in\nparticular by mobilizing a greater proportion of revenues to invest in the priority sectors. Greater use\nof PPPs is also planned. It will, nevertheless, be essential that the authorities improve the efficiency\nof investment: for every Congo franc spent, the authorities should endeavor to achieve the best\npossible outcomes in terms of improving access to and quality of public services. That should come\nabout by strengthening public investment management practices. The IMF’s PIMA evaluation\nframework is designed to help governments in measuring their strengths and weaknesses in this area\nand identifying reform priorities.\n\nPublic investment management in the DRC suffers from weaknesses across the whole project\ncycle, both on paper and in practice (Figure 0.A, Table 0.A, Annex 2). Although the DRC already\nhas adopted an advanced legal framework in the area of budget processes (Law on Public Finance\n(LOFIP)), procurement and public accounting, it lacks clear laws and regulations in the area of\nappraisal, selection, and monitoring of investment projects. The effectiveness of practices is weak,\nparticularly with regard to the budgeting and implementation phases. The most notable weaknesses\nare: the lack of information on investment needs in the national and sectoral strategies, the absence\nof standard project appraisal methodologies, the partial nature of the information on investment\nprojects in the budget documentation, the absence of clear project selection criteria, the large share\nof direct agreements in public procurement, the lack of credibility of commitment ceilings\ncommunicated to line ministries, and the scarcity of reports on the physical and financial execution of\nprojects.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3209}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-001", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0009-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 0.A. Institutional design (ID) and Effectiveness**\n\n\n\n**Figure 0.B. Institutional design (ID) of the institutions of the**\n\n**C-PIMA module in the DRC**\n\n\n\n**(EFF) of public investment management in the DRC**\n\n\n\n**15. Monitoring of**\n\n\n\n**1. Fiscal targets and rules**\n\n\n\n\n\n**15. Monitoring of** **PLANNING**\n\n**IMPLEMENTATION**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**C4. Budgeting**\n\n**and Portfolio**\n**Management**\n\n\n\n**C5. Risk**\n**Management**\n\n\n\n\n\n**13. Portfolio**\n\n\n**Oversight**\n\n\n**12. Availability of**\n**Funding**\n\n\n**11.**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Entities**\n\n\n**4. Project**\n**Appraisal**\n\n\n**5. Alternative**\n**Infrastructure**\n\n**Financing**\n\n\n\n**C5a. Disaster risk**\n\n\n**C4c. Asset management**\n\n**including climate risks**\n\n\n**projects**\n\n\n\n\n\n**C3b. PPP framework**\n**including climate risks**\n\n\n**C3. Project**\n**Appraisal and**\n\n**Selection**\n\n\n\n**C2.**\n**Coordination**\n**between Entities**\n\n\n\n**consideration in project**\n\n**selection**\n\n\n\n**Funding**\n\n\n\n**8. Budgeting for** **Unity**\n**Investment**\n\n**ALLOCATION**\n\n\n\nSource: Mission Source: Mission\n\n\n\n**Administrative and legal fragmentation leads to lack of clarity with regard to project**\n**management responsibilities and to dilution of capacity.** The legal uncertainty, both in law and in\nregulations, on the role of the various parties involved, their multiplicity, the lack of coordination, and\nthe absence of comprehensive and consistent information sharing processes constitute critical limits\nto the efficiency of public investment management. The cumulation of _ad hoc_ committees and\nagencies for the management and oversight of project portfolios of variable sizes, often created to\ncircumvent ineffective procedures, sometimes at the behest of donors, weakens the technical\ncapacity for sound management of projects, in particular those with external financing. Moreover,\ninformation flows are fragmented and/or redundant, leading to suboptimal use of human and\ninformation technology (IT) resources.\n\n**The DRC’s commitments in the fight against climate change are only just starting to feed into**\n**public investment management practices (see Figure 0.B, Table 0.B, Annex 3 for C-PIMA**\n**scores).** It is worth noting among emerging good practices, albeit still in the process of\noperationalization, the role of the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development in\nproviding inter-ministerial coordination of investment decisions, the emergence of an institutional and\nfinancial framework for natural disaster risk management, and the legal obligation, recognized by all,\nof conducting environmental and social impact assessments. The main weaknesses lie in the lack of\nalignment and cross-cutting recognition of climate considerations in the national and sectoral\nstrategies, the absence of a legal framework and of a land management and planning strategy, and\nthe lack of methodologies supporting the assessment of climate risks and impacts on infrastructure.\n\n**Strengthening budget credibility is a key condition for the success of public investment**\n**management reforms in the DRC.** The lack of credibility of budget laws leads the authorities to\ncircumvent the traditional expenditure chain and to implement projects on the basis of the available\ncash resources, without ensuring compliance with the priorities expressed at the time of budgeting.\nBudget execution rates are very low, which discourages all participants involved in the processes of\nproject budgeting and implementation. It is crucial to ensure that the investment envelopes voted by\nparliament are realistic in order to reestablish the budget law as a reference for project\nimplementation.\n\n**Based on the PIMA evaluation, this report puts forward seven high-priority recommendations**\n**that could greatly improve public investment management in the DRC in the short to medium**\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 0.A. Institutional design (ID) and Effectiveness\n\nFigure 0.B. Institutional design (ID) of the institutions of the\n\nC-PIMA module in the DRC\n\n(EFF) of public investment management in the DRC\n\n15. Monitoring of\n\n1. Fiscal targets and rules\n\n15. Monitoring of PLANNING\n\nIMPLEMENTATION\n\nC4. Budgeting\n\nand Portfolio\nManagement\n\nC5. Risk\nManagement\n\n13. Portfolio\n\nOversight\n\n12. Availability of\nFunding\n\n11.\n\nEntities\n\n4. Project\nAppraisal\n\n5. Alternative\nInfrastructure\n\nFinancing\n\nC5a. Disaster risk\n\nC4c. Asset management\n\nincluding climate risks\n\nprojects\n\nC3b. PPP framework\nincluding climate risks\n\nC3. Project\nAppraisal and\n\nSelection\n\nC2.\nCoordination\nbetween Entities\n\nconsideration in project\n\nselection\n\nFunding\n\n8. Budgeting for Unity\nInvestment\n\nALLOCATION\n\nSource: Mission Source: Mission\n\nAdministrative and legal fragmentation leads to lack of clarity with regard to project\nmanagement responsibilities and to dilution of capacity. The legal uncertainty, both in law and in\nregulations, on the role of the various parties involved, their multiplicity, the lack of coordination, and\nthe absence of comprehensive and consistent information sharing processes constitute critical limits\nto the efficiency of public investment management. The cumulation of _ad hoc_ committees and\nagencies for the management and oversight of project portfolios of variable sizes, often created to\ncircumvent ineffective procedures, sometimes at the behest of donors, weakens the technical\ncapacity for sound management of projects, in particular those with external financing. Moreover,\ninformation flows are fragmented and/or redundant, leading to suboptimal use of human and\ninformation technology (IT) resources.\n\nThe DRC’s commitments in the fight against climate change are only just starting to feed into\npublic investment management practices (see Figure 0.B, Table 0.B, Annex 3 for C-PIMA\nscores). It is worth noting among emerging good practices, albeit still in the process of\noperationalization, the role of the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development in\nproviding inter-ministerial coordination of investment decisions, the emergence of an institutional and\nfinancial framework for natural disaster risk management, and the legal obligation, recognized by all,\nof conducting environmental and social impact assessments. The main weaknesses lie in the lack of\nalignment and cross-cutting recognition of climate considerations in the national and sectoral\nstrategies, the absence of a legal framework and of a land management and planning strategy, and\nthe lack of methodologies supporting the assessment of climate risks and impacts on infrastructure.\n\nStrengthening budget credibility is a key condition for the success of public investment\nmanagement reforms in the DRC. The lack of credibility of budget laws leads the authorities to\ncircumvent the traditional expenditure chain and to implement projects on the basis of the available\ncash resources, without ensuring compliance with the priorities expressed at the time of budgeting.\nBudget execution rates are very low, which discourages all participants involved in the processes of\nproject budgeting and implementation. It is crucial to ensure that the investment envelopes voted by\nparliament are realistic in order to reestablish the budget law as a reference for project\nimplementation.\n\nBased on the PIMA evaluation, this report puts forward seven high-priority recommendations\nthat could greatly improve public investment management in the DRC in the short to medium\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3071}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**term.** Table 0.C presents an action plan for 2022-2024, which includes the following priority\nrecommendations:\n\n- **Adopt a decree on public investment management** covering all stages of the project cycle and\nstructuring the institutional framework for project management (Annex 5);\n\n- **Set up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects**, which\ncould be a public institution under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, with the aim of\nstreamlining these functions, pooling skills and knowledge, and centralizing information\n(Annex 4);\n\n- **Improve the oversight over PPPs and associated fiscal risks**, in particular by ensuring the full\nimplementation of the legal framework, dealing with conflicting norms as quickly as possible, and\nbuilding capacity for fiscal risk analysis, specifically within the General Directorate of Public Debt\nat the Ministry of Finance;\n\n- **Include quantified investment needs and envisaged investment costs in strategic planning**\n**documents** (National Development Strategy Plan, sectoral strategies) and align them in a crosscutting way with the country’s climate objectives;\n\n- **Systematize preliminary appraisal of projects**, by developing standard methodologies,\nincluding with regard to climate impact assessment, and by setting up a central support agency at\nthe Ministry of Planning;\n\n- **Produce, maintain, and publish a comprehensive, realistic three-year Public Investment**\n**Program, supporting a more transparent project selection process** (Annex 6) and serving as\nthe main vehicle for reporting to the parliament on current and future projects;\n\n- **Take steps to develop an integrated bank of projects**, supported by an IT system to monitor\nprojects, to be identified by a single code lasting the whole of their life-cycle (Annex 7).\n\n**The report proposes three medium-priority recommendations as well, also set out in**\n**Table 0.C:** (i) strengthen budget unity by improving integration of capital and current budget\npreparation; (ii) ensure better coverage of maintenance needs by the adoption of standard\nmethodologies and the evaluation of additional maintenance needs linked to climate change; and (iii)\ncoordinate capital spending between central government and the provinces, in accordance with the\ndecentralization process.\n\n**Finally, other significant efforts to reform public finance management undertaken by the**\n**Government will contribute to enhancing public investment management.** This relates\nparticularly to the shift to a double budget appropriation system ( _autorisations d’engagement_ et\n_crédits de paiement_ ), to the transition to program-based budgeting, and to the strengthening of\ntransparency and competition in public procurement. Annex 1 provides the relevant actions in these\nareas, drawing from the draft 2022-2024 Priority Action Plan supporting the implementation of the\nGovernment’s 2022-28 Strategic Public Finance Reform Program.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "term. Table 0.C presents an action plan for 2022-2024, which includes the following priority\nrecommendations:\n\n- Adopt a decree on public investment management covering all stages of the project cycle and\nstructuring the institutional framework for project management (Annex 5);\n\n- Set up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects, which\ncould be a public institution under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, with the aim of\nstreamlining these functions, pooling skills and knowledge, and centralizing information\n(Annex 4);\n\n- Improve the oversight over PPPs and associated fiscal risks, in particular by ensuring the full\nimplementation of the legal framework, dealing with conflicting norms as quickly as possible, and\nbuilding capacity for fiscal risk analysis, specifically within the General Directorate of Public Debt\nat the Ministry of Finance;\n\n- Include quantified investment needs and envisaged investment costs in strategic planning\ndocuments (National Development Strategy Plan, sectoral strategies) and align them in a crosscutting way with the country’s climate objectives;\n\n- Systematize preliminary appraisal of projects, by developing standard methodologies,\nincluding with regard to climate impact assessment, and by setting up a central support agency at\nthe Ministry of Planning;\n\n- Produce, maintain, and publish a comprehensive, realistic three-year Public Investment\nProgram, supporting a more transparent project selection process (Annex 6) and serving as\nthe main vehicle for reporting to the parliament on current and future projects;\n\n- Take steps to develop an integrated bank of projects, supported by an IT system to monitor\nprojects, to be identified by a single code lasting the whole of their life-cycle (Annex 7).\n\nThe report proposes three medium-priority recommendations as well, also set out in\nTable 0.C: (i) strengthen budget unity by improving integration of capital and current budget\npreparation; (ii) ensure better coverage of maintenance needs by the adoption of standard\nmethodologies and the evaluation of additional maintenance needs linked to climate change; and (iii)\ncoordinate capital spending between central government and the provinces, in accordance with the\ndecentralization process.\n\nFinally, other significant efforts to reform public finance management undertaken by the\nGovernment will contribute to enhancing public investment management. This relates\nparticularly to the shift to a double budget appropriation system ( _autorisations d’engagement_ et\n_crédits de paiement_ ), to the transition to program-based budgeting, and to the strengthening of\ntransparency and competition in public procurement. Annex 1 provides the relevant actions in these\nareas, drawing from the draft 2022-2024 Priority Action Plan supporting the implementation of the\nGovernment’s 2022-28 Strategic Public Finance Reform Program.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2545}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Stage/ Institution|Col2|Col3|Institutional design|Effectiveness|Priority|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**A. Planning**|**1.**|**Fiscal Targets**
**and Rules**|**Medium** A golden rule is included in the LOFIP, but
there is no rule on debt. A three-year MTFF is prepared
every year, distinguishing current expenditure from
investment spending.
|**Medium** The program with the IMF instills_de facto_
discipline on debt levels. The investment envelopes set
out in the MTFF guide the expenditure ceilings adopted in
the budget.
|**Low**|\n|**A. Planning**|**2.**|**National and**
**Sectoral**
**Planning**|**Medium**The PNSD and a number of sectoral strategies
are published, but provide little information on
investment projects and costs. A few sectoral strategies
include targets on outputs.
|**Weak** The absence of a list of projects in the strategies
and lack of information on their costs hinder the
measurement of their effectiveness. Monitoring and
evaluation of the various strategies have been limited.
|**High**|\n|**A. Planning**|**3.**|**Coordination**
**between**
**Entities**|
**Weak** Coordination of projects between provinces and
the central government is planned on paper. Calculation
of the transfer amounts is not transparent. The analysis
of contingent liabilities remains to be institutionalized.
|
**Weak** Harmonization conferences are no longer held.
Transfers deviate considerably from forecasts. The first
fiscal risk statement (2021) provides analyses of some
contingent liabilities.
|**Medium**|\n|**A. Planning**|**4.**|**Project**
**Appraisal**|
**Weak** The legal framework does not compel to subject
projects to rigorous appraisal, according to a standard
methodology, with the support of a central committee or
agency and including risk analysis.
|
**Weak** Apart from external financing, appraisal is rare, the
absence of a standard methodology and a central
committee or agency compromises the capacity for
selection, and risk analysis is too limited.
|**High**|\n|**A. Planning**|**5.**|**Alternative**
**Investment**
**Financing**|
**Medium** The majority of infrastructure sectors are
competitive on paper. There is a law on PPPs, but not
yet any policy. The legal framework does not require the
authorities to review SOE investment plans.|
**Weak** Only the telecommunications sector is subject to
effective competition. The oversight of PPPs is not yet
centralized. There is no consolidated report on the
financial statements or the investment plans of SOEs.
|**High**
**(PPP)**|\n|**B. Allocation**|**6.**|**Multiyear**
**Budgeting**|
**Medium** The three-year capital expenditure projections,
broken down by ministry, are published, and indicative
three-year ceilings are applied. The three-year Public
Investment Program (PIP) is not published.
|
**Weak** There are significant discrepancies between
capital expenditure projections and expenditure ceilings,
on the one hand, and the budget laws, on the other. The
PIP does not cover all projects and is not regularly
updated.
|**High**|\n|**B. Allocation**|**7.**|**Budget**
**Comprehensive**
**ness and Unity**|**Weak** Considerable investment spending is allowed
without parliamentary authorization or information in the
budget law. The capital and current budgets are
presented in a single document.|
**Weak** The investments of extrabudgetary entities and
PPPs are partially included in the budget. The Ministry of
Budget has no procedure to verify the consistency of the
current and capital budgets.|**High**|\n|**B. Allocation**|**8.**|**Budgeting for**
**Investment**|
**Medium** The LOFIP provides for budgeting in AE-CP
but does not protect ongoing projects up to completion.
Transfers from capital to current appropriations are
possible.
|
**Medium** Budgeting in AE-CP is not effective and ongoing
projects are often supplanted by new ones. Nevertheless,
transfers of capital appropriations to current expenditure
are effectively prevented in the system.
|**Medium**|\n|**B. Allocation**|**9.**|**Maintenance**
**Funding**|**Medium** Standard rules for forecasts of current
maintenance or renovation of nonfinancial assets only
exist in the road sector. The budget nomenclature
clearly identifies such maintenance activities.
|**Weak**The financing required to deal with maintenance
needs, whether current or for renovation, is clearly too
low to preserve the value and ensure the durability of
infrastructure assets.
|**Medium**|\n|**B. Allocation**|**10.**|**Project**
**Selection**|
**Medium** The legal framework provides for the review of
appraisals, but does not provide for standard selection
criteria. The Plan has a list of projects that have been
appraised, but there is no formal obligation to use it.
|
**Weak** The review is only applied to project fiches, the
selection criteria used for budgeting are not relevant and
many projects seem to be selected from outside the list of
appraised projects.
|**High**|\n|**C. Implementation**|**11.**|**Procurement**|
**High** The public procurement law is in line with best
practice in terms of competition, transparency, and
handling of complaints, but public procurement
oversight is deficient in several ways.
|
**Medium** Significant exemptions distort the rules of
competition and transparency, while the system for
handling complaints is satisfactory in terms of time limits
and fairness.
|**High**|\n|**C. Implementation**|**12.**|**Availability of**
**Funding**|
**Medium**Annual month-by-month cash flow forecasts
are prepared, but the commitment plan is quarterly. The
law stipulates that donor funds should be deposited at
the Central Bank in the TSA.
|
**Weak** Quarterly commitment ceilings are overall not
consistent with the cash flow forecasts. Donor funds are
placed in accounts at commercial banks unrelated to the
TSA.
|**High**|\n|**C. Implementation**|**13.**|**Portfolio**
**Management**
**and Oversight**|
**Weak**The legal framework does not require systematic
_ex post_review of projects, but does allow reallocations
between projects, without, however, providing for
systematic oversight and transparent procedures.
|
**Weak** The reports do not systematically provide
information on delays and cost overruns, there are no
reallocations between projects, and_ex post_ reviews by
the Government are rare.
|**High**|\n|**C. Implementation**|**14.**|**Management of**
**Project**
**Implementation**|
**Medium**The arrangements for project management are
not set in a robust framework, and there are no standard
rules about project adjustments. The Court of Accounts
has the mandate to audit projects.
|
**Weak**Staff responsible for implementing projects have
been appointed, but there is no information on
adjustments made to projects. The Court of Accounts
does not audit large-scale projects.|**Medium**|\n|**C. Implementation**|**15.**|**Monitoring of**
**Public Assets**|**Medium**The Government does not have any
comprehensive, up-to-date asset registers. The legal
framework provides for asset and inventory accounting
rules in line with international standards.|**Weak** Asset and inventory accounting are not performed.
Asset inventories are not implemented. Depreciations are
not applied.|**Low**|\n\n\n\n**Table 0.B. C-PIMA Summary table**\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [40.185882568359375, 86.1120376586914, 594.0146484375, 656.7943115234375], "columns": 6, "rows": 16}], "text": "Stage/ Institution Col2 Col3 Institutional design Effectiveness Priority \n\n A. Planning 1. Fiscal Targets and Rules Medium A golden rule is included in the LOFIP, but there is no rule on debt. A three-year MTFF is prepared every year, distinguishing current expenditure from investment spending. Medium The program with the IMF instills_de facto_ discipline on debt levels. The investment envelopes set out in the MTFF guide the expenditure ceilings adopted in the budget. Low \n A. Planning 2. National and Sectoral Planning MediumThe PNSD and a number of sectoral strategies are published, but provide little information on investment projects and costs. A few sectoral strategies include targets on outputs. Weak The absence of a list of projects in the strategies and lack of information on their costs hinder the measurement of their effectiveness. Monitoring and evaluation of the various strategies have been limited. High \n A. Planning 3. Coordination between Entities Weak Coordination of projects between provinces and the central government is planned on paper. Calculation of the transfer amounts is not transparent. The analysis of contingent liabilities remains to be institutionalized. Weak Harmonization conferences are no longer held. Transfers deviate considerably from forecasts. The first fiscal risk statement (2021) provides analyses of some contingent liabilities. Medium \n A. Planning 4. Project Appraisal Weak The legal framework does not compel to subject projects to rigorous appraisal, according to a standard methodology, with the support of a central committee or agency and including risk analysis. Weak Apart from external financing, appraisal is rare, the absence of a standard methodology and a central committee or agency compromises the capacity for selection, and risk analysis is too limited. High \n A. Planning 5. Alternative Investment Financing Medium The majority of infrastructure sectors are competitive on paper. There is a law on PPPs, but not yet any policy. The legal framework does not require the authorities to review SOE investment plans. Weak Only the telecommunications sector is subject to effective competition. The oversight of PPPs is not yet centralized. There is no consolidated report on the financial statements or the investment plans of SOEs. High (PPP) \n B. Allocation 6. Multiyear Budgeting Medium The three-year capital expenditure projections, broken down by ministry, are published, and indicative three-year ceilings are applied. The three-year Public Investment Program (PIP) is not published. Weak There are significant discrepancies between capital expenditure projections and expenditure ceilings, on the one hand, and the budget laws, on the other. The PIP does not cover all projects and is not regularly updated. High \n B. Allocation 7. Budget Comprehensive ness and Unity Weak Considerable investment spending is allowed without parliamentary authorization or information in the budget law. The capital and current budgets are presented in a single document. Weak The investments of extrabudgetary entities and PPPs are partially included in the budget. The Ministry of Budget has no procedure to verify the consistency of the current and capital budgets. High \n B. Allocation 8. Budgeting for Investment Medium The LOFIP provides for budgeting in AE-CP but does not protect ongoing projects up to completion. Transfers from capital to current appropriations are possible. Medium Budgeting in AE-CP is not effective and ongoing projects are often supplanted by new ones. Nevertheless, transfers of capital appropriations to current expenditure are effectively prevented in the system. Medium \n B. Allocation 9. Maintenance Funding Medium Standard rules for forecasts of current maintenance or renovation of nonfinancial assets only exist in the road sector. The budget nomenclature clearly identifies such maintenance activities. WeakThe financing required to deal with maintenance needs, whether current or for renovation, is clearly too low to preserve the value and ensure the durability of infrastructure assets. Medium \n B. Allocation 10. Project Selection Medium The legal framework provides for the review of appraisals, but does not provide for standard selection criteria. The Plan has a list of projects that have been appraised, but there is no formal obligation to use it. Weak The review is only applied to project fiches, the selection criteria used for budgeting are not relevant and many projects seem to be selected from outside the list of appraised projects. High \n C. Implementation 11. Procurement High The public procurement law is in line with best practice in terms of competition, transparency, and handling of complaints, but public procurement oversight is deficient in several ways. Medium Significant exemptions distort the rules of competition and transparency, while the system for handling complaints is satisfactory in terms of time limits and fairness. High \n C. Implementation 12. Availability of Funding MediumAnnual month-by-month cash flow forecasts are prepared, but the commitment plan is quarterly. The law stipulates that donor funds should be deposited at the Central Bank in the TSA. Weak Quarterly commitment ceilings are overall not consistent with the cash flow forecasts. Donor funds are placed in accounts at commercial banks unrelated to the TSA. High \n C. Implementation 13. Portfolio Management and Oversight WeakThe legal framework does not require systematic _ex post_review of projects, but does allow reallocations between projects, without, however, providing for systematic oversight and transparent procedures. Weak The reports do not systematically provide information on delays and cost overruns, there are no reallocations between projects, and_ex post_ reviews by the Government are rare. High \n C. Implementation 14. Management of Project Implementation MediumThe arrangements for project management are not set in a robust framework, and there are no standard rules about project adjustments. The Court of Accounts has the mandate to audit projects. WeakStaff responsible for implementing projects have been appointed, but there is no information on adjustments made to projects. The Court of Accounts does not audit large-scale projects. Medium \n C. Implementation 15. Monitoring of Public Assets MediumThe Government does not have any comprehensive, up-to-date asset registers. The legal framework provides for asset and inventory accounting rules in line with international standards. Weak Asset and inventory accounting are not performed. Asset inventories are not implemented. Depreciations are not applied. Low \n\nTable 0.B. C-PIMA Summary table\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 5734}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Stage/ Institution|Col2|Col3|Institutional design|Priority|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**C-PIMA**|**C1**|**Climate-aware**
**Planning**|**Weak** Public investment planning and the central and provincial
regulations relating to land management and construction do not take
climate change into account.|**High**|\n|**C-PIMA**|**C2**|**Coordination**
**across Public**
**Sector**|**Weak** Public investment decisions relating to climate change are not
coordinated over the whole of the public sphere despite the existence
of thematic groups.|**Medium**|\n|**C-PIMA**|**C3**|**Project**
**Appraisal and**
**Selection**|**Weak**The legal framework does not explicitly take into account
climate change in environmental impact studies, in the PPPs, or in
the criteria used by the Government to select projects for the budget.|**High**|\n|**C-PIMA**|**C4**|**Budgeting and**
**Portfolio**
**Management**|**Weak** There are no specific practices in terms of budgeting, audits/
_ex post_ reviews, or management of assets, which would help take
into account climate change risks and objectives.|**Medium**|\n|**C-PIMA**|**C5**|**Risk**
**Management**|**Medium** The risks associated with the exposure of infrastructure to
climate change are not covered in any publication or analysis of their
budget implications. There are, however,_ex ante_ financing
mechanisms for such risks.
|**Low**|\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [96.36000061035156, 86.1600341796875, 519.719970703125, 284.03948974609375], "columns": 5, "rows": 6}], "text": "Stage/ Institution Col2 Col3 Institutional design Priority \n\n C-PIMA C1 Climate-aware Planning Weak Public investment planning and the central and provincial regulations relating to land management and construction do not take climate change into account. High \n C-PIMA C2 Coordination across Public Sector Weak Public investment decisions relating to climate change are not coordinated over the whole of the public sphere despite the existence of thematic groups. Medium \n C-PIMA C3 Project Appraisal and Selection WeakThe legal framework does not explicitly take into account climate change in environmental impact studies, in the PPPs, or in the criteria used by the Government to select projects for the budget. High \n C-PIMA C4 Budgeting and Portfolio Management Weak There are no specific practices in terms of budgeting, audits/ _ex post_ reviews, or management of assets, which would help take into account climate change risks and objectives. Medium \n C-PIMA C5 Risk Management Medium The risks associated with the exposure of infrastructure to climate change are not covered in any publication or analysis of their budget implications. There are, however,_ex ante_ financing mechanisms for such risks. Low \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 1083}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 0.C. Priority Action Plan to strengthen public investment management**\n\n\n\n**Note:** This table follows the format and numbering of the three-year 2022-2024 Priority Action Plan\nprepared by the authorities to implement the updated 2022-28 Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan.\nIt presents the ten recommendations (“actions” as referred to in the Priority Action Plan) of the PIMA\nand C-PIMA reports. Annex 1 sets forth the actions relating to the PIMA and C-PIMA already included\nin the draft three-year Priority Action Plan, to which the mission made some amendments based on\nits conclusions. Action 1.2.3 below is, exceptionally, a modified version that was included in the initial\ndraft of the Priority Action Plan.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED
OUTCOME(S)|202
2|202
3|202
4|202
5
202
8|OUTCOME
INDICATO
R(S)|REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS|IMPL
EME
NTA
TION
STA
TUS|RESPON
SIBLE
ENTITIES|PRIORIT
Y|TA
NEE
DS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|\n|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|\n|
**Action 1.2.3: Improve**
**oversight of PPPs and**
**associated fiscal risks**
|
The
Government
has an
overview of
the fiscal risks
associated
with the
PPPs.
The credibility
of the budget
is improved.
|
X
|
X|
|
|
PIMA 3c
, 4c,
5b
C-PIMA
C3b|
1. Signature of all implementing decrees of the
PPP law and clarification of the roles and
responsibilities of the ARMP, UC-PPP,
DGCMP, and Ministry of Finance (2022).
2. Establishment of a register of guarantees at
the Ministry of Finance - DGDP (2022).
3. Establishment and updating of a
comprehensive register of PPPs by the ARMP
and the UC-PPP and drafting of a procedures
manual for the law and a guide to project
appraisal, including the assessment of risks
relating to climate change (2022-23).
4. Signature of the decree on the procedures
manual for the law on PPPs (2023).
5. Operationalization of the Standing
Committee on Project Validation with the
Ministry of Finance having a veto power over
the financial viability of projects (2023).
6. Adoption of a national policy relating to
PPPs (2023)||ARMP
MINPLAN
MINFIN
MINBUD
UC-PPP|**High**|Yes|\n|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|
**_Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_**
|\n|
**Action 3.7.1: Adopt a decree**
**on public investment**
**management covering all**
**stages of the project cycle**|
The
management of
public
investments is
set in the legal
framework.|
X|
X|
X||
PIMA 4,
6, 7, 8,
10, 11,
13, 14
C-PIMA
C3|
1. Adoption of the decree on public investment
management (2022).
2. Preparation of the implementing regulations
of the decree, establishing the procedures
manuals and guides on public investment
management (2023-24).
||
MINPLAN
MINBUD
MINFIN|
**High**|Yes|\n|**Action 3.7.2: Set up a single**
**office for coordination and**
**oversight of externally**
**financed projects**|Steering of
externally
financed
projects is
improved.
Oversight of
externally
financed
projects is
centralized.|X|X|||
PIMA 7
a, 7b, 1
3a|1. Definition of the institutional form of the
single office with emphasis on efficiency and
performance in the management of the
portfolio of externally financed projects.
2. Creation of the single office replacing the
current committees and agencies (2022).
3. Preparation of templates for agreement
between the single office and the sectoral
ministries dealing with externally financed
projects.
4. Preparation of regulations formalizing the
relationships between the office and the
institutional users of the data on externally
financed projects (2022-23).
||MINFIN
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries|**High**|
|\n|**Action 3.7.3: Include**
**quantified investment needs**
**and envisaged investment**
**costs in strategic planning**
**documents including those**
**in relation to climate**
**change.**|The link
between
planning and
budgeting is
strengthened.
The consistency
across the|X|X|X||PIMA 2
a, 2b, 2
c
C-PIMA
C1a|1. Addition to the reframed PNSD of an
estimate of the investment needs, a list of
major projects, with their total costs and by
year, and target indicators for the outputs and
outcomes (2022).
2. Alignment of the reframed PNSD with the
climate objectives of the contribution set at the
DRC national level (2022).||MINPLAN
Sectoral
ministries
MEDD
ACE|**High**||\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [46.18000030517578, 184.18154907226562, 583.9405517578125, 719.6580200195312], "columns": 12, "rows": 11}], "text": "Table 0.C. Priority Action Plan to strengthen public investment management\n\nNote: This table follows the format and numbering of the three-year 2022-2024 Priority Action Plan\nprepared by the authorities to implement the updated 2022-28 Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan.\nIt presents the ten recommendations (“actions” as referred to in the Priority Action Plan) of the PIMA\nand C-PIMA reports. Annex 1 sets forth the actions relating to the PIMA and C-PIMA already included\nin the draft three-year Priority Action Plan, to which the mission made some amendments based on\nits conclusions. Action 1.2.3 below is, exceptionally, a modified version that was included in the initial\ndraft of the Priority Action Plan.\n\n STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 202 2 202 3 202 4 202 5 202 8 OUTCOME INDICATO R(S) REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS IMPL EME NTA TION STA TUS RESPON SIBLE ENTITIES PRIORIT Y TA NEE DS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ \n _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2: Develop the fiscal risk management function_ \n Action 1.2.3: Improve oversight of PPPs and associated fiscal risks The Government has an overview of the fiscal risks associated with the PPPs. The credibility of the budget is improved. X X PIMA 3c , 4c, 5b C-PIMA C3b 1. Signature of all implementing decrees of the PPP law and clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the ARMP, UC-PPP, DGCMP, and Ministry of Finance (2022). 2. Establishment of a register of guarantees at the Ministry of Finance - DGDP (2022). 3. Establishment and updating of a comprehensive register of PPPs by the ARMP and the UC-PPP and drafting of a procedures manual for the law and a guide to project appraisal, including the assessment of risks relating to climate change (2022-23). 4. Signature of the decree on the procedures manual for the law on PPPs (2023). 5. Operationalization of the Standing Committee on Project Validation with the Ministry of Finance having a veto power over the financial viability of projects (2023). 6. Adoption of a national policy relating to PPPs (2023) ARMP MINPLAN MINFIN MINBUD UC-PPP High Yes \n _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ \n _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ _Specific target 3.7: Strengthen the management of public investments over the entire length of the project cycle (NEW SPECIFIC TARGET)_ \n Action 3.7.1: Adopt a decree on public investment management covering all stages of the project cycle The management of public investments is set in the legal framework. X X X PIMA 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 C-PIMA C3 1. Adoption of the decree on public investment management (2022). 2. Preparation of the implementing regulations of the decree, establishing the procedures manuals and guides on public investment management (2023-24). MINPLAN MINBUD MINFIN High Yes \n Action 3.7.2: Set up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects Steering of externally financed projects is improved. Oversight of externally financed projects is centralized. X X PIMA 7 a, 7b, 1 3a 1. Definition of the institutional form of the single office with emphasis on efficiency and performance in the management of the portfolio of externally financed projects. 2. Creation of the single office replacing the current committees and agencies (2022). 3. Preparation of templates for agreement between the single office and the sectoral ministries dealing with externally financed projects. 4. Preparation of regulations formalizing the relationships between the office and the institutional users of the data on externally financed projects (2022-23). MINFIN MINBUD Sectoral ministries High \n Action 3.7.3: Include quantified investment needs and envisaged investment costs in strategic planning documents including those in relation to climate change. The link between planning and budgeting is strengthened. The consistency across the X X X PIMA 2 a, 2b, 2 c C-PIMA C1a 1. Addition to the reframed PNSD of an estimate of the investment needs, a list of major projects, with their total costs and by year, and target indicators for the outputs and outcomes (2022). 2. Alignment of the reframed PNSD with the climate objectives of the contribution set at the DRC national level (2022). MINPLAN Sectoral ministries MEDD ACE High \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 6600}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED
OUTCOME(S)|202
2|202
3|202
4|202
5
202
8|OUTCOME
INDICATO
R(S)|REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS|IMPL
EME
NTA
TION
STA
TUS|RESPON
SIBLE
ENTITIES|PRIORIT
Y|TA
NEE
DS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|\n||various
planning tools is
enhanced.||||||3. Adoption of the new law on land
management and planning (2022).
4. Publication of (i) sectoral strategies in the
economic infrastructure sectors, integrating
the climate objectives in a cross-cutting way
(transport, energy, water), and (ii) a land
management and planning strategy (2023-24).
5. Alignment of each sectoral pillar of
the 2024-28 PNSD with the climate objectives
of DRC’s nationally determined contribution
(2024).
|||||\n|**Action 3.7.4: Strengthen the**
**process of preliminary**
**appraisal of projects,**
**including assessment of the**
**impacts relating to climate**
**change.**|Comparative
analysis of the
projects is
improved.
The completion
and financing of
appraisals are
assured.|
X|X|||PIMA 4
a, 4b, 4
c
C-PIMA
C3a|1. Following a survey of the existing
methodologies, including the one currently in
the process of validation (BCECO),
preparation of standard appraisal
methodologies (2022).
2. Following preliminary analysis of the rate of
execution of the appropriations allocated to the
preinvestment fund, optimization and, if
necessary, increase of allocations to the
required level (2022).
3. Establishment within the Ministry of
Planning of a central support structure for
project appraisal (2023)
4. Adoption of a standard methodology for
environmental and social impact studies,
including the systematic assessment of
climate change impacts (2023).
||MINPLAN
MINBUD
BCECO
Sectoral
ministries
ACE|**High**||\n|**Action 3.7.5: Strengthen**
**budget unity by improving**
**integration of capital and**
**current budget preparation**
**processes.**|A consistent
and
complementary
relationship
between capital
and current
budgets is
assured|X|X|X|X|PIMA 7c|1. Introduction of mechanisms for
communication between the parties
responsible for preparation of current budgets
and the DEPs (2022).
2. Establishment of procedures for verifying
the consistency of the two budgets by the
DGPPB during the budget formulation period
(2022).
3. Presentation of the operational classification
crosschecked against the financial
classification (capital / current expenditure) in
the LFI for 2023 (2022)
4. Unification of the procedures for preparing
the capital and current budgets (2029).
||MINPLAN
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries|**Mediu**
**m **|Yes|\n|**Action 3.7.6:** **Produce,**
**maintain, and publish a**
**comprehensive, realistic**
**three-year Public**
**Investment Program,**
**supporting a more**
**transparent project**
**selection process.**|The link
between
planning and
budgeting is
strengthened.
The PIP
supports the
programming,
selection, and
multiyear
budgeting of
projects.
A rigorously
assessed
project pipeline
is available.
|X|X|X||PIMA 6
a, 6b, 6
c, 9c, 10
a,
10b, 10
c
C-PIMA
C3c|
1. Establishment of a list of selection criteria
and publication in advance in the annual
circular of the Ministry of Planning (MP) on the
preparation of the PIP and in the annual
budget circular of the Ministry of the Budget
(MB) (2022).
2. Following a preliminary analysis, clean-up of
the MP’s database of projects to be financed
(2022).
3. Establishment of systematic, frequent
feedback mechanisms of information on the
cost of projects underway to the MP, and
automated sharing of the project database
with the MB and the Ministry of Finance (MF)
(2022).
4. Incorporation of the review of the PIP in the
budget formulation process, and publication of
a PIP aligned with the budget as an annex to
the 2023 LFI (2022).
5. Inclusion of selection criteria aiming to
provide (i) priority to projects contributing to|
|MINPLAN
MINBUDI
N
BCECO
Sectoral
ministries
ACE N|**High**|Yes|\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [46.16999816894531, 72.22152709960938, 583.9505615234375, 702.2584228515625], "columns": 12, "rows": 7}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 202 2 202 3 202 4 202 5 202 8 OUTCOME INDICATO R(S) REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS IMPL EME NTA TION STA TUS RESPON SIBLE ENTITIES PRIORIT Y TA NEE DS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n various planning tools is enhanced. 3. Adoption of the new law on land management and planning (2022). 4. Publication of (i) sectoral strategies in the economic infrastructure sectors, integrating the climate objectives in a cross-cutting way (transport, energy, water), and (ii) a land management and planning strategy (2023-24). 5. Alignment of each sectoral pillar of the 2024-28 PNSD with the climate objectives of DRC’s nationally determined contribution (2024). \n Action 3.7.4: Strengthen the process of preliminary appraisal of projects, including assessment of the impacts relating to climate change. Comparative analysis of the projects is improved. The completion and financing of appraisals are assured. X X PIMA 4 a, 4b, 4 c C-PIMA C3a 1. Following a survey of the existing methodologies, including the one currently in the process of validation (BCECO), preparation of standard appraisal methodologies (2022). 2. Following preliminary analysis of the rate of execution of the appropriations allocated to the preinvestment fund, optimization and, if necessary, increase of allocations to the required level (2022). 3. Establishment within the Ministry of Planning of a central support structure for project appraisal (2023) 4. Adoption of a standard methodology for environmental and social impact studies, including the systematic assessment of climate change impacts (2023). MINPLAN MINBUD BCECO Sectoral ministries ACE High \n Action 3.7.5: Strengthen budget unity by improving integration of capital and current budget preparation processes. A consistent and complementary relationship between capital and current budgets is assured X X X X PIMA 7c 1. Introduction of mechanisms for communication between the parties responsible for preparation of current budgets and the DEPs (2022). 2. Establishment of procedures for verifying the consistency of the two budgets by the DGPPB during the budget formulation period (2022). 3. Presentation of the operational classification crosschecked against the financial classification (capital / current expenditure) in the LFI for 2023 (2022) 4. Unification of the procedures for preparing the capital and current budgets (2029). MINPLAN MINBUD Sectoral ministries Mediu m Yes \n Action 3.7.6: Produce, maintain, and publish a comprehensive, realistic three-year Public Investment Program, supporting a more transparent project selection process. The link between planning and budgeting is strengthened. The PIP supports the programming, selection, and multiyear budgeting of projects. A rigorously assessed project pipeline is available. X X X PIMA 6 a, 6b, 6 c, 9c, 10 a, 10b, 10 c C-PIMA C3c 1. Establishment of a list of selection criteria and publication in advance in the annual circular of the Ministry of Planning (MP) on the preparation of the PIP and in the annual budget circular of the Ministry of the Budget (MB) (2022). 2. Following a preliminary analysis, clean-up of the MP’s database of projects to be financed (2022). 3. Establishment of systematic, frequent feedback mechanisms of information on the cost of projects underway to the MP, and automated sharing of the project database with the MB and the Ministry of Finance (MF) (2022). 4. Incorporation of the review of the PIP in the budget formulation process, and publication of a PIP aligned with the budget as an annex to the 2023 LFI (2022). 5. Inclusion of selection criteria aiming to provide (i) priority to projects contributing to MINPLAN MINBUDI N BCECO Sectoral ministries ACE N High Yes \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3430}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED
OUTCOME(S)|202
2|202
3|202
4|202
5
202
8|OUTCOME
INDICATO
R(S)|REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS|IMPL
EME
NTA
TION
STA
TUS|RESPON
SIBLE
ENTITIES|PRIORIT
Y|TA
NEE
DS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|\n||||||||combating climate change and (ii) priority to
asset rehabilitation projects (2023).
|||||\n|**Action 3.7.7: Ensure better**
**coverage of the needs for**
**ongoing maintenance and**
**renovation of infrastructure**
|The
sustainability of
financial assets
is assured.
|
|X
|
||PIMA 9
a, 9b, 9
c
C-PIMA
C4c|1. Preparation of standard methodologies for
forecasting maintenance and renovation
needs for all categories of nonfinancial assets
(2023).
2. Completion of an assessment of the
additional asset maintenance requirements
arising from climate change (2023).
3. Formal request in the budget circular for
identification and prioritization of maintenance
needs by the sectoral ministries (2023).
||MINBUD
MITPR
(Ministry
for
Infrastruct
ure,
Public
Works
and
Reconstru
ction)
MINPLAN|**Mediu**
**m**|Yes|\n|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|
**_Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|
**_Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_**
|\n|
**Action 6.3.2: Improve**
**coordination of capital**
**spending between central**
**government and the**
**provinces.**
|
Provincial
investment
budgets are
more credible.
The overview
of provincial
project
portfolios is
available.
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
PIMA 3
a, 3b
C-PIMA
C2b
|
1. Reestablishment of annual capital spending
harmonization conferences between the
provinces and central government, covering all
sources of financing and the aspect of climate
change (2022).
2. Notification of the preliminary envelopes to
provinces in June or July after the compilation
of the MTFF (2022).
3. Operationalize the coordination mechanisms
provided for in the PDL-145T, the REDD+
program, and the sectoral thematic groups to
integrate the climate change aspect in
planning at the provincial level (2022-23)||MINPLAN
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries
Provinces
Sectoral
thematic
groups
MEDD|**Mediu**
**m**||\n|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|**_Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|
**_Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_**
|\n|
**Action 8.3.1: Develop an**
**integrated IT system (bank)**
**of investment projects**
|
Oversight of the
physical and
financial
execution of
projects is
enhanced.
The steering,
monitoring, and
reporting of the
project portfolio
is
comprehensive,
frequent, and
pooled.|
X|
X|
X|
X|
PIMA 4,
6, 7, 10
, 13, 14
|
1. Establishment of a consultation framework
between the Ministry of Planning and the
Interministerial Information Technology
Coordination unit of the Finance and the
Budget Ministries (2022)
2. Inclusion in the project fiches of information
on the physical and financial monitoring of
domestically-funded projects, consolidation of
this information in the database of the Ministry
of Planning and pooling of this information with
all those involved (2022).
3. Formalization with the PTFs of a simplified
structure with a standard form enabling
periodic feedback to be provided of
information on physical and financial
implementation of externally financed projects
(2022).
4. Validation of the functional specification
schedule of the information system for
monitoring projects and mobilization of
financing sought (2023).
5. Development of software applications and
tests of the IT system for monitoring projects
throughout their life-cycle (2023)||
MINPLAN
MINBUD
(C2I)
MINFIN
Sectoral
ministries
Implement
ing
agencies
CRESP|
**High**|Yes|\n\n\n##### **I. Public investment trends in the DRC**\n\n**A. TRENDS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL STOCK**\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [46.18000030517578, 72.22152709960938, 583.9405517578125, 631.9384765625], "columns": 12, "rows": 11}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 202 2 202 3 202 4 202 5 202 8 OUTCOME INDICATO R(S) REQUIREMENTS/ BENCHMARKS IMPL EME NTA TION STA TUS RESPON SIBLE ENTITIES PRIORIT Y TA NEE DS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n combating climate change and (ii) priority to asset rehabilitation projects (2023). \n Action 3.7.7: Ensure better coverage of the needs for ongoing maintenance and renovation of infrastructure The sustainability of financial assets is assured. X PIMA 9 a, 9b, 9 c C-PIMA C4c 1. Preparation of standard methodologies for forecasting maintenance and renovation needs for all categories of nonfinancial assets (2023). 2. Completion of an assessment of the additional asset maintenance requirements arising from climate change (2023). 3. Formal request in the budget circular for identification and prioritization of maintenance needs by the sectoral ministries (2023). MINBUD MITPR (Ministry for Infrastruct ure, Public Works and Reconstru ction) MINPLAN Mediu m Yes \n _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ _Strategic pillar 6: Local and provincial financial management_ \n _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ _Specific target 6.3: Strengthen the budget preparation process_ \n Action 6.3.2: Improve coordination of capital spending between central government and the provinces. Provincial investment budgets are more credible. The overview of provincial project portfolios is available. X X PIMA 3 a, 3b C-PIMA C2b 1. Reestablishment of annual capital spending harmonization conferences between the provinces and central government, covering all sources of financing and the aspect of climate change (2022). 2. Notification of the preliminary envelopes to provinces in June or July after the compilation of the MTFF (2022). 3. Operationalize the coordination mechanisms provided for in the PDL-145T, the REDD+ program, and the sectoral thematic groups to integrate the climate change aspect in planning at the provincial level (2022-23) MINPLAN MINBUD Sectoral ministries Provinces Sectoral thematic groups MEDD Mediu m \n _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ _Strategic pillar 8: Digitization of the public finance management system_ \n _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ _Specific target 8.3: Support public investment management by means of an efficient information system - NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE_ \n Action 8.3.1: Develop an integrated IT system (bank) of investment projects Oversight of the physical and financial execution of projects is enhanced. The steering, monitoring, and reporting of the project portfolio is comprehensive, frequent, and pooled. X X X X PIMA 4, 6, 7, 10 , 13, 14 1. Establishment of a consultation framework between the Ministry of Planning and the Interministerial Information Technology Coordination unit of the Finance and the Budget Ministries (2022) 2. Inclusion in the project fiches of information on the physical and financial monitoring of domestically-funded projects, consolidation of this information in the database of the Ministry of Planning and pooling of this information with all those involved (2022). 3. Formalization with the PTFs of a simplified structure with a standard form enabling periodic feedback to be provided of information on physical and financial implementation of externally financed projects (2022). 4. Validation of the functional specification schedule of the information system for monitoring projects and mobilization of financing sought (2023). 5. Development of software applications and tests of the IT system for monitoring projects throughout their life-cycle (2023) MINPLAN MINBUD (C2I) MINFIN Sectoral ministries Implement ing agencies CRESP High Yes \nI. Public investment trends in the DRC\n\nA. TRENDS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL STOCK\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 6515}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**1.** **Despite a recovery since the 2000s, the level of general government investment in the**\n**DRC has been systematically lower than the averages for low-income countries and sub-**\n**Saharan African countries (Figure 1.A).** The DRC suffered a period of conflict and political\ninstability in the 1990s with major humanitarian and social consequences, as well as a collapse in\npublic services. Accordingly, investment by general government did not exceed 0.2 percent of GDP\nbetween 1990 and 2001. With the relative abatement of the conflict, the recovery of growth, and the\nrise in commodity prices, the beginnings of an effort toward reconstruction and rehabilitation got\nunderway in 2002. This led overall, in spite of some volatility, to a recovery in levels of general\ngovernment investment to an average of 3.6 percent of GDP between 2002 and 2019, peaking\nat 6.6 percent in 2014. [1] These levels of investment have been more or less maintained despite efforts\ntoward budget rationalization in 2009-2011 as part of a program with the IMF and also in spite of the\ncollapse of commodity prices after 2014. These two factors mainly affected the level of current\nexpenditure. [2] Nevertheless, the average of 4.1 percent of GDP noted in the DRC between 2015\nand 2019 remains well below the average of 7.8 percent of low-income countries and the average\nof 7.1 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. General government investment fell sharply due to the COVID19 pandemic; according to budget execution statements, central government capital spending was\nonly 0.3 percent of GDP in 2020 and 1.2 percent in 2021.\n\n\n**2.** **General government investment only represented a small proportion of total**\n**investment, however.** Investment by general government only represented on average one fifth of\nthe total investment in the DRC between 2002 and 2019 (Figure 1.B). In contrast, the other sources\nof investment - private sector, public corporations - tripled between 2002 and 2019\nexceeding 20 percent of GDP. Private investment, in particular, increased substantially between 2010\nand 2014 when the DRC launched a series of reforms aimed at improving the business environment\nto protect property rights, strengthen governance, and develop financial and labor markets. In spite of\nthese efforts, total investment nevertheless remains lower than the averages of 23.2 percent\nand 24.7 percent of GDP for sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries, respectively.\n\n\n**3.** **Despite two decades of reconstruction efforts, public capital stock in the DRC remains**\n**one of the lowest in the region.** The 1990s conflict saw significant destruction of physical capital.\nThanks to the reconstruction efforts from 2003 onward, the stock of public capital has increased step\nby step to reach 46 percent of GDP in 2019 (Figure 1.C). Although the gap has been partially\nreduced, the stock of public capital remains far below the averages of other low-income countries or\nthat of sub-Saharan African countries; both of these groups are over 100 percent of GDP. The gap is\neven greater in terms of public capital stock per capita, remaining at a level well below that of other\nresource-rich countries in the region (Figure 1.D).\n\n\n\n**Figure 1.A. General government investment:**\n\n**regional comparisons** (nominal, % of GDP)\n\n\n\n**Figure 1.B. Share of general government**\n\n**investment in total investment** (%)\n\n\n\n1 The DRC also reached the completion point of the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative\nin 2010, enabling it to benefit from debt relief and, thus, an easing of the debt-servicing cost burden.\n\n2 Despite the fall in commodity prices, public investment in the DRC remained at 4.6 percent of GDP\nin 2015-2016 In other resource-rich countries, the drop in prices often leads to abrupt, significant cuts\nin public investment.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "1. Despite a recovery since the 2000s, the level of general government investment in the\nDRC has been systematically lower than the averages for low-income countries and sub-\nSaharan African countries (Figure 1.A). The DRC suffered a period of conflict and political\ninstability in the 1990s with major humanitarian and social consequences, as well as a collapse in\npublic services. Accordingly, investment by general government did not exceed 0.2 percent of GDP\nbetween 1990 and 2001. With the relative abatement of the conflict, the recovery of growth, and the\nrise in commodity prices, the beginnings of an effort toward reconstruction and rehabilitation got\nunderway in 2002. This led overall, in spite of some volatility, to a recovery in levels of general\ngovernment investment to an average of 3.6 percent of GDP between 2002 and 2019, peaking\nat 6.6 percent in 2014. [1] These levels of investment have been more or less maintained despite efforts\ntoward budget rationalization in 2009-2011 as part of a program with the IMF and also in spite of the\ncollapse of commodity prices after 2014. These two factors mainly affected the level of current\nexpenditure. [2] Nevertheless, the average of 4.1 percent of GDP noted in the DRC between 2015\nand 2019 remains well below the average of 7.8 percent of low-income countries and the average\nof 7.1 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. General government investment fell sharply due to the COVID19 pandemic; according to budget execution statements, central government capital spending was\nonly 0.3 percent of GDP in 2020 and 1.2 percent in 2021.\n\n2. General government investment only represented a small proportion of total\ninvestment, however. Investment by general government only represented on average one fifth of\nthe total investment in the DRC between 2002 and 2019 (Figure 1.B). In contrast, the other sources\nof investment - private sector, public corporations - tripled between 2002 and 2019\nexceeding 20 percent of GDP. Private investment, in particular, increased substantially between 2010\nand 2014 when the DRC launched a series of reforms aimed at improving the business environment\nto protect property rights, strengthen governance, and develop financial and labor markets. In spite of\nthese efforts, total investment nevertheless remains lower than the averages of 23.2 percent\nand 24.7 percent of GDP for sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries, respectively.\n\n3. Despite two decades of reconstruction efforts, public capital stock in the DRC remains\none of the lowest in the region. The 1990s conflict saw significant destruction of physical capital.\nThanks to the reconstruction efforts from 2003 onward, the stock of public capital has increased step\nby step to reach 46 percent of GDP in 2019 (Figure 1.C). Although the gap has been partially\nreduced, the stock of public capital remains far below the averages of other low-income countries or\nthat of sub-Saharan African countries; both of these groups are over 100 percent of GDP. The gap is\neven greater in terms of public capital stock per capita, remaining at a level well below that of other\nresource-rich countries in the region (Figure 1.D).\n\nFigure 1.A. General government investment:\n\nregional comparisons (nominal, % of GDP)\n\nFigure 1.B. Share of general government\n\ninvestment in total investment (%)\n\n1 The DRC also reached the completion point of the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative\nin 2010, enabling it to benefit from debt relief and, thus, an easing of the debt-servicing cost burden.\n\n2 Despite the fall in commodity prices, public investment in the DRC remained at 4.6 percent of GDP\nin 2015-2016 In other resource-rich countries, the drop in prices often leads to abrupt, significant cuts\nin public investment.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3219}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-001", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-002", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-003", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0017-004"], "markdown": "10.0\n\n9.0\n\n8.0\n\n7.0\n\n6.0\n\n5.0\n\n4.0\n\n3.0\n\n2.0\n\n1.0\n\n0.0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Figure 1.C. Public capital stock: regional**\n\n**comparisons** (nominal, % of GDP)\n\n140.0\n\n120.0\n\n100.0\n\n\n\n35\n\n30\n\n25\n\n20\n\n15\n\n10\n\n5\n\n0\n\n\nincluding general government\nTotal investment\ninvestment\n\n\n**Figure 1.D. Public capital stock per**\n**capita, 2019** (adjusted at purchasing power\n\nparity in 2017 dollars, thousands)\n\n\n\n\n\nNigeria\n\n\n\nBotswana\n\n\n\nAngola\n\n\n\n\n\nSouth Africa\n\nCongo Rep.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n80.0\n\n60.0\n\n40.0\n\n20.0\n\n0.0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nRwanda\n\n\n\nZambia\n\n\n\nCAR\n\n\n\n\n\nTanzania\n\n\n\nGhana\n\nLiberia\n\n\n\nMali\n\nDRC\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSierra Leone\n\n\n\nthousands of US$, 2017 PPP-adjusted\n\n\n\nSource: IMF staff calculations\n\n\n**4.** **To fulfill the objectives of the 2019-2023 National Development Strategy Plan (PNSD) it**\n**is necessary to contain public debt while creating the fiscal space to invest in the priority**\n**sectors.** The IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) found that, despite fairly low external debt, the\nDRC is at moderate risk of overindebtedness and that its capacity to service its debt remains weak.\nThis level of risk is basically caused by poor mobilization of tax revenues, which restricts the country’s\nscope to enter into new loans without a deterioration of its risk level underlying the DSA. The debt is\nparticularly vulnerable to external shocks, leading to a fall in export revenues or in foreign exchange\nreserves; this, in turn, could provoke a sharp and rapid deterioration in credit rating. As part of the\ncurrent program supported by the IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the authorities have\nundertaken to hold the risk of external overindebtedness at a moderate level. That will rely on a more\nprudent debt policy with, in particular, a ceiling on non-concessional external loans until 2023 and\nefforts to mobilize more in the way of tax revenues, thereby enabling an increase in investments in\nthe priority sectors identified in the five pillars of the PNSD. Furthermore, in accordance with the\nobjectives of the program with the IMF, the Government decided to devote part of its allocation of\nspecial drawing rights to public investment projects in the provinces. Taken as a whole, general\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "10.0\n\n9.0\n\n8.0\n\n7.0\n\n6.0\n\n5.0\n\n4.0\n\n3.0\n\n2.0\n\n1.0\n\n0.0\n\nFigure 1.C. Public capital stock: regional\n\ncomparisons (nominal, % of GDP)\n\n140.0\n\n120.0\n\n100.0\n\n35\n\n30\n\n25\n\n20\n\n15\n\n10\n\n5\n\n0\n\nincluding general government\nTotal investment\ninvestment\n\nFigure 1.D. Public capital stock per\ncapita, 2019 (adjusted at purchasing power\n\nparity in 2017 dollars, thousands)\n\nNigeria\n\nBotswana\n\nAngola\n\nSouth Africa\n\nCongo Rep.\n\n80.0\n\n60.0\n\n40.0\n\n20.0\n\n0.0\n\nRwanda\n\nZambia\n\nCAR\n\nTanzania\n\nGhana\n\nLiberia\n\nMali\n\nDRC\n\nSierra Leone\n\nthousands of US$, 2017 PPP-adjusted\n\nSource: IMF staff calculations\n\n4. To fulfill the objectives of the 2019-2023 National Development Strategy Plan (PNSD) it\nis necessary to contain public debt while creating the fiscal space to invest in the priority\nsectors. The IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) found that, despite fairly low external debt, the\nDRC is at moderate risk of overindebtedness and that its capacity to service its debt remains weak.\nThis level of risk is basically caused by poor mobilization of tax revenues, which restricts the country’s\nscope to enter into new loans without a deterioration of its risk level underlying the DSA. The debt is\nparticularly vulnerable to external shocks, leading to a fall in export revenues or in foreign exchange\nreserves; this, in turn, could provoke a sharp and rapid deterioration in credit rating. As part of the\ncurrent program supported by the IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the authorities have\nundertaken to hold the risk of external overindebtedness at a moderate level. That will rely on a more\nprudent debt policy with, in particular, a ceiling on non-concessional external loans until 2023 and\nefforts to mobilize more in the way of tax revenues, thereby enabling an increase in investments in\nthe priority sectors identified in the five pillars of the PNSD. Furthermore, in accordance with the\nobjectives of the program with the IMF, the Government decided to devote part of its allocation of\nspecial drawing rights to public investment projects in the provinces. Taken as a whole, general\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 1760}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "government investment should thus reach 6 percent of GDP in 2026. An increase in use of publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) is also planned (see Paragraph 9).\n\n\n**5.** **For these investment efforts to come to fruition, measures to improve budget**\n**execution capacity will, however, be indispensable.** The DRC has weak rates of investment\nbudget execution, in the order of 50-70 percent (for the years 2018 -2019). This is particularly due to\nthe lack of credibility of the budget approved by the legislature, which considerably increases the level\nof expected revenues during budget debates in order to inflate spending to optimistic levels. Budget\nexecution is also weakened by cumbersome internal control procedures which incentivizes the use of\nemergency procedures, and by inconsistencies between the management of commitments and of\ncash available. In order to resolve these weaknesses and to improve public financial management,\nin 2021, the authorities adopted a new Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) for 2022-2028.\nBased on eight pillars, it aims, among other things, to provide the country with a modern, credible\nbudget framework that supports government policy priorities and ensures the efficiency of public\nspending.\n\n\n**B. COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT**\n\n\n**6.** **General government investment in the DRC is largely externally financed by external**\n**funding and favors economic infrastructure.** Over the past five years, almost two thirds of general\ngovernment investment has been externally-financed (Figure 1.E). The government’s aim is to\nreverse this trend progressively, to reach a level of 70 percent of domestic financing in 2026. In\naddition, in 2018 (before the pandemic), investment spending in social sectors (including education,\nhealth, housing, and social welfare) represented about 28 percent of capital spending, while\neconomic infrastructure construction represented 42 percent of the total. This breakdown is in line\nwith the average of comparator groups (Figure 1.F). The share of investment spending in social\ninfrastructure did however increase temporarily in 2020-2021, in response to the COVID-19\npandemic.\n\n\n\n**Figure 1.E. Sources of financing for central**\n**government investment spending** (% of GDP)\n\n2.5\n\n\n\n**Figure 1.F. Public investment by function:**\n\n**regional comparisons in 2018***\n\n\n\n100%\n\n\n80%\n\n\n60%\n\n\n40%\n\n\n20%\n\n\n0%\n\n\n|Col1|17%|Col3|23%|Col5|17%|Col7|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||**13%**|**13%**|**13%**|**13%**|**6%**|**6%**|\n||**13%**|**13%**|**5%**|**5%**|**26%**
|**26%**
|\n||**28%**|**28%**|**20%**
|**20%**
|**20%**
|**20%**
|\n||**28%**|**28%**|**52%**|**52%**|**51%**|**51%**|\n||**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|**42%**|\n\n\n\nDRC Low-income\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n2.0\n\n\n1.5\n\n\n1.0\n\n\n0.5\n\n\n0.0\n\n\n\n\n\n2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\nExternally-financed\n\nDomestically financed\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSubsaharan Africa\n\n\n\ncountries\n\n\n\nSource: Data from the authorities and calculations by the mission.\n\n - The amounts of investment by function for the DRC were not available. The mission calculated a proxy using data from\nbudget execution reports, by aggregating capital expenditure and construction outlays by ministry.\n\n\n**7.** **Provinces and decentralized territorial entities (ETDs) contribute moderately to the**\n**public investment effort.** Provincial governments carry out investment projects using their own\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [354.9192199707031, 468.63079833984375, 529.049560546875, 586.942138671875], "columns": 7, "rows": 6}], "text": "government investment should thus reach 6 percent of GDP in 2026. An increase in use of publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) is also planned (see Paragraph 9).\n\n5. For these investment efforts to come to fruition, measures to improve budget\nexecution capacity will, however, be indispensable. The DRC has weak rates of investment\nbudget execution, in the order of 50-70 percent (for the years 2018 -2019). This is particularly due to\nthe lack of credibility of the budget approved by the legislature, which considerably increases the level\nof expected revenues during budget debates in order to inflate spending to optimistic levels. Budget\nexecution is also weakened by cumbersome internal control procedures which incentivizes the use of\nemergency procedures, and by inconsistencies between the management of commitments and of\ncash available. In order to resolve these weaknesses and to improve public financial management,\nin 2021, the authorities adopted a new Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) for 2022-2028.\nBased on eight pillars, it aims, among other things, to provide the country with a modern, credible\nbudget framework that supports government policy priorities and ensures the efficiency of public\nspending.\n\nB. COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT\n\n6. General government investment in the DRC is largely externally financed by external\nfunding and favors economic infrastructure. Over the past five years, almost two thirds of general\ngovernment investment has been externally-financed (Figure 1.E). The government’s aim is to\nreverse this trend progressively, to reach a level of 70 percent of domestic financing in 2026. In\naddition, in 2018 (before the pandemic), investment spending in social sectors (including education,\nhealth, housing, and social welfare) represented about 28 percent of capital spending, while\neconomic infrastructure construction represented 42 percent of the total. This breakdown is in line\nwith the average of comparator groups (Figure 1.F). The share of investment spending in social\ninfrastructure did however increase temporarily in 2020-2021, in response to the COVID-19\npandemic.\n\nFigure 1.E. Sources of financing for central\ngovernment investment spending (% of GDP)\n\n2.5\n\nFigure 1.F. Public investment by function:\n\nregional comparisons in 2018*\n\n100%\n\n80%\n\n60%\n\n40%\n\n20%\n\n0%\n\n Col1 17% Col3 23% Col5 17% Col7 \n\n 13% 13% 13% 13% 6% 6% \n 13% 13% 5% 5% 26% 26% \n 28% 28% 20% 20% 20% 20% \n 28% 28% 52% 52% 51% 51% \n 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% \n\nDRC Low-income\n\n2.0\n\n1.5\n\n1.0\n\n0.5\n\n0.0\n\n2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n\nExternally-financed\n\nDomestically financed\n\nSubsaharan Africa\n\ncountries\n\nSource: Data from the authorities and calculations by the mission.\n\n - The amounts of investment by function for the DRC were not available. The mission calculated a proxy using data from\nbudget execution reports, by aggregating capital expenditure and construction outlays by ministry.\n\n7. Provinces and decentralized territorial entities (ETDs) contribute moderately to the\npublic investment effort. Provincial governments carry out investment projects using their own\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2661}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "resources, fiscal transfers, and funding from donors. [3] They may use debt to finance their investments,\nas allowed by the LOFIP, and they may enter into PPP arrangements (see paragraph 9). The\namounts of transfers actually executed are very low - less than 0.1 percent of GDP. Apart from these\nfiscal transfers, reliable information on investment by provinces and ETDs is lacking. The 2022-24\nMedium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) report nevertheless estimates 2021 capital spending by\nprovinces and ETDs at 0.8 percent of GDP.\n\n\n**8.** **Investment by public corporations in the DRC is substantial.** The Government portfolio\nincludes some forty public corporations. [4] Although the mission was not able to obtain consolidated\ndata on investment executed by all public corporations, planned investment by all public corporations\nover recent years is considered to have been in the order of 2 percent of GDP a year, according to\nthe Ministry of the Portfolio. Investment is basically carried out by the few large public corporations in\nthe portfolio, with, first and foremost, _Société Nationale d’Electricité_ (SNEL) - the national electricity\ncompany - whose investments represented one third of public corporations’ investment in 2021\naccording to the Ministry of the Portfolio. [5] _Générale des Carrières et des Mines_ - mining exploration\nand production company - is also a significant player, which has invested, in particular, in operation of\nmines and other assets in the past few years. The remainder of investment by public corporations is\nlimited, and concentrated in the public transportation sector.\n\n\n\n**Figure 1.G. PPP capital stock** (nominal, % of\nGDP)\n\n\n\n7.0\n\n\n6.0\n\n\n5.0\n\n\n4.0\n\n\n3.0\n\n\n2.0\n\n\n1.0\n\n\n0.0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSource: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)\ndatabase and IMF staff calculations\n\n**9.** **The stock** **of PPP capital**\n**stock in the DRC is significant and growing.** According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in\nInfrastructure (PPI) database, the PPP capital stock never exceeded 0.5 percent of GDP in the past\ntwo decades; this is well below the average stocks observed in low-income countries or Sub-Saharan\n\n\n3 For example, the province of Kinshasa told the mission that its 2022 investment budget was broken\ndown as follows: CGF 630 billion for investments using transfers from central government, CGF 180\nbillion for investments using the province’s own funding, and CGF 299 billion for the Kin Elenda\nproject financed by the World Bank.\n\n4 The Government holds all of the shares in 22 enterprises that have become commercial companies,\nas well as 25 to 50 percent in joint ventures with a blocking minority in 19 companies (2022-2024\nMTFF).\n\n5 The most recent financial report of SNEL found on-line is that for financial year 2016. The\nenterprise’s investments at that time had risen to US$284 million (0.8 percent of GDP).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "resources, fiscal transfers, and funding from donors. [3] They may use debt to finance their investments,\nas allowed by the LOFIP, and they may enter into PPP arrangements (see paragraph 9). The\namounts of transfers actually executed are very low - less than 0.1 percent of GDP. Apart from these\nfiscal transfers, reliable information on investment by provinces and ETDs is lacking. The 2022-24\nMedium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) report nevertheless estimates 2021 capital spending by\nprovinces and ETDs at 0.8 percent of GDP.\n\n8. Investment by public corporations in the DRC is substantial. The Government portfolio\nincludes some forty public corporations. [4] Although the mission was not able to obtain consolidated\ndata on investment executed by all public corporations, planned investment by all public corporations\nover recent years is considered to have been in the order of 2 percent of GDP a year, according to\nthe Ministry of the Portfolio. Investment is basically carried out by the few large public corporations in\nthe portfolio, with, first and foremost, _Société Nationale d’Electricité_ (SNEL) - the national electricity\ncompany - whose investments represented one third of public corporations’ investment in 2021\naccording to the Ministry of the Portfolio. [5] _Générale des Carrières et des Mines_ - mining exploration\nand production company - is also a significant player, which has invested, in particular, in operation of\nmines and other assets in the past few years. The remainder of investment by public corporations is\nlimited, and concentrated in the public transportation sector.\n\nFigure 1.G. PPP capital stock (nominal, % of\nGDP)\n\n7.0\n\n6.0\n\n5.0\n\n4.0\n\n3.0\n\n2.0\n\n1.0\n\n0.0\n\nSource: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)\ndatabase and IMF staff calculations\n\n9. The stock of PPP capital\nstock in the DRC is significant and growing. According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in\nInfrastructure (PPI) database, the PPP capital stock never exceeded 0.5 percent of GDP in the past\ntwo decades; this is well below the average stocks observed in low-income countries or Sub-Saharan\n\n3 For example, the province of Kinshasa told the mission that its 2022 investment budget was broken\ndown as follows: CGF 630 billion for investments using transfers from central government, CGF 180\nbillion for investments using the province’s own funding, and CGF 299 billion for the Kin Elenda\nproject financed by the World Bank.\n\n4 The Government holds all of the shares in 22 enterprises that have become commercial companies,\nas well as 25 to 50 percent in joint ventures with a blocking minority in 19 companies (2022-2024\nMTFF).\n\n5 The most recent financial report of SNEL found on-line is that for financial year 2016. The\nenterprise’s investments at that time had risen to US$284 million (0.8 percent of GDP).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2436}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Africa (Figure 1.G). Nevertheless, according to the latest statement on government fiscal risks, the\nCongolese Agency for Major Works (ACGT, _Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux_ ) currently\nmanages at least seven roads as concessions granted to the private sector, for a total contract\namount of over US$2 billion (about 4 percent of GDP); and several new contracts have been signed\nsince the adoption of the new legal framework applicable to PPPs in 2018. The Banana deep-water\nport project will consist in the construction, within two years, of a 600-meter long quay and a logistics\narea with a storage capacity of approximately 1.3 million metric tons of goods. The central\ngovernment signed a concession agreement in 2021 with DP World for the financing, construction,\noperation, and maintenance of the port, at a cost of US$1.3 billion. The works should get underway\nin 2022 and the length of the concession is initially set at 30 years. Finally, during the technical\nmeetings held with the mission, the existence of PPP projects involving provincial governments was\nconfirmed. However, the absence of a consolidated database is an obstacle to obtaining a\ncomprehensive overview of the stock. This stock is planned to increase in the next few years; the use\nof PPPs was identified in the 2021-2023 _Programme du Gouvernement_ as a key method for financing\nmajor projects.\n\n##### **II. Efficiency and impact of public investment in the DRC**\n\n\n**10. Despite recent efforts, access to most types of basic infrastructure remains limited.**\nAccess to basic infrastructure, in particular to primary school, fell in the 1990s as a result of the civil\nwar. Despite the period of relative calm that followed, access to electricity, health services, and\ndrinking water are still very limited and have even reduced since the end of the 1990s due to faster\ngrowth in the population than in the infrastructure (Figure 2.A).\n\n- _Electricity_ production per capita has stagnated over the last 20 years despite huge hydroelectrical\npotential in the country. According to the World Bank’s worldwide development indicators,\nalthough there has been a modest increase in access to electricity since 2000, only 20 percent of\nthe population was connected in 2018. Access to electricity is not at all uniformly available across\nthe whole of the country, with even some urban areas having no access, and often very limited\naccess in the provinces, even to supply strategic infrastructure. According to the health map of\nthe DRC developed with the support of USAID, [6] only 32 percent of health centers thus had\naccess to electricity in 2019. In addition, line losses are significant; at a rate of 40 percent, the\nWorld Bank [7] considers them to be twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan Africa.\n\n- In the _health sector_, the number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants, which was already low\nduring the 1990s, fell by one third over the past two decades and was less than 1 in 2019. The\nhealth map mentioned above confirms that access to health services is very poor in the\nprovinces: in 2019, only 40 percent of provincial health divisions had at least one specialist doctor\nand 47 percent had a general practitioner.\n\n- The percentage of the population with access to _drinking water_ is estimated at 45 percent as\nagainst 70 percent for comparator groups. The network also suffers from lack of continuity in\ndistribution. Realized production by REGIDESO (the dominant public corporation in drinking\n\n\n6 Survey conducted between July and September 2019 in nine provinces. Results available at\nhttps://dev.cartesanitairerdc.org/data#section-info\n\n7 _République Démocratique du Congo Revue de la Gestion des Dépenses Publiques et de la Responsabilisation_\n_Financière Accroître l’Efficacité et l’Efficience du Secteur Public pour Promouvoir la Croissance et le_\n_Développement._ (DRC: review of public expenditure management and financial accountability - Increasing\nefficacy and efficiency of the public sector to promote growth and development), World Bank Report 2017 Volume II.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Africa (Figure 1.G). Nevertheless, according to the latest statement on government fiscal risks, the\nCongolese Agency for Major Works (ACGT, _Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux_ ) currently\nmanages at least seven roads as concessions granted to the private sector, for a total contract\namount of over US$2 billion (about 4 percent of GDP); and several new contracts have been signed\nsince the adoption of the new legal framework applicable to PPPs in 2018. The Banana deep-water\nport project will consist in the construction, within two years, of a 600-meter long quay and a logistics\narea with a storage capacity of approximately 1.3 million metric tons of goods. The central\ngovernment signed a concession agreement in 2021 with DP World for the financing, construction,\noperation, and maintenance of the port, at a cost of US$1.3 billion. The works should get underway\nin 2022 and the length of the concession is initially set at 30 years. Finally, during the technical\nmeetings held with the mission, the existence of PPP projects involving provincial governments was\nconfirmed. However, the absence of a consolidated database is an obstacle to obtaining a\ncomprehensive overview of the stock. This stock is planned to increase in the next few years; the use\nof PPPs was identified in the 2021-2023 _Programme du Gouvernement_ as a key method for financing\nmajor projects.\nII. Efficiency and impact of public investment in the DRC\n\n10. Despite recent efforts, access to most types of basic infrastructure remains limited.\nAccess to basic infrastructure, in particular to primary school, fell in the 1990s as a result of the civil\nwar. Despite the period of relative calm that followed, access to electricity, health services, and\ndrinking water are still very limited and have even reduced since the end of the 1990s due to faster\ngrowth in the population than in the infrastructure (Figure 2.A).\n\n- _Electricity_ production per capita has stagnated over the last 20 years despite huge hydroelectrical\npotential in the country. According to the World Bank’s worldwide development indicators,\nalthough there has been a modest increase in access to electricity since 2000, only 20 percent of\nthe population was connected in 2018. Access to electricity is not at all uniformly available across\nthe whole of the country, with even some urban areas having no access, and often very limited\naccess in the provinces, even to supply strategic infrastructure. According to the health map of\nthe DRC developed with the support of USAID, [6] only 32 percent of health centers thus had\naccess to electricity in 2019. In addition, line losses are significant; at a rate of 40 percent, the\nWorld Bank [7] considers them to be twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan Africa.\n\n- In the _health sector_, the number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants, which was already low\nduring the 1990s, fell by one third over the past two decades and was less than 1 in 2019. The\nhealth map mentioned above confirms that access to health services is very poor in the\nprovinces: in 2019, only 40 percent of provincial health divisions had at least one specialist doctor\nand 47 percent had a general practitioner.\n\n- The percentage of the population with access to _drinking water_ is estimated at 45 percent as\nagainst 70 percent for comparator groups. The network also suffers from lack of continuity in\ndistribution. Realized production by REGIDESO (the dominant public corporation in drinking\n\n6 Survey conducted between July and September 2019 in nine provinces. Results available at\nhttps://dev.cartesanitairerdc.org/data#section-info\n\n7 _République Démocratique du Congo Revue de la Gestion des Dépenses Publiques et de la Responsabilisation_\n_Financière Accroître l’Efficacité et l’Efficience du Secteur Public pour Promouvoir la Croissance et le_\n_Développement._ (DRC: review of public expenditure management and financial accountability - Increasing\nefficacy and efficiency of the public sector to promote growth and development), World Bank Report 2017 Volume II.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3466}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-001", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0021-002"], "markdown": "water distribution) decreased by 21 percent between 2006 and 2013, meaning that production\ncapacity per inhabitant fell by 7 percent over the same period, accordingly.\n\n- Meanwhile, the road network (not included in Figure 2.A due to lack of comparative data) is\nconfronted with problems of dilapidation and lack of maintenance. According to the 2019-2023\nPNSD, paved roads only accounted for 2.3 percent of the total network at the beginning of the\nperiod, often leading to high transport costs as well as to delivery delays both for people and for\ngoods.\n\n\n**11. In contrast, access to public education infrastructure has shown positive development**\n**since the 1990s.** The number of secondary teachers per 1000 inhabitants nearly tripled in 20 years\nto 4.2 in 2019, exceeding the ratio for comparator groups. However, other indicators reveal\nweaknesses in relation to outputs and outcomes of education. The World Bank’s worldwide\ndevelopment indicators show that in 2016, only 27 percent of the population (aged at least 25 years)\nhad completed secondary education, and 63 percent had completed primary education; and the rate\nof illiteracy in those over the age of 15 was 20 percent.\n\n**Figure 2.A. Indicators of physical access to public infrastructure - 2019**\n\n\nDRC Low-income countries Subsaharan Africa\n\n\n\n\n\nPeople using at least basic\n\ndrinking water services\n\n\n\n4.5\n\n\n4.0\n\n\n3.5\n\n\n3.0\n\n\n2.5\n\n\n2.0\n\n\n1.5\n\n\n1.0\n\n\n0.5\n\n\n0.0\n\n\n\n\n\nPublic education\n\ninfrastructure\n\n\n\nElectricity production per\n\ncapita\n\n\n\nPublic health\ninfrastructure\n\n\n\n100%\n\n90%\n\n80%\n\n70%\n\n60%\n\n50%\n\n40%\n\n30%\n\n20%\n\n10%\n\n0%\n\n\n\nSource: World Bank Worldwide Development Indicators and IMF staff calculations\nNote: The education infrastructure is measured by number of secondary level teachers per 1000 people; production of\nelectricity per inhabitant is in thousands of kWh per person; public health infrastructure is estimated using the number of\nhospital beds per 1000 people.\n\n\n**12. Perception of the quality of infrastructure has deteriorated slightly since 2010 and**\n**remains below that of comparators.** According to the surveys conducted by the World Economic\nForum among business leaders, the perception of quality of infrastructure in the DRC in 2017 (score\nof 2 on a scale of 1 to 7) was worse than that of comparator countries (average score of 3,\nFigure 2.B). The World Bank’s logistical performance indicators reflect the same trend, even showing\na deterioration in perceived quality of trade-related and transport infrastructure since 2010. Finally,\nalthough they are almost ten years old, the surveys conducted in 2013-2014 by the World Bank\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "water distribution) decreased by 21 percent between 2006 and 2013, meaning that production\ncapacity per inhabitant fell by 7 percent over the same period, accordingly.\n\n- Meanwhile, the road network (not included in Figure 2.A due to lack of comparative data) is\nconfronted with problems of dilapidation and lack of maintenance. According to the 2019-2023\nPNSD, paved roads only accounted for 2.3 percent of the total network at the beginning of the\nperiod, often leading to high transport costs as well as to delivery delays both for people and for\ngoods.\n\n11. In contrast, access to public education infrastructure has shown positive development\nsince the 1990s. The number of secondary teachers per 1000 inhabitants nearly tripled in 20 years\nto 4.2 in 2019, exceeding the ratio for comparator groups. However, other indicators reveal\nweaknesses in relation to outputs and outcomes of education. The World Bank’s worldwide\ndevelopment indicators show that in 2016, only 27 percent of the population (aged at least 25 years)\nhad completed secondary education, and 63 percent had completed primary education; and the rate\nof illiteracy in those over the age of 15 was 20 percent.\n\nFigure 2.A. Indicators of physical access to public infrastructure - 2019\n\nDRC Low-income countries Subsaharan Africa\n\nPeople using at least basic\n\ndrinking water services\n\n4.5\n\n4.0\n\n3.5\n\n3.0\n\n2.5\n\n2.0\n\n1.5\n\n1.0\n\n0.5\n\n0.0\n\nPublic education\n\ninfrastructure\n\nElectricity production per\n\ncapita\n\nPublic health\ninfrastructure\n\n100%\n\n90%\n\n80%\n\n70%\n\n60%\n\n50%\n\n40%\n\n30%\n\n20%\n\n10%\n\n0%\n\nSource: World Bank Worldwide Development Indicators and IMF staff calculations\nNote: The education infrastructure is measured by number of secondary level teachers per 1000 people; production of\nelectricity per inhabitant is in thousands of kWh per person; public health infrastructure is estimated using the number of\nhospital beds per 1000 people.\n\n12. Perception of the quality of infrastructure has deteriorated slightly since 2010 and\nremains below that of comparators. According to the surveys conducted by the World Economic\nForum among business leaders, the perception of quality of infrastructure in the DRC in 2017 (score\nof 2 on a scale of 1 to 7) was worse than that of comparator countries (average score of 3,\nFigure 2.B). The World Bank’s logistical performance indicators reflect the same trend, even showing\na deterioration in perceived quality of trade-related and transport infrastructure since 2010. Finally,\nalthough they are almost ten years old, the surveys conducted in 2013-2014 by the World Bank\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2204}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-001", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0022-002"], "markdown": "among private enterprises [8] showed the impact of these weaknesses on the private sector. Almost all\nof the enterprises surveyed stated, in fact, that they had suffered electricity outages, and over half\nidentified electricity as a major constraint on the business climate (Figure 2.C).\n\n\n\n**Figure 2.B. Infrastructure quality as**\n**perceived by business leaders** (scale 1\n7)\n\n\n\n**Figure 2.C. Insufficiencies in access to infrastructure**\n\n\n\ncompanies)\n\n\n\n**as perceived by private companies** (2013-14, % of\n\n\n\n\n\nSubject to\nelectrical outages\n\n\n\n7.0\n\n\n6.0\n\n\n5.0\n\n\n4.0\n\n\n3.0\n\n\n2.0\n\n\n1.0\n\n\n\n\n\n2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n100\n\n90\n\n80\n\n70\n\n60\n\n50\n\n40\n\n30\n\n20\n\n10\n\n0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSubject to water\n\nisufficiencies\n\n\n\nPerceiving\ntransport as a\nmajor constraint\n\n\n\nPerceiving\nelectricity as a\nmajor constraint\n\n\n\nSource: World Economic Forum, IMF staff calculations\n\n\n\nSource: World Bank, 2013 Sample of 529 private enterprises\n\n\n\n**13. The very low levels of public capital stock per capita in the DRC only allowed to**\n**achieve limited results in terms of access to and quality of infrastructure.** The gap between the\nDRC and its comparators in terms of public capital stock per capita is considerably more significant\nthan in terms of physical access to infrastructure. At first sight, this therefore reflects a high level of\nefficiency of public investment compared with other countries, as calculated by IMF staff, with the\nDRC even situated on the efficiency frontier (Figure 2.D). However, this result is not satisfactory in\nitself and should be interpreted with great caution. Public capital stock per capita does not include the\ninfrastructure constructed through PPPs or by public corporations. The indicators for access to\ninfrastructure hide serious disparities between regions. The quality of infrastructure, low in the DRC\n(see previous paragraph), is not taken into account in this figure. Also, the risk of regression is high;\ninfrastructure development struggles to follow demographic growth, and without regular maintenance\nefforts, the electricity and/or water networks suffer from dilapidation and line losses, leading to a\nprogressive deterioration in the service. In sum, the DRC is still well below the standards of\ndevelopment of the region. Meeting these needs will require considerable investments, while fiscal\nspace is limited. It will therefore be absolutely crucial to invest efficiently in order to obtain the best\npossible outcomes in terms of improving access to and quality of public services.\n\n\n8 A World Bank survey was conducted between August 2013 and May 2014 among 529 enterprises.\nThe survey results are available at\nhttps://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2013/congo-dem-rep\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "among private enterprises [8] showed the impact of these weaknesses on the private sector. Almost all\nof the enterprises surveyed stated, in fact, that they had suffered electricity outages, and over half\nidentified electricity as a major constraint on the business climate (Figure 2.C).\n\nFigure 2.B. Infrastructure quality as\nperceived by business leaders (scale 1\n7)\n\nFigure 2.C. Insufficiencies in access to infrastructure\n\ncompanies)\n\nas perceived by private companies (2013-14, % of\n\nSubject to\nelectrical outages\n\n7.0\n\n6.0\n\n5.0\n\n4.0\n\n3.0\n\n2.0\n\n1.0\n\n2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017\n\n100\n\n90\n\n80\n\n70\n\n60\n\n50\n\n40\n\n30\n\n20\n\n10\n\n0\n\nSubject to water\n\nisufficiencies\n\nPerceiving\ntransport as a\nmajor constraint\n\nPerceiving\nelectricity as a\nmajor constraint\n\nSource: World Economic Forum, IMF staff calculations\n\nSource: World Bank, 2013 Sample of 529 private enterprises\n\n13. The very low levels of public capital stock per capita in the DRC only allowed to\nachieve limited results in terms of access to and quality of infrastructure. The gap between the\nDRC and its comparators in terms of public capital stock per capita is considerably more significant\nthan in terms of physical access to infrastructure. At first sight, this therefore reflects a high level of\nefficiency of public investment compared with other countries, as calculated by IMF staff, with the\nDRC even situated on the efficiency frontier (Figure 2.D). However, this result is not satisfactory in\nitself and should be interpreted with great caution. Public capital stock per capita does not include the\ninfrastructure constructed through PPPs or by public corporations. The indicators for access to\ninfrastructure hide serious disparities between regions. The quality of infrastructure, low in the DRC\n(see previous paragraph), is not taken into account in this figure. Also, the risk of regression is high;\ninfrastructure development struggles to follow demographic growth, and without regular maintenance\nefforts, the electricity and/or water networks suffer from dilapidation and line losses, leading to a\nprogressive deterioration in the service. In sum, the DRC is still well below the standards of\ndevelopment of the region. Meeting these needs will require considerable investments, while fiscal\nspace is limited. It will therefore be absolutely crucial to invest efficiently in order to obtain the best\npossible outcomes in terms of improving access to and quality of public services.\n\n8 A World Bank survey was conducted between August 2013 and May 2014 among 529 enterprises.\nThe survey results are available at\nhttps://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2013/congo-dem-rep\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2314}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 2.D. Efficiency frontier (physical access to infrastructure)**\n\n\nSubsaharan Africa Other countries Frontier\n\n160\n\n\n\n140\n\n120\n\n100\n\n80\n\n60\n\n40\n\n20\n\n0\n\n\n\n\n\nPublic capital stock per capita (input)\n\n\n\n\n\nSource: IMF data and IMF staff calculations. The graph highlights the amounts of public capital stock per capita (x-axis) and a synthetic\nindex that aggregates the data for physical access to infrastructure presented in Figure 2.A. When a country is located on the frontier, this means\nthat it has maximized physical access relative to other countries, given the level of investment. However, the efficiency frontier loses its relevance\nfor countries with very low levels of capital stock.\n\n##### **III. Public investment management assessment**\n\n\n**A. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT**\n\n\n**14. This section assesses the institutional design and effectiveness of the 15 public**\n**investment management institutions in the DRC using the PIMA methodology (Figure 3.A).** The\ninstitutions are spread across three stages of the public investment management cycle. (I) ensuring\nsustainable levels of public investment through a sound planning process; (ii) allocating resources to\nthe right sectors and projects; and (iii) implementing the investment projects within the specified\nperiods so as to deliver productive and sustainable assets. The following sections aim to assess the\ninstitutional design (“on paper”) of each institution, based on the laws, regulations, and\nmanuals/guides, as well as its effectiveness (“in practice”) based on the study of actual practices in\nthe DRC. The assessment is based on meetings with the main parties involved and on the data and\ndocuments gathered during the mission. The assessment is focused on the central government’s\npractices in terms of planning, allocation of resources, monitoring of projects, and coordination with\nthe other public sector entities, such as the subnational governments - SNGs (provinces and ETDs)\nand the public corporations.\n\n\n**Figure 3.A. The PIMA assessment framework**\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 2.D. Efficiency frontier (physical access to infrastructure)\n\nSubsaharan Africa Other countries Frontier\n\n160\n\n140\n\n120\n\n100\n\n80\n\n60\n\n40\n\n20\n\n0\n\nPublic capital stock per capita (input)\n\nSource: IMF data and IMF staff calculations. The graph highlights the amounts of public capital stock per capita (x-axis) and a synthetic\nindex that aggregates the data for physical access to infrastructure presented in Figure 2.A. When a country is located on the frontier, this means\nthat it has maximized physical access relative to other countries, given the level of investment. However, the efficiency frontier loses its relevance\nfor countries with very low levels of capital stock.\nIII. Public investment management assessment\n\nA. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT\n\n14. This section assesses the institutional design and effectiveness of the 15 public\ninvestment management institutions in the DRC using the PIMA methodology (Figure 3.A). The\ninstitutions are spread across three stages of the public investment management cycle. (I) ensuring\nsustainable levels of public investment through a sound planning process; (ii) allocating resources to\nthe right sectors and projects; and (iii) implementing the investment projects within the specified\nperiods so as to deliver productive and sustainable assets. The following sections aim to assess the\ninstitutional design (“on paper”) of each institution, based on the laws, regulations, and\nmanuals/guides, as well as its effectiveness (“in practice”) based on the study of actual practices in\nthe DRC. The assessment is based on meetings with the main parties involved and on the data and\ndocuments gathered during the mission. The assessment is focused on the central government’s\npractices in terms of planning, allocation of resources, monitoring of projects, and coordination with\nthe other public sector entities, such as the subnational governments - SNGs (provinces and ETDs)\nand the public corporations.\n\nFigure 3.A. The PIMA assessment framework\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 1741}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0024-001"], "markdown": "\n\nSource: IMF staff\n\n\n**15. There are significant deficiencies in the public investment management institutions in**\n**the DRC, both on paper and in practice.**\n\n\n- Institutional design in the DRC is better in the project implementation stage than in the planning\nand allocation stages (Figure 3.B). That is also true relative to regional averages and countries\nwith the same level of income, with the strengths lying in public procurement (institution 11), cash\nmanagement and asset management (institutions 12 and 15), while the main weaknesses are in\nnational and sectoral planning (institution 2), coordination between public sector entities\n(institution 3), project appraisal (institution 4), and budget comprehensiveness (institution 7).\n\n\n- In practice (Figure 3.C), the _effectiveness_ of public investment management institutions in the\nDRC is often lower than the legal framework suggests; this is particularly true in the areas of\npublic procurement (institution 11), cash management and asset management (institutions 12\nand 15). Effectiveness is slightly higher than institutional design in some cases, thanks to\npractices for the appraisal and oversight of externally-financed projects (institutions 4 and 13) and\nto budget transparency initiatives going above and beyond legal obligations (institutions 3 and 7).\nFinally, the effectiveness of public investment management practices in the DRC is, more often\nthan not, far below that of its comparator groups\n\n\n\n**Figure 3.B. DRC: Strength of public investment**\n**management institutions and comparison with**\n**regional averages and countries of similar income level**\n\n\n\n**Figure 3.C. DRC: Effectiveness of public investment**\n**management practices and comparison with regional**\n\n**averages and countries of similar income level**\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.146, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(181.55007934570312, 71.99993896484375, 447.8213195800781, 337.6999206542969)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 817, "number": 8, "size": 100368, "transform": [266.271240234375, 0.0, -0.0, 265.6999816894531, 181.55007934570312, 71.99993896484375], "width": 817, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Source: IMF staff\n\n15. There are significant deficiencies in the public investment management institutions in\nthe DRC, both on paper and in practice.\n\n- Institutional design in the DRC is better in the project implementation stage than in the planning\nand allocation stages (Figure 3.B). That is also true relative to regional averages and countries\nwith the same level of income, with the strengths lying in public procurement (institution 11), cash\nmanagement and asset management (institutions 12 and 15), while the main weaknesses are in\nnational and sectoral planning (institution 2), coordination between public sector entities\n(institution 3), project appraisal (institution 4), and budget comprehensiveness (institution 7).\n\n- In practice (Figure 3.C), the _effectiveness_ of public investment management institutions in the\nDRC is often lower than the legal framework suggests; this is particularly true in the areas of\npublic procurement (institution 11), cash management and asset management (institutions 12\nand 15). Effectiveness is slightly higher than institutional design in some cases, thanks to\npractices for the appraisal and oversight of externally-financed projects (institutions 4 and 13) and\nto budget transparency initiatives going above and beyond legal obligations (institutions 3 and 7).\nFinally, the effectiveness of public investment management practices in the DRC is, more often\nthan not, far below that of its comparator groups\n\nFigure 3.B. DRC: Strength of public investment\nmanagement institutions and comparison with\nregional averages and countries of similar income level\n\nFigure 3.C. DRC: Effectiveness of public investment\nmanagement practices and comparison with regional\n\naverages and countries of similar income level\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 1556}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-001", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0025-002"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Oversight**\n\n\n\n**Funding**\n\n\n**11.**\n\n\n\n\n\n**Oversight**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**12. Availability of**\n**Funding**\n\n\n**11.**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Investment**\n\n\n**ALLOCATION**\n\n\n\n**Funding**\n\n\n\n**Investment**\n\n\n\n**Funding**\n\n\n\n**ALLOCATION**\n\nSource: Mission Source: Mission\n\n\n**B. PLANNING SUSTAINABLE LEVELS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT**\n\n\n\n**1. Fiscal Targets and Rules** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of reform:_\n_Low)_\n**16. The purpose of this institution is to ascertain the existence of fiscal targets or rules to**\n**facilitate medium-term planning of public investment spending and to ensure long-term public**\n**debt sustainability.** Excessive volatility in investment spending undermines the efficiency of public\ninvestment. The assessment focuses on the existence of fiscal objectives; it does not emphasize a\npreference for any specific fiscal policy or the share of spending that public investment should\noccupy. This first institution aims to ensure that (i) a target or limit is set to enable the Government to\nensure long-term debt sustainability, (ii) fiscal policy is framed by one or more fiscal rules, and (iii) a\nmedium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is in place to align fiscal policy and preparation of the annual\nbudget.\n\n\n**17. The government has no permanent quantitative target or limit for public debt that**\n**would help ensure its sustainability, even though it is** _**de facto**_ **constrained by commitments**\n**made under the program with the IMF** . As part of its membership in the Southern African\nDevelopment Community (SADC), one of the objectives of which is to ensure macroeconomic\nconvergence among its member countries, the DRC must formally avoid having a high percentage of\ngovernment debt to GDP. [9] High-level macroeconomic convergence criteria, including a public debt\nlimit of 60 percent, were adopted by the member countries in 2003 in a regional indicative strategic\nplan. In the absence of an explicit reference to this limit in the documents produced by the\ngovernment, this criterion does not, however, constitute a formal constraint on DRC’s debt\nsustainability. In practice, the General Directorate of Public Debt (DGDP) of the Ministry of Finance\nattends to debt sustainability by setting a medium-term debt strategy, which provides annual debt\ntargets set in accordance with investment needs, while taking into account refinancing and foreign\nexchange risks. However, the DGDP has not completed a debt sustainability analysis since 2017. As\nthings stand, the government’s financial and economic program established with the support of the\n\n\n9 Articles 2 and 7 of the memorandum of understanding of 2011 and Articles 2 and 7 of the Annex on\nFinance and Investment of 2006.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Oversight\n\nFunding\n\n11.\n\nOversight\n\n12. Availability of\nFunding\n\n11.\n\nInvestment\n\nALLOCATION\n\nFunding\n\nInvestment\n\nFunding\n\nALLOCATION\n\nSource: Mission Source: Mission\n\nB. PLANNING SUSTAINABLE LEVELS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT\n\n1. Fiscal Targets and Rules _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of reform:_\n_Low)_\n16. The purpose of this institution is to ascertain the existence of fiscal targets or rules to\nfacilitate medium-term planning of public investment spending and to ensure long-term public\ndebt sustainability. Excessive volatility in investment spending undermines the efficiency of public\ninvestment. The assessment focuses on the existence of fiscal objectives; it does not emphasize a\npreference for any specific fiscal policy or the share of spending that public investment should\noccupy. This first institution aims to ensure that (i) a target or limit is set to enable the Government to\nensure long-term debt sustainability, (ii) fiscal policy is framed by one or more fiscal rules, and (iii) a\nmedium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is in place to align fiscal policy and preparation of the annual\nbudget.\n\n17. The government has no permanent quantitative target or limit for public debt that\nwould help ensure its sustainability, even though it is _de facto_ constrained by commitments\nmade under the program with the IMF . As part of its membership in the Southern African\nDevelopment Community (SADC), one of the objectives of which is to ensure macroeconomic\nconvergence among its member countries, the DRC must formally avoid having a high percentage of\ngovernment debt to GDP. [9] High-level macroeconomic convergence criteria, including a public debt\nlimit of 60 percent, were adopted by the member countries in 2003 in a regional indicative strategic\nplan. In the absence of an explicit reference to this limit in the documents produced by the\ngovernment, this criterion does not, however, constitute a formal constraint on DRC’s debt\nsustainability. In practice, the General Directorate of Public Debt (DGDP) of the Ministry of Finance\nattends to debt sustainability by setting a medium-term debt strategy, which provides annual debt\ntargets set in accordance with investment needs, while taking into account refinancing and foreign\nexchange risks. However, the DGDP has not completed a debt sustainability analysis since 2017. As\nthings stand, the government’s financial and economic program established with the support of the\n\n9 Articles 2 and 7 of the memorandum of understanding of 2011 and Articles 2 and 7 of the Annex on\nFinance and Investment of 2006.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2251}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "IMF’s Extended Credit Facility since 2021, instills effective discipline with regard to debt by\ncommitting the country to maintaining a moderate level of risk of external debt distress, and setting\nceilings on non-concessional external borrowing entered into or guaranteed by the public sector, as\nwell as ceilings on total borrowing.\n\n\n**18. The law on public finance (LOFIP) sets a fiscal rule on the current deficit of the central**\n**and local government, from which the authorities have deviated somewhat in recent years.**\nThe only fiscal rule currently in force in the DRC, according to the IMF definition, [10] is described in\nArticle 15 of the LOFIP. This article requires the central government, and each province and ETD to\nimplement their budgets while balancing their current expenditure with domestic resources. [11] In other\nwords, this “golden rule” enables borrowing solely to finance investment. [12] However, this rule was not\ncomplied with in 2019 and 2020 with a current balance deviating from equilibrium by 0.5 percentage\npoint of GDP, according to the mission’s calculations.\n\n\n**19. A multiyear macro-fiscal framework is prepared every year, enabling distinctions**\n**between current and capital spending.** As set forth in the LOFIP (Article 13), the Ministry of Budget\nsets a three-year MTFF (including the ongoing year and the two following years) covering the whole\ngeneral government. It is based on macroeconomic assumptions supplied by the Ministry of Planning.\nThe MTFF provides aggregate projections for revenues, expenditure, balance, and debt. It\ndistinguishes between current and capital spending but does not distinguish expenditure on ongoing\nprojects from expenditure on new projects. In practice, the MTFF has helped to delineate the overall\namount of investment spending which gets approved in the budget. In the past three years, capital\nappropriations approved in the budget laws have been on average 4 percent higher than the amounts\nprojected a few months earlier in the MTFFs. This gap was only 1 percent for the 2022 budget,\nsuggesting that the MTFF investment envelopes have served as effective ceilings for the budget.\n\n\n**20. Strengthened oversight of medium-term public debt is important, but is a low reform**\n**priority.** The discipline in practical terms imposed by the program with the IMF in force until end-2023\nmeans that actions in this area are less urgent than other reforms covered by the PIMA framework.\nNevertheless, several actions could allow the authorities to ensure that planning and budgeting for\ninvestment are consistent with the objective of public debt sustainability: (i) carrying out an public debt\nsustainability analysis with a broad perimeter including the debt of public corporations, as well as\nalternative scenarios incorporating all the debt instruments, the natural resource operating profiles,\nthe demographic projections, and contingent liabilities [13] ; (ii) the explicit verification, in the MTFF and\nthe budget execution reports, of compliance of the projections with the fiscal rule set by Article 15 of\n\n\n10 A fiscal rule is a long-lasting formal constraint on public finances through predetermined numerical\nlimits to broad fiscal aggregates. The convergence criteria of the SADC and of the Common Market\nfor Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which are indicative in nature, are not considered as\nfiscal rules.\n\n11 The rule excludes internal borrowing, grants, and repayment of loans and advances.\n\n12 The experience of golden rules has shown that they have not always been able to maintain public\ninvestments at high levels (see IMF paper, 2020. _[Well Spent](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Books/Issues/2020/09/03/Well-Spent-How-Strong-Infrastructure-Governance-Can-End-Waste-in-Public-Investment-48603)_, Chapter 7). Moreover, in the absence of\nan explicit limit to the debt, such rules have often encouraged excessive indebtedness to finance\ninvestment projects, frequently leading to unsustainable levels of debt and potentially requiring\nsignificant reductions in public investments to support a fiscal adjustment that has become inevitable.\n\n13Such an analysis, carried out by the DGDP in cooperation with the Ministries of the Portfolio,\nBudget, and Planning, could also be conducted when debt is planned for major infrastructure\nprojects, in order to ensure sustainability.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "IMF’s Extended Credit Facility since 2021, instills effective discipline with regard to debt by\ncommitting the country to maintaining a moderate level of risk of external debt distress, and setting\nceilings on non-concessional external borrowing entered into or guaranteed by the public sector, as\nwell as ceilings on total borrowing.\n\n18. The law on public finance (LOFIP) sets a fiscal rule on the current deficit of the central\nand local government, from which the authorities have deviated somewhat in recent years.\nThe only fiscal rule currently in force in the DRC, according to the IMF definition, [10] is described in\nArticle 15 of the LOFIP. This article requires the central government, and each province and ETD to\nimplement their budgets while balancing their current expenditure with domestic resources. [11] In other\nwords, this “golden rule” enables borrowing solely to finance investment. [12] However, this rule was not\ncomplied with in 2019 and 2020 with a current balance deviating from equilibrium by 0.5 percentage\npoint of GDP, according to the mission’s calculations.\n\n19. A multiyear macro-fiscal framework is prepared every year, enabling distinctions\nbetween current and capital spending. As set forth in the LOFIP (Article 13), the Ministry of Budget\nsets a three-year MTFF (including the ongoing year and the two following years) covering the whole\ngeneral government. It is based on macroeconomic assumptions supplied by the Ministry of Planning.\nThe MTFF provides aggregate projections for revenues, expenditure, balance, and debt. It\ndistinguishes between current and capital spending but does not distinguish expenditure on ongoing\nprojects from expenditure on new projects. In practice, the MTFF has helped to delineate the overall\namount of investment spending which gets approved in the budget. In the past three years, capital\nappropriations approved in the budget laws have been on average 4 percent higher than the amounts\nprojected a few months earlier in the MTFFs. This gap was only 1 percent for the 2022 budget,\nsuggesting that the MTFF investment envelopes have served as effective ceilings for the budget.\n\n20. Strengthened oversight of medium-term public debt is important, but is a low reform\npriority. The discipline in practical terms imposed by the program with the IMF in force until end-2023\nmeans that actions in this area are less urgent than other reforms covered by the PIMA framework.\nNevertheless, several actions could allow the authorities to ensure that planning and budgeting for\ninvestment are consistent with the objective of public debt sustainability: (i) carrying out an public debt\nsustainability analysis with a broad perimeter including the debt of public corporations, as well as\nalternative scenarios incorporating all the debt instruments, the natural resource operating profiles,\nthe demographic projections, and contingent liabilities [13] ; (ii) the explicit verification, in the MTFF and\nthe budget execution reports, of compliance of the projections with the fiscal rule set by Article 15 of\n\n10 A fiscal rule is a long-lasting formal constraint on public finances through predetermined numerical\nlimits to broad fiscal aggregates. The convergence criteria of the SADC and of the Common Market\nfor Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which are indicative in nature, are not considered as\nfiscal rules.\n\n11 The rule excludes internal borrowing, grants, and repayment of loans and advances.\n\n12 The experience of golden rules has shown that they have not always been able to maintain public\ninvestments at high levels (see IMF paper, 2020. _Well Spent_, Chapter 7). Moreover, in the absence of\nan explicit limit to the debt, such rules have often encouraged excessive indebtedness to finance\ninvestment projects, frequently leading to unsustainable levels of debt and potentially requiring\nsignificant reductions in public investments to support a fiscal adjustment that has become inevitable.\n\n13Such an analysis, carried out by the DGDP in cooperation with the Ministries of the Portfolio,\nBudget, and Planning, could also be conducted when debt is planned for major infrastructure\nprojects, in order to ensure sustainability.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3611}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "the LOFIP; and (iii) the provision in the MTFF of the overall distinction between investment spending\non ongoing projects and on new projects.\n\n\n**2. National and Sectoral Planning** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_\n_reform: High)_\n\n**21. Public investment should be guided by national or sectoral strategies or plans with**\n**clear, realistic priorities, cost estimates and precise sectoral objectives** . This institution looks,\nfirst and foremost, into whether national and sectoral investment strategies covering all public\ninvestment projects, whatever their source of funding, are prepared and published. It underlines the\nimportance of quantification of the costs of public investment plans and assesses whether sectoral\nstrategies identify measurable targets for public investment outputs and outcomes.\n\n\n**22. The National Development Strategy Plan (PNSD) and the various existing sectoral**\n**strategies contain little precise information about major projects in their published versions.**\nThe 2019-2023 PNSD (prepared in 2019 and in the process of being reframed) constitutes the main\ndevelopment strategy of the DRC and is published. The PNSD was prepared by integrating the\npriorities of each sector, broken down into strategic pillars, programs, subprograms, and actions to be\nimplemented, and retaining the strategic objectives set forth in the sectoral strategies when these are\navailable. [14] Among the major sectors of economic and social infrastructure usually taken into account\nin the assessment, only two sectoral strategies - the 2019-2022 National Health Care Development\nPlan (PNDS); and the 2016-2025 sectoral strategy for education and training - have been published\nrecently. There is no recent strategy relating to the economic infrastructure sectors. [15] Although the\npublished versions of the PNSD and the sectoral strategies considered here describe the actions by\nmajor pillar or strategic objective, they do not identify clearly a portfolio of investment projects to be\nimplemented. The 2019-2023 Priority Action Program underlying the PNSD does indeed identify\ninvestment projects in some sectors (for example, transport, electricity, housing, etc.), but it is not\npublished. By contrast, the 2021-2023 Government Program identifies a list of priority infrastructure\nprojects, in particular in the sectors of transport, electricity, and water. In practice, some major\nprojects identified in the Government Program or the PAP may be found in the 2022 budget law; the\nabsence of a comprehensive list of projects annexed to the strategies prevents more in-depth\nchecking. However, the standard project fiche that monitors every investment project from its\nidentification to its implementation (see institution 4) requires a relationship with the PNSD and the\nsectoral strategies to be established, suggesting the existence of a link between the initiation of a\nproject and its inclusion in planning.\n\n\n**23. The majority of the national and sectoral strategies do not present information on**\n**underlying costs of investments, whether in total or at individual project level.** The PNSD\nestimates that the total cost of the strategy over five years would be US$47.6 billion, taking all\nsources of funding combined (including funding to be identified). Nevertheless, neither the PNSD, nor\n\n\n14 The PNSD is also supported by sectoral thematic groups created by a decree in 2013, which\nserves as a framework for consultation and harmonization of sectoral actions among the\nGovernment, donors, civil society, and the private sector. These groups also aim to ensure ownership\nof the sectoral strategies by the various parties involved as well as to mobilize the necessary\nfinancing for their implementation.\n\n15 The authorities have also pointed out strategies that have not been updated in the transport and\nenergy sectors. In addition, some subsectors less directly linked to public infrastructure (industrial\ndevelopment plan, 2025 national digital technology plan) are covered by a strategy.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "the LOFIP; and (iii) the provision in the MTFF of the overall distinction between investment spending\non ongoing projects and on new projects.\n\n2. National and Sectoral Planning _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_\n_reform: High)_\n\n21. Public investment should be guided by national or sectoral strategies or plans with\nclear, realistic priorities, cost estimates and precise sectoral objectives . This institution looks,\nfirst and foremost, into whether national and sectoral investment strategies covering all public\ninvestment projects, whatever their source of funding, are prepared and published. It underlines the\nimportance of quantification of the costs of public investment plans and assesses whether sectoral\nstrategies identify measurable targets for public investment outputs and outcomes.\n\n22. The National Development Strategy Plan (PNSD) and the various existing sectoral\nstrategies contain little precise information about major projects in their published versions.\nThe 2019-2023 PNSD (prepared in 2019 and in the process of being reframed) constitutes the main\ndevelopment strategy of the DRC and is published. The PNSD was prepared by integrating the\npriorities of each sector, broken down into strategic pillars, programs, subprograms, and actions to be\nimplemented, and retaining the strategic objectives set forth in the sectoral strategies when these are\navailable. [14] Among the major sectors of economic and social infrastructure usually taken into account\nin the assessment, only two sectoral strategies - the 2019-2022 National Health Care Development\nPlan (PNDS); and the 2016-2025 sectoral strategy for education and training - have been published\nrecently. There is no recent strategy relating to the economic infrastructure sectors. [15] Although the\npublished versions of the PNSD and the sectoral strategies considered here describe the actions by\nmajor pillar or strategic objective, they do not identify clearly a portfolio of investment projects to be\nimplemented. The 2019-2023 Priority Action Program underlying the PNSD does indeed identify\ninvestment projects in some sectors (for example, transport, electricity, housing, etc.), but it is not\npublished. By contrast, the 2021-2023 Government Program identifies a list of priority infrastructure\nprojects, in particular in the sectors of transport, electricity, and water. In practice, some major\nprojects identified in the Government Program or the PAP may be found in the 2022 budget law; the\nabsence of a comprehensive list of projects annexed to the strategies prevents more in-depth\nchecking. However, the standard project fiche that monitors every investment project from its\nidentification to its implementation (see institution 4) requires a relationship with the PNSD and the\nsectoral strategies to be established, suggesting the existence of a link between the initiation of a\nproject and its inclusion in planning.\n\n23. The majority of the national and sectoral strategies do not present information on\nunderlying costs of investments, whether in total or at individual project level. The PNSD\nestimates that the total cost of the strategy over five years would be US$47.6 billion, taking all\nsources of funding combined (including funding to be identified). Nevertheless, neither the PNSD, nor\n\n14 The PNSD is also supported by sectoral thematic groups created by a decree in 2013, which\nserves as a framework for consultation and harmonization of sectoral actions among the\nGovernment, donors, civil society, and the private sector. These groups also aim to ensure ownership\nof the sectoral strategies by the various parties involved as well as to mobilize the necessary\nfinancing for their implementation.\n\n15 The authorities have also pointed out strategies that have not been updated in the transport and\nenergy sectors. In addition, some subsectors less directly linked to public infrastructure (industrial\ndevelopment plan, 2025 national digital technology plan) are covered by a strategy.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3485}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "its underlying PAP, [16] although it is more detailed, present the total cost of investments attached to the\nstrategy. The Government Program does not provide any information on the costs of investment,\neither at the total or the individual project level. The 2016-2025 sectoral strategy for education and\ntraining is the only one to present annual costs of investment by education cycle, but without\nproviding any information on the costs of individual projects. For these various reasons, it is not\npossible to appraise the overall consistency between the total amounts of investment spending in the\nstrategies and those recorded in the successive budget laws.\n\n\n**24. The sectoral strategies taken into consideration include measurable targets for their**\n**outputs and outcomes, but the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of these**\n**targets seems weak.** The sectoral strategies for health and education mentioned above are\nassociated with M&E frameworks specifying the monitoring indicators, their data sources, and annual\ntarget values. Accordingly, the two strategies propose measurable indicators that allow progress in\nterms of access, fairness, and efficiency to be measured relative to target values. [17] The system of\nassessment also provides for the completion of surveys enabling the ongoing collection of data and\nresults by the departments and ministries involved. For these two strategies, interim reviews are\nplanned to measure progress achieved and to assess the relevance of the actions carried out, as well\nas, if necessary, to review the value of the targets set out at the start of the strategy. It is worth noting\nthat within its sectoral pillars, the 2019-2023 PNSD indicates objectives, outcomes, and indicators for\nthe monitoring process, making the link with the various objectives of sustainable development, but it\ndoes not present any quantified target. The efforts to reframe the PNSD already underway aim to\nstrengthen M&E by including quantified targets.\n\n\n**25. Improving information on the nature, costs, outputs, and outcomes of the investment**\n**projects underlying planning is a high priority for reform.** The main planning documents - PNSD\nand sectoral strategies - should therefore also include the total and annual amounts of investment\nneeded to achieve these strategies. When it is reframed, and for the next cycles, the PNSD should\ninclude a list of major investment projects, regardless of their sources of funding, as well as their\nexpected costs. This will require sectoral ministries to carry out an exercise to identify their needs for\nmajor projects, using their sectoral planning mechanisms. The formulation and publication of sectoral\nstrategies in the major economic infrastructure sectors (transport, water, energy) would be helpful in\nthis regard. Finally, the PNSD should attach quantified targets to its indicators to enable its\nperformance to be monitored. The transition to program-based budgeting will provide the opportunity\nto strengthen the links between planning and budgeting, for example by having some performance\nindicators in common.\n\n\n**3. Coordination Between Entities (** _Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_\n_reform: Medium)_\n\n**26. The various levels of government and agencies should coordinate their public**\n**investment actions with a view to achieving consistent planning and implementation.** First this\ninstitution assesses the level of coordination between the Government and the provinces and ETDs,\nand whether the Government uses a transparent, rules-based system to make capital transfers to the\nregional, provincial and local authorities. It also analyzes the framework set up to monitor and publish\n\n\n16 Costs are associated with the investment projects identified in the PAP, but not according to an\neconomic classification that would distinguish operating from capital expenditure.\n\n17 As an example, for education: gross school enrollment rates, average scores in standardized tests,\nand school dropout rates; for health: maternal and neonatal mortality rates, and rates of tuberculosis\nor malaria.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "its underlying PAP, [16] although it is more detailed, present the total cost of investments attached to the\nstrategy. The Government Program does not provide any information on the costs of investment,\neither at the total or the individual project level. The 2016-2025 sectoral strategy for education and\ntraining is the only one to present annual costs of investment by education cycle, but without\nproviding any information on the costs of individual projects. For these various reasons, it is not\npossible to appraise the overall consistency between the total amounts of investment spending in the\nstrategies and those recorded in the successive budget laws.\n\n24. The sectoral strategies taken into consideration include measurable targets for their\noutputs and outcomes, but the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of these\ntargets seems weak. The sectoral strategies for health and education mentioned above are\nassociated with M&E frameworks specifying the monitoring indicators, their data sources, and annual\ntarget values. Accordingly, the two strategies propose measurable indicators that allow progress in\nterms of access, fairness, and efficiency to be measured relative to target values. [17] The system of\nassessment also provides for the completion of surveys enabling the ongoing collection of data and\nresults by the departments and ministries involved. For these two strategies, interim reviews are\nplanned to measure progress achieved and to assess the relevance of the actions carried out, as well\nas, if necessary, to review the value of the targets set out at the start of the strategy. It is worth noting\nthat within its sectoral pillars, the 2019-2023 PNSD indicates objectives, outcomes, and indicators for\nthe monitoring process, making the link with the various objectives of sustainable development, but it\ndoes not present any quantified target. The efforts to reframe the PNSD already underway aim to\nstrengthen M&E by including quantified targets.\n\n25. Improving information on the nature, costs, outputs, and outcomes of the investment\nprojects underlying planning is a high priority for reform. The main planning documents - PNSD\nand sectoral strategies - should therefore also include the total and annual amounts of investment\nneeded to achieve these strategies. When it is reframed, and for the next cycles, the PNSD should\ninclude a list of major investment projects, regardless of their sources of funding, as well as their\nexpected costs. This will require sectoral ministries to carry out an exercise to identify their needs for\nmajor projects, using their sectoral planning mechanisms. The formulation and publication of sectoral\nstrategies in the major economic infrastructure sectors (transport, water, energy) would be helpful in\nthis regard. Finally, the PNSD should attach quantified targets to its indicators to enable its\nperformance to be monitored. The transition to program-based budgeting will provide the opportunity\nto strengthen the links between planning and budgeting, for example by having some performance\nindicators in common.\n\n3. Coordination Between Entities ( _Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_\n_reform: Medium)_\n\n26. The various levels of government and agencies should coordinate their public\ninvestment actions with a view to achieving consistent planning and implementation. First this\ninstitution assesses the level of coordination between the Government and the provinces and ETDs,\nand whether the Government uses a transparent, rules-based system to make capital transfers to the\nregional, provincial and local authorities. It also analyzes the framework set up to monitor and publish\n\n16 Costs are associated with the investment projects identified in the PAP, but not according to an\neconomic classification that would distinguish operating from capital expenditure.\n\n17 As an example, for education: gross school enrollment rates, average scores in standardized tests,\nand school dropout rates; for health: maternal and neonatal mortality rates, and rates of tuberculosis\nor malaria.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3538}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "the Government’s exposure to major fiscal risks relating to public investment projects carried out by\nother government agencies (public corporations and PPPs).\n\n\n**27. The harmonization conferences between the central government and the provinces**\n**planned in the legal framework are no longer organized in practice, and there is no joint**\n**publication of investment plans.** The memorandum of understanding of March 29, 2013 sets forth\nthe practical arrangements for joint management of capital appropriations in five sectors under the\nexclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. [18] According to Articles 8 and 10 of the memorandum,\ninvestment spending funded by transfers to the provinces and ETDs are planned in accordance with\nall the programs and projects of the country as whole, in the context of annual project harmonization\nmeetings coordinated by the Ministry of Planning. Transfer-funded capital spending is budgeted in the\nbudget law, but no multiyear provincial investment plans are published. Further, in practice, the\ncoordination mechanisms are only partially functioning. The investment harmonization meetings in\nadvance of budget formulation have not been held since 2018, as there has been a lack of financing\nfor organizing them. [19] New practices emerged in 2021 as part of preparation of the local development\nplan in the 145 territories (PDL-145T), with planning meetings being held focusing, however, only on\nthe PDL projects. The effectiveness of the coordination is, in the final analysis, called into question by\nthe significant gap between capital transfers approved by vote in the budget and those actually\nexecuted, both in terms of projects and amounts (Table 3.A).\n\n\n**28. The calculation formula used to determine the transfers is not known to provincial**\n**governments, and effective transfers deviate significantly from the amounts planned.** The\nbasic rules for establishing the transfers to the provinces and the amounts allocated to the National\nequalization fund ( _Caisse nationale de péréquation_ ) do exist, [20] but the calculation formula used by\nthe Ministry of the Budget to establish the base, the horizontal distribution among the provinces and\nthe ETDs, and among the three categories of transfer, [21] is not known by the provinces. According to\nthe fiscal calendar, the provisional transfer envelopes are communicated in September of year n-1,\nwhich is six months before the start of fiscal year n. In practice according to the authorities, this\ncommunication is made in November, after the vote on the budget law. The amounts transferred for\ninvestment differ significantly from those planned, with an average execution rate of 5.3 percent\nin 2016-2021. [22] In 2020, according to the accounting law and the Court of Accounts, transfers to the\nprovinces had been budgeted for 858 projects, only 13 of which made use of their funds during the\nyear. In that same year, for the province of Kinshasa, four projects were executed with amounts on\n\n\n18 Health, education, rural development, infrastructure, and other sectors under the exclusive\njurisdiction of the provinces (memorandum of understanding dated March 29, 2013 on the procedures\nfor the application of investment appropriations in the sectors under the exclusive jurisdiction of the\nprovinces.)\n\n19 In practice, according to the Ministry of Planning, planning is carried out to a large extent by\nredirecting unexecuted appropriations to the following year, and on the basis of written\ncommunication with various provinces.\n\n20 The LOFIP sets the main principles for the base of transfers to the provinces and ETDs. It is\nexpected that they will receive 40 percent of the total amount of national revenues. These revenues\nare distributed among the provinces according to their contribution capacity and their demographic\nweight, and potentially the need to compensate for environmental damage related to extractive\nindustry. In addition to this transfer the Constitution set up a National equalization fund, receiving\n10 percent of national revenues.\n\n21 Investments, remunerations, operation.\n\n22 Calculation by the mission based on the data provided by the DGPPB of the Ministry of the Budget.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "the Government’s exposure to major fiscal risks relating to public investment projects carried out by\nother government agencies (public corporations and PPPs).\n\n27. The harmonization conferences between the central government and the provinces\nplanned in the legal framework are no longer organized in practice, and there is no joint\npublication of investment plans. The memorandum of understanding of March 29, 2013 sets forth\nthe practical arrangements for joint management of capital appropriations in five sectors under the\nexclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. [18] According to Articles 8 and 10 of the memorandum,\ninvestment spending funded by transfers to the provinces and ETDs are planned in accordance with\nall the programs and projects of the country as whole, in the context of annual project harmonization\nmeetings coordinated by the Ministry of Planning. Transfer-funded capital spending is budgeted in the\nbudget law, but no multiyear provincial investment plans are published. Further, in practice, the\ncoordination mechanisms are only partially functioning. The investment harmonization meetings in\nadvance of budget formulation have not been held since 2018, as there has been a lack of financing\nfor organizing them. [19] New practices emerged in 2021 as part of preparation of the local development\nplan in the 145 territories (PDL-145T), with planning meetings being held focusing, however, only on\nthe PDL projects. The effectiveness of the coordination is, in the final analysis, called into question by\nthe significant gap between capital transfers approved by vote in the budget and those actually\nexecuted, both in terms of projects and amounts (Table 3.A).\n\n28. The calculation formula used to determine the transfers is not known to provincial\ngovernments, and effective transfers deviate significantly from the amounts planned. The\nbasic rules for establishing the transfers to the provinces and the amounts allocated to the National\nequalization fund ( _Caisse nationale de péréquation_ ) do exist, [20] but the calculation formula used by\nthe Ministry of the Budget to establish the base, the horizontal distribution among the provinces and\nthe ETDs, and among the three categories of transfer, [21] is not known by the provinces. According to\nthe fiscal calendar, the provisional transfer envelopes are communicated in September of year n-1,\nwhich is six months before the start of fiscal year n. In practice according to the authorities, this\ncommunication is made in November, after the vote on the budget law. The amounts transferred for\ninvestment differ significantly from those planned, with an average execution rate of 5.3 percent\nin 2016-2021. [22] In 2020, according to the accounting law and the Court of Accounts, transfers to the\nprovinces had been budgeted for 858 projects, only 13 of which made use of their funds during the\nyear. In that same year, for the province of Kinshasa, four projects were executed with amounts on\n\n18 Health, education, rural development, infrastructure, and other sectors under the exclusive\njurisdiction of the provinces (memorandum of understanding dated March 29, 2013 on the procedures\nfor the application of investment appropriations in the sectors under the exclusive jurisdiction of the\nprovinces.)\n\n19 In practice, according to the Ministry of Planning, planning is carried out to a large extent by\nredirecting unexecuted appropriations to the following year, and on the basis of written\ncommunication with various provinces.\n\n20 The LOFIP sets the main principles for the base of transfers to the provinces and ETDs. It is\nexpected that they will receive 40 percent of the total amount of national revenues. These revenues\nare distributed among the provinces according to their contribution capacity and their demographic\nweight, and potentially the need to compensate for environmental damage related to extractive\nindustry. In addition to this transfer the Constitution set up a National equalization fund, receiving\n10 percent of national revenues.\n\n21 Investments, remunerations, operation.\n\n22 Calculation by the mission based on the data provided by the DGPPB of the Ministry of the Budget.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3593}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0030-001"], "markdown": "average 20 times higher than budgeted (Table 3.A). [23] Finally, although the respective sums have\nbeen budgeted, in actual fact, the Caisse nationale de péréquation has never been supplied with\nfunds.\n\n\n**Table 3.A. Kinshasa City-Province projects executed using central government**\n\n\nAccounting Law.\n**29. The analysis and publication of the contingent liabilities arising from major projects of**\n**the provinces, public corporations, and PPPs still need to be institutionalized.** The legal\nframework does not ensure for either the provinces, [24] the public corporations, [25] or the PPPs that their\ncontingent liabilities are systematically reported to the Ministries of the Budget and Finance. For the\nPPPs in particular, a decree providing a framework for granting the guarantees provided by the 2018\nlaw on PPPs is still not available. [26] Despite these obstacles, in 2021 the General Directorate of Fiscal\nPolicies and Programming (DGPPB) of the Ministry of the Budget prepared, with the help of FAD, and\npublished an initial fiscal risks statement ( _Déclaration sur les Risques Budgétaires_, DRB).\nSpecifically, it covers the fiscal risks linked to public corporations and PPPs, but not those related to\nthe provinces. In light of the conversations with the various entities holding information, the analysis\nremains at an embryonic level, in particular because the information is often only partial. For public\ncorporations, for example, the DRB does not state the contingent liabilities arising from their major\ninvestment projects. For the PPPs, the DRB prepares a partial list of the PPPs in progress, without\nany analysis of the fiscal risks associated with the guarantees granted to these projects.\n\n\n**30. Improved coordination of capital spending between the provinces and central**\n**government and analysis of fiscal risks are medium priorities for reform.**\n\n- _The reestablishment of annual harmonization conferences on investment spending between the_\n_provinces and the central government should provide a more realistic estimate of the projects to_\n_be financed,_ and enable coordination that takes into account all sources of financing. This should\nultimately contribute to a more precise estimate of the expected expenditure for the fiscal year. In\n\n\n23 Coordination problems between central government and the provinces, limited capacities of the\nprovinces to follow the procedure for the execution of transfers, and cumbersome administrative\nprocesses all contribute to the weakness of execution rates. In particular, the provinces do not have\npublic procurement units; they depend on the central ministries to carry out the procurement\nprocedures and management of the expenditure chain.\n\n24 The provinces’ debt is governed by Article 15 of the LOFIP, which sets forth rules for the amounts\nand nature of the borrowing. However, there is no implementing regulation or formal mechanism\nestablishing that the DGDP of the Ministry of Finance supervises compliance with these rules.\n\n25 The DGDP has information on the loans onlent to the public corporations that it supervises.\nNevertheless, neither the DGDP, nor the Ministry of the Budget has an overview of the financial\nhealth of the enterprises or their investment projects. This is a result of there being a single authority\nof financial supervision, specifically the Ministry of the Portfolio, without setting up any channel of\ncommunication with the Ministries of the Budget and Finance.\n\n26 The 2018 law on PPPs provides for a broad range of guarantees, likely to generate considerable\nfiscal risks. Article 15 provides for sovereign guarantees for the effective execution of contracts,\nwhereby the terms for granting them must be established by decree. Moreover, the PPPs are eligible\nfor balancing subsidies without their calculation or verification methods being set out.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0499, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(91.5, 151.37841796875, 541.607177734375, 205.1396484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(122,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 112, "number": 12, "size": 10215, "transform": [450.1071472167969, 0.0, -0.0, 53.76123046875, 91.5, 151.37841796875], "width": 938, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "average 20 times higher than budgeted (Table 3.A). [23] Finally, although the respective sums have\nbeen budgeted, in actual fact, the Caisse nationale de péréquation has never been supplied with\nfunds.\n\nTable 3.A. Kinshasa City-Province projects executed using central government\n\nAccounting Law.\n29. The analysis and publication of the contingent liabilities arising from major projects of\nthe provinces, public corporations, and PPPs still need to be institutionalized. The legal\nframework does not ensure for either the provinces, [24] the public corporations, [25] or the PPPs that their\ncontingent liabilities are systematically reported to the Ministries of the Budget and Finance. For the\nPPPs in particular, a decree providing a framework for granting the guarantees provided by the 2018\nlaw on PPPs is still not available. [26] Despite these obstacles, in 2021 the General Directorate of Fiscal\nPolicies and Programming (DGPPB) of the Ministry of the Budget prepared, with the help of FAD, and\npublished an initial fiscal risks statement ( _Déclaration sur les Risques Budgétaires_, DRB).\nSpecifically, it covers the fiscal risks linked to public corporations and PPPs, but not those related to\nthe provinces. In light of the conversations with the various entities holding information, the analysis\nremains at an embryonic level, in particular because the information is often only partial. For public\ncorporations, for example, the DRB does not state the contingent liabilities arising from their major\ninvestment projects. For the PPPs, the DRB prepares a partial list of the PPPs in progress, without\nany analysis of the fiscal risks associated with the guarantees granted to these projects.\n\n30. Improved coordination of capital spending between the provinces and central\ngovernment and analysis of fiscal risks are medium priorities for reform.\n\n- _The reestablishment of annual harmonization conferences on investment spending between the_\n_provinces and the central government should provide a more realistic estimate of the projects to_\n_be financed,_ and enable coordination that takes into account all sources of financing. This should\nultimately contribute to a more precise estimate of the expected expenditure for the fiscal year. In\n\n23 Coordination problems between central government and the provinces, limited capacities of the\nprovinces to follow the procedure for the execution of transfers, and cumbersome administrative\nprocesses all contribute to the weakness of execution rates. In particular, the provinces do not have\npublic procurement units; they depend on the central ministries to carry out the procurement\nprocedures and management of the expenditure chain.\n\n24 The provinces’ debt is governed by Article 15 of the LOFIP, which sets forth rules for the amounts\nand nature of the borrowing. However, there is no implementing regulation or formal mechanism\nestablishing that the DGDP of the Ministry of Finance supervises compliance with these rules.\n\n25 The DGDP has information on the loans onlent to the public corporations that it supervises.\nNevertheless, neither the DGDP, nor the Ministry of the Budget has an overview of the financial\nhealth of the enterprises or their investment projects. This is a result of there being a single authority\nof financial supervision, specifically the Ministry of the Portfolio, without setting up any channel of\ncommunication with the Ministries of the Budget and Finance.\n\n26 The 2018 law on PPPs provides for a broad range of guarantees, likely to generate considerable\nfiscal risks. Article 15 provides for sovereign guarantees for the effective execution of contracts,\nwhereby the terms for granting them must be established by decree. Moreover, the PPPs are eligible\nfor balancing subsidies without their calculation or verification methods being set out.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3307}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "addition, preliminary notification of the envelopes to the provinces, more in advance of the fiscal\nyear, for example after the preparation of the MTFF planned in June, would be preferable to\nenable the provinces to plan ahead for the preparation of their investment budgets.\n\n- _Managing fiscal risks arising from the PPPs assumes particular significance in light of the_\n_substantial guarantees that may be attached to them_ . That requires the urgent adoption of the\ndecree operationalizing Article 15 of the law on PPPs. It would also be advisable for the Ministry\nof Finance, through the DGDP, to play a strong role in the system for validating all guarantees\nbefore they are issued. A veto power should be given to the Ministry so that it could oppose any\nPPPs considered to be too risky during their review by the new Standing Committee on Project\nValidation. It will also be important to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry in terms of analysis\nof the risks attached to projects.\n\n- _The first DRB of 2021 is a significant step forward, and the underlying fiscal risk analyses should_\n_be expanded and deepened in the future_, in particular to include a review of contingent liabilities\narising from major investment projects and public corporations, as well as an analysis of the\nguarantees granted to the whole portfolio of ongoing PPPs. Challenging actions include the\nestablishment of mechanisms to transmit information on risks from the various entities to the\nDGPPB, and the strengthening of the tools for analysis and supervision of risks.\n\n\n**4. Project Appraisal** _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak:_ _Priority of reform_ _**:**_ _High)_\n\n**31. Good practice in the area of appraisal aims to ensure that projects are analyzed using**\n**a rigorous methodology before being selected and budgeted.** The PIMA methodology requires\nthat major investment projects be subjected to rigorous financial, economic, and technical analysis\nusing a standard methodology with the support of a central authority and incorporating a risk analysis.\n\n\n**32. Besides donor-funded projects, in the absence of a legal framework imposing limits**\n**and with the lack of resources, rigorous preliminary appraisal of public investment projects is**\n**rare.** There is no legal, [27] or even documentary [28] framework setting as principles the systematic\nsubmission of large-scale investment projects to rigorous financial, economic, and technical analysis,\nand the publication of the results of the analysis. In practice, even though externally financed projects\nare generally assessed, [29] those using their own funds are rarely subjected to rigorous appraisal due\nto the lack of resources. The existence of a preinvestment fund, [30] with the purpose of financing\nfeasibility studies for major projects using own funds, is a good practice. According to the Ministry of\nPlanning, the amount allocated to the fund would enable it to finance 10 appraisals a year. However,\nthe budget data analyzed by the mission for the 2018-2022 period, while not comprehensive, suggest\na very low level of execution (or even zero, depending on the year) of the appropriations allocated to\nthis fund. Overall, the ministries with which the mission met stated the frequent absence of appraisals\nfor domestically funded projects. According to the IGF, the poor quality of analyses, or absence\n\n\n27 The order dated July 19, 2019 establishing the Commission for identification and selection of public\ninvestment projects (CISPIP) lays down that technical subcommittees analyze and assess the project\nfeasibility studies without stipulating that they be systematic.\n\n28 The public investment selection manual of the Directorate of Planning and Budgeting of the Ministry\nof Planning (June 2018) specifies the process for feasibility studies, without mentioning anything\nabout it being a systematic process, or referring to their publication. The former procedures manual\non preparation, execution, and M&E of the PIP of November 2002 is obsolete.\n\n29 The procedures of donors, especially multilateral, systematically include mandatory preliminary\nappraisals and publication of their main results.\n\n30 Interministerial order of May 20, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of the\npreinvestment fund.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "addition, preliminary notification of the envelopes to the provinces, more in advance of the fiscal\nyear, for example after the preparation of the MTFF planned in June, would be preferable to\nenable the provinces to plan ahead for the preparation of their investment budgets.\n\n- _Managing fiscal risks arising from the PPPs assumes particular significance in light of the_\n_substantial guarantees that may be attached to them_ . That requires the urgent adoption of the\ndecree operationalizing Article 15 of the law on PPPs. It would also be advisable for the Ministry\nof Finance, through the DGDP, to play a strong role in the system for validating all guarantees\nbefore they are issued. A veto power should be given to the Ministry so that it could oppose any\nPPPs considered to be too risky during their review by the new Standing Committee on Project\nValidation. It will also be important to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry in terms of analysis\nof the risks attached to projects.\n\n- _The first DRB of 2021 is a significant step forward, and the underlying fiscal risk analyses should_\n_be expanded and deepened in the future_, in particular to include a review of contingent liabilities\narising from major investment projects and public corporations, as well as an analysis of the\nguarantees granted to the whole portfolio of ongoing PPPs. Challenging actions include the\nestablishment of mechanisms to transmit information on risks from the various entities to the\nDGPPB, and the strengthening of the tools for analysis and supervision of risks.\n\n4. Project Appraisal _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak:_ _Priority of reform_ _:_ _High)_\n\n31. Good practice in the area of appraisal aims to ensure that projects are analyzed using\na rigorous methodology before being selected and budgeted. The PIMA methodology requires\nthat major investment projects be subjected to rigorous financial, economic, and technical analysis\nusing a standard methodology with the support of a central authority and incorporating a risk analysis.\n\n32. Besides donor-funded projects, in the absence of a legal framework imposing limits\nand with the lack of resources, rigorous preliminary appraisal of public investment projects is\nrare. There is no legal, [27] or even documentary [28] framework setting as principles the systematic\nsubmission of large-scale investment projects to rigorous financial, economic, and technical analysis,\nand the publication of the results of the analysis. In practice, even though externally financed projects\nare generally assessed, [29] those using their own funds are rarely subjected to rigorous appraisal due\nto the lack of resources. The existence of a preinvestment fund, [30] with the purpose of financing\nfeasibility studies for major projects using own funds, is a good practice. According to the Ministry of\nPlanning, the amount allocated to the fund would enable it to finance 10 appraisals a year. However,\nthe budget data analyzed by the mission for the 2018-2022 period, while not comprehensive, suggest\na very low level of execution (or even zero, depending on the year) of the appropriations allocated to\nthis fund. Overall, the ministries with which the mission met stated the frequent absence of appraisals\nfor domestically funded projects. According to the IGF, the poor quality of analyses, or absence\n\n27 The order dated July 19, 2019 establishing the Commission for identification and selection of public\ninvestment projects (CISPIP) lays down that technical subcommittees analyze and assess the project\nfeasibility studies without stipulating that they be systematic.\n\n28 The public investment selection manual of the Directorate of Planning and Budgeting of the Ministry\nof Planning (June 2018) specifies the process for feasibility studies, without mentioning anything\nabout it being a systematic process, or referring to their publication. The former procedures manual\non preparation, execution, and M&E of the PIP of November 2002 is obsolete.\n\n29 The procedures of donors, especially multilateral, systematically include mandatory preliminary\nappraisals and publication of their main results.\n\n30 Interministerial order of May 20, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of the\npreinvestment fund.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3664}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "thereof, explains in part the delays and cost overruns found during implementation. Lastly, very few\nappraisals are published on line and there is no single entry point for appraisals of externally financed\nprojects. The Central Coordination Office (BCECO) does expect for the future, however, to publish\nthe studies about its projects on its website.\n\n\n**33. The absence of standard methodology and of a central support structure for appraisal**\n**compromises the capacity of the authorities to select the most mature projects.** There is no\nstandard methodology or central support structure for the appraisal of major investment projects that\nwould ensure a consistent basis of the analytical process. The procedures of donors provide for their\nown appraisal methodologies and are, thus, by definition, not standardized. The BCECO has a\nmethodology, which is, however, only applied to its own project portfolio; the mission was informed\nthat the Congolese Agency for Major Works (ACGT), which manages significant road infrastructure\nprojects does not have a standard appraisal methodology. The regulatory framework specifying the\npowers of the technical secretariat of the Commission for identification and selection of public\ninvestment projects (CISPIP) or of the BCECO does not explicitly task them with providing technical\nadvice about appraisals and cannot therefore be considered as central support agencies for appraisal\nof major projects.\n\n\n**34. The absence of an institutional framework for risk assessment in the preliminary**\n**studies has a negative impact on risk management during the implementation stage.** There is\nno legal framework requiring a systematic risk assessment during the appraisal of projects. In actual\nfact, risk analysis remains too limited at the appraisal stage to enable active management of risks\nduring the implementation stage. Outside the externally financed projects, [31] according to the\nministries met during the mission, appraisal of domestically funded projects and PPPs does not\nsystematically measure the associated risks. The grid used during identification of projects (see §63)\nprovides a summary appraisal of whether the risks and the mitigation measures have been properly\nidentified, without, however, entering into an extensive analysis. According to the IGF, the risks\ninherent to the projects mentioned by the ministerial departments, such as those in connection with\nsecuring of land, provision of funds within specified periods, delays in execution, and cost overruns,\nvery often arise at the time of project implementation.\n\n\n**35. The strengthening of the preliminary project appraisal process is a high priority of**\n**reform to support the selection of the best projects.** The future decree on public investment\nmanagement will have to lay down the basic principles (i) of systematic submission of all major\ninvestment projects, regardless of their method of funding, to a rigorous environmental, financial,\neconomic and technical appraisal using a standard methodology; (ii) of the publication of the results\nof the analyses; and (iii) of the consideration of the risks in the appraisal and the need to provide for\nmitigation measures. Standard appraisal methodologies will have to be prepared in the short term,\nbased on what is already available and on the various initiatives currently in progress. The financial\nresources allocated to the prefinancing fund will have to be rationalized, and a central support\ncommittee or agency for project appraisal should be set up, ideally at the Ministry of Planning, tasked\nwith producing advice to those responsible for projects and to the appraisers on the required analysis.\n\n\n**5. Alternative Infrastructure Financing** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority_\n_of reform: High (PPP)_\n\n**36. This institution aims to assess the regulatory framework for mobilization of private**\n**investments on economic infrastructure markets, PPPs, and investments by public**\n\n\n31 In December 2021 the BCECO prepared a draft project management manual incorporating risk\nmanagement, which has to be validated at a workshop at a later date.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "thereof, explains in part the delays and cost overruns found during implementation. Lastly, very few\nappraisals are published on line and there is no single entry point for appraisals of externally financed\nprojects. The Central Coordination Office (BCECO) does expect for the future, however, to publish\nthe studies about its projects on its website.\n\n33. The absence of standard methodology and of a central support structure for appraisal\ncompromises the capacity of the authorities to select the most mature projects. There is no\nstandard methodology or central support structure for the appraisal of major investment projects that\nwould ensure a consistent basis of the analytical process. The procedures of donors provide for their\nown appraisal methodologies and are, thus, by definition, not standardized. The BCECO has a\nmethodology, which is, however, only applied to its own project portfolio; the mission was informed\nthat the Congolese Agency for Major Works (ACGT), which manages significant road infrastructure\nprojects does not have a standard appraisal methodology. The regulatory framework specifying the\npowers of the technical secretariat of the Commission for identification and selection of public\ninvestment projects (CISPIP) or of the BCECO does not explicitly task them with providing technical\nadvice about appraisals and cannot therefore be considered as central support agencies for appraisal\nof major projects.\n\n34. The absence of an institutional framework for risk assessment in the preliminary\nstudies has a negative impact on risk management during the implementation stage. There is\nno legal framework requiring a systematic risk assessment during the appraisal of projects. In actual\nfact, risk analysis remains too limited at the appraisal stage to enable active management of risks\nduring the implementation stage. Outside the externally financed projects, [31] according to the\nministries met during the mission, appraisal of domestically funded projects and PPPs does not\nsystematically measure the associated risks. The grid used during identification of projects (see §63)\nprovides a summary appraisal of whether the risks and the mitigation measures have been properly\nidentified, without, however, entering into an extensive analysis. According to the IGF, the risks\ninherent to the projects mentioned by the ministerial departments, such as those in connection with\nsecuring of land, provision of funds within specified periods, delays in execution, and cost overruns,\nvery often arise at the time of project implementation.\n\n35. The strengthening of the preliminary project appraisal process is a high priority of\nreform to support the selection of the best projects. The future decree on public investment\nmanagement will have to lay down the basic principles (i) of systematic submission of all major\ninvestment projects, regardless of their method of funding, to a rigorous environmental, financial,\neconomic and technical appraisal using a standard methodology; (ii) of the publication of the results\nof the analyses; and (iii) of the consideration of the risks in the appraisal and the need to provide for\nmitigation measures. Standard appraisal methodologies will have to be prepared in the short term,\nbased on what is already available and on the various initiatives currently in progress. The financial\nresources allocated to the prefinancing fund will have to be rationalized, and a central support\ncommittee or agency for project appraisal should be set up, ideally at the Ministry of Planning, tasked\nwith producing advice to those responsible for projects and to the appraisers on the required analysis.\n\n5. Alternative Infrastructure Financing _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority_\n_of reform: High (PPP)_\n\n36. This institution aims to assess the regulatory framework for mobilization of private\ninvestments on economic infrastructure markets, PPPs, and investments by public\n\n31 In December 2021 the BCECO prepared a draft project management manual incorporating risk\nmanagement, which has to be validated at a workshop at a later date.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3557}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**corporations.** The assessment focuses on the existence of a legal and regulatory framework that\nfacilitates the participation to investment of the private sector, public corporations, and autonomous\norganizations. It aims to ascertain that (i) a regulatory framework supports competition on the\ncontestable markets for economic infrastructure; (ii) a strategic and legislative framework guides the\npreparation, selection, and management of PPP projects; and (iii) there is a framework for the\noversight of investment plans of public corporations and autonomous organizations, as well as of their\nfinancial results.\n\n\n**37. The majority of major infrastructure sectors have been deregulated in law, but there is**\n**only effective competition in the telecommunications market.** The regulatory frameworks of the\nelectricity, telecommunications, and water sectors opened these markets to competition and\nparticipation of the private sector. [32] Two regulatory authorities, the Electricity Sector Regulatory\nAuthority (ARE) and the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, have been set up and\ngiven administrative and financial autonomy to oversee, among other things, the promotion of\ncompetition. In practice, only the telecommunications market experiences effective competition\nbetween several private operators. In the other two sectors, [33] the public corporations responsible for\nthe production, transport, and distribution of electricity and water - SNEL and REGIDESO - continue\nto be _de facto_ monopolies; the private operators are mainly present in the areas that are poorly\nserved by these two companies, such as the east of the country, or are used to overcome limits in\nproduction capacity. [34] The role of the economic regulators also remains limited. For example,\naccording to the World Bank, the ARE is not able to maintain price competition, as the SNEL offers its\ncustomers subsidized rates (below cost), which makes it difficult for the private operators to market\ntheir electricity at reasonable prices. Transport, in particular road transport, is dominated by private\noperators working in the informal sector.\n\n\n**38. As they are governed by a new legal framework that is in the process of consolidation,**\n**the PPPs are still not covered by a clear national policy, although the PPP project portfolio is**\n**already expanding.** Law 18/016 of July 9, 2018 sets forth the procedures for identification, selection,\nvalidation, and oversight of the PPPs. The law provides for strict separation between the functions of\nmanagement, regulation, approval, and oversight, and sets forth in particular the key role of the\nPublic Contracts Regulatory Authority (ARMP), which is responsible for the selection and appraisal of\nPPP projects as well as their oversight both _ex ante_ _[35]_ and _ex post_ . In application of the law,\nDecree 21/04 of October 2, 2021 creates the PPP Advice and Coordination Unit (UC-PPP) as a new\npublic establishment under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning. Among other tasks, the UCPPP is responsible for implementing the national policy relating to PPPs, maintaining a PPP\ndatabase, assisting with the preparation of projects, and reporting to the Government on the PPP\n\n\n32 For electricity: Law 14/11 of June 17, 2014 on the electricity sector, which does not apply to power\nstations with power of less than or equal to 50KW, and Decree 16/013 of April 12, 2016 on the\ncreation, organization, and operation of the Electricity Sector Regulatory Authority. For water:\nLaw 15/026 of December 31, 2015 concerning water For telecommunications: Framework\nLaw 013/2002 of October 16, 2002 on telecommunications and Law 014/2002 of October 16, 2002\nestablishing the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.\n\n33 Several World Bank reports are used to support effectiveness in this dimension: _Increasing Access to Electricity_\n_in the DRC: Opportunities and Challenges_ . 2020; _Democratic Republic of Congo Systematic Country Diagnostic:_\n_Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State_ 2018.\n\n34 In the electricity sector the mining companies have built their own electric power stations to\novercome SNEL’s production capacity limits.\n\n35 By conferring oversight before the fact to the ARMP, the law on PPPs complicates the regulator’s\nrole, as it would be better for oversight before the fact to be the responsibility of the DGCMP, as\nprovided in the law on procurement and the decree on that directorate’s powers.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "corporations. The assessment focuses on the existence of a legal and regulatory framework that\nfacilitates the participation to investment of the private sector, public corporations, and autonomous\norganizations. It aims to ascertain that (i) a regulatory framework supports competition on the\ncontestable markets for economic infrastructure; (ii) a strategic and legislative framework guides the\npreparation, selection, and management of PPP projects; and (iii) there is a framework for the\noversight of investment plans of public corporations and autonomous organizations, as well as of their\nfinancial results.\n\n37. The majority of major infrastructure sectors have been deregulated in law, but there is\nonly effective competition in the telecommunications market. The regulatory frameworks of the\nelectricity, telecommunications, and water sectors opened these markets to competition and\nparticipation of the private sector. [32] Two regulatory authorities, the Electricity Sector Regulatory\nAuthority (ARE) and the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, have been set up and\ngiven administrative and financial autonomy to oversee, among other things, the promotion of\ncompetition. In practice, only the telecommunications market experiences effective competition\nbetween several private operators. In the other two sectors, [33] the public corporations responsible for\nthe production, transport, and distribution of electricity and water - SNEL and REGIDESO - continue\nto be _de facto_ monopolies; the private operators are mainly present in the areas that are poorly\nserved by these two companies, such as the east of the country, or are used to overcome limits in\nproduction capacity. [34] The role of the economic regulators also remains limited. For example,\naccording to the World Bank, the ARE is not able to maintain price competition, as the SNEL offers its\ncustomers subsidized rates (below cost), which makes it difficult for the private operators to market\ntheir electricity at reasonable prices. Transport, in particular road transport, is dominated by private\noperators working in the informal sector.\n\n38. As they are governed by a new legal framework that is in the process of consolidation,\nthe PPPs are still not covered by a clear national policy, although the PPP project portfolio is\nalready expanding. Law 18/016 of July 9, 2018 sets forth the procedures for identification, selection,\nvalidation, and oversight of the PPPs. The law provides for strict separation between the functions of\nmanagement, regulation, approval, and oversight, and sets forth in particular the key role of the\nPublic Contracts Regulatory Authority (ARMP), which is responsible for the selection and appraisal of\nPPP projects as well as their oversight both _ex ante_ _[35]_ and _ex post_ . In application of the law,\nDecree 21/04 of October 2, 2021 creates the PPP Advice and Coordination Unit (UC-PPP) as a new\npublic establishment under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning. Among other tasks, the UCPPP is responsible for implementing the national policy relating to PPPs, maintaining a PPP\ndatabase, assisting with the preparation of projects, and reporting to the Government on the PPP\n\n32 For electricity: Law 14/11 of June 17, 2014 on the electricity sector, which does not apply to power\nstations with power of less than or equal to 50KW, and Decree 16/013 of April 12, 2016 on the\ncreation, organization, and operation of the Electricity Sector Regulatory Authority. For water:\nLaw 15/026 of December 31, 2015 concerning water For telecommunications: Framework\nLaw 013/2002 of October 16, 2002 on telecommunications and Law 014/2002 of October 16, 2002\nestablishing the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.\n\n33 Several World Bank reports are used to support effectiveness in this dimension: _Increasing Access to Electricity_\n_in the DRC: Opportunities and Challenges_ . 2020; _Democratic Republic of Congo Systematic Country Diagnostic:_\n_Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State_ 2018.\n\n34 In the electricity sector the mining companies have built their own electric power stations to\novercome SNEL’s production capacity limits.\n\n35 By conferring oversight before the fact to the ARMP, the law on PPPs complicates the regulator’s\nrole, as it would be better for oversight before the fact to be the responsibility of the DGCMP, as\nprovided in the law on procurement and the decree on that directorate’s powers.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3889}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "projects implemented every year. The UC-PPP also takes care of the technical secretariat of the\nStanding Committee on Project Validation tasked with the technical approval and analysis of the\nappraisals, requests for bids, and contracts. In this way this decree redistributes the functions that\nwere the responsibility of the ARMP in the 2018 law; in practice the decree is in the process of\noperationalization. In addition, other implementing regulations are still needed for the full\nimplementation of the legal framework. [36] The DRC has no national policy to guide the use of PPPs [37]\nthat the UC-PPP is responsible for applying. Until full application of the law on PPPs, the institutional\nprocedures underlying PPPs suffer from fragmentation among various agencies (in particular the\nARMP and the ACGT), and there is no centralized, consolidated oversight of the whole portfolio of\nongoing projects.\n\n\n**39. The legal framework for the oversight of public corporations does not require review of**\n**their investment plans by the government, even if this is done in practice.** The Ministry of the\nPortfolio is responsible for financial oversight of public corporations, which includes monitoring their\nfinancial performance (in cooperation with the ministries in charge of the technical oversight). [38] The\npublic corporations are required to submit their annual financial statements to the financial oversight\nauthority and to publish them, in accordance with the rules of the Organization for Harmonization of\nBusiness Law in Africa (OHADA). The purpose of the High Council of the Portfolio (CSP), positioned\nunder the direct authority of the Minister of Portfolio, is to carry out the tasks of monitoring, oversight,\nand assessment of the enterprises in the portfolio, as well as to put forward, if necessary, financial\nrecovery or restructuring plans proposed by the Public Corporation Reform Steering Committee\n(COPIREP). [39] It is also responsible for preparing the consolidated financial statements of the\ngovernment’s portfolio and producing the activity reports, albeit without any explicit requirement to\npublish them, and to advise the Minister on the investment and financing programs of the\ncorporations, in cooperation with relevant line ministries. Nevertheless, there is no explicit legal\nobligation for the public corporations to submit their investment plans to the Ministry of the Portfolio\nfor review. In practice, according to the CSP, the public corporations submit their investment plans to\nthe CSP, however. By contrast, no consolidated report on these plans or on their financial statements\nis published. The 2022 statement of fiscal risks does, however, contain information on the level of\ndebt and the financial performance of the corporations in the portfolio.\n\n\n**40. The clarification of the legal framework for PPPs is a high priority for reform.** Given the\npolitical will of the authorities to make significant use of PPPs to develop infrastructure, it is urgent to\nfinalize the implementing decrees of the PPP law, and to settle conflicts between the various legal\n\n\n36 The other implementing regulations must specify, among other things, the model project fiche, the approval\nprocedures, and the various categories of approval authorities and the procedures for granting this Government\nguarantee. An order is also expected setting forth the approval authorities and establishing the approval\nthresholds for PPP procurement, as well as a regulation establishing the response period of the contracting\nauthority to requests for clarification by candidates.\n\n37 A PPP policy is an official document, often adopted by the government, which aims to explain and\ndelineate the conditions for the use of this method of financing and which indicates the infrastructure\nmarkets open to PPPs, the principles for risk-sharing, the PPP financing objectives to be achieved,\nthe type of contract, a list of viable projects able to be completed with a PPP, as well as information\non the project selection, oversight, and reporting criteria, among other things.\n\n38 Law 08/010 of July 7, 2008 establishing the rules on the organization and management of the Government\nportfolio.\n\n39 Decree 13/036 of September 3, 2013 on the creation, organization, and operation of the High\nCouncil of the Portfolio and Decree 9/15 of April 24, 2009 on the creation, organization, and operation\nof the COPIREP.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "projects implemented every year. The UC-PPP also takes care of the technical secretariat of the\nStanding Committee on Project Validation tasked with the technical approval and analysis of the\nappraisals, requests for bids, and contracts. In this way this decree redistributes the functions that\nwere the responsibility of the ARMP in the 2018 law; in practice the decree is in the process of\noperationalization. In addition, other implementing regulations are still needed for the full\nimplementation of the legal framework. [36] The DRC has no national policy to guide the use of PPPs [37]\nthat the UC-PPP is responsible for applying. Until full application of the law on PPPs, the institutional\nprocedures underlying PPPs suffer from fragmentation among various agencies (in particular the\nARMP and the ACGT), and there is no centralized, consolidated oversight of the whole portfolio of\nongoing projects.\n\n39. The legal framework for the oversight of public corporations does not require review of\ntheir investment plans by the government, even if this is done in practice. The Ministry of the\nPortfolio is responsible for financial oversight of public corporations, which includes monitoring their\nfinancial performance (in cooperation with the ministries in charge of the technical oversight). [38] The\npublic corporations are required to submit their annual financial statements to the financial oversight\nauthority and to publish them, in accordance with the rules of the Organization for Harmonization of\nBusiness Law in Africa (OHADA). The purpose of the High Council of the Portfolio (CSP), positioned\nunder the direct authority of the Minister of Portfolio, is to carry out the tasks of monitoring, oversight,\nand assessment of the enterprises in the portfolio, as well as to put forward, if necessary, financial\nrecovery or restructuring plans proposed by the Public Corporation Reform Steering Committee\n(COPIREP). [39] It is also responsible for preparing the consolidated financial statements of the\ngovernment’s portfolio and producing the activity reports, albeit without any explicit requirement to\npublish them, and to advise the Minister on the investment and financing programs of the\ncorporations, in cooperation with relevant line ministries. Nevertheless, there is no explicit legal\nobligation for the public corporations to submit their investment plans to the Ministry of the Portfolio\nfor review. In practice, according to the CSP, the public corporations submit their investment plans to\nthe CSP, however. By contrast, no consolidated report on these plans or on their financial statements\nis published. The 2022 statement of fiscal risks does, however, contain information on the level of\ndebt and the financial performance of the corporations in the portfolio.\n\n40. The clarification of the legal framework for PPPs is a high priority for reform. Given the\npolitical will of the authorities to make significant use of PPPs to develop infrastructure, it is urgent to\nfinalize the implementing decrees of the PPP law, and to settle conflicts between the various legal\n\n36 The other implementing regulations must specify, among other things, the model project fiche, the approval\nprocedures, and the various categories of approval authorities and the procedures for granting this Government\nguarantee. An order is also expected setting forth the approval authorities and establishing the approval\nthresholds for PPP procurement, as well as a regulation establishing the response period of the contracting\nauthority to requests for clarification by candidates.\n\n37 A PPP policy is an official document, often adopted by the government, which aims to explain and\ndelineate the conditions for the use of this method of financing and which indicates the infrastructure\nmarkets open to PPPs, the principles for risk-sharing, the PPP financing objectives to be achieved,\nthe type of contract, a list of viable projects able to be completed with a PPP, as well as information\non the project selection, oversight, and reporting criteria, among other things.\n\n38 Law 08/010 of July 7, 2008 establishing the rules on the organization and management of the Government\nportfolio.\n\n39 Decree 13/036 of September 3, 2013 on the creation, organization, and operation of the High\nCouncil of the Portfolio and Decree 9/15 of April 24, 2009 on the creation, organization, and operation\nof the COPIREP.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3783}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "texts by clarifying the distribution of roles [40] among the various committees and agencies (in particular\nthe ARMP, UC-PPP, and DGCMP). The Ministry of Finance (DGDP) must also play a key role as\nguarantor of the financial viability of the projects, in particular at the stage of their appraisal and\nadoption. A national PPP policy should be set up, specifying the infrastructure markets open to PPPs,\nthe risk-sharing principles, the PPP financing objectives to be achieved, a list of viable projects that\ncould be implemented as PPPs, information on the project selection criteria, their oversight, and the\nrole of the public authorities throughout the process. An effort should also be made to enable the\nARMP and the UC-PPP to keep an up-to-date register of the whole PPP portfolio, including PPPs\ncurrently managed by other agencies (such as the ACGT). Further, in light of the significance of\npublic corporations in the provision of basic public services, the transparency of their financial\nrelationships with the government, as well as their good governance and efficient oversight by the\ngovernment are critical, Although it may be a lower priority in terms of the PIMA, the authorities\nshould publish a consolidated annual report on the financial position of the public corporations, which\nwould include information on the amounts they are investing. The preparation and publication of\ndocuments providing a portfolio strategy, covering the aims of the public shareholders and the\ninvestment and performance targets of the corporations, would also be helpful.\n\n\n**C. ALLOCATING INVESTMENTS TO THE RIGHT SECTORS AND PROJECTS**\n\n\n**6. Multiyear Budgeting** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform: High)_\n\n\n**41. Major public investment projects have a fiscal impact spread over the medium term.** it\nis important to know the total costs and the forecast schedule of payment obligations relating to\nexecution, in order to ensure, at any time, the sustainability of the investment expenditures in relation\nto the macro-fiscal framework. The amount of expenditures required for ongoing projects and new\nprojects must comply with the expenditure ceilings imposed by the macro-fiscal framework. Multiyear\nforecasts of investment spending should appear in the budget documentation, even though the\nbudget system is annual. The three dimensions of this institution aim to check that the multiyear\nperspective is taken into account in public investment planning. The first dimension reviews whether\nthere are any multiyear projections of investment spending and the degree of detail of such\nprojections. The second dimension assesses whether the ministries are notified of the multiyear\ninvestment spending ceilings to enable them to prioritize their projects effectively. The third dimension\nidentifies whether the total costs estimated for each project and the expenditures required for each\nyear in this total are known and accessible by the public.\n\n\n**Figure 3.D. Capital budgets successively planned and voted by parliament (billions of CGF)**\n\n\n40 As expressed in the 2021 FAD report on the emergence of a fiscal risk management function,\nunder an ideal system, the Ministry of Planning would be involved in the identification of projects and\ntheir selection in accordance with the development plan; the sectoral ministries would be in charge of\nsteering contract negotiations and entering into contracts under the regulation of the ARMP, which\nwould be advised by the technical unit attached to the Ministry of Planning, and with the active\ninvolvement of the Ministries of Finance and the Budget for the financial approval of projects after\ntheir appraisal, including the analysis of fiscal risks. _The approval of contracts would be submitted to_\n_the approval units that would be created by decree, with the Ministry of Finance having to play a key_\n_role as guarantor of the financial sustainability of the projects._ Oversight of contracts would be carried\nout by the ARMP, the sectoral authorities, and the Ministry of Finance for fiscal risks.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "texts by clarifying the distribution of roles [40] among the various committees and agencies (in particular\nthe ARMP, UC-PPP, and DGCMP). The Ministry of Finance (DGDP) must also play a key role as\nguarantor of the financial viability of the projects, in particular at the stage of their appraisal and\nadoption. A national PPP policy should be set up, specifying the infrastructure markets open to PPPs,\nthe risk-sharing principles, the PPP financing objectives to be achieved, a list of viable projects that\ncould be implemented as PPPs, information on the project selection criteria, their oversight, and the\nrole of the public authorities throughout the process. An effort should also be made to enable the\nARMP and the UC-PPP to keep an up-to-date register of the whole PPP portfolio, including PPPs\ncurrently managed by other agencies (such as the ACGT). Further, in light of the significance of\npublic corporations in the provision of basic public services, the transparency of their financial\nrelationships with the government, as well as their good governance and efficient oversight by the\ngovernment are critical, Although it may be a lower priority in terms of the PIMA, the authorities\nshould publish a consolidated annual report on the financial position of the public corporations, which\nwould include information on the amounts they are investing. The preparation and publication of\ndocuments providing a portfolio strategy, covering the aims of the public shareholders and the\ninvestment and performance targets of the corporations, would also be helpful.\n\nC. ALLOCATING INVESTMENTS TO THE RIGHT SECTORS AND PROJECTS\n\n6. Multiyear Budgeting _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform: High)_\n\n41. Major public investment projects have a fiscal impact spread over the medium term. it\nis important to know the total costs and the forecast schedule of payment obligations relating to\nexecution, in order to ensure, at any time, the sustainability of the investment expenditures in relation\nto the macro-fiscal framework. The amount of expenditures required for ongoing projects and new\nprojects must comply with the expenditure ceilings imposed by the macro-fiscal framework. Multiyear\nforecasts of investment spending should appear in the budget documentation, even though the\nbudget system is annual. The three dimensions of this institution aim to check that the multiyear\nperspective is taken into account in public investment planning. The first dimension reviews whether\nthere are any multiyear projections of investment spending and the degree of detail of such\nprojections. The second dimension assesses whether the ministries are notified of the multiyear\ninvestment spending ceilings to enable them to prioritize their projects effectively. The third dimension\nidentifies whether the total costs estimated for each project and the expenditures required for each\nyear in this total are known and accessible by the public.\n\nFigure 3.D. Capital budgets successively planned and voted by parliament (billions of CGF)\n\n40 As expressed in the 2021 FAD report on the emergence of a fiscal risk management function,\nunder an ideal system, the Ministry of Planning would be involved in the identification of projects and\ntheir selection in accordance with the development plan; the sectoral ministries would be in charge of\nsteering contract negotiations and entering into contracts under the regulation of the ARMP, which\nwould be advised by the technical unit attached to the Ministry of Planning, and with the active\ninvolvement of the Ministries of Finance and the Budget for the financial approval of projects after\ntheir appraisal, including the analysis of fiscal risks. _The approval of contracts would be submitted to_\n_the approval units that would be created by decree, with the Ministry of Finance having to play a key_\n_role as guarantor of the financial sustainability of the projects._ Oversight of contracts would be carried\nout by the ARMP, the sectoral authorities, and the Ministry of Finance for fiscal risks.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3497}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-001", "cr-2023-058-fig-p0036-002"], "markdown": "billion CF\n\n14,000\n\n\n12,000\n\n\n10,000\n\n\n8,000\n\n\n6,000\n\n\n4,000\n\n\n2,000\n\n\n0\n\n\n\n2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\n\n\n\n0\n\n\n\n\n\n2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\n\n\nMTBF 2022-2024 Approved budget laws\n\nActual expenditure\n\n\nSource: MTFF 2020-2022, 2021-2023, 2022-2024, LFI (Titles VII and VIII) of 2020, 2021, 2022, Cour des Comptes: 2020\nreport on the accounting law, DGPPB: Fiscal Oversight Statement (ESB) of expenditure by heading as at December 31, 2021\n\n\n**42. The multiyear capital spending projections broken down by ministry are published, but**\n**the appropriations in the approved budget differ significantly from them.** The MTFF prepared\neach year by the Government in accordance with Article 76 of the LOFIP contains the projection of\nthe capital spending envelopes for the next three years (see Institution 1). The Medium-Term\nExpenditure Frameworks (MTEF), flowing from the MTFF, break down the capital expenditures over\nthree years by section (ministry) and heading. [41] Nevertheless, there are significant gaps between\nthese multiyear capital spending projections and the initial budget laws (LFIs) approved by vote,\nwhich reduce the usefulness of the exercise for planning. The investment budgets of the last three\nLFIs thus differ significantly (by up to nearly 40 percent) from the forecasts for n+1 and n+2,\ncontained in the MTFFs published previously (Figure 3.D).\n\n**43. Three-year capital spending ceilings are applied to each ministry on an indicative**\n**basis, but they diverge strongly from the approved budget laws.** The budget circular\ncommunicated in June provides these indicative capital spending ceilings, broken down by ministry\nand heading in the MTEF. [42] There are nonetheless significant gaps between these ministerial ceilings\nand the approved budget laws, just as there are gaps between the MTEFs associated with the\nMTFFs and the budget laws. The comparison of ceilings for four infrastructure-intensive ministries\n(budget circular of 2022) with the amounts approved by vote in the 2022 LFI show significant\novershoots, with gaps in both directions, of over 15 percent (Table 3.B).\n\n\n\n**Table 3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n41 There are three headings relating to investment: externally financed investments, investments\nfinanced from own funds, and investments funded by transfer to the provinces and ETDs.\n\n42 According to the 2022 budget preparation circular, the determination of the needs of each sector\nshould take into account the budget constraint, in particular the sectoral envelopes as notified in the\nannex to the circular (presenting the MTEFs).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "billion CF\n\n14,000\n\n12,000\n\n10,000\n\n8,000\n\n6,000\n\n4,000\n\n2,000\n\n0\n\n2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\n\n0\n\n2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\n\nMTBF 2022-2024 Approved budget laws\n\nActual expenditure\n\nSource: MTFF 2020-2022, 2021-2023, 2022-2024, LFI (Titles VII and VIII) of 2020, 2021, 2022, Cour des Comptes: 2020\nreport on the accounting law, DGPPB: Fiscal Oversight Statement (ESB) of expenditure by heading as at December 31, 2021\n\n42. The multiyear capital spending projections broken down by ministry are published, but\nthe appropriations in the approved budget differ significantly from them. The MTFF prepared\neach year by the Government in accordance with Article 76 of the LOFIP contains the projection of\nthe capital spending envelopes for the next three years (see Institution 1). The Medium-Term\nExpenditure Frameworks (MTEF), flowing from the MTFF, break down the capital expenditures over\nthree years by section (ministry) and heading. [41] Nevertheless, there are significant gaps between\nthese multiyear capital spending projections and the initial budget laws (LFIs) approved by vote,\nwhich reduce the usefulness of the exercise for planning. The investment budgets of the last three\nLFIs thus differ significantly (by up to nearly 40 percent) from the forecasts for n+1 and n+2,\ncontained in the MTFFs published previously (Figure 3.D).\n\n43. Three-year capital spending ceilings are applied to each ministry on an indicative\nbasis, but they diverge strongly from the approved budget laws. The budget circular\ncommunicated in June provides these indicative capital spending ceilings, broken down by ministry\nand heading in the MTEF. [42] There are nonetheless significant gaps between these ministerial ceilings\nand the approved budget laws, just as there are gaps between the MTEFs associated with the\nMTFFs and the budget laws. The comparison of ceilings for four infrastructure-intensive ministries\n(budget circular of 2022) with the amounts approved by vote in the 2022 LFI show significant\novershoots, with gaps in both directions, of over 15 percent (Table 3.B).\n\nTable 3.B. Comparison of the ministerial capital spending ceilings presented in the MTEFs and\n\n41 There are three headings relating to investment: externally financed investments, investments\nfinanced from own funds, and investments funded by transfer to the provinces and ETDs.\n\n42 According to the 2022 budget preparation circular, the determination of the needs of each sector\nshould take into account the budget constraint, in particular the sectoral envelopes as notified in the\nannex to the circular (presenting the MTEFs).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2242}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0037-001"], "markdown": "\n\n(July 2020)\n\n**44. The projections for total construction costs for major investment projects are neither**\n**published, consolidated, nor kept up to date comprehensively, even internally.** The Ministry of\nPlanning manages the Public Investment Program (PIP), the purpose of which is to ensure the\nlinkage over a rolling three-year time horizon between planning and budgeting. [43] The PIP [44] is broken\ndown by ministry and includes the total costs of the projects as well as the annual expenditures\nplanned for the next three years. The PIP seems, however, no longer to have been published with the\nbudget documentation since the 1990s. [45] The version kept internally does not comprehensively\nencompass all the projects, thus totaling overall amounts that are well below those budgeted each\nyear. Moreover, it is not kept up to date regularly. In practice, the link between the PIP, a tool\nmanaged by the Ministry of Planning, and the budget formulation process is weak. The Ministry of the\nBudget only has access to the PIP on request, and the PIP is not currently used in the budget\nformulation process.\n\n\n**45. The use of the PIP as a central tool linking planning with budgeting is a high priority**\n**for reform.** The role of the PIP as a basis for planning, multiyear budgeting, and selection of projects\nshould be included in the future decree on public investment management. The publication of a\nmultiyear PIP in the budget documentation showing total project costs over a multiyear horizon is\nconsidered to be international good practice. This would imply introducing a more systematic and\nmore frequent provision of information on total costs (and their development) of planned and current\nprojects by line ministries to the Ministry of Planning. Accordingly, it is important to ensure automated\nsharing of this information with the Ministries of the Budget and Finance, the incorporation of the\nreview of the PIP in the budget formulation process, and its publication with the budget\ndocumentation alongside the budget law. In the short term, a PIP, in which the total amount is aligned\nwith the budget and the MTFF, could be produced and published with the 2023 LFI. An update of the\ncurrent PIP will be necessary to ensure that it encompasses all ongoing projects and those about to\nstart.\n\n\n**7. Budget Comprehensiveness and Unity** _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak: Priority_\n_of reform: High)_\n\n**46. The purpose of this institution is to assess the comprehensiveness and unity of the**\n**investment budget.** Only a presentation of all capital spending in the context of the budget and the\ncoordination of capital spending with the corresponding current expenditures enable optimal budget\ndecisions to be made. Accordingly, the following must be ensured: (i) capital spending is carried out\nfor the main part within the budget framework, (ii) all investment projects, regardless of source of\n\n\n43 The 2009 PIP manual details the procedures for preparation, execution, and follow-up assessment\nof the PIP The manual is not formally covered at present by any legal text, but it draws its origins from\nLaw 86/001 of March 7, 1986 on the approval of the first five-year plan of 1986-1990.\n\n44 The analysis here is mainly based on the most recent version of the PIP submitted to the mission,\ncovering the period 2021-2023.\n\n45Source: Ministry of Planning, Public Investment Programming Conference report 2020-2022\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "(July 2020)\n\n44. The projections for total construction costs for major investment projects are neither\npublished, consolidated, nor kept up to date comprehensively, even internally. The Ministry of\nPlanning manages the Public Investment Program (PIP), the purpose of which is to ensure the\nlinkage over a rolling three-year time horizon between planning and budgeting. [43] The PIP [44] is broken\ndown by ministry and includes the total costs of the projects as well as the annual expenditures\nplanned for the next three years. The PIP seems, however, no longer to have been published with the\nbudget documentation since the 1990s. [45] The version kept internally does not comprehensively\nencompass all the projects, thus totaling overall amounts that are well below those budgeted each\nyear. Moreover, it is not kept up to date regularly. In practice, the link between the PIP, a tool\nmanaged by the Ministry of Planning, and the budget formulation process is weak. The Ministry of the\nBudget only has access to the PIP on request, and the PIP is not currently used in the budget\nformulation process.\n\n45. The use of the PIP as a central tool linking planning with budgeting is a high priority\nfor reform. The role of the PIP as a basis for planning, multiyear budgeting, and selection of projects\nshould be included in the future decree on public investment management. The publication of a\nmultiyear PIP in the budget documentation showing total project costs over a multiyear horizon is\nconsidered to be international good practice. This would imply introducing a more systematic and\nmore frequent provision of information on total costs (and their development) of planned and current\nprojects by line ministries to the Ministry of Planning. Accordingly, it is important to ensure automated\nsharing of this information with the Ministries of the Budget and Finance, the incorporation of the\nreview of the PIP in the budget formulation process, and its publication with the budget\ndocumentation alongside the budget law. In the short term, a PIP, in which the total amount is aligned\nwith the budget and the MTFF, could be produced and published with the 2023 LFI. An update of the\ncurrent PIP will be necessary to ensure that it encompasses all ongoing projects and those about to\nstart.\n\n7. Budget Comprehensiveness and Unity _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak: Priority_\n_of reform: High)_\n\n46. The purpose of this institution is to assess the comprehensiveness and unity of the\ninvestment budget. Only a presentation of all capital spending in the context of the budget and the\ncoordination of capital spending with the corresponding current expenditures enable optimal budget\ndecisions to be made. Accordingly, the following must be ensured: (i) capital spending is carried out\nfor the main part within the budget framework, (ii) all investment projects, regardless of source of\n\n43 The 2009 PIP manual details the procedures for preparation, execution, and follow-up assessment\nof the PIP The manual is not formally covered at present by any legal text, but it draws its origins from\nLaw 86/001 of March 7, 1986 on the approval of the first five-year plan of 1986-1990.\n\n44 The analysis here is mainly based on the most recent version of the PIP submitted to the mission,\ncovering the period 2021-2023.\n\n45Source: Ministry of Planning, Public Investment Programming Conference report 2020-2022\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2919}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "funding, are presented in the budget documentation, and (iii) the capital and current budgets are\nprepared and presented together in the budget documentation.\n\n\n**47. While the legal framework allows significant capital expenditures to be made by means**\n**of extrabudgetary entities and without parliamentary authorization, a large part of their**\n**expenditure using Treasury financing is included in the budget.** [46] Extrabudgetary entities\nsupporting investment projects exist in the form of public establishments, such as the Highways\nOffice (OR) and the Office of Roads and Drainage (OVD), and public services, such as the ACGT.\nThey are not under the obligation to obtain parliamentary authorization for their investment spending\nfinanced by the Treasury or to register them in the general budget. The authorization of their budgets\nand their oversight are the responsibility of their oversight ministry (the Ministry of Infrastructure and\nPublic Works in all three cases). [47] Nor does the LOFIP provide for their expenditures to be included in\nthe LFI, even for information purposes. The mission was not able to verify the annual investment\nbudgets of these entities, but it is likely that they are significant. [48] In practice, the capital expenditures\nof the OR and the OVD are at least partially included in the budget documentation, but not the\nexpenditures of the ACGT. [49] According to the mission’s estimates, over 75 percent of the\nextrabudgetary entities’ domestically-funded capital expenditures are presented in the budget. [50]\nDespite this positive practice for some, it is worth noting that the failure to register projects in the\nbudget law is a frequent occurrence for all types of projects, including those of budgetary entities,\nwhich hence poses a problem of credibility of the budget (Box 3.A).\n\n\n**48. There is no obligation to include the investment projects of public corporations or**\n**PPPs in the budget documentation, even though some do appear in it.** The LOFIP sets forth\nexternally financed capital expenditure as a heading in the budget law, even though donor-funded\nprojects are often executed by extrabudgetary entities that are exempt from registering their budgets\nin the budget law (such as the ACGT or the BCECO). For PPPs and for public corporations’\ninvestment projects, the LOFIP only provides for their inclusion in the budget documentation for\ninformation. The analysis of the 2022 LFI nevertheless shows that in practice the budget\ndocumentation covers projects in all three categories. It is not possible, however, to ascertain that the\nmajority of the projects are included, as there is no consolidated list of projects in any of the three\ncategories.\n\n\n46 This paragraph (dimension 7a of the assessment) focuses on the extrabudgetary entities that\nexecute expenditures using Treasury financing. The externally funded projects and PPPs are covered\nby the following paragraph (dimension 7b). Even though the ACGT was created first and foremost to\nmanage externally financed projects, its role has changed to also manage Treasury-financed\nprojects.\n\n47 Law 08/009 on public establishments does not provide for their budgets to be included or annexed\nto the LFI, or authorized by the National Assembly. Public services, in turn, enjoy financial and\nadministrative autonomy pursuant to the decrees that established them (see Decree 08/17 of\nAugust 26, 2008 on the creation, organization, and operation of the ACGT). Here, too, the oversight\nministry approves the budget, without a mandatory parliamentary authorization or inclusion in the\nbudget law.\n\n48 The ACGT states that it manages a budget of US$2.3 billion (website). By comparison the capital\nexpenditures of the annual budget of the DRC in the 2022 LF total US$3.6 billion.\n\n49 Some capital expenditures of the OR and the OVD are registered in the annual budget of the 2022\nLF under investment by the MITP (Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works). As for the ACGT,\nalthough its budget appears in the budget law, the investment projects that it manages are outside\nthe general budget.\n\n50 Very approximate estimate, based on the 2022 LF (figures for the OVD and the OR), and the 2017\nannual report of the ACGT.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "funding, are presented in the budget documentation, and (iii) the capital and current budgets are\nprepared and presented together in the budget documentation.\n\n47. While the legal framework allows significant capital expenditures to be made by means\nof extrabudgetary entities and without parliamentary authorization, a large part of their\nexpenditure using Treasury financing is included in the budget. [46] Extrabudgetary entities\nsupporting investment projects exist in the form of public establishments, such as the Highways\nOffice (OR) and the Office of Roads and Drainage (OVD), and public services, such as the ACGT.\nThey are not under the obligation to obtain parliamentary authorization for their investment spending\nfinanced by the Treasury or to register them in the general budget. The authorization of their budgets\nand their oversight are the responsibility of their oversight ministry (the Ministry of Infrastructure and\nPublic Works in all three cases). [47] Nor does the LOFIP provide for their expenditures to be included in\nthe LFI, even for information purposes. The mission was not able to verify the annual investment\nbudgets of these entities, but it is likely that they are significant. [48] In practice, the capital expenditures\nof the OR and the OVD are at least partially included in the budget documentation, but not the\nexpenditures of the ACGT. [49] According to the mission’s estimates, over 75 percent of the\nextrabudgetary entities’ domestically-funded capital expenditures are presented in the budget. [50]\nDespite this positive practice for some, it is worth noting that the failure to register projects in the\nbudget law is a frequent occurrence for all types of projects, including those of budgetary entities,\nwhich hence poses a problem of credibility of the budget (Box 3.A).\n\n48. There is no obligation to include the investment projects of public corporations or\nPPPs in the budget documentation, even though some do appear in it. The LOFIP sets forth\nexternally financed capital expenditure as a heading in the budget law, even though donor-funded\nprojects are often executed by extrabudgetary entities that are exempt from registering their budgets\nin the budget law (such as the ACGT or the BCECO). For PPPs and for public corporations’\ninvestment projects, the LOFIP only provides for their inclusion in the budget documentation for\ninformation. The analysis of the 2022 LFI nevertheless shows that in practice the budget\ndocumentation covers projects in all three categories. It is not possible, however, to ascertain that the\nmajority of the projects are included, as there is no consolidated list of projects in any of the three\ncategories.\n\n46 This paragraph (dimension 7a of the assessment) focuses on the extrabudgetary entities that\nexecute expenditures using Treasury financing. The externally funded projects and PPPs are covered\nby the following paragraph (dimension 7b). Even though the ACGT was created first and foremost to\nmanage externally financed projects, its role has changed to also manage Treasury-financed\nprojects.\n\n47 Law 08/009 on public establishments does not provide for their budgets to be included or annexed\nto the LFI, or authorized by the National Assembly. Public services, in turn, enjoy financial and\nadministrative autonomy pursuant to the decrees that established them (see Decree 08/17 of\nAugust 26, 2008 on the creation, organization, and operation of the ACGT). Here, too, the oversight\nministry approves the budget, without a mandatory parliamentary authorization or inclusion in the\nbudget law.\n\n48 The ACGT states that it manages a budget of US$2.3 billion (website). By comparison the capital\nexpenditures of the annual budget of the DRC in the 2022 LF total US$3.6 billion.\n\n49 Some capital expenditures of the OR and the OVD are registered in the annual budget of the 2022\nLF under investment by the MITP (Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works). As for the ACGT,\nalthough its budget appears in the budget law, the investment projects that it manages are outside\nthe general budget.\n\n50 Very approximate estimate, based on the 2022 LF (figures for the OVD and the OR), and the 2017\nannual report of the ACGT.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3594}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0039-001"], "markdown": "- _Externally financed projects are included in the LF, in principle_, even though some - in particular\nthe projects of the ACGT financed by Chinese partners and some other projects executed by the\nBCECO [51] - do not appear in the LF. Also, it is often the case that projects are executed without\nbeing registered in the budget in advance (Box 3.A).\n\n- _Some PPP projects have appeared in the budget documentation since the 2022 LFI._ The DRB in\neffect includes a list of the ACGT’s PPPs, but omits other PPPs, such as those supported by the\nOVD or the Banana deep water port. [52]\n\n- _Some projects supported by public corporations are also included_ . The respective oversight\nministries supervise the capital expenditures and their potential recording in the LFI.\n\n\n**Box 3.A. Gap between investment projects registered in the budget and those executed**\n\nThe Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability report estimates that only 31.6 percent of the projects\nexecuted in 2018 had been registered in advance in the budget. The latest accounting law for fiscal year 2020\nhighlights a similar finding:\n\n- Overruns of budgetary investment appropriations are significant (with an execution rate of\nover 120 percent).\n\n- A significant number of projects not initially registered in the LF are executed, above all externally financed\nprojects (292 projects executed, whereas 153 had been registered).\n\n- Conversely, a large number of projects registered in the LF are not executed, particularly projects financed by\nown funds (41 projects executed as opposed to 708 registered).\n\n\nSource: Court of Accounts: Report on fiscal year 2020, Section 3.2.1.2. N.B.: execution rate comparing execution\nwith the supplementary budget.\n\n\n**49. The capital and current budgets are presented together in the LFI, but prepared**\n**relatively separately.** According to Article 77 of the LOFIP, the Ministry of the Budget prepares the\ndraft budget law for the year (covering both the capital and the current budget), which is submitted in\nthe form of a consolidated document to the National Assembly. The transition toward program-based\nbudgeting is underway and should be completed in 2024. The budget contains a presentation by\n\n\n51 According to the BCECO, it only acts as an agency executing such projects, in the capacity of\ndelegated contracting authority. The responsibility for registering such projects in the LF lies with the\nproject manager.\n\n\n52 The 2022 LFI includes appropriations for the deep-water port of Banana for the Société congolaise\ndes transports publics (Congolese public transport company). However, it appears that there has\nbeen a mistake in the registration, given that this entity was removed from the management of the\nPPP.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1257, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 360.19915771484375, 540.2999267578125, 495.5498046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(106,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 282, "number": 15, "size": 11523, "transform": [450.2999572753906, 0.0, -0.0, 135.3506317138672, 90.0, 360.19915771484375], "width": 938, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "- _Externally financed projects are included in the LF, in principle_, even though some - in particular\nthe projects of the ACGT financed by Chinese partners and some other projects executed by the\nBCECO [51] - do not appear in the LF. Also, it is often the case that projects are executed without\nbeing registered in the budget in advance (Box 3.A).\n\n- _Some PPP projects have appeared in the budget documentation since the 2022 LFI._ The DRB in\neffect includes a list of the ACGT’s PPPs, but omits other PPPs, such as those supported by the\nOVD or the Banana deep water port. [52]\n\n- _Some projects supported by public corporations are also included_ . The respective oversight\nministries supervise the capital expenditures and their potential recording in the LFI.\n\nBox 3.A. Gap between investment projects registered in the budget and those executed\n\nThe Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability report estimates that only 31.6 percent of the projects\nexecuted in 2018 had been registered in advance in the budget. The latest accounting law for fiscal year 2020\nhighlights a similar finding:\n\n- Overruns of budgetary investment appropriations are significant (with an execution rate of\nover 120 percent).\n\n- A significant number of projects not initially registered in the LF are executed, above all externally financed\nprojects (292 projects executed, whereas 153 had been registered).\n\n- Conversely, a large number of projects registered in the LF are not executed, particularly projects financed by\nown funds (41 projects executed as opposed to 708 registered).\n\nSource: Court of Accounts: Report on fiscal year 2020, Section 3.2.1.2. N.B.: execution rate comparing execution\nwith the supplementary budget.\n\n49. The capital and current budgets are presented together in the LFI, but prepared\nrelatively separately. According to Article 77 of the LOFIP, the Ministry of the Budget prepares the\ndraft budget law for the year (covering both the capital and the current budget), which is submitted in\nthe form of a consolidated document to the National Assembly. The transition toward program-based\nbudgeting is underway and should be completed in 2024. The budget contains a presentation by\n\n51 According to the BCECO, it only acts as an agency executing such projects, in the capacity of\ndelegated contracting authority. The responsibility for registering such projects in the LF lies with the\nproject manager.\n\n52 The 2022 LFI includes appropriations for the deep-water port of Banana for the Société congolaise\ndes transports publics (Congolese public transport company). However, it appears that there has\nbeen a mistake in the registration, given that this entity was removed from the management of the\nPPP.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2338}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "functional classification, but, as it is not crossed with the economic classification, it is not possible to\nknow how the capital and current budgets complement each other. In fact, there is significant duality\nin the preparation of budgets. The preparation of the capital budget is coordinated by the Ministry of\nPlanning, which gives specific instructions to the sectoral ministries. [53] The result of this process is\npresented to the Ministry of the Budget at the budget conferences. Although the project fiches shared\nby the sectoral ministries include information on the needs for current appropriations flowing from\ncapital projects, the Ministry of the Budget has no procedure to check that the estimates are reliable\nor that the concomitant appropriations are registered in the current budgets. Furthermore,\nclassification by chapter ( _titre_ ) is not fully adhered to; Chapters VII and VIII, which normally constitute\ncapital expenditures, comprise some current expenditure in practice. [54]\n\n\n**50. The inclusion in the budget law of all capital expenditure is a high priority for reform**\n**and the strengthening of the integration between capital and current budgets is a medium**\n**priority.**\n\n\n- _The inclusion in the budget documentation of all capital expenditure, all types of management,_\n_and sources of financing combined, is a high priority for reform._ Significant work is necessary to\nstrengthen the credibility of the budget, and this work is provided for under the Priority Action Plan\nfor the implementation of the updated Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan. As things stand, a\nsignificant portion of the capital spending comes under exceptional management rules, often\nmanaged by extrabudgetary entities. The rules will have to be strengthened to make sure projects\nare systematically included in the budget documentation, thus ensuring transparency and\ncreating the basis for appropriate fiscal reporting. The future decree on public investment\nmanagement should contain the principle that all public investment projects should be included in\nthe budget.\n\n\n- _A second reform priority, of medium importance, is to better integrate the preparation processes_\n_for capital and current budgets (Box 3.B)._ The coordination could be strengthened, in the first\ninstance, in the sectoral ministries, through mechanisms for communication between the\nDirectorates for Research and Programming (DEPs) and the staff responsible for preparation of\nthe current budgets, and, in the second instance, through procedures for checking the\nconsistency of the two budgets by the Ministry of the Budget ahead of and during the budget\nconferences. The transition to program-based budgeting should help to better integrate the\ncapital and current budgets. A commented version of the Government Chart of Accounts would\nbe helpful to effectively ensure the appropriate economic coding of expenditures. Over the sevenyear horizon of the Public Financial Management Reform Program, more advanced unification of\nthe capital and current budget preparation procedures should be sought, so as to align the DRC\n\n\n53 The Ministry of Planning has organized investment planning conferences, with the participation of\nthe sectoral ministries and the Directorate of Preparation and Monitoring of the Budget (DPSB) of the\nMB (Ministry of the Budget) until 2018.\n\n54 The presentation of the investment projects in the budget law does not include any coding that\nwould break down project expenditures by economic type. The totality of the amounts associated with\nthe projects is considered as investment, while the annual budgeted work plans (PTBAs) of the\nprojects do contain a description of expenditure of all types (goods and services, operation of project\nunits, etc.). Other projects, judging by their name, only seem to cover current expenditures\n(consultants’ fees, etc.) The DRC should move toward having a coding of projects by type of\nexpenditure, so as to isolate, within each project’s expenditure, the part representing gross fixed\ncapital formation from operating expenditure.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "functional classification, but, as it is not crossed with the economic classification, it is not possible to\nknow how the capital and current budgets complement each other. In fact, there is significant duality\nin the preparation of budgets. The preparation of the capital budget is coordinated by the Ministry of\nPlanning, which gives specific instructions to the sectoral ministries. [53] The result of this process is\npresented to the Ministry of the Budget at the budget conferences. Although the project fiches shared\nby the sectoral ministries include information on the needs for current appropriations flowing from\ncapital projects, the Ministry of the Budget has no procedure to check that the estimates are reliable\nor that the concomitant appropriations are registered in the current budgets. Furthermore,\nclassification by chapter ( _titre_ ) is not fully adhered to; Chapters VII and VIII, which normally constitute\ncapital expenditures, comprise some current expenditure in practice. [54]\n\n50. The inclusion in the budget law of all capital expenditure is a high priority for reform\nand the strengthening of the integration between capital and current budgets is a medium\npriority.\n\n- _The inclusion in the budget documentation of all capital expenditure, all types of management,_\n_and sources of financing combined, is a high priority for reform._ Significant work is necessary to\nstrengthen the credibility of the budget, and this work is provided for under the Priority Action Plan\nfor the implementation of the updated Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan. As things stand, a\nsignificant portion of the capital spending comes under exceptional management rules, often\nmanaged by extrabudgetary entities. The rules will have to be strengthened to make sure projects\nare systematically included in the budget documentation, thus ensuring transparency and\ncreating the basis for appropriate fiscal reporting. The future decree on public investment\nmanagement should contain the principle that all public investment projects should be included in\nthe budget.\n\n- _A second reform priority, of medium importance, is to better integrate the preparation processes_\n_for capital and current budgets (Box 3.B)._ The coordination could be strengthened, in the first\ninstance, in the sectoral ministries, through mechanisms for communication between the\nDirectorates for Research and Programming (DEPs) and the staff responsible for preparation of\nthe current budgets, and, in the second instance, through procedures for checking the\nconsistency of the two budgets by the Ministry of the Budget ahead of and during the budget\nconferences. The transition to program-based budgeting should help to better integrate the\ncapital and current budgets. A commented version of the Government Chart of Accounts would\nbe helpful to effectively ensure the appropriate economic coding of expenditures. Over the sevenyear horizon of the Public Financial Management Reform Program, more advanced unification of\nthe capital and current budget preparation procedures should be sought, so as to align the DRC\n\n53 The Ministry of Planning has organized investment planning conferences, with the participation of\nthe sectoral ministries and the Directorate of Preparation and Monitoring of the Budget (DPSB) of the\nMB (Ministry of the Budget) until 2018.\n\n54 The presentation of the investment projects in the budget law does not include any coding that\nwould break down project expenditures by economic type. The totality of the amounts associated with\nthe projects is considered as investment, while the annual budgeted work plans (PTBAs) of the\nprojects do contain a description of expenditure of all types (goods and services, operation of project\nunits, etc.). Other projects, judging by their name, only seem to cover current expenditures\n(consultants’ fees, etc.) The DRC should move toward having a coding of projects by type of\nexpenditure, so as to isolate, within each project’s expenditure, the part representing gross fixed\ncapital formation from operating expenditure.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3508}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "with international best practice and to ensure optimal coordination of the various categories of\nspending.\n\n\n**Box 3.B. Country examples for the joint preparation of the capital and current budgets**\n**Indonesia**\n\n- Recent reforms of the budget planning and formulation process promote allocation of resources based on\noutcomes, regardless of whether it is a matter of capital or current appropriations. To ensure integration of\ncapital and current spending, many sectoral ministries have created integrated planning and budgeting\ndivisions within their directorates. For example, within the Ministry of Education, the General Directorate of\nSchools has five divisions, each of which has a planning and budgeting division covering both infrastructure\nand current expenditure. This organizational structure promotes communication and coordination.\n\n- The capital and current spending proposals are presented under one and the same activity program and\nfunction, and are discussed jointly when annual work programs and budgets are formulated. In addition to\nthis integration of the budget formulation and planning processes, harmonized budget classifications are\nused in the information systems.\n\n**Jordan**\n\n- The capital and current budgets are formulated by the General Directorate of the Budget and are presented\nin the same document. The Ministry of Planning plays a key role, in particular, in the selection of public\ninvestment projects, but does not participate in the process of preparing the consolidated budget.\n\n**Mauritius**\n\n- The process for preparing the public sector investment plan (PSIP), the annual budget, and the MTFF are\nwell coordinated and closely integrated. The budget includes information on capital and current spending\nclassified according to a program structure (with over 200 programs). Details on the investment projects are\nprovided in the PSIP, presented each year with the budget documentation to the Parliament.\n\n- Sector Ministry Support Teams, (SMSTs) at the Ministries of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED)\ncarry out reviews of the sectoral plans of the ministries and their budget proposals. The MOFED is also\ninvolved in the process of appraisal and selection of public investment projects.\n\nSource: Mission, information from previous PIMA missions\n\n\n**8. Budgeting for Investment** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of_\n_reform: Medium)_\n\n**51. Budget procedures should aim to facilitate the availability of appropriations over the**\n**multiyear construction cycle of projects.** The three dimensions under this institution are focused\non three procedures. The first dimension assesses whether future commitments linked to the\ninvestment projects are reflected in the budget documents. Decision makers should always be aware\nof the total cost of a project and the amount that has to be allocated in the future. The second\ndimension relates to the possibility of reallocating funds from capital expenditures during the fiscal\nyear. The capital budget may be reduced if the investment appropriations can be transferred to the\ncurrent budget, which can make the implementation of the capital budget more difficult. Finally, the\nthird dimension relates to the prioritization of ongoing projects over new ones. If ongoing projects do\nnot receive sufficient funding to cover the expenses planned in the budget year, these projects will\nsuffer from implementation delays that lead to inefficiencies and cost overruns.\n\n\n**52. Budgeting based on commitment authorizations (** _**autorisations d’engagement**_ **AEs)**\n**and payment appropriations (** _**crédits de paiement**_ **CPs), which allows to monitor future**\n**payments associated with investment projects, is not yet applied.** Articles 42 and 78 of the\nLOFIP provide for budgeting based on AE-CP, as well as the production of an annex to the draft\nbudget law presenting the AEs and their consumption, in order to produce information on total costs\nof projects, the amounts committed, and the amounts disbursed. In practice, this reform is underway,\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "with international best practice and to ensure optimal coordination of the various categories of\nspending.\n\nBox 3.B. Country examples for the joint preparation of the capital and current budgets\nIndonesia\n\n- Recent reforms of the budget planning and formulation process promote allocation of resources based on\noutcomes, regardless of whether it is a matter of capital or current appropriations. To ensure integration of\ncapital and current spending, many sectoral ministries have created integrated planning and budgeting\ndivisions within their directorates. For example, within the Ministry of Education, the General Directorate of\nSchools has five divisions, each of which has a planning and budgeting division covering both infrastructure\nand current expenditure. This organizational structure promotes communication and coordination.\n\n- The capital and current spending proposals are presented under one and the same activity program and\nfunction, and are discussed jointly when annual work programs and budgets are formulated. In addition to\nthis integration of the budget formulation and planning processes, harmonized budget classifications are\nused in the information systems.\n\nJordan\n\n- The capital and current budgets are formulated by the General Directorate of the Budget and are presented\nin the same document. The Ministry of Planning plays a key role, in particular, in the selection of public\ninvestment projects, but does not participate in the process of preparing the consolidated budget.\n\nMauritius\n\n- The process for preparing the public sector investment plan (PSIP), the annual budget, and the MTFF are\nwell coordinated and closely integrated. The budget includes information on capital and current spending\nclassified according to a program structure (with over 200 programs). Details on the investment projects are\nprovided in the PSIP, presented each year with the budget documentation to the Parliament.\n\n- Sector Ministry Support Teams, (SMSTs) at the Ministries of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED)\ncarry out reviews of the sectoral plans of the ministries and their budget proposals. The MOFED is also\ninvolved in the process of appraisal and selection of public investment projects.\n\nSource: Mission, information from previous PIMA missions\n\n8. Budgeting for Investment _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of_\n_reform: Medium)_\n\n51. Budget procedures should aim to facilitate the availability of appropriations over the\nmultiyear construction cycle of projects. The three dimensions under this institution are focused\non three procedures. The first dimension assesses whether future commitments linked to the\ninvestment projects are reflected in the budget documents. Decision makers should always be aware\nof the total cost of a project and the amount that has to be allocated in the future. The second\ndimension relates to the possibility of reallocating funds from capital expenditures during the fiscal\nyear. The capital budget may be reduced if the investment appropriations can be transferred to the\ncurrent budget, which can make the implementation of the capital budget more difficult. Finally, the\nthird dimension relates to the prioritization of ongoing projects over new ones. If ongoing projects do\nnot receive sufficient funding to cover the expenses planned in the budget year, these projects will\nsuffer from implementation delays that lead to inefficiencies and cost overruns.\n\n52. Budgeting based on commitment authorizations ( _autorisations d’engagement_ AEs)\nand payment appropriations ( _crédits de paiement_ CPs), which allows to monitor future\npayments associated with investment projects, is not yet applied. Articles 42 and 78 of the\nLOFIP provide for budgeting based on AE-CP, as well as the production of an annex to the draft\nbudget law presenting the AEs and their consumption, in order to produce information on total costs\nof projects, the amounts committed, and the amounts disbursed. In practice, this reform is underway,\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3471}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "which means that at this stage, the budget documents only contain the payment appropriations\nassociated with the projects for the first year. The PIP prepared internally by the Ministry of Planning\nshows the total cost of the investment projects, as well as a projection of the payment appropriations\nfor the next three years. However, the PIP is not fully comprehensive and is not part of the budget\ndocumentation submitted to the parliament (see Institution 6). In all, the budget documentation sent to\nthe parliament does not contain information on the total or multiyear costs of investment projects.\n\n\n**53. Transfers of appropriations from capital to current expenditure are possible by way of**\n**ministerial order; this is however not done in practice.** Article 47 of the LOFIP provides that\ntransfers of appropriations may be made between chapters ( _titres_ ) by order of the Minister in charge\nof the budget; that indicates therefore that the Minister of the Budget may allow transfers of capital\nappropriations to current appropriations. The LOFIP does not provide any ceilings on the amount of\nsuch transfers. In practice, however, no transfers of capital appropriations to current appropriations\nhave been applied in recent years. [55] This is related, among other things, to the fact that a module for\nmanaging movements of appropriations was developed by the Interministerial Information\nTechnology Coordination department (C2I) in the PREPABUD software to apply a “lock” on transfers\nof appropriations.\n\n\n**Ongoing projects are not prioritized in the allocation of budget resources to guarantee their**\n**completion in due time.** The annual circular on the preparation of the budget and the letters from\nthe Minister of Planning, which frame the preparation of the capital budget, recommend that the\nsectoral ministries prioritize ongoing projects in their requests for appropriations. However, there is no\nother more stringent mechanism to prioritize the allocation of appropriations to the execution of\nongoing projects. Consequently, some projects that are in the process of implementation are\nsidelined from one year to the next in favor of new projects; then they eventually reappear in the\nbudget for subsequent fiscal years, depending on the choices and decisions of the sectoral ministries,\nwith no oversight by the Ministry of Planning, or the Ministry of the Budget (see the case of the\nMinistry of Mines in Box 3.C). This situation prolongs the duration of projects and actually increases\ntheir final cost of completion due to the interruptions in implementation, in the absence of budget\nappropriations.\n\n\n**Box 3.B. Budgeting in the medium term for the investment projects of the Ministry of**\n\n**Mines**\n\nFrom 2019 to 2022, there was a discontinued decrease from six to three in the number of projects budgeted for\nthe Ministry of Mines; this shows that inclusion in the budget is no guarantee that the project will stay in the\nsubsequent budgets until full completion.\n\n- Three of the six projects budgeted in 2019 were not budgeted in 2020.\n\n- Two of the three projects budgeted in 2020 were not budgeted in 2021.\n\n- One project budgeted in 2019 that was not budgeted in 2020 was revived in 2021.\n\n- In 2022, three new projects were budgeted and all the other projects underway were put on hold, one of\nwhich was revived in the end with a different coding, with a total cost significantly revised upward, which\nclassified it as a new project.\n\nSource: Mission, using the database of the Ministry of Mines.\n\n\n55 This was said by the ministries met by the mission and verified by the mission on the basis of an\nextract from the appropriation transfers produced for the 2021 supplementary budget.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "which means that at this stage, the budget documents only contain the payment appropriations\nassociated with the projects for the first year. The PIP prepared internally by the Ministry of Planning\nshows the total cost of the investment projects, as well as a projection of the payment appropriations\nfor the next three years. However, the PIP is not fully comprehensive and is not part of the budget\ndocumentation submitted to the parliament (see Institution 6). In all, the budget documentation sent to\nthe parliament does not contain information on the total or multiyear costs of investment projects.\n\n53. Transfers of appropriations from capital to current expenditure are possible by way of\nministerial order; this is however not done in practice. Article 47 of the LOFIP provides that\ntransfers of appropriations may be made between chapters ( _titres_ ) by order of the Minister in charge\nof the budget; that indicates therefore that the Minister of the Budget may allow transfers of capital\nappropriations to current appropriations. The LOFIP does not provide any ceilings on the amount of\nsuch transfers. In practice, however, no transfers of capital appropriations to current appropriations\nhave been applied in recent years. [55] This is related, among other things, to the fact that a module for\nmanaging movements of appropriations was developed by the Interministerial Information\nTechnology Coordination department (C2I) in the PREPABUD software to apply a “lock” on transfers\nof appropriations.\n\nOngoing projects are not prioritized in the allocation of budget resources to guarantee their\ncompletion in due time. The annual circular on the preparation of the budget and the letters from\nthe Minister of Planning, which frame the preparation of the capital budget, recommend that the\nsectoral ministries prioritize ongoing projects in their requests for appropriations. However, there is no\nother more stringent mechanism to prioritize the allocation of appropriations to the execution of\nongoing projects. Consequently, some projects that are in the process of implementation are\nsidelined from one year to the next in favor of new projects; then they eventually reappear in the\nbudget for subsequent fiscal years, depending on the choices and decisions of the sectoral ministries,\nwith no oversight by the Ministry of Planning, or the Ministry of the Budget (see the case of the\nMinistry of Mines in Box 3.C). This situation prolongs the duration of projects and actually increases\ntheir final cost of completion due to the interruptions in implementation, in the absence of budget\nappropriations.\n\nBox 3.B. Budgeting in the medium term for the investment projects of the Ministry of\n\nMines\n\nFrom 2019 to 2022, there was a discontinued decrease from six to three in the number of projects budgeted for\nthe Ministry of Mines; this shows that inclusion in the budget is no guarantee that the project will stay in the\nsubsequent budgets until full completion.\n\n- Three of the six projects budgeted in 2019 were not budgeted in 2020.\n\n- Two of the three projects budgeted in 2020 were not budgeted in 2021.\n\n- One project budgeted in 2019 that was not budgeted in 2020 was revived in 2021.\n\n- In 2022, three new projects were budgeted and all the other projects underway were put on hold, one of\nwhich was revived in the end with a different coding, with a total cost significantly revised upward, which\nclassified it as a new project.\n\nSource: Mission, using the database of the Ministry of Mines.\n\n55 This was said by the ministries met by the mission and verified by the mission on the basis of an\nextract from the appropriation transfers produced for the 2021 supplementary budget.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3147}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**54. The reform on safeguarding capital appropriations is of medium priority and should be**\n**included in the transition to program-based budgeting.** The scope for improvement lies above all\nin the full implementation of AE-CP budgeting by 2024 and in communicating the PIP to parliament,\nwhich would enable better knowledge and monitoring of the total cost and the multiyear commitments\nrelating to each project (Institution 6). The procedures guide to AE-CP budgeting should, in particular,\nspecify that reports on the consumption of AEs should contain a breakdown by project. This\ninformation would also help to enable ongoing projects to be prioritized before financing new ones, a\ngeneral principle that could be formally established in the future decree on public investment\nmanagement.\n\n\n**9. Maintenance Funding** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform:_\n_Medium)_\n\n**55. An infrastructure asset cannot offer the benefits promised at the time of its design if it**\n**is not maintained correctly** . This institution focuses on whether maintenance needs are known, and\nhow these maintenance needs are reflected in the budget and in planning. The first dimension relates\nto the existence of a methodology enabling the determination of the need for routine maintenance.\nBarring exceptions, routine maintenance is financed by the current budget. The second dimension\ncovers the existence of a methodology enabling the determination of the need for capital\nmaintenance (major improvements, restoration, and reconstruction). In principle, expenditures linked\nto this type of maintenance are included in the capital budget. The third dimension relates to the\navailability of information to establish the amount of maintenance funding included in the national or\nsectoral plans, and allocated in the budget.\n\n\n**56. The estimation of routine maintenance needs is hindered by the lack of standard**\n**methodologies to assess them, except in the road sector** . According to the ACGT, a standard\nmethodology is used to support road maintenance; however, the mission did not have access to this\nmethodology. There is no methodology in other sectors, including maintenance of buildings. In the\nroad sector, the maintenance processes are well established; they are taken care of by the road\nmanagement agencies (OR, OVD, and the Office for Farm Roads) and funded by the National Road\nMaintenance Fund (FONER). Despite this institutionalization, the needs are greater than the financing\navailable. The financial needs to cover routine maintenance of the DRC's road network are estimated\nby the FONER at US$340 million a year. [56] By contrast, the Annual Road Maintenance Program\nfor 2020, formulated on the basis of the needs expressed by the road management agencies, was\nonly US$108 million, or 32 percent of the actual needs; and only 73 percent of these amounts were\neffectively allocated to routine maintenance (Table 3.C).\n\n|Table 3.C. Comparison between the ro Road management agencies|outine maintena U.S. dollars) Actual needs|ance needs and fu Needs expressed|unding available (in Resources allocated|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Road management agencies**
|
**Actual needs**
|**Needs expressed**
|**Resources allocated**
|\n|
Highways Office
|
-
|
64,109,631
|
27,507,280
|\n|
Office of Roads and Drainage
|
-
|
33,323,492
|
42,322,209
|\n|
Office for Farm Roads
|
-
|
11,416,034
|
3,000,000
|\n|
Infrastructure unit
|
-
|
-
|
4,673,456
|\n|
Protection of road assets
|
-
|
-
|
500,000
|\n|
Other FONER activities
|
-
|
-
|
1,000,000
|\n|
**Total**
|
**340,000,000**
|
**108,849,157**
|
**79,002,945**|\n\n\n\n56 FONER, 2020 Annual activity report\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21333312988281, 546.0911865234375, 539.7866821289062, 649.6079711914062], "columns": 4, "rows": 8}], "text": "54. The reform on safeguarding capital appropriations is of medium priority and should be\nincluded in the transition to program-based budgeting. The scope for improvement lies above all\nin the full implementation of AE-CP budgeting by 2024 and in communicating the PIP to parliament,\nwhich would enable better knowledge and monitoring of the total cost and the multiyear commitments\nrelating to each project (Institution 6). The procedures guide to AE-CP budgeting should, in particular,\nspecify that reports on the consumption of AEs should contain a breakdown by project. This\ninformation would also help to enable ongoing projects to be prioritized before financing new ones, a\ngeneral principle that could be formally established in the future decree on public investment\nmanagement.\n\n9. Maintenance Funding _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform:_\n_Medium)_\n\n55. An infrastructure asset cannot offer the benefits promised at the time of its design if it\nis not maintained correctly . This institution focuses on whether maintenance needs are known, and\nhow these maintenance needs are reflected in the budget and in planning. The first dimension relates\nto the existence of a methodology enabling the determination of the need for routine maintenance.\nBarring exceptions, routine maintenance is financed by the current budget. The second dimension\ncovers the existence of a methodology enabling the determination of the need for capital\nmaintenance (major improvements, restoration, and reconstruction). In principle, expenditures linked\nto this type of maintenance are included in the capital budget. The third dimension relates to the\navailability of information to establish the amount of maintenance funding included in the national or\nsectoral plans, and allocated in the budget.\n\n56. The estimation of routine maintenance needs is hindered by the lack of standard\nmethodologies to assess them, except in the road sector . According to the ACGT, a standard\nmethodology is used to support road maintenance; however, the mission did not have access to this\nmethodology. There is no methodology in other sectors, including maintenance of buildings. In the\nroad sector, the maintenance processes are well established; they are taken care of by the road\nmanagement agencies (OR, OVD, and the Office for Farm Roads) and funded by the National Road\nMaintenance Fund (FONER). Despite this institutionalization, the needs are greater than the financing\navailable. The financial needs to cover routine maintenance of the DRC's road network are estimated\nby the FONER at US$340 million a year. [56] By contrast, the Annual Road Maintenance Program\nfor 2020, formulated on the basis of the needs expressed by the road management agencies, was\nonly US$108 million, or 32 percent of the actual needs; and only 73 percent of these amounts were\neffectively allocated to routine maintenance (Table 3.C).\n\n Table 3.C. Comparison between the ro Road management agencies outine maintena U.S. dollars) Actual needs ance needs and fu Needs expressed unding available (in Resources allocated \n\n Road management agencies Actual needs Needs expressed Resources allocated \n Highways Office - 64,109,631 27,507,280 \n Office of Roads and Drainage - 33,323,492 42,322,209 \n Office for Farm Roads - 11,416,034 3,000,000 \n Infrastructure unit - - 4,673,456 \n Protection of road assets - - 500,000 \n Other FONER activities - - 1,000,000 \n Total 340,000,000 108,849,157 79,002,945 \n\n56 FONER, 2020 Annual activity report\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3033}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**57. The estimation of financing requirements for renovation and restoration is not based**\n**on standard methodologies, except for the road sector.** According to the ACGT, as in the case of\nroutine maintenance, a standard methodology is used to support the assessment of needs for\nrestoration and renovation of roads; however, the mission did not have access to this methodology. In\npractice, several restoration and renovation projects can be found, in particular in the road sector,\nmentioned and included in the PNSD and the Government Program, as well as in the budget laws.\nNevertheless, it is not clear whether that is enough to meet infrastructure restoration needs. The\nmission was not able to verify the financial coverage of needs relating to renovation work registered in\nthe Government budget, as it did not receive an account of the budget requests discussed in planning\nand budgeting conferences.\n\n\n**58. Routine maintenance and major improvement expenditures can be distinguished**\n**precisely from each other, but there is no such distinction in the budget documentation.** The\nDRC’s Government Budget Classification (2015) allows routine maintenance to be distinguished from\nmaintenance which increases the value of assets. [57] The central government budget is based on this\nclassification, which codifies routine maintenance work as current expenditure and renovation and\nrestoration work as capital expenditure, accordingly. The information system is able to provide this\ndata with all the details by government department and economic type, in terms of both forecast and\nexecution. Nevertheless, the budget documentation submitted to the parliament does not provide this\ndistinction, thus preventing the parliament from holding more in-depth discussions on the consistency\nof the policy for the preservation of the value of government assets.\n\n\n**59. The reforms needed to maintain the assets in good condition and to improve their**\n**durability and value are of medium priority.** First, infrastructure asset managing authorities should\nbe provided with standard methodologies for the estimation of routine maintenance, renovation, and\nrestoration needs; then, sufficient resources should be allocated in the budget, for example by\nrequesting that the sectoral ministries identify and prioritize their requirements for routine\nmaintenance and restoration in their budget proposals (Box 3.D). The future decree on public\ninvestment management will have to express the principle of systematic inclusion of project\nmaintenance at the time of project design, budgeting, and implementation.\n\n\n**10. Project Selection** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak_ _**:**_ _Priority of reform: High)_\n\n**60. Project selection based on objective, transparent criteria and procedures is a key**\n**factor in the efficient management of public investment.** The selection of projects consists in\nchoosing public investment projects, taking into account the financing constraints, based on a plan or\na set of projects, appraised against the relevant political, environmental, social and economic\nconditions, to ensure perfect coordination between stages of the investment cycle. The PIMA\nmethodology takes into account (i) the existence of a review of the appraisal of major projects before\nincluding them in the budget; (ii) the publication of standard selection criteria and processes and\ncompliance with them; and (iii) the existence of a list of appraised projects, pending inclusion in the\nannual budget.\n\n\n**Box 3.D. Example of inclusion of project maintenance costs: South Africa**\n\n\n57 Current maintenance is recorded in Title 5 (expenditure on services), categories 5-615\n(maintenance and repair of materials and equipment) and 5-617 (maintenance, decoration, and repair\nof works and buildings). Capital maintenance works are included in Title 8 (construction, repair,\nrestoration, addition of works and buildings, purchase of real estate), categories 8-233 (restoration,\nrepair, addition of works and buildings).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "57. The estimation of financing requirements for renovation and restoration is not based\non standard methodologies, except for the road sector. According to the ACGT, as in the case of\nroutine maintenance, a standard methodology is used to support the assessment of needs for\nrestoration and renovation of roads; however, the mission did not have access to this methodology. In\npractice, several restoration and renovation projects can be found, in particular in the road sector,\nmentioned and included in the PNSD and the Government Program, as well as in the budget laws.\nNevertheless, it is not clear whether that is enough to meet infrastructure restoration needs. The\nmission was not able to verify the financial coverage of needs relating to renovation work registered in\nthe Government budget, as it did not receive an account of the budget requests discussed in planning\nand budgeting conferences.\n\n58. Routine maintenance and major improvement expenditures can be distinguished\nprecisely from each other, but there is no such distinction in the budget documentation. The\nDRC’s Government Budget Classification (2015) allows routine maintenance to be distinguished from\nmaintenance which increases the value of assets. [57] The central government budget is based on this\nclassification, which codifies routine maintenance work as current expenditure and renovation and\nrestoration work as capital expenditure, accordingly. The information system is able to provide this\ndata with all the details by government department and economic type, in terms of both forecast and\nexecution. Nevertheless, the budget documentation submitted to the parliament does not provide this\ndistinction, thus preventing the parliament from holding more in-depth discussions on the consistency\nof the policy for the preservation of the value of government assets.\n\n59. The reforms needed to maintain the assets in good condition and to improve their\ndurability and value are of medium priority. First, infrastructure asset managing authorities should\nbe provided with standard methodologies for the estimation of routine maintenance, renovation, and\nrestoration needs; then, sufficient resources should be allocated in the budget, for example by\nrequesting that the sectoral ministries identify and prioritize their requirements for routine\nmaintenance and restoration in their budget proposals (Box 3.D). The future decree on public\ninvestment management will have to express the principle of systematic inclusion of project\nmaintenance at the time of project design, budgeting, and implementation.\n\n10. Project Selection _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak_ _:_ _Priority of reform: High)_\n\n60. Project selection based on objective, transparent criteria and procedures is a key\nfactor in the efficient management of public investment. The selection of projects consists in\nchoosing public investment projects, taking into account the financing constraints, based on a plan or\na set of projects, appraised against the relevant political, environmental, social and economic\nconditions, to ensure perfect coordination between stages of the investment cycle. The PIMA\nmethodology takes into account (i) the existence of a review of the appraisal of major projects before\nincluding them in the budget; (ii) the publication of standard selection criteria and processes and\ncompliance with them; and (iii) the existence of a list of appraised projects, pending inclusion in the\nannual budget.\n\nBox 3.D. Example of inclusion of project maintenance costs: South Africa\n\n57 Current maintenance is recorded in Title 5 (expenditure on services), categories 5-615\n(maintenance and repair of materials and equipment) and 5-617 (maintenance, decoration, and repair\nof works and buildings). Capital maintenance works are included in Title 8 (construction, repair,\nrestoration, addition of works and buildings, purchase of real estate), categories 8-233 (restoration,\nrepair, addition of works and buildings).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3464}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "In **South Africa**, procedures for annual estimation of maintenance costs by type of infrastructure have been\nestablished, as well as those relating to the needs for renovation or replacement, with a view to effective\nbudgeting to ensure the durability of nonfinancial government assets.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Type of
infrastructure|Average Annual
Maintenance
Budget as % of
Replacement Cost|Key Assumptions|Replacement or Major
Rehabilitation over and
above the Annual
Maintenance Budget
requiring specific capital
budget|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Bulk water storage
|4-8%|Mostly for periodic repair of electrical and mechanical works, storm damage repair, routine
maintenance and periodic maintenance|
every 30 to 50 years|\n|Water treatment
works|4-8%|Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment|every 20 to 30 years|\n|
Water reservoirs|2-3%|Generally low maintenance mostly of telemetry and electrical equipment, storm damage
repair, pipe work repair, safety and security, routine maintenance and periodic maintenance
|
every 20 to 30 years|\n|Water reticulation
|4-8%|Mostly for telemetry and pumping equipment, emergency leak repair and ongoing leak
repair due to degradation, storm damage repair|every 20 to 30 years|\n|Sewage treatment
works|4-8%|
Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment, storm damage and periodic maintenance.
|every 20 to 30 years|\n|
Sewer reticulation
|4-8%|Mostly for pumping equipment, emergency leak repair and ongoing leak repair due to
degradation, blockage removal, storm damage repair,
|every 20 to 30 years|\n|Roads and storm
water|5-10%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (resurfacing
every 7 to 10 years).
|every 20 to 30 years|\n|
Public buildings|4-6%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g.
repainting and cosmetic upgrades every 5 to 10 years).|every 30 to 50 years|\n|Hospitals|5-8%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g.
repainting every 3 to 5 years, and cosmetic and operational upgrades every 7 to 10 years).
|every 20 to 30 years|\n|Schools|4-6%|Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g.
repainting every 5 to 7 years, ).
|every 30 to 50 years|\n|Electricity generation|5-8%|
Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment and dependent on age and technology of
works|every 30 to 50 years|\n|Electricity reticulation|10-15%|
Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, safety and security, routine maintenance
and periodic maintenance (e.g. every 7 to 10 years).|
every 20 to 30 years|\n\n\nSource: Mission\n**61. The regulations confer upon the CISPIP the responsibility for reviewing preliminary**\n**appraisals, but the CISPIP does not meet in practice, and the review of project fiches remains**\n**superficial.** The 2019 order on the CISPIP [58] gives it the role of analyzing and assessing the\nfeasibility studies of projects before their potential selection for inclusion in the PIP and the budget.\nWithin the CISPIP, four technical subcommittees relating to the four sectors of planning are in charge\nof the work of analysis and assessment of the feasibility studies of projects using own funding and the\ncounterparties of projects that are externally funded. [59] Nonetheless, the regulatory framework does\nnot provide for the review of all major projects with the contribution of independent experts or an\nindependent organization. In practice, the CISPIP is not in operation. Although projects are reviewed\nby the Ministry of Planning, this review only looks into whether project fiches have been filled in. This\nreview is carried out during the CPIP, which meets annually in June [60] under the auspices of the\nMinistry of Planning. According to the various departments consulted during the mission, there is no\nreview of externally financed projects, given the difficulties in obtaining comprehensive information\n\n\n58 Order of the Minister of Planning dated July 19, 2019: many DEPs of the ministries spoke of their\nlack of knowledge of this order, which has not really entered into force.\n\n59 Article 4 of the order provides for the presence within the CISPIP of the director of coordination of\nexternal funding, the director or a representative of the PGAI, and the adviser in charge of the CSPP\nto gather information on financing conventions and agreements entered into with donors for\ncofinanced projects.\n\n60 As part of the CPIP, domestically funded projects are reviewed by the DPB and the sectoral\ndirectorates, with the experts from the DEPs of the sectoral ministries.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [92.94522094726562, 109.33172607421875, 535.80419921875, 377.77557373046875], "columns": 4, "rows": 13}], "text": "In South Africa, procedures for annual estimation of maintenance costs by type of infrastructure have been\nestablished, as well as those relating to the needs for renovation or replacement, with a view to effective\nbudgeting to ensure the durability of nonfinancial government assets.\n\n Type of infrastructure Average Annual Maintenance Budget as % of Replacement Cost Key Assumptions Replacement or Major Rehabilitation over and above the Annual Maintenance Budget requiring specific capital budget \n\n Bulk water storage 4-8% Mostly for periodic repair of electrical and mechanical works, storm damage repair, routine maintenance and periodic maintenance every 30 to 50 years \n Water treatment works 4-8% Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment every 20 to 30 years \n Water reservoirs 2-3% Generally low maintenance mostly of telemetry and electrical equipment, storm damage repair, pipe work repair, safety and security, routine maintenance and periodic maintenance every 20 to 30 years \n Water reticulation 4-8% Mostly for telemetry and pumping equipment, emergency leak repair and ongoing leak repair due to degradation, storm damage repair every 20 to 30 years \n Sewage treatment works 4-8% Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment, storm damage and periodic maintenance. every 20 to 30 years \n Sewer reticulation 4-8% Mostly for pumping equipment, emergency leak repair and ongoing leak repair due to degradation, blockage removal, storm damage repair, every 20 to 30 years \n Roads and storm water 5-10% Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (resurfacing every 7 to 10 years). every 20 to 30 years \n Public buildings 4-6% Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g. repainting and cosmetic upgrades every 5 to 10 years). every 30 to 50 years \n Hospitals 5-8% Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g. repainting every 3 to 5 years, and cosmetic and operational upgrades every 7 to 10 years). every 20 to 30 years \n Schools 4-6% Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, and periodic maintenance (e.g. repainting every 5 to 7 years, ). every 30 to 50 years \n Electricity generation 5-8% Mostly for electrical and mechanical equipment and dependent on age and technology of works every 30 to 50 years \n Electricity reticulation 10-15% Mostly for emergency repair, storm damage repair, safety and security, routine maintenance and periodic maintenance (e.g. every 7 to 10 years). every 20 to 30 years \n\nSource: Mission\n61. The regulations confer upon the CISPIP the responsibility for reviewing preliminary\nappraisals, but the CISPIP does not meet in practice, and the review of project fiches remains\nsuperficial. The 2019 order on the CISPIP [58] gives it the role of analyzing and assessing the\nfeasibility studies of projects before their potential selection for inclusion in the PIP and the budget.\nWithin the CISPIP, four technical subcommittees relating to the four sectors of planning are in charge\nof the work of analysis and assessment of the feasibility studies of projects using own funding and the\ncounterparties of projects that are externally funded. [59] Nonetheless, the regulatory framework does\nnot provide for the review of all major projects with the contribution of independent experts or an\nindependent organization. In practice, the CISPIP is not in operation. Although projects are reviewed\nby the Ministry of Planning, this review only looks into whether project fiches have been filled in. This\nreview is carried out during the CPIP, which meets annually in June [60] under the auspices of the\nMinistry of Planning. According to the various departments consulted during the mission, there is no\nreview of externally financed projects, given the difficulties in obtaining comprehensive information\n\n58 Order of the Minister of Planning dated July 19, 2019: many DEPs of the ministries spoke of their\nlack of knowledge of this order, which has not really entered into force.\n\n59 Article 4 of the order provides for the presence within the CISPIP of the director of coordination of\nexternal funding, the director or a representative of the PGAI, and the adviser in charge of the CSPP\nto gather information on financing conventions and agreements entered into with donors for\ncofinanced projects.\n\n60 As part of the CPIP, domestically funded projects are reviewed by the DPB and the sectoral\ndirectorates, with the experts from the DEPs of the sectoral ministries.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3852}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "from the Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI), [61] in the absence of a framework for\nconsultation between the government and donors. During the budget conferences, the Ministry of\nBudget relies on the information contained in the project fiches, validated by the Ministry of Planning,\nwithout undertaking any review of the assessments. With regard to the review of appraisals of PPP\nprojects, the Standing Committee on Project Validation provided for in the laws and regulations (see\nInstitution 5) is not yet in operation.\n\n\n**62. There are no published specific criteria for the selection of appraised projects to be**\n**included in the budget, and the criteria used in practice are not appropriate.** The budget circular\nmentions superficially some standard criteria to assist the sectoral ministries with submitting their\ncapital budget proposals, but it does not say anything about the criteria used by the Ministries of\nPlanning or the Budget to guide the decisions made at the CPIP or at the budget conferences. The\n(unpublished) 2018 project selection manual of the Ministry of Planning proposes a grid of criteria and\na scoring template to ensure objective selection and transparency, but the mission had no evidence\nthat this grid was used in practice. It emerged from meetings held by the mission that project\nselection does not systematically pay attention to the benefits of the project and the realism of the\nimplementation plans. In practice, at the time of budgeting, the Ministry of Budget prioritizes ongoing\nprojects and those with a nonobjection opinion from the DGCMP. [62]\n\n\n**63. The Ministry of Planning can draw up a list of appraised projects, but, in the absence**\n**of a formal obligation to use this pipeline, many projects seem to be selected from outside the**\n**list.** The Ministry of Planning has a project database, stored in Access, which includes the information\nmentioned in the project fiches. Although the mission did not have access to this database, the\nMinistry of Planning indicated that it was possible to draw up a list of appraised projects from it.\nNevertheless, there is no formalized requirement to select projects from this pipeline of appraised\nprojects. [63] In practice, many projects seem to be selected from outside the list. Indeed, this finding\nwas articulated by several sectoral ministries, [64] as well as by the IGF.\n\n\n**64. The development of a more transparent process for the selection of projects prior to**\n**their inclusion in the budget is a high priority for reform.** The future decree on public investment\nmanagement should incorporate the basic principles guiding project selection, that is, selection based\non objective, transparent criteria, and only among projects that have been appraised and are ready to\nbe budgeted. The criteria should be published in the annual circular of the Ministry of Planning on the\npreparation of the PIP, and in the annual budget circular of the Ministry of Budget. Annex 6 presents\nan illustration of a list of relevant selection criteria, including specific criteria relating to climate\nchange. Finally, the effectiveness of the selection process would benefit from the gradual creation of\na bank of projects, supported by an integrated information system, which could follow the projects\nthroughout their life-cycle.\n\n\n61 As provided in Article 2 of Ministerial Order°002/CAB/MIN/PL/2011 of February 7, 2011\nestablishing the PGAI.\n\n\n62 The mission is of the view that these criteria are not appropriate, as, logically, the request for a\nstatement of nonobjection can only be made at the end of the budgeting process. This means,\ntherefore, that, in principle, only ongoing projects are covered by these criteria, and not new projects,\n\n63 The Ministry of Planning indicated that the budgeting process was derived strictly from the\ndecisions made at the budget conferences and that its role stopped before that, thereby highlighting a\ncertain degree of compartmentalization of the committees and agencies, whereas, in essence, public\ninvestment management should be a cycle jointly engaged in by several participants.\n\n64 In this regard, the ministerial departments specifically mentioned the existence of projects attributed\nto their appropriations, but which do not come from their portfolio.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "from the Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI), [61] in the absence of a framework for\nconsultation between the government and donors. During the budget conferences, the Ministry of\nBudget relies on the information contained in the project fiches, validated by the Ministry of Planning,\nwithout undertaking any review of the assessments. With regard to the review of appraisals of PPP\nprojects, the Standing Committee on Project Validation provided for in the laws and regulations (see\nInstitution 5) is not yet in operation.\n\n62. There are no published specific criteria for the selection of appraised projects to be\nincluded in the budget, and the criteria used in practice are not appropriate. The budget circular\nmentions superficially some standard criteria to assist the sectoral ministries with submitting their\ncapital budget proposals, but it does not say anything about the criteria used by the Ministries of\nPlanning or the Budget to guide the decisions made at the CPIP or at the budget conferences. The\n(unpublished) 2018 project selection manual of the Ministry of Planning proposes a grid of criteria and\na scoring template to ensure objective selection and transparency, but the mission had no evidence\nthat this grid was used in practice. It emerged from meetings held by the mission that project\nselection does not systematically pay attention to the benefits of the project and the realism of the\nimplementation plans. In practice, at the time of budgeting, the Ministry of Budget prioritizes ongoing\nprojects and those with a nonobjection opinion from the DGCMP. [62]\n\n63. The Ministry of Planning can draw up a list of appraised projects, but, in the absence\nof a formal obligation to use this pipeline, many projects seem to be selected from outside the\nlist. The Ministry of Planning has a project database, stored in Access, which includes the information\nmentioned in the project fiches. Although the mission did not have access to this database, the\nMinistry of Planning indicated that it was possible to draw up a list of appraised projects from it.\nNevertheless, there is no formalized requirement to select projects from this pipeline of appraised\nprojects. [63] In practice, many projects seem to be selected from outside the list. Indeed, this finding\nwas articulated by several sectoral ministries, [64] as well as by the IGF.\n\n64. The development of a more transparent process for the selection of projects prior to\ntheir inclusion in the budget is a high priority for reform. The future decree on public investment\nmanagement should incorporate the basic principles guiding project selection, that is, selection based\non objective, transparent criteria, and only among projects that have been appraised and are ready to\nbe budgeted. The criteria should be published in the annual circular of the Ministry of Planning on the\npreparation of the PIP, and in the annual budget circular of the Ministry of Budget. Annex 6 presents\nan illustration of a list of relevant selection criteria, including specific criteria relating to climate\nchange. Finally, the effectiveness of the selection process would benefit from the gradual creation of\na bank of projects, supported by an integrated information system, which could follow the projects\nthroughout their life-cycle.\n\n61 As provided in Article 2 of Ministerial Order°002/CAB/MIN/PL/2011 of February 7, 2011\nestablishing the PGAI.\n\n62 The mission is of the view that these criteria are not appropriate, as, logically, the request for a\nstatement of nonobjection can only be made at the end of the budgeting process. This means,\ntherefore, that, in principle, only ongoing projects are covered by these criteria, and not new projects,\n\n63 The Ministry of Planning indicated that the budgeting process was derived strictly from the\ndecisions made at the budget conferences and that its role stopped before that, thereby highlighting a\ncertain degree of compartmentalization of the committees and agencies, whereas, in essence, public\ninvestment management should be a cycle jointly engaged in by several participants.\n\n64 In this regard, the ministerial departments specifically mentioned the existence of projects attributed\nto their appropriations, but which do not come from their portfolio.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3656}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**D. DELIVERING PRODUCTIVE AND DURABLE PUBLIC ASSETS**\n\n\n**11. Procurement** _(Institutional design: High: Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of reform: High)_\n\n**65. This institution aims to assess the degree to which the national procurement**\n**management system promotes and implements good practice.** The procurement system is\nassessed in relation to the implementation (i) of open, competitive, transparent procedures; (ii) of an\nappropriate system for monitoring the contracts awarded; and (iii) of a fair and diligent mechanism for\nthe review of claims made by procurement bidders.\n\n\n**66. The law on procurement and its implementing regulations lay down principles of**\n**competition and publication within a reasonable timeframe, but significant exemptions reduce**\n**their significance in practice** . [65] Article 17 of Law 10/010 of April 27, 2010 on procurement\nestablishes tendering as the basic procedure for awarding public contracts; direct awards are an\nexception subject to strict conditions laid down in Articles 42 and 43. As for publication, Article 34 of\nsaid law stipulates the publication of all tenders, subject to the penalty of being declared void, where\nthe amount is greater than or equal to the tendering thresholds; Articles 35 and 36 set the publication\ndeadlines, as supplemented by Article 88 of Decree 10/22 of June 2, 2010 on the procedures manual\nof the law. The minimum deadline for bidding is 30 days, subject to a reduction to 15 days in duly\nsubstantiated urgent cases, with special authorization by the DGCMP. Tenders are published on the\nARMP website. In practice, according to the assessment carried out by the World Bank in 2020, [66] just\nunder half of the processes (48 percent) are conducted in compliance with the law. Almost all public\nservice contract awards involving a high financial value found in the ACGT portfolio were directly\nawarded, based on special authorizations given to avoid entering into competition. As for the\npublication principle, albeit well established in the legal framework, it is only partially applied, as it is\nnot fully complete, and, in particular, because of the piecemeal communication by the contracting\nauthorities of the initiatives taken by them and the lack of publicity about the cases dealt with in the\noffice of the Minister in charge of the budget.\n\n\n**67. Monitoring of procurement remains patchy, relying on partially complete databases**\n**and analysis that is still largely conducted manually.** The data entry and management tools\ncurrently employed by the ARMP and the DGCMP do not cover all of the contracts and do not enable\nautomated analytical monitoring reports to be produced. The analytical reports are said to be\nproduced manually, but the mission did not obtain any examples of these reports and was thus not\nable to verify their periodicity and timely production. To remedy these weaknesses, the authorities\nhave developed an Integrated Procurement Management System (SIGMAP) with the support of the\nPROFIT Congo project financed by the World Bank), but this has not yet been brought into operation,\neven in the pilot ministries. Development of the e-Procurement process is planned, with the support of\nthe World Bank’s ENCORE project, in order to improve further the efficiency of the procurement\nmanagement system.\n\n\n65 According to the laws and regulations, those involved in the management, awarding, and\nmonitoring of procurement contracts are the contracting authorities, the authorities granting approval,\nthe agency conducting _ex ante_ controls (DGCMP), and the agency for regulation and _ex post_ control\n(ARMP).\n\n\n66 Assessment of the Public Procurement System in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - MAPS II,\nJune 2020, p. 14\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. DELIVERING PRODUCTIVE AND DURABLE PUBLIC ASSETS\n\n11. Procurement _(Institutional design: High: Effectiveness: Medium; Priority of reform: High)_\n\n65. This institution aims to assess the degree to which the national procurement\nmanagement system promotes and implements good practice. The procurement system is\nassessed in relation to the implementation (i) of open, competitive, transparent procedures; (ii) of an\nappropriate system for monitoring the contracts awarded; and (iii) of a fair and diligent mechanism for\nthe review of claims made by procurement bidders.\n\n66. The law on procurement and its implementing regulations lay down principles of\ncompetition and publication within a reasonable timeframe, but significant exemptions reduce\ntheir significance in practice . [65] Article 17 of Law 10/010 of April 27, 2010 on procurement\nestablishes tendering as the basic procedure for awarding public contracts; direct awards are an\nexception subject to strict conditions laid down in Articles 42 and 43. As for publication, Article 34 of\nsaid law stipulates the publication of all tenders, subject to the penalty of being declared void, where\nthe amount is greater than or equal to the tendering thresholds; Articles 35 and 36 set the publication\ndeadlines, as supplemented by Article 88 of Decree 10/22 of June 2, 2010 on the procedures manual\nof the law. The minimum deadline for bidding is 30 days, subject to a reduction to 15 days in duly\nsubstantiated urgent cases, with special authorization by the DGCMP. Tenders are published on the\nARMP website. In practice, according to the assessment carried out by the World Bank in 2020, [66] just\nunder half of the processes (48 percent) are conducted in compliance with the law. Almost all public\nservice contract awards involving a high financial value found in the ACGT portfolio were directly\nawarded, based on special authorizations given to avoid entering into competition. As for the\npublication principle, albeit well established in the legal framework, it is only partially applied, as it is\nnot fully complete, and, in particular, because of the piecemeal communication by the contracting\nauthorities of the initiatives taken by them and the lack of publicity about the cases dealt with in the\noffice of the Minister in charge of the budget.\n\n67. Monitoring of procurement remains patchy, relying on partially complete databases\nand analysis that is still largely conducted manually. The data entry and management tools\ncurrently employed by the ARMP and the DGCMP do not cover all of the contracts and do not enable\nautomated analytical monitoring reports to be produced. The analytical reports are said to be\nproduced manually, but the mission did not obtain any examples of these reports and was thus not\nable to verify their periodicity and timely production. To remedy these weaknesses, the authorities\nhave developed an Integrated Procurement Management System (SIGMAP) with the support of the\nPROFIT Congo project financed by the World Bank), but this has not yet been brought into operation,\neven in the pilot ministries. Development of the e-Procurement process is planned, with the support of\nthe World Bank’s ENCORE project, in order to improve further the efficiency of the procurement\nmanagement system.\n\n65 According to the laws and regulations, those involved in the management, awarding, and\nmonitoring of procurement contracts are the contracting authorities, the authorities granting approval,\nthe agency conducting _ex ante_ controls (DGCMP), and the agency for regulation and _ex post_ control\n(ARMP).\n\n66 Assessment of the Public Procurement System in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - MAPS II,\nJune 2020, p. 14\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3178}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**68. The legal framework provides for a swift and fair process of investigation of**\n**procurement-related complaints, which is largely applied in practice.** The laws and regulations [67]\norganize the handling of disputes and nonjudicial appeals about procurement that come under the\njurisdiction of the contracting authorities and the ARMP. Within the ARMP, these functions are the\nresponsibility of the Dispute Settlement Committee (CRD), which issues its decisions either in a\ndisputes commission or in a disciplinary board. [ 68] To ensure the fairness of its decisions, the CRD\njointly represents the government, the private sector, and civil society. Article 158 of the procurement\nlaw orders the CRD to issue its decisions within 15 days or, in exceptional cases, within 30 days of a\ncomplaint being filed. In practice, these deadlines are respected, to the satisfaction of the private\nsector operators met by the World Bank during its assessment of the public procurement system\nin 2020. [69]\n\n\n**69. Procurement reforms are a high priority.** It will be a matter of reducing the number of\nspecial authorizations, which open the way to direct awards, encouraging competition for major\ninvestment projects, in order to improve the price and quality of acquisition of nonfinancial assets, and\ndeveloping a unified, comprehensive database that enables analytical reports to be produced\nautomatically. Access by the DGCMP to the budget information system should ensure that\nappropriations are available during the approval process and reserved until completion to meet the\nexpenditures. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public finance reforms\n(Annex 1).\n\n\n**12. Availability of Funding** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform:_\n_High)_\n\n**70. The purpose of this institution is to verify whether the systems, procedures, and tools**\n**are in place to ensure the availability of cash for timely payments for investment expenditure.**\nPayments to firms during the construction phase are often significant and the dates of payment may\nbe difficult to estimate accurately, as they will depend on the completion of intermediate tasks. These\naspects increase the risk that liquidity will not be available when the payment authorizations are made\nbased on invoices received from the contractor. Payments not made on time generate arrears,\naccumulation of which leads to an increase in government debt. This institution aims to ensure that (i)\nministries and agencies are able to plan and commit expenditure for investment projects in advance,\nbased on reliable cash flow forecasts; (ii) the funds allocated to financing project expenditure are\ndisbursed on time; and (iii) external financing (from donors) for investment projects is fully integrated\nin the main structure of the government bank accounts.\n\n\n**71. Inconsistencies between the cash flow forecasts, which are regularly updated, and**\n**commitment plans produced on a quarterly basis, prevent ministries from planning their**\n\n\n67 Article 73 of the 2020 law on procurement and Articles 4 and 49 of Decree 10/21 of June 2, 2010\non the organization and operation of the ARMP.\n\n68 Litigation on allocation and execution of contracts is the responsibility of the contracting authorities\nand instructed in the second instance by the CRD, in the event of appeal. Further, the ARMP is\nresponsible for imposing administrative sanctions for regulatory noncompliance in procurement.\n\n\n69 According to the MAPS II report, the majority of private sector operators recognize that the process\nworks well, but that it must be more widely popularized, as it is not well known. 57 percent of the\ndecisions were decided in favor of the plaintiff, while 43 percent of the decisions went in favor of the\ncontracting authorities. In 2016, out of 13 claims, 13 decisions were issued and all were made\nenforceable. The private sector estimates that the CRD performs its role well and states that it is\nsatisfied with the CRD's actions, but is disappointed that the contracting authorities do not always\ncomply with the enforceable decisions.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 48, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "68. The legal framework provides for a swift and fair process of investigation of\nprocurement-related complaints, which is largely applied in practice. The laws and regulations [67]\norganize the handling of disputes and nonjudicial appeals about procurement that come under the\njurisdiction of the contracting authorities and the ARMP. Within the ARMP, these functions are the\nresponsibility of the Dispute Settlement Committee (CRD), which issues its decisions either in a\ndisputes commission or in a disciplinary board. [ 68] To ensure the fairness of its decisions, the CRD\njointly represents the government, the private sector, and civil society. Article 158 of the procurement\nlaw orders the CRD to issue its decisions within 15 days or, in exceptional cases, within 30 days of a\ncomplaint being filed. In practice, these deadlines are respected, to the satisfaction of the private\nsector operators met by the World Bank during its assessment of the public procurement system\nin 2020. [69]\n\n69. Procurement reforms are a high priority. It will be a matter of reducing the number of\nspecial authorizations, which open the way to direct awards, encouraging competition for major\ninvestment projects, in order to improve the price and quality of acquisition of nonfinancial assets, and\ndeveloping a unified, comprehensive database that enables analytical reports to be produced\nautomatically. Access by the DGCMP to the budget information system should ensure that\nappropriations are available during the approval process and reserved until completion to meet the\nexpenditures. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public finance reforms\n(Annex 1).\n\n12. Availability of Funding _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of reform:_\n_High)_\n\n70. The purpose of this institution is to verify whether the systems, procedures, and tools\nare in place to ensure the availability of cash for timely payments for investment expenditure.\nPayments to firms during the construction phase are often significant and the dates of payment may\nbe difficult to estimate accurately, as they will depend on the completion of intermediate tasks. These\naspects increase the risk that liquidity will not be available when the payment authorizations are made\nbased on invoices received from the contractor. Payments not made on time generate arrears,\naccumulation of which leads to an increase in government debt. This institution aims to ensure that (i)\nministries and agencies are able to plan and commit expenditure for investment projects in advance,\nbased on reliable cash flow forecasts; (ii) the funds allocated to financing project expenditure are\ndisbursed on time; and (iii) external financing (from donors) for investment projects is fully integrated\nin the main structure of the government bank accounts.\n\n71. Inconsistencies between the cash flow forecasts, which are regularly updated, and\ncommitment plans produced on a quarterly basis, prevent ministries from planning their\n\n67 Article 73 of the 2020 law on procurement and Articles 4 and 49 of Decree 10/21 of June 2, 2010\non the organization and operation of the ARMP.\n\n68 Litigation on allocation and execution of contracts is the responsibility of the contracting authorities\nand instructed in the second instance by the CRD, in the event of appeal. Further, the ARMP is\nresponsible for imposing administrative sanctions for regulatory noncompliance in procurement.\n\n69 According to the MAPS II report, the majority of private sector operators recognize that the process\nworks well, but that it must be more widely popularized, as it is not well known. 57 percent of the\ndecisions were decided in favor of the plaintiff, while 43 percent of the decisions went in favor of the\ncontracting authorities. In 2016, out of 13 claims, 13 decisions were issued and all were made\nenforceable. The private sector estimates that the CRD performs its role well and states that it is\nsatisfied with the CRD's actions, but is disappointed that the contracting authorities do not always\ncomply with the enforceable decisions.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3515}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**investment expenditure in advance.** The cash flow planning committee [70] prepares cash flow\nforecasts on an annual basis adjusted to a monthly rate and updated monthly, or even weekly, during\nthe course of the year. By contrast, the commitment plan does not provide at the start of the year a\nfull commitment outlook for the whole of the year. The commitment plan is prepared on a quarterly\nbasis and is aligned with the levels of appropriations voted in budget laws, which have suffered in the\npast from a lack of credibility after submission to parliament (see Section 5). At the beginning of the\nyear, only the ceilings for the first quarter are known and quarterly updates are not made until the\nstart of each quarter. As a result, there is insufficient consistency with the cash flow forecasts. In\naddition, the commitment plan only partially incorporates the provisional procurement plans; the\nplans, as well as nonobjection notices are not issued sufficiently early to be taken into account in\nplanning.\n\n\n**72. Investment project expenditure files are subject to rationing according to the**\n**availability of cash, and are not treated as a priority.** The cash flow planning committee sets the\npriorities for settlement of the expenditure files, but without taking into account the payment deadlines\nestablished in the project contract letters. The document providing details on the priorities for\nsettlement does not include enough information on the expenditure files relating to investment\nprojects for them to be taken into account in the cash flow forecasts. The expenditures are thus\nsubject to rationing and may fall into arrears, or indeed be sent back at year-end for recommitment by\noriginating ministries. Accordingly, the cumulative position of domestic debt from budget outlays as at\nend-2021 includes substantial amounts of arrears, totaling US$187 million for procurement of works\n(0.3 percent of GDP).\n\n\n**73. The legal framework stipulates that funds for donors’ projects be placed into the**\n**Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank, but in practice these funds are held at**\n**commercial banks.** Articles 110 and 124 to 126 of the LOFIP, as well as Articles 156 and 157 of the\nGeneral Public Accounting Regulation (RGCP) provide for the deposit of all government liquid assets\nin the TSA at the Central Bank. Accordingly, this rule applies all the more to funds for donor-financed\ninvestment projects - in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005.\nHowever, the effectiveness of this legal framework is flawed in two respects. First, the TSA is not fully\neffective given the scattering of government resources and the formation of pockets of “idle money” in\nthe financial system. Second, under the terms of the agreements signed with the various donors,\nthere is an obligation for them to open accounts at the commercial banks. That damages the\nTreasury’s ability to follow the movement of funds related to externally financed projects, and thus to\ntrack budget execution and the financial operations of the Government on a frequent and\ncomprehensive basis.\n\n\n**74. The reforms relating to improvement of the availability of funds to cover investment**\n**project expenditures are of medium priority.** An effort should be made to adopt the methodological\nguides for the preparation of cash flow plans and commitment plans to strengthen the consistency\nbetween the two tools, as well as taking into account the provisional procurement plans. In addition, it\nis important that the commitment plan be prepared before the start of the fiscal year on an annual\nbasis with a quarterly sequence and that the commitment ceilings be communicated in advance to the\nsectoral ministries. In light of the parliament’s constant upward revision of revenues without\nsupporting new measures, it would also be advisable to strengthen fiscal regulation by having the\ncommitment plan at the beginning of the year based on the draft budget law appropriations, as\n\n\n70 Ministerial Order 053/CAB/MIN/FINANCES/2011 of September 25, 2011 establishing the\norganization and operation of the CPT.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 49, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "investment expenditure in advance. The cash flow planning committee [70] prepares cash flow\nforecasts on an annual basis adjusted to a monthly rate and updated monthly, or even weekly, during\nthe course of the year. By contrast, the commitment plan does not provide at the start of the year a\nfull commitment outlook for the whole of the year. The commitment plan is prepared on a quarterly\nbasis and is aligned with the levels of appropriations voted in budget laws, which have suffered in the\npast from a lack of credibility after submission to parliament (see Section 5). At the beginning of the\nyear, only the ceilings for the first quarter are known and quarterly updates are not made until the\nstart of each quarter. As a result, there is insufficient consistency with the cash flow forecasts. In\naddition, the commitment plan only partially incorporates the provisional procurement plans; the\nplans, as well as nonobjection notices are not issued sufficiently early to be taken into account in\nplanning.\n\n72. Investment project expenditure files are subject to rationing according to the\navailability of cash, and are not treated as a priority. The cash flow planning committee sets the\npriorities for settlement of the expenditure files, but without taking into account the payment deadlines\nestablished in the project contract letters. The document providing details on the priorities for\nsettlement does not include enough information on the expenditure files relating to investment\nprojects for them to be taken into account in the cash flow forecasts. The expenditures are thus\nsubject to rationing and may fall into arrears, or indeed be sent back at year-end for recommitment by\noriginating ministries. Accordingly, the cumulative position of domestic debt from budget outlays as at\nend-2021 includes substantial amounts of arrears, totaling US$187 million for procurement of works\n(0.3 percent of GDP).\n\n73. The legal framework stipulates that funds for donors’ projects be placed into the\nTreasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank, but in practice these funds are held at\ncommercial banks. Articles 110 and 124 to 126 of the LOFIP, as well as Articles 156 and 157 of the\nGeneral Public Accounting Regulation (RGCP) provide for the deposit of all government liquid assets\nin the TSA at the Central Bank. Accordingly, this rule applies all the more to funds for donor-financed\ninvestment projects - in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005.\nHowever, the effectiveness of this legal framework is flawed in two respects. First, the TSA is not fully\neffective given the scattering of government resources and the formation of pockets of “idle money” in\nthe financial system. Second, under the terms of the agreements signed with the various donors,\nthere is an obligation for them to open accounts at the commercial banks. That damages the\nTreasury’s ability to follow the movement of funds related to externally financed projects, and thus to\ntrack budget execution and the financial operations of the Government on a frequent and\ncomprehensive basis.\n\n74. The reforms relating to improvement of the availability of funds to cover investment\nproject expenditures are of medium priority. An effort should be made to adopt the methodological\nguides for the preparation of cash flow plans and commitment plans to strengthen the consistency\nbetween the two tools, as well as taking into account the provisional procurement plans. In addition, it\nis important that the commitment plan be prepared before the start of the fiscal year on an annual\nbasis with a quarterly sequence and that the commitment ceilings be communicated in advance to the\nsectoral ministries. In light of the parliament’s constant upward revision of revenues without\nsupporting new measures, it would also be advisable to strengthen fiscal regulation by having the\ncommitment plan at the beginning of the year based on the draft budget law appropriations, as\n\n70 Ministerial Order 053/CAB/MIN/FINANCES/2011 of September 25, 2011 establishing the\norganization and operation of the CPT.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3502}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "presented by the Government. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public\nfinance reforms (Annex 1).\n\n\n**13. Portfolio Management and Oversight** _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak_ _**:**_ _Priority_\n_of reform: High)_\n\n**75. This institution aims to assess how well management and oversight of the entire**\n**public investment portfolio are conducted in satisfactory fashion.** This assessment is carried out\nusing: (i) the system for monitoring the physical and financial implementation of major projects; (ii) the\nmechanisms for transferring funds from one project to another during the process of implementation;\nand (iii) the procedures for _ex post_ review of projects that have reached the end of the implementation\nstage.\n\n\n**76. The legal framework does not provide for any systematic, consolidated oversight of**\n**the project portfolio and the reports that are produced do not provide any information on**\n**delays and cost overruns.** The Ordinance of March 27, 2020 establishing the powers of the Ministry\nof Planning gives it an automatic role in the oversight of inter-ministerial projects, without specifying\nthat it should be systematic. This responsibility of the Ministry of Planning in terms of oversight of\ninvestment plans or execution is specified as part of the implementation of the PNSD. The legal\nframework governing the BCECO, [71] the CSPP, [72] and the Coordination of External Financing and\nProject Oversight (CRESP) unit of the Office of the President [73] also set forth the powers in terms of\noversight of their respective externally financed project portfolios. In all, no framework specifically\nstipulates the preparation of a consolidated information report on the state of progress of projects,\nregardless of their source of funding. In practice, the reports produced do not provide systematic data\non delays and cost overruns of the project portfolio [74] given the fragmentation of the parties involved,\nthe weakness of the information systems, and the lack of resources to conduct implementation\noversight missions. Oversight of externally financed project implementation follows the procedures\nset by donors, but there are still problems with the periodic collection and the centralization of\ninformation by the PGAI, the technical entity tasked with monitoring and evaluation of these projects\n(see Paragraphs 62 and 125). The Control and Oversight Directorate (DCS) of the Ministry of\nPlanning, the BCECO, the CFEF, the CSPP, the DGDP, and the Directorate for Preparation of the\nAccounts Settlement Law of the Ministry of Finance produce reports at varying periodicities,\nsometimes with delays, [75] basically focusing on the financial and sometimes the physical\nimplementation of projects. The information is not consolidated. The few reports consulted by the\nmission show significant gaps between physical and financial implementation of projects, as well as\ncases of financial over-execution, which are not sufficiently well explained or justified.\n\n\n71 Article 3 of the Decree of August 8, 2001, establishing the organization and operation of the\naforementioned BCECO.\n\n\n72 Article 5 of the Ministerial Order of December 5, 2011, establishing the organization and operation\nof the CSPP.\n\n\n73 Article 2 of the Ordinance of July 25, 2019, establishing the organization and operation of the\nCRESP.\n\n\n74 Specifically due to the lack of information that the DEPs are supposed to provide. Even so, the\nDEPs are still dependent on the resources allocated to them and suffer from a lack of capacity and\npoor sharing of information from the donors.\n\n\n75 This finding relates particularly to the DCS.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 50, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "presented by the Government. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public\nfinance reforms (Annex 1).\n\n13. Portfolio Management and Oversight _(Institutional design: Weak: Effectiveness: Weak_ _:_ _Priority_\n_of reform: High)_\n\n75. This institution aims to assess how well management and oversight of the entire\npublic investment portfolio are conducted in satisfactory fashion. This assessment is carried out\nusing: (i) the system for monitoring the physical and financial implementation of major projects; (ii) the\nmechanisms for transferring funds from one project to another during the process of implementation;\nand (iii) the procedures for _ex post_ review of projects that have reached the end of the implementation\nstage.\n\n76. The legal framework does not provide for any systematic, consolidated oversight of\nthe project portfolio and the reports that are produced do not provide any information on\ndelays and cost overruns. The Ordinance of March 27, 2020 establishing the powers of the Ministry\nof Planning gives it an automatic role in the oversight of inter-ministerial projects, without specifying\nthat it should be systematic. This responsibility of the Ministry of Planning in terms of oversight of\ninvestment plans or execution is specified as part of the implementation of the PNSD. The legal\nframework governing the BCECO, [71] the CSPP, [72] and the Coordination of External Financing and\nProject Oversight (CRESP) unit of the Office of the President [73] also set forth the powers in terms of\noversight of their respective externally financed project portfolios. In all, no framework specifically\nstipulates the preparation of a consolidated information report on the state of progress of projects,\nregardless of their source of funding. In practice, the reports produced do not provide systematic data\non delays and cost overruns of the project portfolio [74] given the fragmentation of the parties involved,\nthe weakness of the information systems, and the lack of resources to conduct implementation\noversight missions. Oversight of externally financed project implementation follows the procedures\nset by donors, but there are still problems with the periodic collection and the centralization of\ninformation by the PGAI, the technical entity tasked with monitoring and evaluation of these projects\n(see Paragraphs 62 and 125). The Control and Oversight Directorate (DCS) of the Ministry of\nPlanning, the BCECO, the CFEF, the CSPP, the DGDP, and the Directorate for Preparation of the\nAccounts Settlement Law of the Ministry of Finance produce reports at varying periodicities,\nsometimes with delays, [75] basically focusing on the financial and sometimes the physical\nimplementation of projects. The information is not consolidated. The few reports consulted by the\nmission show significant gaps between physical and financial implementation of projects, as well as\ncases of financial over-execution, which are not sufficiently well explained or justified.\n\n71 Article 3 of the Decree of August 8, 2001, establishing the organization and operation of the\naforementioned BCECO.\n\n72 Article 5 of the Ministerial Order of December 5, 2011, establishing the organization and operation\nof the CSPP.\n\n73 Article 2 of the Ordinance of July 25, 2019, establishing the organization and operation of the\nCRESP.\n\n74 Specifically due to the lack of information that the DEPs are supposed to provide. Even so, the\nDEPs are still dependent on the resources allocated to them and suffer from a lack of capacity and\npoor sharing of information from the donors.\n\n75 This finding relates particularly to the DCS.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3133}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**77. The reallocation of funds across projects, which is possible under the legal**\n**arrangements, is not carried out in practice.** The LOFIP provides that appropriations may be\ntransferred from one project to another during the implementation stage, across the expenditure\nchapters ( _titres_ ) within any given program (Article 47), across programs of any given ministry /\ninstitution (Article 48), and across programs of different ministries / institutions (Article 49). However,\nthe legal framework does not explicitly stipulate a systematic monitoring process or formalized\ntransparent procedures, which would enable such transfers to be assessed and justified. In practice,\nfunds are not reallocated from one public investment project to another during implementation. The\nimplementation of program-based budgeting is part of the reforms underway. As part of the\nconversations held, the IGF stated that it could “occur that funds were transferred from one\ninvestment project to another without any monitoring and hidden from sight more or less across the\nboard”.\n\n\n**78. The systematic** _**ex post**_ **review of major projects is not formally required and, in**\n**practice, the government’s reviews cover very few large-scale projects.** The legal framework [76]\ngives automatic power to the IGF to conduct such _ex post_ reviews without any formal requirement to\ncarry them out. There is no formal rule in the legal framework covering the obligation to produce a\ncompletion report and to adjust project implementation policies and procedures accordingly. In\npractice, _ex post_ reviews by the government are neither systematically required, nor frequently\ncarried out, given the little resources available and the absence of technical expertise in the relevant\nministries. According to the IGF, the Ministry of Budget limits itself to conducting financial evaluations\nbased on budget execution reports without, however, adopting a comprehensive approach. The\nmission was only able to analyze a single externally financed project completion report, submitted by\nthe CFEF, which was of notably high quality.\n\n\n**79. Strengthening the project portfolio management and oversight capacities to support**\n**decision-making for subsequent budgets is a high priority of reform.** The principles of periodic\nmonitoring of implementation of all major projects, of centralization of information, and of systematic\n_ex post_ review should be incorporated in the future decree on public investment management. In the\nlonger term, the practical procedures for these processes should be revised and streamlined with the\nestablishment of an integrated bank of projects, supported by a project monitoring information\nsystem, whereby projects would be identified by a unique code lasting the whole of their life-cycle.\nAnnex 7 presents the major principles guiding the establishment of this integrated project bank. In the\nshort term, project fiches should include information on the physical and financial monitoring of\ndomestically-financed projects; they should be consolidated in the database of the Ministry of\nPlanning and pooled; additionally, a simplified structure of liaison form (“ _fiche-navette_ ”) could be\nformalized with donors to gather information on externally financed projects. In order to prepare the\nfuture information system, a consultation framework between the Ministry of Planning and the C2I\nshould be set up and operational specifications should be drawn up and validated before developing\nany software.\n\n\n**14. Management of Project Implementation** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak:_\n_Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n**80. This dimension focuses on the management and control of public investment**\n**programs during implementation.** It is assessed by way of the following: (i) the existence of an\n\n\n76 Article 121 of the Law of 2011, on government finance mentioned above, and Articles 138 to140 of\nthe General Public Accounting Regulation.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 51, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "77. The reallocation of funds across projects, which is possible under the legal\narrangements, is not carried out in practice. The LOFIP provides that appropriations may be\ntransferred from one project to another during the implementation stage, across the expenditure\nchapters ( _titres_ ) within any given program (Article 47), across programs of any given ministry /\ninstitution (Article 48), and across programs of different ministries / institutions (Article 49). However,\nthe legal framework does not explicitly stipulate a systematic monitoring process or formalized\ntransparent procedures, which would enable such transfers to be assessed and justified. In practice,\nfunds are not reallocated from one public investment project to another during implementation. The\nimplementation of program-based budgeting is part of the reforms underway. As part of the\nconversations held, the IGF stated that it could “occur that funds were transferred from one\ninvestment project to another without any monitoring and hidden from sight more or less across the\nboard”.\n\n78. The systematic _ex post_ review of major projects is not formally required and, in\npractice, the government’s reviews cover very few large-scale projects. The legal framework [76]\ngives automatic power to the IGF to conduct such _ex post_ reviews without any formal requirement to\ncarry them out. There is no formal rule in the legal framework covering the obligation to produce a\ncompletion report and to adjust project implementation policies and procedures accordingly. In\npractice, _ex post_ reviews by the government are neither systematically required, nor frequently\ncarried out, given the little resources available and the absence of technical expertise in the relevant\nministries. According to the IGF, the Ministry of Budget limits itself to conducting financial evaluations\nbased on budget execution reports without, however, adopting a comprehensive approach. The\nmission was only able to analyze a single externally financed project completion report, submitted by\nthe CFEF, which was of notably high quality.\n\n79. Strengthening the project portfolio management and oversight capacities to support\ndecision-making for subsequent budgets is a high priority of reform. The principles of periodic\nmonitoring of implementation of all major projects, of centralization of information, and of systematic\n_ex post_ review should be incorporated in the future decree on public investment management. In the\nlonger term, the practical procedures for these processes should be revised and streamlined with the\nestablishment of an integrated bank of projects, supported by a project monitoring information\nsystem, whereby projects would be identified by a unique code lasting the whole of their life-cycle.\nAnnex 7 presents the major principles guiding the establishment of this integrated project bank. In the\nshort term, project fiches should include information on the physical and financial monitoring of\ndomestically-financed projects; they should be consolidated in the database of the Ministry of\nPlanning and pooled; additionally, a simplified structure of liaison form (“ _fiche-navette_ ”) could be\nformalized with donors to gather information on externally financed projects. In order to prepare the\nfuture information system, a consultation framework between the Ministry of Planning and the C2I\nshould be set up and operational specifications should be drawn up and validated before developing\nany software.\n\n14. Management of Project Implementation _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak:_\n_Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n80. This dimension focuses on the management and control of public investment\nprograms during implementation. It is assessed by way of the following: (i) the existence of an\n\n76 Article 121 of the Law of 2011, on government finance mentioned above, and Articles 138 to140 of\nthe General Public Accounting Regulation.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3409}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "efficient project management system; (ii) the enactment and application of rules, procedures, and\nguidelines on project adjustments; and (iii) the completion of _ex post_ external audits.\n\n\n**81. Although the framework for project management arrangements is weak, neither**\n**providing for the appointment of senior responsible officers nor for the preparation of**\n**implementation plans, responsible officers are appointed in practice.** There is no legal or\nregulatory basis, including in the texts establishing the powers of the Directorates for Research and\nProgramming (DEPs) of the sectoral ministries or those of the procurement and project management\nunits, stipulating that the implementing ministries and entities should systematically appoint senior\nresponsible officers to manage major investment projects. [77] In practice, the ministries and entities\ntasked with project implementation met during the mission stated that they do appoint project officers,\nmostly reflecting good practice set up by donors. The preparation of implementation plans before the\nstart of projects is, however, not institutionalized. According to the IGF, the patchy definition of\noutputs and activities of projects is a factor that helps to explain the difficulties in completing projects\non time and on budget. [78] The BCECO has a draft project management manual which prescribes the\npreparation of project payment schedules.\n\n\n**82. There are no standard rules on adjustments to projects during their implementation,**\n**and adjustments are consequently not documented.** There is no manual setting standard\nprocedures and rules for the adjustment of costs, implementation deadlines, or outputs of projects,\naccording to the Ministry of Planning. This finding is reflected in practice; the mission was not able to\nidentify any specific practices to adjust projects and document the adjustments. According to the IGF,\nthese adjustments are frequent, however. The estimation of costs at the time of a project’s start-up is\nconsidered often not to be based on sound analyses, and significant adjustments to projects take\nplace during implementation - these factors are thought to be among the key factors that explain the\nobserved budget overruns.\n\n\n**83. The Court of Accounts has the mandate to audit investment projects, but it does not**\n**perform this task due to its limited financial independence.** Under Organic Law 18/024 of\nNovember 13, 2018, the Court of Accounts is given the mandate to audit any and all investment\nprojects carried out with government funds. [79] In practice, specifically due to the limited financial\nindependence of the Court of Accounts, these audits – meaning an in-depth investigation of a major\ninvestment project - are not performed. However, some audits by the Court of Accounts do relate to\npublic investments. For example, it is currently in the process of auditing the procurement procedures\nwithin several national and provincial entities. It also performs spot inspections on projects that are\n\n\n77 The DEPs’ task is to coordinate and ensure the follow-up assessment of the government projects\nand programs developed (Decree 15/043 of December 28, 2015) The procurement and project\nmanagement units have responsibilities primarily in connection with public contracts without clarifying\nwhether they are systematically responsible for the operational implementation of the projects\n(Decree 10/32 of December 28, 2010).\n\n78 According to the IGF the weakness in initial project planning, often without any stable element\ncovering total cost, deadline, or expected outputs, is an aspect that contributes to this finding.\n\n79 The Court of Accounts is empowered to inspect major investment projects using various types of\naudit: judicial review (of the accounts), budget inspection (of the general budget, annex, and special\naccounts), and management audit (of finances to assess their performance). The specific reports of\nmanagement inspections are published, as well as an annual report, and the audit reports are sent to\nthe National Assembly (Article 84 of the LOFIP).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 52, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "efficient project management system; (ii) the enactment and application of rules, procedures, and\nguidelines on project adjustments; and (iii) the completion of _ex post_ external audits.\n\n81. Although the framework for project management arrangements is weak, neither\nproviding for the appointment of senior responsible officers nor for the preparation of\nimplementation plans, responsible officers are appointed in practice. There is no legal or\nregulatory basis, including in the texts establishing the powers of the Directorates for Research and\nProgramming (DEPs) of the sectoral ministries or those of the procurement and project management\nunits, stipulating that the implementing ministries and entities should systematically appoint senior\nresponsible officers to manage major investment projects. [77] In practice, the ministries and entities\ntasked with project implementation met during the mission stated that they do appoint project officers,\nmostly reflecting good practice set up by donors. The preparation of implementation plans before the\nstart of projects is, however, not institutionalized. According to the IGF, the patchy definition of\noutputs and activities of projects is a factor that helps to explain the difficulties in completing projects\non time and on budget. [78] The BCECO has a draft project management manual which prescribes the\npreparation of project payment schedules.\n\n82. There are no standard rules on adjustments to projects during their implementation,\nand adjustments are consequently not documented. There is no manual setting standard\nprocedures and rules for the adjustment of costs, implementation deadlines, or outputs of projects,\naccording to the Ministry of Planning. This finding is reflected in practice; the mission was not able to\nidentify any specific practices to adjust projects and document the adjustments. According to the IGF,\nthese adjustments are frequent, however. The estimation of costs at the time of a project’s start-up is\nconsidered often not to be based on sound analyses, and significant adjustments to projects take\nplace during implementation - these factors are thought to be among the key factors that explain the\nobserved budget overruns.\n\n83. The Court of Accounts has the mandate to audit investment projects, but it does not\nperform this task due to its limited financial independence. Under Organic Law 18/024 of\nNovember 13, 2018, the Court of Accounts is given the mandate to audit any and all investment\nprojects carried out with government funds. [79] In practice, specifically due to the limited financial\nindependence of the Court of Accounts, these audits – meaning an in-depth investigation of a major\ninvestment project - are not performed. However, some audits by the Court of Accounts do relate to\npublic investments. For example, it is currently in the process of auditing the procurement procedures\nwithin several national and provincial entities. It also performs spot inspections on projects that are\n\n77 The DEPs’ task is to coordinate and ensure the follow-up assessment of the government projects\nand programs developed (Decree 15/043 of December 28, 2015) The procurement and project\nmanagement units have responsibilities primarily in connection with public contracts without clarifying\nwhether they are systematically responsible for the operational implementation of the projects\n(Decree 10/32 of December 28, 2010).\n\n78 According to the IGF the weakness in initial project planning, often without any stable element\ncovering total cost, deadline, or expected outputs, is an aspect that contributes to this finding.\n\n79 The Court of Accounts is empowered to inspect major investment projects using various types of\naudit: judicial review (of the accounts), budget inspection (of the general budget, annex, and special\naccounts), and management audit (of finances to assess their performance). The specific reports of\nmanagement inspections are published, as well as an annual report, and the audit reports are sent to\nthe National Assembly (Article 84 of the LOFIP).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3512}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "unfinished, and provides in its annual report [80] a list of projects without physical execution that\nhowever have received payments. These findings have not been followed up by any in-depth audits.\n\n\n**84. The strengthening of the management of project implementation is a medium priority**\n**reform** In particular, the future decree on public investment management will have to lay down a\nframework for project management arrangements and provide for the appointment of project officers,\nthe systematic preparation of project implementation plans, and the adjustment of projects during\nimplementation. A guide issued by the Ministry of Planning could establish a procedure for\nadjustment of projects during implementation. Greater financial autonomy of the Court of Accounts\nshould be provided under the general reforms covered by the Priority Action Plan for public finance\nreforms (Annex 1).\n\n\n**15. Monitoring of Public Assets** _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_\n_reform: Low)_\n\n**85. This institution checks whether government assets are well monitored and their value**\n**properly accounted for and reported in financial statements.** This is assessed looking at (i) the\nregular updating of asset registers based on an analysis of the stock, their value, and their state; (ii)\nthe recording of the value of these nonfinancial assets in government financial accounts; and (iii) the\nrecognition in the government’s income statement of depreciation of the fixed assets.\n\n\n**86. For lack of comprehensive registers, the government does not have detailed**\n**information on its nonfinancial assets.** The formats for government asset registers were\nestablished in the General Public Accounting Regulations (RGCP) of 1952, but these structures have\nnot been updated since then, even to support the establishment of inventory accounting required by\nthe LOFIP. In summary these registers are no longer kept, let alone updated. A small number of\nadministrative entities [81] have registers of their assets, but their format does not enable to document\nrelevant information, such as the identification of the asset, its location and the organization\nresponsible for it, the date of acquisition, the historic cost, and the current value. Furthermore, these\nregisters are not regularly updated, due to the fact that no inventories are carried out. Finally, there is\nno consolidation process that could provide government with inventory accounts.\n\n\n**87. Despite a very specific legal obligation to register nonfinancial assets in the financial**\n**statements, neither the asset accounting, nor the inventory accounting are effectively carried**\n**out.** Articles 98 to 100 of the LOFIP, as well as Articles 118 and 119 of Decree 13/51 of\nNovember 8, 2013 on the Government Chart of Accounts (PCE) require the production of the\nfinancial statements (balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows, and attached notes)\nin accordance with international rules and standards. Ordinance Law 89/017 of February 18, 1989 on\nthe revaluation of fixed assets also applies to nonfinancial assets of the government based on\ncoefficients issued each year by the Minister of finance, based on a proposal of the Standing Council\nof Accounting of the Congo (CPCC). However, general accounting as prescribed by the provisions\nmentioned above is not effectively carried out.\n\n\n**88. The regulatory framework sets forth rules relating to accounting for depreciation of**\n**nonfinancial assets, but these rules are not actually applied.** Articles 33 and 38 to 44 of the\n\n\n80 Public report on fiscal year 2019, section 1.3.1. Results of investigations into projects financed\nusing own funds and not implemented in 20?5-2016 [ _sic_ ].\n\n81 This refers to the case of the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, which updates the registers\nof the real estate assets of the Government’s private estate and government institutions, which carry\nout asset-based accounting.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 53, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "unfinished, and provides in its annual report [80] a list of projects without physical execution that\nhowever have received payments. These findings have not been followed up by any in-depth audits.\n\n84. The strengthening of the management of project implementation is a medium priority\nreform In particular, the future decree on public investment management will have to lay down a\nframework for project management arrangements and provide for the appointment of project officers,\nthe systematic preparation of project implementation plans, and the adjustment of projects during\nimplementation. A guide issued by the Ministry of Planning could establish a procedure for\nadjustment of projects during implementation. Greater financial autonomy of the Court of Accounts\nshould be provided under the general reforms covered by the Priority Action Plan for public finance\nreforms (Annex 1).\n\n15. Monitoring of Public Assets _(Institutional design: Medium; Effectiveness: Weak: Priority of_\n_reform: Low)_\n\n85. This institution checks whether government assets are well monitored and their value\nproperly accounted for and reported in financial statements. This is assessed looking at (i) the\nregular updating of asset registers based on an analysis of the stock, their value, and their state; (ii)\nthe recording of the value of these nonfinancial assets in government financial accounts; and (iii) the\nrecognition in the government’s income statement of depreciation of the fixed assets.\n\n86. For lack of comprehensive registers, the government does not have detailed\ninformation on its nonfinancial assets. The formats for government asset registers were\nestablished in the General Public Accounting Regulations (RGCP) of 1952, but these structures have\nnot been updated since then, even to support the establishment of inventory accounting required by\nthe LOFIP. In summary these registers are no longer kept, let alone updated. A small number of\nadministrative entities [81] have registers of their assets, but their format does not enable to document\nrelevant information, such as the identification of the asset, its location and the organization\nresponsible for it, the date of acquisition, the historic cost, and the current value. Furthermore, these\nregisters are not regularly updated, due to the fact that no inventories are carried out. Finally, there is\nno consolidation process that could provide government with inventory accounts.\n\n87. Despite a very specific legal obligation to register nonfinancial assets in the financial\nstatements, neither the asset accounting, nor the inventory accounting are effectively carried\nout. Articles 98 to 100 of the LOFIP, as well as Articles 118 and 119 of Decree 13/51 of\nNovember 8, 2013 on the Government Chart of Accounts (PCE) require the production of the\nfinancial statements (balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows, and attached notes)\nin accordance with international rules and standards. Ordinance Law 89/017 of February 18, 1989 on\nthe revaluation of fixed assets also applies to nonfinancial assets of the government based on\ncoefficients issued each year by the Minister of finance, based on a proposal of the Standing Council\nof Accounting of the Congo (CPCC). However, general accounting as prescribed by the provisions\nmentioned above is not effectively carried out.\n\n88. The regulatory framework sets forth rules relating to accounting for depreciation of\nnonfinancial assets, but these rules are not actually applied. Articles 33 and 38 to 44 of the\n\n80 Public report on fiscal year 2019, section 1.3.1. Results of investigations into projects financed\nusing own funds and not implemented in 20?5-2016 [ _sic_ ].\n\n81 This refers to the case of the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, which updates the registers\nof the real estate assets of the Government’s private estate and government institutions, which carry\nout asset-based accounting.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3383}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "decree on the PCE require depreciation to be recorded, broken down by type of asset, and booked to\nthe income statement in the form of a depreciation charge. However, depreciation is not calculated,\nas the income statement has not yet been set up.\n\n\n**89. The reforms relating to monitoring nonfinancial assets of the government are not a**\n**priority relative to the other public investment management reforms in the DRC.** These are\nlarge-scale reforms that will take time. They should start with the production of a full inventory, which\nshould be carried out using a gradual approach based on a clear asset valuation methodology. The\ndevelopment of an information system is also necessary to enable inventory accounting to feed into\ngeneral accounting and ensure that the accounting of fixed assets and stocks is of good quality. It\nwould be advisable to establish the institutional framework of inventory accounting and to develop its\nregulatory framework. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public finance\nreforms (Annex 1).\n\n##### **IV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C-** **PIMA)**\n\n\n**A. CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE DRC**\n\n\n**90. The DRC is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to its specific geographical**\n**characteristics.** The annual average temperature has increased by 0.2 degree per decade over the\nlast thirty years and is expected to continue to increase by 1 to 2 degrees by 2050 with a potential\nrise of 5 degrees by 2100. [82] Although the DRC has exceptional natural resources (river system,\narable land, biodiversity, tropical forest, and minerals), it is vulnerable to a very large variety of\nclimate risks, particularly due to its huge land mass (2.4 million km [2] ) and the fact that it spans three\nclimate zones (equatorial, tropical, and high-altitude). The main risks attached to climate change are\ntorrential rain, coastal erosion, earthquakes, flooding, heatwaves, and also seasonal drought. The\nscale of deforestation, combined with periods of heavy rain and with urbanization, also leads to\nparticularly frequent landslides, especially in the Kivu region. The ranking of the DRC (177 [th] out\nof 181 countries) in relation to the Notre Dame University index, [83] which measures both vulnerability\nto climate change (degree of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptation ability) for six key sectors [84] and the\ndegree of preparation (economic, institutional, and social), illustrates the magnitude of the challenges\nahead. Natural disasters linked to climate change will become more and more frequent in the coming\nyears due to the rise in temperature and precipitation, which will have automatic consequences for\nhealth, biodiversity, access to water, agriculture, and employment.\n\n\n**91. The quality and resilience of infrastructure in the DRC are crucial to mitigate the socio-**\n**economic cost of climate change and the risk stemming from natural disasters.** Floods and\ndrought are the natural disasters with the heaviest impact on the Congolese people and economy.\nIndeed, agriculture is the most vulnerable sector, as it represents a very large part of GDP\n(40 percent) and employs almost three out of every four people within the DRC’s labor force.\nTransport infrastructure is also considered to be an essential asset to be adapted given its\n\n\n82 WBG Climate Knowledge Portal (CCKP, 2021). DRC Projected Future Climate.\n\n83 University of Notre Dame (2020). Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.\n\n84 These sectors are: food supply, water, health, ecosystem protection, housing and infrastructure.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 54, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "decree on the PCE require depreciation to be recorded, broken down by type of asset, and booked to\nthe income statement in the form of a depreciation charge. However, depreciation is not calculated,\nas the income statement has not yet been set up.\n\n89. The reforms relating to monitoring nonfinancial assets of the government are not a\npriority relative to the other public investment management reforms in the DRC. These are\nlarge-scale reforms that will take time. They should start with the production of a full inventory, which\nshould be carried out using a gradual approach based on a clear asset valuation methodology. The\ndevelopment of an information system is also necessary to enable inventory accounting to feed into\ngeneral accounting and ensure that the accounting of fixed assets and stocks is of good quality. It\nwould be advisable to establish the institutional framework of inventory accounting and to develop its\nregulatory framework. These reforms are included in the Priority Action Plan for public finance\nreforms (Annex 1).\nIV. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT MODULE (C- PIMA)\n\nA. CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE DRC\n\n90. The DRC is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to its specific geographical\ncharacteristics. The annual average temperature has increased by 0.2 degree per decade over the\nlast thirty years and is expected to continue to increase by 1 to 2 degrees by 2050 with a potential\nrise of 5 degrees by 2100. [82] Although the DRC has exceptional natural resources (river system,\narable land, biodiversity, tropical forest, and minerals), it is vulnerable to a very large variety of\nclimate risks, particularly due to its huge land mass (2.4 million km [2] ) and the fact that it spans three\nclimate zones (equatorial, tropical, and high-altitude). The main risks attached to climate change are\ntorrential rain, coastal erosion, earthquakes, flooding, heatwaves, and also seasonal drought. The\nscale of deforestation, combined with periods of heavy rain and with urbanization, also leads to\nparticularly frequent landslides, especially in the Kivu region. The ranking of the DRC (177 [th] out\nof 181 countries) in relation to the Notre Dame University index, [83] which measures both vulnerability\nto climate change (degree of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptation ability) for six key sectors [84] and the\ndegree of preparation (economic, institutional, and social), illustrates the magnitude of the challenges\nahead. Natural disasters linked to climate change will become more and more frequent in the coming\nyears due to the rise in temperature and precipitation, which will have automatic consequences for\nhealth, biodiversity, access to water, agriculture, and employment.\n\n91. The quality and resilience of infrastructure in the DRC are crucial to mitigate the socio-\neconomic cost of climate change and the risk stemming from natural disasters. Floods and\ndrought are the natural disasters with the heaviest impact on the Congolese people and economy.\nIndeed, agriculture is the most vulnerable sector, as it represents a very large part of GDP\n(40 percent) and employs almost three out of every four people within the DRC’s labor force.\nTransport infrastructure is also considered to be an essential asset to be adapted given its\n\n82 WBG Climate Knowledge Portal (CCKP, 2021). DRC Projected Future Climate.\n\n83 University of Notre Dame (2020). Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.\n\n84 These sectors are: food supply, water, health, ecosystem protection, housing and infrastructure.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3045}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "vulnerability to flooding (roads, bridges, and ports [85] ). The energy sector will also be heavily impacted\nby the rise in extreme weather events, due to the fact that national energy production is almost\nexclusively from hydroelectricity (thanks to two dams) and is thus sensitive to disruptions to river\nflow. [86] Finally, the water sector is of prime importance to the DRC, which has one of the largest fresh\nwater basins in Africa (62 percent of the Congo basin) and where, at the same time, access to\ndrinking water and sanitation is limited (50 million people lack drinking water out of a total Congolese\npopulation of nearly 90 million). Investing in the infrastructure related to water quality and access\n(water supply infrastructure, in particular) will thus be a major challenge for the next few decades in\nthe DRC; this challenge will be made more complicated to address by the impact of climate change.\nInvestment carried out in this sector will also have multiple impacts on other sectors, such as health,\nfood security, and agriculture.\n\n\n**92. The government has committed to ambitious low-carbon emission development**\n**targets with, in particular, more resilient and greener infrastructure.** Following the ratifications of\nthe United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in1997, the Kyoto Protocol\nin 2005, and the Paris Agreement in 2017, the DRC has committed to participating in limiting the\nincrease in global temperature with an emissions reduction target of 21 percent by 2030. Accordingly,\nthe DRC presented a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2017 relating to mitigation and\nadaptation which was revised at end-2021. The NDC relies on the full set of information available, in\nparticular the Third National Communication on Climate Change (2015), the sectoral policies\navailable, such as the national framework strategy REDD+ (2012), [87] the PNSD 2019-2023, and the\nNational Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (NAP) 2022-2026. The NAP has nine priority objectives\nin terms of adaptation: manage forest ecosystems and biodiversity; strengthen resilience of the\nagriculture sector, manage climate risks in small-scale farming, reduce the risk of disasters; provide\nmanagement of water resources and environmental sanitation; strengthen the resilience of the health\nsector; guarantee access by the populations to energy; protect energy production infrastructure; and\nimprove energy efficiency.\n\n\n**B. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE MODULE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**\n\n\n**93. The PIMA climate change module (C-PIMA) assesses five key dimensions of public**\n**investment management from the climate change perspective and constitutes an extension of**\n**the existing PIMA framework.** The C-PIMA institutions strongly resemble the corresponding\ninstitutions of the PIMA, although some of the C-PIMA institutions combine several dimensions\nappearing in separate PIMA institutions, and Institution 5 of the C-PIMA (risk management) has no\nequivalent in the PIMA. Figure 4.A describes the main elements of the C-PIMA and illustrates the\nrelationship between the PIMA and C-PIMA frameworks. However, unlike the PIMA, the C-PIMA\nframework only formally assesses institutional design, given the lack of historical hindsight on\neffective practices, as this is such a new topic.\n\n\n**Figure 4.A. The C-PIMA assessment framework**\n\n\n85 Plan organisation de la réponse de la sécurité civile (ORSEC) en RDC (2012) - Civil security\nresponse organization plan (ORSEC) in the DRC (2012)\n\n86 Climate Risk Country Profile, DRC, World Bank (2021)\n\n87 The REDD+ program will support projects in the forest areas located in the provinces, and plans\nconsultation forums bringing together the Government, local authorities, and civil society.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 55, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "vulnerability to flooding (roads, bridges, and ports [85] ). The energy sector will also be heavily impacted\nby the rise in extreme weather events, due to the fact that national energy production is almost\nexclusively from hydroelectricity (thanks to two dams) and is thus sensitive to disruptions to river\nflow. [86] Finally, the water sector is of prime importance to the DRC, which has one of the largest fresh\nwater basins in Africa (62 percent of the Congo basin) and where, at the same time, access to\ndrinking water and sanitation is limited (50 million people lack drinking water out of a total Congolese\npopulation of nearly 90 million). Investing in the infrastructure related to water quality and access\n(water supply infrastructure, in particular) will thus be a major challenge for the next few decades in\nthe DRC; this challenge will be made more complicated to address by the impact of climate change.\nInvestment carried out in this sector will also have multiple impacts on other sectors, such as health,\nfood security, and agriculture.\n\n92. The government has committed to ambitious low-carbon emission development\ntargets with, in particular, more resilient and greener infrastructure. Following the ratifications of\nthe United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in1997, the Kyoto Protocol\nin 2005, and the Paris Agreement in 2017, the DRC has committed to participating in limiting the\nincrease in global temperature with an emissions reduction target of 21 percent by 2030. Accordingly,\nthe DRC presented a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2017 relating to mitigation and\nadaptation which was revised at end-2021. The NDC relies on the full set of information available, in\nparticular the Third National Communication on Climate Change (2015), the sectoral policies\navailable, such as the national framework strategy REDD+ (2012), [87] the PNSD 2019-2023, and the\nNational Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (NAP) 2022-2026. The NAP has nine priority objectives\nin terms of adaptation: manage forest ecosystems and biodiversity; strengthen resilience of the\nagriculture sector, manage climate risks in small-scale farming, reduce the risk of disasters; provide\nmanagement of water resources and environmental sanitation; strengthen the resilience of the health\nsector; guarantee access by the populations to energy; protect energy production infrastructure; and\nimprove energy efficiency.\n\nB. PIMA CLIMATE CHANGE MODULE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK\n\n93. The PIMA climate change module (C-PIMA) assesses five key dimensions of public\ninvestment management from the climate change perspective and constitutes an extension of\nthe existing PIMA framework. The C-PIMA institutions strongly resemble the corresponding\ninstitutions of the PIMA, although some of the C-PIMA institutions combine several dimensions\nappearing in separate PIMA institutions, and Institution 5 of the C-PIMA (risk management) has no\nequivalent in the PIMA. Figure 4.A describes the main elements of the C-PIMA and illustrates the\nrelationship between the PIMA and C-PIMA frameworks. However, unlike the PIMA, the C-PIMA\nframework only formally assesses institutional design, given the lack of historical hindsight on\neffective practices, as this is such a new topic.\n\nFigure 4.A. The C-PIMA assessment framework\n\n85 Plan organisation de la réponse de la sécurité civile (ORSEC) en RDC (2012) - Civil security\nresponse organization plan (ORSEC) in the DRC (2012)\n\n86 Climate Risk Country Profile, DRC, World Bank (2021)\n\n87 The REDD+ program will support projects in the forest areas located in the provinces, and plans\nconsultation forums bringing together the Government, local authorities, and civil society.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3215}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0056-001"], "markdown": "\n\n**C1. Climate-aware Planning** _(Institutional design: Weak; Priority of reform: High)_\n\n**94. The first C-PIMA institution assesses the extent to which public investment is planned**\n**while taking into account climate change.** Accordingly, the first dimension of this institution\nassesses whether the national public investment plans and strategies are consistent with the\nobjectives of the authorities and the expected outcomes. The second dimension considers whether\nthe Government or the provinces require that the rules regarding land use and construction take\nclimate risk into account. Finally, the third dimension covers the existence of centralized guidance\npromoting climate-aware public investment planning.\n\n\n**95. The national and sectoral strategies are not aligned with the climate targets and**\n**objectives described in the NDC, except for the forestry sector strategy.** The PNSD and\nthe 2021-2023 Government Program include pillars that focus on protection of the environment and\ncombating climate change, but they do not allow for easy cross-referencing with the targets and\nobjectives of the NDC. Although climate change awareness in the national planning documents is a\ngood practice in itself, climate targets and objectives are not reflected in a cross-cutting way in the\nother areas of the PNSD and in the other sectoral documents. As for sectoral strategies, the great\nmajority of the documents reviewed (health, education, and mines, in particular) make no reference to\nclimate change. The Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) strategy and its\ninvestment plan (PIREDD) are an exception, with consistency between the detail of the actions (draft,\npreliminary budget, and impact / effect indicators) and the DRC’s commitments on sustainable forest\nmanagement with the aim of participation in combating climate change. The NAP was also prepared\nwith UNDP support, covering the 2022-2026 period and focused on four sectors: forest, agriculture.,\ncoastal areas, and health. The forthcoming update of the PNSD will provide an opportunity to\nincorporate climate issues more closely in national public investment planning.\n\n\n**96. The central and provincial regulations relating to spatial planning and construction do**\n**not reflect the risks linked to climate change.** Current national regulations on land management\nand construction standards are obsolete. The most recent law specifically concerning spatial and\nurban planning and construction dates from 1973 [88] and therefore does not include any climate\nchange consideration. The DRC’s body of legislation on land management is, however, in the\nprocess of renewal, thanks to the initiative of the Ministry of Land Management, with the completion\n\n\n88 Law 73-021 of July 20, 1973 establishing the general regulations for assets, land and real estate\nregulations, and regulations on guarantees, known as the “loi foncière” (land law).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1122, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 56, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(151.27487182617188, 72.00007629394531, 478.9264221191406, 238.00006103515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 511, "number": 7, "size": 530610, "transform": [327.65155029296875, 0.0, -0.0, 165.99998474121094, 151.27487182617188, 72.00007629394531], "width": 1009, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "C1. Climate-aware Planning _(Institutional design: Weak; Priority of reform: High)_\n\n94. The first C-PIMA institution assesses the extent to which public investment is planned\nwhile taking into account climate change. Accordingly, the first dimension of this institution\nassesses whether the national public investment plans and strategies are consistent with the\nobjectives of the authorities and the expected outcomes. The second dimension considers whether\nthe Government or the provinces require that the rules regarding land use and construction take\nclimate risk into account. Finally, the third dimension covers the existence of centralized guidance\npromoting climate-aware public investment planning.\n\n95. The national and sectoral strategies are not aligned with the climate targets and\nobjectives described in the NDC, except for the forestry sector strategy. The PNSD and\nthe 2021-2023 Government Program include pillars that focus on protection of the environment and\ncombating climate change, but they do not allow for easy cross-referencing with the targets and\nobjectives of the NDC. Although climate change awareness in the national planning documents is a\ngood practice in itself, climate targets and objectives are not reflected in a cross-cutting way in the\nother areas of the PNSD and in the other sectoral documents. As for sectoral strategies, the great\nmajority of the documents reviewed (health, education, and mines, in particular) make no reference to\nclimate change. The Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) strategy and its\ninvestment plan (PIREDD) are an exception, with consistency between the detail of the actions (draft,\npreliminary budget, and impact / effect indicators) and the DRC’s commitments on sustainable forest\nmanagement with the aim of participation in combating climate change. The NAP was also prepared\nwith UNDP support, covering the 2022-2026 period and focused on four sectors: forest, agriculture.,\ncoastal areas, and health. The forthcoming update of the PNSD will provide an opportunity to\nincorporate climate issues more closely in national public investment planning.\n\n96. The central and provincial regulations relating to spatial planning and construction do\nnot reflect the risks linked to climate change. Current national regulations on land management\nand construction standards are obsolete. The most recent law specifically concerning spatial and\nurban planning and construction dates from 1973 [88] and therefore does not include any climate\nchange consideration. The DRC’s body of legislation on land management is, however, in the\nprocess of renewal, thanks to the initiative of the Ministry of Land Management, with the completion\n\n88 Law 73-021 of July 20, 1973 establishing the general regulations for assets, land and real estate\nregulations, and regulations on guarantees, known as the “loi foncière” (land law).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2529}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "of a draft national law on land management due to be submitted in the very near future to the\nparliament; this represents an opportunity to incorporate climate change concerns. In addition, a land\nmanagement strategy and a land use strategy are currently being finalized and include references to\nthe risks associated with climate change, including with a dedicated strategic pillar. Finally, even\nthough the mission was not able to find any examples of provincial regulations on spatial planning\nand construction taking climate risks into account, a notable good practice is the production in\nApril 2021 of a methodological guide for the completion of participatory zoning of village land and\nregional entities as part of the PIREDD, which refers to environmental constraints.\n\n\n**97. So far, there is no centralized support for the preparation and costing of climate-aware**\n**investment strategies.** In effect, there is no dedicated unit to support the sectoral ministries, which\ncould provide technical support to take into account climate issues when they prepare and assess the\ncosts of public investment strategies. The Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development\n(MEDD) and the Congolese Environment Agency (ACE) concentrate the expertise on environmental\nand climate issues within the government and are in charge of the preparation, oversight, and\nassessment of the national plans for sustainable environmental management. [89] However, the MEDD\nhas no explicit mandate to provide technical support for the preparation and costing of sectoral\nplanning strategies taking climate issues into account. The involvement of local participants will also\nbe necessary at the sectoral ministries, in particular in relation to land management (soil and subsoil).\n\n\n**98.** **The reflection of climate change impacts in public investment planning is a high-**\n**priority reform.** To that end, it is important to align the PNSD and the sectoral strategies with the\nNDC’s climate objectives, in order to provide a sectoral breakdown of climate-related objectives,\ntargets, and outcomes. Training for the sectoral ministries could be provided by the MEDD and the\nACE to promote the integration of climate issues in investment strategies. A national strategy for\ncombating climate change would be helpful in the medium term. Moreover, the adoption as soon as\npossible of the new law on land management and the publication of its dedicated strategy are\nnecessary prerequisites for climate-sensitive planning.\n\n\n**C2. Coordination across Public Sector** _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n**99. This institution targets the coordination of climate-related public investment decision-**\n**making across the entire public sector.** The emphasis is placed on the need to adopt a\ncomprehensive approach to climate change. Alongside the government, both provinces / ETDs and\npublic corporations effectively play a significant role in carrying out public investment in response to\nclimate change. This is the reason why the three dimensions of this institution assess in turn whether\nclimate-related investment decisions are coordinated across (i) central government, (ii) general\ngovernment (including local authorities), and (iii) the public sector in its entirety, including public\ncorporations.\n\n\n**100. Sectoral thematic groups have promoted the coordination of public investment**\n**decisions across central government in connection with climate issues.** These sectoral\ngroups, [90] created to support the operationalization of the PNSD, consist of technical committees and\npolicy steering committees, chaired by the various sectoral ministries concerned. Their composition,\nspecified in an operational framework, [91] promotes a cross-cutting approach to sectoral topics,\ninvolving ministries, technical and financial partners, civil society organizations, and the private\n\n\n89 Order 20/017 of March 27, 2020 establishing the powers of the ministries.\n\n90 Decree 13/011 of April 9, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of sectoral thematic\ngroups.\n\n91 New operational framework of sectoral thematic groups (October 2020).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 57, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "of a draft national law on land management due to be submitted in the very near future to the\nparliament; this represents an opportunity to incorporate climate change concerns. In addition, a land\nmanagement strategy and a land use strategy are currently being finalized and include references to\nthe risks associated with climate change, including with a dedicated strategic pillar. Finally, even\nthough the mission was not able to find any examples of provincial regulations on spatial planning\nand construction taking climate risks into account, a notable good practice is the production in\nApril 2021 of a methodological guide for the completion of participatory zoning of village land and\nregional entities as part of the PIREDD, which refers to environmental constraints.\n\n97. So far, there is no centralized support for the preparation and costing of climate-aware\ninvestment strategies. In effect, there is no dedicated unit to support the sectoral ministries, which\ncould provide technical support to take into account climate issues when they prepare and assess the\ncosts of public investment strategies. The Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development\n(MEDD) and the Congolese Environment Agency (ACE) concentrate the expertise on environmental\nand climate issues within the government and are in charge of the preparation, oversight, and\nassessment of the national plans for sustainable environmental management. [89] However, the MEDD\nhas no explicit mandate to provide technical support for the preparation and costing of sectoral\nplanning strategies taking climate issues into account. The involvement of local participants will also\nbe necessary at the sectoral ministries, in particular in relation to land management (soil and subsoil).\n\n98. The reflection of climate change impacts in public investment planning is a high-\npriority reform. To that end, it is important to align the PNSD and the sectoral strategies with the\nNDC’s climate objectives, in order to provide a sectoral breakdown of climate-related objectives,\ntargets, and outcomes. Training for the sectoral ministries could be provided by the MEDD and the\nACE to promote the integration of climate issues in investment strategies. A national strategy for\ncombating climate change would be helpful in the medium term. Moreover, the adoption as soon as\npossible of the new law on land management and the publication of its dedicated strategy are\nnecessary prerequisites for climate-sensitive planning.\n\nC2. Coordination across Public Sector _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n99. This institution targets the coordination of climate-related public investment decision-\nmaking across the entire public sector. The emphasis is placed on the need to adopt a\ncomprehensive approach to climate change. Alongside the government, both provinces / ETDs and\npublic corporations effectively play a significant role in carrying out public investment in response to\nclimate change. This is the reason why the three dimensions of this institution assess in turn whether\nclimate-related investment decisions are coordinated across (i) central government, (ii) general\ngovernment (including local authorities), and (iii) the public sector in its entirety, including public\ncorporations.\n\n100. Sectoral thematic groups have promoted the coordination of public investment\ndecisions across central government in connection with climate issues. These sectoral\ngroups, [90] created to support the operationalization of the PNSD, consist of technical committees and\npolicy steering committees, chaired by the various sectoral ministries concerned. Their composition,\nspecified in an operational framework, [91] promotes a cross-cutting approach to sectoral topics,\ninvolving ministries, technical and financial partners, civil society organizations, and the private\n\n89 Order 20/017 of March 27, 2020 establishing the powers of the ministries.\n\n90 Decree 13/011 of April 9, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of sectoral thematic\ngroups.\n\n91 New operational framework of sectoral thematic groups (October 2020).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3571}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "sector. One thematic group is specifically dedicated to climate matters, the environment, water and\nsanitation, and biodiversity; its membership includes the MEDD (chair) and the Ministries of Water\nresources, of Planning, of Agriculture and of Mines. These thematic groups enable coordinated\nchoices to be made, including in relation to public investment, at the central government level. These\ncommittees do not yet, however, include extrabudgetary entities and PPPs.\n\n\n**101. Mechanisms coordinating project investment relating to climate change between the**\n**central government and the provinces are emerging, but the information on these projects is**\n**not consolidated.** The 2011 environmental law (Article 48) gives the provinces and ETDs, in the\nsame way as the central government, the power to adopt climate change adaptation measures. The\nlegal framework does not explicitly provide, however, for the provinces’ investment spending on\ncombating climate change to be planned and implemented in coordination with central government. [92]\nThe supporting structures for such consultation are nevertheless starting to emerge. For example, the\nNAP emphasizes the significance of decentralization in the operationalization of adaptation strategies\nand lays the foundations for coordination in this area. [93] In addition, the local development plan for\nthe 145 territories (PDL-145T) [94] and the REDD+ strategy provide for consultation and coordination\nmechanisms between the central government and the provinces on climate change issues, which are\nnot yet operational. Further, the thematic groups mentioned above are also provided for at the\nprovincial level as a space for dialog between the center and the provinces. However, finally,\nprovincial investment plans are not published (see Institution 3) in general or for climate changerelated investments.\n\n\n**102. According to the current legal framework, public corporations are not encouraged or**\n**required to make their climate-related investments compliant with national climate policies.**\nThere is no mention of climate change in the legal framework on the oversight of public corporations\nand their investment plans. There is also no formal incentive by the central government for public\ncorporations to take climate change into account in their investment projects, in the absence of a\nportfolio strategy or guidelines on governance. It is worth noting that the 2011 environmental law\nrequires all private and public entities, and thus all public corporations, to carry out social and\nenvironmental impact studies for their investment projects, to be subsequently validated by the ACE,\nbut the effects of climate change are not explicitly part of such studies (see Institution C3).\n\n\n**103. Strengthening the formal coordination of investment decisions relating to climate**\n**change is a medium reform priority.** The existence of sectoral thematic groups is a sound basis for\nimproving cross-cutting awareness of climate change in public investment decisions. An amendment\nto the decree relating to these groups could help extend them to include public corporations. The\nframeworks for consultation between the central government and the provinces provided under\nthe 2013 memorandum could be expanded to take the climate change dimension into account. The\nmechanisms planned under the PDL-145T relating to the REDD+ and the provincial sectoral thematic\ngroups could be operationalized. Finally, the Government as shareholder could insist on the\n\n\n92 Specifically, the 2013 memorandum establishing investment planning coordination mechanisms\nbetween the central government and the provinces (see dimension 3a of the PIMA) remains silent on\nclimate change issues.\n\n93 A guide for the inclusion of adaptation in provincial development plans was prepared in 2019. The\nNAP also proposes the formation of provincial committees on climate change to monitor\nimplementation. These groups are not yet operational.\n\n94 The PDL-145T specifically considers climate change adaptation and mitigation as dimensions\ncross cutting its implementation and provides for coordination mechanisms between central\ngovernment and the provinces.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 58, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "sector. One thematic group is specifically dedicated to climate matters, the environment, water and\nsanitation, and biodiversity; its membership includes the MEDD (chair) and the Ministries of Water\nresources, of Planning, of Agriculture and of Mines. These thematic groups enable coordinated\nchoices to be made, including in relation to public investment, at the central government level. These\ncommittees do not yet, however, include extrabudgetary entities and PPPs.\n\n101. Mechanisms coordinating project investment relating to climate change between the\ncentral government and the provinces are emerging, but the information on these projects is\nnot consolidated. The 2011 environmental law (Article 48) gives the provinces and ETDs, in the\nsame way as the central government, the power to adopt climate change adaptation measures. The\nlegal framework does not explicitly provide, however, for the provinces’ investment spending on\ncombating climate change to be planned and implemented in coordination with central government. [92]\nThe supporting structures for such consultation are nevertheless starting to emerge. For example, the\nNAP emphasizes the significance of decentralization in the operationalization of adaptation strategies\nand lays the foundations for coordination in this area. [93] In addition, the local development plan for\nthe 145 territories (PDL-145T) [94] and the REDD+ strategy provide for consultation and coordination\nmechanisms between the central government and the provinces on climate change issues, which are\nnot yet operational. Further, the thematic groups mentioned above are also provided for at the\nprovincial level as a space for dialog between the center and the provinces. However, finally,\nprovincial investment plans are not published (see Institution 3) in general or for climate changerelated investments.\n\n102. According to the current legal framework, public corporations are not encouraged or\nrequired to make their climate-related investments compliant with national climate policies.\nThere is no mention of climate change in the legal framework on the oversight of public corporations\nand their investment plans. There is also no formal incentive by the central government for public\ncorporations to take climate change into account in their investment projects, in the absence of a\nportfolio strategy or guidelines on governance. It is worth noting that the 2011 environmental law\nrequires all private and public entities, and thus all public corporations, to carry out social and\nenvironmental impact studies for their investment projects, to be subsequently validated by the ACE,\nbut the effects of climate change are not explicitly part of such studies (see Institution C3).\n\n103. Strengthening the formal coordination of investment decisions relating to climate\nchange is a medium reform priority. The existence of sectoral thematic groups is a sound basis for\nimproving cross-cutting awareness of climate change in public investment decisions. An amendment\nto the decree relating to these groups could help extend them to include public corporations. The\nframeworks for consultation between the central government and the provinces provided under\nthe 2013 memorandum could be expanded to take the climate change dimension into account. The\nmechanisms planned under the PDL-145T relating to the REDD+ and the provincial sectoral thematic\ngroups could be operationalized. Finally, the Government as shareholder could insist on the\n\n92 Specifically, the 2013 memorandum establishing investment planning coordination mechanisms\nbetween the central government and the provinces (see dimension 3a of the PIMA) remains silent on\nclimate change issues.\n\n93 A guide for the inclusion of adaptation in provincial development plans was prepared in 2019. The\nNAP also proposes the formation of provincial committees on climate change to monitor\nimplementation. These groups are not yet operational.\n\n94 The PDL-145T specifically considers climate change adaptation and mitigation as dimensions\ncross cutting its implementation and provides for coordination mechanisms between central\ngovernment and the provinces.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3608}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "importance of public corporations taking climate change into account in their investment projects in a\nfuture portfolio strategy.\n\n\n**C3. Project Appraisal** **and Selection** _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n**104. The C-PIMA methodology assesses whether the appraisal and selection of projects**\n**include climate-related analyses and criteria.** The first dimension checks the existence of a\nclimate-related analysis using a standard methodology. The second dimension assesses whether\nclimate-related challenges are taken into account in PPPs. The third dimension measures whether\nclimate-related factors are included in the project selection criteria.\n\n\n**105. The legal framework requires environmental impact studies to be carried out and**\n**reviewed by the ACE, but without explicitly stipulating coverage of climate change.** Article 19 of\nthe 2011 environmental law provides that any policy, plan, or program prepared by the central\ngovernment, provinces, ETDs, or public institutions, where their implementation is likely to have\nsignificant effects on the environment, must be subject to a prior environmental assessment following\nthe procedure laid down in an implementing decree. [95] The bylaws of the ACE [96] stipulate that it is\nresponsible for assessing and approving all such assessments carried out by authorized research\nagencies as well for monitoring their implementation. However, there is no reference at all to climate\nchange in this legal framework on environmental assessments. There is no standard methodology\nestablished for these assessments or any instructions guiding the review of assessments carried out\nby the ACE. Nevertheless, in December 2021, as part of its accreditation process with the Green\nClimate Fund, the BCECO prepared a draft environmental and social procedures manual, including a\nclimate change vulnerability analysis procedure, which shall be validated at a forthcoming workshop.\nIn practice, major infrastructure projects are often submitted to a climate impact analysis. In all, the\nACE conducted over 300 reviews of environmental impact assessments in 2021, and publishes the\nassessments on its website. [97]\n\n\n**106. The legal framework covering PPPs does not address climate change challenges, but**\n**the law on water does address the climate dimension in the granting of concessions.** Beyond\nthe requirements of the private partners, the 2018 law on PPPs does not explicitly take into\nconsideration climate change in terms of risk allocation or contract management. Nevertheless,\nArticle 30 of the 2015 law on water specifically requires climate data to be taken into account in the\nenvironmental and social impact studies relating to the granting of operating concessions in the public\ndomain of water. In practice, the mission was not able to analyze any contracts underlying PPP\nprojects so as to appraise whether climate change was explicitly taken into account in terms of risk\nallocation or contract management.\n\n\n**107. The central government does not use any criteria relating to climate change to guide**\n**the selection of projects that have been appraised.** As described in the assessment under\nInstitution 10, there is no specific published criterion, either linked to climate or not, for the selection of\n\n\n95 Decree of August 2, 2014, establishing the operating rules for environmental protection procedural\nmechanisms.\n\n96 Article 3 of the decree of November 18, 2014, establishing the bylaws of a public institution under\nthe name of ACE.\n\n97 As an example of good practice, the mission was, in particular, able to analyze the final report,\nsubmitted by the ACE, on the environmental and social impact study of August 2019 for the\nconstruction project of feeder roads linking with the road-rail bridge over the Congo River, supported\nby the infrastructure unit of the Ministry in charge of infrastructure, public works, and reconstruction.\nThis study includes a specific point on climate change forecasts and the associated problems.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 59, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "importance of public corporations taking climate change into account in their investment projects in a\nfuture portfolio strategy.\n\nC3. Project Appraisal and Selection _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n104. The C-PIMA methodology assesses whether the appraisal and selection of projects\ninclude climate-related analyses and criteria. The first dimension checks the existence of a\nclimate-related analysis using a standard methodology. The second dimension assesses whether\nclimate-related challenges are taken into account in PPPs. The third dimension measures whether\nclimate-related factors are included in the project selection criteria.\n\n105. The legal framework requires environmental impact studies to be carried out and\nreviewed by the ACE, but without explicitly stipulating coverage of climate change. Article 19 of\nthe 2011 environmental law provides that any policy, plan, or program prepared by the central\ngovernment, provinces, ETDs, or public institutions, where their implementation is likely to have\nsignificant effects on the environment, must be subject to a prior environmental assessment following\nthe procedure laid down in an implementing decree. [95] The bylaws of the ACE [96] stipulate that it is\nresponsible for assessing and approving all such assessments carried out by authorized research\nagencies as well for monitoring their implementation. However, there is no reference at all to climate\nchange in this legal framework on environmental assessments. There is no standard methodology\nestablished for these assessments or any instructions guiding the review of assessments carried out\nby the ACE. Nevertheless, in December 2021, as part of its accreditation process with the Green\nClimate Fund, the BCECO prepared a draft environmental and social procedures manual, including a\nclimate change vulnerability analysis procedure, which shall be validated at a forthcoming workshop.\nIn practice, major infrastructure projects are often submitted to a climate impact analysis. In all, the\nACE conducted over 300 reviews of environmental impact assessments in 2021, and publishes the\nassessments on its website. [97]\n\n106. The legal framework covering PPPs does not address climate change challenges, but\nthe law on water does address the climate dimension in the granting of concessions. Beyond\nthe requirements of the private partners, the 2018 law on PPPs does not explicitly take into\nconsideration climate change in terms of risk allocation or contract management. Nevertheless,\nArticle 30 of the 2015 law on water specifically requires climate data to be taken into account in the\nenvironmental and social impact studies relating to the granting of operating concessions in the public\ndomain of water. In practice, the mission was not able to analyze any contracts underlying PPP\nprojects so as to appraise whether climate change was explicitly taken into account in terms of risk\nallocation or contract management.\n\n107. The central government does not use any criteria relating to climate change to guide\nthe selection of projects that have been appraised. As described in the assessment under\nInstitution 10, there is no specific published criterion, either linked to climate or not, for the selection of\n\n95 Decree of August 2, 2014, establishing the operating rules for environmental protection procedural\nmechanisms.\n\n96 Article 3 of the decree of November 18, 2014, establishing the bylaws of a public institution under\nthe name of ACE.\n\n97 As an example of good practice, the mission was, in particular, able to analyze the final report,\nsubmitted by the ACE, on the environmental and social impact study of August 2019 for the\nconstruction project of feeder roads linking with the road-rail bridge over the Congo River, supported\nby the infrastructure unit of the Ministry in charge of infrastructure, public works, and reconstruction.\nThis study includes a specific point on climate change forecasts and the associated problems.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3444}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "projects that have been appraised for inclusion in the budget. The project appraisal schedule\npresented in the project selection manual of the Ministry of Planning includes environmental criteria\nthat make it possible, albeit in very summary fashion, to assess whether the project is mindful of the\nenvironment, whether the impact on the environment is correctly identified, and whether mitigation\nactions are provided for and appropriate, but without making any explicit reference to climate change.\n\n\n_**108.**_ **The inclusion of climate considerations in the project appraisal and selection process**\n**is a medium priority reform.** In the future decree on public investment management, as in practice,\npreliminary appraisal of major infrastructure projects should systematically include a climate-related\nanalysis following a standard methodology supported by the MEDD. That would make it possible to\nassess whether the potential impacts of projects on greenhouse gas emissions, and the exposure of\nprojects to damage caused by climate-related disasters have been identified and analyzed, before the\nprojects are included in the project bank and in the next PIP, or before they are selected for financing\nin the budget. The legal framework for PPP projects should reflect climate-related risks appropriately.\nGiven that PPPs commit the government over the whole term of the contract, which is generally 20\nto 30 years or more, climate change adaptation or mitigation risks are likely to arise at any time during\nthe term of the contract. Lastly, at the key moment of project selection, factors linked to the climate\nshould be explicitly included in the list of decision-making criteria used by the government.\n\n\n**C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management** _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n**109. This institution relates to the ability of the budgeting and project portfolio management**\n**frameworks to take climate change into account.** The C-PIMA methodology checks the capacity\nto guide climate-related efficacy and efficiency in budget choices made, in particular, by: (I) identifying\nin the budget and budget documentation the specific expenditures and funding in favor of climaterelated investments; (ii) carrying out _ex post_ external audits to measure the impact of projects in\nterms of climate change adaptation and mitigation; and (iii) taking climate risks into account in asset\nmanagement policies.\n\n\n**110. To date, there is no identification of public investment spending relating to climate**\n**change within the budget.** Among the various nomenclatures, the budget uses a COFOG functional\nclassification, which, once it has been crossed with the classification by type, makes it possible to\nassess investment spending relating to environmental protection, but not spending relating to climate\nchange. Another practice worth noting, more specifically in connection with the climate, is the\nexistence of indicators focused on climate change in the provisional annual performance project\n( _projet annuel de performance_ ), in particular for the forestry, water, and the environmental sectors; at\nthis stage, they are not reported because of lack of available data and because the transition to\nprogram-based budgeting is not complete. These practices are, however, not sufficient to identify\nclimate-related investment spending in a cross-cutting fashion and across the various sectors.\n\n\n**111. There is no explicit legal basis for carrying out** _**ex post**_ **reviews or audits on the**\n**outcomes of investment projects in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation.** There\nis no legal basis providing a framework for carrying out internal audits and reviews of major\ninvestment projects (see Institution 13), let alone for the assessment of the contribution of projects to\nclimate objectives. With regard to external auditing, in its 2021-2025 strategic plan the Court of\nAccounts aims to conduct one audit report on the environment each year, without any explicit link with\npublic investment. Moreover, _ex post_ reviews of major projects financed by donors are supposedly\ncarried out, but they were not able to be consulted by the mission. Interesting initiatives aimed at\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 60, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "projects that have been appraised for inclusion in the budget. The project appraisal schedule\npresented in the project selection manual of the Ministry of Planning includes environmental criteria\nthat make it possible, albeit in very summary fashion, to assess whether the project is mindful of the\nenvironment, whether the impact on the environment is correctly identified, and whether mitigation\nactions are provided for and appropriate, but without making any explicit reference to climate change.\n\n_108._ The inclusion of climate considerations in the project appraisal and selection process\nis a medium priority reform. In the future decree on public investment management, as in practice,\npreliminary appraisal of major infrastructure projects should systematically include a climate-related\nanalysis following a standard methodology supported by the MEDD. That would make it possible to\nassess whether the potential impacts of projects on greenhouse gas emissions, and the exposure of\nprojects to damage caused by climate-related disasters have been identified and analyzed, before the\nprojects are included in the project bank and in the next PIP, or before they are selected for financing\nin the budget. The legal framework for PPP projects should reflect climate-related risks appropriately.\nGiven that PPPs commit the government over the whole term of the contract, which is generally 20\nto 30 years or more, climate change adaptation or mitigation risks are likely to arise at any time during\nthe term of the contract. Lastly, at the key moment of project selection, factors linked to the climate\nshould be explicitly included in the list of decision-making criteria used by the government.\n\nC4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management _(Institutional design: Weak: Priority of reform: Medium)_\n\n109. This institution relates to the ability of the budgeting and project portfolio management\nframeworks to take climate change into account. The C-PIMA methodology checks the capacity\nto guide climate-related efficacy and efficiency in budget choices made, in particular, by: (I) identifying\nin the budget and budget documentation the specific expenditures and funding in favor of climaterelated investments; (ii) carrying out _ex post_ external audits to measure the impact of projects in\nterms of climate change adaptation and mitigation; and (iii) taking climate risks into account in asset\nmanagement policies.\n\n110. To date, there is no identification of public investment spending relating to climate\nchange within the budget. Among the various nomenclatures, the budget uses a COFOG functional\nclassification, which, once it has been crossed with the classification by type, makes it possible to\nassess investment spending relating to environmental protection, but not spending relating to climate\nchange. Another practice worth noting, more specifically in connection with the climate, is the\nexistence of indicators focused on climate change in the provisional annual performance project\n( _projet annuel de performance_ ), in particular for the forestry, water, and the environmental sectors; at\nthis stage, they are not reported because of lack of available data and because the transition to\nprogram-based budgeting is not complete. These practices are, however, not sufficient to identify\nclimate-related investment spending in a cross-cutting fashion and across the various sectors.\n\n111. There is no explicit legal basis for carrying out _ex post_ reviews or audits on the\noutcomes of investment projects in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation. There\nis no legal basis providing a framework for carrying out internal audits and reviews of major\ninvestment projects (see Institution 13), let alone for the assessment of the contribution of projects to\nclimate objectives. With regard to external auditing, in its 2021-2025 strategic plan the Court of\nAccounts aims to conduct one audit report on the environment each year, without any explicit link with\npublic investment. Moreover, _ex post_ reviews of major projects financed by donors are supposedly\ncarried out, but they were not able to be consulted by the mission. Interesting initiatives aimed at\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3610}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "strengthening the monitoring of the climate performance of projects are underway, for example the\nimplementation of the Measuring, Reporting and Verification system [98] for the REDD+ strategy.\n\n\n**112. The asset management and maintenance policies do not take climate risks into**\n**account.** According to the road management agencies met by the mission, the standard road\nmaintenance methodologies (the only maintenance methodologies available, see Institution 9) do not\ntake climate aspects into consideration. The legal framework on asset management and monitoring\n(see Institution 15) also fails to reflect the effects of climate risks on the valuation of assets or their\ndepreciation. The MEDD told the mission that it plans to work in the near future with the sectoral\nministries on specific studies to assess these impacts on the assets concerned.\n\n\n**113. Taking climate change issues into account in budgeting and in the management of the**\n**project portfolio is a medium priority.** The future decree on public investment management could\nlay the legal foundations for monitoring and _ex post_ assessment of the impacts of investment projects\non climate change, but that would necessitate setting measurable monitoring targets, starting from\nthe planning stage. The full transition of the DRC to program-based budgeting will be an opportunity\nto establish appropriate monitoring indicators. In addition, the authorities should assess the impact of\nclimate change on the maintenance needs of projects, in order to allow for the allocation of the\nnecessary resources. Finally, setting up a tagging system for climate-related investment spending\nrequires the preparation of nomenclature and information systems, but could be envisaged in the\nmedium term (Box 4.A).\n\n\n**Box 4.A. Climate budget tagging**\n\n**Tagging expenditures according to their impact on the climate when budgets are being prepared,**\n**is a practice that is relatively new internationally.** This practice, which has developed in the past\ndecade, provides an overall picture of budget spending and tax expenditure relating to climate; it\nemphasizes the significance of climate change concerns in the allocation of resources, and enables their\ndevelopment over time to be monitored. Tagging allows each component of the budget to be assessed\nbased on its climate-related (and/or environmental) impact by giving it a “label” according to whether it\nis helpful or harmful to green objectives. Thanks to the intensive technical support of several\ndevelopment partners, climate budget tagging has gained ground in developing and low-income\ncountries (for example, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines). It is also increasingly\nrecognized as a significant tool within the OECD countries and the European Union (for example in\nFrance and Ireland), despite the methodological limits relating to the lack, at this stage, of a generally\naccepted classification of expenditure.\n\n**Three significant issues must be addressed at the time of defining tagging methodologies within**\n**the climate expenditure budget.**\n\n - First of all, it is necessary to **define the relevant climate-related expenditures in terms of both**\n**mitigation and adaptation.** This definition may be based on the expected impact of expenditures\n( _objective-based definition_ ) or based on their identification relying on national documents relating to\nclimate change ( _policy-based definition_ ).\n\n - Next, it is necessary to draw up **a level of coverage for these expenditures within the public**\n**sphere.** Almost all the methodologies used to date cover both current and capital budgets of\n\n\n98 This system is a set of procedures to enable the gathering of factual information (mainly data), and\nthe assessment and verification of the achievement of climate change objectives.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 61, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "strengthening the monitoring of the climate performance of projects are underway, for example the\nimplementation of the Measuring, Reporting and Verification system [98] for the REDD+ strategy.\n\n112. The asset management and maintenance policies do not take climate risks into\naccount. According to the road management agencies met by the mission, the standard road\nmaintenance methodologies (the only maintenance methodologies available, see Institution 9) do not\ntake climate aspects into consideration. The legal framework on asset management and monitoring\n(see Institution 15) also fails to reflect the effects of climate risks on the valuation of assets or their\ndepreciation. The MEDD told the mission that it plans to work in the near future with the sectoral\nministries on specific studies to assess these impacts on the assets concerned.\n\n113. Taking climate change issues into account in budgeting and in the management of the\nproject portfolio is a medium priority. The future decree on public investment management could\nlay the legal foundations for monitoring and _ex post_ assessment of the impacts of investment projects\non climate change, but that would necessitate setting measurable monitoring targets, starting from\nthe planning stage. The full transition of the DRC to program-based budgeting will be an opportunity\nto establish appropriate monitoring indicators. In addition, the authorities should assess the impact of\nclimate change on the maintenance needs of projects, in order to allow for the allocation of the\nnecessary resources. Finally, setting up a tagging system for climate-related investment spending\nrequires the preparation of nomenclature and information systems, but could be envisaged in the\nmedium term (Box 4.A).\n\nBox 4.A. Climate budget tagging\n\nTagging expenditures according to their impact on the climate when budgets are being prepared,\nis a practice that is relatively new internationally. This practice, which has developed in the past\ndecade, provides an overall picture of budget spending and tax expenditure relating to climate; it\nemphasizes the significance of climate change concerns in the allocation of resources, and enables their\ndevelopment over time to be monitored. Tagging allows each component of the budget to be assessed\nbased on its climate-related (and/or environmental) impact by giving it a “label” according to whether it\nis helpful or harmful to green objectives. Thanks to the intensive technical support of several\ndevelopment partners, climate budget tagging has gained ground in developing and low-income\ncountries (for example, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines). It is also increasingly\nrecognized as a significant tool within the OECD countries and the European Union (for example in\nFrance and Ireland), despite the methodological limits relating to the lack, at this stage, of a generally\naccepted classification of expenditure.\n\nThree significant issues must be addressed at the time of defining tagging methodologies within\nthe climate expenditure budget.\n\n - First of all, it is necessary to define the relevant climate-related expenditures in terms of both\nmitigation and adaptation. This definition may be based on the expected impact of expenditures\n( _objective-based definition_ ) or based on their identification relying on national documents relating to\nclimate change ( _policy-based definition_ ).\n\n - Next, it is necessary to draw up a level of coverage for these expenditures within the public\nsphere. Almost all the methodologies used to date cover both current and capital budgets of\n\n98 This system is a set of procedures to enable the gathering of factual information (mainly data), and\nthe assessment and verification of the achievement of climate change objectives.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3263}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "central governments. Some countries have expanded their identification to local government, to\ntransfers to public corporations, and sometimes even to fiscal spending.\n\n - Finally, the issue of **how to estimate the amounts of climate-related spending** remains to be\ndecided. Three approaches are generally used. The first is limited to the identification of programs\nthat have climate change as their main objective. The second also estimates spending associated\nwith all climate-related activities. The third applies weightings to estimate the portion of spending of\nthe program or project that is related to climate.\n\nSources: “ _Climate change budget tagging: a review of international experience_ ” World Bank\n(February 2021) and “ _Climate-sensitive management of public finances – green PFM”_ IMF (August 2021)\n\n\n**C5. Risk Management** _(Institutional design: Medium; Priority of reform: Low)_\n\n**114. This institution assesses how fiscal risks related to climate change affecting**\n**infrastructure are identified and managed.** Natural disasters are persistent sources of macro-fiscal\nrisk and therefore require significant attention. Fiscal risks arise just as much from climate change\nadaptation as from climate change mitigation. The first dimension of this institution assesses whether\nthe authorities publish a national disaster risk management strategy incorporating the exposure of\npublic infrastructure to climate-related disasters. The second dimension considers whether the\ngovernment has set up financing mechanisms to deal with the costs of climate-related damage to\npublic infrastructure. Last, the third dimension focuses on the existence of fiscal risk analysis that\nincludes climate risks to public infrastructure.\n\n\n**115. In addition to the civil security response organization plan (ORSEC) produced in 2012,**\n**there is a draft national natural disaster risk management strategy, but it has not yet been**\n**endorsed by the Government.** The implementation of the ORSEC plan is applicable to the climate\ndisaster response, as it aims to mobilize and coordinate the parties involved in civil security.\nHowever, it does not satisfy this dimension of the C-PIMA assessment, as the plan does not identify\nthe specific risks to infrastructure from climate change (data on location of the risk, exposure of\nassets, or emergency procurement procedures). This essential information is typically integrated in a\nnational natural disaster management strategy. A draft national risk management strategy over a\nperiod of four years has reportedly been produced by the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs\n(MAAH) and apparently is in the process of being updated again for publication by end-2022. Finally,\nthe recent creation [99] of a National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management\nattached to the MAAH, which is both a new institutional structure and a funding mechanism (see next\nparagraph), is aimed at mobilizing and channeling all financial flows and equipment necessary to\ncover humanitarian crises, to take efficient emergency care for victims of disaster and other\ncatastrophic events, and to provide coordination of humanitarian actions and interventions.\n\n\n**116. There are two mechanisms for** _**ex ante**_ **funding - one budgetary and one**\n**extrabudgetary – of infrastructure exposure to climate risks.** The MAAH budget, within the\nbudget law, includes a specific budget allocation to disaster risks entitled “reserve for accidents and\ndisasters” and is executed each year according to the occurrence of unforeseen events, including\ndisasters related to climate change. This represented CGF 65 million in the 2021 LFI and CGF 90\nmillion in the 2022 draft budget law. At the same time, the CSNGHC aims to enhance coverage for\nthe costs of damage related to natural disasters, principally due to a strategic resource mobilization\nplan which is currently being finalized. The mission did not have access to this document, but it\nshould contain a survey of the planned resources for this public institution, which could be assembled\n\n\n99 Decree 21-05 establishing the organization and operation of a public institution under the name of\nthe National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management in the DRC (CSNGHC).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 62, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "central governments. Some countries have expanded their identification to local government, to\ntransfers to public corporations, and sometimes even to fiscal spending.\n\n - Finally, the issue of how to estimate the amounts of climate-related spending remains to be\ndecided. Three approaches are generally used. The first is limited to the identification of programs\nthat have climate change as their main objective. The second also estimates spending associated\nwith all climate-related activities. The third applies weightings to estimate the portion of spending of\nthe program or project that is related to climate.\n\nSources: “ _Climate change budget tagging: a review of international experience_ ” World Bank\n(February 2021) and “ _Climate-sensitive management of public finances – green PFM”_ IMF (August 2021)\n\nC5. Risk Management _(Institutional design: Medium; Priority of reform: Low)_\n\n114. This institution assesses how fiscal risks related to climate change affecting\ninfrastructure are identified and managed. Natural disasters are persistent sources of macro-fiscal\nrisk and therefore require significant attention. Fiscal risks arise just as much from climate change\nadaptation as from climate change mitigation. The first dimension of this institution assesses whether\nthe authorities publish a national disaster risk management strategy incorporating the exposure of\npublic infrastructure to climate-related disasters. The second dimension considers whether the\ngovernment has set up financing mechanisms to deal with the costs of climate-related damage to\npublic infrastructure. Last, the third dimension focuses on the existence of fiscal risk analysis that\nincludes climate risks to public infrastructure.\n\n115. In addition to the civil security response organization plan (ORSEC) produced in 2012,\nthere is a draft national natural disaster risk management strategy, but it has not yet been\nendorsed by the Government. The implementation of the ORSEC plan is applicable to the climate\ndisaster response, as it aims to mobilize and coordinate the parties involved in civil security.\nHowever, it does not satisfy this dimension of the C-PIMA assessment, as the plan does not identify\nthe specific risks to infrastructure from climate change (data on location of the risk, exposure of\nassets, or emergency procurement procedures). This essential information is typically integrated in a\nnational natural disaster management strategy. A draft national risk management strategy over a\nperiod of four years has reportedly been produced by the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions and Affairs\n(MAAH) and apparently is in the process of being updated again for publication by end-2022. Finally,\nthe recent creation [99] of a National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management\nattached to the MAAH, which is both a new institutional structure and a funding mechanism (see next\nparagraph), is aimed at mobilizing and channeling all financial flows and equipment necessary to\ncover humanitarian crises, to take efficient emergency care for victims of disaster and other\ncatastrophic events, and to provide coordination of humanitarian actions and interventions.\n\n116. There are two mechanisms for _ex ante_ funding - one budgetary and one\nextrabudgetary – of infrastructure exposure to climate risks. The MAAH budget, within the\nbudget law, includes a specific budget allocation to disaster risks entitled “reserve for accidents and\ndisasters” and is executed each year according to the occurrence of unforeseen events, including\ndisasters related to climate change. This represented CGF 65 million in the 2021 LFI and CGF 90\nmillion in the 2022 draft budget law. At the same time, the CSNGHC aims to enhance coverage for\nthe costs of damage related to natural disasters, principally due to a strategic resource mobilization\nplan which is currently being finalized. The mission did not have access to this document, but it\nshould contain a survey of the planned resources for this public institution, which could be assembled\n\n99 Decree 21-05 establishing the organization and operation of a public institution under the name of\nthe National Solidarity Fund for Disaster and Humanitarian Management in the DRC (CSNGHC).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3657}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "from budget allocations, national and international donations, parafiscal charges, and contributions\nfrom donors.\n\n\n**117. The fiscal risk statement does indeed mention climate change-related risks, but not the**\n**specific impact on public infrastructure.** The fiscal risk statement, published for the first time in\nSeptember 2021, categorizes the main risks for public finances (macroeconomic, public debt, public\nsector other than central government, financial sector, and other risks). Although some of these risks\nare quantified, those relating to natural disasters are presented only briefly and qualitatively, and the\nimpacts on infrastructure are not assessed. Elsewhere, the MAAH keeping a summary table of\nnatural disasters and their financial impacts over a long period is a good practice, but the table is not\npublished and was not forwarded to the mission.\n\n\n**118. Providing better coverage of climate-related risks that affect public infrastructure is a**\n**low priority for reform, in relation to the other reforms proposed in this report.** The foundations\nfor sound climate-related risk management have recently been laid - the creation of the CSNGHC - or\nare about to be put in place - the draft disaster management strategy and the strategic resource\nmobilization plan for the national fund. It is therefore important to operationalize these various\nprocesses in the next few months and years. Supplementary efforts could also be made to analyze\nand publish the climate change risks that affect infrastructure, in particular to feed into the fiscal risk\nstatement.\n\n##### **V. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**\n\n\n**119. The following section presents the main issues relating to IT support, the legal and**\n**regulatory framework, and staff capacity, which are relevant to all areas of public investment**\n**management.** They are addressed in the PIMA and C-PIMA institutions presented above, but it is\nnevertheless sensible to also address them separately and from a cross-cutting point of view in order\nto assess their strengths and weaknesses. They aim to appraise (i) consistency and\ncomprehensiveness of the legal and regulatory framework for the purposes of effective public\ninvestment management; (ii) the existence of a comprehensive digital information system covering\nprojects, supporting decision-making and monitoring; and (iii) staff capacity.\n\n\n**A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK**\n\n\n**120. The legal framework for public investment management (PIM) is fragmented**\n**(Table 5.A).** Key aspects of PIM are covered by the legal framework for government finance\nmanagement in the broad sense. The 2011 LOFIP, revised in 2018, covers investment spending by\nthe Government, the provinces, and the ETDs, issuing basic rules for its budgeting and execution.\nThe 2010 law on procurement organizes public procurement in all its aspects, in particular as it\nrelates to public works contracts. Moreover, some types of investment are better regulated than\nothers by the existing texts. The 2018 law on PPPs laid down the principles of identification, selection,\nvalidation, and monitoring of PPP projects, but lacks certain implementing decrees to achieve full\napplication. Some investment project execution and oversight entities are subject to regulations\nestablishing their powers, such as the BCECO, ACGT, CSPP, and CFEF, but these regulations only\napply to the portfolios each entity manages.\n\n\n**121. In all, there is no high-level law or regulation that encompasses PIM over the whole**\n**project investment cycle.** In particular, the procedures for appraisal, selection, monitoring of\nphysical / financial implementation, and _ex post_ assessment of projects are not covered by a clear\nlegal framework and are often guided by manuals compiled over many years, generally with the\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 63, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "from budget allocations, national and international donations, parafiscal charges, and contributions\nfrom donors.\n\n117. The fiscal risk statement does indeed mention climate change-related risks, but not the\nspecific impact on public infrastructure. The fiscal risk statement, published for the first time in\nSeptember 2021, categorizes the main risks for public finances (macroeconomic, public debt, public\nsector other than central government, financial sector, and other risks). Although some of these risks\nare quantified, those relating to natural disasters are presented only briefly and qualitatively, and the\nimpacts on infrastructure are not assessed. Elsewhere, the MAAH keeping a summary table of\nnatural disasters and their financial impacts over a long period is a good practice, but the table is not\npublished and was not forwarded to the mission.\n\n118. Providing better coverage of climate-related risks that affect public infrastructure is a\nlow priority for reform, in relation to the other reforms proposed in this report. The foundations\nfor sound climate-related risk management have recently been laid - the creation of the CSNGHC - or\nare about to be put in place - the draft disaster management strategy and the strategic resource\nmobilization plan for the national fund. It is therefore important to operationalize these various\nprocesses in the next few months and years. Supplementary efforts could also be made to analyze\nand publish the climate change risks that affect infrastructure, in particular to feed into the fiscal risk\nstatement.\nV. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES\n\n119. The following section presents the main issues relating to IT support, the legal and\nregulatory framework, and staff capacity, which are relevant to all areas of public investment\nmanagement. They are addressed in the PIMA and C-PIMA institutions presented above, but it is\nnevertheless sensible to also address them separately and from a cross-cutting point of view in order\nto assess their strengths and weaknesses. They aim to appraise (i) consistency and\ncomprehensiveness of the legal and regulatory framework for the purposes of effective public\ninvestment management; (ii) the existence of a comprehensive digital information system covering\nprojects, supporting decision-making and monitoring; and (iii) staff capacity.\n\nA. LEGAL FRAMEWORK\n\n120. The legal framework for public investment management (PIM) is fragmented\n(Table 5.A). Key aspects of PIM are covered by the legal framework for government finance\nmanagement in the broad sense. The 2011 LOFIP, revised in 2018, covers investment spending by\nthe Government, the provinces, and the ETDs, issuing basic rules for its budgeting and execution.\nThe 2010 law on procurement organizes public procurement in all its aspects, in particular as it\nrelates to public works contracts. Moreover, some types of investment are better regulated than\nothers by the existing texts. The 2018 law on PPPs laid down the principles of identification, selection,\nvalidation, and monitoring of PPP projects, but lacks certain implementing decrees to achieve full\napplication. Some investment project execution and oversight entities are subject to regulations\nestablishing their powers, such as the BCECO, ACGT, CSPP, and CFEF, but these regulations only\napply to the portfolios each entity manages.\n\n121. In all, there is no high-level law or regulation that encompasses PIM over the whole\nproject investment cycle. In particular, the procedures for appraisal, selection, monitoring of\nphysical / financial implementation, and _ex post_ assessment of projects are not covered by a clear\nlegal framework and are often guided by manuals compiled over many years, generally with the\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3214}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "support of donors, the application (and knowledge by staff) of which is often uncertain. Budget\ncirculars guide the budgeting of investments without, however, guaranteeing any stability in the\nprocedures from one fiscal year to the next. There are several cases of laws and regulations that\nhave established project management structures that have, nevertheless, remained inactive, such as\nthe 2019 order establishing the CISPIP. Lastly, there are cases of conflicts between standards, such\nas, for example, between the law on PPPs and the law on procurement regarding the jurisdiction of\nthe ARMP, and also between these two laws and the decree on the powers of the UC-PPP regarding\nthe issuance of nonobjection notices.\n\n\n**Table 5.A. Legal texts underlying the PIM procedures in the DRC**\n\n|Laws|Regulations|\n|---|---|\n|
• Law 11/011 of
July 13, 2011 on
public finance
(LOFIP)
• Law 18/016 of
July 9, 2018 on
public-private
partnerships
• Law 10/010 of
April 27, 2010 on
procurement
• Law 11/009 of
July 9, 2011
establishing
fundamental
principles for
protection of the
environment
|
• Ordinance of July 25, 2019, establishing the organization and operation of the CRESP
• Decree 13/050 of November 6, 2013 establishing the General Public Accounting Regulation.
• Decree 21/04 of October 2, 2021 establishing the organization and operation of the PPP Advice and
Coordination Unit
• Decree 08/017 of August 26, 2008 establishing the organization and operation of the ACGT
• Decree of August 8, 2001 establishing the organization and operation of the BCECO.
• Decree 10/22 of June 2, 2010 establishing the procedures manual for the law on procurement
• Decree 10/21 of June 2, 2010 establishing the organization and operation of the ARMP
• Decree 10/32 of December 28, 2010 establishing the organization and operation of the procurement and project
management units (CGPMP)
• Decree 13/51 of November 8, 2013 establishing the Government Chart of Accounts (PCE)
• Decree of August 2, 2014 establishing the operating rules for environmental protection procedural mechanisms
• Decree of November 18, 2014 establishing the bylaws of a public institution under the name of ACE.
• Ministerial order of December 5, 2011 establishing the organization and operation of the Project and Program
Oversight Unit
• Ministerial order of July 19, 2019 establishing the Commission for identification and selection of public
investment projects (CISPIP)
• Interministerial order of May 20, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of the preinvestment fund
• Ministerial order of February 7, 2011 establishing the Investment and Aid Management Platform
• Memorandum of understanding of March 29, 2013 on the procedures for the application of investment
appropriations in the sectors falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces|\n\n\n\n**122. The legal framework for PIM does not explicitly take climate change into account.**\nThe 2011 law on the protection of the environment represented a significant step in awareness of\nenvironmental issues in project appraisal. The obligation to conduct an environmental impact study\nfor every investment project in the DRC is well known by all departments. This law does mention\nclimate change in a specific article (Article 48), but it is too general to be operable. An update of\nthe 2011 law or the adoption of a new law specifically focusing on climate change are under\nconsideration. Finally, the decree on PIM could set the principle of involvement of the MEDD and the\nACE in all stages of the investment cycle to ensure climate change is considered.\n\n\n**123. The adoption of a decree on PIM is a high priority.** The adoption of such a decree\ncovering all stages of the project cycle, would make it possible to define the responsibilities of the\nvarious parties involved in each of these stages, to structure the institutional framework, and to\nprovide guidance for the development of indispensable tools to optimize the management of\ninvestment projects.\n\n\n**B. IT SUPPORT**\n\n\n**124. The authorities have no effective institutional framework to guide, support, and**\n**implement the computerization of PIM.** The IT functions of the main ministries in charge of\nmanaging public investments suffer from limited coordination and a lack of staff with the required\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 64, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16000366210938, 213.2799835205078, 539.8400268554688, 453.44000244140625], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}], "text": "support of donors, the application (and knowledge by staff) of which is often uncertain. Budget\ncirculars guide the budgeting of investments without, however, guaranteeing any stability in the\nprocedures from one fiscal year to the next. There are several cases of laws and regulations that\nhave established project management structures that have, nevertheless, remained inactive, such as\nthe 2019 order establishing the CISPIP. Lastly, there are cases of conflicts between standards, such\nas, for example, between the law on PPPs and the law on procurement regarding the jurisdiction of\nthe ARMP, and also between these two laws and the decree on the powers of the UC-PPP regarding\nthe issuance of nonobjection notices.\n\nTable 5.A. Legal texts underlying the PIM procedures in the DRC\n\n Laws Regulations \n\n • Law 11/011 of July 13, 2011 on public finance (LOFIP) • Law 18/016 of July 9, 2018 on public-private partnerships • Law 10/010 of April 27, 2010 on procurement • Law 11/009 of July 9, 2011 establishing fundamental principles for protection of the environment • Ordinance of July 25, 2019, establishing the organization and operation of the CRESP • Decree 13/050 of November 6, 2013 establishing the General Public Accounting Regulation. • Decree 21/04 of October 2, 2021 establishing the organization and operation of the PPP Advice and Coordination Unit • Decree 08/017 of August 26, 2008 establishing the organization and operation of the ACGT • Decree of August 8, 2001 establishing the organization and operation of the BCECO. • Decree 10/22 of June 2, 2010 establishing the procedures manual for the law on procurement • Decree 10/21 of June 2, 2010 establishing the organization and operation of the ARMP • Decree 10/32 of December 28, 2010 establishing the organization and operation of the procurement and project management units (CGPMP) • Decree 13/51 of November 8, 2013 establishing the Government Chart of Accounts (PCE) • Decree of August 2, 2014 establishing the operating rules for environmental protection procedural mechanisms • Decree of November 18, 2014 establishing the bylaws of a public institution under the name of ACE. • Ministerial order of December 5, 2011 establishing the organization and operation of the Project and Program Oversight Unit • Ministerial order of July 19, 2019 establishing the Commission for identification and selection of public investment projects (CISPIP) • Interministerial order of May 20, 2013 establishing the organization and operation of the preinvestment fund • Ministerial order of February 7, 2011 establishing the Investment and Aid Management Platform • Memorandum of understanding of March 29, 2013 on the procedures for the application of investment appropriations in the sectors falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces \n\n122. The legal framework for PIM does not explicitly take climate change into account.\nThe 2011 law on the protection of the environment represented a significant step in awareness of\nenvironmental issues in project appraisal. The obligation to conduct an environmental impact study\nfor every investment project in the DRC is well known by all departments. This law does mention\nclimate change in a specific article (Article 48), but it is too general to be operable. An update of\nthe 2011 law or the adoption of a new law specifically focusing on climate change are under\nconsideration. Finally, the decree on PIM could set the principle of involvement of the MEDD and the\nACE in all stages of the investment cycle to ensure climate change is considered.\n\n123. The adoption of a decree on PIM is a high priority. The adoption of such a decree\ncovering all stages of the project cycle, would make it possible to define the responsibilities of the\nvarious parties involved in each of these stages, to structure the institutional framework, and to\nprovide guidance for the development of indispensable tools to optimize the management of\ninvestment projects.\n\nB. IT SUPPORT\n\n124. The authorities have no effective institutional framework to guide, support, and\nimplement the computerization of PIM. The IT functions of the main ministries in charge of\nmanaging public investments suffer from limited coordination and a lack of staff with the required\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3636}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "capacities. There is no IT master plan to provide a consistent, coordinated strategy for development\nand operation of computer software supporting PIM, from planning through to accounting for assets.\nNevertheless, the inter-ministerial coordination unit is aiming to build its capacity under the auspices\nof the Ministry in charge of Digitization, which has recently been set up. The current picture is as\nfollows:\n\n- Within the _Ministry of Planning_, the DPB has an IT division that manages the public investment\ndatabase with a staff composed solely of IT specialists. Additionally, the Aid and Investment\nManagement Platform (PGAI) established by Ministerial order on February 7, 2011 is the\ntechnical agency tasked with strengthening its information system, set up to ensure monitoring\nand evaluation of all stages of management of external funding. In this regard, the PGAI serves\nas a single window and is designated by the government as the official source of information on\naid flows in the DRC. In practice, the PGAI is having difficulties in gathering reliable information,\nparticularly with regard to bilateral partners.\n\n- At the _Ministry of the Budget_, the Interministerial Information Technology Coordination\ndepartment (C2I) (staff of 69) coordinates the IT work of the Ministries of the Budget and Finance.\nThe Ministry’s IT function faces many challenges in terms of the financial resources allocated,\nhaving sufficient, competent staff and of motivation, given, in particular, the lack of a dedicated IT\ncareer path. There is no formal coordination mechanism between the IT function of the Ministry of\nPlanning and the C2I.\n\n- In the absence of a dedicated IT stream and sufficient resources, the IT capacities of the _Ministry_\n_of Finance_ are equally weak. The ministry is in charge of chairing the integrated human resources\nand public finance management system digitization steering committee (the “Committee”), which\nstill has to come into operation. The recent updating of the General Operation Plan (POG) for the\ncomputerization of the system of management of public finance and general government,\nmanaged by the Public Finance Reform Orientation Committee (COREF), does not cover the\narea of public finance management, and the Ministry of Planning is not involved in the work.\n\n\n**125. There is no comprehensive, computerized information system for public investment**\n**projects to support decision making and oversight.** The Ministry of Planning has a project\ndatabase (in Access format), following the structure of the project fiches, held in Excel. The PGAI\nadministers its external resources management information system. The Infrastructure Directorate of\nthe Ministry of Planning has developed a mapping [100] of infrastructure projects in the DRC.\nSpecifically, the information on projects is presented by type of financing, by sector, by location, and\nby implementation agency, but the data are not comprehensive and do not contain the amounts of\nfunding. The Ministry of Planning’s information systems have no interface with the “Expenditure\nchain”, which consists of a number of separate applications _(“Préparation du Budget”_ (PREPABUD budget preparation), “ _Gestion des Dépenses”_ (GESDEPENSE - expenditure management), and\nCOMPTA, in particular) that, in some cases, are not fully operational. Further, the _“Système Intégré_\n_de Gestion des Marchés Publics”_ (SIGMAP - integrated procurement management system) is in the\ndeployment phase, and the development of an e-procurement (E-GP) project is being prepared with\nthe support of the World Bank. Finally, the Ministry of Finance is preparing a data warehouse project.\n\n\n**126. There is no specific information system for monitoring climate change.** The MEDD did\nnot mention any system or database in this area beyond the data relating to forests and to weather\npublished on its website. However, the need to gather data on climate change and to have IT\nsystems to manage such data is growing, both to feed into planning and improve the quality of\nassessment and analysis and to monitor the climate performance of the various investment projects.\n\n\n100 https://www.cartoinfrardc.org/gis/.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 65, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "capacities. There is no IT master plan to provide a consistent, coordinated strategy for development\nand operation of computer software supporting PIM, from planning through to accounting for assets.\nNevertheless, the inter-ministerial coordination unit is aiming to build its capacity under the auspices\nof the Ministry in charge of Digitization, which has recently been set up. The current picture is as\nfollows:\n\n- Within the _Ministry of Planning_, the DPB has an IT division that manages the public investment\ndatabase with a staff composed solely of IT specialists. Additionally, the Aid and Investment\nManagement Platform (PGAI) established by Ministerial order on February 7, 2011 is the\ntechnical agency tasked with strengthening its information system, set up to ensure monitoring\nand evaluation of all stages of management of external funding. In this regard, the PGAI serves\nas a single window and is designated by the government as the official source of information on\naid flows in the DRC. In practice, the PGAI is having difficulties in gathering reliable information,\nparticularly with regard to bilateral partners.\n\n- At the _Ministry of the Budget_, the Interministerial Information Technology Coordination\ndepartment (C2I) (staff of 69) coordinates the IT work of the Ministries of the Budget and Finance.\nThe Ministry’s IT function faces many challenges in terms of the financial resources allocated,\nhaving sufficient, competent staff and of motivation, given, in particular, the lack of a dedicated IT\ncareer path. There is no formal coordination mechanism between the IT function of the Ministry of\nPlanning and the C2I.\n\n- In the absence of a dedicated IT stream and sufficient resources, the IT capacities of the _Ministry_\n_of Finance_ are equally weak. The ministry is in charge of chairing the integrated human resources\nand public finance management system digitization steering committee (the “Committee”), which\nstill has to come into operation. The recent updating of the General Operation Plan (POG) for the\ncomputerization of the system of management of public finance and general government,\nmanaged by the Public Finance Reform Orientation Committee (COREF), does not cover the\narea of public finance management, and the Ministry of Planning is not involved in the work.\n\n125. There is no comprehensive, computerized information system for public investment\nprojects to support decision making and oversight. The Ministry of Planning has a project\ndatabase (in Access format), following the structure of the project fiches, held in Excel. The PGAI\nadministers its external resources management information system. The Infrastructure Directorate of\nthe Ministry of Planning has developed a mapping [100] of infrastructure projects in the DRC.\nSpecifically, the information on projects is presented by type of financing, by sector, by location, and\nby implementation agency, but the data are not comprehensive and do not contain the amounts of\nfunding. The Ministry of Planning’s information systems have no interface with the “Expenditure\nchain”, which consists of a number of separate applications _(“Préparation du Budget”_ (PREPABUD budget preparation), “ _Gestion des Dépenses”_ (GESDEPENSE - expenditure management), and\nCOMPTA, in particular) that, in some cases, are not fully operational. Further, the _“Système Intégré_\n_de Gestion des Marchés Publics”_ (SIGMAP - integrated procurement management system) is in the\ndeployment phase, and the development of an e-procurement (E-GP) project is being prepared with\nthe support of the World Bank. Finally, the Ministry of Finance is preparing a data warehouse project.\n\n126. There is no specific information system for monitoring climate change. The MEDD did\nnot mention any system or database in this area beyond the data relating to forests and to weather\npublished on its website. However, the need to gather data on climate change and to have IT\nsystems to manage such data is growing, both to feed into planning and improve the quality of\nassessment and analysis and to monitor the climate performance of the various investment projects.\n\n100 https://www.cartoinfrardc.org/gis/.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3592}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The NAP prepared at end-2021 stipulates that to assess vulnerability to climate change and impact of\nadaptation measures, the DRC should rely on the collection of data from the various national\ninstitutions, in particular the _Agence nationale de météorologie et télédétection par satellite_ (national\nmeteorological and satellite weather monitoring agency), the _Institut national d’études et recherches_\n_agronomiques_ (national institute of agronomic research), the Ministries of Energy, Agriculture, Rural\nand Urban Development, Land Management, Scientific Research, and the universities, as well as\nfrom international and non-governmental organizations, and other agencies, from both the public and\nprivate sector.\n\n\n**127. The development of an integrated bank of projects, which follows them throughout**\n**their life-cycle, is a high priority for reform.** Many processes of the PIM cycle must be supported\nby an information system. These systems are often separate from the applications for budgeting,\npublic procurement, and accounting, finance and budget execution, hence necessitating a pooling\nand sharing of information among all the parties involved. Depending on the maturity of the\ninformation systems, this can take place through the establishment of standard data exchange\nprocedures, the implementation of software interface plans, or posting in a data warehouse, feeding\ninto a decision-making dashboard. The major principles of a project bank are set forth in Annex 7.\n\n\n**C. STAFF CAPACITY**\n\n\n**128. Administrative fragmentation leads to dilution of public investment management**\n**capacities.** Public administration in the DRC is very fragmented and compartmentalized. Institutional\ncomplexity, legal uncertainty, the multiplicity of parties involved, the unproductive use at times of\nexisting capacities, the lack of coordination, and the absence of comprehensive, consistent circulation\nof information blur the roles and responsibilities, and significantly limit the effectiveness of public\ninvestment management. The cumulation of _ad hoc_ project portfolio management and oversight\ncommittees and agencies of variable size, often created to circumvent ineffective procedures,\nsometimes at the behest of donors, weakens the technical capacity for sound management of\nprojects. The information flows among these parties are often nonexistent, or, at best, fragmented\nand redundant, leading to suboptimal use of human and information technology (IT) resources. The\npooling of skills and knowledge (and information) of these various committees and agencies could\nmake a leap forward possible in terms of analysis and monitoring capacities.\n\n\n**129. The majority of ministries and organizations involved in project management indicate**\n**that they need to build capacity.** Training or technical assistance needs have been pointed out at\nall stages of PIM at both the central and the provincial level: planning, enhancing the appraisal,\nselection, and preparation of projects; budgeting, producing a more reliable financial estimate of the\nspending that the Government must take on; monitoring of project implementation, and _ex post_\nevaluation of projects. For PPPs, capacity building will be crucial to enable the DRC to control the\nfiscal risks associated with that modality of project financing.\n\n\n**130. The authorities also point out the need for capacity building in relation to considering**\n**climate change throughout the entire investment cycle.** As the inclusion of climate change issues\nis an aspect that will gain momentum in coming years, awareness-raising and training of the parties\ninvolved will be a significant, or even necessary first step. The central and provincial governments\nmust be made aware as quickly as possible of the impacts of climate change on public investment\nand infrastructure. The sectoral ministries need technical support to incorporate climate issues in their\nplanning and projects, as well as to analyze and assess costs and risks associated with climate\nchange. Given their technical competence in environmental and climate-related issues, the MEDD\nand the ACE are best placed to offer this support.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 66, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The NAP prepared at end-2021 stipulates that to assess vulnerability to climate change and impact of\nadaptation measures, the DRC should rely on the collection of data from the various national\ninstitutions, in particular the _Agence nationale de météorologie et télédétection par satellite_ (national\nmeteorological and satellite weather monitoring agency), the _Institut national d’études et recherches_\n_agronomiques_ (national institute of agronomic research), the Ministries of Energy, Agriculture, Rural\nand Urban Development, Land Management, Scientific Research, and the universities, as well as\nfrom international and non-governmental organizations, and other agencies, from both the public and\nprivate sector.\n\n127. The development of an integrated bank of projects, which follows them throughout\ntheir life-cycle, is a high priority for reform. Many processes of the PIM cycle must be supported\nby an information system. These systems are often separate from the applications for budgeting,\npublic procurement, and accounting, finance and budget execution, hence necessitating a pooling\nand sharing of information among all the parties involved. Depending on the maturity of the\ninformation systems, this can take place through the establishment of standard data exchange\nprocedures, the implementation of software interface plans, or posting in a data warehouse, feeding\ninto a decision-making dashboard. The major principles of a project bank are set forth in Annex 7.\n\nC. STAFF CAPACITY\n\n128. Administrative fragmentation leads to dilution of public investment management\ncapacities. Public administration in the DRC is very fragmented and compartmentalized. Institutional\ncomplexity, legal uncertainty, the multiplicity of parties involved, the unproductive use at times of\nexisting capacities, the lack of coordination, and the absence of comprehensive, consistent circulation\nof information blur the roles and responsibilities, and significantly limit the effectiveness of public\ninvestment management. The cumulation of _ad hoc_ project portfolio management and oversight\ncommittees and agencies of variable size, often created to circumvent ineffective procedures,\nsometimes at the behest of donors, weakens the technical capacity for sound management of\nprojects. The information flows among these parties are often nonexistent, or, at best, fragmented\nand redundant, leading to suboptimal use of human and information technology (IT) resources. The\npooling of skills and knowledge (and information) of these various committees and agencies could\nmake a leap forward possible in terms of analysis and monitoring capacities.\n\n129. The majority of ministries and organizations involved in project management indicate\nthat they need to build capacity. Training or technical assistance needs have been pointed out at\nall stages of PIM at both the central and the provincial level: planning, enhancing the appraisal,\nselection, and preparation of projects; budgeting, producing a more reliable financial estimate of the\nspending that the Government must take on; monitoring of project implementation, and _ex post_\nevaluation of projects. For PPPs, capacity building will be crucial to enable the DRC to control the\nfiscal risks associated with that modality of project financing.\n\n130. The authorities also point out the need for capacity building in relation to considering\nclimate change throughout the entire investment cycle. As the inclusion of climate change issues\nis an aspect that will gain momentum in coming years, awareness-raising and training of the parties\ninvolved will be a significant, or even necessary first step. The central and provincial governments\nmust be made aware as quickly as possible of the impacts of climate change on public investment\nand infrastructure. The sectoral ministries need technical support to incorporate climate issues in their\nplanning and projects, as well as to analyze and assess costs and risks associated with climate\nchange. Given their technical competence in environmental and climate-related issues, the MEDD\nand the ACE are best placed to offer this support.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3589}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**131. A training and technical assistance plan, with financial backing by technical and**\n**financial partners, will support the authorities’ reform strategies.** As set in the Priority Action\nPlan for the implementation of the Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) for 2022-2028\n(Annex 1), a training plan will be developed, adopted, and implemented to support the authorities’\ncapacities. This plan should also strengthen PIM capacity. A training program for PIM could, as a\npriority, enhance the skills and knowledge associated with the planning, monitoring and evaluation of\nprojects, as well as risk analysis, including those associated with PPPs and in connection with climate\nchange.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 67, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "131. A training and technical assistance plan, with financial backing by technical and\nfinancial partners, will support the authorities’ reform strategies. As set in the Priority Action\nPlan for the implementation of the Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) for 2022-2028\n(Annex 1), a training plan will be developed, adopted, and implemented to support the authorities’\ncapacities. This plan should also strengthen PIM capacity. A training program for PIM could, as a\npriority, enhance the skills and knowledge associated with the planning, monitoring and evaluation of\nprojects, as well as risk analysis, including those associated with PPPs and in connection with climate\nchange.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 645}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex 1. Actions from the draft 2022-24 Priority Action Plan in connection with public investment management**\n**Note:** The amendments proposed by the PIMA mission are indicated in red. The actions in yellow are priority actions under the Priority Action\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|\n|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|**_Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_**
|\n|
**Action 1.1.1:** **Strengthen the**
**institutional framework of the**
**macro-fiscal function**
|
CPCM and macro-fiscal unit
operational
The MTFF including the
provisional Government
Flow-of-Funds Table
(TOFE) is consistent with
the macroeconomic
forecasts.
Macro-fiscal analysis in
the budget documents is
improved.
|
X
|X|||Public
Expenditure and
Financial
Accountability
(PEFA) PI-14
and PI-15.
MTFF includes
full, provisional
TOFE
consistent with
the
macroeconomic
forecasts.
PIMA 1|1. Signature of the Interministerial order for the restructuring of the CPCM,
including a TOFE subcommittee (2022).
2. Signature of the Ministerial order establishing the macro-fiscal unit (2022)
3. Adoption of the internal regulations for the functioning of the CPCM (2023).
4. Production of a procedures manual for the preparation of the macro-fiscal
framework.Revision of the presentation of the MTFF to (i) verify explicitly the
compliance of the projections with the fiscal rules (Article 15 LOFIP), (ii)
distinguish between capital expenditure on current projects and capital
expenditure on new projects(2023).|
MINPLAN;
MINBUD.MI
NFIN|**Medium**||\n|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|
**_Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_**
|\n|
**Action 1.2.2: Gradually complete**
**the list of fiscal risks of all**
**general government departments**
**and quantify them in the DRB.**
|
The credibility of the
budget is improved.|
X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-10.
PIMA 3c
C-PIMA 5|1. Strengthen the macroeconomic risk analysis tools and methods
2. Complete the list of specific and institutional fiscal risks and classify them
according to impact and probability of occurrence.
3. Quantify the specific and institutional risks and formulate mitigation
measures,after strengthening the tools and capacities for analysis, particularly
relating to the viability of PPP projects, debt levels of the provinces, and
climate-related risks(2024).
4.Progressively expand and deepen the DRB, in particular to cover a review of
risks arising from major investment projects of the provinces and public
corporations, as well as guarantees granted to the PPPs, and scenarios
involving climate change risks (2024).
|
MINBUD
(DGPPB);
MINPLAN;
ST-CPCM;
CCDMT-RB
(GTRB)|**High**||\n|**Action 1.2.4: Improve the**
**oversight of public corporations**
**(EPs) and administrative public**
**entities (établissements publics**
**administratifs - EPAs)**and the
transparency of the financial flows
between the central government
and these organizations to aid the
analysis of fiscal risks.
|The Government has an
overview of the fiscal risks
associated with the EPs
and EPAs.
|
|X
|X|X|PEFA PI-10.
PIMA 3c, 5b.
C-PIMA 2
|
1. Adoption of a portfolio strategy documentcovering the objectives of public
shareholders and the investment and performance objectives of corporations,
including the importance of taking climate change into account in their
investment projects(2023).
2. Signature of a circular from the Prime Minister instructing the EPs and EPAs
to produce financial reports with a standard financial reporting model attached
within six months of the year-end,and to share them with the Ministries of
Finance and the Budget (2023).
3. Attach to the draft budget a consolidated report of the financial position of
the EPs and EPAs,their investments, and the financial flows between the
Government and these organizations (2024).
4. Strengthen the computerization of the EPs (2022-24).|
Ministry of
the
Portfolio/
High
Council of
the
Portfolio;
MINPLAN;
MINBUD|**High**||\n|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|
**Specific target 1.3:****_ Introduce budget management based on performance_**|\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 68, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [8.978636741638184, 106.66000366210938, 771.7542724609375, 520.5599975585938], "columns": 11, "rows": 10}], "text": "Annex 1. Actions from the draft 2022-24 Priority Action Plan in connection with public investment management\nNote: The amendments proposed by the PIMA mission are indicated in red. The actions in yellow are priority actions under the Priority Action\n\n STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2028 OUTCOME INDICATOR(S) REQUIREMENTS AREAS RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY POINTS TO WATCH/RI SKS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ _Strategic pillar 1: Budget reform_ \n _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ _Specific target 1.1: Strengthen the macro-fiscal function_ \n Action 1.1.1: Strengthen the institutional framework of the macro-fiscal function CPCM and macro-fiscal unit operational The MTFF including the provisional Government Flow-of-Funds Table (TOFE) is consistent with the macroeconomic forecasts. Macro-fiscal analysis in the budget documents is improved. X X Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) PI-14 and PI-15. MTFF includes full, provisional TOFE consistent with the macroeconomic forecasts. PIMA 1 1. Signature of the Interministerial order for the restructuring of the CPCM, including a TOFE subcommittee (2022). 2. Signature of the Ministerial order establishing the macro-fiscal unit (2022) 3. Adoption of the internal regulations for the functioning of the CPCM (2023). 4. Production of a procedures manual for the preparation of the macro-fiscal framework.Revision of the presentation of the MTFF to (i) verify explicitly the compliance of the projections with the fiscal rules (Article 15 LOFIP), (ii) distinguish between capital expenditure on current projects and capital expenditure on new projects(2023). MINPLAN; MINBUD.MI NFIN Medium \n _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ _Specific target 1.2 Develop the fiscal risk management function_ \n Action 1.2.2: Gradually complete the list of fiscal risks of all general government departments and quantify them in the DRB. The credibility of the budget is improved. X X X X PEFA PI-10. PIMA 3c C-PIMA 5 1. Strengthen the macroeconomic risk analysis tools and methods 2. Complete the list of specific and institutional fiscal risks and classify them according to impact and probability of occurrence. 3. Quantify the specific and institutional risks and formulate mitigation measures,after strengthening the tools and capacities for analysis, particularly relating to the viability of PPP projects, debt levels of the provinces, and climate-related risks(2024). 4.Progressively expand and deepen the DRB, in particular to cover a review of risks arising from major investment projects of the provinces and public corporations, as well as guarantees granted to the PPPs, and scenarios involving climate change risks (2024). MINBUD (DGPPB); MINPLAN; ST-CPCM; CCDMT-RB (GTRB) High \n Action 1.2.4: Improve the oversight of public corporations (EPs) and administrative public entities (établissements publics administratifs - EPAs)and the transparency of the financial flows between the central government and these organizations to aid the analysis of fiscal risks. The Government has an overview of the fiscal risks associated with the EPs and EPAs. X X X PEFA PI-10. PIMA 3c, 5b. C-PIMA 2 1. Adoption of a portfolio strategy documentcovering the objectives of public shareholders and the investment and performance objectives of corporations, including the importance of taking climate change into account in their investment projects(2023). 2. Signature of a circular from the Prime Minister instructing the EPs and EPAs to produce financial reports with a standard financial reporting model attached within six months of the year-end,and to share them with the Ministries of Finance and the Budget (2023). 3. Attach to the draft budget a consolidated report of the financial position of the EPs and EPAs,their investments, and the financial flows between the Government and these organizations (2024). 4. Strengthen the computerization of the EPs (2022-24). Ministry of the Portfolio/ High Council of the Portfolio; MINPLAN; MINBUD High \n Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ Specific target 1.3:_ Introduce budget management based on performance_ \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 5719}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|\n|**Action 1.3.4: Gradually increase**
**the number of ministries that**
**have up-to-date strategies and**
**adopt the finalized and updated**
**model of program budgets.**|The targets and indicators
of fiscal programs reflect
government policies.|X|X|X|X|The number of
ministries that
have up-to-date
strategies has
increased.
PIMA 2b, c, 7c
C-PIMA 2, 3|1. Publication of the presidential order to confer powers on the ministries
(2022).
2. Completion of the reclassification and streamlining of government
organizations and signature of the related decree (QIV 2022)
3.Enhance the information on the objectives in the priority action plans, in
particular those relating to climate change. Strengthen the sectoral thematic
groups to ensure greater cross-cutting awareness of climate change in public
investment decisions (2023).
4. Finalize the fiscal program models, includingfor the special accounts,
supplementary budgets and operators, and their adoption by the Council of
Ministers.The models should reinforce the links between planning and
budgeting, for example through the sharing of various performance indicators,
and should establish the indicators for monitoring investments in relation to
climate change(2023).
|
Council of
Ministers;
MINPLAN;
MINBUD
Sectoral
ministries|**High**||\n|**Action 1.3.5: Implement the**
**technical and educational tools**
**for the implementation of**
**budgeting in program mode.**|The capacities for
budgeting by program are
strengthened.|X|X|X||Regulatory
framework for
the transition to
program mode
adopted.
PIMA 7c, 8|
1. Identification of new fiscal management actors, within a framework
establishing their respective roles (2022).
2.Validate the following guides: (I) appointment of persons responsible for
programs and procedures for delegation of the payment authority function,
preparation of the program budget, framework for management dialogs (2023);
(ii) budgeting and application through AE/CP (commitment authorizations/
payment appropriations),in particular with the requirement to break down the
status of consumption of the AEs by project (2023); (iii) procedures for
selection, steering, and governance specific to Government operators (2024);
(iv) Audit of programs; practice of management supervision; (v) preparation of
the MTFF, the overall MTEF, and the ministerial MTEFs; (2024).|
COREF ;
MINBUD
(DGPPB ;
DGDSP) ;
Ministères
sectoriels.|**Medium**||\n|**Action 1.3.6: Improve the**
**credibility of the budget.**
|The Government budget
is executed as planned in
accordance with the
preparation of the
expenditures, and the
gaps between forecasts
and outcomes are
reduced.
|X
|X
|X
|X
|PEFA PI-1, PI-
2, and PI-3
PIMA 6, 7, 8, 14
|1. Forecast fiscal resources solely on the basis of technical considerations and
ascertain that the execution of expenditures follows the provision of the LOFIP
and the General Public Accounting Regulations (RGCP) (LF 2023).
2. Execute almost all the expenditures on the basis of normal procedures (2022
and subsequent years).
|
National
Assembly
and Senate;
Council of
Ministers;
MINFIN;
MINBUD;|**High**||\n|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|**_Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_**|\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 69, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [8.970438003540039, 72.2199935913086, 771.7542724609375, 426.239990234375], "columns": 11, "rows": 7}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2028 OUTCOME INDICATOR(S) REQUIREMENTS AREAS RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY POINTS TO WATCH/RI SKS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n Action 1.3.4: Gradually increase the number of ministries that have up-to-date strategies and adopt the finalized and updated model of program budgets. The targets and indicators of fiscal programs reflect government policies. X X X X The number of ministries that have up-to-date strategies has increased. PIMA 2b, c, 7c C-PIMA 2, 3 1. Publication of the presidential order to confer powers on the ministries (2022). 2. Completion of the reclassification and streamlining of government organizations and signature of the related decree (QIV 2022) 3.Enhance the information on the objectives in the priority action plans, in particular those relating to climate change. Strengthen the sectoral thematic groups to ensure greater cross-cutting awareness of climate change in public investment decisions (2023). 4. Finalize the fiscal program models, includingfor the special accounts, supplementary budgets and operators, and their adoption by the Council of Ministers.The models should reinforce the links between planning and budgeting, for example through the sharing of various performance indicators, and should establish the indicators for monitoring investments in relation to climate change(2023). Council of Ministers; MINPLAN; MINBUD Sectoral ministries High \n Action 1.3.5: Implement the technical and educational tools for the implementation of budgeting in program mode. The capacities for budgeting by program are strengthened. X X X Regulatory framework for the transition to program mode adopted. PIMA 7c, 8 1. Identification of new fiscal management actors, within a framework establishing their respective roles (2022). 2.Validate the following guides: (I) appointment of persons responsible for programs and procedures for delegation of the payment authority function, preparation of the program budget, framework for management dialogs (2023); (ii) budgeting and application through AE/CP (commitment authorizations/ payment appropriations),in particular with the requirement to break down the status of consumption of the AEs by project (2023); (iii) procedures for selection, steering, and governance specific to Government operators (2024); (iv) Audit of programs; practice of management supervision; (v) preparation of the MTFF, the overall MTEF, and the ministerial MTEFs; (2024). COREF ; MINBUD (DGPPB ; DGDSP) ; Ministères sectoriels. Medium \n Action 1.3.6: Improve the credibility of the budget. The Government budget is executed as planned in accordance with the preparation of the expenditures, and the gaps between forecasts and outcomes are reduced. X X X X PEFA PI-1, PI- 2, and PI-3 PIMA 6, 7, 8, 14 1. Forecast fiscal resources solely on the basis of technical considerations and ascertain that the execution of expenditures follows the provision of the LOFIP and the General Public Accounting Regulations (RGCP) (LF 2023). 2. Execute almost all the expenditures on the basis of normal procedures (2022 and subsequent years). National Assembly and Senate; Council of Ministers; MINFIN; MINBUD; High \n _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ _Specific target 1.4: Improve budget documentation to promote transparency and boost parliamentary debate_ \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 4025}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|\n|**Action 1.4.1: Produce all the**
**annexes to the draft budget law**
**as provided in the LOFIP and**
**supplement the documentation to**
**enhance transparency and**
**nourish parliamentary debate.**
|The information provided
by the annexes to the
draft budget law (PLF)
meets the requirements of
the LOFIP and contributes
to greater understanding
of the fiscal issues.
||X|X|X|PEFA PI 5
PIMA 6c, 8, 12|1. Prepare the budget documentation as required by the LOFIP, including the
documents listed under Article 78 (6), (7), and (8) and the last four listed under
Article 79 (5) (2023).
2. Fill in the budget documentation in addition to the requirements of the LOFIP
(specifically, reports on fiscal expenditure, fiscal risk, the general position of
public corporations and institutions, the status of collateral and guarantees
granted by the Government, the annual cash flow plan adjusted to a monthly
rate, the assessment of the stock of debt, and the list of PPPs in progress)and
the Public Investment Program (PIP)(2024).
|
MINBUD
(DGPPB)|**Medium**||\n|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|
**_Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_**
|\n|
**Action 3.2.1: Improve the**
**methodology for preparing and**
**updating commitment plans**
|Steering of budget
execution is improved.
|X
|X
|X
|
|PEFA PI-1, PI-2
and PI-3; PEFA
PI-21
Rate of execution
of the PEB
Level of RAPs in
relation to
expenditures
(pending
payments and
arrears)
PIMA 12a, 12b
|1. Take up a text making preparation of the PEB and the PTR mandatory
(Q4 2022).
2. Adopt the guide for the preparation of the PEBs and the PTR,which
increases the consistency between the two tools(Q1 2023).
3.Strengthen in-year budget regulation by having the commitment plan at the
beginning of the year based on the draft budget law appropriations, as
presented by the Government (2023).
4. Establish the top-down and bottom-up approach in the preparation/ updating
of the PEBs (Q2 2024).|
MINBUD/D
CB/
DGTCP|**High**||\n|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|**_Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_**
|\n|
**Action 3.4.1: Revise the legal and**
**regulatory framework for public**
**contracts using the MAPS II 2021**
**assessment.**
|
The governance of the
procurement system is
strengthened.|
|
X|
X|
X|
PEFA PI-24 (1
to 4)
PIMA 11a, 11b, 1
2a, 12b|1. Revise the laws and regulations pertaining to public procurement on the
basis of the MAPS II recommendations (ARMP, General Directorate for
Procurement Supervision - DGCMP, and procurement and project
management units - CGPMP)and, in particular, further restrict the possibilities
of granting special authorizations, which open the way to private mutual
agreements(Q4 2023).
2. Require the mandatory preparation of provisional plans for procurement
contracts based on the draft budget law adopted in the Council of Ministers
(Q1 2023).
3. Improve the format of the plan for public procurement to be submitted to the
department tasked with the preparation of the commitment plan by
incorporating the budget data in it.|
MINBUD/A
RMP/DGC
MP|**High**||\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 70, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [8.976449966430664, 72.2199935913086, 771.7542724609375, 512.0584716796875], "columns": 11, "rows": 9}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2028 OUTCOME INDICATOR(S) REQUIREMENTS AREAS RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY POINTS TO WATCH/RI SKS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n Action 1.4.1: Produce all the annexes to the draft budget law as provided in the LOFIP and supplement the documentation to enhance transparency and nourish parliamentary debate. The information provided by the annexes to the draft budget law (PLF) meets the requirements of the LOFIP and contributes to greater understanding of the fiscal issues. X X X PEFA PI 5 PIMA 6c, 8, 12 1. Prepare the budget documentation as required by the LOFIP, including the documents listed under Article 78 (6), (7), and (8) and the last four listed under Article 79 (5) (2023). 2. Fill in the budget documentation in addition to the requirements of the LOFIP (specifically, reports on fiscal expenditure, fiscal risk, the general position of public corporations and institutions, the status of collateral and guarantees granted by the Government, the annual cash flow plan adjusted to a monthly rate, the assessment of the stock of debt, and the list of PPPs in progress)and the Public Investment Program (PIP)(2024). MINBUD (DGPPB) Medium \n _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ _Strategic pillar 3: Public expenditure management_ \n _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ _Specific target 3.2: Strengthen the predictability of public spending execution_ \n Action 3.2.1: Improve the methodology for preparing and updating commitment plans Steering of budget execution is improved. X X X PEFA PI-1, PI-2 and PI-3; PEFA PI-21 Rate of execution of the PEB Level of RAPs in relation to expenditures (pending payments and arrears) PIMA 12a, 12b 1. Take up a text making preparation of the PEB and the PTR mandatory (Q4 2022). 2. Adopt the guide for the preparation of the PEBs and the PTR,which increases the consistency between the two tools(Q1 2023). 3.Strengthen in-year budget regulation by having the commitment plan at the beginning of the year based on the draft budget law appropriations, as presented by the Government (2023). 4. Establish the top-down and bottom-up approach in the preparation/ updating of the PEBs (Q2 2024). MINBUD/D CB/ DGTCP High \n _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ _Specific target 3.4: Enhance the transparency and effectiveness of public procurement_ \n Action 3.4.1: Revise the legal and regulatory framework for public contracts using the MAPS II 2021 assessment. The governance of the procurement system is strengthened. X X X PEFA PI-24 (1 to 4) PIMA 11a, 11b, 1 2a, 12b 1. Revise the laws and regulations pertaining to public procurement on the basis of the MAPS II recommendations (ARMP, General Directorate for Procurement Supervision - DGCMP, and procurement and project management units - CGPMP)and, in particular, further restrict the possibilities of granting special authorizations, which open the way to private mutual agreements(Q4 2023). 2. Require the mandatory preparation of provisional plans for procurement contracts based on the draft budget law adopted in the Council of Ministers (Q1 2023). 3. Improve the format of the plan for public procurement to be submitted to the department tasked with the preparation of the commitment plan by incorporating the budget data in it. MINBUD/A RMP/DGC MP High \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 4887}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|\n||||||||4. Authorize the DGCMP to access the budget information system to ascertain
the availability of appropriations for the files on public contracts submitted to it
for supervision (Q2 2022).
5. Interface the procurement management system with the budget execution
system for embedded checks on the availability of appropriations (Q 4 2024)||||\n|**Action 3.4.2: Make the DGCMP**
**the only entry point at the**
**Ministry of the Budget for**
**requests for nonobjection notices**
**on public procurement files (PPM,**
**DAO, special authorizations, etc.)**
**in accordance with the relevant**
**provisions of the procurement**
**code.**
|The transparency of
public procurement is
improved.
|X|X|X||PEFA PI-24 (1
to 4)
PIMA 11|
1. Draw up a form for transmission of requests for notices to the DGCMP for
files entered at the office of the Ministry of the Budget (MINBUD) (Q1 2022).
2.Gradually reduce the number of special authorizations granted by the
DGCMP (2022).|
MINBUD/A
RMP/DGC
MP|High||\n|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|
**_Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_**
|\n|**Action 3.6.2: Keep and regularly**
**update the register of collateral**
**and guarantees granted by the**
**Government.**
|The management of
public debt is
strengthened.
Its viability and
sustainability are regularly
ensured.
||X|X||PEFA PI-13 (1 to 3)
Number of
notices on the
viability and
sustainability of
debt agreements
PIMA 1a|
1. Establish a database of all the agreements with collateral and guarantee
clauses (Q2 2023).
2. Design markers for the collateral and guarantees likely to be called, so that
they can be covered in the budget (Q4 2023).
3.Conduct regular analyses of the viability of the debt, including alternative
scenarios incorporating all debt instruments, natural resource operating
profiles, demographic projections, contingent liabilities, and climate change
(2023).|
MINFIN/DG
DP|**High**||\n|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|**_Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_**
|\n|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|**_Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_**
|\n|
**Action 4.4.1: Implement the**
**institutional framework for**
**inventory accounting, as defined**
**in the LOFIP.**|
Inventory accounting
meets the requirements of
accrual and asset
accounting.
|
|
X|X||The institutional
framework is in
place.
PIMA 15|1. Establish a consultation framework between the DGCTP and the agency
tasked with the management of the Government’s movable and immovable
assets in order to strengthen the institutional framework for inventory
bookkeeping (2023).|
MIN
FIN/DGTCP/
CPCC/MIN
Transp/MIN
BUDGET/DI
G-CC|**Medium**||\n|**Action 4.4.2: Develop the**
**regulatory framework for**
**inventory accounting.**
|**Action 4.4.2: Develop the**
**regulatory framework for**
**inventory accounting.**
|
|
|X
|
|PEFA PI-12
PIMA 15
|
1. Adopt the inventory nomenclatureand a clear methodology for asset
valuation (2024).
2. Adopt the procedures manual for managing inventory accounting (2024).
3. Incorporate inventory accounting rules in the book of accounting standards.
4. Carry out gradually a full inventory of nonfinancial assets (2024).
|
MIN
FIN/DGTCP
/CPCC/MIN
Transp
/MIN
BUDGET
/DIG-CC|**Medium**|**Medium**|\n|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|**_Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._**|\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 71, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [8.982000350952148, 72.2199935913086, 771.7466430664062, 494.52001953125], "columns": 11, "rows": 12}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2028 OUTCOME INDICATOR(S) REQUIREMENTS AREAS RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY POINTS TO WATCH/RI SKS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n 4. Authorize the DGCMP to access the budget information system to ascertain the availability of appropriations for the files on public contracts submitted to it for supervision (Q2 2022). 5. Interface the procurement management system with the budget execution system for embedded checks on the availability of appropriations (Q 4 2024) \n Action 3.4.2: Make the DGCMP the only entry point at the Ministry of the Budget for requests for nonobjection notices on public procurement files (PPM, DAO, special authorizations, etc.) in accordance with the relevant provisions of the procurement code. The transparency of public procurement is improved. X X X PEFA PI-24 (1 to 4) PIMA 11 1. Draw up a form for transmission of requests for notices to the DGCMP for files entered at the office of the Ministry of the Budget (MINBUD) (Q1 2022). 2.Gradually reduce the number of special authorizations granted by the DGCMP (2022). MINBUD/A RMP/DGC MP High \n _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ _Specific target 3.6: Strengthen public debt management_ \n Action 3.6.2: Keep and regularly update the register of collateral and guarantees granted by the Government. The management of public debt is strengthened. Its viability and sustainability are regularly ensured. X X PEFA PI-13 (1 to 3) Number of notices on the viability and sustainability of debt agreements PIMA 1a 1. Establish a database of all the agreements with collateral and guarantee clauses (Q2 2023). 2. Design markers for the collateral and guarantees likely to be called, so that they can be covered in the budget (Q4 2023). 3.Conduct regular analyses of the viability of the debt, including alternative scenarios incorporating all debt instruments, natural resource operating profiles, demographic projections, contingent liabilities, and climate change (2023). MINFIN/DG DP High \n _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ _Strategic pillar 4: Public accounting and cash management_ \n _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ _Specific target 4.4: Prepare the implementation of inventory accounting_ \n Action 4.4.1: Implement the institutional framework for inventory accounting, as defined in the LOFIP. Inventory accounting meets the requirements of accrual and asset accounting. X X The institutional framework is in place. PIMA 15 1. Establish a consultation framework between the DGCTP and the agency tasked with the management of the Government’s movable and immovable assets in order to strengthen the institutional framework for inventory bookkeeping (2023). MIN FIN/DGTCP/ CPCC/MIN Transp/MIN BUDGET/DI G-CC Medium \n Action 4.4.2: Develop the regulatory framework for inventory accounting. Action 4.4.2: Develop the regulatory framework for inventory accounting. X PEFA PI-12 PIMA 15 1. Adopt the inventory nomenclatureand a clear methodology for asset valuation (2024). 2. Adopt the procedures manual for managing inventory accounting (2024). 3. Incorporate inventory accounting rules in the book of accounting standards. 4. Carry out gradually a full inventory of nonfinancial assets (2024). MIN FIN/DGTCP /CPCC/MIN Transp /MIN BUDGET /DIG-CC Medium Medium \n _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ _Specific target 4.8: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts and improve the practice of issuing government securities._ \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 5832}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|**ACTION **|\n|**Action 4.8.1: Strengthen the**
**quality of cash flow forecasts. **|Cash management plan
forecasts are made
reliable.|X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-16 and
PI-21
Gap between
cash flow
forecasts and
outcomes
PIMA 12a, 12b|1. Prepare a procedures manual for drawing up the cash management plan
(2022).
2. Produce the cash management plan on the basis of actual inflows and
disbursements affecting the Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Central
Bank of the Congo (BCC) and the cash shown in the accounting items (2022).|
DGTCP|**High**||\n|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|**_Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_**|\n|**Action 4.9.2: Progressively**
**expand the coverage of the TSA**
|The various parties
involved comply with the
reform.
The TSA is operational
and covers all
Government resources.
|X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-21
Number of
accounts that
are included
under the TSA
again.
PIMA 12c|1. Adopt a communication and awareness-raising strategy for the various
parties concerned on the benefits of consolidating resources in the TSA (2022).
2. Limit the procedure of exemption from the principle of mandatory deposit at
the Treasury of all government liquid assets (2022).
3. With the support of the BCC carry out a comprehensive survey of
government accounts open in the financial system (2022-23).
4. After a stress test of the impact on the financial system of returning to the
Treasury the credit balances of public accounts residing in the financial system,
determine an appropriate approach to a process of closing these accounts and
gradually transferring the balances to the TSA (2023).
5. At the same time carry out discussions with the PTFs in order to proceed with
the transfer of donors’ accounts to the General Treasury Account (TSA) (2024).|
MINFIN,
BCC,
project
team,
DGTCP,
PTF|||\n|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|**_Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|
**_Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_**|\n|
**Action 5.3.1: Strengthen the**
**guarantees of the independence**
**of the Court of Accounts**
|
An independent audit
providing assurance of the
appropriateness and
compliance of the
execution of public
spending is assured.|X|X|X|X|PEFA PI-30.4
PIMA 14c|1. Appointment of the President of the Court of Accounts as of right (2022)
2. Judges take an oath before the President of the Republic, to ratify the
appointment after receiving the opinion of the National Assembly (AN) (2022).
3. Production of the functional organization chart of the Court of Accounts
(2022)
4. Signature of the Decree on the official regulations of the technical and
administrative staff (2023)
5. Signature of an instruction authorizing the automatic transfer of budget
allocations; appoint an accountant to the Court of Accounts who meets the
requirements of independence of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) (2014)
6. Set up an automatic transfer mechanism for budget allocations. (2024)
7. Submit to the National Assembly a proposal to securely establish the
formulation of the budget of the Court of Accounts (2025).|
Court of
Accounts
National
Assembly
(AN)
MINBUD
MINFIN|**High**||\n|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|**_Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_**
|\n|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|
**_Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_**|\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 72, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [8.98045825958252, 72.2199935913086, 771.7542724609375, 518.519775390625], "columns": 11, "rows": 11}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2028 OUTCOME INDICATOR(S) REQUIREMENTS AREAS RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY POINTS TO WATCH/RI SKS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n Action 4.8.1: Strengthen the quality of cash flow forecasts. Cash management plan forecasts are made reliable. X X X X PEFA PI-16 and PI-21 Gap between cash flow forecasts and outcomes PIMA 12a, 12b 1. Prepare a procedures manual for drawing up the cash management plan (2022). 2. Produce the cash management plan on the basis of actual inflows and disbursements affecting the Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Central Bank of the Congo (BCC) and the cash shown in the accounting items (2022). DGTCP High \n _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ _Specific target 4.9: Set up the Treasury Single Account (TSA)_ \n Action 4.9.2: Progressively expand the coverage of the TSA The various parties involved comply with the reform. The TSA is operational and covers all Government resources. X X X X PEFA PI-21 Number of accounts that are included under the TSA again. PIMA 12c 1. Adopt a communication and awareness-raising strategy for the various parties concerned on the benefits of consolidating resources in the TSA (2022). 2. Limit the procedure of exemption from the principle of mandatory deposit at the Treasury of all government liquid assets (2022). 3. With the support of the BCC carry out a comprehensive survey of government accounts open in the financial system (2022-23). 4. After a stress test of the impact on the financial system of returning to the Treasury the credit balances of public accounts residing in the financial system, determine an appropriate approach to a process of closing these accounts and gradually transferring the balances to the TSA (2023). 5. At the same time carry out discussions with the PTFs in order to proceed with the transfer of donors’ accounts to the General Treasury Account (TSA) (2024). MINFIN, BCC, project team, DGTCP, PTF \n _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ _Strategic pillar 5: Public finance auditing_ \n _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ _Specific target 5.3: Strengthen external auditing_ \n Action 5.3.1: Strengthen the guarantees of the independence of the Court of Accounts An independent audit providing assurance of the appropriateness and compliance of the execution of public spending is assured. X X X X PEFA PI-30.4 PIMA 14c 1. Appointment of the President of the Court of Accounts as of right (2022) 2. Judges take an oath before the President of the Republic, to ratify the appointment after receiving the opinion of the National Assembly (AN) (2022). 3. Production of the functional organization chart of the Court of Accounts (2022) 4. Signature of the Decree on the official regulations of the technical and administrative staff (2023) 5. Signature of an instruction authorizing the automatic transfer of budget allocations; appoint an accountant to the Court of Accounts who meets the requirements of independence of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) (2014) 6. Set up an automatic transfer mechanism for budget allocations. (2024) 7. Submit to the National Assembly a proposal to securely establish the formulation of the budget of the Court of Accounts (2025). Court of Accounts National Assembly (AN) MINBUD MINFIN High \n _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ _Pillar 0: Accompanying measures_ \n _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ _Specific target 0.2: Build capacity_ \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 4999}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|STRATEGIC PILLAR|EXPECTED OUTCOME(S)|2022|2023|2024|2025
2028|OUTCOME
INDICATOR(S)|REQUIREMENTS|AREAS
RESPONSIBLE|PRIORITY|POINTS TO
WATCH/RI
SKS|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|**SPECIFIC TARGET**|\n|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|**ACTION **
|\n|**Cross-cutting action 0.2.1:**
**Develop, adopt, and implement a**
**training plan to accompany the**
**implementation of the Strategic**
**Public Finance Reform Plan**
**(PSRFP) 2022-28.**|The capacities of the
various parties involved in
GFP (public financial
management) are
strengthened.|X|X|X|X|Number of annual
training courses|1. Adopt an updated public financial management training plan (2022).
2. Implement the training planthereby strengthening, among other things, the
capacities for public investment management and capacities for analysis of the
fiscal risks arising from PPPs(2022-28).|
COREF,
MINFIN,
MINBUD,
Ministries,
Supervisory
authorities|**High**||\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 73, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [9.000499725341797, 72.239990234375, 771.719970703125, 160.5594940185547], "columns": 11, "rows": 4}], "text": "STRATEGIC PILLAR EXPECTED OUTCOME(S) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2028 OUTCOME INDICATOR(S) REQUIREMENTS AREAS RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY POINTS TO WATCH/RI SKS \n\n SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET SPECIFIC TARGET \n ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION \n Cross-cutting action 0.2.1: Develop, adopt, and implement a training plan to accompany the implementation of the Strategic Public Finance Reform Plan (PSRFP) 2022-28. The capacities of the various parties involved in GFP (public financial management) are strengthened. X X X X Number of annual training courses 1. Adopt an updated public financial management training plan (2022). 2. Implement the training planthereby strengthening, among other things, the capacities for public investment management and capacities for analysis of the fiscal risks arising from PPPs(2022-28). COREF, MINFIN, MINBUD, Ministries, Supervisory authorities High \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 957}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex 2. Detailed PIMA assessment scores**\nThe following colors are used to present the scores:\n\n\n|Score|Weak|Medium|Advanced|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Score
|
1|2
|
3|\n|Color|
||
|\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|I. PLANNING|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n||**Institutional**
**design**|**Effectiveness**|\n|1.a.|
||\n|
1.b|||\n|
1.c|||\n|
2.a.|||\n|
2.b|||\n|
2.c|||\n|
3.a.|||\n|
3.b|||\n|
3.c|||\n|
4.a.|||\n|
4.b|||\n|
4.c|||\n|
5.a.|||\n|
5.b
|
|
|\n|
5.c|||\n\n\n|II. ALLOCATION|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n||**Institutional**
**design**|**Effectiveness**|\n|6.a|
||\n|6.b|||\n|6.c|||\n|7.a|||\n|7.b|||\n|7.c|||\n|8.a|||\n|8.b|||\n|8.c|||\n|9.a|||\n|9.b|||\n|9.c|||\n|10.a|||\n|10.b
|
|
|\n|10.c|||\n\n\n|III. IMPLEMENTATION|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n||**Institutional**
**design**|**Effectiveness**|\n|11.a|
||\n|11.b|||\n|11.c|||\n|12.a|||\n|12.b|||\n|12.c|||\n|13.a|||\n|13.b|||\n|13.c|||\n|14.a|||\n|14.b|||\n|14.c|||\n|15.a|||\n|15.b
|
|
|\n|15.c|||", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 74, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [76.55999755859375, 176.75949096679688, 220.32049560546875, 447.0], "columns": 3, "rows": 17}, {"bbox": [164.4757843017578, 106.67999267578125, 445.32049560546875, 153.239990234375], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}, {"bbox": [233.8800048828125, 176.75949096679688, 377.8800048828125, 447.0], "columns": 3, "rows": 17}, {"bbox": [391.32049560546875, 176.75949096679688, 535.320556640625, 447.0], "columns": 3, "rows": 17}], "text": "Annex 2. Detailed PIMA assessment scores\nThe following colors are used to present the scores:\n\n Score Weak Medium Advanced \n\n Score 1 2 3 \n Color \n\n I. PLANNING Col2 Col3 \n\n Institutional design Effectiveness \n 1.a. \n 1.b \n 1.c \n 2.a. \n 2.b \n 2.c \n 3.a. \n 3.b \n 3.c \n 4.a. \n 4.b \n 4.c \n 5.a. \n 5.b \n 5.c \n\n II. ALLOCATION Col2 Col3 \n\n Institutional design Effectiveness \n 6.a \n 6.b \n 6.c \n 7.a \n 7.b \n 7.c \n 8.a \n 8.b \n 8.c \n 9.a \n 9.b \n 9.c \n 10.a \n 10.b \n 10.c \n\n III. IMPLEMENTATION Col2 Col3 \n\n Institutional design Effectiveness \n 11.a \n 11.b \n 11.c \n 12.a \n 12.b \n 12.c \n 13.a \n 13.b \n 13.c \n 14.a \n 14.b \n 14.c \n 15.a \n 15.b \n 15.c", "text_characters": 434}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex 3. Detailed C-PIMA module assessment scores**\nThe following colors are used to present the scores:\n\n|C1. Climate-aware Planning|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|**C1.a**|**National and sectoral planning**
|\n|**C1.b**|**Land use and building regulations**
|\n|**C1.c**|**Centralized guidance on planning**|\n|**C2. Coordination between Entities**
|**C2. Coordination between Entities**
|\n|**C2.a**|**Coordination across central government**
|\n|**C2.b**|**Coordination with subnational governments**
|\n|**C2.c**|**Oversight framework for public corporations**|\n|**C3. Project Appraisal and Selection**
|**C3. Project Appraisal and Selection**
|\n|**C.3.a**|**Climate analysis in project appraisal**
|\n|**C3.b**|**PPP framework including climate risks**
|\n|**C3.c**|**Climate consideration in project selection**|\n|**C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management**
|**C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management**
|\n|**C4.a.**|**Climate budget tagging**
|\n|**C4.b**|**Ex post review of projects on climate outcomes**
|\n|**C4.c**|**Asset management**|\n|**C5. Risk Management**|**C5. Risk Management**|\n|**C5.a**|**Disaster risk management strategy**|\n|**C5.b**|**Ex ante financing mechanisms**|\n|**C5.c**|**Fiscal risk analysis including climate risks**|\n\n\n|Score|Weak|Medium|Advanced|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Score
|
1|2
|
3|\n|Color|
||
|\n\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 75, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [144.10858154296875, 176.6392364501953, 467.8914489746094, 489.44000244140625], "columns": 2, "rows": 20}, {"bbox": [166.79998779296875, 106.67999267578125, 445.32049560546875, 153.239990234375], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}], "text": "Annex 3. Detailed C-PIMA module assessment scores\nThe following colors are used to present the scores:\n\n C1. Climate-aware Planning Col2 \n\n C1.a National and sectoral planning \n C1.b Land use and building regulations \n C1.c Centralized guidance on planning \n C2. Coordination between Entities C2. Coordination between Entities \n C2.a Coordination across central government \n C2.b Coordination with subnational governments \n C2.c Oversight framework for public corporations \n C3. Project Appraisal and Selection C3. Project Appraisal and Selection \n C.3.a Climate analysis in project appraisal \n C3.b PPP framework including climate risks \n C3.c Climate consideration in project selection \n C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management C4. Budgeting and Portfolio Management \n C4.a. Climate budget tagging \n C4.b Ex post review of projects on climate outcomes \n C4.c Asset management \n C5. Risk Management C5. Risk Management \n C5.a Disaster risk management strategy \n C5.b Ex ante financing mechanisms \n C5.c Fiscal risk analysis including climate risks \n\n Score Weak Medium Advanced \n\n Score 1 2 3 \n Color \n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 963}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex 4. Setting up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects**\n**Management of the externally financed project portfolio in the DRC is fragmented.** Indeed, several\nagencies within the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, and other ministries cover various\nproject portfolios, the features of which, in terms of sectors and donors, often depend on the historic\ncircumstances of their inception. [101] The legal framework establishing the powers of some of these entities\nis often obsolete, or even no longer valid, as in the case of committees or agencies that had a closing\ndate set in the laws and regulations. This poses several problems.\n\n- _This situation complicates the consolidation of information on the projects._ As things stand, the\nauthorities are not able to oversee on a regular basis and in real time the financial and physical flows\nrelating to these projects. The reporting is either not comprehensive, or irregular or late.\n\n- _This fragmentation tends to disperse management skills and knowledge among the various units,_ in a\nsituation where the authorities are lacking human and financial resources.\n\n- _The discussions on the portfolio with the various donors are not optimal due to the lack of coordinated_\n_management._ It is therefore not easy to verify whether, overall, the actions of the various donors are\nwell aligned with the DRC’s strategic priorities and whether the various sectors are given balanced\ncoverage.\n\n- _The performance of this portfolio is thus mixed, as illustrated by the poor rates of uptake of resources._\nVarious reasons underlie the generally slow implementation of externally financed programs and\nprojects; these reasons include the complexity and variability of the procedures required by different\ndonors, and the use of funds for expenditure that is actually ineligible.\n\n- _To continue to exist even when their portfolio has reached its end-date, the committees and agencies_\n_initially tasked with managing externally financed projects then also go on to implement projects_\n_financed by the central government’s own funds._ This is specifically the case with the BCECO and the\nInfrastructure Unit, while their founding regulations tasked them solely with carrying out externally\nfinanced projects. That raises issues relating to the application of internal control procedures.\n\n\n**To remedy this situation, it is important to work towards the establishment of a single office (the**\n**“Office”) tasked with coordination and oversight of all externally financed projects.** Such an entity\nwould allow to pool resources that are currently scattered among the various units. The Office should\nhave the following three core functions:\n\n(i) A front office to organize the pitch for projects to be financed and ensure alignment with the\nstrategic development priorities, participate in funding negotiations with the authorities, and\ngather information on banking flows.\n\n(ii) A middle office that would support the sectoral ministries carrying the budget appropriations\nin the preparation and implementation of projects. Tasks that could benefit from that support\ncould include the conduction of project feasibility studies, the selection of projects to be\nentered in the PIP, the preparation of files for calls for bids, and the contract allocation\nprocess. The sectoral ministries could also choose to delegate the role of principal contractor\nto the Office, in return for fair compensation. In all cases an agreement should be entered\ninto in advance between the sectoral ministry and the Office, in order to ensure clear\nallocation of responsibilities and strict compliance with the rules for budget management and\ncontrol (in particular, the absolute adherence to recording the projects in the respective\nsectoral ministries’ budgets) and the rules relating to procurement. The management fees\nreceived by the Office should be reported transparently in the budget law.\n\n\n101 Among these agencies, it is worth noting the Central Coordination Office (BCECO), the Fragile States\nFinance Implementation Unit (CFEF), the Project and Program Oversight Unit (CSPP), the European\nDevelopment Fund payment authority support unit, and the Aid and Investment Management Platform\n(PGAI).\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 76, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex 4. Setting up a single office for coordination and oversight of externally financed projects\nManagement of the externally financed project portfolio in the DRC is fragmented. Indeed, several\nagencies within the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, and other ministries cover various\nproject portfolios, the features of which, in terms of sectors and donors, often depend on the historic\ncircumstances of their inception. [101] The legal framework establishing the powers of some of these entities\nis often obsolete, or even no longer valid, as in the case of committees or agencies that had a closing\ndate set in the laws and regulations. This poses several problems.\n\n- _This situation complicates the consolidation of information on the projects._ As things stand, the\nauthorities are not able to oversee on a regular basis and in real time the financial and physical flows\nrelating to these projects. The reporting is either not comprehensive, or irregular or late.\n\n- _This fragmentation tends to disperse management skills and knowledge among the various units,_ in a\nsituation where the authorities are lacking human and financial resources.\n\n- _The discussions on the portfolio with the various donors are not optimal due to the lack of coordinated_\n_management._ It is therefore not easy to verify whether, overall, the actions of the various donors are\nwell aligned with the DRC’s strategic priorities and whether the various sectors are given balanced\ncoverage.\n\n- _The performance of this portfolio is thus mixed, as illustrated by the poor rates of uptake of resources._\nVarious reasons underlie the generally slow implementation of externally financed programs and\nprojects; these reasons include the complexity and variability of the procedures required by different\ndonors, and the use of funds for expenditure that is actually ineligible.\n\n- _To continue to exist even when their portfolio has reached its end-date, the committees and agencies_\n_initially tasked with managing externally financed projects then also go on to implement projects_\n_financed by the central government’s own funds._ This is specifically the case with the BCECO and the\nInfrastructure Unit, while their founding regulations tasked them solely with carrying out externally\nfinanced projects. That raises issues relating to the application of internal control procedures.\n\nTo remedy this situation, it is important to work towards the establishment of a single office (the\n“Office”) tasked with coordination and oversight of all externally financed projects. Such an entity\nwould allow to pool resources that are currently scattered among the various units. The Office should\nhave the following three core functions:\n\n(i) A front office to organize the pitch for projects to be financed and ensure alignment with the\nstrategic development priorities, participate in funding negotiations with the authorities, and\ngather information on banking flows.\n\n(ii) A middle office that would support the sectoral ministries carrying the budget appropriations\nin the preparation and implementation of projects. Tasks that could benefit from that support\ncould include the conduction of project feasibility studies, the selection of projects to be\nentered in the PIP, the preparation of files for calls for bids, and the contract allocation\nprocess. The sectoral ministries could also choose to delegate the role of principal contractor\nto the Office, in return for fair compensation. In all cases an agreement should be entered\ninto in advance between the sectoral ministry and the Office, in order to ensure clear\nallocation of responsibilities and strict compliance with the rules for budget management and\ncontrol (in particular, the absolute adherence to recording the projects in the respective\nsectoral ministries’ budgets) and the rules relating to procurement. The management fees\nreceived by the Office should be reported transparently in the budget law.\n\n101 Among these agencies, it is worth noting the Central Coordination Office (BCECO), the Fragile States\nFinance Implementation Unit (CFEF), the Project and Program Oversight Unit (CSPP), the European\nDevelopment Fund payment authority support unit, and the Aid and Investment Management Platform\n(PGAI).\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 3668}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "(iii) A back office, which would keep a comprehensive, consolidated database of the currently\nmanaged externally financed projects, draw up the various monitoring reports for each project\nand donor, and supply financial information to the institutional users, in particular the\nMinistries of Finance, Planning, and the Budget. As the sectoral ministries remain responsible\nfor the appropriations allocated to their projects, the accounting function would be covered by\nthe public accountants assigned to these expenditures under the auspices of the General\nDirectorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting.\n\n\n**The best option in the view of the mission with regard to the institutional form of the Office would**\n**be an** _**établissement public administratif**_ **(administrative public entity) under the financial and**\n**technical oversight of the Ministry of Finance, and which would be the successor to the BCECO.**\nThe benefits of such a structure include financial and administrative autonomy and attractiveness for high\nquality experts. The Office would also benefit from the networks of local correspondents set up by the\nBCECO and the CFEF. The Board of Directors of the Office should include representatives of the\nMinistries of Planning and the Budget, as well as the sectoral ministries, in order to ensure good\ncoordination and exchange of information. The Office should comply with the law on public institutions\nand be given a framework by a regulation setting forth, in particular, the functional relationships with the\nother authorities - specifically the Ministry of Planning (for the planning of public investment) and the\nprofessional experts located in the contracting authorities (for example the directorate of hospital, school,\nand roads and bridges infrastructure). As with any public institution, the Office would have an accounting\nsection to take care of reporting on the operations relating to its activities.\n**The other options available pose problems in terms of financing and potential effectiveness.** An\ninternal entity at a ministry would suffer from a lack of institutional and financial autonomy and would not\nallow proper coordination with the authorities sponsoring the projects. An inter-ministerial committee\nplaced under the joint authority of several ministries, with a permanent technical secretariat to deal with\nthe work, could perform the tasks described above, but its implementation would be complex and its\nattractiveness for high-quality experts would be limited.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 77, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "(iii) A back office, which would keep a comprehensive, consolidated database of the currently\nmanaged externally financed projects, draw up the various monitoring reports for each project\nand donor, and supply financial information to the institutional users, in particular the\nMinistries of Finance, Planning, and the Budget. As the sectoral ministries remain responsible\nfor the appropriations allocated to their projects, the accounting function would be covered by\nthe public accountants assigned to these expenditures under the auspices of the General\nDirectorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting.\n\nThe best option in the view of the mission with regard to the institutional form of the Office would\nbe an _établissement public administratif_ (administrative public entity) under the financial and\ntechnical oversight of the Ministry of Finance, and which would be the successor to the BCECO.\nThe benefits of such a structure include financial and administrative autonomy and attractiveness for high\nquality experts. The Office would also benefit from the networks of local correspondents set up by the\nBCECO and the CFEF. The Board of Directors of the Office should include representatives of the\nMinistries of Planning and the Budget, as well as the sectoral ministries, in order to ensure good\ncoordination and exchange of information. The Office should comply with the law on public institutions\nand be given a framework by a regulation setting forth, in particular, the functional relationships with the\nother authorities - specifically the Ministry of Planning (for the planning of public investment) and the\nprofessional experts located in the contracting authorities (for example the directorate of hospital, school,\nand roads and bridges infrastructure). As with any public institution, the Office would have an accounting\nsection to take care of reporting on the operations relating to its activities.\nThe other options available pose problems in terms of financing and potential effectiveness. An\ninternal entity at a ministry would suffer from a lack of institutional and financial autonomy and would not\nallow proper coordination with the authorities sponsoring the projects. An inter-ministerial committee\nplaced under the joint authority of several ministries, with a permanent technical secretariat to deal with\nthe work, could perform the tasks described above, but its implementation would be complex and its\nattractiveness for high-quality experts would be limited.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2178}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex 5. Guiding principles for preparation of a decree on public investment management**\n\n**The adoption of a decree on public investment management is a high priority.** The adoption of such\na decree covering all stages of the project cycle, would make it possible to define the responsibilities of\nthe various parties involved in each of these stages, to structure the institutional framework, and to\nprovide guidance for the development of indispensable tools to build optimal investment project\nmanagement. This decree should specifically respond to the following basic elements:\n\n- **Applying to all the projects borne by the public sector regardless of their sources of finance** central government, public services and institutions, provinces and ETDs, public corporations, as well\nas PPPs (in accordance with the existing legal framework). The decree should stipulate the anchoring\nof the development programs and projects within the budget and the relationships between the\ndevelopment program and project management units and the budget program managers. It should\nlay down an institutional structure that includes all the relevant parties and provides regulatory\nresponses to any potential areas of conflict among the parties. It must give indications on the rules of\nbehavior of the parties involved in the various stages of the cycle (planning, allocation, and\nimplementation).\n\n- **Setting the framework for planning and budgeting of the projects recorded in the budget** by (i)\nstipulating the rules for the management of the portfolio/bank of projects, in particular the criteria for\nregistration, completion, eligibility for the PIP, integration in the budget, and removal from the\nportfolio; (ii) detailing the activities of the planning and budgeting process, as well as the role of the\nparties involved as part of a unified budget process; (iii) specifying the format of the PIP; and (iv)\nrequiring the register of guarantees to be kept, in particular for PPP projects. The text could also\nprovide for the publication of comprehensive information on the whole of the public investment project\nportfolio, regardless of the source of financing and the management entity.\n\n- **Laying down the main rules for appraisal and selection of projects** by (i) stipulating the approach\nfor identification, appraisal, selection, and completion of projects, as well as the approach to eligibility\nfor the PIP and inclusion in the budget from the perspective of informing the various guides and\nmanuals on their content; (ii) organizing the budgeting and use of study funds to carry out feasibility\nstudies. General selection criteria, including those giving explicit priority to projects combating climate\nchange, could be set forth in the text.\n\n- **Specifying the rules for monitoring project implementation**, particularly covering project\nmanagement units financed both internally and externally, the heads of major projects, and their\nrelationships with the technical and financial supervisors for information reporting.\n\n- **Providing a framework for the process of closing projects and** _**ex post**_ **evaluation** by requiring\nthat inventories, completion audits, and _ex post_ evaluations be carried out.\n\n- **Establishing the principle of systematic inclusion of project maintenance** at the time of project\ndesign, budgeting, and implementation.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 78, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex 5. Guiding principles for preparation of a decree on public investment management\n\nThe adoption of a decree on public investment management is a high priority. The adoption of such\na decree covering all stages of the project cycle, would make it possible to define the responsibilities of\nthe various parties involved in each of these stages, to structure the institutional framework, and to\nprovide guidance for the development of indispensable tools to build optimal investment project\nmanagement. This decree should specifically respond to the following basic elements:\n\n- Applying to all the projects borne by the public sector regardless of their sources of finance central government, public services and institutions, provinces and ETDs, public corporations, as well\nas PPPs (in accordance with the existing legal framework). The decree should stipulate the anchoring\nof the development programs and projects within the budget and the relationships between the\ndevelopment program and project management units and the budget program managers. It should\nlay down an institutional structure that includes all the relevant parties and provides regulatory\nresponses to any potential areas of conflict among the parties. It must give indications on the rules of\nbehavior of the parties involved in the various stages of the cycle (planning, allocation, and\nimplementation).\n\n- Setting the framework for planning and budgeting of the projects recorded in the budget by (i)\nstipulating the rules for the management of the portfolio/bank of projects, in particular the criteria for\nregistration, completion, eligibility for the PIP, integration in the budget, and removal from the\nportfolio; (ii) detailing the activities of the planning and budgeting process, as well as the role of the\nparties involved as part of a unified budget process; (iii) specifying the format of the PIP; and (iv)\nrequiring the register of guarantees to be kept, in particular for PPP projects. The text could also\nprovide for the publication of comprehensive information on the whole of the public investment project\nportfolio, regardless of the source of financing and the management entity.\n\n- Laying down the main rules for appraisal and selection of projects by (i) stipulating the approach\nfor identification, appraisal, selection, and completion of projects, as well as the approach to eligibility\nfor the PIP and inclusion in the budget from the perspective of informing the various guides and\nmanuals on their content; (ii) organizing the budgeting and use of study funds to carry out feasibility\nstudies. General selection criteria, including those giving explicit priority to projects combating climate\nchange, could be set forth in the text.\n\n- Specifying the rules for monitoring project implementation, particularly covering project\nmanagement units financed both internally and externally, the heads of major projects, and their\nrelationships with the technical and financial supervisors for information reporting.\n\n- Providing a framework for the process of closing projects and _ex post_ evaluation by requiring\nthat inventories, completion audits, and _ex post_ evaluations be carried out.\n\n- Establishing the principle of systematic inclusion of project maintenance at the time of project\ndesign, budgeting, and implementation.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2877}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex 6. Illustration of the list of relevant selection criteria**\n\n**The list of selection criteria presented below includes various good practices used in several**\n**countries, including Benin, and adds specific criteria relating to climate change.** Each evaluation\ncriterion and subcriterion may be subject to an order of priority, or potentially weightings, in order to\nattribute overall grades to the various projects.\n\n- **Existence of the project document: (Yes/ No)**\n\n- **Degree of preparation of the project:**\n\n - _Have all the headings of the project fiche been filled in and are the associated documents_\n_attached?_\n\n- **Relevance of the project:**\n\n - _Have social, economic, and environmental needs, including the aspect of climate and gender_\n_equity, been clearly identified?_\n\n - _Have the beneficiaries been qualitatively and quantitatively defined?_\n\n- **Consistency of the project:**\n\n - _Do the project objectives comply with the strategic guidelines in terms of development?_\n\n - _Does the project comply with the strategic priorities for the sector?_\n\n - _Is the internal logic of the project (activities - outcomes - specific targets - general objective)_\n_coherent?_\n\n- **Technical feasibility of the project:**\n\n - _Have the preliminary conditions for starting project implementation (agreements, procedures,_\n_organization, responsibilities, laws and regulations) been established?_\n\n - _Is the technical choice optimal, in particular with regard to climate change?_\n\n- **Economic and financial feasibility of the project:**\n\n - _What is the assessment of internal return?_\n\n- **Appraisal of the cost and financing plan:**\n\n - _What is the cost estimate for carrying out the project?_\n\n - _Is the project financing plan sustainable?_\n\n- **Appraisal of risks, impacts and mitigation measures of the project:**\n\n - _Have the risks of the project, including climate change risk, been assessed, and have plans for_\n_mitigation of these risks been established?_\n\n - _Have the climate change impacts been assessed?_\n\n- **Project implementation strategy:**\n\n - _Have the project implementation mechanisms (operating mode) been established and are they_\n_appropriate?_\n\n - _Has the project implementation plan been established and it is appropriate?_\n\n- **Viability and sustainability of the project:**\n\n - _Have the recurring costs of the project been correctly identified and appraised?_\n\n- **Monitoring and evaluation of the project: (Scale and grade).**\n\n - _What is the relevance of the indicators associated with the project?_\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 79, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex 6. Illustration of the list of relevant selection criteria\n\nThe list of selection criteria presented below includes various good practices used in several\ncountries, including Benin, and adds specific criteria relating to climate change. Each evaluation\ncriterion and subcriterion may be subject to an order of priority, or potentially weightings, in order to\nattribute overall grades to the various projects.\n\n- Existence of the project document: (Yes/ No)\n\n- Degree of preparation of the project:\n\n - _Have all the headings of the project fiche been filled in and are the associated documents_\n_attached?_\n\n- Relevance of the project:\n\n - _Have social, economic, and environmental needs, including the aspect of climate and gender_\n_equity, been clearly identified?_\n\n - _Have the beneficiaries been qualitatively and quantitatively defined?_\n\n- Consistency of the project:\n\n - _Do the project objectives comply with the strategic guidelines in terms of development?_\n\n - _Does the project comply with the strategic priorities for the sector?_\n\n - _Is the internal logic of the project (activities - outcomes - specific targets - general objective)_\n_coherent?_\n\n- Technical feasibility of the project:\n\n - _Have the preliminary conditions for starting project implementation (agreements, procedures,_\n_organization, responsibilities, laws and regulations) been established?_\n\n - _Is the technical choice optimal, in particular with regard to climate change?_\n\n- Economic and financial feasibility of the project:\n\n - _What is the assessment of internal return?_\n\n- Appraisal of the cost and financing plan:\n\n - _What is the cost estimate for carrying out the project?_\n\n - _Is the project financing plan sustainable?_\n\n- Appraisal of risks, impacts and mitigation measures of the project:\n\n - _Have the risks of the project, including climate change risk, been assessed, and have plans for_\n_mitigation of these risks been established?_\n\n - _Have the climate change impacts been assessed?_\n\n- Project implementation strategy:\n\n - _Have the project implementation mechanisms (operating mode) been established and are they_\n_appropriate?_\n\n - _Has the project implementation plan been established and it is appropriate?_\n\n- Viability and sustainability of the project:\n\n - _Have the recurring costs of the project been correctly identified and appraised?_\n\n- Monitoring and evaluation of the project: (Scale and grade).\n\n - _What is the relevance of the indicators associated with the project?_\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2145}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-058-fig-p0080-001"], "markdown": "**Annex 7. Principles guiding the establishment of an integrated bank of projects**\n\n**Most African countries do not yet have fully developed practices in the area of information**\n**systems**, structured around a bank of projects that enables projects to be monitored, identified by a\nunique code, over their entire life-cycle from the initial idea for each project through to its completion.\n\n**In short, however, many important principles remain to be applied with regard to computerization**\n**of the bank of projects, as follows:**\n\n- Making available in advance an effective institutional framework providing steering, coordination,\nsupport, and implementation of the computerization process;\n\n- Integrating the IT development of the bank of projects in a strategy formalized in an IT master plan;\n\n- Allocating to each project in the bank a unique code following the project through its whole life-cycle\nusing a registration system implemented by the Ministry in charge of planning;\n\n- Integrating in the bank of projects functionalities that enable monitoring over the whole life-cycle of\nmanagement, from project ideas to completions, according to the following sequence:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n- Adopting a comprehensive approach to the bank of projects, including projects financed by own\nfunds, external funds, and supported by PPPs, at both national and subnational level;\n\n- Supporting the implementation of the computerized bank of projects with formalized tools, in terms of\nsteering (project fiches, appraisal and selection framework, PIP, dashboards), monitoring, and\ntransmission of information (standard forms) and reporting (standard reports);\n\n- Identifying and facilitating, using keys (registration of projects, budget nomenclature, and registration\nof contracts and PPPs), charts of accounts (general accounting and inventory accounting), data\ninterfaces, and management applications;\n\n- Ensuring the sharing and pooling of information on the bank of projects among all parties involved;\n\n- Promoting development, ownership, proper use, and autonomy among the users of the bank of\nprojects.\n\n**In terms of functionality, an information system supporting public investment management**\n**should enable the following:**\n\n- Development of the project pipeline (identification, preparation, design, and presentation);\n\n- Project appraisal and selection;\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 80, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex 7. Principles guiding the establishment of an integrated bank of projects\n\nMost African countries do not yet have fully developed practices in the area of information\nsystems, structured around a bank of projects that enables projects to be monitored, identified by a\nunique code, over their entire life-cycle from the initial idea for each project through to its completion.\n\nIn short, however, many important principles remain to be applied with regard to computerization\nof the bank of projects, as follows:\n\n- Making available in advance an effective institutional framework providing steering, coordination,\nsupport, and implementation of the computerization process;\n\n- Integrating the IT development of the bank of projects in a strategy formalized in an IT master plan;\n\n- Allocating to each project in the bank a unique code following the project through its whole life-cycle\nusing a registration system implemented by the Ministry in charge of planning;\n\n- Integrating in the bank of projects functionalities that enable monitoring over the whole life-cycle of\nmanagement, from project ideas to completions, according to the following sequence:\n\n- Adopting a comprehensive approach to the bank of projects, including projects financed by own\nfunds, external funds, and supported by PPPs, at both national and subnational level;\n\n- Supporting the implementation of the computerized bank of projects with formalized tools, in terms of\nsteering (project fiches, appraisal and selection framework, PIP, dashboards), monitoring, and\ntransmission of information (standard forms) and reporting (standard reports);\n\n- Identifying and facilitating, using keys (registration of projects, budget nomenclature, and registration\nof contracts and PPPs), charts of accounts (general accounting and inventory accounting), data\ninterfaces, and management applications;\n\n- Ensuring the sharing and pooling of information on the bank of projects among all parties involved;\n\n- Promoting development, ownership, proper use, and autonomy among the users of the bank of\nprojects.\n\nIn terms of functionality, an information system supporting public investment management\nshould enable the following:\n\n- Development of the project pipeline (identification, preparation, design, and presentation);\n\n- Project appraisal and selection;\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 2034}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- An interface with the IT system for budgeting, with the establishment of a key between the coding of\nprojects and the budget nomenclature;\n\n- An interface with the IT system for procurement, with the establishment of a key between the coding\nof projects, the budget nomenclature, and the registration of contracts;\n\n- An interface with the budget implementation system(s) and general accounting;\n\n- Project management;\n\n- Periodic monitoring of physical and financial implementation of projects and the centralization of\ninformation, to steer and monitor the portfolio;\n\n- An interface with the inventory accounting system for management of assets.\n\n\nIMF | Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 81, "report_id": "cr-2023-058", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- An interface with the IT system for budgeting, with the establishment of a key between the coding of\nprojects and the budget nomenclature;\n\n- An interface with the IT system for procurement, with the establishment of a key between the coding\nof projects, the budget nomenclature, and the registration of contracts;\n\n- An interface with the budget implementation system(s) and general accounting;\n\n- Project management;\n\n- Periodic monitoring of physical and financial implementation of projects and the centralization of\ninformation, to steer and monitor the portfolio;\n\n- An interface with the inventory accounting system for management of assets.\n\nIMF Technical Assistance Report – Democratic Republic of the Congo", "text_characters": 604}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a9c9f6fbcbddc74222b8eec88d15161c1c914a73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:31920833ff79628a813348ca8879d6e6747829b8e512527485a5c91a285d3465
+size 27986
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92fc36f0b413e4ade8adf420913fcd35c0340b3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0b5b1bf0bef850fb32d8fce3b5163bcc9b20ee9288d9aaafdcc83ae8069184c1
+size 152080
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..11864756805545dbc9a9a4e03d2f21056e954b40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2a2369322325a68035651837d7be5a67c5335fcd2b153d83eacc768db35fd65e
+size 88898
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0031-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0031-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cbb17b372a04f208777174868c5c7090eb442ac4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0031-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:cd79e4fc8325577789dc1780ca358a4589197548d4473ede76fb6033d1e5ecb1
+size 190651
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0032-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0032-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7b6d0df11e18fd17d7cd2d5e476f236e75aad296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0032-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2b6ac7f6439029d0ef4cfcdb0c1a86e8b0978ee823e6a3a2871fecc33102acb9
+size 76974
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0038-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0038-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55ca29bf60afbd9250be04e1e754e80a8d17f0cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0038-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9ec99d0292c6d7df4027aed4affb67e8a9d155eb3802f0c037da7e692974fec9
+size 72048
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5349cee753950eae066058dacc782fb3560c5440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3e56a5d0c569007cb849f4ac343d1a63dd7c2d532374129e92337d2257b45d14
+size 184760
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..33e3d21f69a5836e034bbf84533a685c3c55853f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-059",
+ "title": "Indonesia: Technical Assistance Report-Financial Soundness Indicators Statistics Mission",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-059.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "fe7f0e702a248ebf387d5d539034cdec1dcf2772c5edca793270e44959f8ed7d",
+ "source_bytes": 1031559,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/30/indonesia-technical-assistance-report-financial-soundness-indicators-statistics-mission-528757",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:33+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 25.382,
+ "page_count": 41,
+ "text_characters": 89189,
+ "table_count": 16,
+ "figure_count": 8,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "INDONESIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS STATISTICS MISSION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "I NDONESIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "T ECHNICAL A SSISTANCE R EPORT ON THE FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS MISSION (JUNE 2–11, 2021)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Prepared by Mahmut Kutlukaya"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Glossary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "DETAILED ACTION PLAN"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 13,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 31,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Appendix I. Indonesia: Financial Soundness Indicators"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 33,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Appendix II. Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas Jasa Keuangan: Officials Met During the Mission"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 36,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Appendix III. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the FSI Definitions"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 40,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Appendix IV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Indonesia: Technical Assistance Report-Financial Soundness Indicators Statistics Remote Mission; IMF Country Report No. 23/59; June 2021",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Financial Soundness Indicators; 2019 FSIs Guide; Deposit takers; Other financial corporations\r\n",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 21 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 21.7.131",
+ "creationDate": "D:20211123143402-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230131131940-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..29597db7aa525df19af6b058de6dfb79e1ca9a66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2124 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/59**
+# **INDONESIA**
+#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—FINANCIAL** **SOUNDNESS INDICATORS STATISTICS MISSION**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance report on Indonesia was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it
+was completed on June 2021.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+**NOVEMBER**
+**2021**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+# **I NDONESIA**
+### **T ECHNICAL A SSISTANCE R EPORT ON THE FINANCIAL** **SOUNDNESS INDICATORS MISSION** **(JUNE 2–11, 2021)**
+
+###### **Prepared by Mahmut Kutlukaya**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+### **CONTENTS**
+
+
+Glossary __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3
+
+
+**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________** 4
+
+
+**DETAILED ACTION PLAN ________________________________________________________________________** 5
+
+
+**INTRODUCTION _________________________________________________________________________________** 8
+A. Background _________________________________________________________________________________ 8
+B. Indonesia’s Financial System ________________________________________________________________ 8
+
+
+**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ___________________________** 12
+A. Consolidation Basis and Institutional Coverage ____________________________________________ 12
+B. Accounting and Regulatory Frameworks Underlying the FSI Data _________________________ 13
+C. Source Data________________________________________________________________________________ 18
+D. Compilation Framework ___________________________________________________________________ 19
+E. FSIs for OFCs ______________________________________________________________________________ 27
+F. FSI Metadata_______________________________________________________________________________ 28
+G. FSI Data and Metadata Reporting _________________________________________________________ 28
+H. Resources, Training, and Technical Cooperation ___________________________________________ 29
+
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Priority Recommendations __________________________________________________________________ 5
+2. The Financial System in Indonesia BI ________________________________________________________ 9
+3. Minimum Capital Requirements Based on Risk Profile _____________________________________ 15
+4. Commercial Banks Based on Business Activities Framework _______________________________ 16
+5. D-SIB Capital Surcharge ___________________________________________________________________ 16
+6. Source Data________________________________________________________________________________ 18
+
+
+**APPENDICES**
+I. Financial Soundness Indicators ____________________________________________________________ 30
+II. Officials Met During the Mission ___________________________________________________________ 32
+III. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the FSI Definitions __________________________ 35
+IV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers ___________________________________________________________ 39
+
+
+**APPENDIX TABLES**
+III.1. Recommended Amendments to FSIs ______________________________________________________ 35
+III.2. Comparison of FSIs Before and After the Technical Assistance _____________________________ 37
+
+
+**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+##### **Glossary**
+
+_2019 FSIs Guide_ _Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide - 2019_
+APD IMF’s Asia & Pacific Department
+BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
+BI Bank Indonesia
+BPD Regional development banks - Bank Pembangunan Daerah
+BPR Rural banks - Bank Perkreditan Rakyat
+CBBA Commercial banks based on business activities
+CBCSDI Cross-border, Cross-sector, Domestically Incorporated consolidation basis
+CDM Concentration and Distribution Measures
+CET-1 Common equity Tier-1
+DL Domestic location basis
+DSAK Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards Board - Dewan Standar Akuntansi
+Keuangan
+D-SIBs Domestic systemically important banks
+DTs Deposit taker
+FAS Financial Access Survey
+FBBs Foreign bank branches
+FSI-SR Sectoral financial statements and memorandum series report forms (new)
+FSIs Financial soundness indicator
+FSIC Institutional coverage report form (new)
+FSM Metadata template (new)
+FX Foreign exchange
+IASB International Accounting Standards Board
+IDR Indonesian Rupiah
+IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+LCR Liquidity coverage ratio
+MFIs Micro finance institutions
+NPLs Nonperforming loans
+NSFR Net stable funding ratio
+OCI Other comprehensive income
+OFCs Other financial corporations
+OJK Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas Jasa Keuangan
+ROA Return on assets
+ROE Return on equity
+RWA Risk-weighted asset
+SNA System of National Accounts
+STA IMF’s Statistics Department
+TA Technical assistance
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**1.** **The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Statistics Department (STA) provided**
+**technical assistance (TA) on financial soundness indicators (FSI) to the Indonesia Financial**
+**Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan - OJK) during June 2-11, 2021** . The mission was
+conducted remotely via video conferences due to travel restrictions because of the COVID-19
+pandemic and travel restrictions. The mission worked with the staff of the OJK on the
+development of FSIs that are in line with the IMF’s _FSIs Compilation Guide 2019 (2019 FSIs_
+_Guide)_ . 0F [1] The mission: (i) reviewed available source data for deposit takers (DTs); (ii) reviewed the
+framework for compiling new FSIs from available source data; (iii) identified areas for
+improvement based on the methodology set forth in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ ; and (iv) reviewed
+available data for other financial corporations (OFCs) to assess the feasibility of a subsequent
+mission.
+
+**2.** **As a result of the mission, the OJK is now in a position to compile quarterly FSIs in**
+**line with the** _**2019**_ _**FSIs Guide**_ . The mission compiled, together with staff of the OJK, 18 core and
+12 additional FSIs for DTs, and two additional FSIs on the size of the OFC’s subsector from the
+available source data. The coverage of DTs for the compilation of FSIs includes 109 commercial
+banks. The FSIs for DTs exclude rural banks, credit unions and credit cooperatives and
+microfinance institutions.
+
+**3.** **The mission reviewed and made recommendations aligning the FSIs currently**
+**compiled by the OJK to assess consistency with the methodology of the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **.**
+Several FSIs need to be updated in order to follow the more prescriptive approach introduced in
+the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . These FSIs include nonperforming loans (NPLs) net of provisions to capital,
+tier 1 capital to assets, return on equity, liquid assets to total assets and liquid assets to short
+term liabilities, net open position in foreign exchange to capital, gross asset/liability position to
+capital, and residential/commercial real estate loans to total loans (Appendix III). Also, the
+mission compiled new FSIs for DTs, including common equity Tier-1 (CET-1) capital to risk
+weighted assets, provisions to nonperforming loans, Tier 1 capital to assets (leverage) ratio,
+liquidity coverage ratio, net stable funding ratio and credit growth to private sector.
+
+**4.** **A timeframe for reporting FSI data and metadata to the IMF was discussed and**
+**agreed on with OJK officials** . As of June 2021, 146 countries’ FSI data are disseminated on the
+IMF’s FSI website, allowing for cross-country comparisons and analyses that are useful to policy
+makers and analysts. The OJK staff may now compile quarterly FSIs for DTs using the workbook
+developed by the mission in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .
+
+
+1 The work of the mission was facilitated by the excellent cooperation provided by officials of the OJK. The list of
+officials met during the mission is in Appendix II.
+
+
+**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**5.** **To support progress in the compilation of FSIs in line with the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **, the**
+**mission recommended a detailed action plan with the priority recommendations** .
+**summarized in Table 1.** Further details can be found in the rest of this report.
+
+**Table 1. Indonesia: Priority Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|**November 2021**|_Finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral_
_financial statements (FSI-SR template) for DTs, including_
_the balance sheet, income statement, and memorandum_
_series, with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1,_
_semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual data_
_beginning from 2005, the new FSI institutional coverage_
_(FSIC template) with annual data starting from 2005,_
_and the new FSI metadata (FSM template)._|**OJK**|
+|**December 2021**|_In coordination with all relevant parties, start regular_
_reporting to STA, for disseminating on the IMF’s FSI_
_website, of the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data_
_beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning_
_from 2011, annual data beginning from 2005, and the_
_new FSIC template with annual data starting from 2005._
_Also report the new FSM template periodically._|**OJK**|
+
+
+### **DETAILED ACTION PLAN**
+
+**6.** **The Action Plan below includes steps to accomplish milestones as well as the target**
+**completion dates.** The plan is for technical compilers. Actions are prioritized as high (H),
+medium (M), low (L), and priority recommendations (PR) identified.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Rec.
No.|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|
+|_1 _|_PR_|_Finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral_
_financial statements (FSI-SR template) for DTs, including the_
_balance sheet, income statement, and memorandum series,_
_with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual_
_data beginning from 2011, annual data beginning from 2005,_|_11/30/2021_|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Rec.
No.|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|||_the new FSI institutional coverage (FSIC template) with annual_
_data starting from 2005, and the new FSI metadata (FSM_
_template)._||
+|_2 _|_PR_|_In coordination with all relevant parties, start regular_
_reporting to STA, for disseminating on the IMF’s FSI website, of_
_the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data beginning from_
_2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual_
_data beginning from 2005, and the new FSIC template with_
_annual data starting from 2005. Also report the new FSM_
_template periodically._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_3 _|_H _|_Agree with the Bank Indonesia (BI) and inform STA on which_
_institution will be the main counterparty to report the new_
_FSIs to STA._|_11/30/2021_|
+|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|
+|_4 _|_H _|_Compile FSIs using cross-border, cross-sector, domestically_
_incorporated consolidation basis._
|_12/31/2022_|
+|_5 _|_H _|_Compile and report to the IMF the concentration and_
_distribution measures (CDM)._
|_06/30/2022_|
+|_6 _|_H _|_Report the deposits with domestic and foreign banks under_
_interbank loans._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_7 _|_H _|_Report general and other provisions on the liability side as_
_required by the 2019 FSIs Guide._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_8 _|_H _|_Exclude foreign bank branches from the compilation of Tier-1_
_capital, total regulatory capital, and risk weighted assets_
_series for the compilation of FSIs._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_9 _|_H _|_In coordination with the BI, identify the source of the abrupt_
_data change in the supervisory deductions data and update_
_the historical series, as necessary._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_10_|_H _|_Estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and_
_incorporate this figure into the total exposure measure_
_memorandum series._|_12/31/2021_|
+
+
+
+**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Rec.
No.|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|_11_|_H _|_Compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in_
_line with the methodology provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_12_|_H _|_Update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the_
_definitions provided in 2019 FSIs Guide._|_12/31/2021_|
+|_13_|_H _|_Report liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_14_|_H _|_Calculate the net open position in foreign exchange to capital_
_in line with the aggregation approach specified in the 2019_
_FSIs Guide._|_12/31/2021_|
+|_15_|_H _|_Start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_16_|_H _|_Start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and_
_reference deposit rates) for the calculation of spread between_
_reference lending and deposit rates._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_17_|_H _|_Compile residential real estate and commercial real estate_
_loans memorandum series in line with the definitions_
_provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_18_|_M _|_Update geographical distribution of loans consistent with the_
_classification of the World Economic Outlook._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_19_|_M _|_Evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign_
_currency linked liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data_
_if the size is considered material._|_12/31/2021_|
+|_20_|_L _|_Report other comprehensive income (OCI) data._
|_12/31/2021_|
+|_21_|_H _|_Report OFC total assets, including the expansion to_
_incorporate total assets of MMFs, ICs and PFs and other OFCs_
_subsectors._|_12/31/2021_|
+|_22_|_H _|_Report institutional coverage for OFCs._|_12/31/2021_|
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+### **INTRODUCTION**
+
+**A. Background**
+
+**7.** **This was the first STA mission on FSIs for the OJK** . Indonesia participated in the
+_Coordinated Compilation Exercise_ that was launched by the IMF in 2004 and has since compiled
+and regularly reported annual FSI data to STA. An STA visited Jakarta, Indonesia during
+July 27-August 9, 2011 to provide TA on FSIs to the BI.
+
+**8.** **Indonesia reports 12 core and 12 encouraged FSIs for DTs and 11 encouraged FSIs,**
+**including two encouraged FSIs for OFCs for other sectors to STA through ICS.** The BI has
+been the main STA counterparty for the reporting of FSIs on a timely basis, while the DTs and
+OFCs related FSIs were being compiled by the OJK. With a letter to STA dated March 3, 2021, the
+OJK requested STA to acknowledge its Group for Integrated Data and Statistics Management
+(GDST) as a counterparty for the financial sector data in Indonesia.
+
+**9.** **The OJK, established in 2011 by the Law No. 21/2011 on Financial Services**
+**Authority, licenses, regulates and supervises the financial services activities in banking,**
+**capital markets, and non-bank financial institutions sectors.** The BI is responsible for
+monetary policy and financial stability.
+
+**10.** **The OJK followed the recommendation of the International Accounting Standards**
+**Board (IASB) on the application of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in**
+**the light of the coronavirus uncertainty.** 1F [2] Also, restructured loans are allowed to be
+categorized underperforming (standard) category until March 31, 2022. With a share exceeding
+20 percent of the total loans, restructured loans may potentially have a large impact on the FSIs,
+including nonperforming loans, once the relaxation measures are ended.
+
+**B. Indonesia’s Financial System**
+
+**11.** **Indonesia’s financial system is comprised of the BI, 109 commercial banks,**
+**1,669 rural banks, 226 deposit taking microfinance institutions, 143 insurance companies**
+**(ICs), 219 pension funds (PFs), 262 money market funds (MMFs), and 715 other types of**
+**financial corporations** . Banks dominate the financial system in Indonesia. As of December 2020,
+total reported assets of the financial system were IDR 12,078 trillion. Assets of the commercial
+banks constitute 76 percent of this total.
+
+**12.** **The OJK is the main regulatory and supervisory authority for DTs and OFCs in**
+**Indonesia** . The OJK is responsible for the regulation and supervision of banks (commercial
+banks, rural banks), capital markets (securities companies, investment managers, etc.), ICs, PFs,
+financing institutions, and other financial services institutions (microfinance institutions,
+
+
+2 See https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/supporting-implementation/ifrs-9/ifrs-9-ecl-and-coronavirus.pdf.
+
+
+**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+guarantee agencies, fintech companies, etc.). The Law No. 21/2011 on Financial Services
+Authority sets out the functions, responsibilities, and powers of the OJK. The principal purposes
+of the OJK are to (i) ensure activities in the financial services sector are conducted in an
+organized, fair, transparent, and accountable manner; (ii) promote growth in the financial system
+in a sustainable and accountable manner; and (iii) protect consumer and public interests.
+
+**13.** **The BI is the central bank of Indonesia.** The mission of the BI, among others, is to
+achieve and maintain price stability through effective monetary policy, to engage in maintaining
+financial system stability through effective macro-prudential policy, and to engage in enhancing
+financial market deepening.
+
+**14.** **DTs in Indonesia are insured by the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC).**
+IDIC insures deposits in the forms of current/checking accounts, time deposits, current/checking
+accounts, certificate of deposits, and/or other forms of deposits that have similar characteristics,
+including Shariah-based deposits, with a limit up to IDR 2 billion per depositor per bank.
+
+**Table 2. Indonesia: The Financial System in Indonesia (excluding the BI)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector|Number
of
institutio
ns|Total assets
(In Trillions
of IDR)
31-Dec-20|Total assets
(Percent of
Nominal
GDP)|Percent of
Total
Financial
System
Assets|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Commercial Banks**
|**109**
|**9,178**
|** 59.46**
|
** 75.98**
|
+|
o/w domestically controlled
|
71
|
6,681
|
43.29
|
55.31
|
+|
-State-owned banks 1/
|
4
|
3,819
|
24.74
|
31.61
|
+|
-Subsidiaries of state-owned banks
(Islamic banks)
|
3
|
240
|
1.55
|
1.98
|
+|
- Regional development banks
|26
|764
|4.95
|6.32
|
+|
- Private banks
|
38
|
1,859
|
12.05
|
15.39
|
+|
o/w foreign controlled
|
30
|
2,061
|
13.35
|
17.06
|
+|
o/w branches of foreign banks
|
8
|
436
|
2.82
|
3.61
|
+|
**Rural banks**
|
**1,669**
|
**170**
|
** 1.10**
|
** 1.41**
|
+|
**Deposit taking microfinance**
**institutions**
|
**226**
|
**1 **
|
** 0.01**
|
** 0.01**
|
+|
**Insurance companies**
|**143**
|**783**
|** 5.07**
|** 6.48**
|
+|
o/w life insurance
|
59
|
581
|
3.76
|
4.81
|
+|
o/w nonlife insurance, reinsurance
|
84
|
202
|
1.31
|
1.67
|
+|
**Pension funds**
|
**219**
|
**317**
|
** 2.05**
|
** 2.62**
|
+|
**Money Market Funds**
|
**262**
|
**95**
|
** 0.61**
|
** 0.78**
|
+|
**Other financial institutions**
|
**715**
|
**1,536**
|
** 9.95**
|
** 12.72**
|
+|
Other insurance
|
5
|
672
|
4.35
|
5.56
|
+|
Leasing companies
|
176
|
456
|
2.95
|
3.78
|
+|
Specialized financing institutions
|
120
|
256
|
1.66
|
2.12
|
+|
Infrastructure financing|
2|
116|
0.75|
0.96|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+|Venture capital|61|19|0.13|0.16|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
Insurance brokers
|
160
|
9
|
0.06
|
0.08
|
+|
Reinsurance brokers
|
42
|
5
|
0.03
|
0.04
|
+|
Peer to peer lending
|
149
|
4
|
0.02|
0.03|
+
+
+1/ Excluding subsidiaries of state-owned banks.
+
+**15.** **The DTs sector comprises commercial banks, rural banks, microfinance institutions,**
+**credit unions and credit cooperatives:**
+
+- Commercial banks are licensed by the OJK for mobilizing funds from the public in the
+form of deposits and channeling them to the public in the form of credit and/or other
+forms. In accordance with the Law No. 7/1992 concerning banking as amended by Law
+No. 10/1998, all banks in Indonesia accept deposits. The commercial banks have sizeable
+overseas activities. Cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities account
+for 3.04 percent and 8.92 percent of total claims and total liabilities respectively.
+
+- There are 26 regional development banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah - BPD) operating
+in Indonesia. BPDs are established by the local provincial government with the purpose
+to boost regional development and providing financial services. BPDs are subject to the
+same rules and regulations enforced for the commercial banks.
+
+- Rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat/BPR) have limited scope of banking activities
+compared to commercial bank. Activities of rural banks are specified in the
+Law No. 7/1992 as amended by the Law Number 10/1998 concerning Banking. However,
+in general, the regulations for rural banks encompass prudential aspects, including
+institutional and licensing requirements, accounting and reporting standards, and
+products and activities. Regulatory framework and reporting requirements for rural banks
+are simplified compared to commercial banks. Rural banks are excluded from market risk
+and legal risk related requirements. These banks are not connected to the payment and
+clearing system and they are restricted in the scope of their operations (i.e., lending in
+foreign currency, equity participation, opening new branches, etc.).
+
+- The regulation framework for microfinance institutions (MFIs) is similar to banks with a
+simpler approach. MFIs are regulated and supervised by the Non-bank Financial
+Institution Directorate of the OJK. The regulation for MFI encompasses the prudential
+aspect, institutional and licensing, accounting, and reporting standards, and product and
+activities. The share of MFIs in the total financial system assets is negligible at around
+0.01 percent.
+
+- Islamic banks provide financial services in accordance with Shariah principles. As of
+December 2020, there are 14 Islamic commercial banks and 163 Islamic rural banks
+
+
+**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+operating in Indonesia. 2F [3] Total assets of Shariah compliant banks are IDR 399.8 trillion,
+4.3 percent of the total assets of the commercial banks. Islamic rural banks constitute less
+than 10 percent of the rural banks’ assets.
+
+- According to the latest data reported to the IMF’s Financial Access Survey, more than
+12,000 credit unions and credit cooperatives were operating in Indonesia as of 2014. 3F [4]
+Credit unions and credit cooperatives are owned and controlled by their members. By
+opening a deposit account at a credit union, an individual becomes a member—and
+partial owner—of the credit union, participating in its equity. The OJK does not collect
+data on the number and size of the credit unions and credit cooperatives.
+
+**16.** **Currently there are no DTs in receivership or liquidation in Indonesia** . The _2019_ _FSIs_
+_Guide_ recommends including DTs in distress if they hold significant positions and to compile FSIs
+both including and excluding these DTs.
+
+**17.** **The OFCs subsector includes ICs, PFs, MMFs** 4F **[5]** **and other types of financial institutions.**
+
+ - Insurance corporations provide financial benefits to policyholders through risk-sharing and
+risk-transfer contracts. As of December 2020, there were 59 life insurance, 84 non-life
+insurance and reinsurance companies operating in Indonesia. Insurance companies
+constitute 6.5 percent of the financial system assets.
+
+ - The pension funds subsector consists of autonomous pension funds that are separate
+funds (i.e., separate institutional units) established for purposes of providing incomes on
+retirement for specific groups of employees which are organized, and directed, by private
+or public employers or jointly by the employers and their employees. There are 219
+pension funds operating in Indonesia. The total size of the pension funds is relatively small
+constituting 2.6 percent of the financial system assets.
+
+ - Other financial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries consist of institutions such as leasing
+companies, brokers, and venture capital and infrastructure financing companies. Other
+financial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries constitute around 12.7 percent of the
+financial system. There are also mandatory insurance and social insurance companies
+operating in Indonesia, which do not function like insurers by constituting reserves and
+charging premiums proportional to the cost of the service provided. Therefore, they are
+not included in the ICs subsector.
+
+
+3 Three government-controlled Islamic commercial banks (ICB) merged on Feb 1, 2021 into one ICB (PT Bank
+Syariah Indonesia). Hence, there are 12 ICBs operating in Indonesia since Feb 2021.
+
+4 The data were not provided after 2014.
+
+5 Money market funds (MMFs) are collective investment schemes that raise funds by issuing shares or units to the
+public. For an investment fund to be recognized as an MMF, there needs to be (1) a certain degree of capital
+certainty (reliable store of value); and (2) the possibility to withdraw funds immediately or on short notice. If the
+conditions above are not met, the institution is not classified as an MMF but as a non‑MMF investment fund.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**A. Consolidation Basis and Institutional Coverage**
+
+**18.** **FSIs for DTs are compiled using unconsolidated data** . This approach covers resident
+domestically controlled and foreign controlled DTs, with their domestic and overseas branches.
+The FSIs data also include the branches in Indonesia of DTs that are incorporated abroad.
+However, foreign deposit taking and foreign and domestic non-deposit taking financial
+subsidiaries of domestically incorporated DTs are excluded from the reporting sample. Also,
+intra-group adjustments are not undertaken. Given the size and complexity of the DTs sector, the
+mission recommended the OJK to compile the FSIs on a “cross-border, cross-sector, domestically
+incorporated” (CBCSDI) basis.
+
+**19.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends that DT’s data be compiled on a (CBCSDI) basis.**
+_Consolidated group reporting_ by a resident DT includes coverage of its own activities and those of
+its branches and financial subsidiaries (except ICs), with any transactions and positions among
+these entities eliminated on consolidation. Such an approach is an essential element of banking
+supervision and is adopted to preserve the integrity of capital in DTs by eliminating double
+counting of capital (double gearing), and to avoid the double counting of income and assets
+arising from the intra-group activity of DTs. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ also recognizes a second option,
+the “domestic location” DL basis as an alternative, for countries with DTs that have (i) very few or
+no foreign branches or subsidiaries, and (ii) very few or no cross-sector subsidiaries. The OJK staff
+noted that while consolidated data are available (i.e., consolidated balance sheet, consolidated
+income and expense statement and consolidated data for prudential regulations) granularity of
+consolidated reporting is not sufficient to produce the underlying FSIs data, including the
+counterparty level data. Also, the OJK does not have data on the number and size of the DT’s
+foreign deposit taking or non-deposit taking financial subsidiaries.
+
+**20.** **FSIs for DTs cover 109 domestically incorporated commercial banks, including**
+**foreign bank branches** . The remainder of the subsector that is not covered includes rural banks,
+MFIs, and credit unions and credit cooperatives. The OJK staff mentioned that the number of the
+rural banks has been decreasing in the recent years and the size of the MFSs is negligible. Rural
+banks and MFIs that meet the definition of DTs are not included in the FSIs compilation due to
+their relatively small asset size (1.41 percent and 0.01 percent of the total assets of the financial
+system, respectively). The mission advised the OJK staff to continue closely monitoring trends in
+the size of the rural banks and consider covering them in the FSIs should their significance
+increase. The mission also highlighted the importance of collecting data on the number and size
+of the credit unions and credit cooperatives, in order to comprehensively assess financial stability
+risks.
+
+
+**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**21.** **Recommendation:**
+
+ - _The OJK to compile FSIs on a CBCSDI consolidation basis._
+
+
+**B. Accounting and Regulatory Frameworks Underlying the FSI Data**
+
+**22.** **Pursuant to BI Regulation No. 8/12/PBI/2006 on Commercial Banks’ Periodic**
+**Reports, banks are required to submit reports through the integrated reporting system of**
+**the BI.** 5F [6] The BI Regulation No 21/9/PBI/2019 on Integrated Commercial Bank Reporting replaced
+the above regulation and is effective as of June 2021. Also, the OJK Regulation No.
+12/POJK.03/2019 on Commercial Bank Reporting and the OJK Regulation No. 63/POJK.03/2020
+on Commercial Bank Reporting require commercial banks to submit reports as requested by the
+OJK.
+
+**23.** **Financial Accounting Standards Board (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan -**
+**DSAK) under the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia - IAI) sets**
+**the accounting standards in Indonesia** . Pursuant to the Law No. 40/2007 concerning limited
+liability company, both public and private companies must comply with accounting standards
+issued by the DSAK-IAI. Indonesia National Accounting Standards (SAK) are adopted from the
+IFRS. Indonesia’s approach to the IFRS implementation is to maintain one-year difference with
+the IFRS as issued by the IASB. As of January 2020, Indonesia started implementing the IFRS 9
+standard.
+
+**24.** **Rural banks apply Indonesian Accounting Standard for Non-Publicly Accountable**
+**Entities set by DSAK-IAI.** The DSAK-IAI has also issued Exposure Draft of Indonesian
+Accounting Standard Private Entities which refers to IFRS for small and medium size enterprises
+and will replace Indonesian Accounting Standard for Non-Publicly Accountable Entities.
+
+**25.** **Indonesia implements the IFRS 9 and a prudential asset classification and**
+**provisioning regulation simultaneously.** 6F **[7]** The OJK Regulation No 40/POJK.03/2019 on Quality
+Assessment of Asset for Commercial Banks that came into effect on January 1, 2020 sets the
+asset classification rules for commercial banks. Credit quality is determined based on business
+prospects, debtor performance, and ability to pay. Commercial banks are required to set aside a
+
+
+6 Other relevant regulations include BI Regulation No 10/40/PBI/2008 on Commercial Banks’ Monthly Reports, BI
+Regulation No 13/8/PBI/2011 on Commercial Banks’ Daily Reports, BI Regulation No 14/12/PBI/2012 on
+Commercial Banks’ Head Offices Reports, and BI Regulation No 15/4/PBI/2013 on Monetary Stability and
+Financial System of Sharia Commercial Banks and Sharia Business Units Monthly Reports.
+
+7 General and specific provisions should be set aside based on the maximum requirement introduced by IFRS 9
+and the prudential provisioning regulation. The OJK staff noted that the average provisioning requirement under
+IFRS 9 is around 60 percent higher compared to that of the prudential regulation. Should IFRS 9 provisions fall
+short of the prudential requirements, the banks are required to deduct the difference from Tier-1 capital.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+minimum provisioning rate of 1 percent and 5 percent for assets under ‘Standard’ and ‘Special
+Mention’ categories respectively.
+
+**26.** **Loans are classified as nonperforming when one or more contractual payments of**
+**interest or principal are past due for 90 days or more** . Delay on payment (90 days rule) is only
+one of the criteria in classifying a loan or other assets as NPLs or nonperforming assets.
+Classification of assets is based on business prospects, performance of the debtors, and
+repayment capability. NPLs must be classified in accordance with the “Substandard”, “Doubtful”
+and “Loss” categories 7F [8] . Minimum specific provisioning requirements of 15, 50 and 100 percent
+need to be set aside for “Substandard”, “Doubtful”, and “Loss” categories respectively.
+
+**27.** **Valuation of financial assets follow national implementation of IFRS 9** . The
+accounting principles for the recognition and measurement of financial assets and liabilities
+discussed in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ follow IFRS 9, with valuation corresponding to the IFRS concept
+of measurement.
+
+**28.** **The Indonesian risk-based capital framework applies to all commercial banks.**
+However, as discussed in the following paragraphs some requirements apply to a smaller group
+of banks. Indonesia has been implementing the Basel-III standards for the definition of capital,
+minimum capital requirements, capital buffers, leverage ratio and liquidity requirements (i.e.
+liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio).
+
+**29.** **In line with the deferral of Basel III implementation by the Basel Committee on**
+**Banking Supervision (BCBS) to increase operational capacity of banks and supervisors to**
+**respond to Covid-19, Indonesia has not started implementing the Basel III standards**
+**finalized in December 2017.** These standards include revised standardized approach for credit
+risk, revised operational risk framework and revised market risk framework. The OJK is planning
+to start implementation in 2023.
+
+**30.** **The OJK published Regulation No. 11/POJK.03/2016 to implement Basel III capital**
+**adequacy framework** . Indonesia has been implementing the minimum capital requirements
+based on CET-1, Tier 1, and total capital ratios. The Basel framework does not apply to rural
+banks. Banks are required to satisfy a minimum capital adequacy of 4.5 percent, 6 percent, and
+8 percent for CET-1, Tier-1 and total regulatory capital, respectively. Additionally, banks are
+required to satisfy minimum capital requirements based on their risk profiles, both individually
+and on a consolidated basis (Table 3). In accordance with the OJK Regulation No.
+5/POJK.03/2015 on Minimum Capital Requirement and Fulfillment of Minimum Core Capital for
+Rural Banks, rural banks are obliged to maintain capital adequacy ratio at least 12 percent of risk
+weighted assets (RWAs). The regulatory regime followed by Islamic banks is similar to the Basel
+framework. Where there are differences, due to the unique characteristics of Islamic banks
+
+
+8 Further details of these categories can be found in the metadata page for Indonesia on the IMF’s FSIs website:
+[https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61404865](https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61404865)
+
+
+**14** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+(e.g., profit-sharing investment accounts), the OJK follows the standards set by the Islamic
+Financial Services Board.
+
+**Table 3. Minimum Capital Requirements Based on Risk Profile**
+
+|Risk profile|Minimum total capital requirement|
+|---|---|
+|
Level-1
|
8 percent
|
+|
Level-2
|
9 - 10 percent
|
+|
Level-3
|
10 - 11 percent
|
+|
Level-4 and Level 5
|
11 – 14 percent|
+
+
+
+**31.** **Commercial banks implement standardized approaches under Basel-II for the**
+**calculation of risk weighted assets** . All commercial banks use the standardized approach for
+credit risk and market risk, and the basic indicators approach for operational risk. Banks are not
+using modeling approaches for the calculation of risk weighted assets (i.e., internal ratings-based
+approach for credit risk, value at risk approach for market risk, and advanced measurement
+approach for operational risk).
+
+
+
+**32.** **Indonesia has completed a Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP)** 8F **[9]**
+**for risk-based capital standards in 2016.** Accordingly, risk-based capital standards were found
+to be largely compliant with the Basel standards. The credit risk component was considered
+materially non-compliant due to (i) a zero-risk weight assignment for all claims against the
+
+
+
+Indonesian government and the BI, regardless of the currency in which they are denominated or
+
+
+
+funded, 9F [10] and (ii) the 50 percent risk weight applied to certain loans to employees and pensioners of
+
+
+
+state-owned enterprises. 10F [11] Definition of regulatory capital (CET-1, Tier-1, Tier-2, supervisory
+
+
+
+deductions) follows Basel-III definition.
+
+
+
+**33.** **Foreign bank branches (FBBs) are subject to Tier-1 and total regulatory capital**
+**requirements.** Tier-1 capital of the FBBs include current year profit and wholesale funds that
+meet certain criteria and Tier-2 capital include provisions up to 1.25 percent of risk weighted
+assets.
+
+**34.** **The OJK implements a categorization approach, Commercial Banks Based on**
+**Business Activities (CBBA), to differentiate prudential regulatory requirements and scope**
+**of banking activities across banks** . Banks are assigned to one of four categories according to
+the level of Tier 1 capital (Table 4). The OJK has issued the Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2020
+concerning Consolidation of Commercial Banks aimed to strengthen the structure, resilience and
+
+
+9 The Basel Committee established a comprehensive Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) in
+2012 to monitor and assess the adoption and implementation of its standards. RCAP reports can be accessed
+[here: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm?m=3%7C14%7C656%7C60](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm?m=3%7C14%7C656%7C60)
+
+10 The Basel framework allows a zero-risk weight to be applied provided that these exposures are denominated
+and funded in domestic currency.
+
+11 Basel framework requires a 75 percent risk weight.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **15**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+competitiveness of the banking industry. Through that regulation, commercial banks are required
+to have at least IDR 3 Trillion of Tier 1 capital no later than December 31, 2022. Banks are allowed
+to meet this requirement gradually: (i) before December 31, 2020, banks must have at least IDR 1
+Trillion of Tier 1 Capital, (ii) before December 31, 2021, banks must have at least IDR 2 Trillion of
+Tier 1 Capital.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Table 4. Commercial Commercial Banks Based on|Banks Based on Business Activities Framework Tier 1 capital|
+|---|---|
+|**Commercial Banks Based on**
**Business Activities**
|**Tier 1 capital**
|
+|
CBBA 1
|Tier 1 less than IDR 1 trillion
|
+|
CBBA 2
|
Tier 1 between IDR 1 trillion and IDR 5 trillion
|
+|
CBBA 3
|
Tier 1 between IDR 5 trillion and IDR 30 trillion
|
+|
CBBA 4
|
Tier 1 from IDR 30 trillion above|
+
+
+
+**35.** **In addition to the minimum capital requirements and in line with the**
+**implementation of Basel-III, banks are also required to maintain capital buffers as follows:**
+
+i. A capital conservation buffer requirement of 2.5 percent of RWAs. The capital
+
+conservation buffer only applies to CBBA 3 and CBBA 4 banks. Due to a relaxation
+measure for COVID-19, the capital conservation buffer imposed is 0 percent until
+March 31, 2022.
+
+ii. A countercyclical capital buffer requirement, as a buffer to anticipate loss against an
+
+excessive credit growth which may potentially disturb the financial system stability, is
+implemented ranging from 0 percent - 2.5 percent of RWAs. Currently, the countercyclical
+buffer is set to 0 percent.
+
+iii. A capital buffer for Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) ranging from
+
+1 percent - 2.5 percent of RWAs. D-SIBs are classified into four groups with different
+capital surcharge requirements (Table 5). There are currently 14 D-SIBs in Indonesia.
+
+**Table 5. D-SIB Capital Surcharge**
+
+|Buffer|Buffer Requirement Percent|
+|---|---|
+|Bucket 1|1|
+|Bucket 2|1.5|
+|Bucket 3|2|
+|Bucket 4
|2.5|
+
+
+
+**16** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**36.** **The OJK Regulation No. 31/POJK.03/2019 on Leverage Ratio Requirement for**
+**Commercial Banks require a 3 percent minimum leverage ratio to be maintained by**
+**commercial banks** . The leverage ratio is defined as Tier 1 capital/Total exposure measure as
+defined in Basel III. Total exposure consists of all balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet
+exposures. Leverage ratio reporting to the OJK started as of 2020Q4. Leverage ratio regulation is
+not implemented for the Islamic banks.
+
+**37.** **Large exposures are defined as the sum of all exposure values of a DT to a**
+**counterparty or to a group of connected counterparties, if it is equal to or above**
+**10 percent of the DT’s Tier-1 capital** . The OJK implemented the large exposures Basel standard
+(the supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures—April 2014) via the
+regulation No. 32/POJK.03/2018 starting from 2019. Large exposures framework applies to all
+conventional commercial banks including foreign banks. Islamic banks are excluded. The OJK is
+working on a draft to implement large exposures framework for Islamic banks.
+
+**38.** **The OJK has implemented the Basel-III liquidity coverage ratio and net stable**
+**funding ratio standards** . The Indonesian framework for liquidity coverage ratio 11F [12] (LCR) and net
+stable funding ratio 12F [13] (NSFR) apply to CBBA 3, CBBA 4, and foreign banks. 13F [14] Islamic banks are
+excluded from LCR and NSFR prudential measures. Indonesia is assessed as compliant with the
+LCR and NSFR Basel standards in the RCAPs conducted in 2016 and 2020, respectively. Banks are
+subjected to 100 percent minimum LCR and NSFR requirements.
+
+**39.** **In addition to the LCR and NSFR ratios, commercial banks in Indonesia are required**
+**to report two liquidity ratios, namely, liquid assets to non-core deposit ratio and liquid**
+**assets to third party funds ratio** . For the purpose of these indicators, liquid assets are defined
+as cash, placements in the central bank (excluding reserve requirements, macroprudential
+intermediation ratio requirement and macroprudential liquidity buffer requirement) and
+government bonds in domestic and foreign currency.
+
+**40.** **In accordance with the BI Regulation No. 7/37/PBI/2005, commercial banks are**
+**required to manage and maintain the net open position in foreign exchange ratio** . Net
+open position in foreign exchange ratio (both on balance sheet and total ratios) at the end of
+each working day should be no more than 20 percent of the capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital). The
+overall net open position is the sum of the absolute values of the (i) the net difference between
+assets and liabilities recorded on balance sheet for all foreign currencies; and (ii) the net
+
+
+12 Adopted through the regulation No. POJK No. 42/POJK.03/2015.
+
+13 Adopted through regulation No. POJK No 50/POJK.03/2017.
+
+14 The foreign bank category refers to (i) branch offices of banks domiciled overseas; (ii) commercial banks in the
+form of an Indonesian legal entity with more than 50 percent of their shares owned by foreign citizens and/or
+foreign legal entities, both individually or jointly; and (iii) banks that are less than 50 percent owned, either
+individually or jointly, by foreign citizens and/or foreign legal entities but are controlled by these foreign citizens
+and/or foreign legal entities.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **17**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+difference between claims and liabilities, comprising both commitments and contingencies,
+recorded in off balance sheet accounts for all foreign currencies, all expressed in Rupiahs.
+
+**C. Source Data**
+
+**41.** **The OJK receives source data from two different sources** . Commercial banks’
+unconsolidated monthly reports, including balance sheets and income statements, are collected
+through the BI’s Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System (Table 6). 14F [15] In addition, the OJK
+directly collects prudential reports on an unconsolidated and consolidated basis. Islamic banks’
+data are mapped to commercial banks data by an automated system. The mapping follows the
+approach provided in Annex 7.4 of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Table 6. Source Data Collection|Compilation and processing|
+|---|---|---|
+|
|**Collection**
|**Compilation and processing**
|
+|
Commercial banks’
monthly reports (Balance
Sheet & Income
Statement).
|
Bank Indonesia – Data
through Commercial Bank
Integrated Reporting System.
|
OJK – Department of Bank
Licensing and Banking
Information.
|
+|
Commercial banks’ micro
prudential reports (e.g.,
Regulatory Capital, LCR,
NSFR).
|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.
|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.
|
+|
Rural Banks (all reports).
|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.|
+
+
+**42.** **Operational and technical validations on the data are conducted automatically by**
+**the IT system.** Additionally, responsible departments check the data for validity and consistency.
+Departments’ responsibilities for Coordinated Integrated Statistics Database are the following:
+
+
+
+
+- **Integrated Statistics Database:** Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group (GDST).
+
+- **Banking Data:** Banking Information Directorate, under Banking Licensing and Information
+Department.
+
+- **Capital Markets Data:** Capital Market Statistics and Information Directorate, under Capital
+Market Supervision Department **.**
+
+- **OFC’s Data:** Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate, under NonBank Financial Industry Supervision Department **.**
+
+**43.** **Data used in the compilation of FSIs are reported on a monthly basis** . Monthly
+reports are due within 30 days of the end of the reporting period. The FSIs are reported to the
+IMF on a quarterly basis. The OJK does not plan to start monthly reporting to STA.
+
+
+15 The consolidated data collected through the Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System cover highly
+aggregated balance sheet and income statement information on a quarterly basis.
+
+
+**18** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**D. Compilation Framework**
+
+**44.** **Indonesia is a timely reporter of FSIs.** The BI has been the main STA counterparty for
+the reporting of FSIs. The FSIs related to DTs and OFCs were being compiled by the OJK and
+shared with the BI for reporting to STA. With a letter dated March 3, 2021, the OJK requested STA
+to acknowledge OJK’s GDST as the data-producing agent for the financial sector data in
+Indonesia. The mission informed the OJK staff that the Indonesian authorities need to agree on
+the main counterparty to report the new FSIs to STA.
+
+**45.** **The mission developed compilation spreadsheets to derive FSIs from source data**
+**(aggregated income statement, balance sheet, and other supervisory series) for DTs** . This
+process involved mapping of historical data that were reported to the IMF to the FSI-SR
+reporting forms. Also, for the new series that are required with the implementation of the _2019_
+_FSIs Guide_, the mission discussed the mapping of source data to the FSI-SR report forms. The
+mapping of the income and expense statement, balance sheet, and supervisory data was
+conducted based on the methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . The compilation spreadsheets
+were provided to the OJK which will ensure a smooth migration for the implementation of the
+new FSI methodology.
+
+**46.** **The mission assisted the OJK in the compilation of 18 core and 12 additional FSIs**
+**for DTs and two additional FSIs relating to the size of OFCs subsectors** . The main differences
+between the existing FSIs compiled by the OJK and those developed during the mission stem
+from compilation methodologies. The FSIs compiled by the mission were based on the
+recommended compilation methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .
+
+**44. The mission also presented the Concentration and Distribution Measure (CDM) tool to**
+**the OJK staff** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ introduced CDMs for selected FSIs to provide critical
+information about financial system vulnerabilities not directly captured by aggregate data. The
+CDM tool aims to provide standard measures that can provide information on tail risks,
+concentrations, and variations in distributions over time. The CDM tool can be downloaded from
+the IMF’s FSIs website 15F [16] . The use of the CDM tool is especially important for Indonesia given the
+considerable variation across banks which may cause sectoral aggregates to be unrepresentative
+for the whole banking system.
+
+**47.** **Recommendations:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to compile and report to the IMF the CDM indicators._
+
+
+ - _The OJK to agree with the BI and inform STA on which institution will be the main_
+_counterparty to report the new FSIs to STA_ .
+
+
+[16 Available at https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Data/2019/cdm-tool.ashx.](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Data/2019/cdm-tool.ashx)
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **19**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**Income Statement**
+
+**48.** **Commercial banks are allowed to accrue interest on NPLs in line with the IFRS 9** 16F [17] .
+However, several banks apply a more prudential approach where accrued interest on NPLs is
+recorded as off-balance sheet in contingencies and recognized as interest income using the
+approach on a cash basis. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends that interest accrued on
+non-performing assets be credited to the provisions for accrual of interest on non-performing
+assets account rather than income. The provision account is reduced only when interest is
+actually paid (i.e., cash basis) and the amount is taken into income. The OJK confirmed that the
+size of accrued interest on NPLs is negligible (around 0.3 percent of accrued interest) and will not
+have significant effect on the income and expense statement and the respective FSIs.
+
+**49.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends that countries report other comprehensive**
+**income (OCI) as an additional line item in their income and expense statements** . Other
+comprehensive income consists mainly of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses that are excluded
+from net income in the income statement as well as unrealized gains and losses in financial
+instruments that are categorized under Fair Value Through Other Comprehensive Income
+(FVOCI). Other comprehensive income is not included in the monthly report forms. However
+commercial banks in Indonesia report to the OJK other comprehensive income in their financial
+reports for quarterly publication. This is in line with the quarterly reporting of the FSIs to STA.
+
+**50.** **Recommendation:**
+
+ - _The OJK to report other comprehensive income (OCI) data._
+
+
+**Balance Sheet**
+
+**51.** **In line with the recommendation of the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **,** **the mission mapped**
+**deposits with domestic and foreign banks on the asset side of the balance sheet to**
+**interbank loans** . This has a significant effect on the structure of the balance sheet and NPL
+figures. The total amount transferred as of 2021Q1 is IDR 245 trillion.
+
+**52.** **Recommendation:**
+
+ - _The OJK to report the deposits with domestic and foreign banks under interbank loans._
+
+
+**53.** **Consistent with the approach adopted in the** _**2019 FSIs Guide,**_ **the mission mapped**
+**provisions on performing loans and other assets to “General and Other Provisions” under**
+**liabilities in the new report forms** . Indonesia was covering general provisions as a deduction
+item under “other assets” on the assets side of the balance sheet. This change increased the total
+size of the DT’s balance sheet by 2.3 percent as of 2021Q1.
+
+
+17 Banks recognize interest income according to IFRS 9, implementing the concept of unwinding interest.
+
+
+**20** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**54.** **Th** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines specific provisions as provisions for loan losses that are**
+**set aside to cover identified NPLs** . In Indonesia specific provisions are calculated according to
+the IFRS 9 lifetime expected losses framework. The IFRS 9 provisioning requirements are around
+60 percent larger than that of the prudential regulatory framework. In line with the _2019 FSIs_
+_Guide_ recommendation, specific provisions are reported on the asset side as a deduction item
+from gross loans.
+
+
+**55.** **Recommendation** :
+
+ - _The OJK to report general and other provisions on the liability side as required by the 2019_
+_FSIs Guide._
+
+
+**Supervisory series**
+
+_Regulatory Capital and Risk Weighted Assets (RWA)_
+
+
+**56.** **The capital adequacy ratios are calculated using the Basel-III definition for total**
+**regulatory capital and its subcomponents (CET-1, additional Tier 1 and Tier 2)** . As
+mentioned in the accounting and regulatory framework section of the report, in addition to
+domestically incorporated commercial banks, foreign bank branches are also subject to minimum
+capital requirements. However, the foreign bank branches are subject to a Tier 1 capital and total
+capital requirement only (i.e., foreign bank branches are not subject to a CET-1 requirement).
+Accordingly, the reported CET-1 and additional tier 1 capital figures for the DTs sector do not
+add up to total Tier 1 capital of the DTs (which also incorporates FBBs).
+
+
+**57.** **While the FBBs constitute around 5 percent of the DTs assets, their reported Tier-1**
+**capital is more than 12 percent of the reported Tier-1 capital of the DTs sector** . The
+regulatory capital rules implemented for the FBBs are not in line with the Basel III standards and
+the size of the FBBs regulatory capital as defined under the OJK regulations has had the potential
+to significantly affect the sectoral aggregates (i.e., the capital adequacy of these institutions
+exceeding 50 percent which is much higher compared to the sectoral average) and hence
+conceal the financial vulnerabilities in the DTs sector. The CBCSDI consolidation basis also
+requires exclusion of FBBs from the FSIs reporting.
+
+
+**58.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines supervisory deductions as those that are not already**
+**deducted from the corresponding regulatory capital components.** The mission identified an
+abrupt drop (i.e., to zero) in supervisory deductions in the historical data starting from 2018Q3
+that was increasing the regulatory capital to RWAs significantly 17F [18] . The OJK staff is working on
+identifying the source of the major change in the reporting.
+
+
+18 Supervisory deductions have 209 basis points effect on the regulatory capital to RWA ratio as of 2018Q2
+(i.e., the last reporting date for the supervisory deductions).
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **21**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**59.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to exclude FBBs from the compilation of Tier-1 capital, total regulatory capital, and_
+_RWA series for the compilation of FSIs._
+
+
+ - _The OJK, in coordination with the BI, to identify the source of the abrupt data change in the_
+_supervisory deductions and update the historical series, as necessary._
+
+
+_Leverage Ratio_
+
+
+**60.** **The new FSIs methodology recommends calculation of the Tier 1 Capital to Assets**
+**ratio based on Basel III leverage measure, for jurisdictions that have implemented Basel III** .
+The OJK produces the total exposure measure in line with the Basel III standard. However, Islamic
+banks are exempted from the Basel III leverage ratio requirement. So, while the numerator for
+the Tier 1 Capital to Assets ratio (i.e., Tier 1 capital) is available for all banks, the denominator is
+produced based on a smaller sample of banks yielding an inconsistent leverage ratio for the
+sector. In order to prevent inconsistency in the reporting, the mission recommended the OJK
+staff to produce a total exposure measure for Islamic banks based on available data and
+incorporate this figure into the total exposure measure. The method for estimating the total
+exposure measure should be provided in the metadata.
+
+**61.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and incorporate this figure into_
+_the total exposure measure memorandum series._
+
+
+_Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital_
+
+
+**62.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **requires NPLs net of provisions to capital FSI to be calculated**
+**by using the total regulatory capital as denominator** . This indicator intends to gauge the
+capacity of bank capital to withstand losses on loans identified as non-performing but not fully
+provisioned. Indonesia has been reporting this FSI by using total capital and reserves obtained
+from the balance sheet, as this option was allowed under the _2006 FSIs Guide_ . This FSI will be
+automatically generated by the FSIs template by using total regulatory capital as the
+denominator.
+
+_Loan Concentration by Economic Activity_
+
+
+**63.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines loan concentration by economic activity FSI (a new FSI)**
+**as the ratio of DTs’ lending to the largest three economic activities, as a proportion of their**
+**total gross loans to nonfinancial corporations** . Lending by economic activity is based on the
+UN International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 4
+(ISIC Rev.4) at its highest level, which provides a widely accepted structure for the classification of
+economic activities. Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS) implements Indonesian
+
+
+**22** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+Standard Industrial Classification (Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha Indonesia (KBLI)) for economic
+activities which is in line with the ISIC Rev.4.
+
+**64.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in line with the_
+_methodology provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
+
+
+**65.** **The mission presented the annualization method of net income before/after tax**
+**and the averaging of total assets and capital and reserves in the computation of return on**
+**assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends using net profit
+before tax for calculation of the ROA and net income after tax for calculating of ROE.
+Accordingly, ROA is calculated using the annualized net income before tax divided by average
+total assets, while ROE is calculated using the annualized net income after tax divided by average
+total equity. In line with the methodology of the _2006 FSIs Guide_, the OJK was reporting the ROE
+by using annualized net income before tax, which needs to be updated with the implementation
+of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . The preferred methods for annualization and averaging of quarterly data
+were presented to the OJK staff as follows (e.g., for 2019):
+
+ - Annualizing net income before/after tax reported on a cumulative basis:
+2019Q1_Annualized = (2019Q1)*4;
+2019Q2_Annualized = (2019Q2)*2;
+2019Q3_Annualized = (2019Q3)/3*4;
+2019Q4_Annualized = (2019Q4).
+
+
+ - Averaging total assets and capital:
+2019Q1_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1)/2;
+2019Q2_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2)/3;
+2019Q3_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2 +2019Q3)/4;
+2019Q4_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2+2019Q3+2019Q4)/5.
+
+_Liquidity indicators_
+
+
+**66.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends the LCR and the NSFR ratios to be compiled by**
+**the countries implementing the Basel-III liquidity standards** . The OJK collects source data for
+the LCR and the NSFR ratios in line with the Basel-III requirements. As discussed above these
+ratios are calculated for a subset of commercial banks (i.e., CBBA 3, CBBA 4 and foreign banks).
+
+**67.** **In addition to Basel-III liquidity indicators, countries are expected to report liquid**
+**assets to total assets and liquid assets to short-term liabilities FSIs** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_
+recommends the broad definition of liquid assets to be used in the compilation of FSIs which
+comprises of (i) currency; (ii) deposits and other financial assets that are available either on
+demand or within three months or less; and (iii) securities that are traded in liquid markets
+(including repo markets) that can be readily converted into cash, with insignificant risk of change
+in value under normal business conditions. Indonesia’s broad definition of liquid assets cover
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **23**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+items such as derivative claims, deferred tax assets and prepaid expenses that do not satisfy the
+_2019 FSIs Guide’s_ definition of liquid assets. Also, for the calculation of internal liquidity ratios
+(i.e., liquid assets to non-core deposit ratio and liquid assets to third party funds ratio), the
+compilers defined liquid assets as cash, placements in the central bank (excluding reserve
+requirements, macroprudential intermediation ratio requirement and macroprudential liquidity
+buffer requirement), and government bonds in domestic and foreign currency. This internal
+definition is in line with the liquid assets’ definition of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ and could be reported
+for compilation of liquidity indicators.
+
+**68.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines short term liabilities as short-term element of DTs’**
+**debt liabilities and the net market value of their financial derivatives positions** . Short-term
+liabilities are those that could be withdrawn either on demand or within three months or less.
+The OJK reports short-term liabilities on a remaining maturity basis.
+
+**69.** **Recommendations:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the definitions provided_
+_in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
+
+ - _The OJK to report liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio._
+
+
+_Net open position in foreign currencies_
+
+
+**70.** **The FSI on net open position in foreign exchange to capital can be calculated using**
+**either on-balance sheet or on- and off-balance sheet measures, but the latter approach is**
+**the preferred approach in the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ . According to the BI regulation (No.
+7/37/PBI/2005), overall net open position is the sum of the absolute values of the net difference
+between assets and liabilities in all foreign currencies recorded on the balance sheet; plus, the
+net difference between claims and liabilities, comprising both commitments and contingencies,
+in all foreign currencies recorded in off balance sheet accounts. The _2019 FSIs Guide_, on the other
+hand, recommends the open position calculation to be made for each foreign currency and gold.
+The overall net open position is then measured by adding the sum of the net short positions or
+the sum of the net long positions, whichever is greater, plus the absolute value of the net
+position in gold. The mission recommended, for the calculation of this FSI, the net open position
+in foreign exchange series to be updated in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ methodology.
+
+**71.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to calculate the FSI on FX net open position in foreign exchange to capital in line_
+_with the aggregation approach specified in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
+
+
+_Large Exposures_
+
+
+**72.** _**The OJK’s large exposures definition is in line with the 2019 FSIs Guide**_ . The
+prudential reporting for the large exposures definition in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ started as
+
+
+**24** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+of 2020/Q4. Before that large exposures series reported by the OJK included only amounts
+exceeding 10 percent of the tier-1 capital (i.e., not the total amount of exposures exceeding
+10 percent of the tier-1 capital). FSIs reporting after 2020/Q4 includes all exposures exceeding
+the specified threshold. The mission suggested to the OJK to update the metadata to explain the
+change in the methodology. Also, the numerator for the FSI needs to be updated in line with the
+_2019 FSIs Guide_ recommendation as Tier-1 capital. Currently, Indonesia reports this indicator by
+using total regulatory capital as numerator.
+
+_Geographical Distribution of Loans to Total Gross Loans_
+
+
+**73.** **In recording the geographic distribution of loans, claims are attributed to**
+**economies on the basis of the residency of the entity on which DTs have claims** . Residency
+is based on the concept of economic territory, which is not always based strictly on physical or
+political borders (see paragraph 2.11 in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ ). The suggested regional grouping of
+countries is provided in Annex 8.2 of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ which is based on the classification
+provided in the IMF’s _World Economic Outlook._
+
+**74.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to update geographical distribution of loans consistent with the classification of the_
+_World Economic Outlook._
+
+
+_Gross asset/liability position in derivatives to capital_
+
+
+**75.** **The FSI gross asset/liability positions in financial derivatives to capital is intended**
+**to gauge the exposure of DTs’ asset/liability positions in financial derivatives relative to**
+**capital.** Capital is measured as the total regulatory capital. Indonesia was using total capital and
+reserves as the denominator for these FSIs. In line with the prescriptive approach in the _2019 FSIs_
+_Guide_, this FSI will be automatically generated by the FSIs template by using total regulatory
+capital as the denominator.
+
+_Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans and Foreign-currency-denominated_
+_liabilities to total liabilities_
+
+
+**76.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends foreign-currency-linked instruments to be**
+**included in the calculation of foreign currency denominated loans and foreign currency**
+**denominated liabilities** . Foreign currency linked instruments are those payable/receivable in
+domestic currency but with the amounts payable/receivable linked to a foreign currency and,
+therefore, considered to be denominated in foreign currency. The OJK FSIs compilation does not
+cover foreign currency linked loans and liabilities and current reporting forms are not sufficient
+for the identification of foreign currency linked amounts.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **25**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**77.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign currency linked_
+_liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data if the size is considered material._
+
+
+_Credit Growth to Private Sector_
+
+
+**78.** **The FSI credit growth to private sector is calculated using the year-over-year**
+**growth rate of total credit to the nonfinancial private sector** . This new FSI intends to capture
+emerging systemic risks and can serve as a forward-looking indicator of potential asset quality
+problems and vulnerabilities in the DT sector. Credit to private sector data provided by the OJK,
+which is consistent with the _2019 FSIs Guide_, includes gross loans extended by DTs to the
+nonfinancial private sector, _plus_ debt securities issued by private nonfinancial corporations and
+held by DTs.
+
+**79.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI._
+
+
+_Spread between Reference Lending and Deposit Rates_
+
+
+**80.** **Indonesia compiles the FSI spread between reference lending and deposit rates.** The
+_2019 FSIs Guide_ requires reporting of the underlying series (i) reference lending rate, and
+(ii) reference deposit rate. The OJK provided these memorandum series during the mission. This
+FSI will be automatically generated by the FSIs template (FSI-SR) using the underlying series.
+
+**81.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and reference deposit_
+_rates) for the calculation of spread between reference lending and deposit rates._
+
+
+_Spread between Highest and Lowest Interbank Rates_
+
+
+**82.** **The FSI spread between highest and lowest interbank rates is available for**
+**Indonesia** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ requires reporting of the underlying series (i) highest interbank
+rate, and (ii) lowest interbank rate. The mission advised the OJK, in coordination with the BI, to
+start reporting underlying series (highest interbank rate and lowest interbank rate) for the
+calculation of spread between highest and lowest interbank rates.
+
+_Real estate markets_
+
+
+**83.** **The OJK compiles residential real estate loans to total loans, and commercial real**
+
+**estate loans to total loans** **FSIs** . The OJK defines residential real estate loans as loans extended to
+households for purchasing houses and apartments. Also, the OJK defines commercial real estate
+loans as loans extended for constructions and real estate sectors. The _2019 FSIs Guide,_ on the
+
+
+**26** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+other hand, defines residential real estate loans as loans that are collateralized by residential real
+estate and commercial real estate loans as loans that are collateralized by commercial real estate,
+loans to construction companies or loans to companies active in the development of real estate.
+The definitions used by the OJK for the residential real estate and commercial real estate are
+narrower in scope in comparison to the _2019 FSIs Guide_ definitions. The OJK staff confirmed the
+availability of the data to update these indicators.
+
+**84.** **Recommendation:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to compile residential real estate and commercial real estate loans memorandum_
+_series in line with the definitions provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
+
+
+**E. FSIs for OFCs**
+
+**85.** **Indonesia has been reporting two FSIs for OFCs, namely, OFC financial assets to**
+**total financial assets and OFC financial assets to GDP** . The OFCs subsector is comprised of ICs,
+PFs, MMFs and other types of OFCs. The OFCs subsector currently accounts for 22 percent of the
+reported assets of the financial system. The mission advised that developments in the OFCs
+subsector be monitored given the importance of the OFCs subsector for Indonesia.
+
+**86.** **The FSIs OFC financial assets to total financial assets and OFC financial assets to**
+**GDP provide metrics to gauge the relative size of the OFCs subsector within the domestic**
+**financial system** . The _2019 FSIs_ _Guide_ recommends similar FSIs for MMFs, ICs and PFs. The OJK
+staff provided data on the assets for MMFs, ICs and PFs subsectors during the mission based on
+which the mission compiled these more granular series.
+
+**87.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends compiling two new FSIs for MMFs, four new FSIs**
+**for ICs, and two new FSIs for PFs** . The OJK staff confirmed the availability of source data for the
+compilation of these FSIs starting from 2014/Q3. The OJK is of the view that sectoral financial
+statements and memorandum series could be compiled by the OJK staff.
+
+**88.** **There are five social insurance and mandatory ICs operating in Indonesia** . These
+include ASABRI (Mandatory insurance for Military Personnel), TASPEN (Mandatory insurance for
+civil servants), JASA RAHARJA (insurance covering accidents from vehicles and other modes of
+transportations such as rail, airplane, ship/boats), BPJS Kesehatan (National Health Insurance) and
+BPJS Ketenagakerjaan (National Worker's Insurance). These companies do not function like
+conventional ICs (i.e., by constituting reserves and charging premiums proportional to the cost of
+the service provided). Therefore, they are categorized under “Other OFCs” subsector.
+
+**89.** **Indonesia has not yet reported institutional coverage for OFCs to STA** . The new
+institutional coverage templates (FSIC) require (i) the number of the ICs, split by ownership and
+their respective total assets, and (ii) the number of other OFCs split by ownership, and their
+respective total assets to be reported through the FSIC template.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **27**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**90.** **Recommendations:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to report OFC total assets, including additional sectorization to incorporate total_
+_assets by MMFs, ICs and PFs and other OFCs subsectors._
+
+
+ - _The OJK to report institutional coverage for OFCs._
+
+
+**F. FSI Metadata**
+
+**91.** **The mission highlighted the need to complement the FSI data with the**
+**corresponding metadata** . Metadata reporting is important for interpreting the FSIs and to allow
+for cross-country comparisons. Any deviations from the recommendations of the _2019 FSIs Guide_
+should be explained in the metadata and updated when necessary. The metadata should contain
+information on the content and coverage of the FSIs, as well as the accounting conventions and
+other national guidelines. The mission developed FSI metadata for DTs and for two additional
+FSIs on the size of OFC subsectors based on the information provided by the authorities. The
+metadata should be updated whenever changes are observed, for instance, when there are
+changes to the accounting and regulatory frameworks or to the call report instructions
+underlying the FSI source data.
+
+**92.** **The understanding of the calculation of key underlying series is important for**
+**better interpretation of FSIs** . Although the _2019 FSIs Guide_ provides guidance on the
+calculation of the underlying FSI series, the calculation of some data series used by national FSI
+compilers may not always be fully in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ due to lack of data.
+Furthermore, there might be some adjustments to the underlying series for the FSI calculation of
+FSIs. Appendix IV presents the detailed FSI metadata for DTs for reference. The mission also
+prepared the FSI metadata Excel file (the FSM file) for reporting together with the FSI data to STA
+for posting on the IMF’s FSI website.
+
+**G. FSI Data and Metadata Reporting**
+
+**93.** **The OJK aims to regularly report the sectoral FSIs for DTs and OFCs to the IMF with**
+**quarterly frequency, to be posted on the IMF’s FSI website, upon the OJK management’s**
+**approval** . As discussed earlier, the OJK can compile and report all 18 core and 12 additional FSIs
+for DTs as well as two additional FSIs on the size of OFC subsectors on a quarterly basis.
+Underlying data available at the OJK for the calculation of FSIs starts from 2005. The mission
+introduced to the OJK officials the new institutional coverage template (FSIC template) with
+information on the (i) number of the reporting DTs and their branches, split by ownership, and
+their respective total assets, (ii) number of the ICs, split by ownership and their respective total
+assets, and (iii) number of other OFCs split by ownership, and their respective total assets. The
+FSIC template should also be reported to the IMF for dissemination.
+
+
+**28** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**94.** **Recommendations:**
+
+
+ - _The OJK to finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral financial statements_
+_(FSI-SR template) for DTs, including balance sheets, income statements, and memorandum_
+_series, with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011,_
+_annual data beginning from 2005, the new FSI institutional coverage (FSIC template) with_
+_annual data starting from 2005, and the new FSI metadata (FSM template)._
+
+ - _The OJK, in coordination with all relevant parties, to start regular reporting to STA, for_
+_disseminating on the IMF’s FSI website, of the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data_
+_beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual data beginning_
+_from 2005, and the new FSIC template with annual data starting from 2005. Also report the_
+_new FSM template periodically._
+
+**H. Resources, Training, and Technical Cooperation**
+
+**95.** **The mission recommended that OJK staff seek to attend regional and HQ training**
+**courses on financial sector statistics** . STA has in the past regularly delivered courses on both
+Monetary and Financial Statistics and FSIs at IMF headquarters, and regional trainings centers.
+Also, recently STA has started delivering remote courses. Details can be found on the webpage of
+the IMF’s Institute for Capacity Development. The mission also provided several training sessions
+to the OJK staff covering the _2019 FSIs Guide_, analytical use of the FSIs, consolidation
+approaches, CDM tool and the new FSIs for OFCs.
+
+**96.** **Recommendation:**
+
+ - _Support OJK officials’ efforts to participate in IMF FSI training courses to improve their_
+_methodological knowledge and skills in compilation and interpretation of FSIs._
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **29**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+##### **Appendix I. Indonesia: Financial Soundness Indicators**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**30** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **31**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+##### **Appendix II. Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas** **Jasa Keuangan: Officials Met During the Mission**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Name|Title|Department/Directorate/Group|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|1|Mr. Rendra Zairuddin Idris|Head of
Department
|International Department|
+|2|Mr. Irnal Fiscallutfi|
Head of
Department
|Banking Licensing and Information Department|
+|3|Mr. Agus Firmansyah|
Head of
Department|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group
|
+|4|Ms. Nuraini Yuanita|
Director|Bank Supervision Development, Supervision and Crisis
Management Development Department|
+|5|Mr. Mohamad Miftah|Director
|
Banking Research and Regulation Department|
+|6|Ms. Yunorita Pariman|Executive
Analyst
|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group|
+|7|Ms. Arasy Jayanti Saputro|
Junior
Analyst|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group|
+|8|Mr. Fauzan Al Asyiq|
Administrator
|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group
|
+|9|Ms. Dian Oktariani|Deputy
Director
|Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|10|Ms. Anggella Aosi Nasution
|
Head of
Subsection
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|11|Mr. Oky Sandi Rumadi
Sihombing|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|12|
Ms. Nursyita Purnami|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|13|Mr. Suciadi Ciptono Rahayu|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|14|Ms. Juwita Adelina Pasaribu|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|15|Mr. Hendra Gunawan|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|16|Mr. Fransiskus Henry Cahyadi|
Junior
Analyst|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|17|Mr. Rorizki Aldila Hutagalung|
Staff|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|18|Mr. Urip Fanto|Administrator
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|
+|19|Mr. Tony|Deputy
Director
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|
+|20|Ms. Patricia|
Deputy
Director
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate
|
+|21|Mr. Riki Ferdian
|
Senior
Analyst|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate
|
+|22|Ms. Diar Lasrumondang
Veronika Putri
|
Analyst
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|
+|23|
Ms. Widya Octavia Dian Ayu
Permata|Subdivision
Head
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate
|
+|24|
Mr. Rolamjaya Hotmartua|
Junior
Analyst|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate|
+
+
+
+**32** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Name|Title|Department/Directorate/Group|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|25|Mr. Muhammad Radhi|Junior
Analyst
|Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|
+|26|Ms. Laras Ayu|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|
+|27|Ms. Nila Khusnika Sari|
Junior
Analyst|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|
+|28|Ms. Dewi Ayuningsih|
Deputy
Director|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|
+|29|Mr. Vidharta Indra Surya|Executive
Analyst|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|
+|30|Mr. Budi Azhari|Senior
Analyst
|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|
+|31|Ms. Listiyani Wulandari|Subdivision
Head|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Bank Supervision Development Directorate
|
+|32|Ms. Vicha Angela Arisandhi|
Junior
Analyst|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|
+|33|Mr. Sendy|Junior
Analyst|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|
+|34|Mr. Asep Suwondo|Director|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate
|
+|35|Mr. Arie Munandar|Deputy
Director|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and
Information Deputy Directorate 1
|
+|36|Mr. Pebriantho Pardamean
Sipahutar|Head
Division|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|
+|37|Mr. Ahmad Aripin|Head
Division|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Employment Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|
+|38|Ms. Devi Libyanda|Staff|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|
+|39|Ms. Oksidea Riveta|Staff|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|
+|40|Mr. Angga Surya Saputra|Subdivision
Head|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|
+|41|Mr. Arya Aditiawanto S|Staff
|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|
+|42|Ms. Luci Irawati|Executive
Analyst
|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|
+|43|Mr. Adityo Pamudji|
Executive
Analyst|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **33**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Name|Title|Department/Directorate/Group|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|44|Mr. Dedi Setiawan|Senior
Analyst
|International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|
+|45|Mr. Zitro Alviotti|
Junior
Analyst
|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|
+|46|Ms. Citra Amalia Yulianti|
Junior
Analyst
|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|
+|47|Ms. Ratih Rachmawati|
Junior
Analyst|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate|
+
+
+
+**34** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+##### **Appendix III. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the** **FSI Definitions**
+
+**The mission recommended the following amendments to align FSIs with the** _**2019 FSIs**_
+_**Guide**_ (Appendix III. Table 1). The recommended amendments include both improvements
+discussed in this report, as well as the incorporation of amendments brought by the _2019 FSIs_
+_Guide_ . While most changes were implemented during the mission and will not require further
+work, those changes requiring a longer timeframe for implementation are bolded in the table
+and spelled out as individual recommendations in this report.
+
+**Appendix III. Table 1. Indonesia: Recommended Amendments to FSIs**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Indicator|Recommendation / Update|
+|---|---|
+|Total Capital to RWA/Tier
1 Capital to
RWA/Common Equity
Tier-1 Capital to RWA|Exclude foreign bank branches from the compilation of Tier-1
capital, total regulatory capital, and risk weighted assets series
for the compilation of FSIs.**(to be implemented)**.|
+|Tier 1 Capital to
Assets/Leverage ratio|Start reporting the new FSI (leverage ratio). Estimate total
exposure measure for Islamic banks and incorporate this figure
into the total exposure measure memorandum series**(to be**
**implemented)**.|
+|NPLs net of provisions to
capital|This FSI is automatically generated by the FSI template by using
total regulatory capital as denominator.|
+|NPLs to total loans|The definition of total loans should be aligned with the_2019 FSIs_
_Guide_ definition.|
+|Provisions to
nonperforming loans|This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using
the specific provisions and nonperforming loans data that is
readily available.|
+|Loan concentration by
economic activity|Compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in line
with the methodology provided in the_2019 FSIs Guide_.|
+|Return on Assets (ROA)|Use annualized net income before tax in the numerator.
Aggregate the numerator as indicated in the report.
This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using
annualized net income before tax.|
+|Return on Equity (ROE)|Use annualized net income after tax in the numerator.
Aggregate the numerator as indicated in the report.
This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using
annualized net income after tax.|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **35**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Indicator|Recommendation / Update|
+|---|---|
+|Interest margin to gross
income|Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from
interest income has limited effect on the indicator.|
+|Noninterest expenses to
gross income|Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from
interest income has limited effect on the indicator.|
+|Liquid assets to total
assets/Liquid assets to
short-term liabilities|Update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the
definitions provided in_2019 FSIs Guide._** (to be implemented)**.|
+|Liquidity coverage ratio|Start reporting the new FSI.|
+|Net stable funding ratio|Start reporting the new FSI.|
+|Net open position in
foreign exchange to
capital|Calculate the FX NOP in line with the aggregation approach
specified in the_2019 FSIs Guide_ **(to be implemented)**.|
+|Large exposures to capital|Large exposures memorandum series to cover all exposures as
defined in the Basel Framework.|
+|Geographical distribution
of loans to total loans|Update geographical distribution of loans consistent with
classification of the World Economic Outlook.|
+|Gross asset/liability
position in derivatives to
capital|These FSIs are automatically generated by the FSIs template by
usingtotal regulatory capital as denominator.|
+|Trading income to total
income|Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from
interest income has limited effect on the indicator.|
+|Personnel expenses to
noninterest expenses|No change.|
+|Spread between reference
lending and deposit rates|Start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and
reference deposit rates) for the calculation of spread between
reference lending and deposit rates.|
+|Customer deposits to total
non-interbank loans|No change.|
+|FX loans to total loans / FX
liabilities to total liabilities|Evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign
currency linked liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data if
the size is considered material**(to be implemented)**.|
+|Credit growth to private
sector|Start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI.|
+
+
+**36** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Indicator|Recommendation / Update|
+|---|---|
+|Assets to total financial
system assets (for total of
OFCs and by
subsectors)/Assets to
gross domestic product
(GDP) (for total of OFCs
and by subsectors)|Report OFC total assets, including additional sectorization to
incorporate total assets by MMFs, ICs and PFs and OFCs: other
subsectors.
Report institutional coverage for OFCs.|
+|Residential real estate
prices|This FSI has been categorized under core FSIs in the 2019 FSIs
Guide.|
+|Residential real estate
loans to total
loans/Commercial real
estate loans to total loans
|Report residential real estate and commercial real estate loans
memorandum series in line with the definitions provided in the
_2019 FSIs Guide_ **(to be implemented)**.|
+
+
+
+**These data and methodological revisions have resulted in significant changes to some FSIs** .
+The mission recommended to the OJK to update the calculation of FSIs in line with the _2019 FSIs_
+_Guide_ . Appendix III-Table 2 covers the size of change observed in the FSIs before and after the
+mission.
+
+**Appendix III. Table 2. Indonesia: Comparison of FSIs Before and After the Technical**
+
+**Assistance**
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **37**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+**38** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+##### **Appendix IV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers**
+
+**Financial Soundness Indicators Metadata for Indonesia**
+
+
+Metadata should be disseminated together with FSI data to facilitate data interpretation.
+Metadata include information about FSIs and their compilation, such as data definitions, how
+data are consolidated, supervisory and accounting rules adopted by the reporting banks,
+institutional coverage, and data sources, which are useful to data users. The updated metadata
+templates also provide a good coverage on the implementation of the prudential measures.
+
+
+**Residence of institutional units**
+
+
+Foreign-owned companies incorporated in Indonesia are classified as residents in line with
+System of National Accounts (2008 SNA), which classifies foreign-owned companies as residents
+in an economic territory where they engage in and intend to continue engaging in economic
+activities and transactions on a significant scale for at least one year.
+
+
+**Exchange rate**
+
+
+Financial institutions use Bank Indonesia mid-market rate (end of reporting period) for
+converting all items in foreign currencies into national currency.
+
+
+**Consolidation basis**
+
+
+FSIs for DTs in Indonesia are compiled on an unconsolidated basis. This approach covers resident
+domestically controlled and foreign controlled DTs, with their domestic and overseas branches.
+The consolidation basis also includes the branches in Indonesia of DTs that are incorporated
+abroad. However, foreign DTs and foreign and domestic non-deposit taking financial subsidiaries
+of domestically incorporated DTs are excluded from the reporting sample.
+
+
+**Consolidation adjustments**
+
+
+Intragroup adjustments refer to the elimination of financial flows (income and expense) and
+financial positions between DTs within the same banking group (parent, its branches, and
+subsidiaries). Intra-group adjustments are not undertaken for the compilation of FSIs.
+
+
+**Institutional coverage**
+
+
+FSIs for DTs cover 109 commercial banks. Rural banks, deposit taking microfinance institutions
+and credit unions and credit cooperatives are not included in the FSIs compilation.
+
+
+**Regulatory framework**
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **39**
+
+
+
+INDONESIA
+
+
+Capital adequacy calculation follows a Basel III approach for the definition of regulatory capital
+and Basel-II approach for the definition of risk weighted assets. Basel III standards such as
+leverage ratio, large exposures framework, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio
+are implemented in Indonesia.
+
+
+**Accounting framework**
+
+
+Both public and private companies must comply with accounting standards issued by the
+DSAK-IAI. Indonesia national accounting standards (SAK) are adopted from the IFRS. Indonesia’s
+approach to the IFRS adaptation is to maintain one-year difference with the IFRS as issued by the
+IASB.
+
+
+**Data Definitions**
+
+
+**Common Equity Tier 1 capital/Tier 1 capital/Total regulatory capital** definitions are in line
+with Basel-III standards.
+
+
+**Risk Weighted Assets** is calculated using standardized approaches for credit and market risk
+and basic indicator approach for operational risk.
+
+
+**High quality liquid assets/total net cash outflows/available stable funding/required stable**
+**funding** definitions are in line with Basel-III standards.
+
+
+**Nonperforming loans (NPLs)** is defined as loans for which one or more contractual payments
+of interest or principal are past due for 90 days or more. Delay on payment (90 days rule) is only
+one of the criteria in classifying a loan or other assets as NPLs or nonperforming assets.
+Classification of assets is basically based on business prospects, performance of the debtors, and
+repayment capability.
+
+
+**Return on assets (ROA)** is calculated as the ratio of annualized net income before tax divided by
+average total assets.
+
+**Return on equity (ROE)** is calculated as the ratio of annualized net income after tax divided by
+average capital and reserves.
+
+**Source data**
+
+
+Source data for compiling FSIs for DTs include income and expense statements, the balance
+sheets and other monthly data collected that are relevant for compiling supervisory series
+relating to definition of capital, deposit breakdown and nonperforming loans. Commercial banks
+are required to submit monthly reporting within 30 days after the reporting period.
+
+
+**40** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a030960b72ebb0c784bba20af6eb4ea1405761a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332b3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-001", "height": 132, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb3a481ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466fce4538d19e1ec383ce6dc67c982d7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "31920833ff79628a813348ca8879d6e6747829b8e512527485a5c91a285d3465", "width": 132}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "183a1b19373b3b34", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-002", "height": 233, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b8ec9187c0404f8a04eff365ff962c8b0078d276cfa9ce1a626d11a7d9d2e3c3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "0b5b1bf0bef850fb32d8fce3b5163bcc9b20ee9288d9aaafdcc83ae8069184c1", "width": 648}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1559514b4f497543", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-003", "height": 257, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aabfd5aa550a76aaaa55daa92a9de6898b68d5aaeb539536d012e0519570e546", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "2a2369322325a68035651837d7be5a67c5335fcd2b153d83eacc768db35fd65e", "width": 789}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0031-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f0f0e0f8f8d8f878", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0031-001", "height": 1010, "page": 31, "phash_256": "9975c4ba7c0e326e4983c6a06304cb38e9587223dc997fa1e66e79ce73c4c9cc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "cd79e4fc8325577789dc1780ca358a4589197548d4473ede76fb6033d1e5ecb1", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0032-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "e078183818d8f8f1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0032-001", "height": 386, "page": 32, "phash_256": "9945dd0f6ee6c7226a36d86063b879197330cce0786787f20fc5971b0793878e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "2b6ac7f6439029d0ef4cfcdb0c1a86e8b0978ee823e6a3a2871fecc33102acb9", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0038-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "80e071f0e1e0e0e8", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0038-001", "height": 461, "page": 38, "phash_256": "8b55782f43a9e3286f2a5fef71ea1f0f0f79d6152b8ab8ca20f08417a382a43e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "9ec99d0292c6d7df4027aed4affb67e8a9d155eb3802f0c037da7e692974fec9", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-059/assets/figures/cr-2023-059-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f8f898f8f9f8b9f8", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-059-fig-p0039-001", "height": 1020, "page": 39, "phash_256": "9955c26d60aacb0a4c61fb6a776673697c19cf885d8cda686723c66e60acd233", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "sha256_normalized_png": "3e56a5d0c569007cb849f4ac343d1a63dd7c2d532374129e92337d2257b45d14", "width": 750}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-059/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a9a33052a9574f147806612f1bdb3051854af49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-059/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-059-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/59**\n# **INDONESIA**\n#### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—FINANCIAL** **SOUNDNESS INDICATORS STATISTICS MISSION**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance report on Indonesia was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed on June 2021.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 1, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/59\nINDONESIA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS STATISTICS MISSION\n\nThis Technical Assistance report on Indonesia was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed on June 2021.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 584}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-059-fig-p0002-003"], "markdown": "**NOVEMBER**\n**2021**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n# **I NDONESIA**\n### **T ECHNICAL A SSISTANCE R EPORT ON THE FINANCIAL** **SOUNDNESS INDICATORS MISSION** **(JUNE 2–11, 2021)**\n\n###### **Prepared by Mahmut Kutlukaya**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1113, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(208.09988403320312, 1.5, 596.099853515625, 140.60000610351562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 337, "number": 1, "size": 661686, "transform": [387.99993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, -139.10000610351562, 208.09988403320312, 140.60000610351562], "width": 779, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(65.39991760253906, 37.65007019042969, 144.59991455078125, 116.00006103515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 327, "number": 0, "size": 32062, "transform": [79.19999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 78.34999084472656, 65.39991760253906, 37.65007019042969], "width": 330, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "NOVEMBER\n2021\nI NDONESIA\nT ECHNICAL A SSISTANCE R EPORT ON THE FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS MISSION (JUNE 2–11, 2021)\nPrepared by Mahmut Kutlukaya", "text_characters": 126}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n### **CONTENTS**\n\n\nGlossary __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3\n\n\n**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________** 4\n\n\n**DETAILED ACTION PLAN ________________________________________________________________________** 5\n\n\n**INTRODUCTION _________________________________________________________________________________** 8\nA. Background _________________________________________________________________________________ 8\nB. Indonesia’s Financial System ________________________________________________________________ 8\n\n\n**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ___________________________** 12\nA. Consolidation Basis and Institutional Coverage ____________________________________________ 12\nB. Accounting and Regulatory Frameworks Underlying the FSI Data _________________________ 13\nC. Source Data________________________________________________________________________________ 18\nD. Compilation Framework ___________________________________________________________________ 19\nE. FSIs for OFCs ______________________________________________________________________________ 27\nF. FSI Metadata_______________________________________________________________________________ 28\nG. FSI Data and Metadata Reporting _________________________________________________________ 28\nH. Resources, Training, and Technical Cooperation ___________________________________________ 29\n\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Priority Recommendations __________________________________________________________________ 5\n2. The Financial System in Indonesia BI ________________________________________________________ 9\n3. Minimum Capital Requirements Based on Risk Profile _____________________________________ 15\n4. Commercial Banks Based on Business Activities Framework _______________________________ 16\n5. D-SIB Capital Surcharge ___________________________________________________________________ 16\n6. Source Data________________________________________________________________________________ 18\n\n\n**APPENDICES**\nI. Financial Soundness Indicators ____________________________________________________________ 30\nII. Officials Met During the Mission ___________________________________________________________ 32\nIII. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the FSI Definitions __________________________ 35\nIV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers ___________________________________________________________ 39\n\n\n**APPENDIX TABLES**\nIII.1. Recommended Amendments to FSIs ______________________________________________________ 35\nIII.2. Comparison of FSIs Before and After the Technical Assistance _____________________________ 37\n\n\n**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nCONTENTS\n\nGlossary 3\n\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _ 4\n\nDETAILED ACTION PLAN 5\n\nINTRODUCTION _ 8\nA. Background _ 8\nB. Indonesia’s Financial System 8\n\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS _ 12\nA. Consolidation Basis and Institutional Coverage 12\nB. Accounting and Regulatory Frameworks Underlying the FSI Data _ 13\nC. Source Data 18\nD. Compilation Framework _ 19\nE. FSIs for OFCs 27\nF. FSI Metadata_ 28\nG. FSI Data and Metadata Reporting _ 28\nH. Resources, Training, and Technical Cooperation _ 29\n\nTABLES\n1. Priority Recommendations 5\n2. The Financial System in Indonesia BI 9\n3. Minimum Capital Requirements Based on Risk Profile _ 15\n4. Commercial Banks Based on Business Activities Framework _ 16\n5. D-SIB Capital Surcharge _ 16\n6. Source Data 18\n\nAPPENDICES\nI. Financial Soundness Indicators 30\nII. Officials Met During the Mission _ 32\nIII. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the FSI Definitions 35\nIV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers _ 39\n\nAPPENDIX TABLES\nIII.1. Recommended Amendments to FSIs 35\nIII.2. Comparison of FSIs Before and After the Technical Assistance _ 37\n\n2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 964}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n##### **Glossary**\n\n_2019 FSIs Guide_ _Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide - 2019_\nAPD IMF’s Asia & Pacific Department\nBCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision\nBI Bank Indonesia\nBPD Regional development banks - Bank Pembangunan Daerah\nBPR Rural banks - Bank Perkreditan Rakyat\nCBBA Commercial banks based on business activities\nCBCSDI Cross-border, Cross-sector, Domestically Incorporated consolidation basis\nCDM Concentration and Distribution Measures\nCET-1 Common equity Tier-1\nDL Domestic location basis\nDSAK Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards Board - Dewan Standar Akuntansi\nKeuangan\nD-SIBs Domestic systemically important banks\nDTs Deposit taker\nFAS Financial Access Survey\nFBBs Foreign bank branches\nFSI-SR Sectoral financial statements and memorandum series report forms (new)\nFSIs Financial soundness indicator\nFSIC Institutional coverage report form (new)\nFSM Metadata template (new)\nFX Foreign exchange\nIASB International Accounting Standards Board\nIDR Indonesian Rupiah\nIFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nLCR Liquidity coverage ratio\nMFIs Micro finance institutions\nNPLs Nonperforming loans\nNSFR Net stable funding ratio\nOCI Other comprehensive income\nOFCs Other financial corporations\nOJK Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas Jasa Keuangan\nROA Return on assets\nROE Return on equity\nRWA Risk-weighted asset\nSNA System of National Accounts\nSTA IMF’s Statistics Department\nTA Technical assistance\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nGlossary\n\n_2019 FSIs Guide_ _Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide - 2019_\nAPD IMF’s Asia & Pacific Department\nBCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision\nBI Bank Indonesia\nBPD Regional development banks - Bank Pembangunan Daerah\nBPR Rural banks - Bank Perkreditan Rakyat\nCBBA Commercial banks based on business activities\nCBCSDI Cross-border, Cross-sector, Domestically Incorporated consolidation basis\nCDM Concentration and Distribution Measures\nCET-1 Common equity Tier-1\nDL Domestic location basis\nDSAK Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards Board - Dewan Standar Akuntansi\nKeuangan\nD-SIBs Domestic systemically important banks\nDTs Deposit taker\nFAS Financial Access Survey\nFBBs Foreign bank branches\nFSI-SR Sectoral financial statements and memorandum series report forms (new)\nFSIs Financial soundness indicator\nFSIC Institutional coverage report form (new)\nFSM Metadata template (new)\nFX Foreign exchange\nIASB International Accounting Standards Board\nIDR Indonesian Rupiah\nIFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nLCR Liquidity coverage ratio\nMFIs Micro finance institutions\nNPLs Nonperforming loans\nNSFR Net stable funding ratio\nOCI Other comprehensive income\nOFCs Other financial corporations\nOJK Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas Jasa Keuangan\nROA Return on assets\nROE Return on equity\nRWA Risk-weighted asset\nSNA System of National Accounts\nSTA IMF’s Statistics Department\nTA Technical assistance\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3", "text_characters": 1318}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**1.** **The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Statistics Department (STA) provided**\n**technical assistance (TA) on financial soundness indicators (FSI) to the Indonesia Financial**\n**Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan - OJK) during June 2-11, 2021** . The mission was\nconducted remotely via video conferences due to travel restrictions because of the COVID-19\npandemic and travel restrictions. The mission worked with the staff of the OJK on the\ndevelopment of FSIs that are in line with the IMF’s _FSIs Compilation Guide 2019 (2019 FSIs_\n_Guide)_ . 0F [1] The mission: (i) reviewed available source data for deposit takers (DTs); (ii) reviewed the\nframework for compiling new FSIs from available source data; (iii) identified areas for\nimprovement based on the methodology set forth in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ ; and (iv) reviewed\navailable data for other financial corporations (OFCs) to assess the feasibility of a subsequent\nmission.\n\n**2.** **As a result of the mission, the OJK is now in a position to compile quarterly FSIs in**\n**line with the** _**2019**_ _**FSIs Guide**_ . The mission compiled, together with staff of the OJK, 18 core and\n12 additional FSIs for DTs, and two additional FSIs on the size of the OFC’s subsector from the\navailable source data. The coverage of DTs for the compilation of FSIs includes 109 commercial\nbanks. The FSIs for DTs exclude rural banks, credit unions and credit cooperatives and\nmicrofinance institutions.\n\n**3.** **The mission reviewed and made recommendations aligning the FSIs currently**\n**compiled by the OJK to assess consistency with the methodology of the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **.**\nSeveral FSIs need to be updated in order to follow the more prescriptive approach introduced in\nthe _2019 FSIs Guide_ . These FSIs include nonperforming loans (NPLs) net of provisions to capital,\ntier 1 capital to assets, return on equity, liquid assets to total assets and liquid assets to short\nterm liabilities, net open position in foreign exchange to capital, gross asset/liability position to\ncapital, and residential/commercial real estate loans to total loans (Appendix III). Also, the\nmission compiled new FSIs for DTs, including common equity Tier-1 (CET-1) capital to risk\nweighted assets, provisions to nonperforming loans, Tier 1 capital to assets (leverage) ratio,\nliquidity coverage ratio, net stable funding ratio and credit growth to private sector.\n\n**4.** **A timeframe for reporting FSI data and metadata to the IMF was discussed and**\n**agreed on with OJK officials** . As of June 2021, 146 countries’ FSI data are disseminated on the\nIMF’s FSI website, allowing for cross-country comparisons and analyses that are useful to policy\nmakers and analysts. The OJK staff may now compile quarterly FSIs for DTs using the workbook\ndeveloped by the mission in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\n\n\n1 The work of the mission was facilitated by the excellent cooperation provided by officials of the OJK. The list of\nofficials met during the mission is in Appendix II.\n\n\n**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n1. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Statistics Department (STA) provided\ntechnical assistance (TA) on financial soundness indicators (FSI) to the Indonesia Financial\nServices Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan - OJK) during June 2-11, 2021 . The mission was\nconducted remotely via video conferences due to travel restrictions because of the COVID-19\npandemic and travel restrictions. The mission worked with the staff of the OJK on the\ndevelopment of FSIs that are in line with the IMF’s _FSIs Compilation Guide 2019 (2019 FSIs_\n_Guide)_ . 0F [1] The mission: (i) reviewed available source data for deposit takers (DTs); (ii) reviewed the\nframework for compiling new FSIs from available source data; (iii) identified areas for\nimprovement based on the methodology set forth in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ ; and (iv) reviewed\navailable data for other financial corporations (OFCs) to assess the feasibility of a subsequent\nmission.\n\n2. As a result of the mission, the OJK is now in a position to compile quarterly FSIs in\nline with the _2019_ _FSIs Guide_ . The mission compiled, together with staff of the OJK, 18 core and\n12 additional FSIs for DTs, and two additional FSIs on the size of the OFC’s subsector from the\navailable source data. The coverage of DTs for the compilation of FSIs includes 109 commercial\nbanks. The FSIs for DTs exclude rural banks, credit unions and credit cooperatives and\nmicrofinance institutions.\n\n3. The mission reviewed and made recommendations aligning the FSIs currently\ncompiled by the OJK to assess consistency with the methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\nSeveral FSIs need to be updated in order to follow the more prescriptive approach introduced in\nthe _2019 FSIs Guide_ . These FSIs include nonperforming loans (NPLs) net of provisions to capital,\ntier 1 capital to assets, return on equity, liquid assets to total assets and liquid assets to short\nterm liabilities, net open position in foreign exchange to capital, gross asset/liability position to\ncapital, and residential/commercial real estate loans to total loans (Appendix III). Also, the\nmission compiled new FSIs for DTs, including common equity Tier-1 (CET-1) capital to risk\nweighted assets, provisions to nonperforming loans, Tier 1 capital to assets (leverage) ratio,\nliquidity coverage ratio, net stable funding ratio and credit growth to private sector.\n\n4. A timeframe for reporting FSI data and metadata to the IMF was discussed and\nagreed on with OJK officials . As of June 2021, 146 countries’ FSI data are disseminated on the\nIMF’s FSI website, allowing for cross-country comparisons and analyses that are useful to policy\nmakers and analysts. The OJK staff may now compile quarterly FSIs for DTs using the workbook\ndeveloped by the mission in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\n\n1 The work of the mission was facilitated by the excellent cooperation provided by officials of the OJK. The list of\nofficials met during the mission is in Appendix II.\n\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2566}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**5.** **To support progress in the compilation of FSIs in line with the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **, the**\n**mission recommended a detailed action plan with the priority recommendations** .\n**summarized in Table 1.** Further details can be found in the rest of this report.\n\n**Table 1. Indonesia: Priority Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|**November 2021**|_Finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral_
_financial statements (FSI-SR template) for DTs, including_
_the balance sheet, income statement, and memorandum_
_series, with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1,_
_semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual data_
_beginning from 2005, the new FSI institutional coverage_
_(FSIC template) with annual data starting from 2005,_
_and the new FSI metadata (FSM template)._|**OJK**|\n|**December 2021**|_In coordination with all relevant parties, start regular_
_reporting to STA, for disseminating on the IMF’s FSI_
_website, of the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data_
_beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning_
_from 2011, annual data beginning from 2005, and the_
_new FSIC template with annual data starting from 2005._
_Also report the new FSM template periodically._|**OJK**|\n\n\n### **DETAILED ACTION PLAN**\n\n**6.** **The Action Plan below includes steps to accomplish milestones as well as the target**\n**completion dates.** The plan is for technical compilers. Actions are prioritized as high (H),\nmedium (M), low (L), and priority recommendations (PR) identified.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Rec.
No.|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|**Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the**
**public.**|\n|_1 _|_PR_|_Finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral_
_financial statements (FSI-SR template) for DTs, including the_
_balance sheet, income statement, and memorandum series,_
_with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual_
_data beginning from 2011, annual data beginning from 2005,_|_11/30/2021_|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.18000030517578, 150.17999267578125, 539.8200073242188, 423.8999938964844], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}, {"bbox": [90.18000030517578, 534.6719970703125, 539.8200073242188, 715.968017578125], "columns": 4, "rows": 3}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n5. To support progress in the compilation of FSIs in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ , the\nmission recommended a detailed action plan with the priority recommendations .\nsummarized in Table 1. Further details can be found in the rest of this report.\n\nTable 1. Indonesia: Priority Recommendations\n\n Target Date Priority Recommendation Responsible Institutions \n\n November 2021 _Finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral_ _financial statements (FSI-SR template) for DTs, including_ _the balance sheet, income statement, and memorandum_ _series, with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1,_ _semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual data_ _beginning from 2005, the new FSI institutional coverage_ _(FSIC template) with annual data starting from 2005,_ _and the new FSI metadata (FSM template)._ OJK \n December 2021 _In coordination with all relevant parties, start regular_ _reporting to STA, for disseminating on the IMF’s FSI_ _website, of the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data_ _beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning_ _from 2011, annual data beginning from 2005, and the_ _new FSIC template with annual data starting from 2005._ _Also report the new FSM template periodically._ OJK \nDETAILED ACTION PLAN\n\n6. The Action Plan below includes steps to accomplish milestones as well as the target\ncompletion dates. The plan is for technical compilers. Actions are prioritized as high (H),\nmedium (M), low (L), and priority recommendations (PR) identified.\n\n Rec. No. Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date \n\n Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the public. Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the public. Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the public. Outcome: A new data set has been compiled and disseminated internally and/or to the public. \n _1 _ _PR_ _Finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral_ _financial statements (FSI-SR template) for DTs, including the_ _balance sheet, income statement, and memorandum series,_ _with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual_ _data beginning from 2011, annual data beginning from 2005,_ _11/30/2021_ \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5", "text_characters": 1933}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Rec.
No.|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|||_the new FSI institutional coverage (FSIC template) with annual_
_data starting from 2005, and the new FSI metadata (FSM_
_template)._||\n|_2 _|_PR_|_In coordination with all relevant parties, start regular_
_reporting to STA, for disseminating on the IMF’s FSI website, of_
_the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data beginning from_
_2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual_
_data beginning from 2005, and the new FSIC template with_
_annual data starting from 2005. Also report the new FSM_
_template periodically._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_3 _|_H _|_Agree with the Bank Indonesia (BI) and inform STA on which_
_institution will be the main counterparty to report the new_
_FSIs to STA._|_11/30/2021_|\n|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|**Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data.**|\n|_4 _|_H _|_Compile FSIs using cross-border, cross-sector, domestically_
_incorporated consolidation basis._
|_12/31/2022_|\n|_5 _|_H _|_Compile and report to the IMF the concentration and_
_distribution measures (CDM)._
|_06/30/2022_|\n|_6 _|_H _|_Report the deposits with domestic and foreign banks under_
_interbank loans._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_7 _|_H _|_Report general and other provisions on the liability side as_
_required by the 2019 FSIs Guide._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_8 _|_H _|_Exclude foreign bank branches from the compilation of Tier-1_
_capital, total regulatory capital, and risk weighted assets_
_series for the compilation of FSIs._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_9 _|_H _|_In coordination with the BI, identify the source of the abrupt_
_data change in the supervisory deductions data and update_
_the historical series, as necessary._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_10_|_H _|_Estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and_
_incorporate this figure into the total exposure measure_
_memorandum series._|_12/31/2021_|\n\n\n\n**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22154235839844, 72.1919937133789, 539.7784423828125, 699.407958984375], "columns": 4, "rows": 12}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Rec. No. Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date \n\n _the new FSI institutional coverage (FSIC template) with annual_ _data starting from 2005, and the new FSI metadata (FSM_ _template)._ \n _2 _ _PR_ _In coordination with all relevant parties, start regular_ _reporting to STA, for disseminating on the IMF’s FSI website, of_ _the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data beginning from_ _2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual_ _data beginning from 2005, and the new FSIC template with_ _annual data starting from 2005. Also report the new FSM_ _template periodically._ _12/31/2021_ \n _3 _ _H _ _Agree with the Bank Indonesia (BI) and inform STA on which_ _institution will be the main counterparty to report the new_ _FSIs to STA._ _11/30/2021_ \n Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data. Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data. Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data. Outcome: Improved periodicity, timeliness, and consistency of data. \n _4 _ _H _ _Compile FSIs using cross-border, cross-sector, domestically_ _incorporated consolidation basis._ _12/31/2022_ \n _5 _ _H _ _Compile and report to the IMF the concentration and_ _distribution measures (CDM)._ _06/30/2022_ \n _6 _ _H _ _Report the deposits with domestic and foreign banks under_ _interbank loans._ _12/31/2021_ \n _7 _ _H _ _Report general and other provisions on the liability side as_ _required by the 2019 FSIs Guide._ _12/31/2021_ \n _8 _ _H _ _Exclude foreign bank branches from the compilation of Tier-1_ _capital, total regulatory capital, and risk weighted assets_ _series for the compilation of FSIs._ _12/31/2021_ \n _9 _ _H _ _In coordination with the BI, identify the source of the abrupt_ _data change in the supervisory deductions data and update_ _the historical series, as necessary._ _12/31/2021_ \n _10_ _H _ _Estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and_ _incorporate this figure into the total exposure measure_ _memorandum series._ _12/31/2021_ \n\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1755}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Rec.
No.|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|_11_|_H _|_Compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in_
_line with the methodology provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_12_|_H _|_Update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the_
_definitions provided in 2019 FSIs Guide._|_12/31/2021_|\n|_13_|_H _|_Report liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_14_|_H _|_Calculate the net open position in foreign exchange to capital_
_in line with the aggregation approach specified in the 2019_
_FSIs Guide._|_12/31/2021_|\n|_15_|_H _|_Start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_16_|_H _|_Start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and_
_reference deposit rates) for the calculation of spread between_
_reference lending and deposit rates._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_17_|_H _|_Compile residential real estate and commercial real estate_
_loans memorandum series in line with the definitions_
_provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_18_|_M _|_Update geographical distribution of loans consistent with the_
_classification of the World Economic Outlook._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_19_|_M _|_Evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign_
_currency linked liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data_
_if the size is considered material._|_12/31/2021_|\n|_20_|_L _|_Report other comprehensive income (OCI) data._
|_12/31/2021_|\n|_21_|_H _|_Report OFC total assets, including the expansion to_
_incorporate total assets of MMFs, ICs and PFs and other OFCs_
_subsectors._|_12/31/2021_|\n|_22_|_H _|_Report institutional coverage for OFCs._|_12/31/2021_|\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22286224365234, 72.1919937133789, 539.7771606445312, 611.927978515625], "columns": 4, "rows": 13}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Rec. No. Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date \n\n _11_ _H _ _Compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in_ _line with the methodology provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._ _12/31/2021_ \n _12_ _H _ _Update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the_ _definitions provided in 2019 FSIs Guide._ _12/31/2021_ \n _13_ _H _ _Report liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio._ _12/31/2021_ \n _14_ _H _ _Calculate the net open position in foreign exchange to capital_ _in line with the aggregation approach specified in the 2019_ _FSIs Guide._ _12/31/2021_ \n _15_ _H _ _Start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI._ _12/31/2021_ \n _16_ _H _ _Start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and_ _reference deposit rates) for the calculation of spread between_ _reference lending and deposit rates._ _12/31/2021_ \n _17_ _H _ _Compile residential real estate and commercial real estate_ _loans memorandum series in line with the definitions_ _provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._ _12/31/2021_ \n _18_ _M _ _Update geographical distribution of loans consistent with the_ _classification of the World Economic Outlook._ _12/31/2021_ \n _19_ _M _ _Evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign_ _currency linked liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data_ _if the size is considered material._ _12/31/2021_ \n _20_ _L _ _Report other comprehensive income (OCI) data._ _12/31/2021_ \n _21_ _H _ _Report OFC total assets, including the expansion to_ _incorporate total assets of MMFs, ICs and PFs and other OFCs_ _subsectors._ _12/31/2021_ \n _22_ _H _ _Report institutional coverage for OFCs._ _12/31/2021_ \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7", "text_characters": 1445}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n**A. Background**\n\n**7.** **This was the first STA mission on FSIs for the OJK** . Indonesia participated in the\n_Coordinated Compilation Exercise_ that was launched by the IMF in 2004 and has since compiled\nand regularly reported annual FSI data to STA. An STA visited Jakarta, Indonesia during\nJuly 27-August 9, 2011 to provide TA on FSIs to the BI.\n\n**8.** **Indonesia reports 12 core and 12 encouraged FSIs for DTs and 11 encouraged FSIs,**\n**including two encouraged FSIs for OFCs for other sectors to STA through ICS.** The BI has\nbeen the main STA counterparty for the reporting of FSIs on a timely basis, while the DTs and\nOFCs related FSIs were being compiled by the OJK. With a letter to STA dated March 3, 2021, the\nOJK requested STA to acknowledge its Group for Integrated Data and Statistics Management\n(GDST) as a counterparty for the financial sector data in Indonesia.\n\n**9.** **The OJK, established in 2011 by the Law No. 21/2011 on Financial Services**\n**Authority, licenses, regulates and supervises the financial services activities in banking,**\n**capital markets, and non-bank financial institutions sectors.** The BI is responsible for\nmonetary policy and financial stability.\n\n**10.** **The OJK followed the recommendation of the International Accounting Standards**\n**Board (IASB) on the application of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in**\n**the light of the coronavirus uncertainty.** 1F [2] Also, restructured loans are allowed to be\ncategorized underperforming (standard) category until March 31, 2022. With a share exceeding\n20 percent of the total loans, restructured loans may potentially have a large impact on the FSIs,\nincluding nonperforming loans, once the relaxation measures are ended.\n\n**B. Indonesia’s Financial System**\n\n**11.** **Indonesia’s financial system is comprised of the BI, 109 commercial banks,**\n**1,669 rural banks, 226 deposit taking microfinance institutions, 143 insurance companies**\n**(ICs), 219 pension funds (PFs), 262 money market funds (MMFs), and 715 other types of**\n**financial corporations** . Banks dominate the financial system in Indonesia. As of December 2020,\ntotal reported assets of the financial system were IDR 12,078 trillion. Assets of the commercial\nbanks constitute 76 percent of this total.\n\n**12.** **The OJK is the main regulatory and supervisory authority for DTs and OFCs in**\n**Indonesia** . The OJK is responsible for the regulation and supervision of banks (commercial\nbanks, rural banks), capital markets (securities companies, investment managers, etc.), ICs, PFs,\nfinancing institutions, and other financial services institutions (microfinance institutions,\n\n\n2 See https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/supporting-implementation/ifrs-9/ifrs-9-ecl-and-coronavirus.pdf.\n\n\n**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nINTRODUCTION\n\nA. Background\n\n7. This was the first STA mission on FSIs for the OJK . Indonesia participated in the\n_Coordinated Compilation Exercise_ that was launched by the IMF in 2004 and has since compiled\nand regularly reported annual FSI data to STA. An STA visited Jakarta, Indonesia during\nJuly 27-August 9, 2011 to provide TA on FSIs to the BI.\n\n8. Indonesia reports 12 core and 12 encouraged FSIs for DTs and 11 encouraged FSIs,\nincluding two encouraged FSIs for OFCs for other sectors to STA through ICS. The BI has\nbeen the main STA counterparty for the reporting of FSIs on a timely basis, while the DTs and\nOFCs related FSIs were being compiled by the OJK. With a letter to STA dated March 3, 2021, the\nOJK requested STA to acknowledge its Group for Integrated Data and Statistics Management\n(GDST) as a counterparty for the financial sector data in Indonesia.\n\n9. The OJK, established in 2011 by the Law No. 21/2011 on Financial Services\nAuthority, licenses, regulates and supervises the financial services activities in banking,\ncapital markets, and non-bank financial institutions sectors. The BI is responsible for\nmonetary policy and financial stability.\n\n10. The OJK followed the recommendation of the International Accounting Standards\nBoard (IASB) on the application of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in\nthe light of the coronavirus uncertainty. 1F [2] Also, restructured loans are allowed to be\ncategorized underperforming (standard) category until March 31, 2022. With a share exceeding\n20 percent of the total loans, restructured loans may potentially have a large impact on the FSIs,\nincluding nonperforming loans, once the relaxation measures are ended.\n\nB. Indonesia’s Financial System\n\n11. Indonesia’s financial system is comprised of the BI, 109 commercial banks,\n1,669 rural banks, 226 deposit taking microfinance institutions, 143 insurance companies\n(ICs), 219 pension funds (PFs), 262 money market funds (MMFs), and 715 other types of\nfinancial corporations . Banks dominate the financial system in Indonesia. As of December 2020,\ntotal reported assets of the financial system were IDR 12,078 trillion. Assets of the commercial\nbanks constitute 76 percent of this total.\n\n12. The OJK is the main regulatory and supervisory authority for DTs and OFCs in\nIndonesia . The OJK is responsible for the regulation and supervision of banks (commercial\nbanks, rural banks), capital markets (securities companies, investment managers, etc.), ICs, PFs,\nfinancing institutions, and other financial services institutions (microfinance institutions,\n\n2 See https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/supporting-implementation/ifrs-9/ifrs-9-ecl-and-coronavirus.pdf.\n\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2324}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nguarantee agencies, fintech companies, etc.). The Law No. 21/2011 on Financial Services\nAuthority sets out the functions, responsibilities, and powers of the OJK. The principal purposes\nof the OJK are to (i) ensure activities in the financial services sector are conducted in an\norganized, fair, transparent, and accountable manner; (ii) promote growth in the financial system\nin a sustainable and accountable manner; and (iii) protect consumer and public interests.\n\n**13.** **The BI is the central bank of Indonesia.** The mission of the BI, among others, is to\nachieve and maintain price stability through effective monetary policy, to engage in maintaining\nfinancial system stability through effective macro-prudential policy, and to engage in enhancing\nfinancial market deepening.\n\n**14.** **DTs in Indonesia are insured by the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC).**\nIDIC insures deposits in the forms of current/checking accounts, time deposits, current/checking\naccounts, certificate of deposits, and/or other forms of deposits that have similar characteristics,\nincluding Shariah-based deposits, with a limit up to IDR 2 billion per depositor per bank.\n\n**Table 2. Indonesia: The Financial System in Indonesia (excluding the BI)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector|Number
of
institutio
ns|Total assets
(In Trillions
of IDR)
31-Dec-20|Total assets
(Percent of
Nominal
GDP)|Percent of
Total
Financial
System
Assets|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Commercial Banks**
|**109**
|**9,178**
|** 59.46**
|
** 75.98**
|\n|
o/w domestically controlled
|
71
|
6,681
|
43.29
|
55.31
|\n|
-State-owned banks 1/
|
4
|
3,819
|
24.74
|
31.61
|\n|
-Subsidiaries of state-owned banks
(Islamic banks)
|
3
|
240
|
1.55
|
1.98
|\n|
- Regional development banks
|26
|764
|4.95
|6.32
|\n|
- Private banks
|
38
|
1,859
|
12.05
|
15.39
|\n|
o/w foreign controlled
|
30
|
2,061
|
13.35
|
17.06
|\n|
o/w branches of foreign banks
|
8
|
436
|
2.82
|
3.61
|\n|
**Rural banks**
|
**1,669**
|
**170**
|
** 1.10**
|
** 1.41**
|\n|
**Deposit taking microfinance**
**institutions**
|
**226**
|
**1 **
|
** 0.01**
|
** 0.01**
|\n|
**Insurance companies**
|**143**
|**783**
|** 5.07**
|** 6.48**
|\n|
o/w life insurance
|
59
|
581
|
3.76
|
4.81
|\n|
o/w nonlife insurance, reinsurance
|
84
|
202
|
1.31
|
1.67
|\n|
**Pension funds**
|
**219**
|
**317**
|
** 2.05**
|
** 2.62**
|\n|
**Money Market Funds**
|
**262**
|
**95**
|
** 0.61**
|
** 0.78**
|\n|
**Other financial institutions**
|
**715**
|
**1,536**
|
** 9.95**
|
** 12.72**
|\n|
Other insurance
|
5
|
672
|
4.35
|
5.56
|\n|
Leasing companies
|
176
|
456
|
2.95
|
3.78
|\n|
Specialized financing institutions
|
120
|
256
|
1.66
|
2.12
|\n|
Infrastructure financing|
2|
116|
0.75|
0.96|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.2300033569336, 323.4800109863281, 539.77001953125, 713.0800170898438], "columns": 5, "rows": 21}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nguarantee agencies, fintech companies, etc.). The Law No. 21/2011 on Financial Services\nAuthority sets out the functions, responsibilities, and powers of the OJK. The principal purposes\nof the OJK are to (i) ensure activities in the financial services sector are conducted in an\norganized, fair, transparent, and accountable manner; (ii) promote growth in the financial system\nin a sustainable and accountable manner; and (iii) protect consumer and public interests.\n\n13. The BI is the central bank of Indonesia. The mission of the BI, among others, is to\nachieve and maintain price stability through effective monetary policy, to engage in maintaining\nfinancial system stability through effective macro-prudential policy, and to engage in enhancing\nfinancial market deepening.\n\n14. DTs in Indonesia are insured by the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC).\nIDIC insures deposits in the forms of current/checking accounts, time deposits, current/checking\naccounts, certificate of deposits, and/or other forms of deposits that have similar characteristics,\nincluding Shariah-based deposits, with a limit up to IDR 2 billion per depositor per bank.\n\nTable 2. Indonesia: The Financial System in Indonesia (excluding the BI)\n\n Sector Number of institutio ns Total assets (In Trillions of IDR) 31-Dec-20 Total assets (Percent of Nominal GDP) Percent of Total Financial System Assets \n\n Commercial Banks 109 9,178 59.46 75.98 \n o/w domestically controlled 71 6,681 43.29 55.31 \n -State-owned banks 1/ 4 3,819 24.74 31.61 \n -Subsidiaries of state-owned banks (Islamic banks) 3 240 1.55 1.98 \n - Regional development banks 26 764 4.95 6.32 \n - Private banks 38 1,859 12.05 15.39 \n o/w foreign controlled 30 2,061 13.35 17.06 \n o/w branches of foreign banks 8 436 2.82 3.61 \n Rural banks 1,669 170 1.10 1.41 \n Deposit taking microfinance institutions 226 1 0.01 0.01 \n Insurance companies 143 783 5.07 6.48 \n o/w life insurance 59 581 3.76 4.81 \n o/w nonlife insurance, reinsurance 84 202 1.31 1.67 \n Pension funds 219 317 2.05 2.62 \n Money Market Funds 262 95 0.61 0.78 \n Other financial institutions 715 1,536 9.95 12.72 \n Other insurance 5 672 4.35 5.56 \n Leasing companies 176 456 2.95 3.78 \n Specialized financing institutions 120 256 1.66 2.12 \n Infrastructure financing 2 116 0.75 0.96 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9", "text_characters": 1938}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n|Venture capital|61|19|0.13|0.16|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
Insurance brokers
|
160
|
9
|
0.06
|
0.08
|\n|
Reinsurance brokers
|
42
|
5
|
0.03
|
0.04
|\n|
Peer to peer lending
|
149
|
4
|
0.02|
0.03|\n\n\n1/ Excluding subsidiaries of state-owned banks.\n\n**15.** **The DTs sector comprises commercial banks, rural banks, microfinance institutions,**\n**credit unions and credit cooperatives:**\n\n- Commercial banks are licensed by the OJK for mobilizing funds from the public in the\nform of deposits and channeling them to the public in the form of credit and/or other\nforms. In accordance with the Law No. 7/1992 concerning banking as amended by Law\nNo. 10/1998, all banks in Indonesia accept deposits. The commercial banks have sizeable\noverseas activities. Cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities account\nfor 3.04 percent and 8.92 percent of total claims and total liabilities respectively.\n\n- There are 26 regional development banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah - BPD) operating\nin Indonesia. BPDs are established by the local provincial government with the purpose\nto boost regional development and providing financial services. BPDs are subject to the\nsame rules and regulations enforced for the commercial banks.\n\n- Rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat/BPR) have limited scope of banking activities\ncompared to commercial bank. Activities of rural banks are specified in the\nLaw No. 7/1992 as amended by the Law Number 10/1998 concerning Banking. However,\nin general, the regulations for rural banks encompass prudential aspects, including\ninstitutional and licensing requirements, accounting and reporting standards, and\nproducts and activities. Regulatory framework and reporting requirements for rural banks\nare simplified compared to commercial banks. Rural banks are excluded from market risk\nand legal risk related requirements. These banks are not connected to the payment and\nclearing system and they are restricted in the scope of their operations (i.e., lending in\nforeign currency, equity participation, opening new branches, etc.).\n\n- The regulation framework for microfinance institutions (MFIs) is similar to banks with a\nsimpler approach. MFIs are regulated and supervised by the Non-bank Financial\nInstitution Directorate of the OJK. The regulation for MFI encompasses the prudential\naspect, institutional and licensing, accounting, and reporting standards, and product and\nactivities. The share of MFIs in the total financial system assets is negligible at around\n0.01 percent.\n\n- Islamic banks provide financial services in accordance with Shariah principles. As of\nDecember 2020, there are 14 Islamic commercial banks and 163 Islamic rural banks\n\n\n**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.24000549316406, 72.239990234375, 539.760009765625, 131.8800048828125], "columns": 5, "rows": 4}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Venture capital 61 19 0.13 0.16 \n\n Insurance brokers 160 9 0.06 0.08 \n Reinsurance brokers 42 5 0.03 0.04 \n Peer to peer lending 149 4 0.02 0.03 \n\n1/ Excluding subsidiaries of state-owned banks.\n\n15. The DTs sector comprises commercial banks, rural banks, microfinance institutions,\ncredit unions and credit cooperatives:\n\n- Commercial banks are licensed by the OJK for mobilizing funds from the public in the\nform of deposits and channeling them to the public in the form of credit and/or other\nforms. In accordance with the Law No. 7/1992 concerning banking as amended by Law\nNo. 10/1998, all banks in Indonesia accept deposits. The commercial banks have sizeable\noverseas activities. Cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities account\nfor 3.04 percent and 8.92 percent of total claims and total liabilities respectively.\n\n- There are 26 regional development banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah - BPD) operating\nin Indonesia. BPDs are established by the local provincial government with the purpose\nto boost regional development and providing financial services. BPDs are subject to the\nsame rules and regulations enforced for the commercial banks.\n\n- Rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat/BPR) have limited scope of banking activities\ncompared to commercial bank. Activities of rural banks are specified in the\nLaw No. 7/1992 as amended by the Law Number 10/1998 concerning Banking. However,\nin general, the regulations for rural banks encompass prudential aspects, including\ninstitutional and licensing requirements, accounting and reporting standards, and\nproducts and activities. Regulatory framework and reporting requirements for rural banks\nare simplified compared to commercial banks. Rural banks are excluded from market risk\nand legal risk related requirements. These banks are not connected to the payment and\nclearing system and they are restricted in the scope of their operations (i.e., lending in\nforeign currency, equity participation, opening new branches, etc.).\n\n- The regulation framework for microfinance institutions (MFIs) is similar to banks with a\nsimpler approach. MFIs are regulated and supervised by the Non-bank Financial\nInstitution Directorate of the OJK. The regulation for MFI encompasses the prudential\naspect, institutional and licensing, accounting, and reporting standards, and product and\nactivities. The share of MFIs in the total financial system assets is negligible at around\n0.01 percent.\n\n- Islamic banks provide financial services in accordance with Shariah principles. As of\nDecember 2020, there are 14 Islamic commercial banks and 163 Islamic rural banks\n\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2256}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\noperating in Indonesia. 2F [3] Total assets of Shariah compliant banks are IDR 399.8 trillion,\n4.3 percent of the total assets of the commercial banks. Islamic rural banks constitute less\nthan 10 percent of the rural banks’ assets.\n\n- According to the latest data reported to the IMF’s Financial Access Survey, more than\n12,000 credit unions and credit cooperatives were operating in Indonesia as of 2014. 3F [4]\nCredit unions and credit cooperatives are owned and controlled by their members. By\nopening a deposit account at a credit union, an individual becomes a member—and\npartial owner—of the credit union, participating in its equity. The OJK does not collect\ndata on the number and size of the credit unions and credit cooperatives.\n\n**16.** **Currently there are no DTs in receivership or liquidation in Indonesia** . The _2019_ _FSIs_\n_Guide_ recommends including DTs in distress if they hold significant positions and to compile FSIs\nboth including and excluding these DTs.\n\n**17.** **The OFCs subsector includes ICs, PFs, MMFs** 4F **[5]** **and other types of financial institutions.**\n\n - Insurance corporations provide financial benefits to policyholders through risk-sharing and\nrisk-transfer contracts. As of December 2020, there were 59 life insurance, 84 non-life\ninsurance and reinsurance companies operating in Indonesia. Insurance companies\nconstitute 6.5 percent of the financial system assets.\n\n - The pension funds subsector consists of autonomous pension funds that are separate\nfunds (i.e., separate institutional units) established for purposes of providing incomes on\nretirement for specific groups of employees which are organized, and directed, by private\nor public employers or jointly by the employers and their employees. There are 219\npension funds operating in Indonesia. The total size of the pension funds is relatively small\nconstituting 2.6 percent of the financial system assets.\n\n - Other financial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries consist of institutions such as leasing\ncompanies, brokers, and venture capital and infrastructure financing companies. Other\nfinancial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries constitute around 12.7 percent of the\nfinancial system. There are also mandatory insurance and social insurance companies\noperating in Indonesia, which do not function like insurers by constituting reserves and\ncharging premiums proportional to the cost of the service provided. Therefore, they are\nnot included in the ICs subsector.\n\n\n3 Three government-controlled Islamic commercial banks (ICB) merged on Feb 1, 2021 into one ICB (PT Bank\nSyariah Indonesia). Hence, there are 12 ICBs operating in Indonesia since Feb 2021.\n\n4 The data were not provided after 2014.\n\n5 Money market funds (MMFs) are collective investment schemes that raise funds by issuing shares or units to the\npublic. For an investment fund to be recognized as an MMF, there needs to be (1) a certain degree of capital\ncertainty (reliable store of value); and (2) the possibility to withdraw funds immediately or on short notice. If the\nconditions above are not met, the institution is not classified as an MMF but as a non‑MMF investment fund.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\noperating in Indonesia. 2F [3] Total assets of Shariah compliant banks are IDR 399.8 trillion,\n4.3 percent of the total assets of the commercial banks. Islamic rural banks constitute less\nthan 10 percent of the rural banks’ assets.\n\n- According to the latest data reported to the IMF’s Financial Access Survey, more than\n12,000 credit unions and credit cooperatives were operating in Indonesia as of 2014. 3F [4]\nCredit unions and credit cooperatives are owned and controlled by their members. By\nopening a deposit account at a credit union, an individual becomes a member—and\npartial owner—of the credit union, participating in its equity. The OJK does not collect\ndata on the number and size of the credit unions and credit cooperatives.\n\n16. Currently there are no DTs in receivership or liquidation in Indonesia . The _2019_ _FSIs_\n_Guide_ recommends including DTs in distress if they hold significant positions and to compile FSIs\nboth including and excluding these DTs.\n\n17. The OFCs subsector includes ICs, PFs, MMFs 4F [5] and other types of financial institutions.\n\n - Insurance corporations provide financial benefits to policyholders through risk-sharing and\nrisk-transfer contracts. As of December 2020, there were 59 life insurance, 84 non-life\ninsurance and reinsurance companies operating in Indonesia. Insurance companies\nconstitute 6.5 percent of the financial system assets.\n\n - The pension funds subsector consists of autonomous pension funds that are separate\nfunds (i.e., separate institutional units) established for purposes of providing incomes on\nretirement for specific groups of employees which are organized, and directed, by private\nor public employers or jointly by the employers and their employees. There are 219\npension funds operating in Indonesia. The total size of the pension funds is relatively small\nconstituting 2.6 percent of the financial system assets.\n\n - Other financial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries consist of institutions such as leasing\ncompanies, brokers, and venture capital and infrastructure financing companies. Other\nfinancial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries constitute around 12.7 percent of the\nfinancial system. There are also mandatory insurance and social insurance companies\noperating in Indonesia, which do not function like insurers by constituting reserves and\ncharging premiums proportional to the cost of the service provided. Therefore, they are\nnot included in the ICs subsector.\n\n3 Three government-controlled Islamic commercial banks (ICB) merged on Feb 1, 2021 into one ICB (PT Bank\nSyariah Indonesia). Hence, there are 12 ICBs operating in Indonesia since Feb 2021.\n\n4 The data were not provided after 2014.\n\n5 Money market funds (MMFs) are collective investment schemes that raise funds by issuing shares or units to the\npublic. For an investment fund to be recognized as an MMF, there needs to be (1) a certain degree of capital\ncertainty (reliable store of value); and (2) the possibility to withdraw funds immediately or on short notice. If the\nconditions above are not met, the institution is not classified as an MMF but as a non‑MMF investment fund.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11", "text_characters": 2690}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**A. Consolidation Basis and Institutional Coverage**\n\n**18.** **FSIs for DTs are compiled using unconsolidated data** . This approach covers resident\ndomestically controlled and foreign controlled DTs, with their domestic and overseas branches.\nThe FSIs data also include the branches in Indonesia of DTs that are incorporated abroad.\nHowever, foreign deposit taking and foreign and domestic non-deposit taking financial\nsubsidiaries of domestically incorporated DTs are excluded from the reporting sample. Also,\nintra-group adjustments are not undertaken. Given the size and complexity of the DTs sector, the\nmission recommended the OJK to compile the FSIs on a “cross-border, cross-sector, domestically\nincorporated” (CBCSDI) basis.\n\n**19.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends that DT’s data be compiled on a (CBCSDI) basis.**\n_Consolidated group reporting_ by a resident DT includes coverage of its own activities and those of\nits branches and financial subsidiaries (except ICs), with any transactions and positions among\nthese entities eliminated on consolidation. Such an approach is an essential element of banking\nsupervision and is adopted to preserve the integrity of capital in DTs by eliminating double\ncounting of capital (double gearing), and to avoid the double counting of income and assets\narising from the intra-group activity of DTs. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ also recognizes a second option,\nthe “domestic location” DL basis as an alternative, for countries with DTs that have (i) very few or\nno foreign branches or subsidiaries, and (ii) very few or no cross-sector subsidiaries. The OJK staff\nnoted that while consolidated data are available (i.e., consolidated balance sheet, consolidated\nincome and expense statement and consolidated data for prudential regulations) granularity of\nconsolidated reporting is not sufficient to produce the underlying FSIs data, including the\ncounterparty level data. Also, the OJK does not have data on the number and size of the DT’s\nforeign deposit taking or non-deposit taking financial subsidiaries.\n\n**20.** **FSIs for DTs cover 109 domestically incorporated commercial banks, including**\n**foreign bank branches** . The remainder of the subsector that is not covered includes rural banks,\nMFIs, and credit unions and credit cooperatives. The OJK staff mentioned that the number of the\nrural banks has been decreasing in the recent years and the size of the MFSs is negligible. Rural\nbanks and MFIs that meet the definition of DTs are not included in the FSIs compilation due to\ntheir relatively small asset size (1.41 percent and 0.01 percent of the total assets of the financial\nsystem, respectively). The mission advised the OJK staff to continue closely monitoring trends in\nthe size of the rural banks and consider covering them in the FSIs should their significance\nincrease. The mission also highlighted the importance of collecting data on the number and size\nof the credit unions and credit cooperatives, in order to comprehensively assess financial stability\nrisks.\n\n\n**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nA. Consolidation Basis and Institutional Coverage\n\n18. FSIs for DTs are compiled using unconsolidated data . This approach covers resident\ndomestically controlled and foreign controlled DTs, with their domestic and overseas branches.\nThe FSIs data also include the branches in Indonesia of DTs that are incorporated abroad.\nHowever, foreign deposit taking and foreign and domestic non-deposit taking financial\nsubsidiaries of domestically incorporated DTs are excluded from the reporting sample. Also,\nintra-group adjustments are not undertaken. Given the size and complexity of the DTs sector, the\nmission recommended the OJK to compile the FSIs on a “cross-border, cross-sector, domestically\nincorporated” (CBCSDI) basis.\n\n19. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends that DT’s data be compiled on a (CBCSDI) basis.\n_Consolidated group reporting_ by a resident DT includes coverage of its own activities and those of\nits branches and financial subsidiaries (except ICs), with any transactions and positions among\nthese entities eliminated on consolidation. Such an approach is an essential element of banking\nsupervision and is adopted to preserve the integrity of capital in DTs by eliminating double\ncounting of capital (double gearing), and to avoid the double counting of income and assets\narising from the intra-group activity of DTs. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ also recognizes a second option,\nthe “domestic location” DL basis as an alternative, for countries with DTs that have (i) very few or\nno foreign branches or subsidiaries, and (ii) very few or no cross-sector subsidiaries. The OJK staff\nnoted that while consolidated data are available (i.e., consolidated balance sheet, consolidated\nincome and expense statement and consolidated data for prudential regulations) granularity of\nconsolidated reporting is not sufficient to produce the underlying FSIs data, including the\ncounterparty level data. Also, the OJK does not have data on the number and size of the DT’s\nforeign deposit taking or non-deposit taking financial subsidiaries.\n\n20. FSIs for DTs cover 109 domestically incorporated commercial banks, including\nforeign bank branches . The remainder of the subsector that is not covered includes rural banks,\nMFIs, and credit unions and credit cooperatives. The OJK staff mentioned that the number of the\nrural banks has been decreasing in the recent years and the size of the MFSs is negligible. Rural\nbanks and MFIs that meet the definition of DTs are not included in the FSIs compilation due to\ntheir relatively small asset size (1.41 percent and 0.01 percent of the total assets of the financial\nsystem, respectively). The mission advised the OJK staff to continue closely monitoring trends in\nthe size of the rural banks and consider covering them in the FSIs should their significance\nincrease. The mission also highlighted the importance of collecting data on the number and size\nof the credit unions and credit cooperatives, in order to comprehensively assess financial stability\nrisks.\n\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2622}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**21.** **Recommendation:**\n\n - _The OJK to compile FSIs on a CBCSDI consolidation basis._\n\n\n**B. Accounting and Regulatory Frameworks Underlying the FSI Data**\n\n**22.** **Pursuant to BI Regulation No. 8/12/PBI/2006 on Commercial Banks’ Periodic**\n**Reports, banks are required to submit reports through the integrated reporting system of**\n**the BI.** 5F [6] The BI Regulation No 21/9/PBI/2019 on Integrated Commercial Bank Reporting replaced\nthe above regulation and is effective as of June 2021. Also, the OJK Regulation No.\n12/POJK.03/2019 on Commercial Bank Reporting and the OJK Regulation No. 63/POJK.03/2020\non Commercial Bank Reporting require commercial banks to submit reports as requested by the\nOJK.\n\n**23.** **Financial Accounting Standards Board (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan -**\n**DSAK) under the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia - IAI) sets**\n**the accounting standards in Indonesia** . Pursuant to the Law No. 40/2007 concerning limited\nliability company, both public and private companies must comply with accounting standards\nissued by the DSAK-IAI. Indonesia National Accounting Standards (SAK) are adopted from the\nIFRS. Indonesia’s approach to the IFRS implementation is to maintain one-year difference with\nthe IFRS as issued by the IASB. As of January 2020, Indonesia started implementing the IFRS 9\nstandard.\n\n**24.** **Rural banks apply Indonesian Accounting Standard for Non-Publicly Accountable**\n**Entities set by DSAK-IAI.** The DSAK-IAI has also issued Exposure Draft of Indonesian\nAccounting Standard Private Entities which refers to IFRS for small and medium size enterprises\nand will replace Indonesian Accounting Standard for Non-Publicly Accountable Entities.\n\n**25.** **Indonesia implements the IFRS 9 and a prudential asset classification and**\n**provisioning regulation simultaneously.** 6F **[7]** The OJK Regulation No 40/POJK.03/2019 on Quality\nAssessment of Asset for Commercial Banks that came into effect on January 1, 2020 sets the\nasset classification rules for commercial banks. Credit quality is determined based on business\nprospects, debtor performance, and ability to pay. Commercial banks are required to set aside a\n\n\n6 Other relevant regulations include BI Regulation No 10/40/PBI/2008 on Commercial Banks’ Monthly Reports, BI\nRegulation No 13/8/PBI/2011 on Commercial Banks’ Daily Reports, BI Regulation No 14/12/PBI/2012 on\nCommercial Banks’ Head Offices Reports, and BI Regulation No 15/4/PBI/2013 on Monetary Stability and\nFinancial System of Sharia Commercial Banks and Sharia Business Units Monthly Reports.\n\n7 General and specific provisions should be set aside based on the maximum requirement introduced by IFRS 9\nand the prudential provisioning regulation. The OJK staff noted that the average provisioning requirement under\nIFRS 9 is around 60 percent higher compared to that of the prudential regulation. Should IFRS 9 provisions fall\nshort of the prudential requirements, the banks are required to deduct the difference from Tier-1 capital.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **13**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n21. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to compile FSIs on a CBCSDI consolidation basis._\n\nB. Accounting and Regulatory Frameworks Underlying the FSI Data\n\n22. Pursuant to BI Regulation No. 8/12/PBI/2006 on Commercial Banks’ Periodic\nReports, banks are required to submit reports through the integrated reporting system of\nthe BI. 5F [6] The BI Regulation No 21/9/PBI/2019 on Integrated Commercial Bank Reporting replaced\nthe above regulation and is effective as of June 2021. Also, the OJK Regulation No.\n12/POJK.03/2019 on Commercial Bank Reporting and the OJK Regulation No. 63/POJK.03/2020\non Commercial Bank Reporting require commercial banks to submit reports as requested by the\nOJK.\n\n23. Financial Accounting Standards Board (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan -\nDSAK) under the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia - IAI) sets\nthe accounting standards in Indonesia . Pursuant to the Law No. 40/2007 concerning limited\nliability company, both public and private companies must comply with accounting standards\nissued by the DSAK-IAI. Indonesia National Accounting Standards (SAK) are adopted from the\nIFRS. Indonesia’s approach to the IFRS implementation is to maintain one-year difference with\nthe IFRS as issued by the IASB. As of January 2020, Indonesia started implementing the IFRS 9\nstandard.\n\n24. Rural banks apply Indonesian Accounting Standard for Non-Publicly Accountable\nEntities set by DSAK-IAI. The DSAK-IAI has also issued Exposure Draft of Indonesian\nAccounting Standard Private Entities which refers to IFRS for small and medium size enterprises\nand will replace Indonesian Accounting Standard for Non-Publicly Accountable Entities.\n\n25. Indonesia implements the IFRS 9 and a prudential asset classification and\nprovisioning regulation simultaneously. 6F [7] The OJK Regulation No 40/POJK.03/2019 on Quality\nAssessment of Asset for Commercial Banks that came into effect on January 1, 2020 sets the\nasset classification rules for commercial banks. Credit quality is determined based on business\nprospects, debtor performance, and ability to pay. Commercial banks are required to set aside a\n\n6 Other relevant regulations include BI Regulation No 10/40/PBI/2008 on Commercial Banks’ Monthly Reports, BI\nRegulation No 13/8/PBI/2011 on Commercial Banks’ Daily Reports, BI Regulation No 14/12/PBI/2012 on\nCommercial Banks’ Head Offices Reports, and BI Regulation No 15/4/PBI/2013 on Monetary Stability and\nFinancial System of Sharia Commercial Banks and Sharia Business Units Monthly Reports.\n\n7 General and specific provisions should be set aside based on the maximum requirement introduced by IFRS 9\nand the prudential provisioning regulation. The OJK staff noted that the average provisioning requirement under\nIFRS 9 is around 60 percent higher compared to that of the prudential regulation. Should IFRS 9 provisions fall\nshort of the prudential requirements, the banks are required to deduct the difference from Tier-1 capital.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13", "text_characters": 2564}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nminimum provisioning rate of 1 percent and 5 percent for assets under ‘Standard’ and ‘Special\nMention’ categories respectively.\n\n**26.** **Loans are classified as nonperforming when one or more contractual payments of**\n**interest or principal are past due for 90 days or more** . Delay on payment (90 days rule) is only\none of the criteria in classifying a loan or other assets as NPLs or nonperforming assets.\nClassification of assets is based on business prospects, performance of the debtors, and\nrepayment capability. NPLs must be classified in accordance with the “Substandard”, “Doubtful”\nand “Loss” categories 7F [8] . Minimum specific provisioning requirements of 15, 50 and 100 percent\nneed to be set aside for “Substandard”, “Doubtful”, and “Loss” categories respectively.\n\n**27.** **Valuation of financial assets follow national implementation of IFRS 9** . The\naccounting principles for the recognition and measurement of financial assets and liabilities\ndiscussed in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ follow IFRS 9, with valuation corresponding to the IFRS concept\nof measurement.\n\n**28.** **The Indonesian risk-based capital framework applies to all commercial banks.**\nHowever, as discussed in the following paragraphs some requirements apply to a smaller group\nof banks. Indonesia has been implementing the Basel-III standards for the definition of capital,\nminimum capital requirements, capital buffers, leverage ratio and liquidity requirements (i.e.\nliquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio).\n\n**29.** **In line with the deferral of Basel III implementation by the Basel Committee on**\n**Banking Supervision (BCBS) to increase operational capacity of banks and supervisors to**\n**respond to Covid-19, Indonesia has not started implementing the Basel III standards**\n**finalized in December 2017.** These standards include revised standardized approach for credit\nrisk, revised operational risk framework and revised market risk framework. The OJK is planning\nto start implementation in 2023.\n\n**30.** **The OJK published Regulation No. 11/POJK.03/2016 to implement Basel III capital**\n**adequacy framework** . Indonesia has been implementing the minimum capital requirements\nbased on CET-1, Tier 1, and total capital ratios. The Basel framework does not apply to rural\nbanks. Banks are required to satisfy a minimum capital adequacy of 4.5 percent, 6 percent, and\n8 percent for CET-1, Tier-1 and total regulatory capital, respectively. Additionally, banks are\nrequired to satisfy minimum capital requirements based on their risk profiles, both individually\nand on a consolidated basis (Table 3). In accordance with the OJK Regulation No.\n5/POJK.03/2015 on Minimum Capital Requirement and Fulfillment of Minimum Core Capital for\nRural Banks, rural banks are obliged to maintain capital adequacy ratio at least 12 percent of risk\nweighted assets (RWAs). The regulatory regime followed by Islamic banks is similar to the Basel\nframework. Where there are differences, due to the unique characteristics of Islamic banks\n\n\n8 Further details of these categories can be found in the metadata page for Indonesia on the IMF’s FSIs website:\n[https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61404865](https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61404865)\n\n\n**14** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nminimum provisioning rate of 1 percent and 5 percent for assets under ‘Standard’ and ‘Special\nMention’ categories respectively.\n\n26. Loans are classified as nonperforming when one or more contractual payments of\ninterest or principal are past due for 90 days or more . Delay on payment (90 days rule) is only\none of the criteria in classifying a loan or other assets as NPLs or nonperforming assets.\nClassification of assets is based on business prospects, performance of the debtors, and\nrepayment capability. NPLs must be classified in accordance with the “Substandard”, “Doubtful”\nand “Loss” categories 7F [8] . Minimum specific provisioning requirements of 15, 50 and 100 percent\nneed to be set aside for “Substandard”, “Doubtful”, and “Loss” categories respectively.\n\n27. Valuation of financial assets follow national implementation of IFRS 9 . The\naccounting principles for the recognition and measurement of financial assets and liabilities\ndiscussed in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ follow IFRS 9, with valuation corresponding to the IFRS concept\nof measurement.\n\n28. The Indonesian risk-based capital framework applies to all commercial banks.\nHowever, as discussed in the following paragraphs some requirements apply to a smaller group\nof banks. Indonesia has been implementing the Basel-III standards for the definition of capital,\nminimum capital requirements, capital buffers, leverage ratio and liquidity requirements (i.e.\nliquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio).\n\n29. In line with the deferral of Basel III implementation by the Basel Committee on\nBanking Supervision (BCBS) to increase operational capacity of banks and supervisors to\nrespond to Covid-19, Indonesia has not started implementing the Basel III standards\nfinalized in December 2017. These standards include revised standardized approach for credit\nrisk, revised operational risk framework and revised market risk framework. The OJK is planning\nto start implementation in 2023.\n\n30. The OJK published Regulation No. 11/POJK.03/2016 to implement Basel III capital\nadequacy framework . Indonesia has been implementing the minimum capital requirements\nbased on CET-1, Tier 1, and total capital ratios. The Basel framework does not apply to rural\nbanks. Banks are required to satisfy a minimum capital adequacy of 4.5 percent, 6 percent, and\n8 percent for CET-1, Tier-1 and total regulatory capital, respectively. Additionally, banks are\nrequired to satisfy minimum capital requirements based on their risk profiles, both individually\nand on a consolidated basis (Table 3). In accordance with the OJK Regulation No.\n5/POJK.03/2015 on Minimum Capital Requirement and Fulfillment of Minimum Core Capital for\nRural Banks, rural banks are obliged to maintain capital adequacy ratio at least 12 percent of risk\nweighted assets (RWAs). The regulatory regime followed by Islamic banks is similar to the Basel\nframework. Where there are differences, due to the unique characteristics of Islamic banks\n\n8 Further details of these categories can be found in the metadata page for Indonesia on the IMF’s FSIs website:\nhttps://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61404865\n\n14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2702}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n(e.g., profit-sharing investment accounts), the OJK follows the standards set by the Islamic\nFinancial Services Board.\n\n**Table 3. Minimum Capital Requirements Based on Risk Profile**\n\n|Risk profile|Minimum total capital requirement|\n|---|---|\n|
Level-1
|
8 percent
|\n|
Level-2
|
9 - 10 percent
|\n|
Level-3
|
10 - 11 percent
|\n|
Level-4 and Level 5
|
11 – 14 percent|\n\n\n\n**31.** **Commercial banks implement standardized approaches under Basel-II for the**\n**calculation of risk weighted assets** . All commercial banks use the standardized approach for\ncredit risk and market risk, and the basic indicators approach for operational risk. Banks are not\nusing modeling approaches for the calculation of risk weighted assets (i.e., internal ratings-based\napproach for credit risk, value at risk approach for market risk, and advanced measurement\napproach for operational risk).\n\n\n\n**32.** **Indonesia has completed a Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP)** 8F **[9]**\n**for risk-based capital standards in 2016.** Accordingly, risk-based capital standards were found\nto be largely compliant with the Basel standards. The credit risk component was considered\nmaterially non-compliant due to (i) a zero-risk weight assignment for all claims against the\n\n\n\nIndonesian government and the BI, regardless of the currency in which they are denominated or\n\n\n\nfunded, 9F [10] and (ii) the 50 percent risk weight applied to certain loans to employees and pensioners of\n\n\n\nstate-owned enterprises. 10F [11] Definition of regulatory capital (CET-1, Tier-1, Tier-2, supervisory\n\n\n\ndeductions) follows Basel-III definition.\n\n\n\n**33.** **Foreign bank branches (FBBs) are subject to Tier-1 and total regulatory capital**\n**requirements.** Tier-1 capital of the FBBs include current year profit and wholesale funds that\nmeet certain criteria and Tier-2 capital include provisions up to 1.25 percent of risk weighted\nassets.\n\n**34.** **The OJK implements a categorization approach, Commercial Banks Based on**\n**Business Activities (CBBA), to differentiate prudential regulatory requirements and scope**\n**of banking activities across banks** . Banks are assigned to one of four categories according to\nthe level of Tier 1 capital (Table 4). The OJK has issued the Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2020\nconcerning Consolidation of Commercial Banks aimed to strengthen the structure, resilience and\n\n\n9 The Basel Committee established a comprehensive Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) in\n2012 to monitor and assess the adoption and implementation of its standards. RCAP reports can be accessed\n[here: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm?m=3%7C14%7C656%7C60](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm?m=3%7C14%7C656%7C60)\n\n10 The Basel framework allows a zero-risk weight to be applied provided that these exposures are denominated\nand funded in domestic currency.\n\n11 Basel framework requires a 75 percent risk weight.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **15**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 135.1599884033203, 539.7999877929688, 207.68003845214844], "columns": 2, "rows": 5}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n(e.g., profit-sharing investment accounts), the OJK follows the standards set by the Islamic\nFinancial Services Board.\n\nTable 3. Minimum Capital Requirements Based on Risk Profile\n\n Risk profile Minimum total capital requirement \n\n Level-1 8 percent \n Level-2 9 - 10 percent \n Level-3 10 - 11 percent \n Level-4 and Level 5 11 – 14 percent \n\n31. Commercial banks implement standardized approaches under Basel-II for the\ncalculation of risk weighted assets . All commercial banks use the standardized approach for\ncredit risk and market risk, and the basic indicators approach for operational risk. Banks are not\nusing modeling approaches for the calculation of risk weighted assets (i.e., internal ratings-based\napproach for credit risk, value at risk approach for market risk, and advanced measurement\napproach for operational risk).\n\n32. Indonesia has completed a Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP) 8F [9]\nfor risk-based capital standards in 2016. Accordingly, risk-based capital standards were found\nto be largely compliant with the Basel standards. The credit risk component was considered\nmaterially non-compliant due to (i) a zero-risk weight assignment for all claims against the\n\nIndonesian government and the BI, regardless of the currency in which they are denominated or\n\nfunded, 9F [10] and (ii) the 50 percent risk weight applied to certain loans to employees and pensioners of\n\nstate-owned enterprises. 10F [11] Definition of regulatory capital (CET-1, Tier-1, Tier-2, supervisory\n\ndeductions) follows Basel-III definition.\n\n33. Foreign bank branches (FBBs) are subject to Tier-1 and total regulatory capital\nrequirements. Tier-1 capital of the FBBs include current year profit and wholesale funds that\nmeet certain criteria and Tier-2 capital include provisions up to 1.25 percent of risk weighted\nassets.\n\n34. The OJK implements a categorization approach, Commercial Banks Based on\nBusiness Activities (CBBA), to differentiate prudential regulatory requirements and scope\nof banking activities across banks . Banks are assigned to one of four categories according to\nthe level of Tier 1 capital (Table 4). The OJK has issued the Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2020\nconcerning Consolidation of Commercial Banks aimed to strengthen the structure, resilience and\n\n9 The Basel Committee established a comprehensive Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) in\n2012 to monitor and assess the adoption and implementation of its standards. RCAP reports can be accessed\nhere: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm?m=3%7C14%7C656%7C60\n\n10 The Basel framework allows a zero-risk weight to be applied provided that these exposures are denominated\nand funded in domestic currency.\n\n11 Basel framework requires a 75 percent risk weight.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 15", "text_characters": 2399}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\ncompetitiveness of the banking industry. Through that regulation, commercial banks are required\nto have at least IDR 3 Trillion of Tier 1 capital no later than December 31, 2022. Banks are allowed\nto meet this requirement gradually: (i) before December 31, 2020, banks must have at least IDR 1\nTrillion of Tier 1 Capital, (ii) before December 31, 2021, banks must have at least IDR 2 Trillion of\nTier 1 Capital.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Table 4. Commercial Commercial Banks Based on|Banks Based on Business Activities Framework Tier 1 capital|\n|---|---|\n|**Commercial Banks Based on**
**Business Activities**
|**Tier 1 capital**
|\n|
CBBA 1
|Tier 1 less than IDR 1 trillion
|\n|
CBBA 2
|
Tier 1 between IDR 1 trillion and IDR 5 trillion
|\n|
CBBA 3
|
Tier 1 between IDR 5 trillion and IDR 30 trillion
|\n|
CBBA 4
|
Tier 1 from IDR 30 trillion above|\n\n\n\n**35.** **In addition to the minimum capital requirements and in line with the**\n**implementation of Basel-III, banks are also required to maintain capital buffers as follows:**\n\ni. A capital conservation buffer requirement of 2.5 percent of RWAs. The capital\n\nconservation buffer only applies to CBBA 3 and CBBA 4 banks. Due to a relaxation\nmeasure for COVID-19, the capital conservation buffer imposed is 0 percent until\nMarch 31, 2022.\n\nii. A countercyclical capital buffer requirement, as a buffer to anticipate loss against an\n\nexcessive credit growth which may potentially disturb the financial system stability, is\nimplemented ranging from 0 percent - 2.5 percent of RWAs. Currently, the countercyclical\nbuffer is set to 0 percent.\n\niii. A capital buffer for Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) ranging from\n\n1 percent - 2.5 percent of RWAs. D-SIBs are classified into four groups with different\ncapital surcharge requirements (Table 5). There are currently 14 D-SIBs in Indonesia.\n\n**Table 5. D-SIB Capital Surcharge**\n\n|Buffer|Buffer Requirement Percent|\n|---|---|\n|Bucket 1|1|\n|Bucket 2|1.5|\n|Bucket 3|2|\n|Bucket 4
|2.5|\n\n\n\n**16** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 157.27572631835938, 539.7999877929688, 266.6000061035156], "columns": 2, "rows": 5}, {"bbox": [164.36000061035156, 546.2799682617188, 465.760009765625, 668.8400268554688], "columns": 2, "rows": 5}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\ncompetitiveness of the banking industry. Through that regulation, commercial banks are required\nto have at least IDR 3 Trillion of Tier 1 capital no later than December 31, 2022. Banks are allowed\nto meet this requirement gradually: (i) before December 31, 2020, banks must have at least IDR 1\nTrillion of Tier 1 Capital, (ii) before December 31, 2021, banks must have at least IDR 2 Trillion of\nTier 1 Capital.\n\n Table 4. Commercial Commercial Banks Based on Banks Based on Business Activities Framework Tier 1 capital \n\n Commercial Banks Based on Business Activities Tier 1 capital \n CBBA 1 Tier 1 less than IDR 1 trillion \n CBBA 2 Tier 1 between IDR 1 trillion and IDR 5 trillion \n CBBA 3 Tier 1 between IDR 5 trillion and IDR 30 trillion \n CBBA 4 Tier 1 from IDR 30 trillion above \n\n35. In addition to the minimum capital requirements and in line with the\nimplementation of Basel-III, banks are also required to maintain capital buffers as follows:\n\ni. A capital conservation buffer requirement of 2.5 percent of RWAs. The capital\n\nconservation buffer only applies to CBBA 3 and CBBA 4 banks. Due to a relaxation\nmeasure for COVID-19, the capital conservation buffer imposed is 0 percent until\nMarch 31, 2022.\n\nii. A countercyclical capital buffer requirement, as a buffer to anticipate loss against an\n\nexcessive credit growth which may potentially disturb the financial system stability, is\nimplemented ranging from 0 percent - 2.5 percent of RWAs. Currently, the countercyclical\nbuffer is set to 0 percent.\n\niii. A capital buffer for Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) ranging from\n\n1 percent - 2.5 percent of RWAs. D-SIBs are classified into four groups with different\ncapital surcharge requirements (Table 5). There are currently 14 D-SIBs in Indonesia.\n\nTable 5. D-SIB Capital Surcharge\n\n Buffer Buffer Requirement Percent \n\n Bucket 1 1 \n Bucket 2 1.5 \n Bucket 3 2 \n Bucket 4 2.5 \n\n16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1593}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**36.** **The OJK Regulation No. 31/POJK.03/2019 on Leverage Ratio Requirement for**\n**Commercial Banks require a 3 percent minimum leverage ratio to be maintained by**\n**commercial banks** . The leverage ratio is defined as Tier 1 capital/Total exposure measure as\ndefined in Basel III. Total exposure consists of all balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet\nexposures. Leverage ratio reporting to the OJK started as of 2020Q4. Leverage ratio regulation is\nnot implemented for the Islamic banks.\n\n**37.** **Large exposures are defined as the sum of all exposure values of a DT to a**\n**counterparty or to a group of connected counterparties, if it is equal to or above**\n**10 percent of the DT’s Tier-1 capital** . The OJK implemented the large exposures Basel standard\n(the supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures—April 2014) via the\nregulation No. 32/POJK.03/2018 starting from 2019. Large exposures framework applies to all\nconventional commercial banks including foreign banks. Islamic banks are excluded. The OJK is\nworking on a draft to implement large exposures framework for Islamic banks.\n\n**38.** **The OJK has implemented the Basel-III liquidity coverage ratio and net stable**\n**funding ratio standards** . The Indonesian framework for liquidity coverage ratio 11F [12] (LCR) and net\nstable funding ratio 12F [13] (NSFR) apply to CBBA 3, CBBA 4, and foreign banks. 13F [14] Islamic banks are\nexcluded from LCR and NSFR prudential measures. Indonesia is assessed as compliant with the\nLCR and NSFR Basel standards in the RCAPs conducted in 2016 and 2020, respectively. Banks are\nsubjected to 100 percent minimum LCR and NSFR requirements.\n\n**39.** **In addition to the LCR and NSFR ratios, commercial banks in Indonesia are required**\n**to report two liquidity ratios, namely, liquid assets to non-core deposit ratio and liquid**\n**assets to third party funds ratio** . For the purpose of these indicators, liquid assets are defined\nas cash, placements in the central bank (excluding reserve requirements, macroprudential\nintermediation ratio requirement and macroprudential liquidity buffer requirement) and\ngovernment bonds in domestic and foreign currency.\n\n**40.** **In accordance with the BI Regulation No. 7/37/PBI/2005, commercial banks are**\n**required to manage and maintain the net open position in foreign exchange ratio** . Net\nopen position in foreign exchange ratio (both on balance sheet and total ratios) at the end of\neach working day should be no more than 20 percent of the capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital). The\noverall net open position is the sum of the absolute values of the (i) the net difference between\nassets and liabilities recorded on balance sheet for all foreign currencies; and (ii) the net\n\n\n12 Adopted through the regulation No. POJK No. 42/POJK.03/2015.\n\n13 Adopted through regulation No. POJK No 50/POJK.03/2017.\n\n14 The foreign bank category refers to (i) branch offices of banks domiciled overseas; (ii) commercial banks in the\nform of an Indonesian legal entity with more than 50 percent of their shares owned by foreign citizens and/or\nforeign legal entities, both individually or jointly; and (iii) banks that are less than 50 percent owned, either\nindividually or jointly, by foreign citizens and/or foreign legal entities but are controlled by these foreign citizens\nand/or foreign legal entities.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **17**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n36. The OJK Regulation No. 31/POJK.03/2019 on Leverage Ratio Requirement for\nCommercial Banks require a 3 percent minimum leverage ratio to be maintained by\ncommercial banks . The leverage ratio is defined as Tier 1 capital/Total exposure measure as\ndefined in Basel III. Total exposure consists of all balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet\nexposures. Leverage ratio reporting to the OJK started as of 2020Q4. Leverage ratio regulation is\nnot implemented for the Islamic banks.\n\n37. Large exposures are defined as the sum of all exposure values of a DT to a\ncounterparty or to a group of connected counterparties, if it is equal to or above\n10 percent of the DT’s Tier-1 capital . The OJK implemented the large exposures Basel standard\n(the supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures—April 2014) via the\nregulation No. 32/POJK.03/2018 starting from 2019. Large exposures framework applies to all\nconventional commercial banks including foreign banks. Islamic banks are excluded. The OJK is\nworking on a draft to implement large exposures framework for Islamic banks.\n\n38. The OJK has implemented the Basel-III liquidity coverage ratio and net stable\nfunding ratio standards . The Indonesian framework for liquidity coverage ratio 11F [12] (LCR) and net\nstable funding ratio 12F [13] (NSFR) apply to CBBA 3, CBBA 4, and foreign banks. 13F [14] Islamic banks are\nexcluded from LCR and NSFR prudential measures. Indonesia is assessed as compliant with the\nLCR and NSFR Basel standards in the RCAPs conducted in 2016 and 2020, respectively. Banks are\nsubjected to 100 percent minimum LCR and NSFR requirements.\n\n39. In addition to the LCR and NSFR ratios, commercial banks in Indonesia are required\nto report two liquidity ratios, namely, liquid assets to non-core deposit ratio and liquid\nassets to third party funds ratio . For the purpose of these indicators, liquid assets are defined\nas cash, placements in the central bank (excluding reserve requirements, macroprudential\nintermediation ratio requirement and macroprudential liquidity buffer requirement) and\ngovernment bonds in domestic and foreign currency.\n\n40. In accordance with the BI Regulation No. 7/37/PBI/2005, commercial banks are\nrequired to manage and maintain the net open position in foreign exchange ratio . Net\nopen position in foreign exchange ratio (both on balance sheet and total ratios) at the end of\neach working day should be no more than 20 percent of the capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital). The\noverall net open position is the sum of the absolute values of the (i) the net difference between\nassets and liabilities recorded on balance sheet for all foreign currencies; and (ii) the net\n\n12 Adopted through the regulation No. POJK No. 42/POJK.03/2015.\n\n13 Adopted through regulation No. POJK No 50/POJK.03/2017.\n\n14 The foreign bank category refers to (i) branch offices of banks domiciled overseas; (ii) commercial banks in the\nform of an Indonesian legal entity with more than 50 percent of their shares owned by foreign citizens and/or\nforeign legal entities, both individually or jointly; and (iii) banks that are less than 50 percent owned, either\nindividually or jointly, by foreign citizens and/or foreign legal entities but are controlled by these foreign citizens\nand/or foreign legal entities.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17", "text_characters": 2816}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\ndifference between claims and liabilities, comprising both commitments and contingencies,\nrecorded in off balance sheet accounts for all foreign currencies, all expressed in Rupiahs.\n\n**C. Source Data**\n\n**41.** **The OJK receives source data from two different sources** . Commercial banks’\nunconsolidated monthly reports, including balance sheets and income statements, are collected\nthrough the BI’s Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System (Table 6). 14F [15] In addition, the OJK\ndirectly collects prudential reports on an unconsolidated and consolidated basis. Islamic banks’\ndata are mapped to commercial banks data by an automated system. The mapping follows the\napproach provided in Annex 7.4 of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Table 6. Source Data Collection|Compilation and processing|\n|---|---|---|\n|
|**Collection**
|**Compilation and processing**
|\n|
Commercial banks’
monthly reports (Balance
Sheet & Income
Statement).
|
Bank Indonesia – Data
through Commercial Bank
Integrated Reporting System.
|
OJK – Department of Bank
Licensing and Banking
Information.
|\n|
Commercial banks’ micro
prudential reports (e.g.,
Regulatory Capital, LCR,
NSFR).
|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.
|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.
|\n|
Rural Banks (all reports).
|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.|OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.|\n\n\n**42.** **Operational and technical validations on the data are conducted automatically by**\n**the IT system.** Additionally, responsible departments check the data for validity and consistency.\nDepartments’ responsibilities for Coordinated Integrated Statistics Database are the following:\n\n\n\n\n- **Integrated Statistics Database:** Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group (GDST).\n\n- **Banking Data:** Banking Information Directorate, under Banking Licensing and Information\nDepartment.\n\n- **Capital Markets Data:** Capital Market Statistics and Information Directorate, under Capital\nMarket Supervision Department **.**\n\n- **OFC’s Data:** Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate, under NonBank Financial Industry Supervision Department **.**\n\n**43.** **Data used in the compilation of FSIs are reported on a monthly basis** . Monthly\nreports are due within 30 days of the end of the reporting period. The FSIs are reported to the\nIMF on a quarterly basis. The OJK does not plan to start monthly reporting to STA.\n\n\n15 The consolidated data collected through the Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System cover highly\naggregated balance sheet and income statement information on a quarterly basis.\n\n\n**18** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.19200134277344, 246.32052612304688, 539.8079833984375, 410.9599914550781], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\ndifference between claims and liabilities, comprising both commitments and contingencies,\nrecorded in off balance sheet accounts for all foreign currencies, all expressed in Rupiahs.\n\nC. Source Data\n\n41. The OJK receives source data from two different sources . Commercial banks’\nunconsolidated monthly reports, including balance sheets and income statements, are collected\nthrough the BI’s Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System (Table 6). 14F [15] In addition, the OJK\ndirectly collects prudential reports on an unconsolidated and consolidated basis. Islamic banks’\ndata are mapped to commercial banks data by an automated system. The mapping follows the\napproach provided in Annex 7.4 of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\n\n Col1 Table 6. Source Data Collection Compilation and processing \n\n Collection Compilation and processing \n Commercial banks’ monthly reports (Balance Sheet & Income Statement). Bank Indonesia – Data through Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System. OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information. \n Commercial banks’ micro prudential reports (e.g., Regulatory Capital, LCR, NSFR). OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information. OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information. \n Rural Banks (all reports). OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information. OJK – Department of Bank Licensing and Banking Information. \n\n42. Operational and technical validations on the data are conducted automatically by\nthe IT system. Additionally, responsible departments check the data for validity and consistency.\nDepartments’ responsibilities for Coordinated Integrated Statistics Database are the following:\n\n- Integrated Statistics Database: Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group (GDST).\n\n- Banking Data: Banking Information Directorate, under Banking Licensing and Information\nDepartment.\n\n- Capital Markets Data: Capital Market Statistics and Information Directorate, under Capital\nMarket Supervision Department .\n\n- OFC’s Data: Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate, under NonBank Financial Industry Supervision Department .\n\n43. Data used in the compilation of FSIs are reported on a monthly basis . Monthly\nreports are due within 30 days of the end of the reporting period. The FSIs are reported to the\nIMF on a quarterly basis. The OJK does not plan to start monthly reporting to STA.\n\n15 The consolidated data collected through the Commercial Bank Integrated Reporting System cover highly\naggregated balance sheet and income statement information on a quarterly basis.\n\n18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2228}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**D. Compilation Framework**\n\n**44.** **Indonesia is a timely reporter of FSIs.** The BI has been the main STA counterparty for\nthe reporting of FSIs. The FSIs related to DTs and OFCs were being compiled by the OJK and\nshared with the BI for reporting to STA. With a letter dated March 3, 2021, the OJK requested STA\nto acknowledge OJK’s GDST as the data-producing agent for the financial sector data in\nIndonesia. The mission informed the OJK staff that the Indonesian authorities need to agree on\nthe main counterparty to report the new FSIs to STA.\n\n**45.** **The mission developed compilation spreadsheets to derive FSIs from source data**\n**(aggregated income statement, balance sheet, and other supervisory series) for DTs** . This\nprocess involved mapping of historical data that were reported to the IMF to the FSI-SR\nreporting forms. Also, for the new series that are required with the implementation of the _2019_\n_FSIs Guide_, the mission discussed the mapping of source data to the FSI-SR report forms. The\nmapping of the income and expense statement, balance sheet, and supervisory data was\nconducted based on the methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . The compilation spreadsheets\nwere provided to the OJK which will ensure a smooth migration for the implementation of the\nnew FSI methodology.\n\n**46.** **The mission assisted the OJK in the compilation of 18 core and 12 additional FSIs**\n**for DTs and two additional FSIs relating to the size of OFCs subsectors** . The main differences\nbetween the existing FSIs compiled by the OJK and those developed during the mission stem\nfrom compilation methodologies. The FSIs compiled by the mission were based on the\nrecommended compilation methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\n\n**44. The mission also presented the Concentration and Distribution Measure (CDM) tool to**\n**the OJK staff** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ introduced CDMs for selected FSIs to provide critical\ninformation about financial system vulnerabilities not directly captured by aggregate data. The\nCDM tool aims to provide standard measures that can provide information on tail risks,\nconcentrations, and variations in distributions over time. The CDM tool can be downloaded from\nthe IMF’s FSIs website 15F [16] . The use of the CDM tool is especially important for Indonesia given the\nconsiderable variation across banks which may cause sectoral aggregates to be unrepresentative\nfor the whole banking system.\n\n**47.** **Recommendations:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to compile and report to the IMF the CDM indicators._\n\n\n - _The OJK to agree with the BI and inform STA on which institution will be the main_\n_counterparty to report the new FSIs to STA_ .\n\n\n[16 Available at https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Data/2019/cdm-tool.ashx.](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Data/2019/cdm-tool.ashx)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **19**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nD. Compilation Framework\n\n44. Indonesia is a timely reporter of FSIs. The BI has been the main STA counterparty for\nthe reporting of FSIs. The FSIs related to DTs and OFCs were being compiled by the OJK and\nshared with the BI for reporting to STA. With a letter dated March 3, 2021, the OJK requested STA\nto acknowledge OJK’s GDST as the data-producing agent for the financial sector data in\nIndonesia. The mission informed the OJK staff that the Indonesian authorities need to agree on\nthe main counterparty to report the new FSIs to STA.\n\n45. The mission developed compilation spreadsheets to derive FSIs from source data\n(aggregated income statement, balance sheet, and other supervisory series) for DTs . This\nprocess involved mapping of historical data that were reported to the IMF to the FSI-SR\nreporting forms. Also, for the new series that are required with the implementation of the _2019_\n_FSIs Guide_, the mission discussed the mapping of source data to the FSI-SR report forms. The\nmapping of the income and expense statement, balance sheet, and supervisory data was\nconducted based on the methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . The compilation spreadsheets\nwere provided to the OJK which will ensure a smooth migration for the implementation of the\nnew FSI methodology.\n\n46. The mission assisted the OJK in the compilation of 18 core and 12 additional FSIs\nfor DTs and two additional FSIs relating to the size of OFCs subsectors . The main differences\nbetween the existing FSIs compiled by the OJK and those developed during the mission stem\nfrom compilation methodologies. The FSIs compiled by the mission were based on the\nrecommended compilation methodology of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ .\n\n44. The mission also presented the Concentration and Distribution Measure (CDM) tool to\nthe OJK staff . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ introduced CDMs for selected FSIs to provide critical\ninformation about financial system vulnerabilities not directly captured by aggregate data. The\nCDM tool aims to provide standard measures that can provide information on tail risks,\nconcentrations, and variations in distributions over time. The CDM tool can be downloaded from\nthe IMF’s FSIs website 15F [16] . The use of the CDM tool is especially important for Indonesia given the\nconsiderable variation across banks which may cause sectoral aggregates to be unrepresentative\nfor the whole banking system.\n\n47. Recommendations:\n\n - _The OJK to compile and report to the IMF the CDM indicators._\n\n - _The OJK to agree with the BI and inform STA on which institution will be the main_\n_counterparty to report the new FSIs to STA_ .\n\n16 Available at https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Data/2019/cdm-tool.ashx.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 19", "text_characters": 2282}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**Income Statement**\n\n**48.** **Commercial banks are allowed to accrue interest on NPLs in line with the IFRS 9** 16F [17] .\nHowever, several banks apply a more prudential approach where accrued interest on NPLs is\nrecorded as off-balance sheet in contingencies and recognized as interest income using the\napproach on a cash basis. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends that interest accrued on\nnon-performing assets be credited to the provisions for accrual of interest on non-performing\nassets account rather than income. The provision account is reduced only when interest is\nactually paid (i.e., cash basis) and the amount is taken into income. The OJK confirmed that the\nsize of accrued interest on NPLs is negligible (around 0.3 percent of accrued interest) and will not\nhave significant effect on the income and expense statement and the respective FSIs.\n\n**49.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends that countries report other comprehensive**\n**income (OCI) as an additional line item in their income and expense statements** . Other\ncomprehensive income consists mainly of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses that are excluded\nfrom net income in the income statement as well as unrealized gains and losses in financial\ninstruments that are categorized under Fair Value Through Other Comprehensive Income\n(FVOCI). Other comprehensive income is not included in the monthly report forms. However\ncommercial banks in Indonesia report to the OJK other comprehensive income in their financial\nreports for quarterly publication. This is in line with the quarterly reporting of the FSIs to STA.\n\n**50.** **Recommendation:**\n\n - _The OJK to report other comprehensive income (OCI) data._\n\n\n**Balance Sheet**\n\n**51.** **In line with the recommendation of the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **,** **the mission mapped**\n**deposits with domestic and foreign banks on the asset side of the balance sheet to**\n**interbank loans** . This has a significant effect on the structure of the balance sheet and NPL\nfigures. The total amount transferred as of 2021Q1 is IDR 245 trillion.\n\n**52.** **Recommendation:**\n\n - _The OJK to report the deposits with domestic and foreign banks under interbank loans._\n\n\n**53.** **Consistent with the approach adopted in the** _**2019 FSIs Guide,**_ **the mission mapped**\n**provisions on performing loans and other assets to “General and Other Provisions” under**\n**liabilities in the new report forms** . Indonesia was covering general provisions as a deduction\nitem under “other assets” on the assets side of the balance sheet. This change increased the total\nsize of the DT’s balance sheet by 2.3 percent as of 2021Q1.\n\n\n17 Banks recognize interest income according to IFRS 9, implementing the concept of unwinding interest.\n\n\n**20** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nIncome Statement\n\n48. Commercial banks are allowed to accrue interest on NPLs in line with the IFRS 9 16F [17] .\nHowever, several banks apply a more prudential approach where accrued interest on NPLs is\nrecorded as off-balance sheet in contingencies and recognized as interest income using the\napproach on a cash basis. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends that interest accrued on\nnon-performing assets be credited to the provisions for accrual of interest on non-performing\nassets account rather than income. The provision account is reduced only when interest is\nactually paid (i.e., cash basis) and the amount is taken into income. The OJK confirmed that the\nsize of accrued interest on NPLs is negligible (around 0.3 percent of accrued interest) and will not\nhave significant effect on the income and expense statement and the respective FSIs.\n\n49. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends that countries report other comprehensive\nincome (OCI) as an additional line item in their income and expense statements . Other\ncomprehensive income consists mainly of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses that are excluded\nfrom net income in the income statement as well as unrealized gains and losses in financial\ninstruments that are categorized under Fair Value Through Other Comprehensive Income\n(FVOCI). Other comprehensive income is not included in the monthly report forms. However\ncommercial banks in Indonesia report to the OJK other comprehensive income in their financial\nreports for quarterly publication. This is in line with the quarterly reporting of the FSIs to STA.\n\n50. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to report other comprehensive income (OCI) data._\n\nBalance Sheet\n\n51. In line with the recommendation of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ , the mission mapped\ndeposits with domestic and foreign banks on the asset side of the balance sheet to\ninterbank loans . This has a significant effect on the structure of the balance sheet and NPL\nfigures. The total amount transferred as of 2021Q1 is IDR 245 trillion.\n\n52. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to report the deposits with domestic and foreign banks under interbank loans._\n\n53. Consistent with the approach adopted in the _2019 FSIs Guide,_ the mission mapped\nprovisions on performing loans and other assets to “General and Other Provisions” under\nliabilities in the new report forms . Indonesia was covering general provisions as a deduction\nitem under “other assets” on the assets side of the balance sheet. This change increased the total\nsize of the DT’s balance sheet by 2.3 percent as of 2021Q1.\n\n17 Banks recognize interest income according to IFRS 9, implementing the concept of unwinding interest.\n\n20 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2248}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**54.** **Th** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines specific provisions as provisions for loan losses that are**\n**set aside to cover identified NPLs** . In Indonesia specific provisions are calculated according to\nthe IFRS 9 lifetime expected losses framework. The IFRS 9 provisioning requirements are around\n60 percent larger than that of the prudential regulatory framework. In line with the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ recommendation, specific provisions are reported on the asset side as a deduction item\nfrom gross loans.\n\n\n**55.** **Recommendation** :\n\n - _The OJK to report general and other provisions on the liability side as required by the 2019_\n_FSIs Guide._\n\n\n**Supervisory series**\n\n_Regulatory Capital and Risk Weighted Assets (RWA)_\n\n\n**56.** **The capital adequacy ratios are calculated using the Basel-III definition for total**\n**regulatory capital and its subcomponents (CET-1, additional Tier 1 and Tier 2)** . As\nmentioned in the accounting and regulatory framework section of the report, in addition to\ndomestically incorporated commercial banks, foreign bank branches are also subject to minimum\ncapital requirements. However, the foreign bank branches are subject to a Tier 1 capital and total\ncapital requirement only (i.e., foreign bank branches are not subject to a CET-1 requirement).\nAccordingly, the reported CET-1 and additional tier 1 capital figures for the DTs sector do not\nadd up to total Tier 1 capital of the DTs (which also incorporates FBBs).\n\n\n**57.** **While the FBBs constitute around 5 percent of the DTs assets, their reported Tier-1**\n**capital is more than 12 percent of the reported Tier-1 capital of the DTs sector** . The\nregulatory capital rules implemented for the FBBs are not in line with the Basel III standards and\nthe size of the FBBs regulatory capital as defined under the OJK regulations has had the potential\nto significantly affect the sectoral aggregates (i.e., the capital adequacy of these institutions\nexceeding 50 percent which is much higher compared to the sectoral average) and hence\nconceal the financial vulnerabilities in the DTs sector. The CBCSDI consolidation basis also\nrequires exclusion of FBBs from the FSIs reporting.\n\n\n**58.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines supervisory deductions as those that are not already**\n**deducted from the corresponding regulatory capital components.** The mission identified an\nabrupt drop (i.e., to zero) in supervisory deductions in the historical data starting from 2018Q3\nthat was increasing the regulatory capital to RWAs significantly 17F [18] . The OJK staff is working on\nidentifying the source of the major change in the reporting.\n\n\n18 Supervisory deductions have 209 basis points effect on the regulatory capital to RWA ratio as of 2018Q2\n(i.e., the last reporting date for the supervisory deductions).\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **21**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n54. Th _2019 FSIs Guide_ defines specific provisions as provisions for loan losses that are\nset aside to cover identified NPLs . In Indonesia specific provisions are calculated according to\nthe IFRS 9 lifetime expected losses framework. The IFRS 9 provisioning requirements are around\n60 percent larger than that of the prudential regulatory framework. In line with the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ recommendation, specific provisions are reported on the asset side as a deduction item\nfrom gross loans.\n\n55. Recommendation :\n\n - _The OJK to report general and other provisions on the liability side as required by the 2019_\n_FSIs Guide._\n\nSupervisory series\n\n_Regulatory Capital and Risk Weighted Assets (RWA)_\n\n56. The capital adequacy ratios are calculated using the Basel-III definition for total\nregulatory capital and its subcomponents (CET-1, additional Tier 1 and Tier 2) . As\nmentioned in the accounting and regulatory framework section of the report, in addition to\ndomestically incorporated commercial banks, foreign bank branches are also subject to minimum\ncapital requirements. However, the foreign bank branches are subject to a Tier 1 capital and total\ncapital requirement only (i.e., foreign bank branches are not subject to a CET-1 requirement).\nAccordingly, the reported CET-1 and additional tier 1 capital figures for the DTs sector do not\nadd up to total Tier 1 capital of the DTs (which also incorporates FBBs).\n\n57. While the FBBs constitute around 5 percent of the DTs assets, their reported Tier-1\ncapital is more than 12 percent of the reported Tier-1 capital of the DTs sector . The\nregulatory capital rules implemented for the FBBs are not in line with the Basel III standards and\nthe size of the FBBs regulatory capital as defined under the OJK regulations has had the potential\nto significantly affect the sectoral aggregates (i.e., the capital adequacy of these institutions\nexceeding 50 percent which is much higher compared to the sectoral average) and hence\nconceal the financial vulnerabilities in the DTs sector. The CBCSDI consolidation basis also\nrequires exclusion of FBBs from the FSIs reporting.\n\n58. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ defines supervisory deductions as those that are not already\ndeducted from the corresponding regulatory capital components. The mission identified an\nabrupt drop (i.e., to zero) in supervisory deductions in the historical data starting from 2018Q3\nthat was increasing the regulatory capital to RWAs significantly 17F [18] . The OJK staff is working on\nidentifying the source of the major change in the reporting.\n\n18 Supervisory deductions have 209 basis points effect on the regulatory capital to RWA ratio as of 2018Q2\n(i.e., the last reporting date for the supervisory deductions).\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 21", "text_characters": 2336}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**59.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to exclude FBBs from the compilation of Tier-1 capital, total regulatory capital, and_\n_RWA series for the compilation of FSIs._\n\n\n - _The OJK, in coordination with the BI, to identify the source of the abrupt data change in the_\n_supervisory deductions and update the historical series, as necessary._\n\n\n_Leverage Ratio_\n\n\n**60.** **The new FSIs methodology recommends calculation of the Tier 1 Capital to Assets**\n**ratio based on Basel III leverage measure, for jurisdictions that have implemented Basel III** .\nThe OJK produces the total exposure measure in line with the Basel III standard. However, Islamic\nbanks are exempted from the Basel III leverage ratio requirement. So, while the numerator for\nthe Tier 1 Capital to Assets ratio (i.e., Tier 1 capital) is available for all banks, the denominator is\nproduced based on a smaller sample of banks yielding an inconsistent leverage ratio for the\nsector. In order to prevent inconsistency in the reporting, the mission recommended the OJK\nstaff to produce a total exposure measure for Islamic banks based on available data and\nincorporate this figure into the total exposure measure. The method for estimating the total\nexposure measure should be provided in the metadata.\n\n**61.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and incorporate this figure into_\n_the total exposure measure memorandum series._\n\n\n_Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital_\n\n\n**62.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **requires NPLs net of provisions to capital FSI to be calculated**\n**by using the total regulatory capital as denominator** . This indicator intends to gauge the\ncapacity of bank capital to withstand losses on loans identified as non-performing but not fully\nprovisioned. Indonesia has been reporting this FSI by using total capital and reserves obtained\nfrom the balance sheet, as this option was allowed under the _2006 FSIs Guide_ . This FSI will be\nautomatically generated by the FSIs template by using total regulatory capital as the\ndenominator.\n\n_Loan Concentration by Economic Activity_\n\n\n**63.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines loan concentration by economic activity FSI (a new FSI)**\n**as the ratio of DTs’ lending to the largest three economic activities, as a proportion of their**\n**total gross loans to nonfinancial corporations** . Lending by economic activity is based on the\nUN International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 4\n(ISIC Rev.4) at its highest level, which provides a widely accepted structure for the classification of\neconomic activities. Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS) implements Indonesian\n\n\n**22** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n59. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to exclude FBBs from the compilation of Tier-1 capital, total regulatory capital, and_\n_RWA series for the compilation of FSIs._\n\n - _The OJK, in coordination with the BI, to identify the source of the abrupt data change in the_\n_supervisory deductions and update the historical series, as necessary._\n\n_Leverage Ratio_\n\n60. The new FSIs methodology recommends calculation of the Tier 1 Capital to Assets\nratio based on Basel III leverage measure, for jurisdictions that have implemented Basel III .\nThe OJK produces the total exposure measure in line with the Basel III standard. However, Islamic\nbanks are exempted from the Basel III leverage ratio requirement. So, while the numerator for\nthe Tier 1 Capital to Assets ratio (i.e., Tier 1 capital) is available for all banks, the denominator is\nproduced based on a smaller sample of banks yielding an inconsistent leverage ratio for the\nsector. In order to prevent inconsistency in the reporting, the mission recommended the OJK\nstaff to produce a total exposure measure for Islamic banks based on available data and\nincorporate this figure into the total exposure measure. The method for estimating the total\nexposure measure should be provided in the metadata.\n\n61. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and incorporate this figure into_\n_the total exposure measure memorandum series._\n\n_Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital_\n\n62. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ requires NPLs net of provisions to capital FSI to be calculated\nby using the total regulatory capital as denominator . This indicator intends to gauge the\ncapacity of bank capital to withstand losses on loans identified as non-performing but not fully\nprovisioned. Indonesia has been reporting this FSI by using total capital and reserves obtained\nfrom the balance sheet, as this option was allowed under the _2006 FSIs Guide_ . This FSI will be\nautomatically generated by the FSIs template by using total regulatory capital as the\ndenominator.\n\n_Loan Concentration by Economic Activity_\n\n63. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ defines loan concentration by economic activity FSI (a new FSI)\nas the ratio of DTs’ lending to the largest three economic activities, as a proportion of their\ntotal gross loans to nonfinancial corporations . Lending by economic activity is based on the\nUN International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 4\n(ISIC Rev.4) at its highest level, which provides a widely accepted structure for the classification of\neconomic activities. Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS) implements Indonesian\n\n22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2263}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nStandard Industrial Classification (Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha Indonesia (KBLI)) for economic\nactivities which is in line with the ISIC Rev.4.\n\n**64.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in line with the_\n_methodology provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n\n**65.** **The mission presented the annualization method of net income before/after tax**\n**and the averaging of total assets and capital and reserves in the computation of return on**\n**assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends using net profit\nbefore tax for calculation of the ROA and net income after tax for calculating of ROE.\nAccordingly, ROA is calculated using the annualized net income before tax divided by average\ntotal assets, while ROE is calculated using the annualized net income after tax divided by average\ntotal equity. In line with the methodology of the _2006 FSIs Guide_, the OJK was reporting the ROE\nby using annualized net income before tax, which needs to be updated with the implementation\nof the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . The preferred methods for annualization and averaging of quarterly data\nwere presented to the OJK staff as follows (e.g., for 2019):\n\n - Annualizing net income before/after tax reported on a cumulative basis:\n2019Q1_Annualized = (2019Q1)*4;\n2019Q2_Annualized = (2019Q2)*2;\n2019Q3_Annualized = (2019Q3)/3*4;\n2019Q4_Annualized = (2019Q4).\n\n\n - Averaging total assets and capital:\n2019Q1_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1)/2;\n2019Q2_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2)/3;\n2019Q3_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2 +2019Q3)/4;\n2019Q4_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2+2019Q3+2019Q4)/5.\n\n_Liquidity indicators_\n\n\n**66.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends the LCR and the NSFR ratios to be compiled by**\n**the countries implementing the Basel-III liquidity standards** . The OJK collects source data for\nthe LCR and the NSFR ratios in line with the Basel-III requirements. As discussed above these\nratios are calculated for a subset of commercial banks (i.e., CBBA 3, CBBA 4 and foreign banks).\n\n**67.** **In addition to Basel-III liquidity indicators, countries are expected to report liquid**\n**assets to total assets and liquid assets to short-term liabilities FSIs** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_\nrecommends the broad definition of liquid assets to be used in the compilation of FSIs which\ncomprises of (i) currency; (ii) deposits and other financial assets that are available either on\ndemand or within three months or less; and (iii) securities that are traded in liquid markets\n(including repo markets) that can be readily converted into cash, with insignificant risk of change\nin value under normal business conditions. Indonesia’s broad definition of liquid assets cover\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **23**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nStandard Industrial Classification (Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha Indonesia (KBLI)) for economic\nactivities which is in line with the ISIC Rev.4.\n\n64. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in line with the_\n_methodology provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n65. The mission presented the annualization method of net income before/after tax\nand the averaging of total assets and capital and reserves in the computation of return on\nassets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends using net profit\nbefore tax for calculation of the ROA and net income after tax for calculating of ROE.\nAccordingly, ROA is calculated using the annualized net income before tax divided by average\ntotal assets, while ROE is calculated using the annualized net income after tax divided by average\ntotal equity. In line with the methodology of the _2006 FSIs Guide_, the OJK was reporting the ROE\nby using annualized net income before tax, which needs to be updated with the implementation\nof the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . The preferred methods for annualization and averaging of quarterly data\nwere presented to the OJK staff as follows (e.g., for 2019):\n\n - Annualizing net income before/after tax reported on a cumulative basis:\n2019Q1_Annualized = (2019Q1)*4;\n2019Q2_Annualized = (2019Q2)*2;\n2019Q3_Annualized = (2019Q3)/3*4;\n2019Q4_Annualized = (2019Q4).\n\n - Averaging total assets and capital:\n2019Q1_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1)/2;\n2019Q2_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2)/3;\n2019Q3_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2 +2019Q3)/4;\n2019Q4_Annualized = (2018Q4+2019Q1+2019Q2+2019Q3+2019Q4)/5.\n\n_Liquidity indicators_\n\n66. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends the LCR and the NSFR ratios to be compiled by\nthe countries implementing the Basel-III liquidity standards . The OJK collects source data for\nthe LCR and the NSFR ratios in line with the Basel-III requirements. As discussed above these\nratios are calculated for a subset of commercial banks (i.e., CBBA 3, CBBA 4 and foreign banks).\n\n67. In addition to Basel-III liquidity indicators, countries are expected to report liquid\nassets to total assets and liquid assets to short-term liabilities FSIs . The _2019 FSIs Guide_\nrecommends the broad definition of liquid assets to be used in the compilation of FSIs which\ncomprises of (i) currency; (ii) deposits and other financial assets that are available either on\ndemand or within three months or less; and (iii) securities that are traded in liquid markets\n(including repo markets) that can be readily converted into cash, with insignificant risk of change\nin value under normal business conditions. Indonesia’s broad definition of liquid assets cover\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 23", "text_characters": 2330}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nitems such as derivative claims, deferred tax assets and prepaid expenses that do not satisfy the\n_2019 FSIs Guide’s_ definition of liquid assets. Also, for the calculation of internal liquidity ratios\n(i.e., liquid assets to non-core deposit ratio and liquid assets to third party funds ratio), the\ncompilers defined liquid assets as cash, placements in the central bank (excluding reserve\nrequirements, macroprudential intermediation ratio requirement and macroprudential liquidity\nbuffer requirement), and government bonds in domestic and foreign currency. This internal\ndefinition is in line with the liquid assets’ definition of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ and could be reported\nfor compilation of liquidity indicators.\n\n**68.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **defines short term liabilities as short-term element of DTs’**\n**debt liabilities and the net market value of their financial derivatives positions** . Short-term\nliabilities are those that could be withdrawn either on demand or within three months or less.\nThe OJK reports short-term liabilities on a remaining maturity basis.\n\n**69.** **Recommendations:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the definitions provided_\n_in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n - _The OJK to report liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio._\n\n\n_Net open position in foreign currencies_\n\n\n**70.** **The FSI on net open position in foreign exchange to capital can be calculated using**\n**either on-balance sheet or on- and off-balance sheet measures, but the latter approach is**\n**the preferred approach in the** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ . According to the BI regulation (No.\n7/37/PBI/2005), overall net open position is the sum of the absolute values of the net difference\nbetween assets and liabilities in all foreign currencies recorded on the balance sheet; plus, the\nnet difference between claims and liabilities, comprising both commitments and contingencies,\nin all foreign currencies recorded in off balance sheet accounts. The _2019 FSIs Guide_, on the other\nhand, recommends the open position calculation to be made for each foreign currency and gold.\nThe overall net open position is then measured by adding the sum of the net short positions or\nthe sum of the net long positions, whichever is greater, plus the absolute value of the net\nposition in gold. The mission recommended, for the calculation of this FSI, the net open position\nin foreign exchange series to be updated in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ methodology.\n\n**71.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to calculate the FSI on FX net open position in foreign exchange to capital in line_\n_with the aggregation approach specified in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n\n_Large Exposures_\n\n\n**72.** _**The OJK’s large exposures definition is in line with the 2019 FSIs Guide**_ . The\nprudential reporting for the large exposures definition in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ started as\n\n\n**24** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nitems such as derivative claims, deferred tax assets and prepaid expenses that do not satisfy the\n_2019 FSIs Guide’s_ definition of liquid assets. Also, for the calculation of internal liquidity ratios\n(i.e., liquid assets to non-core deposit ratio and liquid assets to third party funds ratio), the\ncompilers defined liquid assets as cash, placements in the central bank (excluding reserve\nrequirements, macroprudential intermediation ratio requirement and macroprudential liquidity\nbuffer requirement), and government bonds in domestic and foreign currency. This internal\ndefinition is in line with the liquid assets’ definition of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ and could be reported\nfor compilation of liquidity indicators.\n\n68. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ defines short term liabilities as short-term element of DTs’\ndebt liabilities and the net market value of their financial derivatives positions . Short-term\nliabilities are those that could be withdrawn either on demand or within three months or less.\nThe OJK reports short-term liabilities on a remaining maturity basis.\n\n69. Recommendations:\n\n - _The OJK to update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the definitions provided_\n_in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n - _The OJK to report liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio._\n\n_Net open position in foreign currencies_\n\n70. The FSI on net open position in foreign exchange to capital can be calculated using\neither on-balance sheet or on- and off-balance sheet measures, but the latter approach is\nthe preferred approach in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ . According to the BI regulation (No.\n7/37/PBI/2005), overall net open position is the sum of the absolute values of the net difference\nbetween assets and liabilities in all foreign currencies recorded on the balance sheet; plus, the\nnet difference between claims and liabilities, comprising both commitments and contingencies,\nin all foreign currencies recorded in off balance sheet accounts. The _2019 FSIs Guide_, on the other\nhand, recommends the open position calculation to be made for each foreign currency and gold.\nThe overall net open position is then measured by adding the sum of the net short positions or\nthe sum of the net long positions, whichever is greater, plus the absolute value of the net\nposition in gold. The mission recommended, for the calculation of this FSI, the net open position\nin foreign exchange series to be updated in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ methodology.\n\n71. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to calculate the FSI on FX net open position in foreign exchange to capital in line_\n_with the aggregation approach specified in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n_Large Exposures_\n\n72. _The OJK’s large exposures definition is in line with the 2019 FSIs Guide_ . The\nprudential reporting for the large exposures definition in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ started as\n\n24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2427}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nof 2020/Q4. Before that large exposures series reported by the OJK included only amounts\nexceeding 10 percent of the tier-1 capital (i.e., not the total amount of exposures exceeding\n10 percent of the tier-1 capital). FSIs reporting after 2020/Q4 includes all exposures exceeding\nthe specified threshold. The mission suggested to the OJK to update the metadata to explain the\nchange in the methodology. Also, the numerator for the FSI needs to be updated in line with the\n_2019 FSIs Guide_ recommendation as Tier-1 capital. Currently, Indonesia reports this indicator by\nusing total regulatory capital as numerator.\n\n_Geographical Distribution of Loans to Total Gross Loans_\n\n\n**73.** **In recording the geographic distribution of loans, claims are attributed to**\n**economies on the basis of the residency of the entity on which DTs have claims** . Residency\nis based on the concept of economic territory, which is not always based strictly on physical or\npolitical borders (see paragraph 2.11 in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ ). The suggested regional grouping of\ncountries is provided in Annex 8.2 of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ which is based on the classification\nprovided in the IMF’s _World Economic Outlook._\n\n**74.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to update geographical distribution of loans consistent with the classification of the_\n_World Economic Outlook._\n\n\n_Gross asset/liability position in derivatives to capital_\n\n\n**75.** **The FSI gross asset/liability positions in financial derivatives to capital is intended**\n**to gauge the exposure of DTs’ asset/liability positions in financial derivatives relative to**\n**capital.** Capital is measured as the total regulatory capital. Indonesia was using total capital and\nreserves as the denominator for these FSIs. In line with the prescriptive approach in the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_, this FSI will be automatically generated by the FSIs template by using total regulatory\ncapital as the denominator.\n\n_Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans and Foreign-currency-denominated_\n_liabilities to total liabilities_\n\n\n**76.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends foreign-currency-linked instruments to be**\n**included in the calculation of foreign currency denominated loans and foreign currency**\n**denominated liabilities** . Foreign currency linked instruments are those payable/receivable in\ndomestic currency but with the amounts payable/receivable linked to a foreign currency and,\ntherefore, considered to be denominated in foreign currency. The OJK FSIs compilation does not\ncover foreign currency linked loans and liabilities and current reporting forms are not sufficient\nfor the identification of foreign currency linked amounts.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **25**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nof 2020/Q4. Before that large exposures series reported by the OJK included only amounts\nexceeding 10 percent of the tier-1 capital (i.e., not the total amount of exposures exceeding\n10 percent of the tier-1 capital). FSIs reporting after 2020/Q4 includes all exposures exceeding\nthe specified threshold. The mission suggested to the OJK to update the metadata to explain the\nchange in the methodology. Also, the numerator for the FSI needs to be updated in line with the\n_2019 FSIs Guide_ recommendation as Tier-1 capital. Currently, Indonesia reports this indicator by\nusing total regulatory capital as numerator.\n\n_Geographical Distribution of Loans to Total Gross Loans_\n\n73. In recording the geographic distribution of loans, claims are attributed to\neconomies on the basis of the residency of the entity on which DTs have claims . Residency\nis based on the concept of economic territory, which is not always based strictly on physical or\npolitical borders (see paragraph 2.11 in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ ). The suggested regional grouping of\ncountries is provided in Annex 8.2 of the _2019 FSIs Guide_ which is based on the classification\nprovided in the IMF’s _World Economic Outlook._\n\n74. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to update geographical distribution of loans consistent with the classification of the_\n_World Economic Outlook._\n\n_Gross asset/liability position in derivatives to capital_\n\n75. The FSI gross asset/liability positions in financial derivatives to capital is intended\nto gauge the exposure of DTs’ asset/liability positions in financial derivatives relative to\ncapital. Capital is measured as the total regulatory capital. Indonesia was using total capital and\nreserves as the denominator for these FSIs. In line with the prescriptive approach in the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_, this FSI will be automatically generated by the FSIs template by using total regulatory\ncapital as the denominator.\n\n_Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans and Foreign-currency-denominated_\n_liabilities to total liabilities_\n\n76. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends foreign-currency-linked instruments to be\nincluded in the calculation of foreign currency denominated loans and foreign currency\ndenominated liabilities . Foreign currency linked instruments are those payable/receivable in\ndomestic currency but with the amounts payable/receivable linked to a foreign currency and,\ntherefore, considered to be denominated in foreign currency. The OJK FSIs compilation does not\ncover foreign currency linked loans and liabilities and current reporting forms are not sufficient\nfor the identification of foreign currency linked amounts.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25", "text_characters": 2278}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**77.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign currency linked_\n_liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data if the size is considered material._\n\n\n_Credit Growth to Private Sector_\n\n\n**78.** **The FSI credit growth to private sector is calculated using the year-over-year**\n**growth rate of total credit to the nonfinancial private sector** . This new FSI intends to capture\nemerging systemic risks and can serve as a forward-looking indicator of potential asset quality\nproblems and vulnerabilities in the DT sector. Credit to private sector data provided by the OJK,\nwhich is consistent with the _2019 FSIs Guide_, includes gross loans extended by DTs to the\nnonfinancial private sector, _plus_ debt securities issued by private nonfinancial corporations and\nheld by DTs.\n\n**79.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI._\n\n\n_Spread between Reference Lending and Deposit Rates_\n\n\n**80.** **Indonesia compiles the FSI spread between reference lending and deposit rates.** The\n_2019 FSIs Guide_ requires reporting of the underlying series (i) reference lending rate, and\n(ii) reference deposit rate. The OJK provided these memorandum series during the mission. This\nFSI will be automatically generated by the FSIs template (FSI-SR) using the underlying series.\n\n**81.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and reference deposit_\n_rates) for the calculation of spread between reference lending and deposit rates._\n\n\n_Spread between Highest and Lowest Interbank Rates_\n\n\n**82.** **The FSI spread between highest and lowest interbank rates is available for**\n**Indonesia** . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ requires reporting of the underlying series (i) highest interbank\nrate, and (ii) lowest interbank rate. The mission advised the OJK, in coordination with the BI, to\nstart reporting underlying series (highest interbank rate and lowest interbank rate) for the\ncalculation of spread between highest and lowest interbank rates.\n\n_Real estate markets_\n\n\n**83.** **The OJK compiles residential real estate loans to total loans, and commercial real**\n\n**estate loans to total loans** **FSIs** . The OJK defines residential real estate loans as loans extended to\nhouseholds for purchasing houses and apartments. Also, the OJK defines commercial real estate\nloans as loans extended for constructions and real estate sectors. The _2019 FSIs Guide,_ on the\n\n\n**26** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n77. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign currency linked_\n_liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data if the size is considered material._\n\n_Credit Growth to Private Sector_\n\n78. The FSI credit growth to private sector is calculated using the year-over-year\ngrowth rate of total credit to the nonfinancial private sector . This new FSI intends to capture\nemerging systemic risks and can serve as a forward-looking indicator of potential asset quality\nproblems and vulnerabilities in the DT sector. Credit to private sector data provided by the OJK,\nwhich is consistent with the _2019 FSIs Guide_, includes gross loans extended by DTs to the\nnonfinancial private sector, _plus_ debt securities issued by private nonfinancial corporations and\nheld by DTs.\n\n79. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI._\n\n_Spread between Reference Lending and Deposit Rates_\n\n80. Indonesia compiles the FSI spread between reference lending and deposit rates. The\n_2019 FSIs Guide_ requires reporting of the underlying series (i) reference lending rate, and\n(ii) reference deposit rate. The OJK provided these memorandum series during the mission. This\nFSI will be automatically generated by the FSIs template (FSI-SR) using the underlying series.\n\n81. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and reference deposit_\n_rates) for the calculation of spread between reference lending and deposit rates._\n\n_Spread between Highest and Lowest Interbank Rates_\n\n82. The FSI spread between highest and lowest interbank rates is available for\nIndonesia . The _2019 FSIs Guide_ requires reporting of the underlying series (i) highest interbank\nrate, and (ii) lowest interbank rate. The mission advised the OJK, in coordination with the BI, to\nstart reporting underlying series (highest interbank rate and lowest interbank rate) for the\ncalculation of spread between highest and lowest interbank rates.\n\n_Real estate markets_\n\n83. The OJK compiles residential real estate loans to total loans, and commercial real\n\nestate loans to total loans FSIs . The OJK defines residential real estate loans as loans extended to\nhouseholds for purchasing houses and apartments. Also, the OJK defines commercial real estate\nloans as loans extended for constructions and real estate sectors. The _2019 FSIs Guide,_ on the\n\n26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2090}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nother hand, defines residential real estate loans as loans that are collateralized by residential real\nestate and commercial real estate loans as loans that are collateralized by commercial real estate,\nloans to construction companies or loans to companies active in the development of real estate.\nThe definitions used by the OJK for the residential real estate and commercial real estate are\nnarrower in scope in comparison to the _2019 FSIs Guide_ definitions. The OJK staff confirmed the\navailability of the data to update these indicators.\n\n**84.** **Recommendation:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to compile residential real estate and commercial real estate loans memorandum_\n_series in line with the definitions provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\n\n**E. FSIs for OFCs**\n\n**85.** **Indonesia has been reporting two FSIs for OFCs, namely, OFC financial assets to**\n**total financial assets and OFC financial assets to GDP** . The OFCs subsector is comprised of ICs,\nPFs, MMFs and other types of OFCs. The OFCs subsector currently accounts for 22 percent of the\nreported assets of the financial system. The mission advised that developments in the OFCs\nsubsector be monitored given the importance of the OFCs subsector for Indonesia.\n\n**86.** **The FSIs OFC financial assets to total financial assets and OFC financial assets to**\n**GDP provide metrics to gauge the relative size of the OFCs subsector within the domestic**\n**financial system** . The _2019 FSIs_ _Guide_ recommends similar FSIs for MMFs, ICs and PFs. The OJK\nstaff provided data on the assets for MMFs, ICs and PFs subsectors during the mission based on\nwhich the mission compiled these more granular series.\n\n**87.** **The** _**2019 FSIs Guide**_ **recommends compiling two new FSIs for MMFs, four new FSIs**\n**for ICs, and two new FSIs for PFs** . The OJK staff confirmed the availability of source data for the\ncompilation of these FSIs starting from 2014/Q3. The OJK is of the view that sectoral financial\nstatements and memorandum series could be compiled by the OJK staff.\n\n**88.** **There are five social insurance and mandatory ICs operating in Indonesia** . These\ninclude ASABRI (Mandatory insurance for Military Personnel), TASPEN (Mandatory insurance for\ncivil servants), JASA RAHARJA (insurance covering accidents from vehicles and other modes of\ntransportations such as rail, airplane, ship/boats), BPJS Kesehatan (National Health Insurance) and\nBPJS Ketenagakerjaan (National Worker's Insurance). These companies do not function like\nconventional ICs (i.e., by constituting reserves and charging premiums proportional to the cost of\nthe service provided). Therefore, they are categorized under “Other OFCs” subsector.\n\n**89.** **Indonesia has not yet reported institutional coverage for OFCs to STA** . The new\ninstitutional coverage templates (FSIC) require (i) the number of the ICs, split by ownership and\ntheir respective total assets, and (ii) the number of other OFCs split by ownership, and their\nrespective total assets to be reported through the FSIC template.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **27**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nother hand, defines residential real estate loans as loans that are collateralized by residential real\nestate and commercial real estate loans as loans that are collateralized by commercial real estate,\nloans to construction companies or loans to companies active in the development of real estate.\nThe definitions used by the OJK for the residential real estate and commercial real estate are\nnarrower in scope in comparison to the _2019 FSIs Guide_ definitions. The OJK staff confirmed the\navailability of the data to update these indicators.\n\n84. Recommendation:\n\n - _The OJK to compile residential real estate and commercial real estate loans memorandum_\n_series in line with the definitions provided in the 2019 FSIs Guide._\n\nE. FSIs for OFCs\n\n85. Indonesia has been reporting two FSIs for OFCs, namely, OFC financial assets to\ntotal financial assets and OFC financial assets to GDP . The OFCs subsector is comprised of ICs,\nPFs, MMFs and other types of OFCs. The OFCs subsector currently accounts for 22 percent of the\nreported assets of the financial system. The mission advised that developments in the OFCs\nsubsector be monitored given the importance of the OFCs subsector for Indonesia.\n\n86. The FSIs OFC financial assets to total financial assets and OFC financial assets to\nGDP provide metrics to gauge the relative size of the OFCs subsector within the domestic\nfinancial system . The _2019 FSIs_ _Guide_ recommends similar FSIs for MMFs, ICs and PFs. The OJK\nstaff provided data on the assets for MMFs, ICs and PFs subsectors during the mission based on\nwhich the mission compiled these more granular series.\n\n87. The _2019 FSIs Guide_ recommends compiling two new FSIs for MMFs, four new FSIs\nfor ICs, and two new FSIs for PFs . The OJK staff confirmed the availability of source data for the\ncompilation of these FSIs starting from 2014/Q3. The OJK is of the view that sectoral financial\nstatements and memorandum series could be compiled by the OJK staff.\n\n88. There are five social insurance and mandatory ICs operating in Indonesia . These\ninclude ASABRI (Mandatory insurance for Military Personnel), TASPEN (Mandatory insurance for\ncivil servants), JASA RAHARJA (insurance covering accidents from vehicles and other modes of\ntransportations such as rail, airplane, ship/boats), BPJS Kesehatan (National Health Insurance) and\nBPJS Ketenagakerjaan (National Worker's Insurance). These companies do not function like\nconventional ICs (i.e., by constituting reserves and charging premiums proportional to the cost of\nthe service provided). Therefore, they are categorized under “Other OFCs” subsector.\n\n89. Indonesia has not yet reported institutional coverage for OFCs to STA . The new\ninstitutional coverage templates (FSIC) require (i) the number of the ICs, split by ownership and\ntheir respective total assets, and (ii) the number of other OFCs split by ownership, and their\nrespective total assets to be reported through the FSIC template.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 27", "text_characters": 2522}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**90.** **Recommendations:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to report OFC total assets, including additional sectorization to incorporate total_\n_assets by MMFs, ICs and PFs and other OFCs subsectors._\n\n\n - _The OJK to report institutional coverage for OFCs._\n\n\n**F. FSI Metadata**\n\n**91.** **The mission highlighted the need to complement the FSI data with the**\n**corresponding metadata** . Metadata reporting is important for interpreting the FSIs and to allow\nfor cross-country comparisons. Any deviations from the recommendations of the _2019 FSIs Guide_\nshould be explained in the metadata and updated when necessary. The metadata should contain\ninformation on the content and coverage of the FSIs, as well as the accounting conventions and\nother national guidelines. The mission developed FSI metadata for DTs and for two additional\nFSIs on the size of OFC subsectors based on the information provided by the authorities. The\nmetadata should be updated whenever changes are observed, for instance, when there are\nchanges to the accounting and regulatory frameworks or to the call report instructions\nunderlying the FSI source data.\n\n**92.** **The understanding of the calculation of key underlying series is important for**\n**better interpretation of FSIs** . Although the _2019 FSIs Guide_ provides guidance on the\ncalculation of the underlying FSI series, the calculation of some data series used by national FSI\ncompilers may not always be fully in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ due to lack of data.\nFurthermore, there might be some adjustments to the underlying series for the FSI calculation of\nFSIs. Appendix IV presents the detailed FSI metadata for DTs for reference. The mission also\nprepared the FSI metadata Excel file (the FSM file) for reporting together with the FSI data to STA\nfor posting on the IMF’s FSI website.\n\n**G. FSI Data and Metadata Reporting**\n\n**93.** **The OJK aims to regularly report the sectoral FSIs for DTs and OFCs to the IMF with**\n**quarterly frequency, to be posted on the IMF’s FSI website, upon the OJK management’s**\n**approval** . As discussed earlier, the OJK can compile and report all 18 core and 12 additional FSIs\nfor DTs as well as two additional FSIs on the size of OFC subsectors on a quarterly basis.\nUnderlying data available at the OJK for the calculation of FSIs starts from 2005. The mission\nintroduced to the OJK officials the new institutional coverage template (FSIC template) with\ninformation on the (i) number of the reporting DTs and their branches, split by ownership, and\ntheir respective total assets, (ii) number of the ICs, split by ownership and their respective total\nassets, and (iii) number of other OFCs split by ownership, and their respective total assets. The\nFSIC template should also be reported to the IMF for dissemination.\n\n\n**28** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n90. Recommendations:\n\n - _The OJK to report OFC total assets, including additional sectorization to incorporate total_\n_assets by MMFs, ICs and PFs and other OFCs subsectors._\n\n - _The OJK to report institutional coverage for OFCs._\n\nF. FSI Metadata\n\n91. The mission highlighted the need to complement the FSI data with the\ncorresponding metadata . Metadata reporting is important for interpreting the FSIs and to allow\nfor cross-country comparisons. Any deviations from the recommendations of the _2019 FSIs Guide_\nshould be explained in the metadata and updated when necessary. The metadata should contain\ninformation on the content and coverage of the FSIs, as well as the accounting conventions and\nother national guidelines. The mission developed FSI metadata for DTs and for two additional\nFSIs on the size of OFC subsectors based on the information provided by the authorities. The\nmetadata should be updated whenever changes are observed, for instance, when there are\nchanges to the accounting and regulatory frameworks or to the call report instructions\nunderlying the FSI source data.\n\n92. The understanding of the calculation of key underlying series is important for\nbetter interpretation of FSIs . Although the _2019 FSIs Guide_ provides guidance on the\ncalculation of the underlying FSI series, the calculation of some data series used by national FSI\ncompilers may not always be fully in line with the _2019 FSIs Guide_ due to lack of data.\nFurthermore, there might be some adjustments to the underlying series for the FSI calculation of\nFSIs. Appendix IV presents the detailed FSI metadata for DTs for reference. The mission also\nprepared the FSI metadata Excel file (the FSM file) for reporting together with the FSI data to STA\nfor posting on the IMF’s FSI website.\n\nG. FSI Data and Metadata Reporting\n\n93. The OJK aims to regularly report the sectoral FSIs for DTs and OFCs to the IMF with\nquarterly frequency, to be posted on the IMF’s FSI website, upon the OJK management’s\napproval . As discussed earlier, the OJK can compile and report all 18 core and 12 additional FSIs\nfor DTs as well as two additional FSIs on the size of OFC subsectors on a quarterly basis.\nUnderlying data available at the OJK for the calculation of FSIs starts from 2005. The mission\nintroduced to the OJK officials the new institutional coverage template (FSIC template) with\ninformation on the (i) number of the reporting DTs and their branches, split by ownership, and\ntheir respective total assets, (ii) number of the ICs, split by ownership and their respective total\nassets, and (iii) number of other OFCs split by ownership, and their respective total assets. The\nFSIC template should also be reported to the IMF for dissemination.\n\n28 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2315}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**94.** **Recommendations:**\n\n\n - _The OJK to finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral financial statements_\n_(FSI-SR template) for DTs, including balance sheets, income statements, and memorandum_\n_series, with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011,_\n_annual data beginning from 2005, the new FSI institutional coverage (FSIC template) with_\n_annual data starting from 2005, and the new FSI metadata (FSM template)._\n\n - _The OJK, in coordination with all relevant parties, to start regular reporting to STA, for_\n_disseminating on the IMF’s FSI website, of the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data_\n_beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual data beginning_\n_from 2005, and the new FSIC template with annual data starting from 2005. Also report the_\n_new FSM template periodically._\n\n**H. Resources, Training, and Technical Cooperation**\n\n**95.** **The mission recommended that OJK staff seek to attend regional and HQ training**\n**courses on financial sector statistics** . STA has in the past regularly delivered courses on both\nMonetary and Financial Statistics and FSIs at IMF headquarters, and regional trainings centers.\nAlso, recently STA has started delivering remote courses. Details can be found on the webpage of\nthe IMF’s Institute for Capacity Development. The mission also provided several training sessions\nto the OJK staff covering the _2019 FSIs Guide_, analytical use of the FSIs, consolidation\napproaches, CDM tool and the new FSIs for OFCs.\n\n**96.** **Recommendation:**\n\n - _Support OJK officials’ efforts to participate in IMF FSI training courses to improve their_\n_methodological knowledge and skills in compilation and interpretation of FSIs._\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **29**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n94. Recommendations:\n\n - _The OJK to finalize and report to STA for review the new FSI sectoral financial statements_\n_(FSI-SR template) for DTs, including balance sheets, income statements, and memorandum_\n_series, with quarterly data beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011,_\n_annual data beginning from 2005, the new FSI institutional coverage (FSIC template) with_\n_annual data starting from 2005, and the new FSI metadata (FSM template)._\n\n - _The OJK, in coordination with all relevant parties, to start regular reporting to STA, for_\n_disseminating on the IMF’s FSI website, of the new FSI-SR template with quarterly data_\n_beginning from 2012/Q1, semi-annual data beginning from 2011, annual data beginning_\n_from 2005, and the new FSIC template with annual data starting from 2005. Also report the_\n_new FSM template periodically._\n\nH. Resources, Training, and Technical Cooperation\n\n95. The mission recommended that OJK staff seek to attend regional and HQ training\ncourses on financial sector statistics . STA has in the past regularly delivered courses on both\nMonetary and Financial Statistics and FSIs at IMF headquarters, and regional trainings centers.\nAlso, recently STA has started delivering remote courses. Details can be found on the webpage of\nthe IMF’s Institute for Capacity Development. The mission also provided several training sessions\nto the OJK staff covering the _2019 FSIs Guide_, analytical use of the FSIs, consolidation\napproaches, CDM tool and the new FSIs for OFCs.\n\n96. Recommendation:\n\n - _Support OJK officials’ efforts to participate in IMF FSI training courses to improve their_\n_methodological knowledge and skills in compilation and interpretation of FSIs._\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 29", "text_characters": 1493}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-059-fig-p0031-001"], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n##### **Appendix I. Indonesia: Financial Soundness Indicators**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**30** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nAppendix I. Indonesia: Financial Soundness Indicators\n\n30 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 84}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-059-fig-p0032-001"], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **31**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 31", "text_characters": 36}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n##### **Appendix II. Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas** **Jasa Keuangan: Officials Met During the Mission**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Name|Title|Department/Directorate/Group|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|1|Mr. Rendra Zairuddin Idris|Head of
Department
|International Department|\n|2|Mr. Irnal Fiscallutfi|
Head of
Department
|Banking Licensing and Information Department|\n|3|Mr. Agus Firmansyah|
Head of
Department|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group
|\n|4|Ms. Nuraini Yuanita|
Director|Bank Supervision Development, Supervision and Crisis
Management Development Department|\n|5|Mr. Mohamad Miftah|Director
|
Banking Research and Regulation Department|\n|6|Ms. Yunorita Pariman|Executive
Analyst
|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group|\n|7|Ms. Arasy Jayanti Saputro|
Junior
Analyst|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group|\n|8|Mr. Fauzan Al Asyiq|
Administrator
|Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group
|\n|9|Ms. Dian Oktariani|Deputy
Director
|Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|10|Ms. Anggella Aosi Nasution
|
Head of
Subsection
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|11|Mr. Oky Sandi Rumadi
Sihombing|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|12|
Ms. Nursyita Purnami|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|13|Mr. Suciadi Ciptono Rahayu|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|14|Ms. Juwita Adelina Pasaribu|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|15|Mr. Hendra Gunawan|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|16|Mr. Fransiskus Henry Cahyadi|
Junior
Analyst|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|17|Mr. Rorizki Aldila Hutagalung|
Staff|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|18|Mr. Urip Fanto|Administrator
|
Banking Licensing and Information
Department/Banking Information Directorate
|\n|19|Mr. Tony|Deputy
Director
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|\n|20|Ms. Patricia|
Deputy
Director
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate
|\n|21|Mr. Riki Ferdian
|
Senior
Analyst|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate
|\n|22|Ms. Diar Lasrumondang
Veronika Putri
|
Analyst
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|\n|23|
Ms. Widya Octavia Dian Ayu
Permata|Subdivision
Head
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate
|\n|24|
Mr. Rolamjaya Hotmartua|
Junior
Analyst|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate|\n\n\n\n**32** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.23077392578125, 124.1513900756836, 539.0491943359375, 717.527587890625], "columns": 4, "rows": 25}], "text": "INDONESIA\nAppendix II. Indonesia Financial Services Authority - Otoritas Jasa Keuangan: Officials Met During the Mission\n\n Col1 Name Title Department/Directorate/Group \n\n 1 Mr. Rendra Zairuddin Idris Head of Department International Department \n 2 Mr. Irnal Fiscallutfi Head of Department Banking Licensing and Information Department \n 3 Mr. Agus Firmansyah Head of Department Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group \n 4 Ms. Nuraini Yuanita Director Bank Supervision Development, Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department \n 5 Mr. Mohamad Miftah Director Banking Research and Regulation Department \n 6 Ms. Yunorita Pariman Executive Analyst Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group \n 7 Ms. Arasy Jayanti Saputro Junior Analyst Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group \n 8 Mr. Fauzan Al Asyiq Administrator Integrated Data Management and Statistics Group \n 9 Ms. Dian Oktariani Deputy Director Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 10 Ms. Anggella Aosi Nasution Head of Subsection Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 11 Mr. Oky Sandi Rumadi Sihombing Junior Analyst Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 12 Ms. Nursyita Purnami Junior Analyst Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 13 Mr. Suciadi Ciptono Rahayu Junior Analyst Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 14 Ms. Juwita Adelina Pasaribu Junior Analyst Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 15 Mr. Hendra Gunawan Junior Analyst Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 16 Mr. Fransiskus Henry Cahyadi Junior Analyst Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 17 Mr. Rorizki Aldila Hutagalung Staff Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 18 Mr. Urip Fanto Administrator Banking Licensing and Information Department/Banking Information Directorate \n 19 Mr. Tony Deputy Director Banking Research and Regulation Department/Research Directorate \n 20 Ms. Patricia Deputy Director Banking Research and Regulation Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate \n 21 Mr. Riki Ferdian Senior Analyst Banking Research and Regulation Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate \n 22 Ms. Diar Lasrumondang Veronika Putri Analyst Banking Research and Regulation Department/Research Directorate \n 23 Ms. Widya Octavia Dian Ayu Permata Subdivision Head Banking Research and Regulation Department/Commercial Bank Regulation Directorate \n 24 Mr. Rolamjaya Hotmartua Junior Analyst Banking Research and Regulation Department/Research Directorate \n\n32 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2434}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Name|Title|Department/Directorate/Group|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|25|Mr. Muhammad Radhi|Junior
Analyst
|Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|\n|26|Ms. Laras Ayu|
Junior
Analyst
|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|\n|27|Ms. Nila Khusnika Sari|
Junior
Analyst|
Banking Research and Regulation
Department/Research Directorate
|\n|28|Ms. Dewi Ayuningsih|
Deputy
Director|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|\n|29|Mr. Vidharta Indra Surya|Executive
Analyst|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|\n|30|Mr. Budi Azhari|Senior
Analyst
|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|\n|31|Ms. Listiyani Wulandari|Subdivision
Head|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Bank Supervision Development Directorate
|\n|32|Ms. Vicha Angela Arisandhi|
Junior
Analyst|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|\n|33|Mr. Sendy|Junior
Analyst|
Supervision and Crisis Management Development
Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis
Management Protocol Directorate
|\n|34|Mr. Asep Suwondo|Director|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate
|\n|35|Mr. Arie Munandar|Deputy
Director|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and
Information Deputy Directorate 1
|\n|36|Mr. Pebriantho Pardamean
Sipahutar|Head
Division|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|\n|37|Mr. Ahmad Aripin|Head
Division|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Employment Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|\n|38|Ms. Devi Libyanda|Staff|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|\n|39|Ms. Oksidea Riveta|Staff|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|\n|40|Mr. Angga Surya Saputra|Subdivision
Head|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|\n|41|Mr. Arya Aditiawanto S|Staff
|
Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information
Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security
Agency Statistics and Information Division
|\n|42|Ms. Luci Irawati|Executive
Analyst
|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|\n|43|Mr. Adityo Pamudji|
Executive
Analyst|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **33**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22857666015625, 72.1919937133789, 539.0513916015625, 698.8076171875], "columns": 4, "rows": 20}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Col1 Name Title Department/Directorate/Group \n\n 25 Mr. Muhammad Radhi Junior Analyst Banking Research and Regulation Department/Research Directorate \n 26 Ms. Laras Ayu Junior Analyst Banking Research and Regulation Department/Research Directorate \n 27 Ms. Nila Khusnika Sari Junior Analyst Banking Research and Regulation Department/Research Directorate \n 28 Ms. Dewi Ayuningsih Deputy Director Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis Management Protocol Directorate \n 29 Mr. Vidharta Indra Surya Executive Analyst Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis Management Protocol Directorate \n 30 Mr. Budi Azhari Senior Analyst Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis Management Protocol Directorate \n 31 Ms. Listiyani Wulandari Subdivision Head Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department/Bank Supervision Development Directorate \n 32 Ms. Vicha Angela Arisandhi Junior Analyst Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis Management Protocol Directorate \n 33 Mr. Sendy Junior Analyst Supervision and Crisis Management Development Department/Industry Profile Analysis and Crisis Management Protocol Directorate \n 34 Mr. Asep Suwondo Director Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate \n 35 Mr. Arie Munandar Deputy Director Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Deputy Directorate 1 \n 36 Mr. Pebriantho Pardamean Sipahutar Head Division Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security Agency Statistics and Information Division \n 37 Mr. Ahmad Aripin Head Division Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Insurance/Employment Social Security Agency Statistics and Information Division \n 38 Ms. Devi Libyanda Staff Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security Agency Statistics and Information Division \n 39 Ms. Oksidea Riveta Staff Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security Agency Statistics and Information Division \n 40 Mr. Angga Surya Saputra Subdivision Head Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security Agency Statistics and Information Division \n 41 Mr. Arya Aditiawanto S Staff Non-Bank Financial Industry Statistics and Information Directorate/Insurance/Health Care Social Security Agency Statistics and Information Division \n 42 Ms. Luci Irawati Executive Analyst International Department/Multilateral Relations Directorate \n 43 Mr. Adityo Pamudji Executive Analyst International Department/Multilateral Relations Directorate \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 33", "text_characters": 2595}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Name|Title|Department/Directorate/Group|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|44|Mr. Dedi Setiawan|Senior
Analyst
|International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|\n|45|Mr. Zitro Alviotti|
Junior
Analyst
|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|\n|46|Ms. Citra Amalia Yulianti|
Junior
Analyst
|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate
|\n|47|Ms. Ratih Rachmawati|
Junior
Analyst|
International Department/Multilateral Relations
Directorate|\n\n\n\n**34** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.24000549316406, 72.239990234375, 539.0399780273438, 188.52001953125], "columns": 4, "rows": 5}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Col1 Name Title Department/Directorate/Group \n\n 44 Mr. Dedi Setiawan Senior Analyst International Department/Multilateral Relations Directorate \n 45 Mr. Zitro Alviotti Junior Analyst International Department/Multilateral Relations Directorate \n 46 Ms. Citra Amalia Yulianti Junior Analyst International Department/Multilateral Relations Directorate \n 47 Ms. Ratih Rachmawati Junior Analyst International Department/Multilateral Relations Directorate \n\n34 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 432}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n##### **Appendix III. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the** **FSI Definitions**\n\n**The mission recommended the following amendments to align FSIs with the** _**2019 FSIs**_\n_**Guide**_ (Appendix III. Table 1). The recommended amendments include both improvements\ndiscussed in this report, as well as the incorporation of amendments brought by the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ . While most changes were implemented during the mission and will not require further\nwork, those changes requiring a longer timeframe for implementation are bolded in the table\nand spelled out as individual recommendations in this report.\n\n**Appendix III. Table 1. Indonesia: Recommended Amendments to FSIs**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Indicator|Recommendation / Update|\n|---|---|\n|Total Capital to RWA/Tier
1 Capital to
RWA/Common Equity
Tier-1 Capital to RWA|Exclude foreign bank branches from the compilation of Tier-1
capital, total regulatory capital, and risk weighted assets series
for the compilation of FSIs.**(to be implemented)**.|\n|Tier 1 Capital to
Assets/Leverage ratio|Start reporting the new FSI (leverage ratio). Estimate total
exposure measure for Islamic banks and incorporate this figure
into the total exposure measure memorandum series**(to be**
**implemented)**.|\n|NPLs net of provisions to
capital|This FSI is automatically generated by the FSI template by using
total regulatory capital as denominator.|\n|NPLs to total loans|The definition of total loans should be aligned with the_2019 FSIs_
_Guide_ definition.|\n|Provisions to
nonperforming loans|This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using
the specific provisions and nonperforming loans data that is
readily available.|\n|Loan concentration by
economic activity|Compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in line
with the methodology provided in the_2019 FSIs Guide_.|\n|Return on Assets (ROA)|Use annualized net income before tax in the numerator.
Aggregate the numerator as indicated in the report.
This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using
annualized net income before tax.|\n|Return on Equity (ROE)|Use annualized net income after tax in the numerator.
Aggregate the numerator as indicated in the report.
This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using
annualized net income after tax.|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **35**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [91.89600372314453, 247.12001037597656, 538.10400390625, 707.8396606445312], "columns": 2, "rows": 9}], "text": "INDONESIA\nAppendix III. Summary of Recommended Amendments to the FSI Definitions\n\nThe mission recommended the following amendments to align FSIs with the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ (Appendix III. Table 1). The recommended amendments include both improvements\ndiscussed in this report, as well as the incorporation of amendments brought by the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ . While most changes were implemented during the mission and will not require further\nwork, those changes requiring a longer timeframe for implementation are bolded in the table\nand spelled out as individual recommendations in this report.\n\nAppendix III. Table 1. Indonesia: Recommended Amendments to FSIs\n\n Indicator Recommendation / Update \n\n Total Capital to RWA/Tier 1 Capital to RWA/Common Equity Tier-1 Capital to RWA Exclude foreign bank branches from the compilation of Tier-1 capital, total regulatory capital, and risk weighted assets series for the compilation of FSIs.(to be implemented). \n Tier 1 Capital to Assets/Leverage ratio Start reporting the new FSI (leverage ratio). Estimate total exposure measure for Islamic banks and incorporate this figure into the total exposure measure memorandum series(to be implemented). \n NPLs net of provisions to capital This FSI is automatically generated by the FSI template by using total regulatory capital as denominator. \n NPLs to total loans The definition of total loans should be aligned with the_2019 FSIs_ _Guide_ definition. \n Provisions to nonperforming loans This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using the specific provisions and nonperforming loans data that is readily available. \n Loan concentration by economic activity Compile loan concentration by economic activity indicator in line with the methodology provided in the_2019 FSIs Guide_. \n Return on Assets (ROA) Use annualized net income before tax in the numerator. Aggregate the numerator as indicated in the report. This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using annualized net income before tax. \n Return on Equity (ROE) Use annualized net income after tax in the numerator. Aggregate the numerator as indicated in the report. This FSI is automatically generated by the FSIs template by using annualized net income after tax. \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35", "text_characters": 1924}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Indicator|Recommendation / Update|\n|---|---|\n|Interest margin to gross
income|Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from
interest income has limited effect on the indicator.|\n|Noninterest expenses to
gross income|Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from
interest income has limited effect on the indicator.|\n|Liquid assets to total
assets/Liquid assets to
short-term liabilities|Update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the
definitions provided in_2019 FSIs Guide._** (to be implemented)**.|\n|Liquidity coverage ratio|Start reporting the new FSI.|\n|Net stable funding ratio|Start reporting the new FSI.|\n|Net open position in
foreign exchange to
capital|Calculate the FX NOP in line with the aggregation approach
specified in the_2019 FSIs Guide_ **(to be implemented)**.|\n|Large exposures to capital|Large exposures memorandum series to cover all exposures as
defined in the Basel Framework.|\n|Geographical distribution
of loans to total loans|Update geographical distribution of loans consistent with
classification of the World Economic Outlook.|\n|Gross asset/liability
position in derivatives to
capital|These FSIs are automatically generated by the FSIs template by
usingtotal regulatory capital as denominator.|\n|Trading income to total
income|Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from
interest income has limited effect on the indicator.|\n|Personnel expenses to
noninterest expenses|No change.|\n|Spread between reference
lending and deposit rates|Start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and
reference deposit rates) for the calculation of spread between
reference lending and deposit rates.|\n|Customer deposits to total
non-interbank loans|No change.|\n|FX loans to total loans / FX
liabilities to total liabilities|Evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign
currency linked liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data if
the size is considered material**(to be implemented)**.|\n|Credit growth to private
sector|Start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI.|\n\n\n**36** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [91.9058837890625, 72.15999603271484, 538.0941162109375, 686.3599853515625], "columns": 2, "rows": 16}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Indicator Recommendation / Update \n\n Interest margin to gross income Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from interest income has limited effect on the indicator. \n Noninterest expenses to gross income Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from interest income has limited effect on the indicator. \n Liquid assets to total assets/Liquid assets to short-term liabilities Update the liquid assets memorandum series in line with the definitions provided in_2019 FSIs Guide._ (to be implemented). \n Liquidity coverage ratio Start reporting the new FSI. \n Net stable funding ratio Start reporting the new FSI. \n Net open position in foreign exchange to capital Calculate the FX NOP in line with the aggregation approach specified in the_2019 FSIs Guide_ (to be implemented). \n Large exposures to capital Large exposures memorandum series to cover all exposures as defined in the Basel Framework. \n Geographical distribution of loans to total loans Update geographical distribution of loans consistent with classification of the World Economic Outlook. \n Gross asset/liability position in derivatives to capital These FSIs are automatically generated by the FSIs template by usingtotal regulatory capital as denominator. \n Trading income to total income Deduction of accrued interest on nonperforming loans from interest income has limited effect on the indicator. \n Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses No change. \n Spread between reference lending and deposit rates Start reporting underlying series (reference lending rates and reference deposit rates) for the calculation of spread between reference lending and deposit rates. \n Customer deposits to total non-interbank loans No change. \n FX loans to total loans / FX liabilities to total liabilities Evaluate the size of foreign currency linked loans and foreign currency linked liabilities for the DTs and start collecting data if the size is considered material(to be implemented). \n Credit growth to private sector Start reporting the new credit growth to private sector FSI. \n\n36 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1776}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-059-fig-p0038-001"], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Indicator|Recommendation / Update|\n|---|---|\n|Assets to total financial
system assets (for total of
OFCs and by
subsectors)/Assets to
gross domestic product
(GDP) (for total of OFCs
and by subsectors)|Report OFC total assets, including additional sectorization to
incorporate total assets by MMFs, ICs and PFs and OFCs: other
subsectors.
Report institutional coverage for OFCs.|\n|Residential real estate
prices|This FSI has been categorized under core FSIs in the 2019 FSIs
Guide.|\n|Residential real estate
loans to total
loans/Commercial real
estate loans to total loans
|Report residential real estate and commercial real estate loans
memorandum series in line with the definitions provided in the
_2019 FSIs Guide_ **(to be implemented)**.|\n\n\n\n**These data and methodological revisions have resulted in significant changes to some FSIs** .\nThe mission recommended to the OJK to update the calculation of FSIs in line with the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ . Appendix III-Table 2 covers the size of change observed in the FSIs before and after the\nmission.\n\n**Appendix III. Table 2. Indonesia: Comparison of FSIs Before and After the Technical**\n\n**Assistance**\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **37**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.54461669921875, 72.15999603271484, 539.4553833007812, 308.3599853515625], "columns": 2, "rows": 4}], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n Indicator Recommendation / Update \n\n Assets to total financial system assets (for total of OFCs and by subsectors)/Assets to gross domestic product (GDP) (for total of OFCs and by subsectors) Report OFC total assets, including additional sectorization to incorporate total assets by MMFs, ICs and PFs and OFCs: other subsectors. Report institutional coverage for OFCs. \n Residential real estate prices This FSI has been categorized under core FSIs in the 2019 FSIs Guide. \n Residential real estate loans to total loans/Commercial real estate loans to total loans Report residential real estate and commercial real estate loans memorandum series in line with the definitions provided in the _2019 FSIs Guide_ (to be implemented). \n\nThese data and methodological revisions have resulted in significant changes to some FSIs .\nThe mission recommended to the OJK to update the calculation of FSIs in line with the _2019 FSIs_\n_Guide_ . Appendix III-Table 2 covers the size of change observed in the FSIs before and after the\nmission.\n\nAppendix III. Table 2. Indonesia: Comparison of FSIs Before and After the Technical\n\nAssistance\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 37", "text_characters": 977}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-059-fig-p0039-001"], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\n**38** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\n38 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 36}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n##### **Appendix IV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers**\n\n**Financial Soundness Indicators Metadata for Indonesia**\n\n\nMetadata should be disseminated together with FSI data to facilitate data interpretation.\nMetadata include information about FSIs and their compilation, such as data definitions, how\ndata are consolidated, supervisory and accounting rules adopted by the reporting banks,\ninstitutional coverage, and data sources, which are useful to data users. The updated metadata\ntemplates also provide a good coverage on the implementation of the prudential measures.\n\n\n**Residence of institutional units**\n\n\nForeign-owned companies incorporated in Indonesia are classified as residents in line with\nSystem of National Accounts (2008 SNA), which classifies foreign-owned companies as residents\nin an economic territory where they engage in and intend to continue engaging in economic\nactivities and transactions on a significant scale for at least one year.\n\n\n**Exchange rate**\n\n\nFinancial institutions use Bank Indonesia mid-market rate (end of reporting period) for\nconverting all items in foreign currencies into national currency.\n\n\n**Consolidation basis**\n\n\nFSIs for DTs in Indonesia are compiled on an unconsolidated basis. This approach covers resident\ndomestically controlled and foreign controlled DTs, with their domestic and overseas branches.\nThe consolidation basis also includes the branches in Indonesia of DTs that are incorporated\nabroad. However, foreign DTs and foreign and domestic non-deposit taking financial subsidiaries\nof domestically incorporated DTs are excluded from the reporting sample.\n\n\n**Consolidation adjustments**\n\n\nIntragroup adjustments refer to the elimination of financial flows (income and expense) and\nfinancial positions between DTs within the same banking group (parent, its branches, and\nsubsidiaries). Intra-group adjustments are not undertaken for the compilation of FSIs.\n\n\n**Institutional coverage**\n\n\nFSIs for DTs cover 109 commercial banks. Rural banks, deposit taking microfinance institutions\nand credit unions and credit cooperatives are not included in the FSIs compilation.\n\n\n**Regulatory framework**\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **39**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\nAppendix IV. FSI Metadata for Deposit Takers\n\nFinancial Soundness Indicators Metadata for Indonesia\n\nMetadata should be disseminated together with FSI data to facilitate data interpretation.\nMetadata include information about FSIs and their compilation, such as data definitions, how\ndata are consolidated, supervisory and accounting rules adopted by the reporting banks,\ninstitutional coverage, and data sources, which are useful to data users. The updated metadata\ntemplates also provide a good coverage on the implementation of the prudential measures.\n\nResidence of institutional units\n\nForeign-owned companies incorporated in Indonesia are classified as residents in line with\nSystem of National Accounts (2008 SNA), which classifies foreign-owned companies as residents\nin an economic territory where they engage in and intend to continue engaging in economic\nactivities and transactions on a significant scale for at least one year.\n\nExchange rate\n\nFinancial institutions use Bank Indonesia mid-market rate (end of reporting period) for\nconverting all items in foreign currencies into national currency.\n\nConsolidation basis\n\nFSIs for DTs in Indonesia are compiled on an unconsolidated basis. This approach covers resident\ndomestically controlled and foreign controlled DTs, with their domestic and overseas branches.\nThe consolidation basis also includes the branches in Indonesia of DTs that are incorporated\nabroad. However, foreign DTs and foreign and domestic non-deposit taking financial subsidiaries\nof domestically incorporated DTs are excluded from the reporting sample.\n\nConsolidation adjustments\n\nIntragroup adjustments refer to the elimination of financial flows (income and expense) and\nfinancial positions between DTs within the same banking group (parent, its branches, and\nsubsidiaries). Intra-group adjustments are not undertaken for the compilation of FSIs.\n\nInstitutional coverage\n\nFSIs for DTs cover 109 commercial banks. Rural banks, deposit taking microfinance institutions\nand credit unions and credit cooperatives are not included in the FSIs compilation.\n\nRegulatory framework\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 39", "text_characters": 1843}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "INDONESIA\n\n\nCapital adequacy calculation follows a Basel III approach for the definition of regulatory capital\nand Basel-II approach for the definition of risk weighted assets. Basel III standards such as\nleverage ratio, large exposures framework, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio\nare implemented in Indonesia.\n\n\n**Accounting framework**\n\n\nBoth public and private companies must comply with accounting standards issued by the\nDSAK-IAI. Indonesia national accounting standards (SAK) are adopted from the IFRS. Indonesia’s\napproach to the IFRS adaptation is to maintain one-year difference with the IFRS as issued by the\nIASB.\n\n\n**Data Definitions**\n\n\n**Common Equity Tier 1 capital/Tier 1 capital/Total regulatory capital** definitions are in line\nwith Basel-III standards.\n\n\n**Risk Weighted Assets** is calculated using standardized approaches for credit and market risk\nand basic indicator approach for operational risk.\n\n\n**High quality liquid assets/total net cash outflows/available stable funding/required stable**\n**funding** definitions are in line with Basel-III standards.\n\n\n**Nonperforming loans (NPLs)** is defined as loans for which one or more contractual payments\nof interest or principal are past due for 90 days or more. Delay on payment (90 days rule) is only\none of the criteria in classifying a loan or other assets as NPLs or nonperforming assets.\nClassification of assets is basically based on business prospects, performance of the debtors, and\nrepayment capability.\n\n\n**Return on assets (ROA)** is calculated as the ratio of annualized net income before tax divided by\naverage total assets.\n\n**Return on equity (ROE)** is calculated as the ratio of annualized net income after tax divided by\naverage capital and reserves.\n\n**Source data**\n\n\nSource data for compiling FSIs for DTs include income and expense statements, the balance\nsheets and other monthly data collected that are relevant for compiling supervisory series\nrelating to definition of capital, deposit breakdown and nonperforming loans. Commercial banks\nare required to submit monthly reporting within 30 days after the reporting period.\n\n\n**40** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-059", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "INDONESIA\n\nCapital adequacy calculation follows a Basel III approach for the definition of regulatory capital\nand Basel-II approach for the definition of risk weighted assets. Basel III standards such as\nleverage ratio, large exposures framework, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio\nare implemented in Indonesia.\n\nAccounting framework\n\nBoth public and private companies must comply with accounting standards issued by the\nDSAK-IAI. Indonesia national accounting standards (SAK) are adopted from the IFRS. Indonesia’s\napproach to the IFRS adaptation is to maintain one-year difference with the IFRS as issued by the\nIASB.\n\nData Definitions\n\nCommon Equity Tier 1 capital/Tier 1 capital/Total regulatory capital definitions are in line\nwith Basel-III standards.\n\nRisk Weighted Assets is calculated using standardized approaches for credit and market risk\nand basic indicator approach for operational risk.\n\nHigh quality liquid assets/total net cash outflows/available stable funding/required stable\nfunding definitions are in line with Basel-III standards.\n\nNonperforming loans (NPLs) is defined as loans for which one or more contractual payments\nof interest or principal are past due for 90 days or more. Delay on payment (90 days rule) is only\none of the criteria in classifying a loan or other assets as NPLs or nonperforming assets.\nClassification of assets is basically based on business prospects, performance of the debtors, and\nrepayment capability.\n\nReturn on assets (ROA) is calculated as the ratio of annualized net income before tax divided by\naverage total assets.\n\nReturn on equity (ROE) is calculated as the ratio of annualized net income after tax divided by\naverage capital and reserves.\n\nSource data\n\nSource data for compiling FSIs for DTs include income and expense statements, the balance\nsheets and other monthly data collected that are relevant for compiling supervisory series\nrelating to definition of capital, deposit breakdown and nonperforming loans. Commercial banks\nare required to submit monthly reporting within 30 days after the reporting period.\n\n40 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1801}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55f76af5702fbc2b31a09f0c2503a9f0b7eae736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb
+size 33384
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0004-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0004-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..80b2d7f48ff46abd0f1801601d2df5eb42a93992
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0004-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:203295459bc1c69e4b4c247dacac1ee956c94afc8f40505486e54b36948e3efb
+size 2472
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e4db3603e80a0c2b1ed64660ece263d05982448
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a2a040dab7023a9aa5f94e020249f8d49d9b678b7a57ccdf1a7067810a2ae2be
+size 150236
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..42ffd88de3b5f26e29ac3630f759623d7858b0aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:48953317b4e7c137a2a28de774128ecdb82a38dbf16fac41a2e147d3b874c7ed
+size 31560
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..539e969f5fd14ee5d4d8d81bdd5664c5c1c58223
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:95a8bbe53a0812bdb068ac435e90ab7aae8b9d6aec8766500d4eed76dde5741c
+size 36146
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8a1bd40984b0acaf80d5d1ea4775e93d095a90b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b67132de4d5fe4eef06f10a8836bbb8f6583eed2e790da465ad0c593fb7054dd
+size 45797
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0027-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0027-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d61b71986be0e8aaa9a2f084c327fa7f9b99dce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0027-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:628388597e969a4eef8fd858986d3404d5ab6f9397dd71bead97c65eff03d6fc
+size 63487
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0028-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0028-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c2cdb5083e31dc98f1fbc438117c2f63c07a0616
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0028-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ea131b0ea5aad947cd1f19045fd82f2ddf543b98146da4fe0880b2d2af728690
+size 50431
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0029-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0029-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ab090ed6d2074020e26b732c65f3d0cd54ab2c87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0029-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3a2af15b4412323b1a9b75c0b7fd1274a95c44938645f5ea4a156d6b4447ebfb
+size 51416
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0030-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0030-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..04fcf64eb54368430b3d76d9eb09774bcd189902
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0030-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0229ae201597dfe578e2f102f2167a22a28c2ef03f9fe4b5e5b47aee2155ec21
+size 61702
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0031-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0031-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3eb0280e029444b83359a14670198fe4b131421c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0031-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c83865b4ea26622bd20bd37f10df863f9a94ce4d8345a081ea9283656925d366
+size 6950
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0034-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0034-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0597b996278d0ab56a4049c761410e88d505428
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0034-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b6fcca08dc480ea1992a7fd169baedc2dfd574f5ba7c3dd775a34441dbfcb9d8
+size 147577
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0035-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0035-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6eb6a89744345d820b943f2590b87c8b9ae263f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0035-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:381b63e59cf6a634fad24e7618cf04c8de0ed58990dcee3e7172ce1e0dee899a
+size 116198
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0038-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0038-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa3eef3b57fb2101bb4cbb6dfc2b147b9ae6592c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0038-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ea82652eeb897e42dc31d4846b160ea0f8a06ef7c3a0a240b81ec533bd29fd17
+size 179706
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2b6ece71441fbc004b3bddc92f5d0ab176571831
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d01077707d77b38291450439a87549875bcc77d6f25e095996f577fd74a918cf
+size 30762
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ae8677d6220620b4204546c19e9adcce91f0cdc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-060",
+ "title": "Republic of Armenia: Technical Assistance Report on Personal Income Tax: Policy Review and Introduction of a Universal Declaration",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-060.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "6151253e95d9a2f854c9925efad04e2b8b1b7fe68fe2e4fe2f7350d50e10f01b",
+ "source_bytes": 1182109,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/01/30/republic-of-armenia-technical-assistance-report-on-personal-income-tax-policy-review-and-528760",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:30+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 21.005,
+ "page_count": 46,
+ "text_characters": 103843,
+ "table_count": 3,
+ "figure_count": 16,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PERSONAL INCOME TAX: POLICY REVIEW AND INTRODUCTION OF A UNIVERSAL DECLARATION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "Republic of Armenia Personal Income Tax: Policy Review and Introduction of a Universal Declaration"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "GLOSSARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "PREFACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "I. INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 13,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "II. TAX POLICY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 32,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "III. TAX ADMINISTRATION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 43,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "IV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 44,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "REFERENCES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 45,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT REVENUE BY SOURCE, LATEST AVAILABLE YEAR (PERCENT OF GDP)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 46,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "APPENDIX II. MEASURES OF PROGRESSIVE AND REDISTRIBUTIVE CAPACITIES"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Armenia: Technical Assistance Report on Personal Income Tax: Policy Review and Introduction of a Universal Declaration; IMF Country Report No. 23/60; November 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Personal income tax, universal income declaration, tax incentives. ",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.39",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230118103748-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230130160720-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ccd6c29479d750a4243d1e28caf7f1558d98d910
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2578 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/60**
+# **REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**
+##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PERSONAL** **INCOME TAX: POLICY REVIEW AND INTRODUCTION** **OF A UNIVERSAL DECLARATION**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Republic of Armenia was prepared by a staff team of
+the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it
+was completed in November 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+## **Republic of Armenia** **Personal Income Tax: Policy Review and** **Introduction of a Universal Declaration**
+
+
+Charles Vellutini, Graham Whyte, Andualem Mengistu
+
+
+**Technical Report**
+
+
+**January 2023**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the
+staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of the
+Republic of Armenia (the "TA recipient") in response to their request for
+technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries
+thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and
+members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities
+of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff and
+other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest,
+unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see
+Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance
+Information—
+[Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information).](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)
+Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to
+parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the
+TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and
+donors with legitimate interest shall require the explicit consent of the
+TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.
+
+
+**This technical assistance (TA) was provided in part by financial support from the European**
+**Union.**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**GLOSSARY _______________________________________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+**PREFACE _________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 7**
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________________ 10**
+
+**II. TAX POLICY _________________________________________________________________________________ 12**
+A. Key Features of the PIT _______________________________________________________________________ 12
+B. Directions of Reforms _________________________________________________________________________ 18
+C. Impact of Reforms Options on Revenue and Progressivity ____________________________________ 21
+
+**III. TAX ADMINISTRATION ____________________________________________________________________ 31**
+A. Current Administrative System _______________________________________________________________ 31
+B. Universal Declaration Administrative System _________________________________________________ 32
+C. Implementation Governance and Project Management ______________________________________ 37
+D. Implementation Risks and Mitigations ________________________________________________________ 40
+
+**IV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT _________________________________________________________________ 42**
+
+**REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________________________________ 43**
+
+**APPENDIXES**
+I. Government Revenue by Source, Latest Available Year (Percent of GDP) ______________________ 44
+II. Measures of Progressive and Redistributive Capacities _______________________________________ 45
+
+
+**BOXES**
+
+1. Summary of Recommendations ________________________________________________________________________ 9
+2. Declaration from the Australian tax return ___________________________________________________________ 34
+3. International good practice design principles ________________________________________________________ 35
+4. Scope of Project Team Briefs _________________________________________________________________________ 39
+5. UX Based Design Principles ___________________________________________________________________________ 40
+
+
+**FIGURES**
+
+1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In Percent of GDP) __ 15
+2. Tax Wedge (2021) ____________________________________________________________________________________ 16
+3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020) __________________ 21
+4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019 _____________________________ 22
+5. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Reforming Mortgage Interest ______________________ 25
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades _________________________________ 26
+7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap _______________________ 27
+8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket __________________ 28
+9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit__________________________ 29
+10. PIT Revenue across Scenarios _______________________________________________________________________ 30
+11. Implementation Timeline ____________________________________________________________________________ 33
+12. The Three Phases ____________________________________________________________________________________ 34
+13. Implementation Cycle _______________________________________________________________________________ 37
+14. The Governance Pyramid ____________________________________________________________________________ 38
+
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Armenia, Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP) ___________________________________________________________ 10
+2. The 2018 Tax Reform _________________________________________________________________________________ 12
+3. Key PIT and SSC Rates in Armenia and Comparator Countries, 2022 ________________________________ 14
+4. Summary Statistics based on Taxpayer Level Labor Income Data (2021) ____________________________ 15
+5. Summary of Proposed Options ______________________________________________________________________ 23
+6. Summary of The Existing Mortgage Interest Credit System _________________________________________ 24
+7. Implementation Risks and Mitigations _______________________________________________________________ 41
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+### **GLOSSARY**
+
+AMD Armenian Dram
+CBA Central Bank of Armenia
+CD Capacity Development
+CIT Corporate Income Tax
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+FY Fiscal Year
+GDP Gross Domestic Product
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+IWTC In-Work Tax Credit
+MoF Ministry of Finance
+PIT Personal Income Tax
+RoA Republic of Armenia
+SRC State Revenue Committee
+SSC Social Security Contribution
+TA Technical Assistance
+VAT Value Added Tax
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+### **PREFACE**
+
+At the request of the Minister of Finance, a technical team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department
+(FAD) visited Armenia between August 29 – September 9, 2022 to assist the authorities in
+implementing a Universal personal income tax (PIT) Declaration. The mission comprised Charles
+Vellutini, Graham Whyte, and Andualem Mengistu. The mission met with Mr. Tigran Khachatryan,
+Minister of Finance, with Mr. Arman Poghosyan, Deputy Minister of Finance, Mr. Artur Manukyan,
+Deputy Chairman of the State Revenue Committee and various staff members of the Ministry of
+Finance. The mission also met with Mr. Nerses Yeritsyan, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of
+Armenia and various senior staff of the CBA; Mr. David Davit Khachatryan, Deputy Minister of the
+Minister of Labor and Social Affairs; Mr. Ashot Muradyan, Deputy Chairman of the State Revenue
+Committee and his staff and Ms. Haykuhi Harutyunyan, Chairwoman of the Corruption Prevention
+Commission. The mission also had fruitful meetings with Mr. Ori Alaverdyan, Head of Revenue Policy
+and Administration Methodology Department, Ministry of Finance, who was very instrumental in
+coordinating government responses to the mission’s inquiries. At the conclusion of the mission,
+recommended options for reform were discussed with the Minister of Finance and his team.
+
+
+The mission expresses its gratitude to all the individuals it met with for their cooperation.
+
+
+The mission also thanks Mr. Mehdi Raissi, Resident Representative of the IMF in Armenia, and Mr.
+Vahram Janvelyan (IMF), Ms. Marine Aleksanyan (IMF) for their valuable assistance during the
+mission.
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+**The government of the Republic of Armenia has expressed its intention to introduce a**
+**Universal Personal Income Tax (PIT) Declaration for individual taxpayers who are not in**
+**business.** The Declaration would be implemented in phases: civil servants (in 2024 reporting FY2023
+income), employees (in 2025 reporting FY2024 income), and other individual taxpayers (in 2026
+reporting FY2025 income). The declaration would be annual, and it would cover all types of income.
+
+
+**At the request of the Minister of Finance, a team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD)**
+**visited Armenia to assist the authorities in implementing a Universal PIT Declaration.** The joint
+Tax Policy and Revenue Administration mission provided recommendations to improve the PIT
+design and tackle potential implementation challenges of introducing the Universal PIT Declaration.
+
+
+**Tax Policy**
+
+**The PIT is currently characterized by a strong revenue performance and low progressivity.** The
+redistributive capacity of Armenia’s PIT is at the lowest end of its regional peers. At 6.1 percent of
+GDP in 2021, Armenia’s PIT revenue is significant. However, the 21 percent (2022) flat tax rate on
+employment income, the absence of standard allowance, and a regressive mortgage interest tax
+credit limit the PIT’s progressivity. The cap on the Social Security Contribution (SSC) to the state
+pension system (Pillar II) further weakens progressivity.
+
+
+**Costly and regressive tax incentives should be repealed.** Firstly, the mortgage interest tax credit
+should be repealed, or at least strictly capped. In addition, unless the reform deals with the existing
+stock of mortgages, the revenue loss will continue to be significant for the next decade. Limiting the
+mortgage interest credit on existing contracts rather than its complete removal may ease
+implementation with a minimal revenue cost and a significant increase in progressivity. Secondly, the
+tax credit on reinvested dividends is overly generous and should be eliminated. Thirdly, capital gains
+should be taxed, with an exempt allowance for private residences calibrated to cover most or all
+capital gains for most taxpayers.
+
+
+**A Universal PIT Declaration makes it possible to implement a more progressive PIT.** A Universal
+PIT Declaration would make it possible to implement a zero-rated bracket and an In-Work Tax Credit
+(IWTC) through the aggregation and annualization of taxable income, and the corresponding endof-year refunds or tax top-up. Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity
+(including auditing of individuals) and on fiscal feasibility, a zero-rated bracket or a IWTC would
+introduce significant progressivity and would provide incentives to comply with the Declaration (as
+end-of-year refunds would become possible). An IWTC would be better-targeted than a zero-bracket
+and encourage labor supply and formalization.
+
+
+**A microenterprise regime should be a simplified collection mechanism, not a preferential**
+**regime.** The authorities plan to bring employees of microenterprises under the standard PIT regime,
+a justified reform (replacing and eliminating the monthly AMD 5,000 lumpsum tax per employee),
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+but one leaving unchanged the total exemption of individuals themselves under the regime (not
+their employees).
+
+
+**Tax Administration**
+
+**The Universal Declaration Administrative System is a major reform in size and scope** . It will
+require a significant Information Technology (IT) build, will have wide ranging community impacts,
+and will require good communication with all stakeholders, in particular the affected taxpayers. There
+are many of the necessary foundations in place. These include a mature withholding tax system, a
+register of employees, and mandatory electronic lodgment of the withholding return. There are
+significant implementation risks that need to be managed.
+
+
+**While the detailed Policy is being developed, it is essential that the State Revenue Committee**
+**(SRC) and Ministry of Finance (MoF) work together on the detailed design.** This is to ensure that
+it can be implemented efficiently and effectively with low costs of compliance by the taxpayers. A
+working group should be formed to finalize the design with both senior MoF and SRC staff and the
+staff who will build and operate it. Once the design is finalized this group will cease and a steering
+group would be formed.
+
+
+**The mission team recommends that in line with international good practice, SRC prefills the**
+**Universal Declaration as much as possible through maximizing the use of third-party**
+**information and withholding taxes.** This should include all types of income. Armenian banks are
+currently not required to report interest income with a unique identifier for the holder of the
+account. This means that interest income will not be pre-filled, and this may undermine the policy
+intent. This gap must be addressed by the Government by amending Bank Secrecy laws to ensure
+that interest income can be prefilled. Should the authorities bring employees of microenterprises
+under the standard PIT regime the employers must be included in the reporting regime and their
+universal declarations prefilled.
+
+
+**To ensure strong governance and accountability during the implementation phase, a steering**
+**group should be formed immediately.** The steering group should have very senior chairmanship
+and members should be drawn from all ministries with an interest in the reform. It provides strategic
+leadership and direction, to oversee the work of a Project Management Board. The Project
+Management Board should include experts with relevant technical and project management skills
+and experience and be chaired at the Deputy Chairman level. It is charged with managing and
+coordinating the work of project teams identifying and managing resource bottlenecks and other
+risks.
+
+
+**There are several issues that need to be considered, particularly the taxpayer register.**
+**compliance with the current system, and the withholding system** . For example, there is no
+register of individuals who earn passive income. It is also important that the withholding system is
+robust and as many employers are in it. High compliance levels with the current system will ensure a
+smooth transition. Using Compliance Risk Management principles, SRC should undertake Risk
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+Assessments on the risk areas and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, including
+recommendations for law changes.
+
+
+**Individual taxpayers must be subject to audit based on proper risk-assessment.** The
+introduction of a Universal PIT Declaration, and the collection of comprehensive information on
+individual taxpayers, is an excellent opportunity and justification to include natural persons in the
+scope of possible audits.
+
+
+**Capacity Development**
+
+**The authorities may consider requesting assistance on a possible reform of the taxation of**
+**micro and small enterprises. The SRC may consider requesting capacity development**
+**assistance from the IMF on implementation of the Universal Declaration.** The area that may be
+of greatest assistance is addressing the risks identified and advising on international good practices
+to mitigate them.
+
+
+**Box 1. Summary of Recommendations**
+
+**Tax Policy Recommendations**
+
+- Repeal the tax credit on mortgage interest, with grandfathering of existing contracts with yearly interest
+below an upper limit in the range of AMD 245,0000-300,000.
+
+- Repeal the tax credit on reinvested dividends.
+
+- Introduce a 10 percent (same as on interest) withholding tax on capital gains, excluding capital gains on
+housing to the sale of a taxpayers’ primary residence up to a specific amount to be calibrated to cover
+most or all capital gains for most taxpayers.
+
+- Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of individuals) and
+on the fiscal feasibility of the measure, introduce a zero-rated PIT bracket with an upper threshold in the
+range of AMD 240,000-300,000 annually.
+
+- Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of individuals),
+consider the introduction of an In-Work Tax Credit that is annually capped at AMD 53,000 and phase out
+for income above AMD 800,000.
+
+- Seek FAD assistance on micro and small enterprise taxation.
+
+**Tax Administration Recommendations**
+
+- As a matter of urgency, create a joint SRC and MoF working party to co-design the new system so that all
+administrative and policy issues are considered, and an efficient and effective system is implemented. Once
+the design is finalized this group will cease and a steering group etc. would be formed.
+
+- Implement the governance and project management structures and arrangements as set out in Section III,
+Figure 13 and 14 below. As a matter of urgency, implement Stage 0 (setting up of governance structure,
+agreeing action plans, and initiating consultations).
+
+- Amend the Bank Secrecy law so that it is mandatory for banks to provide the SRC with all interest
+payments and a unique identifier so that the interest can be pre-filled into the individual tax declaration.
+
+- Amend the Tax Code to allow tax audits of individuals.
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+### **I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+**1.** **At 6.1 percent of GDP in 2021, the PIT is a significant source of revenue in Armenia**
+**(Table 1).** Since 2020, it has been levied at flat rates on both employment and passive capital income
+(dividends, interest, rental income, and royalties). Taxpayers who only derive income from
+employment or passive capital income are not required to file a tax declaration or return and are
+taxed on a withholding basis (see Section III).
+
+
+**Table 1. Armenia, Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP)**
+
+**2019** **2020** **2021**
+VAT 7.7% 7.6% 8.0%
+Excise tax 2.1% 2.0% 1.6%
+Profit tax (CIT) 3.6% 2.4% 2.3%
+Income tax (PIT) 6.7% 6.7% 6.1%
+Custom duties 1.5% 1.1% 1.2%
+Social security contributions 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%
+Other tax revenues 0.5% 2.2% 2.9%
+Other revenue 1.4% 2. 0% 1.2%
+**Total** **23.7%** **24.4%** **23.9%**
+_Source: MoF._
+
+**2.** **The authorities have expressed their intention to introduce a Universal PIT Declaration**
+**and have requested FAD assistance on the implementation of the measure.** This joint Tax Policy
+(FADT1) and Revenue Administration (FADR1) mission addressed the tax policy and administration
+challenges (and opportunities) of a Universal PIT Declaration. Its key characteristics, as currently
+envisioned by the authorities are as follows:
+
+
+ - The declaration would be implemented in stages: first civil servants (FY2024 reporting on
+FY2023), then employees (FY2025 reporting on FY2024), and finally other individual taxpayers
+(FY2026 reporting on FY2025).
+
+
+ - It would be yearly.
+
+
+ - It would be comprehensive, covering all types of income.
+
+
+**3.** **While it is primarily a collection and compliance issue, the introduction of systematic**
+**return filing by individuals has important tax policy ramifications** . First, the simplified and
+transparent computation of comprehensive income from various sources would be significantly
+facilitated by a PIT declaration. This, in turn, would allow for tax policies otherwise difficult to
+implement, including more progressivity in the PIT rate schedule as well as targeted tax incentives.
+Second, there is a long-term benefit in gathering individual information from taxpayers in terms of
+policy analysis. For instance, the distributional impact of tax expenditures (or the removal thereof)
+relies on the existence of high-quality taxpayer-level data, on employment income but also on
+capital income – all of which is made easier with the existence of comprehensive return filing. In this
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+mission, we focus on the first aspect of the tax policy implications, that is, how a declaration would
+pave the way for changes in the PIT, and how they would provide incentives for taxpayers to comply
+with return filing. In the process, a broad policy review of the PIT was conducted, which in turn led to
+policy recommendations not always conditional on the introduction of the declaration but
+nevertheless important in their own right (and consistent with previous TA provided by FAD in 2016
+and 2018). Microsimulations of the main reform options are developed, with the estimated impact of
+each option on revenue and progressivity.
+
+
+**4.** **The implementation of a Universal PIT Declaration presents the tax administration with**
+**significant challenges and opportunities.** The size and scope of this should not be underestimated.
+It will require a large and complex Information Technology (IT) build, communication with
+stakeholders, and it will impact on many in the community. Above all, it will be a new experience for
+taxpayers, and this will in itself raise many challenges.
+
+
+**5.** **This report is organized as follows.** Section II reviews tax policy aspects, Section III
+addresses tax administration, and Section IV lists capacity development needs.
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+#### **II. TAX POLICY**
+
+**A.** **Key Features of the PIT**
+
+**Labor and Capital Income**
+
+**6.** **Armenia’s PIT is a simple, easy-to-administer, dual income tax system with flat rates**
+**applying to both labor and capital income.** The 2020 reform eliminated progressivity in the PIT for
+all types of income (Table 2). As a result, employment income is taxed at a flat rate of 21 percent [1]
+with no standard personal allowance -- that is, income is taxed from the first AMD. Dividends are
+taxed at 5 percent while interest, rental income and royalties attract a 10 percent rate. Importantly,
+capital gains on the disposal of personal property are not taxed. As noted, PIT on employment and
+passive income, with only few exceptions, is withheld at source by employers, banks or other
+sources [2] .
+
+
+**Table 2. The 2018 Tax Reform** **[3]**
+
+
+
+**The 2019 system** **The current system (2022)**
+
+
+
+
+- Progressive labor income tax with a 23% tax
+rate on income up to a monthly income of
+AMD 150,000 AMD, 28% on monthly income
+in the range of AMD 150,000 and AMD 2
+million, and a 36% tax on income above AMD
+2 million.
+
+
+- The mandatory pension contribution is 2.5%
+of the monthly gross income (up to a
+monthly maximum base of AMD 500,000).
+There is no pension contribution on income
+above AMD 500,000.
+
+
+
+
+- A flat 21% tax rate on all income
+
+
+
+
+- The mandatory pension contribution is 2.5% - Pension contribution is 10%, of which 5.5% [4]
+of the monthly gross income (up to a is contributed by the state. There is a cap on
+monthly maximum base of AMD 500,000). the state contribution of 5.5% of a monthly
+There is no pension contribution on income gross income of AMD 500,000. In addition,
+above AMD 500,000. no pension contributions at all apply to
+
+gross monthly income in excess of 1.02
+million.
+
+- Taxpayers are allowed to claim any amount - Mortgage interest tax credit is allowable
+of tax due as a mortgage interest tax credit. only for properties with a value not
+
+
+
+_Source: MoF._
+
+
+
+
+- Mortgage interest tax credit is allowable
+only for properties with a value not
+exceeding AMD 55 million.
+
+
+
+**7.** **Social security contributions (SSCs) cover pensions only, with no SSCs for healthcare or**
+**unemployment insurance.** There are three pillars in the Armenian pension system: a budget
+
+
+1 Will be 20 percent from January 2023.
+
+
+
+2 See page 32 below for more details.
+
+
+
+3 The reform was decided in 2018 and implemented in 2020.
+
+
+
+4 Will be 5 percent from January 2023.
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+financed defined benefit component (Pillar I), a mandatory pension fund plan (Pillar II) and a
+voluntary pension fund component (Pillar III). From July 1, 2018, contributions to the pension fund
+plan (Pillar II) are mandatory for all employees born after January 1, 1974, including employees of the
+private sector. In 2021, there are 477,820 participants in Pillar II (or about 64 percent of individual
+taxpayers with PIT withheld on employment income, see Table 4). The rate of contribution for Pillar II
+is 10 percent of gross income, of which 5.5 percent is contributed by the state [5] and 4.5 percent by
+employees. Additionally, the state contribution on Pillar II is capped at 5.5 percent of a yearly income
+of AMD 6 million (2.6 times GDP per capita) – which tends to be progressive as the effective rate
+increases with income; and no contributions at all apply to yearly income in excess of AMD 12 24
+million (5.3 times GDP per capita) – which on the other hand contributes to the regressivity of the
+․
+system. [6] Pillar II contributions are not deductible for PIT purposes, and Pillar II pension payments are
+correspondingly tax-exempt. Pillar II is therefore a TEE pension system [7] . Voluntary pension plans
+(Pillar III) are, in contrast, deductible up to 5 percent of gross taxable income and corresponding
+pensions are taxable. Pillar III is ETT [8] . However, participation to Pillar III is negligible, with only 547
+participants as of June 2022.
+
+
+
+5 Will be 5 percent from January 2023.
+
+
+
+6 With these limits and rates, as of 2022, the employee’s average contribution rate is 5.5 percent up to a yearly income
+of AMD 6 million; it gradually rises to 7.3 percent over the AMD 6-12.2 million income range; and gradually declines
+for income above AMD 12.2 million (with a zero marginal contribution rate).
+
+
+
+7 Tax-Exempt-Exempt (TEE) means that contributions are taxed but earnings on those contributions as well as
+withdrawal of the benefit are not taxed.
+
+
+
+8 Exempt-Tax-Tax (ETT) means that contributions are exempt but earnings on those contributions as well as
+withdrawal of the benefit are taxed.
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+**Table 3. Key PIT and SSC Rates in Armenia and Comparator Countries, 2022**
+
+
+
+**Min**
+
+**PIT**
+**rate**
+
+
+
+**Top**
+
+**PIT**
+**rate**
+
+
+
+**PIT**
+**standard**
+**allowance**
+
+**(mult.**
+**GDP per**
+
+
+
+**PIT Top**
+**threshold**
+
+**(mult.**
+**GDP per**
+
+**cap.)**
+
+
+
+**Capital**
+
+**gains**
+
+
+
+**Divi-**
+**dends**
+
+
+
+**Interest** **Rents** **Royal-**
+
+**ties**
+
+
+
+**SSCs**
+**Employee**
+
+
+
+**SSCs**
+**Employer**
+
+
+
+**SSCs**
+**Total**
+
+
+
+**Tax**
+**Wedge**
+
+
+
+**cap.)**
+
+
+
+Albania 13.0% 23.0% 0.54 2.68 15.0% 8.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 11.2% 16.7% 27.9% 41.0%
+
+**5.5-**
+**Armenia** **21.0%** **21.0%** - - **0.0%** **5.0%** **10.0%** **10.0%** **10.0%** **5.5-7.3%** **0.0%** **26.0%** **[9]**
+**7.3%**
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+Azerbaijan 14.0% 25.0% - 3.28
+
+inc.
+
+0% on real
+Belarus 13.0% 13.0% 0.08 estate
+
+
+
+6.013.0% 1.0% 34.0% 35.0% 36.0%
+13.0%
+
+
+
+10.0% 10.0% 14.0% 14.0% 3.0% 22.0% 25.0% 40.0%
+inc.
+
+
+
+Bosnia and
+10.0% 10.0% 0.31 - 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 31.0% 10.5% 41.5% 44.0%
+Herz.
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+Bulgaria 10.0% 10.0% 0.02
+
+
+5.0% 8-10% 13.8% 18.5% 32.3% 35.0%
+inc.
+
+
+
+20% on
+Croatia 24.0% 36.0% 0.43 3.25 12.0% 12-40% 24.0% 24.0% 20.0% 18.2% 38.2% 57.0%
+real estate
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+Estonia 20.0% 20.0% 0.28
+
+
+
+ - [Ordinary ]
+inc. inc.
+
+
+
+inc.
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+
+
+
+inc.
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+
+
+
+3.6% 33.0% 36.6% 42.0%
+inc.
+
+
+
+Georgia 20.0% 20.0% - - 20.0% 5.0% 5.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0%
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+Kosovo 4.0% 10.0% 0.23 1.28
+
+inc.
+
+Ordinary
+Moldova 12.0% 12.0% 0.27
+
+
+inc.
+
+
+
+5.0% 5.0% 10.0% 19.0%
+
+
+
+6.0% 12.0% 12.0% 6.0% 18.0% 24.0% 30.0%
+inc.
+
+
+
+Montenegro 9.0% 9.0% - - 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 24.0% 8.3% 32.3% 36.0%
+
+
+
+North Ordinary
+10.0% 18.0% 0.28 3.08
+Macedonia inc.
+
+
+
+10.0% 28.0% 0.0% 28.0% 41.0%
+inc.
+
+10% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 6.3% 31.3% 36.0%
+
+13.013.0% 13.0% 0.0% 30.0% 30.0% 33.0%
+inc. 35.0%
+
+
+
+Romania 10.0% 10.0% 0.16 - 10% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 6.3% 31.3% 36.0%
+
+
+
+Ordinary
+Russia 13.0% 13.0% 0.04
+
+
+Serbia 10.0% 15.0% 3.26 6.52 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 20.0% 20.0% 19.9% 16.7% 36.6% 42.0%
+
+Slovenia 16.0% 50.0% 0.34 2.92 10-27.5% 27.5% 25.0% 27.5% 25.0% 22.1% 15.5% 37.6% 66.0%
+
+Turkey 15.0% 40.0% 0.28 7.67 10.0% 15.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 14.0% 27.0% 41.0% 59.0%
+
+Ukraine 18.0% 18.0% 0.10 - 5.0-18.0% 6.5% 19.5% 19.5% 19.5% 0.0% 22.0% 22.0% 33.0%
+
+_Source: IBFD, tax codes._
+
+
+
+**8.** **The PIT revenue performance continued to be impressive** . Armenia’s PIT revenue of 6.1
+percent of GDP in 2021 compares with a mere 3.7 percent of GDP in comparator countries on
+average [10] for the same year (Figure 1 and Appendix A). While in slight decline with respect to 2019
+and 2020 – possibly reflecting the suppression of the highest bracket during the 2018 reform (Table
+
+2) –, this is still an impressive performance. The relatively high average tax rate (22 percent in 2021)
+and, above all, an effective withholding collection mechanism are likely drivers of this encouraging
+outcome.
+
+
+9 Based on 5.5 percent employee contribution.
+
+10 Simple non-weighted average.
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+**Table 4. Summary Statistics based on Taxpayer Level Labor Income Data (2021)**
+
+
+
+Number of taxpayers with positive labor income 739,997
+Number of taxpayers contributing to Pillar II 477,820
+Number of taxpayers not contributing to Pillar II 260,134
+Number of taxpayers claiming mortgage interest tax credit (positive 20,426
+amount)
+
+
+
+20,426
+
+
+
+_Sources: SRC, IMF Staff calculations._
+
+
+
+**Figure 1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In**
+
+**Percent of GDP)**
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: FADTP ECOS Database (IMF)._
+
+
+**9.** **Armenia’s labor tax wedge is low but regressive (** Figure 2 **).** At 26.5 percent overall, the
+labor tax wedge ranks low among comparator countries (Figure 2, left panel). This is mainly due to
+low SSCs – with other countries in the region having significantly higher rates of social contributions
+(Table 3). This is a positive feature of labor taxation from a tax efficiency viewpoint [11], as it suggests
+that taxation alone is not a significant impediment to employment formalization generally. However,
+
+Figure 2 (right panel) shows that the tax wedge is in fact highest for low incomes, that is, markedly
+regressive. This is important in a context where informal employment still accounts for more than
+
+
+11 The efficiency of a tax system refers to its ability to influence the behavior of taxpayers – here the decision to enter
+formal employment.
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+one third of total employment [12], as it suggests that the labor tax wedge, while not high overall, could
+be a hurdle to the formalization of low-income earners.
+
+
+**Figure 2. Tax Wedge (2021)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Tax Wedges from Statutory Rates|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32|Col33|Col34|Col35|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|
+|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|||
+|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|||||
+|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|||||||
+|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|||||||||
+|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||
+|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||||||
+
+
+
+
+
+_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._
+
+_Notes: Tax Wedge = (PIT liability + Employee SCCs + Employer SCCs) / (Gross wage + Employer SCCs). The red_
+_vertical line in the right panel indicates the annual minimum wages for age over 35. Income is in thousands of AMD._
+
+
+**Business Income**
+
+
+**10.** **Business income earned by individuals is not taxed under the PIT** . Individual
+(unincorporated) businesses are taxed under one of the following regimes: individual businesses with
+a yearly turnover above AMD 115 million ($ 280,000) are mandated VAT taxpayers and subject to the
+standard CIT at 18 percent of profits (with standard deduction of business expenses [13] ); (ii) businesses
+with turnover between AMD 24 million ($ 60,000) and AMD 115 million can opt for the turnover
+
+
+12 35.8 percent of the labor force was informal in 2020 (source: Household Labor Force Survey).
+
+13 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 102 and following.
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+tax [14], where turnover is taxed at rates determined by the type of economic activity [15] ; (iii) Individual
+businesses with turnover below AMD 24 million can opt for the microenterprise regime (see
+below) [16] . In all three situations, business income is not taxed under the income tax (PIT).
+
+
+**11.** **The microenterprise regime provides total exemption of individual business income.**
+Individuals under the microenterprise regime only pay a lumpsum tax of AMD 5,000 per month and
+per employee [17] . An individual with no employees does not pay any tax under this regime (and is not
+enrolled under any of the mandatory pension schemes, Pillars I and II, and corresponding are not
+eligible to the pension benefits).
+
+**Incentives**
+
+**12.** **A commendable characteristic of the PIT is the reduced number of incentives** . There are
+only three incentive mechanisms, and they are all tax credits (not deductions), contributing to the
+simplicity of the system. However, incentives on mortgage interest and on the reinvestment of
+dividends appear exceedingly generous.
+
+
+**13.** **The tax credit on mortgage interest** **[18]** **is costly and regressive.** There is a 100 percent tax
+credit on interest paid on mortgage contracts to build or acquire individual residences from the
+primary market (new buildings). There are limits to this incentive: (i) After the 2018 reform, the value
+of the property must not exceed AMD 55 million ($ 0.14 million140,000); (ii) The maximum tax credit
+is AMD 6 million per year ($15,000) or the annual PIT liability of the taxpayer, whichever is lowest [19] ;
+(iii) Each physical person is entitled to only one incentivized mortgage contract in their lifetime.
+Despite these limitations, the amount of tax credit is considerable at AMD 22.7 billion in 2021 (or 5.3
+percent of overall PIT revenue). This incentive is also regressive, with the top decile of taxpayers
+claiming 90 percent of the credit (see detailed analysis page 24).
+
+
+**14.** **A tax credit on reinvested dividends** **[20]** **is excessively generous.** A 100 percent tax credit is
+granted on dividends reinvested (in the form of new shares or a value increase of existing shares).
+Conditions and limitations are that: (i) dividend reinvestments must take place during the same fiscal
+year dividends are distributed; and (ii) the tax credit is capped by the tax paid on dividends that year
+(5 percent of dividends). In practice, this mechanism enables investors to distribute dividends tax
+
+
+14 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 253 and following. They can also opt for the VAT and the standard CIT.
+
+
+
+15 For instance, 5 percent for trade, 3,5 percent for manufacturing, 10 percent for notaries. In addition, pension
+contributions of an individual under the turnover tax are as follows: (i) she will pay a yearly lumpsum profit tax of
+AMD 60,000 as enrollment under Pillar I; another lumpsum payment of the same amount is for Pillar II mandatory
+contributions.
+
+
+
+16 It can also opt for the turnover tax.
+
+
+
+17 Employees of an individual business under the microenterprise regime also pay standard pension contributions
+(withheld by their employer).
+
+
+
+18 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 160.
+
+19 Therefore, they can be no refund of the tax credit.
+
+
+
+20 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 159, Alinea 4.
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+free. For example, if reinvestment is set equal to the 5 percent tax (and no more), no net taxes are
+effectively paid; the investor obtains 95 percent of the distributed dividends tax-free, while retaining
+5 percent of that amount as equity. [21]
+
+
+**15.** **A tax credit on tuition fee targets students for graduate and post-graduate studies** **[22]**
+**has limited impact and cost to the system.** A 100 percent tax credit on tuition fees can be claimed
+by students (not their parents) – and is not refundable. Because students are typically not highincome earners, the amount of tax credit effectively used is low at AMD 200 million in 2021, limiting
+the impact and cost of this incentive.
+
+**B.** **Directions of Reforms**
+
+**16.** **The mortgage interest tax credit should be repealed for all new mortgage contracts,**
+**and at least strictly capped for existing mortgage contracts.** The authorities have confirmed their
+intention to repeal this incentive on new mortgage contracts in the Yerevan area. However, leaving
+the mechanism untouched on existing contracts would be a long-term revenue burden and a
+continued strong contribution to the regressivity of the system. It is recommended to repeal the
+incentive on all contracts, new and existing – while grandfathering existing contracts under limiting
+conditions [23] . Simulations presented below suggest that the incentive should be (i) repealed on all
+new contracts; (ii) on existing contracts, it could be grandfathered but capped at a value of interest of
+AMD 245,000 per year, per taxpayer, or gradually phased out by grandfathering only interest
+payments on mortgage contracts for the first three years of a contract.
+
+
+**17.** **The tax credit on reinvested dividends is overly generous and should be suppressed.**
+Because it provides a straightforward mechanism to effectively avoid any taxation of dividends, also
+contributing to the regressivity of the tax system, this incentive should be repealed.
+
+
+**18.** **Capital gains should be taxed.** Most jurisdictions impose tax on capital gains made by
+resident and non-residents from the disposal of immovable property and investment securities,
+including Armenia’s comparator countries (Table 3). The international experience shows that
+differential treatment of interest, dividends, and capital gains causes distortions in asset portfolios
+
+
+
+21 We received data on passive income (interest, dividend, etc.) at the withholding agent level (such as banks). The
+data for 2021 shows that before the tax credit, total due tax on dividend income was AMD 15.7 billion (0.22 percent of
+GDP). However, taxpayers claimed back 9.4 billion of the tax as a credit (0.13 percent of GDP). In other words, 60
+percent of the tax was claimed as a credit. Therefore, the effective tax rate on dividends was only 2 percent (i.e., 5
+percent statutory rate multiplied by 40 percent of the gross tax).
+
+
+
+22 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 160.1.
+
+
+
+23 UK’s Mortgage Interest Relief at Source (MIRAS) was abolished in 2000 without any grandfathering, but it had been
+gradually curtailed prior to its suppression to, eventually, cover only about 10 percent of interest payments. The 2021
+US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) capped the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) to interest deduction to the first
+$ 750,000 in principal value (down from $ 1 million), again with no grandfathering. In Ireland, the Tax Relief at Source
+(TRS) on mortgage interest was abolished in 2013 on new mortgages, but existing mortgages up to 2012 were
+grandfathered up to 2020, when the incentive was repealed entirely.
+
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+and erodes the capital income tax base. Neutral taxation of all capital income can minimize
+avoidance and strengthen revenue mobilization in a progressive manner. For these reasons, capital
+gains made by individuals on immovable property and investment securities should be taxed, as is
+the current practice in most countries, including Armenia’s peers (Table 3). To minimize distortions,
+the rate should be the same of that applying to interest (10 percent).
+
+
+**19.** **However, it is common practice for an individual’s home to be partially or wholly**
+**exempt from capital gains taxation.** [24] An exemption to capital gains taxation could be provided
+for a specific amount of the capital gains on primary residences. That exemption amount would be
+calibrated so it covers most or all of the capital gains for most taxpayers. As a result, there would be
+zero capital gains tax for most taxpayers on sale of their primary residence, but high-income
+individuals would still pay capital gains tax on the gain in excess of the exemption. The exemption
+amount would have to be set based on examination of housing markets and would have to be
+adjusted over time as housing prices change.
+
+
+**20.** **Microenterprises should benefit from a simplified collection mechanism, not a**
+**preferential regime.** The authorities plan to bring employees of microenterprises under the
+standard PIT regime (replacing and eliminating the monthly AMD 5,000 lumpsum tax per employee),
+a justified reform. However, the situation of the individuals under the microenterprise regime
+themselves (not their employees) is not addressed. While their employees would now be under the
+standard PIT (and Pillar II pension scheme), they would still benefit from total tax exemption and
+would still be outside the pension system. It is acknowledged that reforming this regime has
+implications on the turnover tax regime, as well as on the VAT, and is clearly outside the scope of this
+mission. It is nevertheless recommended to address this critical issue; FAD assistance could be
+provided.
+
+
+**21.** **A Universal PIT Declaration would make it possible to implement a more progressive**
+**PIT.** In the current situation with no yearly return filing, there is no practical mechanism for assessing
+the taxable income of an employee working only a few months during the year, or an employee with
+several sources of income. A Universal PIT Declaration would correct that and would make it possible
+to implement a zero-rated bracket or an In-Work Tax Credit (IWTC, see below) through the
+aggregation and annualization of taxable income, and the corresponding end-of-year refunds or tax
+top-up [25] .
+
+
+24 There are several reasons for the exemption. First, a capital gain on the disposal of a home will usually be “illusory”
+since the owner will normally have to use all the proceeds of sale to purchase another comparable home. Second,
+there will be a continuing problem of determining the value base of a home as all expenditures on repairs, alterations,
+and extensions would need to be accounted for and classified into those that enhanced the value of the home (and,
+therefore, included in determining the value base of the home) and those that related only to the use or enjoyment of
+the home. Third, a home is commonly owned for long periods and, over time, a taxpayer may not retain the records
+of expenditures necessary to properly determine the value base of the home.
+
+25 Before the 2018 reform, with no universal declaration, progressivity was indeed only partially implemented, with no
+end-of-year regularizations.
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+**22.** **A zero-rated bracket would re-introduce progressivity into the system** . Introducing a
+zero-rated bracket (minimum income level to be liable to PIT) would be consistent with the practice
+of country comparators and international practice generally [26], as taxing labor income from the first
+dollar is detrimental to the perceived equity of the tax system and provides negative incentives to
+enter formal employment (a relevant issue in Armenia, as noted). In the context of the introduction
+of the PIT Declaration, a zero-rated bracket would also be an incentive to comply with it. Simulations
+presented below show that combining the repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit with the
+introduction of a zero-rated bracket with an upper threshold of AMD 240,000 [27] (or 0.13 times GDP
+per capita – at the lower end of the experience of the comparator countries, see Table 3) would have
+limited overall impact on revenue while significantly enhancing progressivity. However, if taken in
+isolation, the revenue impact of the measure, even with relatively low threshold (AMD 240,000, or
+only 0.13 percent of GDP per capita), would not be negligible at 0.46 percent of GDP. Furthermore, a
+zero-rated bracket creates new opportunities for tax evasion, notably by fraudulently splitting
+individual incomes. For these reasons, it is advisable to condition the implementation of a zero-rated
+bracket not only on the effective repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit but also to an assessment
+of the administrative implementation capacity, including auditing capacity (see Section III on
+auditing).
+
+
+**23.** **An IWTC** **[28]** **would further improve progressivity and incentivize employment**
+**formalization** . In addition to a zero-rated bracket, an IWTC would make full use of a Universal PIT
+Declaration, and would also provide incentives to comply with it, further enhancing progressivity and
+improving incentives to low-skill and part-time workers to join formal employment. Simulations
+below show that the net fiscal cost of an IWTC can be made manageable as a function of its key
+characteristics (maximum credit, range of eligible income), especially when combined with revenueenhancing measures such as the repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit. Nevertheless, it is
+acknowledged that an IWTC, which implies net outlays to taxpayers, poses specific compliance and
+fraud risks. A well-functioning IWTC assumes sufficient compliance management capacity, including,
+critically, auditing capacity. For these reasons, like the zero-rated bracket above but more so as it
+involved net outlays, the implementation of an IWTC in Armenia must be subject to a careful
+assessment of administrative implementation capacity and is not likely to be implementable in the
+short term.
+
+
+
+26 Most UE countries have a zero-rated bracket or a standard allowance.
+
+
+
+27 This income level is based on numerical simulations as an acceptable trade-off between revenue loss and gains in
+progressivity (see next sub-section).
+
+
+
+28 For a given worker, the value of a typical IWTC varies with employment with the objective of encouraging entry into
+formal employment: it quickly increases as employment income rises from zero; after reaching a maximum amount, it
+diminishes as income reaches higher levels. Examples of IWTC employment-contingent payments include those in the
+United States (the Earned Income Tax Credit), the United Kingdom (the Working Tax Credit, moving to the Universal
+Credit), Sweden (the Earned Income Tax Credit), Belgium (In-Work Benefit), France (the Prime d’Activité), Canada (SelfSufficiency Program), and Ireland (the Family Income Supplement). Most IWTCs are contingent on earned income
+alone (US, Sweden, France) while some include labor hours as well as low earnings as a specific condition of
+entitlement. See Immervoll and Pearson (2009).
+
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+**24.** **“Social credits” such as PIT credits or deductions for health or education spending are**
+**not advisable.** While a Universal PIT Declaration would make it easier to implement such tax credits
+or deductions, they would likely be regressive – benefitting those households that can afford them;
+could erode the revenue performance of the PIT (as shown by the revenue impact of the mortgage
+interest tax credit); are not the standard approach to building redistributive health insurance systems,
+which is through social security contributions, or other sources of resource, levied in addition to or
+beside the PIT. This topic is outside the scope of this mission and specific FAD advice could be
+provided on social protection.
+
+**C.** **Impact of Reforms Options on Revenue and Progressivity**
+
+**Progressivity and Redistributive Capacity of The Current PIT**
+
+**25.** **The PIT is currently characterized by low progressivity and low redistributive capacity.**
+The flat and relatively high tax rate, the absence of standard allowance or zero-rated bracket, a
+highly regressive mortgage interest tax credit, and the cap on pension contribution limit the
+progressivity of the tax system. Figure 3 shows that that the redistributive capacity of Armenia’s PIT is
+at the lowest end of its regional peers.
+
+
+**Figure 3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Notes: The redistributive capacity measures the difference between the Gini coefficients of income before and after tax_
+_respectively. Progressivity measures the difference between the Gini coefficients of tax and pre-tax income (the more the_
+_tax is concentrated on high incomes, the stronger the progressivity). The average tax rate is the ratio of total revenue_
+_collected to total pre-tax income (i.e., revenue to GDP ratio). See Appendix B for methodological orientations._
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+_Sources: Tax code, SWIID 9.2, World Revenue Longitudinal Database (IMF), IBFD, EY, IMF Staff computations._
+
+
+**26.** **The introduction of the flat tax system in 2020 has been associated with a fall in PIT**
+**revenue and has reduced the progressivity of the tax system.** Although the tax system before the
+reform had some of the regressive elements maintained in the current system such as mortgage
+interest tax credit and cap on pension contribution, the progressive tax rates contributed to its
+progressivity and revenue mobilization potential (Figure 4). The comparison of the two systems
+shows that the redistributive index and progressivity index decreased from 0.31 to -0.32 and from
+1.32 to 0.02, respectively. In addition, although attribution is difficult, the reform was concomitant
+with a revenue loss from PIT to the amount of 0.7 percent of GDP [29] .
+
+
+**Figure 4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+29 Note that some of the loss may be due to the way the tax is simulated. In the 2021 system, since tax rate is a flat 22
+percent, it does not matter whether a person has one job or two or three. However, in a progressive rate structure (the
+2019 system) and in the absence of a comprehensive income declaration, income splitting may lower one’s tax liability.
+The simulation presented in this section assumes a comprehensive declaration. Therefore, the estimated revenue loss
+is at the higher end of possible revenue loss from the reform. Also, as our microdata is limited to labor income, the
+simulation only captures the impact of the tax policy change on this income category, ignoring individual entrepreneurs
+possibly switching to the microenterprise regime.
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+**Simulations**
+
+**27.** **The key reform options recommended above have been simulated using a**
+**microsimulation model based on taxpayer-level data** . We use the 2021 taxpayer-level data to
+analyze the impact of the reforms on revenue, distribution, and progressivity. Although wage income
+is taxed through final withholding, the State Revenue Committee (SRC) receives information on
+individual employment income and withheld tax. Employees have a Public Social Number that
+uniquely identifies them in the micro data received from the SRC. In addition, individual taxpayers file
+a mortgage deduction claim every quarter using the SRC’s e-filing portal. The mission received both
+data separately and merged them using the unique Public Social Number. The simulations presented
+below are based on this merged dataset. On the other hand, lack of taxpayer level passive income
+data (interest, dividend, and rental income) means that this type of income is not included in our
+simulations. Table 5 summarizes the five simulated options.
+
+
+**Table 5. Summary of Proposed Options**
+
+Scenarios Assumptions
+
+Current - Income tax rate of 22%. [30]
+
+ - The social contribution is 3.5% up to AMD 6,000,000 and 10% for income above
+AMD 6,000,000. If annual income is above AMD 12,240,000, then pension
+contribution is capped at AMD 828,000.
+
+ - Mortgage interest tax credit that does not exceed the income tax due.
+
+Option 1a - Current system with:
+
+ - Elimination of the tax credit for mortgage interest.
+
+Option 1b - Current system with:
+
+ - A limit, rather than complete elimination, of the mortgage interest tax credit
+
+ - We set the threshold for the credit such that 20 percent of the credit is preserved.
+The resulting threshold is AMD 245,000 per year. [31]
+
+Option 2 - Option 1a with:
+
+ - Zero tax rate up to an annual income of AMD 240,000. [32]
+
+Option 3 - Option 2 with:
+
+ - In-work tax credit (IWTC) that:
+
+ - (i) linearly increases with income from a basic amount of AMD 15,000 to a maximum
+of AMD 53,000 over the AMD 0 – 240,000 income range (for this segment, the
+Government would make net payments to taxpayers); (ii) is constant in nominal
+
+
+
+30 Based on the 2020 tax reform the flat tax rate on labor income was set to decrease from 23 percent in 2020 to 22
+percent in 2021, 21 percent in 2022, and 20 percent from 2023 on.
+
+
+
+31 Note that with a flat tax rate of 22 percent as of 2021 and an exchange rate of AMD 503 per USD, a credit of AMD
+245,000 is equivalent to an AMD 1.12 million ($ 2,214) tax deduction.
+
+
+
+32 The parameters are selected based on two criteria. First, we consider the practice in peer countries. The median PIT
+threshold for zero brackets is 25 percent of GDP Per capita. However, due to the skewed income distribution in
+Armenia, such a threshold will lead to significant revenue loss. Therefore, we adjust the threshold to 14 percent of
+GDP per capita (the top income in the first decile).
+
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+(AMD) terms over the AMD 240,000 – 520,000 range; and (iii) linearly decreases with
+income from AMD 53,000 to 0 over the AMD 520,000-800,000 AMD range. [33]
+
+_Source: IMF Staff calculations._
+
+_Note: All income figures are annual amounts._
+
+**Eliminating the Mortgage Interest Tax Credit**
+
+**28.** **The mortgage interest tax credit in Armenia is highly skewed to high income earners.** A
+significant share of the credit is claimed by few taxpayers (20 percent claiming above 50 percent of
+the credit, see Figure 5, top panels). In addition, when combined with individual income data, the
+analysis shows that the top 10 percent of taxpayers for reported income claim 90 percent of all
+credits, making this incentive particularly regressive (Figure 5, lower left panel).
+
+
+**Table 6. Summary of The Existing Mortgage Interest Credit System**
+
+
+
+Category Description
+
+
+
+Mortgage Interest Tax Credit
+Rules
+
+
+
+The quarterly limit for mortgage interest credit is AMD 1.5 million.
+
+
+
+Number of Taxpayers Claiming the
+Credit
+
+
+Total Mortgage Interest Credit
+Claimed in 2021
+
+_Source: MoF._
+
+
+
+An apartment/house with value above AMD 55 million is not eligible for
+
+the mortgage deduction.
+
+
+20,400
+
+
+AMD 22.7 billion (5.3% of total PIT Revenue)
+
+
+
+**29.** **Eliminating the mortgage interest credit improves progressivity, redistributive capacity**
+**of the tax system, and revenue mobilization** . As higher income earners benefit more from the
+mortgage interest credit, the removal of the tax credit for mortgage interest improves the progressivity
+and redistributive capacity of the tax system (Figure 5 lower right panel). The redistributive capacity
+index increases to 0.36 from -0.3 whereas progressivity increases from 0.02 to 1.6. As of 2021, the
+government credits back 22.7 billion of potential tax revenue to those that claim mortgage interest
+credit (see Table ). A reform that eliminates these credits would raise revenue by 0.34 percent of GDP
+or 5.3 percent of current government revenue from PIT [34] . Finally, the authorities indicated that there
+is evidence that the introduction of this tax credit fueled a boom in mortgage credit and real estate
+demand. Removing it could therefore support the stability of financial markets as well.
+
+
+33 520,000 AMD is the highest income for those in the bottom two deciles (the 20th percentile).
+
+34 Revenue from PIT in 2021 was AMD 426.7 billion.
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+**Figure 5. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Reforming Mortgage Interest Credit**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Average Mortgage Interest Credit
decile
4000
AMD)by
3000
Credit('000
2000
Interest
Mortgage 1000
Average
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of mortgage interest credit|Total Mortgage Interest Credit
decile
8000
by
AMD)
6000
Credit(million
4000
Interest
2000
Mortgage
Total 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of mortgage interest credit
t)|
+|---|---|
+|0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
mortgage interest credit claimed by each Decile(percent)
0
5
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Decile of income
The Share of Mortgage Interest Credit Claimed|0
50000 100000 150000
Number of Taxpayers
0
5
10 15 20 25 30
Average Effective Tax Rate(percen
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000
16000
17000
18000
19000
20000
Annual Income ('000 AMD)
current
option1a
number of taxpayers
Armenia: Effective Tax Rate by Income Level|
+
+
+
+_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations_
+
+_Notes: (a) The upper left panel describes the average mortgage interest credit (in thousands of AMD); (b) The upper right_
+_panel describes the total mortgage interest credit claimed by decile (in millions of AMD). (iii) The lower left panel_
+_describes the distribution of mortgage interest credit by income level. (iv) The lower right panel shows the distribution of_
+_the effective tax rate._
+
+
+**30.** **However, unless the reform deals with the existing stock of mortgages, the revenue**
+**loss continues to be significant over the next decade** . As Figure 6 shows (Option A), even if new
+mortgages issued starting from 2023 stop being eligible [35], the revenue loss from existing stock of
+mortgages continues to be a significant drain on the government revenue. Therefore, any policy that
+aims at minimizing the revenue loss and introducing progressivity has to deal with limiting the
+benefit for existing stock of mortgages.
+
+
+35 The authorities plan to stop new mortgages that are issued after 2023 in Yerevan from being eligible for the
+mortgage interest credit. As of 2021, 97 percent of all mortgages are issued for properties in Yerevan and 95 percent
+of interest credit is from properties in Yerevan. As a result, the planned reform will almost completely stop the
+issuance of new mortgages eligible for tax credit.
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+**Figure 6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: CBA and IMF Staff calculations._
+
+_**Option A**_ _is the current policy, including the announced suppression of the tax credit on any mortgage issued after January_
+_2023 in Yerevan_ _[36]_ _. Under this scenario, all mortgages issued until 2022 continue to receive tax credit until the end of the_
+_contract._
+_**Option B**_ _involves limiting the number of years a mortgage can qualify for tax credit, starting in 2023. Under this_
+_scenario, all mortgages would continue to qualify for tax credit but only for three years since being issued._
+
+_**Option C-Option F**_ _involve imitating the amount of tax credit per mortgage, starting in 2023. In option C, the limit is_
+_AMD 1 million, in option D the limit is AMD 750,000, in option E the limit is AMD 525,000, and finally in option F the limit_
+_is AMD 245,000._
+
+
+**31.** **Limiting the mortgage interest credit on existing contracts rather than its complete**
+**removal may ease implementation while maintaining the revenue gain and an increase in**
+**progressivity.** The proposed cap of AMD 245,000 [37] on annual mortgage interest tax credit (Option F)
+limits the credit claimed to 20 percent of current level. As a result, it increases government revenue by
+0.27 percent of GDP compared to the baseline (current system). In addition, the redistribution and
+
+
+36 Since Yerevan accounts for 95 percent of all mortgages, the policy amounts to eliminating mortgage interest tax
+credit from 2023 on.
+
+37 We allocate 20 percent of the claim on the existing stock of mortgages to be still available. The interest credit
+threshold that still leaves 20 percent of the credit claimed in 2021 is AMD 245,000. Note that with a flat tax rate of 22
+percent as of 2021 and an exchange rate of 503 AMD per USD, a credit of AMD 245,000 is equivalent to an AMD 1.12
+million ($ 2,214) tax deduction.
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+progressivity indexes increase from -0.3 to 0.38 and 0.02 to 1.68, respectively. Figure 7 illustrates how
+the effective tax rates increases with income under various reforms scenarios.
+
+
+**Figure 7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Note: In option 1a we assume that the mortgage interest credit is eliminated for all contracts. In option 1b, a cap of AMD_
+_245,000 (Option F) is assumed on existing mortgages rather than an immediate zeroing of the benefit._
+
+
+**Introducing a Zero-Rate Bracket [Option 2]**
+
+**32.** **With its favorable revenue and distributional impact as well as relative ease of**
+**administration, a zero-rated bracket could be considered** . The proposed standard deduction of
+AMD 240,000 is 13 percent of GDP per capita and is equivalent to $ 593. The proposed threshold is at
+the lower end of peer countries as a multiple of GDP per capita (see Table 3) and has been set running
+simulations – seeking a adequate balance between revenue losses and progressivity gains. Introducing
+this standard tax deduction in addition to changing the mortgage interest credit rule increases the
+redistributive and progressivity index by 1.9 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively. If combined with
+the elimination of the mortgage interest credit, on net, government revenue remains close to the
+baseline current system (Figure 10).
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+**Figure 8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._
+
+
+**Introducing an IWTC**
+
+**33.** **An IWTC incentivizes formalization and further increases progressivity with limited**
+**revenue loss** **[38]** . In this illustrative scenario, we introduce an IWTC in addition to a zero-rated bracket
+and the elimination of the mortgage interest tax credit. An IWTC is simulated with the characteristics
+specified under Option 3 (see Table 5): at the lowest income levels (below AMD 240,000), the IWTC is
+a net outlay (as the PIT rate is zero) which increases with income, rewarding additional labor supply;
+at higher income levels, the IWTC only decreases gradually (above EUR 53,000), which is also
+incentive-compatible with increased labor supply. This IWTC implies that the lowest 10 percent of
+labor income earners receive a net payment from the Government. Such a reform significantly
+improves the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the tax and transfer system (from -0.32 to
+2.57 and from 0.02 to 9.41 respectively). As Figure 9, right panel, shows, this impact is due to a large
+reduction in the effective tax rate of low-income taxpayers. In addition, the revenue loss associated
+with the reform is minimal (0.19 percent of GDP). The proposed standard deduction and IWTC will be
+relatively revenue neutral even with only capping the tax credit on existing mortgage contracts,
+
+
+38 For a context regarding the in-work credit, the earned income tax credit in the US ranges from $560 to $6,935.
+Adjusting for GDP per capita difference, the minimum credit is 16,000 AMD. Considering the revenue implication, we
+choose a slightly lower value of 15000 AMD. The maximum credit in our scenario is equivalent to $1,980.
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+rather than its complete elimination [39] . The progressivity and redistribution indexes, compared to
+baseline, increase from 0.02 to 9.28 and from -0.32 to 2.47, respectively.
+
+
+**Figure 9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Summary of Impact on Revenue**
+
+**34.** **Reforming the mortgage interest tax credit enables the introduction of a standard**
+**allowance and an IWTC in a close to revenue-neutral way** . As Figure 10 shows, stopping the credit
+including for the existing stock of mortgages increases government revenue by at least 0.34 percent
+of GDP [40] . Grandfathering the existing stock of mortgages with a limit on the amount of credit they can
+
+
+39 Note that option 4 (limiting the mortgage interest credit) includes the standard deduction and in-work credit.
+
+40 The figure we included is calculated as AMD 22.7 billion of mortgage credit as of 2021 divided by a GDP of AMD
+6.983 trillion. The tax expenditure report issued by the Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, is estimated to be AMD
+38 billion for 2022. The main difference between the actual benefit provided (AMD 22.7 billion) and the estimated tax
+expenditure (AMD 38 billion) is that the former (actual) accounts for all the limitations on the credit. These include the
+AMD 6 million annual cap. And some of the mortgages may not even get the entire AMD 6 million cap as there is a 1.5
+million quarterly cap. i.e., If the mortgage interest in the first quarter, for instance, is AMD 1 million and 1.7 million in
+the other three quarters, the taxpayer will only get AMD 5.5 million instead of the whole 6 million credit. In fact, our
+simulations show that once these factors are accounted for, the mortgage interest tax credit claims in 2021 drop from
+AMD 38 billion to 22.7 billion.
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+claim annually (AMD 245,000) keeps the revenue gain while enabling a smoother transition [41] . Finally,
+coupling standard deduction and IWTC with elimination of mortgage interest credit leads to minimal
+loss of revenue (0.19 percent of GDP) compared to the current scenario. As mentioned, caveats apply
+on the feasibility of introducing a zero-rated bracket and an IWTC in the short term.
+
+
+**Figure 10. PIT Revenue across Scenarios**
+
+
+Revenue, tax credit, and mortgage interest credit as a share of GDP
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|5.82 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.81|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|
+|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|||0.62|||||0.62|||||0.62|||||0.6|||||0.62||||
+|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|
+
+
+
+current option1a option1b option2 option3
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._
+
+_Note: SSC is social security contributions from all pension pillars._
+
+
+**Tax Policy Recommendations**
+
+ - Repeal the tax credit on mortgage interest, with grandfathering of existing contracts with
+yearly interest below an upper limit in the range of AMD 245,0000-300,000, which could yield
+up to 0.27 percent of GDP in new tax revenue and significantly improve progressivity of the
+tax system.
+
+ - Repeal the tax credit on reinvested dividends, which could yield at least 0.13 percent of GDP
+in new revenue.
+
+
+41 In this scenario (cap on mortgage credit), government revenue increases by 0.27 percent of GDP capered to the
+current system.
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+- Introduce a 10 percent withholding tax on capital gains, excluding capital gains on housing to
+the sale of a taxpayers’ primary residence, up to a specific amount to be calibrated so it covers
+most or all capital gains for most taxpayers.
+
+ - Conditionally, on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of
+individuals) and on the fiscal feasibility of the measure, introduce a zero-rated PIT bracket
+with an upper threshold in the range of AMD 240,000-300,000 annually, which would cost
+about 0.46 percent of GDP.
+
+ - Conditionally, on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of
+individuals), consider the introduction of an IWTC that is annually capped at AMD 53,000 and
+phase out for income above AMD 800,000, which could cost about 0.19 percent of GDP.
+## **III. TAX ADMINISTRATION**
+
+**A.** **Current Administrative System**
+
+**35.** **The State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia (SRC) is the national Tax**
+**Administration.** It is charged with maintaining the current system of taxation of individuals who are
+not in business as long as it is required and implementing the new Universal Declaration Policy (the
+Policy) through creating the Universal Declaration Administrative System (the System). The two
+systems will operate in parallel until the current system is redundant.
+
+
+**36.** **Armenia’s tax system is a self-assessment system.** **[42]** Under this system the income and
+claims a taxpayer makes in their declaration are accepted by the tax administration after electronic
+pre-assessment checks and an assessment notice is issued. Even though a declaration may be initially
+accepted it may still be subject to further risk based post-assessment review or adjustments if thirdparty data is corrected. Currently the SRC has no legislative power to undertake audits of PIT
+Taxpayers. It is recommended that the Tax Code is amended to allow tax audits of individuals This is
+an important consideration in the design of the new system.
+
+
+**37.** **Individuals are not subject to audit.** As pointed out by the 2016 and 2018 FAD capacity
+development (CD) missions, the law allows audit of companies but not individuals (natural persons).
+With sufficient information collection mechanisms in place, audits by tax authorities should act as an
+incentive for increased compliance and tax collection from individuals. The introduction of a
+Universal PIT Declaration, with the collection of comprehensive information on individual taxpayers,
+is an excellent opportunity and justification to include natural persons in the scope of audits.
+
+
+**38.** **Under the current system, individual taxpayers who are not in business (i.e., only derive**
+**income from employment or passive income) are not required to file a tax declaration or**
+
+
+42 As advised by MoF.
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+**return.** The current system is streamlined because employees are taxed on a flat rate of 21 percent [43]
+with no threshold, as noted. The final PIT is withheld by the employer, reported electronically, and
+paid to the SRC monthly. Withholders of taxes are called Tax Agents. The reporting includes a wide
+range of information, including name and a unique identifier. There is also withholding and reporting
+to the SRC of passive income by payers (Tax Agents) and this includes, interest, dividends, royalties,
+and some rental arrangements. There is no reporting system for rental income where the rental is
+arranged privately and not by a rental agent (Tax Agent). The extent of noncompliance is unknown.
+
+
+**39.** **There are several incentives that are provided through the tax system.** Taxpayers claim
+these through various systems on a quarterly or annual basis, depending on the benefit (see
+description above). They claim a refund from tax withheld and it is paid into a bank account.
+
+
+**40.** **There are many of the necessary foundations for the new Universal Declaration**
+**Administrative System already in place.** These include a mature withholding tax system with
+58,945 [44] employers, 739,997 [45] employees, and mandatory electronic lodgment of the withholding
+return. However, they do not report information to identify the owner of the account to the SRC.
+
+
+**41.** **Importantly, there are good IT systems and infrastructure in place.** Since 2010 all
+functions have been automated. There has been significant World Bank support in this area.
+
+**B.** **Universal Declaration Administrative System**
+
+**42.** **The proposed Universal Declaration Administrative System** **[46]** **for PIT is a major reform**
+**in size and scope** . It will require a significant IT build, will have wide ranging community impacts,
+and will require good communication with all stakeholders, in particular the affected taxpayers. It is
+important to note that this is not just an IT challenge, it will impact on many areas of the SRC. The
+SRC advised that it is expected that the IT build would take twelve months to complete once the
+legislation is passed.
+
+
+**43.** **Many countries have implemented a system of Universal Declaration** . [47] They have
+developed Universal Declaration Administrative Systems to support their declaration regimes which
+
+
+
+43 Rates to change to 20 percent in 2023.
+
+
+
+44 See International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) Data 2018.
+
+
+
+45 See T able 4 above.
+
+
+
+46 See high-level description of the system in Prime Ministers Decree N 919 2022-2025 Program for Managing Tax
+Revenue.
+
+
+
+47 See, for example, Tax Administration 2021, Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging
+Economies, OECD, page 334.
+
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+may go by many different names and “brands”. [48] A simulator of the Australian tax return system for
+individual taxpayers was provided to MoF and SRC staff. [49]
+
+
+**44.** **In summary, the proposed Universal Declaration Administrative System will operate on**
+**the following basis.** The SRC will continue to collect withholding tax and identifying data from
+employers and passive income providers. This data and the data that it already holds (e.g., the data
+in the register of employees) will be presented electronically to an individual as a prefilled return. The
+individual will either accept or add missing income (e.g., Private Rental Arrangements and income
+not reported by a Tax Agent). If the taxpayer does not sign the declaration after a certain period, it
+will be taken as deemed acceptance by the taxpayer. [50] Below is a high-level timeline for the launch
+of the new system.
+
+
+**Figure 11. Implementation Timeline**
+
+
+_Source: IMF Staff._
+
+
+**45.** **Taxpayers** **will then electronically “sign” the return and make a declaration that it is**
+**true and correct.** If they do not sign the return within sixty days (based on international good
+
+
+
+
+
+48 For example, the Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) system is branded myTax which is a registered trademark.
+
+
+
+[49 See ATO simulator at https://onlineservicessimulator.ato.gov.au/.](https://onlineservicessimulator.ato.gov.au/)
+
+
+
+50 There are at least fifteen countries with deemed acceptance: Austria, Belgium, Cabo Verde, Denmark, Finland,
+France, Grenada, Hungary, Malta, Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa. See ISORA Data
+2022.
+
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+practice), it will be deemed as accepted by the taxpayer (deemed acceptance). In Box 2 below is an
+example of the declaration that is required in the Australian tax return for individual taxpayers. [51]
+
+
+**Box 2. Declaration from the Australian tax return**
+
+I declare that:
+
+ - all the information on this tax return, including pre-filled information, is true and correct
+
+ - all the income I have to declare for 2021-22 is included, and
+
+ - I have the necessary receipts and other records – or expect to obtain the necessary written evidence within
+a reasonable time of lodging this tax return - to support my claims for deductions and tax offsets.
+
+
+**46.** **The Universal Declaration Administrative System is planned to be introduced on a**
+**phased approach from 2024 reporting FY2023 income.** Importantly, the first Phase will include
+State and Municipal employees, citizens of the Republic of Armenia (RoA) holding public positions,
+shareholders of companies, private entrepreneurs and notaries public, and individuals earning
+income without withholding tax withheld by a Tax Agent. Figure 12 below sets out the three phases.
+It is estimated that 200,000 taxpayers will be involved in Phase 1. [52] Phasing is supported by the
+Mission Team as it mitigates several implementation risks.
+
+
+**Figure 12. The Three Phases**
+
+
+_Source: Armenia MoF._
+
+
+**47.** **The final Universal Declaration Detailed Policy (the Policy) that can be used to build a**
+**new system has not yet been finalized and approved by the Government of Armenia** **[53]** **.** There is
+no conclusive statement of the Policy as it is still in development. At this stage there are questions
+outstanding, for example, who will be included in the declaration population has not been
+determined. For example, should all citizens, minors, people, for example, on a non-taxable pension
+and others who have no legal obligation to participate in the tax system be included. Including those
+
+
+
+
+
+51 In the Australian tax system, the return must be signed. There is no provision for deemed acceptance.
+
+
+
+52 Source MoF.
+
+
+
+53 The High-Level Policy is in Prime Ministers Decree N 919 2022-2025 Program for Managing Tax Revenue.
+
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+people who have no legal obligation to participate in the tax system will add complexity to the
+system.
+
+
+**48.** **The Mission Team were advised that the Universal Declaration Policy would be**
+**finalized by the end of December 2022.** In the interim, it is essential that the MoF and SRC work
+together on the design to ensure that it can be implemented efficiently and effectively with low costs
+of compliance by the taxpayers. It is recommended that a working group be formed with both senior
+MOF and SRC staff and the staff who will build and operate the new Universal Declaration
+Administrative System to resolve some of the outstanding issues.
+
+
+**49.** **Once the Policy is approved by Cabinet, further legislation will be required to give**
+**effect to the Policy** . For example, there is no legislative power to review and alter the declaration by
+the SRC after acceptance or deemed acceptance. [54] To undertake such a review using indirect audit
+techniques, in the most egregious cases, would require access to full bank information in those
+cases. [55] The additional indirect audit methods recommended in the recent IMF-FAD report [56] would
+need to be incorporated into the Tax Code.
+
+
+**50.** **There are several design principles that were identified by the mission team that**
+**should be kept in mind.** They are based on a strong focus on the user experience (UX). This is
+essential for the adoption of the system by the community. UX design is entirely focused on users,
+which makes usability of the design one of the most crucial user experience design principles. The
+basic principle is it will not get take up by the users unless it is easy to use.
+
+
+**51.** **The identified international good practice design principles are in** Box 3 **below and are**
+**self-explanatory.** There may be other design principles identified when the Policy is final.
+
+**Box 3. International Good Practice Design Principles**
+
+The Universal Declaration Administrative System should:
+
+ - Be implemented on the phased approach as planned.
+
+ - Prefill data, as much as possible, from third-party data (including interest income from banks) and
+information held on SRC systems.
+
+ - Be based on the principle of reporting to government agencies only once.
+
+ - Be a secure online system able to be accessed on computers and other devices.
+
+ - Bring together in one place not only incomes, but all benefits (tax transfers) that are provided through the
+tax systems.
+
+
+
+54 It is common in Universal Declaration systems for third-party data providers to re-report data because of errors.
+
+55 See recommendations in IMF-FAD Report, _Republic of Armenia Tax Compliance - Indirect Audit Methods_, September
+2021.
+
+56 See recommendations in IMF-FAD Report, _Republic of Armenia Tax Compliance - Indirect Audit Methods_, September
+2021.
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+**52.** **The mission team recommends that, in line with international good practice, SRC**
+**prefills the Universal Declaration as much as possible** . In this situation, the tax administration,
+rather than the taxpayer, is the originator of the declaration for a majority of the personal income
+taxpayer population, using a large range of third-party information sources and other information
+held by it, which is relevant to each taxpayer’s tax affairs. In countries where these arrangements
+have been established on a comprehensive basis, prefilled returns are made available to the relevant
+taxpayer electronically for their confirmation, or if necessary, to obtain any additional information
+required to enable a final assessment to be made. There are limitations that will depend on the tax
+system, as to the extent to which complete and accurate prefilled returns can be generated for the
+bulk of the taxpayer population. Based on international good practice, the declaration would be
+available on a secure online system.
+
+
+**53.** **As noted, in the current system the Armenian banks are not required to report interest**
+**income with a unique identifier for the holder of the account.** In the new system this means that
+interest income will not be able to pre-filled, and it may undermine the Government’s policy intent
+for the Universal Declaration. It will mean that all income will not be disclosed. The Mission Team
+met with the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank who advised the Mission Team that an agreement
+can be reached where the banks would be required to provide this data to the SRC for the purposes
+of prefilling the Universal Declaration.
+
+
+**54.** **There are several foundational issues that need to be considered, particularly the**
+**taxpayer register, compliance with the current system, and the withholding system** . A
+comprehensive system of taxpayer registration and identification is critical for the effective operation
+of a Universal Declaration Regime. The SRC has an employee register in place. There does not appear
+to be register of individuals who earn passive income and so the taxpayer register is not complete. It
+is also important that the withholding system is robust and as many employers who should be in the
+system are in the system. It is important that there are high compliance levels with the current
+system to ensure a smooth transition to the new system. A number of compliance risks that impact
+on the new system were raised, including Rental income and Freelancers. It is recommended that the
+SRC, using Compliance Risk Management processes [57], undertake Risk Assessments on the Taxpayer
+Register, Rental Income, Freelancers, Seasonal Workers, and the Platform Economy and develop
+appropriate Compliance Improvement Plans [58] . Changes to the law may be required to address these
+risks.
+
+
+57 See _Revenue Administration: Compliance Risk Management: Overarching Framework to Drive Revenue Performance_,
+[IMF at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-Management-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479)
+[Management-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-Management-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479)
+
+[58 See Compliance Risk Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans, IMF at Compliance Risk](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/03/18/Compliance-Risk-Management-Developing-Compliance-Improvement-Plans-515263)
+[Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans (imf.org).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/03/18/Compliance-Risk-Management-Developing-Compliance-Improvement-Plans-515263)
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+**C.** **Implementation Governance and Project Management**
+
+**55.** **Reform projects on this scale have the potential to cause major disruption to the day-**
+**to-day activities of all stakeholders who depend on the smooth running of the tax system.**
+These risks, to both the existing and the new system, are best managed and mitigated by staging the
+implementation of the reform. This involves comprehensive requirement mapping of each
+component of the reform and repeated testing and refinement until each component achieves an
+agreed performance standard, while the existing system continues to operate until every component
+is proved to be ready to be brought into play.
+
+
+**56.** **The implementation cycle characterizing such an approach may be divided into six key**
+**stages.** The first two stages lay the foundations for the reform. The next two are about designing,
+testing, and sequencing each separate component of the reform. The fifth stage entails full
+implementation of the new system and occurs only when all the individual components are
+performing satisfactorily. And the final stage, which is about learning how to refine and improve the
+new system, occurs once it has bedded in. This staged approach is summarized in Figure 13, below.
+Further explanation of each stage can be found in the IMF Technical Note and Manual 21/01. [59]
+
+
+**Figure 13. Implementation Cycle**
+
+
+_Source: IMF Staff._
+
+**57.** **Stage 0 is critical and should be implemented as a matter of urgency.** Stage 0 lays the
+first foundations for the reform by establishing a transparent and accountable governance
+framework and effective internal and external communications strategies. This framework should
+consist of three basic layers, represented in Figure 14, with a cross government steering group
+
+
+[59 See Integrating the Collection of Social Insurance Contributions and Personal Income Taxes, IMF at Integrating the](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2021/08/10/Integrating-the-Collection-of-Social-Insurance-Contributions-and-Personal-Income-Taxes-460643)
+[Collection of Social Insurance Contributions and Personal Income Taxes (imf.org)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2021/08/10/Integrating-the-Collection-of-Social-Insurance-Contributions-and-Personal-Income-Taxes-460643)
+
+
+37
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+providing strategic oversight and cross-government support for the project; a Project Management
+Board (with MoF representation) responsible for overall management and coordination; and
+specialist project teams providing the detailed planning and implementation work on each strand of
+the reform.
+
+
+**Figure 14. The Governance Pyramid**
+
+
+_Source: IMF Staff._
+
+
+**58.** **Appropriate staffing—both in terms of skills and stakeholder representation—of each**
+**of these governance layers is important.** This should help ensure that the detailed changes
+necessary are properly scoped and budgeted for, that all stakeholders are consulted, involved, and
+represented, and that the project receives continuing support at the highest government level.
+
+
+**59.** **The Steering Group should have very senior chairmanship and members should be**
+**drawn from all ministries with an interest in the reform.** In addition to the SRC and MoF, the
+Steering Group’s composition will depend on Armenia’s institutional framework. Its job is to provide
+strategic leadership and direction, to oversee the work of the project board, to resolve
+interdepartmental disagreements, and to ensure enduring high-level political commitment to the
+change. Such commitment will usually depend on wider stakeholder support for the project;
+including one or more nongovernment representatives—from, for example, bodies representing
+employers and tax professionals—on the Steering Group can help secure and maintain that support,
+as well as providing an external perspective.
+
+
+**60.** **The Project Management Board should include experts with relevant technical and**
+**project management skills and experience and be chaired a by senior SRC official at the**
+**Deputy Chairman level.** It is charged with managing and coordinating the work of the project
+teams, producing a consolidated budget and timeline and reconciling it with the steering group, and
+identifying and managing resource bottlenecks and other risks.
+
+
+38
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**61.** **Project teams should be staffed full-time by subject experts in the various strands of**
+**the reform— IT, legislation, operational processes, compliance, taxpayer services, and so on.**
+Their job will be to scope in detail the nature of the changes necessary in their respective areas, to
+produce realistic timetables and budgets, and to implement those changes in due course. During
+Stage 1 the project teams carry out detailed scoping of the various changes needed in their areas of
+responsibility. This would include producing resource budgets and implementation timelines, which
+are then tested and consolidated by the Project Management Board and reconciled with the Steering
+Group. The work of the project teams needs to cover all the aspects and implications of the reform:
+legislation, IT, business processes, employer reporting and electronic processes, audit and risk
+assessment routines, banking, accounting, debt management and arrears collection, organizational
+changes, the transfer, recruitment and training of staff, and employer and other taxpayer information
+and education.
+
+
+**62.** **A typical scope of a project team brief is shown in** Box 4 **below.** The Project Management
+Board consolidates the results of these scoping exercises to produce a budget and timeline for the
+project as a whole. It should also identify potential interdependencies and other risks and develop
+strategies for managing them, including escalation to steering group level when necessary.
+
+
+**Box 4. Scope of Project Team Briefs**
+
+Brief for each workstream to include:
+
+ - Clear mapping of the work to be undertaken.
+
+ - Timelines for delivery of each work component.
+
+ - Milestones with delivery dates to allow tracking and early warning of risks.
+
+ - Dependencies: internal (with other workstreams) and external (with other department and government
+reforms).
+
+ - Connection between workstream activities and overarching reform.
+
+ - Appropriate parameters to measure success of team’s delivery.
+
+ - Estimated budget including clearly identified contingency.
+
+ - Details of key staff resources and where/how obtainable.
+
+ - Workstream risk register.
+
+_Source: IMF Staff._
+
+
+**63.** **As much as possible, the principles of UX based design should be used.** Box 5 below sets
+out the main principles.
+
+
+39
+
+
+
+**Box 5. UX Based Design Principles**
+
+ - **Start early.** Early in the project, spend time with current and prospective users to better understand their
+
+perspective and the context of the problem.
+
+ - **Use a range of methods of UX based design.** Use a range of qualitative and quantitative research methods to
+
+determine people’s goals, needs, and behaviors.
+
+ - **Use prototypes.** Use prototypes to test your assumptions and solutions with real people, in the field if possible.
+
+ - **Share your findings.** Document and share your research findings with team members, managers, and the
+
+public whenever practical.
+
+ - **Test regularly.** As the product is being built, regularly test it with potential users to ensure it meets people’s
+
+needs.
+
+_Source IMF Staff._
+
+
+**64.** **The SRC can learn from other tax administrations who have implemented such systems.**
+For example, Kazakhstan, a fellow member country of the IMF’s Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia
+Regional Capacity Development Center (CCAMTAC) [60], has already shared its experiences. The IMF
+can assist the SRC to connect with other Tax Administrations in the region that have implemented
+Universal Declaration Systems.
+
+**D.** **Implementation Risks and Mitigations**
+
+**65.** **There are several significant implementation risks that need to be managed and**
+**mitigated.** As the Policy is not finalized, the list of implementation risks is not yet comprehensive.
+Table 8 below sets out some of the possible risks and mitigation strategies to be considered and
+adopted.
+
+
+60 See https://ccamtac.imf.org/
+
+
+40
+
+
+
+**Table 7. Implementation Risks and Mitigations**
+
+
+
+**Risk** **Mitigation**
+
+
+
+There is poor governance of the reform. Implement the structures and arrangements described in the
+‘Implementation Governance and Project Management‘ sub-section
+above (Figure 13, Figure 14)
+There is poor planning. SRC to develop a comprehensive Project Plan to implement to new
+system as soon as possible.
+There are compliance issues with the current Develop a risk assessment to evaluate the extent of the noncompliance
+system (e.g., Rental income, Freelancers, and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, if necessary, to address
+Seasonal and Platform Workers, and Private the risks. This may include recommendations to change the law.
+Rental Arrangements) that should be Addressing these risks, will require access to bank information and the
+addressed in preparation for the new system. power to undertake audits of individuals.
+
+
+
+There are compliance issues with the current Develop a risk assessment to evaluate the extent of the noncompliance
+system (e.g., Rental income, Freelancers, and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, if necessary, to address
+Seasonal and Platform Workers, and Private the risks. This may include recommendations to change the law.
+Rental Arrangements) that should be Addressing these risks, will require access to bank information and the
+addressed in preparation for the new system. power to undertake audits of individuals.
+
+The SRC staff do not know about the new Develop a staff skilling and training plan. Ensure that all SRC staff have
+system or can’t advise individual taxpayers. an awareness of the new system and that there are sufficient SRC
+
+
+
+The SRC staff do not know about the new Develop a staff skilling and training plan. Ensure that all SRC staff have
+system or can’t advise individual taxpayers. an awareness of the new system and that there are sufficient SRC
+
+experts to advise individual taxpayers.
+Individual taxpayers have not heard about the Develop a Marketing and Communication Plan.
+new system.
+
+
+
+Develop a Marketing and Communication Plan.
+
+
+
+Individual taxpayers do not know how to use
+the new system.
+
+
+
+Individual taxpayers do not know how to use Have clear instructions in place so that individual taxpayers can “selfthe new system. service” as much as possible and have other taxpayer services in place
+
+e.g., call-center, provision of advice, education, website.
+An individual taxpayer's prefill data is not Ensure that there is extensive third-party data collection and quality of
+complete or available. data.
+
+
+
+An individual taxpayer's prefill data is not Ensure that there is extensive third-party data collection and quality of
+complete or available. data.
+
+Information Technology Build and Declaration Ensure that SRC’s current IT technology and capacity can deliver the
+interface and systems. new system.
+
+
+
+Ensure that SRC’s current IT technology and capacity can deliver the
+
+
+
+new system.
+
+
+
+Compliance assurance. The new system may generate refunds and the SRC needs to ensure
+
+
+
+that there is integrity in the tax refund system to mitigate potential
+
+
+
+fraud. In addition, improving compliance with the registration,
+
+
+
+Individual Taxpayers do not know that the
+declaration is available to review and sign.
+
+Low community take-up and a low level of
+participation.
+
+
+
+withholding and reporting systems.
+
+
+
+Look at ways to inform the taxpayer, e.g., email or SMS.
+
+
+
+Low community take-up and a low level of Ensure that Individual Taxpayers understand the benefits of
+participation. participating. In later phases, there will be taxpayers with low financial
+
+literacy and potently poor access to technology/internet. Consider
+international good practices to support these taxpayers e.g., volunteer
+services provided by community members to assist with electronic
+lodgment.
+Taxpayers have to pay for an electronic Ensure that taxpayers can “sign” their declaration without charge.
+signature to sign their declaration.
+
+
+
+Ensure that taxpayers can “sign” their declaration without charge.
+
+
+
+Senior Civil Servants will have to lodge an AntiCorruption Declaration and a Universal
+Declaration.
+
+
+
+Ensure that those affected understand why.
+
+
+
+The Taxpayer Register is not complete. The taxpayer register is a foundation on which to build the new system.
+Ensuring that the system is complete is essential. SRC needs to make it
+easy for initial registration of natural persons via multiple registration
+channels.
+Poor consultation with external stakeholders. Set up a consultation forum with impacted stakeholders.
+_Source: IMF Staff._
+
+
+
+41
+
+
+
+**Revenue Administration Recommandations**
+
+ - As a matter of urgency, create a joint SRC and MoF working party to co-design the new
+system so that all administrative and policy issues are considered, and an efficient and
+effective system is implemented.
+
+ - Implement the governance and project management structures and arrangements as set out
+in Figure 13 and 14, above. As a matter of urgency, implement Stage 0.
+
+ - Amend the Bank Secrecy law so that it is mandatory for banks to provide the SRC with all
+interest receipts and a unique identifier so that the interest can be pre-filled into the
+individual tax declaration.
+
+ - Amend the Tax Code to allow tax audits of individuals.
+
+### **IV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT**
+
+**66.** **The SRC may consider requesting CD assistance from the IMF on implementation of the**
+**Universal Declaration.** The area that may be of greatest assistance is addressing the risks identified
+in Table 8, above, and advising on international good practices to mitigate them.
+
+
+**67.** **The authorities may also consider requesting IMF assistance on a possible reform of the**
+**taxation of micro and small enterprises.** This issue, which also bears on CIT and VAT, could be the
+object of specific assistance. Assistance could also be provided on social protection.
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+### **REFERENCES**
+
+
+
+Benítez, Juan Carlos, and Charles Vellutini. 2021. “Measuring the Redistributive Capacity of Tax Policies.”
+
+
+
+IMF Working Paper WP/21/252. International Monetary Fund.
+Dardanoni, Valentino, and Peter J. Lambert. 2002. “Progressivity Comparisons.” _Journal of Public Economics_
+
+86 (1): 99–122.
+Immervoll, Herwig, and Mark Pearson. 2009. “A Good Time for Making Work Pay? Taking Stock of In-Work
+
+
+
+Benefits and Related Measures across the OECD.” Working Paper 3. IZA Policy Paper.
+Kakwani, Nanak C. 1977. “Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison.” _The Economic_
+
+
+
+_Journal_ 87 (345): 71–80.
+Musgrave, R. A., and Tun Thin. 1948. “Income Tax Progression, 1929-48.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 56
+
+
+
+(6): 498–514.
+Reynolds, Morgan, and Eugene Smolensky. 1977. _Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of_
+
+
+
+_Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970_ . Academic Press.
+
+
+
+43
+
+
+
+###### **APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT REVENUE BY SOURCE, LATEST** **AVAILABLE YEAR (PERCENT OF GDP)**
+
+
+
+Other Social Grants Other
+
+Taxes Contribut Revenue
+
+
+
+Taxes
+
+
+
+Grants
+
+
+
+Country Year Total
+Revenue
+
+
+
+Tax Revenue
+
+(excl. SSC)
+
+
+
+Personal
+
+Income
+
+
+
+Income, Profits, and Capital Gains
+
+
+
+Payroll
+
+
+
+Property
+
+
+
+Consumption Internati
+
+
+
+Corporate
+
+
+
+Corporate Total Payroll Property
+
+Other General VAT Excises Other Total
+Income Income
+
+
+
+onal
+Trade
+
+
+
+Social
+Contribut
+
+
+
+ions
+
+
+
+Armenia 2020 25.2 22.0 6.7 2.4 0.0 9.1 … 0.4 7.9 7.5 2.0 ... 11.7 1.1 … 0.4 0.9 1.9
+Albania 2019 27.2 19.4 1.9 2.9 0.0 4.7 … 0.3 8.3 7.8 2.8 ... 13.7 0.4 0.2 5.7 0.5 1.6
+Azerbaijan 2020 33.8 15.8 … … … … … … … … … ... … … 15.8 3.3 0.0 14.7
+Belarus 2020 35.8 22.8 4.5 2.1 0.0 6.7 … 0.9 9.2 8.5 2.1 ... 11.7 2.8 0.6 10.9 0.4 1.7
+
+Herzegovina 2020 41.6 22.0 1.8 1.7 0.0 3.6 … 0.3 16.7 16.7 0.3 ... 17.6 0.0 0.5 15.8 0.2 3.5
+Bulgaria 2021 35.0 20.7 3.7 2.6 0.0 6.2 … … 14.0 … … ... 14.0 0.2 1.1 7.3 2.6 6.0
+Croatia 2020 48.0 25.8 3.8 2.3 0.0 6.1 … 0.7 13.1 12.8 4.3 ... 18.9 0.0 0.1 12.1 2.7 7.4
+Estonia 2021 40.4 22.4 7.1 1.7 … 8.7 … … 9.5 … … ... 9.5 3.5 0.6 12.5 2.3 3.2
+Georgia 2020 25.1 22.2 6.7 1.9 0.0 8.6 … 0.9 9.2 9.2 3.3 ... 12.5 0.2 0.1 … 0.8 2.1
+Kosovo 2020 25.5 22.1 2.3 1.3 0.0 3.6 … … … … … ... 16.7 1.5 0.4 … 0.6 2.7
+Moldova 2019 29.9 19.0 1.9 2.6 0.0 4.4 … 0.3 9.6 9.6 3.0 ... 13.5 0.9 0.0 8.7 0.8 1.4
+
+Montenegro 2020 43.3 26.9 4.0 1.9 … 5.9 … 0.4 … 12.7 4.9 ... 17.6 0.5 2.6 11.4 1.6 3.4
+
+Macedonia 2020 28.6 17.4 2.9 1.6 0.0 4.4 … 0.2 7.3 7.0 3.5 ... 11.4 1.0 0.3 10.0 0.4 0.8
+Romania 2020 28.9 14.3 2.5 1.9 0.0 4.4 … 0.5 6.5 6.1 2.9 ... 10.1 0.0 … 12.0 1.6 1.1
+Russia 2020 35.3 24.5 3.7 3.7 0.5 7.9 … 0.5 6.9 6.9 1.8 ... 9.3 1.7 5.1 7.7 0.0 3.0
+Serbia 2020 41.3 24.1 3.7 2.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.8 10.2 10.0 5.8 ... 17.2 1.0 … 13.6 0.5 3.1
+Slovenia 2019 43.8 21.5 5.3 2.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.6 8.0 8.0 3.5 ... 13.5 0.1 0.0 15.7 … 6.6
+Turkey 2021 28.9 16.6 3.1 2.5 … 5.6 … … 8.3 … … ... 8.3 0.5 2.2 5.3 … 6.2
+Ukraine 2020 40.0 27.3 7.0 2.8 0.0 9.9 … … … … … ... 13.5 0.7 3.3 7.2 … 5.5
+
+
+Avg, excl. Armenia 35.2 21.6 3.7 2.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.6 9.5 9.3 3.0 ... 13.8 0.8 4.1 10.3 0.8 7.1
+
+Avg, incl. Armenia 34.6 21.6 3.9 2.2 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.5 9.4 9.2 2.9 ... 13.7 0.8 4.1 9.6 0.8 6.8
+
+_Source: FADTP ECOS Database (Internal)._
+
+_Note: Tax Revenue does not include Social Contributions. "..." fields represent missing values._
+
+
+44
+
+
+
+###### **APPENDIX II. MEASURES OF PROGRESSIVE AND REDISTRIBUTIVE** **CAPACITIES**
+
+The standard measurement of the redistributive effect of taxation, as developed by Musgrave and Thin
+(1948) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), is the difference between the Gini coefficients of respectively
+pre- and post-tax income. In the same spirit, the progressivity index proposed by Kakwani (1977) is
+defined as the difference between the Gini coefficients of respectively pre-tax income and the tax
+liabilities—the more the tax liability is concentrated on higher incomes, the more progressive is the PIT.
+
+A critical contribution of Kakwani was to decompose the total redistributive effects of taxation into its
+progressivity and its “size”, measured as the ratio of total tax liabilities over total pre-tax income (referred
+to as the aggregate tax rate). The intuition behind this decomposition is that progressivity is a necessary
+but not a sufficient condition of redistribution. For example, a PIT generating a total revenue of 0.001
+percent of GDP can be made extremely progressive—that is, strongly concentrated on high incomes—but
+would still achieve little income redistribution, simply because it is too small.
+
+Like the Reynolds-Smolensky index, a limitation of the Kakwani index (and the related decomposition) is
+that it is a function of the pre-tax distribution, therefore confusing the measurement of the intrinsic
+progressivity of each tax regime with any given initial conditions in the economy. The literature has
+proposed procedures that make redistribution indices comparable across countries and years, controlling
+for differences in pre-tax distributions. The analysis in this report uses a methodology that “transplants”
+tax regimes to be compared into a common base with an identical pre-tax distribution (Dardanoni and
+Lambert 2002). The indices thus computed are the intrinsic progressive and redistributive capacities of the
+PIT in each country, corrected for pre-tax distributions. The calculations use simulated microdata based on
+Gini coefficients of pre-tax income (Benítez and Vellutini 2021).
+
+
+45
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28fd6c19b58e3571f6d92e0368ccfb368714a90f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0002-001", "height": 203, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0004-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0040802020004000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0004-001", "height": 49, "page": 4, "phash_256": "f80803cf07f37f60f804701ef83807c387e77ff0fc00701ef83e07c387e3783c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "203295459bc1c69e4b4c247dacac1ee956c94afc8f40505486e54b36948e3efb", "width": 748}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "14190d5919251616", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0016-001", "height": 464, "page": 16, "phash_256": "fbfb535b84405cba5baf85208ca07aff931db3753a3d1987c303482b64f2c1c8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "a2a040dab7023a9aa5f94e020249f8d49d9b678b7a57ccdf1a7067810a2ae2be", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": "Figure 2. Tax Wedge (2021)", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "50c044c064603707", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0017-001", "height": 481, "page": 17, "phash_256": "97abc1e968549e1563ea397a9f057a809e3c69566955d4aa770a9a756918c965", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "48953317b4e7c137a2a28de774128ecdb82a38dbf16fac41a2e147d3b874c7ed", "width": 401}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": "Figure 3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020)", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0b0aac8ca8c0713", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0022-001", "height": 479, "page": 22, "phash_256": "807f80777fa0f768c99866e2926679995e66199a666859b4e64253e9c995364e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "95a8bbe53a0812bdb068ac435e90ab7aae8b9d6aec8766500d4eed76dde5741c", "width": 725}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": "Figure 4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96b8c2d0607c0f38", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0023-001", "height": 480, "page": 23, "phash_256": "95eac1ea781d3e8595e062f43ff007c072e0981fa2157ad5956e9ed0cae7961a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "b67132de4d5fe4eef06f10a8836bbb8f6583eed2e790da465ad0c593fb7054dd", "width": 660}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0027-001.png", "caption": "Figure 6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9b9496929be90515", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0027-001", "height": 449, "page": 27, "phash_256": "80df91f77ec26f38a9187fa04e8138566c68c687303458c297237d9cc7ba9f8d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "628388597e969a4eef8fd858986d3404d5ab6f9397dd71bead97c65eff03d6fc", "width": 804}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0028-001.png", "caption": "Figure 7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "868ad0c0607c0d86", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0028-001", "height": 506, "page": 28, "phash_256": "95eac1ea683d3e9785e263d01fe4878a7b813c3c2a156af5d07a4e14c9f3c568", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "ea131b0ea5aad947cd1f19045fd82f2ddf543b98146da4fe0880b2d2af728690", "width": 774}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0029-001.png", "caption": "Figure 8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8694d0d0e07c0da6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0029-001", "height": 480, "page": 29, "phash_256": "85ead1ea78153e8585e262f81ff487ca7be03c172a156af5d0786314c8d9c56e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "3a2af15b4412323b1a9b75c0b7fd1274a95c44938645f5ea4a156d6b4447ebfb", "width": 734}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0030-001.png", "caption": "Figure 9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8accccccccc73336", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0030-001", "height": 480, "page": 30, "phash_256": "87fbc27f38844f90b45b1ba4c7d93ccc4bc4a4e62ac5e3319466c349d274b54e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "0229ae201597dfe578e2f102f2167a22a28c2ef03f9fe4b5e5b47aee2155ec21", "width": 813}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0031-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c6d6c6d7d6e6f7c6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0031-001", "height": 78, "page": 31, "phash_256": "85fb03fd7c05fc02d344de82f244c6c418bbb19d3a6bbd0d7a0b5a2b05f446f2", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "c83865b4ea26622bd20bd37f10df863f9a94ce4d8345a081ea9283656925d366", "width": 470}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0034-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f12726c461d1d42", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0034-001", "height": 420, "page": 34, "phash_256": "fee46d5ef80bb803875e36e45d6ec80bb883875e86f49725c1a99ce490a1d0e3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "b6fcca08dc480ea1992a7fd169baedc2dfd574f5ba7c3dd775a34441dbfcb9d8", "width": 780}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0035-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4dc94d4d49ed6dcd", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0035-001", "height": 210, "page": 35, "phash_256": "830d524956588cb7ebf326da561b179cb904e1e39d235138535d0e5d8eb6f0b6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "381b63e59cf6a634fad24e7618cf04c8de0ed58990dcee3e7172ce1e0dee899a", "width": 780}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0038-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0022c6c45c236718", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0038-001", "height": 348, "page": 38, "phash_256": "e6c813be8867e84113be84d3f91896b6ec6d393cc6e913edb814c4438b76fc14", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "ea82652eeb897e42dc31d4846b160ea0f8a06ef7c3a0a240b81ec533bd29fd17", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-060/assets/figures/cr-2023-060-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "094d1733694dcca3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-060-fig-p0039-001", "height": 329, "page": 39, "phash_256": "82aaed3d32c3d3344d3cb0d3ccd34c4bd3dc2c0cf0c3033cf47309b3f34c3ccb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "sha256_normalized_png": "d01077707d77b38291450439a87549875bcc77d6f25e095996f577fd74a918cf", "width": 540}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-060/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e8ce7649929b32e96b8cbc5b7caf3a79d39fd432
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-060/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/60**\n# **REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**\n##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PERSONAL** **INCOME TAX: POLICY REVIEW AND INTRODUCTION** **OF A UNIVERSAL DECLARATION**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Armenia was prepared by a staff team of\nthe International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed in November 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/60\nREPUBLIC OF ARMENIA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON PERSONAL INCOME TAX: POLICY REVIEW AND INTRODUCTION OF A UNIVERSAL DECLARATION\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Armenia was prepared by a staff team of\nthe International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed in November 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 628}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n## **Republic of Armenia** **Personal Income Tax: Policy Review and** **Introduction of a Universal Declaration**\n\n\nCharles Vellutini, Graham Whyte, Andualem Mengistu\n\n\n**Technical Report**\n\n\n**January 2023**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.249755859375, 486.11083984375, 365.999755859375, 607.61083984375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(255,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 209, "number": 5, "size": 38469, "transform": [120.74999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 121.49998474121094, 245.249755859375, 486.11083984375], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nRepublic of Armenia Personal Income Tax: Policy Review and Introduction of a Universal Declaration\n\nCharles Vellutini, Graham Whyte, Andualem Mengistu\n\nTechnical Report\n\nJanuary 2023", "text_characters": 179}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the\nstaff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of the\nRepublic of Armenia (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and\nmembers of their staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff and\nother technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest,\nunless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see\nOperational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance\nInformation—\n[Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information).](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to\nparties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the\nTA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest shall require the explicit consent of the\nTA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.\n\n\n**This technical assistance (TA) was provided in part by financial support from the European**\n**Union.**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the\nstaff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of the\nRepublic of Armenia (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and\nmembers of their staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities\nof the TA recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff and\nother technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest,\nunless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see\nOperational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance\nInformation—\nStaff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information).\nDisclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to\nparties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the\nTA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest shall require the explicit consent of the\nTA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.\n\nThis technical assistance (TA) was provided in part by financial support from the European\nUnion.", "text_characters": 1043}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0004-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**GLOSSARY _______________________________________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n**PREFACE _________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 7**\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________________ 10**\n\n**II. TAX POLICY _________________________________________________________________________________ 12**\nA. Key Features of the PIT _______________________________________________________________________ 12\nB. Directions of Reforms _________________________________________________________________________ 18\nC. Impact of Reforms Options on Revenue and Progressivity ____________________________________ 21\n\n**III. TAX ADMINISTRATION ____________________________________________________________________ 31**\nA. Current Administrative System _______________________________________________________________ 31\nB. Universal Declaration Administrative System _________________________________________________ 32\nC. Implementation Governance and Project Management ______________________________________ 37\nD. Implementation Risks and Mitigations ________________________________________________________ 40\n\n**IV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT _________________________________________________________________ 42**\n\n**REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________________________________ 43**\n\n**APPENDIXES**\nI. Government Revenue by Source, Latest Available Year (Percent of GDP) ______________________ 44\nII. Measures of Progressive and Redistributive Capacities _______________________________________ 45\n\n\n**BOXES**\n\n1. Summary of Recommendations ________________________________________________________________________ 9\n2. Declaration from the Australian tax return ___________________________________________________________ 34\n3. International good practice design principles ________________________________________________________ 35\n4. Scope of Project Team Briefs _________________________________________________________________________ 39\n5. UX Based Design Principles ___________________________________________________________________________ 40\n\n\n**FIGURES**\n\n1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In Percent of GDP) __ 15\n2. Tax Wedge (2021) ____________________________________________________________________________________ 16\n3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020) __________________ 21\n4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019 _____________________________ 22\n5. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Reforming Mortgage Interest ______________________ 25\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "GLOSSARY _ 5\n\nPREFACE _ 6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7\n\nI. INTRODUCTION _ 10\n\nII. TAX POLICY _ 12\nA. Key Features of the PIT _ 12\nB. Directions of Reforms _ 18\nC. Impact of Reforms Options on Revenue and Progressivity 21\n\nIII. TAX ADMINISTRATION 31\nA. Current Administrative System _ 31\nB. Universal Declaration Administrative System _ 32\nC. Implementation Governance and Project Management 37\nD. Implementation Risks and Mitigations 40\n\nIV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT _ 42\n\nREFERENCES _ 43\n\nAPPENDIXES\nI. Government Revenue by Source, Latest Available Year (Percent of GDP) 44\nII. Measures of Progressive and Redistributive Capacities _ 45\n\nBOXES\n\n1. Summary of Recommendations 9\n2. Declaration from the Australian tax return _ 34\n3. International good practice design principles 35\n4. Scope of Project Team Briefs _ 39\n5. UX Based Design Principles _ 40\n\nFIGURES\n\n1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In Percent of GDP) 15\n2. Tax Wedge (2021) 16\n3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020) 21\n4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019 _ 22\n5. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Reforming Mortgage Interest 25\n\n3", "text_characters": 1006}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades _________________________________ 26\n7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap _______________________ 27\n8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket __________________ 28\n9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit__________________________ 29\n10. PIT Revenue across Scenarios _______________________________________________________________________ 30\n11. Implementation Timeline ____________________________________________________________________________ 33\n12. The Three Phases ____________________________________________________________________________________ 34\n13. Implementation Cycle _______________________________________________________________________________ 37\n14. The Governance Pyramid ____________________________________________________________________________ 38\n\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Armenia, Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP) ___________________________________________________________ 10\n2. The 2018 Tax Reform _________________________________________________________________________________ 12\n3. Key PIT and SSC Rates in Armenia and Comparator Countries, 2022 ________________________________ 14\n4. Summary Statistics based on Taxpayer Level Labor Income Data (2021) ____________________________ 15\n5. Summary of Proposed Options ______________________________________________________________________ 23\n6. Summary of The Existing Mortgage Interest Credit System _________________________________________ 24\n7. Implementation Risks and Mitigations _______________________________________________________________ 41\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades _ 26\n7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap _ 27\n8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket 28\n9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit 29\n10. PIT Revenue across Scenarios _ 30\n11. Implementation Timeline 33\n12. The Three Phases 34\n13. Implementation Cycle _ 37\n14. The Governance Pyramid 38\n\nTABLES\n1. Armenia, Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP) _ 10\n2. The 2018 Tax Reform _ 12\n3. Key PIT and SSC Rates in Armenia and Comparator Countries, 2022 14\n4. Summary Statistics based on Taxpayer Level Labor Income Data (2021) 15\n5. Summary of Proposed Options 23\n6. Summary of The Existing Mortgage Interest Credit System _ 24\n7. Implementation Risks and Mitigations _ 41\n\n4", "text_characters": 705}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **GLOSSARY**\n\nAMD Armenian Dram\nCBA Central Bank of Armenia\nCD Capacity Development\nCIT Corporate Income Tax\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nFY Fiscal Year\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nIWTC In-Work Tax Credit\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nPIT Personal Income Tax\nRoA Republic of Armenia\nSRC State Revenue Committee\nSSC Social Security Contribution\nTA Technical Assistance\nVAT Value Added Tax\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "GLOSSARY\n\nAMD Armenian Dram\nCBA Central Bank of Armenia\nCD Capacity Development\nCIT Corporate Income Tax\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nFY Fiscal Year\nGDP Gross Domestic Product\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nIWTC In-Work Tax Credit\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nPIT Personal Income Tax\nRoA Republic of Armenia\nSRC State Revenue Committee\nSSC Social Security Contribution\nTA Technical Assistance\nVAT Value Added Tax\n\n5", "text_characters": 348}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **PREFACE**\n\nAt the request of the Minister of Finance, a technical team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department\n(FAD) visited Armenia between August 29 – September 9, 2022 to assist the authorities in\nimplementing a Universal personal income tax (PIT) Declaration. The mission comprised Charles\nVellutini, Graham Whyte, and Andualem Mengistu. The mission met with Mr. Tigran Khachatryan,\nMinister of Finance, with Mr. Arman Poghosyan, Deputy Minister of Finance, Mr. Artur Manukyan,\nDeputy Chairman of the State Revenue Committee and various staff members of the Ministry of\nFinance. The mission also met with Mr. Nerses Yeritsyan, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of\nArmenia and various senior staff of the CBA; Mr. David Davit Khachatryan, Deputy Minister of the\nMinister of Labor and Social Affairs; Mr. Ashot Muradyan, Deputy Chairman of the State Revenue\nCommittee and his staff and Ms. Haykuhi Harutyunyan, Chairwoman of the Corruption Prevention\nCommission. The mission also had fruitful meetings with Mr. Ori Alaverdyan, Head of Revenue Policy\nand Administration Methodology Department, Ministry of Finance, who was very instrumental in\ncoordinating government responses to the mission’s inquiries. At the conclusion of the mission,\nrecommended options for reform were discussed with the Minister of Finance and his team.\n\n\nThe mission expresses its gratitude to all the individuals it met with for their cooperation.\n\n\nThe mission also thanks Mr. Mehdi Raissi, Resident Representative of the IMF in Armenia, and Mr.\nVahram Janvelyan (IMF), Ms. Marine Aleksanyan (IMF) for their valuable assistance during the\nmission.\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nAt the request of the Minister of Finance, a technical team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department\n(FAD) visited Armenia between August 29 – September 9, 2022 to assist the authorities in\nimplementing a Universal personal income tax (PIT) Declaration. The mission comprised Charles\nVellutini, Graham Whyte, and Andualem Mengistu. The mission met with Mr. Tigran Khachatryan,\nMinister of Finance, with Mr. Arman Poghosyan, Deputy Minister of Finance, Mr. Artur Manukyan,\nDeputy Chairman of the State Revenue Committee and various staff members of the Ministry of\nFinance. The mission also met with Mr. Nerses Yeritsyan, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of\nArmenia and various senior staff of the CBA; Mr. David Davit Khachatryan, Deputy Minister of the\nMinister of Labor and Social Affairs; Mr. Ashot Muradyan, Deputy Chairman of the State Revenue\nCommittee and his staff and Ms. Haykuhi Harutyunyan, Chairwoman of the Corruption Prevention\nCommission. The mission also had fruitful meetings with Mr. Ori Alaverdyan, Head of Revenue Policy\nand Administration Methodology Department, Ministry of Finance, who was very instrumental in\ncoordinating government responses to the mission’s inquiries. At the conclusion of the mission,\nrecommended options for reform were discussed with the Minister of Finance and his team.\n\nThe mission expresses its gratitude to all the individuals it met with for their cooperation.\n\nThe mission also thanks Mr. Mehdi Raissi, Resident Representative of the IMF in Armenia, and Mr.\nVahram Janvelyan (IMF), Ms. Marine Aleksanyan (IMF) for their valuable assistance during the\nmission.\n\n6", "text_characters": 1376}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**The government of the Republic of Armenia has expressed its intention to introduce a**\n**Universal Personal Income Tax (PIT) Declaration for individual taxpayers who are not in**\n**business.** The Declaration would be implemented in phases: civil servants (in 2024 reporting FY2023\nincome), employees (in 2025 reporting FY2024 income), and other individual taxpayers (in 2026\nreporting FY2025 income). The declaration would be annual, and it would cover all types of income.\n\n\n**At the request of the Minister of Finance, a team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD)**\n**visited Armenia to assist the authorities in implementing a Universal PIT Declaration.** The joint\nTax Policy and Revenue Administration mission provided recommendations to improve the PIT\ndesign and tackle potential implementation challenges of introducing the Universal PIT Declaration.\n\n\n**Tax Policy**\n\n**The PIT is currently characterized by a strong revenue performance and low progressivity.** The\nredistributive capacity of Armenia’s PIT is at the lowest end of its regional peers. At 6.1 percent of\nGDP in 2021, Armenia’s PIT revenue is significant. However, the 21 percent (2022) flat tax rate on\nemployment income, the absence of standard allowance, and a regressive mortgage interest tax\ncredit limit the PIT’s progressivity. The cap on the Social Security Contribution (SSC) to the state\npension system (Pillar II) further weakens progressivity.\n\n\n**Costly and regressive tax incentives should be repealed.** Firstly, the mortgage interest tax credit\nshould be repealed, or at least strictly capped. In addition, unless the reform deals with the existing\nstock of mortgages, the revenue loss will continue to be significant for the next decade. Limiting the\nmortgage interest credit on existing contracts rather than its complete removal may ease\nimplementation with a minimal revenue cost and a significant increase in progressivity. Secondly, the\ntax credit on reinvested dividends is overly generous and should be eliminated. Thirdly, capital gains\nshould be taxed, with an exempt allowance for private residences calibrated to cover most or all\ncapital gains for most taxpayers.\n\n\n**A Universal PIT Declaration makes it possible to implement a more progressive PIT.** A Universal\nPIT Declaration would make it possible to implement a zero-rated bracket and an In-Work Tax Credit\n(IWTC) through the aggregation and annualization of taxable income, and the corresponding endof-year refunds or tax top-up. Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity\n(including auditing of individuals) and on fiscal feasibility, a zero-rated bracket or a IWTC would\nintroduce significant progressivity and would provide incentives to comply with the Declaration (as\nend-of-year refunds would become possible). An IWTC would be better-targeted than a zero-bracket\nand encourage labor supply and formalization.\n\n\n**A microenterprise regime should be a simplified collection mechanism, not a preferential**\n**regime.** The authorities plan to bring employees of microenterprises under the standard PIT regime,\na justified reform (replacing and eliminating the monthly AMD 5,000 lumpsum tax per employee),\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThe government of the Republic of Armenia has expressed its intention to introduce a\nUniversal Personal Income Tax (PIT) Declaration for individual taxpayers who are not in\nbusiness. The Declaration would be implemented in phases: civil servants (in 2024 reporting FY2023\nincome), employees (in 2025 reporting FY2024 income), and other individual taxpayers (in 2026\nreporting FY2025 income). The declaration would be annual, and it would cover all types of income.\n\nAt the request of the Minister of Finance, a team from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD)\nvisited Armenia to assist the authorities in implementing a Universal PIT Declaration. The joint\nTax Policy and Revenue Administration mission provided recommendations to improve the PIT\ndesign and tackle potential implementation challenges of introducing the Universal PIT Declaration.\n\nTax Policy\n\nThe PIT is currently characterized by a strong revenue performance and low progressivity. The\nredistributive capacity of Armenia’s PIT is at the lowest end of its regional peers. At 6.1 percent of\nGDP in 2021, Armenia’s PIT revenue is significant. However, the 21 percent (2022) flat tax rate on\nemployment income, the absence of standard allowance, and a regressive mortgage interest tax\ncredit limit the PIT’s progressivity. The cap on the Social Security Contribution (SSC) to the state\npension system (Pillar II) further weakens progressivity.\n\nCostly and regressive tax incentives should be repealed. Firstly, the mortgage interest tax credit\nshould be repealed, or at least strictly capped. In addition, unless the reform deals with the existing\nstock of mortgages, the revenue loss will continue to be significant for the next decade. Limiting the\nmortgage interest credit on existing contracts rather than its complete removal may ease\nimplementation with a minimal revenue cost and a significant increase in progressivity. Secondly, the\ntax credit on reinvested dividends is overly generous and should be eliminated. Thirdly, capital gains\nshould be taxed, with an exempt allowance for private residences calibrated to cover most or all\ncapital gains for most taxpayers.\n\nA Universal PIT Declaration makes it possible to implement a more progressive PIT. A Universal\nPIT Declaration would make it possible to implement a zero-rated bracket and an In-Work Tax Credit\n(IWTC) through the aggregation and annualization of taxable income, and the corresponding endof-year refunds or tax top-up. Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity\n(including auditing of individuals) and on fiscal feasibility, a zero-rated bracket or a IWTC would\nintroduce significant progressivity and would provide incentives to comply with the Declaration (as\nend-of-year refunds would become possible). An IWTC would be better-targeted than a zero-bracket\nand encourage labor supply and formalization.\n\nA microenterprise regime should be a simplified collection mechanism, not a preferential\nregime. The authorities plan to bring employees of microenterprises under the standard PIT regime,\na justified reform (replacing and eliminating the monthly AMD 5,000 lumpsum tax per employee),\n\n7", "text_characters": 2701}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "but one leaving unchanged the total exemption of individuals themselves under the regime (not\ntheir employees).\n\n\n**Tax Administration**\n\n**The Universal Declaration Administrative System is a major reform in size and scope** . It will\nrequire a significant Information Technology (IT) build, will have wide ranging community impacts,\nand will require good communication with all stakeholders, in particular the affected taxpayers. There\nare many of the necessary foundations in place. These include a mature withholding tax system, a\nregister of employees, and mandatory electronic lodgment of the withholding return. There are\nsignificant implementation risks that need to be managed.\n\n\n**While the detailed Policy is being developed, it is essential that the State Revenue Committee**\n**(SRC) and Ministry of Finance (MoF) work together on the detailed design.** This is to ensure that\nit can be implemented efficiently and effectively with low costs of compliance by the taxpayers. A\nworking group should be formed to finalize the design with both senior MoF and SRC staff and the\nstaff who will build and operate it. Once the design is finalized this group will cease and a steering\ngroup would be formed.\n\n\n**The mission team recommends that in line with international good practice, SRC prefills the**\n**Universal Declaration as much as possible through maximizing the use of third-party**\n**information and withholding taxes.** This should include all types of income. Armenian banks are\ncurrently not required to report interest income with a unique identifier for the holder of the\naccount. This means that interest income will not be pre-filled, and this may undermine the policy\nintent. This gap must be addressed by the Government by amending Bank Secrecy laws to ensure\nthat interest income can be prefilled. Should the authorities bring employees of microenterprises\nunder the standard PIT regime the employers must be included in the reporting regime and their\nuniversal declarations prefilled.\n\n\n**To ensure strong governance and accountability during the implementation phase, a steering**\n**group should be formed immediately.** The steering group should have very senior chairmanship\nand members should be drawn from all ministries with an interest in the reform. It provides strategic\nleadership and direction, to oversee the work of a Project Management Board. The Project\nManagement Board should include experts with relevant technical and project management skills\nand experience and be chaired at the Deputy Chairman level. It is charged with managing and\ncoordinating the work of project teams identifying and managing resource bottlenecks and other\nrisks.\n\n\n**There are several issues that need to be considered, particularly the taxpayer register.**\n**compliance with the current system, and the withholding system** . For example, there is no\nregister of individuals who earn passive income. It is also important that the withholding system is\nrobust and as many employers are in it. High compliance levels with the current system will ensure a\nsmooth transition. Using Compliance Risk Management principles, SRC should undertake Risk\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "but one leaving unchanged the total exemption of individuals themselves under the regime (not\ntheir employees).\n\nTax Administration\n\nThe Universal Declaration Administrative System is a major reform in size and scope . It will\nrequire a significant Information Technology (IT) build, will have wide ranging community impacts,\nand will require good communication with all stakeholders, in particular the affected taxpayers. There\nare many of the necessary foundations in place. These include a mature withholding tax system, a\nregister of employees, and mandatory electronic lodgment of the withholding return. There are\nsignificant implementation risks that need to be managed.\n\nWhile the detailed Policy is being developed, it is essential that the State Revenue Committee\n(SRC) and Ministry of Finance (MoF) work together on the detailed design. This is to ensure that\nit can be implemented efficiently and effectively with low costs of compliance by the taxpayers. A\nworking group should be formed to finalize the design with both senior MoF and SRC staff and the\nstaff who will build and operate it. Once the design is finalized this group will cease and a steering\ngroup would be formed.\n\nThe mission team recommends that in line with international good practice, SRC prefills the\nUniversal Declaration as much as possible through maximizing the use of third-party\ninformation and withholding taxes. This should include all types of income. Armenian banks are\ncurrently not required to report interest income with a unique identifier for the holder of the\naccount. This means that interest income will not be pre-filled, and this may undermine the policy\nintent. This gap must be addressed by the Government by amending Bank Secrecy laws to ensure\nthat interest income can be prefilled. Should the authorities bring employees of microenterprises\nunder the standard PIT regime the employers must be included in the reporting regime and their\nuniversal declarations prefilled.\n\nTo ensure strong governance and accountability during the implementation phase, a steering\ngroup should be formed immediately. The steering group should have very senior chairmanship\nand members should be drawn from all ministries with an interest in the reform. It provides strategic\nleadership and direction, to oversee the work of a Project Management Board. The Project\nManagement Board should include experts with relevant technical and project management skills\nand experience and be chaired at the Deputy Chairman level. It is charged with managing and\ncoordinating the work of project teams identifying and managing resource bottlenecks and other\nrisks.\n\nThere are several issues that need to be considered, particularly the taxpayer register.\ncompliance with the current system, and the withholding system . For example, there is no\nregister of individuals who earn passive income. It is also important that the withholding system is\nrobust and as many employers are in it. High compliance levels with the current system will ensure a\nsmooth transition. Using Compliance Risk Management principles, SRC should undertake Risk\n\n8", "text_characters": 2632}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Assessments on the risk areas and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, including\nrecommendations for law changes.\n\n\n**Individual taxpayers must be subject to audit based on proper risk-assessment.** The\nintroduction of a Universal PIT Declaration, and the collection of comprehensive information on\nindividual taxpayers, is an excellent opportunity and justification to include natural persons in the\nscope of possible audits.\n\n\n**Capacity Development**\n\n**The authorities may consider requesting assistance on a possible reform of the taxation of**\n**micro and small enterprises. The SRC may consider requesting capacity development**\n**assistance from the IMF on implementation of the Universal Declaration.** The area that may be\nof greatest assistance is addressing the risks identified and advising on international good practices\nto mitigate them.\n\n\n**Box 1. Summary of Recommendations**\n\n**Tax Policy Recommendations**\n\n- Repeal the tax credit on mortgage interest, with grandfathering of existing contracts with yearly interest\nbelow an upper limit in the range of AMD 245,0000-300,000.\n\n- Repeal the tax credit on reinvested dividends.\n\n- Introduce a 10 percent (same as on interest) withholding tax on capital gains, excluding capital gains on\nhousing to the sale of a taxpayers’ primary residence up to a specific amount to be calibrated to cover\nmost or all capital gains for most taxpayers.\n\n- Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of individuals) and\non the fiscal feasibility of the measure, introduce a zero-rated PIT bracket with an upper threshold in the\nrange of AMD 240,000-300,000 annually.\n\n- Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of individuals),\nconsider the introduction of an In-Work Tax Credit that is annually capped at AMD 53,000 and phase out\nfor income above AMD 800,000.\n\n- Seek FAD assistance on micro and small enterprise taxation.\n\n**Tax Administration Recommendations**\n\n- As a matter of urgency, create a joint SRC and MoF working party to co-design the new system so that all\nadministrative and policy issues are considered, and an efficient and effective system is implemented. Once\nthe design is finalized this group will cease and a steering group etc. would be formed.\n\n- Implement the governance and project management structures and arrangements as set out in Section III,\nFigure 13 and 14 below. As a matter of urgency, implement Stage 0 (setting up of governance structure,\nagreeing action plans, and initiating consultations).\n\n- Amend the Bank Secrecy law so that it is mandatory for banks to provide the SRC with all interest\npayments and a unique identifier so that the interest can be pre-filled into the individual tax declaration.\n\n- Amend the Tax Code to allow tax audits of individuals.\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Assessments on the risk areas and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, including\nrecommendations for law changes.\n\nIndividual taxpayers must be subject to audit based on proper risk-assessment. The\nintroduction of a Universal PIT Declaration, and the collection of comprehensive information on\nindividual taxpayers, is an excellent opportunity and justification to include natural persons in the\nscope of possible audits.\n\nCapacity Development\n\nThe authorities may consider requesting assistance on a possible reform of the taxation of\nmicro and small enterprises. The SRC may consider requesting capacity development\nassistance from the IMF on implementation of the Universal Declaration. The area that may be\nof greatest assistance is addressing the risks identified and advising on international good practices\nto mitigate them.\n\nBox 1. Summary of Recommendations\n\nTax Policy Recommendations\n\n- Repeal the tax credit on mortgage interest, with grandfathering of existing contracts with yearly interest\nbelow an upper limit in the range of AMD 245,0000-300,000.\n\n- Repeal the tax credit on reinvested dividends.\n\n- Introduce a 10 percent (same as on interest) withholding tax on capital gains, excluding capital gains on\nhousing to the sale of a taxpayers’ primary residence up to a specific amount to be calibrated to cover\nmost or all capital gains for most taxpayers.\n\n- Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of individuals) and\non the fiscal feasibility of the measure, introduce a zero-rated PIT bracket with an upper threshold in the\nrange of AMD 240,000-300,000 annually.\n\n- Conditionally on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of individuals),\nconsider the introduction of an In-Work Tax Credit that is annually capped at AMD 53,000 and phase out\nfor income above AMD 800,000.\n\n- Seek FAD assistance on micro and small enterprise taxation.\n\nTax Administration Recommendations\n\n- As a matter of urgency, create a joint SRC and MoF working party to co-design the new system so that all\nadministrative and policy issues are considered, and an efficient and effective system is implemented. Once\nthe design is finalized this group will cease and a steering group etc. would be formed.\n\n- Implement the governance and project management structures and arrangements as set out in Section III,\nFigure 13 and 14 below. As a matter of urgency, implement Stage 0 (setting up of governance structure,\nagreeing action plans, and initiating consultations).\n\n- Amend the Bank Secrecy law so that it is mandatory for banks to provide the SRC with all interest\npayments and a unique identifier so that the interest can be pre-filled into the individual tax declaration.\n\n- Amend the Tax Code to allow tax audits of individuals.\n\n9", "text_characters": 2364}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n**1.** **At 6.1 percent of GDP in 2021, the PIT is a significant source of revenue in Armenia**\n**(Table 1).** Since 2020, it has been levied at flat rates on both employment and passive capital income\n(dividends, interest, rental income, and royalties). Taxpayers who only derive income from\nemployment or passive capital income are not required to file a tax declaration or return and are\ntaxed on a withholding basis (see Section III).\n\n\n**Table 1. Armenia, Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP)**\n\n**2019** **2020** **2021**\nVAT 7.7% 7.6% 8.0%\nExcise tax 2.1% 2.0% 1.6%\nProfit tax (CIT) 3.6% 2.4% 2.3%\nIncome tax (PIT) 6.7% 6.7% 6.1%\nCustom duties 1.5% 1.1% 1.2%\nSocial security contributions 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%\nOther tax revenues 0.5% 2.2% 2.9%\nOther revenue 1.4% 2. 0% 1.2%\n**Total** **23.7%** **24.4%** **23.9%**\n_Source: MoF._\n\n**2.** **The authorities have expressed their intention to introduce a Universal PIT Declaration**\n**and have requested FAD assistance on the implementation of the measure.** This joint Tax Policy\n(FADT1) and Revenue Administration (FADR1) mission addressed the tax policy and administration\nchallenges (and opportunities) of a Universal PIT Declaration. Its key characteristics, as currently\nenvisioned by the authorities are as follows:\n\n\n - The declaration would be implemented in stages: first civil servants (FY2024 reporting on\nFY2023), then employees (FY2025 reporting on FY2024), and finally other individual taxpayers\n(FY2026 reporting on FY2025).\n\n\n - It would be yearly.\n\n\n - It would be comprehensive, covering all types of income.\n\n\n**3.** **While it is primarily a collection and compliance issue, the introduction of systematic**\n**return filing by individuals has important tax policy ramifications** . First, the simplified and\ntransparent computation of comprehensive income from various sources would be significantly\nfacilitated by a PIT declaration. This, in turn, would allow for tax policies otherwise difficult to\nimplement, including more progressivity in the PIT rate schedule as well as targeted tax incentives.\nSecond, there is a long-term benefit in gathering individual information from taxpayers in terms of\npolicy analysis. For instance, the distributional impact of tax expenditures (or the removal thereof)\nrelies on the existence of high-quality taxpayer-level data, on employment income but also on\ncapital income – all of which is made easier with the existence of comprehensive return filing. In this\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. At 6.1 percent of GDP in 2021, the PIT is a significant source of revenue in Armenia\n(Table 1). Since 2020, it has been levied at flat rates on both employment and passive capital income\n(dividends, interest, rental income, and royalties). Taxpayers who only derive income from\nemployment or passive capital income are not required to file a tax declaration or return and are\ntaxed on a withholding basis (see Section III).\n\nTable 1. Armenia, Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP)\n\n2019 2020 2021\nVAT 7.7% 7.6% 8.0%\nExcise tax 2.1% 2.0% 1.6%\nProfit tax (CIT) 3.6% 2.4% 2.3%\nIncome tax (PIT) 6.7% 6.7% 6.1%\nCustom duties 1.5% 1.1% 1.2%\nSocial security contributions 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%\nOther tax revenues 0.5% 2.2% 2.9%\nOther revenue 1.4% 2. 0% 1.2%\nTotal 23.7% 24.4% 23.9%\n_Source: MoF._\n\n2. The authorities have expressed their intention to introduce a Universal PIT Declaration\nand have requested FAD assistance on the implementation of the measure. This joint Tax Policy\n(FADT1) and Revenue Administration (FADR1) mission addressed the tax policy and administration\nchallenges (and opportunities) of a Universal PIT Declaration. Its key characteristics, as currently\nenvisioned by the authorities are as follows:\n\n - The declaration would be implemented in stages: first civil servants (FY2024 reporting on\nFY2023), then employees (FY2025 reporting on FY2024), and finally other individual taxpayers\n(FY2026 reporting on FY2025).\n\n - It would be yearly.\n\n - It would be comprehensive, covering all types of income.\n\n3. While it is primarily a collection and compliance issue, the introduction of systematic\nreturn filing by individuals has important tax policy ramifications . First, the simplified and\ntransparent computation of comprehensive income from various sources would be significantly\nfacilitated by a PIT declaration. This, in turn, would allow for tax policies otherwise difficult to\nimplement, including more progressivity in the PIT rate schedule as well as targeted tax incentives.\nSecond, there is a long-term benefit in gathering individual information from taxpayers in terms of\npolicy analysis. For instance, the distributional impact of tax expenditures (or the removal thereof)\nrelies on the existence of high-quality taxpayer-level data, on employment income but also on\ncapital income – all of which is made easier with the existence of comprehensive return filing. In this\n\n10", "text_characters": 2027}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "mission, we focus on the first aspect of the tax policy implications, that is, how a declaration would\npave the way for changes in the PIT, and how they would provide incentives for taxpayers to comply\nwith return filing. In the process, a broad policy review of the PIT was conducted, which in turn led to\npolicy recommendations not always conditional on the introduction of the declaration but\nnevertheless important in their own right (and consistent with previous TA provided by FAD in 2016\nand 2018). Microsimulations of the main reform options are developed, with the estimated impact of\neach option on revenue and progressivity.\n\n\n**4.** **The implementation of a Universal PIT Declaration presents the tax administration with**\n**significant challenges and opportunities.** The size and scope of this should not be underestimated.\nIt will require a large and complex Information Technology (IT) build, communication with\nstakeholders, and it will impact on many in the community. Above all, it will be a new experience for\ntaxpayers, and this will in itself raise many challenges.\n\n\n**5.** **This report is organized as follows.** Section II reviews tax policy aspects, Section III\naddresses tax administration, and Section IV lists capacity development needs.\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "mission, we focus on the first aspect of the tax policy implications, that is, how a declaration would\npave the way for changes in the PIT, and how they would provide incentives for taxpayers to comply\nwith return filing. In the process, a broad policy review of the PIT was conducted, which in turn led to\npolicy recommendations not always conditional on the introduction of the declaration but\nnevertheless important in their own right (and consistent with previous TA provided by FAD in 2016\nand 2018). Microsimulations of the main reform options are developed, with the estimated impact of\neach option on revenue and progressivity.\n\n4. The implementation of a Universal PIT Declaration presents the tax administration with\nsignificant challenges and opportunities. The size and scope of this should not be underestimated.\nIt will require a large and complex Information Technology (IT) build, communication with\nstakeholders, and it will impact on many in the community. Above all, it will be a new experience for\ntaxpayers, and this will in itself raise many challenges.\n\n5. This report is organized as follows. Section II reviews tax policy aspects, Section III\naddresses tax administration, and Section IV lists capacity development needs.\n\n11", "text_characters": 1049}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **II. TAX POLICY**\n\n**A.** **Key Features of the PIT**\n\n**Labor and Capital Income**\n\n**6.** **Armenia’s PIT is a simple, easy-to-administer, dual income tax system with flat rates**\n**applying to both labor and capital income.** The 2020 reform eliminated progressivity in the PIT for\nall types of income (Table 2). As a result, employment income is taxed at a flat rate of 21 percent [1]\nwith no standard personal allowance -- that is, income is taxed from the first AMD. Dividends are\ntaxed at 5 percent while interest, rental income and royalties attract a 10 percent rate. Importantly,\ncapital gains on the disposal of personal property are not taxed. As noted, PIT on employment and\npassive income, with only few exceptions, is withheld at source by employers, banks or other\nsources [2] .\n\n\n**Table 2. The 2018 Tax Reform** **[3]**\n\n\n\n**The 2019 system** **The current system (2022)**\n\n\n\n\n- Progressive labor income tax with a 23% tax\nrate on income up to a monthly income of\nAMD 150,000 AMD, 28% on monthly income\nin the range of AMD 150,000 and AMD 2\nmillion, and a 36% tax on income above AMD\n2 million.\n\n\n- The mandatory pension contribution is 2.5%\nof the monthly gross income (up to a\nmonthly maximum base of AMD 500,000).\nThere is no pension contribution on income\nabove AMD 500,000.\n\n\n\n\n- A flat 21% tax rate on all income\n\n\n\n\n- The mandatory pension contribution is 2.5% - Pension contribution is 10%, of which 5.5% [4]\nof the monthly gross income (up to a is contributed by the state. There is a cap on\nmonthly maximum base of AMD 500,000). the state contribution of 5.5% of a monthly\nThere is no pension contribution on income gross income of AMD 500,000. In addition,\nabove AMD 500,000. no pension contributions at all apply to\n\ngross monthly income in excess of 1.02\nmillion.\n\n- Taxpayers are allowed to claim any amount - Mortgage interest tax credit is allowable\nof tax due as a mortgage interest tax credit. only for properties with a value not\n\n\n\n_Source: MoF._\n\n\n\n\n- Mortgage interest tax credit is allowable\nonly for properties with a value not\nexceeding AMD 55 million.\n\n\n\n**7.** **Social security contributions (SSCs) cover pensions only, with no SSCs for healthcare or**\n**unemployment insurance.** There are three pillars in the Armenian pension system: a budget\n\n\n1 Will be 20 percent from January 2023.\n\n\n\n2 See page 32 below for more details.\n\n\n\n3 The reform was decided in 2018 and implemented in 2020.\n\n\n\n4 Will be 5 percent from January 2023.\n\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "II. TAX POLICY\n\nA. Key Features of the PIT\n\nLabor and Capital Income\n\n6. Armenia’s PIT is a simple, easy-to-administer, dual income tax system with flat rates\napplying to both labor and capital income. The 2020 reform eliminated progressivity in the PIT for\nall types of income (Table 2). As a result, employment income is taxed at a flat rate of 21 percent [1]\nwith no standard personal allowance -- that is, income is taxed from the first AMD. Dividends are\ntaxed at 5 percent while interest, rental income and royalties attract a 10 percent rate. Importantly,\ncapital gains on the disposal of personal property are not taxed. As noted, PIT on employment and\npassive income, with only few exceptions, is withheld at source by employers, banks or other\nsources [2] .\n\nTable 2. The 2018 Tax Reform [3]\n\nThe 2019 system The current system (2022)\n\n- Progressive labor income tax with a 23% tax\nrate on income up to a monthly income of\nAMD 150,000 AMD, 28% on monthly income\nin the range of AMD 150,000 and AMD 2\nmillion, and a 36% tax on income above AMD\n2 million.\n\n- The mandatory pension contribution is 2.5%\nof the monthly gross income (up to a\nmonthly maximum base of AMD 500,000).\nThere is no pension contribution on income\nabove AMD 500,000.\n\n- A flat 21% tax rate on all income\n\n- The mandatory pension contribution is 2.5% - Pension contribution is 10%, of which 5.5% [4]\nof the monthly gross income (up to a is contributed by the state. There is a cap on\nmonthly maximum base of AMD 500,000). the state contribution of 5.5% of a monthly\nThere is no pension contribution on income gross income of AMD 500,000. In addition,\nabove AMD 500,000. no pension contributions at all apply to\n\ngross monthly income in excess of 1.02\nmillion.\n\n- Taxpayers are allowed to claim any amount - Mortgage interest tax credit is allowable\nof tax due as a mortgage interest tax credit. only for properties with a value not\n\n_Source: MoF._\n\n- Mortgage interest tax credit is allowable\nonly for properties with a value not\nexceeding AMD 55 million.\n\n7. Social security contributions (SSCs) cover pensions only, with no SSCs for healthcare or\nunemployment insurance. There are three pillars in the Armenian pension system: a budget\n\n1 Will be 20 percent from January 2023.\n\n2 See page 32 below for more details.\n\n3 The reform was decided in 2018 and implemented in 2020.\n\n4 Will be 5 percent from January 2023.\n\n12", "text_characters": 1956}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "financed defined benefit component (Pillar I), a mandatory pension fund plan (Pillar II) and a\nvoluntary pension fund component (Pillar III). From July 1, 2018, contributions to the pension fund\nplan (Pillar II) are mandatory for all employees born after January 1, 1974, including employees of the\nprivate sector. In 2021, there are 477,820 participants in Pillar II (or about 64 percent of individual\ntaxpayers with PIT withheld on employment income, see Table 4). The rate of contribution for Pillar II\nis 10 percent of gross income, of which 5.5 percent is contributed by the state [5] and 4.5 percent by\nemployees. Additionally, the state contribution on Pillar II is capped at 5.5 percent of a yearly income\nof AMD 6 million (2.6 times GDP per capita) – which tends to be progressive as the effective rate\nincreases with income; and no contributions at all apply to yearly income in excess of AMD 12 24\nmillion (5.3 times GDP per capita) – which on the other hand contributes to the regressivity of the\n․\nsystem. [6] Pillar II contributions are not deductible for PIT purposes, and Pillar II pension payments are\ncorrespondingly tax-exempt. Pillar II is therefore a TEE pension system [7] . Voluntary pension plans\n(Pillar III) are, in contrast, deductible up to 5 percent of gross taxable income and corresponding\npensions are taxable. Pillar III is ETT [8] . However, participation to Pillar III is negligible, with only 547\nparticipants as of June 2022.\n\n\n\n5 Will be 5 percent from January 2023.\n\n\n\n6 With these limits and rates, as of 2022, the employee’s average contribution rate is 5.5 percent up to a yearly income\nof AMD 6 million; it gradually rises to 7.3 percent over the AMD 6-12.2 million income range; and gradually declines\nfor income above AMD 12.2 million (with a zero marginal contribution rate).\n\n\n\n7 Tax-Exempt-Exempt (TEE) means that contributions are taxed but earnings on those contributions as well as\nwithdrawal of the benefit are not taxed.\n\n\n\n8 Exempt-Tax-Tax (ETT) means that contributions are exempt but earnings on those contributions as well as\nwithdrawal of the benefit are taxed.\n\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "financed defined benefit component (Pillar I), a mandatory pension fund plan (Pillar II) and a\nvoluntary pension fund component (Pillar III). From July 1, 2018, contributions to the pension fund\nplan (Pillar II) are mandatory for all employees born after January 1, 1974, including employees of the\nprivate sector. In 2021, there are 477,820 participants in Pillar II (or about 64 percent of individual\ntaxpayers with PIT withheld on employment income, see Table 4). The rate of contribution for Pillar II\nis 10 percent of gross income, of which 5.5 percent is contributed by the state [5] and 4.5 percent by\nemployees. Additionally, the state contribution on Pillar II is capped at 5.5 percent of a yearly income\nof AMD 6 million (2.6 times GDP per capita) – which tends to be progressive as the effective rate\nincreases with income; and no contributions at all apply to yearly income in excess of AMD 12 24\nmillion (5.3 times GDP per capita) – which on the other hand contributes to the regressivity of the\n․\nsystem. [6] Pillar II contributions are not deductible for PIT purposes, and Pillar II pension payments are\ncorrespondingly tax-exempt. Pillar II is therefore a TEE pension system [7] . Voluntary pension plans\n(Pillar III) are, in contrast, deductible up to 5 percent of gross taxable income and corresponding\npensions are taxable. Pillar III is ETT [8] . However, participation to Pillar III is negligible, with only 547\nparticipants as of June 2022.\n\n5 Will be 5 percent from January 2023.\n\n6 With these limits and rates, as of 2022, the employee’s average contribution rate is 5.5 percent up to a yearly income\nof AMD 6 million; it gradually rises to 7.3 percent over the AMD 6-12.2 million income range; and gradually declines\nfor income above AMD 12.2 million (with a zero marginal contribution rate).\n\n7 Tax-Exempt-Exempt (TEE) means that contributions are taxed but earnings on those contributions as well as\nwithdrawal of the benefit are not taxed.\n\n8 Exempt-Tax-Tax (ETT) means that contributions are exempt but earnings on those contributions as well as\nwithdrawal of the benefit are taxed.\n\n13", "text_characters": 1757}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 3. Key PIT and SSC Rates in Armenia and Comparator Countries, 2022**\n\n\n\n**Min**\n\n**PIT**\n**rate**\n\n\n\n**Top**\n\n**PIT**\n**rate**\n\n\n\n**PIT**\n**standard**\n**allowance**\n\n**(mult.**\n**GDP per**\n\n\n\n**PIT Top**\n**threshold**\n\n**(mult.**\n**GDP per**\n\n**cap.)**\n\n\n\n**Capital**\n\n**gains**\n\n\n\n**Divi-**\n**dends**\n\n\n\n**Interest** **Rents** **Royal-**\n\n**ties**\n\n\n\n**SSCs**\n**Employee**\n\n\n\n**SSCs**\n**Employer**\n\n\n\n**SSCs**\n**Total**\n\n\n\n**Tax**\n**Wedge**\n\n\n\n**cap.)**\n\n\n\nAlbania 13.0% 23.0% 0.54 2.68 15.0% 8.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 11.2% 16.7% 27.9% 41.0%\n\n**5.5-**\n**Armenia** **21.0%** **21.0%** - - **0.0%** **5.0%** **10.0%** **10.0%** **10.0%** **5.5-7.3%** **0.0%** **26.0%** **[9]**\n**7.3%**\n\n\n\nOrdinary\nAzerbaijan 14.0% 25.0% - 3.28\n\ninc.\n\n0% on real\nBelarus 13.0% 13.0% 0.08 estate\n\n\n\n6.013.0% 1.0% 34.0% 35.0% 36.0%\n13.0%\n\n\n\n10.0% 10.0% 14.0% 14.0% 3.0% 22.0% 25.0% 40.0%\ninc.\n\n\n\nBosnia and\n10.0% 10.0% 0.31 - 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 31.0% 10.5% 41.5% 44.0%\nHerz.\n\n\n\nOrdinary\nBulgaria 10.0% 10.0% 0.02 \n\n\n5.0% 8-10% 13.8% 18.5% 32.3% 35.0%\ninc.\n\n\n\n20% on\nCroatia 24.0% 36.0% 0.43 3.25 12.0% 12-40% 24.0% 24.0% 20.0% 18.2% 38.2% 57.0%\nreal estate\n\n\n\nOrdinary\nEstonia 20.0% 20.0% 0.28 \n\n\n\n - [Ordinary ]\ninc. inc.\n\n\n\ninc.\n\n\n\nOrdinary\n\n\n\ninc.\n\n\n\nOrdinary\n\n\n\n3.6% 33.0% 36.6% 42.0%\ninc.\n\n\n\nGeorgia 20.0% 20.0% - - 20.0% 5.0% 5.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0%\n\n\n\nOrdinary\nKosovo 4.0% 10.0% 0.23 1.28\n\ninc.\n\nOrdinary\nMoldova 12.0% 12.0% 0.27 \n\n\ninc.\n\n\n\n5.0% 5.0% 10.0% 19.0%\n\n\n\n6.0% 12.0% 12.0% 6.0% 18.0% 24.0% 30.0%\ninc.\n\n\n\nMontenegro 9.0% 9.0% - - 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 24.0% 8.3% 32.3% 36.0%\n\n\n\nNorth Ordinary\n10.0% 18.0% 0.28 3.08\nMacedonia inc.\n\n\n\n10.0% 28.0% 0.0% 28.0% 41.0%\ninc.\n\n10% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 6.3% 31.3% 36.0%\n\n13.013.0% 13.0% 0.0% 30.0% 30.0% 33.0%\ninc. 35.0%\n\n\n\nRomania 10.0% 10.0% 0.16 - 10% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 6.3% 31.3% 36.0%\n\n\n\nOrdinary\nRussia 13.0% 13.0% 0.04 \n\n\nSerbia 10.0% 15.0% 3.26 6.52 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 20.0% 20.0% 19.9% 16.7% 36.6% 42.0%\n\nSlovenia 16.0% 50.0% 0.34 2.92 10-27.5% 27.5% 25.0% 27.5% 25.0% 22.1% 15.5% 37.6% 66.0%\n\nTurkey 15.0% 40.0% 0.28 7.67 10.0% 15.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 14.0% 27.0% 41.0% 59.0%\n\nUkraine 18.0% 18.0% 0.10 - 5.0-18.0% 6.5% 19.5% 19.5% 19.5% 0.0% 22.0% 22.0% 33.0%\n\n_Source: IBFD, tax codes._\n\n\n\n**8.** **The PIT revenue performance continued to be impressive** . Armenia’s PIT revenue of 6.1\npercent of GDP in 2021 compares with a mere 3.7 percent of GDP in comparator countries on\naverage [10] for the same year (Figure 1 and Appendix A). While in slight decline with respect to 2019\nand 2020 – possibly reflecting the suppression of the highest bracket during the 2018 reform (Table\n\n2) –, this is still an impressive performance. The relatively high average tax rate (22 percent in 2021)\nand, above all, an effective withholding collection mechanism are likely drivers of this encouraging\noutcome.\n\n\n9 Based on 5.5 percent employee contribution.\n\n10 Simple non-weighted average.\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table 3. Key PIT and SSC Rates in Armenia and Comparator Countries, 2022\n\nMin\n\nPIT\nrate\n\nTop\n\nPIT\nrate\n\nPIT\nstandard\nallowance\n\n(mult.\nGDP per\n\nPIT Top\nthreshold\n\n(mult.\nGDP per\n\ncap.)\n\nCapital\n\ngains\n\nDivi-\ndends\n\nInterest Rents Royal-\n\nties\n\nSSCs\nEmployee\n\nSSCs\nEmployer\n\nSSCs\nTotal\n\nTax\nWedge\n\ncap.)\n\nAlbania 13.0% 23.0% 0.54 2.68 15.0% 8.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 11.2% 16.7% 27.9% 41.0%\n\n5.5-\nArmenia 21.0% 21.0% - - 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 5.5-7.3% 0.0% 26.0% [9]\n7.3%\n\nOrdinary\nAzerbaijan 14.0% 25.0% - 3.28\n\ninc.\n\n0% on real\nBelarus 13.0% 13.0% 0.08 estate\n\n6.013.0% 1.0% 34.0% 35.0% 36.0%\n13.0%\n\n10.0% 10.0% 14.0% 14.0% 3.0% 22.0% 25.0% 40.0%\ninc.\n\nBosnia and\n10.0% 10.0% 0.31 - 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 31.0% 10.5% 41.5% 44.0%\nHerz.\n\nOrdinary\nBulgaria 10.0% 10.0% 0.02 \n\n5.0% 8-10% 13.8% 18.5% 32.3% 35.0%\ninc.\n\n20% on\nCroatia 24.0% 36.0% 0.43 3.25 12.0% 12-40% 24.0% 24.0% 20.0% 18.2% 38.2% 57.0%\nreal estate\n\nOrdinary\nEstonia 20.0% 20.0% 0.28 \n\n - [Ordinary ]\ninc. inc.\n\ninc.\n\nOrdinary\n\ninc.\n\nOrdinary\n\n3.6% 33.0% 36.6% 42.0%\ninc.\n\nGeorgia 20.0% 20.0% - - 20.0% 5.0% 5.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0%\n\nOrdinary\nKosovo 4.0% 10.0% 0.23 1.28\n\ninc.\n\nOrdinary\nMoldova 12.0% 12.0% 0.27 \n\ninc.\n\n5.0% 5.0% 10.0% 19.0%\n\n6.0% 12.0% 12.0% 6.0% 18.0% 24.0% 30.0%\ninc.\n\nMontenegro 9.0% 9.0% - - 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 24.0% 8.3% 32.3% 36.0%\n\nNorth Ordinary\n10.0% 18.0% 0.28 3.08\nMacedonia inc.\n\n10.0% 28.0% 0.0% 28.0% 41.0%\ninc.\n\n10% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 6.3% 31.3% 36.0%\n\n13.013.0% 13.0% 0.0% 30.0% 30.0% 33.0%\ninc. 35.0%\n\nRomania 10.0% 10.0% 0.16 - 10% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 6.3% 31.3% 36.0%\n\nOrdinary\nRussia 13.0% 13.0% 0.04 \n\nSerbia 10.0% 15.0% 3.26 6.52 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 20.0% 20.0% 19.9% 16.7% 36.6% 42.0%\n\nSlovenia 16.0% 50.0% 0.34 2.92 10-27.5% 27.5% 25.0% 27.5% 25.0% 22.1% 15.5% 37.6% 66.0%\n\nTurkey 15.0% 40.0% 0.28 7.67 10.0% 15.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 14.0% 27.0% 41.0% 59.0%\n\nUkraine 18.0% 18.0% 0.10 - 5.0-18.0% 6.5% 19.5% 19.5% 19.5% 0.0% 22.0% 22.0% 33.0%\n\n_Source: IBFD, tax codes._\n\n8. The PIT revenue performance continued to be impressive . Armenia’s PIT revenue of 6.1\npercent of GDP in 2021 compares with a mere 3.7 percent of GDP in comparator countries on\naverage [10] for the same year (Figure 1 and Appendix A). While in slight decline with respect to 2019\nand 2020 – possibly reflecting the suppression of the highest bracket during the 2018 reform (Table\n\n2) –, this is still an impressive performance. The relatively high average tax rate (22 percent in 2021)\nand, above all, an effective withholding collection mechanism are likely drivers of this encouraging\noutcome.\n\n9 Based on 5.5 percent employee contribution.\n\n10 Simple non-weighted average.\n\n14", "text_characters": 2162}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0016-001"], "markdown": "**Table 4. Summary Statistics based on Taxpayer Level Labor Income Data (2021)**\n\n\n\nNumber of taxpayers with positive labor income 739,997\nNumber of taxpayers contributing to Pillar II 477,820\nNumber of taxpayers not contributing to Pillar II 260,134\nNumber of taxpayers claiming mortgage interest tax credit (positive 20,426\namount)\n\n\n\n20,426\n\n\n\n_Sources: SRC, IMF Staff calculations._\n\n\n\n**Figure 1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In**\n\n**Percent of GDP)**\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: FADTP ECOS Database (IMF)._\n\n\n**9.** **Armenia’s labor tax wedge is low but regressive (** Figure 2 **).** At 26.5 percent overall, the\nlabor tax wedge ranks low among comparator countries (Figure 2, left panel). This is mainly due to\nlow SSCs – with other countries in the region having significantly higher rates of social contributions\n(Table 3). This is a positive feature of labor taxation from a tax efficiency viewpoint [11], as it suggests\nthat taxation alone is not a significant impediment to employment formalization generally. However,\n\nFigure 2 (right panel) shows that the tax wedge is in fact highest for low incomes, that is, markedly\nregressive. This is important in a context where informal employment still accounts for more than\n\n\n11 The efficiency of a tax system refers to its ability to influence the behavior of taxpayers – here the decision to enter\nformal employment.\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2678, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(73.5, 219.418701171875, 541.3499755859375, 496.8979797363281)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 1290, "number": 14, "size": 524505, "transform": [467.8499755859375, 0.0, -0.0, 277.4792785644531, 73.5, 219.418701171875], "width": 2175, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Table 4. Summary Statistics based on Taxpayer Level Labor Income Data (2021)\n\nNumber of taxpayers with positive labor income 739,997\nNumber of taxpayers contributing to Pillar II 477,820\nNumber of taxpayers not contributing to Pillar II 260,134\nNumber of taxpayers claiming mortgage interest tax credit (positive 20,426\namount)\n\n20,426\n\n_Sources: SRC, IMF Staff calculations._\n\nFigure 1. General Government Tax Revenue Mix, Latest Available Year of Actual Data (In\n\nPercent of GDP)\n\n_Source: FADTP ECOS Database (IMF)._\n\n9. Armenia’s labor tax wedge is low but regressive ( Figure 2 ). At 26.5 percent overall, the\nlabor tax wedge ranks low among comparator countries (Figure 2, left panel). This is mainly due to\nlow SSCs – with other countries in the region having significantly higher rates of social contributions\n(Table 3). This is a positive feature of labor taxation from a tax efficiency viewpoint [11], as it suggests\nthat taxation alone is not a significant impediment to employment formalization generally. However,\n\nFigure 2 (right panel) shows that the tax wedge is in fact highest for low incomes, that is, markedly\nregressive. This is important in a context where informal employment still accounts for more than\n\n11 The efficiency of a tax system refers to its ability to influence the behavior of taxpayers – here the decision to enter\nformal employment.\n\n15", "text_characters": 1147}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "one third of total employment [12], as it suggests that the labor tax wedge, while not high overall, could\nbe a hurdle to the formalization of low-income earners.\n\n\n**Figure 2. Tax Wedge (2021)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Tax Wedges from Statutory Rates|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32|Col33|Col34|Col35|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|\n|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|59.4
66.3|||\n|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|||||\n|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|||||||\n|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|40.441.041.441.6
43.8
56.7|||||||||\n|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||\n|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|18.620.0
26.5
29.9
32.833.134.535.736.136.5|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||||||\n\n\n\n\n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Notes: Tax Wedge = (PIT liability + Employee SCCs + Employer SCCs) / (Gross wage + Employer SCCs). The red_\n_vertical line in the right panel indicates the annual minimum wages for age over 35. Income is in thousands of AMD._\n\n\n**Business Income**\n\n\n**10.** **Business income earned by individuals is not taxed under the PIT** . Individual\n(unincorporated) businesses are taxed under one of the following regimes: individual businesses with\na yearly turnover above AMD 115 million ($ 280,000) are mandated VAT taxpayers and subject to the\nstandard CIT at 18 percent of profits (with standard deduction of business expenses [13] ); (ii) businesses\nwith turnover between AMD 24 million ($ 60,000) and AMD 115 million can opt for the turnover\n\n\n12 35.8 percent of the labor force was informal in 2020 (source: Household Labor Force Survey).\n\n13 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 102 and following.\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [116.76652526855469, 149.24380493164062, 309.8877868652344, 363.0015869140625], "columns": 35, "rows": 11}], "text": "one third of total employment [12], as it suggests that the labor tax wedge, while not high overall, could\nbe a hurdle to the formalization of low-income earners.\n\nFigure 2. Tax Wedge (2021)\n\n Tax Wedges from Statutory Rates Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 Col14 Col15 Col16 Col17 Col18 Col19 Col20 Col21 Col22 Col23 Col24 Col25 Col26 Col27 Col28 Col29 Col30 Col31 Col32 Col33 Col34 Col35 \n\n 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 \n 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 59.4 66.3 \n 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 \n 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 \n 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 40.441.041.441.6 43.8 56.7 \n 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 \n 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 \n 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 \n 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 \n 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 18.620.0 26.5 29.9 32.833.134.535.736.136.5 \n \n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Notes: Tax Wedge = (PIT liability + Employee SCCs + Employer SCCs) / (Gross wage + Employer SCCs). The red_\n_vertical line in the right panel indicates the annual minimum wages for age over 35. Income is in thousands of AMD._\n\nBusiness Income\n\n10. Business income earned by individuals is not taxed under the PIT . Individual\n(unincorporated) businesses are taxed under one of the following regimes: individual businesses with\na yearly turnover above AMD 115 million ($ 280,000) are mandated VAT taxpayers and subject to the\nstandard CIT at 18 percent of profits (with standard deduction of business expenses [13] ); (ii) businesses\nwith turnover between AMD 24 million ($ 60,000) and AMD 115 million can opt for the turnover\n\n12 35.8 percent of the labor force was informal in 2020 (source: Household Labor Force Survey).\n\n13 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 102 and following.\n\n16", "text_characters": 5559}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "tax [14], where turnover is taxed at rates determined by the type of economic activity [15] ; (iii) Individual\nbusinesses with turnover below AMD 24 million can opt for the microenterprise regime (see\nbelow) [16] . In all three situations, business income is not taxed under the income tax (PIT).\n\n\n**11.** **The microenterprise regime provides total exemption of individual business income.**\nIndividuals under the microenterprise regime only pay a lumpsum tax of AMD 5,000 per month and\nper employee [17] . An individual with no employees does not pay any tax under this regime (and is not\nenrolled under any of the mandatory pension schemes, Pillars I and II, and corresponding are not\neligible to the pension benefits).\n\n**Incentives**\n\n**12.** **A commendable characteristic of the PIT is the reduced number of incentives** . There are\nonly three incentive mechanisms, and they are all tax credits (not deductions), contributing to the\nsimplicity of the system. However, incentives on mortgage interest and on the reinvestment of\ndividends appear exceedingly generous.\n\n\n**13.** **The tax credit on mortgage interest** **[18]** **is costly and regressive.** There is a 100 percent tax\ncredit on interest paid on mortgage contracts to build or acquire individual residences from the\nprimary market (new buildings). There are limits to this incentive: (i) After the 2018 reform, the value\nof the property must not exceed AMD 55 million ($ 0.14 million140,000); (ii) The maximum tax credit\nis AMD 6 million per year ($15,000) or the annual PIT liability of the taxpayer, whichever is lowest [19] ;\n(iii) Each physical person is entitled to only one incentivized mortgage contract in their lifetime.\nDespite these limitations, the amount of tax credit is considerable at AMD 22.7 billion in 2021 (or 5.3\npercent of overall PIT revenue). This incentive is also regressive, with the top decile of taxpayers\nclaiming 90 percent of the credit (see detailed analysis page 24).\n\n\n**14.** **A tax credit on reinvested dividends** **[20]** **is excessively generous.** A 100 percent tax credit is\ngranted on dividends reinvested (in the form of new shares or a value increase of existing shares).\nConditions and limitations are that: (i) dividend reinvestments must take place during the same fiscal\nyear dividends are distributed; and (ii) the tax credit is capped by the tax paid on dividends that year\n(5 percent of dividends). In practice, this mechanism enables investors to distribute dividends tax\n\n\n14 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 253 and following. They can also opt for the VAT and the standard CIT.\n\n\n\n15 For instance, 5 percent for trade, 3,5 percent for manufacturing, 10 percent for notaries. In addition, pension\ncontributions of an individual under the turnover tax are as follows: (i) she will pay a yearly lumpsum profit tax of\nAMD 60,000 as enrollment under Pillar I; another lumpsum payment of the same amount is for Pillar II mandatory\ncontributions.\n\n\n\n16 It can also opt for the turnover tax.\n\n\n\n17 Employees of an individual business under the microenterprise regime also pay standard pension contributions\n(withheld by their employer).\n\n\n\n18 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 160.\n\n19 Therefore, they can be no refund of the tax credit.\n\n\n\n20 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 159, Alinea 4.\n\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "tax [14], where turnover is taxed at rates determined by the type of economic activity [15] ; (iii) Individual\nbusinesses with turnover below AMD 24 million can opt for the microenterprise regime (see\nbelow) [16] . In all three situations, business income is not taxed under the income tax (PIT).\n\n11. The microenterprise regime provides total exemption of individual business income.\nIndividuals under the microenterprise regime only pay a lumpsum tax of AMD 5,000 per month and\nper employee [17] . An individual with no employees does not pay any tax under this regime (and is not\nenrolled under any of the mandatory pension schemes, Pillars I and II, and corresponding are not\neligible to the pension benefits).\n\nIncentives\n\n12. A commendable characteristic of the PIT is the reduced number of incentives . There are\nonly three incentive mechanisms, and they are all tax credits (not deductions), contributing to the\nsimplicity of the system. However, incentives on mortgage interest and on the reinvestment of\ndividends appear exceedingly generous.\n\n13. The tax credit on mortgage interest [18] is costly and regressive. There is a 100 percent tax\ncredit on interest paid on mortgage contracts to build or acquire individual residences from the\nprimary market (new buildings). There are limits to this incentive: (i) After the 2018 reform, the value\nof the property must not exceed AMD 55 million ($ 0.14 million140,000); (ii) The maximum tax credit\nis AMD 6 million per year ($15,000) or the annual PIT liability of the taxpayer, whichever is lowest [19] ;\n(iii) Each physical person is entitled to only one incentivized mortgage contract in their lifetime.\nDespite these limitations, the amount of tax credit is considerable at AMD 22.7 billion in 2021 (or 5.3\npercent of overall PIT revenue). This incentive is also regressive, with the top decile of taxpayers\nclaiming 90 percent of the credit (see detailed analysis page 24).\n\n14. A tax credit on reinvested dividends [20] is excessively generous. A 100 percent tax credit is\ngranted on dividends reinvested (in the form of new shares or a value increase of existing shares).\nConditions and limitations are that: (i) dividend reinvestments must take place during the same fiscal\nyear dividends are distributed; and (ii) the tax credit is capped by the tax paid on dividends that year\n(5 percent of dividends). In practice, this mechanism enables investors to distribute dividends tax\n\n14 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 253 and following. They can also opt for the VAT and the standard CIT.\n\n15 For instance, 5 percent for trade, 3,5 percent for manufacturing, 10 percent for notaries. In addition, pension\ncontributions of an individual under the turnover tax are as follows: (i) she will pay a yearly lumpsum profit tax of\nAMD 60,000 as enrollment under Pillar I; another lumpsum payment of the same amount is for Pillar II mandatory\ncontributions.\n\n16 It can also opt for the turnover tax.\n\n17 Employees of an individual business under the microenterprise regime also pay standard pension contributions\n(withheld by their employer).\n\n18 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 160.\n\n19 Therefore, they can be no refund of the tax credit.\n\n20 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 159, Alinea 4.\n\n17", "text_characters": 2732}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "free. For example, if reinvestment is set equal to the 5 percent tax (and no more), no net taxes are\neffectively paid; the investor obtains 95 percent of the distributed dividends tax-free, while retaining\n5 percent of that amount as equity. [21]\n\n\n**15.** **A tax credit on tuition fee targets students for graduate and post-graduate studies** **[22]**\n**has limited impact and cost to the system.** A 100 percent tax credit on tuition fees can be claimed\nby students (not their parents) – and is not refundable. Because students are typically not highincome earners, the amount of tax credit effectively used is low at AMD 200 million in 2021, limiting\nthe impact and cost of this incentive.\n\n**B.** **Directions of Reforms**\n\n**16.** **The mortgage interest tax credit should be repealed for all new mortgage contracts,**\n**and at least strictly capped for existing mortgage contracts.** The authorities have confirmed their\nintention to repeal this incentive on new mortgage contracts in the Yerevan area. However, leaving\nthe mechanism untouched on existing contracts would be a long-term revenue burden and a\ncontinued strong contribution to the regressivity of the system. It is recommended to repeal the\nincentive on all contracts, new and existing – while grandfathering existing contracts under limiting\nconditions [23] . Simulations presented below suggest that the incentive should be (i) repealed on all\nnew contracts; (ii) on existing contracts, it could be grandfathered but capped at a value of interest of\nAMD 245,000 per year, per taxpayer, or gradually phased out by grandfathering only interest\npayments on mortgage contracts for the first three years of a contract.\n\n\n**17.** **The tax credit on reinvested dividends is overly generous and should be suppressed.**\nBecause it provides a straightforward mechanism to effectively avoid any taxation of dividends, also\ncontributing to the regressivity of the tax system, this incentive should be repealed.\n\n\n**18.** **Capital gains should be taxed.** Most jurisdictions impose tax on capital gains made by\nresident and non-residents from the disposal of immovable property and investment securities,\nincluding Armenia’s comparator countries (Table 3). The international experience shows that\ndifferential treatment of interest, dividends, and capital gains causes distortions in asset portfolios\n\n\n\n21 We received data on passive income (interest, dividend, etc.) at the withholding agent level (such as banks). The\ndata for 2021 shows that before the tax credit, total due tax on dividend income was AMD 15.7 billion (0.22 percent of\nGDP). However, taxpayers claimed back 9.4 billion of the tax as a credit (0.13 percent of GDP). In other words, 60\npercent of the tax was claimed as a credit. Therefore, the effective tax rate on dividends was only 2 percent (i.e., 5\npercent statutory rate multiplied by 40 percent of the gross tax).\n\n\n\n22 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 160.1.\n\n\n\n23 UK’s Mortgage Interest Relief at Source (MIRAS) was abolished in 2000 without any grandfathering, but it had been\ngradually curtailed prior to its suppression to, eventually, cover only about 10 percent of interest payments. The 2021\nUS Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) capped the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) to interest deduction to the first\n$ 750,000 in principal value (down from $ 1 million), again with no grandfathering. In Ireland, the Tax Relief at Source\n(TRS) on mortgage interest was abolished in 2013 on new mortgages, but existing mortgages up to 2012 were\ngrandfathered up to 2020, when the incentive was repealed entirely.\n\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "free. For example, if reinvestment is set equal to the 5 percent tax (and no more), no net taxes are\neffectively paid; the investor obtains 95 percent of the distributed dividends tax-free, while retaining\n5 percent of that amount as equity. [21]\n\n15. A tax credit on tuition fee targets students for graduate and post-graduate studies [22]\nhas limited impact and cost to the system. A 100 percent tax credit on tuition fees can be claimed\nby students (not their parents) – and is not refundable. Because students are typically not highincome earners, the amount of tax credit effectively used is low at AMD 200 million in 2021, limiting\nthe impact and cost of this incentive.\n\nB. Directions of Reforms\n\n16. The mortgage interest tax credit should be repealed for all new mortgage contracts,\nand at least strictly capped for existing mortgage contracts. The authorities have confirmed their\nintention to repeal this incentive on new mortgage contracts in the Yerevan area. However, leaving\nthe mechanism untouched on existing contracts would be a long-term revenue burden and a\ncontinued strong contribution to the regressivity of the system. It is recommended to repeal the\nincentive on all contracts, new and existing – while grandfathering existing contracts under limiting\nconditions [23] . Simulations presented below suggest that the incentive should be (i) repealed on all\nnew contracts; (ii) on existing contracts, it could be grandfathered but capped at a value of interest of\nAMD 245,000 per year, per taxpayer, or gradually phased out by grandfathering only interest\npayments on mortgage contracts for the first three years of a contract.\n\n17. The tax credit on reinvested dividends is overly generous and should be suppressed.\nBecause it provides a straightforward mechanism to effectively avoid any taxation of dividends, also\ncontributing to the regressivity of the tax system, this incentive should be repealed.\n\n18. Capital gains should be taxed. Most jurisdictions impose tax on capital gains made by\nresident and non-residents from the disposal of immovable property and investment securities,\nincluding Armenia’s comparator countries (Table 3). The international experience shows that\ndifferential treatment of interest, dividends, and capital gains causes distortions in asset portfolios\n\n21 We received data on passive income (interest, dividend, etc.) at the withholding agent level (such as banks). The\ndata for 2021 shows that before the tax credit, total due tax on dividend income was AMD 15.7 billion (0.22 percent of\nGDP). However, taxpayers claimed back 9.4 billion of the tax as a credit (0.13 percent of GDP). In other words, 60\npercent of the tax was claimed as a credit. Therefore, the effective tax rate on dividends was only 2 percent (i.e., 5\npercent statutory rate multiplied by 40 percent of the gross tax).\n\n22 Tax Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 160.1.\n\n23 UK’s Mortgage Interest Relief at Source (MIRAS) was abolished in 2000 without any grandfathering, but it had been\ngradually curtailed prior to its suppression to, eventually, cover only about 10 percent of interest payments. The 2021\nUS Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) capped the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) to interest deduction to the first\n$ 750,000 in principal value (down from $ 1 million), again with no grandfathering. In Ireland, the Tax Relief at Source\n(TRS) on mortgage interest was abolished in 2013 on new mortgages, but existing mortgages up to 2012 were\ngrandfathered up to 2020, when the incentive was repealed entirely.\n\n18", "text_characters": 2973}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "and erodes the capital income tax base. Neutral taxation of all capital income can minimize\navoidance and strengthen revenue mobilization in a progressive manner. For these reasons, capital\ngains made by individuals on immovable property and investment securities should be taxed, as is\nthe current practice in most countries, including Armenia’s peers (Table 3). To minimize distortions,\nthe rate should be the same of that applying to interest (10 percent).\n\n\n**19.** **However, it is common practice for an individual’s home to be partially or wholly**\n**exempt from capital gains taxation.** [24] An exemption to capital gains taxation could be provided\nfor a specific amount of the capital gains on primary residences. That exemption amount would be\ncalibrated so it covers most or all of the capital gains for most taxpayers. As a result, there would be\nzero capital gains tax for most taxpayers on sale of their primary residence, but high-income\nindividuals would still pay capital gains tax on the gain in excess of the exemption. The exemption\namount would have to be set based on examination of housing markets and would have to be\nadjusted over time as housing prices change.\n\n\n**20.** **Microenterprises should benefit from a simplified collection mechanism, not a**\n**preferential regime.** The authorities plan to bring employees of microenterprises under the\nstandard PIT regime (replacing and eliminating the monthly AMD 5,000 lumpsum tax per employee),\na justified reform. However, the situation of the individuals under the microenterprise regime\nthemselves (not their employees) is not addressed. While their employees would now be under the\nstandard PIT (and Pillar II pension scheme), they would still benefit from total tax exemption and\nwould still be outside the pension system. It is acknowledged that reforming this regime has\nimplications on the turnover tax regime, as well as on the VAT, and is clearly outside the scope of this\nmission. It is nevertheless recommended to address this critical issue; FAD assistance could be\nprovided.\n\n\n**21.** **A Universal PIT Declaration would make it possible to implement a more progressive**\n**PIT.** In the current situation with no yearly return filing, there is no practical mechanism for assessing\nthe taxable income of an employee working only a few months during the year, or an employee with\nseveral sources of income. A Universal PIT Declaration would correct that and would make it possible\nto implement a zero-rated bracket or an In-Work Tax Credit (IWTC, see below) through the\naggregation and annualization of taxable income, and the corresponding end-of-year refunds or tax\ntop-up [25] .\n\n\n24 There are several reasons for the exemption. First, a capital gain on the disposal of a home will usually be “illusory”\nsince the owner will normally have to use all the proceeds of sale to purchase another comparable home. Second,\nthere will be a continuing problem of determining the value base of a home as all expenditures on repairs, alterations,\nand extensions would need to be accounted for and classified into those that enhanced the value of the home (and,\ntherefore, included in determining the value base of the home) and those that related only to the use or enjoyment of\nthe home. Third, a home is commonly owned for long periods and, over time, a taxpayer may not retain the records\nof expenditures necessary to properly determine the value base of the home.\n\n25 Before the 2018 reform, with no universal declaration, progressivity was indeed only partially implemented, with no\nend-of-year regularizations.\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "and erodes the capital income tax base. Neutral taxation of all capital income can minimize\navoidance and strengthen revenue mobilization in a progressive manner. For these reasons, capital\ngains made by individuals on immovable property and investment securities should be taxed, as is\nthe current practice in most countries, including Armenia’s peers (Table 3). To minimize distortions,\nthe rate should be the same of that applying to interest (10 percent).\n\n19. However, it is common practice for an individual’s home to be partially or wholly\nexempt from capital gains taxation. [24] An exemption to capital gains taxation could be provided\nfor a specific amount of the capital gains on primary residences. That exemption amount would be\ncalibrated so it covers most or all of the capital gains for most taxpayers. As a result, there would be\nzero capital gains tax for most taxpayers on sale of their primary residence, but high-income\nindividuals would still pay capital gains tax on the gain in excess of the exemption. The exemption\namount would have to be set based on examination of housing markets and would have to be\nadjusted over time as housing prices change.\n\n20. Microenterprises should benefit from a simplified collection mechanism, not a\npreferential regime. The authorities plan to bring employees of microenterprises under the\nstandard PIT regime (replacing and eliminating the monthly AMD 5,000 lumpsum tax per employee),\na justified reform. However, the situation of the individuals under the microenterprise regime\nthemselves (not their employees) is not addressed. While their employees would now be under the\nstandard PIT (and Pillar II pension scheme), they would still benefit from total tax exemption and\nwould still be outside the pension system. It is acknowledged that reforming this regime has\nimplications on the turnover tax regime, as well as on the VAT, and is clearly outside the scope of this\nmission. It is nevertheless recommended to address this critical issue; FAD assistance could be\nprovided.\n\n21. A Universal PIT Declaration would make it possible to implement a more progressive\nPIT. In the current situation with no yearly return filing, there is no practical mechanism for assessing\nthe taxable income of an employee working only a few months during the year, or an employee with\nseveral sources of income. A Universal PIT Declaration would correct that and would make it possible\nto implement a zero-rated bracket or an In-Work Tax Credit (IWTC, see below) through the\naggregation and annualization of taxable income, and the corresponding end-of-year refunds or tax\ntop-up [25] .\n\n24 There are several reasons for the exemption. First, a capital gain on the disposal of a home will usually be “illusory”\nsince the owner will normally have to use all the proceeds of sale to purchase another comparable home. Second,\nthere will be a continuing problem of determining the value base of a home as all expenditures on repairs, alterations,\nand extensions would need to be accounted for and classified into those that enhanced the value of the home (and,\ntherefore, included in determining the value base of the home) and those that related only to the use or enjoyment of\nthe home. Third, a home is commonly owned for long periods and, over time, a taxpayer may not retain the records\nof expenditures necessary to properly determine the value base of the home.\n\n25 Before the 2018 reform, with no universal declaration, progressivity was indeed only partially implemented, with no\nend-of-year regularizations.\n\n19", "text_characters": 2982}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**22.** **A zero-rated bracket would re-introduce progressivity into the system** . Introducing a\nzero-rated bracket (minimum income level to be liable to PIT) would be consistent with the practice\nof country comparators and international practice generally [26], as taxing labor income from the first\ndollar is detrimental to the perceived equity of the tax system and provides negative incentives to\nenter formal employment (a relevant issue in Armenia, as noted). In the context of the introduction\nof the PIT Declaration, a zero-rated bracket would also be an incentive to comply with it. Simulations\npresented below show that combining the repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit with the\nintroduction of a zero-rated bracket with an upper threshold of AMD 240,000 [27] (or 0.13 times GDP\nper capita – at the lower end of the experience of the comparator countries, see Table 3) would have\nlimited overall impact on revenue while significantly enhancing progressivity. However, if taken in\nisolation, the revenue impact of the measure, even with relatively low threshold (AMD 240,000, or\nonly 0.13 percent of GDP per capita), would not be negligible at 0.46 percent of GDP. Furthermore, a\nzero-rated bracket creates new opportunities for tax evasion, notably by fraudulently splitting\nindividual incomes. For these reasons, it is advisable to condition the implementation of a zero-rated\nbracket not only on the effective repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit but also to an assessment\nof the administrative implementation capacity, including auditing capacity (see Section III on\nauditing).\n\n\n**23.** **An IWTC** **[28]** **would further improve progressivity and incentivize employment**\n**formalization** . In addition to a zero-rated bracket, an IWTC would make full use of a Universal PIT\nDeclaration, and would also provide incentives to comply with it, further enhancing progressivity and\nimproving incentives to low-skill and part-time workers to join formal employment. Simulations\nbelow show that the net fiscal cost of an IWTC can be made manageable as a function of its key\ncharacteristics (maximum credit, range of eligible income), especially when combined with revenueenhancing measures such as the repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit. Nevertheless, it is\nacknowledged that an IWTC, which implies net outlays to taxpayers, poses specific compliance and\nfraud risks. A well-functioning IWTC assumes sufficient compliance management capacity, including,\ncritically, auditing capacity. For these reasons, like the zero-rated bracket above but more so as it\ninvolved net outlays, the implementation of an IWTC in Armenia must be subject to a careful\nassessment of administrative implementation capacity and is not likely to be implementable in the\nshort term.\n\n\n\n26 Most UE countries have a zero-rated bracket or a standard allowance.\n\n\n\n27 This income level is based on numerical simulations as an acceptable trade-off between revenue loss and gains in\nprogressivity (see next sub-section).\n\n\n\n28 For a given worker, the value of a typical IWTC varies with employment with the objective of encouraging entry into\nformal employment: it quickly increases as employment income rises from zero; after reaching a maximum amount, it\ndiminishes as income reaches higher levels. Examples of IWTC employment-contingent payments include those in the\nUnited States (the Earned Income Tax Credit), the United Kingdom (the Working Tax Credit, moving to the Universal\nCredit), Sweden (the Earned Income Tax Credit), Belgium (In-Work Benefit), France (the Prime d’Activité), Canada (SelfSufficiency Program), and Ireland (the Family Income Supplement). Most IWTCs are contingent on earned income\nalone (US, Sweden, France) while some include labor hours as well as low earnings as a specific condition of\nentitlement. See Immervoll and Pearson (2009).\n\n\n\n20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "22. A zero-rated bracket would re-introduce progressivity into the system . Introducing a\nzero-rated bracket (minimum income level to be liable to PIT) would be consistent with the practice\nof country comparators and international practice generally [26], as taxing labor income from the first\ndollar is detrimental to the perceived equity of the tax system and provides negative incentives to\nenter formal employment (a relevant issue in Armenia, as noted). In the context of the introduction\nof the PIT Declaration, a zero-rated bracket would also be an incentive to comply with it. Simulations\npresented below show that combining the repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit with the\nintroduction of a zero-rated bracket with an upper threshold of AMD 240,000 [27] (or 0.13 times GDP\nper capita – at the lower end of the experience of the comparator countries, see Table 3) would have\nlimited overall impact on revenue while significantly enhancing progressivity. However, if taken in\nisolation, the revenue impact of the measure, even with relatively low threshold (AMD 240,000, or\nonly 0.13 percent of GDP per capita), would not be negligible at 0.46 percent of GDP. Furthermore, a\nzero-rated bracket creates new opportunities for tax evasion, notably by fraudulently splitting\nindividual incomes. For these reasons, it is advisable to condition the implementation of a zero-rated\nbracket not only on the effective repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit but also to an assessment\nof the administrative implementation capacity, including auditing capacity (see Section III on\nauditing).\n\n23. An IWTC [28] would further improve progressivity and incentivize employment\nformalization . In addition to a zero-rated bracket, an IWTC would make full use of a Universal PIT\nDeclaration, and would also provide incentives to comply with it, further enhancing progressivity and\nimproving incentives to low-skill and part-time workers to join formal employment. Simulations\nbelow show that the net fiscal cost of an IWTC can be made manageable as a function of its key\ncharacteristics (maximum credit, range of eligible income), especially when combined with revenueenhancing measures such as the repeal of the mortgage interest tax credit. Nevertheless, it is\nacknowledged that an IWTC, which implies net outlays to taxpayers, poses specific compliance and\nfraud risks. A well-functioning IWTC assumes sufficient compliance management capacity, including,\ncritically, auditing capacity. For these reasons, like the zero-rated bracket above but more so as it\ninvolved net outlays, the implementation of an IWTC in Armenia must be subject to a careful\nassessment of administrative implementation capacity and is not likely to be implementable in the\nshort term.\n\n26 Most UE countries have a zero-rated bracket or a standard allowance.\n\n27 This income level is based on numerical simulations as an acceptable trade-off between revenue loss and gains in\nprogressivity (see next sub-section).\n\n28 For a given worker, the value of a typical IWTC varies with employment with the objective of encouraging entry into\nformal employment: it quickly increases as employment income rises from zero; after reaching a maximum amount, it\ndiminishes as income reaches higher levels. Examples of IWTC employment-contingent payments include those in the\nUnited States (the Earned Income Tax Credit), the United Kingdom (the Working Tax Credit, moving to the Universal\nCredit), Sweden (the Earned Income Tax Credit), Belgium (In-Work Benefit), France (the Prime d’Activité), Canada (SelfSufficiency Program), and Ireland (the Family Income Supplement). Most IWTCs are contingent on earned income\nalone (US, Sweden, France) while some include labor hours as well as low earnings as a specific condition of\nentitlement. See Immervoll and Pearson (2009).\n\n20", "text_characters": 3249}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0022-001"], "markdown": "**24.** **“Social credits” such as PIT credits or deductions for health or education spending are**\n**not advisable.** While a Universal PIT Declaration would make it easier to implement such tax credits\nor deductions, they would likely be regressive – benefitting those households that can afford them;\ncould erode the revenue performance of the PIT (as shown by the revenue impact of the mortgage\ninterest tax credit); are not the standard approach to building redistributive health insurance systems,\nwhich is through social security contributions, or other sources of resource, levied in addition to or\nbeside the PIT. This topic is outside the scope of this mission and specific FAD advice could be\nprovided on social protection.\n\n**C.** **Impact of Reforms Options on Revenue and Progressivity**\n\n**Progressivity and Redistributive Capacity of The Current PIT**\n\n**25.** **The PIT is currently characterized by low progressivity and low redistributive capacity.**\nThe flat and relatively high tax rate, the absence of standard allowance or zero-rated bracket, a\nhighly regressive mortgage interest tax credit, and the cap on pension contribution limit the\nprogressivity of the tax system. Figure 3 shows that that the redistributive capacity of Armenia’s PIT is\nat the lowest end of its regional peers.\n\n\n**Figure 3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Notes: The redistributive capacity measures the difference between the Gini coefficients of income before and after tax_\n_respectively. Progressivity measures the difference between the Gini coefficients of tax and pre-tax income (the more the_\n_tax is concentrated on high incomes, the stronger the progressivity). The average tax rate is the ratio of total revenue_\n_collected to total pre-tax income (i.e., revenue to GDP ratio). See Appendix B for methodological orientations._\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "24. “Social credits” such as PIT credits or deductions for health or education spending are\nnot advisable. While a Universal PIT Declaration would make it easier to implement such tax credits\nor deductions, they would likely be regressive – benefitting those households that can afford them;\ncould erode the revenue performance of the PIT (as shown by the revenue impact of the mortgage\ninterest tax credit); are not the standard approach to building redistributive health insurance systems,\nwhich is through social security contributions, or other sources of resource, levied in addition to or\nbeside the PIT. This topic is outside the scope of this mission and specific FAD advice could be\nprovided on social protection.\n\nC. Impact of Reforms Options on Revenue and Progressivity\n\nProgressivity and Redistributive Capacity of The Current PIT\n\n25. The PIT is currently characterized by low progressivity and low redistributive capacity.\nThe flat and relatively high tax rate, the absence of standard allowance or zero-rated bracket, a\nhighly regressive mortgage interest tax credit, and the cap on pension contribution limit the\nprogressivity of the tax system. Figure 3 shows that that the redistributive capacity of Armenia’s PIT is\nat the lowest end of its regional peers.\n\nFigure 3. Progressivity and Redistributive Capacities Among Regional Comparators (2020)\n\n_Notes: The redistributive capacity measures the difference between the Gini coefficients of income before and after tax_\n_respectively. Progressivity measures the difference between the Gini coefficients of tax and pre-tax income (the more the_\n_tax is concentrated on high incomes, the stronger the progressivity). The average tax rate is the ratio of total revenue_\n_collected to total pre-tax income (i.e., revenue to GDP ratio). See Appendix B for methodological orientations._\n\n21", "text_characters": 1567}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "_Sources: Tax code, SWIID 9.2, World Revenue Longitudinal Database (IMF), IBFD, EY, IMF Staff computations._\n\n\n**26.** **The introduction of the flat tax system in 2020 has been associated with a fall in PIT**\n**revenue and has reduced the progressivity of the tax system.** Although the tax system before the\nreform had some of the regressive elements maintained in the current system such as mortgage\ninterest tax credit and cap on pension contribution, the progressive tax rates contributed to its\nprogressivity and revenue mobilization potential (Figure 4). The comparison of the two systems\nshows that the redistributive index and progressivity index decreased from 0.31 to -0.32 and from\n1.32 to 0.02, respectively. In addition, although attribution is difficult, the reform was concomitant\nwith a revenue loss from PIT to the amount of 0.7 percent of GDP [29] .\n\n\n**Figure 4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n29 Note that some of the loss may be due to the way the tax is simulated. In the 2021 system, since tax rate is a flat 22\npercent, it does not matter whether a person has one job or two or three. However, in a progressive rate structure (the\n2019 system) and in the absence of a comprehensive income declaration, income splitting may lower one’s tax liability.\nThe simulation presented in this section assumes a comprehensive declaration. Therefore, the estimated revenue loss\nis at the higher end of possible revenue loss from the reform. Also, as our microdata is limited to labor income, the\nsimulation only captures the impact of the tax policy change on this income category, ignoring individual entrepreneurs\npossibly switching to the microenterprise regime.\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "_Sources: Tax code, SWIID 9.2, World Revenue Longitudinal Database (IMF), IBFD, EY, IMF Staff computations._\n\n26. The introduction of the flat tax system in 2020 has been associated with a fall in PIT\nrevenue and has reduced the progressivity of the tax system. Although the tax system before the\nreform had some of the regressive elements maintained in the current system such as mortgage\ninterest tax credit and cap on pension contribution, the progressive tax rates contributed to its\nprogressivity and revenue mobilization potential (Figure 4). The comparison of the two systems\nshows that the redistributive index and progressivity index decreased from 0.31 to -0.32 and from\n1.32 to 0.02, respectively. In addition, although attribution is difficult, the reform was concomitant\nwith a revenue loss from PIT to the amount of 0.7 percent of GDP [29] .\n\nFigure 4. Implication of the 2020 Tax Reform Compared to The System in 2019\n\n29 Note that some of the loss may be due to the way the tax is simulated. In the 2021 system, since tax rate is a flat 22\npercent, it does not matter whether a person has one job or two or three. However, in a progressive rate structure (the\n2019 system) and in the absence of a comprehensive income declaration, income splitting may lower one’s tax liability.\nThe simulation presented in this section assumes a comprehensive declaration. Therefore, the estimated revenue loss\nis at the higher end of possible revenue loss from the reform. Also, as our microdata is limited to labor income, the\nsimulation only captures the impact of the tax policy change on this income category, ignoring individual entrepreneurs\npossibly switching to the microenterprise regime.\n\n22", "text_characters": 1419}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Simulations**\n\n**27.** **The key reform options recommended above have been simulated using a**\n**microsimulation model based on taxpayer-level data** . We use the 2021 taxpayer-level data to\nanalyze the impact of the reforms on revenue, distribution, and progressivity. Although wage income\nis taxed through final withholding, the State Revenue Committee (SRC) receives information on\nindividual employment income and withheld tax. Employees have a Public Social Number that\nuniquely identifies them in the micro data received from the SRC. In addition, individual taxpayers file\na mortgage deduction claim every quarter using the SRC’s e-filing portal. The mission received both\ndata separately and merged them using the unique Public Social Number. The simulations presented\nbelow are based on this merged dataset. On the other hand, lack of taxpayer level passive income\ndata (interest, dividend, and rental income) means that this type of income is not included in our\nsimulations. Table 5 summarizes the five simulated options.\n\n\n**Table 5. Summary of Proposed Options**\n\nScenarios Assumptions\n\nCurrent - Income tax rate of 22%. [30]\n\n - The social contribution is 3.5% up to AMD 6,000,000 and 10% for income above\nAMD 6,000,000. If annual income is above AMD 12,240,000, then pension\ncontribution is capped at AMD 828,000.\n\n - Mortgage interest tax credit that does not exceed the income tax due.\n\nOption 1a - Current system with:\n\n - Elimination of the tax credit for mortgage interest.\n\nOption 1b - Current system with:\n\n - A limit, rather than complete elimination, of the mortgage interest tax credit\n\n - We set the threshold for the credit such that 20 percent of the credit is preserved.\nThe resulting threshold is AMD 245,000 per year. [31]\n\nOption 2 - Option 1a with:\n\n - Zero tax rate up to an annual income of AMD 240,000. [32]\n\nOption 3 - Option 2 with:\n\n - In-work tax credit (IWTC) that:\n\n - (i) linearly increases with income from a basic amount of AMD 15,000 to a maximum\nof AMD 53,000 over the AMD 0 – 240,000 income range (for this segment, the\nGovernment would make net payments to taxpayers); (ii) is constant in nominal\n\n\n\n30 Based on the 2020 tax reform the flat tax rate on labor income was set to decrease from 23 percent in 2020 to 22\npercent in 2021, 21 percent in 2022, and 20 percent from 2023 on.\n\n\n\n31 Note that with a flat tax rate of 22 percent as of 2021 and an exchange rate of AMD 503 per USD, a credit of AMD\n245,000 is equivalent to an AMD 1.12 million ($ 2,214) tax deduction.\n\n\n\n32 The parameters are selected based on two criteria. First, we consider the practice in peer countries. The median PIT\nthreshold for zero brackets is 25 percent of GDP Per capita. However, due to the skewed income distribution in\nArmenia, such a threshold will lead to significant revenue loss. Therefore, we adjust the threshold to 14 percent of\nGDP per capita (the top income in the first decile).\n\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Simulations\n\n27. The key reform options recommended above have been simulated using a\nmicrosimulation model based on taxpayer-level data . We use the 2021 taxpayer-level data to\nanalyze the impact of the reforms on revenue, distribution, and progressivity. Although wage income\nis taxed through final withholding, the State Revenue Committee (SRC) receives information on\nindividual employment income and withheld tax. Employees have a Public Social Number that\nuniquely identifies them in the micro data received from the SRC. In addition, individual taxpayers file\na mortgage deduction claim every quarter using the SRC’s e-filing portal. The mission received both\ndata separately and merged them using the unique Public Social Number. The simulations presented\nbelow are based on this merged dataset. On the other hand, lack of taxpayer level passive income\ndata (interest, dividend, and rental income) means that this type of income is not included in our\nsimulations. Table 5 summarizes the five simulated options.\n\nTable 5. Summary of Proposed Options\n\nScenarios Assumptions\n\nCurrent - Income tax rate of 22%. [30]\n\n - The social contribution is 3.5% up to AMD 6,000,000 and 10% for income above\nAMD 6,000,000. If annual income is above AMD 12,240,000, then pension\ncontribution is capped at AMD 828,000.\n\n - Mortgage interest tax credit that does not exceed the income tax due.\n\nOption 1a - Current system with:\n\n - Elimination of the tax credit for mortgage interest.\n\nOption 1b - Current system with:\n\n - A limit, rather than complete elimination, of the mortgage interest tax credit\n\n - We set the threshold for the credit such that 20 percent of the credit is preserved.\nThe resulting threshold is AMD 245,000 per year. [31]\n\nOption 2 - Option 1a with:\n\n - Zero tax rate up to an annual income of AMD 240,000. [32]\n\nOption 3 - Option 2 with:\n\n - In-work tax credit (IWTC) that:\n\n - (i) linearly increases with income from a basic amount of AMD 15,000 to a maximum\nof AMD 53,000 over the AMD 0 – 240,000 income range (for this segment, the\nGovernment would make net payments to taxpayers); (ii) is constant in nominal\n\n30 Based on the 2020 tax reform the flat tax rate on labor income was set to decrease from 23 percent in 2020 to 22\npercent in 2021, 21 percent in 2022, and 20 percent from 2023 on.\n\n31 Note that with a flat tax rate of 22 percent as of 2021 and an exchange rate of AMD 503 per USD, a credit of AMD\n245,000 is equivalent to an AMD 1.12 million ($ 2,214) tax deduction.\n\n32 The parameters are selected based on two criteria. First, we consider the practice in peer countries. The median PIT\nthreshold for zero brackets is 25 percent of GDP Per capita. However, due to the skewed income distribution in\nArmenia, such a threshold will lead to significant revenue loss. Therefore, we adjust the threshold to 14 percent of\nGDP per capita (the top income in the first decile).\n\n23", "text_characters": 2381}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "(AMD) terms over the AMD 240,000 – 520,000 range; and (iii) linearly decreases with\nincome from AMD 53,000 to 0 over the AMD 520,000-800,000 AMD range. [33]\n\n_Source: IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Note: All income figures are annual amounts._\n\n**Eliminating the Mortgage Interest Tax Credit**\n\n**28.** **The mortgage interest tax credit in Armenia is highly skewed to high income earners.** A\nsignificant share of the credit is claimed by few taxpayers (20 percent claiming above 50 percent of\nthe credit, see Figure 5, top panels). In addition, when combined with individual income data, the\nanalysis shows that the top 10 percent of taxpayers for reported income claim 90 percent of all\ncredits, making this incentive particularly regressive (Figure 5, lower left panel).\n\n\n**Table 6. Summary of The Existing Mortgage Interest Credit System**\n\n\n\nCategory Description\n\n\n\nMortgage Interest Tax Credit\nRules\n\n\n\nThe quarterly limit for mortgage interest credit is AMD 1.5 million.\n\n\n\nNumber of Taxpayers Claiming the\nCredit\n\n\nTotal Mortgage Interest Credit\nClaimed in 2021\n\n_Source: MoF._\n\n\n\nAn apartment/house with value above AMD 55 million is not eligible for\n\nthe mortgage deduction.\n\n\n20,400\n\n\nAMD 22.7 billion (5.3% of total PIT Revenue)\n\n\n\n**29.** **Eliminating the mortgage interest credit improves progressivity, redistributive capacity**\n**of the tax system, and revenue mobilization** . As higher income earners benefit more from the\nmortgage interest credit, the removal of the tax credit for mortgage interest improves the progressivity\nand redistributive capacity of the tax system (Figure 5 lower right panel). The redistributive capacity\nindex increases to 0.36 from -0.3 whereas progressivity increases from 0.02 to 1.6. As of 2021, the\ngovernment credits back 22.7 billion of potential tax revenue to those that claim mortgage interest\ncredit (see Table ). A reform that eliminates these credits would raise revenue by 0.34 percent of GDP\nor 5.3 percent of current government revenue from PIT [34] . Finally, the authorities indicated that there\nis evidence that the introduction of this tax credit fueled a boom in mortgage credit and real estate\ndemand. Removing it could therefore support the stability of financial markets as well.\n\n\n33 520,000 AMD is the highest income for those in the bottom two deciles (the 20th percentile).\n\n34 Revenue from PIT in 2021 was AMD 426.7 billion.\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "(AMD) terms over the AMD 240,000 – 520,000 range; and (iii) linearly decreases with\nincome from AMD 53,000 to 0 over the AMD 520,000-800,000 AMD range. [33]\n\n_Source: IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Note: All income figures are annual amounts._\n\nEliminating the Mortgage Interest Tax Credit\n\n28. The mortgage interest tax credit in Armenia is highly skewed to high income earners. A\nsignificant share of the credit is claimed by few taxpayers (20 percent claiming above 50 percent of\nthe credit, see Figure 5, top panels). In addition, when combined with individual income data, the\nanalysis shows that the top 10 percent of taxpayers for reported income claim 90 percent of all\ncredits, making this incentive particularly regressive (Figure 5, lower left panel).\n\nTable 6. Summary of The Existing Mortgage Interest Credit System\n\nCategory Description\n\nMortgage Interest Tax Credit\nRules\n\nThe quarterly limit for mortgage interest credit is AMD 1.5 million.\n\nNumber of Taxpayers Claiming the\nCredit\n\nTotal Mortgage Interest Credit\nClaimed in 2021\n\n_Source: MoF._\n\nAn apartment/house with value above AMD 55 million is not eligible for\n\nthe mortgage deduction.\n\n20,400\n\nAMD 22.7 billion (5.3% of total PIT Revenue)\n\n29. Eliminating the mortgage interest credit improves progressivity, redistributive capacity\nof the tax system, and revenue mobilization . As higher income earners benefit more from the\nmortgage interest credit, the removal of the tax credit for mortgage interest improves the progressivity\nand redistributive capacity of the tax system (Figure 5 lower right panel). The redistributive capacity\nindex increases to 0.36 from -0.3 whereas progressivity increases from 0.02 to 1.6. As of 2021, the\ngovernment credits back 22.7 billion of potential tax revenue to those that claim mortgage interest\ncredit (see Table ). A reform that eliminates these credits would raise revenue by 0.34 percent of GDP\nor 5.3 percent of current government revenue from PIT [34] . Finally, the authorities indicated that there\nis evidence that the introduction of this tax credit fueled a boom in mortgage credit and real estate\ndemand. Removing it could therefore support the stability of financial markets as well.\n\n33 520,000 AMD is the highest income for those in the bottom two deciles (the 20th percentile).\n\n34 Revenue from PIT in 2021 was AMD 426.7 billion.\n\n24", "text_characters": 1969}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Figure 5. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Reforming Mortgage Interest Credit**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Average Mortgage Interest Credit
decile
4000
AMD)by
3000
Credit('000
2000
Interest
Mortgage 1000
Average
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of mortgage interest credit|Total Mortgage Interest Credit
decile
8000
by
AMD)
6000
Credit(million
4000
Interest
2000
Mortgage
Total 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of mortgage interest credit
t)|\n|---|---|\n|0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
mortgage interest credit claimed by each Decile(percent)
0
5
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Decile of income
The Share of Mortgage Interest Credit Claimed|0
50000 100000 150000
Number of Taxpayers
0
5
10 15 20 25 30
Average Effective Tax Rate(percen
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000
16000
17000
18000
19000
20000
Annual Income ('000 AMD)
current
option1a
number of taxpayers
Armenia: Effective Tax Rate by Income Level|\n\n\n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations_\n\n_Notes: (a) The upper left panel describes the average mortgage interest credit (in thousands of AMD); (b) The upper right_\n_panel describes the total mortgage interest credit claimed by decile (in millions of AMD). (iii) The lower left panel_\n_describes the distribution of mortgage interest credit by income level. (iv) The lower right panel shows the distribution of_\n_the effective tax rate._\n\n\n**30.** **However, unless the reform deals with the existing stock of mortgages, the revenue**\n**loss continues to be significant over the next decade** . As Figure 6 shows (Option A), even if new\nmortgages issued starting from 2023 stop being eligible [35], the revenue loss from existing stock of\nmortgages continues to be a significant drain on the government revenue. Therefore, any policy that\naims at minimizing the revenue loss and introducing progressivity has to deal with limiting the\nbenefit for existing stock of mortgages.\n\n\n35 The authorities plan to stop new mortgages that are issued after 2023 in Yerevan from being eligible for the\nmortgage interest credit. As of 2021, 97 percent of all mortgages are issued for properties in Yerevan and 95 percent\nof interest credit is from properties in Yerevan. As a result, the planned reform will almost completely stop the\nissuance of new mortgages eligible for tax credit.\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [80.30447387695312, 99.27056884765625, 561.2015380859375, 402.94854736328125], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}], "text": "Figure 5. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Reforming Mortgage Interest Credit\n\n Average Mortgage Interest Credit decile 4000 AMD)by 3000 Credit('000 2000 Interest Mortgage 1000 Average 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Decile of mortgage interest credit Total Mortgage Interest Credit decile 8000 by AMD) 6000 Credit(million 4000 Interest 2000 Mortgage Total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Decile of mortgage interest credit t) \n\n 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 mortgage interest credit claimed by each Decile(percent) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Decile of income The Share of Mortgage Interest Credit Claimed 0 50000 100000 150000 Number of Taxpayers 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Average Effective Tax Rate(percen 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 15000 16000 17000 18000 19000 20000 Annual Income ('000 AMD) current option1a number of taxpayers Armenia: Effective Tax Rate by Income Level \n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations_\n\n_Notes: (a) The upper left panel describes the average mortgage interest credit (in thousands of AMD); (b) The upper right_\n_panel describes the total mortgage interest credit claimed by decile (in millions of AMD). (iii) The lower left panel_\n_describes the distribution of mortgage interest credit by income level. (iv) The lower right panel shows the distribution of_\n_the effective tax rate._\n\n30. However, unless the reform deals with the existing stock of mortgages, the revenue\nloss continues to be significant over the next decade . As Figure 6 shows (Option A), even if new\nmortgages issued starting from 2023 stop being eligible [35], the revenue loss from existing stock of\nmortgages continues to be a significant drain on the government revenue. Therefore, any policy that\naims at minimizing the revenue loss and introducing progressivity has to deal with limiting the\nbenefit for existing stock of mortgages.\n\n35 The authorities plan to stop new mortgages that are issued after 2023 in Yerevan from being eligible for the\nmortgage interest credit. As of 2021, 97 percent of all mortgages are issued for properties in Yerevan and 95 percent\nof interest credit is from properties in Yerevan. As a result, the planned reform will almost completely stop the\nissuance of new mortgages eligible for tax credit.\n\n25", "text_characters": 1911}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0027-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: CBA and IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_**Option A**_ _is the current policy, including the announced suppression of the tax credit on any mortgage issued after January_\n_2023 in Yerevan_ _[36]_ _. Under this scenario, all mortgages issued until 2022 continue to receive tax credit until the end of the_\n_contract._\n_**Option B**_ _involves limiting the number of years a mortgage can qualify for tax credit, starting in 2023. Under this_\n_scenario, all mortgages would continue to qualify for tax credit but only for three years since being issued._\n\n_**Option C-Option F**_ _involve imitating the amount of tax credit per mortgage, starting in 2023. In option C, the limit is_\n_AMD 1 million, in option D the limit is AMD 750,000, in option E the limit is AMD 525,000, and finally in option F the limit_\n_is AMD 245,000._\n\n\n**31.** **Limiting the mortgage interest credit on existing contracts rather than its complete**\n**removal may ease implementation while maintaining the revenue gain and an increase in**\n**progressivity.** The proposed cap of AMD 245,000 [37] on annual mortgage interest tax credit (Option F)\nlimits the credit claimed to 20 percent of current level. As a result, it increases government revenue by\n0.27 percent of GDP compared to the baseline (current system). In addition, the redistribution and\n\n\n36 Since Yerevan accounts for 95 percent of all mortgages, the policy amounts to eliminating mortgage interest tax\ncredit from 2023 on.\n\n37 We allocate 20 percent of the claim on the existing stock of mortgages to be still available. The interest credit\nthreshold that still leaves 20 percent of the credit claimed in 2021 is AMD 245,000. Note that with a flat tax rate of 22\npercent as of 2021 and an exchange rate of 503 AMD per USD, a credit of AMD 245,000 is equivalent to an AMD 1.12\nmillion ($ 2,214) tax deduction.\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 6. Mortgage Interest Eligible for Tax Credit in the Next Two Decades\n\n_Source: CBA and IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Option A_ _is the current policy, including the announced suppression of the tax credit on any mortgage issued after January_\n_2023 in Yerevan_ _[36]_ _. Under this scenario, all mortgages issued until 2022 continue to receive tax credit until the end of the_\n_contract._\n_Option B_ _involves limiting the number of years a mortgage can qualify for tax credit, starting in 2023. Under this_\n_scenario, all mortgages would continue to qualify for tax credit but only for three years since being issued._\n\n_Option C-Option F_ _involve imitating the amount of tax credit per mortgage, starting in 2023. In option C, the limit is_\n_AMD 1 million, in option D the limit is AMD 750,000, in option E the limit is AMD 525,000, and finally in option F the limit_\n_is AMD 245,000._\n\n31. Limiting the mortgage interest credit on existing contracts rather than its complete\nremoval may ease implementation while maintaining the revenue gain and an increase in\nprogressivity. The proposed cap of AMD 245,000 [37] on annual mortgage interest tax credit (Option F)\nlimits the credit claimed to 20 percent of current level. As a result, it increases government revenue by\n0.27 percent of GDP compared to the baseline (current system). In addition, the redistribution and\n\n36 Since Yerevan accounts for 95 percent of all mortgages, the policy amounts to eliminating mortgage interest tax\ncredit from 2023 on.\n\n37 We allocate 20 percent of the claim on the existing stock of mortgages to be still available. The interest credit\nthreshold that still leaves 20 percent of the credit claimed in 2021 is AMD 245,000. Note that with a flat tax rate of 22\npercent as of 2021 and an exchange rate of 503 AMD per USD, a credit of AMD 245,000 is equivalent to an AMD 1.12\nmillion ($ 2,214) tax deduction.\n\n26", "text_characters": 1573}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0028-001"], "markdown": "progressivity indexes increase from -0.3 to 0.38 and 0.02 to 1.68, respectively. Figure 7 illustrates how\nthe effective tax rates increases with income under various reforms scenarios.\n\n\n**Figure 7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Note: In option 1a we assume that the mortgage interest credit is eliminated for all contracts. In option 1b, a cap of AMD_\n_245,000 (Option F) is assumed on existing mortgages rather than an immediate zeroing of the benefit._\n\n\n**Introducing a Zero-Rate Bracket [Option 2]**\n\n**32.** **With its favorable revenue and distributional impact as well as relative ease of**\n**administration, a zero-rated bracket could be considered** . The proposed standard deduction of\nAMD 240,000 is 13 percent of GDP per capita and is equivalent to $ 593. The proposed threshold is at\nthe lower end of peer countries as a multiple of GDP per capita (see Table 3) and has been set running\nsimulations – seeking a adequate balance between revenue losses and progressivity gains. Introducing\nthis standard tax deduction in addition to changing the mortgage interest credit rule increases the\nredistributive and progressivity index by 1.9 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively. If combined with\nthe elimination of the mortgage interest credit, on net, government revenue remains close to the\nbaseline current system (Figure 10).\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "progressivity indexes increase from -0.3 to 0.38 and 0.02 to 1.68, respectively. Figure 7 illustrates how\nthe effective tax rates increases with income under various reforms scenarios.\n\nFigure 7. Implication of a Repeal of Mortgage Interest Tax Credit Compared to a Cap\n\n_Note: In option 1a we assume that the mortgage interest credit is eliminated for all contracts. In option 1b, a cap of AMD_\n_245,000 (Option F) is assumed on existing mortgages rather than an immediate zeroing of the benefit._\n\nIntroducing a Zero-Rate Bracket [Option 2]\n\n32. With its favorable revenue and distributional impact as well as relative ease of\nadministration, a zero-rated bracket could be considered . The proposed standard deduction of\nAMD 240,000 is 13 percent of GDP per capita and is equivalent to $ 593. The proposed threshold is at\nthe lower end of peer countries as a multiple of GDP per capita (see Table 3) and has been set running\nsimulations – seeking a adequate balance between revenue losses and progressivity gains. Introducing\nthis standard tax deduction in addition to changing the mortgage interest credit rule increases the\nredistributive and progressivity index by 1.9 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively. If combined with\nthe elimination of the mortgage interest credit, on net, government revenue remains close to the\nbaseline current system (Figure 10).\n\n27", "text_characters": 1147}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0029-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._\n\n\n**Introducing an IWTC**\n\n**33.** **An IWTC incentivizes formalization and further increases progressivity with limited**\n**revenue loss** **[38]** . In this illustrative scenario, we introduce an IWTC in addition to a zero-rated bracket\nand the elimination of the mortgage interest tax credit. An IWTC is simulated with the characteristics\nspecified under Option 3 (see Table 5): at the lowest income levels (below AMD 240,000), the IWTC is\na net outlay (as the PIT rate is zero) which increases with income, rewarding additional labor supply;\nat higher income levels, the IWTC only decreases gradually (above EUR 53,000), which is also\nincentive-compatible with increased labor supply. This IWTC implies that the lowest 10 percent of\nlabor income earners receive a net payment from the Government. Such a reform significantly\nimproves the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the tax and transfer system (from -0.32 to\n2.57 and from 0.02 to 9.41 respectively). As Figure 9, right panel, shows, this impact is due to a large\nreduction in the effective tax rate of low-income taxpayers. In addition, the revenue loss associated\nwith the reform is minimal (0.19 percent of GDP). The proposed standard deduction and IWTC will be\nrelatively revenue neutral even with only capping the tax credit on existing mortgage contracts,\n\n\n38 For a context regarding the in-work credit, the earned income tax credit in the US ranges from $560 to $6,935.\nAdjusting for GDP per capita difference, the minimum credit is 16,000 AMD. Considering the revenue implication, we\nchoose a slightly lower value of 15000 AMD. The maximum credit in our scenario is equivalent to $1,980.\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 8. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing a Zero-Rated Bracket\n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._\n\nIntroducing an IWTC\n\n33. An IWTC incentivizes formalization and further increases progressivity with limited\nrevenue loss [38] . In this illustrative scenario, we introduce an IWTC in addition to a zero-rated bracket\nand the elimination of the mortgage interest tax credit. An IWTC is simulated with the characteristics\nspecified under Option 3 (see Table 5): at the lowest income levels (below AMD 240,000), the IWTC is\na net outlay (as the PIT rate is zero) which increases with income, rewarding additional labor supply;\nat higher income levels, the IWTC only decreases gradually (above EUR 53,000), which is also\nincentive-compatible with increased labor supply. This IWTC implies that the lowest 10 percent of\nlabor income earners receive a net payment from the Government. Such a reform significantly\nimproves the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the tax and transfer system (from -0.32 to\n2.57 and from 0.02 to 9.41 respectively). As Figure 9, right panel, shows, this impact is due to a large\nreduction in the effective tax rate of low-income taxpayers. In addition, the revenue loss associated\nwith the reform is minimal (0.19 percent of GDP). The proposed standard deduction and IWTC will be\nrelatively revenue neutral even with only capping the tax credit on existing mortgage contracts,\n\n38 For a context regarding the in-work credit, the earned income tax credit in the US ranges from $560 to $6,935.\nAdjusting for GDP per capita difference, the minimum credit is 16,000 AMD. Considering the revenue implication, we\nchoose a slightly lower value of 15000 AMD. The maximum credit in our scenario is equivalent to $1,980.\n\n28", "text_characters": 1502}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0030-001"], "markdown": "rather than its complete elimination [39] . The progressivity and redistribution indexes, compared to\nbaseline, increase from 0.02 to 9.28 and from -0.32 to 2.47, respectively.\n\n\n**Figure 9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Summary of Impact on Revenue**\n\n**34.** **Reforming the mortgage interest tax credit enables the introduction of a standard**\n**allowance and an IWTC in a close to revenue-neutral way** . As Figure 10 shows, stopping the credit\nincluding for the existing stock of mortgages increases government revenue by at least 0.34 percent\nof GDP [40] . Grandfathering the existing stock of mortgages with a limit on the amount of credit they can\n\n\n39 Note that option 4 (limiting the mortgage interest credit) includes the standard deduction and in-work credit.\n\n40 The figure we included is calculated as AMD 22.7 billion of mortgage credit as of 2021 divided by a GDP of AMD\n6.983 trillion. The tax expenditure report issued by the Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, is estimated to be AMD\n38 billion for 2022. The main difference between the actual benefit provided (AMD 22.7 billion) and the estimated tax\nexpenditure (AMD 38 billion) is that the former (actual) accounts for all the limitations on the credit. These include the\nAMD 6 million annual cap. And some of the mortgages may not even get the entire AMD 6 million cap as there is a 1.5\nmillion quarterly cap. i.e., If the mortgage interest in the first quarter, for instance, is AMD 1 million and 1.7 million in\nthe other three quarters, the taxpayer will only get AMD 5.5 million instead of the whole 6 million credit. In fact, our\nsimulations show that once these factors are accounted for, the mortgage interest tax credit claims in 2021 drop from\nAMD 38 billion to 22.7 billion.\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "rather than its complete elimination [39] . The progressivity and redistribution indexes, compared to\nbaseline, increase from 0.02 to 9.28 and from -0.32 to 2.47, respectively.\n\nFigure 9. Progressivity and Redistributive Implication of Introducing in-work credit\n\nSummary of Impact on Revenue\n\n34. Reforming the mortgage interest tax credit enables the introduction of a standard\nallowance and an IWTC in a close to revenue-neutral way . As Figure 10 shows, stopping the credit\nincluding for the existing stock of mortgages increases government revenue by at least 0.34 percent\nof GDP [40] . Grandfathering the existing stock of mortgages with a limit on the amount of credit they can\n\n39 Note that option 4 (limiting the mortgage interest credit) includes the standard deduction and in-work credit.\n\n40 The figure we included is calculated as AMD 22.7 billion of mortgage credit as of 2021 divided by a GDP of AMD\n6.983 trillion. The tax expenditure report issued by the Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, is estimated to be AMD\n38 billion for 2022. The main difference between the actual benefit provided (AMD 22.7 billion) and the estimated tax\nexpenditure (AMD 38 billion) is that the former (actual) accounts for all the limitations on the credit. These include the\nAMD 6 million annual cap. And some of the mortgages may not even get the entire AMD 6 million cap as there is a 1.5\nmillion quarterly cap. i.e., If the mortgage interest in the first quarter, for instance, is AMD 1 million and 1.7 million in\nthe other three quarters, the taxpayer will only get AMD 5.5 million instead of the whole 6 million credit. In fact, our\nsimulations show that once these factors are accounted for, the mortgage interest tax credit claims in 2021 drop from\nAMD 38 billion to 22.7 billion.\n\n29", "text_characters": 1485}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0031-001"], "markdown": "claim annually (AMD 245,000) keeps the revenue gain while enabling a smoother transition [41] . Finally,\ncoupling standard deduction and IWTC with elimination of mortgage interest credit leads to minimal\nloss of revenue (0.19 percent of GDP) compared to the current scenario. As mentioned, caveats apply\non the feasibility of introducing a zero-rated bracket and an IWTC in the short term.\n\n\n**Figure 10. PIT Revenue across Scenarios**\n\n\nRevenue, tax credit, and mortgage interest credit as a share of GDP\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|5.82 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.81|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|\n|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|5.20
5.49
5.26
5.26
4.79
5.42 5.42
4.79
5.425.30||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|||0.62|||||0.62|||||0.62|||||0.6|||||0.62||||\n|||||||||||||||||||||||||||\n|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|-0.33
-0.07
-0.12|\n\n\n\ncurrent option1a option1b option2 option3\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Note: SSC is social security contributions from all pension pillars._\n\n\n**Tax Policy Recommendations**\n\n - Repeal the tax credit on mortgage interest, with grandfathering of existing contracts with\nyearly interest below an upper limit in the range of AMD 245,0000-300,000, which could yield\nup to 0.27 percent of GDP in new tax revenue and significantly improve progressivity of the\ntax system.\n\n - Repeal the tax credit on reinvested dividends, which could yield at least 0.13 percent of GDP\nin new revenue.\n\n\n41 In this scenario (cap on mortgage credit), government revenue increases by 0.27 percent of GDP capered to the\ncurrent system.\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [146.30703735351562, 187.215576171875, 507.3139953613281, 374.9258117675781], "columns": 26, "rows": 13}], "text": "claim annually (AMD 245,000) keeps the revenue gain while enabling a smoother transition [41] . Finally,\ncoupling standard deduction and IWTC with elimination of mortgage interest credit leads to minimal\nloss of revenue (0.19 percent of GDP) compared to the current scenario. As mentioned, caveats apply\non the feasibility of introducing a zero-rated bracket and an IWTC in the short term.\n\nFigure 10. PIT Revenue across Scenarios\n\nRevenue, tax credit, and mortgage interest credit as a share of GDP\n\n 5.82 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.81 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 Col14 Col15 Col16 Col17 Col18 Col19 Col20 Col21 Col22 Col23 Col24 Col25 Col26 \n\n 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 \n 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 \n 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 \n 5.20 5.49 5.26 5.26 4.79 5.42 5.42 4.79 5.425.30 \n \n \n \n \n \n 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.6 0.62 \n \n -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 -0.33 -0.07 -0.12 \n\ncurrent option1a option1b option2 option3\n\n_Sources: SRC, IBFD, IMF Staff calculations._\n\n_Note: SSC is social security contributions from all pension pillars._\n\nTax Policy Recommendations\n\n - Repeal the tax credit on mortgage interest, with grandfathering of existing contracts with\nyearly interest below an upper limit in the range of AMD 245,0000-300,000, which could yield\nup to 0.27 percent of GDP in new tax revenue and significantly improve progressivity of the\ntax system.\n\n - Repeal the tax credit on reinvested dividends, which could yield at least 0.13 percent of GDP\nin new revenue.\n\n41 In this scenario (cap on mortgage credit), government revenue increases by 0.27 percent of GDP capered to the\ncurrent system.\n\n30", "text_characters": 2892}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Introduce a 10 percent withholding tax on capital gains, excluding capital gains on housing to\nthe sale of a taxpayers’ primary residence, up to a specific amount to be calibrated so it covers\nmost or all capital gains for most taxpayers.\n\n - Conditionally, on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of\nindividuals) and on the fiscal feasibility of the measure, introduce a zero-rated PIT bracket\nwith an upper threshold in the range of AMD 240,000-300,000 annually, which would cost\nabout 0.46 percent of GDP.\n\n - Conditionally, on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of\nindividuals), consider the introduction of an IWTC that is annually capped at AMD 53,000 and\nphase out for income above AMD 800,000, which could cost about 0.19 percent of GDP.\n## **III. TAX ADMINISTRATION**\n\n**A.** **Current Administrative System**\n\n**35.** **The State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia (SRC) is the national Tax**\n**Administration.** It is charged with maintaining the current system of taxation of individuals who are\nnot in business as long as it is required and implementing the new Universal Declaration Policy (the\nPolicy) through creating the Universal Declaration Administrative System (the System). The two\nsystems will operate in parallel until the current system is redundant.\n\n\n**36.** **Armenia’s tax system is a self-assessment system.** **[42]** Under this system the income and\nclaims a taxpayer makes in their declaration are accepted by the tax administration after electronic\npre-assessment checks and an assessment notice is issued. Even though a declaration may be initially\naccepted it may still be subject to further risk based post-assessment review or adjustments if thirdparty data is corrected. Currently the SRC has no legislative power to undertake audits of PIT\nTaxpayers. It is recommended that the Tax Code is amended to allow tax audits of individuals This is\nan important consideration in the design of the new system.\n\n\n**37.** **Individuals are not subject to audit.** As pointed out by the 2016 and 2018 FAD capacity\ndevelopment (CD) missions, the law allows audit of companies but not individuals (natural persons).\nWith sufficient information collection mechanisms in place, audits by tax authorities should act as an\nincentive for increased compliance and tax collection from individuals. The introduction of a\nUniversal PIT Declaration, with the collection of comprehensive information on individual taxpayers,\nis an excellent opportunity and justification to include natural persons in the scope of audits.\n\n\n**38.** **Under the current system, individual taxpayers who are not in business (i.e., only derive**\n**income from employment or passive income) are not required to file a tax declaration or**\n\n\n42 As advised by MoF.\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Introduce a 10 percent withholding tax on capital gains, excluding capital gains on housing to\nthe sale of a taxpayers’ primary residence, up to a specific amount to be calibrated so it covers\nmost or all capital gains for most taxpayers.\n\n - Conditionally, on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of\nindividuals) and on the fiscal feasibility of the measure, introduce a zero-rated PIT bracket\nwith an upper threshold in the range of AMD 240,000-300,000 annually, which would cost\nabout 0.46 percent of GDP.\n\n - Conditionally, on an assessment of sufficient administrative capacity (including auditing of\nindividuals), consider the introduction of an IWTC that is annually capped at AMD 53,000 and\nphase out for income above AMD 800,000, which could cost about 0.19 percent of GDP.\nIII. TAX ADMINISTRATION\n\nA. Current Administrative System\n\n35. The State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia (SRC) is the national Tax\nAdministration. It is charged with maintaining the current system of taxation of individuals who are\nnot in business as long as it is required and implementing the new Universal Declaration Policy (the\nPolicy) through creating the Universal Declaration Administrative System (the System). The two\nsystems will operate in parallel until the current system is redundant.\n\n36. Armenia’s tax system is a self-assessment system. [42] Under this system the income and\nclaims a taxpayer makes in their declaration are accepted by the tax administration after electronic\npre-assessment checks and an assessment notice is issued. Even though a declaration may be initially\naccepted it may still be subject to further risk based post-assessment review or adjustments if thirdparty data is corrected. Currently the SRC has no legislative power to undertake audits of PIT\nTaxpayers. It is recommended that the Tax Code is amended to allow tax audits of individuals This is\nan important consideration in the design of the new system.\n\n37. Individuals are not subject to audit. As pointed out by the 2016 and 2018 FAD capacity\ndevelopment (CD) missions, the law allows audit of companies but not individuals (natural persons).\nWith sufficient information collection mechanisms in place, audits by tax authorities should act as an\nincentive for increased compliance and tax collection from individuals. The introduction of a\nUniversal PIT Declaration, with the collection of comprehensive information on individual taxpayers,\nis an excellent opportunity and justification to include natural persons in the scope of audits.\n\n38. Under the current system, individual taxpayers who are not in business (i.e., only derive\nincome from employment or passive income) are not required to file a tax declaration or\n\n42 As advised by MoF.\n\n31", "text_characters": 2339}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**return.** The current system is streamlined because employees are taxed on a flat rate of 21 percent [43]\nwith no threshold, as noted. The final PIT is withheld by the employer, reported electronically, and\npaid to the SRC monthly. Withholders of taxes are called Tax Agents. The reporting includes a wide\nrange of information, including name and a unique identifier. There is also withholding and reporting\nto the SRC of passive income by payers (Tax Agents) and this includes, interest, dividends, royalties,\nand some rental arrangements. There is no reporting system for rental income where the rental is\narranged privately and not by a rental agent (Tax Agent). The extent of noncompliance is unknown.\n\n\n**39.** **There are several incentives that are provided through the tax system.** Taxpayers claim\nthese through various systems on a quarterly or annual basis, depending on the benefit (see\ndescription above). They claim a refund from tax withheld and it is paid into a bank account.\n\n\n**40.** **There are many of the necessary foundations for the new Universal Declaration**\n**Administrative System already in place.** These include a mature withholding tax system with\n58,945 [44] employers, 739,997 [45] employees, and mandatory electronic lodgment of the withholding\nreturn. However, they do not report information to identify the owner of the account to the SRC.\n\n\n**41.** **Importantly, there are good IT systems and infrastructure in place.** Since 2010 all\nfunctions have been automated. There has been significant World Bank support in this area.\n\n**B.** **Universal Declaration Administrative System**\n\n**42.** **The proposed Universal Declaration Administrative System** **[46]** **for PIT is a major reform**\n**in size and scope** . It will require a significant IT build, will have wide ranging community impacts,\nand will require good communication with all stakeholders, in particular the affected taxpayers. It is\nimportant to note that this is not just an IT challenge, it will impact on many areas of the SRC. The\nSRC advised that it is expected that the IT build would take twelve months to complete once the\nlegislation is passed.\n\n\n**43.** **Many countries have implemented a system of Universal Declaration** . [47] They have\ndeveloped Universal Declaration Administrative Systems to support their declaration regimes which\n\n\n\n43 Rates to change to 20 percent in 2023.\n\n\n\n44 See International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) Data 2018.\n\n\n\n45 See T able 4 above.\n\n\n\n46 See high-level description of the system in Prime Ministers Decree N 919 2022-2025 Program for Managing Tax\nRevenue.\n\n\n\n47 See, for example, Tax Administration 2021, Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging\nEconomies, OECD, page 334.\n\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "return. The current system is streamlined because employees are taxed on a flat rate of 21 percent [43]\nwith no threshold, as noted. The final PIT is withheld by the employer, reported electronically, and\npaid to the SRC monthly. Withholders of taxes are called Tax Agents. The reporting includes a wide\nrange of information, including name and a unique identifier. There is also withholding and reporting\nto the SRC of passive income by payers (Tax Agents) and this includes, interest, dividends, royalties,\nand some rental arrangements. There is no reporting system for rental income where the rental is\narranged privately and not by a rental agent (Tax Agent). The extent of noncompliance is unknown.\n\n39. There are several incentives that are provided through the tax system. Taxpayers claim\nthese through various systems on a quarterly or annual basis, depending on the benefit (see\ndescription above). They claim a refund from tax withheld and it is paid into a bank account.\n\n40. There are many of the necessary foundations for the new Universal Declaration\nAdministrative System already in place. These include a mature withholding tax system with\n58,945 [44] employers, 739,997 [45] employees, and mandatory electronic lodgment of the withholding\nreturn. However, they do not report information to identify the owner of the account to the SRC.\n\n41. Importantly, there are good IT systems and infrastructure in place. Since 2010 all\nfunctions have been automated. There has been significant World Bank support in this area.\n\nB. Universal Declaration Administrative System\n\n42. The proposed Universal Declaration Administrative System [46] for PIT is a major reform\nin size and scope . It will require a significant IT build, will have wide ranging community impacts,\nand will require good communication with all stakeholders, in particular the affected taxpayers. It is\nimportant to note that this is not just an IT challenge, it will impact on many areas of the SRC. The\nSRC advised that it is expected that the IT build would take twelve months to complete once the\nlegislation is passed.\n\n43. Many countries have implemented a system of Universal Declaration . [47] They have\ndeveloped Universal Declaration Administrative Systems to support their declaration regimes which\n\n43 Rates to change to 20 percent in 2023.\n\n44 See International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) Data 2018.\n\n45 See T able 4 above.\n\n46 See high-level description of the system in Prime Ministers Decree N 919 2022-2025 Program for Managing Tax\nRevenue.\n\n47 See, for example, Tax Administration 2021, Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging\nEconomies, OECD, page 334.\n\n32", "text_characters": 2249}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0034-001"], "markdown": "may go by many different names and “brands”. [48] A simulator of the Australian tax return system for\nindividual taxpayers was provided to MoF and SRC staff. [49]\n\n\n**44.** **In summary, the proposed Universal Declaration Administrative System will operate on**\n**the following basis.** The SRC will continue to collect withholding tax and identifying data from\nemployers and passive income providers. This data and the data that it already holds (e.g., the data\nin the register of employees) will be presented electronically to an individual as a prefilled return. The\nindividual will either accept or add missing income (e.g., Private Rental Arrangements and income\nnot reported by a Tax Agent). If the taxpayer does not sign the declaration after a certain period, it\nwill be taken as deemed acceptance by the taxpayer. [50] Below is a high-level timeline for the launch\nof the new system.\n\n\n**Figure 11. Implementation Timeline**\n\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n\n**45.** **Taxpayers** **will then electronically “sign” the return and make a declaration that it is**\n**true and correct.** If they do not sign the return within sixty days (based on international good\n\n\n\n\n\n48 For example, the Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) system is branded myTax which is a registered trademark.\n\n\n\n[49 See ATO simulator at https://onlineservicessimulator.ato.gov.au/.](https://onlineservicessimulator.ato.gov.au/)\n\n\n\n50 There are at least fifteen countries with deemed acceptance: Austria, Belgium, Cabo Verde, Denmark, Finland,\nFrance, Grenada, Hungary, Malta, Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa. See ISORA Data\n2022.\n\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2426, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(72.0, 269.5888671875, 540.0, 520.8888549804688)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 370, "number": 13, "size": 33832, "transform": [467.9999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 251.29998779296875, 72.0, 269.5888671875], "width": 689, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "may go by many different names and “brands”. [48] A simulator of the Australian tax return system for\nindividual taxpayers was provided to MoF and SRC staff. [49]\n\n44. In summary, the proposed Universal Declaration Administrative System will operate on\nthe following basis. The SRC will continue to collect withholding tax and identifying data from\nemployers and passive income providers. This data and the data that it already holds (e.g., the data\nin the register of employees) will be presented electronically to an individual as a prefilled return. The\nindividual will either accept or add missing income (e.g., Private Rental Arrangements and income\nnot reported by a Tax Agent). If the taxpayer does not sign the declaration after a certain period, it\nwill be taken as deemed acceptance by the taxpayer. [50] Below is a high-level timeline for the launch\nof the new system.\n\nFigure 11. Implementation Timeline\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n45. Taxpayers will then electronically “sign” the return and make a declaration that it is\ntrue and correct. If they do not sign the return within sixty days (based on international good\n\n48 For example, the Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) system is branded myTax which is a registered trademark.\n\n49 See ATO simulator at https://onlineservicessimulator.ato.gov.au/.\n\n50 There are at least fifteen countries with deemed acceptance: Austria, Belgium, Cabo Verde, Denmark, Finland,\nFrance, Grenada, Hungary, Malta, Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa. See ISORA Data\n2022.\n\n33", "text_characters": 1298}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0035-001"], "markdown": "practice), it will be deemed as accepted by the taxpayer (deemed acceptance). In Box 2 below is an\nexample of the declaration that is required in the Australian tax return for individual taxpayers. [51]\n\n\n**Box 2. Declaration from the Australian tax return**\n\nI declare that:\n\n - all the information on this tax return, including pre-filled information, is true and correct\n\n - all the income I have to declare for 2021-22 is included, and\n\n - I have the necessary receipts and other records – or expect to obtain the necessary written evidence within\na reasonable time of lodging this tax return - to support my claims for deductions and tax offsets.\n\n\n**46.** **The Universal Declaration Administrative System is planned to be introduced on a**\n**phased approach from 2024 reporting FY2023 income.** Importantly, the first Phase will include\nState and Municipal employees, citizens of the Republic of Armenia (RoA) holding public positions,\nshareholders of companies, private entrepreneurs and notaries public, and individuals earning\nincome without withholding tax withheld by a Tax Agent. Figure 12 below sets out the three phases.\nIt is estimated that 200,000 taxpayers will be involved in Phase 1. [52] Phasing is supported by the\nMission Team as it mitigates several implementation risks.\n\n\n**Figure 12. The Three Phases**\n\n\n_Source: Armenia MoF._\n\n\n**47.** **The final Universal Declaration Detailed Policy (the Policy) that can be used to build a**\n**new system has not yet been finalized and approved by the Government of Armenia** **[53]** **.** There is\nno conclusive statement of the Policy as it is still in development. At this stage there are questions\noutstanding, for example, who will be included in the declaration population has not been\ndetermined. For example, should all citizens, minors, people, for example, on a non-taxable pension\nand others who have no legal obligation to participate in the tax system be included. Including those\n\n\n\n\n\n51 In the Australian tax system, the return must be signed. There is no provision for deemed acceptance.\n\n\n\n52 Source MoF.\n\n\n\n53 The High-Level Policy is in Prime Ministers Decree N 919 2022-2025 Program for Managing Tax Revenue.\n\n\n\n34", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.121, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(72.0, 371.0458679199219, 540.0, 496.3458557128906)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 385, "number": 16, "size": 68385, "transform": [467.9999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 125.29998016357422, 72.0, 371.0458679199219], "width": 1438, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "practice), it will be deemed as accepted by the taxpayer (deemed acceptance). In Box 2 below is an\nexample of the declaration that is required in the Australian tax return for individual taxpayers. [51]\n\nBox 2. Declaration from the Australian tax return\n\nI declare that:\n\n - all the information on this tax return, including pre-filled information, is true and correct\n\n - all the income I have to declare for 2021-22 is included, and\n\n - I have the necessary receipts and other records – or expect to obtain the necessary written evidence within\na reasonable time of lodging this tax return - to support my claims for deductions and tax offsets.\n\n46. The Universal Declaration Administrative System is planned to be introduced on a\nphased approach from 2024 reporting FY2023 income. Importantly, the first Phase will include\nState and Municipal employees, citizens of the Republic of Armenia (RoA) holding public positions,\nshareholders of companies, private entrepreneurs and notaries public, and individuals earning\nincome without withholding tax withheld by a Tax Agent. Figure 12 below sets out the three phases.\nIt is estimated that 200,000 taxpayers will be involved in Phase 1. [52] Phasing is supported by the\nMission Team as it mitigates several implementation risks.\n\nFigure 12. The Three Phases\n\n_Source: Armenia MoF._\n\n47. The final Universal Declaration Detailed Policy (the Policy) that can be used to build a\nnew system has not yet been finalized and approved by the Government of Armenia [53] . There is\nno conclusive statement of the Policy as it is still in development. At this stage there are questions\noutstanding, for example, who will be included in the declaration population has not been\ndetermined. For example, should all citizens, minors, people, for example, on a non-taxable pension\nand others who have no legal obligation to participate in the tax system be included. Including those\n\n51 In the Australian tax system, the return must be signed. There is no provision for deemed acceptance.\n\n52 Source MoF.\n\n53 The High-Level Policy is in Prime Ministers Decree N 919 2022-2025 Program for Managing Tax Revenue.\n\n34", "text_characters": 1783}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "people who have no legal obligation to participate in the tax system will add complexity to the\nsystem.\n\n\n**48.** **The Mission Team were advised that the Universal Declaration Policy would be**\n**finalized by the end of December 2022.** In the interim, it is essential that the MoF and SRC work\ntogether on the design to ensure that it can be implemented efficiently and effectively with low costs\nof compliance by the taxpayers. It is recommended that a working group be formed with both senior\nMOF and SRC staff and the staff who will build and operate the new Universal Declaration\nAdministrative System to resolve some of the outstanding issues.\n\n\n**49.** **Once the Policy is approved by Cabinet, further legislation will be required to give**\n**effect to the Policy** . For example, there is no legislative power to review and alter the declaration by\nthe SRC after acceptance or deemed acceptance. [54] To undertake such a review using indirect audit\ntechniques, in the most egregious cases, would require access to full bank information in those\ncases. [55] The additional indirect audit methods recommended in the recent IMF-FAD report [56] would\nneed to be incorporated into the Tax Code.\n\n\n**50.** **There are several design principles that were identified by the mission team that**\n**should be kept in mind.** They are based on a strong focus on the user experience (UX). This is\nessential for the adoption of the system by the community. UX design is entirely focused on users,\nwhich makes usability of the design one of the most crucial user experience design principles. The\nbasic principle is it will not get take up by the users unless it is easy to use.\n\n\n**51.** **The identified international good practice design principles are in** Box 3 **below and are**\n**self-explanatory.** There may be other design principles identified when the Policy is final.\n\n**Box 3. International Good Practice Design Principles**\n\nThe Universal Declaration Administrative System should:\n\n - Be implemented on the phased approach as planned.\n\n - Prefill data, as much as possible, from third-party data (including interest income from banks) and\ninformation held on SRC systems.\n\n - Be based on the principle of reporting to government agencies only once.\n\n - Be a secure online system able to be accessed on computers and other devices.\n\n - Bring together in one place not only incomes, but all benefits (tax transfers) that are provided through the\ntax systems.\n\n\n\n54 It is common in Universal Declaration systems for third-party data providers to re-report data because of errors.\n\n55 See recommendations in IMF-FAD Report, _Republic of Armenia Tax Compliance - Indirect Audit Methods_, September\n2021.\n\n56 See recommendations in IMF-FAD Report, _Republic of Armenia Tax Compliance - Indirect Audit Methods_, September\n2021.\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "people who have no legal obligation to participate in the tax system will add complexity to the\nsystem.\n\n48. The Mission Team were advised that the Universal Declaration Policy would be\nfinalized by the end of December 2022. In the interim, it is essential that the MoF and SRC work\ntogether on the design to ensure that it can be implemented efficiently and effectively with low costs\nof compliance by the taxpayers. It is recommended that a working group be formed with both senior\nMOF and SRC staff and the staff who will build and operate the new Universal Declaration\nAdministrative System to resolve some of the outstanding issues.\n\n49. Once the Policy is approved by Cabinet, further legislation will be required to give\neffect to the Policy . For example, there is no legislative power to review and alter the declaration by\nthe SRC after acceptance or deemed acceptance. [54] To undertake such a review using indirect audit\ntechniques, in the most egregious cases, would require access to full bank information in those\ncases. [55] The additional indirect audit methods recommended in the recent IMF-FAD report [56] would\nneed to be incorporated into the Tax Code.\n\n50. There are several design principles that were identified by the mission team that\nshould be kept in mind. They are based on a strong focus on the user experience (UX). This is\nessential for the adoption of the system by the community. UX design is entirely focused on users,\nwhich makes usability of the design one of the most crucial user experience design principles. The\nbasic principle is it will not get take up by the users unless it is easy to use.\n\n51. The identified international good practice design principles are in Box 3 below and are\nself-explanatory. There may be other design principles identified when the Policy is final.\n\nBox 3. International Good Practice Design Principles\n\nThe Universal Declaration Administrative System should:\n\n - Be implemented on the phased approach as planned.\n\n - Prefill data, as much as possible, from third-party data (including interest income from banks) and\ninformation held on SRC systems.\n\n - Be based on the principle of reporting to government agencies only once.\n\n - Be a secure online system able to be accessed on computers and other devices.\n\n - Bring together in one place not only incomes, but all benefits (tax transfers) that are provided through the\ntax systems.\n\n54 It is common in Universal Declaration systems for third-party data providers to re-report data because of errors.\n\n55 See recommendations in IMF-FAD Report, _Republic of Armenia Tax Compliance - Indirect Audit Methods_, September\n2021.\n\n56 See recommendations in IMF-FAD Report, _Republic of Armenia Tax Compliance - Indirect Audit Methods_, September\n2021.\n\n35", "text_characters": 2299}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**52.** **The mission team recommends that, in line with international good practice, SRC**\n**prefills the Universal Declaration as much as possible** . In this situation, the tax administration,\nrather than the taxpayer, is the originator of the declaration for a majority of the personal income\ntaxpayer population, using a large range of third-party information sources and other information\nheld by it, which is relevant to each taxpayer’s tax affairs. In countries where these arrangements\nhave been established on a comprehensive basis, prefilled returns are made available to the relevant\ntaxpayer electronically for their confirmation, or if necessary, to obtain any additional information\nrequired to enable a final assessment to be made. There are limitations that will depend on the tax\nsystem, as to the extent to which complete and accurate prefilled returns can be generated for the\nbulk of the taxpayer population. Based on international good practice, the declaration would be\navailable on a secure online system.\n\n\n**53.** **As noted, in the current system the Armenian banks are not required to report interest**\n**income with a unique identifier for the holder of the account.** In the new system this means that\ninterest income will not be able to pre-filled, and it may undermine the Government’s policy intent\nfor the Universal Declaration. It will mean that all income will not be disclosed. The Mission Team\nmet with the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank who advised the Mission Team that an agreement\ncan be reached where the banks would be required to provide this data to the SRC for the purposes\nof prefilling the Universal Declaration.\n\n\n**54.** **There are several foundational issues that need to be considered, particularly the**\n**taxpayer register, compliance with the current system, and the withholding system** . A\ncomprehensive system of taxpayer registration and identification is critical for the effective operation\nof a Universal Declaration Regime. The SRC has an employee register in place. There does not appear\nto be register of individuals who earn passive income and so the taxpayer register is not complete. It\nis also important that the withholding system is robust and as many employers who should be in the\nsystem are in the system. It is important that there are high compliance levels with the current\nsystem to ensure a smooth transition to the new system. A number of compliance risks that impact\non the new system were raised, including Rental income and Freelancers. It is recommended that the\nSRC, using Compliance Risk Management processes [57], undertake Risk Assessments on the Taxpayer\nRegister, Rental Income, Freelancers, Seasonal Workers, and the Platform Economy and develop\nappropriate Compliance Improvement Plans [58] . Changes to the law may be required to address these\nrisks.\n\n\n57 See _Revenue Administration: Compliance Risk Management: Overarching Framework to Drive Revenue Performance_,\n[IMF at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-Management-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479)\n[Management-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-Management-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479)\n\n[58 See Compliance Risk Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans, IMF at Compliance Risk](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/03/18/Compliance-Risk-Management-Developing-Compliance-Improvement-Plans-515263)\n[Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans (imf.org).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/03/18/Compliance-Risk-Management-Developing-Compliance-Improvement-Plans-515263)\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "52. The mission team recommends that, in line with international good practice, SRC\nprefills the Universal Declaration as much as possible . In this situation, the tax administration,\nrather than the taxpayer, is the originator of the declaration for a majority of the personal income\ntaxpayer population, using a large range of third-party information sources and other information\nheld by it, which is relevant to each taxpayer’s tax affairs. In countries where these arrangements\nhave been established on a comprehensive basis, prefilled returns are made available to the relevant\ntaxpayer electronically for their confirmation, or if necessary, to obtain any additional information\nrequired to enable a final assessment to be made. There are limitations that will depend on the tax\nsystem, as to the extent to which complete and accurate prefilled returns can be generated for the\nbulk of the taxpayer population. Based on international good practice, the declaration would be\navailable on a secure online system.\n\n53. As noted, in the current system the Armenian banks are not required to report interest\nincome with a unique identifier for the holder of the account. In the new system this means that\ninterest income will not be able to pre-filled, and it may undermine the Government’s policy intent\nfor the Universal Declaration. It will mean that all income will not be disclosed. The Mission Team\nmet with the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank who advised the Mission Team that an agreement\ncan be reached where the banks would be required to provide this data to the SRC for the purposes\nof prefilling the Universal Declaration.\n\n54. There are several foundational issues that need to be considered, particularly the\ntaxpayer register, compliance with the current system, and the withholding system . A\ncomprehensive system of taxpayer registration and identification is critical for the effective operation\nof a Universal Declaration Regime. The SRC has an employee register in place. There does not appear\nto be register of individuals who earn passive income and so the taxpayer register is not complete. It\nis also important that the withholding system is robust and as many employers who should be in the\nsystem are in the system. It is important that there are high compliance levels with the current\nsystem to ensure a smooth transition to the new system. A number of compliance risks that impact\non the new system were raised, including Rental income and Freelancers. It is recommended that the\nSRC, using Compliance Risk Management processes [57], undertake Risk Assessments on the Taxpayer\nRegister, Rental Income, Freelancers, Seasonal Workers, and the Platform Economy and develop\nappropriate Compliance Improvement Plans [58] . Changes to the law may be required to address these\nrisks.\n\n57 See _Revenue Administration: Compliance Risk Management: Overarching Framework to Drive Revenue Performance_,\nIMF at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2022/08/26/Revenue-Administration-Compliance-Risk-\nManagement-Overarching-Framework-to-Drive-Revenue-520479\n\n58 See Compliance Risk Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans, IMF at Compliance Risk\nManagement: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans (imf.org).\n\n36", "text_characters": 2765}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0038-001"], "markdown": "**C.** **Implementation Governance and Project Management**\n\n**55.** **Reform projects on this scale have the potential to cause major disruption to the day-**\n**to-day activities of all stakeholders who depend on the smooth running of the tax system.**\nThese risks, to both the existing and the new system, are best managed and mitigated by staging the\nimplementation of the reform. This involves comprehensive requirement mapping of each\ncomponent of the reform and repeated testing and refinement until each component achieves an\nagreed performance standard, while the existing system continues to operate until every component\nis proved to be ready to be brought into play.\n\n\n**56.** **The implementation cycle characterizing such an approach may be divided into six key**\n**stages.** The first two stages lay the foundations for the reform. The next two are about designing,\ntesting, and sequencing each separate component of the reform. The fifth stage entails full\nimplementation of the new system and occurs only when all the individual components are\nperforming satisfactorily. And the final stage, which is about learning how to refine and improve the\nnew system, occurs once it has bedded in. This staged approach is summarized in Figure 13, below.\nFurther explanation of each stage can be found in the IMF Technical Note and Manual 21/01. [59]\n\n\n**Figure 13. Implementation Cycle**\n\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n**57.** **Stage 0 is critical and should be implemented as a matter of urgency.** Stage 0 lays the\nfirst foundations for the reform by establishing a transparent and accountable governance\nframework and effective internal and external communications strategies. This framework should\nconsist of three basic layers, represented in Figure 14, with a cross government steering group\n\n\n[59 See Integrating the Collection of Social Insurance Contributions and Personal Income Taxes, IMF at Integrating the](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2021/08/10/Integrating-the-Collection-of-Social-Insurance-Contributions-and-Personal-Income-Taxes-460643)\n[Collection of Social Insurance Contributions and Personal Income Taxes (imf.org)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2021/08/10/Integrating-the-Collection-of-Social-Insurance-Contributions-and-Personal-Income-Taxes-460643)\n\n\n37\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2012, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(72.0, 362.05810546875, 540.0499267578125, 570.4080810546875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 434, "number": 11, "size": 76422, "transform": [468.0499572753906, 0.0, -0.0, 208.34999084472656, 72.0, 362.05810546875], "width": 975, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "C. Implementation Governance and Project Management\n\n55. Reform projects on this scale have the potential to cause major disruption to the day-\nto-day activities of all stakeholders who depend on the smooth running of the tax system.\nThese risks, to both the existing and the new system, are best managed and mitigated by staging the\nimplementation of the reform. This involves comprehensive requirement mapping of each\ncomponent of the reform and repeated testing and refinement until each component achieves an\nagreed performance standard, while the existing system continues to operate until every component\nis proved to be ready to be brought into play.\n\n56. The implementation cycle characterizing such an approach may be divided into six key\nstages. The first two stages lay the foundations for the reform. The next two are about designing,\ntesting, and sequencing each separate component of the reform. The fifth stage entails full\nimplementation of the new system and occurs only when all the individual components are\nperforming satisfactorily. And the final stage, which is about learning how to refine and improve the\nnew system, occurs once it has bedded in. This staged approach is summarized in Figure 13, below.\nFurther explanation of each stage can be found in the IMF Technical Note and Manual 21/01. [59]\n\nFigure 13. Implementation Cycle\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n57. Stage 0 is critical and should be implemented as a matter of urgency. Stage 0 lays the\nfirst foundations for the reform by establishing a transparent and accountable governance\nframework and effective internal and external communications strategies. This framework should\nconsist of three basic layers, represented in Figure 14, with a cross government steering group\n\n59 See Integrating the Collection of Social Insurance Contributions and Personal Income Taxes, IMF at Integrating the\nCollection of Social Insurance Contributions and Personal Income Taxes (imf.org)\n\n37", "text_characters": 1645}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-060-fig-p0039-001"], "markdown": "providing strategic oversight and cross-government support for the project; a Project Management\nBoard (with MoF representation) responsible for overall management and coordination; and\nspecialist project teams providing the detailed planning and implementation work on each strand of\nthe reform.\n\n\n**Figure 14. The Governance Pyramid**\n\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n\n**58.** **Appropriate staffing—both in terms of skills and stakeholder representation—of each**\n**of these governance layers is important.** This should help ensure that the detailed changes\nnecessary are properly scoped and budgeted for, that all stakeholders are consulted, involved, and\nrepresented, and that the project receives continuing support at the highest government level.\n\n\n**59.** **The Steering Group should have very senior chairmanship and members should be**\n**drawn from all ministries with an interest in the reform.** In addition to the SRC and MoF, the\nSteering Group’s composition will depend on Armenia’s institutional framework. Its job is to provide\nstrategic leadership and direction, to oversee the work of the project board, to resolve\ninterdepartmental disagreements, and to ensure enduring high-level political commitment to the\nchange. Such commitment will usually depend on wider stakeholder support for the project;\nincluding one or more nongovernment representatives—from, for example, bodies representing\nemployers and tax professionals—on the Steering Group can help secure and maintain that support,\nas well as providing an external perspective.\n\n\n**60.** **The Project Management Board should include experts with relevant technical and**\n**project management skills and experience and be chaired a by senior SRC official at the**\n**Deputy Chairman level.** It is charged with managing and coordinating the work of the project\nteams, producing a consolidated budget and timeline and reconciling it with the steering group, and\nidentifying and managing resource bottlenecks and other risks.\n\n\n38\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1313, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(144.0, 165.4150390625, 467.79998779296875, 361.9089660644531)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 480, "number": 10, "size": 113892, "transform": [323.79998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 196.49392700195312, 144.0, 165.4150390625], "width": 791, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "providing strategic oversight and cross-government support for the project; a Project Management\nBoard (with MoF representation) responsible for overall management and coordination; and\nspecialist project teams providing the detailed planning and implementation work on each strand of\nthe reform.\n\nFigure 14. The Governance Pyramid\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n58. Appropriate staffing—both in terms of skills and stakeholder representation—of each\nof these governance layers is important. This should help ensure that the detailed changes\nnecessary are properly scoped and budgeted for, that all stakeholders are consulted, involved, and\nrepresented, and that the project receives continuing support at the highest government level.\n\n59. The Steering Group should have very senior chairmanship and members should be\ndrawn from all ministries with an interest in the reform. In addition to the SRC and MoF, the\nSteering Group’s composition will depend on Armenia’s institutional framework. Its job is to provide\nstrategic leadership and direction, to oversee the work of the project board, to resolve\ninterdepartmental disagreements, and to ensure enduring high-level political commitment to the\nchange. Such commitment will usually depend on wider stakeholder support for the project;\nincluding one or more nongovernment representatives—from, for example, bodies representing\nemployers and tax professionals—on the Steering Group can help secure and maintain that support,\nas well as providing an external perspective.\n\n60. The Project Management Board should include experts with relevant technical and\nproject management skills and experience and be chaired a by senior SRC official at the\nDeputy Chairman level. It is charged with managing and coordinating the work of the project\nteams, producing a consolidated budget and timeline and reconciling it with the steering group, and\nidentifying and managing resource bottlenecks and other risks.\n\n38", "text_characters": 1661}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**61.** **Project teams should be staffed full-time by subject experts in the various strands of**\n**the reform— IT, legislation, operational processes, compliance, taxpayer services, and so on.**\nTheir job will be to scope in detail the nature of the changes necessary in their respective areas, to\nproduce realistic timetables and budgets, and to implement those changes in due course. During\nStage 1 the project teams carry out detailed scoping of the various changes needed in their areas of\nresponsibility. This would include producing resource budgets and implementation timelines, which\nare then tested and consolidated by the Project Management Board and reconciled with the Steering\nGroup. The work of the project teams needs to cover all the aspects and implications of the reform:\nlegislation, IT, business processes, employer reporting and electronic processes, audit and risk\nassessment routines, banking, accounting, debt management and arrears collection, organizational\nchanges, the transfer, recruitment and training of staff, and employer and other taxpayer information\nand education.\n\n\n**62.** **A typical scope of a project team brief is shown in** Box 4 **below.** The Project Management\nBoard consolidates the results of these scoping exercises to produce a budget and timeline for the\nproject as a whole. It should also identify potential interdependencies and other risks and develop\nstrategies for managing them, including escalation to steering group level when necessary.\n\n\n**Box 4. Scope of Project Team Briefs**\n\nBrief for each workstream to include:\n\n - Clear mapping of the work to be undertaken.\n\n - Timelines for delivery of each work component.\n\n - Milestones with delivery dates to allow tracking and early warning of risks.\n\n - Dependencies: internal (with other workstreams) and external (with other department and government\nreforms).\n\n - Connection between workstream activities and overarching reform.\n\n - Appropriate parameters to measure success of team’s delivery.\n\n - Estimated budget including clearly identified contingency.\n\n - Details of key staff resources and where/how obtainable.\n\n - Workstream risk register.\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n\n**63.** **As much as possible, the principles of UX based design should be used.** Box 5 below sets\nout the main principles.\n\n\n39", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "61. Project teams should be staffed full-time by subject experts in the various strands of\nthe reform— IT, legislation, operational processes, compliance, taxpayer services, and so on.\nTheir job will be to scope in detail the nature of the changes necessary in their respective areas, to\nproduce realistic timetables and budgets, and to implement those changes in due course. During\nStage 1 the project teams carry out detailed scoping of the various changes needed in their areas of\nresponsibility. This would include producing resource budgets and implementation timelines, which\nare then tested and consolidated by the Project Management Board and reconciled with the Steering\nGroup. The work of the project teams needs to cover all the aspects and implications of the reform:\nlegislation, IT, business processes, employer reporting and electronic processes, audit and risk\nassessment routines, banking, accounting, debt management and arrears collection, organizational\nchanges, the transfer, recruitment and training of staff, and employer and other taxpayer information\nand education.\n\n62. A typical scope of a project team brief is shown in Box 4 below. The Project Management\nBoard consolidates the results of these scoping exercises to produce a budget and timeline for the\nproject as a whole. It should also identify potential interdependencies and other risks and develop\nstrategies for managing them, including escalation to steering group level when necessary.\n\nBox 4. Scope of Project Team Briefs\n\nBrief for each workstream to include:\n\n - Clear mapping of the work to be undertaken.\n\n - Timelines for delivery of each work component.\n\n - Milestones with delivery dates to allow tracking and early warning of risks.\n\n - Dependencies: internal (with other workstreams) and external (with other department and government\nreforms).\n\n - Connection between workstream activities and overarching reform.\n\n - Appropriate parameters to measure success of team’s delivery.\n\n - Estimated budget including clearly identified contingency.\n\n - Details of key staff resources and where/how obtainable.\n\n - Workstream risk register.\n\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n63. As much as possible, the principles of UX based design should be used. Box 5 below sets\nout the main principles.\n\n39", "text_characters": 1911}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 5. UX Based Design Principles**\n\n - **Start early.** Early in the project, spend time with current and prospective users to better understand their\n\nperspective and the context of the problem.\n\n - **Use a range of methods of UX based design.** Use a range of qualitative and quantitative research methods to\n\ndetermine people’s goals, needs, and behaviors.\n\n - **Use prototypes.** Use prototypes to test your assumptions and solutions with real people, in the field if possible.\n\n - **Share your findings.** Document and share your research findings with team members, managers, and the\n\npublic whenever practical.\n\n - **Test regularly.** As the product is being built, regularly test it with potential users to ensure it meets people’s\n\nneeds.\n\n_Source IMF Staff._\n\n\n**64.** **The SRC can learn from other tax administrations who have implemented such systems.**\nFor example, Kazakhstan, a fellow member country of the IMF’s Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia\nRegional Capacity Development Center (CCAMTAC) [60], has already shared its experiences. The IMF\ncan assist the SRC to connect with other Tax Administrations in the region that have implemented\nUniversal Declaration Systems.\n\n**D.** **Implementation Risks and Mitigations**\n\n**65.** **There are several significant implementation risks that need to be managed and**\n**mitigated.** As the Policy is not finalized, the list of implementation risks is not yet comprehensive.\nTable 8 below sets out some of the possible risks and mitigation strategies to be considered and\nadopted.\n\n\n60 See https://ccamtac.imf.org/\n\n\n40", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 5. UX Based Design Principles\n\n - Start early. Early in the project, spend time with current and prospective users to better understand their\n\nperspective and the context of the problem.\n\n - Use a range of methods of UX based design. Use a range of qualitative and quantitative research methods to\n\ndetermine people’s goals, needs, and behaviors.\n\n - Use prototypes. Use prototypes to test your assumptions and solutions with real people, in the field if possible.\n\n - Share your findings. Document and share your research findings with team members, managers, and the\n\npublic whenever practical.\n\n - Test regularly. As the product is being built, regularly test it with potential users to ensure it meets people’s\n\nneeds.\n\n_Source IMF Staff._\n\n64. The SRC can learn from other tax administrations who have implemented such systems.\nFor example, Kazakhstan, a fellow member country of the IMF’s Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia\nRegional Capacity Development Center (CCAMTAC) [60], has already shared its experiences. The IMF\ncan assist the SRC to connect with other Tax Administrations in the region that have implemented\nUniversal Declaration Systems.\n\nD. Implementation Risks and Mitigations\n\n65. There are several significant implementation risks that need to be managed and\nmitigated. As the Policy is not finalized, the list of implementation risks is not yet comprehensive.\nTable 8 below sets out some of the possible risks and mitigation strategies to be considered and\nadopted.\n\n60 See https://ccamtac.imf.org/\n\n40", "text_characters": 1275}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 7. Implementation Risks and Mitigations**\n\n\n\n**Risk** **Mitigation**\n\n\n\nThere is poor governance of the reform. Implement the structures and arrangements described in the\n‘Implementation Governance and Project Management‘ sub-section\nabove (Figure 13, Figure 14)\nThere is poor planning. SRC to develop a comprehensive Project Plan to implement to new\nsystem as soon as possible.\nThere are compliance issues with the current Develop a risk assessment to evaluate the extent of the noncompliance\nsystem (e.g., Rental income, Freelancers, and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, if necessary, to address\nSeasonal and Platform Workers, and Private the risks. This may include recommendations to change the law.\nRental Arrangements) that should be Addressing these risks, will require access to bank information and the\naddressed in preparation for the new system. power to undertake audits of individuals.\n\n\n\nThere are compliance issues with the current Develop a risk assessment to evaluate the extent of the noncompliance\nsystem (e.g., Rental income, Freelancers, and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, if necessary, to address\nSeasonal and Platform Workers, and Private the risks. This may include recommendations to change the law.\nRental Arrangements) that should be Addressing these risks, will require access to bank information and the\naddressed in preparation for the new system. power to undertake audits of individuals.\n\nThe SRC staff do not know about the new Develop a staff skilling and training plan. Ensure that all SRC staff have\nsystem or can’t advise individual taxpayers. an awareness of the new system and that there are sufficient SRC\n\n\n\nThe SRC staff do not know about the new Develop a staff skilling and training plan. Ensure that all SRC staff have\nsystem or can’t advise individual taxpayers. an awareness of the new system and that there are sufficient SRC\n\nexperts to advise individual taxpayers.\nIndividual taxpayers have not heard about the Develop a Marketing and Communication Plan.\nnew system.\n\n\n\nDevelop a Marketing and Communication Plan.\n\n\n\nIndividual taxpayers do not know how to use\nthe new system.\n\n\n\nIndividual taxpayers do not know how to use Have clear instructions in place so that individual taxpayers can “selfthe new system. service” as much as possible and have other taxpayer services in place\n\ne.g., call-center, provision of advice, education, website.\nAn individual taxpayer's prefill data is not Ensure that there is extensive third-party data collection and quality of\ncomplete or available. data.\n\n\n\nAn individual taxpayer's prefill data is not Ensure that there is extensive third-party data collection and quality of\ncomplete or available. data.\n\nInformation Technology Build and Declaration Ensure that SRC’s current IT technology and capacity can deliver the\ninterface and systems. new system.\n\n\n\nEnsure that SRC’s current IT technology and capacity can deliver the\n\n\n\nnew system.\n\n\n\nCompliance assurance. The new system may generate refunds and the SRC needs to ensure\n\n\n\nthat there is integrity in the tax refund system to mitigate potential\n\n\n\nfraud. In addition, improving compliance with the registration,\n\n\n\nIndividual Taxpayers do not know that the\ndeclaration is available to review and sign.\n\nLow community take-up and a low level of\nparticipation.\n\n\n\nwithholding and reporting systems.\n\n\n\nLook at ways to inform the taxpayer, e.g., email or SMS.\n\n\n\nLow community take-up and a low level of Ensure that Individual Taxpayers understand the benefits of\nparticipation. participating. In later phases, there will be taxpayers with low financial\n\nliteracy and potently poor access to technology/internet. Consider\ninternational good practices to support these taxpayers e.g., volunteer\nservices provided by community members to assist with electronic\nlodgment.\nTaxpayers have to pay for an electronic Ensure that taxpayers can “sign” their declaration without charge.\nsignature to sign their declaration.\n\n\n\nEnsure that taxpayers can “sign” their declaration without charge.\n\n\n\nSenior Civil Servants will have to lodge an AntiCorruption Declaration and a Universal\nDeclaration.\n\n\n\nEnsure that those affected understand why.\n\n\n\nThe Taxpayer Register is not complete. The taxpayer register is a foundation on which to build the new system.\nEnsuring that the system is complete is essential. SRC needs to make it\neasy for initial registration of natural persons via multiple registration\nchannels.\nPoor consultation with external stakeholders. Set up a consultation forum with impacted stakeholders.\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n\n\n41", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table 7. Implementation Risks and Mitigations\n\nRisk Mitigation\n\nThere is poor governance of the reform. Implement the structures and arrangements described in the\n‘Implementation Governance and Project Management‘ sub-section\nabove (Figure 13, Figure 14)\nThere is poor planning. SRC to develop a comprehensive Project Plan to implement to new\nsystem as soon as possible.\nThere are compliance issues with the current Develop a risk assessment to evaluate the extent of the noncompliance\nsystem (e.g., Rental income, Freelancers, and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, if necessary, to address\nSeasonal and Platform Workers, and Private the risks. This may include recommendations to change the law.\nRental Arrangements) that should be Addressing these risks, will require access to bank information and the\naddressed in preparation for the new system. power to undertake audits of individuals.\n\nThere are compliance issues with the current Develop a risk assessment to evaluate the extent of the noncompliance\nsystem (e.g., Rental income, Freelancers, and develop Compliance Improvement Plans, if necessary, to address\nSeasonal and Platform Workers, and Private the risks. This may include recommendations to change the law.\nRental Arrangements) that should be Addressing these risks, will require access to bank information and the\naddressed in preparation for the new system. power to undertake audits of individuals.\n\nThe SRC staff do not know about the new Develop a staff skilling and training plan. Ensure that all SRC staff have\nsystem or can’t advise individual taxpayers. an awareness of the new system and that there are sufficient SRC\n\nThe SRC staff do not know about the new Develop a staff skilling and training plan. Ensure that all SRC staff have\nsystem or can’t advise individual taxpayers. an awareness of the new system and that there are sufficient SRC\n\nexperts to advise individual taxpayers.\nIndividual taxpayers have not heard about the Develop a Marketing and Communication Plan.\nnew system.\n\nDevelop a Marketing and Communication Plan.\n\nIndividual taxpayers do not know how to use\nthe new system.\n\nIndividual taxpayers do not know how to use Have clear instructions in place so that individual taxpayers can “selfthe new system. service” as much as possible and have other taxpayer services in place\n\ne.g., call-center, provision of advice, education, website.\nAn individual taxpayer's prefill data is not Ensure that there is extensive third-party data collection and quality of\ncomplete or available. data.\n\nAn individual taxpayer's prefill data is not Ensure that there is extensive third-party data collection and quality of\ncomplete or available. data.\n\nInformation Technology Build and Declaration Ensure that SRC’s current IT technology and capacity can deliver the\ninterface and systems. new system.\n\nEnsure that SRC’s current IT technology and capacity can deliver the\n\nnew system.\n\nCompliance assurance. The new system may generate refunds and the SRC needs to ensure\n\nthat there is integrity in the tax refund system to mitigate potential\n\nfraud. In addition, improving compliance with the registration,\n\nIndividual Taxpayers do not know that the\ndeclaration is available to review and sign.\n\nLow community take-up and a low level of\nparticipation.\n\nwithholding and reporting systems.\n\nLook at ways to inform the taxpayer, e.g., email or SMS.\n\nLow community take-up and a low level of Ensure that Individual Taxpayers understand the benefits of\nparticipation. participating. In later phases, there will be taxpayers with low financial\n\nliteracy and potently poor access to technology/internet. Consider\ninternational good practices to support these taxpayers e.g., volunteer\nservices provided by community members to assist with electronic\nlodgment.\nTaxpayers have to pay for an electronic Ensure that taxpayers can “sign” their declaration without charge.\nsignature to sign their declaration.\n\nEnsure that taxpayers can “sign” their declaration without charge.\n\nSenior Civil Servants will have to lodge an AntiCorruption Declaration and a Universal\nDeclaration.\n\nEnsure that those affected understand why.\n\nThe Taxpayer Register is not complete. The taxpayer register is a foundation on which to build the new system.\nEnsuring that the system is complete is essential. SRC needs to make it\neasy for initial registration of natural persons via multiple registration\nchannels.\nPoor consultation with external stakeholders. Set up a consultation forum with impacted stakeholders.\n_Source: IMF Staff._\n\n41", "text_characters": 3832}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Revenue Administration Recommandations**\n\n - As a matter of urgency, create a joint SRC and MoF working party to co-design the new\nsystem so that all administrative and policy issues are considered, and an efficient and\neffective system is implemented.\n\n - Implement the governance and project management structures and arrangements as set out\nin Figure 13 and 14, above. As a matter of urgency, implement Stage 0.\n\n - Amend the Bank Secrecy law so that it is mandatory for banks to provide the SRC with all\ninterest receipts and a unique identifier so that the interest can be pre-filled into the\nindividual tax declaration.\n\n - Amend the Tax Code to allow tax audits of individuals.\n\n### **IV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT**\n\n**66.** **The SRC may consider requesting CD assistance from the IMF on implementation of the**\n**Universal Declaration.** The area that may be of greatest assistance is addressing the risks identified\nin Table 8, above, and advising on international good practices to mitigate them.\n\n\n**67.** **The authorities may also consider requesting IMF assistance on a possible reform of the**\n**taxation of micro and small enterprises.** This issue, which also bears on CIT and VAT, could be the\nobject of specific assistance. Assistance could also be provided on social protection.\n\n\n42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Revenue Administration Recommandations\n\n - As a matter of urgency, create a joint SRC and MoF working party to co-design the new\nsystem so that all administrative and policy issues are considered, and an efficient and\neffective system is implemented.\n\n - Implement the governance and project management structures and arrangements as set out\nin Figure 13 and 14, above. As a matter of urgency, implement Stage 0.\n\n - Amend the Bank Secrecy law so that it is mandatory for banks to provide the SRC with all\ninterest receipts and a unique identifier so that the interest can be pre-filled into the\nindividual tax declaration.\n\n - Amend the Tax Code to allow tax audits of individuals.\nIV. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT\n\n66. The SRC may consider requesting CD assistance from the IMF on implementation of the\nUniversal Declaration. The area that may be of greatest assistance is addressing the risks identified\nin Table 8, above, and advising on international good practices to mitigate them.\n\n67. The authorities may also consider requesting IMF assistance on a possible reform of the\ntaxation of micro and small enterprises. This issue, which also bears on CIT and VAT, could be the\nobject of specific assistance. Assistance could also be provided on social protection.\n\n42", "text_characters": 1047}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **REFERENCES**\n\n\n\nBenítez, Juan Carlos, and Charles Vellutini. 2021. “Measuring the Redistributive Capacity of Tax Policies.”\n\n\n\nIMF Working Paper WP/21/252. International Monetary Fund.\nDardanoni, Valentino, and Peter J. Lambert. 2002. “Progressivity Comparisons.” _Journal of Public Economics_\n\n86 (1): 99–122.\nImmervoll, Herwig, and Mark Pearson. 2009. “A Good Time for Making Work Pay? Taking Stock of In-Work\n\n\n\nBenefits and Related Measures across the OECD.” Working Paper 3. IZA Policy Paper.\nKakwani, Nanak C. 1977. “Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison.” _The Economic_\n\n\n\n_Journal_ 87 (345): 71–80.\nMusgrave, R. A., and Tun Thin. 1948. “Income Tax Progression, 1929-48.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 56\n\n\n\n(6): 498–514.\nReynolds, Morgan, and Eugene Smolensky. 1977. _Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of_\n\n\n\n_Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970_ . Academic Press.\n\n\n\n43", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REFERENCES\n\nBenítez, Juan Carlos, and Charles Vellutini. 2021. “Measuring the Redistributive Capacity of Tax Policies.”\n\nIMF Working Paper WP/21/252. International Monetary Fund.\nDardanoni, Valentino, and Peter J. Lambert. 2002. “Progressivity Comparisons.” _Journal of Public Economics_\n\n86 (1): 99–122.\nImmervoll, Herwig, and Mark Pearson. 2009. “A Good Time for Making Work Pay? Taking Stock of In-Work\n\nBenefits and Related Measures across the OECD.” Working Paper 3. IZA Policy Paper.\nKakwani, Nanak C. 1977. “Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison.” _The Economic_\n\n_Journal_ 87 (345): 71–80.\nMusgrave, R. A., and Tun Thin. 1948. “Income Tax Progression, 1929-48.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 56\n\n(6): 498–514.\nReynolds, Morgan, and Eugene Smolensky. 1977. _Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of_\n\n_Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970_ . Academic Press.\n\n43", "text_characters": 777}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT REVENUE BY SOURCE, LATEST** **AVAILABLE YEAR (PERCENT OF GDP)**\n\n\n\nOther Social Grants Other\n\nTaxes Contribut Revenue\n\n\n\nTaxes\n\n\n\nGrants\n\n\n\nCountry Year Total\nRevenue\n\n\n\nTax Revenue\n\n(excl. SSC)\n\n\n\nPersonal\n\nIncome\n\n\n\nIncome, Profits, and Capital Gains\n\n\n\nPayroll\n\n\n\nProperty\n\n\n\nConsumption Internati\n\n\n\nCorporate\n\n\n\nCorporate Total Payroll Property\n\nOther General VAT Excises Other Total\nIncome Income\n\n\n\nonal\nTrade\n\n\n\nSocial\nContribut\n\n\n\nions\n\n\n\nArmenia 2020 25.2 22.0 6.7 2.4 0.0 9.1 … 0.4 7.9 7.5 2.0 ... 11.7 1.1 … 0.4 0.9 1.9\nAlbania 2019 27.2 19.4 1.9 2.9 0.0 4.7 … 0.3 8.3 7.8 2.8 ... 13.7 0.4 0.2 5.7 0.5 1.6\nAzerbaijan 2020 33.8 15.8 … … … … … … … … … ... … … 15.8 3.3 0.0 14.7\nBelarus 2020 35.8 22.8 4.5 2.1 0.0 6.7 … 0.9 9.2 8.5 2.1 ... 11.7 2.8 0.6 10.9 0.4 1.7\n\nHerzegovina 2020 41.6 22.0 1.8 1.7 0.0 3.6 … 0.3 16.7 16.7 0.3 ... 17.6 0.0 0.5 15.8 0.2 3.5\nBulgaria 2021 35.0 20.7 3.7 2.6 0.0 6.2 … … 14.0 … … ... 14.0 0.2 1.1 7.3 2.6 6.0\nCroatia 2020 48.0 25.8 3.8 2.3 0.0 6.1 … 0.7 13.1 12.8 4.3 ... 18.9 0.0 0.1 12.1 2.7 7.4\nEstonia 2021 40.4 22.4 7.1 1.7 … 8.7 … … 9.5 … … ... 9.5 3.5 0.6 12.5 2.3 3.2\nGeorgia 2020 25.1 22.2 6.7 1.9 0.0 8.6 … 0.9 9.2 9.2 3.3 ... 12.5 0.2 0.1 … 0.8 2.1\nKosovo 2020 25.5 22.1 2.3 1.3 0.0 3.6 … … … … … ... 16.7 1.5 0.4 … 0.6 2.7\nMoldova 2019 29.9 19.0 1.9 2.6 0.0 4.4 … 0.3 9.6 9.6 3.0 ... 13.5 0.9 0.0 8.7 0.8 1.4\n\nMontenegro 2020 43.3 26.9 4.0 1.9 … 5.9 … 0.4 … 12.7 4.9 ... 17.6 0.5 2.6 11.4 1.6 3.4\n\nMacedonia 2020 28.6 17.4 2.9 1.6 0.0 4.4 … 0.2 7.3 7.0 3.5 ... 11.4 1.0 0.3 10.0 0.4 0.8\nRomania 2020 28.9 14.3 2.5 1.9 0.0 4.4 … 0.5 6.5 6.1 2.9 ... 10.1 0.0 … 12.0 1.6 1.1\nRussia 2020 35.3 24.5 3.7 3.7 0.5 7.9 … 0.5 6.9 6.9 1.8 ... 9.3 1.7 5.1 7.7 0.0 3.0\nSerbia 2020 41.3 24.1 3.7 2.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.8 10.2 10.0 5.8 ... 17.2 1.0 … 13.6 0.5 3.1\nSlovenia 2019 43.8 21.5 5.3 2.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.6 8.0 8.0 3.5 ... 13.5 0.1 0.0 15.7 … 6.6\nTurkey 2021 28.9 16.6 3.1 2.5 … 5.6 … … 8.3 … … ... 8.3 0.5 2.2 5.3 … 6.2\nUkraine 2020 40.0 27.3 7.0 2.8 0.0 9.9 … … … … … ... 13.5 0.7 3.3 7.2 … 5.5\n\n\nAvg, excl. Armenia 35.2 21.6 3.7 2.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.6 9.5 9.3 3.0 ... 13.8 0.8 4.1 10.3 0.8 7.1\n\nAvg, incl. Armenia 34.6 21.6 3.9 2.2 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.5 9.4 9.2 2.9 ... 13.7 0.8 4.1 9.6 0.8 6.8\n\n_Source: FADTP ECOS Database (Internal)._\n\n_Note: Tax Revenue does not include Social Contributions. \"...\" fields represent missing values._\n\n\n44", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT REVENUE BY SOURCE, LATEST AVAILABLE YEAR (PERCENT OF GDP)\n\nOther Social Grants Other\n\nTaxes Contribut Revenue\n\nTaxes\n\nGrants\n\nCountry Year Total\nRevenue\n\nTax Revenue\n\n(excl. SSC)\n\nPersonal\n\nIncome\n\nIncome, Profits, and Capital Gains\n\nPayroll\n\nProperty\n\nConsumption Internati\n\nCorporate\n\nCorporate Total Payroll Property\n\nOther General VAT Excises Other Total\nIncome Income\n\nonal\nTrade\n\nSocial\nContribut\n\nions\n\nArmenia 2020 25.2 22.0 6.7 2.4 0.0 9.1 … 0.4 7.9 7.5 2.0 ... 11.7 1.1 … 0.4 0.9 1.9\nAlbania 2019 27.2 19.4 1.9 2.9 0.0 4.7 … 0.3 8.3 7.8 2.8 ... 13.7 0.4 0.2 5.7 0.5 1.6\nAzerbaijan 2020 33.8 15.8 … … … … … … … … … ... … … 15.8 3.3 0.0 14.7\nBelarus 2020 35.8 22.8 4.5 2.1 0.0 6.7 … 0.9 9.2 8.5 2.1 ... 11.7 2.8 0.6 10.9 0.4 1.7\n\nHerzegovina 2020 41.6 22.0 1.8 1.7 0.0 3.6 … 0.3 16.7 16.7 0.3 ... 17.6 0.0 0.5 15.8 0.2 3.5\nBulgaria 2021 35.0 20.7 3.7 2.6 0.0 6.2 … … 14.0 … … ... 14.0 0.2 1.1 7.3 2.6 6.0\nCroatia 2020 48.0 25.8 3.8 2.3 0.0 6.1 … 0.7 13.1 12.8 4.3 ... 18.9 0.0 0.1 12.1 2.7 7.4\nEstonia 2021 40.4 22.4 7.1 1.7 … 8.7 … … 9.5 … … ... 9.5 3.5 0.6 12.5 2.3 3.2\nGeorgia 2020 25.1 22.2 6.7 1.9 0.0 8.6 … 0.9 9.2 9.2 3.3 ... 12.5 0.2 0.1 … 0.8 2.1\nKosovo 2020 25.5 22.1 2.3 1.3 0.0 3.6 … … … … … ... 16.7 1.5 0.4 … 0.6 2.7\nMoldova 2019 29.9 19.0 1.9 2.6 0.0 4.4 … 0.3 9.6 9.6 3.0 ... 13.5 0.9 0.0 8.7 0.8 1.4\n\nMontenegro 2020 43.3 26.9 4.0 1.9 … 5.9 … 0.4 … 12.7 4.9 ... 17.6 0.5 2.6 11.4 1.6 3.4\n\nMacedonia 2020 28.6 17.4 2.9 1.6 0.0 4.4 … 0.2 7.3 7.0 3.5 ... 11.4 1.0 0.3 10.0 0.4 0.8\nRomania 2020 28.9 14.3 2.5 1.9 0.0 4.4 … 0.5 6.5 6.1 2.9 ... 10.1 0.0 … 12.0 1.6 1.1\nRussia 2020 35.3 24.5 3.7 3.7 0.5 7.9 … 0.5 6.9 6.9 1.8 ... 9.3 1.7 5.1 7.7 0.0 3.0\nSerbia 2020 41.3 24.1 3.7 2.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.8 10.2 10.0 5.8 ... 17.2 1.0 … 13.6 0.5 3.1\nSlovenia 2019 43.8 21.5 5.3 2.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.6 8.0 8.0 3.5 ... 13.5 0.1 0.0 15.7 … 6.6\nTurkey 2021 28.9 16.6 3.1 2.5 … 5.6 … … 8.3 … … ... 8.3 0.5 2.2 5.3 … 6.2\nUkraine 2020 40.0 27.3 7.0 2.8 0.0 9.9 … … … … … ... 13.5 0.7 3.3 7.2 … 5.5\n\nAvg, excl. Armenia 35.2 21.6 3.7 2.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.6 9.5 9.3 3.0 ... 13.8 0.8 4.1 10.3 0.8 7.1\n\nAvg, incl. Armenia 34.6 21.6 3.9 2.2 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.5 9.4 9.2 2.9 ... 13.7 0.8 4.1 9.6 0.8 6.8\n\n_Source: FADTP ECOS Database (Internal)._\n\n_Note: Tax Revenue does not include Social Contributions. \"...\" fields represent missing values._\n\n44", "text_characters": 1831}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **APPENDIX II. MEASURES OF PROGRESSIVE AND REDISTRIBUTIVE** **CAPACITIES**\n\nThe standard measurement of the redistributive effect of taxation, as developed by Musgrave and Thin\n(1948) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), is the difference between the Gini coefficients of respectively\npre- and post-tax income. In the same spirit, the progressivity index proposed by Kakwani (1977) is\ndefined as the difference between the Gini coefficients of respectively pre-tax income and the tax\nliabilities—the more the tax liability is concentrated on higher incomes, the more progressive is the PIT.\n\nA critical contribution of Kakwani was to decompose the total redistributive effects of taxation into its\nprogressivity and its “size”, measured as the ratio of total tax liabilities over total pre-tax income (referred\nto as the aggregate tax rate). The intuition behind this decomposition is that progressivity is a necessary\nbut not a sufficient condition of redistribution. For example, a PIT generating a total revenue of 0.001\npercent of GDP can be made extremely progressive—that is, strongly concentrated on high incomes—but\nwould still achieve little income redistribution, simply because it is too small.\n\nLike the Reynolds-Smolensky index, a limitation of the Kakwani index (and the related decomposition) is\nthat it is a function of the pre-tax distribution, therefore confusing the measurement of the intrinsic\nprogressivity of each tax regime with any given initial conditions in the economy. The literature has\nproposed procedures that make redistribution indices comparable across countries and years, controlling\nfor differences in pre-tax distributions. The analysis in this report uses a methodology that “transplants”\ntax regimes to be compared into a common base with an identical pre-tax distribution (Dardanoni and\nLambert 2002). The indices thus computed are the intrinsic progressive and redistributive capacities of the\nPIT in each country, corrected for pre-tax distributions. The calculations use simulated microdata based on\nGini coefficients of pre-tax income (Benítez and Vellutini 2021).\n\n\n45", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-060", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "APPENDIX II. MEASURES OF PROGRESSIVE AND REDISTRIBUTIVE CAPACITIES\n\nThe standard measurement of the redistributive effect of taxation, as developed by Musgrave and Thin\n(1948) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), is the difference between the Gini coefficients of respectively\npre- and post-tax income. In the same spirit, the progressivity index proposed by Kakwani (1977) is\ndefined as the difference between the Gini coefficients of respectively pre-tax income and the tax\nliabilities—the more the tax liability is concentrated on higher incomes, the more progressive is the PIT.\n\nA critical contribution of Kakwani was to decompose the total redistributive effects of taxation into its\nprogressivity and its “size”, measured as the ratio of total tax liabilities over total pre-tax income (referred\nto as the aggregate tax rate). The intuition behind this decomposition is that progressivity is a necessary\nbut not a sufficient condition of redistribution. For example, a PIT generating a total revenue of 0.001\npercent of GDP can be made extremely progressive—that is, strongly concentrated on high incomes—but\nwould still achieve little income redistribution, simply because it is too small.\n\nLike the Reynolds-Smolensky index, a limitation of the Kakwani index (and the related decomposition) is\nthat it is a function of the pre-tax distribution, therefore confusing the measurement of the intrinsic\nprogressivity of each tax regime with any given initial conditions in the economy. The literature has\nproposed procedures that make redistribution indices comparable across countries and years, controlling\nfor differences in pre-tax distributions. The analysis in this report uses a methodology that “transplants”\ntax regimes to be compared into a common base with an identical pre-tax distribution (Dardanoni and\nLambert 2002). The indices thus computed are the intrinsic progressive and redistributive capacities of the\nPIT in each country, corrected for pre-tax distributions. The calculations use simulated microdata based on\nGini coefficients of pre-tax income (Benítez and Vellutini 2021).\n\n45", "text_characters": 1793}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..acfc99d3eefa2b56c8c9c14d3b9336f693e8fb69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:de964647303f0ec84423a23c5b06f69725e05591ab6ab29420b8d534be0725a5
+size 32958
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..75bc4ea6b6cdaac66de44e31a7472addea827932
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:66fab1d7bfb6277c7b8f3b54ac6503d81a2539138a38137dbcdca724d13274ab
+size 29254
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67e517a64b490f8a5fb4cfcf431ca1d9b6a2dece
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e997ecd7c8cfc3d423f3a26844dc4458dbb01eebacf97df39e177bb3cda0a4ed
+size 144148
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f400d4ef825488bf3542684a1178ce70d1079813
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b9d38576b83570f011688f6106a07f42717eaec194f966622d72491618eb58ee
+size 84841
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0012-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0012-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6003557833b9ab2a387cd407698175c56f94e76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0012-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:707a3d4261efca29b318cebc0d1c91c37ee6bf77d0e35b9eb93c2073c75761cb
+size 56368
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..251cb82f3deed202e88149f3c71bbbf2a6d32654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5df8c9c479d2b3a7cec00514cf7a5492cd727b831d5019567c53e292e67fb47c
+size 48034
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d941147b6f28b8fb97cb5136bdb3293599dd787d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:def6032f329c47a07680545d4fdd17be6781f47e7f5389f9c9200fafdfd1b6a4
+size 190347
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..64613af6eda09aeac0d6bce5ca3485c121334fbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d650928eb173499527a909129b4b6a4dd4e9d18c233e8a9d26228456e4f33149
+size 183909
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c9b7a6dace36ba02dd6a2a4d655f38e2d9561931
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-072",
+ "title": "Republic of Iraq: Technical Assistance Report on Government Finance Statistics (December 5-19, 2021)",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-072.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "2cd746d6eacef3549d34f7a3cc11b5e84d1b610e713a9682623bbb3657e31d8f",
+ "source_bytes": 1195284,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/02/03/republic-of-iraq-technical-assistance-report-on-government-finance-statistics-december-5-19-529124",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:33+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 26.912,
+ "page_count": 25,
+ "text_characters": 45673,
+ "table_count": 12,
+ "figure_count": 8,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "23/72 التقرير القُطري رقم الصادر عن صند و ق النقد الدولي"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "عراقال جمهورية"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "19– تقرير المساعدة الفنية عن بعثة إحصاءات مالية( الحكومة5 ) ديسمبر/كانون األول2021"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "صندوق النقد الدولي واشنطن العاصمة"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "الحكومة مالیة إحصاءات بعثة تقریر (2021 األول، دیسمبر/كانون 19-)5"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "، وطارق عبد القادر دقة إعداد نادین أبو خالد، ویوسف"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "المحتویات"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "المختصرات ائمة ق"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "ذات األولویة توصیاتوال ملخص نتائج البعثة"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "دلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 موائمة – ألف"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 10,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "تطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" – باء"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 12,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة تحسین منھجیة إعداد ونشر جیم"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "التغطیة المؤسسیةدال"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 15,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "المسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثة ھاء"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "جمهورية العراق: تقرير المساعدة الفنية عن بعثة إحصاءات مالية الحكومة (5–19 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2021); نوفمبر/تشر;لتقرير القُطري رقم 23/72",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230125163851-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230206181024-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b30b32359ab65dc2b600bb70c3e4c7271b32fb0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1616 @@
+
+
+
+###### 23/72 التقرير القُطري رقم **الصادر عن صند و ق النقد الدولي**
+## **عراقال جمهورية**
+### **19– تقرير المساعدة الفنية عن بعثة إحصاءات مالية( الحكومة5** **) ديسمبر/كانون األول2021**
+
+أعد هذا التقرير عن جمهورية العراق فريق من خبراء صندوق النقد الدولي. ويستند التقرير إلى المعلومات
+
+. المتوافرة وقت استكماله في نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني2022
+
+
+ويمكن الحصول على نسخ من هذا التقرير بمراسلة العنوان:التالي
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+2023 يناير/كانون الثاني
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+
+(202) 623-7201 :فاكس - (202) 623-7430 :هاتف
+
+[http://www.imf.org :إنترنت](http://www.imf.org/) [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) :بريد إلكتروني
+
+
+المطبوعةللنسخة دوالرا أمريكيا :السعر18
+
+##### **صندوق النقد الدولي** **واشنطن العاصمة**
+
+
+2023:حقوق الطبع والنشر صندوق النقد الدولي - ©
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### **الحكومة مالیة إحصاءات بعثة تقریر** **(2021 األول، دیسمبر/كانون 19-)5**
+
+##### **، وطارق عبد القادر دقة إعداد نادین أبو خالد، ویوسف**
+
+
+
+**تشرنوفمبر/**
+
+
+
+**الثاني** **ین**
+
+
+
+**2022**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+### المحتویات
+
+
+3______________________________________________________ قائمة المختصرات
+
+
+**4** _______________________________________ **ذات األولویة** **والتوصیات ملخص نتائج البعثة**
+
+**6** _____________________________________________ **التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات**
+
+7 ________________الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 ل دلی ألف- موائمة
+
+9__________________________________________ "تطبیق "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة باء
+11 ______________________________ الحكومة ونشرھاإعداد إحصاءات مالیة منھجیة تحسینجیم
+14___________________________________________________ التغطیة المؤسسیةدال
+15__________________________________________ المسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثةھاء
+
+
+**الجداول**
+
+6________________________________________________ التوصیات ذات األولویة– 1
+
+9____ ________________________________ ھیكل الرموز – التصنیف لقتصادي الوطني - 2
+
+10_____ ________________________________ ھیكل الرموز – التصنیف اإلداري الوطني - 3
+
+
+
+**الملحقات**
+
+16______ ________________________________البعثة خالل إنجازھا تم التيالملفات قائمة– 1
+
+17 _____________________________( جدول7 ) 2020لسنة للنفقات الوظیفي تصنیفال جدول– 2
+
+19 _______________________ 2020-حكومة المركزیة المدرجة بالموازنة لسنة 2019ال بیان دین– 3
+
+20________________________________________________الحكومیة الجھات قائمة– 4
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **2**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+#### **المختصرات ائمة ق**
+
+Budgetary Central Government BCG الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة
+
+Central Bank of Iraq CBI البنك المركزي العراقي
+
+Chart of Accounts COA الحسابات دلیل / شجرة
+
+Classification of the Functions of Government COFOG تصنیف وظائف الحكومة
+
+IMF’s Middle East Center for Economic and Finance CEF مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في
+الشرق األوسط
+
+General Government GG الحكومة العامة
+
+Extrabudgetary unit EBU وحدة خارج الموازنة
+
+Fiscal year FY السنة المالیة
+
+Government Finance Statistics GFS إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة
+
+Government Finance Statistics Yearbook GFSY الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة
+
+
+
+مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في
+
+
+
+_Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_ _GFSM 2014_ دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014
+
+
+
+Integrated Financial Management Information System IFMIS نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد
+
+International Monetary Fund IMF صندوق النقد الدولي
+
+The Middle East Regional Technical Assistance METAC مركز المساعدة الفنیة اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط
+Center
+
+Local Governments LG الحكومات المحلیة
+
+Ministry of Finance MOF وزارة المالیة
+
+Public Sector Debt Statistics PSDS إحصاءات دین القطاع العام
+
+
+
+إحصاءات دین القطاع العام: مرشد لمعدیھا
+
+
+
+_Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide for Compilers and_ _PSDSG_ إحصاءات دین القطاع العام: مرشد لمعدیھا
+_Users 2011_ _2011_ ،ومستخدمیھا2011
+
+
+
+Public Sector Institutional Table PSIT جدول مؤسسات القطاع العام
+
+Social Security Fund SSF لجتماعي صندوق الضمان
+
+Statistics Department of the IMF STA إدارة اإلحصاءات بصندوق النقد الدولي
+
+Technical assistance TA المساعدة الفنیة
+
+United Nations UN األمم المتحدة
+
+United Nations Conference on Trade and UNCTAD (مؤتمر األمم المتحدة للتجارة والتنمیة )أونكتاد
+Development
+
+
+
+**3** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+### **ذات األولویة توصیاتوال ملخص نتائج البعثة**
+
+**، للمساعدة الفنیة والتدریب بشأن إحصاءات مالیة الحكومةعن بُعد بعثة أجریت ،تلبیة لطلب وزارة المالیة** **-1**
+
+**إصالح الموازنة مشروع ، وكان ھدفھا األساسي ھو دعم السلطات في تنفیذ دیسمبر/كانون األول2021** **16-في الفترة 5**
+
+)خبیر في إحصاءات دقة، واشترك فیھا األستاذ یوسف (إدارة اإلحصاءات ). وقادت البعثة السیدة نادین أبو خالد **الوطنیة**
+
+في إطار التعاون بین إدارة اإلحصاءات وصندوق النقد ( صندوق النقد العربي)مالیة الحكومة( واألستاذ طارق عبد القادر
+
+بیة )عربستات(. العربي تحت مظلة مبادرة اإلحصاءات العر
+
+
+
+**وما** **النقاشات التي تمتالبعثة عن تقدیرھا للخبراء في دوائر الموازنة والمحاسبة والدین العام على** **تُعرب** **-2**
+
+وتعرب البعثة عن امتنانھا الخاص للسیدة طیف سامي، وكیلة وزارة المالیة **قدموه من معلومات بشأن موضوع البعثة.**
+
+رئاستھا لالجتماعات، والسیدة اكتفاء فلیح على دعمھا طوال فترة البعثة. والمدیرة العامة لدائرة الموازنة، على
+
+
+
+**قید الذي یمثل واحدا من عدة مشروعات إصالحیة الوطنیة تنفیذ مشروع إصالح الموازنة** **بدأت وزارة المالیة** **-3**
+
+**الصادرة في "الورقة البیضاء" اإلعداد في ظل استراتیجیة اإلصالح القتصادي األوسع نطاقا التي نصت علیھا**
+
+المحاسبة والدین العام في تنفیذ الموازنة ودوائر للبعثة في دعم الرئیسیة وتمثلت األھداف **.أكتوبر/تشرین األول 2020**
+
+دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة ي بتعزیز إعداد الموازنة وتقاریرھا وفقا إلطار المعن [۱] لستراتیجي المھمات المتعلقة بالھدف
+
+.وإدماجھ في نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد 2014لعام
+
+
+
+**نظام** **إلعداد** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **وفي ھذا الصدد، ركزت أنشطة البعثة على إدماج إطار** **-4**
+
+المھام واضطلعت البعثة **معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد وبناء القدرات في مجال إنتاج ونشر إحصاءات المالیة العامة.**
+
+بدء إعداد (دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014)و ؛2دلیل الحسابات الجدید بتصنیفات : )1( استكمال موائمةالتالیة
+
+إحصاءات بیانات ( مراجعة؛ و)3إلعداد التقاریربیانات اإلنفاق استنادا إلى تصنیف وظائف الحكومة وتقدیم التدریب العملي
+
+
+
+المھام واضطلعت البعثة **معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد وبناء القدرات في مجال إنتاج ونشر إحصاءات المالیة العامة.**
+
+
+
+. (التوسع األولي لنطاق تغطیة تقاریر إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة)؛ و4مالیة الحكومة للسنة المالیة 2020
+
+
+
+**بصورة** **لعام 2014جدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة دلیل الحسابات ال** **موائمة استكملت البعثة** **-5**
+
+واستعدادا لتطبیق نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد، تم وضع **شاملة إلدماجھ في نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد.**
+
+لیل إحصاءات مالیة من د و2014طبعتي 2001لسترشاد إلى حد ما بالتصنیف الوارد في دلیل حسابات شامل جدید مع
+
+
+
+والنسخة الحالیة من دلیل الحسابات مقسمة إلى عدة حسابات تتضمن مزیجا من حسابات اإلیرادات والنفقات یمكن . الحكومة
+
+
+
+لصول معامالت المتعلقة بتستند الحسابات األخرى ال بینما ،دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014مع بسھولة مطابقتھ
+
+قائمة الحسابات الكاملة موائمة . وتمت2014/عرض الدلیل في نسختیھ 2001 ى إل للتزامات()الموجودات و والخصوم
+
+وتتألف .دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 مع التصنیف لقتصادي الوارد في (على مستوى البنود )الجدول 1
+
+لستثماریة، قات بما فیھا البرامج الخاصة(، والموازنة القائمة من حسابات موازنة النفقات الجاریة )اإلیرادات والنف
+
+
+
+. المالیة للتزاماتومعامالت الموجودات و
+
+
+
+**شاملة** **موائمةنحو تحسین تصنیف الموازنة، دعمت البعثة وزارة المالیة في إجراء أول** **مھمة وكخطوة** **-6**
+
+وتستخدم إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة إطار "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" الذي وضعتھ األمم المتحدة، **. لتصنیف وظائف الحكومة**
+
+لقتصادیة، التي تتوخى الحكومات تحقیقھا من خالل عدة أنواع من لجتماعیة- وھو تصنیف مفصل للوظائف، أو األھداف
+
+لحكومة" في إطار تصنیف الموازنة بدعم النفقات. وفي عام 2014، كانت ھناك محاولة أولى لتطبیق "تصنیف وظائف ا
+
+، مصادر البیانات المتاحة . واستعرضت البعثة(METAC)اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط" الفنیة "مركز المساعدة من
+
+مفصلة لنظام "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" باستخدام موائمةلستثماریة، وقدمت من خالل تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنتین الجاریة و
+
+لقتصادي. مزیج من التصنیف اإلداري و
+
+
+( في مشروع إصالح الموازنة العامة للدولة )المشروع األول( المتعلق بوضع نظم وقواعد1-لستراتیجي1 ) المصدر: وزارة المالیة: الھدف 1
+
+. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014لمشاریع إنفاق واستثمار تركز على إنتاج ونشر تقاریر شاملة ومنتظمة عن الموازنة بما یتوافق مع
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **4**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+**تطبیقیة عن إعداد مفاھیم "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" واستكملت جدول "تصنیف** **ورشة عمل قدمت البعثة** **-7**
+
+ومة" ومفاھیمھ وفي ھذا السیاق، قدمت البعثة عرضا عن "تصنیف وظائف الحك **.وظائف الحكومة" للسنة المالیة 2020**
+
+الشائعة. وساقت البعثة أمثلة لتجارب البلدان في إعداد "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" لتإلشك اوأھمواستخداماتھ األساسیة
+
+. في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2020 وإنتاج جدول 7منھجیة اعداد واستعرضت أمام المشاركین
+
+
+
+إحصاءات دین القطاع" **وتطبیق منھجیةالعام في العراق إدخال تحسینات قطاع ال یتطلب إعداد تقاریر دین** **-8**
+
+
+
+الدین ألغراض عن ففي الوقت الراھن، تعد وزارة المالیة تقاریر . العام: مرشد لمعدیھا ومستخدمیھا"، الصادر في2011
+
+
+
+امت بتحدیثھا إلدراجھا في وق و2020العام لعامي 2019 قطاعال . وقد استعرضت البعثة بیانات دینالداخلیة فقطالرقابة
+
+یجمع بین حملة الدیون وأدوات مزیج بإحصاءات مالیة الحكومة التي تقدم سنویا. وتتسم تقاریر الدین الداخلیة الحالیة جداول
+
+تحسین بمكانوسیكون من األھمیة ألرصدة والتدفقات. لعدم الدمج المنتظم لستحقاق و آجال عدم اإلشارة إلى ، مع الدین
+
+
+
+على أساس ربع سنوي لتعزیز الشفافیة. ھاجودة بیانات الدین والبدء في نشر
+
+
+
+، **بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة** **یكلف** **من دوائر الوزارة المعنیةعمل** **فریق** **تشكیل ینبغي لوزارة المالیة** **-9**
+
+اعداد البیانات بالشكل مسؤول عن التنسیق بین الدوائر المختلفة فیما یتعلق بتبادل البیانات، وضمان ا ھذ یكون الفریقعلى أن
+
+. واعداد جداول إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة ونشرھا، ، )التصنیف المساعد( لكسل" السلیم حسب األداة المعدة لذلك "ملف
+
+التي یتم جمعھا من خارج دائرة تفریغ وتصنیف البیانات والحذر من األخطاء التي قد تنتج عندوینبغي تجنب التأخیر
+
+المحاسبة.
+
+
+
+**لتحسین تغطیة إحصاءات مالیة** **مراحل** **یة علىمنھجتطبیق في** **تبدأ إضافة إلى ذلك، ینبغي لوزارة المالیة أن** **-10**
+
+شركة عامة حوالي 113یوجد . ففي العراق **(BCG)الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة** **اوسع من نطاقالحكومة**
+
+ینبغي إجراء مراجعة دقیقة لقائمة الكیانات العامة بغیة التأكد من سالمة تصنیفھا ، تتألف من شركات عامة مالیة وغیر مالیة
+
+وستمثل .دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014الوحدات خارج الموازنة، وفقا إلرشادات او ضمن الشركات العامة
+
+الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة. عن لتوسیع نطاق التغطیة ة ھذه المراجعة خطوة أولى حاسم
+
+
+**- التوصیات ذات األولویة الجدول1**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ﺦﯾرﺎﺗﻟا
ﺔ ﯾﻧﻌﻣﻟا تﺎﺳﺳؤﻣﻟا ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا تاذ تﺎﯾﺻوﺗﻟا
ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا|Col2|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي
ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌد ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة 2019
-
2020
ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﺳﺗﻛﻣﺎل ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت دﯾن
اﻟ
ﻘطﺎع
اﻟﻌﺎم
وﺗﻘﻠﯾص
اﻟﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺎت اﻹﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ.|
إﺑرﯾل/ﻧﯾﺳﺎن1
2022
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|إدراج ﺟدول "ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات
ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ
ﻟﻌﺎم2020
وإﻋداد ﺟدول "ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ" ﻟﻠﻔﺗرة2017
-
2019
.|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران
2022
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﺳﺗﻧﺎدا إﻟﻰ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوارد ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2014
ﺑدورﯾﺔ وﺗوﻗﯾت ﻣﻧﺗظم
|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران
2022
|
+
+
+
+لدائرة المحاسبة للمراجعة و لعتماد وإعادة ارسالھ 2020 - 2019 الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة المعد عن الفترة تم تصحیح وارسال 1
+
+إلدارة اإلحصاءات لدى الصندوق.
+
+
+
+**5** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ﺔﺑﺳﺎﺣﻣﻟاو ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا رﺋاود ،ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا ةرازو
مﺎﻌﻟا نﯾدﻟاو|2014 مﺎﻌﻟ ﺔﻣوﻛﺣﻟا ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣ تاءﺎﺻﺣإ لﯾﻟد ﻊﻣ تﺎﺑﺎﺳﺣﻟا لﯾﻟد ﺔﻣﺋاوﻣ نﻣ ةدﺎﻔﺗﺳﻻا ﻲﻐﺑﻧﯾ
ﻲ ﻟﺎﻣﻟا لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا ﺔ ﻣﻼﺳ نﺎﻣﺿﻟ ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗ طﻘﻓ سﯾﻟو ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا دادﻋا رﯾرﺎﻘﺗ دادﻋا ﻲﻓ
ﺔ ﻧزاوﻣﻟا دادﻋا ﺔﻠﺣرﻣ ﻲﻓ ل ﺟﻻا ﺔطﺳوﺗﻣ تاؤﺑﻧﺗﻟا دادﻋاو|ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا دﯾﻗ|
+|---|---|---|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم
|ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ
واﻹداري
واﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي
وﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟﺑراﻣﺞ
وﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت
ﻓﯾﻣﺎ
ﯾﺧص
ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺗﯾن
اﻟﺟﺎرﯾﺔ
واﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ
|ﻗﯾد
اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، داﺋرﺗﺎ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ|ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2021
ﻣن ﺧﻼل إدراج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
.اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑراﻣﺞ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣوزﻋﺔ ﺣﺳب ﺗﺻﻧﯾﻔﮭﺎ اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي|ﺳﺑﺗﻣﺑر/أﯾﻠول
2022
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، داﺋرﺗﺎ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ
|ﺑﻧﺎء ﻗدرات ﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺗﻔﺻﯾﻠﻲ اﻛﺛر
.
|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|ﺑﻧﺎء
اﻟ
ﻘدرات
اﻻﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ
ل
ﻟﻣوظﻔﯾن
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم.|أﻛﺗوﺑر/ﺗﺷرﯾن
اﻷول2022
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر إﺣﺻﺎءات
اﻟ
دﯾن ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدرﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ ﺑﺻﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ وﻓﻘﺎ
.ﻟﻠﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم
|ﺗﺷﻛﯾل
ﻓرﯾﻖ
ﻋﻣل ﻣن ﻣﺧﺗﻠف اﻟدواﺋر ﺗﻛﻠف ﺑﺈﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ.
|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران
2022
|
+
+
+
+**تفاصیل إضافیة حول التوصیات ذات** التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات **وتتضمن خطة العمل الواردة في قسم** **-11**
+**األولویة واإلجراءات واألھداف المرحلیة الرئیسیة ذات الصلة.**
+### **التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ|ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا|ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا|
+|---|---|---|
+|
اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول–
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ
|
اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول–
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ
|
اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول–
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ
|
+|إﺑرﯾل/ﻧﯾﺳﺎن2
2022
|
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي
ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌد ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة
2019
-
2020
ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﺳﺗﻛﻣﺎل اﻟﻧﻘص ﻓﻲ ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت دﯾن
اﻟ
ﻘطﺎع
اﻟﻌﺎم
واﻟﺣد ﻣن اﻟﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺎت اﻹﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ.
|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|إدراج ﺟدول "ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات
ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2020
وإﻋداد ﺟدول
"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ"
ﻟﻠﻔﺗرة2017
-
2019
.|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﺳﺗﻧﺎدا إﻟﻰ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوارد ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل
إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2014
ﺑدورﯾﺔ وﺗوﻗﯾت ﻣﻧﺗظم
.
|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+
+
+
+للمراجعة والموافقة وإعادة لدائرة المحاسبة 2020 - 2019 الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة المعد عن الفترة تم تصحیح وارسال 2
+
+ارسالھا إلدارة اإلحصاءات لدى الصندوق
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **6**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ|ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا|ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا|
+|---|---|---|
+|
ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|
ﺗوﻓﯾر ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺗواﺗر
)ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت رﺑﻊ ﺳﻧوﯾﺔ او ﺷﮭرﯾﺔ(
ﻟﻘﺎﻋدة ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت
.اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟدوﻟﯾﺔ|
ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|
+|ﻗﯾد
اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|ﯾﻧﺑﻐﻲ
اﻻﺳﺗﻔﺎدة
ﻣن
ﻣواﺋﻣﺔ
دﻟﯾل
اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت
دﻟﯾل ﻣﻊ
إﺣﺻﺎءات
ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ
ﻟﻌﺎم
2014
ﻓﻲ
اﻋداد
ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر
اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
وﻟﯾس
ﻓﻘط
ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
ﻟﺿﻣﺎن
ﺳﻼﻣﺔ
اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾل
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻲ
واﻋداد
اﻟﺗﻧﺑؤات
ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
اﻻﺟل
ﻓﻲ ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|
+|ﻗﯾد
اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ
واﻹداري
واﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي
وﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟﺑراﻣﺞ
وﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت
ﻓﯾﻣﺎ
ﯾﺧص
ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺗﯾن
اﻟﺟﺎرﯾﺔ
واﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ
|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|
+|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ–
أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ–
أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ–
أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ|
+|
أﻛﺗوﺑر/ﺗﺷرﯾن اﻷول2022
|ﺑﻧﺎء اﻟﻘدرات
اﻻﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ
ﻟﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل إﻋداد
.إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر إﺣﺻﺎءات
اﻟ
دﯾن ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدرﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
.ﺑﺻﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+|/دﯾﺳﻣﺑر
ﻛﺎﻧون اﻷول 2022
|ﺗﺣري اﻟﺷﻔﺎﻓﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻹﻓﺻﺎح ﻋن اﻟﻣﺗﺄﺧرات ﻗﯾد اﻟﻣﺗﺄﺧرات اﻟﻣﺗراﻛﻣﺔ
.واﻟﻣﺳددة ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎرھﺎ ﻣطﺎﻟﺑﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|
+|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|.إدراج ﻧﻣوذج ﺟدول "ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ" ﻓﻲ وﺛﺎﺋﻖ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ|
+|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|ﺑﻧﺎء
ﻗدرات
ﻣوظﻔﻲ
وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
ﻓﻲ
ﻣﺟﺎل
اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟو
ﯾﻔﻲ ظ
ﺑﺷﻛل
ﺗﻔﺻﯾﻠﻲ
اﻛﺛر
.
|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2021
ﻣن
ﺧﻼل إدراج
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑراﻣﺞ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣوزﻋﺔ ﺣﺳب ﺗﺻﻧﯾﻔﮭﺎ
.اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+|ﻣﺎرس/آذار 2022
|ﻣراﺟﻌﺔ وﺗﺣدﯾث
اﻟ
ﺟدول
اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﻲ
اﻟذي
ﯾﻌرض اﻟﺗوزﯾﻊ اﻟﻘطﺎﻋﻲ
ﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم.
|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|
+|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران 2023
|ﺗوﺳﯾﻊ ﻧطﺎق ﺗﻐطﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺳﻧوﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧدﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ إﻋداد
إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﺗﺗﺿﻣن اﻟوﺣدات ﺧﺎرج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ وﺻﻧﺎدﯾﻖ اﻟﺿﻣﺎن اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ.
|ﻣﻧﺧﻔﺿﺔ
|
+|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث–
ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث–
ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث–
ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات|
+|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|
ﺗﺷﻛﯾل
ﻓرﯾﻖ
ﻋﻣل ﻣن ﻣﺧﺗﻠف اﻟدواﺋر ﺗﻛﻠف ﺑﺈﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
.اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|
+
+
+**7** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ|ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا|ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا|
+|---|---|---|
+|
ﻗﯾد اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|
ﻣواﺋﻣﺔ
دﻟﯾل اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺎﺳﺗﻣرار ﻣﻊ إطﺎر دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ
ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎره وﺛﯾﻘﺔ ﺣﯾﺔ ﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﺣدﯾﺛﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺿوء اﻹﺻدار اﻟﺟدﯾد ﻣن دﻟﯾل
.اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت ودﻟﯾل اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ|
ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|
+
+
+##### دلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 موائمة – ألف
+
+
+
+**كجزء من تنفیذ مشروع** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **تعد وزارة المالیة في الوقت الحالي لدمج إطار تس** **-12**
+
+، وافق مجلس الوزراء على. وفي فبرایر/شباط 2021 **نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد الذي تأخر تنفیذه لعدة أسباب**
+
+" تضمنت عددا من اإلصالحات منھا إسناد تنفیذ نظام معلومات اإلدارة "الورقة البیضاءخطة إصالحات شاملة عُرفت باسم
+
+ق، أطلق البنك المالیة الموحد إلى وزارة المالیة. وفي عام 2016، وبعد إخفاق المحاولة السابقة لتنفیذ ھذا النظام في العرا
+
+
+3
+لدعم تحدیث نظم اإلدارة المالیة العامة تضمن عددا من المج لت، منھا تصمیم وإعداد اختصاصات [2] الدولي مشروعا جدیدا
+ومھام مشروع نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد. ولكن عقب اإلعالن عن الدعوة لتقدیم العروض، لم تتم ترسیة أي
+
+لستعداد لجولة مناقصات أخرى في عام مشروع و عقود بسبب إخفاق المناقصة، مما دفع السلطات إلى مراجعة نطاق ال
+
+
+
+
+[2] الدولي مشروعا جدیدا
+
+
+
+.على األرجح 2022
+
+
+
+**واستعدادا لتطبیق نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد، تم وضع دلیل حسابات شامل جدید مع السترشاد إلى حد** **-13**
+
+دلیل الحسابات . والنسخة الحالیة من من دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة و2014طبعتي2001 **ما بالتصنیف الوارد في**
+
+یل إحصاءات مالیة بسھولة مع دل موائمتھمقسمة إلى عدة حسابات تتضمن مزیجا من حسابات اإلیرادات والنفقات یمكن
+
+
+
+إلى عرض ( للتزاماتالموجودات و )األصول والخصوم الحكومة لعام 2014، بینما ال تستند الحسابات األخرى لمعامالت
+
+
+
+سبیل المثال، یقید بیع الموجودات الثابتة كجزء من حسابات اإلیرادات، بینما تقید . فعلى2014/الدلیل في نسختیھ 2001
+أعمال التصرف في الموجودات الثابتة كجزء من حسابات النفقات. كذلك یتم التعامل مع اإلیرادات والنفقات المعاد تمویلھا
+
+.دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014ال في كإیرادات ونفقات على الترتیب، ولیس كإیرادات ونفقات سالبة كما ھو الح
+
+الحسابات الخاصة األخرى، مثل حساب تمویل العجز على غرار بنود الموازنة، بدال من اشتقاقھا من الحسابات ویتم تصنیف
+
+سابات الدین ضمن النفقات. عالوة على ذلك، یعید اإلصدار الحالي من دلیل الح تقید مدفوعاتأعلى الخط وتحت الخط، كما
+إدراج عدد من الحسابات التي وردت في إصدارات سابقة من الدلیل، مما یجعل قائمة الحسابات طویلة للغایة. وأشارت
+لحتفاظ بھذه الحسابات تحسبا للحاجة إلى الرجوع إلیھا في وقت الحق، ولكنھا أقرت أن إضافة ھذه السلطات إلى أنھ تم
+
+
+
+. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014دلیل الحسابات مع إطار موائمةالحسابات أدت إلى صعوبة أكبر في
+
+
+
+**تمھیدا لدمجھ في** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **دلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار** **موائمة استكملت البعثة** **-14**
+
+( مع التصنیفالجدول 2الحسابات على مستوى البنود ) شجرة موائمة. وتمت **نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد**
+
+من حسابات موازنة النفقات شجرة الحسابات . وتتألفدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014لقتصادي الوارد في
+
+. وتستخدم لصول والخصوم لستثماریة، ومعامالت الجاریة )اإلیرادات والنفقات بما فیھا البرامج الخاصة(، والموازنة
+
+لستثماریة تصنیفا مختلفا )حسب القطاع والنوع(، ولكنھا تسمح بإدراج التصنیف المقابل في إحصاءات مالیة الموازنة
+
+،وتُصنف البرامج الخاصة، وھي مجموعة فرعیة من موازنة النفقات الجاریة .(الجدول 2الحكومة على مستوى البنود )
+
+. وتتضمن موائمةدي، وال تتطلب بالتالي معاملة خاصة عند اللقتصا حسب طبیعة البرنامج، ویتم توزیعھا وفقا للتصنیف
+
+.(الحسابات والتصنیف المقابل لھا في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة )المرفق 1 ووصفالرموز موائمةال
+
+
+
+لنتھاء30 = ، تاریخ دیسمبر/كانون األول2016 = تاریخ البدء28] ،تحدیث نظم اإلدارة المالیة العامة، مشروع رقم P151357 مشروع [2] 3
+
+[ . نوفمبر/تشرین الثاني2021
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **8**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+**ھیكل الرموز– التصنیف لقتصادي الوطني** **–** **الجدول2**
+
+
+
+**التفاصیلرعي البند الف** **البند** **الباب**
+
+**الفرعیة**
+
+
+
+ضرائب **–** O1
+
+الدخل
+
+األجور **–** O1
+
+والرواتب
+
+
+
+ضرائب **–** O2
+
+الدخل والثروة
+
+تعویضات **–** O2
+
+العاملین
+
+
+
+**الطبیعة الفرعیةطبیعة المعاملة**
+
+**للمعاملة**
+
+اإلیرادات- 1 **اإلیرادات- 1**
+
+الجاریة
+
+النفقات **–** O1 **النفقات- 2**
+
+الجاریة
+
+
+النفقات **–** O2 **الستثمار** **- 3**
+
+الرأسمالیة
+
+
+وزارة المالیة :المصدر
+
+
+
+بنود محددة، إن
+
+وجدت
+
+
+
+ضرائب الرواتب في **–** O1
+
+القطاع العام
+
+
+
+محددة، معامالت الرواتب **–** O1
+
+إن وجدت:
+
+الرواتب
+
+الساسیة
+
+مشروعات السدود والخزانات **–** OO1
+
+محددة
+
+
+
+السدود **–** OO1 قطاع الزراعة **–** O1
+
+والخزانات
+
+ومشروعات حجز
+
+المیاه
+
+
+
+**في إعداد تقاریر تنفیذ** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **دلیل الحسابات مع** **موائمة ینبغي الستفادة من** **-15**
+
+في سیاق مشروع إصالح الموازنة الوطنیة، ستعتمد وزارة المالیة خالل الفترة . **الموازنة لضمان سالمة التحلیل المالي**
+
+
+
+4
+المتمثل في
+
+
+
+
+[3] لستراتیجي لتنفیذ الھدف 201دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 4دلیل الحسابات مع موائمةالمقبلة على
+
+
+
+دلیل إحصاءات مالیة دوري استنادا إلى التصنیف الوارد في بشكلتحسین جودة تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة وضمان إصدارھا
+
+
+
+ألغراض دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014استخدام طریقة العرض الواردة في الحكومة لعام 2014، ویفضل
+
+
+
+متوسطة األجل، واعتبارھا أداة التحلیل الرئیسیة في مرحلة إعداد الموازنة. التنبؤاتتحلیل سیاسة المالیة العامة وإعداد
+
+
+
+التوصیات :
+
+
+
+مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة باعتباره وثیقة حیة بشكل مستمرنموذج دلیل الحسابات موائمة تحدیث _-_
+
+
+
+اإلصدار الجدید من دلیل الحسابات ودلیل المحاسبة العامة یمكن تحدیثھا في ضوء
+
+
+
+اعدادتقاریراعداد في 2014لعامالحكومةمالیةإحصاءاتدلیل مع الحساباتدلیل موائمة من لستفادة **ا** ینبغي _-_
+
+
+
+اعداد مرحلة في لجل **ا** متوسطةالتنبؤاتواعدادالماليالتحلیلسالمةلضمان الموازنةتنفیذفقط ولیسالموازنة
+
+
+
+الموازنة
+
+
+
+إعداد ونشر تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة استنادا إلى التصنیف الوارد في دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 _-_
+
+
+
+بدوریة وتوقیت منتظم
+
+
+
+تطبیق التصنیف الوظیفي واإلداري و لقتصادي وتصنیف البرامج وتطبیق منھجیة اعداد البیانات فیما یخص **ا** _-_
+
+
+
+لستثماریةوازنتین الجاریة و **ا** الم مرحلة اعداد
+
+
+##### **تطبیق "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" – باء**
+
+وتستخدم **.تحرص وزارة المالیة على تطبیق التصنیف الوظیفي للنفقات كخطوة مھمة نحو تحسین تصنیف الموازنة** **-16**
+
+للوظائف، أو إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة إطار "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" الذي وضعتھ األمم المتحدة، وھو تصنیف مفصل
+
+النفقات. وفي عام مختلف انواعتحقیقھا من خالل لة العامةالحكوم تسعى وحدات / لقتصادیة، التي لجتماعیة األھداف
+
+
+
+المتعلق بوضع نظم وقواعد و (( في مشروع إصالح الموازنة العامة للدولة )المشروع األول1-لستراتیجي )1 الھدف ،المصدر: وزارة المالیة [3] 4
+
+دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام تركز على إنتاج ونشر تقاریر شاملة ومنتظمة عن الموازنة بما یتوافق یة التي استثمارالمشروعات ال وللنفقات
+
+. 2014
+
+
+**9** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+، كانت ھناك محاولة أولى لتطبیق "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" في إطار تصنیف الموازنة بدعم من "مركز المساعدة2014
+
+التابع لصندوق النقد الدولي. ولكن لم یتم إحراز أي تقدم في ھذا الصدد (METAC)وسط" الفنیة اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األ
+
+إلعداد "تصنیف أفضل الممارسات ، تقتضيدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014حتى اآلن. ووفقا للمعاییر الواردة في
+
+یتضح أن التصنیف اإلداري ومن خالل تجارب البلدان أنھ **ا** ل كل معاملة. على مستوى تصنیفان یتم الوظائف الحكومة"
+
+. وبالنسبة لموازنات البرامج الھیئات او البرامجیمثل نقطة انطالق إذا ما تضمن التفاصیل الالزمة على مستوى الدوائر أو
+
+. لنشطةو لبرامج ااألھداف واإلمارات العربیة المتحدة(، یتم إعداد التصنیف الوظیفي على مستوى دولة )كما ھو الحال في
+
+
+**شاملة أولیة لتصنیف وظائف الحكومة باستخدام مزیج من التصنیف** **موائمةلھذا الھدف، أجرت البعثة** **-وتحقیقا17**
+
+، من خالل تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنتین مصادر البیانات المتوفرة واستعرضت البعثة **واإلداري وتصنیف البرامج.** **القتصادي**
+
+،إلى وزارات ودوائر وأقسام. ومقارنة بالتصنیف لقتصادي ( لستثماریة. وینقسم التصنیف اإلداري )الجدول 3الجاریة و
+
+
+
+موائمة یتضمن التصنیف اإلداري توزیعا للبرامج الخاصة حسب طبیعتھا. وإلعداد "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة"، أجرت البعثة
+
+
+
+( التبویب المتقاطع)( جمیع البرامج الخاصة المسندة إلى وحدات تنظیمیة، و3)( جمیع الوحدات التنظیمیة، و2: )1تضمنت
+
+راجع الجدول ) ( النفقات لستثماریة موزعة حسب القطاع والبند/المشروع لقتصادي والوحدات التنظیمیة، و)4 للتصنیف
+
+تصنیف معامالت الدین العام موائمةنیف وظائف الحكومة"، وال سیما مع "تص تفصیلیة موائمة (. وكان البد من إجراء _2_
+
+
+
+نظرا ألنھ یتم التعامل حالیا مع مدفوعات سداد أصل الدین كنفقات ولیس كتمویل )راجع القسم ألف(.
+
+
+
+**وتم استكمال** **ومنھجیة اعداد البیانات،** **تطبیقیة عن مفاھیم "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة"** **ورشة عمل قدمت البعثة** **-18**
+
+
+
+. وفي ھذا السیاق، قدمت البعثة عرضا عن "تصنیف وظائف **جدول "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" للسنة المالیة 2020**
+
+أمثلة لتجارب البلدان في إعداد كما قدمتالحكومة" ومفاھیمھ واستخداماتھ األساسیة والمواطن ذات المشكالت الشائعة.
+
+في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة رقم7دول جإعداد وإنتاج ة منھجی"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" واستعرضت أمام المشاركین
+
+
+
+لعام.
+
+
+
+**في إعداد بیانات "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة"** **وفرھا فریق الوزارةالبعثة أحدث تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة التي ت -استخدم19**
+
+
+
+المالیة للسنة الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة في النفقات ارقام مطابقة األساس ھذا على . تموقد **لعام 2020**
+
+
+
+. 2020
+
+
+
+**ھیكل الرموز– التصنیف اإلداري الوطني** **–** **الجدول3**
+
+
+
+القسم الباب الفرعي الباب
+()یستخدم في إعداد الحسابات ()وحدات الموازنة
+
+
+
+حسب المعاییر وحدة إداریة )مركز تكلفة–
+
+
+
+(المحاسبیة
+
+
+
+مقر الوزارة الوزارة
+الوك لت/الدوائر الحكومیة
+الممولة من الموازنة، إن )المؤسسات المملوكة للدولة
+
+
+
+(وجدت
+
+
+
+مقر وزارة المالیة - O1 وزارة المالیة **–** O5
+
+
+
+مدیریة المعاشات الحكومیة في كركوك – OO1 مقر وزارة المالیة - O1
+ال مدیریة العامة للمعاشات الحكومیة **02**
+
+
+
+المصدر: السلطات
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **10**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+التوصیات :
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+.ضمن وثائق الموازنة ( _COFOG_ ) إدراج التصنیف الوظیفي _-_
+
+
+
+( عند تقدیم البیانات للنشر في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات _COFOG_ ) "إدراج جدول "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة _-_
+
+
+
+2019- وإعداد ونشر جدول "تصنیف وظائف الحكومة" للسنوات المالیة من2017مالیة الحكومة لعام 2020
+
+
+
+. اكثرتفصیليبشكلالوظیفيالتصنیفمجال في المالیةوزارةموظفيقدرات بناء _-_
+
+
+##### إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة تحسین منھجیة إعداد ونشر جیم
+**( ناقشت البعثة مع موظفي دائرة المحاسبة مسألة الرتفاع الكبیر في الحسابات مستحقة الدفع )الجدول3** **-20**
+
+. ویرجع لرتفاع في الحسابات مستحقة الدفع إلى قید حوالي **المدرجة في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة2020**
+
+، (، حسابات( في نوفمبر/تشرین الثاني2020دینار عراقي في حسابات الضمانات )وتُعامل كالتزامات )3318 ترلیون8
+
+ونتیجة للتأخر .انعكاسا لسلسلة من النفقات لستثماریة دون السنویة التي تعھدت بھا وزارات مختلفة تجاه أطراف أخرى
+لنتھاء من غلق الحسابات، لم یكن قد تم بعد تسجیل قیود مقابلة لھا كنفقات استثماریة. فعلى سبیل المثال، تعھدت وزارة في
+
+.تریلیون دینار عراقي لم تكن قد تمت تسویتھا بعد. ویُتوقع تسویتھا خالل السنة الدفاع بنفقات استثماریة تبلغ حوالي 1,2
+
+لك، استعرضت البعثة بعض مسائل التصنیف الخاطئ وقامت بتصحیحھا. وعالوة على ذ
+
+
+
+**لم تقدم وزارة المالیة حتى اآلن سوى بیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة السنویة لقاعدة بیانات صندوق النقد** **-21**
+
+بیانات إحصاءات مالیة إلعداد )التصنیف المساعد( تطبیق إكسیل من خالل باستخدام أداة اإلحصاءات وتُنتَج ھذه **الدولي.**
+الحكومة الشھریة وربع السنویة والسنویة. وتستطیع وزارة المالیة، بحد أدنى من الجھود، أن تبدأ في نشر بیانات عالیة
+
+العملیات الشھري بیان للوزارةالتواتر من خالل قاعدة بیانات "اإلحصاءات المالیة الدولیة" وأن تنشر في الموقع اإللكتروني
+
+دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة بما یتوافق مع نموذج لعن إحصاءات المالیة العامة
+
+.. وتحث البعثة وزارة المالیة على تحسین ممارساتھا في نشر البیانات من أجل زیادة الشفافیةلعام 2014
+
+
+**11** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+**إلدراجھا في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة التي** **و2020العام لعامي 2019** **قطاع ال استعرضت البعثة بیانات دین** **-22**
+
+المعلومات التي قدمتھا السلطات في تحدیث صحیفة بیانات الدین البعثة استُخْدِمَت **تُقَدَّ م سنویا ولتقلیل التفاوتات اإلحصائیة.**
+
+العدید من معامالت الدین ت عام 2020، أُجري خاللبیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. إدراج في المصدریة المستخدمة
+المحلي التي یتعین أن تنعكس في صحیفة البیانات. وتم تحویل أذون الخزانة )أو التحویل لتمویل العجز( في حیازة البنوك
+
+كان مجموع خصمھا. وبنھایة عام 2020وشركات النفط إلى قروض طویلة المدى، بعد أن قام البنك المركزي العراقي ب
+
+تریلیون دینار عراقي ھي قیمة أذون الخزانة المخصومة تریلیون دینار عراقي، منھا42 الدین المحلي اإلجمالي قد بلغ 65,5
+
+
+
+ذلك تمك .تریلیون دینار عراقي في حیازة البنك المركزي العراقي، ووصلت قیمة القروض المحلیة غیر المُسددة إلى 18
+
+لم تكن مُدْرَجة فیھا من قبل. وبلغ الدین الخارجي 28,3ي الت دیث بیانات الدین الخارجي بمعلومات عن القروض الجدیدة تح
+
+
+
+وراء تصحیح األخطاء السابقة العام في عام 2019 قطاعال تریلیون دینار عراقي )الملحق الرابع(. وكان إدراج بیانات دین
+في حساب التغیر في حسابات الموجودات المالیة تحت مسمى "العملة والودائع" )في سلسلة البیانات الزمنیة للفترة من
+
+، صححت (. وبالنسبة لعام2020 ( كما قلل أیضا من التفاوتات اإلحصائیة في بیان العملیات )الجدول32020–2017
+
+تریلیون دینار عراقي( في نھایة بإدراج عملیات إصدار أذون الخزانة )بقیمة12 بعثة التفاوتات اإلحصائیة لعام 2020ال
+
+بین إدماج موائمةلدى السلطات. وینبغي مواصلة الالمساعد ، ولم تكن مرصودة على نحو كافٍ في التصنیفعام 2020
+
+
+
+أثناء البعثة القادمة. أرصدة الدیون وتدفقاتھا في "ملف مساعد التصنیف"
+
+
+
+**عمل** **فریق لتجنب تقدیم بیانات غیر كاملة عن إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة مستقبال، ینبغي لوزارة المالیة أن تنشئ** **-23**
+
+مسؤول عن التنسیق ا العمل ھذ فریق یكونعلى أن **كَلَّ ف بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. دوائر الوزارة ذات العالقة یُ من**
+
+وإدراج البیانات في إحصاءات التصنیف المساعدفیما یتعلق بتبادل البیانات، وضمان التسجیل السلیم في بین الدوائر المختلفة
+
+مالیة الحكومة. وینبغي أن تتجنب التأخیر والسھو في تسجیل البیانات التي یتم جمعھا من خارج دائرة المحاسبة.
+
+
+
+:إحصاءات دین القطاع العام **" منھجیةالعام في العراق إدخال تحسینات ومراعاة** **قطاعال یتطلب إعداد تقاریر دین** **-24**
+
+
+
+وتقوم وزارة المالیة حالیا بإعداد تقاریر عن الدین ألغراض النشر **.** 2011 **"، الصادر في** مرشد لمعدیھا ومستخدمیھا
+
+
+
+یستغرق قد ما بشكل الكتروني غیر متوفرةالبیانات المصدریة على أساس شھري، فھي توفر من . وبرغمالداخلي والرقابة
+
+طریقة إصدارھا فترة طویلة، وال سیما في حالة الدیون المحلیة. وال یتم كذلك الحصول على كل المعلومات المتعلقة بالدیون ب
+
+الدیون وأدوات الدین، مع عدم اإلشارة ي امل ح. وتتسم تقاریر الدین الداخلیة الحالیة بما تتضمنھ من مزیج یجمع بین ةل سھ
+لستحقاق. ویتعین إیالء أھمیة قصوى لتحسین جودة تقاریر الدیون والبدء في نشر تقاریر ربع سنویة عن الدیون إلى آجال
+
+العام، ویعود تاریخ آخر تقریر ربع سنوي طاعق ال عراق حالیا بالفعل أي تقریر عن دین توخیا لمزید من الشفافیة. وال ینشر ال
+
+
+
+.عن الدین نُشِرَ في الموقع اإللكتروني إلى عام 2016
+
+
+
+**الدورة التدریبیة** **المحاسبة** **ودائرة** **الموازنة** **دائرة كبدایة، توصي البعثة بشدة بحضور موظفي دائرة الدین العام** **-25**
+
+في فمن المقرر عقد ھذه الدورة التدریبیة في أكتوبر/تشرین األول 2022 **إعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام.** **حولالقادمة**
+
+( ویمكن أن تفید معدي بیانات الدین المحلي والدینمركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في الشرق األوسط )CEF
+
+. العام قطاعال دین بیاناتونشر على أفضل الممارسات في إعداد تتضمنحیث الخارجي بشكل كبیر
+
+
+
+**، افتقار تغطیة المتأخرات** **المتعلقة ب التساق الشمول** **األخرى في إعداد بیانات الدین** **نقاط الضعف الحالیة ومن** **-26**
+
+تُدْرَج المتأخرات حالیا في بیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة وال في جداول الدین. ومع ھذا، كانت السلطات قد اتخذت حیث ال
+
+نحو سد بعض الفجوات في البیانات، بإجراء مسوح لجمع معلومات عن المتأخرات من كل خطوة أولى في عام 2017
+
+. وبالتالي، تتبعت تریلیون دینار عراقي بنھایة2017 والي 6وحدات اإلنفاق. وبلغت المتأخرات المستحقة للمقاولین ح
+السلطات سداد المتأخرات المتراكمة ورصدت التعھدات. وتمت تسویة ھذه المتأخرات على مدار الثالث سنوات الماضیة:
+
+ا في عام ( تم سداد30 من المبلغ نقد%2) مقابل سندات الخزانة )وھي مدرجة في الدین المحلي(، و% ( تم سداد40)1
+
+تدرج في موازنة 2021 أن اً حالی . وتخطط وزارة المالیة2019 أخرى نقدا في عام% ( تم سداد30)، و32018
+مخصصات لتسویة المتأخرات المتبادلة بشأن مدفوعات فواتیر الكھرباء. وینبغي أن یتبع معدو إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة
+
+،(، ویجب علیھم جمع المعلومات عن المتأخرات بدءا من نشأتھامنھجا أشمل وأكثر منھجیة في قید المتأخرات )اإلطار 1
+
+دفوعات المستحقة وحتى إطفائھا، أي عند سداد المتأخرات، أو إعادة جدولتھا، أو شطب الدائن أي من وقت عدم سداد الم
+
+لھا.
+
+
+التوصیات :
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **12**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة عن طریق استكمال2020-بیانات 2019تضمین تحسین عملیة _-_
+
+العام والحد من التفاوتات اإلحصائیة.قطاع دین النقص في بیانات
+
+في مجال إعداد إحصاءات وزارة المالیةفي المحاسبةودائرةالموازنة، دائرةالعامالدیندائرةموظفي بناء قدرات _-_
+دین القطاع العام، من خالل حضور الدورة التدریبیة عن إحصاءات دین القطاع العام المقرر عقدھا في
+
+.في مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في الشرق األوسط ومقره الكویتأكتوبر/تشرین األول 2022
+
+یة ھو إعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام للحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في ینبغي أن یكون الھدف الرئیسي للبعثة التال _-_
+
+الموازنة ونشرھا على أساس منتظم بما یتوافق مع المرشد إلعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام.
+
+بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لتحسین عملیة التنسیق. ف [َّ ] كَل ُیعمل بین الدوائر یق فر إنشاء _-_
+
+ت بشفافیة وقید ھذه المتأخرات على أساس من الشفافیة كمطالبات على الحكومة. اإلفصاح عن المتأخرا _-_
+
+"تقدیم بیانات عالیة التواتر إلدراجھا في قاعدة بیانات "اإلحصاءات المالیة الدولیة _-_
+##### التغطیة المؤسسیةدال
+
+
+تنعكس . و **یغطي تقریر إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة في الوقت الراھن الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة** **-27**
+
+األنشطة التي تُجرى حالیا ضمن الموازنة في تقریر المالیة العامة. ویمكن إضافة الكیانات المستقلة إلى ھذه التغطیة جمیع
+
+لقتصاد. ویمكن أن تتسع ركزیة وتعكس تأثیر أنشطة الحكومة على بالتدریج حتى تغطي التقاریر كل نفقات الحكومة الم
+
+التغطیة في نھایة المطاف لتتضمن حسابات الحكومة دون المركزیة فتغطي الحكومة العامة بأكملھا.
+
+
+
+وھي الحكومة المركزیة )وتضم رئاسة ، **یضم قطاع الحكومة العامة في العراق العدید من الوحدات المؤسسیة** **-28**
+
+مجلس النواب ومكتب رئیس الوزراء والقضاء والوزارات والدوائر واألجھزة التي تعمل على مستوى الحكومة الجمھوریة و
+
+محافظة(، )مثل بلدیة موزعة على19 المركزیة(، والحكومات المحلیة التي تتألف من عدد كبیر من البلدیات )حوالي 393
+
+صالح الدین وبابل واألنبار وكركوك، ...(.
+
+
+**:تنقسم الحكومة المركزیة في العراق إلى ثالثة قطاعات فرعیة**
+
+
+
+تتضمن كیانات مثل رئاسة الجمھوریة ومجلس النواب ومكتب **:() الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنةBCG**
+.وزارة وكیانا مدرجا في الموازنة السنویة للعراق رئیس الوزراء والقضاء و22
+
+
+وحدة حكومیة مستقلة تؤدي مھامھا بدعم مالي من ضمن حوالي 66تت **:(وحدات خارج الموازنة )EBUs** الحكومات المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة بصفة أساسیة ومن إیراداتھا الذاتیة. ونظرا لعدم كفایة المعلومات المتاحة
+
+
+
+من قطاعھا كیانا ضعن طبیعتھا وأنشطتھا، بدأت البعثة بتصنیف قائمة الكیانات ذاتیة التمویل التي تتضمن 180
+لجتماعي، والشركات العامة المالیة وغیر المالیة( )الملحق الصحیح )الوحدات خارج الموازنة وصنادیق الضمان
+
+
+
+الخامس(
+
+
+
+لجتماعي الذي یغطي موظفي لجتماعي من صندوق الضمان یتألف قطاع الضمان **الضمان الجتماعي:**
+القطاعین الخاص والعام وصندوق تقاعد موظفي الدولة.
+
+وتوفر ھذه **.(شركة عامة تتألف من شركات عامة مالیة وغیر مالیة )الملحق الخامس** **یضم العراق حوالي113** **-29**
+
+، أو تنظم السوق لضمان شراء السلع والخدمات وحیازتھا وبیعھا ذات داللة اقتصادیةالكیانات السلع والخدمات بأسعار
+
+سائر طائلة. فعلى سبیل المثال، المتأخرات الكبیرة التي تتحملھا ، أو تنظم القطاع المالي. وقد تتحمل كذلك خسوقیةبأسعار
+شركات الطاقة مقابل إمدادات الوقود لتولید الكھرباء ال تظھر في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. ویتعین إجراء مراجعة شاملة
+
+ا یتوافق مع المبادئ التوجیھیة لقائمة الكیانات العامة لضمان سالمة تصنیفھا كشركات عامة مقابل الوحدات خارج الموازنة بم
+
+
+**13** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+وسوف تمثل ھذه المراجعة خطوة أولى بالغة األھمیة في منھج تدریجي نحو. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 في
+
+توسیع التغطیة لتتجاوز الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة.
+
+
+**الشكل البیاني2: القطاع العام في جمھوریة العراق**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+والخبراء المصدر: دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014
+
+
+التوصیات :
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+لكیانات القطاع العام.القطاعيجدول التقسیم مراجعة وتحدیث _-_
+
+
+
+الوحدات خارج الموازنة، وصنادیق الضمان التوسع في تغطیة البیانات السنویة في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لتشمل _-_
+
+
+
+لجتماعي. **ا**
+
+
+##### المسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثة ھاء
+|ﺔ ﺳﺳؤﻣﻟا|م ﺳﻻا|
+|---|---|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|/اﻟﺳﯾدة طﯾف ﺳﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﺣﻣد/وﻛﯾﻠﺔ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﻣدﯾرة اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟداﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻟﺳﯾدة اﻛﺗﻔﺎء ﻓﻠﯾﺢ ﺣﺳن|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻟﺳﯾدة ﻣﯾﺳﺎء ﻛﺎظم ﺟﻧدر|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻟﺳﯾدة إﺳراء وﻟﯾد ﺧﻠﯾﻔﺔ|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻟﺳﯾدة آﻓﺎق ﻧﺟم ﻋﺑد ﷲ|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ زﯾد ﻣؤﯾد ﻋﺑد اﻟرزاق|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة ا
ﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻋﻠﻰ ھﺎﺷم رﺣﯾﻣﺔ
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﺑﺳﺎم ﺻﺎﺋب ﻓﻠﯾﺢ|
+
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **14**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+|ﺔ ﻧزاوﻣﻟا ةرﺋاد/ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا ةرازو|د وﻣﺣ مﺳﺎﺟ ﺎﻧر ةدﯾﺳﻟا|
+|---|---|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻣﺻطﻔﻰ ﺟوھر
|
+|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
|اﻟﺳﯾدة ﻟﯾﻠﻰ ﺷﻼل ﻣوﺳﻰ|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ|
اﻟﺳﯾدة ﺑﺎن ﺣﺳﯾن ﺳﯾد|
+|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
|
اﻟﺳﯾدة زﯾﻧب ﺟواد|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ|
اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ھﺎﻧﻲ ﺣﻛﻣت إﻟﯾﺎس|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ|
اﻟﺳﯾدة اﻓﺗﻛﺎر ﺣﺳﯾن ﻋﻠﻲ|
+|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ
ﻋﻠﻲ
ﻋﺑﺎس
|
+|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟدﯾن
|اﻟﺳﯾدة
رؤى
وﻻء
ﺻﺑﺣﻲ
|
+|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/
داﺋرة اﻟدﯾن|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﯾﻘظﺎن
ﻋﻘﯾل
ﺣﺳن|
+|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟدﯾن
|اواﺋل
ﻋﺑد
اﻟﺳﺎﺗر
|
+|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
|ﺳوﺳن
ﺟﻣﻌﺔ
ﻣﺣﻣد
|
+
+
+
+**15** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+**التي تم إنجازها خ��ل البعثة** **الملفات** **قائمةلملحق ا��ول.** ا
+
+
+لى الرابط التالي: محفوظة عالبعثة والمقدمة إلى السلطات خ��ل ال اكسل ملفاتبقائمة
+
+[https://intlmonetaryfund-](https://intlmonetaryfund-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Mission%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN)
+[my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Missi](https://intlmonetaryfund-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Mission%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN)
+
+[on%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN](https://intlmonetaryfund-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Mission%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN)
+
+
+**GFSM2014** **موائمة شجرة الحسابات الجدیدة مع تصنیفات دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة** **-** **1**
+
+
+**2020** **لسنة فقات حسب بینات النفقات نیف الوظیفي للجداول اعداد التصن** **-** **2**
+
+
+**یف الوظیفي التصناإلداري مع یفالتصن** **موائمة** **جدول** **-** **3**
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **16**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+**17** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+**( )جدول7لسنة 2020** **للنفقات** **تصنيف الوظيفي ال الملحق الثاني. جدول**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **18**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+**2020-المدرجة بالموازنة لسنة 2019** **المركزية** **الحكومة** **دين** **اتالملحق الثالث. بيان**
+
+
+
+**ف 2020**
+
+**4** **ف32020** **ف22020** **2020ف1** **2019**
+
+
+
+بملیارات الدینار العراقي
+
+
+
+**65,494.9** **54,024.8** **40,697.3** **39,893.3** **40,410.1** **الدين الداخلي**
+
+
+
+3,324.3 3,324.4 3,324.4 3,324.4 3,324.3 ()ا��حتياطي القانوني حوا��ت لتمويل العجز
+
+
+)محمولة من المصارف و حوا��ت لتمويل العجز –
+
+
+
+503.5 503.5 1,771.2 6,530.5 6,530.5 ��كات النف (ط
+
+
+
+40,452.0 28,452.0 18,884.3 14,125.0 14,125.0 )مخصومة لدى البنك (المركزي حوا��ت لتمويل العجز
+
+18,046.3 18,046.3 13,028.8 12,028.8 12,528.8 قروض
+
+
+
+1,555.5 1,555.5 1,555.5 1,755.5 1,755.5 (الدين القديم حوا��ت )البنك المركزي
+1,613.3 2,143.1 2,133.1 2,129.1 2,146.0 سنــــــدات المقاوليـــــن
+
+
+
+**28,454.6** **28,685.7** **30,032.1** **30,028.5** **31,053.2** **الدين الخارجي**
+
+
+
+5,410.6 5,410.6 5,616.7 5,616.7 5,616.7 سندات الدين
+
+6,406.0 6,406.0 6,824.7 6,825.4 7,274.5 خارج نادي باريس قروض نادي باريس\
+
+
+
+16,638.0 16,869.1 17,590.7 17,586.4 18,162.0 قروض
+
+
+
+**93,949.5** **82,710.5** **70,729.4** **69,921.7** **71,463.2** **مجموع الدين العام القائم**
+
+
+
+بنود التذكير
+_1182_ _1182_ _1182_ _1182_ _1182_ ) سعر ال��ف (د.ع.| د.أ
+
+
+
+**فوائد الدين المدفوعة**
+
+
+
+509.41 46.10 28.65 489.82 1,343.94 الدين الداخلي
+
+
+
+49.88 431.04 76.04 451.53 1,100.29 الدين الخارجي
+
+
+
+**19** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+**الجهات الحكومية** **قائمة .الملحق الرابع**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ﻒﯿﻨﺼﺘﻟا|ﺔﮭﺠﻟا|ةرازﻮﻟا ﻢﻗر|
+|---|---|---|
+|**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|** داﺋﺮة اﻟﻌﺘﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺔ**
|**3**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﮭﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺎ ﻟﻠﺤﺞ واﻟﻌﻤﺮة**
|
**3 **
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺼﻨﺪوق اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ**
**اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﯿﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** دﯾﻮان اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة **
** اﻟﻌﯿﺎدات**
**اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ**
** اﻟﺸﻌﺒﯿﺔ**
|
**9**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﺮﺑﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻤﻔﺘﻮﺣﺔ**
|
**12**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻟﺠﻨﺔ **
** ﺻﻨﺪوق دﻋﻢ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﺮ**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** دار اﻟﺸﺆون اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**15**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة اﻟﻔﻨﻮن اﻟﺘﺸﻜﯿﻠﯿﺔ**
|
**15**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة اﻟﺴﯿﻨﻤﺎ واﻟﻤﺴﺮح**
|
**15**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺣﺔ**
|
**15**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﺤﻮث اﻟﺒﻨﺎء**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻻﺳﻜﺎن**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎء**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺎري**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** دار**
**اﻟﻀﯿﺎﻓﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**43**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻻﻋﻼم اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ**
|
**43**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻻﻋﻼم واﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت**
|
**43**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة ﻣﺠﺎري ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**43**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة ﻣﺎء ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**43**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة**
|
**47**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻟﺒﺼﺮة**
|
**47**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة**
|
**47**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى**
|
**48**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى**
|
**48**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى**
|
**48**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**49**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**49**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**49**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر**
|
**50**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر**
|
**50**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر**
|
**50**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ**
|
**51**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ**
|
**51**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ**
|
**51**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**|
** اﻻدارة اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ**|
**52**
|
+
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **20**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ﺔﻠﻘﺘﺴﻣ ﺔﮭﺟ|ﻞﺑﺎﺑ ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ءﺎﻣ ﺔﯾﺮﯾﺪﻣ|52|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ**
|
**52**
|
+|
** ﺟﮭﺔ**
**ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ**
|
**52**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻻﻧﺒﺎر**
|
**53**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر**
|
**53**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر**
|
**53**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن**
|
**54**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن**
|
**54**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن**
|
**54**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻻدارة اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف**
|
**57**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف**
|
**57**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف**
|
**57**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**58**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**58**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**58**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء**
**ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ**
|
**59**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ**
|
**59**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ**
|
**59**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء**
|
**60**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء**
|
**60**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء**
|
**60**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ**
|
**61**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ**
|
**61**
|
+|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ**
|
**61**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﮭﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺎطﻖ اﻟﺤﺮة**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﯾﻖ اﻻدوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ**
|
**9**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺒﺎﻋﺔ واﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺮﺑﻮﯾﺔ**
|
**12**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﻐﺬاﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**14**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻟﻸﺳﻮاق اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺤﺒﻮب**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺴﯿﺎرات واﻟﻤﻜﺎﺋﻦ**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿﻊ اﻟﺤﺒﻮب**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺎرض واﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**14**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺪﯾﻨﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺣﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺒﺎﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**15**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺒﺮي**
|
**16**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﻨﻘﻞ**
|
**16**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻓﺮﯾﻦ واﻟﻮﻓﻮد**
|
**16**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺒﺤﺮي**|
**16**
|
+
+
+
+**21** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+|ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|قاﺮﻌﻟا ءﻰﻧاﻮﻤﻟ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻛﺮﺸﻟا|16|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻜﻚ اﻟﺤﺪﯾﺪ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**16**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﻄﻮط اﻟﺠﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**16**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻻدارة اﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺨﺎص**
|
**16**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻼﺣﺔ اﻟﺠﻮﯾﺔ**
|
**16**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎروق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮﺷﯿﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺘﺼﻢ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺣﻤﻮراﺑﻰ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﺷﻮر اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎو اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺳﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**18**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺬور**
|
**19**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﮭﯿﺰات اﻟﺰراﻋﯿﺔ**
|
**19**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮاﻓﺪﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﺴﺪود**
|
**20**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎو اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺮي**
|
**20**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺮي**
|
**20**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻏﺎز اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ(اﻟﺠﻨﻮب )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﺧﻄﻮط اﻻﻧﺎﺑﯿﺐ اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﻐﺎز )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔﻟﻠﻤﻌﺪات اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﺜﻘﯿﻠﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ(ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻮزﯾﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺠﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺤﻔﺮاﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﯾﻖ اﻟﻨﻔﻂ )ﺳﻮﻣﻮ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎﻓﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﺎﻗﻼت اﻟﻨﻔﻂ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻏﺎز اﻟﺠﻨﻮب- ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ ذي ﻗﺎر)ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺪﯾﺪ واﻟﺼﻠﺐ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺳﻨﺎد اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﻲ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻟﻠﻔﻮﺳﻔﺎت**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎرس اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﺳﻤﺪة/اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﺑﻦ ﻣﺎﺟﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**|
**23**
|
+
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **22**
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+|ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|ﺔﯿﺋﺎﺸﻧﻻا تﺎﻋﺎﻨﺼﻠﻟ ﮫﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﮫﻛﺮﺸﻟا|23|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ**
**اﻟﻌﺎﻣﮫ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﻤﯿﻢ وﺗﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﯾﻊ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺰوراء اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﺳﻤﺪة/اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت**
**اﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻨﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اور اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺒﺘﺮوﻛﯿﻤﯿﺎوﯾﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻜﺒﺮﯾﺖ اﻟﻤﺸﺮاق**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﺤﺺ واﻟﺘﺄھﯿﻞ اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﻲ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺤﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻدوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ اس دي اي**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻨﺤﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﯿﻜﺎﻧﯿﻜﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻔﻮﻻذﯾﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎرات واﻟﻤﻌﺪات**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ **
** ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻨﺴﯿﺞ واﻟﺠﻠﻮد**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺮات اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻜﯿﻤﯿﺎوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺒﯿﺪات**
|
**23**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺘﻮﺟﺎت اﻟﻐﺬاﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻟﻸﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻤﻌﺪات اﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت واﻟﻘﺪرة**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﮭﯿﺪروﻟﯿﻜﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ واﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺰﺟﺎج واﻟﺤﺮارﯾﺎت**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﻄﺎطﯿﺔ واﻻطﺎرات**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻤﻨﺖ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج**
** اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج**
** اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج**
** اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻔﺮات اﻻوﺳﻂ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﺠﻨﻮب**
|
**29**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ**
**ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﺸﻤﺎل**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻔﺤﺺ وﺗﺄھﯿﻞ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻔﺮات اﻻوﺳﻂ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﻮﺳﻂ**
|
**29**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺴﻼم اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**31**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺗﺼﺎﻻت**
**واﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﯿﺔ**
|
**31**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﯾﺪ واﻟﺘﻮﻓﯿﺮ**
|
**31**
|
+|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**|
** اﻟﺒﻨﻚ**
**اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰي اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ**|
**43**
|
+
+
+
+**23** ي صندوق النقد الدول
+
+
+
+جمھوریة العراق
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺪﺷر ﻦﺑا ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|43|
+|---|---|---|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺮاﻓﺪﯾﻦ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺼﺮف**
**اﻟﺰراﻋﻲ**
**()ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺼﺮف**
**اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ**
**()ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻌﻘﺎري )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺮﺷﯿﺪ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**5**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻮطﻨﯿﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ**
**اﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﯿﺔ**
|
**5**
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﺎرة**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻲ**
|
**5 **
|
+|
** ﺻﻨﺪوق ﺿﻤﺎن**
**اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ**|
** داﺋﺮة اﻟﺘﻘﺎﻋﺪ واﻟﻀﻤﺎن اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﺎل**|
**8 **|
+
+
+
+يصندوق النقد الدول **24**
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b9080965cfcf846c86850093818e5e819af7251f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "08081a2a62d20841", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0001-001", "height": 165, "page": 1, "phash_256": "c55a377efab54f918eb5326ea54a0f1bb2e44a818d1b3466c1d18d1ab0e6c2b5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "de964647303f0ec84423a23c5b06f69725e05591ab6ab29420b8d534be0725a5", "width": 938}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332b3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-001", "height": 132, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538d19e1ec383ce69ce78982d7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "66fab1d7bfb6277c7b8f3b54ac6503d81a2539138a38137dbcdca724d13274ab", "width": 133}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "183a1b1d37393b34", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-002", "height": 223, "page": 2, "phash_256": "b8ee9187c0404f8a10eff365ff962c890078d276efa9ce1a224d11a7d9f2e3c3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "e997ecd7c8cfc3d423f3a26844dc4458dbb01eebacf97df39e177bb3cda0a4ed", "width": 648}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2a65534575150bc9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-003", "height": 220, "page": 2, "phash_256": "effe1c77e1291cefc728316099636b028de0e2479952632098e377b886f65553", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "b9d38576b83570f011688f6106a07f42717eaec194f966622d72491618eb58ee", "width": 788}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0012-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0a455919335b4d00", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0012-001", "height": 445, "page": 12, "phash_256": "fa945aad856ba542781e3a9293c6c7ed6fad3c329719a64268c6e18e9586362d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "707a3d4261efca29b318cebc0d1c91c37ee6bf77d0e35b9eb93c2073c75761cb", "width": 758}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4d8e3333dddd4c4d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0015-001", "height": 376, "page": 15, "phash_256": "b3cdfc782601239863d82643dc3333ce87fdc501f8f01de719767846cc7387a2", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "5df8c9c479d2b3a7cec00514cf7a5492cd727b831d5019567c53e292e67fb47c", "width": 758}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "617d7d7d7d7d7d7d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0018-001", "height": 721, "page": 18, "phash_256": "9b804bff4d6e4cff4d6e4fef68ec483e68254c07f162e2313895ba15b834b900", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "def6032f329c47a07680545d4fdd17be6781f47e7f5389f9c9200fafdfd1b6a4", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-072/assets/figures/cr-2023-072-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "7d5d7d3d7d7d7d7d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-072-fig-p0019-001", "height": 690, "page": 19, "phash_256": "9a103938e3ce4e913c724e911e1dc7dc39e7bc231efd3178387c3d6360a393e0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "sha256_normalized_png": "d650928eb173499527a909129b4b6a4dd4e9d18c233e8a9d26228456e4f33149", "width": 781}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-072/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8035da03d839df73c649d5ac9ca32a34df7215c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-072/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-072-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n###### 23/72 التقرير القُطري رقم **الصادر عن صند و ق النقد الدولي**\n## **عراقال جمهورية**\n### **19– تقرير المساعدة الفنية عن بعثة إحصاءات مالية( الحكومة5** **) ديسمبر/كانون األول2021**\n\nأعد هذا التقرير عن جمهورية العراق فريق من خبراء صندوق النقد الدولي. ويستند التقرير إلى المعلومات\n\n. المتوافرة وقت استكماله في نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني2022\n\n\nويمكن الحصول على نسخ من هذا التقرير بمراسلة العنوان:التالي\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\n2023 يناير/كانون الثاني\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\n\n(202) 623-7201 :فاكس - (202) 623-7430 :هاتف\n\n[http://www.imf.org :إنترنت](http://www.imf.org/) [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) :بريد إلكتروني\n\n\nالمطبوعةللنسخة دوالرا أمريكيا :السعر18\n\n##### **صندوق النقد الدولي** **واشنطن العاصمة**\n\n\n2023:حقوق الطبع والنشر صندوق النقد الدولي - ©", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1145, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(49.75, 1.75, 614.5, 100.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 116, "number": 3, "size": 5970, "transform": [564.75, 0.0, -0.0, 98.25, 49.75, 1.75], "width": 734, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "23/72 التقرير القُطري رقم الصادر عن صند و ق النقد الدولي\nعراقال جمهورية\n19– تقرير المساعدة الفنية عن بعثة إحصاءات مالية( الحكومة5 ) ديسمبر/كانون األول2021\n\nأعد هذا التقرير عن جمهورية العراق فريق من خبراء صندوق النقد الدولي. ويستند التقرير إلى المعلومات\n\n. المتوافرة وقت استكماله في نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني2022\n\nويمكن الحصول على نسخ من هذا التقرير بمراسلة العنوان:التالي\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n2023 يناير/كانون الثاني\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\n\n(202) 623-7201 :فاكس - (202) 623-7430 :هاتف\n\nhttp://www.imf.org :إنترنت publications@imf.org :بريد إلكتروني\n\nالمطبوعةللنسخة دوالرا أمريكيا :السعر18\nصندوق النقد الدولي واشنطن العاصمة\n\n2023:حقوق الطبع والنشر صندوق النقد الدولي - ©", "text_characters": 600}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-072-fig-p0002-003"], "markdown": "\n\n\n### **الحكومة مالیة إحصاءات بعثة تقریر** **(2021 األول، دیسمبر/كانون 19-)5**\n\n##### **، وطارق عبد القادر دقة إعداد نادین أبو خالد، ویوسف**\n\n\n\n**تشرنوفمبر/**\n\n\n\n**الثاني** **ین**\n\n\n\n**2022**\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1065, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(61.499996185302734, 21.75, 449.49993896484375, 154.84999084472656)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 337, "number": 5, "size": 94810, "transform": [387.99993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, -133.09999084472656, 61.499996185302734, 154.84999084472656], "width": 779, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(474.7574157714844, 44.24992370605469, 553.9500732421875, 122.59991455078125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 239, "number": 2, "size": 22450, "transform": [79.19267272949219, 0.0, -0.0, 78.34999084472656, 474.7574157714844, 44.24992370605469], "width": 242, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "الحكومة مالیة إحصاءات بعثة تقریر (2021 األول، دیسمبر/كانون 19-)5\n، وطارق عبد القادر دقة إعداد نادین أبو خالد، ویوسف\n\nتشرنوفمبر/\n\nالثاني ین\n\n2022", "text_characters": 119}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n### المحتویات\n\n\n3______________________________________________________ قائمة المختصرات\n\n\n**4** _______________________________________ **ذات األولویة** **والتوصیات ملخص نتائج البعثة**\n\n**6** _____________________________________________ **التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات**\n\n7 ________________الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 ل دلی ألف- موائمة\n\n9__________________________________________ \"تطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة باء\n11 ______________________________ الحكومة ونشرھاإعداد إحصاءات مالیة منھجیة تحسینجیم\n14___________________________________________________ التغطیة المؤسسیةدال\n15__________________________________________ المسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثةھاء\n\n\n**الجداول**\n\n6________________________________________________ التوصیات ذات األولویة– 1\n\n9____ ________________________________ ھیكل الرموز – التصنیف لقتصادي الوطني - 2\n\n10_____ ________________________________ ھیكل الرموز – التصنیف اإلداري الوطني - 3\n\n\n\n**الملحقات**\n\n16______ ________________________________البعثة خالل إنجازھا تم التيالملفات قائمة– 1\n\n17 _____________________________( جدول7 ) 2020لسنة للنفقات الوظیفي تصنیفال جدول– 2\n\n19 _______________________ 2020-حكومة المركزیة المدرجة بالموازنة لسنة 2019ال بیان دین– 3\n\n20________________________________________________الحكومیة الجھات قائمة– 4\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **2**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\nالمحتویات\n\n3 قائمة المختصرات\n\n4 _ ذات األولویة والتوصیات ملخص نتائج البعثة\n\n6 _ التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات\n\n7 الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 ل دلی ألف- موائمة\n\n9 \"تطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة باء\n11 الحكومة ونشرھاإعداد إحصاءات مالیة منھجیة تحسینجیم\n14_ التغطیة المؤسسیةدال\n15 المسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثةھاء\n\nالجداول\n\n6 التوصیات ذات األولویة– 1\n\n9 ھیكل الرموز – التصنیف لقتصادي الوطني - 2\n\n10_ ھیكل الرموز – التصنیف اإلداري الوطني - 3\n\nالملحقات\n\n16 البعثة خالل إنجازھا تم التيالملفات قائمة– 1\n\n17 _( جدول7 ) 2020لسنة للنفقات الوظیفي تصنیفال جدول– 2\n\n19 _ 2020-حكومة المركزیة المدرجة بالموازنة لسنة 2019ال بیان دین– 3\n\n20الحكومیة الجھات قائمة– 4\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 2", "text_characters": 586}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n#### **المختصرات ائمة ق**\n\nBudgetary Central Government BCG الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة\n\nCentral Bank of Iraq CBI البنك المركزي العراقي\n\nChart of Accounts COA الحسابات دلیل / شجرة\n\nClassification of the Functions of Government COFOG تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\n\nIMF’s Middle East Center for Economic and Finance CEF مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في\nالشرق األوسط\n\nGeneral Government GG الحكومة العامة\n\nExtrabudgetary unit EBU وحدة خارج الموازنة\n\nFiscal year FY السنة المالیة\n\nGovernment Finance Statistics GFS إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة\n\nGovernment Finance Statistics Yearbook GFSY الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة\n\n\n\nمركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في\n\n\n\n_Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_ _GFSM 2014_ دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014\n\n\n\nIntegrated Financial Management Information System IFMIS نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد\n\nInternational Monetary Fund IMF صندوق النقد الدولي\n\nThe Middle East Regional Technical Assistance METAC مركز المساعدة الفنیة اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط\nCenter\n\nLocal Governments LG الحكومات المحلیة\n\nMinistry of Finance MOF وزارة المالیة\n\nPublic Sector Debt Statistics PSDS إحصاءات دین القطاع العام\n\n\n\nإحصاءات دین القطاع العام: مرشد لمعدیھا\n\n\n\n_Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide for Compilers and_ _PSDSG_ إحصاءات دین القطاع العام: مرشد لمعدیھا\n_Users 2011_ _2011_ ،ومستخدمیھا2011\n\n\n\nPublic Sector Institutional Table PSIT جدول مؤسسات القطاع العام\n\nSocial Security Fund SSF لجتماعي صندوق الضمان\n\nStatistics Department of the IMF STA إدارة اإلحصاءات بصندوق النقد الدولي\n\nTechnical assistance TA المساعدة الفنیة\n\nUnited Nations UN األمم المتحدة\n\nUnited Nations Conference on Trade and UNCTAD (مؤتمر األمم المتحدة للتجارة والتنمیة )أونكتاد\nDevelopment\n\n\n\n**3** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\nالمختصرات ائمة ق\n\nBudgetary Central Government BCG الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة\n\nCentral Bank of Iraq CBI البنك المركزي العراقي\n\nChart of Accounts COA الحسابات دلیل / شجرة\n\nClassification of the Functions of Government COFOG تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\n\nIMF’s Middle East Center for Economic and Finance CEF مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في\nالشرق األوسط\n\nGeneral Government GG الحكومة العامة\n\nExtrabudgetary unit EBU وحدة خارج الموازنة\n\nFiscal year FY السنة المالیة\n\nGovernment Finance Statistics GFS إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة\n\nGovernment Finance Statistics Yearbook GFSY الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة\n\nمركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في\n\n_Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014_ _GFSM 2014_ دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014\n\nIntegrated Financial Management Information System IFMIS نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد\n\nInternational Monetary Fund IMF صندوق النقد الدولي\n\nThe Middle East Regional Technical Assistance METAC مركز المساعدة الفنیة اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط\nCenter\n\nLocal Governments LG الحكومات المحلیة\n\nMinistry of Finance MOF وزارة المالیة\n\nPublic Sector Debt Statistics PSDS إحصاءات دین القطاع العام\n\nإحصاءات دین القطاع العام: مرشد لمعدیھا\n\n_Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide for Compilers and_ _PSDSG_ إحصاءات دین القطاع العام: مرشد لمعدیھا\n_Users 2011_ _2011_ ،ومستخدمیھا2011\n\nPublic Sector Institutional Table PSIT جدول مؤسسات القطاع العام\n\nSocial Security Fund SSF لجتماعي صندوق الضمان\n\nStatistics Department of the IMF STA إدارة اإلحصاءات بصندوق النقد الدولي\n\nTechnical assistance TA المساعدة الفنیة\n\nUnited Nations UN األمم المتحدة\n\nUnited Nations Conference on Trade and UNCTAD (مؤتمر األمم المتحدة للتجارة والتنمیة )أونكتاد\nDevelopment\n\n3 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 1464}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n### **ذات األولویة توصیاتوال ملخص نتائج البعثة**\n\n**، للمساعدة الفنیة والتدریب بشأن إحصاءات مالیة الحكومةعن بُعد بعثة أجریت ،تلبیة لطلب وزارة المالیة** **-1**\n\n**إصالح الموازنة مشروع ، وكان ھدفھا األساسي ھو دعم السلطات في تنفیذ دیسمبر/كانون األول2021** **16-في الفترة 5**\n\n)خبیر في إحصاءات دقة، واشترك فیھا األستاذ یوسف (إدارة اإلحصاءات ). وقادت البعثة السیدة نادین أبو خالد **الوطنیة**\n\nفي إطار التعاون بین إدارة اإلحصاءات وصندوق النقد ( صندوق النقد العربي)مالیة الحكومة( واألستاذ طارق عبد القادر\n\nبیة )عربستات(. العربي تحت مظلة مبادرة اإلحصاءات العر\n\n\n\n**وما** **النقاشات التي تمتالبعثة عن تقدیرھا للخبراء في دوائر الموازنة والمحاسبة والدین العام على** **تُعرب** **-2**\n\nوتعرب البعثة عن امتنانھا الخاص للسیدة طیف سامي، وكیلة وزارة المالیة **قدموه من معلومات بشأن موضوع البعثة.**\n\nرئاستھا لالجتماعات، والسیدة اكتفاء فلیح على دعمھا طوال فترة البعثة. والمدیرة العامة لدائرة الموازنة، على\n\n\n\n**قید الذي یمثل واحدا من عدة مشروعات إصالحیة الوطنیة تنفیذ مشروع إصالح الموازنة** **بدأت وزارة المالیة** **-3**\n\n**الصادرة في \"الورقة البیضاء\" اإلعداد في ظل استراتیجیة اإلصالح القتصادي األوسع نطاقا التي نصت علیھا**\n\nالمحاسبة والدین العام في تنفیذ الموازنة ودوائر للبعثة في دعم الرئیسیة وتمثلت األھداف **.أكتوبر/تشرین األول 2020**\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة ي بتعزیز إعداد الموازنة وتقاریرھا وفقا إلطار المعن [۱] لستراتیجي المھمات المتعلقة بالھدف\n\n.وإدماجھ في نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد 2014لعام\n\n\n\n**نظام** **إلعداد** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **وفي ھذا الصدد، ركزت أنشطة البعثة على إدماج إطار** **-4**\n\nالمھام واضطلعت البعثة **معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد وبناء القدرات في مجال إنتاج ونشر إحصاءات المالیة العامة.**\n\nبدء إعداد (دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014)و ؛2دلیل الحسابات الجدید بتصنیفات : )1( استكمال موائمةالتالیة\n\nإحصاءات بیانات ( مراجعة؛ و)3إلعداد التقاریربیانات اإلنفاق استنادا إلى تصنیف وظائف الحكومة وتقدیم التدریب العملي\n\n\n\nالمھام واضطلعت البعثة **معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد وبناء القدرات في مجال إنتاج ونشر إحصاءات المالیة العامة.**\n\n\n\n. (التوسع األولي لنطاق تغطیة تقاریر إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة)؛ و4مالیة الحكومة للسنة المالیة 2020\n\n\n\n**بصورة** **لعام 2014جدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة دلیل الحسابات ال** **موائمة استكملت البعثة** **-5**\n\nواستعدادا لتطبیق نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد، تم وضع **شاملة إلدماجھ في نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد.**\n\nلیل إحصاءات مالیة من د و2014طبعتي 2001لسترشاد إلى حد ما بالتصنیف الوارد في دلیل حسابات شامل جدید مع\n\n\n\nوالنسخة الحالیة من دلیل الحسابات مقسمة إلى عدة حسابات تتضمن مزیجا من حسابات اإلیرادات والنفقات یمكن . الحكومة\n\n\n\nلصول معامالت المتعلقة بتستند الحسابات األخرى ال بینما ،دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014مع بسھولة مطابقتھ\n\nقائمة الحسابات الكاملة موائمة . وتمت2014/عرض الدلیل في نسختیھ 2001 ى إل للتزامات()الموجودات و والخصوم\n\nوتتألف .دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 مع التصنیف لقتصادي الوارد في (على مستوى البنود )الجدول 1\n\nلستثماریة، قات بما فیھا البرامج الخاصة(، والموازنة القائمة من حسابات موازنة النفقات الجاریة )اإلیرادات والنف\n\n\n\n. المالیة للتزاماتومعامالت الموجودات و\n\n\n\n**شاملة** **موائمةنحو تحسین تصنیف الموازنة، دعمت البعثة وزارة المالیة في إجراء أول** **مھمة وكخطوة** **-6**\n\nوتستخدم إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة إطار \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" الذي وضعتھ األمم المتحدة، **. لتصنیف وظائف الحكومة**\n\nلقتصادیة، التي تتوخى الحكومات تحقیقھا من خالل عدة أنواع من لجتماعیة- وھو تصنیف مفصل للوظائف، أو األھداف\n\nلحكومة\" في إطار تصنیف الموازنة بدعم النفقات. وفي عام 2014، كانت ھناك محاولة أولى لتطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف ا\n\n، مصادر البیانات المتاحة . واستعرضت البعثة(METAC)اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط\" الفنیة \"مركز المساعدة من\n\nمفصلة لنظام \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" باستخدام موائمةلستثماریة، وقدمت من خالل تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنتین الجاریة و\n\nلقتصادي. مزیج من التصنیف اإلداري و\n\n\n( في مشروع إصالح الموازنة العامة للدولة )المشروع األول( المتعلق بوضع نظم وقواعد1-لستراتیجي1 ) المصدر: وزارة المالیة: الھدف 1\n\n. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014لمشاریع إنفاق واستثمار تركز على إنتاج ونشر تقاریر شاملة ومنتظمة عن الموازنة بما یتوافق مع\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **4**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\nذات األولویة توصیاتوال ملخص نتائج البعثة\n\n، للمساعدة الفنیة والتدریب بشأن إحصاءات مالیة الحكومةعن بُعد بعثة أجریت ،تلبیة لطلب وزارة المالیة -1\n\nإصالح الموازنة مشروع ، وكان ھدفھا األساسي ھو دعم السلطات في تنفیذ دیسمبر/كانون األول2021 16-في الفترة 5\n\n)خبیر في إحصاءات دقة، واشترك فیھا األستاذ یوسف (إدارة اإلحصاءات ). وقادت البعثة السیدة نادین أبو خالد الوطنیة\n\nفي إطار التعاون بین إدارة اإلحصاءات وصندوق النقد ( صندوق النقد العربي)مالیة الحكومة( واألستاذ طارق عبد القادر\n\nبیة )عربستات(. العربي تحت مظلة مبادرة اإلحصاءات العر\n\nوما النقاشات التي تمتالبعثة عن تقدیرھا للخبراء في دوائر الموازنة والمحاسبة والدین العام على تُعرب -2\n\nوتعرب البعثة عن امتنانھا الخاص للسیدة طیف سامي، وكیلة وزارة المالیة قدموه من معلومات بشأن موضوع البعثة.\n\nرئاستھا لالجتماعات، والسیدة اكتفاء فلیح على دعمھا طوال فترة البعثة. والمدیرة العامة لدائرة الموازنة، على\n\nقید الذي یمثل واحدا من عدة مشروعات إصالحیة الوطنیة تنفیذ مشروع إصالح الموازنة بدأت وزارة المالیة -3\n\nالصادرة في \"الورقة البیضاء\" اإلعداد في ظل استراتیجیة اإلصالح القتصادي األوسع نطاقا التي نصت علیھا\n\nالمحاسبة والدین العام في تنفیذ الموازنة ودوائر للبعثة في دعم الرئیسیة وتمثلت األھداف .أكتوبر/تشرین األول 2020\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة ي بتعزیز إعداد الموازنة وتقاریرھا وفقا إلطار المعن [۱] لستراتیجي المھمات المتعلقة بالھدف\n\n.وإدماجھ في نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد 2014لعام\n\nنظام إلعداد دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 وفي ھذا الصدد، ركزت أنشطة البعثة على إدماج إطار -4\n\nالمھام واضطلعت البعثة معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد وبناء القدرات في مجال إنتاج ونشر إحصاءات المالیة العامة.\n\nبدء إعداد (دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014)و ؛2دلیل الحسابات الجدید بتصنیفات : )1( استكمال موائمةالتالیة\n\nإحصاءات بیانات ( مراجعة؛ و)3إلعداد التقاریربیانات اإلنفاق استنادا إلى تصنیف وظائف الحكومة وتقدیم التدریب العملي\n\nالمھام واضطلعت البعثة معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد وبناء القدرات في مجال إنتاج ونشر إحصاءات المالیة العامة.\n\n. (التوسع األولي لنطاق تغطیة تقاریر إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة)؛ و4مالیة الحكومة للسنة المالیة 2020\n\nبصورة لعام 2014جدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة دلیل الحسابات ال موائمة استكملت البعثة -5\n\nواستعدادا لتطبیق نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد، تم وضع شاملة إلدماجھ في نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد.\n\nلیل إحصاءات مالیة من د و2014طبعتي 2001لسترشاد إلى حد ما بالتصنیف الوارد في دلیل حسابات شامل جدید مع\n\nوالنسخة الحالیة من دلیل الحسابات مقسمة إلى عدة حسابات تتضمن مزیجا من حسابات اإلیرادات والنفقات یمكن . الحكومة\n\nلصول معامالت المتعلقة بتستند الحسابات األخرى ال بینما ،دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014مع بسھولة مطابقتھ\n\nقائمة الحسابات الكاملة موائمة . وتمت2014/عرض الدلیل في نسختیھ 2001 ى إل للتزامات()الموجودات و والخصوم\n\nوتتألف .دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 مع التصنیف لقتصادي الوارد في (على مستوى البنود )الجدول 1\n\nلستثماریة، قات بما فیھا البرامج الخاصة(، والموازنة القائمة من حسابات موازنة النفقات الجاریة )اإلیرادات والنف\n\n. المالیة للتزاماتومعامالت الموجودات و\n\nشاملة موائمةنحو تحسین تصنیف الموازنة، دعمت البعثة وزارة المالیة في إجراء أول مھمة وكخطوة -6\n\nوتستخدم إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة إطار \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" الذي وضعتھ األمم المتحدة، . لتصنیف وظائف الحكومة\n\nلقتصادیة، التي تتوخى الحكومات تحقیقھا من خالل عدة أنواع من لجتماعیة- وھو تصنیف مفصل للوظائف، أو األھداف\n\nلحكومة\" في إطار تصنیف الموازنة بدعم النفقات. وفي عام 2014، كانت ھناك محاولة أولى لتطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف ا\n\n، مصادر البیانات المتاحة . واستعرضت البعثة(METAC)اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط\" الفنیة \"مركز المساعدة من\n\nمفصلة لنظام \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" باستخدام موائمةلستثماریة، وقدمت من خالل تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنتین الجاریة و\n\nلقتصادي. مزیج من التصنیف اإلداري و\n\n( في مشروع إصالح الموازنة العامة للدولة )المشروع األول( المتعلق بوضع نظم وقواعد1-لستراتیجي1 ) المصدر: وزارة المالیة: الھدف 1\n\n. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014لمشاریع إنفاق واستثمار تركز على إنتاج ونشر تقاریر شاملة ومنتظمة عن الموازنة بما یتوافق مع\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 4", "text_characters": 3189}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n**تطبیقیة عن إعداد مفاھیم \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" واستكملت جدول \"تصنیف** **ورشة عمل قدمت البعثة** **-7**\n\nومة\" ومفاھیمھ وفي ھذا السیاق، قدمت البعثة عرضا عن \"تصنیف وظائف الحك **.وظائف الحكومة\" للسنة المالیة 2020**\n\nالشائعة. وساقت البعثة أمثلة لتجارب البلدان في إعداد \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" لتإلشك اوأھمواستخداماتھ األساسیة\n\n. في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2020 وإنتاج جدول 7منھجیة اعداد واستعرضت أمام المشاركین\n\n\n\nإحصاءات دین القطاع\" **وتطبیق منھجیةالعام في العراق إدخال تحسینات قطاع ال یتطلب إعداد تقاریر دین** **-8**\n\n\n\nالدین ألغراض عن ففي الوقت الراھن، تعد وزارة المالیة تقاریر . العام: مرشد لمعدیھا ومستخدمیھا\"، الصادر في2011\n\n\n\nامت بتحدیثھا إلدراجھا في وق و2020العام لعامي 2019 قطاعال . وقد استعرضت البعثة بیانات دینالداخلیة فقطالرقابة\n\nیجمع بین حملة الدیون وأدوات مزیج بإحصاءات مالیة الحكومة التي تقدم سنویا. وتتسم تقاریر الدین الداخلیة الحالیة جداول\n\nتحسین بمكانوسیكون من األھمیة ألرصدة والتدفقات. لعدم الدمج المنتظم لستحقاق و آجال عدم اإلشارة إلى ، مع الدین\n\n\n\nعلى أساس ربع سنوي لتعزیز الشفافیة. ھاجودة بیانات الدین والبدء في نشر\n\n\n\n، **بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة** **یكلف** **من دوائر الوزارة المعنیةعمل** **فریق** **تشكیل ینبغي لوزارة المالیة** **-9**\n\nاعداد البیانات بالشكل مسؤول عن التنسیق بین الدوائر المختلفة فیما یتعلق بتبادل البیانات، وضمان ا ھذ یكون الفریقعلى أن\n\n. واعداد جداول إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة ونشرھا، ، )التصنیف المساعد( لكسل\" السلیم حسب األداة المعدة لذلك \"ملف\n\nالتي یتم جمعھا من خارج دائرة تفریغ وتصنیف البیانات والحذر من األخطاء التي قد تنتج عندوینبغي تجنب التأخیر\n\nالمحاسبة.\n\n\n\n**لتحسین تغطیة إحصاءات مالیة** **مراحل** **یة علىمنھجتطبیق في** **تبدأ إضافة إلى ذلك، ینبغي لوزارة المالیة أن** **-10**\n\nشركة عامة حوالي 113یوجد . ففي العراق **(BCG)الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة** **اوسع من نطاقالحكومة**\n\nینبغي إجراء مراجعة دقیقة لقائمة الكیانات العامة بغیة التأكد من سالمة تصنیفھا ، تتألف من شركات عامة مالیة وغیر مالیة\n\nوستمثل .دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014الوحدات خارج الموازنة، وفقا إلرشادات او ضمن الشركات العامة\n\nالحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة. عن لتوسیع نطاق التغطیة ة ھذه المراجعة خطوة أولى حاسم\n\n\n**- التوصیات ذات األولویة الجدول1**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ﺦﯾرﺎﺗﻟا
ﺔ ﯾﻧﻌﻣﻟا تﺎﺳﺳؤﻣﻟا ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا تاذ تﺎﯾﺻوﺗﻟا
ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا|Col2|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي
ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌد ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة 2019
-
2020
ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﺳﺗﻛﻣﺎل ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت دﯾن
اﻟ
ﻘطﺎع
اﻟﻌﺎم
وﺗﻘﻠﯾص
اﻟﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺎت اﻹﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ.|
إﺑرﯾل/ﻧﯾﺳﺎن1
2022
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|إدراج ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات
ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ
ﻟﻌﺎم2020
وإﻋداد ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻟﻠﻔﺗرة2017
-
2019
.|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران
2022
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﺳﺗﻧﺎدا إﻟﻰ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوارد ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2014
ﺑدورﯾﺔ وﺗوﻗﯾت ﻣﻧﺗظم
|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران
2022
|\n\n\n\nلدائرة المحاسبة للمراجعة و لعتماد وإعادة ارسالھ 2020 - 2019 الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة المعد عن الفترة تم تصحیح وارسال 1\n\nإلدارة اإلحصاءات لدى الصندوق.\n\n\n\n**5** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [55.152000427246094, 440.5793762207031, 579.0479736328125, 610.5], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nتطبیقیة عن إعداد مفاھیم \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" واستكملت جدول \"تصنیف ورشة عمل قدمت البعثة -7\n\nومة\" ومفاھیمھ وفي ھذا السیاق، قدمت البعثة عرضا عن \"تصنیف وظائف الحك .وظائف الحكومة\" للسنة المالیة 2020\n\nالشائعة. وساقت البعثة أمثلة لتجارب البلدان في إعداد \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" لتإلشك اوأھمواستخداماتھ األساسیة\n\n. في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2020 وإنتاج جدول 7منھجیة اعداد واستعرضت أمام المشاركین\n\nإحصاءات دین القطاع\" وتطبیق منھجیةالعام في العراق إدخال تحسینات قطاع ال یتطلب إعداد تقاریر دین -8\n\nالدین ألغراض عن ففي الوقت الراھن، تعد وزارة المالیة تقاریر . العام: مرشد لمعدیھا ومستخدمیھا\"، الصادر في2011\n\nامت بتحدیثھا إلدراجھا في وق و2020العام لعامي 2019 قطاعال . وقد استعرضت البعثة بیانات دینالداخلیة فقطالرقابة\n\nیجمع بین حملة الدیون وأدوات مزیج بإحصاءات مالیة الحكومة التي تقدم سنویا. وتتسم تقاریر الدین الداخلیة الحالیة جداول\n\nتحسین بمكانوسیكون من األھمیة ألرصدة والتدفقات. لعدم الدمج المنتظم لستحقاق و آجال عدم اإلشارة إلى ، مع الدین\n\nعلى أساس ربع سنوي لتعزیز الشفافیة. ھاجودة بیانات الدین والبدء في نشر\n\n، بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة یكلف من دوائر الوزارة المعنیةعمل فریق تشكیل ینبغي لوزارة المالیة -9\n\nاعداد البیانات بالشكل مسؤول عن التنسیق بین الدوائر المختلفة فیما یتعلق بتبادل البیانات، وضمان ا ھذ یكون الفریقعلى أن\n\n. واعداد جداول إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة ونشرھا، ، )التصنیف المساعد( لكسل\" السلیم حسب األداة المعدة لذلك \"ملف\n\nالتي یتم جمعھا من خارج دائرة تفریغ وتصنیف البیانات والحذر من األخطاء التي قد تنتج عندوینبغي تجنب التأخیر\n\nالمحاسبة.\n\nلتحسین تغطیة إحصاءات مالیة مراحل یة علىمنھجتطبیق في تبدأ إضافة إلى ذلك، ینبغي لوزارة المالیة أن -10\n\nشركة عامة حوالي 113یوجد . ففي العراق (BCG)الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة اوسع من نطاقالحكومة\n\nینبغي إجراء مراجعة دقیقة لقائمة الكیانات العامة بغیة التأكد من سالمة تصنیفھا ، تتألف من شركات عامة مالیة وغیر مالیة\n\nوستمثل .دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014الوحدات خارج الموازنة، وفقا إلرشادات او ضمن الشركات العامة\n\nالحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة. عن لتوسیع نطاق التغطیة ة ھذه المراجعة خطوة أولى حاسم\n\n- التوصیات ذات األولویة الجدول1\n\n ﺦﯾرﺎﺗﻟا ﺔ ﯾﻧﻌﻣﻟا تﺎﺳﺳؤﻣﻟا ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا تاذ تﺎﯾﺻوﺗﻟا ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا Col2 Col3 \n\n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌد ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة 2019 - 2020 ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﺳﺗﻛﻣﺎل ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت دﯾن اﻟ ﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم وﺗﻘﻠﯾص اﻟﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺎت اﻹﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ. إﺑرﯾل/ﻧﯾﺳﺎن1 2022 \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم إدراج ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2020 وإﻋداد ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻟﻠﻔﺗرة2017 - 2019 . ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران 2022 \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم إﻋداد وﻧﺷر ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﺳﺗﻧﺎدا إﻟﻰ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوارد ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2014 ﺑدورﯾﺔ وﺗوﻗﯾت ﻣﻧﺗظم ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران 2022 \n\nلدائرة المحاسبة للمراجعة و لعتماد وإعادة ارسالھ 2020 - 2019 الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة المعد عن الفترة تم تصحیح وارسال 1\n\nإلدارة اإلحصاءات لدى الصندوق.\n\n5 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 2396}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ﺔﺑﺳﺎﺣﻣﻟاو ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا رﺋاود ،ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا ةرازو
مﺎﻌﻟا نﯾدﻟاو|2014 مﺎﻌﻟ ﺔﻣوﻛﺣﻟا ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣ تاءﺎﺻﺣإ لﯾﻟد ﻊﻣ تﺎﺑﺎﺳﺣﻟا لﯾﻟد ﺔﻣﺋاوﻣ نﻣ ةدﺎﻔﺗﺳﻻا ﻲﻐﺑﻧﯾ
ﻲ ﻟﺎﻣﻟا لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا ﺔ ﻣﻼﺳ نﺎﻣﺿﻟ ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗ طﻘﻓ سﯾﻟو ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا دادﻋا رﯾرﺎﻘﺗ دادﻋا ﻲﻓ
ﺔ ﻧزاوﻣﻟا دادﻋا ﺔﻠﺣرﻣ ﻲﻓ ل ﺟﻻا ﺔطﺳوﺗﻣ تاؤﺑﻧﺗﻟا دادﻋاو|ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا دﯾﻗ|\n|---|---|---|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم
|ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ
واﻹداري
واﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي
وﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟﺑراﻣﺞ
وﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت
ﻓﯾﻣﺎ
ﯾﺧص
ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺗﯾن
اﻟﺟﺎرﯾﺔ
واﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ
|ﻗﯾد
اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، داﺋرﺗﺎ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ|ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2021
ﻣن ﺧﻼل إدراج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
.اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑراﻣﺞ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣوزﻋﺔ ﺣﺳب ﺗﺻﻧﯾﻔﮭﺎ اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي|ﺳﺑﺗﻣﺑر/أﯾﻠول
2022
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، داﺋرﺗﺎ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ
|ﺑﻧﺎء ﻗدرات ﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺗﻔﺻﯾﻠﻲ اﻛﺛر
.
|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|ﺑﻧﺎء
اﻟ
ﻘدرات
اﻻﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ
ل
ﻟﻣوظﻔﯾن
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم.|أﻛﺗوﺑر/ﺗﺷرﯾن
اﻷول2022
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر إﺣﺻﺎءات
اﻟ
دﯾن ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدرﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ ﺑﺻﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ وﻓﻘﺎ
.ﻟﻠﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم
|ﺗﺷﻛﯾل
ﻓرﯾﻖ
ﻋﻣل ﻣن ﻣﺧﺗﻠف اﻟدواﺋر ﺗﻛﻠف ﺑﺈﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ.
|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران
2022
|\n\n\n\n**تفاصیل إضافیة حول التوصیات ذات** التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات **وتتضمن خطة العمل الواردة في قسم** **-11**\n**األولویة واإلجراءات واألھداف المرحلیة الرئیسیة ذات الصلة.**\n### **التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ|ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا|ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا|\n|---|---|---|\n|
اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول–
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ
|
اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول–
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ
|
اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول–
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ
|\n|إﺑرﯾل/ﻧﯾﺳﺎن2
2022
|
ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي
ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌد ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة
2019
-
2020
ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﺳﺗﻛﻣﺎل اﻟﻧﻘص ﻓﻲ ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت دﯾن
اﻟ
ﻘطﺎع
اﻟﻌﺎم
واﻟﺣد ﻣن اﻟﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺎت اﻹﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ.
|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|إدراج ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات
ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2020
وإﻋداد ﺟدول
\"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\"
ﻟﻠﻔﺗرة2017
-
2019
.|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﺳﺗﻧﺎدا إﻟﻰ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوارد ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل
إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2014
ﺑدورﯾﺔ وﺗوﻗﯾت ﻣﻧﺗظم
.
|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n\n\n\nللمراجعة والموافقة وإعادة لدائرة المحاسبة 2020 - 2019 الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة المعد عن الفترة تم تصحیح وارسال 2\n\nارسالھا إلدارة اإلحصاءات لدى الصندوق\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **6**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [55.16999816894531, 63.17999267578125, 579.030029296875, 342.7796325683594], "columns": 3, "rows": 7}, {"bbox": [89.96041870117188, 430.739990234375, 544.0005493164062, 649.3800048828125], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ﺔﺑﺳﺎﺣﻣﻟاو ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا رﺋاود ،ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا ةرازو مﺎﻌﻟا نﯾدﻟاو 2014 مﺎﻌﻟ ﺔﻣوﻛﺣﻟا ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣ تاءﺎﺻﺣإ لﯾﻟد ﻊﻣ تﺎﺑﺎﺳﺣﻟا لﯾﻟد ﺔﻣﺋاوﻣ نﻣ ةدﺎﻔﺗﺳﻻا ﻲﻐﺑﻧﯾ ﻲ ﻟﺎﻣﻟا لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا ﺔ ﻣﻼﺳ نﺎﻣﺿﻟ ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗ طﻘﻓ سﯾﻟو ﺔﻧزاوﻣﻟا دادﻋا رﯾرﺎﻘﺗ دادﻋا ﻲﻓ ﺔ ﻧزاوﻣﻟا دادﻋا ﺔﻠﺣرﻣ ﻲﻓ ل ﺟﻻا ﺔطﺳوﺗﻣ تاؤﺑﻧﺗﻟا دادﻋاو ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا دﯾﻗ \n\n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ واﻹداري واﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي وﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟﺑراﻣﺞ وﺗطﺑﯾﻖ ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ اﻋداد اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻓﯾﻣﺎ ﯾﺧص ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ اﻋداد اﻟﻣوازﻧﺗﯾن اﻟﺟﺎرﯾﺔ واﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ ﻗﯾد اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، داﺋرﺗﺎ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2021 ﻣن ﺧﻼل إدراج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ .اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑراﻣﺞ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣوزﻋﺔ ﺣﺳب ﺗﺻﻧﯾﻔﮭﺎ اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي ﺳﺑﺗﻣﺑر/أﯾﻠول 2022 \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، داﺋرﺗﺎ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺑﻧﺎء ﻗدرات ﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺗﻔﺻﯾﻠﻲ اﻛﺛر . ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم ﺑﻧﺎء اﻟ ﻘدرات اﻻﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ ل ﻟﻣوظﻔﯾن ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم. أﻛﺗوﺑر/ﺗﺷرﯾن اﻷول2022 \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم إﻋداد وﻧﺷر إﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟ دﯾن ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدرﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ ﺑﺻﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ وﻓﻘﺎ .ﻟﻠﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، دواﺋر اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ واﻟدﯾن اﻟﻌﺎم ﺗﺷﻛﯾل ﻓرﯾﻖ ﻋﻣل ﻣن ﻣﺧﺗﻠف اﻟدواﺋر ﺗﻛﻠف ﺑﺈﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ. ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران 2022 \n\nتفاصیل إضافیة حول التوصیات ذات التقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات وتتضمن خطة العمل الواردة في قسم -11\nاألولویة واإلجراءات واألھداف المرحلیة الرئیسیة ذات الصلة.\nالتقییم الفني التفصیلي والتوصیات\n\n ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا \n\n اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول– ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول– ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻷول– ﺗﺣﺳﯾن دورﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت وﺣداﺛﺗﮭﺎ واﺗﺳﺎﻗﮭﺎ \n إﺑرﯾل/ﻧﯾﺳﺎن2 2022 ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌد ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة 2019 - 2020 ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﺳﺗﻛﻣﺎل اﻟﻧﻘص ﻓﻲ ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت دﯾن اﻟ ﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم واﻟﺣد ﻣن اﻟﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺎت اﻹﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ. ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022 إدراج ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب اﻟﺳﻧوي ﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2020 وإﻋداد ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻟﻠﻔﺗرة2017 - 2019 . ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022 إﻋداد وﻧﺷر ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﺳﺗﻧﺎدا إﻟﻰ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوارد ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2014 ﺑدورﯾﺔ وﺗوﻗﯾت ﻣﻧﺗظم . ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n\nللمراجعة والموافقة وإعادة لدائرة المحاسبة 2020 - 2019 الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة المعد عن الفترة تم تصحیح وارسال 2\n\nارسالھا إلدارة اإلحصاءات لدى الصندوق\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 6", "text_characters": 2017}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ|ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا|ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا|\n|---|---|---|\n|
ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|
ﺗوﻓﯾر ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺗواﺗر
)ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت رﺑﻊ ﺳﻧوﯾﺔ او ﺷﮭرﯾﺔ(
ﻟﻘﺎﻋدة ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت
.اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟدوﻟﯾﺔ|
ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|\n|ﻗﯾد
اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|ﯾﻧﺑﻐﻲ
اﻻﺳﺗﻔﺎدة
ﻣن
ﻣواﺋﻣﺔ
دﻟﯾل
اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت
دﻟﯾل ﻣﻊ
إﺣﺻﺎءات
ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ
ﻟﻌﺎم
2014
ﻓﻲ
اﻋداد
ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر
اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
وﻟﯾس
ﻓﻘط
ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
ﻟﺿﻣﺎن
ﺳﻼﻣﺔ
اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾل
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻲ
واﻋداد
اﻟﺗﻧﺑؤات
ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
اﻻﺟل
ﻓﻲ ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|\n|ﻗﯾد
اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ
واﻹداري
واﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي
وﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟﺑراﻣﺞ
وﺗطﺑﯾﻖ
ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت
ﻓﯾﻣﺎ
ﯾﺧص
ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ
اﻋداد
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺗﯾن
اﻟﺟﺎرﯾﺔ
واﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ
|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|\n|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ–
أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ–
أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ–
أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ|\n|
أﻛﺗوﺑر/ﺗﺷرﯾن اﻷول2022
|ﺑﻧﺎء اﻟﻘدرات
اﻻﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ
ﻟﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل إﻋداد
.إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|إﻋداد وﻧﺷر إﺣﺻﺎءات
اﻟ
دﯾن ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدرﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
.ﺑﺻﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n|/دﯾﺳﻣﺑر
ﻛﺎﻧون اﻷول 2022
|ﺗﺣري اﻟﺷﻔﺎﻓﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻹﻓﺻﺎح ﻋن اﻟﻣﺗﺄﺧرات ﻗﯾد اﻟﻣﺗﺄﺧرات اﻟﻣﺗراﻛﻣﺔ
.واﻟﻣﺳددة ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎرھﺎ ﻣطﺎﻟﺑﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|\n|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|.إدراج ﻧﻣوذج ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻓﻲ وﺛﺎﺋﻖ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ|\n|ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
|ﺑﻧﺎء
ﻗدرات
ﻣوظﻔﻲ
وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
ﻓﻲ
ﻣﺟﺎل
اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف
اﻟو
ﯾﻔﻲ ظ
ﺑﺷﻛل
ﺗﻔﺻﯾﻠﻲ
اﻛﺛر
.
|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2021
ﻣن
ﺧﻼل إدراج
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑراﻣﺞ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣوزﻋﺔ ﺣﺳب ﺗﺻﻧﯾﻔﮭﺎ
.اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n|ﻣﺎرس/آذار 2022
|ﻣراﺟﻌﺔ وﺗﺣدﯾث
اﻟ
ﺟدول
اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﻲ
اﻟذي
ﯾﻌرض اﻟﺗوزﯾﻊ اﻟﻘطﺎﻋﻲ
ﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم.
|ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|\n|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران 2023
|ﺗوﺳﯾﻊ ﻧطﺎق ﺗﻐطﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺳﻧوﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧدﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ إﻋداد
إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﺗﺗﺿﻣن اﻟوﺣدات ﺧﺎرج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ وﺻﻧﺎدﯾﻖ اﻟﺿﻣﺎن اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ.
|ﻣﻧﺧﻔﺿﺔ
|\n|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث–
ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث–
ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات|اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث–
ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات|\n|ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022
|
ﺗﺷﻛﯾل
ﻓرﯾﻖ
ﻋﻣل ﻣن ﻣﺧﺗﻠف اﻟدواﺋر ﺗﻛﻠف ﺑﺈﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
.اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ|ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ
|\n\n\n**7** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.9854736328125, 63.17999267578125, 543.9755249023438, 663.899658203125], "columns": 3, "rows": 15}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا \n\n ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ ﺗوﻓﯾر ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺗواﺗر )ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت رﺑﻊ ﺳﻧوﯾﺔ او ﺷﮭرﯾﺔ( ﻟﻘﺎﻋدة ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت .اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟدوﻟﯾﺔ ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \n ﻗﯾد اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ﯾﻧﺑﻐﻲ اﻻﺳﺗﻔﺎدة ﻣن ﻣواﺋﻣﺔ دﻟﯾل اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت دﻟﯾل ﻣﻊ إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم 2014 ﻓﻲ اﻋداد ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر اﻋداد اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ وﻟﯾس ﻓﻘط ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ ﻟﺿﻣﺎن ﺳﻼﻣﺔ اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻲ واﻋداد اﻟﺗﻧﺑؤات ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ اﻻﺟل ﻓﻲ ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ اﻋداد اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \n ﻗﯾد اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ واﻹداري واﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي وﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟﺑراﻣﺞ وﺗطﺑﯾﻖ ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ اﻋداد اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻓﯾﻣﺎ ﯾﺧص ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ اﻋداد اﻟﻣوازﻧﺗﯾن اﻟﺟﺎرﯾﺔ واﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \n اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ– أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ– أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ– أﺳﺎس ﻣﻧﮭﺟﻲ ﻹﻋداد اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات ﯾﺳﺗﻧد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﯾﯾر واﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ وأﻓﺿل اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎرف ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ دوﻟﯾﺎ \n أﻛﺗوﺑر/ﺗﺷرﯾن اﻷول2022 ﺑﻧﺎء اﻟﻘدرات اﻻﺣﺻﺎﺋﯾﺔ ﻟﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل إﻋداد .إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ إﻋداد وﻧﺷر إﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟ دﯾن ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدرﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ .ﺑﺻﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات دﯾن اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n /دﯾﺳﻣﺑر ﻛﺎﻧون اﻷول 2022 ﺗﺣري اﻟﺷﻔﺎﻓﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻹﻓﺻﺎح ﻋن اﻟﻣﺗﺄﺧرات ﻗﯾد اﻟﻣﺗﺄﺧرات اﻟﻣﺗراﻛﻣﺔ .واﻟﻣﺳددة ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎرھﺎ ﻣطﺎﻟﺑﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \n ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022 .إدراج ﻧﻣوذج ﺟدول \"ﺗﺻﻧﯾف وظﺎﺋف اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ\" ﻓﻲ وﺛﺎﺋﻖ اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \n ﯾﺣدد ﻻﺣﻘﺎ ﺑﻧﺎء ﻗدرات ﻣوظﻔﻲ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل اﻟﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻟو ﯾﻔﻲ ظ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺗﻔﺻﯾﻠﻲ اﻛﺛر . ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022 ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم2021 ﻣن ﺧﻼل إدراج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑراﻣﺞ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣوزﻋﺔ ﺣﺳب ﺗﺻﻧﯾﻔﮭﺎ .اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n ﻣﺎرس/آذار 2022 ﻣراﺟﻌﺔ وﺗﺣدﯾث اﻟ ﺟدول اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﻲ اﻟذي ﯾﻌرض اﻟﺗوزﯾﻊ اﻟﻘطﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت اﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم. ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \n ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران 2023 ﺗوﺳﯾﻊ ﻧطﺎق ﺗﻐطﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺳﻧوﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧدﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ إﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻟﺗﺗﺿﻣن اﻟوﺣدات ﺧﺎرج اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ وﺻﻧﺎدﯾﻖ اﻟﺿﻣﺎن اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ. ﻣﻧﺧﻔﺿﺔ \n اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث– ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث– ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات اﻟﻣﺧرج اﻟﺛﺎﻟث– ﺿﻣﺎن ﺗواﻓر اﻟﺑﯾﺋﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ واﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻹﻋداد وﻧﺷر اﻹﺣﺻﺎءات \n ﯾوﻧﯾو/ﺣزﯾران2022 ﺗﺷﻛﯾل ﻓرﯾﻖ ﻋﻣل ﻣن ﻣﺧﺗﻠف اﻟدواﺋر ﺗﻛﻠف ﺑﺈﻋداد إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ .اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ \n\n7 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 1920}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ|ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا|ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا|\n|---|---|---|\n|
ﻗﯾد اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ
|
ﻣواﺋﻣﺔ
دﻟﯾل اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺎﺳﺗﻣرار ﻣﻊ إطﺎر دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ
ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎره وﺛﯾﻘﺔ ﺣﯾﺔ ﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﺣدﯾﺛﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺿوء اﻹﺻدار اﻟﺟدﯾد ﻣن دﻟﯾل
.اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت ودﻟﯾل اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ|
ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ
|\n\n\n##### دلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 موائمة – ألف\n\n\n\n**كجزء من تنفیذ مشروع** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **تعد وزارة المالیة في الوقت الحالي لدمج إطار تس** **-12**\n\n، وافق مجلس الوزراء على. وفي فبرایر/شباط 2021 **نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد الذي تأخر تنفیذه لعدة أسباب**\n\n\" تضمنت عددا من اإلصالحات منھا إسناد تنفیذ نظام معلومات اإلدارة \"الورقة البیضاءخطة إصالحات شاملة عُرفت باسم\n\nق، أطلق البنك المالیة الموحد إلى وزارة المالیة. وفي عام 2016، وبعد إخفاق المحاولة السابقة لتنفیذ ھذا النظام في العرا\n\n\n3\nلدعم تحدیث نظم اإلدارة المالیة العامة تضمن عددا من المج لت، منھا تصمیم وإعداد اختصاصات [2] الدولي مشروعا جدیدا\nومھام مشروع نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد. ولكن عقب اإلعالن عن الدعوة لتقدیم العروض، لم تتم ترسیة أي\n\nلستعداد لجولة مناقصات أخرى في عام مشروع و عقود بسبب إخفاق المناقصة، مما دفع السلطات إلى مراجعة نطاق ال\n\n\n\n\n[2] الدولي مشروعا جدیدا\n\n\n\n.على األرجح 2022\n\n\n\n**واستعدادا لتطبیق نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد، تم وضع دلیل حسابات شامل جدید مع السترشاد إلى حد** **-13**\n\nدلیل الحسابات . والنسخة الحالیة من من دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة و2014طبعتي2001 **ما بالتصنیف الوارد في**\n\nیل إحصاءات مالیة بسھولة مع دل موائمتھمقسمة إلى عدة حسابات تتضمن مزیجا من حسابات اإلیرادات والنفقات یمكن\n\n\n\nإلى عرض ( للتزاماتالموجودات و )األصول والخصوم الحكومة لعام 2014، بینما ال تستند الحسابات األخرى لمعامالت\n\n\n\nسبیل المثال، یقید بیع الموجودات الثابتة كجزء من حسابات اإلیرادات، بینما تقید . فعلى2014/الدلیل في نسختیھ 2001\nأعمال التصرف في الموجودات الثابتة كجزء من حسابات النفقات. كذلك یتم التعامل مع اإلیرادات والنفقات المعاد تمویلھا\n\n.دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014ال في كإیرادات ونفقات على الترتیب، ولیس كإیرادات ونفقات سالبة كما ھو الح\n\nالحسابات الخاصة األخرى، مثل حساب تمویل العجز على غرار بنود الموازنة، بدال من اشتقاقھا من الحسابات ویتم تصنیف\n\nسابات الدین ضمن النفقات. عالوة على ذلك، یعید اإلصدار الحالي من دلیل الح تقید مدفوعاتأعلى الخط وتحت الخط، كما\nإدراج عدد من الحسابات التي وردت في إصدارات سابقة من الدلیل، مما یجعل قائمة الحسابات طویلة للغایة. وأشارت\nلحتفاظ بھذه الحسابات تحسبا للحاجة إلى الرجوع إلیھا في وقت الحق، ولكنھا أقرت أن إضافة ھذه السلطات إلى أنھ تم\n\n\n\n. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014دلیل الحسابات مع إطار موائمةالحسابات أدت إلى صعوبة أكبر في\n\n\n\n**تمھیدا لدمجھ في** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **دلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار** **موائمة استكملت البعثة** **-14**\n\n( مع التصنیفالجدول 2الحسابات على مستوى البنود ) شجرة موائمة. وتمت **نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد**\n\nمن حسابات موازنة النفقات شجرة الحسابات . وتتألفدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014لقتصادي الوارد في\n\n. وتستخدم لصول والخصوم لستثماریة، ومعامالت الجاریة )اإلیرادات والنفقات بما فیھا البرامج الخاصة(، والموازنة\n\nلستثماریة تصنیفا مختلفا )حسب القطاع والنوع(، ولكنھا تسمح بإدراج التصنیف المقابل في إحصاءات مالیة الموازنة\n\n،وتُصنف البرامج الخاصة، وھي مجموعة فرعیة من موازنة النفقات الجاریة .(الجدول 2الحكومة على مستوى البنود )\n\n. وتتضمن موائمةدي، وال تتطلب بالتالي معاملة خاصة عند اللقتصا حسب طبیعة البرنامج، ویتم توزیعھا وفقا للتصنیف\n\n.(الحسابات والتصنیف المقابل لھا في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة )المرفق 1 ووصفالرموز موائمةال\n\n\n\nلنتھاء30 = ، تاریخ دیسمبر/كانون األول2016 = تاریخ البدء28] ،تحدیث نظم اإلدارة المالیة العامة، مشروع رقم P151357 مشروع [2] 3\n\n[ . نوفمبر/تشرین الثاني2021\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **8**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.92033386230469, 63.17999267578125, 544.0406494140625, 136.3800048828125], "columns": 3, "rows": 2}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ف دﮭﺗﺳﻣﻟا ذﯾﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺦﯾرﺎﺗ ﺔ ﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا ﺔﯾﻠﺣرﻣﻟا فادھﻷا/تاءارﺟﻹا ﺔ ﯾوﻟوﻷا \n\n ﻗﯾد اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ﻣواﺋﻣﺔ دﻟﯾل اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺎﺳﺗﻣرار ﻣﻊ إطﺎر دﻟﯾل إﺣﺻﺎءات ﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎره وﺛﯾﻘﺔ ﺣﯾﺔ ﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﺣدﯾﺛﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺿوء اﻹﺻدار اﻟﺟدﯾد ﻣن دﻟﯾل .اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت ودﻟﯾل اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺗوﺳطﺔ \nدلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 موائمة – ألف\n\nكجزء من تنفیذ مشروع دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 تعد وزارة المالیة في الوقت الحالي لدمج إطار تس -12\n\n، وافق مجلس الوزراء على. وفي فبرایر/شباط 2021 نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد الذي تأخر تنفیذه لعدة أسباب\n\n\" تضمنت عددا من اإلصالحات منھا إسناد تنفیذ نظام معلومات اإلدارة \"الورقة البیضاءخطة إصالحات شاملة عُرفت باسم\n\nق، أطلق البنك المالیة الموحد إلى وزارة المالیة. وفي عام 2016، وبعد إخفاق المحاولة السابقة لتنفیذ ھذا النظام في العرا\n\n3\nلدعم تحدیث نظم اإلدارة المالیة العامة تضمن عددا من المج لت، منھا تصمیم وإعداد اختصاصات [2] الدولي مشروعا جدیدا\nومھام مشروع نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد. ولكن عقب اإلعالن عن الدعوة لتقدیم العروض، لم تتم ترسیة أي\n\nلستعداد لجولة مناقصات أخرى في عام مشروع و عقود بسبب إخفاق المناقصة، مما دفع السلطات إلى مراجعة نطاق ال\n\n[2] الدولي مشروعا جدیدا\n\n.على األرجح 2022\n\nواستعدادا لتطبیق نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد، تم وضع دلیل حسابات شامل جدید مع السترشاد إلى حد -13\n\nدلیل الحسابات . والنسخة الحالیة من من دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة و2014طبعتي2001 ما بالتصنیف الوارد في\n\nیل إحصاءات مالیة بسھولة مع دل موائمتھمقسمة إلى عدة حسابات تتضمن مزیجا من حسابات اإلیرادات والنفقات یمكن\n\nإلى عرض ( للتزاماتالموجودات و )األصول والخصوم الحكومة لعام 2014، بینما ال تستند الحسابات األخرى لمعامالت\n\nسبیل المثال، یقید بیع الموجودات الثابتة كجزء من حسابات اإلیرادات، بینما تقید . فعلى2014/الدلیل في نسختیھ 2001\nأعمال التصرف في الموجودات الثابتة كجزء من حسابات النفقات. كذلك یتم التعامل مع اإلیرادات والنفقات المعاد تمویلھا\n\n.دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014ال في كإیرادات ونفقات على الترتیب، ولیس كإیرادات ونفقات سالبة كما ھو الح\n\nالحسابات الخاصة األخرى، مثل حساب تمویل العجز على غرار بنود الموازنة، بدال من اشتقاقھا من الحسابات ویتم تصنیف\n\nسابات الدین ضمن النفقات. عالوة على ذلك، یعید اإلصدار الحالي من دلیل الح تقید مدفوعاتأعلى الخط وتحت الخط، كما\nإدراج عدد من الحسابات التي وردت في إصدارات سابقة من الدلیل، مما یجعل قائمة الحسابات طویلة للغایة. وأشارت\nلحتفاظ بھذه الحسابات تحسبا للحاجة إلى الرجوع إلیھا في وقت الحق، ولكنھا أقرت أن إضافة ھذه السلطات إلى أنھ تم\n\n. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014دلیل الحسابات مع إطار موائمةالحسابات أدت إلى صعوبة أكبر في\n\nتمھیدا لدمجھ في دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 دلیل الحسابات الجدید مع إطار موائمة استكملت البعثة -14\n\n( مع التصنیفالجدول 2الحسابات على مستوى البنود ) شجرة موائمة. وتمت نظام معلومات اإلدارة المالیة الموحد\n\nمن حسابات موازنة النفقات شجرة الحسابات . وتتألفدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014لقتصادي الوارد في\n\n. وتستخدم لصول والخصوم لستثماریة، ومعامالت الجاریة )اإلیرادات والنفقات بما فیھا البرامج الخاصة(، والموازنة\n\nلستثماریة تصنیفا مختلفا )حسب القطاع والنوع(، ولكنھا تسمح بإدراج التصنیف المقابل في إحصاءات مالیة الموازنة\n\n،وتُصنف البرامج الخاصة، وھي مجموعة فرعیة من موازنة النفقات الجاریة .(الجدول 2الحكومة على مستوى البنود )\n\n. وتتضمن موائمةدي، وال تتطلب بالتالي معاملة خاصة عند اللقتصا حسب طبیعة البرنامج، ویتم توزیعھا وفقا للتصنیف\n\n.(الحسابات والتصنیف المقابل لھا في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة )المرفق 1 ووصفالرموز موائمةال\n\nلنتھاء30 = ، تاریخ دیسمبر/كانون األول2016 = تاریخ البدء28] ،تحدیث نظم اإلدارة المالیة العامة، مشروع رقم P151357 مشروع [2] 3\n\n[ . نوفمبر/تشرین الثاني2021\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 8", "text_characters": 2864}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n**ھیكل الرموز– التصنیف لقتصادي الوطني** **–** **الجدول2**\n\n\n\n**التفاصیلرعي البند الف** **البند** **الباب**\n\n**الفرعیة**\n\n\n\nضرائب **–** O1\n\nالدخل\n\nاألجور **–** O1\n\nوالرواتب\n\n\n\nضرائب **–** O2\n\nالدخل والثروة\n\nتعویضات **–** O2\n\nالعاملین\n\n\n\n**الطبیعة الفرعیةطبیعة المعاملة**\n\n**للمعاملة**\n\nاإلیرادات- 1 **اإلیرادات- 1**\n\nالجاریة\n\nالنفقات **–** O1 **النفقات- 2**\n\nالجاریة\n\n\nالنفقات **–** O2 **الستثمار** **- 3**\n\nالرأسمالیة\n\n\nوزارة المالیة :المصدر\n\n\n\nبنود محددة، إن\n\nوجدت\n\n\n\nضرائب الرواتب في **–** O1\n\nالقطاع العام\n\n\n\nمحددة، معامالت الرواتب **–** O1\n\nإن وجدت:\n\nالرواتب\n\nالساسیة\n\nمشروعات السدود والخزانات **–** OO1\n\nمحددة\n\n\n\nالسدود **–** OO1 قطاع الزراعة **–** O1\n\nوالخزانات\n\nومشروعات حجز\n\nالمیاه\n\n\n\n**في إعداد تقاریر تنفیذ** دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 **دلیل الحسابات مع** **موائمة ینبغي الستفادة من** **-15**\n\nفي سیاق مشروع إصالح الموازنة الوطنیة، ستعتمد وزارة المالیة خالل الفترة . **الموازنة لضمان سالمة التحلیل المالي**\n\n\n\n4\nالمتمثل في\n\n\n\n\n[3] لستراتیجي لتنفیذ الھدف 201دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 4دلیل الحسابات مع موائمةالمقبلة على\n\n\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة دوري استنادا إلى التصنیف الوارد في بشكلتحسین جودة تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة وضمان إصدارھا\n\n\n\nألغراض دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014استخدام طریقة العرض الواردة في الحكومة لعام 2014، ویفضل\n\n\n\nمتوسطة األجل، واعتبارھا أداة التحلیل الرئیسیة في مرحلة إعداد الموازنة. التنبؤاتتحلیل سیاسة المالیة العامة وإعداد\n\n\n\nالتوصیات :\n\n\n\nمع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة باعتباره وثیقة حیة بشكل مستمرنموذج دلیل الحسابات موائمة تحدیث _-_\n\n\n\nاإلصدار الجدید من دلیل الحسابات ودلیل المحاسبة العامة یمكن تحدیثھا في ضوء\n\n\n\nاعدادتقاریراعداد في 2014لعامالحكومةمالیةإحصاءاتدلیل مع الحساباتدلیل موائمة من لستفادة **ا** ینبغي _-_\n\n\n\nاعداد مرحلة في لجل **ا** متوسطةالتنبؤاتواعدادالماليالتحلیلسالمةلضمان الموازنةتنفیذفقط ولیسالموازنة\n\n\n\nالموازنة\n\n\n\nإعداد ونشر تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة استنادا إلى التصنیف الوارد في دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 _-_\n\n\n\nبدوریة وتوقیت منتظم\n\n\n\nتطبیق التصنیف الوظیفي واإلداري و لقتصادي وتصنیف البرامج وتطبیق منھجیة اعداد البیانات فیما یخص **ا** _-_\n\n\n\nلستثماریةوازنتین الجاریة و **ا** الم مرحلة اعداد\n\n\n##### **تطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" – باء**\n\nوتستخدم **.تحرص وزارة المالیة على تطبیق التصنیف الوظیفي للنفقات كخطوة مھمة نحو تحسین تصنیف الموازنة** **-16**\n\nللوظائف، أو إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة إطار \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" الذي وضعتھ األمم المتحدة، وھو تصنیف مفصل\n\nالنفقات. وفي عام مختلف انواعتحقیقھا من خالل لة العامةالحكوم تسعى وحدات / لقتصادیة، التي لجتماعیة األھداف\n\n\n\nالمتعلق بوضع نظم وقواعد و (( في مشروع إصالح الموازنة العامة للدولة )المشروع األول1-لستراتیجي )1 الھدف ،المصدر: وزارة المالیة [3] 4\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام تركز على إنتاج ونشر تقاریر شاملة ومنتظمة عن الموازنة بما یتوافق یة التي استثمارالمشروعات ال وللنفقات\n\n. 2014\n\n\n**9** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nھیكل الرموز– التصنیف لقتصادي الوطني – الجدول2\n\nالتفاصیلرعي البند الف البند الباب\n\nالفرعیة\n\nضرائب – O1\n\nالدخل\n\nاألجور – O1\n\nوالرواتب\n\nضرائب – O2\n\nالدخل والثروة\n\nتعویضات – O2\n\nالعاملین\n\nالطبیعة الفرعیةطبیعة المعاملة\n\nللمعاملة\n\nاإلیرادات- 1 اإلیرادات- 1\n\nالجاریة\n\nالنفقات – O1 النفقات- 2\n\nالجاریة\n\nالنفقات – O2 الستثمار - 3\n\nالرأسمالیة\n\nوزارة المالیة :المصدر\n\nبنود محددة، إن\n\nوجدت\n\nضرائب الرواتب في – O1\n\nالقطاع العام\n\nمحددة، معامالت الرواتب – O1\n\nإن وجدت:\n\nالرواتب\n\nالساسیة\n\nمشروعات السدود والخزانات – OO1\n\nمحددة\n\nالسدود – OO1 قطاع الزراعة – O1\n\nوالخزانات\n\nومشروعات حجز\n\nالمیاه\n\nفي إعداد تقاریر تنفیذ دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 دلیل الحسابات مع موائمة ینبغي الستفادة من -15\n\nفي سیاق مشروع إصالح الموازنة الوطنیة، ستعتمد وزارة المالیة خالل الفترة . الموازنة لضمان سالمة التحلیل المالي\n\n4\nالمتمثل في\n\n[3] لستراتیجي لتنفیذ الھدف 201دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 4دلیل الحسابات مع موائمةالمقبلة على\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة دوري استنادا إلى التصنیف الوارد في بشكلتحسین جودة تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة وضمان إصدارھا\n\nألغراض دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014استخدام طریقة العرض الواردة في الحكومة لعام 2014، ویفضل\n\nمتوسطة األجل، واعتبارھا أداة التحلیل الرئیسیة في مرحلة إعداد الموازنة. التنبؤاتتحلیل سیاسة المالیة العامة وإعداد\n\nالتوصیات :\n\nمع إطار دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة باعتباره وثیقة حیة بشكل مستمرنموذج دلیل الحسابات موائمة تحدیث _-_\n\nاإلصدار الجدید من دلیل الحسابات ودلیل المحاسبة العامة یمكن تحدیثھا في ضوء\n\nاعدادتقاریراعداد في 2014لعامالحكومةمالیةإحصاءاتدلیل مع الحساباتدلیل موائمة من لستفادة ا ینبغي _-_\n\nاعداد مرحلة في لجل ا متوسطةالتنبؤاتواعدادالماليالتحلیلسالمةلضمان الموازنةتنفیذفقط ولیسالموازنة\n\nالموازنة\n\nإعداد ونشر تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة استنادا إلى التصنیف الوارد في دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014 _-_\n\nبدوریة وتوقیت منتظم\n\nتطبیق التصنیف الوظیفي واإلداري و لقتصادي وتصنیف البرامج وتطبیق منھجیة اعداد البیانات فیما یخص ا _-_\n\nلستثماریةوازنتین الجاریة و ا الم مرحلة اعداد\nتطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" – باء\n\nوتستخدم .تحرص وزارة المالیة على تطبیق التصنیف الوظیفي للنفقات كخطوة مھمة نحو تحسین تصنیف الموازنة -16\n\nللوظائف، أو إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة إطار \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" الذي وضعتھ األمم المتحدة، وھو تصنیف مفصل\n\nالنفقات. وفي عام مختلف انواعتحقیقھا من خالل لة العامةالحكوم تسعى وحدات / لقتصادیة، التي لجتماعیة األھداف\n\nالمتعلق بوضع نظم وقواعد و (( في مشروع إصالح الموازنة العامة للدولة )المشروع األول1-لستراتیجي )1 الھدف ،المصدر: وزارة المالیة [3] 4\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام تركز على إنتاج ونشر تقاریر شاملة ومنتظمة عن الموازنة بما یتوافق یة التي استثمارالمشروعات ال وللنفقات\n\n. 2014\n\n9 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 2105}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n، كانت ھناك محاولة أولى لتطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" في إطار تصنیف الموازنة بدعم من \"مركز المساعدة2014\n\nالتابع لصندوق النقد الدولي. ولكن لم یتم إحراز أي تقدم في ھذا الصدد (METAC)وسط\" الفنیة اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األ\n\nإلعداد \"تصنیف أفضل الممارسات ، تقتضيدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014حتى اآلن. ووفقا للمعاییر الواردة في\n\nیتضح أن التصنیف اإلداري ومن خالل تجارب البلدان أنھ **ا** ل كل معاملة. على مستوى تصنیفان یتم الوظائف الحكومة\"\n\n. وبالنسبة لموازنات البرامج الھیئات او البرامجیمثل نقطة انطالق إذا ما تضمن التفاصیل الالزمة على مستوى الدوائر أو\n\n. لنشطةو لبرامج ااألھداف واإلمارات العربیة المتحدة(، یتم إعداد التصنیف الوظیفي على مستوى دولة )كما ھو الحال في\n\n\n**شاملة أولیة لتصنیف وظائف الحكومة باستخدام مزیج من التصنیف** **موائمةلھذا الھدف، أجرت البعثة** **-وتحقیقا17**\n\n، من خالل تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنتین مصادر البیانات المتوفرة واستعرضت البعثة **واإلداري وتصنیف البرامج.** **القتصادي**\n\n،إلى وزارات ودوائر وأقسام. ومقارنة بالتصنیف لقتصادي ( لستثماریة. وینقسم التصنیف اإلداري )الجدول 3الجاریة و\n\n\n\nموائمة یتضمن التصنیف اإلداري توزیعا للبرامج الخاصة حسب طبیعتھا. وإلعداد \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\"، أجرت البعثة\n\n\n\n( التبویب المتقاطع)( جمیع البرامج الخاصة المسندة إلى وحدات تنظیمیة، و3)( جمیع الوحدات التنظیمیة، و2: )1تضمنت\n\nراجع الجدول ) ( النفقات لستثماریة موزعة حسب القطاع والبند/المشروع لقتصادي والوحدات التنظیمیة، و)4 للتصنیف\n\nتصنیف معامالت الدین العام موائمةنیف وظائف الحكومة\"، وال سیما مع \"تص تفصیلیة موائمة (. وكان البد من إجراء _2_\n\n\n\nنظرا ألنھ یتم التعامل حالیا مع مدفوعات سداد أصل الدین كنفقات ولیس كتمویل )راجع القسم ألف(.\n\n\n\n**وتم استكمال** **ومنھجیة اعداد البیانات،** **تطبیقیة عن مفاھیم \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\"** **ورشة عمل قدمت البعثة** **-18**\n\n\n\n. وفي ھذا السیاق، قدمت البعثة عرضا عن \"تصنیف وظائف **جدول \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" للسنة المالیة 2020**\n\nأمثلة لتجارب البلدان في إعداد كما قدمتالحكومة\" ومفاھیمھ واستخداماتھ األساسیة والمواطن ذات المشكالت الشائعة.\n\nفي إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة رقم7دول جإعداد وإنتاج ة منھجی\"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" واستعرضت أمام المشاركین\n\n\n\nلعام.\n\n\n\n**في إعداد بیانات \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\"** **وفرھا فریق الوزارةالبعثة أحدث تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة التي ت -استخدم19**\n\n\n\nالمالیة للسنة الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة في النفقات ارقام مطابقة األساس ھذا على . تموقد **لعام 2020**\n\n\n\n. 2020\n\n\n\n**ھیكل الرموز– التصنیف اإلداري الوطني** **–** **الجدول3**\n\n\n\nالقسم الباب الفرعي الباب\n()یستخدم في إعداد الحسابات ()وحدات الموازنة\n\n\n\nحسب المعاییر وحدة إداریة )مركز تكلفة–\n\n\n\n(المحاسبیة\n\n\n\nمقر الوزارة الوزارة\nالوك لت/الدوائر الحكومیة\nالممولة من الموازنة، إن )المؤسسات المملوكة للدولة\n\n\n\n(وجدت\n\n\n\nمقر وزارة المالیة - O1 وزارة المالیة **–** O5\n\n\n\nمدیریة المعاشات الحكومیة في كركوك – OO1 مقر وزارة المالیة - O1\nال مدیریة العامة للمعاشات الحكومیة **02**\n\n\n\nالمصدر: السلطات\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **10**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n، كانت ھناك محاولة أولى لتطبیق \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" في إطار تصنیف الموازنة بدعم من \"مركز المساعدة2014\n\nالتابع لصندوق النقد الدولي. ولكن لم یتم إحراز أي تقدم في ھذا الصدد (METAC)وسط\" الفنیة اإلقلیمي لمنطقة الشرق األ\n\nإلعداد \"تصنیف أفضل الممارسات ، تقتضيدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014حتى اآلن. ووفقا للمعاییر الواردة في\n\nیتضح أن التصنیف اإلداري ومن خالل تجارب البلدان أنھ ا ل كل معاملة. على مستوى تصنیفان یتم الوظائف الحكومة\"\n\n. وبالنسبة لموازنات البرامج الھیئات او البرامجیمثل نقطة انطالق إذا ما تضمن التفاصیل الالزمة على مستوى الدوائر أو\n\n. لنشطةو لبرامج ااألھداف واإلمارات العربیة المتحدة(، یتم إعداد التصنیف الوظیفي على مستوى دولة )كما ھو الحال في\n\nشاملة أولیة لتصنیف وظائف الحكومة باستخدام مزیج من التصنیف موائمةلھذا الھدف، أجرت البعثة -وتحقیقا17\n\n، من خالل تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنتین مصادر البیانات المتوفرة واستعرضت البعثة واإلداري وتصنیف البرامج. القتصادي\n\n،إلى وزارات ودوائر وأقسام. ومقارنة بالتصنیف لقتصادي ( لستثماریة. وینقسم التصنیف اإلداري )الجدول 3الجاریة و\n\nموائمة یتضمن التصنیف اإلداري توزیعا للبرامج الخاصة حسب طبیعتھا. وإلعداد \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\"، أجرت البعثة\n\n( التبویب المتقاطع)( جمیع البرامج الخاصة المسندة إلى وحدات تنظیمیة، و3)( جمیع الوحدات التنظیمیة، و2: )1تضمنت\n\nراجع الجدول ) ( النفقات لستثماریة موزعة حسب القطاع والبند/المشروع لقتصادي والوحدات التنظیمیة، و)4 للتصنیف\n\nتصنیف معامالت الدین العام موائمةنیف وظائف الحكومة\"، وال سیما مع \"تص تفصیلیة موائمة (. وكان البد من إجراء _2_\n\nنظرا ألنھ یتم التعامل حالیا مع مدفوعات سداد أصل الدین كنفقات ولیس كتمویل )راجع القسم ألف(.\n\nوتم استكمال ومنھجیة اعداد البیانات، تطبیقیة عن مفاھیم \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" ورشة عمل قدمت البعثة -18\n\n. وفي ھذا السیاق، قدمت البعثة عرضا عن \"تصنیف وظائف جدول \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" للسنة المالیة 2020\n\nأمثلة لتجارب البلدان في إعداد كما قدمتالحكومة\" ومفاھیمھ واستخداماتھ األساسیة والمواطن ذات المشكالت الشائعة.\n\nفي إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة رقم7دول جإعداد وإنتاج ة منھجی\"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" واستعرضت أمام المشاركین\n\nلعام.\n\nفي إعداد بیانات \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" وفرھا فریق الوزارةالبعثة أحدث تقاریر تنفیذ الموازنة التي ت -استخدم19\n\nالمالیة للسنة الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة في النفقات ارقام مطابقة األساس ھذا على . تموقد لعام 2020\n\n. 2020\n\nھیكل الرموز– التصنیف اإلداري الوطني – الجدول3\n\nالقسم الباب الفرعي الباب\n()یستخدم في إعداد الحسابات ()وحدات الموازنة\n\nحسب المعاییر وحدة إداریة )مركز تكلفة–\n\n(المحاسبیة\n\nمقر الوزارة الوزارة\nالوك لت/الدوائر الحكومیة\nالممولة من الموازنة، إن )المؤسسات المملوكة للدولة\n\n(وجدت\n\nمقر وزارة المالیة - O1 وزارة المالیة – O5\n\nمدیریة المعاشات الحكومیة في كركوك – OO1 مقر وزارة المالیة - O1\nال مدیریة العامة للمعاشات الحكومیة 02\n\nالمصدر: السلطات\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 10", "text_characters": 2180}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-072-fig-p0012-001"], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nالتوصیات :\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n.ضمن وثائق الموازنة ( _COFOG_ ) إدراج التصنیف الوظیفي _-_\n\n\n\n( عند تقدیم البیانات للنشر في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات _COFOG_ ) \"إدراج جدول \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة _-_\n\n\n\n2019- وإعداد ونشر جدول \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" للسنوات المالیة من2017مالیة الحكومة لعام 2020\n\n\n\n. اكثرتفصیليبشكلالوظیفيالتصنیفمجال في المالیةوزارةموظفيقدرات بناء _-_\n\n\n##### إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة تحسین منھجیة إعداد ونشر جیم\n**( ناقشت البعثة مع موظفي دائرة المحاسبة مسألة الرتفاع الكبیر في الحسابات مستحقة الدفع )الجدول3** **-20**\n\n. ویرجع لرتفاع في الحسابات مستحقة الدفع إلى قید حوالي **المدرجة في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة2020**\n\n، (، حسابات( في نوفمبر/تشرین الثاني2020دینار عراقي في حسابات الضمانات )وتُعامل كالتزامات )3318 ترلیون8\n\nونتیجة للتأخر .انعكاسا لسلسلة من النفقات لستثماریة دون السنویة التي تعھدت بھا وزارات مختلفة تجاه أطراف أخرى\nلنتھاء من غلق الحسابات، لم یكن قد تم بعد تسجیل قیود مقابلة لھا كنفقات استثماریة. فعلى سبیل المثال، تعھدت وزارة في\n\n.تریلیون دینار عراقي لم تكن قد تمت تسویتھا بعد. ویُتوقع تسویتھا خالل السنة الدفاع بنفقات استثماریة تبلغ حوالي 1,2\n\nلك، استعرضت البعثة بعض مسائل التصنیف الخاطئ وقامت بتصحیحھا. وعالوة على ذ\n\n\n\n**لم تقدم وزارة المالیة حتى اآلن سوى بیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة السنویة لقاعدة بیانات صندوق النقد** **-21**\n\nبیانات إحصاءات مالیة إلعداد )التصنیف المساعد( تطبیق إكسیل من خالل باستخدام أداة اإلحصاءات وتُنتَج ھذه **الدولي.**\nالحكومة الشھریة وربع السنویة والسنویة. وتستطیع وزارة المالیة، بحد أدنى من الجھود، أن تبدأ في نشر بیانات عالیة\n\nالعملیات الشھري بیان للوزارةالتواتر من خالل قاعدة بیانات \"اإلحصاءات المالیة الدولیة\" وأن تنشر في الموقع اإللكتروني\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة بما یتوافق مع نموذج لعن إحصاءات المالیة العامة\n\n.. وتحث البعثة وزارة المالیة على تحسین ممارساتھا في نشر البیانات من أجل زیادة الشفافیةلعام 2014\n\n\n**11** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2496, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 93.35751342773438, 544.5, 359.5074768066406)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(174,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 431, "number": 24, "size": 27987, "transform": [454.4999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 266.14996337890625, 90.0, 93.35751342773438], "width": 736, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nالتوصیات :\n\n.ضمن وثائق الموازنة ( _COFOG_ ) إدراج التصنیف الوظیفي _-_\n\n( عند تقدیم البیانات للنشر في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات _COFOG_ ) \"إدراج جدول \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة _-_\n\n2019- وإعداد ونشر جدول \"تصنیف وظائف الحكومة\" للسنوات المالیة من2017مالیة الحكومة لعام 2020\n\n. اكثرتفصیليبشكلالوظیفيالتصنیفمجال في المالیةوزارةموظفيقدرات بناء _-_\nإحصاءات مالیة الحكومة تحسین منھجیة إعداد ونشر جیم\n( ناقشت البعثة مع موظفي دائرة المحاسبة مسألة الرتفاع الكبیر في الحسابات مستحقة الدفع )الجدول3 -20\n\n. ویرجع لرتفاع في الحسابات مستحقة الدفع إلى قید حوالي المدرجة في الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة2020\n\n، (، حسابات( في نوفمبر/تشرین الثاني2020دینار عراقي في حسابات الضمانات )وتُعامل كالتزامات )3318 ترلیون8\n\nونتیجة للتأخر .انعكاسا لسلسلة من النفقات لستثماریة دون السنویة التي تعھدت بھا وزارات مختلفة تجاه أطراف أخرى\nلنتھاء من غلق الحسابات، لم یكن قد تم بعد تسجیل قیود مقابلة لھا كنفقات استثماریة. فعلى سبیل المثال، تعھدت وزارة في\n\n.تریلیون دینار عراقي لم تكن قد تمت تسویتھا بعد. ویُتوقع تسویتھا خالل السنة الدفاع بنفقات استثماریة تبلغ حوالي 1,2\n\nلك، استعرضت البعثة بعض مسائل التصنیف الخاطئ وقامت بتصحیحھا. وعالوة على ذ\n\nلم تقدم وزارة المالیة حتى اآلن سوى بیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة السنویة لقاعدة بیانات صندوق النقد -21\n\nبیانات إحصاءات مالیة إلعداد )التصنیف المساعد( تطبیق إكسیل من خالل باستخدام أداة اإلحصاءات وتُنتَج ھذه الدولي.\nالحكومة الشھریة وربع السنویة والسنویة. وتستطیع وزارة المالیة، بحد أدنى من الجھود، أن تبدأ في نشر بیانات عالیة\n\nالعملیات الشھري بیان للوزارةالتواتر من خالل قاعدة بیانات \"اإلحصاءات المالیة الدولیة\" وأن تنشر في الموقع اإللكتروني\n\nدلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة بما یتوافق مع نموذج لعن إحصاءات المالیة العامة\n\n.. وتحث البعثة وزارة المالیة على تحسین ممارساتھا في نشر البیانات من أجل زیادة الشفافیةلعام 2014\n\n11 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 1498}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n**إلدراجھا في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة التي** **و2020العام لعامي 2019** **قطاع ال استعرضت البعثة بیانات دین** **-22**\n\nالمعلومات التي قدمتھا السلطات في تحدیث صحیفة بیانات الدین البعثة استُخْدِمَت **تُقَدَّ م سنویا ولتقلیل التفاوتات اإلحصائیة.**\n\nالعدید من معامالت الدین ت عام 2020، أُجري خاللبیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. إدراج في المصدریة المستخدمة\nالمحلي التي یتعین أن تنعكس في صحیفة البیانات. وتم تحویل أذون الخزانة )أو التحویل لتمویل العجز( في حیازة البنوك\n\nكان مجموع خصمھا. وبنھایة عام 2020وشركات النفط إلى قروض طویلة المدى، بعد أن قام البنك المركزي العراقي ب\n\nتریلیون دینار عراقي ھي قیمة أذون الخزانة المخصومة تریلیون دینار عراقي، منھا42 الدین المحلي اإلجمالي قد بلغ 65,5\n\n\n\nذلك تمك .تریلیون دینار عراقي في حیازة البنك المركزي العراقي، ووصلت قیمة القروض المحلیة غیر المُسددة إلى 18\n\nلم تكن مُدْرَجة فیھا من قبل. وبلغ الدین الخارجي 28,3ي الت دیث بیانات الدین الخارجي بمعلومات عن القروض الجدیدة تح\n\n\n\nوراء تصحیح األخطاء السابقة العام في عام 2019 قطاعال تریلیون دینار عراقي )الملحق الرابع(. وكان إدراج بیانات دین\nفي حساب التغیر في حسابات الموجودات المالیة تحت مسمى \"العملة والودائع\" )في سلسلة البیانات الزمنیة للفترة من\n\n، صححت (. وبالنسبة لعام2020 ( كما قلل أیضا من التفاوتات اإلحصائیة في بیان العملیات )الجدول32020–2017\n\nتریلیون دینار عراقي( في نھایة بإدراج عملیات إصدار أذون الخزانة )بقیمة12 بعثة التفاوتات اإلحصائیة لعام 2020ال\n\nبین إدماج موائمةلدى السلطات. وینبغي مواصلة الالمساعد ، ولم تكن مرصودة على نحو كافٍ في التصنیفعام 2020\n\n\n\nأثناء البعثة القادمة. أرصدة الدیون وتدفقاتھا في \"ملف مساعد التصنیف\"\n\n\n\n**عمل** **فریق لتجنب تقدیم بیانات غیر كاملة عن إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة مستقبال، ینبغي لوزارة المالیة أن تنشئ** **-23**\n\nمسؤول عن التنسیق ا العمل ھذ فریق یكونعلى أن **كَلَّ ف بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. دوائر الوزارة ذات العالقة یُ من**\n\nوإدراج البیانات في إحصاءات التصنیف المساعدفیما یتعلق بتبادل البیانات، وضمان التسجیل السلیم في بین الدوائر المختلفة\n\nمالیة الحكومة. وینبغي أن تتجنب التأخیر والسھو في تسجیل البیانات التي یتم جمعھا من خارج دائرة المحاسبة.\n\n\n\n:إحصاءات دین القطاع العام **\" منھجیةالعام في العراق إدخال تحسینات ومراعاة** **قطاعال یتطلب إعداد تقاریر دین** **-24**\n\n\n\nوتقوم وزارة المالیة حالیا بإعداد تقاریر عن الدین ألغراض النشر **.** 2011 **\"، الصادر في** مرشد لمعدیھا ومستخدمیھا\n\n\n\nیستغرق قد ما بشكل الكتروني غیر متوفرةالبیانات المصدریة على أساس شھري، فھي توفر من . وبرغمالداخلي والرقابة\n\nطریقة إصدارھا فترة طویلة، وال سیما في حالة الدیون المحلیة. وال یتم كذلك الحصول على كل المعلومات المتعلقة بالدیون ب\n\nالدیون وأدوات الدین، مع عدم اإلشارة ي امل ح. وتتسم تقاریر الدین الداخلیة الحالیة بما تتضمنھ من مزیج یجمع بین ةل سھ\nلستحقاق. ویتعین إیالء أھمیة قصوى لتحسین جودة تقاریر الدیون والبدء في نشر تقاریر ربع سنویة عن الدیون إلى آجال\n\nالعام، ویعود تاریخ آخر تقریر ربع سنوي طاعق ال عراق حالیا بالفعل أي تقریر عن دین توخیا لمزید من الشفافیة. وال ینشر ال\n\n\n\n.عن الدین نُشِرَ في الموقع اإللكتروني إلى عام 2016\n\n\n\n**الدورة التدریبیة** **المحاسبة** **ودائرة** **الموازنة** **دائرة كبدایة، توصي البعثة بشدة بحضور موظفي دائرة الدین العام** **-25**\n\nفي فمن المقرر عقد ھذه الدورة التدریبیة في أكتوبر/تشرین األول 2022 **إعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام.** **حولالقادمة**\n\n( ویمكن أن تفید معدي بیانات الدین المحلي والدینمركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في الشرق األوسط )CEF\n\n. العام قطاعال دین بیاناتونشر على أفضل الممارسات في إعداد تتضمنحیث الخارجي بشكل كبیر\n\n\n\n**، افتقار تغطیة المتأخرات** **المتعلقة ب التساق الشمول** **األخرى في إعداد بیانات الدین** **نقاط الضعف الحالیة ومن** **-26**\n\nتُدْرَج المتأخرات حالیا في بیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة وال في جداول الدین. ومع ھذا، كانت السلطات قد اتخذت حیث ال\n\nنحو سد بعض الفجوات في البیانات، بإجراء مسوح لجمع معلومات عن المتأخرات من كل خطوة أولى في عام 2017\n\n. وبالتالي، تتبعت تریلیون دینار عراقي بنھایة2017 والي 6وحدات اإلنفاق. وبلغت المتأخرات المستحقة للمقاولین ح\nالسلطات سداد المتأخرات المتراكمة ورصدت التعھدات. وتمت تسویة ھذه المتأخرات على مدار الثالث سنوات الماضیة:\n\nا في عام ( تم سداد30 من المبلغ نقد%2) مقابل سندات الخزانة )وھي مدرجة في الدین المحلي(، و% ( تم سداد40)1\n\nتدرج في موازنة 2021 أن اً حالی . وتخطط وزارة المالیة2019 أخرى نقدا في عام% ( تم سداد30)، و32018\nمخصصات لتسویة المتأخرات المتبادلة بشأن مدفوعات فواتیر الكھرباء. وینبغي أن یتبع معدو إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة\n\n،(، ویجب علیھم جمع المعلومات عن المتأخرات بدءا من نشأتھامنھجا أشمل وأكثر منھجیة في قید المتأخرات )اإلطار 1\n\nدفوعات المستحقة وحتى إطفائھا، أي عند سداد المتأخرات، أو إعادة جدولتھا، أو شطب الدائن أي من وقت عدم سداد الم\n\nلھا.\n\n\nالتوصیات :\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **12**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nإلدراجھا في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة التي و2020العام لعامي 2019 قطاع ال استعرضت البعثة بیانات دین -22\n\nالمعلومات التي قدمتھا السلطات في تحدیث صحیفة بیانات الدین البعثة استُخْدِمَت تُقَدَّ م سنویا ولتقلیل التفاوتات اإلحصائیة.\n\nالعدید من معامالت الدین ت عام 2020، أُجري خاللبیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. إدراج في المصدریة المستخدمة\nالمحلي التي یتعین أن تنعكس في صحیفة البیانات. وتم تحویل أذون الخزانة )أو التحویل لتمویل العجز( في حیازة البنوك\n\nكان مجموع خصمھا. وبنھایة عام 2020وشركات النفط إلى قروض طویلة المدى، بعد أن قام البنك المركزي العراقي ب\n\nتریلیون دینار عراقي ھي قیمة أذون الخزانة المخصومة تریلیون دینار عراقي، منھا42 الدین المحلي اإلجمالي قد بلغ 65,5\n\nذلك تمك .تریلیون دینار عراقي في حیازة البنك المركزي العراقي، ووصلت قیمة القروض المحلیة غیر المُسددة إلى 18\n\nلم تكن مُدْرَجة فیھا من قبل. وبلغ الدین الخارجي 28,3ي الت دیث بیانات الدین الخارجي بمعلومات عن القروض الجدیدة تح\n\nوراء تصحیح األخطاء السابقة العام في عام 2019 قطاعال تریلیون دینار عراقي )الملحق الرابع(. وكان إدراج بیانات دین\nفي حساب التغیر في حسابات الموجودات المالیة تحت مسمى \"العملة والودائع\" )في سلسلة البیانات الزمنیة للفترة من\n\n، صححت (. وبالنسبة لعام2020 ( كما قلل أیضا من التفاوتات اإلحصائیة في بیان العملیات )الجدول32020–2017\n\nتریلیون دینار عراقي( في نھایة بإدراج عملیات إصدار أذون الخزانة )بقیمة12 بعثة التفاوتات اإلحصائیة لعام 2020ال\n\nبین إدماج موائمةلدى السلطات. وینبغي مواصلة الالمساعد ، ولم تكن مرصودة على نحو كافٍ في التصنیفعام 2020\n\nأثناء البعثة القادمة. أرصدة الدیون وتدفقاتھا في \"ملف مساعد التصنیف\"\n\nعمل فریق لتجنب تقدیم بیانات غیر كاملة عن إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة مستقبال، ینبغي لوزارة المالیة أن تنشئ -23\n\nمسؤول عن التنسیق ا العمل ھذ فریق یكونعلى أن كَلَّ ف بإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. دوائر الوزارة ذات العالقة یُ من\n\nوإدراج البیانات في إحصاءات التصنیف المساعدفیما یتعلق بتبادل البیانات، وضمان التسجیل السلیم في بین الدوائر المختلفة\n\nمالیة الحكومة. وینبغي أن تتجنب التأخیر والسھو في تسجیل البیانات التي یتم جمعھا من خارج دائرة المحاسبة.\n\n:إحصاءات دین القطاع العام \" منھجیةالعام في العراق إدخال تحسینات ومراعاة قطاعال یتطلب إعداد تقاریر دین -24\n\nوتقوم وزارة المالیة حالیا بإعداد تقاریر عن الدین ألغراض النشر . 2011 \"، الصادر في مرشد لمعدیھا ومستخدمیھا\n\nیستغرق قد ما بشكل الكتروني غیر متوفرةالبیانات المصدریة على أساس شھري، فھي توفر من . وبرغمالداخلي والرقابة\n\nطریقة إصدارھا فترة طویلة، وال سیما في حالة الدیون المحلیة. وال یتم كذلك الحصول على كل المعلومات المتعلقة بالدیون ب\n\nالدیون وأدوات الدین، مع عدم اإلشارة ي امل ح. وتتسم تقاریر الدین الداخلیة الحالیة بما تتضمنھ من مزیج یجمع بین ةل سھ\nلستحقاق. ویتعین إیالء أھمیة قصوى لتحسین جودة تقاریر الدیون والبدء في نشر تقاریر ربع سنویة عن الدیون إلى آجال\n\nالعام، ویعود تاریخ آخر تقریر ربع سنوي طاعق ال عراق حالیا بالفعل أي تقریر عن دین توخیا لمزید من الشفافیة. وال ینشر ال\n\n.عن الدین نُشِرَ في الموقع اإللكتروني إلى عام 2016\n\nالدورة التدریبیة المحاسبة ودائرة الموازنة دائرة كبدایة، توصي البعثة بشدة بحضور موظفي دائرة الدین العام -25\n\nفي فمن المقرر عقد ھذه الدورة التدریبیة في أكتوبر/تشرین األول 2022 إعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام. حولالقادمة\n\n( ویمكن أن تفید معدي بیانات الدین المحلي والدینمركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في الشرق األوسط )CEF\n\n. العام قطاعال دین بیاناتونشر على أفضل الممارسات في إعداد تتضمنحیث الخارجي بشكل كبیر\n\n، افتقار تغطیة المتأخرات المتعلقة ب التساق الشمول األخرى في إعداد بیانات الدین نقاط الضعف الحالیة ومن -26\n\nتُدْرَج المتأخرات حالیا في بیانات إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة وال في جداول الدین. ومع ھذا، كانت السلطات قد اتخذت حیث ال\n\nنحو سد بعض الفجوات في البیانات، بإجراء مسوح لجمع معلومات عن المتأخرات من كل خطوة أولى في عام 2017\n\n. وبالتالي، تتبعت تریلیون دینار عراقي بنھایة2017 والي 6وحدات اإلنفاق. وبلغت المتأخرات المستحقة للمقاولین ح\nالسلطات سداد المتأخرات المتراكمة ورصدت التعھدات. وتمت تسویة ھذه المتأخرات على مدار الثالث سنوات الماضیة:\n\nا في عام ( تم سداد30 من المبلغ نقد%2) مقابل سندات الخزانة )وھي مدرجة في الدین المحلي(، و% ( تم سداد40)1\n\nتدرج في موازنة 2021 أن اً حالی . وتخطط وزارة المالیة2019 أخرى نقدا في عام% ( تم سداد30)، و32018\nمخصصات لتسویة المتأخرات المتبادلة بشأن مدفوعات فواتیر الكھرباء. وینبغي أن یتبع معدو إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة\n\n،(، ویجب علیھم جمع المعلومات عن المتأخرات بدءا من نشأتھامنھجا أشمل وأكثر منھجیة في قید المتأخرات )اإلطار 1\n\nدفوعات المستحقة وحتى إطفائھا، أي عند سداد المتأخرات، أو إعادة جدولتھا، أو شطب الدائن أي من وقت عدم سداد الم\n\nلھا.\n\nالتوصیات :\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 12", "text_characters": 3539}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\nفي الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة عن طریق استكمال2020-بیانات 2019تضمین تحسین عملیة _-_\n\nالعام والحد من التفاوتات اإلحصائیة.قطاع دین النقص في بیانات\n\nفي مجال إعداد إحصاءات وزارة المالیةفي المحاسبةودائرةالموازنة، دائرةالعامالدیندائرةموظفي بناء قدرات _-_\nدین القطاع العام، من خالل حضور الدورة التدریبیة عن إحصاءات دین القطاع العام المقرر عقدھا في\n\n.في مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في الشرق األوسط ومقره الكویتأكتوبر/تشرین األول 2022\n\nیة ھو إعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام للحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في ینبغي أن یكون الھدف الرئیسي للبعثة التال _-_\n\nالموازنة ونشرھا على أساس منتظم بما یتوافق مع المرشد إلعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام.\n\nبإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لتحسین عملیة التنسیق. ف [َّ ] كَل ُیعمل بین الدوائر یق فر إنشاء _-_\n\nت بشفافیة وقید ھذه المتأخرات على أساس من الشفافیة كمطالبات على الحكومة. اإلفصاح عن المتأخرا _-_\n\n\"تقدیم بیانات عالیة التواتر إلدراجھا في قاعدة بیانات \"اإلحصاءات المالیة الدولیة _-_\n##### التغطیة المؤسسیةدال\n\n\nتنعكس . و **یغطي تقریر إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة في الوقت الراھن الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة** **-27**\n\nاألنشطة التي تُجرى حالیا ضمن الموازنة في تقریر المالیة العامة. ویمكن إضافة الكیانات المستقلة إلى ھذه التغطیة جمیع\n\nلقتصاد. ویمكن أن تتسع ركزیة وتعكس تأثیر أنشطة الحكومة على بالتدریج حتى تغطي التقاریر كل نفقات الحكومة الم\n\nالتغطیة في نھایة المطاف لتتضمن حسابات الحكومة دون المركزیة فتغطي الحكومة العامة بأكملھا.\n\n\n\nوھي الحكومة المركزیة )وتضم رئاسة ، **یضم قطاع الحكومة العامة في العراق العدید من الوحدات المؤسسیة** **-28**\n\nمجلس النواب ومكتب رئیس الوزراء والقضاء والوزارات والدوائر واألجھزة التي تعمل على مستوى الحكومة الجمھوریة و\n\nمحافظة(، )مثل بلدیة موزعة على19 المركزیة(، والحكومات المحلیة التي تتألف من عدد كبیر من البلدیات )حوالي 393\n\nصالح الدین وبابل واألنبار وكركوك، ...(.\n\n\n**:تنقسم الحكومة المركزیة في العراق إلى ثالثة قطاعات فرعیة**\n\n\n\nتتضمن كیانات مثل رئاسة الجمھوریة ومجلس النواب ومكتب **:() الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنةBCG** \n.وزارة وكیانا مدرجا في الموازنة السنویة للعراق رئیس الوزراء والقضاء و22\n\n\nوحدة حكومیة مستقلة تؤدي مھامھا بدعم مالي من ضمن حوالي 66تت **:(وحدات خارج الموازنة )EBUs** الحكومات المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة بصفة أساسیة ومن إیراداتھا الذاتیة. ونظرا لعدم كفایة المعلومات المتاحة\n\n\n\nمن قطاعھا كیانا ضعن طبیعتھا وأنشطتھا، بدأت البعثة بتصنیف قائمة الكیانات ذاتیة التمویل التي تتضمن 180\nلجتماعي، والشركات العامة المالیة وغیر المالیة( )الملحق الصحیح )الوحدات خارج الموازنة وصنادیق الضمان\n\n\n\nالخامس(\n\n\n\nلجتماعي الذي یغطي موظفي لجتماعي من صندوق الضمان یتألف قطاع الضمان **الضمان الجتماعي:** \nالقطاعین الخاص والعام وصندوق تقاعد موظفي الدولة.\n\nوتوفر ھذه **.(شركة عامة تتألف من شركات عامة مالیة وغیر مالیة )الملحق الخامس** **یضم العراق حوالي113** **-29**\n\n، أو تنظم السوق لضمان شراء السلع والخدمات وحیازتھا وبیعھا ذات داللة اقتصادیةالكیانات السلع والخدمات بأسعار\n\nسائر طائلة. فعلى سبیل المثال، المتأخرات الكبیرة التي تتحملھا ، أو تنظم القطاع المالي. وقد تتحمل كذلك خسوقیةبأسعار\nشركات الطاقة مقابل إمدادات الوقود لتولید الكھرباء ال تظھر في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. ویتعین إجراء مراجعة شاملة\n\nا یتوافق مع المبادئ التوجیھیة لقائمة الكیانات العامة لضمان سالمة تصنیفھا كشركات عامة مقابل الوحدات خارج الموازنة بم\n\n\n**13** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nفي الكتاب السنوي إلحصاءات مالیة الحكومة عن طریق استكمال2020-بیانات 2019تضمین تحسین عملیة _-_\n\nالعام والحد من التفاوتات اإلحصائیة.قطاع دین النقص في بیانات\n\nفي مجال إعداد إحصاءات وزارة المالیةفي المحاسبةودائرةالموازنة، دائرةالعامالدیندائرةموظفي بناء قدرات _-_\nدین القطاع العام، من خالل حضور الدورة التدریبیة عن إحصاءات دین القطاع العام المقرر عقدھا في\n\n.في مركز صندوق النقد الدولي لالقتصاد والتمویل في الشرق األوسط ومقره الكویتأكتوبر/تشرین األول 2022\n\nیة ھو إعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام للحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في ینبغي أن یكون الھدف الرئیسي للبعثة التال _-_\n\nالموازنة ونشرھا على أساس منتظم بما یتوافق مع المرشد إلعداد إحصاءات دین القطاع العام.\n\nبإعداد إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لتحسین عملیة التنسیق. ف [َّ ] كَل ُیعمل بین الدوائر یق فر إنشاء _-_\n\nت بشفافیة وقید ھذه المتأخرات على أساس من الشفافیة كمطالبات على الحكومة. اإلفصاح عن المتأخرا _-_\n\n\"تقدیم بیانات عالیة التواتر إلدراجھا في قاعدة بیانات \"اإلحصاءات المالیة الدولیة _-_\nالتغطیة المؤسسیةدال\n\nتنعكس . و یغطي تقریر إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة في الوقت الراھن الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة -27\n\nاألنشطة التي تُجرى حالیا ضمن الموازنة في تقریر المالیة العامة. ویمكن إضافة الكیانات المستقلة إلى ھذه التغطیة جمیع\n\nلقتصاد. ویمكن أن تتسع ركزیة وتعكس تأثیر أنشطة الحكومة على بالتدریج حتى تغطي التقاریر كل نفقات الحكومة الم\n\nالتغطیة في نھایة المطاف لتتضمن حسابات الحكومة دون المركزیة فتغطي الحكومة العامة بأكملھا.\n\nوھي الحكومة المركزیة )وتضم رئاسة ، یضم قطاع الحكومة العامة في العراق العدید من الوحدات المؤسسیة -28\n\nمجلس النواب ومكتب رئیس الوزراء والقضاء والوزارات والدوائر واألجھزة التي تعمل على مستوى الحكومة الجمھوریة و\n\nمحافظة(، )مثل بلدیة موزعة على19 المركزیة(، والحكومات المحلیة التي تتألف من عدد كبیر من البلدیات )حوالي 393\n\nصالح الدین وبابل واألنبار وكركوك، ...(.\n\n:تنقسم الحكومة المركزیة في العراق إلى ثالثة قطاعات فرعیة\n\nتتضمن كیانات مثل رئاسة الجمھوریة ومجلس النواب ومكتب :() الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنةBCG \n.وزارة وكیانا مدرجا في الموازنة السنویة للعراق رئیس الوزراء والقضاء و22\n\nوحدة حكومیة مستقلة تؤدي مھامھا بدعم مالي من ضمن حوالي 66تت :(وحدات خارج الموازنة )EBUs الحكومات المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة بصفة أساسیة ومن إیراداتھا الذاتیة. ونظرا لعدم كفایة المعلومات المتاحة\n\nمن قطاعھا كیانا ضعن طبیعتھا وأنشطتھا، بدأت البعثة بتصنیف قائمة الكیانات ذاتیة التمویل التي تتضمن 180\nلجتماعي، والشركات العامة المالیة وغیر المالیة( )الملحق الصحیح )الوحدات خارج الموازنة وصنادیق الضمان\n\nالخامس(\n\nلجتماعي الذي یغطي موظفي لجتماعي من صندوق الضمان یتألف قطاع الضمان الضمان الجتماعي: \nالقطاعین الخاص والعام وصندوق تقاعد موظفي الدولة.\n\nوتوفر ھذه .(شركة عامة تتألف من شركات عامة مالیة وغیر مالیة )الملحق الخامس یضم العراق حوالي113 -29\n\n، أو تنظم السوق لضمان شراء السلع والخدمات وحیازتھا وبیعھا ذات داللة اقتصادیةالكیانات السلع والخدمات بأسعار\n\nسائر طائلة. فعلى سبیل المثال، المتأخرات الكبیرة التي تتحملھا ، أو تنظم القطاع المالي. وقد تتحمل كذلك خسوقیةبأسعار\nشركات الطاقة مقابل إمدادات الوقود لتولید الكھرباء ال تظھر في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة. ویتعین إجراء مراجعة شاملة\n\nا یتوافق مع المبادئ التوجیھیة لقائمة الكیانات العامة لضمان سالمة تصنیفھا كشركات عامة مقابل الوحدات خارج الموازنة بم\n\n13 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 2572}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-072-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\nوسوف تمثل ھذه المراجعة خطوة أولى بالغة األھمیة في منھج تدریجي نحو. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 في\n\nتوسیع التغطیة لتتجاوز الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة.\n\n\n**الشكل البیاني2: القطاع العام في جمھوریة العراق**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nوالخبراء المصدر: دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014\n\n\nالتوصیات :\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nلكیانات القطاع العام.القطاعيجدول التقسیم مراجعة وتحدیث _-_\n\n\n\nالوحدات خارج الموازنة، وصنادیق الضمان التوسع في تغطیة البیانات السنویة في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لتشمل _-_\n\n\n\nلجتماعي. **ا**\n\n\n##### المسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثة ھاء\n|ﺔ ﺳﺳؤﻣﻟا|م ﺳﻻا|\n|---|---|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|/اﻟﺳﯾدة طﯾف ﺳﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﺣﻣد/وﻛﯾﻠﺔ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
اﻟﻣدﯾرة اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟداﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻟﺳﯾدة اﻛﺗﻔﺎء ﻓﻠﯾﺢ ﺣﺳن|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻟﺳﯾدة ﻣﯾﺳﺎء ﻛﺎظم ﺟﻧدر|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻟﺳﯾدة إﺳراء وﻟﯾد ﺧﻠﯾﻔﺔ|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻟﺳﯾدة آﻓﺎق ﻧﺟم ﻋﺑد ﷲ|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ زﯾد ﻣؤﯾد ﻋﺑد اﻟرزاق|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة ا
ﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻋﻠﻰ ھﺎﺷم رﺣﯾﻣﺔ
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﺑﺳﺎم ﺻﺎﺋب ﻓﻠﯾﺢ|\n\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **14**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2108, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.00000762939453, 128.3965301513672, 544.5, 353.24652099609375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 375, "number": 21, "size": 36069, "transform": [454.4999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 224.84999084472656, 90.00000762939453, 128.3965301513672], "width": 758, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [{"bbox": [166.29644775390625, 493.3599853515625, 467.66455078125, 706.8800048828125], "columns": 2, "rows": 9}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nوسوف تمثل ھذه المراجعة خطوة أولى بالغة األھمیة في منھج تدریجي نحو. دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام 2014 في\n\nتوسیع التغطیة لتتجاوز الحكومة المركزیة المدرجة في الموازنة.\n\nالشكل البیاني2: القطاع العام في جمھوریة العراق\n\nوالخبراء المصدر: دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لعام2014\n\nالتوصیات :\n\nلكیانات القطاع العام.القطاعيجدول التقسیم مراجعة وتحدیث _-_\n\nالوحدات خارج الموازنة، وصنادیق الضمان التوسع في تغطیة البیانات السنویة في إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة لتشمل _-_\n\nلجتماعي. ا\nالمسؤولون الذین التقت بھم البعثة ھاء\n ﺔ ﺳﺳؤﻣﻟا م ﺳﻻا \n\n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ /اﻟﺳﯾدة طﯾف ﺳﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﺣﻣد/وﻛﯾﻠﺔ وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣدﯾرة اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟداﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة اﻛﺗﻔﺎء ﻓﻠﯾﺢ ﺣﺳن \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة ﻣﯾﺳﺎء ﻛﺎظم ﺟﻧدر \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة إﺳراء وﻟﯾد ﺧﻠﯾﻔﺔ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة آﻓﺎق ﻧﺟم ﻋﺑد ﷲ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ زﯾد ﻣؤﯾد ﻋﺑد اﻟرزاق \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة ا ﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻋﻠﻰ ھﺎﺷم رﺣﯾﻣﺔ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﺑﺳﺎم ﺻﺎﺋب ﻓﻠﯾﺢ \n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 14", "text_characters": 863}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n|ﺔ ﻧزاوﻣﻟا ةرﺋاد/ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا ةرازو|د وﻣﺣ مﺳﺎﺟ ﺎﻧر ةدﯾﺳﻟا|\n|---|---|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻣﺻطﻔﻰ ﺟوھر
|\n|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
|اﻟﺳﯾدة ﻟﯾﻠﻰ ﺷﻼل ﻣوﺳﻰ|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ|
اﻟﺳﯾدة ﺑﺎن ﺣﺳﯾن ﺳﯾد|\n|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
|
اﻟﺳﯾدة زﯾﻧب ﺟواد|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ|
اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ھﺎﻧﻲ ﺣﻛﻣت إﻟﯾﺎس|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ|
اﻟﺳﯾدة اﻓﺗﻛﺎر ﺣﺳﯾن ﻋﻠﻲ|\n|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ
|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ
ﻋﻠﻲ
ﻋﺑﺎس
|\n|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟدﯾن
|اﻟﺳﯾدة
رؤى
وﻻء
ﺻﺑﺣﻲ
|\n|وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/
داﺋرة اﻟدﯾن|اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﯾﻘظﺎن
ﻋﻘﯾل
ﺣﺳن|\n|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟدﯾن
|اواﺋل
ﻋﺑد
اﻟﺳﺎﺗر
|\n|وزارة
اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ
/
داﺋرة
اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ
|ﺳوﺳن
ﺟﻣﻌﺔ
ﻣﺣﻣد
|\n\n\n\n**15** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [166.302001953125, 63.15999221801758, 467.65899658203125, 321.32000732421875], "columns": 2, "rows": 12}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ﺔ ﻧزاوﻣﻟا ةرﺋاد/ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا ةرازو د وﻣﺣ مﺳﺎﺟ ﺎﻧر ةدﯾﺳﻟا \n\n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻣﺻطﻔﻰ ﺟوھر \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة ﻟﯾﻠﻰ ﺷﻼل ﻣوﺳﻰ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة ﺑﺎن ﺣﺳﯾن ﺳﯾد \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة زﯾﻧب ﺟواد \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ھﺎﻧﻲ ﺣﻛﻣت إﻟﯾﺎس \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﺳﯾدة اﻓﺗﻛﺎر ﺣﺳﯾن ﻋﻠﻲ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ / داﺋرة اﻟﻣوازﻧﺔ اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﺑﺎس \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ / داﺋرة اﻟدﯾن اﻟﺳﯾدة رؤى وﻻء ﺻﺑﺣﻲ \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ/ داﺋرة اﻟدﯾن اﻷﺳﺗﺎذ ﯾﻘظﺎن ﻋﻘﯾل ﺣﺳن \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ / داﺋرة اﻟدﯾن اواﺋل ﻋﺑد اﻟﺳﺎﺗر \n وزارة اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ / داﺋرة اﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ ﺳوﺳن ﺟﻣﻌﺔ ﻣﺣﻣد \n\n15 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 524}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n**التي تم إنجازها خ��ل البعثة** **الملفات** **قائمةلملحق ا��ول.** ا\n\n\nلى الرابط التالي: محفوظة عالبعثة والمقدمة إلى السلطات خ��ل ال اكسل ملفاتبقائمة\n\n[https://intlmonetaryfund-](https://intlmonetaryfund-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Mission%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN)\n[my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Missi](https://intlmonetaryfund-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Mission%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN)\n\n[on%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN](https://intlmonetaryfund-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Mission%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN)\n\n\n**GFSM2014** **موائمة شجرة الحسابات الجدیدة مع تصنیفات دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة** **-** **1**\n\n\n**2020** **لسنة فقات حسب بینات النفقات نیف الوظیفي للجداول اعداد التصن** **-** **2**\n\n\n**یف الوظیفي التصناإلداري مع یفالتصن** **موائمة** **جدول** **-** **3**\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **16**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nالتي تم إنجازها خ��ل البعثة الملفات قائمةلملحق ا��ول. ا\n\nلى الرابط التالي: محفوظة عالبعثة والمقدمة إلى السلطات خ��ل ال اكسل ملفاتبقائمة\n\nhttps://intlmonetaryfund-\nmy.sharepoint.com/:f:/r/personal/naboukhaledyazbeck_imf_org/Documents/Iraq%20GFS%20Missi\n\non%20December%202021?csf=1&web=1&e=Zqt8TN\n\nGFSM2014 موائمة شجرة الحسابات الجدیدة مع تصنیفات دلیل إحصاءات مالیة الحكومة - 1\n\n2020 لسنة فقات حسب بینات النفقات نیف الوظیفي للجداول اعداد التصن - 2\n\nیف الوظیفي التصناإلداري مع یفالتصن موائمة جدول - 3\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 16", "text_characters": 464}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-072-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n**17** ي صندوق النقد الدول\n\n\n\n**( )جدول7لسنة 2020** **للنفقات** **تصنيف الوظيفي ال الملحق الثاني. جدول**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.4015, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 140.53610229492188, 539.99609375, 572.986083984375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 937, "number": 7, "size": 169134, "transform": [449.9960632324219, 0.0, -0.0, 432.4499816894531, 90.0, 140.53610229492188], "width": 975, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n17 ي صندوق النقد الدول\n\n( )جدول7لسنة 2020 للنفقات تصنيف الوظيفي ال الملحق الثاني. جدول", "text_characters": 84}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-072-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **18**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.3994, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(90.0, 93.724609375, 558.0499267578125, 507.3265380859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 833, "number": 4, "size": 134253, "transform": [468.0499572753906, 0.0, -0.0, 413.6019287109375, 90.0, 93.724609375], "width": 975, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 18", "text_characters": 31}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n**2020-المدرجة بالموازنة لسنة 2019** **المركزية** **الحكومة** **دين** **اتالملحق الثالث. بيان**\n\n\n\n**ف 2020**\n\n**4** **ف32020** **ف22020** **2020ف1** **2019**\n\n\n\nبملیارات الدینار العراقي\n\n\n\n**65,494.9** **54,024.8** **40,697.3** **39,893.3** **40,410.1** **الدين الداخلي**\n\n\n\n3,324.3 3,324.4 3,324.4 3,324.4 3,324.3 ()ا��حتياطي القانوني حوا��ت لتمويل العجز\n\n\n)محمولة من المصارف و حوا��ت لتمويل العجز –\n\n\n\n503.5 503.5 1,771.2 6,530.5 6,530.5 ��كات النف (ط\n\n\n\n40,452.0 28,452.0 18,884.3 14,125.0 14,125.0 )مخصومة لدى البنك (المركزي حوا��ت لتمويل العجز\n\n18,046.3 18,046.3 13,028.8 12,028.8 12,528.8 قروض\n\n\n\n1,555.5 1,555.5 1,555.5 1,755.5 1,755.5 (الدين القديم حوا��ت )البنك المركزي\n1,613.3 2,143.1 2,133.1 2,129.1 2,146.0 سنــــــدات المقاوليـــــن\n\n\n\n**28,454.6** **28,685.7** **30,032.1** **30,028.5** **31,053.2** **الدين الخارجي**\n\n\n\n5,410.6 5,410.6 5,616.7 5,616.7 5,616.7 سندات الدين\n\n6,406.0 6,406.0 6,824.7 6,825.4 7,274.5 خارج نادي باريس قروض نادي باريس\\\n\n\n\n16,638.0 16,869.1 17,590.7 17,586.4 18,162.0 قروض\n\n\n\n**93,949.5** **82,710.5** **70,729.4** **69,921.7** **71,463.2** **مجموع الدين العام القائم**\n\n\n\nبنود التذكير\n_1182_ _1182_ _1182_ _1182_ _1182_ ) سعر ال��ف (د.ع.| د.أ\n\n\n\n**فوائد الدين المدفوعة**\n\n\n\n509.41 46.10 28.65 489.82 1,343.94 الدين الداخلي\n\n\n\n49.88 431.04 76.04 451.53 1,100.29 الدين الخارجي\n\n\n\n**19** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n2020-المدرجة بالموازنة لسنة 2019 المركزية الحكومة دين اتالملحق الثالث. بيان\n\nف 2020\n\n4 ف32020 ف22020 2020ف1 2019\n\nبملیارات الدینار العراقي\n\n65,494.9 54,024.8 40,697.3 39,893.3 40,410.1 الدين الداخلي\n\n3,324.3 3,324.4 3,324.4 3,324.4 3,324.3 ()ا��حتياطي القانوني حوا��ت لتمويل العجز\n\n)محمولة من المصارف و حوا��ت لتمويل العجز –\n\n503.5 503.5 1,771.2 6,530.5 6,530.5 ��كات النف (ط\n\n40,452.0 28,452.0 18,884.3 14,125.0 14,125.0 )مخصومة لدى البنك (المركزي حوا��ت لتمويل العجز\n\n18,046.3 18,046.3 13,028.8 12,028.8 12,528.8 قروض\n\n1,555.5 1,555.5 1,555.5 1,755.5 1,755.5 (الدين القديم حوا��ت )البنك المركزي\n1,613.3 2,143.1 2,133.1 2,129.1 2,146.0 سنــــــدات المقاوليـــــن\n\n28,454.6 28,685.7 30,032.1 30,028.5 31,053.2 الدين الخارجي\n\n5,410.6 5,410.6 5,616.7 5,616.7 5,616.7 سندات الدين\n\n6,406.0 6,406.0 6,824.7 6,825.4 7,274.5 خارج نادي باريس قروض نادي باريس\\\n\n16,638.0 16,869.1 17,590.7 17,586.4 18,162.0 قروض\n\n93,949.5 82,710.5 70,729.4 69,921.7 71,463.2 مجموع الدين العام القائم\n\nبنود التذكير\n_1182_ _1182_ _1182_ _1182_ _1182_ ) سعر ال��ف (د.ع. د.أ\n\nفوائد الدين المدفوعة\n\n509.41 46.10 28.65 489.82 1,343.94 الدين الداخلي\n\n49.88 431.04 76.04 451.53 1,100.29 الدين الخارجي\n\n19 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 1021}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n**الجهات الحكومية** **قائمة .الملحق الرابع**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ﻒﯿﻨﺼﺘﻟا|ﺔﮭﺠﻟا|ةرازﻮﻟا ﻢﻗر|\n|---|---|---|\n|**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|** داﺋﺮة اﻟﻌﺘﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺔ**
|**3**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﮭﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺎ ﻟﻠﺤﺞ واﻟﻌﻤﺮة**
|
**3 **
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺼﻨﺪوق اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ**
**اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﯿﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** دﯾﻮان اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة **
** اﻟﻌﯿﺎدات**
**اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ**
** اﻟﺸﻌﺒﯿﺔ**
|
**9**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﺮﺑﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻤﻔﺘﻮﺣﺔ**
|
**12**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻟﺠﻨﺔ **
** ﺻﻨﺪوق دﻋﻢ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﺮ**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** دار اﻟﺸﺆون اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**15**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة اﻟﻔﻨﻮن اﻟﺘﺸﻜﯿﻠﯿﺔ**
|
**15**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة اﻟﺴﯿﻨﻤﺎ واﻟﻤﺴﺮح**
|
**15**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺣﺔ**
|
**15**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﺤﻮث اﻟﺒﻨﺎء**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻻﺳﻜﺎن**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎء**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺎري**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** دار**
**اﻟﻀﯿﺎﻓﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**43**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻻﻋﻼم اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ**
|
**43**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻻﻋﻼم واﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت**
|
**43**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة ﻣﺠﺎري ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**43**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** داﺋﺮة ﻣﺎء ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**43**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة**
|
**47**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻟﺒﺼﺮة**
|
**47**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة**
|
**47**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى**
|
**48**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى**
|
**48**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى**
|
**48**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**49**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**49**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**49**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر**
|
**50**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر**
|
**50**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر**
|
**50**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ**
|
**51**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ**
|
**51**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ**
|
**51**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**|
** اﻻدارة اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ**|
**52**
|\n\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **20**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.51399993896484, 112.739990234375, 521.6465454101562, 704.2196655273438], "columns": 3, "rows": 39}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\nالجهات الحكومية قائمة .الملحق الرابع\n\n ﻒﯿﻨﺼﺘﻟا ﺔﮭﺠﻟا ةرازﻮﻟا ﻢﻗر \n\n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة اﻟﻌﺘﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺔ 3 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﮭﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺎ ﻟﻠﺤﺞ واﻟﻌﻤﺮة 3 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺪوق اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﯿﺔ 5 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ دﯾﻮان اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ 5 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة اﻟﻌﯿﺎدات اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﯿﺔ 9 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﺮﺑﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻤﻔﺘﻮﺣﺔ 12 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻟﺠﻨﺔ ﺻﻨﺪوق دﻋﻢ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﺮ 14 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ دار اﻟﺸﺆون اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 15 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة اﻟﻔﻨﻮن اﻟﺘﺸﻜﯿﻠﯿﺔ 15 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة اﻟﺴﯿﻨﻤﺎ واﻟﻤﺴﺮح 15 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺣﺔ 15 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﺤﻮث اﻟﺒﻨﺎء 18 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻻﺳﻜﺎن 18 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎء 18 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺎري 18 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ 18 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ دار اﻟﻀﯿﺎﻓﺔ 21 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد 43 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻻﻋﻼم اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ 43 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻻﻋﻼم واﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت 43 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة ﻣﺠﺎري ﺑﻐﺪاد 43 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ داﺋﺮة ﻣﺎء ﺑﻐﺪاد 43 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة 47 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة 47 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة 47 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى 48 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى 48 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧﯿﻨﻮى 48 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد 49 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد 49 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﻐﺪاد 49 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر 50 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر 50 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ذي ﻗﺎر 50 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ 51 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ 51 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ 51 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻻدارة اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ 52 \n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 20", "text_characters": 1271}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ﺔﻠﻘﺘﺴﻣ ﺔﮭﺟ|ﻞﺑﺎﺑ ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ءﺎﻣ ﺔﯾﺮﯾﺪﻣ|52|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ**
|
**52**
|\n|
** ﺟﮭﺔ**
**ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ**
|
**52**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻻﻧﺒﺎر**
|
**53**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر**
|
**53**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر**
|
**53**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن**
|
**54**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن**
|
**54**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن**
|
**54**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻻدارة اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ**
|
**55**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف**
|
**57**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف**
|
**57**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف**
|
**57**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**58**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**58**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**58**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء**
**ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ **
** اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ**
|
**59**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ**
|
**59**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ**
|
**59**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء**
|
**60**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء**
|
**60**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء**
|
**60**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ**
|
**61**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ**
|
**61**
|\n|
**ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ**
|
**61**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﮭﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺎطﻖ اﻟﺤﺮة**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﯾﻖ اﻻدوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ**
|
**9**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺒﺎﻋﺔ واﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺮﺑﻮﯾﺔ**
|
**12**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﻐﺬاﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**14**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻟﻸﺳﻮاق اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺤﺒﻮب**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺴﯿﺎرات واﻟﻤﻜﺎﺋﻦ**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿﻊ اﻟﺤﺒﻮب**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺎرض واﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**14**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺪﯾﻨﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺣﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺒﺎﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**15**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺒﺮي**
|
**16**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﻨﻘﻞ**
|
**16**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻓﺮﯾﻦ واﻟﻮﻓﻮد**
|
**16**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺒﺤﺮي**|
**16**
|\n\n\n\n**21** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.5145492553711, 63.17999267578125, 521.64599609375, 708.2999877929688], "columns": 3, "rows": 43}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ﺔﻠﻘﺘﺴﻣ ﺔﮭﺟ ﻞﺑﺎﺑ ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ءﺎﻣ ﺔﯾﺮﯾﺪﻣ 52 \n\n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ 52 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﺑﻞ 52 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر 53 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر 53 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻻﻧﺒﺎر 53 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن 54 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن 54 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن 54 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻻدارة اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ 55 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ 55 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ 55 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ واﺳﻂ 55 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف 57 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف 57 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﺠﻒ اﻻﺷﺮف 57 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ 58 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ 58 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻮاﻧﯿﺔ 58 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ 59 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ 59 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﻨﻰ 59 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء 60 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء 60 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﺑﻼء 60 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺎء ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ 61 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺠﺎري ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ 61 \n ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺒﻠﺪﯾﺔ ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ 61 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﮭﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺎطﻖ اﻟﺤﺮة 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﯾﻖ اﻻدوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ 9 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺒﺎﻋﺔ واﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺮﺑﻮﯾﺔ 12 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﻐﺬاﺋﯿﺔ 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻸﺳﻮاق اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺤﺒﻮب 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺴﯿﺎرات واﻟﻤﻜﺎﺋﻦ 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿﻊ اﻟﺤﺒﻮب 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺎرض واﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ 14 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺪﯾﻨﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺣﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺒﺎﻧﯿﺔ 15 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺒﺮي 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﻨﻘﻞ 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻓﺮﯾﻦ واﻟﻮﻓﻮد 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺒﺤﺮي 16 \n\n21 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 1771}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n|ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|قاﺮﻌﻟا ءﻰﻧاﻮﻤﻟ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻛﺮﺸﻟا|16|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻜﻚ اﻟﺤﺪﯾﺪ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**16**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﻄﻮط اﻟﺠﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**16**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻻدارة اﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺨﺎص**
|
**16**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻼﺣﺔ اﻟﺠﻮﯾﺔ**
|
**16**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎروق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮﺷﯿﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺘﺼﻢ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺣﻤﻮراﺑﻰ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﺷﻮر اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎو اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺳﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**18**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺬور**
|
**19**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﮭﯿﺰات اﻟﺰراﻋﯿﺔ**
|
**19**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮاﻓﺪﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﺴﺪود**
|
**20**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎو اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺮي**
|
**20**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺮي**
|
**20**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻏﺎز اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ(اﻟﺠﻨﻮب )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﺧﻄﻮط اﻻﻧﺎﺑﯿﺐ اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﻐﺎز )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔﻟﻠﻤﻌﺪات اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﺜﻘﯿﻠﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ(ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻮزﯾﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺠﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺤﻔﺮاﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﯾﻖ اﻟﻨﻔﻂ )ﺳﻮﻣﻮ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎﻓﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﺎﻗﻼت اﻟﻨﻔﻂ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻏﺎز اﻟﺠﻨﻮب- ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ ذي ﻗﺎر)ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**21**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺪﯾﺪ واﻟﺼﻠﺐ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺳﻨﺎد اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﻲ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻟﻠﻔﻮﺳﻔﺎت**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎرس اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﺳﻤﺪة/اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﺑﻦ ﻣﺎﺟﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**|
**23**
|\n\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **22**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.5145492553711, 63.17999267578125, 521.64599609375, 708.2999877929688], "columns": 3, "rows": 43}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ قاﺮﻌﻟا ءﻰﻧاﻮﻤﻟ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻛﺮﺸﻟا 16 \n\n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻜﻚ اﻟﺤﺪﯾﺪ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﻄﻮط اﻟﺠﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻻدارة اﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﺨﺎص 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻼﺣﺔ اﻟﺠﻮﯾﺔ 16 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎروق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮﺷﯿﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺘﺼﻢ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻻﻧﺸﺎﺋﯿﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺣﻤﻮراﺑﻰ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﺷﻮر اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻻت اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎو اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺳﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 18 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺬور 19 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﮭﯿﺰات اﻟﺰراﻋﯿﺔ 19 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮاﻓﺪﯾﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﺴﺪود 20 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎو اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺮي 20 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺮي 20 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻏﺎز اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﻣﺼﺎﻓﻲ(اﻟﺠﻨﻮب )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﺧﻄﻮط اﻻﻧﺎﺑﯿﺐ اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﮫ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﻐﺎز )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔﻟﻠﻤﻌﺪات اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﺜﻘﯿﻠﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ(ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻮزﯾﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺠﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺤﻔﺮاﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﺒﺼﺮة )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﯾﻖ اﻟﻨﻔﻂ )ﺳﻮﻣﻮ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ اﻟﺸﻤﺎل )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎﻓﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﻄﯿﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﺎﻗﻼت اﻟﻨﻔﻂ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻏﺎز اﻟﺠﻨﻮب- ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ ﻣﯿﺴﺎن )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﻂ ذي ﻗﺎر)ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 21 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺪﯾﺪ واﻟﺼﻠﺐ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺳﻨﺎد اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﻲ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﻮﺳﻔﺎت 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺎرس اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﺳﻤﺪة/اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﺑﻦ ﻣﺎﺟﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 23 \n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 22", "text_characters": 1944}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n|ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|ﺔﯿﺋﺎﺸﻧﻻا تﺎﻋﺎﻨﺼﻠﻟ ﮫﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﮫﻛﺮﺸﻟا|23|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ**
**اﻟﻌﺎﻣﮫ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﻤﯿﻢ وﺗﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﯾﻊ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺰوراء اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﺳﻤﺪة/اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت**
**اﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻨﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اور اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺒﺘﺮوﻛﯿﻤﯿﺎوﯾﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻜﺒﺮﯾﺖ اﻟﻤﺸﺮاق**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﺤﺺ واﻟﺘﺄھﯿﻞ اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﻲ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺤﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻدوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ اس دي اي**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻨﺤﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﯿﻜﺎﻧﯿﻜﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻔﻮﻻذﯾﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎرات واﻟﻤﻌﺪات**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ **
** ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻨﺴﯿﺞ واﻟﺠﻠﻮد**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺮات اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻜﯿﻤﯿﺎوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺒﯿﺪات**
|
**23**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺘﻮﺟﺎت اﻟﻐﺬاﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻟﻸﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻤﻌﺪات اﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت واﻟﻘﺪرة**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﮭﯿﺪروﻟﯿﻜﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ**
**ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ واﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺰﺟﺎج واﻟﺤﺮارﯾﺎت**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﻄﺎطﯿﺔ واﻻطﺎرات**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻤﻨﺖ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**23**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج**
** اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج**
** اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج**
** اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻔﺮات اﻻوﺳﻂ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
**ﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﺠﻨﻮب**
|
**29**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ**
**ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﺑﻐﺪاد**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﺸﻤﺎل**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻔﺤﺺ وﺗﺄھﯿﻞ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻔﺮات اﻻوﺳﻂ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﻮﺳﻂ**
|
**29**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺴﻼم اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**31**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺗﺼﺎﻻت**
**واﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﯿﺔ**
|
**31**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﯾﺪ واﻟﺘﻮﻓﯿﺮ**
|
**31**
|\n|
**ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**|
** اﻟﺒﻨﻚ**
**اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰي اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ**|
**43**
|\n\n\n\n**23** ي صندوق النقد الدول", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.5145492553711, 63.17999267578125, 521.64599609375, 708.2999877929688], "columns": 3, "rows": 43}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ ﺔﯿﺋﺎﺸﻧﻻا تﺎﻋﺎﻨﺼﻠﻟ ﮫﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﮫﻛﺮﺸﻟا 23 \n\n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﮫ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﻤﯿﻢ وﺗﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﯾﻊ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺰوراء اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﺳﻤﺪة/اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻨﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اور اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺒﺘﺮوﻛﯿﻤﯿﺎوﯾﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻜﺒﺮﯾﺖ اﻟﻤﺸﺮاق 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﺤﺺ واﻟﺘﺄھﯿﻞ اﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﻲ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺤﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻻدوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺔ اس دي اي 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻨﺤﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﯿﻜﺎﻧﯿﻜﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻔﻮﻻذﯾﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎرات واﻟﻤﻌﺪات 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻨﺴﯿﺞ واﻟﺠﻠﻮد 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻔﺮات اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻜﯿﻤﯿﺎوﯾﺔ واﻟﻤﺒﯿﺪات 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺘﻮﺟﺎت اﻟﻐﺬاﺋﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻸﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻤﻌﺪات اﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت واﻟﻘﺪرة 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﮭﯿﺪروﻟﯿﻜﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ واﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺰﺟﺎج واﻟﺤﺮارﯾﺎت 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ دﯾﺎﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﻄﺎطﯿﺔ واﻻطﺎرات 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻤﻨﺖ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ 23 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻔﺮات اﻻوﺳﻂ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﺠﻨﻮب 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﺑﻐﺪاد 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﺸﻤﺎل 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻔﺤﺺ وﺗﺄھﯿﻞ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﯿﺔ /اﻟﻔﺮات اﻻوﺳﻂ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ ﻛﮭﺮﺑﺎء اﻟﻮﺳﻂ 29 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺴﻼم اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ 31 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺗﺼﺎﻻت واﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﯿﺔ 31 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﯾﺪ واﻟﺘﻮﻓﯿﺮ 31 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰي اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ 43 \n\n23 ي صندوق النقد الدول", "text_characters": 2216}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺪﺷر ﻦﺑا ﺔﻛﺮﺷ|43|\n|---|---|---|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** (ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺮاﻓﺪﯾﻦ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺼﺮف**
**اﻟﺰراﻋﻲ**
**()ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺼﺮف**
**اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ**
**()ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻌﻘﺎري )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
**(ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺮﺷﯿﺪ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**5**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻮطﻨﯿﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ**
**اﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﯿﺔ**
|
**5**
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﺎرة**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ**
|
** ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻲ**
|
**5 **
|\n|
** ﺻﻨﺪوق ﺿﻤﺎن**
**اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ**|
** داﺋﺮة اﻟﺘﻘﺎﻋﺪ واﻟﻀﻤﺎن اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﺎل**|
**8 **|\n\n\n\nيصندوق النقد الدول **24**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-072", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.52000427246094, 63.239990234375, 521.6405029296875, 271.32000732421875], "columns": 3, "rows": 13}], "text": "جمھوریة العراق\n\n ﺔﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﺷ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺪﺷر ﻦﺑا ﺔﻛﺮﺷ 43 \n\n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺮاﻓﺪﯾﻦ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﺰراﻋﻲ ()ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ ()ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻌﻘﺎري )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ (ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺮﺷﯿﺪ )ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻮطﻨﯿﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ اﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﯿﺔ 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﺎرة 5 \n ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﻨﮭﺮﯾﻦ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻲ 5 \n ﺻﻨﺪوق ﺿﻤﺎن اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ داﺋﺮة اﻟﺘﻘﺎﻋﺪ واﻟﻀﻤﺎن اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﺎل 8 \n\nيصندوق النقد الدول 24", "text_characters": 507}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..50f013b6afaa36733e98387b51fe18962fda8177
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2a911b4c13a8601265ab9ac46471e144f09eff4ac2bf2febbeb4d2761bc4cfc2
+size 126328
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0013-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0013-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d145e4f7fe363200ce5e87721cc0977db41f144
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0013-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:12c1bf96957a2eba5938d0e8f3ae6813d9ef7a56ced8f776699ad086064721b9
+size 35248
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aba6b356ea5d679785b6988142b3d122d5436cff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:167ec0a16d50715dfb03bd6c787eecc10c17a7d611e2b3e61a669eb6a453488c
+size 68496
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..edcc0291cd26c2833f654d6ff710cc0e1182cd13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:db076e4f51339b9f7de99d3879e8fe059bf45f5b930b4ab6d10e2471ff3b517b
+size 73210
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa77689f9626af06e010d84a4e04a1a196f3107e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:60e6ae268c2a1a49b493b5610c55ae3b7a748d3322b1e50cb5a3d0f72acf707b
+size 37178
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca4f52375469e49a0ff7945c8d9498923cf97bc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5038f4f5f4ae0f6e76dbe2cd434b2a12c83b86ce0d1bc48d122d15035d2db3be
+size 59569
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c81e8e20ad3135cbee42ab6d892816962b7e11a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b60d1eecb751bc5f829d90814f5c0e3e0e738cfac546968f64e824bf4d1cf0f4
+size 53071
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7750f832963359110d795d537a5786e10b1e3f5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b1dc0d92291e77b63eea8f5132e16f828568572012dc1252a55789b3efebea88
+size 68217
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f0c7ab9ea3bca67772ad4ee18c4ff612f0246da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:72a3ad4dd5d49983ab12162b129167aa6b528e2dd5ac85e236247c102c2e81fd
+size 74930
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..84239cec0e3f8406dcb6105990470c9e4e4b4d8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3db97d0e96ca2ca378312163b273a4c3cf01253b5437fd3791dc84b382a7a4b2
+size 48188
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..557efe38ba5ee0a6c545b5359d11f7e409f611be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:152f0a92375b56fd17da1b9bbd352864dd57d8801692f8afe64a0503e543c81d
+size 70326
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d89839159732e982d5b644b3fa22b3de4777798
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c690bae2a1dbd2acd08b6ab742d593c03b49b6bcf2bb1726fecaabc1dabf29fb
+size 102924
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96dc8b1ebe7bc5afb0b5f26fa00f796991d4d9fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5ee7c183cb3bbad68ada67fe39af92326c23549c6d1b935237ba1e2766e4e627
+size 186588
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09e50dd5cadfc8860a70210346e4283a6c7140dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bc0aea1a5ef53d154b201b2ca1569105eaa020b0f1dd914a5ac59dd3752fe5ad
+size 9375
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3769ecb6e204a0aa14f8ea6e7fdca11a0df46f56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:87b2d86eb7642ab183e0775f96d1a6345f832b6bbd8004a445d770cd1f044174
+size 56388
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7474b740e5a3b50bd440274c326dbcf73e81e285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dcd1024385ed57c87d02f01207fb5c95bdbc15d544017e86b7c7f102ad04caca
+size 32399
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dc290422f40656d43c8733405de636cdb6f14c47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:08c15f0e23a9f757fde6b56f31c3aa5e55c134b365f36364cd546321249fe2dd
+size 23587
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..95d44e07720f5883a678e8b716f9b11222b701e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c8f5b4e1bd9e50f9a303424c62706949371f9316957afa8bc56e973d20699a5f
+size 111613
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..baf9757d3fe5f4b80b8cc06e1ec833c0b5a3b6eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88faa2489539fa6b7a8ffd0d1a47a35afcc3fb04cff7fe71042752f217f07ec2
+size 123371
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..883ad131c08467e77bed7c8240686b2498b6cc28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f92dcb51f27d9cca4d90ebf54ecb42499c28b791b110a20d069764c7548807ff
+size 39063
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b3d9dd30c050351aae427356e9badef908196d2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:39fb15fccc31369e661798ce9d08aae74d2616104938dafe7addb1b044ee872b
+size 93632
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f05718271777904cfcc2d98a76d805ddd630076e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e5fc24aa90c0f1a7ac9b66f14be86ca9f91db4bf324a4cb6bbc1848c77b81b37
+size 51371
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..26a0d1e5add53308e6165288dda69feb437d5119
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:baac606a6804b535bea4d91ea9f0c609b32e6508426b52cc1f90a52c1d23b4c4
+size 58397
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4dffc9328d9ba97b39a26b477e8795808d2a77b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d32646272b7d350325ae0bb9a512dae72bbbb3511bc72c1d47bca2e3bbd916d6
+size 69642
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b34cc89a9eb27217cefc05816776f0aa8c10ec7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d40533bcb9b3ebb68330df19f4fcf208c14accd807b0fbde06502ee348065214
+size 77815
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1667db4007a9043f2e8e0d8a4f5199b5cdbc4ad7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fd3de5c9ea0b94eeea0fd67a3b5fa2b0c810a5ade8ca32832b30a7e2932934d5
+size 68437
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..279f89a0b1e12e48f77d0530f94d8fd6096568bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bc7c73fa8532508e2d38641ab89eb2f44b4fad7df3f1f065414e05b374b4bf1a
+size 86852
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7ec1e27edaf954e3421c1a12f85ff5d479c9e98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0d3cf241b5d9c6e13f4711c733f4cf4b4e553a39caa209af77daf68f55a5bd06
+size 8351
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b54a959b7276373059847d4206f67452736d82cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:98bce02d1e22889175008da60309224c4a10d95042c86be586982e83bc74349d
+size 53518
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7246d3e125a998ca87c10c552183bca5d822f1f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7016a37bfb299b7a90f561f41835155a228d4a5b351d7145c44a37d70d284e0b
+size 221231
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2f614ff1006defff33e5908466c1ba4baffcfc61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:993ac10318fd64d9239a6ef4df86fc7a7326e68451db885672ebd4252dae7d61
+size 5184
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..535041e19f7cd0fc1f784cfe9bd18acf4d9fcf9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3aec5e315269545d8f266262a5bcf178b6e82f40712d9be8b1b89f1a503e0b92
+size 55052
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7118a007d92295bddca8a706d7e36bf849b02b3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f26cd097325c126e450ecb9229c46a389338a957a73f88d8578f57add41e2fe3
+size 70629
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6bb6172431f037b1601c40ee3fa43b7daf3e20b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:68c318d3354082885ff29181b3ca3d6fc77abf624773fb0420686a5431bd08d5
+size 69301
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28d3dd3e811ce8a79bd33ba0d1778658e20da6be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3f6c83d91d60a308fa7201f0e6d699af144589b5fa71d90db9e23a0a4a3f37df
+size 69489
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f82ea886896cf602655a8860fe2cea682683ac42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:592a9fe367e7062800b4254536e6d0ba463ce6ae875b81f2e21078fb3a4d5c6a
+size 57803
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d4634c4cd7e4fe9bb8bce68fc0a6e61e147aadd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fd6ed70edce4a82a1e976bd4116fbec1567651933ead4e04ed25956addd3775d
+size 33179
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bf69dfb12f3ac2f0235ddf9d3ce18e08a552db65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aad58de431959d5597f55517f9fb412402d0e539677ae7f5de739f555f80c6d4
+size 81424
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38c4f0d8cb5018e79b53dc70c0511d4836b2172a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1ccf81f586edfdfbab4b676821d60ed65b2295855ed203fa4388eaa0d435f356
+size 141703
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cf3be144689ae10bf1bfb17ddab0614b897cddfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:753e265288063f127e4625c28c42c2ad92cc87e27b983d21d5c43690960061dc
+size 87344
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8704a1feefbaadbf6f8affd514cd9b5b313aa21b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fa7470cdd1c00b551a1fc33acd00e43eeff30c003d09dfc7f4274564dbac7db7
+size 38195
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..79d01343f418fbabf1db6fec636da03b5966dea6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d1a0d0607520df28f889661769ec2011cb42897f78a917569e604810c1b729e3
+size 125986
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4cd3b662f6706a378450325a2733c803d580a823
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:33b54e1af444f40a21231a0ac0a3cbd0588baa40c72007d98ad88f8aaf17efed
+size 61517
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a73557d3b5e9ec57af95e6743c0a22e9fb8c9d87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5e14690f0a7b24bcc7fb0348bd08eed66e195aa27d5172620e857a02534163b3
+size 83367
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad3b66fe59d64f55ee493b8405a76d58c7f66bc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a4e29d0571c975bef70b075177eacc0e111e17bc839dfc0f37ea3c34ac8262bd
+size 183349
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a8f11d4fcafbf66c23f77b0285502b2a17d7c0a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4dbc96306578cfe99138bc938e4b764c16b596574ebaee628b90b08ab10c6df0
+size 85043
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-008.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-008.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98dd607c557543586fd4418334dac6295553e5f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-008.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b3924c06a9ff74e6c63f440d9a09c928d305d1d71760cf34d7258db021b773cf
+size 299205
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bd665160689fa850cac8fef02c247153e0c234e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fe5021165c2c5ea5d4cc4fd606d137d24c577efd57bdb49646b16318a3d66596
+size 97611
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1244009538ae7c3c5d6ab6a342a5d1f356e64e7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bbe03b2f3e6a529501b80b3923c4b64e6febca3b304853d177ff4aefaff62d18
+size 128590
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a45b308d631c11db24a55fa8203bf5dcabdd6343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8ec3d1202ed342011dde05aa03a6a840f34a45de4c07dbb0433aac5a979d7349
+size 108292
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e9362dc92330749195ddceefcbf53dd42194a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3f0cbd3d7156407b319119571cba68f774e88e22db49a5198fbcfb45129b49d1
+size 129426
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..588891a56847bf22faf8176de16449eed7c744f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5abc85005531d266cb1967fda92b0b0a953840798bbfd76dd1ede3eddd4c2870
+size 114852
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e44c1cc8dcc4b25206216400a88fc8ef156b7e3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4abf9e9a3f5d8d23352d5116b50c6b83ffc73a800524ab81aac99e2c83f3f185
+size 129226
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..842c574a9c4c18b42000989454d8e40f0ba4b323
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6193eb35bb15b8c7c687afd52068daaed2318e661cd12886ce8d401aa0238ef2
+size 61728
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..06605d1febb7f1f4339fc54cc5301280603d7d6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bfc0c61272d920a0660e7e0b9e0306d5fe97acafc25d3acf03a85030261fe507
+size 77413
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7ee45edf8b12bbaa46a79686cfc71074f51b49ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:cdb8c3948a6fe70a60483191396ff353ca382923f8a4e61933225f901099c294
+size 74592
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9e51215bf135133f358f1ee9007001c71a4352a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b9a2318a1dd27caf02b347025cb4903dc2ea7aaee1c0574a5279835d1cf62d67
+size 107358
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..adce01583dc984880b6f2497459c9c2406be14cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4562399916ea76344e94b7a6ba765f8f67097c5a1453e686ea60db1ea318877a
+size 24223
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b30e2654c1176eb364cef458d1a2df8c3a3d68b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0d5fdc7ce755ddc40d5d5f131bed4f69b015877aff635fc8b5514ad65d783ee6
+size 88591
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2260188dd33a28c59b1a988e6810fbf873dabfe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-082",
+ "title": "Panama: Technical Assistance Report-Macroprudential Policy Frameworks",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-082.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "87f4f1bf8478e0b876a38d2a64abefc32bb789f13b519349181afbcbe42afac9",
+ "source_bytes": 2843739,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/02/10/panama-technical-assistance-report-macroprudential-policy-frameworks-529672",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:19+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 14.423,
+ "page_count": 27,
+ "text_characters": 40237,
+ "table_count": 3,
+ "figure_count": 60,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "PANAMA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT–– MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Panama: Technical Assistance Report-Macroprudential Policy Frameworks; IMF Country Report No. 23/82; June 2022 ",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230118101601-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230210111547-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d6c559150dbea69abafd0ace910fd9e375b6f006
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1030 @@
+
+
+
+
+February 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/82**
+### **PANAMA**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––** **MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Panama was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in June 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+3
+
+
+**Contents** **Page**
+
+
+Glossary .............................................................................................................................4
+
+
+Preface ...............................................................................................................................5
+
+
+Executive Summary ............................................................................................................6
+
+
+I. Introduction.....................................................................................................................8
+
+
+II. Institutional Arrangements..............................................................................................8
+
+A. Willingness to Act ..............................................................................................9
+B. Ability to Act ....................................................................................................10
+C. Interagency Cooperation....................................................................................10
+D. Recommendations.............................................................................................10
+
+
+III. Systemic Risk Assessments for Policy Decisions..........................................................13
+
+A. Analyses and Mapping in Panama .....................................................................13
+B. Recommendations .............................................................................................15
+
+
+Appendix: Presentation Slides ...........................................................................................18
+
+Figures
+1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools...................................................................12
+2. Macroprudential Analysis..............................................................................................16
+
+Tables
+1. Key Recommendation .....................................................................................................7
+2. Member of the FCC ......................................................................................................10
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+**GLOSSARY**
+
+
+CCoB Capital Conservation Buffer
+CCSBSO Central American Council of Superintendents of Banks,
+Insurance, and other Financial Entities (Consejo Centroamericano de
+Superintendentes de Bancos, de Seguros y de Otras Instituciones
+Financieras)
+CCyB Countercyclical Capital Buffer
+DSTI Debt Service to Income
+FCC Financial Coordination Council (Consejo de Coordinación Financiera)
+FSD Financial Studies Division (Dirección de Estudios Financieros)
+FSR Financial Stability Report
+GEFR Regional Financial Stability Committee (Grupo de Estabilidad
+Financiera Regional)
+LTV Loan to Value
+RMD Risk Management Division (Dirección de Riesgos)
+SBP Superintendency of Banks of Panama (Superintendencia de Bancos
+de Panamá)
+TA Technical Assistance
+TC Technical Committee
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+**PREFACE**
+
+
+At the request of the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (SBP), an IMF technical
+assistance (TA) mission took place virtually during August 3 - 9, 2021 to evaluate the
+macroprudential policy framework in Panama and develop a roadmap to strengthen it. The
+virtual mission was provided by Machiko Narita and Attila Csajbok (both MCM) and a
+follow-up virtual mission is planned for later this year to assist in the preparation of
+additional tools. This mission was part of a multi-topic MCM TA project comprising two
+other workstreams, on Basel II/III standards and the stress testing framework. Anastassiya
+Marina and Jose Roberto Effio (MCM TA project managers) joined the mission for the
+opening and concluding meetings. Messes. Joyce Denton and Hilda Tejada (IMF’s
+interpreter team) provided interpretation services during the mission.
+
+The mission held virtual meetings with a joint team from the SBP’s Financial Studies
+Division (FSD, _Dirección de Estudios Financieros_ ) and Risk Management Division (RMD,
+_Dirección de Riesgos_ ). This team consisted of Mr. Javier Motta (Director of FSD) and
+Ms. Nahila Melgar (Director of RMD), as well as Ms. Ingrid Arboleda, Ms. Delia Cuan, and
+Mr. Patricio Mosquera (all FSD). Mr. Amauri Castillo (Superintendent of Banks) also joined
+part of the opening and concluding meetings.
+
+We would like to thank the SBP staff for their excellent collaboration, their responses to the
+questionnaire, helpful presentations, and productive meetings. We would also like to thank
+them for collecting and sharing the relevant materials as needed during the mission.
+
+
+
+6
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+
+**The mission assisted the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (SBP) in developing a**
+**roadmap to strengthen the macroprudential policy framework in Panama.** This mission
+was the third workstream under the multi-topic MCM TA project that the SBP requested in
+October 2020 to enhance its capacity to safeguard financial stability. This macroprudential
+policy mission was built on the findings from the diagnostic missions of the other two
+workstreams, on Basel standards and stress testing respectively, as well as the Article IV
+team’s analyses. A follow-up virtual mission is planned for later this year to assist in the
+preparation of additional macroprudential tools.
+
+**The mission found that the SBP has adequate capacity to conduct macroprudential**
+**policy.** The SBP has broad powers to direct macroprudential policy tools and to collect
+information. It also has an effective internal process to conduct systemic risk assessments for
+policy decisions, supported by a dedicated unit—the Financial Studies Division (FSD)—
+using a rich set of analytical tools and data. Information sharing with other supervisory
+agencies has been done through the mutual representation of some directors at the Boards of
+the Superintendencies of Banks, Insurance, and Securities, respectively, and at the Financial
+Coordination Council (FCC).
+
+**The mission’s main recommendation is to tighten the link between policy objectives,**
+**assessments, and tools (Table 1).** The mission recommends preparing and publishing a
+macroprudential strategy document to clarify the set of indicators and tools corresponding to
+the policy objectives. This will help the SBP take timely actions with the policy tools tailored
+to emerging systemic risks. Communication should also be enhanced by making more use of
+the Financial Stability Report (FSR) to explain policy decisions and to provide the
+underlying analysis. The mission also made recommendations on other aspects, such as the
+expansion of the policy toolkit, in particular to include borrower-based measures (e.g., caps
+on the loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios), which will be followed up on in the
+second mission.
+
+
+
+7
+
+
+**Table 1. Key Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommendation|Priority|Timeframe1/|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Institutional Arrangements**|**Institutional Arrangements**|**Institutional Arrangements**|
+|1. Set up terms of reference (TOR) for the Technical Committee (TC)
to regularly discuss macroprudential issues, or establish a dedicated
macroprudential committee with a clear TOR; while in either option,
the TOR for the TC should be clearly set up, the frequency should
be at least quarterly, the FSD should be responsible for setting the
meeting agenda, and meeting minutes should be kept when policy
proposals are discussed (¶11,12)
|Medium
|Medium
|
+|2. Hold regular meetings (quarterly or semiannually) dedicated to
macroprudential policy issues at the SBP Board (¶11,12)|Medium|Medium|
+|
3. Draft a macroprudential strategy document that explains objectives,
indicators, and how they are mapped into policy instruments (¶13;
please also see recommendations 9, 10, and 11)
|High
|Short
|
+|4. Publish the macroprudential strategy document (¶13)
|Medium
|Long
|
+|5. Make more use of the Financial Stability Report (FSR) to explain
policy decisions and to provide the underlying analysis (¶14)|Medium|Medium|
+|6. Enhance the external communication of the FSR, complementing its
press conference with a press release and an expert-level
presentation, as well as publishing the FSR in English in addition to
Spanish (¶15)|Medium|Medium|
+|
7. Form a working group of technical-level staff from the FCC member
agencies to assess relevant systemic risks for policy discussions.
(¶16)|Low|Long|
+|
8. Consider adding to the Internal Rules and Regulations (Resolución
#1) of the FCC, or its underlying Law as needed, a clause to issue
recommendations to its members with a “comply-or-explain”
mechanism (¶16)|Low|Long|
+|
**Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools**|
**Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools**|
**Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools**|
+|
9. Specify core and additional indicators as well as associated
analyses in the macroprudential strategy document for each type of
systemic risk (e.g., as listed in Figure 1) (¶22)|High|Short|
+|10. Develop a strategy for addressing household sector risks by
specifying the main risk indicators and designing borrower-based
tools, preparing for the second TA mission of this macroprudential
policy workstream (¶23)|High|Short|
+|
11. Refine the strategy for existing tools, reflecting the planned addition
of the Basel III capital and liquidity tools (¶24, 25)|Medium|Medium|
+|
12. Evaluate the intended effects of any measures taken, using the main
indicators specified in the strategy, and any unintended side effects
(¶26)|Medium|Long|
+|
13. Establish a clear definition of “income” for the purpose of borrower
measures, collect income data of borrowers, and make further
efforts to collect data on commercial real estate prices (¶27)
|High
|Medium
|
+|14. Expand analyses, if feasible, by launching a quarterly lending survey
of banks and by constructing a contemporaneous financial stress
index from market-based indicators (¶28)|Medium|Long|
+
+
+
+1/ Short term: less than 12 months; Medium term: between 12 and 24 months; Long term: more than 24 months. The
+indicated timeframes must be considered relative and administered with discretion by the SBP, taking into account the
+negative impacts on the financial system caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBP is the authority responsible of
+implementing all recommendations, except for the seventh and eighth items, whose responsible authority is the FCC.
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+
+**1.** **The Superintendency of Banks in Panama (SBP) plays the key role for financial**
+**stability.** [As specified in Article 5 of the Banking Law (No. 9-1998), the SBP is tasked with](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/prev-cont-il-op/leg-fram/banking_law)
+safeguarding the soundness and efficiency of the banking system. While there is no explicit
+mandate to promote the stability of the entire financial system, beyond the banking system,
+the SBP plays the leading role in promoting financial stability given that the banking system
+accounts for about 90 percent of the financial sector. There is no central bank in Panama.
+
+
+**2.** **This technical assistance (TA) mission evaluated the macroprudential policy**
+**framework in Panama.** **[1]** The mission assessed (1) the institutional arrangements; (2) the
+framework to assess systemic risks to prepare for policy actions; and (3) took a preliminary
+look at the available tools ahead of the planned follow-up mission on the toolkit. The
+[assessment was conducted based on the IMF guidance (IMF, 2014a), taking into account the](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)
+country-specific circumstances in Panama. The assessments were also built on the findings
+and recommendations from the recent TA on Basel II/III standards and the stress testing
+framework, as well as the Article IV team’s analyses. [2]
+
+
+**3.** **This TA report summarizes the mission’s findings and recommendations.**
+Section II assesses the current institutional arrangements. Section III reviews how systemic
+risks are assessed to guide policy decisions, for each type of systemic risks described in the
+[IMF guidance (IMF, 2014a), and as relevant for Panama. It also evaluates the adequacy of](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)
+policy tools in each of these domains, informing the planned second virtual mission on
+additional tools. The Appendix includes the presentation slides used by the mission members
+during the mission.
+
+
+**II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**
+
+
+**4.** **A strong institutional framework is essential for macroprudential policy to be**
+**effective.** The IMF guidance suggests three key principles. Institutional arrangements should
+ensure (1) the willingness to act in the face of opposition, supported by a clear mandate,
+organized policy process, and effective communication; (2) the ability to act, with adequate
+powers to take policy actions and to collect information; and (3) cooperation across all
+relevant agencies for financial stability. Recommendations are provided after reviewing each
+of these aspects of the current framework in Panama.
+
+
+1 Panama has the two-year arrangement under the IMF’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), approved on
+January 19, 2021, as insurance against extreme external shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. It is
+important to continue efforts to safeguard financial stability, enhancing the frameworks of banking regulations,
+risk assessment and stress testing, and macroprudential policy.
+
+
+2 In particular, see [IMF (2021)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/30/Panama-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-463116) and “Towards a More Resilient Financial Sector” and “Macroprudential Policy
+in Panama: Implications for the Real Estate Market” in [IMF (2020). The virtual missions took place for Basel](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/21/Panama-Selected-Issues-49355)
+standards in March 10-April 6, 2021, and for the stress testing framework in April 30 - May 6, 2021.
+
+
+
+9
+
+
+**A. Willingness to Act**
+
+
+**5.** **The SBP has a legal basis to conduct macroprudential policy.** The Banking Law
+[(No. 9-1998) provides the SBP with the objective to safeguard the soundness and efficiency](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/prev-cont-il-op/leg-fram/banking_law)
+of the banking system (Article 5). Expanding the coverage of this objective from the banking
+system to the entire financial system could be considered in the future, because systemic
+risks can go beyond the banking system. [3] However, the current objective is assessed as
+practically sufficient at present because about 90 percent of the financial sector assets are
+held in the banking system, and thus, promoting banking sector stability goes a long way to
+ensure the stability of the entire financial system.
+
+
+**6.** **The SBP has an effective decision-making process.** The Financial Studies Division
+(FSD) is a dedicated unit for macroprudential analyses, in close collaboration with the Risk
+Management Division (RMD), which is responsible for the analyses of microprudential
+issues. These analyses are discussed at the Technical Committee (TC), where the
+Superintendent and the Directors of the FSD, the RMD, the Supervision Division, and the
+Regulations Division participate. While there are no preset rules on the meeting frequency or
+agenda setting, the TC meets as needed, with the agenda proposed by the members. [4] The TC
+is a consultative body, with the Superintendent deciding on policy proposals to be raised to
+the Board. The ultimate policy decisions are made by the approval of the Board of Directors
+of the SBP, which consists of seven independent members. [5]
+
+
+**7.** **The SBP’s communication has not been active on macroprudential policy.** While
+the SBP states on its website that it conducts macroprudential supervision with the necessary
+regulations for the banking system, [6] it has not elaborated on the intermediate objectives of
+macroprudential policy or the approaches to achieve them. While the regulations that the
+SBP publishes include the explanation of their background and the policy intentions, the SBP
+has not actively explained such policies to the public, for example, in the annual Financial
+Stability Report (FSR). [7]
+
+
+[3 Please see paragraph 78 of IMF (2013a)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Key-Aspects-of-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4803) and paragraph 10 of [IMF (2013b), for example.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Implementing-Macroprudential-Policy-Selected-Legal-Issues-PP4802)
+
+
+4 In other words, there is no guarantee to discuss macroprudential issues regularly. The frequency of the TC
+meetings has been monthly or more since the onset of the pandemic, while it used to be semiannual previously.
+
+
+5 The Board consists of seven professionals and businesspersons without ties to the banking sector, five of
+which are elected and the other two are appointed by the Board of Directors of the Superintendence of
+Securities Markets and the Superintendency of Insurance and Reinsurance, respectively. Please see the current
+Directors at [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/about-sbp/board-of-directors.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/about-sbp/board-of-directors)
+
+
+6 Please see the SBP’s supervisory framework: [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/supervisory-framework.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/supervisory-framework)
+
+
+7 The SBP publishes regulations at [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/laws-and-reg/rules; and the annual](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/laws-and-reg/rules)
+Financial Stability Report and other analyses at [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios)
+
+
+
+10
+
+
+**B. Ability to Act**
+
+
+**8.** **The SBP has broad powers to direct macroprudential policy tools and to collect**
+**information from the banking sector.** As per Article 11 of the Banking Law, the SBP is
+empowered to establish necessary regulations to achieve its objectives specified in Article 5.
+For macroprudential policy, this means that the SBP can directly introduce, repeal, or change
+the calibration of policy instruments, if they are deemed necessary to safeguard the
+soundness and efficiency of the banking system. Chapter IX of the Banking Law grants the
+SBP the right to request information from banks and banking groups.
+
+
+**C. Interagency Cooperation**
+
+
+
+**9.** **The Financial Coordination Council (FCC) was established in 2011 for domestic**
+**interagency cooperation.** The FCC consists of six domestic supervisory agencies (Table 2),
+with the main objective to strengthen
+
+**Table 2. Members of the FCC**
+
+information exchange and coordination on
+
+ - Superintendence of Banks in Panama
+
+regulatory policies across supervisory - Superintendence of Securities Markets
+agencies. The FCC Board is chaired by the - Superintendence of Insurance and
+Superintendent of Banks and meets Reinsurance
+
+ - Panamanian Autonomous Cooperative
+
+quarterly. [8] As per Article 9 of Title I of Law
+
+Institute
+
+No. 67, the FCC has power to make - System of Savings and Capitalization of
+recommendations to its members (“soft Pensions of Public Servants
+
+ - National Directorate of Financial
+
+power”). So far, the FCC’s role has been
+
+Companies of the Ministry of Commerce
+
+mostly information sharing. [9]
+
+
+
+**Table 2. Members of the FCC**
+
+
+
+
+- Superintendence of Banks in Panama
+
+- Superintendence of Securities Markets
+
+- Superintendence of Insurance and
+Reinsurance
+
+- Panamanian Autonomous Cooperative
+Institute
+
+- System of Savings and Capitalization of
+Pensions of Public Servants
+
+- National Directorate of Financial
+Companies of the Ministry of Commerce
+and Industry
+
+
+
+Source: Title I of Law No. 67 of September 1, 2011.
+
+**10.** **The SBP has also been involved in**
+**cross-border cooperation for financial stability.** The SBP is part of the Central American
+Council of Superintendents of Banks, Insurance, and other Financial Entities (CCSBSO),
+which aims to facilitate cooperation and to promote financial stability in the region. [10] The
+SBP also participates in the committee for regional financial stability (Grupo de Estabilidad
+Financiera Regional, GEFR), consisting of the central banks and the superintendencies in
+Central America, and collaborates on the Regional Financial Stability Report.
+
+
+**D. Recommendations**
+
+
+**11.** **The SBP is encouraged to institutionalize the decision-making process for**
+**macroprudential policy.** While the TC has been facilitating internal discussions on financial
+
+
+8 Additional _ad hoc_ meetings can be also held at the request of any FCC members (Article 3 of the FCC
+Resolución #1). The SBP serves as the technical secretariat of the FCC (Article 16 of the FCC Resolución #1).
+
+
+9 In addition to the FCC, interagency information sharing has been facilitated via mutual representation of some
+directors at the Boards of the Superintendencies of Banks, Insurance, and Securities, respectively.
+
+
+10 Please see the [CCSBSO website.](https://ccsbso.org/)
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+stability, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to maintain good practice
+even after the crisis. This is particularly true for macroprudential policy because it needs to
+act when systemic risks are building up in good times. In this regard, it would be useful to set
+up terms of references for the TC to ensure that macroprudential issues are regularly
+discussed (e.g., quarterly at least) so that the SBP can take any policy actions on a timely
+basis. Alternatively, the SBP could create a dedicated macroprudential committee, with a
+clear delineation from the role of the TC. Under either option, terms of references for the TC
+should be clearly set up. Also, the FSD should be responsible for setting the meeting agenda,
+and the meeting minutes should be kept when policy proposals are discussed so that minority
+voices are also recorded. In addition, the Board should have regular meetings dedicated to
+macroprudential policy (e.g., semiannually), including a meeting where the annual FSR is
+discussed and approved.
+
+
+**12.** **Clarifying a dedicated process for macroprudential policy will enhance the**
+**“willingness to act.”** It will help ensure regular and timely discussions on macroprudential
+issues. It will also foster open discussion when tensions arise between microprudential and
+[macroprudential perspectives (e.g., paragraph 32, IMF 2013a), while the current close](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Key-Aspects-of-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4803)
+collaboration on both perspectives across divisions at the SBP should be kept.
+
+
+**13.** **The SBP should consider establishing a macroprudential policy strategy to be**
+**shared with the public.** An increasing number of macroprudential authorities publish a
+strategy document (Table 3), which elaborates their policy framework. The strategy
+document should explain the goals, the indicators followed, and how they are mapped into
+policy instruments. Publishing such a strategy document helps counter the “inaction” biases
+that can arise in the face of opposition, by promoting public understanding of the need for
+macroprudential measures. [11] The SBP can start drafting a strategy document for internal use
+first, and eventually publish it after refining the strategy over a few policy cycles.
+
+
+
+**Table 1** _**.**_ **Examples of Macroprudential Policy Strategy Documents**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Finansinspektionen
(Sweden)|https://www.fi.se/contentassets/be52777b45194e2892a243793817b7ff/fi-
och-finansiell-stabilitet-20191219.pdf|
+|---|---|
+|Financial Policy
Committee (UK)
|https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-
bulletin/2013/q3/macroprudential-policy-at-the-boe|
+|Czech National Bank
|https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/macroprudential-policy/
|
+|Central Bank of Malta
|https://www.centralbankmalta.org/macro-prudential-policy
|
+|Reserve Bank of New
Zealand|https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation-and-supervision/oversight-of-
banks/standards-and-requirements-for-banks/macroprudential-policy|
+|National Bank of
Serbia|https://nbs.rs/en/ciljevi-i-funkcije/finansijska-stabilnost/finansijska-
stabilnost/|
+
+
+
+11 For example, please see paragraphs 57 and 79 of [IMF (2013a) and paragraph 51 of](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Key-Aspects-of-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4803) [IMF (2014a).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+**14.** **Communication can be further strengthened on macroprudential policy,**
+**particularly through the FSR.** The SBP is encouraged to make more use of the FSR to
+explain policy decisions and to provide the underlying analysis. Systemic risk analyses
+should be linked to the policy objectives specified in the strategy document, so that any need
+for policy responses can be assessed. Ex-post evaluation of the macroprudential measures
+taken could also usefully be discussed. Periodic updates on risks and policies, consistent with
+the macroprudential strategy, help demonstrate the SBP’s commitment to take policy action
+as needed, as well as build policy credibility (e.g., paragraph 52 of [IMF 2014a).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)
+
+
+**15.** **The SBP should also continue its efforts to reach to a broader audience when**
+**delivering the FSR.** The recent high-level press conferences by the Superintendent at the
+FSR publication are a good practice that should continue. [12] The SBP could consider
+complementing them with a press release, and an expert-level presentation with a Q&A
+session with market analysts and financial journalists. The SBP could also consider
+publishing the FSR in English as well as in Spanish, especially given Panama’s importance
+as a financial hub.
+
+
+**16.** **Continued efforts are encouraged to foster domestic interagency cooperation.**
+While being mindful of different capacities across supervisory agencies, especially given the
+different size of each financial sector, the FCC could consider strengthening its roles beyond
+information sharing. For example, the FCC could identify financial stability issues that are
+relevant for FCC members and form a working group of technical-level staff from the
+member agencies to assess systemic risks for policy discussions. Also, consideration could be
+given to review and amend the Internal Rules and Regulations (Resolución #1) of the FCC,
+or its underlying Law as needed, so that it can issue recommendations to its members with a
+“comply-or-explain” clause, moving the FCC from “soft power” to “semi-hard power.” This
+could help the SBP to fulfill macroprudential responsibilities when any policy actions are
+needed to be taken by other supervisory agencies for financial stability, e.g., in the case of
+regulatory leakages. [13]
+
+
+12 The presentation materials are accessible via: [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/presentaciones.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/presentaciones)
+
+
+13 For example, please see paragraph 87 of [IMF (2014a).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+**III.** **SYSTEMIC RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR POLICY DECISIONS**
+
+
+
+**17.** **Continuous assessment** Figure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools
+**of evolving risks is key to**
+**macroprudential policy making.**
+There are different types of
+systemic risks, which are best
+addressed by different policy
+instruments (Figure 1). Since the
+prominence of each systemic risk
+changes over time, it is prudent to
+keep all types of risks on the radar
+screen by monitoring indicators of
+each type of risks. When References: [IMF (2014a)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925) and [IMF (2014b).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-Detailed-Guidance-on-Instruments-PP4928)
+indicators suggest emerging
+vulnerabilities, the need for any policy responses should be assessed on a timely basis, with
+deeper analyses conducted as needed. This multi-dimensional nature of systemic risks and
+tools highlight the importance to establish a macroprudential strategy, with clear links
+between policy objectives, risk assessments, and tools.
+
+
+
+Figure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools
+
+
+
+
+
+References: [IMF (2014a)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925) and [IMF (2014b).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-Detailed-Guidance-on-Instruments-PP4928)
+
+
+
+**A. Analyses and Mapping in Panama**
+
+
+**18.** **The FSD, in close collaboration with the RMD, conducts systemic risk**
+**assessments using a rich set of analytical tools and data.** Regular monitoring tools include
+a heat map of risks, a cobweb diagram, liquidity stress tests, and solvency stress tests. [14] The
+set of risk indicators in the heat map is rich, including credit indicators (e.g., growth of credit,
+share of risky credit), banking sector indicators (e.g., solvency and liquidity indicators), and
+market indicators (e.g., volatility of sovereign bond yields, the emerging markets bond
+index). [15] The FSD also rightly exercises expert judgement when interpreting indicators—for
+example, for the credit-to-GDP gap analysis, they explored alternative filtering techniques
+(e.g., [Yogo 2008,](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176508000128?via%3Dihub) [Hamilton 2018), when faced with the statistical drawbacks of mechanically](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/100/5/831/58479/Why-You-Should-Never-Use-the-Hodrick-Prescott)
+applying the standard HP filter, which generates an artificial credit boom before the large
+drop in GDP in the wake of COVID-19.
+
+
+**19.** **The FSD also conducts in-depth analyses for specific vulnerabilities, while they**
+**are not always tied to the discussion of specific policy tools.** The FSD provides useful
+insights into systemic risks through tailored analyses (e.g., household indebtedness, real
+estate sector), which are discussed at the TC and some of which are publicly available. [16]
+
+
+14 FSD is upgrading the solvency stress test model under the ongoing MCM TA.
+
+
+15 The definitions of indicators are consistent with those used in the GEFR with regional peers.
+
+
+16 Some analyses are available at the [SBP website.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios)
+
+
+
+14
+
+
+Such analyses could also be used to discuss the need for policy actions, such as any
+adjustments to the existing policy tools or the need for additional tools (Table 4).
+
+
+**Table 4: Policy Objectives and Instruments**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Objective|Instrument|
+|---|---|
+|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Dynamic Provisions|
+|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Capital Conservation Buffer*|
+|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Limits to the leverage ratio|
+|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Sectoral risk weights for mortgage loans|
+|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Sectoral risk weights for corporate loans|
+|2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity
mismatches or market illiquidity|Minimum requirement on liquid assets|
+|2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity
mismatches or market illiquidity|Liquidity coverage ratio requirement|
+|2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity
mismatches or market illiquidity|Net stable funding ratio requirement*|
+|3. Limit the concentration of direct and indirect risk|Limit to large exposures|
+|4. Limit systemic effect of inappropriate incentives to
reduce moral hazard|Capital surcharges for systemically
important institutions*|
+
+
+
+[Source: The SBP and the IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Home.aspx)
+
+Notes: Instruments with asterisk (*) are currently not in place but under consideration by the SBP.
+
+
+**20.** **Few of the existing tools are intended to be used in a time-varying manner,**
+**which limits the SBP’s ability to actively tighten and loosen the macroprudential stance**
+**to lean against and mitigate the risks of financial cycles.** The main anticyclical tool is
+dynamic provisioning, which follows a formula depending on the growth of risk-weighted
+assets and special provisions in individual banks. Its accumulation and release are therefore
+automatic and do not require policy decisions. However, after the onset of COVID-19, the
+SBP made a discretionary decision to release 80 percent of dynamic provisions as a
+pre-emptive measure, well before the increase in special provisions would have started to
+decrease it automatically. This can be considered as a macroprudential decision, to loosen the
+stance in the wake of an unprecedented GDP contraction in order to mitigate the risk of a
+credit crunch and the emergence of a vicious circle between credit and real activity. That
+said, the SBP made it clear to the mission that it does not intend to adjust the parameters of
+other tools in its toolkit (such as the sectoral risk weights for mortgages and corporate loans)
+actively, in a time-varying manner.
+
+
+**21.** **The SBP has made continuous efforts to ensure adequate data for analyses,**
+**including micro-level data.** The SBP has established an internal database that contains
+granular data of all loans from all banks in Panama. It includes the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
+at the origination and subsequent repayment performance for each loan, as well as total debt
+service payments for each borrower. The SBP plans to add a new field to the database for the
+income of the borrower at the time of loan origination, which banks already collect, so that a
+debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio at loan origination can be calculated, possibly not just
+for new loans, but also for existing ones.
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+**B. Recommendations**
+
+
+**22.** **The SBP is encouraged to clarify and tighten the links between policy objectives,**
+**assessments, and tools.** Specifically, the SBP can organize main indicators and analyses for
+each type of systemic risks to assess the need for policy actions with appropriate tools
+(Figure 1). This will help the SBP take timely actions with the policy tools tailored to
+emerging systemic risks. Also, as discussed earlier, the SBP should consider explaining the
+mapping in the macroprudential strategy document, as done by [Finansinspektionen](https://www.fi.se/contentassets/be52777b45194e2892a243793817b7ff/fi-och-finansiell-stabilitet-20191219.pdf)
+(e.g., page 25) and other macroprudential authorities.
+
+
+**23.** **The SBP should continue the preparatory work to introduce borrower-based**
+**tools at an appropriate time, as part of developing a strategy.** The SBP is considering
+introducing borrower-based tools (e.g., caps on the DSTI and LTV ratios) at an appropriate
+time, and conducting preparatory work (e.g., analyses and data collection). Adding such tools
+would be valuable because Panama has experienced vulnerabilities from growing household
+sector loans before the pandemic [17] and because existing tools would not be best suited to
+address cyclical risks that are specific to the household sector (Table 4). The SBP should
+develop a strategy in addressing the household sector risks, by specifying the main risk
+indicators and designing appropriate tools. The authorities could find useful the detailed
+guidance in [IMF (2014b) in producing the strategy.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-Detailed-Guidance-on-Instruments-PP4928) [18] A follow-up TA mission is planned to
+assist this work.
+
+
+**24.** **The SBP should refine the current strategy for existing tools, reflecting the**
+**planned addition of the Basel III tools.** In line with the recommendations of the TA on
+Basel standards, at an appropriate time, the SBP plans to implement some macroprudential
+tools, including the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCoB). [19] In this context, it becomes more
+important to clarify the main objectives of each tool. For example, with clarified objectives,
+the SBP is encouraged to assess the need to adjust any parameters of the dynamic provisions
+(e.g., its floor and cap) when the CCoB is fully implemented. Likewise, the merits of
+introducing a Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) should be carefully assessed, especially
+whether, if implemented, it should complement or replace the existing dynamic provisioning
+tool. Similar assessments are also encouraged for liquidity tools, clarifying the strategy.
+
+
+**25.** **The timing of any activation of additional tools should be guided by the strategy.**
+The SBP should determine the appropriate timing and modality of each measure, assessing
+macro-financial developments based on its strategy (i.e., objectives, main indicators). For
+
+
+17 Please see “Macroprudential Policy in Panama: Implications for the Real Estate Market” and “Towards a
+More Resilient Financial Sector” in [IMF (2020), as well as the](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/21/Panama-Selected-Issues-49355) [Staff Report](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/30/Panama-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-463116) of the 2021 Article IV consultation.
+
+
+18 It would be also useful to check Section III of the [IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/ChapterQuery.aspx) to study what
+borrower-based tools are implemented in other countries to address household sector risks.
+
+
+19 Please see the TA report (2021) “Basel II/III implementation roadmap (Hoja de ruta para la implementación
+de Basilea II/III).”
+
+
+
+16
+
+
+example, to build resilience with minimal tightening effects, many countries introduced the
+CCoB in a phased-in manner over several years. [20] Also, in the context of the COVID-19
+pandemic, some countries postponed the planned phased introduction of capital buffers for
+systemically important financial institutions, because procyclical tightening of prudential
+policies would be counterproductive by discouraging bank lending and slowing economic
+recovery. [21] Developing a clear strategy would help the SBP on the planned implementation
+of additional tools and its communication to the public.
+
+
+**26.** **The SBP should continue building experience in evaluating policy effects.**
+Macroprudential analysis goes beyond systemic risk monitoring (Figure 2). Policy
+evaluation, both ex post and ex ante (i.e., policy simulation), is also important part of the
+policy making process. For example, the SBP is encouraged to evaluate the intended effects
+of any measures taken, using the main indicators specified in the strategy, and any
+unintended side effects (e.g., on real GDP growth). Such an evaluation helps the SBP to
+assess any needs for policy adjustments, together with feedback from market participants and
+experiences from other countries. [22]
+
+
+**Figure 2. Macroprudential Analysis**
+
+
+Source: The Mission Team
+
+
+20 Please see Section II.B. of the [IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Home.aspx)
+
+
+21 Please see in MCM notes on [Macroprudential Relaxation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-main-operational-aspects-for-macroprudential-policy-relaxation.ashx) and [Unwinding policies for Banking Systems.](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-unwinding-covid-19-policy-interventions-for-banking-systems.ashx)
+
+
+22 The authorities may find useful the IMF’s [iMaPP database](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/iMaPPDatabase.aspx) for empirical analyses. Please see [Alam et al.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/22/Digging-Deeper-Evidence-on-the-Effects-of-Macroprudential-Policies-from-a-New-Database-46658)
+[(2019), who introduced it and studied the effects and side-effects of various tools. Please also see](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/22/Digging-Deeper-Evidence-on-the-Effects-of-Macroprudential-Policies-from-a-New-Database-46658) [Galati and](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecca.12229)
+[Moessner (2018), Araujo et al. (2021), and](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecca.12229) [BCBS (2021)](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp38.htm) for literature surveys.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+**27.** **Continued efforts are encouraged to fill data gaps.** **[23]** For the borrower-level data of
+income that the SBP plans to collect from banks, the mission suggested checking the
+definition of “income” under the Labor Code, [24] which already imposes a cap on DSTI ratio.
+Unless there is a major issue, it is recommended to use the same definition for the potential
+new DSTI regulation and thus for the collection of data, with a view to minimize complexity
+and reporting burdens for banks. The SBP could also consider constructing indices of real
+estate prices, possibly in collaboration with the national statistical agency (Instituto Nacional
+de Estadística y Censo - Panamá). [25] Such efforts are already on their way for residential real
+estate prices, but would be very important to expand to commercial real estate prices as well,
+as construction loans make up a sizable portion (more than 11 percent) of the total loan
+portfolio.
+
+
+**28.** **The SBP should keep the strategy updated with evolving needs for new**
+**indicators and analytical tools.** It is commendable that the FSD, in collaboration with
+RMD, is exploring various methods and data to assess evolving systemic risks. The SBP is
+also upgrading the solvency stress testing framework with the help of ongoing MCM TA, [26]
+which could also be useful for macroprudential decisions (e.g., to gauge the level of
+resilience to be targeted for capital tools). [27] The SBP should continue these good efforts and
+keep the strategy updated accordingly. The SBP could also consider launching a quarterly
+lending survey to measure changes in banks’ (non-price) credit conditions and expectations
+of loan growth. [28] It is also encouraged to continue exploring the feasibility of constructing a
+contemporaneous financial stress index from market-based indicators. [29]
+
+
+23 Please also see the Informational Annex in the [Staff Report](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/30/Panama-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-463116) of the 2021 Article IV consultation.
+
+
+24 Article 161, numerals 11 and 13.
+
+
+25 The second mission will follow up on this possibility.
+
+
+26 Please see the TA report (2021) “Stress Testing (Pruebas de Estrés).”
+
+
+27 The upgrade of the stress testing framework also involves revamping the macro forecasting model, the output
+of which (baseline forecasts of GDP, inflation and credit) can be used to forecast the credit-to-GDP ratio on a
+two-year horizon which is a very useful forward-looking indicator for macroprudential analysis. It can also help
+stabilize the estimated trend of credit-to-GDP, mitigating some of the statistical drawbacks of the filtering
+techniques used to calculate the credit gap (see Gerdrup, Kvinlog and Schaanning 2013 on this technique).
+
+
+[28 For example, the ECB conducts the euro area bank lending survey (BLS), which is explained by](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/index.en.html) [Köhler-](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop179.en.pdf)
+[Ulbrich et al. (2016)—the ECB occasional paper No. 179. The ECB publishes the results with a quick analysis](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop179.en.pdf)
+and interpretation on its website every quarter (e.g., [Q2 2021).](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/ecb.blssurvey2021q2~b868c78ada.en.html)
+
+
+29 Please see examples of such an index in the [ESRB risk dashboard and the](https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html) [FSR of National Bank of Ukraine.](https://bank.gov.ua/en/stability/report)
+
+
+
+18
+
+
+**I. APPENDIX:** **PRESENTATION SLIDES**
+
+
+Please see below includes the presentation slides used by the mission members during the
+mission.
+
+**1.** **Overview:**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+20
+
+
+**2.** **Analysis and Mapping, with the example from the Malta FSAP in 2019**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+24
+
+
+**3.** **Policy Evaluation**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+25
+
+
+**4.** **Mission’s findings and recommendations at the concluding meeting**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d53df21d42e58e0e1b52d7a7a134cb79b9471862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9799c9366071c945", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1239, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aaba24fe20beb494bd902497b78107872793bf91a5972496a4963cf2a07fc07d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "2a911b4c13a8601265ab9ac46471e144f09eff4ac2bf2febbeb4d2761bc4cfc2", "width": 951}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0013-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3373616363636363", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0013-001", "height": 240, "page": 13, "phash_256": "ceea88b0889f9d8bb0f8666fb149b334e2066b669555b79be04594cb3b346370", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "12c1bf96957a2eba5938d0e8f3ae6813d9ef7a56ced8f776699ad086064721b9", "width": 405}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5d3515153d392f07", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0016-001", "height": 353, "page": 16, "phash_256": "fe9f479c85609163c7f6239e9155876218223c1d1e9e7e807b8c93778442ceed", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "167ec0a16d50715dfb03bd6c787eecc10c17a7d611e2b3e61a669eb6a453488c", "width": 601}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f0c3313830b0f05", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-001", "height": 328, "page": 18, "phash_256": "e950950416afe1516bfa95811f3ee0729cea908fc39c4b3b947132eee58c0fbc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "db076e4f51339b9f7de99d3879e8fe059bf45f5b930b4ab6d10e2471ff3b517b", "width": 438}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8480960f8c8c8041", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-002", "height": 328, "page": 18, "phash_256": "f205d8a15aafd2093ffeadd6255a85520f5a2f582dc62366a1581cf6af302759", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "60e6ae268c2a1a49b493b5610c55ae3b7a748d3322b1e50cb5a3d0f72acf707b", "width": 427}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "86967d6465332041", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-003", "height": 322, "page": 18, "phash_256": "bf40e014407fe94042bf95143faafa801eeac117c21f1fa2e3971ac79ea83fbc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "5038f4f5f4ae0f6e76dbe2cd434b2a12c83b86ce0d1bc48d122d15035d2db3be", "width": 428}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8686392f2f2b8649", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-004", "height": 322, "page": 18, "phash_256": "bd05b14041ffc4103feac5003a6fca954e9e9e4a4abb915a94166ba36be16cbf", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "b60d1eecb751bc5f829d90814f5c0e3e0e738cfac546968f64e824bf4d1cf0f4", "width": 437}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3b0b363c3b3b2345", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-001", "height": 346, "page": 19, "phash_256": "bc01bd4062fefa1516bbd0053faac5e00bb991b9c0ff8ea691a2603fe5683fa8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "b1dc0d92291e77b63eea8f5132e16f828568572012dc1252a55789b3efebea88", "width": 458}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5533333361333335", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-002", "height": 345, "page": 19, "phash_256": "c885c37d34fa96d642aebd2d612bd2d61ad6ed293d244ad6965a056bc1b45364", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "72a3ad4dd5d49983ab12162b129167aa6b528e2dd5ac85e236247c102c2e81fd", "width": 457}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0e33332323232321", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-003", "height": 337, "page": 19, "phash_256": "eec4b155111ff52d3122ee2e191eced14eddccd993d2c2b64b229550c69d48f2", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "3db97d0e96ca2ca378312163b273a4c3cf01253b5437fd3791dc84b382a7a4b2", "width": 459}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2f13333366951b05", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-004", "height": 348, "page": 19, "phash_256": "ad91bc0472fcc29027abac615afaef861b0ed0b907fac042077fc47af0682dbd", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "152f0a92375b56fd17da1b9bbd352864dd57d8801692f8afe64a0503e543c81d", "width": 457}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8c0d612117960c2d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-005", "height": 352, "page": 19, "phash_256": "fe805ea0815fb15f1c7b6e90492c971c3f883ee060d3c9b379a69c36945985de", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "c690bae2a1dbd2acd08b6ab742d593c03b49b6bcf2bb1726fecaabc1dabf29fb", "width": 457}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3eb3716e63709eb1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-006", "height": 358, "page": 19, "phash_256": "9f7c1d57e083b4401f7cb758eb83eb8fe0e0c0801f3e147f70e114c11b3f10ef", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "5ee7c183cb3bbad68ada67fe39af92326c23549c6d1b935237ba1e2766e4e627", "width": 458}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "808096968c820041", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-001", "height": 340, "page": 20, "phash_256": "b051d5400baec71c22bbb4c30aeec71c0bbefcc330e39338cb1e4cce34f333b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "bc0aea1a5ef53d154b201b2ca1569105eaa020b0f1dd914a5ac59dd3752fe5ad", "width": 452}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8c4b467e3b7c3021", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-002", "height": 340, "page": 20, "phash_256": "b700e55542ab93156aaa950127aaecd53bbbd9070cae49ff0ce31cba98c34ecb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "87b2d86eb7642ab183e0775f96d1a6345f832b6bbd8004a445d770cd1f044174", "width": 467}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "04001617164c0010", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-003", "height": 330, "page": 20, "phash_256": "f6a5daab5aa9d2297ca6aff623598d560d568f582dd2a5c2a1499c6a2f3021d4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "dcd1024385ed57c87d02f01207fb5c95bdbc15d544017e86b7c7f102ad04caca", "width": 439}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "000022334d000001", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-004", "height": 331, "page": 20, "phash_256": "eab5ff84154ac45a6ab1fea51504815a62fbfea53d04914a42fbe4f3bc143b14", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "08c15f0e23a9f757fde6b56f31c3aa5e55c134b365f36364cd546321249fe2dd", "width": 440}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "31474a2b73735733", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-005", "height": 319, "page": 20, "phash_256": "afb3b34440c0cedb1a4de9b213748d9763d9d86c6c9f936549b6d20b1b68e4d0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "c8f5b4e1bd9e50f9a303424c62706949371f9316957afa8bc56e973d20699a5f", "width": 439}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "269e5b5b45652505", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-006", "height": 319, "page": 20, "phash_256": "eaddb17e6c01ee019723ce9d1bcef2cd1132c2b932759752cf054ec4c7229326", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "88faa2489539fa6b7a8ffd0d1a47a35afcc3fb04cff7fe71042752f217f07ec2", "width": 440}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "84800f0f92b40581", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-001", "height": 342, "page": 21, "phash_256": "e800971642e99c792b07fed2179fe1e91c74cb063cd3b1f9c3ae9c5568240797", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "f92dcb51f27d9cca4d90ebf54ecb42499c28b791b110a20d069764c7548807ff", "width": 456}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "230f32232390331b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-002", "height": 342, "page": 21, "phash_256": "e904e5b416ebb2c36e1ccd3814e7be0a6e58c0e305e7e13c35bed0e79e334618", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "39fb15fccc31369e661798ce9d08aae74d2616104938dafe7addb1b044ee872b", "width": 459}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6107335123233fc1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-003", "height": 342, "page": 21, "phash_256": "e95a97a514a5685e4bc196973c3ecd25534bb4d684b4d92d305bcc56c9179369", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "e5fc24aa90c0f1a7ac9b66f14be86ca9f91db4bf324a4cb6bbc1848c77b81b37", "width": 456}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "290d0d2933052233", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-004", "height": 342, "page": 21, "phash_256": "ba01e2d645a0bd8d1b0fee7262d4992d11c9d4c325f2cf6885fad9e2c778070f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "baac606a6804b535bea4d91ea9f0c609b32e6508426b52cc1f90a52c1d23b4c4", "width": 459}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "453319352371532a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-005", "height": 347, "page": 21, "phash_256": "ea8fb57861f8ee871578ea8d1307b1786987973260dd99079771e9cc9130c217", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "d32646272b7d350325ae0bb9a512dae72bbbb3511bc72c1d47bca2e3bbd916d6", "width": 462}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1333331b3f57732c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-006", "height": 347, "page": 21, "phash_256": "bfc4cb373688eb94142bebc41423ea1d14c0c133344dcfe2159c9c4f97f2937e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "d40533bcb9b3ebb68330df19f4fcf208c14accd807b0fbde06502ee348065214", "width": 462}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "215b3f3d1f1b23d3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-001", "height": 346, "page": 22, "phash_256": "bba2b7da407fea3f04d8c8ed4807a4423ff29bfb177fc520c80bc845a5d4e051", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "fd3de5c9ea0b94eeea0fd67a3b5fa2b0c810a5ade8ca32832b30a7e2932934d5", "width": 460}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "517511272f2b4d89", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-002", "height": 346, "page": 22, "phash_256": "bfc0bad042bab72f053fc03a585892cc2ce3ed131be4bb786d033634b47ec153", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "bc7c73fa8532508e2d38641ab89eb2f44b4fad7df3f1f065414e05b374b4bf1a", "width": 461}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0010001616600001", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-003", "height": 347, "page": 22, "phash_256": "f575f5700ecfd74629b8f538064bd64629a4f138065bc64e69a479b03479865b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "0d3cf241b5d9c6e13f4711c733f4cf4b4e553a39caa209af77daf68f55a5bd06", "width": 462}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4931332323232321", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-004", "height": 347, "page": 22, "phash_256": "eee8d2d2135fd26a3360eeae3515acb52db58d9db113e02e492295516a9f6826", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "98bce02d1e22889175008da60309224c4a10d95042c86be586982e83bc74349d", "width": 463}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "65635313c4252585", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-005", "height": 699, "page": 22, "phash_256": "ce8bad6d4ebbc6a2312cf8893995f11b1d718255b17495a231a492a69d6ae4fa", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "7016a37bfb299b7a90f561f41835155a228d4a5b351d7145c44a37d70d284e0b", "width": 931}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0008000c0c300001", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-006", "height": 347, "page": 22, "phash_256": "f75df75808a6ddf22219f74808e6ddb22219f74808e6d9b2233976598cc659a6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "993ac10318fd64d9239a6ef4df86fc7a7326e68451db885672ebd4252dae7d61", "width": 462}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0b4d2707236105bd", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-007", "height": 347, "page": 22, "phash_256": "eebabfe81344ca554017c0154cc5bd212ff8fafa53aac2bee4ce9572c8558c41", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "3aec5e315269545d8f266262a5bcf178b6e82f40712d9be8b1b89f1a503e0b92", "width": 462}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5b4d71733313132d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-001", "height": 348, "page": 23, "phash_256": "efaabfe91075e15235458d154891b84107bbf6fe33ecf126d627cc1d8c419851", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "f26cd097325c126e450ecb9229c46a389338a957a73f88d8578f57add41e2fe3", "width": 465}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "494d7377736313ad", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-002", "height": 349, "page": 23, "phash_256": "efbabfe85075e1111405d8154a159f5a3dfaf0ed466bd73a12b6cc4ca4458954", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "68c318d3354082885ff29181b3ca3d6fc77abf624773fb0420686a5431bd08d5", "width": 465}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "494d37773733013c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-003", "height": 348, "page": 23, "phash_256": "fff8bff84245d2251511e0512845bc070ff8b5fa64efd32e132a8cd1b457c852", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "3f6c83d91d60a308fa7201f0e6d699af144589b5fa71d90db9e23a0a4a3f37df", "width": 465}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8c1b3b0c371b0bc1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-004", "height": 348, "page": 23, "phash_256": "bf01b7d940fde00e444eb366172eec993bf1cbec68d49472cc059f269572c891", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "592a9fe367e7062800b4254536e6d0ba463ce6ae875b81f2e21078fb3a4d5c6a", "width": 465}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8480161f8c8c0090", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-001", "height": 344, "page": 24, "phash_256": "f2a1daab58abd2297caeadf623518556055c8f782df2a54221599c723f3823dc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "fd6ed70edce4a82a1e976bd4116fbec1567651933ead4e04ed25956addd3775d", "width": 458}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "968363634d630349", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-002", "height": 344, "page": 24, "phash_256": "efd9b5b41024f2c612b7ad491dccc33151b8da67430b934c1ff94e7b90748dc8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "aad58de431959d5597f55517f9fb412402d0e539677ae7f5de739f555f80c6d4", "width": 458}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1c4f4d136e5d3388", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-003", "height": 396, "page": 24, "phash_256": "bfe0ebfe404794474057f8b03af8b6e84beec9151d108d5fc02c5e282fb9d813", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "1ccf81f586edfdfbab4b676821d60ed65b2295855ed203fa4388eaa0d435f356", "width": 528}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4446661f178e08b0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-001", "height": 345, "page": 25, "phash_256": "a7b727bf27bff2ac5821d8085849b95d3f5fb5d36218c8096222e046cc660ff4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "753e265288063f127e4625c28c42c2ad92cc87e27b983d21d5c43690960061dc", "width": 460}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0040908088904000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-002", "height": 345, "page": 25, "phash_256": "c07fa07c3f808fc1430fb4d878f3c07d4f1ca7c11fc38f3c6038e07f1f078fc0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "fa7470cdd1c00b551a1fc33acd00e43eeff30c003d09dfc7f4274564dbac7db7", "width": 459}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8c0f333230593333", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-003", "height": 347, "page": 25, "phash_256": "bdc1e37c641bc399d07c3d8bc3f03c460bb19c468d7c19f3cc66ca33198c943e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "d1a0d0607520df28f889661769ec2011cb42897f78a917569e604810c1b729e3", "width": 463}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8e0f637307210001", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-004", "height": 347, "page": 25, "phash_256": "afe0a7c8400fc0977ab595a80d68af706bf3d02f1e359d111da16be92b728f52", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "33b54e1af444f40a21231a0ac0a3cbd0588baa40c72007d98ad88f8aaf17efed", "width": 462}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "13338e1c36537582", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-005", "height": 345, "page": 25, "phash_256": "bfc5f0104ff18ecd704cb3b66133c47106e3916e510c87de6033c5333eff7888", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "5e14690f0a7b24bcc7fb0348bd08eed66e195aa27d5172620e857a02534163b3", "width": 460}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "81818d4f63021c71", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-006", "height": 1047, "page": 25, "phash_256": "a94042aa40bfd015afe8bd54469b10cf3fb00fedd116c3d5728e0fbb4c4833f7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "a4e29d0571c975bef70b075177eacc0e111e17bc839dfc0f37ea3c34ac8262bd", "width": 464}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "174e4c8096174196", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-007", "height": 347, "page": 25, "phash_256": "b4ccb3324b33ecc44883cb4334bcb73c137f953c4ccdcb03c10b34ec973a857b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "4dbc96306578cfe99138bc938e4b764c16b596574ebaee628b90b08ab10c6df0", "width": 463}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-008.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "460e8e7f332f0e37", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-008", "height": 1049, "page": 25, "phash_256": "b7d527b726fe37b72dff26fe06bb3c9c033efce4da03e0a05821da085800d300", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "b3924c06a9ff74e6c63f440d9a09c928d305d1d71760cf34d7258db021b773cf", "width": 464}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "512766c726667d31", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-001", "height": 354, "page": 26, "phash_256": "aef7eb191b9dbdf4610083530443bee514fee93a492e9dee929e9443f1d0d010", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "fe5021165c2c5ea5d4cc4fd606d137d24c577efd57bdb49646b16318a3d66596", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "961f637165317d4d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-002", "height": 354, "page": 26, "phash_256": "bfffe0107101f0a344089efd588adbea0c559b546acfc28e970a9741df614d5e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "bbe03b2f3e6a529501b80b3923c4b64e6febca3b304853d177ff4aefaff62d18", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4c33332323232321", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-003", "height": 355, "page": 26, "phash_256": "eea891d7111ff72a3362eeae1955eec94cd5c8c99151e226696095516a9d6966", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "8ec3d1202ed342011dde05aa03a6a840f34a45de4c07dbb0433aac5a979d7349", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "db733d4f3f737181", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-004", "height": 355, "page": 26, "phash_256": "bfe0bfaa40078db7003ff38a44ca9cf11f80e7543ef995506a1cc46f95577089", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "3f0cbd3d7156407b319119571cba68f774e88e22db49a5198fbcfb45129b49d1", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2f276f7b37272749", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-005", "height": 354, "page": 26, "phash_256": "bfd0da5b4003a407117fbf966402cfe814bd93f86331c1ac42dec57c95ad951d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "5abc85005531d266cb1967fda92b0b0a953840798bbfd76dd1ede3eddd4c2870", "width": 470}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0d0d33694b7f5d95", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-006", "height": 354, "page": 26, "phash_256": "bff0f240405fb77b41409afd1d70cec15aad9db7498a958b34a5c40f954f45a4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "4abf9e9a3f5d8d23352d5116b50c6b83ffc73a800524ab81aac99e2c83f3f185", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "171e2515353b0f28", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-001", "height": 354, "page": 27, "phash_256": "fa9fedd60562b9636a9cea1c193fce184e98916a17e1c1a138bf64bcc4a065e1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "6193eb35bb15b8c7c687afd52068daaed2318e661cd12886ce8d401aa0238ef2", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "160379191d0f2480", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-002", "height": 354, "page": 27, "phash_256": "bff0f82c400fa55f102f95242fd0d6ab3fa2c2cb16938352c3579691c74a53e7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "bfc0c61272d920a0660e7e0b9e0306d5fe97acafc25d3acf03a85030261fe507", "width": 466}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "33736d1f1b0f0089", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-003", "height": 354, "page": 27, "phash_256": "bfc0fe824017b96868d6a45537e8c7aa49b392bd40b99479d2b4c0bd85f196e6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "cdb8c3948a6fe70a60483191396ff353ca382923f8a4e61933225f901099c294", "width": 472}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "262765316b1b3303", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-004", "height": 354, "page": 27, "phash_256": "bf5094ab4017eb14c4afbf5211aceed3178cc1ed4e5390ac6bd0d3c391ce9790", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "b9a2318a1dd27caf02b347025cb4903dc2ea7aaee1c0574a5279835d1cf62d67", "width": 466}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8c485b4380000080", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-005", "height": 349, "page": 27, "phash_256": "bf55b758500fc40746f0eff03b1e990e11fad8b64897c8064d429df218bf189f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "4562399916ea76344e94b7a6ba765f8f67097c5a1453e686ea60db1ea318877a", "width": 466}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-082/assets/figures/cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "39514d2d4f6b3919", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-006", "height": 354, "page": 27, "phash_256": "bff0c3fe491fcbb5005fbe00620f95db6622d1e6857e95c274078555f1c26c0a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "sha256_normalized_png": "0d5fdc7ce755ddc40d5d5f131bed4f69b015877aff635fc8b5514ad65d783ee6", "width": 472}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-082/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bc256b09f5d4488b8e6eca43f5250d0f686f65a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-082/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nFebruary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/82**\n### **PANAMA**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––** **MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Panama was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in June 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "February 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/82\nPANAMA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT–– MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS\n\nThis technical assistance report on Panama was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in June 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 566}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL REPORT\n\n\n\nPANAMA\n\nMacroprudential Policy Framework\n\nJune 2022\n\n\nPrepared By\nMachiko Narita (Mission Chief, MCM)\nAttila Csajbok (MCM)\n\n\n\n\n\nAuthoring Departments:\nMonetary and Capital Markets\nDepartment", "text_characters": 174}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "3\n\n\n**Contents** **Page**\n\n\nGlossary .............................................................................................................................4\n\n\nPreface ...............................................................................................................................5\n\n\nExecutive Summary ............................................................................................................6\n\n\nI. Introduction.....................................................................................................................8\n\n\nII. Institutional Arrangements..............................................................................................8\n\nA. Willingness to Act ..............................................................................................9\nB. Ability to Act ....................................................................................................10\nC. Interagency Cooperation....................................................................................10\nD. Recommendations.............................................................................................10\n\n\nIII. Systemic Risk Assessments for Policy Decisions..........................................................13\n\nA. Analyses and Mapping in Panama .....................................................................13\nB. Recommendations .............................................................................................15\n\n\nAppendix: Presentation Slides ...........................................................................................18\n\nFigures\n1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools...................................................................12\n2. Macroprudential Analysis..............................................................................................16\n\nTables\n1. Key Recommendation .....................................................................................................7\n2. Member of the FCC ......................................................................................................10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3\n\nContents Page\n\nGlossary .............................................................................................................................4\n\nPreface ...............................................................................................................................5\n\nExecutive Summary ............................................................................................................6\n\nI. Introduction.....................................................................................................................8\n\nII. Institutional Arrangements..............................................................................................8\n\nA. Willingness to Act ..............................................................................................9\nB. Ability to Act ....................................................................................................10\nC. Interagency Cooperation....................................................................................10\nD. Recommendations.............................................................................................10\n\nIII. Systemic Risk Assessments for Policy Decisions..........................................................13\n\nA. Analyses and Mapping in Panama .....................................................................13\nB. Recommendations .............................................................................................15\n\nAppendix: Presentation Slides ...........................................................................................18\n\nFigures\n1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools...................................................................12\n2. Macroprudential Analysis..............................................................................................16\n\nTables\n1. Key Recommendation .....................................................................................................7\n2. Member of the FCC ......................................................................................................10", "text_characters": 2032}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "4\n\n\n**GLOSSARY**\n\n\nCCoB Capital Conservation Buffer\nCCSBSO Central American Council of Superintendents of Banks,\nInsurance, and other Financial Entities (Consejo Centroamericano de\nSuperintendentes de Bancos, de Seguros y de Otras Instituciones\nFinancieras)\nCCyB Countercyclical Capital Buffer\nDSTI Debt Service to Income\nFCC Financial Coordination Council (Consejo de Coordinación Financiera)\nFSD Financial Studies Division (Dirección de Estudios Financieros)\nFSR Financial Stability Report\nGEFR Regional Financial Stability Committee (Grupo de Estabilidad\nFinanciera Regional)\nLTV Loan to Value\nRMD Risk Management Division (Dirección de Riesgos)\nSBP Superintendency of Banks of Panama (Superintendencia de Bancos\nde Panamá)\nTA Technical Assistance\nTC Technical Committee", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "4\n\nGLOSSARY\n\nCCoB Capital Conservation Buffer\nCCSBSO Central American Council of Superintendents of Banks,\nInsurance, and other Financial Entities (Consejo Centroamericano de\nSuperintendentes de Bancos, de Seguros y de Otras Instituciones\nFinancieras)\nCCyB Countercyclical Capital Buffer\nDSTI Debt Service to Income\nFCC Financial Coordination Council (Consejo de Coordinación Financiera)\nFSD Financial Studies Division (Dirección de Estudios Financieros)\nFSR Financial Stability Report\nGEFR Regional Financial Stability Committee (Grupo de Estabilidad\nFinanciera Regional)\nLTV Loan to Value\nRMD Risk Management Division (Dirección de Riesgos)\nSBP Superintendency of Banks of Panama (Superintendencia de Bancos\nde Panamá)\nTA Technical Assistance\nTC Technical Committee", "text_characters": 667}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "5\n\n\n**PREFACE**\n\n\nAt the request of the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (SBP), an IMF technical\nassistance (TA) mission took place virtually during August 3 - 9, 2021 to evaluate the\nmacroprudential policy framework in Panama and develop a roadmap to strengthen it. The\nvirtual mission was provided by Machiko Narita and Attila Csajbok (both MCM) and a\nfollow-up virtual mission is planned for later this year to assist in the preparation of\nadditional tools. This mission was part of a multi-topic MCM TA project comprising two\nother workstreams, on Basel II/III standards and the stress testing framework. Anastassiya\nMarina and Jose Roberto Effio (MCM TA project managers) joined the mission for the\nopening and concluding meetings. Messes. Joyce Denton and Hilda Tejada (IMF’s\ninterpreter team) provided interpretation services during the mission.\n\nThe mission held virtual meetings with a joint team from the SBP’s Financial Studies\nDivision (FSD, _Dirección de Estudios Financieros_ ) and Risk Management Division (RMD,\n_Dirección de Riesgos_ ). This team consisted of Mr. Javier Motta (Director of FSD) and\nMs. Nahila Melgar (Director of RMD), as well as Ms. Ingrid Arboleda, Ms. Delia Cuan, and\nMr. Patricio Mosquera (all FSD). Mr. Amauri Castillo (Superintendent of Banks) also joined\npart of the opening and concluding meetings.\n\nWe would like to thank the SBP staff for their excellent collaboration, their responses to the\nquestionnaire, helpful presentations, and productive meetings. We would also like to thank\nthem for collecting and sharing the relevant materials as needed during the mission.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "5\n\nPREFACE\n\nAt the request of the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (SBP), an IMF technical\nassistance (TA) mission took place virtually during August 3 - 9, 2021 to evaluate the\nmacroprudential policy framework in Panama and develop a roadmap to strengthen it. The\nvirtual mission was provided by Machiko Narita and Attila Csajbok (both MCM) and a\nfollow-up virtual mission is planned for later this year to assist in the preparation of\nadditional tools. This mission was part of a multi-topic MCM TA project comprising two\nother workstreams, on Basel II/III standards and the stress testing framework. Anastassiya\nMarina and Jose Roberto Effio (MCM TA project managers) joined the mission for the\nopening and concluding meetings. Messes. Joyce Denton and Hilda Tejada (IMF’s\ninterpreter team) provided interpretation services during the mission.\n\nThe mission held virtual meetings with a joint team from the SBP’s Financial Studies\nDivision (FSD, _Dirección de Estudios Financieros_ ) and Risk Management Division (RMD,\n_Dirección de Riesgos_ ). This team consisted of Mr. Javier Motta (Director of FSD) and\nMs. Nahila Melgar (Director of RMD), as well as Ms. Ingrid Arboleda, Ms. Delia Cuan, and\nMr. Patricio Mosquera (all FSD). Mr. Amauri Castillo (Superintendent of Banks) also joined\npart of the opening and concluding meetings.\n\nWe would like to thank the SBP staff for their excellent collaboration, their responses to the\nquestionnaire, helpful presentations, and productive meetings. We would also like to thank\nthem for collecting and sharing the relevant materials as needed during the mission.", "text_characters": 1354}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "6\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n\n**The mission assisted the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (SBP) in developing a**\n**roadmap to strengthen the macroprudential policy framework in Panama.** This mission\nwas the third workstream under the multi-topic MCM TA project that the SBP requested in\nOctober 2020 to enhance its capacity to safeguard financial stability. This macroprudential\npolicy mission was built on the findings from the diagnostic missions of the other two\nworkstreams, on Basel standards and stress testing respectively, as well as the Article IV\nteam’s analyses. A follow-up virtual mission is planned for later this year to assist in the\npreparation of additional macroprudential tools.\n\n**The mission found that the SBP has adequate capacity to conduct macroprudential**\n**policy.** The SBP has broad powers to direct macroprudential policy tools and to collect\ninformation. It also has an effective internal process to conduct systemic risk assessments for\npolicy decisions, supported by a dedicated unit—the Financial Studies Division (FSD)—\nusing a rich set of analytical tools and data. Information sharing with other supervisory\nagencies has been done through the mutual representation of some directors at the Boards of\nthe Superintendencies of Banks, Insurance, and Securities, respectively, and at the Financial\nCoordination Council (FCC).\n\n**The mission’s main recommendation is to tighten the link between policy objectives,**\n**assessments, and tools (Table 1).** The mission recommends preparing and publishing a\nmacroprudential strategy document to clarify the set of indicators and tools corresponding to\nthe policy objectives. This will help the SBP take timely actions with the policy tools tailored\nto emerging systemic risks. Communication should also be enhanced by making more use of\nthe Financial Stability Report (FSR) to explain policy decisions and to provide the\nunderlying analysis. The mission also made recommendations on other aspects, such as the\nexpansion of the policy toolkit, in particular to include borrower-based measures (e.g., caps\non the loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios), which will be followed up on in the\nsecond mission.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThe mission assisted the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (SBP) in developing a\nroadmap to strengthen the macroprudential policy framework in Panama. This mission\nwas the third workstream under the multi-topic MCM TA project that the SBP requested in\nOctober 2020 to enhance its capacity to safeguard financial stability. This macroprudential\npolicy mission was built on the findings from the diagnostic missions of the other two\nworkstreams, on Basel standards and stress testing respectively, as well as the Article IV\nteam’s analyses. A follow-up virtual mission is planned for later this year to assist in the\npreparation of additional macroprudential tools.\n\nThe mission found that the SBP has adequate capacity to conduct macroprudential\npolicy. The SBP has broad powers to direct macroprudential policy tools and to collect\ninformation. It also has an effective internal process to conduct systemic risk assessments for\npolicy decisions, supported by a dedicated unit—the Financial Studies Division (FSD)—\nusing a rich set of analytical tools and data. Information sharing with other supervisory\nagencies has been done through the mutual representation of some directors at the Boards of\nthe Superintendencies of Banks, Insurance, and Securities, respectively, and at the Financial\nCoordination Council (FCC).\n\nThe mission’s main recommendation is to tighten the link between policy objectives,\nassessments, and tools (Table 1). The mission recommends preparing and publishing a\nmacroprudential strategy document to clarify the set of indicators and tools corresponding to\nthe policy objectives. This will help the SBP take timely actions with the policy tools tailored\nto emerging systemic risks. Communication should also be enhanced by making more use of\nthe Financial Stability Report (FSR) to explain policy decisions and to provide the\nunderlying analysis. The mission also made recommendations on other aspects, such as the\nexpansion of the policy toolkit, in particular to include borrower-based measures (e.g., caps\non the loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios), which will be followed up on in the\nsecond mission.", "text_characters": 1840}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "7\n\n\n**Table 1. Key Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Recommendation|Priority|Timeframe1/|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Institutional Arrangements**|**Institutional Arrangements**|**Institutional Arrangements**|\n|1. Set up terms of reference (TOR) for the Technical Committee (TC)
to regularly discuss macroprudential issues, or establish a dedicated
macroprudential committee with a clear TOR; while in either option,
the TOR for the TC should be clearly set up, the frequency should
be at least quarterly, the FSD should be responsible for setting the
meeting agenda, and meeting minutes should be kept when policy
proposals are discussed (¶11,12)
|Medium
|Medium
|\n|2. Hold regular meetings (quarterly or semiannually) dedicated to
macroprudential policy issues at the SBP Board (¶11,12)|Medium|Medium|\n|
3. Draft a macroprudential strategy document that explains objectives,
indicators, and how they are mapped into policy instruments (¶13;
please also see recommendations 9, 10, and 11)
|High
|Short
|\n|4. Publish the macroprudential strategy document (¶13)
|Medium
|Long
|\n|5. Make more use of the Financial Stability Report (FSR) to explain
policy decisions and to provide the underlying analysis (¶14)|Medium|Medium|\n|6. Enhance the external communication of the FSR, complementing its
press conference with a press release and an expert-level
presentation, as well as publishing the FSR in English in addition to
Spanish (¶15)|Medium|Medium|\n|
7. Form a working group of technical-level staff from the FCC member
agencies to assess relevant systemic risks for policy discussions.
(¶16)|Low|Long|\n|
8. Consider adding to the Internal Rules and Regulations (Resolución
#1) of the FCC, or its underlying Law as needed, a clause to issue
recommendations to its members with a “comply-or-explain”
mechanism (¶16)|Low|Long|\n|
**Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools**|
**Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools**|
**Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools**|\n|
9. Specify core and additional indicators as well as associated
analyses in the macroprudential strategy document for each type of
systemic risk (e.g., as listed in Figure 1) (¶22)|High|Short|\n|10. Develop a strategy for addressing household sector risks by
specifying the main risk indicators and designing borrower-based
tools, preparing for the second TA mission of this macroprudential
policy workstream (¶23)|High|Short|\n|
11. Refine the strategy for existing tools, reflecting the planned addition
of the Basel III capital and liquidity tools (¶24, 25)|Medium|Medium|\n|
12. Evaluate the intended effects of any measures taken, using the main
indicators specified in the strategy, and any unintended side effects
(¶26)|Medium|Long|\n|
13. Establish a clear definition of “income” for the purpose of borrower
measures, collect income data of borrowers, and make further
efforts to collect data on commercial real estate prices (¶27)
|High
|Medium
|\n|14. Expand analyses, if feasible, by launching a quarterly lending survey
of banks and by constructing a contemporaneous financial stress
index from market-based indicators (¶28)|Medium|Long|\n\n\n\n1/ Short term: less than 12 months; Medium term: between 12 and 24 months; Long term: more than 24 months. The\nindicated timeframes must be considered relative and administered with discretion by the SBP, taking into account the\nnegative impacts on the financial system caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBP is the authority responsible of\nimplementing all recommendations, except for the seventh and eighth items, whose responsible authority is the FCC.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.10277557373047, 99.59998321533203, 540.322265625, 670.780029296875], "columns": 3, "rows": 17}], "text": "7\n\nTable 1. Key Recommendations\n\n Recommendation Priority Timeframe1/ \n\n Institutional Arrangements Institutional Arrangements Institutional Arrangements \n 1. Set up terms of reference (TOR) for the Technical Committee (TC) to regularly discuss macroprudential issues, or establish a dedicated macroprudential committee with a clear TOR; while in either option, the TOR for the TC should be clearly set up, the frequency should be at least quarterly, the FSD should be responsible for setting the meeting agenda, and meeting minutes should be kept when policy proposals are discussed (¶11,12) Medium Medium \n 2. Hold regular meetings (quarterly or semiannually) dedicated to macroprudential policy issues at the SBP Board (¶11,12) Medium Medium \n 3. Draft a macroprudential strategy document that explains objectives, indicators, and how they are mapped into policy instruments (¶13; please also see recommendations 9, 10, and 11) High Short \n 4. Publish the macroprudential strategy document (¶13) Medium Long \n 5. Make more use of the Financial Stability Report (FSR) to explain policy decisions and to provide the underlying analysis (¶14) Medium Medium \n 6. Enhance the external communication of the FSR, complementing its press conference with a press release and an expert-level presentation, as well as publishing the FSR in English in addition to Spanish (¶15) Medium Medium \n 7. Form a working group of technical-level staff from the FCC member agencies to assess relevant systemic risks for policy discussions. (¶16) Low Long \n 8. Consider adding to the Internal Rules and Regulations (Resolución #1) of the FCC, or its underlying Law as needed, a clause to issue recommendations to its members with a “comply-or-explain” mechanism (¶16) Low Long \n Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools Macroprudential Policy Analysis and Tools \n 9. Specify core and additional indicators as well as associated analyses in the macroprudential strategy document for each type of systemic risk (e.g., as listed in Figure 1) (¶22) High Short \n 10. Develop a strategy for addressing household sector risks by specifying the main risk indicators and designing borrower-based tools, preparing for the second TA mission of this macroprudential policy workstream (¶23) High Short \n 11. Refine the strategy for existing tools, reflecting the planned addition of the Basel III capital and liquidity tools (¶24, 25) Medium Medium \n 12. Evaluate the intended effects of any measures taken, using the main indicators specified in the strategy, and any unintended side effects (¶26) Medium Long \n 13. Establish a clear definition of “income” for the purpose of borrower measures, collect income data of borrowers, and make further efforts to collect data on commercial real estate prices (¶27) High Medium \n 14. Expand analyses, if feasible, by launching a quarterly lending survey of banks and by constructing a contemporaneous financial stress index from market-based indicators (¶28) Medium Long \n\n1/ Short term: less than 12 months; Medium term: between 12 and 24 months; Long term: more than 24 months. The\nindicated timeframes must be considered relative and administered with discretion by the SBP, taking into account the\nnegative impacts on the financial system caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBP is the authority responsible of\nimplementing all recommendations, except for the seventh and eighth items, whose responsible authority is the FCC.", "text_characters": 2928}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "8\n\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n\n**1.** **The Superintendency of Banks in Panama (SBP) plays the key role for financial**\n**stability.** [As specified in Article 5 of the Banking Law (No. 9-1998), the SBP is tasked with](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/prev-cont-il-op/leg-fram/banking_law)\nsafeguarding the soundness and efficiency of the banking system. While there is no explicit\nmandate to promote the stability of the entire financial system, beyond the banking system,\nthe SBP plays the leading role in promoting financial stability given that the banking system\naccounts for about 90 percent of the financial sector. There is no central bank in Panama.\n\n\n**2.** **This technical assistance (TA) mission evaluated the macroprudential policy**\n**framework in Panama.** **[1]** The mission assessed (1) the institutional arrangements; (2) the\nframework to assess systemic risks to prepare for policy actions; and (3) took a preliminary\nlook at the available tools ahead of the planned follow-up mission on the toolkit. The\n[assessment was conducted based on the IMF guidance (IMF, 2014a), taking into account the](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)\ncountry-specific circumstances in Panama. The assessments were also built on the findings\nand recommendations from the recent TA on Basel II/III standards and the stress testing\nframework, as well as the Article IV team’s analyses. [2]\n\n\n**3.** **This TA report summarizes the mission’s findings and recommendations.**\nSection II assesses the current institutional arrangements. Section III reviews how systemic\nrisks are assessed to guide policy decisions, for each type of systemic risks described in the\n[IMF guidance (IMF, 2014a), and as relevant for Panama. It also evaluates the adequacy of](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)\npolicy tools in each of these domains, informing the planned second virtual mission on\nadditional tools. The Appendix includes the presentation slides used by the mission members\nduring the mission.\n\n\n**II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**\n\n\n**4.** **A strong institutional framework is essential for macroprudential policy to be**\n**effective.** The IMF guidance suggests three key principles. Institutional arrangements should\nensure (1) the willingness to act in the face of opposition, supported by a clear mandate,\norganized policy process, and effective communication; (2) the ability to act, with adequate\npowers to take policy actions and to collect information; and (3) cooperation across all\nrelevant agencies for financial stability. Recommendations are provided after reviewing each\nof these aspects of the current framework in Panama.\n\n\n1 Panama has the two-year arrangement under the IMF’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), approved on\nJanuary 19, 2021, as insurance against extreme external shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. It is\nimportant to continue efforts to safeguard financial stability, enhancing the frameworks of banking regulations,\nrisk assessment and stress testing, and macroprudential policy.\n\n\n2 In particular, see [IMF (2021)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/30/Panama-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-463116) and “Towards a More Resilient Financial Sector” and “Macroprudential Policy\nin Panama: Implications for the Real Estate Market” in [IMF (2020). The virtual missions took place for Basel](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/21/Panama-Selected-Issues-49355)\nstandards in March 10-April 6, 2021, and for the stress testing framework in April 30 - May 6, 2021.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "8\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. The Superintendency of Banks in Panama (SBP) plays the key role for financial\nstability. As specified in Article 5 of the Banking Law (No. 9-1998), the SBP is tasked with\nsafeguarding the soundness and efficiency of the banking system. While there is no explicit\nmandate to promote the stability of the entire financial system, beyond the banking system,\nthe SBP plays the leading role in promoting financial stability given that the banking system\naccounts for about 90 percent of the financial sector. There is no central bank in Panama.\n\n2. This technical assistance (TA) mission evaluated the macroprudential policy\nframework in Panama. [1] The mission assessed (1) the institutional arrangements; (2) the\nframework to assess systemic risks to prepare for policy actions; and (3) took a preliminary\nlook at the available tools ahead of the planned follow-up mission on the toolkit. The\nassessment was conducted based on the IMF guidance (IMF, 2014a), taking into account the\ncountry-specific circumstances in Panama. The assessments were also built on the findings\nand recommendations from the recent TA on Basel II/III standards and the stress testing\nframework, as well as the Article IV team’s analyses. [2]\n\n3. This TA report summarizes the mission’s findings and recommendations.\nSection II assesses the current institutional arrangements. Section III reviews how systemic\nrisks are assessed to guide policy decisions, for each type of systemic risks described in the\nIMF guidance (IMF, 2014a), and as relevant for Panama. It also evaluates the adequacy of\npolicy tools in each of these domains, informing the planned second virtual mission on\nadditional tools. The Appendix includes the presentation slides used by the mission members\nduring the mission.\n\nII. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS\n\n4. A strong institutional framework is essential for macroprudential policy to be\neffective. The IMF guidance suggests three key principles. Institutional arrangements should\nensure (1) the willingness to act in the face of opposition, supported by a clear mandate,\norganized policy process, and effective communication; (2) the ability to act, with adequate\npowers to take policy actions and to collect information; and (3) cooperation across all\nrelevant agencies for financial stability. Recommendations are provided after reviewing each\nof these aspects of the current framework in Panama.\n\n1 Panama has the two-year arrangement under the IMF’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), approved on\nJanuary 19, 2021, as insurance against extreme external shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. It is\nimportant to continue efforts to safeguard financial stability, enhancing the frameworks of banking regulations,\nrisk assessment and stress testing, and macroprudential policy.\n\n2 In particular, see IMF (2021) and “Towards a More Resilient Financial Sector” and “Macroprudential Policy\nin Panama: Implications for the Real Estate Market” in IMF (2020). The virtual missions took place for Basel\nstandards in March 10-April 6, 2021, and for the stress testing framework in April 30 - May 6, 2021.", "text_characters": 2641}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "9\n\n\n**A. Willingness to Act**\n\n\n**5.** **The SBP has a legal basis to conduct macroprudential policy.** The Banking Law\n[(No. 9-1998) provides the SBP with the objective to safeguard the soundness and efficiency](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/prev-cont-il-op/leg-fram/banking_law)\nof the banking system (Article 5). Expanding the coverage of this objective from the banking\nsystem to the entire financial system could be considered in the future, because systemic\nrisks can go beyond the banking system. [3] However, the current objective is assessed as\npractically sufficient at present because about 90 percent of the financial sector assets are\nheld in the banking system, and thus, promoting banking sector stability goes a long way to\nensure the stability of the entire financial system.\n\n\n**6.** **The SBP has an effective decision-making process.** The Financial Studies Division\n(FSD) is a dedicated unit for macroprudential analyses, in close collaboration with the Risk\nManagement Division (RMD), which is responsible for the analyses of microprudential\nissues. These analyses are discussed at the Technical Committee (TC), where the\nSuperintendent and the Directors of the FSD, the RMD, the Supervision Division, and the\nRegulations Division participate. While there are no preset rules on the meeting frequency or\nagenda setting, the TC meets as needed, with the agenda proposed by the members. [4] The TC\nis a consultative body, with the Superintendent deciding on policy proposals to be raised to\nthe Board. The ultimate policy decisions are made by the approval of the Board of Directors\nof the SBP, which consists of seven independent members. [5]\n\n\n**7.** **The SBP’s communication has not been active on macroprudential policy.** While\nthe SBP states on its website that it conducts macroprudential supervision with the necessary\nregulations for the banking system, [6] it has not elaborated on the intermediate objectives of\nmacroprudential policy or the approaches to achieve them. While the regulations that the\nSBP publishes include the explanation of their background and the policy intentions, the SBP\nhas not actively explained such policies to the public, for example, in the annual Financial\nStability Report (FSR). [7]\n\n\n[3 Please see paragraph 78 of IMF (2013a)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Key-Aspects-of-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4803) and paragraph 10 of [IMF (2013b), for example.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Implementing-Macroprudential-Policy-Selected-Legal-Issues-PP4802)\n\n\n4 In other words, there is no guarantee to discuss macroprudential issues regularly. The frequency of the TC\nmeetings has been monthly or more since the onset of the pandemic, while it used to be semiannual previously.\n\n\n5 The Board consists of seven professionals and businesspersons without ties to the banking sector, five of\nwhich are elected and the other two are appointed by the Board of Directors of the Superintendence of\nSecurities Markets and the Superintendency of Insurance and Reinsurance, respectively. Please see the current\nDirectors at [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/about-sbp/board-of-directors.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/about-sbp/board-of-directors)\n\n\n6 Please see the SBP’s supervisory framework: [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/supervisory-framework.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/supervisory-framework)\n\n\n7 The SBP publishes regulations at [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/laws-and-reg/rules; and the annual](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/laws-and-reg/rules)\nFinancial Stability Report and other analyses at [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "9\n\nA. Willingness to Act\n\n5. The SBP has a legal basis to conduct macroprudential policy. The Banking Law\n(No. 9-1998) provides the SBP with the objective to safeguard the soundness and efficiency\nof the banking system (Article 5). Expanding the coverage of this objective from the banking\nsystem to the entire financial system could be considered in the future, because systemic\nrisks can go beyond the banking system. [3] However, the current objective is assessed as\npractically sufficient at present because about 90 percent of the financial sector assets are\nheld in the banking system, and thus, promoting banking sector stability goes a long way to\nensure the stability of the entire financial system.\n\n6. The SBP has an effective decision-making process. The Financial Studies Division\n(FSD) is a dedicated unit for macroprudential analyses, in close collaboration with the Risk\nManagement Division (RMD), which is responsible for the analyses of microprudential\nissues. These analyses are discussed at the Technical Committee (TC), where the\nSuperintendent and the Directors of the FSD, the RMD, the Supervision Division, and the\nRegulations Division participate. While there are no preset rules on the meeting frequency or\nagenda setting, the TC meets as needed, with the agenda proposed by the members. [4] The TC\nis a consultative body, with the Superintendent deciding on policy proposals to be raised to\nthe Board. The ultimate policy decisions are made by the approval of the Board of Directors\nof the SBP, which consists of seven independent members. [5]\n\n7. The SBP’s communication has not been active on macroprudential policy. While\nthe SBP states on its website that it conducts macroprudential supervision with the necessary\nregulations for the banking system, [6] it has not elaborated on the intermediate objectives of\nmacroprudential policy or the approaches to achieve them. While the regulations that the\nSBP publishes include the explanation of their background and the policy intentions, the SBP\nhas not actively explained such policies to the public, for example, in the annual Financial\nStability Report (FSR). [7]\n\n3 Please see paragraph 78 of IMF (2013a) and paragraph 10 of IMF (2013b), for example.\n\n4 In other words, there is no guarantee to discuss macroprudential issues regularly. The frequency of the TC\nmeetings has been monthly or more since the onset of the pandemic, while it used to be semiannual previously.\n\n5 The Board consists of seven professionals and businesspersons without ties to the banking sector, five of\nwhich are elected and the other two are appointed by the Board of Directors of the Superintendence of\nSecurities Markets and the Superintendency of Insurance and Reinsurance, respectively. Please see the current\nDirectors at https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/about-sbp/board-of-directors.\n\n6 Please see the SBP’s supervisory framework: https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/supervisory-framework.\n\n7 The SBP publishes regulations at https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/laws-and-reg/rules; and the annual\nFinancial Stability Report and other analyses at https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios.", "text_characters": 2686}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "10\n\n\n**B. Ability to Act**\n\n\n**8.** **The SBP has broad powers to direct macroprudential policy tools and to collect**\n**information from the banking sector.** As per Article 11 of the Banking Law, the SBP is\nempowered to establish necessary regulations to achieve its objectives specified in Article 5.\nFor macroprudential policy, this means that the SBP can directly introduce, repeal, or change\nthe calibration of policy instruments, if they are deemed necessary to safeguard the\nsoundness and efficiency of the banking system. Chapter IX of the Banking Law grants the\nSBP the right to request information from banks and banking groups.\n\n\n**C. Interagency Cooperation**\n\n\n\n**9.** **The Financial Coordination Council (FCC) was established in 2011 for domestic**\n**interagency cooperation.** The FCC consists of six domestic supervisory agencies (Table 2),\nwith the main objective to strengthen\n\n**Table 2. Members of the FCC**\n\ninformation exchange and coordination on\n\n - Superintendence of Banks in Panama\n\nregulatory policies across supervisory - Superintendence of Securities Markets\nagencies. The FCC Board is chaired by the - Superintendence of Insurance and\nSuperintendent of Banks and meets Reinsurance\n\n - Panamanian Autonomous Cooperative\n\nquarterly. [8] As per Article 9 of Title I of Law\n\nInstitute\n\nNo. 67, the FCC has power to make - System of Savings and Capitalization of\nrecommendations to its members (“soft Pensions of Public Servants\n\n - National Directorate of Financial\n\npower”). So far, the FCC’s role has been\n\nCompanies of the Ministry of Commerce\n\nmostly information sharing. [9]\n\n\n\n**Table 2. Members of the FCC**\n\n\n\n\n- Superintendence of Banks in Panama\n\n- Superintendence of Securities Markets\n\n- Superintendence of Insurance and\nReinsurance\n\n- Panamanian Autonomous Cooperative\nInstitute\n\n- System of Savings and Capitalization of\nPensions of Public Servants\n\n- National Directorate of Financial\nCompanies of the Ministry of Commerce\nand Industry\n\n\n\nSource: Title I of Law No. 67 of September 1, 2011.\n\n**10.** **The SBP has also been involved in**\n**cross-border cooperation for financial stability.** The SBP is part of the Central American\nCouncil of Superintendents of Banks, Insurance, and other Financial Entities (CCSBSO),\nwhich aims to facilitate cooperation and to promote financial stability in the region. [10] The\nSBP also participates in the committee for regional financial stability (Grupo de Estabilidad\nFinanciera Regional, GEFR), consisting of the central banks and the superintendencies in\nCentral America, and collaborates on the Regional Financial Stability Report.\n\n\n**D. Recommendations**\n\n\n**11.** **The SBP is encouraged to institutionalize the decision-making process for**\n**macroprudential policy.** While the TC has been facilitating internal discussions on financial\n\n\n8 Additional _ad hoc_ meetings can be also held at the request of any FCC members (Article 3 of the FCC\nResolución #1). The SBP serves as the technical secretariat of the FCC (Article 16 of the FCC Resolución #1).\n\n\n9 In addition to the FCC, interagency information sharing has been facilitated via mutual representation of some\ndirectors at the Boards of the Superintendencies of Banks, Insurance, and Securities, respectively.\n\n\n10 Please see the [CCSBSO website.](https://ccsbso.org/)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "10\n\nB. Ability to Act\n\n8. The SBP has broad powers to direct macroprudential policy tools and to collect\ninformation from the banking sector. As per Article 11 of the Banking Law, the SBP is\nempowered to establish necessary regulations to achieve its objectives specified in Article 5.\nFor macroprudential policy, this means that the SBP can directly introduce, repeal, or change\nthe calibration of policy instruments, if they are deemed necessary to safeguard the\nsoundness and efficiency of the banking system. Chapter IX of the Banking Law grants the\nSBP the right to request information from banks and banking groups.\n\nC. Interagency Cooperation\n\n9. The Financial Coordination Council (FCC) was established in 2011 for domestic\ninteragency cooperation. The FCC consists of six domestic supervisory agencies (Table 2),\nwith the main objective to strengthen\n\nTable 2. Members of the FCC\n\ninformation exchange and coordination on\n\n - Superintendence of Banks in Panama\n\nregulatory policies across supervisory - Superintendence of Securities Markets\nagencies. The FCC Board is chaired by the - Superintendence of Insurance and\nSuperintendent of Banks and meets Reinsurance\n\n - Panamanian Autonomous Cooperative\n\nquarterly. [8] As per Article 9 of Title I of Law\n\nInstitute\n\nNo. 67, the FCC has power to make - System of Savings and Capitalization of\nrecommendations to its members (“soft Pensions of Public Servants\n\n - National Directorate of Financial\n\npower”). So far, the FCC’s role has been\n\nCompanies of the Ministry of Commerce\n\nmostly information sharing. [9]\n\nTable 2. Members of the FCC\n\n- Superintendence of Banks in Panama\n\n- Superintendence of Securities Markets\n\n- Superintendence of Insurance and\nReinsurance\n\n- Panamanian Autonomous Cooperative\nInstitute\n\n- System of Savings and Capitalization of\nPensions of Public Servants\n\n- National Directorate of Financial\nCompanies of the Ministry of Commerce\nand Industry\n\nSource: Title I of Law No. 67 of September 1, 2011.\n\n10. The SBP has also been involved in\ncross-border cooperation for financial stability. The SBP is part of the Central American\nCouncil of Superintendents of Banks, Insurance, and other Financial Entities (CCSBSO),\nwhich aims to facilitate cooperation and to promote financial stability in the region. [10] The\nSBP also participates in the committee for regional financial stability (Grupo de Estabilidad\nFinanciera Regional, GEFR), consisting of the central banks and the superintendencies in\nCentral America, and collaborates on the Regional Financial Stability Report.\n\nD. Recommendations\n\n11. The SBP is encouraged to institutionalize the decision-making process for\nmacroprudential policy. While the TC has been facilitating internal discussions on financial\n\n8 Additional _ad hoc_ meetings can be also held at the request of any FCC members (Article 3 of the FCC\nResolución #1). The SBP serves as the technical secretariat of the FCC (Article 16 of the FCC Resolución #1).\n\n9 In addition to the FCC, interagency information sharing has been facilitated via mutual representation of some\ndirectors at the Boards of the Superintendencies of Banks, Insurance, and Securities, respectively.\n\n10 Please see the CCSBSO website.", "text_characters": 2691}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "11\n\n\nstability, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to maintain good practice\neven after the crisis. This is particularly true for macroprudential policy because it needs to\nact when systemic risks are building up in good times. In this regard, it would be useful to set\nup terms of references for the TC to ensure that macroprudential issues are regularly\ndiscussed (e.g., quarterly at least) so that the SBP can take any policy actions on a timely\nbasis. Alternatively, the SBP could create a dedicated macroprudential committee, with a\nclear delineation from the role of the TC. Under either option, terms of references for the TC\nshould be clearly set up. Also, the FSD should be responsible for setting the meeting agenda,\nand the meeting minutes should be kept when policy proposals are discussed so that minority\nvoices are also recorded. In addition, the Board should have regular meetings dedicated to\nmacroprudential policy (e.g., semiannually), including a meeting where the annual FSR is\ndiscussed and approved.\n\n\n**12.** **Clarifying a dedicated process for macroprudential policy will enhance the**\n**“willingness to act.”** It will help ensure regular and timely discussions on macroprudential\nissues. It will also foster open discussion when tensions arise between microprudential and\n[macroprudential perspectives (e.g., paragraph 32, IMF 2013a), while the current close](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Key-Aspects-of-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4803)\ncollaboration on both perspectives across divisions at the SBP should be kept.\n\n\n**13.** **The SBP should consider establishing a macroprudential policy strategy to be**\n**shared with the public.** An increasing number of macroprudential authorities publish a\nstrategy document (Table 3), which elaborates their policy framework. The strategy\ndocument should explain the goals, the indicators followed, and how they are mapped into\npolicy instruments. Publishing such a strategy document helps counter the “inaction” biases\nthat can arise in the face of opposition, by promoting public understanding of the need for\nmacroprudential measures. [11] The SBP can start drafting a strategy document for internal use\nfirst, and eventually publish it after refining the strategy over a few policy cycles.\n\n\n\n**Table 1** _**.**_ **Examples of Macroprudential Policy Strategy Documents**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Finansinspektionen
(Sweden)|https://www.fi.se/contentassets/be52777b45194e2892a243793817b7ff/fi-
och-finansiell-stabilitet-20191219.pdf|\n|---|---|\n|Financial Policy
Committee (UK)
|https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-
bulletin/2013/q3/macroprudential-policy-at-the-boe|\n|Czech National Bank
|https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/macroprudential-policy/
|\n|Central Bank of Malta
|https://www.centralbankmalta.org/macro-prudential-policy
|\n|Reserve Bank of New
Zealand|https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation-and-supervision/oversight-of-
banks/standards-and-requirements-for-banks/macroprudential-policy|\n|National Bank of
Serbia|https://nbs.rs/en/ciljevi-i-funkcije/finansijska-stabilnost/finansijska-
stabilnost/|\n\n\n\n11 For example, please see paragraphs 57 and 79 of [IMF (2013a) and paragraph 51 of](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Key-Aspects-of-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4803) [IMF (2014a).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [89.7249984741211, 503.1666564941406, 541.510009765625, 649.9833374023438], "columns": 2, "rows": 6}], "text": "11\n\nstability, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to maintain good practice\neven after the crisis. This is particularly true for macroprudential policy because it needs to\nact when systemic risks are building up in good times. In this regard, it would be useful to set\nup terms of references for the TC to ensure that macroprudential issues are regularly\ndiscussed (e.g., quarterly at least) so that the SBP can take any policy actions on a timely\nbasis. Alternatively, the SBP could create a dedicated macroprudential committee, with a\nclear delineation from the role of the TC. Under either option, terms of references for the TC\nshould be clearly set up. Also, the FSD should be responsible for setting the meeting agenda,\nand the meeting minutes should be kept when policy proposals are discussed so that minority\nvoices are also recorded. In addition, the Board should have regular meetings dedicated to\nmacroprudential policy (e.g., semiannually), including a meeting where the annual FSR is\ndiscussed and approved.\n\n12. Clarifying a dedicated process for macroprudential policy will enhance the\n“willingness to act.” It will help ensure regular and timely discussions on macroprudential\nissues. It will also foster open discussion when tensions arise between microprudential and\nmacroprudential perspectives (e.g., paragraph 32, IMF 2013a), while the current close\ncollaboration on both perspectives across divisions at the SBP should be kept.\n\n13. The SBP should consider establishing a macroprudential policy strategy to be\nshared with the public. An increasing number of macroprudential authorities publish a\nstrategy document (Table 3), which elaborates their policy framework. The strategy\ndocument should explain the goals, the indicators followed, and how they are mapped into\npolicy instruments. Publishing such a strategy document helps counter the “inaction” biases\nthat can arise in the face of opposition, by promoting public understanding of the need for\nmacroprudential measures. [11] The SBP can start drafting a strategy document for internal use\nfirst, and eventually publish it after refining the strategy over a few policy cycles.\n\nTable 1 _._ Examples of Macroprudential Policy Strategy Documents\n\n Finansinspektionen (Sweden) https://www.fi.se/contentassets/be52777b45194e2892a243793817b7ff/fi- och-finansiell-stabilitet-20191219.pdf \n\n Financial Policy Committee (UK) https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly- bulletin/2013/q3/macroprudential-policy-at-the-boe \n Czech National Bank https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/macroprudential-policy/ \n Central Bank of Malta https://www.centralbankmalta.org/macro-prudential-policy \n Reserve Bank of New Zealand https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation-and-supervision/oversight-of- banks/standards-and-requirements-for-banks/macroprudential-policy \n National Bank of Serbia https://nbs.rs/en/ciljevi-i-funkcije/finansijska-stabilnost/finansijska- stabilnost/ \n\n11 For example, please see paragraphs 57 and 79 of IMF (2013a) and paragraph 51 of IMF (2014a).", "text_characters": 2642}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "12\n\n\n**14.** **Communication can be further strengthened on macroprudential policy,**\n**particularly through the FSR.** The SBP is encouraged to make more use of the FSR to\nexplain policy decisions and to provide the underlying analysis. Systemic risk analyses\nshould be linked to the policy objectives specified in the strategy document, so that any need\nfor policy responses can be assessed. Ex-post evaluation of the macroprudential measures\ntaken could also usefully be discussed. Periodic updates on risks and policies, consistent with\nthe macroprudential strategy, help demonstrate the SBP’s commitment to take policy action\nas needed, as well as build policy credibility (e.g., paragraph 52 of [IMF 2014a).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)\n\n\n**15.** **The SBP should also continue its efforts to reach to a broader audience when**\n**delivering the FSR.** The recent high-level press conferences by the Superintendent at the\nFSR publication are a good practice that should continue. [12] The SBP could consider\ncomplementing them with a press release, and an expert-level presentation with a Q&A\nsession with market analysts and financial journalists. The SBP could also consider\npublishing the FSR in English as well as in Spanish, especially given Panama’s importance\nas a financial hub.\n\n\n**16.** **Continued efforts are encouraged to foster domestic interagency cooperation.**\nWhile being mindful of different capacities across supervisory agencies, especially given the\ndifferent size of each financial sector, the FCC could consider strengthening its roles beyond\ninformation sharing. For example, the FCC could identify financial stability issues that are\nrelevant for FCC members and form a working group of technical-level staff from the\nmember agencies to assess systemic risks for policy discussions. Also, consideration could be\ngiven to review and amend the Internal Rules and Regulations (Resolución #1) of the FCC,\nor its underlying Law as needed, so that it can issue recommendations to its members with a\n“comply-or-explain” clause, moving the FCC from “soft power” to “semi-hard power.” This\ncould help the SBP to fulfill macroprudential responsibilities when any policy actions are\nneeded to be taken by other supervisory agencies for financial stability, e.g., in the case of\nregulatory leakages. [13]\n\n\n12 The presentation materials are accessible via: [https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/presentaciones.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/presentaciones)\n\n\n13 For example, please see paragraph 87 of [IMF (2014a).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "12\n\n14. Communication can be further strengthened on macroprudential policy,\nparticularly through the FSR. The SBP is encouraged to make more use of the FSR to\nexplain policy decisions and to provide the underlying analysis. Systemic risk analyses\nshould be linked to the policy objectives specified in the strategy document, so that any need\nfor policy responses can be assessed. Ex-post evaluation of the macroprudential measures\ntaken could also usefully be discussed. Periodic updates on risks and policies, consistent with\nthe macroprudential strategy, help demonstrate the SBP’s commitment to take policy action\nas needed, as well as build policy credibility (e.g., paragraph 52 of IMF 2014a).\n\n15. The SBP should also continue its efforts to reach to a broader audience when\ndelivering the FSR. The recent high-level press conferences by the Superintendent at the\nFSR publication are a good practice that should continue. [12] The SBP could consider\ncomplementing them with a press release, and an expert-level presentation with a Q&A\nsession with market analysts and financial journalists. The SBP could also consider\npublishing the FSR in English as well as in Spanish, especially given Panama’s importance\nas a financial hub.\n\n16. Continued efforts are encouraged to foster domestic interagency cooperation.\nWhile being mindful of different capacities across supervisory agencies, especially given the\ndifferent size of each financial sector, the FCC could consider strengthening its roles beyond\ninformation sharing. For example, the FCC could identify financial stability issues that are\nrelevant for FCC members and form a working group of technical-level staff from the\nmember agencies to assess systemic risks for policy discussions. Also, consideration could be\ngiven to review and amend the Internal Rules and Regulations (Resolución #1) of the FCC,\nor its underlying Law as needed, so that it can issue recommendations to its members with a\n“comply-or-explain” clause, moving the FCC from “soft power” to “semi-hard power.” This\ncould help the SBP to fulfill macroprudential responsibilities when any policy actions are\nneeded to be taken by other supervisory agencies for financial stability, e.g., in the case of\nregulatory leakages. [13]\n\n12 The presentation materials are accessible via: https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/presentaciones.\n\n13 For example, please see paragraph 87 of IMF (2014a).", "text_characters": 2051}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0013-001"], "markdown": "13\n\n\n**III.** **SYSTEMIC RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR POLICY DECISIONS**\n\n\n\n**17.** **Continuous assessment** Figure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools\n**of evolving risks is key to**\n**macroprudential policy making.**\nThere are different types of\nsystemic risks, which are best\naddressed by different policy\ninstruments (Figure 1). Since the\nprominence of each systemic risk\nchanges over time, it is prudent to\nkeep all types of risks on the radar\nscreen by monitoring indicators of\neach type of risks. When References: [IMF (2014a)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925) and [IMF (2014b).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-Detailed-Guidance-on-Instruments-PP4928)\nindicators suggest emerging\nvulnerabilities, the need for any policy responses should be assessed on a timely basis, with\ndeeper analyses conducted as needed. This multi-dimensional nature of systemic risks and\ntools highlight the importance to establish a macroprudential strategy, with clear links\nbetween policy objectives, risk assessments, and tools.\n\n\n\nFigure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools\n\n\n\n\n\nReferences: [IMF (2014a)](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-PP4925) and [IMF (2014b).](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-Detailed-Guidance-on-Instruments-PP4928)\n\n\n\n**A. Analyses and Mapping in Panama**\n\n\n**18.** **The FSD, in close collaboration with the RMD, conducts systemic risk**\n**assessments using a rich set of analytical tools and data.** Regular monitoring tools include\na heat map of risks, a cobweb diagram, liquidity stress tests, and solvency stress tests. [14] The\nset of risk indicators in the heat map is rich, including credit indicators (e.g., growth of credit,\nshare of risky credit), banking sector indicators (e.g., solvency and liquidity indicators), and\nmarket indicators (e.g., volatility of sovereign bond yields, the emerging markets bond\nindex). [15] The FSD also rightly exercises expert judgement when interpreting indicators—for\nexample, for the credit-to-GDP gap analysis, they explored alternative filtering techniques\n(e.g., [Yogo 2008,](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176508000128?via%3Dihub) [Hamilton 2018), when faced with the statistical drawbacks of mechanically](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/100/5/831/58479/Why-You-Should-Never-Use-the-Hodrick-Prescott)\napplying the standard HP filter, which generates an artificial credit boom before the large\ndrop in GDP in the wake of COVID-19.\n\n\n**19.** **The FSD also conducts in-depth analyses for specific vulnerabilities, while they**\n**are not always tied to the discussion of specific policy tools.** The FSD provides useful\ninsights into systemic risks through tailored analyses (e.g., household indebtedness, real\nestate sector), which are discussed at the TC and some of which are publicly available. [16]\n\n\n14 FSD is upgrading the solvency stress test model under the ongoing MCM TA.\n\n\n15 The definitions of indicators are consistent with those used in the GEFR with regional peers.\n\n\n16 Some analyses are available at the [SBP website.](https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/es/fin-y-est/estudios)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0718, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(270.1499938964844, 120.36001586914062, 512.969970703125, 263.760009765625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 13, "size": 80649, "transform": [242.82000732421875, 0.0, -0.0, 143.39999389648438, 270.1499938964844, 120.36001586914062], "width": 762, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "13\n\nIII. SYSTEMIC RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR POLICY DECISIONS\n\n17. Continuous assessment Figure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools\nof evolving risks is key to\nmacroprudential policy making.\nThere are different types of\nsystemic risks, which are best\naddressed by different policy\ninstruments (Figure 1). Since the\nprominence of each systemic risk\nchanges over time, it is prudent to\nkeep all types of risks on the radar\nscreen by monitoring indicators of\neach type of risks. When References: IMF (2014a) and IMF (2014b).\nindicators suggest emerging\nvulnerabilities, the need for any policy responses should be assessed on a timely basis, with\ndeeper analyses conducted as needed. This multi-dimensional nature of systemic risks and\ntools highlight the importance to establish a macroprudential strategy, with clear links\nbetween policy objectives, risk assessments, and tools.\n\nFigure 1. Mapping between Vulnerabilities and Tools\n\nReferences: IMF (2014a) and IMF (2014b).\n\nA. Analyses and Mapping in Panama\n\n18. The FSD, in close collaboration with the RMD, conducts systemic risk\nassessments using a rich set of analytical tools and data. Regular monitoring tools include\na heat map of risks, a cobweb diagram, liquidity stress tests, and solvency stress tests. [14] The\nset of risk indicators in the heat map is rich, including credit indicators (e.g., growth of credit,\nshare of risky credit), banking sector indicators (e.g., solvency and liquidity indicators), and\nmarket indicators (e.g., volatility of sovereign bond yields, the emerging markets bond\nindex). [15] The FSD also rightly exercises expert judgement when interpreting indicators—for\nexample, for the credit-to-GDP gap analysis, they explored alternative filtering techniques\n(e.g., Yogo 2008, Hamilton 2018), when faced with the statistical drawbacks of mechanically\napplying the standard HP filter, which generates an artificial credit boom before the large\ndrop in GDP in the wake of COVID-19.\n\n19. The FSD also conducts in-depth analyses for specific vulnerabilities, while they\nare not always tied to the discussion of specific policy tools. The FSD provides useful\ninsights into systemic risks through tailored analyses (e.g., household indebtedness, real\nestate sector), which are discussed at the TC and some of which are publicly available. [16]\n\n14 FSD is upgrading the solvency stress test model under the ongoing MCM TA.\n\n15 The definitions of indicators are consistent with those used in the GEFR with regional peers.\n\n16 Some analyses are available at the SBP website.", "text_characters": 2159}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "14\n\n\nSuch analyses could also be used to discuss the need for policy actions, such as any\nadjustments to the existing policy tools or the need for additional tools (Table 4).\n\n\n**Table 4: Policy Objectives and Instruments**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Objective|Instrument|\n|---|---|\n|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Dynamic Provisions|\n|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Capital Conservation Buffer*|\n|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Limits to the leverage ratio|\n|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Sectoral risk weights for mortgage loans|\n|1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and
leverage|Sectoral risk weights for corporate loans|\n|2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity
mismatches or market illiquidity|Minimum requirement on liquid assets|\n|2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity
mismatches or market illiquidity|Liquidity coverage ratio requirement|\n|2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity
mismatches or market illiquidity|Net stable funding ratio requirement*|\n|3. Limit the concentration of direct and indirect risk|Limit to large exposures|\n|4. Limit systemic effect of inappropriate incentives to
reduce moral hazard|Capital surcharges for systemically
important institutions*|\n\n\n\n[Source: The SBP and the IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Home.aspx)\n\nNotes: Instruments with asterisk (*) are currently not in place but under consideration by the SBP.\n\n\n**20.** **Few of the existing tools are intended to be used in a time-varying manner,**\n**which limits the SBP’s ability to actively tighten and loosen the macroprudential stance**\n**to lean against and mitigate the risks of financial cycles.** The main anticyclical tool is\ndynamic provisioning, which follows a formula depending on the growth of risk-weighted\nassets and special provisions in individual banks. Its accumulation and release are therefore\nautomatic and do not require policy decisions. However, after the onset of COVID-19, the\nSBP made a discretionary decision to release 80 percent of dynamic provisions as a\npre-emptive measure, well before the increase in special provisions would have started to\ndecrease it automatically. This can be considered as a macroprudential decision, to loosen the\nstance in the wake of an unprecedented GDP contraction in order to mitigate the risk of a\ncredit crunch and the emergence of a vicious circle between credit and real activity. That\nsaid, the SBP made it clear to the mission that it does not intend to adjust the parameters of\nother tools in its toolkit (such as the sectoral risk weights for mortgages and corporate loans)\nactively, in a time-varying manner.\n\n\n**21.** **The SBP has made continuous efforts to ensure adequate data for analyses,**\n**including micro-level data.** The SBP has established an internal database that contains\ngranular data of all loans from all banks in Panama. It includes the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio\nat the origination and subsequent repayment performance for each loan, as well as total debt\nservice payments for each borrower. The SBP plans to add a new field to the database for the\nincome of the borrower at the time of loan origination, which banks already collect, so that a\ndebt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio at loan origination can be calculated, possibly not just\nfor new loans, but also for existing ones.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.90760803222656, 132.75997924804688, 540.3173828125, 291.23333740234375], "columns": 2, "rows": 11}], "text": "14\n\nSuch analyses could also be used to discuss the need for policy actions, such as any\nadjustments to the existing policy tools or the need for additional tools (Table 4).\n\nTable 4: Policy Objectives and Instruments\n\n Objective Instrument \n\n 1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and leverage Dynamic Provisions \n 1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and leverage Capital Conservation Buffer* \n 1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and leverage Limits to the leverage ratio \n 1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and leverage Sectoral risk weights for mortgage loans \n 1. Attenuate and avoid excessive credit growth and leverage Sectoral risk weights for corporate loans \n 2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity mismatches or market illiquidity Minimum requirement on liquid assets \n 2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity mismatches or market illiquidity Liquidity coverage ratio requirement \n 2. Attenuate and avoid excessive maturity mismatches or market illiquidity Net stable funding ratio requirement* \n 3. Limit the concentration of direct and indirect risk Limit to large exposures \n 4. Limit systemic effect of inappropriate incentives to reduce moral hazard Capital surcharges for systemically important institutions* \n\nSource: The SBP and the IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.\n\nNotes: Instruments with asterisk (*) are currently not in place but under consideration by the SBP.\n\n20. Few of the existing tools are intended to be used in a time-varying manner,\nwhich limits the SBP’s ability to actively tighten and loosen the macroprudential stance\nto lean against and mitigate the risks of financial cycles. The main anticyclical tool is\ndynamic provisioning, which follows a formula depending on the growth of risk-weighted\nassets and special provisions in individual banks. Its accumulation and release are therefore\nautomatic and do not require policy decisions. However, after the onset of COVID-19, the\nSBP made a discretionary decision to release 80 percent of dynamic provisions as a\npre-emptive measure, well before the increase in special provisions would have started to\ndecrease it automatically. This can be considered as a macroprudential decision, to loosen the\nstance in the wake of an unprecedented GDP contraction in order to mitigate the risk of a\ncredit crunch and the emergence of a vicious circle between credit and real activity. That\nsaid, the SBP made it clear to the mission that it does not intend to adjust the parameters of\nother tools in its toolkit (such as the sectoral risk weights for mortgages and corporate loans)\nactively, in a time-varying manner.\n\n21. The SBP has made continuous efforts to ensure adequate data for analyses,\nincluding micro-level data. The SBP has established an internal database that contains\ngranular data of all loans from all banks in Panama. It includes the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio\nat the origination and subsequent repayment performance for each loan, as well as total debt\nservice payments for each borrower. The SBP plans to add a new field to the database for the\nincome of the borrower at the time of loan origination, which banks already collect, so that a\ndebt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio at loan origination can be calculated, possibly not just\nfor new loans, but also for existing ones.", "text_characters": 2781}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "15\n\n\n**B. Recommendations**\n\n\n**22.** **The SBP is encouraged to clarify and tighten the links between policy objectives,**\n**assessments, and tools.** Specifically, the SBP can organize main indicators and analyses for\neach type of systemic risks to assess the need for policy actions with appropriate tools\n(Figure 1). This will help the SBP take timely actions with the policy tools tailored to\nemerging systemic risks. Also, as discussed earlier, the SBP should consider explaining the\nmapping in the macroprudential strategy document, as done by [Finansinspektionen](https://www.fi.se/contentassets/be52777b45194e2892a243793817b7ff/fi-och-finansiell-stabilitet-20191219.pdf)\n(e.g., page 25) and other macroprudential authorities.\n\n\n**23.** **The SBP should continue the preparatory work to introduce borrower-based**\n**tools at an appropriate time, as part of developing a strategy.** The SBP is considering\nintroducing borrower-based tools (e.g., caps on the DSTI and LTV ratios) at an appropriate\ntime, and conducting preparatory work (e.g., analyses and data collection). Adding such tools\nwould be valuable because Panama has experienced vulnerabilities from growing household\nsector loans before the pandemic [17] and because existing tools would not be best suited to\naddress cyclical risks that are specific to the household sector (Table 4). The SBP should\ndevelop a strategy in addressing the household sector risks, by specifying the main risk\nindicators and designing appropriate tools. The authorities could find useful the detailed\nguidance in [IMF (2014b) in producing the strategy.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-Guidance-Note-on-Macroprudential-Policy-Detailed-Guidance-on-Instruments-PP4928) [18] A follow-up TA mission is planned to\nassist this work.\n\n\n**24.** **The SBP should refine the current strategy for existing tools, reflecting the**\n**planned addition of the Basel III tools.** In line with the recommendations of the TA on\nBasel standards, at an appropriate time, the SBP plans to implement some macroprudential\ntools, including the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCoB). [19] In this context, it becomes more\nimportant to clarify the main objectives of each tool. For example, with clarified objectives,\nthe SBP is encouraged to assess the need to adjust any parameters of the dynamic provisions\n(e.g., its floor and cap) when the CCoB is fully implemented. Likewise, the merits of\nintroducing a Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) should be carefully assessed, especially\nwhether, if implemented, it should complement or replace the existing dynamic provisioning\ntool. Similar assessments are also encouraged for liquidity tools, clarifying the strategy.\n\n\n**25.** **The timing of any activation of additional tools should be guided by the strategy.**\nThe SBP should determine the appropriate timing and modality of each measure, assessing\nmacro-financial developments based on its strategy (i.e., objectives, main indicators). For\n\n\n17 Please see “Macroprudential Policy in Panama: Implications for the Real Estate Market” and “Towards a\nMore Resilient Financial Sector” in [IMF (2020), as well as the](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/21/Panama-Selected-Issues-49355) [Staff Report](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/30/Panama-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-463116) of the 2021 Article IV consultation.\n\n\n18 It would be also useful to check Section III of the [IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/ChapterQuery.aspx) to study what\nborrower-based tools are implemented in other countries to address household sector risks.\n\n\n19 Please see the TA report (2021) “Basel II/III implementation roadmap (Hoja de ruta para la implementación\nde Basilea II/III).”", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "15\n\nB. Recommendations\n\n22. The SBP is encouraged to clarify and tighten the links between policy objectives,\nassessments, and tools. Specifically, the SBP can organize main indicators and analyses for\neach type of systemic risks to assess the need for policy actions with appropriate tools\n(Figure 1). This will help the SBP take timely actions with the policy tools tailored to\nemerging systemic risks. Also, as discussed earlier, the SBP should consider explaining the\nmapping in the macroprudential strategy document, as done by Finansinspektionen\n(e.g., page 25) and other macroprudential authorities.\n\n23. The SBP should continue the preparatory work to introduce borrower-based\ntools at an appropriate time, as part of developing a strategy. The SBP is considering\nintroducing borrower-based tools (e.g., caps on the DSTI and LTV ratios) at an appropriate\ntime, and conducting preparatory work (e.g., analyses and data collection). Adding such tools\nwould be valuable because Panama has experienced vulnerabilities from growing household\nsector loans before the pandemic [17] and because existing tools would not be best suited to\naddress cyclical risks that are specific to the household sector (Table 4). The SBP should\ndevelop a strategy in addressing the household sector risks, by specifying the main risk\nindicators and designing appropriate tools. The authorities could find useful the detailed\nguidance in IMF (2014b) in producing the strategy. [18] A follow-up TA mission is planned to\nassist this work.\n\n24. The SBP should refine the current strategy for existing tools, reflecting the\nplanned addition of the Basel III tools. In line with the recommendations of the TA on\nBasel standards, at an appropriate time, the SBP plans to implement some macroprudential\ntools, including the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCoB). [19] In this context, it becomes more\nimportant to clarify the main objectives of each tool. For example, with clarified objectives,\nthe SBP is encouraged to assess the need to adjust any parameters of the dynamic provisions\n(e.g., its floor and cap) when the CCoB is fully implemented. Likewise, the merits of\nintroducing a Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) should be carefully assessed, especially\nwhether, if implemented, it should complement or replace the existing dynamic provisioning\ntool. Similar assessments are also encouraged for liquidity tools, clarifying the strategy.\n\n25. The timing of any activation of additional tools should be guided by the strategy.\nThe SBP should determine the appropriate timing and modality of each measure, assessing\nmacro-financial developments based on its strategy (i.e., objectives, main indicators). For\n\n17 Please see “Macroprudential Policy in Panama: Implications for the Real Estate Market” and “Towards a\nMore Resilient Financial Sector” in IMF (2020), as well as the Staff Report of the 2021 Article IV consultation.\n\n18 It would be also useful to check Section III of the IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey to study what\nborrower-based tools are implemented in other countries to address household sector risks.\n\n19 Please see the TA report (2021) “Basel II/III implementation roadmap (Hoja de ruta para la implementación\nde Basilea II/III).”", "text_characters": 2736}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0016-001"], "markdown": "16\n\n\nexample, to build resilience with minimal tightening effects, many countries introduced the\nCCoB in a phased-in manner over several years. [20] Also, in the context of the COVID-19\npandemic, some countries postponed the planned phased introduction of capital buffers for\nsystemically important financial institutions, because procyclical tightening of prudential\npolicies would be counterproductive by discouraging bank lending and slowing economic\nrecovery. [21] Developing a clear strategy would help the SBP on the planned implementation\nof additional tools and its communication to the public.\n\n\n**26.** **The SBP should continue building experience in evaluating policy effects.**\nMacroprudential analysis goes beyond systemic risk monitoring (Figure 2). Policy\nevaluation, both ex post and ex ante (i.e., policy simulation), is also important part of the\npolicy making process. For example, the SBP is encouraged to evaluate the intended effects\nof any measures taken, using the main indicators specified in the strategy, and any\nunintended side effects (e.g., on real GDP growth). Such an evaluation helps the SBP to\nassess any needs for policy adjustments, together with feedback from market participants and\nexperiences from other countries. [22]\n\n\n**Figure 2. Macroprudential Analysis**\n\n\nSource: The Mission Team\n\n\n20 Please see Section II.B. of the [IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Home.aspx)\n\n\n21 Please see in MCM notes on [Macroprudential Relaxation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-main-operational-aspects-for-macroprudential-policy-relaxation.ashx) and [Unwinding policies for Banking Systems.](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-unwinding-covid-19-policy-interventions-for-banking-systems.ashx)\n\n\n22 The authorities may find useful the IMF’s [iMaPP database](https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/iMaPPDatabase.aspx) for empirical analyses. Please see [Alam et al.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/22/Digging-Deeper-Evidence-on-the-Effects-of-Macroprudential-Policies-from-a-New-Database-46658)\n[(2019), who introduced it and studied the effects and side-effects of various tools. Please also see](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/22/Digging-Deeper-Evidence-on-the-Effects-of-Macroprudential-Policies-from-a-New-Database-46658) [Galati and](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecca.12229)\n[Moessner (2018), Araujo et al. (2021), and](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecca.12229) [BCBS (2021)](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp38.htm) for literature surveys.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1568, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(133.8000030517578, 348.260009765625, 494.1199951171875, 559.2100219726562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 363, "number": 10, "size": 93471, "transform": [360.32000732421875, 0.0, -0.0, 210.9499969482422, 133.8000030517578, 348.260009765625], "width": 620, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "16\n\nexample, to build resilience with minimal tightening effects, many countries introduced the\nCCoB in a phased-in manner over several years. [20] Also, in the context of the COVID-19\npandemic, some countries postponed the planned phased introduction of capital buffers for\nsystemically important financial institutions, because procyclical tightening of prudential\npolicies would be counterproductive by discouraging bank lending and slowing economic\nrecovery. [21] Developing a clear strategy would help the SBP on the planned implementation\nof additional tools and its communication to the public.\n\n26. The SBP should continue building experience in evaluating policy effects.\nMacroprudential analysis goes beyond systemic risk monitoring (Figure 2). Policy\nevaluation, both ex post and ex ante (i.e., policy simulation), is also important part of the\npolicy making process. For example, the SBP is encouraged to evaluate the intended effects\nof any measures taken, using the main indicators specified in the strategy, and any\nunintended side effects (e.g., on real GDP growth). Such an evaluation helps the SBP to\nassess any needs for policy adjustments, together with feedback from market participants and\nexperiences from other countries. [22]\n\nFigure 2. Macroprudential Analysis\n\nSource: The Mission Team\n\n20 Please see Section II.B. of the IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.\n\n21 Please see in MCM notes on Macroprudential Relaxation and Unwinding policies for Banking Systems.\n\n22 The authorities may find useful the IMF’s iMaPP database for empirical analyses. Please see Alam et al.\n(2019), who introduced it and studied the effects and side-effects of various tools. Please also see Galati and\nMoessner (2018), Araujo et al. (2021), and BCBS (2021) for literature surveys.", "text_characters": 1514}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "17\n\n\n**27.** **Continued efforts are encouraged to fill data gaps.** **[23]** For the borrower-level data of\nincome that the SBP plans to collect from banks, the mission suggested checking the\ndefinition of “income” under the Labor Code, [24] which already imposes a cap on DSTI ratio.\nUnless there is a major issue, it is recommended to use the same definition for the potential\nnew DSTI regulation and thus for the collection of data, with a view to minimize complexity\nand reporting burdens for banks. The SBP could also consider constructing indices of real\nestate prices, possibly in collaboration with the national statistical agency (Instituto Nacional\nde Estadística y Censo - Panamá). [25] Such efforts are already on their way for residential real\nestate prices, but would be very important to expand to commercial real estate prices as well,\nas construction loans make up a sizable portion (more than 11 percent) of the total loan\nportfolio.\n\n\n**28.** **The SBP should keep the strategy updated with evolving needs for new**\n**indicators and analytical tools.** It is commendable that the FSD, in collaboration with\nRMD, is exploring various methods and data to assess evolving systemic risks. The SBP is\nalso upgrading the solvency stress testing framework with the help of ongoing MCM TA, [26]\nwhich could also be useful for macroprudential decisions (e.g., to gauge the level of\nresilience to be targeted for capital tools). [27] The SBP should continue these good efforts and\nkeep the strategy updated accordingly. The SBP could also consider launching a quarterly\nlending survey to measure changes in banks’ (non-price) credit conditions and expectations\nof loan growth. [28] It is also encouraged to continue exploring the feasibility of constructing a\ncontemporaneous financial stress index from market-based indicators. [29]\n\n\n23 Please also see the Informational Annex in the [Staff Report](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/30/Panama-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-463116) of the 2021 Article IV consultation.\n\n\n24 Article 161, numerals 11 and 13.\n\n\n25 The second mission will follow up on this possibility.\n\n\n26 Please see the TA report (2021) “Stress Testing (Pruebas de Estrés).”\n\n\n27 The upgrade of the stress testing framework also involves revamping the macro forecasting model, the output\nof which (baseline forecasts of GDP, inflation and credit) can be used to forecast the credit-to-GDP ratio on a\ntwo-year horizon which is a very useful forward-looking indicator for macroprudential analysis. It can also help\nstabilize the estimated trend of credit-to-GDP, mitigating some of the statistical drawbacks of the filtering\ntechniques used to calculate the credit gap (see Gerdrup, Kvinlog and Schaanning 2013 on this technique).\n\n\n[28 For example, the ECB conducts the euro area bank lending survey (BLS), which is explained by](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/index.en.html) [Köhler-](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop179.en.pdf)\n[Ulbrich et al. (2016)—the ECB occasional paper No. 179. The ECB publishes the results with a quick analysis](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop179.en.pdf)\nand interpretation on its website every quarter (e.g., [Q2 2021).](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/ecb.blssurvey2021q2~b868c78ada.en.html)\n\n\n29 Please see examples of such an index in the [ESRB risk dashboard and the](https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html) [FSR of National Bank of Ukraine.](https://bank.gov.ua/en/stability/report)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "17\n\n27. Continued efforts are encouraged to fill data gaps. [23] For the borrower-level data of\nincome that the SBP plans to collect from banks, the mission suggested checking the\ndefinition of “income” under the Labor Code, [24] which already imposes a cap on DSTI ratio.\nUnless there is a major issue, it is recommended to use the same definition for the potential\nnew DSTI regulation and thus for the collection of data, with a view to minimize complexity\nand reporting burdens for banks. The SBP could also consider constructing indices of real\nestate prices, possibly in collaboration with the national statistical agency (Instituto Nacional\nde Estadística y Censo - Panamá). [25] Such efforts are already on their way for residential real\nestate prices, but would be very important to expand to commercial real estate prices as well,\nas construction loans make up a sizable portion (more than 11 percent) of the total loan\nportfolio.\n\n28. The SBP should keep the strategy updated with evolving needs for new\nindicators and analytical tools. It is commendable that the FSD, in collaboration with\nRMD, is exploring various methods and data to assess evolving systemic risks. The SBP is\nalso upgrading the solvency stress testing framework with the help of ongoing MCM TA, [26]\nwhich could also be useful for macroprudential decisions (e.g., to gauge the level of\nresilience to be targeted for capital tools). [27] The SBP should continue these good efforts and\nkeep the strategy updated accordingly. The SBP could also consider launching a quarterly\nlending survey to measure changes in banks’ (non-price) credit conditions and expectations\nof loan growth. [28] It is also encouraged to continue exploring the feasibility of constructing a\ncontemporaneous financial stress index from market-based indicators. [29]\n\n23 Please also see the Informational Annex in the Staff Report of the 2021 Article IV consultation.\n\n24 Article 161, numerals 11 and 13.\n\n25 The second mission will follow up on this possibility.\n\n26 Please see the TA report (2021) “Stress Testing (Pruebas de Estrés).”\n\n27 The upgrade of the stress testing framework also involves revamping the macro forecasting model, the output\nof which (baseline forecasts of GDP, inflation and credit) can be used to forecast the credit-to-GDP ratio on a\ntwo-year horizon which is a very useful forward-looking indicator for macroprudential analysis. It can also help\nstabilize the estimated trend of credit-to-GDP, mitigating some of the statistical drawbacks of the filtering\ntechniques used to calculate the credit gap (see Gerdrup, Kvinlog and Schaanning 2013 on this technique).\n\n28 For example, the ECB conducts the euro area bank lending survey (BLS), which is explained by Köhler-\nUlbrich et al. (2016)—the ECB occasional paper No. 179. The ECB publishes the results with a quick analysis\nand interpretation on its website every quarter (e.g., Q2 2021).\n\n29 Please see examples of such an index in the ESRB risk dashboard and the FSR of National Bank of Ukraine.", "text_characters": 2534}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0018-004"], "markdown": "18\n\n\n**I. APPENDIX:** **PRESENTATION SLIDES**\n\n\nPlease see below includes the presentation slides used by the mission members during the\nmission.\n\n**1.** **Overview:**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1063, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(318.75, 162.72998046875, 581.25, 359.0799865722656)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 564, "number": 6, "size": 292830, "transform": [262.5, 0.0, -0.0, 196.35000610351562, 318.75, 162.72998046875], "width": 754, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(319.5, 370.47998046875, 581.2999877929688, 563.22998046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 559, "number": 9, "size": 138597, "transform": [261.79998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 192.75, 319.5, 370.47998046875], "width": 742, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(57.0, 162.72000122070312, 313.1499938964844, 359.19000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 563, "number": 7, "size": 32937, "transform": [256.1499938964844, 0.0, -0.0, 196.47000122070312, 57.0, 162.72000122070312], "width": 734, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(56.75, 370.219970703125, 313.1499938964844, 562.969970703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 554, "number": 8, "size": 173535, "transform": [256.3999938964844, 0.0, -0.0, 192.75, 56.75, 370.219970703125], "width": 737, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "18\n\nI. APPENDIX: PRESENTATION SLIDES\n\nPlease see below includes the presentation slides used by the mission members during the\nmission.\n\n1. Overview:", "text_characters": 125}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0019-006"], "markdown": "19\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1212, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(43.5, 497.25, 318.0, 711.2999877929688)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 549, "number": 8, "size": 88061, "transform": [274.5, 0.0, -0.0, 214.0500030517578, 43.5, 497.25], "width": 730, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.0, 497.2500305175781, 591.75, 707.6500244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 553, "number": 9, "size": 48529, "transform": [273.75, 0.0, -0.0, 210.39999389648438, 318.0, 497.2500305175781], "width": 731, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.0, 284.25, 591.75, 492.04998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 549, "number": 7, "size": 213762, "transform": [273.75, 0.0, -0.0, 207.8000030517578, 318.0, 284.25], "width": 735, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(43.349998474121094, 77.25, 318.0, 284.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 557, "number": 4, "size": 186837, "transform": [274.6499938964844, 0.0, -0.0, 207.0, 43.349998474121094, 77.25], "width": 739, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.1499938964844, 77.44999694824219, 591.9000244140625, 284.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 553, "number": 5, "size": 279636, "transform": [273.75, 0.0, -0.0, 206.8000030517578, 318.1499938964844, 77.44999694824219], "width": 732, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(43.650001525878906, 290.25, 318.1499938964844, 491.95001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 541, "number": 6, "size": 184245, "transform": [274.5, 0.0, -0.0, 201.6999969482422, 43.650001525878906, 290.25], "width": 724, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "19", "text_characters": 2}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0020-006"], "markdown": "20\n\n\n**2.** **Analysis and Mapping, with the example from the Malta FSAP in 2019**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1177, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(303.0, 72.0, 582.75, 276.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 553, "number": 5, "size": 196392, "transform": [279.75, 0.0, -0.0, 204.0, 303.0, 72.0], "width": 739, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(32.25, 72.0, 302.8500061035156, 276.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 551, "number": 4, "size": 35196, "transform": [270.6000061035156, 0.0, -0.0, 204.0, 32.25, 72.0], "width": 731, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(312.0, 324.72998046875, 576.0, 522.72998046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 7, "size": 56919, "transform": [264.0, 0.0, -0.0, 198.0, 312.0, 324.72998046875], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(42.0, 325.47998046875, 305.0, 522.72998046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 89541, "transform": [263.0, 0.0, -0.0, 197.25, 42.0, 325.47998046875], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(312.0, 527.7269897460938, 576.0, 718.7769775390625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 546, "number": 9, "size": 58853, "transform": [264.0, 0.0, -0.0, 191.0500030517578, 312.0, 527.7269897460938], "width": 728, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(42.0, 527.7269897460938, 305.0, 718.2269897460938)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 539, "number": 8, "size": 50577, "transform": [263.0, 0.0, -0.0, 190.5, 42.0, 527.7269897460938], "width": 725, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "20\n\n2. Analysis and Mapping, with the example from the Malta FSAP in 2019", "text_characters": 59}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0021-006"], "markdown": "21\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1186, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(25.5, 497.2499694824219, 302.29998779296875, 704.8499755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 7, "size": 168000, "transform": [276.79998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 207.60000610351562, 25.5, 497.2499694824219], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.75, 497.2499694824219, 583.5499877929688, 704.8499755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 8, "size": 157017, "transform": [276.79998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 207.60000610351562, 306.75, 497.2499694824219], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.75, 73.5, 582.0, 278.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 35908, "transform": [275.25, 0.0, -0.0, 204.75, 306.75, 73.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.75, 283.5, 582.0, 488.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 133602, "transform": [275.25, 0.0, -0.0, 204.75, 306.75, 283.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(29.200000762939453, 283.5, 302.25, 488.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 174564, "transform": [273.04998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 204.75, 29.200000762939453, 283.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(29.25, 73.5, 302.29998779296875, 278.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 3, "size": 92946, "transform": [273.04998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 204.75, 29.25, 73.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "21", "text_characters": 2}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-006", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0022-007"], "markdown": "22\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1187, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(36.0, 283.45001220703125, 313.0, 491.20001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 20487, "transform": [277.0, 0.0, -0.0, 207.75, 36.0, 283.45001220703125], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.5, 283.45001220703125, 593.5, 491.20001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 126234, "transform": [277.0, 0.0, -0.0, 207.75, 316.5, 283.45001220703125], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(36.0, 499.5000305175781, 313.0, 707.1500244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 7, "size": 13332, "transform": [277.0, 0.0, -0.0, 207.64999389648438, 36.0, 499.5000305175781], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.5, 499.5000305175781, 593.4000244140625, 707.1500244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 8, "size": 110913, "transform": [276.8999938964844, 0.0, -0.0, 207.64999389648438, 316.5, 499.5000305175781], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.5, 73.5, 592.5, 280.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 162033, "transform": [276.0, 0.0, -0.0, 207.0, 316.5, 73.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(36.0, 73.50001525878906, 312.0, 280.45001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 3, "size": 130221, "transform": [276.0, 0.0, -0.0, 206.9499969482422, 36.0, 73.50001525878906], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "22", "text_characters": 2}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0023-004"], "markdown": "23\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1197, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(311.25, 73.5, 589.5, 282.1000061035156)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 136392, "transform": [278.25, 0.0, -0.0, 208.60000610351562, 311.25, 73.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(29.25, 73.5, 307.25, 282.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 3, "size": 139746, "transform": [278.0, 0.0, -0.0, 208.5, 29.25, 73.5], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(29.25, 285.0, 307.25, 493.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 138213, "transform": [278.0, 0.0, -0.0, 208.5, 29.25, 285.0], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(311.25, 285.0, 589.25, 493.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 112335, "transform": [278.0, 0.0, -0.0, 208.5, 311.25, 285.0], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "23", "text_characters": 2}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0024-003"], "markdown": "24\n\n\n**3.** **Policy Evaluation**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1545, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(127.5, 324.75, 443.5, 561.75)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 45428, "transform": [316.0, 0.0, -0.0, 237.0, 127.5, 324.75], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(36.45000076293945, 104.25, 310.45001220703125, 309.75)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 85827, "transform": [274.0, 0.0, -0.0, 205.5, 36.45000076293945, 104.25], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.5, 104.25, 590.5, 309.75)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 36078, "transform": [274.0, 0.0, -0.0, 205.5, 316.5, 104.25], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "24\n\n\n3. Policy Evaluation", "text_characters": 20}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-006", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-007", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0025-008"], "markdown": "25\n\n\n**4.** **Mission’s findings and recommendations at the concluding meeting**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1187, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(29.25, 300.0, 306.25, 507.75)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 37753, "transform": [277.0, 0.0, -0.0, 207.75, 29.25, 300.0], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(312.75, 300.75, 589.75, 508.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 30213, "transform": [277.0, 0.0, -0.0, 207.75, 312.75, 300.75], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(29.25, 511.25, 306.239990234375, 718.9500122070312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 7, "size": 28164, "transform": [276.989990234375, 0.0, -0.0, 207.6999969482422, 29.25, 511.25], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(29.25, 90.75, 304.5, 297.1499938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 3, "size": 30797, "transform": [275.25, 0.0, -0.0, 206.39999389648438, 29.25, 90.75], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(312.45001220703125, 511.2500305175781, 587.7000122070312, 717.6500244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 8, "size": 31875, "transform": [275.25, 0.0, -0.0, 206.39999389648438, 312.45001220703125, 511.2500305175781], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(312.70001220703125, 90.89999389648438, 587.7000122070312, 297.1499938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 13117, "transform": [275.0, 0.0, -0.0, 206.25, 312.70001220703125, 90.89999389648438], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "25\n\n4. Mission’s findings and recommendations at the concluding meeting", "text_characters": 61}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0026-006"], "markdown": "26\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1237, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(30.75, 290.25, 313.5, 502.29998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 57630, "transform": [282.75, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0500030517578, 30.75, 290.25], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.45001220703125, 290.20001220703125, 599.1500244140625, 502.25)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 39287, "transform": [282.70001220703125, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0500030517578, 316.45001220703125, 290.20001220703125], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(30.75, 73.50001525878906, 313.5, 285.45001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 3, "size": 47817, "transform": [282.75, 0.0, -0.0, 211.9499969482422, 30.75, 73.50001525878906], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.5, 506.75, 599.1700439453125, 718.7000122070312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 8, "size": 57299, "transform": [282.6700134277344, 0.0, -0.0, 211.9499969482422, 316.5, 506.75], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.3999938964844, 73.50001525878906, 599.0, 285.45001220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 52526, "transform": [282.6000061035156, 0.0, -0.0, 211.9499969482422, 316.3999938964844, 73.50001525878906], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(32.25, 506.75, 313.5, 718.7000122070312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 7, "size": 52009, "transform": [281.25, 0.0, -0.0, 211.9499969482422, 32.25, 506.75], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "26", "text_characters": 2}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-001", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-002", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-003", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-004", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-005", "cr-2023-082-fig-p0027-006"], "markdown": "27\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1237, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-082", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(30.75, 73.49998474121094, 313.5, 285.54998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 3, "size": 158709, "transform": [282.75, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0500030517578, 30.75, 73.49998474121094], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(30.700000762939453, 291.0, 313.45001220703125, 503.04998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 5, "size": 117033, "transform": [282.75, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0500030517578, 30.700000762939453, 291.0], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(30.75, 506.5999755859375, 313.5, 718.5999755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 7, "size": 141327, "transform": [282.75, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0, 30.75, 506.5999755859375], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.75, 73.49998474121094, 597.75, 285.54998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 4, "size": 124974, "transform": [279.0, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0500030517578, 318.75, 73.49998474121094], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.75, 291.0, 597.75, 503.04998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 6, "size": 39671, "transform": [279.0, 0.0, -0.0, 212.0500030517578, 318.75, 291.0], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.75, 508.25, 597.72998046875, 717.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 450, "number": 8, "size": 47913, "transform": [278.9800109863281, 0.0, -0.0, 209.25, 318.75, 508.25], "width": 600, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "27", "text_characters": 2}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd95a278b0ab0a9ec1895719dada19e94b9cfa9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c7e00a24a7f248046cb11fbe7a2d248accfd7b869b019d8c6c0219bd9504d739
+size 139161
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98aefc6471e7c75bcb3946cc320ce4e8f1c6c767
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e006290dfd026852f7f9826d3f4bfe7bbb6756c36e8673f58b2f3319f4493d31
+size 51140
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..157f73dfc6cd3f6af98ba3145f614b2278ee24da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:412a891e5192f4ddac54c8eab745796b1472440e6249920c69040b4b5334b4f5
+size 211625
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0008-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0008-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3b1e8c1e863b62a701026e678decbb8cd2ad45ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0008-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4fe872c16a386a5bfada8447a5c5a7ca3aa69f50b325664db21deae3ff484468
+size 57990
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..18d205a5417ca65ab34bac242f16c02f55b73845
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:12392fcfa8814a6055a92d3a560fb78e233449b8b3b02aa871ef39728fe2725f
+size 66761
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8a66a82397851f2c3b2b8fa2be451ffc644bae93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3c0a71272c4fa6eb9d40493720158a1a77819116251ed9402d1ba9d933f4056a
+size 22787
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0024-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0024-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b886c2026aaaa42ae422dd0cf55725d476703b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0024-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b14dcc7c5609a708eae7af14b82b18e04e4f7f54c41b2965a176472e9cd9570b
+size 27410
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a0e8e01524dd5af17a144d62096eaf2d5f39aca8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-095",
+ "title": "Republic of Madagascar: Technical Assistance Report-Government Finance Statistics Mission",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-095.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "8ea6d8414a7fa48d5ce068b20f5ee94ea6f69311151e321aa851adfcfc46f128",
+ "source_bytes": 520237,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/03/06/republic-of-madagascar-technical-assistance-report-government-finance-statistics-mission-530614",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:11+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 11.414,
+ "page_count": 26,
+ "text_characters": 50628,
+ "table_count": 11,
+ "figure_count": 8,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "RÉPUBLIQUE DE MADAGASCAR"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Table des Matières(u)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Sigles et Acronymes"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Synthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations Prioritaires"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Section I. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et Recommandations"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 20,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Appendices"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": " République de Madagascar: rapport de la mission d’assistance technique sur les statistiques de finances publiques (14-25 Novembre 2022) Rapport du FMI No. 23/95; Mars 2023 ",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Statistiques de Finances Publiques",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230303122330-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230306120339-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..214852ae2c9338b7e303dbb6d0b01f72e748e7c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
+
+
+
+
+Mars 2023
+
+
+
+**Rapport du FMI No. 23/95**
+
+### **RÉPUBLIQUE DE MADAGASCAR**
+
+**RAPPORT DE LA MISSION D’ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE SUR LES**
+**STATISTIQUES DE FINANCES PUBLIQUES**
+**(14–25 NOVEMBRE 2022)**
+
+
+Ce document sur la République de Madagascar a été préparé par une équipe du Fonds
+monétaire international. Il est basé sur les informations disponibles au moment de son
+achèvement en novembre 2022.
+
+
+Des exemplaires de ce rapport sont disponibles au public à partir de
+
+
+Fonds monétaire international • Services de publication
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Téléphone : (202) 623-7430 • Fax : (202) 623-7201
+E-mail : [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Prix : $18.00 par copie imprimée
+
+
+**Fonds monétaire international**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+###### **Table des Matières(u)**
+
+**Sigles et Acronymes ................................................................................................................................... 4**
+
+
+**Synthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations ................................................................ 5**
+
+
+**Section II. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et Recommandations ......................................................... 8**
+
+A. Travail de la mission .............................................................................................................................. 14
+B. Couverture des statistiques et sources de données .............................................................................. 14
+C. Sources de données .............................................................................................................................. 15
+D. Consolidation ......................................................................................................................................... 16
+E. Dette et compte de patrimoine ............................................................................................................... 17
+F. Responsables rencontrées au cours de la mission ............................................................................... 18
+
+
+**Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 19**
+
+Appendice A. Consolidation ........................................................................................................................ 19
+Appendice B. Fichiers préparés pendant la mission ................................................................................... 25
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 3
+
+
+
+###### **Sigles et Acronymes**
+
+AONT Autres Opérations Nettes du Trésor
+CNaPS Caisse Nationale de Protection Sociale
+CTD Collectivités Territoriales Décentralisées
+DCP Direction de la Comptabilité Publique
+DE Direction des Études de la Direction Générale du Trésor
+DGT Direction Générale du Trésor
+EPA Établissement Publics à Caractère Administratif
+EPIC Établissement Publics à Caractère Industriel ou Commercial
+FMI Fonds Monétaire International
+INSTAT Institut National de la Statistique
+MEF Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances
+_MSFP 2014_ _Manuel de Statistiques de Finances Publiques 2014_
+OGT Opérations Globales du Trésor (désigne aussi le Tableau des Opérations
+Globales du Trésor)
+PSMFP Plan Stratégique de Modernisation des Finances Publiques
+SDSP Statistiques de la Dette du Secteur Public
+SFP Statistiques de Finances Publiques
+SOAP Situation des Opérations des Administrations Publiques
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 4
+
+
+
+###### **Synthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations** **Prioritaires**
+
+**1.** **A la demande du ministère de l’économie et des finances (MEF) de la République de**
+**Madagascar et en consultation avec le département Afrique du Fonds monétaire international**
+**(FMI), une mission d’assistance technique en statistiques de finances publiques (SFP) du**
+**Département des statistiques du FMI (STA) a été conduite à distance du 14 au 25 novembre**
+**2022 avec la Direction des Études (DE) de la Direction Générale du Trésor (DGT) du MEF** .
+L’objectif de la mission était d’appuyer les autorités malgaches à l’adoption des concepts, définitions
+et la méthodologie du _Manuel de statistiques de finances publiques_ ( _MSFP_ ) _2014_ et du _Guide des_
+_statistiques de la dette du secteur public pour les statisticiens et les utilisateurs_ dans le cadre du
+fonds fiduciaire multilatéral Données pour Décider (D4D) [1] et du Plan Stratégique de Modernisation
+des Finances Publiques (PSMFP) de la République de Madagascar. Cette mission s’inscrit aussi
+dans le prolongement des missions d’assistance technique précédentes dans ce domaine.
+
+
+**2.** **Depuis 2016, alors dans le cadre du projet EDDI2** **[2]** **et ensuite dans le cadre du fonds**
+**fiduciaire de stabilité du secteur financier (FSSF), les autorités malgaches ont réalisé des**
+**progrès significatifs dans le domaine des SFP** . La qualité des données de l'administration centrale
+budgétaire (ACB) s'est améliorée, comme indiqué dans les conclusions des missions
+ci-dessous :
+
+
+- Les balances comptables mensuelles relatives aux opérations des différents sous-secteurs
+des administrations publiques sont produites régulièrement. Il s’agit de la balance générale
+du Trésor pour les opérations de l’État et des balances comptables consolidées des
+Établissements Publics Administratifs (EPA) ainsi que des Collectivités Territoriales
+Décentralisées (CTD). La balance et les états financiers de la Caisse Nationale de
+Prévoyance Sociale (CNaPS) sont disponibles annuellement. Il est donc maintenant possible
+d’envisager la préparation et la diffusion des SFP pour l’ensemble des sous-secteurs de
+l’administration publique malgache, du moins agrégées, même si une consolidation
+suffisamment fiable ne peut se faire dans un premier temps.
+
+- La communication des SFP à STA pour diffusion à la base de données annuelle sur les SFP
+est courante par le biais du remplissage du questionnaire annuel des SFP relatif aux
+opérations de l’administration centrale budgétaire. La communication de données se fait
+aussi pour les statistiques de la dette du secteur publique (SDSP) couvrant les
+administrations centrales pour diffusion à la base de données conjointe du FMI et de la
+Banque Mondiale sur les SDSP trimestrielles.
+
+
+1 [https://www.imf.org/en/Capacity-Development/D4D](https://www.imf.org/en/Capacity-Development/D4D)
+
+2 Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 du Department for International Development du Royaume-Uni.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 5
+
+
+
+- L’enregistrement des Autres Opérations Nettes du Trésor (AONT) s’effectue maintenant en
+grande partie sur une base brute plutôt que nette, ce qui améliore sensiblement la
+transparence et la lisibilité de ces opérations et permet d’améliorer leur traitement statistique.
+
+- Les SFP sur les opérations de l’administration centrale extrabudgétaire et des collectivités
+locales sont déjà préparées (même si ce n’est encore qu’à l’état de projet et si elles ne sont
+pas encore communiquées au FMI).
+
+
+**3.** **Deux recommandations antérieures sont toujours en cours** :
+
+
+- Les travaux de mise en place d’un outil pour la préparation des SFP relatives à la CNaPS, qui
+sont retardés dû aux difficultés rencontrées dans l’obtention de sources de données
+exploitables électroniquement.
+
+- La production de données consolidées, qui se heurte aux écarts importants des montants
+relatifs aux flux réciproques entre administrations publiques.
+
+
+**4.** **L’achèvement de deux objectifs de nature stratégique clés qui avait été déjà reporté**
+**pour diverses raisons est toujours en attente.** Ces objectifs concernent :
+
+
+- L’amélioration du cadre règlementaire pour les SFP par l’adoption d’un texte régissant leur
+production et leur diffusion et ;
+
+- L’adoption du cadre analytique et des classifications du _MSFP 2014_ comme mode de
+confection et de présentation des SFP nationales (et plus particulièrement du tableau des
+OGT).
+
+
+**5.** **Bien que des difficultés persistent, les perspectives sont prometteuses** . Plus
+généralement, les difficultés rencontrées lors de la préparation des statistiques concernent
+principalement la présentation et les supports de certaines sources de données, ce qui constitue un
+obstacle à la systématisation des procédures. [3] L’établissement des SFP devrait bénéficier de la
+révision en cours de la nomenclature budgétaire qui s’effectue avec l’appui du Département des
+finances publiques du FMI, et qui vise à harmoniser la nomenclature avec les classifications du
+_MSFP 2014._
+
+
+**6.** **Afin de contribuer aux progrès des domaines susmentionnés, la mission a**
+**recommandé un plan d'action détaillé sur un an et retenu trois recommandations prioritaires**
+**présentées au bas de cette synthèse, lesquelles revêtent une importance particulière pour**
+**améliorer les différentes dimensions de la qualité des données sur les SFP** . De plus amples
+informations sur les recommandations prioritaires et les mesures/jalons correspondants se trouvent
+dans le plan d'action, à la section « Évaluation technique détaillée et recommandations ».
+
+
+3 La systématisation des procédures devrait être facilitée par l’harmonisation en cours de la nomenclature budgétaire avec celle du
+_MSFP 2014_ ainsi qu’avec la digitalisation envisagée par la DE.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 6
+
+
+
+**Tableau 1** . **Recommandations prioritaires**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 7
+
+
+
+###### **Section I. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et** **Recommandations**
+
+**7.** **Les SFP pour une couverture institutionnelle plus large ne sont pas encore diffusées**
+**bien que produite à l’interne** . Le MEF répond au questionnaire annuel de SFP relatives aux
+opérations de l’ACB. Bien qu’elles ne soient pas encore communiquées au FMI, la DE établit aussi
+des statistiques pour les EPA ainsi que des CTD à titre provisoire. Avec les statistiques produites
+durant la mission pour la CNaPS, les SFP produites pourront donc s’étendre aisément à l’ensemble
+des trois sous-secteurs d’administration publique (sans toutefois, dans un premier temps, inclure tous
+les EPN non marchands).
+
+
+**8.** **Il persiste des difficultés dans la production des SFP** . Les difficultés rencontrées lors de
+la préparation des statistiques concernent principalement les sources de données, plus
+particulièrement leur (1) présentation, support, et éventuellement leur fréquence et délai de
+production ou (2) leur interprétation.
+
+
+**9.** **L’adoption d’un cadre règlementaire encadrant la production des SFP serait important** .
+En vue de pallier aux difficultés rencontrées dans la production de SFP, la DE devrait pouvoir
+intervenir auprès des pourvoyeurs de données rapidement et formellement et pouvoir imposer le
+respect de certaines règles et critères concernant la communication des données sources. Il pourrait
+être souhaitable d’étendre les prérogatives de la DE, ceci en vue, entre autres, d’accroitre son
+autorité sur les pourvoyeurs de données, notamment quand ceux-ci ne sont pas sous la tutelle du
+MEF. C’est à cette fin que les missions précédentes avaient recommandé l’adoption d’un cadre
+règlementaire pour la production et la diffusion des SFP à l’instar de la pratique adoptée dans de
+nombreux pays. Plus précisément, il s’agirait d’adopter un texte légal ou règlementaire comme pour
+les autres domaines statistiques, y compris les statistiques macroéconomiques – statistiques du
+secteur réel (production, prix, comptabilité nationale entre autres) – au travers de la loi statistique, et
+statistiques monétaires et financières et du secteur extérieur au travers de la règlementation bancaire
+et financière. Étendre cette approche aux SFP est considéré constituer une bonne pratique
+permettant de formaliser la fonction statistique du service responsable de ces statistiques et de
+l’investir de l’autorité nécessaire à la réalisation de sa mission.
+
+
+**10.** **Des travaux sont en cours pour l’adoption d’un texte réglementaire fixant les modalités**
+**de production des SFP** . L’adoption d’un tel cadre règlementaire pour les SFP fait l’objet de travaux
+depuis plusieurs années et un premier projet de décret avait été préparé et revue par le ministre de
+l’Économie et des finances. La mission recommande la finalisation du projet suivi de l’adoption
+prochaine du décret.
+
+
+_**Recommandation**_
+
+
+ - Finaliser le projet de décret relatif au cadre réglementaire en matière de production et de
+diffusion des SFP, et adopter le décret.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 8
+
+
+
+**11.** **Le plan d’actions ci-dessous a pour objectif d’orienter la DE dans ses activités**
+**statistiques au cours de 2023** .
+
+
+**Tableau 2.** **Plan d’actions** **[4]**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
+|Élevée|1. Relancer
l’adoption du
décret portant
production et
diffusion des
SFP.
|Le décret est
adopté.
|30 juin
2023
||Ceci est une action du
Plan Stratégique de
Modernisation des
Finances Publiques
(PSMFP).
|
+||2. Signature d'un
protocole
d'accord entre la
DE et l’INSTAT.
|Le protocole
d’accord est
signé.
|NA
||Cette recommandation
n’est plus pertinente
dans la mesure où
l’INSTAT et la DE font
tous deux désormais
partie du même
ministère de tutelle, qui
est le MEF.
|
+|Élevée
|3. Établir et
signer des
protocoles entre
la DE et les
pourvoyeurs de
données-source.
|- Dépend de
l’adoption du
décret relatif aux
SFP.
-Les protocoles
d’accord sont
signés.
Cf. plus bas la
section sur
l’organisation du
travail.
|30
septembre
2023
||Cet aspect peut
s’appliquer aux
pourvoyeurs de
données d’entités
externes au MEF (la
CNaPS actuellement).
L’extension du champ
aux EPA et CTD
échappant à la tutelle
du Trésor pourrait être
facilitée par l’adoption
de tels protocoles.
|
+|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|
+
+
+4 L’horizon de ce plan d’action se limite à 2023.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 9
+
+
+
+|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|Elevée
|4. Revoir et
compléter autant
que possible les
tableaux de
correspondance
établis par la
mission entre les
divers plans
comptables
d’administration
publique et la
nomenclature du
_MSFP 201_~~_4._~~
|
Les tableaux de
correspondance
sont vérifiés et
complétés.
|En continu
||Certains problèmes
relatifs au traitement
de la Classe 1 et, le
cas échéant, des
provisions doivent être
résolus en étroite
collaboration avec les
services comptables
concernés.
|
+|Élevée
|
5. Vérifier la
cohérence entre
les différents
tableaux de
correspondance.
|Des procédures
sont mises en
place pour
assurer la
cohérence de
tableaux
distincts.
|En continu
||L’existence de
tableaux de
correspondance
propres à chaque
sous-secteur
d’administration
publique présente le
risque d’incohérences
entre les statistiques
des différents sous-
secteurs. La
vérification de la
cohérence peut passer
par l’établissement
d’un tableau de
correspondance
unique pour les
comptes communs aux
différents plans
comptables.|
+|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
+|Élevée
|6.
Consolidation :
Procéder à
l’identification
des flux entre les
différents
niveaux
d’administration
publique et à leur
quantification.
|Les flux intra et
inter-
gouvernementa
ux les plus
importants sont
identifiés et
consignés dans
un tableau de
qui à qui.
|30 juin
2023 pour
les
données de
2021 30
septembre
2023 pour
les
données de
2022.
||Des écarts parfois
considérables existent
dans les flux
réciproques entre
administrations. Un
rapprochement est
essentiel pour
poursuivre les travaux
de consolidation.|
+|Élevée|
7. Assemblage,
remplissage et
communication
des tableaux de
recettes, charges
et de
transactions sur
actifs et passifs|Le questionnaire
de SFP pour
l’ensemble,
consolidé ou
agrégé des
administrations
publiques est
rempli et|
30
septembre
2023|||
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 10
+
+
+
+|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||portant sur
l’exercice 2022
dans le
questionnaire de
SFP du FMI.
|
communiqué au
Département
des statistiques
du FMI.
||||
+|Moyenne
|
8. Élaboration
d’un compte de
patrimoine
financier
statistique de
l’administration
publique centrale
budgétaire (État)
portant sur
l’exercice 2021
et remplissage
du Tableau 6 du
questionnaire de
SFP pour
l’exercice 2021
|Un compte de
patrimoine
statistique est
élaboré puis
communiqué au
Département
des statistiques
du FMI.
|30
septembre
2023
Fusionner
avec le 10,
car objectif
principal
est le
même
remplissag
e formulaire
6, 6A et 6B
||Les encours d’actifs
financiers et de passifs
apparaissent déjà dans
la balance du Trésor.
La question de
valorisation des actifs
à la valeur de marché
ne se posera que pour
les participations
(entretemps les
valeurs comptables
pourront être utilisées).
Les passifs de dette
devront sans doute
être complétés à l’aide
de la situation de la
dette.
|
+|Moyenne
|9. Vérification de
la cohérence
entre les
statistiques de
dette et les
passifs de dette
du compte de
patrimoine
financier.
|Les passifs
constituant de la
dette sont
cohérents avec
les statistiques
de la dette.
|En continu
||
La cohérence entre les
passifs de dette du
compte de patrimoine
et les statistiques de
dette est un élément
important de la qualité
des données.
|
+|Élevée
|10.Une fois
validées,
communication
des statistiques
de passifs et de
dette dans le
questionnaire de
SFP du FMI
(Tableau 6, 6A et
6B).
|Les statistiques
de la dette de
l’administration
centrale sont
communiquées
au FMI.
|30
septembre
2023
||La cohérence entre les
flux et stocks de dette
devra être vérifiée.
|
+|Moyenne|11. Préparation
de la Situation
des flux de
trésorerie (SFT)
pour
l’administration
centrale
budgétaire dans
la Situation II du
questionnaire de
SFP.|-La SFT de
l’État est
produite et
communiquée
au FMI.|Décembre
2023||Cet objectif pourra
faire l’objet de la
prochaine mission.|
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 11
+
+
+
+|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
+|Élevée
|12. Fournir une
évaluation de
l’importance des
EPA et CTD déjà
saisis dans les
statistiques
relatifs à leur
ensemble.
|Le poids des
entités saisis
par rapport à
l’ensemble est
évalué.
|31 juin
2023
|
|À présent, les SFP ne
comprennent que les
EPA et CTD gérées
par le Trésor. Un
indicateur d’évaluation
de leur degré de
représentativité
permettrait de juger de
l’importance à apporter
à l’extension du champ
statistiques.
|
+|Moyenne
|13. Extension du
champ
statistiques aux
EPA hors
gestion par le
Trésor et aux
Établissement
Public à
caractère
Industriel ou
Commercial
(EPIC) non-
marchands,
selon la
pertinence).
|Le triage entre
EPIC
marchands et
non marchands
est engagé.
Les SFP pour
les EPIC non
marchands sont
élaborées.
|2023 puis
en continu
||
L’extension du champ
statistique est une
action du PSMFP.
La pertinence de
l’inclusion des EPIC
dépendra de leur poids
par rapport à
l’ensemble de
l’administration
centrale. Cette action
nécessitera une
assistance technique.|
+|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
+|
|14. Dans le
contexte des
protocoles
mentionnés plus
haut (action 3) et
selon les
besoins, établir
des mécanismes
et calendriers de
communication
spontanée des
données de
base.
|Des
mécanismes et
des calendriers
de
communication
des données
sont mis en
place.
|NA
|
|Sauf peut-être en ce
qui concerne la
CNaPS, cette activité
n’est plus jugée
pertinente dans la
mesure où les
données comptables
sont régulièrement
produites et fournies
par la DGT.
|
+|Élevée|
15. Selon les
besoins, établir,
pour les
pourvoyeurs de
données de
base, des
questionnaires
de présentation
des données-
source et|Les
questionnaires
et formulaires
spécifiques sont
préparés et
proposés aux
comptables de
certains
services|30 juin
2023 ou
selon les
besoins||Le recours à des
questionnaires est
parfois utile en vue
d’obtenir des
informations
supplémentaires,
comme certains types
de ventilation qui
peuvent ne pas être
identifiables dans les|
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 12
+
+
+
+|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||d’information
supplémentaire.
|
pourvoyeurs de
données
|||balances
communiquées à la
DE.
|
+|Élevée
|16. S’entendre
avec la CNaPS
sur la
communication
de source de
données
électroniquement
exploitables.
|L’ensemble des
états financiers
et la balance
générale des
comptes sont
communiqués
sur support
Excel
|
30 mars
2023
|
|
|
+|Moyenne
|
17. Adoption du
_MSFP 2014_ pour
l’OGT.
|
L’OGT adopte la
présentation de
la SOAP et les
classifications
du_ MSFP 2014._
|À
envisager à
moyen
terme
|
|Il s’agit d’adopter le
cadre analytique et les
classifications du
_MSFP 2014_pour
l’OGT. Ceci est un
objectif déclaré des
autorités malgaches
qui devra faire l’objet
d’une consultation
avec le Département
Afrique du FMI.
|
+|Moyenne
|18. Rédaction
d’un document
de type
Concepts,
Sources et
Méthodes.|Le document en
question est
rédigé puis mis
à jour au cours
du temps.|L’adoption
par les
autorités du
_MSFP_
_2014_
comme
méthodolog
ie de
référence
pour l’OGT
et
l’ensemble
des SFP
contribuera
à la
rédaction
d’un tel
document.||
En plus de son
caractère
méthodologique, ce
type de document doit
entre autres pouvoir
servir de manuel de
procédures. Il est un
moyen de contribuer à
la formation des
nouvelles recrues et,
d’assurer la continuité
des tâches en cas de
départ du personnel de
la DE, ainsi que de
familiariser les agents
extérieurs à la DE.
Ceci est une action du
PSMFP. Elle est aussi
d’une haute
importance. La priorité
moyenne qui lui est
attribuée s’explique
uniquement par le fait
qu’une telle rédaction
ne peut se faire dans
le court terme.|
+|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 13
+
+
+
+**A. Travail de la mission**
+
+**12. Le travail de la mission a principalement porté sur** :
+
+
+- L’examen des statistiques établies par la DE pour les opérations de l’État, des EPA et des
+CTD ;
+
+- L’agrégation des statistiques des trois sous-secteurs susmentionnés en vue de
+l’établissement des statistiques portant sur l’ensemble des administrations publiques ;
+
+- Les procédures de la consolidation de ces SFP, y compris l’examen des transferts inter
+gouvernementaux sujets à être éliminés lors de la consolidation de l’ensemble des
+sous-secteurs d’administration publique ;
+
+- La production des statistiques relatives aux opérations de la CNaPS ;
+
+- L’examen des travaux menés par la DE en vue de produire le compte de patrimoine financier
+pour l’administration centrale budgétaire (l’État) ;
+
+- L’examen et la mise à jour du plan d’actions avec comme objectif l’élaboration et la
+communication de ces statistiques consolidées vers le troisième trimestre 2023.
+
+
+**13. Les travaux relatifs aux SFP pour l’OGT, les EPA, les CTD et la CNaPS ont été**
+**consignés dans un ensemble de fichiers Excel d’établissement des données** . Ils comprennent
+entre autres (1) les tableaux de correspondance respectifs entre les nomenclatures comptable et
+statistique et (2) l’outil de classification des données-source de chacun de ces sous-secteurs. La liste
+de ces fichiers est fournie à l’appendice B de ce rapport.
+
+
+**B. Couverture des statistiques et sources de données**
+
+**14.** Le champ de l’administration publique malgache comprend l’État (l’administration centrale
+budgétaire), les Établissements Publics Nationaux non marchands (principalement les EPA et les
+EPIC) qui constituent l’administration centrale hors budget, la CNaPS pour le sous-secteur de
+sécurité sociale, ainsi que les CTD pour le sous-secteur d’administration locale.
+
+
+**15. Le champ effectivement couvert par les statistiques est déterminé par la disponibilité**
+**des sources de données** . Les sources suivantes étant déjà disponibles :
+
+
+- Pour l’État : La balance générale du Trésor complétée par des données issues de la
+comptabilité budgétaire, de la banque centrale de Madagascar et de la Direction de la Dette ;
+
+- Pour les EPA : la balance comptable consolidée des EPA gérés par le Trésor ;
+
+- Pour les CTD : la balance comptable consolidée des CTD gérées par le Trésor ;
+
+- Pour la CNaPS, la balance comptable et les états financiers.
+
+
+**16. La DE envisage d’étendre le champ aux EPA qui ne sont pas gérés par le Trésor et aux**
+**EPIC non marchand** . Ceci demandera l’accès aux sources de données de ces établissements, et
+dans le cas des EPIC l’identification des entités non marchandes.
+
+**17. La DE a exprimé son intention d’étendre le champ de l’administration publique aux**
+**autres entités de l’administration publique, à savoir principalement les EPA et les CTD non**
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 14
+
+
+
+**gérés par le Trésor et les EPIC non marchands** . [5] Quoique conforme aux normes internationales,
+cet élargissement du champ pourrait constituer une lourde tâche, et il serait souhaitable qu’elle ne
+soit pas entreprise aux dépends de la consolidation des procédures et pratiques déjà mises en place.
+Les gains pour l’analyse des finances publiques qui pourraient découler de ce projet d’expansion
+dépendront du poids de ces nouvelles entités dans l’ensemble du champ des administrations
+publiques. À cet égard et afin d’évaluer ces gains et de mieux piloter le calendrier d’extension du
+champ statistique, il serait alors utile de construire un indicateur de la représentativité des EPA et des
+CTD déjà saisis dans les statistiques. En fait plusieurs indicateurs pourraient être facilement
+construits, par exemple sur la base des transferts et subventions versées aux entités gérées par le
+Trésor par rapport au total de ces versements, sur la base des recettes ou dépenses relatives, ou
+encore sur la base des effectifs relatifs _._
+
+
+_**Recommandation**_
+
+
+- Construire plusieurs indicateurs de l’importance des opérations des EPA et CTD couverts par
+les statistiques par rapport à l’ensemble de leurs opérations respectives. Sur la base des
+priorités ainsi établies ;
+
+- Étendre le champ statistique des administrations publiques aux EPA et CTD qui ne sont pas
+gérées par le Trésor ;
+
+- Identifier les EPIC et les entreprises publiques non marchands les plus importants.
+
+
+**C.** **Sources de données**
+
+**18.** **Le format et support de certaines sources de données compliquent sensiblement**
+**l’établissement des SFP** . Ceci alourdit le travail de la DE en constituant un obstacle majeur à la
+systématisation et à l’automatisation des procédures et pratiques statistiques. Par exemple,
+l’établissement des statistiques de la CNaPS pour l’exercice 2021 a dû être effectué à partir de
+documents PDF-image (tant pour la balance des comptes que pour les états financiers), ce qui a
+demandé une transcription manuelle de l’information comptable qui s’y trouvait. De plus, parce que la
+balance pour 2021 était sensiblement moins détaillée que celle de 2020, les classifications effectuées
+dans le tableau de correspondance précédent n’ont pu être utilisés et un nouveau tableau a dû être
+établi. [6] Plus généralement et en résumé :
+
+
+- Le format PDF-image est complètement inadapté à la préparation des statistiques car les
+documents concernés ne sont ni lisibles électroniquement ni copiables.
+
+- Le changement de présentation lors d’un nouvel exercice élimine la possibilité d’exploiter les
+outils et procédures mis en place précédemment.
+
+
+5 À terme, le champ statistique des administrations publiques devra comprendre les entreprises publiques nationales
+non marchandes.
+
+6 Quand cela était possible le détail de la balance a pu être obtenu à partir des informations détaillées des états
+financiers (eux aussi sous format image). En plus de constituer une perte de temps considérable, un risque d’erreurs
+de recopiage existe.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 15
+
+
+
+**19. Il sera essentiel d’établir un accord entre la DE et la CNaPS en vue d’assurer la**
+**communication régulière des états comptables et financiers de cette dernière, selon une**
+**présentation déterminée d’un commun accord et sur support Excel** . Le détail de la balance
+devra aussi être suffisant afin de permettre de retrouver les différentes ventilations présentées dans
+les états financiers.
+
+
+_**Recommandation**_
+
+
+- S’accorder avec la CNaPS sur la présentation et le support de communication des données
+sources. Ces dernières doivent être suffisamment détaillées pour permettre une classification
+adéquate et exploitable électroniquement, idéalement les états financiers dans leur
+présentation pour l’exercice 2021 sur support Excel et accompagnés de la balance générale
+détaillée (comme l’était la balance 2020 communiquée à la mission de 2021).
+
+
+**D. Consolidation**
+
+
+**20. Le processus de consolidation consiste à agréger les statistiques des différents sous-**
+**secteurs, puis à éliminer les transferts entre les unités d’administration publique** (transferts
+inter ou intra gouvernementaux). Tant que les données source sur ces transferts sont cohérentes
+entre elles, c’est-à-dire tant que les transferts effectués par un sous-secteur sont égaux aux transferts
+reçus, le processus de consolidation ne présente pas de difficulté.
+
+
+**21. Dans les statistiques portant sur 2021, une tentative de consolidation intra**
+**gouvernementale a déjà été effectuée par la DE pour les transferts internes aux OGT ainsi que**
+**pour les transferts internes aux CTD** . Cependant, dans ce dernier cas, il y aura lieu de revoir les
+sources de données relatives aux transferts car, dans la balance consolidée des CTD, les transferts
+reçus par les CTD en provenance d’autres CTD (en classe 1 et 7) ne sont pas accompagnées de
+versements (en classe 6).
+
+
+**22. Au niveau des transferts intergouvernementaux les données-source font apparaitre**
+**des écarts importants entre les montants relatifs aux dépenses et aux recettes de transferts** .
+Ceci peut s’expliquer par plusieurs facteurs (ces aspects sont développés à l’appendice A) :
+
+
+- Le champ des transferts accordé est plus vaste que celui des transferts reçus. Ceci est
+généralement le cas quand le champ institutionnel des statistiques relatives aux
+sous-secteurs d’administration publique est plus restreint que celui des unités
+d’administration publique bénéficiaires de ces transferts.
+
+- La base d’enregistrement en comptabilité pour enregistrer les versements est différente de
+celle utilisée pour l’enregistrement des recettes de transferts.
+
+
+_**Recommandation**_
+
+
+- _Expliquer les écarts constatés entre les transferts et subventions versés ou à payer par le_
+_budget et les montants constatés comme reçus ou à recevoir par les bénéficiaires sur la base_
+_des balances respectives ou d’informations complémentaires._
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 16
+
+
+
+- _Effectuer les ajustements de consolidation aux données agrégées pour 2021 et communiquer_
+_les SFP consolidées au Département des statistiques. Communiquer seulement les SFP_
+_agrégées si la consolidation n’est pas possible._
+
+
+**E. Dette et compte de patrimoine**
+
+**23. Les statistiques sur la dette publique sont préparées par la Direction de la Dette de la**
+**DGT** . Madagascar communique ces statistiques à la Banque Mondiale dans le cadre de l’initiative
+conjointe sur la dette publique de cette institution et du FMI. Le champ institutionnel est celui de l’État
+et couvre donc la quasi-totalité de la dette des administrations publiques malgaches puisque les
+autres sous-secteurs ne sont pas normalement habilités à s’endetter. Ces statistiques couvrent les
+émissions de titres (bons et obligations) et les crédits intérieurs et extérieurs. Il conviendrait d’y
+ajouter les passifs sous formes de dépôts des correspondants aux Trésor éventuellement détenus
+par des entités n’appartenant pas au champ de l’administration publique [7] ainsi que les autres
+comptes à payer. Cette information est disponible dans la Balance générale des comptes.
+
+
+**24. Le tableau 6 du questionnaire de SFP du FMI, qui concerne le compte de patrimoine,**
+**n’est toujours pas renseigné par la DE** . Cependant, rien ne s’oppose en principe au remplissage
+de ce tableau puisque la balance des comptes fournit les encours d’actifs financiers et passifs. Une
+mission précédente avait d’ailleurs établi une maquette de compte de patrimoine statistique. [8]
+
+
+_**Recommandation**_
+
+
+- Établir un compte de patrimoine statistique à partir de la balance générale des comptes.
+
+
+7 Les dépôts au Trésor détenues par des unités d’administration publique sont éliminés lors de la consolidation.
+
+8 Il s’agit principalement de classifier les actifs et passifs comptables selon les catégories du _MSFP 2014_ . Cette classification est déjà
+faite pour établir les flux statistiques de financement et peut donc être appliquée aux encours.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 17
+
+
+
+**F.** **Responsables rencontrées au cours de la mission**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 18
+
+
+
+**APPENDICE A. CONSOLIDATION**
+
+
+###### **Appendices**
+
+**CONSOLIDATION**
+
+
+
+La consolidation concerne l’élimination des statistiques des transferts d’une administration publique
+nationale à une autre administration publique nationale soit, plus généralement, l’éliminations des
+transferts entre administrations. En principe, de tels transferts doivent être éliminés des statistiques, à
+l’exception des transferts relatifs aux cotisations sociales.
+
+
+Ces transferts en question peuvent être obligatoires ou volontaires, avec ou sans contrepartie.
+L’attention portée dans cette note sera sur les transferts volontaires sans contrepartie. En
+statistiques, de tels transferts entre administrations publiques sont dénommés « dons ».
+
+
+Globalement, il existe deux sortes de transferts entre administrations publiques nationales :
+
+
+- Les transferts intergouvernementaux entre deux sous-secteurs de l’administration : par
+exemple entre l’administration centrale et l’administration locale.
+
+- Les transferts intra gouvernementaux interne a un sous-secteur d’administration publique ;
+par exemple un transfert au sein des opérations de l’État (administration centrale budgétaire)
+comme les transferts du budget générale vers les comptes particuliers du Trésor.
+
+
+**Consolidation des transferts intergouvernementaux**
+
+
+Il s’agit d’identifier les transferts entre deux sous-secteurs d’administration puis de les éliminer des
+statistiques. Dans le cas de Madagascar l’attention sera portée sur les transferts entre
+l’administration centrale et l’administration locale. Le processus fait intervenir deux opérations
+distinctes :
+
+
+- L’identification des transferts inter gouvernementaux et
+
+- Leur élimination.
+
+
+En principe, les transferts versés doivent être égaux aux transferts reçus. Cette égalité (ou symétrie)
+assure qu’au niveau global aucun transfert intergouvernemental n’apparait dans les statistiques de
+l’ensemble consolidé. Très souvent, cette égalité n’est pas exactement vérifiée, et ce pour plusieurs
+raisons, dont des différences dans les pratiques comptables du donateur et du destinataire. Quand
+cette égalité n’est pas vérifiée, un résiduel de transfert subsiste au niveau consolidé, ce qui peut
+paraitre illogique et anormal. La question alors se pose de comment faire disparaitre ce résiduel.
+
+
+Schématiquement, le processus de consolidation s’effectue comme suit :
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 19
+
+
+
+|Transfert de l’État vers les CTD Transferts effectués par|Transferts reçus par les CTD|Ensemble|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Transferts effectués par**
**l’État**|**Transferts reçus par les CTD**
|**Ensemble**|
+|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
+|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|Charge : 1000
|
+|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|
Recette : 1000|
+|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
+|Charge de dons (233) : 1000
|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|Charge de dons : 0
|
+|
Ajustement :
-1000|
Ajustement :
-1000|
Recette de dons : 0|
+
+
+
+Quand, dans les sources de données, le montant des dons reçus s’écarte de celui des dons
+accordés, la cause de la différence doit être recherchée. Si l’écart peut être attribué à une différence
+relative au moment d’enregistrement, le résiduel peut être alors inclus avec les autres comptes à
+payer ou à recevoir.
+
+
+D’autres solutions plus ou moins arbitraires existent si l’origine de l’écart ne peut pas être identifiée :
+
+
+- Il est possible de ne pas publier ou de publier partiellement les informations sur les dons.
+Ceci entraine souvent la nécessité de supprimer d’autres données afin de ne pas permettre à
+l’utilisateur de retrouver par différence les informations manquantes. Cette approche est à
+éviter autant que possible.
+
+
+- La solution la plus transparente (et justifiée dans certains cas) serait de publier les données
+sur les dons accordées et reçus telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les sources de données,
+c’est-à-dire de montrer la différence, et d’expliquer cette dernière dans les métadonnées
+(notes de bas de page par exemple). Cette approche serait effectivement justifiée
+(et aurait l’avantage d’être transparente) quand l’écart en question est dû à des différences de
+champs relatifs à ce qui est accordé et ce qui est reçu. Cette approche n’est pas retenue par
+le Département des statistiques pour sa base de données car il insiste sur l’absence de dons
+intergouvernementaux au niveau consolidé.
+
+
+Sur la base de ces considérations, il est nécessaire de recourir à des artifices plus ou moins justifiés
+afin de traiter le déséquilibre en objet. Cela consisterait à traiter le résiduel comme un transfert non
+identifié (282 au niveau des charges et au niveau des recettes). Une illustration de ce traitement est
+présentée ci-dessous.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Transferts effectués par
l’État|Transferts reçus par les CTD|Ensemble|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
+|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|Charge : 1000
|
+|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|
Recette : 800|
+|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
+|Charge de dons (233) : 800
|
Recette de dons (133) : 800
|Charge de dons : 0
|
+|
Transferts divers (282) : 200
|
Ajustement :
-800|
Transferts divers (282) : 200
|
+|
Ajustement :
-800|
Ajustement :
-800|
Recette de dons : 0|
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 20
+
+
+
+Ce traitement permet d’éviter de faire apparaitre un montant autre que zéro au niveau de l’ensemble
+consolidé. Dans le cas où le transfert reçu est plus important que le transfert effectué, la différence
+peut être attribuée au 1441 ou 1442.
+
+
+**Examen de la situation à Madagascar**
+
+Au préalable il est nécessaire de préciser que les données sur les transferts budgétaires effectués
+vers les CTD et les EPA sont exhaustives et couvrent l’ensemble des entités bénéficiaires alors que
+les données sur les transferts reçus ne concernent que les unités gérées par le Trésor (135 CTD sur
+un total de 1718 et 97 EPA sur un total d’environ 140). [9] La différence entre les deux flux de données
+peut raisonnablement être attribuée à cette différence de champ, même si d’autres facteurs peuvent
+rentrer en jeu (comme, par exemple, des différences relatives aux moments d’enregistrement).
+
+
+_Transferts budgétaires de l’État vers les CTD et les EPA_
+
+|Les transferts budgétaires ve Transferts|ers les CTD se décomposent Effectués|t comme suit (en milliers d’Ar Reçus|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**Transferts**
|**Effectués**
|**Reçus**
|
+|
Courants
|
97,771.72
|
21,460.31
|
+|
En capital
|
28,000.00
|
23,729.75
|
+|
**Total**
|
125,771.72|
45,190.06|
+
+
+
+- Les transferts budgétaires vers les EPA, quant à eux, se décomposent comme suit ( _en_
+
+|milliers d’Ariary) : Transferts|Effectués|Reçus|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**Transferts**
|**Effectués**
|**Reçus**
|
+|
Courants
|
90,862.34
|
64,818.95
|
+|
En capital
|
34,241.71
|
120,159.66
|
+|
**Total**
|
125,104.05|
184,978.61|
+
+
+
+Les différences observées sont généralement considérables et ne se prêtent donc pas à un exercice
+de consolidation sans au préalable connaitre l’origine des écarts constatés en vue de les redresser
+éventuellement. Comme il a été déjà mentionné, les facteurs à prendre en considération
+comprennent le champ des données, la base d’enregistrement et l’utilisation des comptes appropriés.
+Il faudra donc se familiariser avec les instructions comptables à respecter par les entités concernées,
+mais aussi s’assurer que les pratiques comptables sont bien conformes à aux instructions et normes.
+
+
+**Enregistrement des subventions aux EPA et CTD**
+
+Le schéma ci-dessous décrit l’enregistrement des transferts et subventions dans le tableau des OGT
+et la comptabilité des destinataires.
+
+
+9 Cf. _Liste des établissement nationaux_, Ministère des Finances et du Budget, décembre 2018,
+[http://www.mef.gov.mg/assets/file/communique/324.pdf](http://www.mef.gov.mg/assets/file/communique/324.pdf) . Il existe aussi 28 Etablissements Publics à Caractère
+Professionnel ou Culturel.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 21
+
+
+
+**Schéma d'Enregistrement d'une Subvention**
+
+
+Le schéma ci-dessous présent un schéma d'enregistrement des subventions budgétaires au profit des collectivités territoriales
+décentralisées (qui s'appliquerait aussi aux EPA) ainsi que les dépenses que ces subventions entrainent. Un schéma de l'enregistrement
+des recettes et dépenses propres des CTD est aussi présenté. Il serait souhaitable que la DE confirme ou infirme la compréhension de la
+mission et, en cas de confirmation, que ce schéma soit précisé en fournissant le nom et numéro des comptes utilisés. Au cas où le schéma
+présenté ne correspondrait pas aux pratiques comptables en vigueur, prière de décrire celles-ci.
+
+
+Deux situations sont examinées respectivement dans la comptabilité du Trésor et celle d'un CTD hypothétique
+(Cf. ci-dessous la description des opérations) :
+
+
+ - L'enregistrement de subventions budgétaires aux CTD suivi par l'utilisation de ces subventions sous forme de dépenses : les
+identifiants 1E, 2E et 3E correspondent aux différentes étapes de l'enregistrement dans la comptabilité du Trésor (E faisant
+référence à l'État). Les identifiants 2C et 3C correspondent aux différentes étapes de l'enregistrement dans la comptabilité de la
+collectivité.
+
+ - L'enregistrement, en rouge, des recettes propres des CTD et des dépenses éventuelles. L'enregistrement des recettes et dépenses
+sont identifiées 4C et 5C dans la comptabilité de la collectivité et par 4E et 5E dans la comptabilité du Trésor.
+
+
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 22
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Description des Enregistrements**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Enregistrement d'une subvention budgétaire|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|
**1 **
|
Une subvention budgétaire est enregistrée au profit de la collectivité. Dans les comptes du Trésor, un compte de charge est débité par le
crédit d'un compte de correspondant au profit de la collectivité.
|
+|**2E**
|
Le paiement effectif de la subvention est constaté par un débit au compte de correspondant et un crédit au compte de dépôt de la
collectivité (correspondant). Aucun mouvement de caisse est nécessaire.
|
+|**2C**
|
Dans sa comptabilité, la collectivité constate la subvention à recevoir en créditant un compte de recettes budgétaire et débitant un compte
à recevoir.
|
+|**3E**
|
La dépense par la collectivité donne lieu, dans la comptabilité du Trésor, à un débit au compte de correspondant et à un crédit à un
compte financier (caisse).
|
+|**3C**
|
Dans sa comptabilité, la collectivité enregistre une dépense au débit d'un compte de dépense budgétaire (charge par exemple) et un
crédit à son compte au Trésor.
|
+|
**Enregistrement d'une recette propre à la collectivité et dépense (en rouge)**
|
**Enregistrement d'une recette propre à la collectivité et dépense (en rouge)**
|
+|
**4C**
|
Dans la comptabilité de la collectivité, l'encaissement d'une recette propre donne lieu à un crédit à un compte de recette budgétaire et un
débit au compte de dépôt au Trésor
|
+|**4E**|
Dans la comptabilité du Trésor, l'encaissement de la recette de la collectivité donne lieu à un débit au compte caisse. L'engagement du
Trésor vis-à-vis de la collectivité est constaté par un crédit au compte de correspondant.|
+
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 23
+
+
+
+|5C|La dépense, comme précédemment, donne lieu à un débit à un compte de dépense budgétaire et un crédit au compte du Trésor de la
collectivité.|
+|---|---|
+|**5E**
|
Dans la comptabilité de l'État, la dépense de la collectivité locale est enregistrée par un débit au compte de correspondant et un crédit au
compte caisse.
|
+
+
+seulement.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 24
+
+
+
+**APPENDICE B. FICHIERS PREPARES PENDANT LA MISSION**
+
+
+**1.** Deux fichiers d’établissement des SFP pour les EPA comprenant :
+
+- Un fichier de correspondance entre la nomenclature comptable des EPA et les
+classifications _du MSFP 2014_, **NEW CORRESP EPA.XLSX** ;
+
+- Un fichier de traitement des données-sources et de remplissage des tableaux statistiques
+pour les opérations des EPA, **SFP EPA 2021 VM.xls** .
+
+**2.** Deux fichiers d’établissement des SFP pour les CTD comprenant :
+
+- Un fichier de correspondance entre la nomenclature comptable des CTD et les
+classifications _du MSFP 2014_, **NEW CORRESP.xlsx** ;
+
+- Un fichier de traitement des données-sources et de remplissage des tableaux statistiques
+pour les opérations des **SFP PCOP CTD 2021VM.xlsx.**
+
+**3** . Un fichier d’établissement des SFP pour la CNaPS : **SFP CNAPSBAL 2021.xlsx.** La
+balance utilisée dans ce fichier est complétée par des ventilations détaillées extraites des états
+financiers dans le fichier intermédiaire **CNAPS BALANCE 2021 2.xlsx.**
+
+
+- Feuille BALANCE: la transcription en Excel de la balance des comptes pour 2021 de la
+CNaPS obtenue sur support PDF.
+
+- Feuille CORRESPONDANCE : La correspondance entre la nomenclature de la balance et
+les catégories du MSFP 2024.
+
+- Feuille BALANCE ETATS FIN : Un tableau de travail destiné à établir des correspondances
+entre la balance et les états financiers en vue de compléter la balance par des ventilations
+détaillées. Ce sont ces ventilations qui ont été recopiées dans la feuille SOURCE du fichier
+**SFP CNAPSBAL 2021.xlsx** .
+
+
+**4** . Un fichier de d’établissement des données des OGT comprenant une feuille de traitement
+des données des OGT et des feuilles de remplissage des tableaux statistiques, **Tableau de**
+**passage OGT SFP 2021 2.xlsx.**
+
+
+**5.** Un fichier **CONSOLIDATION 2.xlsx** qui rassemble des SFP des différents sous-secteurs en
+vue de leur consolidation. Étant donné les écarts entre flux intergouvernementaux (Cf. plus haut
+dans le texte), la consolidation n’a pas été effectuée et a été remplacée simplement par une
+agrégation.
+
+
+FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 25
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f6decb604b6741a864cc5cf8fef9fb13cbfd7bf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5d11517ec0415945", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1319, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bbff78f86aaac55495553fbf94054e07c9079545915466fae05060fe9055d151", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "c7e00a24a7f248046cb11fbe7a2d248accfd7b869b019d8c6c0219bd9504d739", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4c69cd96174d2b4c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-001", "height": 289, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e3f427a5cb4dfe5834b20821b6c2f0cec935cfac4bf48dc3f80f72dc948e0360", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "e006290dfd026852f7f9826d3f4bfe7bbb6756c36e8673f58b2f3319f4493d31", "width": 316}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "602b0b1b808c8c94", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-002", "height": 1319, "page": 3, "phash_256": "a7401d90e62fc02fd8bd326349f668d97267ccd933722dca4f58b3269c8d1336", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "412a891e5192f4ddac54c8eab745796b1472440e6249920c69040b4b5334b4f5", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0008-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b2cd0ccf0dcecd0c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0008-001", "height": 263, "page": 8, "phash_256": "a3cf4c5b1c340d3458360d331cb0768427cb8b6bda6ea3cdea9be3ca83c9dea0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "4fe872c16a386a5bfada8447a5c5a7ca3aa69f50b325664db21deae3ff484468", "width": 783}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "543333339bd3d31b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0019-001", "height": 448, "page": 19, "phash_256": "a9937c8f77ec03b93646468546d7326707a6346e3d89236269b9299a94ed09b7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "12392fcfa8814a6055a92d3a560fb78e233449b8b3b02aa871ef39728fe2725f", "width": 532}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c316166214769694", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0023-001", "height": 304, "page": 23, "phash_256": "fde36964692ccf16cb128b260f56782c78dc1de7492bcf23458be0a01cd41fd5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "3c0a71272c4fa6eb9d40493720158a1a77819116251ed9402d1ba9d933f4056a", "width": 1081}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-095/assets/figures/cr-2023-095-fig-p0024-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a690944ad0d47454", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-095-fig-p0024-001", "height": 272, "page": 24, "phash_256": "c7ca60886c84acf5acf5aea4e4b564dd6c8867cb49f8cc45f0200fff514973ca", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "sha256_normalized_png": "b14dcc7c5609a708eae7af14b82b18e04e4f7f54c41b2965a176472e9cd9570b", "width": 1081}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-095/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea2e878aa99ac458ddebd4dfe30e150f66043d2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-095/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMars 2023\n\n\n\n**Rapport du FMI No. 23/95**\n\n### **RÉPUBLIQUE DE MADAGASCAR**\n\n**RAPPORT DE LA MISSION D’ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE SUR LES**\n**STATISTIQUES DE FINANCES PUBLIQUES**\n**(14–25 NOVEMBRE 2022)**\n\n\nCe document sur la République de Madagascar a été préparé par une équipe du Fonds\nmonétaire international. Il est basé sur les informations disponibles au moment de son\nachèvement en novembre 2022.\n\n\nDes exemplaires de ce rapport sont disponibles au public à partir de\n\n\nFonds monétaire international • Services de publication\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTéléphone : (202) 623-7430 • Fax : (202) 623-7201\nE-mail : [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrix : $18.00 par copie imprimée\n\n\n**Fonds monétaire international**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Mars 2023\n\nRapport du FMI No. 23/95\nRÉPUBLIQUE DE MADAGASCAR\n\nRAPPORT DE LA MISSION D’ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE SUR LES\nSTATISTIQUES DE FINANCES PUBLIQUES\n(14–25 NOVEMBRE 2022)\n\nCe document sur la République de Madagascar a été préparé par une équipe du Fonds\nmonétaire international. Il est basé sur les informations disponibles au moment de son\nachèvement en novembre 2022.\n\nDes exemplaires de ce rapport sont disponibles au public à partir de\n\nFonds monétaire international • Services de publication\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTéléphone : (202) 623-7430 • Fax : (202) 623-7201\nE-mail : publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrix : $18.00 par copie imprimée\n\nFonds monétaire international\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 637}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "RAPPORT TECHNIQUE\n\n\nREPUBLIQUE DE\nMADAGASCAR\nRAPPORT DE MISSION EN STATISTIQUES\nDE FINANCES PUBLIQUES\nMARS 2023\n\n\n\nPréparé par\nVINCENT MARIE\n\n\n\n\n\n Département auteur :\n Département des Statistiques\n\n\n\n\n\n FMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 4", "text_characters": 237}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-001", "cr-2023-095-fig-p0003-002"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0675, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(211.32493591308594, 541.92333984375, 400.66162109375, 714.623291015625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 603, "number": 3, "size": 34917, "transform": [189.33668518066406, 0.0, -0.0, 172.69998168945312, 211.32493591308594, 541.92333984375], "width": 561, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "AVERTISSEMENT\n\n« Le présent document rassemble des conseils techniques fournis par les services du Fonds monétaire\ninternational (FMI) aux autorités du Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances de la République de\nMadagascar (ci-après le « bénéficiaire des activités de développement des capacités ») en réponse à\nleur demande d’assistance technique. Ce document (dans sa totalité, en partie ou sous une forme\nrésumée) peut être communiqué par le FMI à l’administrateur du FMI pour la République de Madagascar,\nà d’autres administrateurs du FMI et à des membres de leurs équipes, ainsi qu’à d’autres organismes ou\nentités du bénéficiaire des activités de développement des capacités et, à leur demande, aux services de\nla Banque mondiale, à d’autres prestataires d’assistance technique et bailleurs de fonds dont l’intérêt est\nlégitime, et à des membres du comité d’orientation du fonds fiduciaire Données pour Décider, sauf si le\nbénéficiaire des activités de développement des capacités s’y oppose expressément (voir les directives\nopérationnelles sur la diffusion des informations relatives aux activités de développement des capacités).\nLa publication du présent rapport ou sa communication (intégralement ou en partie) à des parties\nextérieures au FMI autres que des organismes ou entités du bénéficiaire des activités de développement\ndes capacités, les services de la Banque mondiale, d’autres fournisseurs d’assistance technique et\nbailleurs de fonds ayant un intérêt légitime et des membres du comité d’orientation du fonds fiduciaire\nDonnées pour Décider requiert le consentement explicite du bénéficiaire des activités de développement\ndes capacités et du département des statistiques du FMI. »\n\n\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 4", "text_characters": 1529}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **Table des Matières(u)**\n\n**Sigles et Acronymes ................................................................................................................................... 4**\n\n\n**Synthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations ................................................................ 5**\n\n\n**Section II. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et Recommandations ......................................................... 8**\n\nA. Travail de la mission .............................................................................................................................. 14\nB. Couverture des statistiques et sources de données .............................................................................. 14\nC. Sources de données .............................................................................................................................. 15\nD. Consolidation ......................................................................................................................................... 16\nE. Dette et compte de patrimoine ............................................................................................................... 17\nF. Responsables rencontrées au cours de la mission ............................................................................... 18\n\n\n**Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 19**\n\nAppendice A. Consolidation ........................................................................................................................ 19\nAppendice B. Fichiers préparés pendant la mission ................................................................................... 25\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table des Matières(u)\n\nSigles et Acronymes ................................................................................................................................... 4\n\nSynthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations ................................................................ 5\n\nSection II. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et Recommandations ......................................................... 8\n\nA. Travail de la mission .............................................................................................................................. 14\nB. Couverture des statistiques et sources de données .............................................................................. 14\nC. Sources de données .............................................................................................................................. 15\nD. Consolidation ......................................................................................................................................... 16\nE. Dette et compte de patrimoine ............................................................................................................... 17\nF. Responsables rencontrées au cours de la mission ............................................................................... 18\n\nAppendices ................................................................................................................................................ 19\n\nAppendice A. Consolidation ........................................................................................................................ 19\nAppendice B. Fichiers préparés pendant la mission ................................................................................... 25\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 3", "text_characters": 1735}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **Sigles et Acronymes**\n\nAONT Autres Opérations Nettes du Trésor\nCNaPS Caisse Nationale de Protection Sociale\nCTD Collectivités Territoriales Décentralisées\nDCP Direction de la Comptabilité Publique\nDE Direction des Études de la Direction Générale du Trésor\nDGT Direction Générale du Trésor\nEPA Établissement Publics à Caractère Administratif\nEPIC Établissement Publics à Caractère Industriel ou Commercial\nFMI Fonds Monétaire International\nINSTAT Institut National de la Statistique\nMEF Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances\n_MSFP 2014_ _Manuel de Statistiques de Finances Publiques 2014_\nOGT Opérations Globales du Trésor (désigne aussi le Tableau des Opérations\nGlobales du Trésor)\nPSMFP Plan Stratégique de Modernisation des Finances Publiques\nSDSP Statistiques de la Dette du Secteur Public\nSFP Statistiques de Finances Publiques\nSOAP Situation des Opérations des Administrations Publiques\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Sigles et Acronymes\n\nAONT Autres Opérations Nettes du Trésor\nCNaPS Caisse Nationale de Protection Sociale\nCTD Collectivités Territoriales Décentralisées\nDCP Direction de la Comptabilité Publique\nDE Direction des Études de la Direction Générale du Trésor\nDGT Direction Générale du Trésor\nEPA Établissement Publics à Caractère Administratif\nEPIC Établissement Publics à Caractère Industriel ou Commercial\nFMI Fonds Monétaire International\nINSTAT Institut National de la Statistique\nMEF Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances\n_MSFP 2014_ _Manuel de Statistiques de Finances Publiques 2014_\nOGT Opérations Globales du Trésor (désigne aussi le Tableau des Opérations\nGlobales du Trésor)\nPSMFP Plan Stratégique de Modernisation des Finances Publiques\nSDSP Statistiques de la Dette du Secteur Public\nSFP Statistiques de Finances Publiques\nSOAP Situation des Opérations des Administrations Publiques\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 4", "text_characters": 844}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **Synthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations** **Prioritaires**\n\n**1.** **A la demande du ministère de l’économie et des finances (MEF) de la République de**\n**Madagascar et en consultation avec le département Afrique du Fonds monétaire international**\n**(FMI), une mission d’assistance technique en statistiques de finances publiques (SFP) du**\n**Département des statistiques du FMI (STA) a été conduite à distance du 14 au 25 novembre**\n**2022 avec la Direction des Études (DE) de la Direction Générale du Trésor (DGT) du MEF** .\nL’objectif de la mission était d’appuyer les autorités malgaches à l’adoption des concepts, définitions\net la méthodologie du _Manuel de statistiques de finances publiques_ ( _MSFP_ ) _2014_ et du _Guide des_\n_statistiques de la dette du secteur public pour les statisticiens et les utilisateurs_ dans le cadre du\nfonds fiduciaire multilatéral Données pour Décider (D4D) [1] et du Plan Stratégique de Modernisation\ndes Finances Publiques (PSMFP) de la République de Madagascar. Cette mission s’inscrit aussi\ndans le prolongement des missions d’assistance technique précédentes dans ce domaine.\n\n\n**2.** **Depuis 2016, alors dans le cadre du projet EDDI2** **[2]** **et ensuite dans le cadre du fonds**\n**fiduciaire de stabilité du secteur financier (FSSF), les autorités malgaches ont réalisé des**\n**progrès significatifs dans le domaine des SFP** . La qualité des données de l'administration centrale\nbudgétaire (ACB) s'est améliorée, comme indiqué dans les conclusions des missions\nci-dessous :\n\n\n- Les balances comptables mensuelles relatives aux opérations des différents sous-secteurs\ndes administrations publiques sont produites régulièrement. Il s’agit de la balance générale\ndu Trésor pour les opérations de l’État et des balances comptables consolidées des\nÉtablissements Publics Administratifs (EPA) ainsi que des Collectivités Territoriales\nDécentralisées (CTD). La balance et les états financiers de la Caisse Nationale de\nPrévoyance Sociale (CNaPS) sont disponibles annuellement. Il est donc maintenant possible\nd’envisager la préparation et la diffusion des SFP pour l’ensemble des sous-secteurs de\nl’administration publique malgache, du moins agrégées, même si une consolidation\nsuffisamment fiable ne peut se faire dans un premier temps.\n\n- La communication des SFP à STA pour diffusion à la base de données annuelle sur les SFP\nest courante par le biais du remplissage du questionnaire annuel des SFP relatif aux\nopérations de l’administration centrale budgétaire. La communication de données se fait\naussi pour les statistiques de la dette du secteur publique (SDSP) couvrant les\nadministrations centrales pour diffusion à la base de données conjointe du FMI et de la\nBanque Mondiale sur les SDSP trimestrielles.\n\n\n1 [https://www.imf.org/en/Capacity-Development/D4D](https://www.imf.org/en/Capacity-Development/D4D)\n\n2 Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 du Department for International Development du Royaume-Uni.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Synthèse des Résultats de la Mission et Recommandations Prioritaires\n\n1. A la demande du ministère de l’économie et des finances (MEF) de la République de\nMadagascar et en consultation avec le département Afrique du Fonds monétaire international\n(FMI), une mission d’assistance technique en statistiques de finances publiques (SFP) du\nDépartement des statistiques du FMI (STA) a été conduite à distance du 14 au 25 novembre\n2022 avec la Direction des Études (DE) de la Direction Générale du Trésor (DGT) du MEF .\nL’objectif de la mission était d’appuyer les autorités malgaches à l’adoption des concepts, définitions\net la méthodologie du _Manuel de statistiques de finances publiques_ ( _MSFP_ ) _2014_ et du _Guide des_\n_statistiques de la dette du secteur public pour les statisticiens et les utilisateurs_ dans le cadre du\nfonds fiduciaire multilatéral Données pour Décider (D4D) [1] et du Plan Stratégique de Modernisation\ndes Finances Publiques (PSMFP) de la République de Madagascar. Cette mission s’inscrit aussi\ndans le prolongement des missions d’assistance technique précédentes dans ce domaine.\n\n2. Depuis 2016, alors dans le cadre du projet EDDI2 [2] et ensuite dans le cadre du fonds\nfiduciaire de stabilité du secteur financier (FSSF), les autorités malgaches ont réalisé des\nprogrès significatifs dans le domaine des SFP . La qualité des données de l'administration centrale\nbudgétaire (ACB) s'est améliorée, comme indiqué dans les conclusions des missions\nci-dessous :\n\n- Les balances comptables mensuelles relatives aux opérations des différents sous-secteurs\ndes administrations publiques sont produites régulièrement. Il s’agit de la balance générale\ndu Trésor pour les opérations de l’État et des balances comptables consolidées des\nÉtablissements Publics Administratifs (EPA) ainsi que des Collectivités Territoriales\nDécentralisées (CTD). La balance et les états financiers de la Caisse Nationale de\nPrévoyance Sociale (CNaPS) sont disponibles annuellement. Il est donc maintenant possible\nd’envisager la préparation et la diffusion des SFP pour l’ensemble des sous-secteurs de\nl’administration publique malgache, du moins agrégées, même si une consolidation\nsuffisamment fiable ne peut se faire dans un premier temps.\n\n- La communication des SFP à STA pour diffusion à la base de données annuelle sur les SFP\nest courante par le biais du remplissage du questionnaire annuel des SFP relatif aux\nopérations de l’administration centrale budgétaire. La communication de données se fait\naussi pour les statistiques de la dette du secteur publique (SDSP) couvrant les\nadministrations centrales pour diffusion à la base de données conjointe du FMI et de la\nBanque Mondiale sur les SDSP trimestrielles.\n\n1 https://www.imf.org/en/Capacity-Development/D4D\n\n2 Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative 2 du Department for International Development du Royaume-Uni.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 5", "text_characters": 2520}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- L’enregistrement des Autres Opérations Nettes du Trésor (AONT) s’effectue maintenant en\ngrande partie sur une base brute plutôt que nette, ce qui améliore sensiblement la\ntransparence et la lisibilité de ces opérations et permet d’améliorer leur traitement statistique.\n\n- Les SFP sur les opérations de l’administration centrale extrabudgétaire et des collectivités\nlocales sont déjà préparées (même si ce n’est encore qu’à l’état de projet et si elles ne sont\npas encore communiquées au FMI).\n\n\n**3.** **Deux recommandations antérieures sont toujours en cours** :\n\n\n- Les travaux de mise en place d’un outil pour la préparation des SFP relatives à la CNaPS, qui\nsont retardés dû aux difficultés rencontrées dans l’obtention de sources de données\nexploitables électroniquement.\n\n- La production de données consolidées, qui se heurte aux écarts importants des montants\nrelatifs aux flux réciproques entre administrations publiques.\n\n\n**4.** **L’achèvement de deux objectifs de nature stratégique clés qui avait été déjà reporté**\n**pour diverses raisons est toujours en attente.** Ces objectifs concernent :\n\n\n- L’amélioration du cadre règlementaire pour les SFP par l’adoption d’un texte régissant leur\nproduction et leur diffusion et ;\n\n- L’adoption du cadre analytique et des classifications du _MSFP 2014_ comme mode de\nconfection et de présentation des SFP nationales (et plus particulièrement du tableau des\nOGT).\n\n\n**5.** **Bien que des difficultés persistent, les perspectives sont prometteuses** . Plus\ngénéralement, les difficultés rencontrées lors de la préparation des statistiques concernent\nprincipalement la présentation et les supports de certaines sources de données, ce qui constitue un\nobstacle à la systématisation des procédures. [3] L’établissement des SFP devrait bénéficier de la\nrévision en cours de la nomenclature budgétaire qui s’effectue avec l’appui du Département des\nfinances publiques du FMI, et qui vise à harmoniser la nomenclature avec les classifications du\n_MSFP 2014._\n\n\n**6.** **Afin de contribuer aux progrès des domaines susmentionnés, la mission a**\n**recommandé un plan d'action détaillé sur un an et retenu trois recommandations prioritaires**\n**présentées au bas de cette synthèse, lesquelles revêtent une importance particulière pour**\n**améliorer les différentes dimensions de la qualité des données sur les SFP** . De plus amples\ninformations sur les recommandations prioritaires et les mesures/jalons correspondants se trouvent\ndans le plan d'action, à la section « Évaluation technique détaillée et recommandations ».\n\n\n3 La systématisation des procédures devrait être facilitée par l’harmonisation en cours de la nomenclature budgétaire avec celle du\n_MSFP 2014_ ainsi qu’avec la digitalisation envisagée par la DE.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- L’enregistrement des Autres Opérations Nettes du Trésor (AONT) s’effectue maintenant en\ngrande partie sur une base brute plutôt que nette, ce qui améliore sensiblement la\ntransparence et la lisibilité de ces opérations et permet d’améliorer leur traitement statistique.\n\n- Les SFP sur les opérations de l’administration centrale extrabudgétaire et des collectivités\nlocales sont déjà préparées (même si ce n’est encore qu’à l’état de projet et si elles ne sont\npas encore communiquées au FMI).\n\n3. Deux recommandations antérieures sont toujours en cours :\n\n- Les travaux de mise en place d’un outil pour la préparation des SFP relatives à la CNaPS, qui\nsont retardés dû aux difficultés rencontrées dans l’obtention de sources de données\nexploitables électroniquement.\n\n- La production de données consolidées, qui se heurte aux écarts importants des montants\nrelatifs aux flux réciproques entre administrations publiques.\n\n4. L’achèvement de deux objectifs de nature stratégique clés qui avait été déjà reporté\npour diverses raisons est toujours en attente. Ces objectifs concernent :\n\n- L’amélioration du cadre règlementaire pour les SFP par l’adoption d’un texte régissant leur\nproduction et leur diffusion et ;\n\n- L’adoption du cadre analytique et des classifications du _MSFP 2014_ comme mode de\nconfection et de présentation des SFP nationales (et plus particulièrement du tableau des\nOGT).\n\n5. Bien que des difficultés persistent, les perspectives sont prometteuses . Plus\ngénéralement, les difficultés rencontrées lors de la préparation des statistiques concernent\nprincipalement la présentation et les supports de certaines sources de données, ce qui constitue un\nobstacle à la systématisation des procédures. [3] L’établissement des SFP devrait bénéficier de la\nrévision en cours de la nomenclature budgétaire qui s’effectue avec l’appui du Département des\nfinances publiques du FMI, et qui vise à harmoniser la nomenclature avec les classifications du\n_MSFP 2014._\n\n6. Afin de contribuer aux progrès des domaines susmentionnés, la mission a\nrecommandé un plan d'action détaillé sur un an et retenu trois recommandations prioritaires\nprésentées au bas de cette synthèse, lesquelles revêtent une importance particulière pour\naméliorer les différentes dimensions de la qualité des données sur les SFP . De plus amples\ninformations sur les recommandations prioritaires et les mesures/jalons correspondants se trouvent\ndans le plan d'action, à la section « Évaluation technique détaillée et recommandations ».\n\n3 La systématisation des procédures devrait être facilitée par l’harmonisation en cours de la nomenclature budgétaire avec celle du\n_MSFP 2014_ ainsi qu’avec la digitalisation envisagée par la DE.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 6", "text_characters": 2377}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0008-001"], "markdown": "**Tableau 1** . **Recommandations prioritaires**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Tableau 1 . Recommandations prioritaires\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 7", "text_characters": 110}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **Section I. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et** **Recommandations**\n\n**7.** **Les SFP pour une couverture institutionnelle plus large ne sont pas encore diffusées**\n**bien que produite à l’interne** . Le MEF répond au questionnaire annuel de SFP relatives aux\nopérations de l’ACB. Bien qu’elles ne soient pas encore communiquées au FMI, la DE établit aussi\ndes statistiques pour les EPA ainsi que des CTD à titre provisoire. Avec les statistiques produites\ndurant la mission pour la CNaPS, les SFP produites pourront donc s’étendre aisément à l’ensemble\ndes trois sous-secteurs d’administration publique (sans toutefois, dans un premier temps, inclure tous\nles EPN non marchands).\n\n\n**8.** **Il persiste des difficultés dans la production des SFP** . Les difficultés rencontrées lors de\nla préparation des statistiques concernent principalement les sources de données, plus\nparticulièrement leur (1) présentation, support, et éventuellement leur fréquence et délai de\nproduction ou (2) leur interprétation.\n\n\n**9.** **L’adoption d’un cadre règlementaire encadrant la production des SFP serait important** .\nEn vue de pallier aux difficultés rencontrées dans la production de SFP, la DE devrait pouvoir\nintervenir auprès des pourvoyeurs de données rapidement et formellement et pouvoir imposer le\nrespect de certaines règles et critères concernant la communication des données sources. Il pourrait\nêtre souhaitable d’étendre les prérogatives de la DE, ceci en vue, entre autres, d’accroitre son\nautorité sur les pourvoyeurs de données, notamment quand ceux-ci ne sont pas sous la tutelle du\nMEF. C’est à cette fin que les missions précédentes avaient recommandé l’adoption d’un cadre\nrèglementaire pour la production et la diffusion des SFP à l’instar de la pratique adoptée dans de\nnombreux pays. Plus précisément, il s’agirait d’adopter un texte légal ou règlementaire comme pour\nles autres domaines statistiques, y compris les statistiques macroéconomiques – statistiques du\nsecteur réel (production, prix, comptabilité nationale entre autres) – au travers de la loi statistique, et\nstatistiques monétaires et financières et du secteur extérieur au travers de la règlementation bancaire\net financière. Étendre cette approche aux SFP est considéré constituer une bonne pratique\npermettant de formaliser la fonction statistique du service responsable de ces statistiques et de\nl’investir de l’autorité nécessaire à la réalisation de sa mission.\n\n\n**10.** **Des travaux sont en cours pour l’adoption d’un texte réglementaire fixant les modalités**\n**de production des SFP** . L’adoption d’un tel cadre règlementaire pour les SFP fait l’objet de travaux\ndepuis plusieurs années et un premier projet de décret avait été préparé et revue par le ministre de\nl’Économie et des finances. La mission recommande la finalisation du projet suivi de l’adoption\nprochaine du décret.\n\n\n_**Recommandation**_\n\n\n - Finaliser le projet de décret relatif au cadre réglementaire en matière de production et de\ndiffusion des SFP, et adopter le décret.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Section I. Évaluation Technique Détaillée et Recommandations\n\n7. Les SFP pour une couverture institutionnelle plus large ne sont pas encore diffusées\nbien que produite à l’interne . Le MEF répond au questionnaire annuel de SFP relatives aux\nopérations de l’ACB. Bien qu’elles ne soient pas encore communiquées au FMI, la DE établit aussi\ndes statistiques pour les EPA ainsi que des CTD à titre provisoire. Avec les statistiques produites\ndurant la mission pour la CNaPS, les SFP produites pourront donc s’étendre aisément à l’ensemble\ndes trois sous-secteurs d’administration publique (sans toutefois, dans un premier temps, inclure tous\nles EPN non marchands).\n\n8. Il persiste des difficultés dans la production des SFP . Les difficultés rencontrées lors de\nla préparation des statistiques concernent principalement les sources de données, plus\nparticulièrement leur (1) présentation, support, et éventuellement leur fréquence et délai de\nproduction ou (2) leur interprétation.\n\n9. L’adoption d’un cadre règlementaire encadrant la production des SFP serait important .\nEn vue de pallier aux difficultés rencontrées dans la production de SFP, la DE devrait pouvoir\nintervenir auprès des pourvoyeurs de données rapidement et formellement et pouvoir imposer le\nrespect de certaines règles et critères concernant la communication des données sources. Il pourrait\nêtre souhaitable d’étendre les prérogatives de la DE, ceci en vue, entre autres, d’accroitre son\nautorité sur les pourvoyeurs de données, notamment quand ceux-ci ne sont pas sous la tutelle du\nMEF. C’est à cette fin que les missions précédentes avaient recommandé l’adoption d’un cadre\nrèglementaire pour la production et la diffusion des SFP à l’instar de la pratique adoptée dans de\nnombreux pays. Plus précisément, il s’agirait d’adopter un texte légal ou règlementaire comme pour\nles autres domaines statistiques, y compris les statistiques macroéconomiques – statistiques du\nsecteur réel (production, prix, comptabilité nationale entre autres) – au travers de la loi statistique, et\nstatistiques monétaires et financières et du secteur extérieur au travers de la règlementation bancaire\net financière. Étendre cette approche aux SFP est considéré constituer une bonne pratique\npermettant de formaliser la fonction statistique du service responsable de ces statistiques et de\nl’investir de l’autorité nécessaire à la réalisation de sa mission.\n\n10. Des travaux sont en cours pour l’adoption d’un texte réglementaire fixant les modalités\nde production des SFP . L’adoption d’un tel cadre règlementaire pour les SFP fait l’objet de travaux\ndepuis plusieurs années et un premier projet de décret avait été préparé et revue par le ministre de\nl’Économie et des finances. La mission recommande la finalisation du projet suivi de l’adoption\nprochaine du décret.\n\n_Recommandation_\n\n - Finaliser le projet de décret relatif au cadre réglementaire en matière de production et de\ndiffusion des SFP, et adopter le décret.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 8", "text_characters": 2596}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**11.** **Le plan d’actions ci-dessous a pour objectif d’orienter la DE dans ses activités**\n**statistiques au cours de 2023** .\n\n\n**Tableau 2.** **Plan d’actions** **[4]**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Cadre règlementaire_
|\n|Élevée|1. Relancer
l’adoption du
décret portant
production et
diffusion des
SFP.
|Le décret est
adopté.
|30 juin
2023
||Ceci est une action du
Plan Stratégique de
Modernisation des
Finances Publiques
(PSMFP).
|\n||2. Signature d'un
protocole
d'accord entre la
DE et l’INSTAT.
|Le protocole
d’accord est
signé.
|NA
||Cette recommandation
n’est plus pertinente
dans la mesure où
l’INSTAT et la DE font
tous deux désormais
partie du même
ministère de tutelle, qui
est le MEF.
|\n|Élevée
|3. Établir et
signer des
protocoles entre
la DE et les
pourvoyeurs de
données-source.
|- Dépend de
l’adoption du
décret relatif aux
SFP.
-Les protocoles
d’accord sont
signés.
Cf. plus bas la
section sur
l’organisation du
travail.
|30
septembre
2023
||Cet aspect peut
s’appliquer aux
pourvoyeurs de
données d’entités
externes au MEF (la
CNaPS actuellement).
L’extension du champ
aux EPA et CTD
échappant à la tutelle
du Trésor pourrait être
facilitée par l’adoption
de tels protocoles.
|\n|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|**_Résultat :_**_Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_|\n\n\n4 L’horizon de ce plan d’action se limite à 2023.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [43.765716552734375, 132.20570373535156, 518.67431640625, 573.1199951171875], "columns": 6, "rows": 6}], "text": "11. Le plan d’actions ci-dessous a pour objectif d’orienter la DE dans ses activités\nstatistiques au cours de 2023 .\n\nTableau 2. Plan d’actions [4]\n\n Priorité Mesure/repère Risques hypothétiques/ Indicateurs vérifiables Date de réalisation prévue Date de réalisation effective Remarque \n\n _Résultat :__Cadre règlementaire_ _Résultat :__Cadre règlementaire_ _Résultat :__Cadre règlementaire_ _Résultat :__Cadre règlementaire_ _Résultat :__Cadre règlementaire_ _Résultat :__Cadre règlementaire_ \n Élevée 1. Relancer l’adoption du décret portant production et diffusion des SFP. Le décret est adopté. 30 juin 2023 Ceci est une action du Plan Stratégique de Modernisation des Finances Publiques (PSMFP). \n 2. Signature d'un protocole d'accord entre la DE et l’INSTAT. Le protocole d’accord est signé. NA Cette recommandation n’est plus pertinente dans la mesure où l’INSTAT et la DE font tous deux désormais partie du même ministère de tutelle, qui est le MEF. \n Élevée 3. Établir et signer des protocoles entre la DE et les pourvoyeurs de données-source. - Dépend de l’adoption du décret relatif aux SFP. -Les protocoles d’accord sont signés. Cf. plus bas la section sur l’organisation du travail. 30 septembre 2023 Cet aspect peut s’appliquer aux pourvoyeurs de données d’entités externes au MEF (la CNaPS actuellement). L’extension du champ aux EPA et CTD échappant à la tutelle du Trésor pourrait être facilitée par l’adoption de tels protocoles. \n _Résultat :__Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_ _Résultat :__Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_ _Résultat :__Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_ _Résultat :__Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_ _Résultat :__Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_ _Résultat :__Rapprochement entre les nomenclatures des sources de base et du MSFP 2014_ \n\n4 L’horizon de ce plan d’action se limite à 2023.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 9", "text_characters": 1789}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|Elevée
|4. Revoir et
compléter autant
que possible les
tableaux de
correspondance
établis par la
mission entre les
divers plans
comptables
d’administration
publique et la
nomenclature du
_MSFP 201_~~_4._~~
|
Les tableaux de
correspondance
sont vérifiés et
complétés.
|En continu
||Certains problèmes
relatifs au traitement
de la Classe 1 et, le
cas échéant, des
provisions doivent être
résolus en étroite
collaboration avec les
services comptables
concernés.
|\n|Élevée
|
5. Vérifier la
cohérence entre
les différents
tableaux de
correspondance.
|Des procédures
sont mises en
place pour
assurer la
cohérence de
tableaux
distincts.
|En continu
||L’existence de
tableaux de
correspondance
propres à chaque
sous-secteur
d’administration
publique présente le
risque d’incohérences
entre les statistiques
des différents sous-
secteurs. La
vérification de la
cohérence peut passer
par l’établissement
d’un tableau de
correspondance
unique pour les
comptes communs aux
différents plans
comptables.|\n|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_
|\n|Élevée
|6.
Consolidation :
Procéder à
l’identification
des flux entre les
différents
niveaux
d’administration
publique et à leur
quantification.
|Les flux intra et
inter-
gouvernementa
ux les plus
importants sont
identifiés et
consignés dans
un tableau de
qui à qui.
|30 juin
2023 pour
les
données de
2021 30
septembre
2023 pour
les
données de
2022.
||Des écarts parfois
considérables existent
dans les flux
réciproques entre
administrations. Un
rapprochement est
essentiel pour
poursuivre les travaux
de consolidation.|\n|Élevée|
7. Assemblage,
remplissage et
communication
des tableaux de
recettes, charges
et de
transactions sur
actifs et passifs|Le questionnaire
de SFP pour
l’ensemble,
consolidé ou
agrégé des
administrations
publiques est
rempli et|
30
septembre
2023|||\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [43.765716552734375, 63.20570755004883, 518.67431640625, 717.1538696289062], "columns": 6, "rows": 6}], "text": "Priorité Mesure/repère Risques hypothétiques/ Indicateurs vérifiables Date de réalisation prévue Date de réalisation effective Remarque \n\n Elevée 4. Revoir et compléter autant que possible les tableaux de correspondance établis par la mission entre les divers plans comptables d’administration publique et la nomenclature du _MSFP 201_~~_4._~~ Les tableaux de correspondance sont vérifiés et complétés. En continu Certains problèmes relatifs au traitement de la Classe 1 et, le cas échéant, des provisions doivent être résolus en étroite collaboration avec les services comptables concernés. \n Élevée 5. Vérifier la cohérence entre les différents tableaux de correspondance. Des procédures sont mises en place pour assurer la cohérence de tableaux distincts. En continu L’existence de tableaux de correspondance propres à chaque sous-secteur d’administration publique présente le risque d’incohérences entre les statistiques des différents sous- secteurs. La vérification de la cohérence peut passer par l’établissement d’un tableau de correspondance unique pour les comptes communs aux différents plans comptables. \n _Résultat :__Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_ _Résultat :__Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_ _Résultat :__Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_ _Résultat :__Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_ _Résultat :__Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_ _Résultat :__Consolidation et remplissage du questionnaire de SFP_ \n Élevée 6. Consolidation : Procéder à l’identification des flux entre les différents niveaux d’administration publique et à leur quantification. Les flux intra et inter- gouvernementa ux les plus importants sont identifiés et consignés dans un tableau de qui à qui. 30 juin 2023 pour les données de 2021 30 septembre 2023 pour les données de 2022. Des écarts parfois considérables existent dans les flux réciproques entre administrations. Un rapprochement est essentiel pour poursuivre les travaux de consolidation. \n Élevée 7. Assemblage, remplissage et communication des tableaux de recettes, charges et de transactions sur actifs et passifs Le questionnaire de SFP pour l’ensemble, consolidé ou agrégé des administrations publiques est rempli et 30 septembre 2023 \n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 10", "text_characters": 2041}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||portant sur
l’exercice 2022
dans le
questionnaire de
SFP du FMI.
|
communiqué au
Département
des statistiques
du FMI.
||||\n|Moyenne
|
8. Élaboration
d’un compte de
patrimoine
financier
statistique de
l’administration
publique centrale
budgétaire (État)
portant sur
l’exercice 2021
et remplissage
du Tableau 6 du
questionnaire de
SFP pour
l’exercice 2021
|Un compte de
patrimoine
statistique est
élaboré puis
communiqué au
Département
des statistiques
du FMI.
|30
septembre
2023
Fusionner
avec le 10,
car objectif
principal
est le
même
remplissag
e formulaire
6, 6A et 6B
||Les encours d’actifs
financiers et de passifs
apparaissent déjà dans
la balance du Trésor.
La question de
valorisation des actifs
à la valeur de marché
ne se posera que pour
les participations
(entretemps les
valeurs comptables
pourront être utilisées).
Les passifs de dette
devront sans doute
être complétés à l’aide
de la situation de la
dette.
|\n|Moyenne
|9. Vérification de
la cohérence
entre les
statistiques de
dette et les
passifs de dette
du compte de
patrimoine
financier.
|Les passifs
constituant de la
dette sont
cohérents avec
les statistiques
de la dette.
|En continu
||
La cohérence entre les
passifs de dette du
compte de patrimoine
et les statistiques de
dette est un élément
important de la qualité
des données.
|\n|Élevée
|10.Une fois
validées,
communication
des statistiques
de passifs et de
dette dans le
questionnaire de
SFP du FMI
(Tableau 6, 6A et
6B).
|Les statistiques
de la dette de
l’administration
centrale sont
communiquées
au FMI.
|30
septembre
2023
||La cohérence entre les
flux et stocks de dette
devra être vérifiée.
|\n|Moyenne|11. Préparation
de la Situation
des flux de
trésorerie (SFT)
pour
l’administration
centrale
budgétaire dans
la Situation II du
questionnaire de
SFP.|-La SFT de
l’État est
produite et
communiquée
au FMI.|Décembre
2023||Cet objectif pourra
faire l’objet de la
prochaine mission.|\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [43.765716552734375, 63.20570755004883, 518.67431640625, 710.1942749023438], "columns": 6, "rows": 6}], "text": "Priorité Mesure/repère Risques hypothétiques/ Indicateurs vérifiables Date de réalisation prévue Date de réalisation effective Remarque \n\n portant sur l’exercice 2022 dans le questionnaire de SFP du FMI. communiqué au Département des statistiques du FMI. \n Moyenne 8. Élaboration d’un compte de patrimoine financier statistique de l’administration publique centrale budgétaire (État) portant sur l’exercice 2021 et remplissage du Tableau 6 du questionnaire de SFP pour l’exercice 2021 Un compte de patrimoine statistique est élaboré puis communiqué au Département des statistiques du FMI. 30 septembre 2023 Fusionner avec le 10, car objectif principal est le même remplissag e formulaire 6, 6A et 6B Les encours d’actifs financiers et de passifs apparaissent déjà dans la balance du Trésor. La question de valorisation des actifs à la valeur de marché ne se posera que pour les participations (entretemps les valeurs comptables pourront être utilisées). Les passifs de dette devront sans doute être complétés à l’aide de la situation de la dette. \n Moyenne 9. Vérification de la cohérence entre les statistiques de dette et les passifs de dette du compte de patrimoine financier. Les passifs constituant de la dette sont cohérents avec les statistiques de la dette. En continu La cohérence entre les passifs de dette du compte de patrimoine et les statistiques de dette est un élément important de la qualité des données. \n Élevée 10.Une fois validées, communication des statistiques de passifs et de dette dans le questionnaire de SFP du FMI (Tableau 6, 6A et 6B). Les statistiques de la dette de l’administration centrale sont communiquées au FMI. 30 septembre 2023 La cohérence entre les flux et stocks de dette devra être vérifiée. \n Moyenne 11. Préparation de la Situation des flux de trésorerie (SFT) pour l’administration centrale budgétaire dans la Situation II du questionnaire de SFP. -La SFT de l’État est produite et communiquée au FMI. Décembre 2023 Cet objectif pourra faire l’objet de la prochaine mission. \n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 11", "text_characters": 1774}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|
**_Résultat :_**_Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_
|\n|Élevée
|12. Fournir une
évaluation de
l’importance des
EPA et CTD déjà
saisis dans les
statistiques
relatifs à leur
ensemble.
|Le poids des
entités saisis
par rapport à
l’ensemble est
évalué.
|31 juin
2023
|
|À présent, les SFP ne
comprennent que les
EPA et CTD gérées
par le Trésor. Un
indicateur d’évaluation
de leur degré de
représentativité
permettrait de juger de
l’importance à apporter
à l’extension du champ
statistiques.
|\n|Moyenne
|13. Extension du
champ
statistiques aux
EPA hors
gestion par le
Trésor et aux
Établissement
Public à
caractère
Industriel ou
Commercial
(EPIC) non-
marchands,
selon la
pertinence).
|Le triage entre
EPIC
marchands et
non marchands
est engagé.
Les SFP pour
les EPIC non
marchands sont
élaborées.
|2023 puis
en continu
||
L’extension du champ
statistique est une
action du PSMFP.
La pertinence de
l’inclusion des EPIC
dépendra de leur poids
par rapport à
l’ensemble de
l’administration
centrale. Cette action
nécessitera une
assistance technique.|\n|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|
**_Résultats :_**_Organisation du travail et autres aspects_
|\n|
|14. Dans le
contexte des
protocoles
mentionnés plus
haut (action 3) et
selon les
besoins, établir
des mécanismes
et calendriers de
communication
spontanée des
données de
base.
|Des
mécanismes et
des calendriers
de
communication
des données
sont mis en
place.
|NA
|
|Sauf peut-être en ce
qui concerne la
CNaPS, cette activité
n’est plus jugée
pertinente dans la
mesure où les
données comptables
sont régulièrement
produites et fournies
par la DGT.
|\n|Élevée|
15. Selon les
besoins, établir,
pour les
pourvoyeurs de
données de
base, des
questionnaires
de présentation
des données-
source et|Les
questionnaires
et formulaires
spécifiques sont
préparés et
proposés aux
comptables de
certains
services|30 juin
2023 ou
selon les
besoins||Le recours à des
questionnaires est
parfois utile en vue
d’obtenir des
informations
supplémentaires,
comme certains types
de ventilation qui
peuvent ne pas être
identifiables dans les|\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [43.77000045776367, 63.20570755004883, 518.6700439453125, 713.0742797851562], "columns": 6, "rows": 7}], "text": "Priorité Mesure/repère Risques hypothétiques/ Indicateurs vérifiables Date de réalisation prévue Date de réalisation effective Remarque \n\n _Résultat :__Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_ _Résultat :__Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_ _Résultat :__Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_ _Résultat :__Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_ _Résultat :__Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_ _Résultat :__Définition et extension du champ institutionnel_ \n Élevée 12. Fournir une évaluation de l’importance des EPA et CTD déjà saisis dans les statistiques relatifs à leur ensemble. Le poids des entités saisis par rapport à l’ensemble est évalué. 31 juin 2023 À présent, les SFP ne comprennent que les EPA et CTD gérées par le Trésor. Un indicateur d’évaluation de leur degré de représentativité permettrait de juger de l’importance à apporter à l’extension du champ statistiques. \n Moyenne 13. Extension du champ statistiques aux EPA hors gestion par le Trésor et aux Établissement Public à caractère Industriel ou Commercial (EPIC) non- marchands, selon la pertinence). Le triage entre EPIC marchands et non marchands est engagé. Les SFP pour les EPIC non marchands sont élaborées. 2023 puis en continu L’extension du champ statistique est une action du PSMFP. La pertinence de l’inclusion des EPIC dépendra de leur poids par rapport à l’ensemble de l’administration centrale. Cette action nécessitera une assistance technique. \n _Résultats :__Organisation du travail et autres aspects_ _Résultats :__Organisation du travail et autres aspects_ _Résultats :__Organisation du travail et autres aspects_ _Résultats :__Organisation du travail et autres aspects_ _Résultats :__Organisation du travail et autres aspects_ _Résultats :__Organisation du travail et autres aspects_ \n 14. Dans le contexte des protocoles mentionnés plus haut (action 3) et selon les besoins, établir des mécanismes et calendriers de communication spontanée des données de base. Des mécanismes et des calendriers de communication des données sont mis en place. NA Sauf peut-être en ce qui concerne la CNaPS, cette activité n’est plus jugée pertinente dans la mesure où les données comptables sont régulièrement produites et fournies par la DGT. \n Élevée 15. Selon les besoins, établir, pour les pourvoyeurs de données de base, des questionnaires de présentation des données- source et Les questionnaires et formulaires spécifiques sont préparés et proposés aux comptables de certains services 30 juin 2023 ou selon les besoins Le recours à des questionnaires est parfois utile en vue d’obtenir des informations supplémentaires, comme certains types de ventilation qui peuvent ne pas être identifiables dans les \n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 12", "text_characters": 2412}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Priorité|Mesure/repère|Risques
hypothétiques/
Indicateurs
vérifiables|Date de
réalisation
prévue|Date de
réalisation
effective|Remarque|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||d’information
supplémentaire.
|
pourvoyeurs de
données
|||balances
communiquées à la
DE.
|\n|Élevée
|16. S’entendre
avec la CNaPS
sur la
communication
de source de
données
électroniquement
exploitables.
|L’ensemble des
états financiers
et la balance
générale des
comptes sont
communiqués
sur support
Excel
|
30 mars
2023
|
|
|\n|Moyenne
|
17. Adoption du
_MSFP 2014_ pour
l’OGT.
|
L’OGT adopte la
présentation de
la SOAP et les
classifications
du_ MSFP 2014._
|À
envisager à
moyen
terme
|
|Il s’agit d’adopter le
cadre analytique et les
classifications du
_MSFP 2014_pour
l’OGT. Ceci est un
objectif déclaré des
autorités malgaches
qui devra faire l’objet
d’une consultation
avec le Département
Afrique du FMI.
|\n|Moyenne
|18. Rédaction
d’un document
de type
Concepts,
Sources et
Méthodes.|Le document en
question est
rédigé puis mis
à jour au cours
du temps.|L’adoption
par les
autorités du
_MSFP_
_2014_
comme
méthodolog
ie de
référence
pour l’OGT
et
l’ensemble
des SFP
contribuera
à la
rédaction
d’un tel
document.||
En plus de son
caractère
méthodologique, ce
type de document doit
entre autres pouvoir
servir de manuel de
procédures. Il est un
moyen de contribuer à
la formation des
nouvelles recrues et,
d’assurer la continuité
des tâches en cas de
départ du personnel de
la DE, ainsi que de
familiariser les agents
extérieurs à la DE.
Ceci est une action du
PSMFP. Elle est aussi
d’une haute
importance. La priorité
moyenne qui lui est
attribuée s’explique
uniquement par le fait
qu’une telle rédaction
ne peut se faire dans
le court terme.|\n|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [43.765716552734375, 63.20570755004883, 518.67431640625, 694.1997680664062], "columns": 6, "rows": 6}], "text": "Priorité Mesure/repère Risques hypothétiques/ Indicateurs vérifiables Date de réalisation prévue Date de réalisation effective Remarque \n\n d’information supplémentaire. pourvoyeurs de données balances communiquées à la DE. \n Élevée 16. S’entendre avec la CNaPS sur la communication de source de données électroniquement exploitables. L’ensemble des états financiers et la balance générale des comptes sont communiqués sur support Excel 30 mars 2023 \n Moyenne 17. Adoption du _MSFP 2014_ pour l’OGT. L’OGT adopte la présentation de la SOAP et les classifications du_ MSFP 2014._ À envisager à moyen terme Il s’agit d’adopter le cadre analytique et les classifications du _MSFP 2014_pour l’OGT. Ceci est un objectif déclaré des autorités malgaches qui devra faire l’objet d’une consultation avec le Département Afrique du FMI. \n Moyenne 18. Rédaction d’un document de type Concepts, Sources et Méthodes. Le document en question est rédigé puis mis à jour au cours du temps. L’adoption par les autorités du _MSFP_ _2014_ comme méthodolog ie de référence pour l’OGT et l’ensemble des SFP contribuera à la rédaction d’un tel document. En plus de son caractère méthodologique, ce type de document doit entre autres pouvoir servir de manuel de procédures. Il est un moyen de contribuer à la formation des nouvelles recrues et, d’assurer la continuité des tâches en cas de départ du personnel de la DE, ainsi que de familiariser les agents extérieurs à la DE. Ceci est une action du PSMFP. Elle est aussi d’une haute importance. La priorité moyenne qui lui est attribuée s’explique uniquement par le fait qu’une telle rédaction ne peut se faire dans le court terme. \n \n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 13", "text_characters": 1466}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**A. Travail de la mission**\n\n**12. Le travail de la mission a principalement porté sur** :\n\n\n- L’examen des statistiques établies par la DE pour les opérations de l’État, des EPA et des\nCTD ;\n\n- L’agrégation des statistiques des trois sous-secteurs susmentionnés en vue de\nl’établissement des statistiques portant sur l’ensemble des administrations publiques ;\n\n- Les procédures de la consolidation de ces SFP, y compris l’examen des transferts inter\ngouvernementaux sujets à être éliminés lors de la consolidation de l’ensemble des\nsous-secteurs d’administration publique ;\n\n- La production des statistiques relatives aux opérations de la CNaPS ;\n\n- L’examen des travaux menés par la DE en vue de produire le compte de patrimoine financier\npour l’administration centrale budgétaire (l’État) ;\n\n- L’examen et la mise à jour du plan d’actions avec comme objectif l’élaboration et la\ncommunication de ces statistiques consolidées vers le troisième trimestre 2023.\n\n\n**13. Les travaux relatifs aux SFP pour l’OGT, les EPA, les CTD et la CNaPS ont été**\n**consignés dans un ensemble de fichiers Excel d’établissement des données** . Ils comprennent\nentre autres (1) les tableaux de correspondance respectifs entre les nomenclatures comptable et\nstatistique et (2) l’outil de classification des données-source de chacun de ces sous-secteurs. La liste\nde ces fichiers est fournie à l’appendice B de ce rapport.\n\n\n**B. Couverture des statistiques et sources de données**\n\n**14.** Le champ de l’administration publique malgache comprend l’État (l’administration centrale\nbudgétaire), les Établissements Publics Nationaux non marchands (principalement les EPA et les\nEPIC) qui constituent l’administration centrale hors budget, la CNaPS pour le sous-secteur de\nsécurité sociale, ainsi que les CTD pour le sous-secteur d’administration locale.\n\n\n**15. Le champ effectivement couvert par les statistiques est déterminé par la disponibilité**\n**des sources de données** . Les sources suivantes étant déjà disponibles :\n\n\n- Pour l’État : La balance générale du Trésor complétée par des données issues de la\ncomptabilité budgétaire, de la banque centrale de Madagascar et de la Direction de la Dette ;\n\n- Pour les EPA : la balance comptable consolidée des EPA gérés par le Trésor ;\n\n- Pour les CTD : la balance comptable consolidée des CTD gérées par le Trésor ;\n\n- Pour la CNaPS, la balance comptable et les états financiers.\n\n\n**16. La DE envisage d’étendre le champ aux EPA qui ne sont pas gérés par le Trésor et aux**\n**EPIC non marchand** . Ceci demandera l’accès aux sources de données de ces établissements, et\ndans le cas des EPIC l’identification des entités non marchandes.\n\n**17. La DE a exprimé son intention d’étendre le champ de l’administration publique aux**\n**autres entités de l’administration publique, à savoir principalement les EPA et les CTD non**\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "A. Travail de la mission\n\n12. Le travail de la mission a principalement porté sur :\n\n- L’examen des statistiques établies par la DE pour les opérations de l’État, des EPA et des\nCTD ;\n\n- L’agrégation des statistiques des trois sous-secteurs susmentionnés en vue de\nl’établissement des statistiques portant sur l’ensemble des administrations publiques ;\n\n- Les procédures de la consolidation de ces SFP, y compris l’examen des transferts inter\ngouvernementaux sujets à être éliminés lors de la consolidation de l’ensemble des\nsous-secteurs d’administration publique ;\n\n- La production des statistiques relatives aux opérations de la CNaPS ;\n\n- L’examen des travaux menés par la DE en vue de produire le compte de patrimoine financier\npour l’administration centrale budgétaire (l’État) ;\n\n- L’examen et la mise à jour du plan d’actions avec comme objectif l’élaboration et la\ncommunication de ces statistiques consolidées vers le troisième trimestre 2023.\n\n13. Les travaux relatifs aux SFP pour l’OGT, les EPA, les CTD et la CNaPS ont été\nconsignés dans un ensemble de fichiers Excel d’établissement des données . Ils comprennent\nentre autres (1) les tableaux de correspondance respectifs entre les nomenclatures comptable et\nstatistique et (2) l’outil de classification des données-source de chacun de ces sous-secteurs. La liste\nde ces fichiers est fournie à l’appendice B de ce rapport.\n\nB. Couverture des statistiques et sources de données\n\n14. Le champ de l’administration publique malgache comprend l’État (l’administration centrale\nbudgétaire), les Établissements Publics Nationaux non marchands (principalement les EPA et les\nEPIC) qui constituent l’administration centrale hors budget, la CNaPS pour le sous-secteur de\nsécurité sociale, ainsi que les CTD pour le sous-secteur d’administration locale.\n\n15. Le champ effectivement couvert par les statistiques est déterminé par la disponibilité\ndes sources de données . Les sources suivantes étant déjà disponibles :\n\n- Pour l’État : La balance générale du Trésor complétée par des données issues de la\ncomptabilité budgétaire, de la banque centrale de Madagascar et de la Direction de la Dette ;\n\n- Pour les EPA : la balance comptable consolidée des EPA gérés par le Trésor ;\n\n- Pour les CTD : la balance comptable consolidée des CTD gérées par le Trésor ;\n\n- Pour la CNaPS, la balance comptable et les états financiers.\n\n16. La DE envisage d’étendre le champ aux EPA qui ne sont pas gérés par le Trésor et aux\nEPIC non marchand . Ceci demandera l’accès aux sources de données de ces établissements, et\ndans le cas des EPIC l’identification des entités non marchandes.\n\n17. La DE a exprimé son intention d’étendre le champ de l’administration publique aux\nautres entités de l’administration publique, à savoir principalement les EPA et les CTD non\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 14", "text_characters": 2418}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**gérés par le Trésor et les EPIC non marchands** . [5] Quoique conforme aux normes internationales,\ncet élargissement du champ pourrait constituer une lourde tâche, et il serait souhaitable qu’elle ne\nsoit pas entreprise aux dépends de la consolidation des procédures et pratiques déjà mises en place.\nLes gains pour l’analyse des finances publiques qui pourraient découler de ce projet d’expansion\ndépendront du poids de ces nouvelles entités dans l’ensemble du champ des administrations\npubliques. À cet égard et afin d’évaluer ces gains et de mieux piloter le calendrier d’extension du\nchamp statistique, il serait alors utile de construire un indicateur de la représentativité des EPA et des\nCTD déjà saisis dans les statistiques. En fait plusieurs indicateurs pourraient être facilement\nconstruits, par exemple sur la base des transferts et subventions versées aux entités gérées par le\nTrésor par rapport au total de ces versements, sur la base des recettes ou dépenses relatives, ou\nencore sur la base des effectifs relatifs _._\n\n\n_**Recommandation**_\n\n\n- Construire plusieurs indicateurs de l’importance des opérations des EPA et CTD couverts par\nles statistiques par rapport à l’ensemble de leurs opérations respectives. Sur la base des\npriorités ainsi établies ;\n\n- Étendre le champ statistique des administrations publiques aux EPA et CTD qui ne sont pas\ngérées par le Trésor ;\n\n- Identifier les EPIC et les entreprises publiques non marchands les plus importants.\n\n\n**C.** **Sources de données**\n\n**18.** **Le format et support de certaines sources de données compliquent sensiblement**\n**l’établissement des SFP** . Ceci alourdit le travail de la DE en constituant un obstacle majeur à la\nsystématisation et à l’automatisation des procédures et pratiques statistiques. Par exemple,\nl’établissement des statistiques de la CNaPS pour l’exercice 2021 a dû être effectué à partir de\ndocuments PDF-image (tant pour la balance des comptes que pour les états financiers), ce qui a\ndemandé une transcription manuelle de l’information comptable qui s’y trouvait. De plus, parce que la\nbalance pour 2021 était sensiblement moins détaillée que celle de 2020, les classifications effectuées\ndans le tableau de correspondance précédent n’ont pu être utilisés et un nouveau tableau a dû être\nétabli. [6] Plus généralement et en résumé :\n\n\n- Le format PDF-image est complètement inadapté à la préparation des statistiques car les\ndocuments concernés ne sont ni lisibles électroniquement ni copiables.\n\n- Le changement de présentation lors d’un nouvel exercice élimine la possibilité d’exploiter les\noutils et procédures mis en place précédemment.\n\n\n5 À terme, le champ statistique des administrations publiques devra comprendre les entreprises publiques nationales\nnon marchandes.\n\n6 Quand cela était possible le détail de la balance a pu être obtenu à partir des informations détaillées des états\nfinanciers (eux aussi sous format image). En plus de constituer une perte de temps considérable, un risque d’erreurs\nde recopiage existe.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "gérés par le Trésor et les EPIC non marchands . [5] Quoique conforme aux normes internationales,\ncet élargissement du champ pourrait constituer une lourde tâche, et il serait souhaitable qu’elle ne\nsoit pas entreprise aux dépends de la consolidation des procédures et pratiques déjà mises en place.\nLes gains pour l’analyse des finances publiques qui pourraient découler de ce projet d’expansion\ndépendront du poids de ces nouvelles entités dans l’ensemble du champ des administrations\npubliques. À cet égard et afin d’évaluer ces gains et de mieux piloter le calendrier d’extension du\nchamp statistique, il serait alors utile de construire un indicateur de la représentativité des EPA et des\nCTD déjà saisis dans les statistiques. En fait plusieurs indicateurs pourraient être facilement\nconstruits, par exemple sur la base des transferts et subventions versées aux entités gérées par le\nTrésor par rapport au total de ces versements, sur la base des recettes ou dépenses relatives, ou\nencore sur la base des effectifs relatifs _._\n\n_Recommandation_\n\n- Construire plusieurs indicateurs de l’importance des opérations des EPA et CTD couverts par\nles statistiques par rapport à l’ensemble de leurs opérations respectives. Sur la base des\npriorités ainsi établies ;\n\n- Étendre le champ statistique des administrations publiques aux EPA et CTD qui ne sont pas\ngérées par le Trésor ;\n\n- Identifier les EPIC et les entreprises publiques non marchands les plus importants.\n\nC. Sources de données\n\n18. Le format et support de certaines sources de données compliquent sensiblement\nl’établissement des SFP . Ceci alourdit le travail de la DE en constituant un obstacle majeur à la\nsystématisation et à l’automatisation des procédures et pratiques statistiques. Par exemple,\nl’établissement des statistiques de la CNaPS pour l’exercice 2021 a dû être effectué à partir de\ndocuments PDF-image (tant pour la balance des comptes que pour les états financiers), ce qui a\ndemandé une transcription manuelle de l’information comptable qui s’y trouvait. De plus, parce que la\nbalance pour 2021 était sensiblement moins détaillée que celle de 2020, les classifications effectuées\ndans le tableau de correspondance précédent n’ont pu être utilisés et un nouveau tableau a dû être\nétabli. [6] Plus généralement et en résumé :\n\n- Le format PDF-image est complètement inadapté à la préparation des statistiques car les\ndocuments concernés ne sont ni lisibles électroniquement ni copiables.\n\n- Le changement de présentation lors d’un nouvel exercice élimine la possibilité d’exploiter les\noutils et procédures mis en place précédemment.\n\n5 À terme, le champ statistique des administrations publiques devra comprendre les entreprises publiques nationales\nnon marchandes.\n\n6 Quand cela était possible le détail de la balance a pu être obtenu à partir des informations détaillées des états\nfinanciers (eux aussi sous format image). En plus de constituer une perte de temps considérable, un risque d’erreurs\nde recopiage existe.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 15", "text_characters": 2604}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**19. Il sera essentiel d’établir un accord entre la DE et la CNaPS en vue d’assurer la**\n**communication régulière des états comptables et financiers de cette dernière, selon une**\n**présentation déterminée d’un commun accord et sur support Excel** . Le détail de la balance\ndevra aussi être suffisant afin de permettre de retrouver les différentes ventilations présentées dans\nles états financiers.\n\n\n_**Recommandation**_\n\n\n- S’accorder avec la CNaPS sur la présentation et le support de communication des données\nsources. Ces dernières doivent être suffisamment détaillées pour permettre une classification\nadéquate et exploitable électroniquement, idéalement les états financiers dans leur\nprésentation pour l’exercice 2021 sur support Excel et accompagnés de la balance générale\ndétaillée (comme l’était la balance 2020 communiquée à la mission de 2021).\n\n\n**D. Consolidation**\n\n\n**20. Le processus de consolidation consiste à agréger les statistiques des différents sous-**\n**secteurs, puis à éliminer les transferts entre les unités d’administration publique** (transferts\ninter ou intra gouvernementaux). Tant que les données source sur ces transferts sont cohérentes\nentre elles, c’est-à-dire tant que les transferts effectués par un sous-secteur sont égaux aux transferts\nreçus, le processus de consolidation ne présente pas de difficulté.\n\n\n**21. Dans les statistiques portant sur 2021, une tentative de consolidation intra**\n**gouvernementale a déjà été effectuée par la DE pour les transferts internes aux OGT ainsi que**\n**pour les transferts internes aux CTD** . Cependant, dans ce dernier cas, il y aura lieu de revoir les\nsources de données relatives aux transferts car, dans la balance consolidée des CTD, les transferts\nreçus par les CTD en provenance d’autres CTD (en classe 1 et 7) ne sont pas accompagnées de\nversements (en classe 6).\n\n\n**22. Au niveau des transferts intergouvernementaux les données-source font apparaitre**\n**des écarts importants entre les montants relatifs aux dépenses et aux recettes de transferts** .\nCeci peut s’expliquer par plusieurs facteurs (ces aspects sont développés à l’appendice A) :\n\n\n- Le champ des transferts accordé est plus vaste que celui des transferts reçus. Ceci est\ngénéralement le cas quand le champ institutionnel des statistiques relatives aux\nsous-secteurs d’administration publique est plus restreint que celui des unités\nd’administration publique bénéficiaires de ces transferts.\n\n- La base d’enregistrement en comptabilité pour enregistrer les versements est différente de\ncelle utilisée pour l’enregistrement des recettes de transferts.\n\n\n_**Recommandation**_\n\n\n- _Expliquer les écarts constatés entre les transferts et subventions versés ou à payer par le_\n_budget et les montants constatés comme reçus ou à recevoir par les bénéficiaires sur la base_\n_des balances respectives ou d’informations complémentaires._\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "19. Il sera essentiel d’établir un accord entre la DE et la CNaPS en vue d’assurer la\ncommunication régulière des états comptables et financiers de cette dernière, selon une\nprésentation déterminée d’un commun accord et sur support Excel . Le détail de la balance\ndevra aussi être suffisant afin de permettre de retrouver les différentes ventilations présentées dans\nles états financiers.\n\n_Recommandation_\n\n- S’accorder avec la CNaPS sur la présentation et le support de communication des données\nsources. Ces dernières doivent être suffisamment détaillées pour permettre une classification\nadéquate et exploitable électroniquement, idéalement les états financiers dans leur\nprésentation pour l’exercice 2021 sur support Excel et accompagnés de la balance générale\ndétaillée (comme l’était la balance 2020 communiquée à la mission de 2021).\n\nD. Consolidation\n\n20. Le processus de consolidation consiste à agréger les statistiques des différents sous-\nsecteurs, puis à éliminer les transferts entre les unités d’administration publique (transferts\ninter ou intra gouvernementaux). Tant que les données source sur ces transferts sont cohérentes\nentre elles, c’est-à-dire tant que les transferts effectués par un sous-secteur sont égaux aux transferts\nreçus, le processus de consolidation ne présente pas de difficulté.\n\n21. Dans les statistiques portant sur 2021, une tentative de consolidation intra\ngouvernementale a déjà été effectuée par la DE pour les transferts internes aux OGT ainsi que\npour les transferts internes aux CTD . Cependant, dans ce dernier cas, il y aura lieu de revoir les\nsources de données relatives aux transferts car, dans la balance consolidée des CTD, les transferts\nreçus par les CTD en provenance d’autres CTD (en classe 1 et 7) ne sont pas accompagnées de\nversements (en classe 6).\n\n22. Au niveau des transferts intergouvernementaux les données-source font apparaitre\ndes écarts importants entre les montants relatifs aux dépenses et aux recettes de transferts .\nCeci peut s’expliquer par plusieurs facteurs (ces aspects sont développés à l’appendice A) :\n\n- Le champ des transferts accordé est plus vaste que celui des transferts reçus. Ceci est\ngénéralement le cas quand le champ institutionnel des statistiques relatives aux\nsous-secteurs d’administration publique est plus restreint que celui des unités\nd’administration publique bénéficiaires de ces transferts.\n\n- La base d’enregistrement en comptabilité pour enregistrer les versements est différente de\ncelle utilisée pour l’enregistrement des recettes de transferts.\n\n_Recommandation_\n\n- _Expliquer les écarts constatés entre les transferts et subventions versés ou à payer par le_\n_budget et les montants constatés comme reçus ou à recevoir par les bénéficiaires sur la base_\n_des balances respectives ou d’informations complémentaires._\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 16", "text_characters": 2478}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- _Effectuer les ajustements de consolidation aux données agrégées pour 2021 et communiquer_\n_les SFP consolidées au Département des statistiques. Communiquer seulement les SFP_\n_agrégées si la consolidation n’est pas possible._\n\n\n**E. Dette et compte de patrimoine**\n\n**23. Les statistiques sur la dette publique sont préparées par la Direction de la Dette de la**\n**DGT** . Madagascar communique ces statistiques à la Banque Mondiale dans le cadre de l’initiative\nconjointe sur la dette publique de cette institution et du FMI. Le champ institutionnel est celui de l’État\net couvre donc la quasi-totalité de la dette des administrations publiques malgaches puisque les\nautres sous-secteurs ne sont pas normalement habilités à s’endetter. Ces statistiques couvrent les\némissions de titres (bons et obligations) et les crédits intérieurs et extérieurs. Il conviendrait d’y\najouter les passifs sous formes de dépôts des correspondants aux Trésor éventuellement détenus\npar des entités n’appartenant pas au champ de l’administration publique [7] ainsi que les autres\ncomptes à payer. Cette information est disponible dans la Balance générale des comptes.\n\n\n**24. Le tableau 6 du questionnaire de SFP du FMI, qui concerne le compte de patrimoine,**\n**n’est toujours pas renseigné par la DE** . Cependant, rien ne s’oppose en principe au remplissage\nde ce tableau puisque la balance des comptes fournit les encours d’actifs financiers et passifs. Une\nmission précédente avait d’ailleurs établi une maquette de compte de patrimoine statistique. [8]\n\n\n_**Recommandation**_\n\n\n- Établir un compte de patrimoine statistique à partir de la balance générale des comptes.\n\n\n7 Les dépôts au Trésor détenues par des unités d’administration publique sont éliminés lors de la consolidation.\n\n8 Il s’agit principalement de classifier les actifs et passifs comptables selon les catégories du _MSFP 2014_ . Cette classification est déjà\nfaite pour établir les flux statistiques de financement et peut donc être appliquée aux encours.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- _Effectuer les ajustements de consolidation aux données agrégées pour 2021 et communiquer_\n_les SFP consolidées au Département des statistiques. Communiquer seulement les SFP_\n_agrégées si la consolidation n’est pas possible._\n\nE. Dette et compte de patrimoine\n\n23. Les statistiques sur la dette publique sont préparées par la Direction de la Dette de la\nDGT . Madagascar communique ces statistiques à la Banque Mondiale dans le cadre de l’initiative\nconjointe sur la dette publique de cette institution et du FMI. Le champ institutionnel est celui de l’État\net couvre donc la quasi-totalité de la dette des administrations publiques malgaches puisque les\nautres sous-secteurs ne sont pas normalement habilités à s’endetter. Ces statistiques couvrent les\némissions de titres (bons et obligations) et les crédits intérieurs et extérieurs. Il conviendrait d’y\najouter les passifs sous formes de dépôts des correspondants aux Trésor éventuellement détenus\npar des entités n’appartenant pas au champ de l’administration publique [7] ainsi que les autres\ncomptes à payer. Cette information est disponible dans la Balance générale des comptes.\n\n24. Le tableau 6 du questionnaire de SFP du FMI, qui concerne le compte de patrimoine,\nn’est toujours pas renseigné par la DE . Cependant, rien ne s’oppose en principe au remplissage\nde ce tableau puisque la balance des comptes fournit les encours d’actifs financiers et passifs. Une\nmission précédente avait d’ailleurs établi une maquette de compte de patrimoine statistique. [8]\n\n_Recommandation_\n\n- Établir un compte de patrimoine statistique à partir de la balance générale des comptes.\n\n7 Les dépôts au Trésor détenues par des unités d’administration publique sont éliminés lors de la consolidation.\n\n8 Il s’agit principalement de classifier les actifs et passifs comptables selon les catégories du _MSFP 2014_ . Cette classification est déjà\nfaite pour établir les flux statistiques de financement et peut donc être appliquée aux encours.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 17", "text_characters": 1753}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "**F.** **Responsables rencontrées au cours de la mission**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "F. Responsables rencontrées au cours de la mission\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 18", "text_characters": 118}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**APPENDICE A. CONSOLIDATION**\n\n\n###### **Appendices**\n\n**CONSOLIDATION**\n\n\n\nLa consolidation concerne l’élimination des statistiques des transferts d’une administration publique\nnationale à une autre administration publique nationale soit, plus généralement, l’éliminations des\ntransferts entre administrations. En principe, de tels transferts doivent être éliminés des statistiques, à\nl’exception des transferts relatifs aux cotisations sociales.\n\n\nCes transferts en question peuvent être obligatoires ou volontaires, avec ou sans contrepartie.\nL’attention portée dans cette note sera sur les transferts volontaires sans contrepartie. En\nstatistiques, de tels transferts entre administrations publiques sont dénommés « dons ».\n\n\nGlobalement, il existe deux sortes de transferts entre administrations publiques nationales :\n\n\n- Les transferts intergouvernementaux entre deux sous-secteurs de l’administration : par\nexemple entre l’administration centrale et l’administration locale.\n\n- Les transferts intra gouvernementaux interne a un sous-secteur d’administration publique ;\npar exemple un transfert au sein des opérations de l’État (administration centrale budgétaire)\ncomme les transferts du budget générale vers les comptes particuliers du Trésor.\n\n\n**Consolidation des transferts intergouvernementaux**\n\n\nIl s’agit d’identifier les transferts entre deux sous-secteurs d’administration puis de les éliminer des\nstatistiques. Dans le cas de Madagascar l’attention sera portée sur les transferts entre\nl’administration centrale et l’administration locale. Le processus fait intervenir deux opérations\ndistinctes :\n\n\n- L’identification des transferts inter gouvernementaux et\n\n- Leur élimination.\n\n\nEn principe, les transferts versés doivent être égaux aux transferts reçus. Cette égalité (ou symétrie)\nassure qu’au niveau global aucun transfert intergouvernemental n’apparait dans les statistiques de\nl’ensemble consolidé. Très souvent, cette égalité n’est pas exactement vérifiée, et ce pour plusieurs\nraisons, dont des différences dans les pratiques comptables du donateur et du destinataire. Quand\ncette égalité n’est pas vérifiée, un résiduel de transfert subsiste au niveau consolidé, ce qui peut\nparaitre illogique et anormal. La question alors se pose de comment faire disparaitre ce résiduel.\n\n\nSchématiquement, le processus de consolidation s’effectue comme suit :\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "APPENDICE A. CONSOLIDATION\nAppendices\n\nCONSOLIDATION\n\nLa consolidation concerne l’élimination des statistiques des transferts d’une administration publique\nnationale à une autre administration publique nationale soit, plus généralement, l’éliminations des\ntransferts entre administrations. En principe, de tels transferts doivent être éliminés des statistiques, à\nl’exception des transferts relatifs aux cotisations sociales.\n\nCes transferts en question peuvent être obligatoires ou volontaires, avec ou sans contrepartie.\nL’attention portée dans cette note sera sur les transferts volontaires sans contrepartie. En\nstatistiques, de tels transferts entre administrations publiques sont dénommés « dons ».\n\nGlobalement, il existe deux sortes de transferts entre administrations publiques nationales :\n\n- Les transferts intergouvernementaux entre deux sous-secteurs de l’administration : par\nexemple entre l’administration centrale et l’administration locale.\n\n- Les transferts intra gouvernementaux interne a un sous-secteur d’administration publique ;\npar exemple un transfert au sein des opérations de l’État (administration centrale budgétaire)\ncomme les transferts du budget générale vers les comptes particuliers du Trésor.\n\nConsolidation des transferts intergouvernementaux\n\nIl s’agit d’identifier les transferts entre deux sous-secteurs d’administration puis de les éliminer des\nstatistiques. Dans le cas de Madagascar l’attention sera portée sur les transferts entre\nl’administration centrale et l’administration locale. Le processus fait intervenir deux opérations\ndistinctes :\n\n- L’identification des transferts inter gouvernementaux et\n\n- Leur élimination.\n\nEn principe, les transferts versés doivent être égaux aux transferts reçus. Cette égalité (ou symétrie)\nassure qu’au niveau global aucun transfert intergouvernemental n’apparait dans les statistiques de\nl’ensemble consolidé. Très souvent, cette égalité n’est pas exactement vérifiée, et ce pour plusieurs\nraisons, dont des différences dans les pratiques comptables du donateur et du destinataire. Quand\ncette égalité n’est pas vérifiée, un résiduel de transfert subsiste au niveau consolidé, ce qui peut\nparaitre illogique et anormal. La question alors se pose de comment faire disparaitre ce résiduel.\n\nSchématiquement, le processus de consolidation s’effectue comme suit :\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 19", "text_characters": 2103}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Transfert de l’État vers les CTD Transferts effectués par|Transferts reçus par les CTD|Ensemble|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Transferts effectués par**
**l’État**|**Transferts reçus par les CTD**
|**Ensemble**|\n|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|\n|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|Charge : 1000
|\n|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|
Recette : 1000|\n|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|\n|Charge de dons (233) : 1000
|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|Charge de dons : 0
|\n|
Ajustement :
-1000|
Ajustement :
-1000|
Recette de dons : 0|\n\n\n\nQuand, dans les sources de données, le montant des dons reçus s’écarte de celui des dons\naccordés, la cause de la différence doit être recherchée. Si l’écart peut être attribué à une différence\nrelative au moment d’enregistrement, le résiduel peut être alors inclus avec les autres comptes à\npayer ou à recevoir.\n\n\nD’autres solutions plus ou moins arbitraires existent si l’origine de l’écart ne peut pas être identifiée :\n\n\n- Il est possible de ne pas publier ou de publier partiellement les informations sur les dons.\nCeci entraine souvent la nécessité de supprimer d’autres données afin de ne pas permettre à\nl’utilisateur de retrouver par différence les informations manquantes. Cette approche est à\néviter autant que possible.\n\n\n- La solution la plus transparente (et justifiée dans certains cas) serait de publier les données\nsur les dons accordées et reçus telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les sources de données,\nc’est-à-dire de montrer la différence, et d’expliquer cette dernière dans les métadonnées\n(notes de bas de page par exemple). Cette approche serait effectivement justifiée\n(et aurait l’avantage d’être transparente) quand l’écart en question est dû à des différences de\nchamps relatifs à ce qui est accordé et ce qui est reçu. Cette approche n’est pas retenue par\nle Département des statistiques pour sa base de données car il insiste sur l’absence de dons\nintergouvernementaux au niveau consolidé.\n\n\nSur la base de ces considérations, il est nécessaire de recourir à des artifices plus ou moins justifiés\nafin de traiter le déséquilibre en objet. Cela consisterait à traiter le résiduel comme un transfert non\nidentifié (282 au niveau des charges et au niveau des recettes). Une illustration de ce traitement est\nprésentée ci-dessous.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Transferts effectués par
l’État|Transferts reçus par les CTD|Ensemble|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|
**_Avant consolidation_ **
|\n|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|Charge : 1000
|\n|Charge de dons (233) : 1000|
Recette de dons (133) : 1000
|
Recette : 800|\n|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|
**_Après consolidation_**
|\n|Charge de dons (233) : 800
|
Recette de dons (133) : 800
|Charge de dons : 0
|\n|
Transferts divers (282) : 200
|
Ajustement :
-800|
Transferts divers (282) : 200
|\n|
Ajustement :
-800|
Ajustement :
-800|
Recette de dons : 0|\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.2117691040039, 61.68866729736328, 539.7882690429688, 187.5], "columns": 3, "rows": 7}, {"bbox": [72.2117691040039, 584.2193603515625, 539.7882690429688, 697.0196533203125], "columns": 3, "rows": 8}], "text": "Transfert de l’État vers les CTD Transferts effectués par Transferts reçus par les CTD Ensemble \n\n Transferts effectués par l’État Transferts reçus par les CTD Ensemble \n _Avant consolidation_ _Avant consolidation_ _Avant consolidation_ \n Charge de dons (233) : 1000 Recette de dons (133) : 1000 Charge : 1000 \n Charge de dons (233) : 1000 Recette de dons (133) : 1000 Recette : 1000 \n _Après consolidation_ _Après consolidation_ _Après consolidation_ \n Charge de dons (233) : 1000 Recette de dons (133) : 1000 Charge de dons : 0 \n Ajustement : -1000 Ajustement : -1000 Recette de dons : 0 \n\nQuand, dans les sources de données, le montant des dons reçus s’écarte de celui des dons\naccordés, la cause de la différence doit être recherchée. Si l’écart peut être attribué à une différence\nrelative au moment d’enregistrement, le résiduel peut être alors inclus avec les autres comptes à\npayer ou à recevoir.\n\nD’autres solutions plus ou moins arbitraires existent si l’origine de l’écart ne peut pas être identifiée :\n\n- Il est possible de ne pas publier ou de publier partiellement les informations sur les dons.\nCeci entraine souvent la nécessité de supprimer d’autres données afin de ne pas permettre à\nl’utilisateur de retrouver par différence les informations manquantes. Cette approche est à\néviter autant que possible.\n\n- La solution la plus transparente (et justifiée dans certains cas) serait de publier les données\nsur les dons accordées et reçus telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les sources de données,\nc’est-à-dire de montrer la différence, et d’expliquer cette dernière dans les métadonnées\n(notes de bas de page par exemple). Cette approche serait effectivement justifiée\n(et aurait l’avantage d’être transparente) quand l’écart en question est dû à des différences de\nchamps relatifs à ce qui est accordé et ce qui est reçu. Cette approche n’est pas retenue par\nle Département des statistiques pour sa base de données car il insiste sur l’absence de dons\nintergouvernementaux au niveau consolidé.\n\nSur la base de ces considérations, il est nécessaire de recourir à des artifices plus ou moins justifiés\nafin de traiter le déséquilibre en objet. Cela consisterait à traiter le résiduel comme un transfert non\nidentifié (282 au niveau des charges et au niveau des recettes). Une illustration de ce traitement est\nprésentée ci-dessous.\n\n Transferts effectués par l’État Transferts reçus par les CTD Ensemble \n\n _Avant consolidation_ _Avant consolidation_ _Avant consolidation_ \n Charge de dons (233) : 1000 Recette de dons (133) : 1000 Charge : 1000 \n Charge de dons (233) : 1000 Recette de dons (133) : 1000 Recette : 800 \n _Après consolidation_ _Après consolidation_ _Après consolidation_ \n Charge de dons (233) : 800 Recette de dons (133) : 800 Charge de dons : 0 \n Transferts divers (282) : 200 Ajustement : -800 Transferts divers (282) : 200 \n Ajustement : -800 Ajustement : -800 Recette de dons : 0 \n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 20", "text_characters": 2485}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Ce traitement permet d’éviter de faire apparaitre un montant autre que zéro au niveau de l’ensemble\nconsolidé. Dans le cas où le transfert reçu est plus important que le transfert effectué, la différence\npeut être attribuée au 1441 ou 1442.\n\n\n**Examen de la situation à Madagascar**\n\nAu préalable il est nécessaire de préciser que les données sur les transferts budgétaires effectués\nvers les CTD et les EPA sont exhaustives et couvrent l’ensemble des entités bénéficiaires alors que\nles données sur les transferts reçus ne concernent que les unités gérées par le Trésor (135 CTD sur\nun total de 1718 et 97 EPA sur un total d’environ 140). [9] La différence entre les deux flux de données\npeut raisonnablement être attribuée à cette différence de champ, même si d’autres facteurs peuvent\nrentrer en jeu (comme, par exemple, des différences relatives aux moments d’enregistrement).\n\n\n_Transferts budgétaires de l’État vers les CTD et les EPA_\n\n|Les transferts budgétaires ve Transferts|ers les CTD se décomposent Effectués|t comme suit (en milliers d’Ar Reçus|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**Transferts**
|**Effectués**
|**Reçus**
|\n|
Courants
|
97,771.72
|
21,460.31
|\n|
En capital
|
28,000.00
|
23,729.75
|\n|
**Total**
|
125,771.72|
45,190.06|\n\n\n\n- Les transferts budgétaires vers les EPA, quant à eux, se décomposent comme suit ( _en_\n\n|milliers d’Ariary) : Transferts|Effectués|Reçus|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**Transferts**
|**Effectués**
|**Reçus**
|\n|
Courants
|
90,862.34
|
64,818.95
|\n|
En capital
|
34,241.71
|
120,159.66
|\n|
**Total**
|
125,104.05|
184,978.61|\n\n\n\nLes différences observées sont généralement considérables et ne se prêtent donc pas à un exercice\nde consolidation sans au préalable connaitre l’origine des écarts constatés en vue de les redresser\néventuellement. Comme il a été déjà mentionné, les facteurs à prendre en considération\ncomprennent le champ des données, la base d’enregistrement et l’utilisation des comptes appropriés.\nIl faudra donc se familiariser avec les instructions comptables à respecter par les entités concernées,\nmais aussi s’assurer que les pratiques comptables sont bien conformes à aux instructions et normes.\n\n\n**Enregistrement des subventions aux EPA et CTD**\n\nLe schéma ci-dessous décrit l’enregistrement des transferts et subventions dans le tableau des OGT\net la comptabilité des destinataires.\n\n\n9 Cf. _Liste des établissement nationaux_, Ministère des Finances et du Budget, décembre 2018,\n[http://www.mef.gov.mg/assets/file/communique/324.pdf](http://www.mef.gov.mg/assets/file/communique/324.pdf) . Il existe aussi 28 Etablissements Publics à Caractère\nProfessionnel ou Culturel.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [108.19200134277344, 283.80474853515625, 503.8079833984375, 360.05963134765625], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}, {"bbox": [108.19200134277344, 388.36993408203125, 503.8079833984375, 465.05999755859375], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "Ce traitement permet d’éviter de faire apparaitre un montant autre que zéro au niveau de l’ensemble\nconsolidé. Dans le cas où le transfert reçu est plus important que le transfert effectué, la différence\npeut être attribuée au 1441 ou 1442.\n\nExamen de la situation à Madagascar\n\nAu préalable il est nécessaire de préciser que les données sur les transferts budgétaires effectués\nvers les CTD et les EPA sont exhaustives et couvrent l’ensemble des entités bénéficiaires alors que\nles données sur les transferts reçus ne concernent que les unités gérées par le Trésor (135 CTD sur\nun total de 1718 et 97 EPA sur un total d’environ 140). [9] La différence entre les deux flux de données\npeut raisonnablement être attribuée à cette différence de champ, même si d’autres facteurs peuvent\nrentrer en jeu (comme, par exemple, des différences relatives aux moments d’enregistrement).\n\n_Transferts budgétaires de l’État vers les CTD et les EPA_\n\n Les transferts budgétaires ve Transferts ers les CTD se décomposent Effectués t comme suit (en milliers d’Ar Reçus \n\n Transferts Effectués Reçus \n Courants 97,771.72 21,460.31 \n En capital 28,000.00 23,729.75 \n Total 125,771.72 45,190.06 \n\n- Les transferts budgétaires vers les EPA, quant à eux, se décomposent comme suit ( _en_\n\n milliers d’Ariary) : Transferts Effectués Reçus \n\n Transferts Effectués Reçus \n Courants 90,862.34 64,818.95 \n En capital 34,241.71 120,159.66 \n Total 125,104.05 184,978.61 \n\nLes différences observées sont généralement considérables et ne se prêtent donc pas à un exercice\nde consolidation sans au préalable connaitre l’origine des écarts constatés en vue de les redresser\néventuellement. Comme il a été déjà mentionné, les facteurs à prendre en considération\ncomprennent le champ des données, la base d’enregistrement et l’utilisation des comptes appropriés.\nIl faudra donc se familiariser avec les instructions comptables à respecter par les entités concernées,\nmais aussi s’assurer que les pratiques comptables sont bien conformes à aux instructions et normes.\n\nEnregistrement des subventions aux EPA et CTD\n\nLe schéma ci-dessous décrit l’enregistrement des transferts et subventions dans le tableau des OGT\net la comptabilité des destinataires.\n\n9 Cf. _Liste des établissement nationaux_, Ministère des Finances et du Budget, décembre 2018,\nhttp://www.mef.gov.mg/assets/file/communique/324.pdf . Il existe aussi 28 Etablissements Publics à Caractère\nProfessionnel ou Culturel.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 21", "text_characters": 2136}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "**Schéma d'Enregistrement d'une Subvention**\n\n\nLe schéma ci-dessous présent un schéma d'enregistrement des subventions budgétaires au profit des collectivités territoriales\ndécentralisées (qui s'appliquerait aussi aux EPA) ainsi que les dépenses que ces subventions entrainent. Un schéma de l'enregistrement\ndes recettes et dépenses propres des CTD est aussi présenté. Il serait souhaitable que la DE confirme ou infirme la compréhension de la\nmission et, en cas de confirmation, que ce schéma soit précisé en fournissant le nom et numéro des comptes utilisés. Au cas où le schéma\nprésenté ne correspondrait pas aux pratiques comptables en vigueur, prière de décrire celles-ci.\n\n\nDeux situations sont examinées respectivement dans la comptabilité du Trésor et celle d'un CTD hypothétique\n(Cf. ci-dessous la description des opérations) :\n\n\n - L'enregistrement de subventions budgétaires aux CTD suivi par l'utilisation de ces subventions sous forme de dépenses : les\nidentifiants 1E, 2E et 3E correspondent aux différentes étapes de l'enregistrement dans la comptabilité du Trésor (E faisant\nréférence à l'État). Les identifiants 2C et 3C correspondent aux différentes étapes de l'enregistrement dans la comptabilité de la\ncollectivité.\n\n - L'enregistrement, en rouge, des recettes propres des CTD et des dépenses éventuelles. L'enregistrement des recettes et dépenses\nsont identifiées 4C et 5C dans la comptabilité de la collectivité et par 4E et 5E dans la comptabilité du Trésor.\n\n\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Schéma d'Enregistrement d'une Subvention\n\nLe schéma ci-dessous présent un schéma d'enregistrement des subventions budgétaires au profit des collectivités territoriales\ndécentralisées (qui s'appliquerait aussi aux EPA) ainsi que les dépenses que ces subventions entrainent. Un schéma de l'enregistrement\ndes recettes et dépenses propres des CTD est aussi présenté. Il serait souhaitable que la DE confirme ou infirme la compréhension de la\nmission et, en cas de confirmation, que ce schéma soit précisé en fournissant le nom et numéro des comptes utilisés. Au cas où le schéma\nprésenté ne correspondrait pas aux pratiques comptables en vigueur, prière de décrire celles-ci.\n\nDeux situations sont examinées respectivement dans la comptabilité du Trésor et celle d'un CTD hypothétique\n(Cf. ci-dessous la description des opérations) :\n\n - L'enregistrement de subventions budgétaires aux CTD suivi par l'utilisation de ces subventions sous forme de dépenses : les\nidentifiants 1E, 2E et 3E correspondent aux différentes étapes de l'enregistrement dans la comptabilité du Trésor (E faisant\nréférence à l'État). Les identifiants 2C et 3C correspondent aux différentes étapes de l'enregistrement dans la comptabilité de la\ncollectivité.\n\n - L'enregistrement, en rouge, des recettes propres des CTD et des dépenses éventuelles. L'enregistrement des recettes et dépenses\nsont identifiées 4C et 5C dans la comptabilité de la collectivité et par 4E et 5E dans la comptabilité du Trésor.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 22", "text_characters": 1328}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-095-fig-p0024-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n**Description des Enregistrements**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Enregistrement d'une subvention budgétaire|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|
**1 **
|
Une subvention budgétaire est enregistrée au profit de la collectivité. Dans les comptes du Trésor, un compte de charge est débité par le
crédit d'un compte de correspondant au profit de la collectivité.
|\n|**2E**
|
Le paiement effectif de la subvention est constaté par un débit au compte de correspondant et un crédit au compte de dépôt de la
collectivité (correspondant). Aucun mouvement de caisse est nécessaire.
|\n|**2C**
|
Dans sa comptabilité, la collectivité constate la subvention à recevoir en créditant un compte de recettes budgétaire et débitant un compte
à recevoir.
|\n|**3E**
|
La dépense par la collectivité donne lieu, dans la comptabilité du Trésor, à un débit au compte de correspondant et à un crédit à un
compte financier (caisse).
|\n|**3C**
|
Dans sa comptabilité, la collectivité enregistre une dépense au débit d'un compte de dépense budgétaire (charge par exemple) et un
crédit à son compte au Trésor.
|\n|
**Enregistrement d'une recette propre à la collectivité et dépense (en rouge)**
|
**Enregistrement d'une recette propre à la collectivité et dépense (en rouge)**
|\n|
**4C**
|
Dans la comptabilité de la collectivité, l'encaissement d'une recette propre donne lieu à un crédit à un compte de recette budgétaire et un
débit au compte de dépôt au Trésor
|\n|**4E**|
Dans la comptabilité du Trésor, l'encaissement de la recette de la collectivité donne lieu à un débit au compte caisse. L'engagement du
Trésor vis-à-vis de la collectivité est constaté par un crédit au compte de correspondant.|\n\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.40916442871094, 330.239990234375, 720.0908203125, 518.9600219726562], "columns": 2, "rows": 9}], "text": "Description des Enregistrements\n\n Enregistrement d'une subvention budgétaire Col2 \n\n 1 Une subvention budgétaire est enregistrée au profit de la collectivité. Dans les comptes du Trésor, un compte de charge est débité par le crédit d'un compte de correspondant au profit de la collectivité. \n 2E Le paiement effectif de la subvention est constaté par un débit au compte de correspondant et un crédit au compte de dépôt de la collectivité (correspondant). Aucun mouvement de caisse est nécessaire. \n 2C Dans sa comptabilité, la collectivité constate la subvention à recevoir en créditant un compte de recettes budgétaire et débitant un compte à recevoir. \n 3E La dépense par la collectivité donne lieu, dans la comptabilité du Trésor, à un débit au compte de correspondant et à un crédit à un compte financier (caisse). \n 3C Dans sa comptabilité, la collectivité enregistre une dépense au débit d'un compte de dépense budgétaire (charge par exemple) et un crédit à son compte au Trésor. \n Enregistrement d'une recette propre à la collectivité et dépense (en rouge) Enregistrement d'une recette propre à la collectivité et dépense (en rouge) \n 4C Dans la comptabilité de la collectivité, l'encaissement d'une recette propre donne lieu à un crédit à un compte de recette budgétaire et un débit au compte de dépôt au Trésor \n 4E Dans la comptabilité du Trésor, l'encaissement de la recette de la collectivité donne lieu à un débit au compte caisse. L'engagement du Trésor vis-à-vis de la collectivité est constaté par un crédit au compte de correspondant. \n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 23", "text_characters": 1363}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|5C|La dépense, comme précédemment, donne lieu à un débit à un compte de dépense budgétaire et un crédit au compte du Trésor de la
collectivité.|\n|---|---|\n|**5E**
|
Dans la comptabilité de l'État, la dépense de la collectivité locale est enregistrée par un débit au compte de correspondant et un crédit au
compte caisse.
|\n\n\nseulement.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.24000549316406, 72.239990234375, 719.760009765625, 119.27998352050781], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}], "text": "5C La dépense, comme précédemment, donne lieu à un débit à un compte de dépense budgétaire et un crédit au compte du Trésor de la collectivité. \n\n 5E Dans la comptabilité de l'État, la dépense de la collectivité locale est enregistrée par un débit au compte de correspondant et un crédit au compte caisse. \n\nseulement.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 24", "text_characters": 335}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**APPENDICE B. FICHIERS PREPARES PENDANT LA MISSION**\n\n\n**1.** Deux fichiers d’établissement des SFP pour les EPA comprenant :\n\n- Un fichier de correspondance entre la nomenclature comptable des EPA et les\nclassifications _du MSFP 2014_, **NEW CORRESP EPA.XLSX** ;\n\n- Un fichier de traitement des données-sources et de remplissage des tableaux statistiques\npour les opérations des EPA, **SFP EPA 2021 VM.xls** .\n\n**2.** Deux fichiers d’établissement des SFP pour les CTD comprenant :\n\n- Un fichier de correspondance entre la nomenclature comptable des CTD et les\nclassifications _du MSFP 2014_, **NEW CORRESP.xlsx** ;\n\n- Un fichier de traitement des données-sources et de remplissage des tableaux statistiques\npour les opérations des **SFP PCOP CTD 2021VM.xlsx.**\n\n**3** . Un fichier d’établissement des SFP pour la CNaPS : **SFP CNAPSBAL 2021.xlsx.** La\nbalance utilisée dans ce fichier est complétée par des ventilations détaillées extraites des états\nfinanciers dans le fichier intermédiaire **CNAPS BALANCE 2021 2.xlsx.**\n\n\n- Feuille BALANCE: la transcription en Excel de la balance des comptes pour 2021 de la\nCNaPS obtenue sur support PDF.\n\n- Feuille CORRESPONDANCE : La correspondance entre la nomenclature de la balance et\nles catégories du MSFP 2024.\n\n- Feuille BALANCE ETATS FIN : Un tableau de travail destiné à établir des correspondances\nentre la balance et les états financiers en vue de compléter la balance par des ventilations\ndétaillées. Ce sont ces ventilations qui ont été recopiées dans la feuille SOURCE du fichier\n**SFP CNAPSBAL 2021.xlsx** .\n\n\n**4** . Un fichier de d’établissement des données des OGT comprenant une feuille de traitement\ndes données des OGT et des feuilles de remplissage des tableaux statistiques, **Tableau de**\n**passage OGT SFP 2021 2.xlsx.**\n\n\n**5.** Un fichier **CONSOLIDATION 2.xlsx** qui rassemble des SFP des différents sous-secteurs en\nvue de leur consolidation. Étant donné les écarts entre flux intergouvernementaux (Cf. plus haut\ndans le texte), la consolidation n’a pas été effectuée et a été remplacée simplement par une\nagrégation.\n\n\nFMI | Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques | 25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-095", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "APPENDICE B. FICHIERS PREPARES PENDANT LA MISSION\n\n1. Deux fichiers d’établissement des SFP pour les EPA comprenant :\n\n- Un fichier de correspondance entre la nomenclature comptable des EPA et les\nclassifications _du MSFP 2014_, NEW CORRESP EPA.XLSX ;\n\n- Un fichier de traitement des données-sources et de remplissage des tableaux statistiques\npour les opérations des EPA, SFP EPA 2021 VM.xls .\n\n2. Deux fichiers d’établissement des SFP pour les CTD comprenant :\n\n- Un fichier de correspondance entre la nomenclature comptable des CTD et les\nclassifications _du MSFP 2014_, NEW CORRESP.xlsx ;\n\n- Un fichier de traitement des données-sources et de remplissage des tableaux statistiques\npour les opérations des SFP PCOP CTD 2021VM.xlsx.\n\n3 . Un fichier d’établissement des SFP pour la CNaPS : SFP CNAPSBAL 2021.xlsx. La\nbalance utilisée dans ce fichier est complétée par des ventilations détaillées extraites des états\nfinanciers dans le fichier intermédiaire CNAPS BALANCE 2021 2.xlsx.\n\n- Feuille BALANCE: la transcription en Excel de la balance des comptes pour 2021 de la\nCNaPS obtenue sur support PDF.\n\n- Feuille CORRESPONDANCE : La correspondance entre la nomenclature de la balance et\nles catégories du MSFP 2024.\n\n- Feuille BALANCE ETATS FIN : Un tableau de travail destiné à établir des correspondances\nentre la balance et les états financiers en vue de compléter la balance par des ventilations\ndétaillées. Ce sont ces ventilations qui ont été recopiées dans la feuille SOURCE du fichier\nSFP CNAPSBAL 2021.xlsx .\n\n4 . Un fichier de d’établissement des données des OGT comprenant une feuille de traitement\ndes données des OGT et des feuilles de remplissage des tableaux statistiques, Tableau de\npassage OGT SFP 2021 2.xlsx.\n\n5. Un fichier CONSOLIDATION 2.xlsx qui rassemble des SFP des différents sous-secteurs en\nvue de leur consolidation. Étant donné les écarts entre flux intergouvernementaux (Cf. plus haut\ndans le texte), la consolidation n’a pas été effectuée et a été remplacée simplement par une\nagrégation.\n\nFMI Rapport technique — République de Madagascar Statistiques de finances publiques 25", "text_characters": 1766}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..73441cb5ff6dd92ba98f55cf6c58eed746e7ddd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e72574383df98255c89ddc71b8e897fbfee66f6f573647225ec00e311d479eb7
+size 178985
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a59234e25528d1c5af702b091abba2224b1b0990
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88a0cf71d756aefeafed8c511eeb6eed69482f68966da4bbf10def9599d4367f
+size 3832
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48176e7182d1fba6d838a823980f6ba2e06456a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d64308d3cb3d579d8f75676da870d15fcc2bfcbc7aa37cf83cf8b9bce32d0368
+size 1368
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4222855d83f95a95266bb5fcef16833e4230d033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:300d3d880f4dee3785b39b6ea69deca1b0a973a480649822f2e74a7cee6896bd
+size 1441
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..295b73fce417fdaa4b20ecd03dcc0ffd95ffa1f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:285347b635e7194f29dd0ed3877c2df8c9deba494e9c8c23836496143123287c
+size 5859
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e12066ab1a835f9d48a4ff8f2108916bda6ff64e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d9bf8f8ab69b20290a4ddf01cdfe2495ee1cecb578dd25a6ada52c91ddc11454
+size 2841
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e35d7ae72cde0281a7123f8bfc07d0456c2c439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fd23e327c2d232d81358de07c5d0e66083b36edd329810b6def566b7cdf45e83
+size 933
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d1a6e4adbff5a77f065ffd6721890859f969d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dc26011404190a86224cd50c8e54144e355467163655469886fd5f1391fa7c86
+size 2436
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-008.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-008.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2c57ae0cd8b9edeff29ac212cc9542cab38ac479
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-008.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:568b50767c2178e259304f993344b152aa76de8d58348fe255be3007de2c7b69
+size 3377
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-009.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-009.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7b20bfbe8ac228cd9bf6bd01ae6ea6afecec506f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-009.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:193a5d97eb4ac8de1ff311b624c12000e94e8ae6fa3f4c32b5f216494775a494
+size 4814
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-010.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-010.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3889e4f8e4cb707fe13ed360484b3efe66f2640e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-010.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e5e600b24fbbfcf09799fcc7db27dd94a51926c73b4a1b01c3f9008c3e83dbde
+size 5122
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-011.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-011.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcf49452f3a51097dd1140d3157b8ee946718cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-011.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ea49a0e063110b2158fe34322372f8f406685116f9933bb5688fefc29a2421da
+size 5329
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-012.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-012.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b1429d79f72fa127968e4a888ab36711fc1cf1c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-012.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:47559f93ed6062460af6ea4ce7428435c42c612253325aea1c530ad02035fdbf
+size 1044
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-013.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-013.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1eb350b5dcd6b53457ffb7fae7cabe135c2b55e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-013.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:40e18f26b775a705b16c9875460d00ecbc8ad1b8ae90af837ae52f69c0aa855f
+size 8701
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-014.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-014.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5ac45a312a2eff5a69158b03f009bda753cda11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-014.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0d003d092262c5d939d69da7884afa337b06d24baffc3fd9eec954a2cb764150
+size 1233
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-015.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-015.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e400b4b0f2bb1269d6363cf0c5ecba3cf4dc32df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-015.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:27c6b066fe13a9336888c3acc3f475700e58fb111b81184b04fb87f6c313dfe7
+size 3886
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-016.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-016.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..df4097b3e36c0217902226faf0608bbf7bf185fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-016.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:db6c902de5416d24c36e9c27ec4a66a002851913e6a66002a4e314d8942de80d
+size 2000
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-017.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-017.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d427714559f4d0315ed902c9dc165e9d5558c1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-017.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5ea8d7ea525d218bb79c05b2fe4febd2ff6eb3544f5f9519d66d8fc377faa5e0
+size 3762
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-018.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-018.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3bcd04738170147f90c9ca4b0019ed624899710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-018.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9dd88a9c19033224426aacd9dcf69fb194d04587127bad0c41927cbf38825270
+size 3275
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-019.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-019.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bdd010c6723ed7735224989c9eb5589ec530d2b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-019.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:885a1b2d7c0cec791f5ab0d4e0d455ef9f5ce2ee8d6f569a744bb77594b046dc
+size 1341
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-020.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-020.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f8b8bed93ded1b7817430879e010a58458c3e443
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-020.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0c09a6c932a04106a6592dbf1db85b810d3064097f720ca189844d709f72b81b
+size 961
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-021.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-021.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f094631ef87991d208bf8e80ea3103308fff5a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-021.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5605365aa1f9fa0ccff27a6a2efac446feed14ad267b36de22e16ca3dc796dd0
+size 3687
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-022.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-022.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd728daa41b082b2564d7085f71ed4a4375cdbeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-022.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:869801645f8108ea71494fe95a6a012eb3c629c36efc79de82995822b9d8b793
+size 4413
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-023.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-023.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..267c3845c95cd8bb9b6005405729a1de2e084427
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-023.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e613d837fb55f701b665f8533ab480c3ecc1e442b93f35f236217ab8ab2d3c13
+size 2648
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-024.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-024.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d2183261fac7e0443e7dd811cef0eed858ad9946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-024.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:09ae250073f354e2c98ff56c356a5e726ca702cf283188f0f39a2bc287046ea9
+size 2863
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-025.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-025.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2f04facf6d4ee9b1d9c8d0e1e967670f21e11d93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-025.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0b9d75152af6fbad312f6e0e6840c1cf1b18949f87772218930e024935cd9abe
+size 2401
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-026.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-026.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dddfc8bdadea15637d6e33d8e0f4cc2a4013c119
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-026.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c90e4866dc0fe70ee2d8644cd9afc587b5b40b5d2fba75a19f69c6d97c58334
+size 7225
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-027.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-027.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3a1e8d8ac89874a5ba21ffcb699fcc427155118e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-027.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c9fc3c107a616878fc3aebc4cca3c0ee639de8d9649e8c0c5a1edc1e96ae0eea
+size 10931
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-028.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-028.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..906804ae2acda16d834460617cab4db1efda98bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-028.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:06d2cd794bd3f06ec3e08f1906b0b4f7437442f43859880a65bb27cfeadbb75d
+size 5684
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-029.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-029.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..64ae7318d6098070d91e97cbc2f8faadf299a88c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-029.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f842b137d2736dba1c8d0b372b47be808b0feca85fefd0511fdfb3cb486c5f04
+size 291561
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..269d42ebfa94e9cd1fa42047dc2d9a471e415d73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-096",
+ "title": "St. Kitts and Nevis: Technical Assistance Report-Strengthening Core Business Functions Audit Capacity (RTAT)",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-096.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "7ffd4372d7a089f0d8f978ce8f1acb69cd7d73d5a4e8dcdbc257cb565b3411bb",
+ "source_bytes": 421995,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/02/22/st-530071",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:05+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 3.251,
+ "page_count": 10,
+ "text_characters": 14532,
+ "table_count": 0,
+ "figure_count": 31,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "ST. KITTS AND NEVIS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––STRENGTHENING CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS AUDIT CAPACITY (RTAT)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Table of Contents"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Acronyms and Abbreviations"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Executive Summary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Main Findings"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Agreed Next Steps"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 10,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Appendix"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "St. Kitts and Nevis: Technical Assistance Report-Strengthening Core Business Functions Audit Capacity (RTAT); IMF Country Report No. 23/96; April 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "Strengthening audit capacity \r\n",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20220629075201-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230222110228-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0ddca48c295d353959281dee952441f6a68a3f4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+
+
+
+
+February 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/96**
+### **ST. KITTS AND NEVIS**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––STRENGTHENING** **CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS AUDIT CAPACITY (RTAT)**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on St. Kitts and Nevis was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in April 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+##### **Table of Contents**
+
+**Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................2**
+
+
+**Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................3**
+
+
+**Main Findings ...................................................................................................................................4**
+
+
+Introduction .............................................................................................................................4
+
+
+Training of the Financial Sector Audit Team .................................................................................4
+
+
+Review of several returns and drafting an Audit Program................................................................4
+
+
+Effects of Covid-19 ...................................................................................................................5
+
+
+Profile Meetings .......................................................................................................................5
+
+
+**Agreed Next Steps ............................................................................................................................6**
+
+
+**Appendix ..........................................................................................................................................7**
+
+
+Appendix I. List of Training Topics ..............................................................................................7
+
+
+DM# 7256828
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 1
+
+
+
+##### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**
+
+CARTAC Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre
+
+
+CD Capacity Development
+
+
+IRD St. Kitts and Nevis’ Inland Revenue Division
+
+
+RTAT Regional Tax Audit Team Training Program
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 2
+
+
+
+##### **Executive Summary**
+
+In response to a request from the St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division (IRD), CARTAC provided capacity
+development (CD) in strengthening audit capacity under the Regional Tax Audit Team (RTAT) training program.
+
+
+The main objective of this CD was to strengthen capacity to audit and verify accuracy of reporting by taxpayers in
+the Financial Sector. The CD started with the provision of five days of training of IRD auditors where the purpose
+was to prepare the authorities to implement the necessary actions in adopting good practice in auditing the
+Financial Sector. The training included (i) an overview of the financial sector and business processes; (ii)
+assistance to the auditors to develop a better understanding of the various financial products/instruments; (iii)
+guidance in auditing the banks and insurance companies; and (iv) awareness of the key tax risks within this sector.
+The training also included reviewing of financial statements and tax returns for several banks and insurance
+companies, developed an audit schedule and provided guidance preparing audit notification letters.
+
+
+The CD was delivered in a series of short targeted virtual interactions with IRD staff during the period from
+November 15, 2021 to April 20, 2022.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 3
+
+
+
+##### **Main Findings**
+
+**Introduction**
+
+
+The purpose of the CD was to strengthen the capacity of the St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division (IRD) to
+audit and manage compliance within the financial sector. Auditors were trained on techniques and methods for
+auditing financial institutions and were introduced to the concept of starting a program of profile meetings and
+cooperative compliance within the sector. These meetings would give the auditors more insight and knowledge
+
+of the sector and its operations. The CD also provided advice to the IRD auditors on specific issues they have
+come across in performing audits in the sector. Due to the suspension of travel because of the COVID -19
+pandemic, the mission was carried out remotely. The mode of delivery included emails and remote training using
+Teams which involved shared video presentations and chat. The training topics presented are listed in Appendix
+1.
+
+
+**Training of the Financial Sector Audit Team**
+
+
+The Financial Sector Audit Team attended all of the training sessions, five days in total. Training was provided
+on a number of issues related to the financial sector (see Appendix 1) and in particular IRD received the
+following:
+
+
+(i) an overview of the Financial Sector industry;
+(ii) an insight into how a financial institution records transactions;
+(iii) how these transactions are reflected in the profit and loss account and the balance sheet;
+(iv) guidance on how to carry out an audit on a financial institution, including how to prepare for the
+audit;
+(v) an outline of the key risks in this sector; and
+(vi) how to establish key controls that should be in place within an institution, which may give the IRD
+guidance regarding the details provided in the accounts.
+
+
+The attendees were presented with documentation supporting each area covered, including a template for an
+audit test work sheet.
+
+
+In addition to the above, the training provided the auditors with;
+
+(i) techniques to help develop audit test schedules;
+(ii) understanding of the various financial products (e.g. futures, options, derivatives etc.) offered by
+financial institutions;
+(iii) an understanding of how a bank or insurance company would calculate and book any profit or loss
+on the provision of these services; and
+(iv) the importance of a program of profile meetings in bringing a deeper understanding of the sector
+and its operations.
+
+
+**Review of several returns and drafting an Audit Program**
+
+
+IRD auditors were assisted in reviewing a number of audit cases. This assistance helped in resolving issues that
+the auditors had discovered during previous audits. In particular, some of the issues discussed were:
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 4
+
+
+
+(i) the operation of withholding tax;
+(ii) helping the auditors overcome their lack of experience and understanding banking operations
+and their IT systems;
+(iii) uncertainty on what sample size should be used for effective audit testing; and
+(iv) application of VAT on leasing.
+
+The St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division auditors presented four tax returns which were reviewed. A
+number of potential tax issues were identified, and the expert worked together with the IRD audit team to develop
+audit schedules and audit letters for each of the two companies. This exercise gave the audit team valuable insight
+into the financial sector and the processes within this industry. This process allowed the IRD financial sector
+auditors to;
+
+(i) identify potential tax risks for these two companies and the industry as a whole;
+(ii) draft a set of audit test schedules for these companies, which will also be applicable to other
+companies within this sector;
+(iii) develop a list of potential tax issues for the audit team to discuss with these banks;
+(iv) obtain an understanding of the issues and transaction(s) identified;
+(v) understand the accounting and tax treatment adopted by the banks and also understand the tax
+implications of this treatment; and
+(vi) decide on whether to initiate an audit on some (accounting) issues or accept the account and tax
+treatment adopted by the taxpayer.
+
+
+**Effects of Covid-19**
+
+
+The CD raised awareness of the auditors on the effect of COVID-19 on the banks **.** These includes:
+
+(i) how a number of banks were helping the cash flow of companies by granting “repayment
+holidays” and how this would affect their interest income;
+(ii) how banks would have to potentially upwardly adjust their level of bad debt provisions; and
+(iii) how the IRD would have to establish the way the adjustments are reflected in the annual accounts
+and anticipate lesser revenue from the sector.
+
+The CD also raised awareness on how the insurance sector is impacted by COVID-19. It highlighted that, within
+the insurance industry, companies may have had to return some of their premium income to the policy holders
+because the level of risk covered was reduced as a result of the economic downturn. This also makes it important
+that IRD establishes how this reduced premium income is reflected in the accounts of insurers. It is imperative
+that this reduction in premiums is also reflected in the accounts of the insured, especially if it is claimable as
+deduction from taxable income.
+
+
+**Profile Meetings**
+
+
+The concept of “Profile Meetings”, in which the audit team would arrange an annual meeting with the companies
+in the financial sector, was discussed. Profile Meetings are an informal information gathering process with
+companies, which allows IRD to collect information about companies and get details and understanding on some
+key transactions outside the audit forum. These meetings would provide the St. Kitts and Nevis Financial Sector
+Audit Team with an opportunity to discuss with the banks their business operations, key transactions recorded on
+the returns, the bank’s future plans and to gain an understanding of key issues within the bank’s annual accounts
+and get an overview of the controls in place within a company. These meetings will enhance the IRD’s compliance
+risk management processes and complement the current work on identifying key risks within each company and
+build risk profiles. The IRD has been encouraged to set up a program of Profile Meetings with a number of financial
+sector companies as well as companies from other industries.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 5
+
+
+
+##### **Agreed Next Steps**
+
+The IRD will build on this training and CD when designing future audit program. Given the importance of Financial
+Sector in St. Kitts and Nevis, further support to ensure compliance in the sector would be beneficial. The IRD will
+need further assistance to strengthen the audit program of the Financial Sector and support to review of tax returns
+of the companies in that sector. As a first step the audit team should, develop a program of profile meetings to
+gather relevant information on the operations of various businesses in the sector.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 6
+
+
+
+##### **Appendix**
+
+**Appendix I. List of Training Topics**
+
+
+1 Introduction into the World of Banking
+
+
+2 Overview of the Financial Sector (Banking, Insurance, Treasury and Lending)
+
+
+3 Financial Instruments explained
+
+
+4 Concept of Transfer Pricing
+
+
+5 Inter-Company Charges
+
+
+6 Inter-Company Loans
+
+
+7 Leasing
+
+
+8 The Audit Function
+
+ - Planning an audit (sources of information available)
+
+ - Performing the audit (the different types of audits)
+
+ - Finalizing / Closing the audit
+
+ - The Audit Report
+
+9 Fee / Commission Income
+
+
+10 Cost of Equity / Tier 1 Capital
+
+
+11 Bad Debt Provisions / Bad Debts
+
+
+12 Accounting for Provisions
+
+
+13 Accounting Standard IFRS 9
+
+
+14 Foreign Tax credits
+
+
+15 Group Relief
+
+
+16 Life Assurance & General Insurance
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 7
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..da88ab3e5c77e1500c210a5de702c4195880e026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "697631c185302073", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1239, "page": 2, "phash_256": "df415b41df01432f43efd06f58797878d869487c486f4b0f43a8df219f035b41", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "e72574383df98255c89ddc71b8e897fbfee66f6f573647225ec00e311d479eb7", "width": 950}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "34a1a464cc848480", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-001", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d4cacc484b3439a5b5cabfc0f48033183b9c3bc43fcab631c238c4bccdfc4b67", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "88a0cf71d756aefeafed8c511eeb6eed69482f68966da4bbf10def9599d4367f", "width": 105}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "92ca76baba76ead2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-002", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8955e2226222b9ccb88c4e635e23738877888ce31de26338777879ce7dde9633", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "d64308d3cb3d579d8f75676da870d15fcc2bfcbc7aa37cf83cf8b9bce32d0368", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f1f1e96969e9f9f1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-003", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9a61799a99a686656799699e6666666519679999679961966196666664e69999", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "300d3d880f4dee3785b39b6ea69deca1b0a973a480649822f2e74a7cee6896bd", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5230696d69697032", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-004", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "de7f64c679a793366796649966589a669669699a0c67999e1a661319099664ce", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "285347b635e7194f29dd0ed3877c2df8c9deba494e9c8c23836496143123287c", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "553333f0e8b0b292", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-005", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "99857e667d99966b661991f69a65599f65a69699668679e51866961966818619", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "d9bf8f8ab69b20290a4ddf01cdfe2495ee1cecb578dd25a6ada52c91ddc11454", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a09292a282828282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-006", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d015703f78aa8f170fbf841f083f6fe06fc0cfc06fe02faa801f083f0c3f841f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "fd23e327c2d232d81358de07c5d0e66083b36edd329810b6def566b7cdf45e83", "width": 91}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b2b28ecc8cccb2b2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-007", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "911619b719b6e64ce64c19b3e659e4c61966e79be798186d1865e69ce6981963", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "dc26011404190a86224cd50c8e54144e355467163655469886fd5f1391fa7c86", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-008.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "54d468b2b268c454", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-008", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d5df6e8127886874689f9e671f42c1e1c29da56785666859c8797e0626663fa1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "568b50767c2178e259304f993344b152aa76de8d58348fe255be3007de2c7b69", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-009.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "23a42c6e7c8c120a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-009", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d449e44b689608b419e0ef40368835c91dee1ff437b06b1c491ec6ff6f7b2331", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "193a5d97eb4ac8de1ff311b624c12000e94e8ae6fa3f4c32b5f216494775a494", "width": 120}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-010.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4a4a4c454ac8c81", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-010", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d4c4cc444b4b31eb29b697c331691cb41fcb39c334b5c35eec0eccb40b4a33bb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "e5e600b24fbbfcf09799fcc7db27dd94a51926c73b4a1b01c3f9008c3e83dbde", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-011.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "26a4a46454acac83", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-011", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d480cc44694411cb5dc3ffc03b08399c1dec3fe077b0e318c09ccffe6b7b3331", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "ea49a0e063110b2158fe34322372f8f406685116f9933bb5688fefc29a2421da", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-012.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a020d09020828080", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-012", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e04170013e0f9e0f1fbf03f8c1f003f89f1f9e0f7e0ff001f001700ffe0f1f3e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "47559f93ed6062460af6ea4ce7428435c42c612253325aea1c530ad02035fdbf", "width": 91}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-013.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "98c670989870c698", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-013", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "91157ef06222bd9831115e665c22a7912f1153e657c239792bf01cbe55fc3a77", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "40e18f26b775a705b16c9875460d00ecbc8ad1b8ae90af837ae52f69c0aa855f", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-014.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "908cb2b2aa8c9282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-014", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "986619a66799e659986699a667996659666699a619e6e6796699659919669866", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "0d003d092262c5d939d69da7884afa337b06d24baffc3fd9eec954a2cb764150", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-015.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a891a54e8c6a76ee", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-015", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d618c0c319a6f33c25e7af4b925838c36f982d3f7de885133576157c61412dbc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "27c6b066fe13a9336888c3acc3f475700e58fb111b81184b04fb87f6c313dfe7", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-016.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "52522a4c4c546868", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-016", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "f77566669998999966678666799e86196666999a59998986767e08615d9b2661", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "db6c902de5416d24c36e9c27ec4a66a002851913e6a66002a4e314d8942de80d", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-017.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "24a424648c8c9488", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-017", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "c44acc4048b439a53dc3bfc2f7803b183b9c3bcc3fc0b730e238c03cc4fccffe", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "5ea8d7ea525d218bb79c05b2fe4febd2ff6eb3544f5f9519d66d8fc377faa5e0", "width": 106}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-018.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2b96cc7171ec9633", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-018", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8445ff95e1115ee7786557bb569921ef55a7885f117f228500079ae900217fde", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "9dd88a9c19033224426aacd9dcf69fb194d04587127bad0c41927cbf38825270", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-019.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6868684c4c686868", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-019", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8616999959666666619966665866999e60e6de6670f9199978669b1978e9d999", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "885a1b2d7c0cec791f5ab0d4e0d455ef9f5ce2ee8d6f569a744bb77594b046dc", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-020.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "80aa94b2b2b28ca2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-020", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9991667966669996199b66616667d99999445e66659967991ae6996666996619", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "0c09a6c932a04106a6592dbf1db85b810d3064097f720ca189844d709f72b81b", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-021.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6aa4924aadb6daa9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-021", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "b81074205a188c205618ab204598aac475e8aafc65f6a2fb75f7aafb7575aafb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "5605365aa1f9fa0ccff27a6a2efac446feed14ad267b36de22e16ca3dc796dd0", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-022.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "27a4ac6c4ca4948a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-022", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d449c448693439b51b4bef40b69431c91de43ff46b58631cc09ccdffb6b13239", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "869801645f8108ea71494fe95a6a012eb3c629c36efc79de82995822b9d8b793", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-023.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4020104848102040", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-023", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ffff83c11ce0703e07ff9fc301e76418c03fbbe7030f4ff84041f0c62018447f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "e613d837fb55f701b665f8533ab480c3ecc1e442b93f35f236217ab8ab2d3c13", "width": 90}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-024.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6868686868f3ff68", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-024", "height": 56, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8f0f8fffb3e070028fef70304c4f93276cd0704a97274dd070628f9f71d08e69", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "09ae250073f354e2c98ff56c356a5e726ca702cf283188f0f39a2bc287046ea9", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-025.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d4b26d4c4c4db2d4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-025", "height": 65, "page": 3, "phash_256": "961e7967596126926596c33c661a98659667cccd9861349bc79a692579b99676", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "0b9d75152af6fbad312f6e0e6840c1cf1b18949f87772218930e024935cd9abe", "width": 96}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-026.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f0f47331b51310f", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-026", "height": 65, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ebfa663cb40591c2a53f9c0fc7e86734929660b8c652964c5919d9e39c473c67", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c90e4866dc0fe70ee2d8644cd9afc587b5b40b5d2fba75a19f69c6d97c58334", "width": 65}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-027.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f3371e8aaf17317", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-027", "height": 68, "page": 3, "phash_256": "aabece31bd53b0a2b42e835cb0f58d71d3c31c678b4d35addb642210cc83598f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "c9fc3c107a616878fc3aebc4cca3c0ee639de8d9649e8c0c5a1edc1e96ae0eea", "width": 73}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-028.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b3cecdae32a6a6cc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-028", "height": 68, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e466232622baec45f9be3862da49eb9f3c10f4aed2718e307f2efd10548e134a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "06d2cd794bd3f06ec3e08f1906b0b4f7437442f43859880a65bb27cfeadbb75d", "width": 61}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-096/assets/figures/cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-029.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "430b633b27661105", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-029", "height": 1320, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bfe04f52d09fa509667898e6c708f0ef905e670978e4c67039a5821fe07f3d8a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "sha256_normalized_png": "f842b137d2736dba1c8d0b372b47be808b0feca85fefd0511fdfb3cb486c5f04", "width": 1020}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-096/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..884fdf0428ffd2598314b9013796069f8519d4ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-096/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-096-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nFebruary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/96**\n### **ST. KITTS AND NEVIS**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––STRENGTHENING** **CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS AUDIT CAPACITY (RTAT)**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on St. Kitts and Nevis was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in April 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 1, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "February 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/96\nST. KITTS AND NEVIS\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––STRENGTHENING CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS AUDIT CAPACITY (RTAT)\n\nThis technical assistance report on St. Kitts and Nevis was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in April 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 609}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-096-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\nST. KITTS AND NEVIS\nStrengthening Core Business Functions\nAudit Capacity (RTAT)\n\n\nAPRIL 2022\n\n\n\nPrepared By\nMartin Roche\n\n\n\n\n\nMEMBERS\nAnguilla, St. Kitts and Nevis, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,\nCayman Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,\nSt. Maarten, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands\n\nPARTNERS\nCanada, United Kingdom, European Union, Netherlands, Mexico, Caribbean Development Bank , USAID,\nEastern Caribbean Central Bank", "text_characters": 522}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-001", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-002", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-003", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-004", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-005", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-006", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-007", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-008", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-009", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-010", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-011", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-012", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-013", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-014", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-015", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-016", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-017", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-018", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-019", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-020", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-021", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-022", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-023", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-024", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-025", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-026", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-027", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-028", "cr-2023-096-fig-p0003-029"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0053, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(229.9499969482422, 349.9700012207031, 301.95001220703125, 385.9700012207031)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 38, "size": 9624, "transform": [72.0, 0.0, -0.0, 36.0, 229.9499969482422, 349.9700012207031], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(64.19999694824219, 349.9700012207031, 136.1999969482422, 385.9700012207031)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 36, "size": 8643, "transform": [72.0, 0.0, -0.0, 36.0, 64.19999694824219, 349.9700012207031], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(147.14999389648438, 349.9700012207031, 219.14999389648438, 385.9700012207031)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 37, "size": 9060, "transform": [72.0, 0.0, -0.0, 36.0, 147.14999389648438, 349.9700012207031], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(392.0, 504.8900146484375, 464.0, 540.8900146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 52, "size": 6144, "transform": [72.0, 0.0, -0.0, 36.0, 392.0, 504.8900146484375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(68.69999694824219, 272.51300048828125, 131.35000610351562, 308.489990234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 93, "number": 30, "size": 5127, "transform": [62.650001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97700119018555, 68.69999694824219, 272.51300048828125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(315.4700012207031, 427.4230041503906, 378.1199951171875, 463.3999938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 93, "number": 45, "size": 6519, "transform": [62.650001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97700119018555, 315.4700012207031, 427.4230041503906], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(315.9700012207031, 272.5059814453125, 377.57000732421875, 308.489990234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 33, "size": 2271, "transform": [61.599998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98400115966797, 315.9700012207031, 272.5059814453125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(397.0, 272.5059814453125, 458.6000061035156, 308.489990234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 34, "size": 2943, "transform": [61.599998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98400115966797, 397.0, 272.5059814453125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(474.79998779296875, 272.5059814453125, 536.3999633789062, 308.489990234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 35, "size": 21609, "transform": [61.599998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98400115966797, 474.79998779296875, 272.5059814453125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(184.6999969482422, 629.5399780273438, 241.79800415039062, 668.239990234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 109, "number": 55, "size": 5343, "transform": [57.097999572753906, 0.0, -0.0, 38.70000076293945, 184.6999969482422, 629.5399780273438], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(152.4499969482422, 427.427978515625, 213.85000610351562, 463.39996337890625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 43, "size": 4983, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 152.4499969482422, 427.427978515625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(152.4499969482422, 504.88800048828125, 213.85000610351562, 540.8599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 49, "size": 2490, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 152.4499969482422, 504.88800048828125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(397.29998779296875, 349.968017578125, 458.6999816894531, 385.94000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 40, "size": 6960, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 397.29998779296875, 349.968017578125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(475.1000061035156, 349.968017578125, 536.5, 385.94000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 41, "size": 5724, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 475.1000061035156, 349.968017578125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(69.5, 427.427978515625, 130.89999389648438, 463.39996337890625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 42, "size": 8390, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 69.5, 427.427978515625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(397.29998779296875, 427.427978515625, 458.6999816894531, 463.39996337890625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 46, "size": 4353, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 397.29998779296875, 427.427978515625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(475.1000061035156, 427.427978515625, 536.5, 463.39996337890625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 47, "size": 4344, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 475.1000061035156, 427.427978515625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(235.25, 504.88800048828125, 296.6499938964844, 540.8599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 50, "size": 2226, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 235.25, 504.88800048828125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(316.2699890136719, 504.88800048828125, 377.66998291015625, 540.8599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 51, "size": 3456, "transform": [61.400001525878906, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97200012207031, 316.2699890136719, 504.88800048828125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(235.32000732421875, 427.4259948730469, 296.57000732421875, 463.4100036621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 44, "size": 4416, "transform": [61.25, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98400115966797, 235.32000732421875, 427.4259948730469], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(152.64999389648438, 272.510009765625, 213.64999389648438, 308.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 31, "size": 5163, "transform": [61.0, 0.0, -0.0, 35.9900016784668, 152.64999389648438, 272.510009765625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(252.64999389648438, 632.489990234375, 317.4110107421875, 665.5899658203125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 82, "number": 56, "size": 5739, "transform": [64.76100158691406, 0.0, -0.0, 33.099998474121094, 252.64999389648438, 632.489990234375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(238.82000732421875, 272.5119934082031, 293.07000732421875, 308.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 107, "number": 32, "size": 2688, "transform": [54.25, 0.0, -0.0, 35.987998962402344, 238.82000732421875, 272.5119934082031], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(319.9700012207031, 349.9700012207031, 373.9700012207031, 385.9700012207031)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 107, "number": 39, "size": 4347, "transform": [54.0, 0.0, -0.0, 36.0, 319.9700012207031, 349.9700012207031], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(73.19999694824219, 505.8809814453125, 127.14999389648438, 541.8599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 99, "number": 48, "size": 12507, "transform": [53.95000076293945, 0.0, -0.0, 35.979000091552734, 73.19999694824219, 505.8809814453125], "width": 149, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(511.8999938964844, 628.988037109375, 555.1500244140625, 669.0800170898438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 111, "number": 60, "size": 6539, "transform": [43.25, 0.0, -0.0, 40.09199905395508, 511.8999938964844, 628.988037109375], "width": 120, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(402.2699890136719, 629.5399780273438, 440.9700012207031, 668.239990234375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 130, "number": 58, "size": 20448, "transform": [38.70000076293945, 0.0, -0.0, 38.70000076293945, 402.2699890136719, 629.5399780273438], "width": 130, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(137.5500030517578, 628.989990234375, 173.89100646972656, 669.0899658203125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 115, "number": 54, "size": 21456, "transform": [36.340999603271484, 0.0, -0.0, 40.099998474121094, 137.5500030517578, 628.989990234375], "width": 105, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "DISCLAIMER\n\nThe contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff of the International Monetary Fund\n(IMF) to the authorities of St. Kitts and Nevis (the “TA recipient”) in response to their request for technical\nassistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and\nupon their request, to World Bank staff, and other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest, including members of the Steering Committee of CARTAC, unless the TA recipient specifically objects\nto such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance Information).\nPublication or Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside the IMF other\nthan agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, including members of the Steering Committee of CARTAC, shall require the\nexplicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.\n\n\nMEMBERS\n\n\n\n\n\n Anguilla St. Kitts and Aruba The Bahamas Barbados Belize\n Nevis\n\n\n\n\n\n Bermuda British Virgin Cayman Islands Curaçao Dominica Grenada\n Islands\n\n\n\n\n\n Guyana Haiti Jamaica Montserrat St. Kitts and St. Lucia\n Nevis\n\n\n\n\n\n St. Maarten St. Vincent and Suriname Trinidad and Turks and Caicos\n the Grenadines Tobago Islands\n\n\n\nPARTNERS\n\n\n\n\n\n Canada UK aid European Ministry of Secretaría de Caribbean USA AID Eastern\n Union Foreign Affairs Hacienda y Development Caribbean\n of the Crédito Bank Central\n Netherlands Público Bank\n Mexico", "text_characters": 1446}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Table of Contents**\n\n**Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................2**\n\n\n**Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................3**\n\n\n**Main Findings ...................................................................................................................................4**\n\n\nIntroduction .............................................................................................................................4\n\n\nTraining of the Financial Sector Audit Team .................................................................................4\n\n\nReview of several returns and drafting an Audit Program................................................................4\n\n\nEffects of Covid-19 ...................................................................................................................5\n\n\nProfile Meetings .......................................................................................................................5\n\n\n**Agreed Next Steps ............................................................................................................................6**\n\n\n**Appendix ..........................................................................................................................................7**\n\n\nAppendix I. List of Training Topics ..............................................................................................7\n\n\nDM# 7256828\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 1", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table of Contents\n\nAcronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................2\n\nExecutive Summary ..........................................................................................................................3\n\nMain Findings ...................................................................................................................................4\n\nIntroduction .............................................................................................................................4\n\nTraining of the Financial Sector Audit Team .................................................................................4\n\nReview of several returns and drafting an Audit Program................................................................4\n\nEffects of Covid-19 ...................................................................................................................5\n\nProfile Meetings .......................................................................................................................5\n\nAgreed Next Steps ............................................................................................................................6\n\nAppendix ..........................................................................................................................................7\n\nAppendix I. List of Training Topics ..............................................................................................7\n\nDM# 7256828\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 1", "text_characters": 1516}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**\n\nCARTAC Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre\n\n\nCD Capacity Development\n\n\nIRD St. Kitts and Nevis’ Inland Revenue Division\n\n\nRTAT Regional Tax Audit Team Training Program\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 2", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Acronyms and Abbreviations\n\nCARTAC Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre\n\nCD Capacity Development\n\nIRD St. Kitts and Nevis’ Inland Revenue Division\n\nRTAT Regional Tax Audit Team Training Program\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 2", "text_characters": 199}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Executive Summary**\n\nIn response to a request from the St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division (IRD), CARTAC provided capacity\ndevelopment (CD) in strengthening audit capacity under the Regional Tax Audit Team (RTAT) training program.\n\n\nThe main objective of this CD was to strengthen capacity to audit and verify accuracy of reporting by taxpayers in\nthe Financial Sector. The CD started with the provision of five days of training of IRD auditors where the purpose\nwas to prepare the authorities to implement the necessary actions in adopting good practice in auditing the\nFinancial Sector. The training included (i) an overview of the financial sector and business processes; (ii)\nassistance to the auditors to develop a better understanding of the various financial products/instruments; (iii)\nguidance in auditing the banks and insurance companies; and (iv) awareness of the key tax risks within this sector.\nThe training also included reviewing of financial statements and tax returns for several banks and insurance\ncompanies, developed an audit schedule and provided guidance preparing audit notification letters.\n\n\nThe CD was delivered in a series of short targeted virtual interactions with IRD staff during the period from\nNovember 15, 2021 to April 20, 2022.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Executive Summary\n\nIn response to a request from the St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division (IRD), CARTAC provided capacity\ndevelopment (CD) in strengthening audit capacity under the Regional Tax Audit Team (RTAT) training program.\n\nThe main objective of this CD was to strengthen capacity to audit and verify accuracy of reporting by taxpayers in\nthe Financial Sector. The CD started with the provision of five days of training of IRD auditors where the purpose\nwas to prepare the authorities to implement the necessary actions in adopting good practice in auditing the\nFinancial Sector. The training included (i) an overview of the financial sector and business processes; (ii)\nassistance to the auditors to develop a better understanding of the various financial products/instruments; (iii)\nguidance in auditing the banks and insurance companies; and (iv) awareness of the key tax risks within this sector.\nThe training also included reviewing of financial statements and tax returns for several banks and insurance\ncompanies, developed an audit schedule and provided guidance preparing audit notification letters.\n\nThe CD was delivered in a series of short targeted virtual interactions with IRD staff during the period from\nNovember 15, 2021 to April 20, 2022.\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 3", "text_characters": 1098}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Main Findings**\n\n**Introduction**\n\n\nThe purpose of the CD was to strengthen the capacity of the St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division (IRD) to\naudit and manage compliance within the financial sector. Auditors were trained on techniques and methods for\nauditing financial institutions and were introduced to the concept of starting a program of profile meetings and\ncooperative compliance within the sector. These meetings would give the auditors more insight and knowledge\n\nof the sector and its operations. The CD also provided advice to the IRD auditors on specific issues they have\ncome across in performing audits in the sector. Due to the suspension of travel because of the COVID -19\npandemic, the mission was carried out remotely. The mode of delivery included emails and remote training using\nTeams which involved shared video presentations and chat. The training topics presented are listed in Appendix\n1.\n\n\n**Training of the Financial Sector Audit Team**\n\n\nThe Financial Sector Audit Team attended all of the training sessions, five days in total. Training was provided\non a number of issues related to the financial sector (see Appendix 1) and in particular IRD received the\nfollowing:\n\n\n(i) an overview of the Financial Sector industry;\n(ii) an insight into how a financial institution records transactions;\n(iii) how these transactions are reflected in the profit and loss account and the balance sheet;\n(iv) guidance on how to carry out an audit on a financial institution, including how to prepare for the\naudit;\n(v) an outline of the key risks in this sector; and\n(vi) how to establish key controls that should be in place within an institution, which may give the IRD\nguidance regarding the details provided in the accounts.\n\n\nThe attendees were presented with documentation supporting each area covered, including a template for an\naudit test work sheet.\n\n\nIn addition to the above, the training provided the auditors with;\n\n(i) techniques to help develop audit test schedules;\n(ii) understanding of the various financial products (e.g. futures, options, derivatives etc.) offered by\nfinancial institutions;\n(iii) an understanding of how a bank or insurance company would calculate and book any profit or loss\non the provision of these services; and\n(iv) the importance of a program of profile meetings in bringing a deeper understanding of the sector\nand its operations.\n\n\n**Review of several returns and drafting an Audit Program**\n\n\nIRD auditors were assisted in reviewing a number of audit cases. This assistance helped in resolving issues that\nthe auditors had discovered during previous audits. In particular, some of the issues discussed were:\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Main Findings\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe purpose of the CD was to strengthen the capacity of the St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division (IRD) to\naudit and manage compliance within the financial sector. Auditors were trained on techniques and methods for\nauditing financial institutions and were introduced to the concept of starting a program of profile meetings and\ncooperative compliance within the sector. These meetings would give the auditors more insight and knowledge\n\nof the sector and its operations. The CD also provided advice to the IRD auditors on specific issues they have\ncome across in performing audits in the sector. Due to the suspension of travel because of the COVID -19\npandemic, the mission was carried out remotely. The mode of delivery included emails and remote training using\nTeams which involved shared video presentations and chat. The training topics presented are listed in Appendix\n1.\n\nTraining of the Financial Sector Audit Team\n\nThe Financial Sector Audit Team attended all of the training sessions, five days in total. Training was provided\non a number of issues related to the financial sector (see Appendix 1) and in particular IRD received the\nfollowing:\n\n(i) an overview of the Financial Sector industry;\n(ii) an insight into how a financial institution records transactions;\n(iii) how these transactions are reflected in the profit and loss account and the balance sheet;\n(iv) guidance on how to carry out an audit on a financial institution, including how to prepare for the\naudit;\n(v) an outline of the key risks in this sector; and\n(vi) how to establish key controls that should be in place within an institution, which may give the IRD\nguidance regarding the details provided in the accounts.\n\nThe attendees were presented with documentation supporting each area covered, including a template for an\naudit test work sheet.\n\nIn addition to the above, the training provided the auditors with;\n\n(i) techniques to help develop audit test schedules;\n(ii) understanding of the various financial products (e.g. futures, options, derivatives etc.) offered by\nfinancial institutions;\n(iii) an understanding of how a bank or insurance company would calculate and book any profit or loss\non the provision of these services; and\n(iv) the importance of a program of profile meetings in bringing a deeper understanding of the sector\nand its operations.\n\nReview of several returns and drafting an Audit Program\n\nIRD auditors were assisted in reviewing a number of audit cases. This assistance helped in resolving issues that\nthe auditors had discovered during previous audits. In particular, some of the issues discussed were:\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 4", "text_characters": 2245}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "(i) the operation of withholding tax;\n(ii) helping the auditors overcome their lack of experience and understanding banking operations\nand their IT systems;\n(iii) uncertainty on what sample size should be used for effective audit testing; and\n(iv) application of VAT on leasing.\n\nThe St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division auditors presented four tax returns which were reviewed. A\nnumber of potential tax issues were identified, and the expert worked together with the IRD audit team to develop\naudit schedules and audit letters for each of the two companies. This exercise gave the audit team valuable insight\ninto the financial sector and the processes within this industry. This process allowed the IRD financial sector\nauditors to;\n\n(i) identify potential tax risks for these two companies and the industry as a whole;\n(ii) draft a set of audit test schedules for these companies, which will also be applicable to other\ncompanies within this sector;\n(iii) develop a list of potential tax issues for the audit team to discuss with these banks;\n(iv) obtain an understanding of the issues and transaction(s) identified;\n(v) understand the accounting and tax treatment adopted by the banks and also understand the tax\nimplications of this treatment; and\n(vi) decide on whether to initiate an audit on some (accounting) issues or accept the account and tax\ntreatment adopted by the taxpayer.\n\n\n**Effects of Covid-19**\n\n\nThe CD raised awareness of the auditors on the effect of COVID-19 on the banks **.** These includes:\n\n(i) how a number of banks were helping the cash flow of companies by granting “repayment\nholidays” and how this would affect their interest income;\n(ii) how banks would have to potentially upwardly adjust their level of bad debt provisions; and\n(iii) how the IRD would have to establish the way the adjustments are reflected in the annual accounts\nand anticipate lesser revenue from the sector.\n\nThe CD also raised awareness on how the insurance sector is impacted by COVID-19. It highlighted that, within\nthe insurance industry, companies may have had to return some of their premium income to the policy holders\nbecause the level of risk covered was reduced as a result of the economic downturn. This also makes it important\nthat IRD establishes how this reduced premium income is reflected in the accounts of insurers. It is imperative\nthat this reduction in premiums is also reflected in the accounts of the insured, especially if it is claimable as\ndeduction from taxable income.\n\n\n**Profile Meetings**\n\n\nThe concept of “Profile Meetings”, in which the audit team would arrange an annual meeting with the companies\nin the financial sector, was discussed. Profile Meetings are an informal information gathering process with\ncompanies, which allows IRD to collect information about companies and get details and understanding on some\nkey transactions outside the audit forum. These meetings would provide the St. Kitts and Nevis Financial Sector\nAudit Team with an opportunity to discuss with the banks their business operations, key transactions recorded on\nthe returns, the bank’s future plans and to gain an understanding of key issues within the bank’s annual accounts\nand get an overview of the controls in place within a company. These meetings will enhance the IRD’s compliance\nrisk management processes and complement the current work on identifying key risks within each company and\nbuild risk profiles. The IRD has been encouraged to set up a program of Profile Meetings with a number of financial\nsector companies as well as companies from other industries.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "(i) the operation of withholding tax;\n(ii) helping the auditors overcome their lack of experience and understanding banking operations\nand their IT systems;\n(iii) uncertainty on what sample size should be used for effective audit testing; and\n(iv) application of VAT on leasing.\n\nThe St. Kitts and Nevis Inland Revenue Division auditors presented four tax returns which were reviewed. A\nnumber of potential tax issues were identified, and the expert worked together with the IRD audit team to develop\naudit schedules and audit letters for each of the two companies. This exercise gave the audit team valuable insight\ninto the financial sector and the processes within this industry. This process allowed the IRD financial sector\nauditors to;\n\n(i) identify potential tax risks for these two companies and the industry as a whole;\n(ii) draft a set of audit test schedules for these companies, which will also be applicable to other\ncompanies within this sector;\n(iii) develop a list of potential tax issues for the audit team to discuss with these banks;\n(iv) obtain an understanding of the issues and transaction(s) identified;\n(v) understand the accounting and tax treatment adopted by the banks and also understand the tax\nimplications of this treatment; and\n(vi) decide on whether to initiate an audit on some (accounting) issues or accept the account and tax\ntreatment adopted by the taxpayer.\n\nEffects of Covid-19\n\nThe CD raised awareness of the auditors on the effect of COVID-19 on the banks . These includes:\n\n(i) how a number of banks were helping the cash flow of companies by granting “repayment\nholidays” and how this would affect their interest income;\n(ii) how banks would have to potentially upwardly adjust their level of bad debt provisions; and\n(iii) how the IRD would have to establish the way the adjustments are reflected in the annual accounts\nand anticipate lesser revenue from the sector.\n\nThe CD also raised awareness on how the insurance sector is impacted by COVID-19. It highlighted that, within\nthe insurance industry, companies may have had to return some of their premium income to the policy holders\nbecause the level of risk covered was reduced as a result of the economic downturn. This also makes it important\nthat IRD establishes how this reduced premium income is reflected in the accounts of insurers. It is imperative\nthat this reduction in premiums is also reflected in the accounts of the insured, especially if it is claimable as\ndeduction from taxable income.\n\nProfile Meetings\n\nThe concept of “Profile Meetings”, in which the audit team would arrange an annual meeting with the companies\nin the financial sector, was discussed. Profile Meetings are an informal information gathering process with\ncompanies, which allows IRD to collect information about companies and get details and understanding on some\nkey transactions outside the audit forum. These meetings would provide the St. Kitts and Nevis Financial Sector\nAudit Team with an opportunity to discuss with the banks their business operations, key transactions recorded on\nthe returns, the bank’s future plans and to gain an understanding of key issues within the bank’s annual accounts\nand get an overview of the controls in place within a company. These meetings will enhance the IRD’s compliance\nrisk management processes and complement the current work on identifying key risks within each company and\nbuild risk profiles. The IRD has been encouraged to set up a program of Profile Meetings with a number of financial\nsector companies as well as companies from other industries.\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 5", "text_characters": 3022}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Agreed Next Steps**\n\nThe IRD will build on this training and CD when designing future audit program. Given the importance of Financial\nSector in St. Kitts and Nevis, further support to ensure compliance in the sector would be beneficial. The IRD will\nneed further assistance to strengthen the audit program of the Financial Sector and support to review of tax returns\nof the companies in that sector. As a first step the audit team should, develop a program of profile meetings to\ngather relevant information on the operations of various businesses in the sector.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Agreed Next Steps\n\nThe IRD will build on this training and CD when designing future audit program. Given the importance of Financial\nSector in St. Kitts and Nevis, further support to ensure compliance in the sector would be beneficial. The IRD will\nneed further assistance to strengthen the audit program of the Financial Sector and support to review of tax returns\nof the companies in that sector. As a first step the audit team should, develop a program of profile meetings to\ngather relevant information on the operations of various businesses in the sector.\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 6", "text_characters": 493}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Appendix**\n\n**Appendix I. List of Training Topics**\n\n\n1 Introduction into the World of Banking\n\n\n2 Overview of the Financial Sector (Banking, Insurance, Treasury and Lending)\n\n\n3 Financial Instruments explained\n\n\n4 Concept of Transfer Pricing\n\n\n5 Inter-Company Charges\n\n\n6 Inter-Company Loans\n\n\n7 Leasing\n\n\n8 The Audit Function\n\n - Planning an audit (sources of information available)\n\n - Performing the audit (the different types of audits)\n\n - Finalizing / Closing the audit\n\n - The Audit Report\n\n9 Fee / Commission Income\n\n\n10 Cost of Equity / Tier 1 Capital\n\n\n11 Bad Debt Provisions / Bad Debts\n\n\n12 Accounting for Provisions\n\n\n13 Accounting Standard IFRS 9\n\n\n14 Foreign Tax credits\n\n\n15 Group Relief\n\n\n16 Life Assurance & General Insurance\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis | 7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-096", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix\n\nAppendix I. List of Training Topics\n\n1 Introduction into the World of Banking\n\n2 Overview of the Financial Sector (Banking, Insurance, Treasury and Lending)\n\n3 Financial Instruments explained\n\n4 Concept of Transfer Pricing\n\n5 Inter-Company Charges\n\n6 Inter-Company Loans\n\n7 Leasing\n\n8 The Audit Function\n\n - Planning an audit (sources of information available)\n\n - Performing the audit (the different types of audits)\n\n - Finalizing / Closing the audit\n\n - The Audit Report\n\n9 Fee / Commission Income\n\n10 Cost of Equity / Tier 1 Capital\n\n11 Bad Debt Provisions / Bad Debts\n\n12 Accounting for Provisions\n\n13 Accounting Standard IFRS 9\n\n14 Foreign Tax credits\n\n15 Group Relief\n\n16 Life Assurance & General Insurance\n\nIMF CARTAC St. Kitts and Nevis 7", "text_characters": 610}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af714c628ebaa2b77929732ac880a20ec7a694cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2
+size 56088
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ec6c0201e4e2f4b013c5785e4a312d10592ad7c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:101fea475be7ba4e568de2a834456fba3c5dab2a1b7baf5ffa97753ce4c4d593
+size 133447
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3321fbb15206e2f1505bca140bffbd3a7f5047d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3498525da019172b76ff0e0159a8abe44cec2cabb592f21c0eabd7504ba635ba
+size 1570
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d33491c06828d67115f1fa9477de3ec6b81ac54b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7e7f6a7a6e8a499b71c225ff4cefe946cde785afdee381cdd51bf875b3a800d3
+size 50005
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..186e8c395ed0b5ec1caafb6918e6835a746a1357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f1cff500f7cd9d1ad49776637059a20b750706dd25f7de94f8faac7a3e5208a1
+size 3912
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48b7c6816feaf68b2856d36b84329285f5503ccd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a1930862fa22f5b983cc8147140083d5f7dc57a7f0f6c4cbc1e9f77330bb7c46
+size 33133
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..06af15fa6cb1e469c2c8c3d61a04c2bdf8982834
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dfc10874da0194d6d56f3b3ca7efc941c7f608f7a66c4c75ae1400937e83ae4c
+size 21947
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..10106930b25677a641df157547fc32b352083dbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:65436717f9560b81e38008ed2fe1db56edaf14e7912b88300e2150c2431a2192
+size 222006
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55f76af5702fbc2b31a09f0c2503a9f0b7eae736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb
+size 33384
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..882b73c7ad97e5daa999aa6ed7d01417853f88fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3e824c676aef66d1c40ccd0831b0082660abdc614047a4f746b4033bba201da5
+size 33965
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..84941e0351c5f3cf3d167e15c77a3088efa6039a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7afe71cf83526649261441add2489d73979408d8fd9acc071ec92683243b1c10
+size 15685
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6174bd1e4600d3336ac2306b1f0dc8aaa8d89950
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0e16a98b7652b26d49b7f948161153a165d9064aa72bf74bceccc854e4217f63
+size 47274
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6696bfd80b77072d78a3c18351797ac8e4cb02bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:75c09b4c3d5273073fa0d257c784758d90897340b5ae25694a8db8b08404e574
+size 32215
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0281fbe6da323e7a554ccd55afbb2238144fb525
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c42906a17ed9efc1a1df73106a135b4eb609dd23633100a095cb0a2de26b0e38
+size 29822
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f38765c2968de0cd7890c61d099e3ae857aa5d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:87e508d9d697bf97e31f058a48aaf91e3917e9564d516e08b7f0cd6ecd5e8d65
+size 60643
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c3da26f1b17baaaaa49f473b06b16ed16c550f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b5b951df32e0b35928fa872dcb0d3d934214213ebc83181fe5f764f1ed434f28
+size 26992
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b387bef8e0b4ad95998c31878e6a85b83dbaa0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5bd4f142b431d79a4889debaf234b1ac2f6176d92179c48297a574422e9e6a03
+size 55158
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dd336f2c3b7401eb26a6bffacfd6fffcece1230f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c64edfe4e5a24f8aef40a71e8da94400263150db019cb13cb3229c46bf87c93d
+size 109389
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..59988b5676fb1b4bf37311920babe8fe471548e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6d337a4cbfe88882d653e1f82257f5d7d847c4478406c945cbd1fbc22947b2d7
+size 19232
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ae13ab2b90ff5d4e47a03e253a68abac8de0c953
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:04402eefc285a0284e46d100a80ae8499972ab51be839d6261a29f11656368c5
+size 21757
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1aee207934a3d6d5e82f6a3e07e4df2f4b02a4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c81fe7f2dc9eb1b17fe03f6a97bd23fd2a0475d1dcd9733525063e4c845e9089
+size 14697
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e0af788c0a50f114412bd80eb5e2737df0c04fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9efbc4baeae706e26e2ae1790ed9185b4c1843aa63db7d276a0be4166da6db33
+size 18999
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f2f9268417bb01e71846f27b5629b36f76d67b27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:057de37f3c40d52656a56b74da53d1f0fd5a81d24d80fd6de8d1e02cee7c518a
+size 14029
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..053859060d3e54273a9e800123d34cc05ae4dc38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e1647fe772cad4a3a52d7be03a945a059e67db7ae2bdf78aae35b765405fdafb
+size 18712
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0024-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0024-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..247b1213071622ca0bd52ad24cb83f169ef393e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0024-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f276c8b3125f69a58853cd62d5f676c04fff7d177b8ec37a5881564f047265ef
+size 97479
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0025-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0025-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1e61eee1a29e0dc81314c739d7fcfe0ac00958eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0025-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:cea43c1680f68cb27b5a68a616c91d3d5b09064b2eb78e6ddb27e1ef4b12f964
+size 96642
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..75365960f0588aa03e58b9d85ee00fb7b2e0b41d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d8259495cc936ab454ec8d26c4f3898a47b9fe6f0f707a154a424fd57aa30c4c
+size 44046
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..afd53e7c23781fcfdda60ef7b27924846ce3603b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d0dd3087f67456187097113b24de31c5fbdb0eb4b84b7b890556716d85c23b52
+size 27156
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0029-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0029-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..db19ebf32429f3d8ca26b8a81cb17a8785b64fc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0029-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e54e2dfdfef130f329a7baa9b6e61d6c753150d14bd0701dc3cafbaea58f0122
+size 24945
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0031-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0031-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..acf0b565b4b07bb28eb2f05b6edc4c41578000d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0031-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3e0f924b01fc6fcdf1f8ab087dd2c86ebe0d0a284710d9cf5b47988a6102b31c
+size 226066
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0032-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0032-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f2e482ebc7ca43c6b2ec45a76f2d8d49e0edeede
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0032-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c5c32c3133b93f4605f1398fc8909ccf491a4d9d63abe9c7c9f85b91b994f8b2
+size 88375
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a9ac277065ae2e969211237e6206262acd1dfd48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6d99bd7d64b7434014710df99bab6d7f7ece73560d8df623b439ec59bc4f4529
+size 52470
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..997e47421fc5667673c19fc0b06310c92b2bbfb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e8dedb73b358270977a868a35df14ee1ec73b1ca6980692abb6e9c61506b6c04
+size 36157
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb96eedb02d06f07c298f98c3e31ec4623804032
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b1b7013f1b8be351c32e51d141cd4adaa048e302215f4029deca5624f2eb367f
+size 30388
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b8e502b307766af663af9d3cd51dbddd0350a97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9a794c504d98babd15c8478b0b1b415dc47876faf6227769147be6d1c95b2fad
+size 32728
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b500baf09ce45a80245cc2218de7f246df9f5c76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:12b36d66793157bb70ed77e4daf6e111a9e0ad3e3fb97ddcaf491ec91a96a954
+size 38616
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..93488aa8ce0fd6976711ac9fb524124e5c98615e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dae31e9e62cb9da06a2a934d85592c6e434902e9f7be6089256292b28c7e8802
+size 31797
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0041-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0041-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ddee6ec24caf3078d5accee8df55b2dc22622e45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0041-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8ae5835008365e24dab40621249210cb2f85a72d4323772423f24c2f4e5c1887
+size 37686
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0043-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0043-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a7f39d05b10a253f74f67565827b859c27988c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0043-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ce77ad5690cc6a66e002c0f11b848ef9d1f80e5b4f34f17765f7397a8ba05d0d
+size 196341
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..687a24e40587bfab25faf927c6ad7f800e787743
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e2c6c58ce5c4d5593b103cc4fb53174aed003cc41f31b716011d68e5fc2f11af
+size 30335
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d726db842763976bf5d464aa715d43f61b2056d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6c002af02e6bc8d8df0cd2b9e96c4cff464cfee0534e2e6c45013c1dacbf010b
+size 15140
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9abca81a045923d4a56006345e10b08e4480ea5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-097",
+ "title": "Costa Rica: Technical Assistance Report-Upgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal Framework",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-097.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "8ff29c3d94f1c565e1a2978483f5394d3d330d9346f14e7e79ec6f44f2ae3453",
+ "source_bytes": 2387840,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/02/22/costa-rica-technical-assistance-report-upgrading-the-rule-based-fiscal-framework-530076",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-22T00:01:55+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 28.4,
+ "page_count": 56,
+ "text_characters": 129108,
+ "table_count": 9,
+ "figure_count": 41,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "ocr_applied_pages": [],
+ "ocr_engine": null,
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "COSTA RICA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "COSTA RICA Upgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal Framework"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "PREFACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 12,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "I. INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 13,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "II. ASSESSING THE CURRENT FISCAL RULE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 20,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "III. ADDRESSING IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 36,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "IV. MEDIUM-TERM CONSIDERATIONS OF THE FISCAL RULES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 42,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "V. STRENGTHENING THE MTFF TO SUPPORT THE RULES-BASED FRAMEWORK"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 48,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "VI. REFERENCES"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Costa Rica: Technical Assistance Report-Upgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal Framework; IMF Country Report No. 23/97; January 2023",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230113160009-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230222120954-05'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dba132145fee87d208cde2517fac278cdcaa38ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2763 @@
+
+
+
+
+January 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/97**
+### **COSTA RICA**
+
+**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––** **UPGRADING THE**
+**RULE-BASED FISCAL FRAMEWORK**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Costa Rica was prepared by a staff team of the
+
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+
+completed in November 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+#### **COSTA RICA** **Upgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal Framework**
+
+
+W. Raphael Lam, Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia, and Carlos Herrero
+Garcia
+
+
+**Technical Assistance Report**
+
+
+**January 2023**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by
+the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities
+of Costa Rica (the "TA recipient") in response to their request for
+technical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries
+thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and
+members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or
+instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to
+World Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and
+donors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically
+objects to such disclosure (see _[Staff Operational Guidance for the](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)_
+_[Dissemination of Capacity Development Information](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)_ ). Disclosure of
+this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties
+outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA
+recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and
+donors with legitimate interest shall require the explicit consent of
+the TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.
+
+
+
+**CONTENTS**
+
+
+A. The Current Fiscal Rule __________________________________________________________ 11
+B. Strengths and Challenges of the Fiscal Rules Framework ________________________ 14
+
+
+A. Amending the Coverage to Exclude Entities from the Fiscal Rules _______________ 19
+B. Excluding Expenditure Items from the Fiscal Rule ________________________________ 25
+C. Revising the Ex-post Compliance Measurement _________________________________ 30
+D. Escape Clauses __________________________________________________________________ 32
+E. Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 33
+
+
+A. Risk-Based Approach in Setting a Medium-term Debt Anchor __________________ 34
+B. Estimating a Medium-Term Debt Anchor for Costa Rica _________________________ 35
+C. Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 40
+
+
+A. Reinforcing the MTFF framework ________________________________________________ 40
+B. Recent Progress of the MTFF in Costa Rica ______________________________________ 42
+C. Pending Issues Regarding the MTFF in Costa Rica _______________________________ 44
+D. Independent Fiscal Council ______________________________________________________ 45
+E. Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 46
+
+
+1. Selected Country Examples of Exclusions from Expenditure Rules _____________________________ 28
+
+
+**FIGURES**
+
+
+1. Recent Fiscal Developments in Costa Rica _____________________________________________________ 10
+2. Nonfinancial Public Sector in Costa Rica_______________________________________________________ 10
+3. Changes in Fiscal Rules during the Pandemic vs Global Financial Crisis________________________ 15
+4. Deviation from the Deficit Rule Limits _________________________________________________________ 15
+5. Deviation from the Debt Limits ________________________________________________________________ 15
+6. Expenditure Rule Limits Depend on Nominal GDP Growth and Government Debt Levels _____ 16
+7. Distribution of Real Government Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022 _____________________ 17
+8. Counterfactual Scenarios: Expenditure Rule and Constraint on Current Budget Balance Applied
+since 2013 _______________________________________________________________________________________ 18
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+9. Total Expenditures Excluded under Various Proposals _________________________________________ 21
+10. GFSM Statistical Principles in Identifying General Government Activity ______________________ 22
+11. Selected GFSM Classification Categories _____________________________________________________ 23
+12. Share of Proposed Exclusions in the Total Expenditure of the Central Government __________ 25
+13. Share of Proposed Exclusions in the Total Expenditure of the NFPS __________________________ 25
+14. Implications for Primary Expenditure of Excluding Interest Payments from the Fiscal Rules __ 27
+15. Verification of Compliance with the Expenditure Rule ________________________________________ 30
+16. Fiscal Rules of Medium-Term Anchor and Operational Budget Limits Worldwide ____________ 34
+17. Debt Levels and Spreads in Emerging Market Economies ____________________________________ 36
+18. Spreads in Emerging Market Economies, 2000-21 ___________________________________________ 36
+19. Debt Levels and Sovereign Ratings in Emerging Market Economies _________________________ 37
+20. Debt Anchor with Sufficient Buffers __________________________________________________________ 37
+21. Current Spending and Debt Projections under the Fiscal Rule, 2024-2035 ___________________ 39
+22. Calendar of the MTFF and National Budgets _________________________________________________ 44
+
+**TABLES**
+
+
+1. Parameters of the Existing Fiscal Rules on Expenditure Growth________________________________ 11
+2. List of NFPS Entities and Local Governments Excluded from the Fiscal Rules __________________ 13
+3. Ceilings on Expenditure Growth under the Fiscal Rules, 2020-2023 ___________________________ 14
+4. Proposed Amendments to the Fiscal Rule for Specific Institutions Pending Approval by the
+Legislative Assembly _____________________________________________________________________________ 20
+5. Selected Country Examples on the Use of Expenditure Rules __________________________________ 29
+6. Measuring Compliance with Expenditure Growth Ceilings _____________________________________ 31
+7. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Gross Debt Anchor __________________________________________ 38
+8. Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks under Existing Rule, 2024-2035 ________________________ 39
+9. Fiscal Risks Management Toolkit ______________________________________________________________ 41
+10. Expenditure ceilings and MTFF 2021-2023 ___________________________________________________ 43
+
+**ANNEXES**
+
+
+Annex I. List of entities included in STAP fiscal statistics (2021) __________________________________ 48
+Annex II. Calibrating the Medium-term Debt Anchor ____________________________________________ 51
+Annex III. Progress of MTFF since the Capacity Development Missions in 2020-21 ______________ 53
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+##### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**
+
+CCSS Social Security Entity of Costa Rica
+CG Central Government
+CGR Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic
+CNE National Commission for Risk Prevention and Emergency Response
+DGCP Directorate General of Public Credit
+DGPN General Directorate of National Budget
+EBE Extrabudgetary Entities
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+GFSM Government Finance Statistics Manual
+ICE Institute of Electricity of Costa Rica
+ID Decentralized Institutions
+ICT Institute of Tourism of Costa Rica
+LA Legislative Assembly
+LGs Local Governments
+LSPF Law on Strengthening Public Finance (Law 9635)
+MFU Macro Fiscal Unit
+MoF Ministry of Finance
+MTFF Medium-Term Fiscal Framework
+NFPS Nonfinancial Public Sector
+PCs Public Corporations
+PIM Public Investment Management
+PPPs Public-Private Partnerships
+PROCOMER Trade Promotion of Costa Rica
+RECOPE Costa Rican Oil Refinery
+SIPP Information System for Plans and Budgets of the CGR
+STAP Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority
+TA Technical Assistance
+WEO World Economic Outlook
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+##### **PREFACE**
+
+In response to a request from the Minister of Finance, a Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) mission
+conducted hybrid discussions from October 31 to November 22, 2022 to provide technical assistance
+(TA) regarding the design and implementation of fiscal rules. The mission was led by W. Raphael Lam
+and comprised Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia (all FAD), and Carlos Herrero Garcia
+(FAD Short-term Expert).
+
+
+At the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the mission held discussions with Finance Minister Costa Jaen,
+Marco Solera, Michael Contreras; Ana Miriam Araya, Jose Luis Araya, Carlos Oviedo, Kenneth Acuña,
+Néstor Chinchilla, Olman Cortés, Rafael Oviedo from STAP, DGPN, _and Grupo Regla Fiscal_ . At the
+_Contraloría General de la República_, the mission held discussions with Amelia Jiménez, Daniel Sáenz,
+Karen Garro, Nancy Campos, María Salomé Murillo, Marilyn Zúñiga, Vivian Garbanzo, Fabiola
+Rodríguez, Sujey Montoya, Edwin Zúñiga. The mission also met with representatives from various
+agencies, including Gustavo Picado (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social); Ing. Jorge Zapata, Mariela
+Solís, Natalia _Vega (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados)_ ; Guisella Morera, Silvia
+Mora, Marco Acuña, Jacqueline Hidalgo _(Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad)_ ; Eddie Villalobos,
+Víctor Díaz, Mariela Calderón (Procomer); Rodolfo Fonseca _(Municipalidad de San José);_ Ennio
+Rodríguez, Magda Brenes (Colegio de Ciencias Económicas); Ricardo Monge, Gloriana Ivankovich
+_(Academia de Centroamérica);_ Ruth Andrade, Alberto López, Olga Espinoza, William Rodríguez,
+Mariela López, Alejandra Fernández, Rafael Soto, Wilson Orozco _(Instituto Costarricense de Turismo);_
+Jorge Vargas, Pamela Jiménez, Susan Rodríguez _(Estado de la Nac_ ión); Betty Sanchez y Juan Carlos
+Quirós (BCCR); and Jose Luis Arce (Consejo Fiscal). The mission also presented the key findings to
+Kattia Cambronero Aguiluz, Pilar Cisneros Gallo, María Daniela Rojas Salas, Eli Feinzaig Mintz, Óscar
+Izquierdo Sandí, Jonathan Jesús Acuña Soto, Olga Lidia Morera Arrieta, and Rosaura Méndez
+Gamboa of the Legislative Assembly.
+
+
+The mission expresses its gratitude for the excellent cooperation it received from all government
+officials and for the candid discussions. Particular thanks are due to Mr. Marco Solera, Mr. Michael
+Contreras, and Ms. Jimena Ureña for their insights and excellent cooperation before and during the
+mission. The mission also received administrative support, research assistance, and interpretation
+services from Claudia Diaz Saldias, Zhonghao Wei (all FAD); Anette Schorr, Martha Florez, Yvonne
+Fisher, Cynthia Abad, Silvina Bresler, and Mariano De Anton.
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+##### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+**The fiscal rule that came into force in 2020 has bolstered fiscal discipline and served Costa Rica**
+**well.** The rule sets ceilings on nominal expenditure growth for current and total expenditures linked to
+past nominal GDP growth and debt levels. The rule—explicitly identified in the Law 9635—is transparent,
+relatively simple, and allows flexibility in crises through an escape clause. The rule has been instrumental
+in the policy framework. It not only guides the fiscal policy in the budget, but also coalesces public
+opinion on the need for fiscal discipline. Along with other fiscal reforms, the government commitment to
+the fiscal rule has been instrumental to fiscal adjustment in 2021-22.
+
+
+**Nonetheless, several limitations of the fiscal rule came to light during the early stage of**
+**implementation.** The limitations of the rule were reinforced by the inherent budget fragmentation as well
+as adverse effects from the pandemic. Outside the national budget of the central government, fiscal rules
+are applied uniformly at the entity level for a wide range of public institutions, leading to distortions or
+excessively tight constraints for some. Moreover, the verification of compliance with the rule also brought
+an unintended tightening in 2021-2022 from under-execution of the budget during the pandemic.
+
+
+**The expenditure limits are set to become more binding amid rising debt and high inflation in the**
+**near term.** Although the escape clause allowed for higher spending during the pandemic, the ceilings on
+nominal expenditure growth have turned tighter as debt exceeded 60 percent of GDP and GDP
+contracted in 2020. The rule implies an expenditure cut in real terms amid high inflation in the near term.
+The government is therefore under pressure to accommodate spending needs in response to the cost-ofliving crisis.
+
+
+**To address these immediate challenges, the government and lawmakers have enacted or proposed**
+**amendments to the fiscal rules.** An executive decree revised the method to verify compliance in July
+2022 to avoid the unintended tightening from an under-execution of the budget in some entities. Various
+amendments to Law 9635 propose to (i) exclude certain entities (such as some decentralized institutions
+or public corporations) from the rule; and (ii) exclude expenditure items such as capital expenditure or
+interest payments. Some amendments would bring permanent changes to the fiscal rule without
+necessarily addressing the near-term challenges. The proposed amendments would further reduce the
+coverage of the rules from about 60 percent to 45 percent of total expenditures in the nonfinancial public
+sector (or from 93 to 65 percent in the national budget of the central government). While excluding some
+nonstate public entities and public corporations is reasonable, ad-hoc changes without precise and
+verifiable criteria could undermine the credibility of the fiscal rule framework.
+
+
+**It is thus urgent to develop objective criteria to prevent ad-hoc exclusions of entities from the**
+**fiscal rules.** A principles-based classification would allay political pressure for ad-hoc exclusions. The
+criteria should follow the statistical principles of the Government Finance Statistics Manual: entities under
+government control and classified as a non-market producer should be included in the fiscal rule. Entities
+that fall outside by these criteria should be monitored according to a risk-based set of indicators agreed
+by STAP, such as debt ratio, revenue to cost ratio, or the degree of central government transfers to the
+entity. Whereas including the social security and local governments is not feasible at present, they should
+be subject to monitoring by the MOF.
+
+
+**The compliance with the fiscal rule should be assessed at the aggregate level, at least for the**
+**central government statistical concept (including extrabudgetary entities).** The MoF and STAP
+should be empowered by law to allocate resources across decentralized institutions (extrabudgetary
+entities) and the national budget among competing needs. The rule will be assessed for the overall central
+government instead of by individual entities.
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+**Expenditures covered by the fiscal rule should remain broad.** Key items such as capital expenditure
+and interest expense should not be excluded from the rule. The proposed amendments to exclude capital
+expenditure when debt levels are high will weaken the link between the fiscal rule and debt dynamics,
+may create incentives for creative accounting, and ultimately undermine the credibility of the fiscal rules.
+To better address contingencies such as court rulings, the government should create a contingency
+reserve line in the budget within the overall expenditure limits.
+
+
+**Externally financed expenditure should be included in the expenditure rule.** The budget documents
+can include an annex to provide information on externally financed expenditure. This would help reduce
+budget fragmentation and allow for a more comprehensive capital budget, in line with the Public
+Investment Management Assessment (PIMA). This information will also be useful for verifying ex-post
+compliance with the fiscal rules.
+
+
+**Ex-post compliance of the expenditure rule could be verified based on the fiscal outturn relative to**
+**the initial budget of the previous year.** This would avoid the unintended effects from an underexecuted budget. The verification of compliance with the fiscal rules should be made comparing this base
+(initial budget of the previous year, adjusted with the best estimate of external financing) with the
+spending outturn (on an accrual basis) of the current year. Compared to the current method to assess
+compliance (July 2022 Decree), it would increase transparency and link more closely to debt reduction.
+
+
+**Over the medium term, introducing an explicit debt anchor would supplement the expenditure rule**
+**in upholding debt sustainability.** A combination of an expenditure rule with a medium-term anchor is
+common across countries. In Costa Rica, it can help align annual fiscal policy with the objective of
+maintaining debt sustainability over the medium term. The best practice is to maintain a debt level that
+provides a prudent safety buffer to respond to adverse shocks while keeping debt below its limit—the
+level that could exert a drag on growth, raise the borrowing cost significantly, or risk debt distress.
+
+
+**A risk-based approach in determining the debt anchor would consider the macroeconomic shocks**
+**and debt composition in Costa Rica, alongside with the sizable development needs.** Our analysis
+suggests it would be appropriate to aim for a medium-term debt anchor of about 40-50 percent of GDP.
+This is lower than the elevated level at present but still credible for the government to commit to achieve
+by the mid-2030s with sustained fiscal efforts. After a debt anchor is established in the fiscal rule
+framework, ensuring consistency between the anchor and expenditure rule (ceilings on expenditure
+growth) would be important.
+
+
+**Integrating the debt anchor in the medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) would reinforce**
+**consistency.** Significant progress was made in developing the MTFF, introduced in 2021 to provide
+transparent communication of the fiscal strategy and forward guidance to the budget process. The MTFF
+would lay out the expenditure growth rate consistent with the expenditure rule and reaching the anchor
+over the medium term.
+
+**The fiscal council can strengthen oversight.** The monitoring of compliance with the fiscal rules would
+require a broader assessment of the macro-fiscal projections in the MTFF and debt sustainability beyond
+just verifying that fiscal outturns comply with the expenditure ceiling. Resources commensurate to the
+fiscal council’s mandate need to be allocated so that it can fulfill its responsibilities.
+
+
+**The main recommendations to support the revision and implementation of the fiscal rule are**
+**shown in the Table below.**
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+|Col1|Table of Key Recommendations|Col3|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Report**|**Main Recommendations**|**Short- (ST) or**
**Medium-term (MT)**|
+|**Section**
**III**|The institutional coverage of the fiscal rule should be the general government, as defined in
Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). As local governments and the social security
(CCSS) are currently excluded from the rules, MOF should monitor them under a risk-based
approach. Over time, the Legislative Assembly should consider including these entities in the
fiscal rule.|ST|
+||Ministry of Finance should develop verifiable and objective criteria to identify which public
entities should be included in the fiscal rule and seek approval of those criteria by Legislative
Assembly, in accordance with GFSM. Entities that are under government control and
nonmarket producers should be considered as government entities and included in the fiscal
rules. Other entities need to be monitored under a risk-based approach to be developed by
MOF and enhance debt regulations to cover the authorization outside of central
government.|ST|
+|
|Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to indicate that the exclusion of
entities from the fiscal rules should be based on GFSM criteria specified by Ministry of
Finance.|ST|
+||Ministry of Finance should present an assessment on legal changes needed to empower the
ministry and in particular STAP to make the expenditure limits applicable to the overall
central government (GFSM) at the aggregate level, including extrabudgetary entities such as
Decentralized Institutions, instead of by individual entities.|ST|
+||Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to avoid references to excluding
capital expenditure, court rulings, and interest expenses from the expenditure rule. Create a
general contingency reserve in the budget (e.g., a separate budget line) that could cover
expenditure from court rulings, among others, subject to the aggregate expenditure ceilings.|ST|
+||Amend the executive decree to include a comparison of expenditure growth between the
final outturn (accrual basis) at the end of a fiscal year (instead of final budget) and the initial
budget of the previous fiscal year (adjusted by an estimate of externally funded expenditure).
Ex ante and in-year compliance verification at budget level remains the same, adding the
estimate of externally funded expenditure.|
ST|
+||Include the best annual estimate of externally funded expenditure in an annex to budget
documents provided to the Legislative Assembly.|MT|
+||Modify the escape clause provision_(Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; Article 16 of the LSPF)_ by
amending Bill 23330 such that the maximum transition period applies when the escape
clause is activated in either one of the conditions (emergency or recession).|MT|
+|**Section**
**IV**|Amend the Law to introduce a medium-term debt anchor in the fiscal rule to ensure debt
sustainability. Periodic review (e.g., every 5 years) on the overall fiscal rule framework
(including calibrating expenditure rule limits to ensure the consistency after the medium-
term debt anchor is established) can help ensure fiscal rules contribute toward debt
sustainability.|MT|
+|**Section**
**V**|Integrate the debt anchor in the medium-term fiscal framework. The MTFF would lay out the
expenditure growth rate consistent with the expenditure rule and reaching the debt anchor
over the medium term.|MT|
+||Amend the law to strengthen fiscal oversight with an operational and independent fiscal
council.|MT|
+
+
+
+Note: ‘Short-term’ indicates the recommendations can be completed by end-March 2023, while ‘medium-term’ indicates
+recommendations to be implemented over the next 2-3 years.
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+##### **I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+**1.** **After a strong rebound in 2021, slowing trading partner growth and tightening of**
+**global financial conditions are weighing on activity in Costa Rica.** Elevated inflationary
+pressures--partly because higher international food and energy price were allowed to pass through
+to retail prices—have prompted the central bank to accelerate its move to a neutral policy stance.
+
+
+**2.** **Fiscal performance has exceeded the Fund’s program target in fiscal year 2022 so far**,
+driven by higher tax revenues and higher than expected yields from 2018 tax reforms (Figure 1).
+Expenditures were restrained by the fiscal rule, contributing to a lower public debt relative to Fund
+program targets. The strong fiscal performance provides scope for a modest increase in social
+spending—comprising conditional cash transfers and temporary food vouchers—to support the
+most vulnerable households. The central government primary surplus is expected to reach 1 percent
+of GDP by end 2022, the highest since 2008.
+
+
+**3.** **Costa Rica’s fiscal rule continues to play a pivotal role in anchoring debt sustainability,**
+**though there is scope for improvements.** The authorities approved an executive decree in July
+2022 and submitted a bill to the Legislative Assembly to address operational constraints in the
+implementation of fiscal rules and allow for additional spending. The authorities are considering, with
+technical support from the Fund, reforms to the fiscal rule. The technical advice aims to help
+authorities determine an appropriate institutional coverage of the fiscal rule and facilitate a better
+reallocation of resources given the budget fragmentation, while maintaining a broad coverage of the
+rules and essential role in reducing debt. The existing expenditure rule covers a subset of
+expenditures in the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS), in which the central government accounts for
+less than half of the total expenditures (Figure 2).
+
+
+
+**Figure 1. Recent Fiscal Developments in**
+
+**Costa Rica**
+(Percent of GDP)
+
+
+
+**Figure 2. Nonfinancial Public Sector in**
+
+**Costa Rica**
+(Percent of total consolidated nonfinancial
+public sector expenditures, average 2017-21)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Sources: National authorities, Haver, IMF World Economic Outlook, and IMF staff calculations.
+
+
+Notes: Data for 2022 are projections.
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+##### **II. ASSESSING THE CURRENT FISCAL RULE**
+
+**A.** **The Current Fiscal Rule**
+
+**4.** **The 2018** _**Law to Strengthen Public Finance**_ **(LSPF) introduced a fiscal rule that sets**
+**limits on expenditure growth** . The fiscal rule entered into force in 2020. The rule sets a ceiling on
+current expenditure growth (as well as total expenditure growth if debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP)
+for the central government and most entities in the Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS). The rule
+establishes that the growth on current expenditures will be a function of the average nominal GDP
+growth over the previous four years, adjusted by a parameter that depends on the government debtto-GDP ratio (Table 1). As central government debt has risen above 60 percent of GDP in 2020, the
+growth in current and capital expenditures cannot exceed 65 percent of the average nominal GDP
+growth of the previous 4 years, suggesting a tighter expenditure limit in the coming years. The
+expenditure rule that came into force in 2020 supplements the pre-existing ‘golden rule’, which
+requires current expenditure cannot be financed by government debt but has not been complied
+since 2009.
+
+
+**Table 1. Parameters of the Existing Fiscal Rules on Expenditure Growth**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Government Debt-to-GDP Thresholds|Expenditure Growth Limits|
+|---|---|
+|Debt to GDP < 30% or current expenditure
of central government ≤ 17% of GDP|Growth in current expenditures ≤ 100% of average nominal
GDP growth over the previous four years.|
+|30% ≤ Debt to GDP < 45%|Growth in current expenditures ≤ 85% of average nominal
GDP growth over the previous four years.|
+|45% ≤ Debt to GDP <60%|Growth in current expenditures ≤ 75% of average nominal
GDP growth over the previous four years.|
+|Debt to GDP ≥ 60%|Growth capital and current expenditures ≤ 65% of average
nominal GDP growth over the previous four years.|
+
+
+Source: Law to Strengthen Public Finances, 2018.
+
+
+**5.** **Initially, the fiscal rule covered the central government and most entities in the rest of**
+**the NFPS.** Decree 41641-H (Art. 2), that regulates the fiscal rule, states that “The ceiling on
+expenditures applies to the National Budget of the central government _as a whole_ and _individually_ to
+the decentralized public bodies in the NFPS”. It means that, in practice, each entity in the NFPS would
+be subject to the same annual expenditure growth ceiling, although the LSPF did not explicitly
+indicate such application at the individual entity level.
+
+
+**6.** **Some major nonfinancial public sector entities and local governments, however, were**
+**excluded from the fiscal rule** (Table 2) **.** When the 2018 LSPF Law was legislated, some entities were
+excluded, such as (i) the Social Security (CCSS) regarding expenditures on pensions; (ii) Public
+Corporations (PC) that were classified to carry out commercial activities under market competition
+and whose debt-to-assets ratio is below 50 percent (such as ICE-Telecom); and iii) the national oil
+company (RECOPE) on its spending on oil imports. In 2020, Local Governments (LG) were also
+excluded from the fiscal rule, though transfers from the national budget were subject to the rule. The
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+Constitutional interpretations also excluded health in CCSS and the CCSS as a whole from the
+expenditure rule. In May 2022, several specific expenditure items from selected institutions were
+excluded, including the Social Development and Family Allowances Fund (FODESAF) (see Section III). [1]
+
+
+**7.** **The LSPF defined ex-ante compliance on a budgetary basis and ex-post compliance on**
+**an execution basis** . The LSPF (Art. 19) establishes that the central government and the NFPS entities
+must formulate their initial budgets and modifications in compliance with the fiscal rule. Therefore,
+growth in current expenditure in the initial budget of year _t_ or in-year modifications could not
+exceed the pre-determined growth ceiling relative to the initial budget of year _t-1_ . Ex-post
+compliance is also defined in the LSPF Law in terms of outturn expenditure (Art. 21 LSPF
+“ _liquidación_ ”), Compliance with the fiscal rule is monitored on a quarterly and annual basis. The
+General Directorate of the National Budget (DGPN) and the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary
+Authority (STAP) prepare quarterly reports on the outturns of current and recently of total
+expenditures. They must also prepare an annual compliance report, based on the previous year's
+budget execution. This report is submitted to the Comptroller Office (CGR) that, in turn, prepares its
+own report and submits it to the Legislative Assembly (LA). According to the 2018 LSPF, the CGR
+evaluates ex-post compliance based on executed expenditure growth in year _t_ relative to executed
+expenditure in year _t-1_ . However, in July 2022, the basis of ex-post compliance was revised to
+comparing the growth rate of expenditure in the final budget relative to the initial budget of the
+previous year (Executive Decree N° 43589-H) (see Section III).
+
+
+**8.** **The fiscal rule came into force in 2020 budget preparation and the escape clause was**
+**soon activated at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.** In March 2020, the government activated
+the escape clause for two years by declaring a national emergency (confirmed by the National
+Emergency Commission (CNE)) and communicated that expenditure of the central government and
+16 other decentralized institutions would not be subject to the expenditure ceiling (Table 3). [2] As
+government debt crossed above the 60 percent of GDP threshold in 2020, the growth ceilings would
+apply to total expenditures starting from 2022 budget preparation. This also implies that certain
+NFPS expenditure items will be tightened, for example, (i) pensions can only be indexed to the rise in
+the cost of living, and (ii) the wage bill for public employees will be frozen. Additional restrictions
+also prohibit that the central government subscribes loans or credits, except to finance the public
+debt or capital expenditure, and bail-out or subsidies to private entities will need the approval of the
+Legislative Assembly.
+
+
+1 Law to strengthen regional competitiveness and to promote the attraction of investments outside the Greater
+Metropolitan Area. Nº 10234 May 4, 2022.
+
+2 Emergency spending totaled 295 billion colons (or 0.8 percent of GDP) in 2020 and another 137 billion colons in
+2021 (or 0.4 percent of GDP), respectively, on _Bono Proteger_ to families, health supplies, vaccinations, and to CCSS to
+mitigate the minimum contribution base reduction.
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+**Table 2. List of NFPS Entities and Local Governments Excluded from the Fiscal Rules**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Institution|Scope of exclusions|Year of
exclusion|Share NFPS total
expenditures,
2021 (percent)|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Social Security (CCSS)**|All expenditure (pensions by Law,
health spending at a later stage,
not in the LSPF)|2018|20.5|
+|**Public corporation carrying out**
**commercial activities in a**
**competitive market and has debt is**
**less than 50 percent of assets**|Expenditure related to commercial
activities in a competitive market
setting|2018|3.4|
+|**National Oil Company (RECOPE)**|Oil import spending|2018|8.0|
+|**INEC**|Free surplus and financial yields
allocated to national census|2019|-|
+|**Municipalities and district councils**|Transfers from the CG are not
excluded|2020|3.1|
+|**Cantonal Sports Committees**|All expenditure|2020|-|
+|**Fishing Institute (Instituto**
**Costarricense de Pesca y**
**Acuicultura) (*)**|IDB-funded fisheries and
aquaculture sustainable
development project expenditure|2021|0.04|
+|**National Guarantee Fund (*)**|Contributions of the Ministry of
Finance|2022|0.3|
+|**National Fund for Forest Financing**
**(FONAFIFO)**|Payments to forest owners to
finance their environmental
services|2022|-|
+|**National Institute for Women**
**911 Emergency Service**|Financing for the Domestic and
Gender Violence Service|2022|-|
+|**Board of Port Administration and**
**Economic Development of the**
**Atlantic Coast (Japdeva)**|Capital expenditure on regional
and local development plans
financed by the port charges from
Moin Port’s Cargo Terminal|2022|-|
+|**Costa Rican Drug Institute**|Funds seized in counter-narcotics
operations|2022|-|
+|**Fund for Social Development and**
**Family Allowances (FODESAF)**|All expenditure|2022|3.5|
+|** 911 Emergency Service**|Fee on telecommunication
services|2022|0.03|
+
+
+Source: Compiled by the mission team based on national authorities’ documents.
+
+
+(*) Projected expenditure in 2022.
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+**Table 3. Ceilings on Expenditure Growth under the Fiscal Rules, 2020-2023**
+
+(Percent)
+
+|Col1|2020|2021|2022|2023|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Current Expenditure**|4.67|4.13|1.96|2.56|
+|**Total expenditure**|Not-applicable|Not-applicable|1.96|2.56|
+
+
+
+Source: Authorities’ Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks 2021 – 2025 and 2022 -2027.
+
+
+Note: Escape clause was activated during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21. Government debt exceeded 60 percent
+of GDP in 2020.
+
+**B.** **Strengths and Challenges of the Fiscal Rules Framework**
+
+**9.** **The expenditure rule has desirable features supporting fiscal responsibility and has**
+**served Costa Rica well** . The objectives of the rule are explicitly identified in the LSPF, which sets
+clear criteria to assess the functioning of the rule. Second, the expenditure rule is relatively simple
+and transparent, in that the ceilings on expenditure growth are communicated and widely
+recognized in the budget preparation and implementation. Third, the rule envisages nominal current
+expenditure growing less than nominal GDP, which helps mitigate expenditure pressures that often
+lead to excessive deficits. Before the expenditure rule came into force in 2020, current expenditure
+grew at a faster pace than nominal GDP growth by about 2-3 percentage points on average between
+2012 and 2019. The expenditure rule has facilitated fiscal discipline and helped contain expenditure
+growth, contributing to the improvement of fiscal balances in 2021-22.
+
+
+**10.** **Several other design features have been in line with good principles of fiscal rules.**
+According to the LSPF, the rule must hold both ex-ante in budget preparation, as well as in ex-post
+verification to contain the risk of slippages during budget execution ( _Art. 19 and 21 LSPF_ ). It also has
+an escape clause to provide flexibility in response to severe shocks. Moreover, enforcement of the
+rules is supported by the CGR, a separate entity from the Ministry of Finance. The government is also
+required in the Law to specific reporting obligations and information sharing.
+
+
+**11.** **The fiscal rule has been instrumental in Costa Rica’s policy framework.** It does not only
+provide predictability of fiscal policy, but also coalesced political consensus for fiscal responsibility
+and anchored the public debate on the budget. Policymakers have a general consensus that
+expenditure rule help contain government spending, making the needs for reducing government
+debt and improving public financial management more prominent. Compliance with the expenditure
+rule was largely met and the activation of escape clause in 2020-21 was broadly appropriate. The
+central government complied with the expenditure rule in 2020 excluding the emergency spending
+under the escape clause (CGR 2022). [3] The CGR indicated that only 12 institutions out of 154 did not
+
+
+3 According to the Decree 41641–H, the excluded expenditure in one year due to the activation of the escape clause
+must be subtracted from the base for calculating the ceiling in the next year 2022.
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+comply with the fiscal rule in 2020, while 22 institutions did not comply in 2021. [4] In terms of
+executed current expenditure, non-compliant entities excluding the central government increased
+from less than 1 percent in 2020 to nearly 5 percent in 2021. The executed current expenditure for the
+central government grew by 5.9 percent in 2021, well above the 4.2 percent ceiling. [5]
+
+
+
+**12.** **As in most countries, including Costa**
+**Rica, the pandemic put the fiscal rules and**
+**frameworks to test.** During the pandemic, over
+80 percent of countries with fiscal rules have
+activated the escape clauses or suspended
+temporarily fiscal rules, a much higher
+percentage than during the global financial crisis
+(Figure 3; Davoodi and others 2022). About half
+of countries with fiscal rules have had deficits or
+debt exceeding the limits of their fiscal rules. As
+a result, many countries, including Costa Rica,
+are facing the challenge of how to return to the
+fiscal rules (Davoodi and others 2022; Valencia
+and Ulloa-Suarez 2022) (Figures 4 and 5).
+
+
+**Figure 4. Deviation from the Deficit Rule**
+
+**Limits** (Percent of GDP by income group)
+
+
+
+**Figure 3. Changes in Fiscal Rules during the**
+
+**Pandemic vs Global Financial Crisis**
+(Percentage of countries with fiscal rules)
+
+
+Source: Davoodi and others 2022, IMF Fiscal Rules
+Dataset 2021.
+
+
+**Figure 5. Deviation from the Debt Limits**
+
+(Percent of GDP by income group)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Sources: Davoodi and others 2022; IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset: 1985-2021; IMF WEO Database.
+
+
+4 According to the CGR report, in 2020, 29 entities did not provide enough information to the CGR to verify their
+compliance to the fiscal rules. In 2021, only 104 entities were subject to the rule, due to the integration of the
+Deconcentrated Entities (OD) into the national budget. In 2021, 22 entities did not comply with the rule and 25 did
+not provide enough information.
+
+5 In contrast, the legal requirement on current expenditure being financed only with current revenues (Article 6 of the
+Law 8131 for Financial Management and Public Budget, passed in June 2000) was not complied with in the last
+decade.
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+**13.** **While the escape clause provided some flexibility during the pandemic, the**
+**expenditure limits are set to become more binding over the near term.** Out of prudence, the
+government chose not to invoke the recession part of the escape clause even though there was a
+recession in 2020. The escape clause allowed the government to put in place an additional spending
+of 1.2 percent of GDP in 2020-21 to respond to the pandemic. The government, out of prudential
+reasons, did not invoke the recession provision of the escape clause. This implies that the
+government would need to return to the expenditure ceiling when they exit from the escape clause
+starting in 2022 rather than having a 3-year transition period (allowed if the escape clause is linked
+to a recession). The specification of the expenditure rule implies tighter limits in the coming 2-3 years
+starting from 2022 despite nominal GDP growth recovering to pre-pandemic levels. Since the rule
+prescribes that annual expenditure growth ceilings for year T are linked to the 4-year average of
+nominal GDP growth between years T-5 and T-2, the effect of the growth slowdown in 2020 will kick
+in from 2022 to 2025. In addition, the rise in government debt-to-GDP over 60 percent of GDP
+during the pandemic has triggered a lower debt-linked adjusting factor, from 85 percent in 2018 to
+65 percent starting in 2022, with the expenditure ceilings also applied to total expenditures rather
+than just current spending. These imply that the expenditure growth ceilings under the fiscal rule
+would diminish from about 6 percent before the pandemic to less than 4 percent in the coming 2-3
+years (Figure 6). Ceilings would then be higher from 2026 onwards as the decline in 2020 nominal
+GDP growth will no longer enter the calculation of the expenditure ceilings.
+
+
+**Figure 6. Expenditure Rule Limits Depend on Nominal GDP Growth and Government**
+
+**Debt Levels** (Percent)
+
+
+Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.
+
+
+Note: The 4-year moving average of nominal GDP growth for year T is based on years T-5 to T-2, while the
+debt-linked adjustment factor is based on year T-2, according to the fiscal rule.
+
+**14.** **The tightening of expenditure limits takes place amid high unanticipated inflation.**
+Inflation surprises affect public finances through multiple channels, including by reducing real
+expenditure in the short term (because some items are not fully indexed to inflation), as well as
+lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio given nominal GDP is higher. In 2022, growth in real expenditure is
+projected to be negative, at the lower part of the distribution across emerging market economies
+(Figure 7), but real growth in social benefits will remain positive (even if deflated with CPI inflation).
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**15.** **Several limitations of the fiscal rule came to light during its early implementation** .
+
+
+
+
+- _Unintended effects from an under-execution of budgets._ The pandemic has led to an underexecution of the budget of many
+
+**Figure 7. Distribution of Real Government**
+
+decentralized entities, as their activity was
+
+**Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022**
+
+hampered by lockdown restrictions and social
+
+(Percent of countries)
+
+distancing. As a result, the expenditure base—
+which the expenditure growth limits are
+applied on—was reduced such that some
+entities were constrained with smaller
+expenditure ceilings and could not undertake
+normal operations in 2021 and onwards. The
+tighter base given the under-execution of the
+previous year has imposed an unintended
+tightening on expenditures, giving rise to
+repeated legislative requests to exclude
+certain spending or exclude entities from the
+
+
+
+**Figure 7. Distribution of Real Government**
+
+
+
+**Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022**
+
+
+
+(Percent of countries)
+
+
+
+
+
+Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
+
+
+
+
+- _Budget fragmentation._ The long-standing Note: Deflated with GDP deflator.
+fragmentation of the budget has made
+implementation of the fiscal rules even more challenging. The non-financial public sector (NFPS)
+comprises the national budget central government, local governments (82), social security
+(CCSS), other decentralized institutions (43), and public corporations (30). The expenditure rule
+limit, in practice was not applied at the _aggregate level_ for the general government or NFPS but
+individually applied to entities. Therefore, spending allocation is limited to within the national
+budget of the central government. The verification of the rules has not provisioned for
+compensation among those entities. While this reflects a long-standing challenge, the
+application of the expenditure ceiling at individual level made compliance challenging for some
+basic services provision (e.g., 911 emergency service). The large needs to expand social spending
+during the pandemic were constrained, partly because of the ceiling on expenditure growth.
+
+
+- _Lack of a medium-term debt anchor._ The absence of a specific reference to debt in the LSPF has
+made it difficult to substantiate the objective of fiscal sustainability and assess if the parameters
+of existing expenditure rules is adequately set to achieve the objective. For example, a counterfactual analysis shows that if the existing expenditure rules had been in place since 2013, they
+would only have led to a small reduction of current spending and debt to GDP relative to the
+actual levels, with debt continuing to rise as a share of GDP (Figure 8). This is because, in the
+reference period, nominal GDP growth was strong and debt low, implying loose expenditure
+growth ceilings. The rising debt has cast doubts whether the expenditure rule is sufficient to
+ensure debt sustainability and build buffers against protracted shocks. On the other hand, if the
+government had adhered to the requirement not to borrow for current expenditure (stipulated in
+Article 6 of Law 8131 in 2001) since 2016 (with a transition period starting in 2013), government
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+debt would have remained broadly stable between 2012 and 2019, but with a decline in current
+expenditure that would be socially infeasible.
+
+
+**Figure 8. Counterfactual Scenarios: Expenditure Rule and Constraint on Current Budget**
+
+**Balance Applied since 2013**
+
+
+Sources: Ministry of Finance, World Economic Outlook, and authors’ calculations.
+
+
+Notes: All variables other than current spending and debt are kept as in the actual data. The current balance scenario
+assumes a 3-year transition period to comply by 2016.
+
+
+- _Limited independent fiscal oversight._ In principle, the monitoring of compliance would require a
+broader assessment of the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the MTFF and an assessment
+of the debt sustainability beyond just verifying that fiscal outturns meet the expenditure ceilings.
+The CGR has been transparent and fulfilled its reporting obligations, but its current mandate
+does not cover these assessments and has focused on auditing whether expenditures of the
+government and other entities grew within the prescribed limits. The existing fiscal council does
+not have sufficient resources nor capacity to provide such fiscal oversight.
+
+
+**16.** **It is understandable that some implementation challenges emerged as the rule just**
+**came into force in 2020, at the same time as the pandemic hit the economy.** As the expenditure
+ceiling becomes tighter in the near term, the authorities face pressure from both legislative and
+executive proposals to exclude certain entities or spending items from the fiscal rule. But some
+proposals would bring permanent changes to the rules and are not well suited to resolve near-term
+challenges.
+
+##### **III. ADDRESSING IMMEDIATE** **IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES**
+
+
+**17.** **To address the immediate implementation challenges, the government as well as**
+**parliamentary members have presented various proposals to revise the rules.** These proposals
+broadly include (i) revising the measurement of rule compliance, (ii) excluding certain expenditure
+items from the fiscal rule, and (iii) excluding non-state public entities and other entities from the
+expenditure limits. These revisions likely bring permanent changes—some of these exclusions were
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+approved without a set of common criteria, while others are under consideration by the Legislative
+Assembly (Table 4). However, ad-hoc or frequent amendments to the fiscal rule may fall short of the
+principles of well-designed fiscal rules and could undermine credibility. Those amendments may not
+be well-suited to address the tighter expenditure limits or constraints arising from entity-level
+compliance. Since the fiscal rule was put in place, the decree regulating the LSPF has undergone 7
+revisions and 11 entities were excluded by law. Further revisions to the fiscal rule will need to be
+based on good principles including maintaining broad coverage to achieve the final objective of
+debt sustainability, while ensuring enforcement of the fiscal rules.
+
+
+**A.** **Amending the Coverage to Exclude Entities from the Fiscal Rules**
+
+**Proposals by the government and parliamentary members**
+
+**18.** **In September 2022, the government submitted a bill to reform the fiscal rules aiming**
+**to address implementation shortcomings** [. Bill Nº 23330 proposes to further exclude the following](https://delfino.cr/asamblea/proyecto/23330)
+entities from the fiscal rule: i) all public corporations (PC) that carry out commercial activity in a
+competitive market, even those with high debt, except for the part of the current transfers from the
+central government; ii) non-state public entities except for those receiving transfers from the central
+government. The bill also proposes to exclude various types of expenditure items (Section III.B).
+
+
+**19.** **In parallel, the Legislative Assembly is considering several other amendments to**
+**exclude entities from the fiscal rules.** Twenty draft bills are pending discussion at the Legislative
+Assembly. Various parties have put forward proposals to exclude entities or amend the fiscal rules,
+arguing that expenditure limits have imposed constraints on critical spending and investment,
+especially for entities that under-executed their budgets owing to lockdown restrictions during the
+pandemic. In some cases, those entities run a surplus and have adequate resources to invest but
+cannot do so because the fiscal rules are applied at the individual entity level (Table 4). These
+amendments often are entity specific without a set of common criteria. Aside from exclusions, the
+base reference variable was modified in the case of National Tourism Institute (ICT) when applying
+the ceilings on expenditure growth, thus allowing it to increase actual spending while still complying
+with the expenditure rule.
+
+
+**20.** **The government proposal aims to enhance flexibility for these excluded entities.** In the
+imminent term, it would relax spending limits and alleviate political pressures from the cost-of-living
+crisis as expenditure growth ceilings are falling short of headline inflation. Among the entities subject
+to potential exclusion are decentralized institutions, public corporations, and non-state public
+entities that follow different budget procedures owing to the budget fragmentation in Costa Rica.
+
+
+**Assessment and Recommendations**
+
+**21.** **Well-designed fiscal rules tend to have broad institutional coverage, encompassing all**
+**key components of fiscal operations that have significant effects on the economy or on fiscal**
+**sustainability** . In principle, fiscal rules should cover all relevant fiscal and quasi-fiscal operations,
+provided that reliable data on those operations are available on a timely basis. A broad coverage
+prevents incentives to reallocate expenditure toward entities or activity that are not covered in the
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+fiscal rules, which could undermine the objectives to curb overall spending and reduce government
+debt.
+
+
+**Table 4. Proposed Amendments to the Fiscal Rule for Specific Institutions Pending**
+
+**Approval by the Legislative Assembly**
+
+
+Sources: CGR and authors’ compilation.
+
+
+**22.** **The proposals to exclude further entities and expenditure items in the draft bill (No.**
+**23330) may go against good principles.** The proposed revisions appear to lack common criteria. If
+applied, the exclusions of entities and expenditure items would significantly reduce the coverage of
+the rule from 60 percent to 44 percent of total NFPS expenditures, according to the final outturn
+data in 2021 (Figure 9). Similar large reduction of the coverage by the fiscal rules will also happen in
+the national budget of the central government as well as in the decentralized sector. The fiscal rule
+would then have covered only two-thirds of central government spending. Some other countries that
+adopt expenditure rules, such as Paraguay and Peru, the coverage of the fiscal rules has reached
+more than 90 percent of total government expenditures. Therefore, further exclusions of expenditure
+items and government entities will put the coverage of Costa Rica’s fiscal rule below the typical
+coverage in Latin America.
+
+
+**23.** **The bill may help ease the imminent expenditure constraints under the fiscal rules but**
+**at a high risk.** As spending in selected entities will not be counted towards the expenditure ceilings,
+the government may meet imminent spending pressures by scaling up spending in those activities
+without breaching the expenditure growth limits. Even if the intention is not to accommodate higher
+spending, there would be considerable pressures to approve budgets at the limit. However, the bill
+would bring structural changes to the fiscal rules by reducing their coverage significantly.
+
+
+**24.** **As a result, there is an imminent need to identify the coverage and perimeters of the**
+**fiscal rules and establish a sound framework to determine which entities should be included.**
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Such a framework will help the government address repeated ad-hoc requests to amend the rules—
+which could further undermine credibility—and implementation challenges noted in Section II. Some
+criteria put forward in various proposals, such as the entities generating own revenues, may not be
+fully aligned with international statistical concepts in GFSM, while some others such as the debt-toasset ratio would help serve as complementary indicators.
+
+
+**Figure 9. Total Expenditures Excluded under Various Proposals**
+
+(Share of Expenditures in Percent)
+
+
+
+Current situation
+
+
+
+Government’s proposal
+
+
+
+IMF’s proposal
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Sources: CGR reports (2022), national authorities’ data, and authors’ calculations.
+
+
+**25.** **The fiscal rules in Costa Rica should ideally cover the general government** . This would
+have two important implications:
+
+
+1. All fiscal operations classified to be government activities, including those currently
+performed by decentralized institutions or some nonstate public entities, would be included
+in the fiscal rules, while activities that are not fiscal operations would be excluded.
+
+
+2. Local government spending and spending on social security and healthcare by the CCSS
+would ideally be covered by the fiscal rules over the medium term.
+
+
+**26.** **Identifying government entities would require an objective set of criteria regarding**
+**decentralized or nonstate public entities.** The IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM)
+classifies an entity as part of the government if two broad criteria (among others) are met: the entity
+is under government control _and_ a nonmarket producer (Figure 10; full details in GFSM 2014 Figure
+2.4). The use of GFSM is also consistent with other public sector reforms like Hacienda Digital, the
+transition to IPSAS in accounting, and the technical assistance on the reporting of fiscal statistics
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+under the Fund EFF program. The authorities commit to gradually report fiscal statistics according to
+the GFSM by 2025.
+
+
+**Figure 10. GFSM Statistical Principles in Identifying General Government Activity**
+
+
+Source: Authors’ compilation based on Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014.
+
+
+- _**Government control.**_ Government control is defined as the ability to determine the general
+policy or program of an entity (GFSM 2014). Several indicators can help determine if the entity is
+controlled by the government, including (i) the ownership or the rights to control the board or
+appoint or remove key officers; (ii) provisions or existence of a contractual agreement for
+governments to determine general policy and program; (iii) high degree of financing by the
+government, including borrowing from the government; and (iv) the government takes on risk
+exposures for the activity of the entity. A single indicator could be sufficient to determine control,
+though in some cases a consideration of separate indicators may collectively help determine it.
+Entities that are not financially viable and expose government to risks are likely to be classified as
+government entities.
+
+
+- _**Nonmarket producer**_ **.** A nonmarket producer provides its output to others for free or at prices
+that are not economically significant. This means that prices have little or no influence on how
+much the producer is prepared to supply and on the quantity demanded. Private corporations
+are generally market producers. When there is government control, however, prices may be
+modified for public policy purposes. Even when the sales of public corporations cover a large
+portion of their costs, they may not respond to market conditions like a profit-maximizing firm.
+In general, an entity is classified as a nonmarket producer if its sales (excluding taxes and
+transfers) is less than half of the production cost (including wages and investment costs) over a
+sustained multiyear period, although this value is just a reference and a case by case judgement
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+is needed. [6] It is likely that a corporation receiving substantial government transfers or financial
+support, or enjoying risk-reducing factors such as government guarantees, would respond to
+market conditions differently because of softer budget constraints and is therefore likely to be a
+nonmarket producer.
+
+
+**27.** **The government should classify all decentralized institutions or public corporations**
+**according to the above GFSM principles to determine whether they should be included in the**
+**fiscal rules.** Entities that are not controlled by the government should be excluded (for example,
+some professional associations currently classified as non-state public entities) (Figure 11). Entities
+that are controlled by the government and operate as a nonmarket producer should be included,
+whereas those operating as a market producer are classified as public corporations and excluded
+from the fiscal rules. The GFSM principles of government control and nonmarket producers are
+related to but different from the criteria specified in the decree. For example, an entity running on a
+commercial basis could be a market producer although an entity running at a surplus or profit over
+the years may rely on government support and therefore not be a market producer. Similarly, a
+nonmarket producer can be receiving or not receiving government transfers or can have high or low
+debt-to-asset ratios.
+
+
+**Figure 11. Selected GFSM Classification Categories**
+
+
+**28.** **For entities classified as** _**public corporations**_ **outside the fiscal rules, other monitoring**
+**will still be necessary to ensure they do not pose significant fiscal risks.** The Fund has developed
+some tools for fiscal risks assessment (FRAT and SOE health check) categorizing the level of risk and
+
+
+6 It is necessary to compare between sales value and the production costs when determining an entity is a public
+corporation (state-owned enterprise) or a government entity (belong to the general government). Sales are measured
+before any taxes applicable and exclude all payment receivable from government unless they would be granted to
+any producer of the same activity. Production costs are calculated as the sum of compensation to employees, use of
+goods and services, consumption of fixed capital, and other taxes on production. The return to capital is included in
+production costs. Subsidies receivable on production are not deducted from the production cost.
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[mitigating measures (IMF Fiscal Risk Toolkit). For example, the government should expand the report](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/Fiscal-Risks/Fiscal-Risks-Toolkit)
+on their operations, cashflow statements, and balance sheet to monitor their financial viability and
+government exposures. Public corporations should continue to be subject to approval for new
+material borrowings, be audited, and have clear performance indicators. Fiscal risks statements
+should incorporate public corporations and follow a risk-based approach concentrating the
+monitoring to high-risk entities. High-risk entities should be subject to enhanced control to be made
+explicit in the regulations.
+
+
+**29.** **The current debt monitoring and authorization is fragmented among the entities of the**
+**NFPS.** The Law 7010 establishes that only the MoF has borrowing capacity at the central
+government. The annual budget approves the domestic bonds issuance and each new loan requires
+approval by the Legislative Assembly (external loans by qualified majority and internal loans by
+simple majority). The sovereign guarantee for public entities will undergo the same process.
+However, the other entities with “autonomy” such as Universities, local governments and social
+security, and public banks do not need approval, except for sovereign guarantees. Overall the debt
+among those entities is moderate but some are rising rapidly in recent years. In order to mitigate the
+fiscal risks, tighter debt authorization is necessary to scrutinize the financial and debt servicing
+conditions of the borrowing entity, the conditions of the loans, and the final approval of the MoF.
+Many countries have implemented a system of alerts and thresholds plus prudent financial
+conditions are required (Mexico, Spain).
+
+
+**30.** **The expenditure growth ceiling could apply to central government (statistical concept)**
+**including the aggregate of national budget and decentralized institutions.** Applying the
+expenditure ceilings individually to each decentralized institution creates rigidity in their budgets and
+pose challenges on the compliance of the fiscal rule. Ideally, the government should minimize the
+use of extrabudgetary entities (EBE) and integrate them into the national budget. As this is not
+feasible at present, at least the fiscal rule could apply to the aggregate of national budget and
+decentralized institutions. This would allow flexibility to compensate expenditure growth among the
+entities, for instance, higher social spending in some decentralized entity can be compensated by
+less expenditures in others so as to meet the aggregate ceiling (Annex 1). It would need that STAP is
+empowered by law to approve and monitor the compensating activity according to fiscal policy
+guidelines and priorities.
+
+
+**31.** **In the medium term, the authorities should consider including the local governments**
+**and social security (CCSS) in the fiscal rule.** These entities are part of the general government
+under the statistical principles and therefore should eventually be covered by the fiscal rule. The
+fiscal rule will _not_ affect the autonomy of local governments, as other countries with varying degree
+of intergovernmental relations are able to establish fiscal rules covering the general government or
+adopt subnational fiscal rules (Ralyea and others 2018). Recognizing the inclusion is not feasible at
+present, the CGR and Ministry of Finance should put in place enhanced monitoring and control to
+avoid fiscal slippages, including reflecting them in the fiscal risk report and publishing regularly longterm projections for health and pension spending. The MOF should also require monthly or quarterly
+financial information from these entities, require authorization when they incur new debt, and
+enhance information exchange. Incentives can also be applied to encourage prudent public finances,
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+such as balanced budget principles for local governments, and good PFM practices. When modifying
+the legal framework to include them in the fiscal rule over time, however, each local government or
+social security (CCSS) should _not_ be subject to a uniform expenditure limit at individual entity levels.
+Certain flexibility needs to be built in, while respecting the overall fiscal envelope under the
+expenditure limits. For example, bringing the social security and health care spending into the
+national budget or central government (statistical concept) would give the government flexibility to
+better prioritize spending among competing needs.
+
+
+**B.** **Excluding Expenditure Items from the Fiscal Rule**
+
+**Government proposal**
+
+**32.** **The government submitted a bill in September 2022 to exclude several expenditure**
+**items from the fiscal rule.** The proposal (Bill Nº 23330) excludes the following items: capital
+expenditures (regardless of the debt level), interest expenditure (only for the central government),
+externally-financed projects (both existing projects that have financing rolling over ( _revalidaciones_ )
+and new international grants and loans), court rulings pending a final judgement, and contractual
+obligations of the airport concessions. These items to be excluded represent about 35 percent of the
+total expenditure of the central government (or 17 percent of total NFPS expenditures) (Figures 12
+and 13). The bill is under discussion at the Legislative Assembly.
+
+
+
+**Figure 12. Share of Proposed Exclusions in**
+
+**the Total Expenditure of the Central**
+
+**Government**
+(Share of expenditures in percent)
+
+
+
+**Figure 13. Share of Proposed Exclusions in**
+
+**the Total Expenditure of the NFPS**
+
+(Share of expenditures in percent)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Sources: CGR reports (2022), national authorities’ data, and authors’ calculations.
+
+
+**Assessment and recommendations**
+
+**33.** **The fiscal rule would cover a much narrower share of expenditure under the proposed**
+**exclusions.** The exclusions are against the principle that a well-designed fiscal rule should cover all
+main fiscal aggregates that can affect fiscal policy and debt sustainability (Eyraud and others 2018).
+They tend to undermine fiscal credibility, as a large share of fiscal activity would not be monitored or
+covered by the fiscal rule. In such case, even full compliance with the fiscal rule would not guarantee
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+reducing debt vulnerabilities. Activity excluded from the rule could pose significant risks to public
+finances. The exclusion also reduces the counter-cyclical property of the expenditure rule during
+adverse shocks.
+
+
+**34.** **Many countries exclude certain expenditure items in their fiscal rules but the**
+**experience has been mixed** (Box 1 and Table 5). Some spending items are excluded to safeguard
+priority spending such as social protection or public investment for development needs. On the
+other hand, some expenditure items are not easy to monitor, due to the lack of or delays in
+information. Although exclusions are common, such exclusions often give rise to implementation
+challenges, as they make fiscal rules less transparent and harder to monitor. Additional distortions
+are prevalent as those exclusions give incentives for creative accounting to reclassify expenditure to
+other categories not subject to fiscal rules. The latter risk can be mitigated because the Law 9635
+includes certification from the entities on capital expenditure classification and control from STAP
+and DGPN.
+
+
+**35.** **The proposed exclusions in Costa Rica create limited spending space but present**
+**significant risks.** Although the exclusion of expenditure items could give rise to additional policy
+space to spend, it could bring risks and undermine fiscal discipline and efforts to control
+expenditures and fiscal consolidation.
+
+
+- _Capital expenditures._ The existing fiscal rule already has a provision to protect capital
+expenditures: expenditure growth ceilings only apply to current spending when debt is below 60
+percent of GDP. As capital expenditures often involve multi-year spending, excluding them from
+the fiscal rules will lead to distortions, less transparency, and give incentives for creative
+accounting with potential undue classification of expenditure items. Over the past few years,
+capital expenditures were always under-executed relative to the budget amount; it is therefore
+unclear whether the key binding constraint on aggregate public investment is the fiscal rule or
+rather unintended under-execution.
+
+
+- _Externally financed projects._ At present, the government does not include all capital expenditures
+in the initial budget because at the time of budget preparation the nature and size of externallyfinanced projects are uncertain. Externally-financed projects are included through in-year budget
+modifications, which can be large for some institutions and unrelated to expected annual
+execution, and are reflected in the final budget. As the government has revised the reference
+(July 2022 decree) to assess the compliance of fiscal rule (Section III.A), it intends to exclude
+externally-financed projects from the fiscal rule. Excluding externally-financed projects from the
+rule might encourage relying further on external financing.
+
+
+- _Interest bill_ . A key rationale for excluding interest payment from the fiscal rule is that interest
+spending represents the cost of previous deficits (incurred in the form of debt) and is outside the
+direct control of government. Some countries therefore adopt limits on primary spending or
+primary balance. However, for countries whose priority is to reduce debt over time, focusing on
+overall expenditure or balance (that is, including the interest bill) in the fiscal rule is appropriate
+as they link directly to the debt dynamics. In Costa Rica, an exclusion of interest bill in the fiscal
+rule might loosen the primary expenditure limit modestly in the near term (by up to 0.4 percent
+of GDP under the authorities’ projection), but the additional space could be offset in the future
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+depending on the macroeconomic outlook (Figure 14). For example, a faster decline in the
+interest bill would relax primary expenditure growth under the existing rule but would leave it
+unchanged if interest was excluded. Frequent amendments to the rules may also undermine the
+credibility of fiscal rules, in turn raising the borrowing cost of the government.
+
+
+
+
+- _Contingent liabilities from court rulings and_ **Figure 14. Implications for Primary**
+_contractual obligations on airport concessions_ . **Expenditure of Excluding Interest**
+The authorities indicated that there are two **Payments from the Fiscal Rules**
+court rulings that may incur as an expense to (Percent of GDP)
+the central government at (0.4 percent of GDP)
+if government loses in the legal cases.
+Excluding such contingent expenses is not
+recommended. A more appropriate way will be
+to keep a contingency reserve in the budget to
+account for the court rulings as well as other
+possible spending contingencies. Some other
+countries maintain a reserve of about 2-3
+percent of annual government expenditures for
+such contingencies and the council of ministers
+
+Sources: Authors’ estimates.
+
+(or the cabinet) approves its use. Over the
+medium term, the potential realization of Notes: the path for spending excluding interest (red
+contingencies should be incorporated through dotted line) is independent of the interest bill
+
+assumptions. A faster decline in the interest bill
+
+better fiscal planning under the MTFF fiscal
+
+generates more room for primary spending growth
+
+path. The same would apply for the contractual
+
+under the existing rule projection. The blue line is
+
+obligations with companies operating the indicative as it refers to a specific set of
+concessions for airports (Juan Santamaría and macroeconomic assumptions.
+Daniel Oduber). The accrued expenditure
+should be included as part of overall expenditure when assessing compliance with the fiscal rule
+for the general government.
+
+
+**36.** **Existing proposed amendments represent a departure from good principles of fiscal**
+**rules and could affect the implementation of fiscal rule in a permanent way.** The additional
+spending space from these exclusions in the near term does not seem to outweigh the costs and
+risks involved, including undermining the credibility of the fiscal rule given it is still at the early stage
+of implementation. To rectify the bills already submitted to the Legislative Assembly, it is
+recommended to propose a modification in line with principles of well-designed fiscal rules as the
+bill is under review by relevant legislative committees. Further proposals to amend the fiscal rules
+would benefit from thorough and unified cost-benefit analyses.
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+**Figure 14. Implications for Primary**
+
+
+
+**Expenditure of Excluding Interest**
+
+
+
+**Payments from the Fiscal Rules**
+
+
+
+(Percent of GDP)
+
+
+
+
+
+Sources: Authors’ estimates.
+
+
+
+Notes: the path for spending excluding interest (red
+dotted line) is independent of the interest bill
+assumptions. A faster decline in the interest bill
+generates more room for primary spending growth
+under the existing rule projection. The blue line is
+indicative as it refers to a specific set of
+macroeconomic assumptions.
+
+
+
+**Box 1. Selected Country Examples of Exclusions from Expenditure Rules**
+
+
+This Box illustrates the coverage of expenditure rules in selected countries in Central and Latin America.
+While a well-designed fiscal rule calls for a broad coverage of key fiscal aggregates, many countries
+exclude certain expenditure items in their expenditure rules. The exclusions arise from several causes. On
+the one hand, some spending items are excluded to safeguard priority spending such as social
+protection or public investment. On the other hand, some expenditure items are not easy to monitor,
+due to the lack of or delay in available information.
+
+
+From an economic point view, there are some reasons to exclude specific expenditure items in a fiscal
+rule (Cordes and others 2015). Interest payments are sometimes excluded from fiscal rules as they are
+not under the direct control of governments. Certain cyclical automatic-stabilizing expenditures, such as
+unemployment benefits, are sometimes excluded in expenditure rules (e.g., in the European Union).
+
+
+Exclusions of expenditure items in the fiscal rule vary among countries. Some exclude capital spending
+from the expenditure rule or set a floor of capital spending, though that can give rise to implementation
+challenges (Davoodi and others 2022). Some countries exclude interest payments, pensions, or cyclical
+expenditure such as unemployment benefits. In some cases, the expenditure rule is directly defined in
+terms of primary (or primary current) expenditure ceilings, excluding interest payments.
+
+
+Several Central and Latin American countries have exclusions in their expenditure rules (Table 5). Many
+expenditures rules in Latin America are usually defined in terms of primary spending, with interest
+payments excluded. Exceptions are Costa Rica and Peru, with the latter including interest payments in
+the current expenditure rule, but also specifying that the limits on non-financial spending exclude
+interest payments. Some other countries have budget balance rules (Chile, Mexico, Peru), with a few
+defining them in terms of structural or primary balances. Several cases (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) also
+have debt rules in place.
+
+
+Public investment is often excluded from Central and Latin American expenditure rules. For example, the
+expenditure rule in Mexico is set on current spending only, thereby excluding all investment spending. In
+Argentina, capital expenditure is excluded from the rule in the jurisdictions that registered a surplus the
+previous year, while only partially for those jurisdictions with a deficit.
+
+
+Some other exclusions depend on countries’ institutional framework. In countries where subnational
+governments get large transfers from the central government, for instance through automatic revenue
+sharing formula, these transfers tend to be excluded from the fiscal rule (Mexico and Argentina).
+Countries with rigid and earmarked expenditures, such as pre-allocations to specific items, sometimes
+exclude them. For example, Ecuador excludes spending items that are specified in the constitution for
+pre-allocated expenditure to education, health, and transfers to regional governments. The expenditure
+rule of Mexico excludes expenditure items such as pensions and fuels for electricity generation.
+
+
+Even though exclusions of spending items are common in expenditure rules, such exclusions often give
+rise to implementation challenges. The exclusions make fiscal rules less transparent and harder to
+monitor. Exclusions also limit the ability to restrain aggregate expenditures, posing more challenges to
+reducing debt vulnerabilities. Additional distortions are prevalent as those exclusions give incentives for
+creative accounting to reclassify expenditure items not subject to fiscal rules. These challenges are
+particularly relevant for capital expenditures as it often involves multi-year spending and efficiency
+concerns. Certain current expenditures may be reclassified to public investment to bypass the rule limits.
+Including capital expenditure in the fiscal rule would promote better transparency and use of resources.
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+**Table 5. Selected Country Examples on the Use of Expenditure Rules**
+
+
+Sources: Authors’ compilation based on IMF Fiscal Rule Dataset 2021.
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**C.** **Revising the Ex-post Compliance Measurement**
+
+**Government executive decree**
+
+**38.** **The government modified the methodology for verifying compliance with the fiscal**
+**rules in July 2022.** Executive Decree N° 43589-H, enacted in July 2022, changed the reference
+variable for verification of ex-post compliance to the final budget of a given fiscal year relative to
+the initial budget of the previous fiscal year (Figure 15). This implies that the compliance is
+assessed based only on budgetary terms rather than final outturn and does not consider the
+externally funded spending. [7]
+
+
+**Figure 15. Verification of Compliance with the Expenditure Rule**
+
+
+Sources: Authors’ compilation of the compliance reference variables based on executive decree N° 43589-H.
+
+
+**Assessment and Recommendations**
+
+**39.** **The revision of the reference variable used to verify compliance was an attempt to**
+**address a shortcoming in the fiscal rule.** Under-execution of the budget had carry-on effects
+for future limits of expenditure growth and thereby discouraged saving through improving
+spending efficiency. For example, the lower-than-anticipated execution in 2020 owing to
+lockdown restrictions led to a lower base regarding the 2021 expenditure growth limit.
+
+
+**40.** **While the revision may address the unintended effects of budget under-execution,**
+**it brought up other challenges.** First, the monitoring of the final budget becomes less
+
+
+7 A new executive decree (N° 43589-H) was enacted in July 2022, which amended the executive decree 41641-H
+implementing the LSPF.
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+transparent for the public. Monitoring the budget modifications to arrive at the final budget
+would require frequent access to Information System on Plans and Budgets (SIPP) and dedicated
+websites. The final budget often does not have the same comprehensive explanatory notes as
+the execution data. In general, the use of final budget in verifying compliance deviates from
+common practice. The CGR also indicated that compliance based on the final budget cannot be
+subject to legal sanctions because the final budget remains an estimate and not an outturn. The
+use of the final budget should still be kept for ex-ante and in-year monitoring and preventive
+action.
+
+
+**41.** **Using the final budget as a base for applying expenditure growth ceilings creates a**
+**challenge related to externally financed projects.** Those projects are included in the final
+budget through in-year modifications, but are not included in the initial budget. The final budget
+includes the multi-year funding without annualizing the expected execution. Table 6 contains
+estimates of what would have been the ex-ante and ex-post assessment before and after the
+executive decree (Decree 43589-H) over recent years. Externally-financed expenditure accounts
+for one-fifth of capital expenditure of the national budget of central government. Instead, the
+rest of NFPS entities include the externally-financed expenditure both in the initial budget and
+modifications. CGR and Ministry of Finance have different interpretations on the inclusion. The
+Ministry of Finance intends to exclude externally financed projects from the final budget to verify
+the compliance relative to the initial budget, while CGR includes those but do not adjust the
+initial budget reference with the estimated externally-financed spending.
+
+
+**Table 6. Measuring Compliance with Expenditure Growth Ceilings**
+
+
+**CG spending growth rate (percent)**
+
+**2020** **2021** **2022**
+**Rule**
+total spending n.a. n.a. 2.0
+current spending 4.7 4.1 2.0
+**Ex-ante verification (initial (T) vs initial (T-1))**
+total spending 5.4 1.1 2.0
+current spending 4.4 2.1 2.1
+**New ex-post verification (final w/ ext. fin. (T) vs initial (T-1))**
+total spending 11.5 14.6 14.4
+current spending 4.5 5.2 3.1
+**New ex-post verification (final w/o ext. fin. (T) vs initial (T-1))**
+total spending -1.7 -4.4 2.4
+current spending -1.2 -3.0 2.5
+**Old ex-post verification (executed (T) vs executed (T-1))**
+total spending -3.3 9.0 n.a.
+current spending 0.7 7.4 n.a.
+
+
+Sources: National authorities’ Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks 2021 – 2025 and 2022 -2027 _, Ministerio de_
+_Hacienda_, and authors calculations.
+
+
+Note: Excluding spending covered by the escape clause from the final budget and execution amounts in 2020
+and 2021 (0.8 and 0.4 percent of GDP, respectively). The rule ceiling does not apply to total spending in 2020
+and 2021 (marked as n.a.) as T-2 debt was below 60 percent of GDP.
+
+
+**42.** **A preferred approach to assess ex-post compliance would be to compare the final**
+**outturn relative to the initial budget of the previous year** **while making an estimate of**
+**externally-financed expenditure** . The final outturn is observable and relates directly to debt
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+dynamics. The comparison of the final outturn with the initial budget would resolve the underexecution challenges arising when using the final execution of the previous year. The execution
+accounts for all funding sources, including externally-financed projects, but the initial budget
+used as reference does not include those. In that context, one option would be to add the
+estimated annual execution of the externally-financed expenditure to the initial budget such that
+the reference would be comparable to the final execution. To this end, the budget document (or
+a supplementary annex to the budget) can include the list of projects and estimated expenditure
+with external financing for the next budget year, for information purposes. This would be the
+same practice as other NFPS entities apply today. [8] It would help improve budget unity on the
+capital expenditure and strengthen the link between verification of compliance and the fiscal
+sustainability objective.
+
+
+**43.** **However, this approach may involve procedural changes in STAP and DGPN.** It is
+because the initial budget only involves domestic financing items, while the external financing of
+projects is approved in separate procedures. If the preferable option of comparing final outturns
+with initial budget is not feasible, a closer analysis on the annual execution of externally-financed
+projects as well as their implications on government debt is necessary. In case the reference base
+is the initial budget of the previous fiscal year without including an estimate of externallyfinanced projects, a separate expenditure control is necessary as externally-financed projects
+represent an important part of government expenditures and external loans add to government
+debt.
+
+
+**44.** **For ex-ante compliance with fiscal rules, the comparison of budgets would still be**
+**useful to avoid large deviations before the final execution (as in Art. 19 LSPF).** The ex-ante
+verification helps prevent large deviations from the rule during the year. The base reference
+(initial budget) would have to be adjusted with the estimate of the annual externally-financed
+expenditure as noted above. The first time of adjusting the initial budget with an estimate can
+apply the effective execution of the previous year to avoid an overestimate.
+
+
+**D.** **Escape Clauses**
+
+**45.** **The fiscal rule includes an escape clause in the event of a national emergency or**
+**sharp economic downturn.** The escape clause can be activated for two years if (i) there is a
+state of national emergency, which allows emergency spending of at least 0.3 percent of GDP; or
+(ii) there is an economic recession or if GDP growth is projected to fall below 1 percent. In case
+(ii), the suspension of the rule is up to two years if the previous levels of real GDP are not
+recovered before, and there is a three-year transition period to return to the rule. In periods of
+
+
+8 The Congress would not have to approve the estimate because it had already approved those projects in
+separate occasions when the government borrowed externally. But the inclusion of such information in the annex
+to the budget would give comprehensive information of the capital expenditure for the year independent of the
+funding source.
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+extraordinary favorable economic growth (real GDP growth over 6 percent for two years) the
+Ministry of Finance (MoF) can raise the current expenditure growth parameter up to 85 percent.
+
+
+**46.** **The escape clause provision could allow for a transition period also after national**
+**emergencies** (Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; Article 16 of the LSPF). A two- to three-year
+transition appears appropriate when countries exit from national emergencies or recessions,
+which may help avoid an abrupt withdrawal of primary spending. A robust procedure to activate
+the clause and a narrow set of circumstances remain important.
+
+
+**E.** **Recommendations**
+
+**Coverage of the expenditure rule**
+
+- The institutional coverage of the fiscal rule should apply to general government, as defined
+in Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). Over time, the Legislative Assembly should
+consider including local governments and the social security (CCSS) in the fiscal rule. In the
+interim, Ministry of Finance will closely monitor them under a risk-based approach.
+
+
+- MOF should develop verifiable and objective criteria to identify which public entities should
+be included in the fiscal rule, in accordance with GFSM and other indicators.
+
+
+- Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to indicate that the exclusion of
+entities from the fiscal rules should be based on GFSM criteria specified by MOF (or including
+those criteria in the law). Entities that are under government control and nonmarket
+producers should be considered as government entities and included in the fiscal rules.
+Other entities need to be monitored under a risk-based approach to be developed by MOF,
+and debt regulations to cover the authorization outside of central government should be
+enhanced.
+
+
+- MoF will present an assessment on legal changes needed to empower the ministry and in
+particular STAP to make the expenditure limits applicable to the overall central government
+(GFSM) at the aggregate level, including extrabudgetary entities such as Decentralized
+Institutions, instead of by individual entities.
+
+
+**Excluding expenditure items**
+
+- Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to avoid excluding capital
+expenditure, court rulings, and interest expenses from the expenditure rules. Create a
+contingency reserve in the budget (e.g., a separate budget line) that will cover court rulings,
+among others, subject to the aggregate expenditure ceilings.
+
+
+**Verification of compliance**
+
+- Clarify the executive decree to include the comparison of expenditure growth between the
+final outturn at the end of a fiscal year relative to the initial budget of the previous fiscal year
+plus an estimate of externally funded expenditure. Ex ante and in-year verification at budget
+level remains the same but adding the annual estimate of the externally funded expenditure.
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+- Include the best estimate of annual externally funded expenditure in an annex to budget
+documents provided to the Legislative Assembly.
+
+
+**Other provisions**
+
+- Modify the escape clause provision _(_ Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; _Article 16 of the LSPF)_
+such that the maximum transition period applies when the escape clause is activated in either
+one of the triggering conditions (emergency or recession).
+
+##### **IV. MEDIUM-TERM CONSIDERATIONS OF** **THE FISCAL RULES**
+
+
+**A.** **Risk-Based Approach in Setting a Medium-term Debt Anchor**
+
+**47.** **The annual ceilings on expenditure growth could be supported by an explicit**
+**medium-term debt anchor.** International experience suggests that well-designed fiscal rules
+have a medium-term anchor linked to the objective of fiscal sustainability and defined in terms
+of a stock variable (typically, gross debt in percent of GDP). Anchoring fiscal policy to a stock
+variable is appropriate because fiscal sustainability is determined by the government balance
+sheet, and its capacity to meet financing needs and service debt. However, because the debt
+stock is not under the full control of the government, the debt anchor should guide fiscal policy
+over the medium term (Caselli et al. 2018, Caselli and others 2022). One (or a few) operational
+limit(s) should instead guide near-term fiscal policy and budget preparations. The operational
+limits such as expenditure rule should have a clear link with the fiscal anchor—in which adhering
+to the expenditure rule over time would ensure a high likelihood of achieving the debt anchor
+and maintain debt sustainability over the medium term. In addition, operational limits such as
+deficit targets or expenditure limits should contribute to macroeconomic stability over business
+cycles, for example through a countercyclical primary balance.
+
+
+**Figure 16. Fiscal Rules of Worldwide**
+
+
+
+**Types of Fiscal Rules**
+(Number of countries with specific type of fiscal rule)
+
+
+Source: Davoodi and others (2022).
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+**Common Adoption of Fiscal Rules, 2021**
+
+(Number of countries)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Note: The Venn diagram (right-hand-side chart) shows the overlap of different rules across the world. For
+example, there are 5 countries that adopt all four types of fiscal rules and 35 countries that adopt debt rules with
+both budget balance rules and expenditure rules
+
+
+**48.** **A combination of expenditure rules with a debt rule is common in practice.** As of
+2021, 85 countries adopted fiscal rules that included an explicit ceiling on government debt, and
+this number has been increasing over time (Figure 16). At the same time, more than 80 percent
+of countries with a debt ceiling have also rules imposing constraints on the (nominal or
+structural) budget balance, and among those, almost a third has expenditure ceilings (Figure 16).
+
+
+**49.** **A risk-based approach to set the medium-term anchor requires determining a debt**
+**limit and a precautionary buffer:**
+
+
+- _A (maximum) debt limit._ The debt limit is the level debt should not exceed. There is
+consensus that debt could be in distress with debt dynamics getting out of control when
+debt surpasses a certain level, and the literature abounds with estimates of this threshold
+(IMF 2016). However, this country-specific threshold is highly uncertain in the post-pandemic
+environment, in part because of unanticipated inflation, rapid rises in nominal interest rates,
+uncertainty about the neutral interest rate, and concerns about government efforts in
+undertaking adjustments. The latest literature suggests that the debt limit can be sensitive to
+growth and interest rates differentials, as well as to the elasticity of interest rates to debt
+(Caselli and others 2022; Mian, Sufi, and Straub 2022). As a result, considerations other than
+the risk of debt distress also motivate the choice of a maximum debt limit, for example, the
+adverse impact of higher debt on growth and financing conditions. Debt should not exceed
+the level that drags growth or that triggers a sharp rise in spreads or ratings downgrade.
+
+
+- _A safety buffer._ Keeping debt close to the limit would not be prudent, as an adverse shock
+(for example, from a tightening of financial conditions) could quickly push debt above the
+limit and lead to a surge in spreads or debt distress. It would be prudent to maintain a safety
+buffer such that under normal circumstances, debt would stay sufficiently below the limit.
+The safety buffer raises the likelihood that debt would remain sustainable (that is, below the
+limit) even under negative shocks, and that policymakers have space to respond to shocks
+and stabilize the economy. The safety buffer also allows governments time and space to take
+corrective measures if debt starts trending up.
+
+**B.** **Estimating a Medium-Term Debt Anchor for Costa Rica**
+
+**50.** **The authorities should consider introducing a medium-term anchor on gross**
+**government debt.** The current fiscal rule in Costa Rica has an operational limit—a ceiling on
+expenditure growth linked to the 4-year moving average of previous nominal GDP growth and
+the previous debt-to-GDP ratio--but without a debt rule it is uncertain if the expenditure ceilings
+are consistent with the objective of reducing government debt over time and maintaining debt
+sustainability. The following discusses an appropriate government debt anchor based on the IMF
+guidance note on calibrating fiscal rules (Caselli and others 2018). This involves two steps:
+
+
+- **Setting a debt limit** : We consider that an appropriate range for the debt limit would be
+about 65 to 70 percent of GDP, slightly below the 70 percent threshold applied to emerging
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+market-access countries in the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework for Market
+Access Countries (IMF 2013). [9] A level below the 70 percent of GDP benchmark is justified
+because sovereign spreads and credit risk in Costa Rica have recently surpassed those of the
+average emerging-market economy for a similar level of government debt (Figure 17).
+Moreover, spreads for Costa Rica sovereign bonds have been higher than those of 75
+percent of emerging market economies since 2014 (Figures 18 and 19).
+
+
+- **Estimating the debt anchor** : The sustained rise in government debt over the last decade in
+Costa Rica calls for a precautionary approach when setting the debt anchor. Costa Rica
+experienced a doubling of debt from 34 to 68 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2021 as
+adverse shocks occurred and nominal growth slowed down. We determine a safety buffer
+based on the stochastic nature of the debt, the tolerance for risks, and the size and likelihood
+of contingent liabilities. [10] The debt anchor is calibrated so that the distribution of debt
+dynamics (a fan chart) starting from the debt anchor stays below the maximum debt limit
+over a 6-year horizon with a high probability. Intuitively, the debt anchor is the highest level
+of debt that the government could reach and still have a relatively low risk of experiencing
+fiscal distress over the medium-term. The methodology is described in Annex II.
+
+
+
+**Figure 17. Debt Levels and Spreads in**
+
+**Emerging Market Economies**
+
+(Percent)
+
+
+Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global
+Debt Database, and JPMorgan.
+
+
+Notes: Spreads in log terms. Excludes Venezuela.
+
+
+
+**Figure 18. Spreads in Emerging Market**
+
+**Economies, 2000-21**
+
+(Basis points)
+
+
+Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global Debt
+Database, and Fitch.
+
+
+Note: Data for sovereign spreads of Costa Rica are not
+available before 2012.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+9 The DSA methodology was revised recently (IMF, 2021), but has moved away from homogeneous debt
+thresholds across countries within an income group.
+
+10 In Costa Rica, the possible contingent liabilities arise from government guaranteed debt of public entities,
+natural disaster risks, pensions, court rulings, local governments, financial sector risks, and public-private
+partnerships. As of mid-2022, the quantified medium-term contingent liabilities were about 9 percent of GDP
+This is similar to the average in a sample of advanced and emerging market economies (Bova and others 2016),
+which finds that the probability that contingent liabilities exceeding 1 percent of GDP materialize in a year is
+about 6 percent, with the average fiscal cost of these realizations at about 10 percent of GDP.
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+- Based on the historical realization of macroeconomic shocks and contingent liabilities in
+Costa Rica, a prudent gross debt anchor for Costa Rica’s central government is estimated to
+be between 35 and 50 percent of GDP if policymakers are tolerant of a 10 percent probability
+that debt may breach the maximum debt limit of 65-70 percent of GDP over the medium
+term (Figure 20). This would provide a reasonable safety buffer allowing Costa Rica to
+withstand typical adverse macroeconomic shocks in the medium term. A lower debt limit or a
+lower tolerance for risk would require a lower debt anchor (Table 7).
+
+
+**Figure 19. Debt Levels and Sovereign Ratings in Emerging Market Economies**
+
+(Credit ratings)
+
+
+Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global Debt Database, and Fitch Ratings.
+
+
+**Figure 20. Debt Anchor with Sufficient Buffers**
+
+(Percent of GDP)
+
+
+Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook and IMF Staff estimates.
+
+
+Notes: using the IMF [Fiscal Rule Calibration Tool] (Eyraud and others, 2018).
+The chart simulates the evolution of debt from an anchor level under a distribution
+of shocks based on historical data.
+
+
+37
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Gross Debt Anchor**
+
+
+
+**Baseline**
+**scenario**
+
+
+
+**Higher risk**
+
+
+
+**tolerance**
+
+
+
+**Lower**
+**debt limit**
+
+
+
+**No Contingent**
+
+
+
+**scenario** **tolerance** **debt limit** **Liabilities**
+
+Parameters
+Debt limit (percent of GDP) 70 70 65 70
+Risk tolerance (probability of exceeding 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0
+limit, percent)
+
+
+
+5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0
+
+
+
+Contingent liabilities (percent of GDP) 9.3 9.3 9.3 0.0
+Results
+
+**Debt anchor (percent of GDP)** **45.3** **49.8** **35.4** **61.5**
+p10-p90 range at year 5 (percent of 13.8 14.1 13.9 13.0
+GDP)
+
+Source: IMF Staff estimates.
+
+
+Note: Assuming a maximum primary balance of 2.5 percent. The contingent liabilities are estimated by the
+national authorities. The simulation assumes that about 1.5 percent of contingent liabilities materialize every year,
+cumulating to 9.3 percent of GDP over 6 years.
+
+
+**51.** **Additional considerations of fiscal risks and development needs in Costa Rica will**
+**affect the choice of the debt anchor** . Mapping these spending needs to a medium-term debt
+anchor would require some judgement. For example, public spending on health and social
+protection (through transfers by central governments to CCSS) are expected to rise over time.
+Investing in infrastructure (such as education, roads, and climate adaptation) remains a priority. It
+could increase productive capacity, but also financing needs, so its implications for the debt-toGDP ratio will need to be considered when setting a medium-term debt anchor.
+
+
+**52.** **Complying with the existing expenditure rule is expected to put debt on a path**
+**reaching the debt anchor at about 50 percent of GDP by 2035** . Based on the projections in
+the IMF 2022 Staff Report for the Third Review under the EFF (IMF 2022) and the application of
+the existing expenditure rule, current spending would be contained, while debt-to-GDP would
+gradually fall to about 50 percent of GDP by 2035 (Figure 21). However, adhering to the
+expenditure rule will require a sizeable reduction in total expenditure as a share of GDP by 3
+percentage points of GDP over next 15 years. To the extent cutting expenditure proves
+economically or politically difficult, additional revenue measures will be needed to finance
+additional spending needs. Setting a medium-term debt anchor would allow policymakers to
+recalibrate the expenditure path following structural shocks (e.g., a permanent increase in
+revenues), and still attain the same debt anchor levels over a similar horizon (Table 8).
+
+
+38
+
+
+
+**Table 8. Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks under Existing Rule Ceilings, 2024-2035**
+
+
+**Current expenditure growth,** **Debt in 2035,**
+
+**2024-2035 average, percent** **percent of GDP**
+
+Baseline 4.5 52.5
+
+Higher NGDP growth (+1ppt) 5.2 39.6
+
+Higher interest rate (+1ppt) 4.3 56.7
+
+Higher revenue (+1 pct of GDP) 4.7 36.3
+
+
+Sources: IMF Staff Estimates.
+
+
+Notes: Each row other than baseline introduces one shock at a time. The shock applies to the entire period
+2024-2035. For reference, the current expenditure growth ceiling in 2022 was 1.96 percent of GDP. The
+projections assume government expenditures are at the ceilings prescribed under the fiscal rule. If the
+government adopts more ambitious adjustment with expenditures growing within the ceilings, then debt
+levels would decline further by 2035.
+
+
+**53.** **The debt anchor can be set to cover central government debt (in gross terms), with**
+**an aim to include debt incurred by municipalities and local governments when**
+**consolidated data become timelier and available.** Local government debt remains modest at
+0.2 percent of GDP in 2021 at the aggregate level. The central government is the main source of
+borrowing, contributing 85 percent of the consolidated NFPS debt level in 2021.
+
+
+**Figure 21. Current Spending and Debt Projections under the Fiscal Rule, 2024-2035**
+
+
+Sources: IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis.
+
+
+Note: Corresponds to baseline scenario in Table 8. Notes: The Debt Sustainability Analysis extends until 2031.
+Beyond 2031 all macroeconomic variables except for current spending and debt are assumed to remain
+constant, and the current spending path is determined by the fiscal rule.
+
+
+**54.** **Introducing a debt limit and anchor likely requires an amendment to the current**
+**Fiscal Responsibility Law (Law 9635).** The concept of debt anchor should be described in the
+law in terms of its role in contributing to fiscal sustainability, rather than as legally binding
+constraints on near-term fiscal policies. The constraining role of debt exceeding the anchor level
+would be formalized in a correction mechanism. The introduction of a medium-term anchor
+
+
+39
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+should be consistent with the fact that expenditure ceilings are the operational constraint on
+near-term fiscal policy in Costa Rica. The expenditure rule parameters, along with other nonparametric aspects of the fiscal rule framework, would need to be reviewed periodically (e.g.,
+every 5 years) when the debt anchor is in place to ensure that they remain consistent with
+reaching the debt anchor under the MTFF.
+
+**C.** **Recommendations**
+
+- Include a medium-term debt anchor in the current fiscal rule framework. The government,
+through consultation of stakeholders, would propose a gross debt anchor for the central
+government consistent with maintaining fiscal sustainability with high probability and to be
+operationalized through an expenditure rule. The proposal would also specify the
+institutional and economic coverage of the debt anchor.
+
+
+- Recalibrate expenditure rule limits periodically (every 5 years) after the debt anchor is
+established in the fiscal rule to ensure the consistency with the medium-term debt anchor.
+
+##### **V. STRENGTHENING THE MTFF TO SUPPORT** **THE RULES-BASED FRAMEWORK**
+
+
+**A.** **Reinforcing the MTFF framework**
+
+**The role of the MTFF and its linkage with fiscal rules**
+
+**55.** **The fiscal rule needs to be complemented by a medium-term fiscal framework**
+**(MTFF).** The MTFF sets the fiscal envelope for 3-5 years, guiding the annual budgets, and needs
+to be consistent with the fiscal rules to achieve fiscal sustainability. Many countries, like Costa
+Rica, have established numerical fiscal rules on expenditures that impose ceilings on expenditure
+growth in a legislation. [11] The expenditure limits need to be consistent with the fiscal path set in
+the MTFF, converging to the medium-term debt anchor and credibly guiding the annual budgets.
+To support the credibility of the fiscal path and underlying MTFF projections, countries often (1)
+prepare alternative macroeconomic scenarios that impact the fiscal projections and sensitivity
+analysis, and (2) empower independent fiscal councils to assess macroeconomic and fiscal
+forecasts.
+
+
+**56.** **MTFFs tend to include fiscal risk assessments not only at the macroeconomic level**
+**but on specific fiscal risks.** The government needs to control for the fiscal risks arising from
+entities or expenditure items that are excluded from the fiscal rules, such as public corporations,
+
+
+11 Some countries with well-established MTFFs can, alternatively, set the operational limits in the MTFF to reach a
+sustainable level of debt and not in the legal framework. The expenditure limits would be binding for the period
+of the MTFF plan (Caselli and others 2022). Then, those parameters of the fiscal rules can be calibrated
+periodically. How to make those expenditure ceilings binding is still a challenge and will in most cases need legal
+provisions on corrective action to avoid or correct excessive expenditure or deficits.
+
+
+40
+
+
+
+subnational governments, and pension funds to avoid putting fiscal sustainability at risk. A better
+assessment of fiscal risks includes preparing a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) following a riskbased approach (Table 9). The management of fiscal risks can be divided into four stages:
+identification, mitigation, provision for risks that cannot be mitigated, and building of fiscal
+buffers to accommodate residual risks (IMF 2016). Good practices in the management of specific
+fiscal risks are described in Table 9.
+
+
+**Table 9. Fiscal Risks Management Toolkit**
+
+
+Source: Analyzing and Managing fiscal Risks: Best Practices (IMF 2016).
+
+
+**57.** **Strengthening the budget process is critical for a successful implementation of**
+**fiscal rules and a credible MTFF.** The fragmented budget process and non-comprehensive
+budgets—such as the existence of significant extrabudgetary entities or dual budgets for capital
+and current expenditures, or for external and internal funding—complicate the implementation
+and monitoring of fiscal rules, which could eventually undermine their credibility. The MTFF often
+faces coordination issues with different entities involved in projections, delays in information
+sharing, and less transparent monitoring if information is not easily available. The lack of a
+comprehensive budget requires more efforts to coordinate the MTFF that includes the NFPS and
+different sources of fiscal reporting.
+
+
+**58.** **Another pillar of the fiscal rule’s framework is enhancing the transparency of**
+**government finance statistics.** In general, countries with good quality, coverage, and timeliness
+
+
+41
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+of fiscal reporting will enable the monitoring of fiscal rules. Governments can take early or
+preventive action in case of deviation from the rule limits. At the same time, a broader coverage
+of fiscal rules becomes possible in countries with monthly or quarterly fiscal statistics covering
+the general government and NFPS, and with timely consolidation of accounts. This enables the
+fiscal rules to better contribute toward the objective of fiscal sustainability. In that context,
+covering extra-budgetary activities within the central government statistics is crucial for the wellfunctioning of fiscal rules.
+
+
+**59.** **The MTFF includes the policy mix of current spending and investments for the**
+**medium-term.** Instead of excluding capital expenditures in fiscal rules (that is, the golden rules)
+or setting a limit on current expenditure by law, it is more effective and credible to consider the
+composition in the government fiscal plans (MTFF) and the cycle for investment execution. In this
+sense, the MTFF should present the most likely investment scenario as the baseline and
+compliant with the overall expenditure limits, instead of putting public investment as a residual
+value or as an optimistic path in national development plans.
+
+**B.** **Recent Progress of the MTFF in Costa Rica**
+
+**60.** **The authorities have made progress in developing an MTFF since 2020 and aligning**
+**their fiscal strategy consistent with the fiscal rules and debt projections** . The development
+of the MTFF has been supported by FAD capacity development during 2020-2022 and led to the
+fulfilment of two Structural Benchmarks of the IMF EFF program, which requires the publication
+of the MTFF for the central government in 2021 and for the NFPS in 2022 (Annex III). The
+development of the MTFF was also supported by a medium-term debt strategy report (April
+2022). The MTFF report presents the no-policy change scenario, the policy reforms, and the final
+scenario, and assesses the compliance with fiscal rules (expenditure ceilings) of the previous and
+following years. The macro-fiscal model is being enhanced with IMF-ICD support to incorporate
+the macroeconomic part and be able to do shock scenarios.
+
+
+**61.** **The MTFF in Costa Rica also includes an analysis of fiscal risks, which is deemed**
+**good practice** . This analysis includes macroeconomic risks and specific risks (public corporations,
+pensions, natural disasters, court rulings, local governments, private-public partnerships (PPPs),
+financial sector and public debt). Most analyses are qualitative but some risks are quantified, and
+mitigation measures are included in some cases.
+
+
+**62.** **The expansion of the MTFF to the NFPS in 2022 has partly overcome the**
+**fragmentation in the fiscal plans between the national budget and rest of the NFPS.** The
+fiscal rules and MTFF follow a top-down approach by setting the fiscal aggregates to guide the
+budget preparation. However, in Costa Rica, the expenditure rule is based on individual entities,
+with a rather bottom-up approach except for the budgetary CG. In this case, the MTFF provides a
+top-down overview of deficit and debt consistent with the expenditure ceilings under the fiscal
+rules, as well as an overall projection with the contribution of the subsectors to the fiscal
+objectives.
+
+
+**63.** **The MTFF is the link between the fiscal rules and annual budget.** The preparation of
+the MTFF should guide the budget, and the projection should reflect the envisaged execution.
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+The MTFF has to be in line with the expenditure rule in the budget and in execution. Table 10
+shows that the MTFF complies with the annual expenditure growth ceilings for the national
+budget. However, NFPS expenditure growth exceeds the ceiling because some entities in the
+NFPS are excluded from the rule.
+
+
+**Table 10. Expenditure ceilings and MTFF 2021-2023**
+
+(Percent)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|2021|2022|2023|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Expenditure Rule: Current Expenditure**|4.13|1.96|2.56|
+|MTFF expenditure growth projection CG|5.8|1.25|2.61|
+|MTFF expenditure growth projection NFPS|Non-
applicable|5.22|4.69|
+|**Expenditure Rule: Total expenditure**|Non-
applicable|1.96|2.56|
+|MTFF expenditure growth projection CG|Non-
applicable|1.96|2.56|
+|MTFF expenditure growth projection NFPS|Non-
applicable|5.6|5.0|
+
+
+
+Note: Expenditure growth projections for the CG are actual executed data in 2021 and exclude Covid-19 related
+expenditure and the excess expenditure over the ceiling of the previous year. For 2022 and 2023 it excludes some
+items exempted from the rule.
+
+
+**64.** **The calendar of the MTFF publication (April and August each year) reflects the**
+**budget preparation and the budget proposal.** The MTFF requires having final execution data
+of the previous fiscal year that is consolidated by STAP in March each year. It also needs the
+decision on the expenditure rule in March and the macroeconomic scenario from the central
+bank (BCCR). The MoF has successfully published the MTFF in April in 2021 and 2022 and
+updated it for the central government in August (Figure 22).
+
+
+**65.** **The projection model of the MTFF needs assumptions on the consolidation of the**
+**NFPS** . The framework developed with FAD capacity development includes a fiscal database and
+the projection model (for the central and local governments, social security (CCSS), rest of
+decentralized institutions (ID), and public corporations) to consolidate to the NFPS projections.
+The model includes the baseline scenario, policy measures, and final scenario in compliance with
+the fiscal rule by subsector. Some assumptions are needed to project the subsectors as many of
+those are excluded from the fiscal rule (central government, ID sector (without Social Security)
+and around 50 percent of the expenditure of public corporations are assumed rule-compliant).
+The rule’s compliance in the model is ensured by adjusting public current transfers (CG), private
+transfers (ID sector) and good and services expenditure in public corporations. In this exercise,
+the role of national budget transfers is key as it is used for the consolidation among subsectors,
+ensuring compliance with the fiscal rules at each subsector and consolidated levels.
+
+
+43
+
+
+
+**Figure 22. Calendar of the MTFF and National Budgets**
+
+
+Sources: Authors’ compilation.
+
+
+**C.** **Pending Issues Regarding the MTFF in Costa Rica**
+
+**66.** **Demands for exclusions from the expenditure rule have complicated the MTFF**
+**projection exercise, making it less transparent** . An increasing number of expenditure items
+and significant entities are excluded from the fiscal rule. Without a medium-term debt anchor, it
+is possible that entities not covered by the rule could overspend and contribute to the debt
+buildup. The MTFF exercise is important as it brings a transparent discussion of the feasibility of
+the expenditure ceilings to reach a debt anchor and how the subsectors could contribute or
+compensate each other. However, the exclusions and difficult coordination in obtaining
+information of entities outside the fiscal rules have reduced the transparency.
+
+
+**67.** **The MTFF only reports on central government debt as the rule thresholds apply.** It is
+advisable to expand the scope of the debt sustainability analysis to cover NFPS debt as there is
+published data at MoF, including the government guaranteed debt. However, there are
+limitations to the NFPS consolidated public debt. The debt management office (DGCP) does not
+have detailed data on public debt holders within the NFPS regarding terms, interest rates, and
+currency denomination that are required to calculate the average effective interest rate of the
+consolidated debt. For this reason, the projection was based on the interest rates of the central
+government non-consolidated debt, which could have overestimated the interest payments.
+
+
+**68.** **The recent decree that established the compliance with the rule at budget level**
+**introduces challenges to the MTFF projections.** The MTFF reflects expenditure projections in
+terms of expected execution and including all expenditure items. Since the introduction of the
+July 2022 decree, only the initial and final budgets are considered for the expenditure rule
+compliance, excluding all externally-financed projects that account for around 20 percent of
+
+
+44
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+central government capital expenditure in 2021, as currently these are not included in the initial
+budget. The starting point of the MTFF projections is the execution of last fiscal year and not the
+final budget of last year for a consistent presentation of the fiscal path, and the projection
+includes all expenditures irrespective of their financing sources. Therefore, the MTFF includes an
+estimate of expenditures funded across all sources. In order to make it comparable to the initial
+budget the assumptions on external funding have to be made explicit. Also, the assumptions of
+under-execution if any should be made explicit. The MTFF should comply with the fiscal rules and
+explain the deviations and underlying assumptions compared to the budget.
+
+
+**69.** **The operation of the macro fiscal unit (MFU) to improve projections and the MTFF**
+**report remains a challenge.** There are resource constraints in the MoF that limit the ability to
+carry out NFPS medium-term projections. The MTFF is prepared by a small group of two stable
+staff at the Minister’s office whose tasks do not allow for full-time dedication to the projections,
+making it difficult to sustain in the future. A MFU led by a directorate in charge of macro-fiscal
+issues at MoF with sufficient resources would be needed.
+
+
+**70.** **In the short term, the MTFF could explicitly integrate the debt anchor as the final**
+**objective that guides the fiscal path.** Even if the LSPF could take time to introduce the debt
+anchor, the MTFF could include it as a government long-term objective that is needed to guide
+the central government and NFPS projections, and its link to the expenditure rule.
+
+**D.** **Independent Fiscal Council**
+
+**71.** **Costa Rica established a Fiscal Council in 2019 but has not been operational.** The
+council was established as an independent body conformed by five members (initially only
+three). Four of the Fiscal Council members are designated by the Government and the fifth one is
+chosen by the Legislative Assembly. They must be independent professionals with a solid
+knowledge of macroeconomics and public finance. However, members of the Council work adhonorem without renumeration. The establishment of the Fiscal Council was one of the loan
+conditions by Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 2021 for improving fiscal
+sustainability. Currently, the Council only has one member, with two having resigned in 2021 and
+another two in 2022.
+
+
+**72.** **The Fiscal Council’s main task is to evaluate macro-fiscal developments** . The Fiscal
+Council is tasked to be responsible for preparing reports to evaluate the performance of the MoF
+regarding fiscal policy developments, fiscal rule monitoring, and fiscal risk assessment. More
+specifically, the Fiscal Council should give its opinion on the fiscal projections in the MTFF and on
+the macro projections in the annual budget, as well as the underlying assumptions and
+methodologies of those projections. It also should give its opinion on the MoF’s management of
+fiscal risks. Finally, it should comment on the quarterly and annual reports monitoring the fiscal
+rule.
+
+
+**73.** **The Fiscal Council does not have resources to perform its duties** . The Council does
+not have its own staff to perform its duties such as elaborating the reports. It does not have its
+own communication channel (e.g., a designated website). While recognizing the overall need to
+limit spending in Costa Rica, it is advisable to have the Fiscal Council to have its own budget line
+
+
+45
+
+
+
+to secure adequate resources commensurate with its mandate over time. It will need to voice its
+opinion publicly on fiscal issues within its mandate, including the compliance with fiscal rules and
+assessment of debt sustainability. The MoF will also need to share information on a timely basis
+with the Council so that it can perform its duties. The regulation should clarify the calendar of
+information sharing from Ministry of Finance and the timing of fiscal council inputs and reports
+to enhance accountability.
+
+**E.** **Recommendations**
+
+- Continue to strengthen the MTFF that presents the fiscal path consistent with fiscal rules
+compliance and aligned to a medium-term debt anchor.
+
+
+- Reinforce Hacienda Digital project to allow for timely fiscal reporting on consolidated NFPS
+fiscal accounts and public debt.
+
+
+- The MOF should present to the Ministry of Planning a proposal to create the Macro Fiscal
+Unit (MFU) with a directorate and sufficient personnel and resources.
+
+
+- Amend the law to strengthen independent fiscal oversight with the necessary provisions to
+make the independent fiscal council operational.
+
+##### **VI. REFERENCES**
+
+
+[Mian, A., L. Straub,L. and A. Sufi (2022). "A Goldilocks Theory of Fiscal Deficits," NBER Working](https://www.nber.org/papers/w29707#:~:text=This%20paper%20proposes%20a%20tractable,primary%20deficit%20unambiguously%20raises%20debt.)
+Papers 29707, National Bureau of Economic Research.
+
+
+Caselli, F., L. Eyraud, A. Hodge, F. Diaz Kalan, Y. Kim, V. Lledó,S. Mbaye, A. Popescu, W. H. Reuter,J.
+[Reynaud, E. Ture, and P. Wingender (2018). “Second Generation Fiscal Rules: Balancing](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2018/04/12/~/media/AB330D5FB8074E7189C986298E0393A7.ashx)
+[Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability” IMF Staff Discussion Note, Technical Background Papers](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2018/04/12/~/media/AB330D5FB8074E7189C986298E0393A7.ashx)
+to SDN/18/04
+
+
+Caselli, F. H. Davoodi, C. Goncalves, G. Hee Hong, A. Lagerborg, P. Medas, A. D. M. Nguyen, and J.
+Yoo (2022). “The Return to Fiscal Rules”. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2022/002.
+
+
+Corbacho, A., and T. Ter-Minassian, 2013. “Public Financial Management Requirements for
+Effective Implementation of Fiscal Rules.” In _The International Handbook of Public Financial_
+_Management_, ed. R. Hemming, R. Allen, and B. Potter. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
+
+
+Cordes,T., T. Kinda, P. Muthoora and A. Weber (2015).” Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for
+Sound Fiscal Policy?”. IMF Working Paper WP/15/29
+
+
+Davoodi H.R., P. Elger, A. Fotiou, D. Garcia-Macia, X. Han, A. Lagerborg, W.R. Lam, and P. Medas.
+[(2022).“Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Councils: Recent Trends and Performance during the Pandemic”,](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2022/English/wpiea2022011-print-pdf.ashx)
+IMF Working Paper No.22/11.
+
+
+46
+
+
+
+Debrun, X, J. Ostry, T. Willems, and C. Wyplosz (2019). "Public Debt Sustainability," CEPR
+Discussion Papers 14010
+
+
+[Eyraud, L., X. Debrun, A. Hodge, V. Leedo, C. Pattillo. 2018. “Second Generation Fiscal Rules:](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2018/sdn1804-on-second-generation-fiscal-rules.ashx)
+[Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability”, IMF Staff Discussion Note, April 2018,](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2018/sdn1804-on-second-generation-fiscal-rules.ashx)
+Washington, D.C.
+
+
+[Gbohoui, W. and P. Medas. 2020. “Fiscal Rules, Escape Clauses, and Large Shocks”, IMF Special](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/enspecial-series-on-covid19fiscal-rules-escape-clauses-and-large-shocks.ashx#:~:text=A%20large%20shock%20may%20put,framework%20that%20is%20too%20inflexible.&text=In%20the%20absence%20of%20escape,pandemic%20or%20other%20large%20shocks.)
+Series on Fiscal Policies to Respond to COVID-19, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
+
+
+[IMF. 2016. “Analyzing and Managing Fiscal Risks—Best Practices”, June 2016, International](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2016/_050416.ashx)
+Monetary Fund Policy Paper, Washington, D.C.
+
+
+IMF, 2021. “Fiscal Rules Database—Technical Note”, IMF Technical Manual, Washington, D.C.
+International Monetary Fund.
+
+
+Thornton, J. and C. Vasilakis. 2018. “Fiscal Rules and Government Borrowing Costs: International
+Evidence” _Economic Inquiry_ Vol. 56, No. 1, January 2018, 446–459.
+
+
+Valencia, O. and C. Ulloa-Suarez. 2022. “Numerical Compliance with Fiscal Rules in Latin America
+and the Carribbean”, IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-1345, Inter-American Development Bank,
+September 2022.
+
+
+47
+
+
+
+**Annex I. List of Entities Included in STAP Fiscal Statistics, 2021**
+
+|National budget of the central government|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|_Asamblea Legislativa_|ASAMBLEA|
+|_Contraloría General de la República_|CGR|
+|_Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República_|DEFENSORIA|
+|_Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería_|MAG|
+|_Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Telecomunicaciones_|MICITT|
+|_Ministerio de Comercio Exterior_|COMEX|
+|_Ministerio de Cultura y Juventud_|MCJ|
+|_Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio_|MEIC|
+|_Ministerio de Educación Pública_|MEP|
+|_Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía_|MGOBER|
+|_Ministerio de Hacienda_|MHD|
+|_Ministerio de Justicia y Paz_|MJUSTI|
+|_Ministerio de la Presidencia_|MP|
+|_Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes_|MOPT|
+|_Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica_|MIDEPLAN|
+|_Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto_|RE|
+|_Ministerio de Salud_|MSALUD|
+|_Ministerio de Seguridad Pública_|MSP|
+|_Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social_|MTSS|
+|_Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos_|MIVAH|
+|_Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía_|MINAE|
+|_Poder Judicial_|JUDICIAL|
+|_Presidencia de la República_|PREREP|
+|_Regímenes de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto de la República_|REGPEN|
+|_Servicio de la Deuda Pública_|DEUDA|
+|_Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones_|TSE|
+|||
+|**_Decentralized Institutions_**||
+|_Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos_|ARESEP|
+|_Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos de Costa Rica_|BCBCR|
+|_Caja Costarricense Seguro Social_|CCSS|
+|_Comisión de Energía Atómica de Costa Rica_|CEA|
+|_Academia Nacional de Ciencias_|CIENCIAS|
+|_Consejo Nacional de Cooperativas_|CONACOOP|
+|_Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas_|CONAI|
+|_Consejo Nacional de Rectores_|CONARE|
+|_Corporación Arrocera Nacional_|CONARROZ|
+|_Consejo Nacional Investigación Científica y Tecnológico_|CONICIT|
+|_Corporación Ganadera_|CORFOGA|
+|_Colegio Universitario de Cartago_|CUCA|
+|_Colegio Universitario de Limón_|CUNLIMON|
+|_Ente Costarricense de Acreditación_|ECA|
+|_Sistema de Emergencias 9-1-1_|EMERGENCIAS 911|
+|_Instituto Costarricense del Deporte y la Recreación_|ICODER|
+|_Instituto Costarricense de Turismo_|ICT|
+
+
+
+48
+
+
+
+|Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal|IFAM|
+|---|---|
+|_Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social_|IMAS|
+|_Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje_|INA|
+|_Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres_|INAMU|
+|_Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuacultura_|INCOPESCA|
+|_Instituto de Desarrollo Rural_|INDER|
+|_Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Y Censos_|INEC|
+|_Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica_|ITCR|
+|_Junta Administrativa del Colegio San Luis Gonzaga_|JACSLG|
+|_Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur de la Provincia de_
_Puntarenas_|JUDESUR|
+|_Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional_|JUPEMA|
+|_Oficina Nacional Forestal_|ONAFO|
+|_Oficina Nacional de Semillas_|ONS|
+|_Patronato Nacional de Ciegos_|PANACI|
+|_Patronato Nacional de Rehabilitación_|PANARE|
+|_Patronato Nacional de la Infancia_|PANI|
+|_Programa Integral de Mercadeo Agropecuario_|PIMA|
+|_Promotora de Comercio Exterior_|PROCOMER|
+|_Servicio Nacional Aguas Subterráneas Riego Y Avenamiento._|SENARA|
+|_Sistema Nacional de Acreditación de la Educación Superior_|SINAES|
+|_Sistema Nacional de Información Unificado y Registro Unico de_
_Beneficiarios del Estado_|SINURIBE|
+|_Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones_|SUTEL|
+|_Universidad de Costa Rica_|UCR|
+|_Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica_|UNA|
+|_Universidad Estatal a Distancia_|UNED|
+|_Universidad Técnica Nacional_|UTN|
+|||
+|**_Local governments_**||
+|_Gobiernos Locales_|GOBLOCAL|
+|_Federación de Municipalidades Cantones Productores de Banano_|CAPROBA|
+|_Federación de Municipalidades de Cartago_|FEMUCARTAGO|
+|_Federación de Municipalidades de Heredia_|FEDEHEREDIA|
+|_Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José_|FEMETRON|
+|_Federación Occidental de Municipalidades de Alajuela_|FEDOMA|
+|_Junta Administradora del Cementerio General y las Rosas de Alajuela_|JACGRA|
+|_Junta Administrativa de Cementerios de de Goicoechea_|JACGOICOECHEA|
+|_Federación de Consejos Municipales de Distrito de Costa Rica_|FCMDCR|
+|_Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales_|UNGL|
+|||
+|**_Public corporations_**||
+|_BANPROCESA S.R.L_|BANPROCESA|
+|_Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz_|CNFL|
+|_Consejo Nacional de Producción_|CNP|
+|_Correos de Costa Rica S.A._|CORREOS|
+|_Editorial Costa Rica_|ECR|
+|_Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia_|ESPH|
+
+
+49
+
+
+
+|Empresa Hidroeléctrica los Negros S.A.|EHLN S.A.|
+|---|---|
+|_Gestión Cobro Grupo ICE S.A._|ICE-G COBRO|
+|_Hospital del Trauma_|IRSS (HOSPITAL TRAU)|
+|_Instituto Costarricense Acueductos y Alcantarillado_|ICAA|
+|_Instituto Costarricense Electricidad Energía_|ICE(ENERG)|
+|_Instituto Costarricense Electricidad Telecomunicaciones_|ICE(TELEC)|
+|_Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles_|INCOFER|
+|_Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico_|INCOP|
+|_Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago_|JASEC|
+|_Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo Vertiente Atlántica_|JAPDEVA|
+|_Junta Protección Social de San José_|JPS|
+|_Radiográfica Costarricense S.A._|RACSA|
+|_Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A._|RECOPE S.A|
+|_Sistema Nacional de Radio y Televisión S.A._|SINART S.A.|
+
+
+50
+
+
+
+**Annex II. Calibrating the Medium-term Debt Anchor**
+
+
+This Annex describes the methodology to determine a safety buffer and the debt anchor. The
+methodology first generates stochastic macroeconomic and fiscal shocks based on historical
+data and an econometric model and subsequently simulates possible paths for government debt
+using a debt accumulation equation and a fiscal reaction function. The full description of the
+stochastic approach is in IMF (2016) and Debrun and others (2018).
+
+
+First, we construct a variance-covariance matrix to account for typical macroeconomic shocks in
+Costa Rica at annual frequency. Data are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook
+database. The variance-covariance matrix obtained from historical data describes the joint
+dynamics of the macroeconomic (non-fiscal) variables needed to project public debt, namely real
+interest rates, real GDP growth, the exchange rate, debt stock-flow residuals, and terms of trade
+shocks. The results are estimated over a relatively short period starting from 1990 due to data
+availability, and excluding the pandemic period. The estimated variance-covariance matrix is then
+used to generate 5,000 sequences of macroeconomic shocks 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 over the six-year projection
+
+horizon.
+
+
+For each of the 5,000 shock simulations, macroeconomic variables are computed over the sixyear horizon, adding the generated shocks each year as the error term. A preferred approach
+would use a VAR to estimate the underlying shocks and make projections, as the lagged effect of
+macroeconomic shocks can be taken into account through the autoregressive structure of the
+model, but that would require quarterly data.
+
+
+Third, the methodology uses a fiscal reaction function based on a panel estimation of 26
+emerging market economies. The fiscal reaction function links the primary balance to public
+debt, while also accounting for economic conditions measured by the output gap. More
+specifically, the estimated equation takes the following form:
+
+
+𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡(1 −𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
+
+
+where 𝑝𝑏 is the ratio of the primary fiscal balance to GDP; 𝑑 is the gross public debt-to-GDP
+ratio; 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝 is the contemporaneous output gap; 𝐷 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the output
+gap is nonnegative (actual output above or equal trend) and 0 otherwise to capture the potential
+asymmetric effects of the output gap on the primary balance; and 𝛼 are country fixed effects and
+_t_ refers to the year. To account for the possibility that fiscal policy can itself be a source of
+shocks, the primary balance is subject to a fiscal policy shock 𝜑𝑖, 𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝜑𝑖 ), where 𝜎2𝜑𝑖 is
+calibrated to the country-specific variance of the residuals of the reaction function.
+
+
+The reaction function is restricted by assuming that the maximum primary surplus that a country
+is capable of achieving following a shock is capped at 2½ percent of GDP for emerging market
+economies, following Escolano and others (2014). The fiscal reaction function allows for an
+asymmetric response to the output gap, so that the primary balance may deteriorate more when
+the output gap is negative than it improves when the gap is positive ( 𝛽3 > 𝛽2 ). The output gap is
+projected over the forecast horizon using GDP growth forecasts obtained from simulations
+
+
+51
+
+
+
+(based on the joint distribution of macroeconomic variables) combined with a Hodrick-Prescott
+filter to estimate potential output.
+
+
+Fourth, the debt trajectories are obtained by combining the shocks with the fiscal policy response
+and debt accumulation equations. A projected debt path is computed for each set of countryspecific shocks, which include shocks to the macroeconomic variables from the variancecovariance matrix, and fiscal specific shocks.
+
+
+For each projection year, the frequency distribution of the projected debt-to-GDP ratios is
+calculated and allows for a probabilistic analysis of debt trajectories. In particular, it is possible to
+calculate the share of the debt paths that cross a given debt limit at a certain year.
+
+
+The validity of this approach is conditioned on the quality of the shocks generated to produce
+the forecasts. Some shortcomings include the possibility that relationships estimated using past
+data may not be relevant for the future or/and the forecasting model does not have a
+satisfactory goodness-of-fit.
+
+
+52
+
+
+
+**Annex III. Progress of MTFF since the Capacity Development**
+
+**Missions in 2020-21**
+
+
+
+
+
+|Main 2020-22 Technical Assistance Mission
Recommendations|Deadline|Preliminary assessment of progress|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Improve fiscal strategy**|||
+|Address the lack of a debt anchor. Change the
legal framework to establish it and define 4-year
debt and deficit sustainable paths in the MTFF.
Clarify the fiscal rule and its monitoring in terms
of budget and execution.|2020|Not met|
+|**Improve the budgetary process**|||
+|Contingency reserve in the budget and the
MTFF for both the CG and other institutions|2021|Not met|
+|**Prepare the MTFF**|||
+|Prepare the MTFF for the NFPS in April, and
update it for the CG in August, focusing on
fiscal policy measures, fiscal risk assessment and
debt paths.|2021 and
2022|Done 2021 and 2022|
+|Develop fiscal projection capacities, by using
and updating the fiscal model and the
databases developed with FAD|2021 and
2022|In progress|
+|Expand debt sustainability analysis in 2022 from
the CG to the NFPS|2022|Not met|
+|**Institutional and legal framework**|||
+|Establish a Macro Fiscal Unit as soon as
possible, with enough human resources to
perform its duties.|2022|Not met|
+|Regulate the process for preparing the MTFF:
information flows between institutions and
MOF, process of approval by the Council of
Ministers, opinion by the Fiscal Council.|2021|Not met|
+|**Fiscal projections**|||
+|Develop macroeconomic projection capacities
and analyze the sensitivity of fiscal projections
to macro shocks|2023|In progress (ICD 2022-2023 technical
assistance)|
+
+
+53
+
+
+
+**Fiscal Affairs Department**
+
+International Monetary Fund
+700 19th Street NW
+Washington, DC 20431
+USA
+[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..691f170c829e5cea20820670270dc967bd8195a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "aea50b7c0344ac2f749c2c8894dd69dc4a8930bdd0f58d54b644b4aabee623c2", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "607f7d1d7f7c7fac", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-001", "height": 771, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bfff7ffed0397ffed0316fc6d0002ffdf00c864190008610393c6761f006ce13", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "101fea475be7ba4e568de2a834456fba3c5dab2a1b7baf5ffa97753ce4c4d593", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2ca2d0f9b430328b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-002", "height": 44, "page": 2, "phash_256": "9c27c20e65183ca53ad03b4ad3e5a1db88bd0ed6558b8ee50eeb0e74456ea3b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "3498525da019172b76ff0e0159a8abe44cec2cabb592f21c0eabd7504ba635ba", "width": 63}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f8d4b4accccecbcf", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-003", "height": 467, "page": 2, "phash_256": "83a09c1d29e963fe7e731bd41c896d527aa6a16b581d2f8e0e165b0178ac45fe", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "7e7f6a7a6e8a499b71c225ff4cefe946cde785afdee381cdd51bf875b3a800d3", "width": 522}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9a72ec92a2929c78", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-004", "height": 123, "page": 2, "phash_256": "91000daf3bafe9016a57f19a475e16be6c4a86556c69c0f66de178c26e87f81a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "f1cff500f7cd9d1ad49776637059a20b750706dd25f7de94f8faac7a3e5208a1", "width": 131}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f2e0c36898feecfc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-005", "height": 534, "page": 2, "phash_256": "9792cb284492b5637826e49a695dd1b359e98a54336bb65a324d8dca0df795a6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "a1930862fa22f5b983cc8147140083d5f7dc57a7f0f6c4cbc1e9f77330bb7c46", "width": 314}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d2dfdfdfc8c82140", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-006", "height": 172, "page": 2, "phash_256": "81c381c3a1c3455b655bad5f851b5d197d1c85ab91ab7e885dab81abab826d4b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "dfc10874da0194d6d56f3b3ca7efc941c7f608f7a66c4c75ae1400937e83ae4c", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "7e5d5f7e9cb4d2de", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-007", "height": 1320, "page": 2, "phash_256": "91df7e7c6fc390bd7678efc3587ca1034fb0fc4ec1998e602f1e61e18d02c210", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "65436717f9560b81e38008ed2fe1db56edaf14e7912b88300e2150c2431a2192", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0003-001", "height": 203, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5c5b230d75450401", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-001", "height": 197, "page": 12, "phash_256": "fbeaa940814116b536b6f426e4668d751b2b7a49d24b6edeccc6c9b21bb03e24", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "3e824c676aef66d1c40ccd0831b0082660abdc614047a4f746b4033bba201da5", "width": 327}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0d262606060e0b33", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-002", "height": 227, "page": 12, "phash_256": "e42764279ad2b2da8f29db69b349cd3493256cd2cd363106cc93993668dbcc9a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "7afe71cf83526649261441add2489d73979408d8fd9acc071ec92683243b1c10", "width": 291}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": "Figure 5. Deviation from the Debt Limits", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b119da5c6d4d5a0b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-001", "height": 249, "page": 17, "phash_256": "b3b99119c8067c671eefc1b04bda371df405f319c3b8875684e61eebc042ed32", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "0e16a98b7652b26d49b7f948161153a165d9064aa72bf74bceccc854e4217f63", "width": 367}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4e99331451755533", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-002", "height": 280, "page": 17, "phash_256": "ea8d957295726e8d79a595736d5b6b8490341ed9ef4bd12658b4c64ac60278b4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "75c09b4c3d5273073fa0d257c784758d90897340b5ae25694a8db8b08404e574", "width": 361}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6c58981535737533", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-003", "height": 280, "page": 17, "phash_256": "f88db10685724ef97e81927329fa6d4e960f1ba4e9f4f00a6ecddba6c2226889", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "c42906a17ed9efc1a1df73106a135b4eb609dd23633100a095cb0a2de26b0e38", "width": 357}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "7131b939b3313931", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0018-001", "height": 256, "page": 18, "phash_256": "fa78c58787876c9de5851a5885b6f069f01bd212834cb14b9136c625b757b766", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "87e508d9d697bf97e31f058a48aaf91e3917e9564d516e08b7f0cd6ecd5e8d65", "width": 732}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4332b8a990e4e71", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0019-001", "height": 265, "page": 19, "phash_256": "e75548558e8a74ca91daa72b3626db786f1c1821d8d6270eb82b84d7e58acdad", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "b5b951df32e0b35928fa872dcb0d3d934214213ebc83181fe5f764f1ed434f28", "width": 360}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "232bde5a585a9e58", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0020-001", "height": 272, "page": 20, "phash_256": "d5188e63ae637b111ee77598618ad3dc74b57829e0c2e0b5872d6cd2e0b4c3ad", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "5bd4f142b431d79a4889debaf234b1ac2f6176d92179c48297a574422e9e6a03", "width": 763}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "bb6e2e2c2c26af2e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0022-001", "height": 412, "page": 22, "phash_256": "a6550b7e69fb29fc3990297b6dba79ca4499390431dc16774d1cb6c1f641f500", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "c64edfe4e5a24f8aef40a71e8da94400263150db019cb13cb3229c46bf87c93d", "width": 727}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0d4d1e9b1b9b9e0d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-001", "height": 175, "page": 23, "phash_256": "b179c797c687987ccc3870e5398e678fb65227188d711e6999e758e3c9865848", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "6d337a4cbfe88882d653e1f82257f5d7d847c4478406c945cbd1fbc22947b2d7", "width": 229}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4c4c06131b9b1656", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-002", "height": 197, "page": 23, "phash_256": "b9f8c62787873978ce7a61c531397486ce70275ab9610e6dc9a718399996cc71", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "04402eefc285a0284e46d100a80ae8499972ab51be839d6261a29f11656368c5", "width": 229}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "166d9f9b1b939749", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-003", "height": 201, "page": 23, "phash_256": "b9f99307c6879c483b7a61e371cc639ec6331e788d210e619dc6c98cf598c32e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "c81fe7f2dc9eb1b17fe03f6a97bd23fd2a0475d1dcd9733525063e4c845e9089", "width": 245}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6d4d9e9b1b139a4d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-004", "height": 188, "page": 23, "phash_256": "b1389699c6878c781c7861e12dd3338ee71ae61ad869c261dce758e7999e4f30", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "9efbc4baeae706e26e2ae1790ed9185b4c1843aa63db7d276a0be4166da6db33", "width": 229}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6c4c869703030e4c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-005", "height": 176, "page": 23, "phash_256": "e5689ec797974b6a9a7a61a58c63749ec239265ad86c5269c9a69c60d996de30", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "057de37f3c40d52656a56b74da53d1f0fd5a81d24d80fd6de8d1e02cee7c518a", "width": 229}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6e4c9e1b1b27474c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-006", "height": 189, "page": 23, "phash_256": "b139939bc787cc6c187861a1f8e4339fe31a66188865d261c8e79ce6f986c39e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "e1647fe772cad4a3a52d7be03a945a059e67db7ae2bdf78aae35b765405fdafb", "width": 243}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0024-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "abfb6e696b6b4b53", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0024-001", "height": 359, "page": 24, "phash_256": "8f0f900ff060600ef87097f0f0206ff0f4a85fe01fff9bca588f951069c761eb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "f276c8b3125f69a58853cd62d5f676c04fff7d177b8ec37a5881564f047265ef", "width": 565}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0025-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "69694d49494d4949", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0025-001", "height": 345, "page": 25, "phash_256": "a38f7e4afd12b777c8f35caa35bc40ec01a923e94ae81b3ec457a357fc10c802", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "cea43c1680f68cb27b5a68a616c91d3d5b09064b2eb78e6ddb27e1ef4b12f964", "width": 700}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0a4e06a71616066b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-001", "height": 257, "page": 27, "phash_256": "e42d6619929299cc994d98e6c9246db32dd2620e659b7259236d6274f64d5f2f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "d8259495cc936ab454ec8d26c4f3898a47b9fe6f0f707a154a424fd57aa30c4c", "width": 361}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3b0d86272b1e8f0d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-002", "height": 270, "page": 27, "phash_256": "e46e6c4493d09b1bc92b6da4b4b4329224d2764f9b698b3c76d49934d993ccd3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "d0dd3087f67456187097113b24de31c5fbdb0eb4b84b7b890556716d85c23b52", "width": 352}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0029-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "868c209f83ad3c19", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0029-001", "height": 238, "page": 29, "phash_256": "b003e596b5cb60d661f13c169f0bcf06e1e1d8f0d87c8c1f9f0fcfc1134d9078", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "e54e2dfdfef130f329a7baa9b6e61d6c753150d14bd0701dc3cafbaea58f0122", "width": 351}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0031-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4757577765653521", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0031-001", "height": 656, "page": 31, "phash_256": "8e90e5e3b77bc66907331d321342356a73c53db61232603660351337f2d6b5eb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "3e0f924b01fc6fcdf1f8ab087dd2c86ebe0d0a284710d9cf5b47988a6102b31c", "width": 1062}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0032-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "7337767535e53552", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0032-001", "height": 432, "page": 32, "phash_256": "afe48d431f18c07f1f80039b837df66119bdc2361ec183bff0137ec8a07b3dc0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "c5c32c3133b93f4605f1398fc8909ccf491a4d9d63abe9c7c9f85b91b994f8b2", "width": 733}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f4e170f0f17460d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-001", "height": 236, "page": 36, "phash_256": "e5a6393f86c973a8da1ee904f96907b11dc520179ea645e6e95afc0ad0999bd0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "6d99bd7d64b7434014710df99bab6d7f7ece73560d8df623b439ec59bc4f4529", "width": 301}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4c1e6c992267d55", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-002", "height": 242, "page": 36, "phash_256": "8baac27ade8298cff39d3611a436adc4a91d6a7992c3729e6c708bc462359ea9", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "e8dedb73b358270977a868a35df14ee1ec73b1ca6980692abb6e9c61506b6c04", "width": 322}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "074cc8b93b430e8c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-001", "height": 222, "page": 38, "phash_256": "b278323c675a6d4e389c7898cb6687331c669964cbe09ca79cc79ce58791c789", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "b1b7013f1b8be351c32e51d141cd4adaa048e302215f4029deca5624f2eb367f", "width": 360}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "299a9d5861354b6f", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-002", "height": 232, "page": 38, "phash_256": "bb98e01cb85778674fc4b3fdb8166e26c7ccb1f0d01ac584816195fac53a85e5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "9a794c504d98babd15c8478b0b1b415dc47876faf6227769147be6d1c95b2fad", "width": 375}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1796c199b8b7e70e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-001", "height": 292, "page": 39, "phash_256": "a012796e65d22cda3b784ad7dab39e688e19976b8e2d962d9685c784958d6594", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "12b36d66793157bb70ed77e4daf6e111a9e0ad3e3fb97ddcaf491ec91a96a954", "width": 387}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8129d1c18f3f6092", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-002", "height": 303, "page": 39, "phash_256": "eaa5ca85955a355a63e4ce3d90faa3d5ce1e98f13380270f3c704bc35a1f14f8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "dae31e9e62cb9da06a2a934d85592c6e434902e9f7be6089256292b28c7e8802", "width": 407}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0041-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2b2b8462397c4c33", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0041-001", "height": 251, "page": 41, "phash_256": "9e08ee5f7e1b1a082f7fa52a3699f056d1eae4a5e3d420f2c03df385a1e044f8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "8ae5835008365e24dab40621249210cb2f85a72d4323772423f24c2f4e5c1887", "width": 739}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0043-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "494d8fcb33376b47", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0043-001", "height": 540, "page": 43, "phash_256": "ab19533267915ee250fe417e60dbd96e94838b059fcce4b1831bacf5985a952c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "ce77ad5690cc6a66e002c0f11b848ef9d1f80e5b4f34f17765f7397a8ba05d0d", "width": 758}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "95a8aab8a8851798", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-001", "height": 200, "page": 46, "phash_256": "f8f04607b8d866e69bcfa4f860e29b98e6e6d8d884a470a6d9c92682dbcbb155", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "e2c6c58ce5c4d5593b103cc4fb53174aed003cc41f31b716011d68e5fc2f11af", "width": 386}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-097/assets/figures/cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "cdceee6c0f109899", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-002", "height": 215, "page": 46, "phash_256": "b0d3861b5965f965376c165c7920db64976c346079809b2c8e477045ebac9f6f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "sha256_normalized_png": "6c002af02e6bc8d8df0cd2b9e96c4cff464cfee0534e2e6c45013c1dacbf010b", "width": 136}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-097/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01f43bd27a5460fddb08ae7006b8ca02912b8515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-097/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nJanuary 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/97**\n### **COSTA RICA**\n\n**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––** **UPGRADING THE**\n**RULE-BASED FISCAL FRAMEWORK**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Costa Rica was prepared by a staff team of the\n\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\n\ncompleted in November 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 8053, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "January 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/97\nCOSTA RICA\n\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT–– UPGRADING THE\nRULE-BASED FISCAL FRAMEWORK\n\nThis technical assistance report on Costa Rica was prepared by a staff team of the\n\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\n\ncompleted in November 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 581}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-002", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-003", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-004", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-005", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-006", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0002-007"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.9129, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(-33.3519172668457, -79.14419555664062, 715.4481201171875, 462.2958068847656)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 1504, "number": 551, "size": 56855, "transform": [748.800048828125, 0.0, -0.0, 541.4400024414062, -33.3519172668457, -79.14419555664062], "width": 2080, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(-58.011905670166016, 688.915771484375, 667.7481079101562, 854.5157470703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "DeviceGray", "has-mask": false, "height": 460, "number": 548, "size": 23145, "transform": [725.760009765625, 0.0, -0.0, 165.60000610351562, -58.011905670166016, 688.915771484375], "width": 2016, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(246.0, 417.0, 559.0, 697.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 280, "number": 538, "size": 0, "transform": [313.0, 0.0, 0.0, 280.0, 246.0, 417.0], "width": 313, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(26.0, 430.0, 214.0, 750.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 320, "number": 542, "size": 0, "transform": [188.0, 0.0, 0.0, 320.0, 26.0, 430.0], "width": 188, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(490.0, 634.0, 568.0, 707.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 73, "number": 547, "size": 0, "transform": [78.0, 0.0, 0.0, 73.0, 490.0, 634.0], "width": 78, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(532.0, 608.0, 569.0, 634.0)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 26, "number": 546, "size": 0, "transform": [37.0, 0.0, 0.0, 26.0, 532.0, 608.0], "width": 37, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nCOSTA RICA\nUpgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal\nFramework\n\n\n\n\n\nW. Raphael Lam, Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia, and\nCarlos Herrero Garcia\n Technical Report | January 2023\n\n\n\n\n\n I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D", "text_characters": 198}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n#### **COSTA RICA** **Upgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal Framework**\n\n\nW. Raphael Lam, Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia, and Carlos Herrero\nGarcia\n\n\n**Technical Assistance Report**\n\n\n**January 2023**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.25, 491.6400146484375, 366.0, 613.1400146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 209, "number": 6, "size": 66327, "transform": [120.75, 0.0, -0.0, 121.5, 245.25, 491.6400146484375], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nCOSTA RICA Upgrading the Rule-Based Fiscal Framework\n\nW. Raphael Lam, Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia, and Carlos Herrero\nGarcia\n\nTechnical Assistance Report\n\nJanuary 2023", "text_characters": 182}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Costa Rica (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and\nmembers of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see _[Staff Operational Guidance for the](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)_\n_[Dissemination of Capacity Development Information](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)_ ). Disclosure of\nthis report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties\noutside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA\nrecipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest shall require the explicit consent of\nthe TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by\nthe staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities\nof Costa Rica (the \"TA recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries\nthereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive Directors and\nmembers of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically\nobjects to such disclosure (see _Staff Operational Guidance for the_\n_Dissemination of Capacity Development Information_ ). Disclosure of\nthis report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties\noutside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA\nrecipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and\ndonors with legitimate interest shall require the explicit consent of\nthe TA recipient and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.", "text_characters": 901}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**CONTENTS**\n\n\nA. The Current Fiscal Rule __________________________________________________________ 11\nB. Strengths and Challenges of the Fiscal Rules Framework ________________________ 14\n\n\nA. Amending the Coverage to Exclude Entities from the Fiscal Rules _______________ 19\nB. Excluding Expenditure Items from the Fiscal Rule ________________________________ 25\nC. Revising the Ex-post Compliance Measurement _________________________________ 30\nD. Escape Clauses __________________________________________________________________ 32\nE. Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 33\n\n\nA. Risk-Based Approach in Setting a Medium-term Debt Anchor __________________ 34\nB. Estimating a Medium-Term Debt Anchor for Costa Rica _________________________ 35\nC. Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 40\n\n\nA. Reinforcing the MTFF framework ________________________________________________ 40\nB. Recent Progress of the MTFF in Costa Rica ______________________________________ 42\nC. Pending Issues Regarding the MTFF in Costa Rica _______________________________ 44\nD. Independent Fiscal Council ______________________________________________________ 45\nE. Recommendations _______________________________________________________________ 46\n\n\n1. Selected Country Examples of Exclusions from Expenditure Rules _____________________________ 28\n\n\n**FIGURES**\n\n\n1. Recent Fiscal Developments in Costa Rica _____________________________________________________ 10\n2. Nonfinancial Public Sector in Costa Rica_______________________________________________________ 10\n3. Changes in Fiscal Rules during the Pandemic vs Global Financial Crisis________________________ 15\n4. Deviation from the Deficit Rule Limits _________________________________________________________ 15\n5. Deviation from the Debt Limits ________________________________________________________________ 15\n6. Expenditure Rule Limits Depend on Nominal GDP Growth and Government Debt Levels _____ 16\n7. Distribution of Real Government Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022 _____________________ 17\n8. Counterfactual Scenarios: Expenditure Rule and Constraint on Current Budget Balance Applied\nsince 2013 _______________________________________________________________________________________ 18\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0087, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "CONTENTS\n\nA. The Current Fiscal Rule 11\nB. Strengths and Challenges of the Fiscal Rules Framework 14\n\nA. Amending the Coverage to Exclude Entities from the Fiscal Rules _ 19\nB. Excluding Expenditure Items from the Fiscal Rule 25\nC. Revising the Ex-post Compliance Measurement _ 30\nD. Escape Clauses 32\nE. Recommendations _ 33\n\nA. Risk-Based Approach in Setting a Medium-term Debt Anchor 34\nB. Estimating a Medium-Term Debt Anchor for Costa Rica _ 35\nC. Recommendations _ 40\n\nA. Reinforcing the MTFF framework 40\nB. Recent Progress of the MTFF in Costa Rica 42\nC. Pending Issues Regarding the MTFF in Costa Rica _ 44\nD. Independent Fiscal Council 45\nE. Recommendations _ 46\n\n1. Selected Country Examples of Exclusions from Expenditure Rules _ 28\n\nFIGURES\n\n1. Recent Fiscal Developments in Costa Rica _ 10\n2. Nonfinancial Public Sector in Costa Rica_ 10\n3. Changes in Fiscal Rules during the Pandemic vs Global Financial Crisis 15\n4. Deviation from the Deficit Rule Limits _ 15\n5. Deviation from the Debt Limits 15\n6. Expenditure Rule Limits Depend on Nominal GDP Growth and Government Debt Levels _ 16\n7. Distribution of Real Government Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022 _ 17\n8. Counterfactual Scenarios: Expenditure Rule and Constraint on Current Budget Balance Applied\nsince 2013 _ 18\n\n3", "text_characters": 1067}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "9. Total Expenditures Excluded under Various Proposals _________________________________________ 21\n10. GFSM Statistical Principles in Identifying General Government Activity ______________________ 22\n11. Selected GFSM Classification Categories _____________________________________________________ 23\n12. Share of Proposed Exclusions in the Total Expenditure of the Central Government __________ 25\n13. Share of Proposed Exclusions in the Total Expenditure of the NFPS __________________________ 25\n14. Implications for Primary Expenditure of Excluding Interest Payments from the Fiscal Rules __ 27\n15. Verification of Compliance with the Expenditure Rule ________________________________________ 30\n16. Fiscal Rules of Medium-Term Anchor and Operational Budget Limits Worldwide ____________ 34\n17. Debt Levels and Spreads in Emerging Market Economies ____________________________________ 36\n18. Spreads in Emerging Market Economies, 2000-21 ___________________________________________ 36\n19. Debt Levels and Sovereign Ratings in Emerging Market Economies _________________________ 37\n20. Debt Anchor with Sufficient Buffers __________________________________________________________ 37\n21. Current Spending and Debt Projections under the Fiscal Rule, 2024-2035 ___________________ 39\n22. Calendar of the MTFF and National Budgets _________________________________________________ 44\n\n**TABLES**\n\n\n1. Parameters of the Existing Fiscal Rules on Expenditure Growth________________________________ 11\n2. List of NFPS Entities and Local Governments Excluded from the Fiscal Rules __________________ 13\n3. Ceilings on Expenditure Growth under the Fiscal Rules, 2020-2023 ___________________________ 14\n4. Proposed Amendments to the Fiscal Rule for Specific Institutions Pending Approval by the\nLegislative Assembly _____________________________________________________________________________ 20\n5. Selected Country Examples on the Use of Expenditure Rules __________________________________ 29\n6. Measuring Compliance with Expenditure Growth Ceilings _____________________________________ 31\n7. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Gross Debt Anchor __________________________________________ 38\n8. Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks under Existing Rule, 2024-2035 ________________________ 39\n9. Fiscal Risks Management Toolkit ______________________________________________________________ 41\n10. Expenditure ceilings and MTFF 2021-2023 ___________________________________________________ 43\n\n**ANNEXES**\n\n\nAnnex I. List of entities included in STAP fiscal statistics (2021) __________________________________ 48\nAnnex II. Calibrating the Medium-term Debt Anchor ____________________________________________ 51\nAnnex III. Progress of MTFF since the Capacity Development Missions in 2020-21 ______________ 53\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "9. Total Expenditures Excluded under Various Proposals _ 21\n10. GFSM Statistical Principles in Identifying General Government Activity 22\n11. Selected GFSM Classification Categories _ 23\n12. Share of Proposed Exclusions in the Total Expenditure of the Central Government 25\n13. Share of Proposed Exclusions in the Total Expenditure of the NFPS 25\n14. Implications for Primary Expenditure of Excluding Interest Payments from the Fiscal Rules 27\n15. Verification of Compliance with the Expenditure Rule 30\n16. Fiscal Rules of Medium-Term Anchor and Operational Budget Limits Worldwide 34\n17. Debt Levels and Spreads in Emerging Market Economies 36\n18. Spreads in Emerging Market Economies, 2000-21 _ 36\n19. Debt Levels and Sovereign Ratings in Emerging Market Economies _ 37\n20. Debt Anchor with Sufficient Buffers 37\n21. Current Spending and Debt Projections under the Fiscal Rule, 2024-2035 _ 39\n22. Calendar of the MTFF and National Budgets _ 44\n\nTABLES\n\n1. Parameters of the Existing Fiscal Rules on Expenditure Growth 11\n2. List of NFPS Entities and Local Governments Excluded from the Fiscal Rules 13\n3. Ceilings on Expenditure Growth under the Fiscal Rules, 2020-2023 _ 14\n4. Proposed Amendments to the Fiscal Rule for Specific Institutions Pending Approval by the\nLegislative Assembly _ 20\n5. Selected Country Examples on the Use of Expenditure Rules 29\n6. Measuring Compliance with Expenditure Growth Ceilings _ 31\n7. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Gross Debt Anchor 38\n8. Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks under Existing Rule, 2024-2035 39\n9. Fiscal Risks Management Toolkit 41\n10. Expenditure ceilings and MTFF 2021-2023 _ 43\n\nANNEXES\n\nAnnex I. List of entities included in STAP fiscal statistics (2021) 48\nAnnex II. Calibrating the Medium-term Debt Anchor 51\nAnnex III. Progress of MTFF since the Capacity Development Missions in 2020-21 53\n\n4", "text_characters": 1561}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**\n\nCCSS Social Security Entity of Costa Rica\nCG Central Government\nCGR Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic\nCNE National Commission for Risk Prevention and Emergency Response\nDGCP Directorate General of Public Credit\nDGPN General Directorate of National Budget\nEBE Extrabudgetary Entities\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nGFSM Government Finance Statistics Manual\nICE Institute of Electricity of Costa Rica\nID Decentralized Institutions\nICT Institute of Tourism of Costa Rica\nLA Legislative Assembly\nLGs Local Governments\nLSPF Law on Strengthening Public Finance (Law 9635)\nMFU Macro Fiscal Unit\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nMTFF Medium-Term Fiscal Framework\nNFPS Nonfinancial Public Sector\nPCs Public Corporations\nPIM Public Investment Management\nPPPs Public-Private Partnerships\nPROCOMER Trade Promotion of Costa Rica\nRECOPE Costa Rican Oil Refinery\nSIPP Information System for Plans and Budgets of the CGR\nSTAP Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority\nTA Technical Assistance\nWEO World Economic Outlook\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\nCCSS Social Security Entity of Costa Rica\nCG Central Government\nCGR Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic\nCNE National Commission for Risk Prevention and Emergency Response\nDGCP Directorate General of Public Credit\nDGPN General Directorate of National Budget\nEBE Extrabudgetary Entities\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nGFSM Government Finance Statistics Manual\nICE Institute of Electricity of Costa Rica\nID Decentralized Institutions\nICT Institute of Tourism of Costa Rica\nLA Legislative Assembly\nLGs Local Governments\nLSPF Law on Strengthening Public Finance (Law 9635)\nMFU Macro Fiscal Unit\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nMTFF Medium-Term Fiscal Framework\nNFPS Nonfinancial Public Sector\nPCs Public Corporations\nPIM Public Investment Management\nPPPs Public-Private Partnerships\nPROCOMER Trade Promotion of Costa Rica\nRECOPE Costa Rican Oil Refinery\nSIPP Information System for Plans and Budgets of the CGR\nSTAP Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority\nTA Technical Assistance\nWEO World Economic Outlook\n\n5", "text_characters": 897}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **PREFACE**\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Finance, a Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) mission\nconducted hybrid discussions from October 31 to November 22, 2022 to provide technical assistance\n(TA) regarding the design and implementation of fiscal rules. The mission was led by W. Raphael Lam\nand comprised Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia (all FAD), and Carlos Herrero Garcia\n(FAD Short-term Expert).\n\n\nAt the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the mission held discussions with Finance Minister Costa Jaen,\nMarco Solera, Michael Contreras; Ana Miriam Araya, Jose Luis Araya, Carlos Oviedo, Kenneth Acuña,\nNéstor Chinchilla, Olman Cortés, Rafael Oviedo from STAP, DGPN, _and Grupo Regla Fiscal_ . At the\n_Contraloría General de la República_, the mission held discussions with Amelia Jiménez, Daniel Sáenz,\nKaren Garro, Nancy Campos, María Salomé Murillo, Marilyn Zúñiga, Vivian Garbanzo, Fabiola\nRodríguez, Sujey Montoya, Edwin Zúñiga. The mission also met with representatives from various\nagencies, including Gustavo Picado (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social); Ing. Jorge Zapata, Mariela\nSolís, Natalia _Vega (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados)_ ; Guisella Morera, Silvia\nMora, Marco Acuña, Jacqueline Hidalgo _(Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad)_ ; Eddie Villalobos,\nVíctor Díaz, Mariela Calderón (Procomer); Rodolfo Fonseca _(Municipalidad de San José);_ Ennio\nRodríguez, Magda Brenes (Colegio de Ciencias Económicas); Ricardo Monge, Gloriana Ivankovich\n_(Academia de Centroamérica);_ Ruth Andrade, Alberto López, Olga Espinoza, William Rodríguez,\nMariela López, Alejandra Fernández, Rafael Soto, Wilson Orozco _(Instituto Costarricense de Turismo);_\nJorge Vargas, Pamela Jiménez, Susan Rodríguez _(Estado de la Nac_ ión); Betty Sanchez y Juan Carlos\nQuirós (BCCR); and Jose Luis Arce (Consejo Fiscal). The mission also presented the key findings to\nKattia Cambronero Aguiluz, Pilar Cisneros Gallo, María Daniela Rojas Salas, Eli Feinzaig Mintz, Óscar\nIzquierdo Sandí, Jonathan Jesús Acuña Soto, Olga Lidia Morera Arrieta, and Rosaura Méndez\nGamboa of the Legislative Assembly.\n\n\nThe mission expresses its gratitude for the excellent cooperation it received from all government\nofficials and for the candid discussions. Particular thanks are due to Mr. Marco Solera, Mr. Michael\nContreras, and Ms. Jimena Ureña for their insights and excellent cooperation before and during the\nmission. The mission also received administrative support, research assistance, and interpretation\nservices from Claudia Diaz Saldias, Zhonghao Wei (all FAD); Anette Schorr, Martha Florez, Yvonne\nFisher, Cynthia Abad, Silvina Bresler, and Mariano De Anton.\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nIn response to a request from the Minister of Finance, a Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) mission\nconducted hybrid discussions from October 31 to November 22, 2022 to provide technical assistance\n(TA) regarding the design and implementation of fiscal rules. The mission was led by W. Raphael Lam\nand comprised Virginia Alonso Albarran, Daniel Garcia-Macia (all FAD), and Carlos Herrero Garcia\n(FAD Short-term Expert).\n\nAt the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the mission held discussions with Finance Minister Costa Jaen,\nMarco Solera, Michael Contreras; Ana Miriam Araya, Jose Luis Araya, Carlos Oviedo, Kenneth Acuña,\nNéstor Chinchilla, Olman Cortés, Rafael Oviedo from STAP, DGPN, _and Grupo Regla Fiscal_ . At the\n_Contraloría General de la República_, the mission held discussions with Amelia Jiménez, Daniel Sáenz,\nKaren Garro, Nancy Campos, María Salomé Murillo, Marilyn Zúñiga, Vivian Garbanzo, Fabiola\nRodríguez, Sujey Montoya, Edwin Zúñiga. The mission also met with representatives from various\nagencies, including Gustavo Picado (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social); Ing. Jorge Zapata, Mariela\nSolís, Natalia _Vega (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados)_ ; Guisella Morera, Silvia\nMora, Marco Acuña, Jacqueline Hidalgo _(Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad)_ ; Eddie Villalobos,\nVíctor Díaz, Mariela Calderón (Procomer); Rodolfo Fonseca _(Municipalidad de San José);_ Ennio\nRodríguez, Magda Brenes (Colegio de Ciencias Económicas); Ricardo Monge, Gloriana Ivankovich\n_(Academia de Centroamérica);_ Ruth Andrade, Alberto López, Olga Espinoza, William Rodríguez,\nMariela López, Alejandra Fernández, Rafael Soto, Wilson Orozco _(Instituto Costarricense de Turismo);_\nJorge Vargas, Pamela Jiménez, Susan Rodríguez _(Estado de la Nac_ ión); Betty Sanchez y Juan Carlos\nQuirós (BCCR); and Jose Luis Arce (Consejo Fiscal). The mission also presented the key findings to\nKattia Cambronero Aguiluz, Pilar Cisneros Gallo, María Daniela Rojas Salas, Eli Feinzaig Mintz, Óscar\nIzquierdo Sandí, Jonathan Jesús Acuña Soto, Olga Lidia Morera Arrieta, and Rosaura Méndez\nGamboa of the Legislative Assembly.\n\nThe mission expresses its gratitude for the excellent cooperation it received from all government\nofficials and for the candid discussions. Particular thanks are due to Mr. Marco Solera, Mr. Michael\nContreras, and Ms. Jimena Ureña for their insights and excellent cooperation before and during the\nmission. The mission also received administrative support, research assistance, and interpretation\nservices from Claudia Diaz Saldias, Zhonghao Wei (all FAD); Anette Schorr, Martha Florez, Yvonne\nFisher, Cynthia Abad, Silvina Bresler, and Mariano De Anton.\n\n6", "text_characters": 2309}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**The fiscal rule that came into force in 2020 has bolstered fiscal discipline and served Costa Rica**\n**well.** The rule sets ceilings on nominal expenditure growth for current and total expenditures linked to\npast nominal GDP growth and debt levels. The rule—explicitly identified in the Law 9635—is transparent,\nrelatively simple, and allows flexibility in crises through an escape clause. The rule has been instrumental\nin the policy framework. It not only guides the fiscal policy in the budget, but also coalesces public\nopinion on the need for fiscal discipline. Along with other fiscal reforms, the government commitment to\nthe fiscal rule has been instrumental to fiscal adjustment in 2021-22.\n\n\n**Nonetheless, several limitations of the fiscal rule came to light during the early stage of**\n**implementation.** The limitations of the rule were reinforced by the inherent budget fragmentation as well\nas adverse effects from the pandemic. Outside the national budget of the central government, fiscal rules\nare applied uniformly at the entity level for a wide range of public institutions, leading to distortions or\nexcessively tight constraints for some. Moreover, the verification of compliance with the rule also brought\nan unintended tightening in 2021-2022 from under-execution of the budget during the pandemic.\n\n\n**The expenditure limits are set to become more binding amid rising debt and high inflation in the**\n**near term.** Although the escape clause allowed for higher spending during the pandemic, the ceilings on\nnominal expenditure growth have turned tighter as debt exceeded 60 percent of GDP and GDP\ncontracted in 2020. The rule implies an expenditure cut in real terms amid high inflation in the near term.\nThe government is therefore under pressure to accommodate spending needs in response to the cost-ofliving crisis.\n\n\n**To address these immediate challenges, the government and lawmakers have enacted or proposed**\n**amendments to the fiscal rules.** An executive decree revised the method to verify compliance in July\n2022 to avoid the unintended tightening from an under-execution of the budget in some entities. Various\namendments to Law 9635 propose to (i) exclude certain entities (such as some decentralized institutions\nor public corporations) from the rule; and (ii) exclude expenditure items such as capital expenditure or\ninterest payments. Some amendments would bring permanent changes to the fiscal rule without\nnecessarily addressing the near-term challenges. The proposed amendments would further reduce the\ncoverage of the rules from about 60 percent to 45 percent of total expenditures in the nonfinancial public\nsector (or from 93 to 65 percent in the national budget of the central government). While excluding some\nnonstate public entities and public corporations is reasonable, ad-hoc changes without precise and\nverifiable criteria could undermine the credibility of the fiscal rule framework.\n\n\n**It is thus urgent to develop objective criteria to prevent ad-hoc exclusions of entities from the**\n**fiscal rules.** A principles-based classification would allay political pressure for ad-hoc exclusions. The\ncriteria should follow the statistical principles of the Government Finance Statistics Manual: entities under\ngovernment control and classified as a non-market producer should be included in the fiscal rule. Entities\nthat fall outside by these criteria should be monitored according to a risk-based set of indicators agreed\nby STAP, such as debt ratio, revenue to cost ratio, or the degree of central government transfers to the\nentity. Whereas including the social security and local governments is not feasible at present, they should\nbe subject to monitoring by the MOF.\n\n\n**The compliance with the fiscal rule should be assessed at the aggregate level, at least for the**\n**central government statistical concept (including extrabudgetary entities).** The MoF and STAP\nshould be empowered by law to allocate resources across decentralized institutions (extrabudgetary\nentities) and the national budget among competing needs. The rule will be assessed for the overall central\ngovernment instead of by individual entities.\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThe fiscal rule that came into force in 2020 has bolstered fiscal discipline and served Costa Rica\nwell. The rule sets ceilings on nominal expenditure growth for current and total expenditures linked to\npast nominal GDP growth and debt levels. The rule—explicitly identified in the Law 9635—is transparent,\nrelatively simple, and allows flexibility in crises through an escape clause. The rule has been instrumental\nin the policy framework. It not only guides the fiscal policy in the budget, but also coalesces public\nopinion on the need for fiscal discipline. Along with other fiscal reforms, the government commitment to\nthe fiscal rule has been instrumental to fiscal adjustment in 2021-22.\n\nNonetheless, several limitations of the fiscal rule came to light during the early stage of\nimplementation. The limitations of the rule were reinforced by the inherent budget fragmentation as well\nas adverse effects from the pandemic. Outside the national budget of the central government, fiscal rules\nare applied uniformly at the entity level for a wide range of public institutions, leading to distortions or\nexcessively tight constraints for some. Moreover, the verification of compliance with the rule also brought\nan unintended tightening in 2021-2022 from under-execution of the budget during the pandemic.\n\nThe expenditure limits are set to become more binding amid rising debt and high inflation in the\nnear term. Although the escape clause allowed for higher spending during the pandemic, the ceilings on\nnominal expenditure growth have turned tighter as debt exceeded 60 percent of GDP and GDP\ncontracted in 2020. The rule implies an expenditure cut in real terms amid high inflation in the near term.\nThe government is therefore under pressure to accommodate spending needs in response to the cost-ofliving crisis.\n\nTo address these immediate challenges, the government and lawmakers have enacted or proposed\namendments to the fiscal rules. An executive decree revised the method to verify compliance in July\n2022 to avoid the unintended tightening from an under-execution of the budget in some entities. Various\namendments to Law 9635 propose to (i) exclude certain entities (such as some decentralized institutions\nor public corporations) from the rule; and (ii) exclude expenditure items such as capital expenditure or\ninterest payments. Some amendments would bring permanent changes to the fiscal rule without\nnecessarily addressing the near-term challenges. The proposed amendments would further reduce the\ncoverage of the rules from about 60 percent to 45 percent of total expenditures in the nonfinancial public\nsector (or from 93 to 65 percent in the national budget of the central government). While excluding some\nnonstate public entities and public corporations is reasonable, ad-hoc changes without precise and\nverifiable criteria could undermine the credibility of the fiscal rule framework.\n\nIt is thus urgent to develop objective criteria to prevent ad-hoc exclusions of entities from the\nfiscal rules. A principles-based classification would allay political pressure for ad-hoc exclusions. The\ncriteria should follow the statistical principles of the Government Finance Statistics Manual: entities under\ngovernment control and classified as a non-market producer should be included in the fiscal rule. Entities\nthat fall outside by these criteria should be monitored according to a risk-based set of indicators agreed\nby STAP, such as debt ratio, revenue to cost ratio, or the degree of central government transfers to the\nentity. Whereas including the social security and local governments is not feasible at present, they should\nbe subject to monitoring by the MOF.\n\nThe compliance with the fiscal rule should be assessed at the aggregate level, at least for the\ncentral government statistical concept (including extrabudgetary entities). The MoF and STAP\nshould be empowered by law to allocate resources across decentralized institutions (extrabudgetary\nentities) and the national budget among competing needs. The rule will be assessed for the overall central\ngovernment instead of by individual entities.\n\n7", "text_characters": 3520}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Expenditures covered by the fiscal rule should remain broad.** Key items such as capital expenditure\nand interest expense should not be excluded from the rule. The proposed amendments to exclude capital\nexpenditure when debt levels are high will weaken the link between the fiscal rule and debt dynamics,\nmay create incentives for creative accounting, and ultimately undermine the credibility of the fiscal rules.\nTo better address contingencies such as court rulings, the government should create a contingency\nreserve line in the budget within the overall expenditure limits.\n\n\n**Externally financed expenditure should be included in the expenditure rule.** The budget documents\ncan include an annex to provide information on externally financed expenditure. This would help reduce\nbudget fragmentation and allow for a more comprehensive capital budget, in line with the Public\nInvestment Management Assessment (PIMA). This information will also be useful for verifying ex-post\ncompliance with the fiscal rules.\n\n\n**Ex-post compliance of the expenditure rule could be verified based on the fiscal outturn relative to**\n**the initial budget of the previous year.** This would avoid the unintended effects from an underexecuted budget. The verification of compliance with the fiscal rules should be made comparing this base\n(initial budget of the previous year, adjusted with the best estimate of external financing) with the\nspending outturn (on an accrual basis) of the current year. Compared to the current method to assess\ncompliance (July 2022 Decree), it would increase transparency and link more closely to debt reduction.\n\n\n**Over the medium term, introducing an explicit debt anchor would supplement the expenditure rule**\n**in upholding debt sustainability.** A combination of an expenditure rule with a medium-term anchor is\ncommon across countries. In Costa Rica, it can help align annual fiscal policy with the objective of\nmaintaining debt sustainability over the medium term. The best practice is to maintain a debt level that\nprovides a prudent safety buffer to respond to adverse shocks while keeping debt below its limit—the\nlevel that could exert a drag on growth, raise the borrowing cost significantly, or risk debt distress.\n\n\n**A risk-based approach in determining the debt anchor would consider the macroeconomic shocks**\n**and debt composition in Costa Rica, alongside with the sizable development needs.** Our analysis\nsuggests it would be appropriate to aim for a medium-term debt anchor of about 40-50 percent of GDP.\nThis is lower than the elevated level at present but still credible for the government to commit to achieve\nby the mid-2030s with sustained fiscal efforts. After a debt anchor is established in the fiscal rule\nframework, ensuring consistency between the anchor and expenditure rule (ceilings on expenditure\ngrowth) would be important.\n\n\n**Integrating the debt anchor in the medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) would reinforce**\n**consistency.** Significant progress was made in developing the MTFF, introduced in 2021 to provide\ntransparent communication of the fiscal strategy and forward guidance to the budget process. The MTFF\nwould lay out the expenditure growth rate consistent with the expenditure rule and reaching the anchor\nover the medium term.\n\n**The fiscal council can strengthen oversight.** The monitoring of compliance with the fiscal rules would\nrequire a broader assessment of the macro-fiscal projections in the MTFF and debt sustainability beyond\njust verifying that fiscal outturns comply with the expenditure ceiling. Resources commensurate to the\nfiscal council’s mandate need to be allocated so that it can fulfill its responsibilities.\n\n\n**The main recommendations to support the revision and implementation of the fiscal rule are**\n**shown in the Table below.**\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Expenditures covered by the fiscal rule should remain broad. Key items such as capital expenditure\nand interest expense should not be excluded from the rule. The proposed amendments to exclude capital\nexpenditure when debt levels are high will weaken the link between the fiscal rule and debt dynamics,\nmay create incentives for creative accounting, and ultimately undermine the credibility of the fiscal rules.\nTo better address contingencies such as court rulings, the government should create a contingency\nreserve line in the budget within the overall expenditure limits.\n\nExternally financed expenditure should be included in the expenditure rule. The budget documents\ncan include an annex to provide information on externally financed expenditure. This would help reduce\nbudget fragmentation and allow for a more comprehensive capital budget, in line with the Public\nInvestment Management Assessment (PIMA). This information will also be useful for verifying ex-post\ncompliance with the fiscal rules.\n\nEx-post compliance of the expenditure rule could be verified based on the fiscal outturn relative to\nthe initial budget of the previous year. This would avoid the unintended effects from an underexecuted budget. The verification of compliance with the fiscal rules should be made comparing this base\n(initial budget of the previous year, adjusted with the best estimate of external financing) with the\nspending outturn (on an accrual basis) of the current year. Compared to the current method to assess\ncompliance (July 2022 Decree), it would increase transparency and link more closely to debt reduction.\n\nOver the medium term, introducing an explicit debt anchor would supplement the expenditure rule\nin upholding debt sustainability. A combination of an expenditure rule with a medium-term anchor is\ncommon across countries. In Costa Rica, it can help align annual fiscal policy with the objective of\nmaintaining debt sustainability over the medium term. The best practice is to maintain a debt level that\nprovides a prudent safety buffer to respond to adverse shocks while keeping debt below its limit—the\nlevel that could exert a drag on growth, raise the borrowing cost significantly, or risk debt distress.\n\nA risk-based approach in determining the debt anchor would consider the macroeconomic shocks\nand debt composition in Costa Rica, alongside with the sizable development needs. Our analysis\nsuggests it would be appropriate to aim for a medium-term debt anchor of about 40-50 percent of GDP.\nThis is lower than the elevated level at present but still credible for the government to commit to achieve\nby the mid-2030s with sustained fiscal efforts. After a debt anchor is established in the fiscal rule\nframework, ensuring consistency between the anchor and expenditure rule (ceilings on expenditure\ngrowth) would be important.\n\nIntegrating the debt anchor in the medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) would reinforce\nconsistency. Significant progress was made in developing the MTFF, introduced in 2021 to provide\ntransparent communication of the fiscal strategy and forward guidance to the budget process. The MTFF\nwould lay out the expenditure growth rate consistent with the expenditure rule and reaching the anchor\nover the medium term.\n\nThe fiscal council can strengthen oversight. The monitoring of compliance with the fiscal rules would\nrequire a broader assessment of the macro-fiscal projections in the MTFF and debt sustainability beyond\njust verifying that fiscal outturns comply with the expenditure ceiling. Resources commensurate to the\nfiscal council’s mandate need to be allocated so that it can fulfill its responsibilities.\n\nThe main recommendations to support the revision and implementation of the fiscal rule are\nshown in the Table below.\n\n8", "text_characters": 3198}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Col1|Table of Key Recommendations|Col3|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Report**|**Main Recommendations**|**Short- (ST) or**
**Medium-term (MT)**|\n|**Section**
**III**|The institutional coverage of the fiscal rule should be the general government, as defined in
Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). As local governments and the social security
(CCSS) are currently excluded from the rules, MOF should monitor them under a risk-based
approach. Over time, the Legislative Assembly should consider including these entities in the
fiscal rule.|ST|\n||Ministry of Finance should develop verifiable and objective criteria to identify which public
entities should be included in the fiscal rule and seek approval of those criteria by Legislative
Assembly, in accordance with GFSM. Entities that are under government control and
nonmarket producers should be considered as government entities and included in the fiscal
rules. Other entities need to be monitored under a risk-based approach to be developed by
MOF and enhance debt regulations to cover the authorization outside of central
government.|ST|\n|
|Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to indicate that the exclusion of
entities from the fiscal rules should be based on GFSM criteria specified by Ministry of
Finance.|ST|\n||Ministry of Finance should present an assessment on legal changes needed to empower the
ministry and in particular STAP to make the expenditure limits applicable to the overall
central government (GFSM) at the aggregate level, including extrabudgetary entities such as
Decentralized Institutions, instead of by individual entities.|ST|\n||Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to avoid references to excluding
capital expenditure, court rulings, and interest expenses from the expenditure rule. Create a
general contingency reserve in the budget (e.g., a separate budget line) that could cover
expenditure from court rulings, among others, subject to the aggregate expenditure ceilings.|ST|\n||Amend the executive decree to include a comparison of expenditure growth between the
final outturn (accrual basis) at the end of a fiscal year (instead of final budget) and the initial
budget of the previous fiscal year (adjusted by an estimate of externally funded expenditure).
Ex ante and in-year compliance verification at budget level remains the same, adding the
estimate of externally funded expenditure.|
ST|\n||Include the best annual estimate of externally funded expenditure in an annex to budget
documents provided to the Legislative Assembly.|MT|\n||Modify the escape clause provision_(Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; Article 16 of the LSPF)_ by
amending Bill 23330 such that the maximum transition period applies when the escape
clause is activated in either one of the conditions (emergency or recession).|MT|\n|**Section**
**IV**|Amend the Law to introduce a medium-term debt anchor in the fiscal rule to ensure debt
sustainability. Periodic review (e.g., every 5 years) on the overall fiscal rule framework
(including calibrating expenditure rule limits to ensure the consistency after the medium-
term debt anchor is established) can help ensure fiscal rules contribute toward debt
sustainability.|MT|\n|**Section**
**V**|Integrate the debt anchor in the medium-term fiscal framework. The MTFF would lay out the
expenditure growth rate consistent with the expenditure rule and reaching the debt anchor
over the medium term.|MT|\n||Amend the law to strengthen fiscal oversight with an operational and independent fiscal
council.|MT|\n\n\n\nNote: ‘Short-term’ indicates the recommendations can be completed by end-March 2023, while ‘medium-term’ indicates\nrecommendations to be implemented over the next 2-3 years.\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [58.19630813598633, 71.98786163330078, 570.147705078125, 695.2259521484375], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Col1 Table of Key Recommendations Col3 \n\n Report Main Recommendations Short- (ST) or Medium-term (MT) \n Section III The institutional coverage of the fiscal rule should be the general government, as defined in Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). As local governments and the social security (CCSS) are currently excluded from the rules, MOF should monitor them under a risk-based approach. Over time, the Legislative Assembly should consider including these entities in the fiscal rule. ST \n Ministry of Finance should develop verifiable and objective criteria to identify which public entities should be included in the fiscal rule and seek approval of those criteria by Legislative Assembly, in accordance with GFSM. Entities that are under government control and nonmarket producers should be considered as government entities and included in the fiscal rules. Other entities need to be monitored under a risk-based approach to be developed by MOF and enhance debt regulations to cover the authorization outside of central government. ST \n Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to indicate that the exclusion of entities from the fiscal rules should be based on GFSM criteria specified by Ministry of Finance. ST \n Ministry of Finance should present an assessment on legal changes needed to empower the ministry and in particular STAP to make the expenditure limits applicable to the overall central government (GFSM) at the aggregate level, including extrabudgetary entities such as Decentralized Institutions, instead of by individual entities. ST \n Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to avoid references to excluding capital expenditure, court rulings, and interest expenses from the expenditure rule. Create a general contingency reserve in the budget (e.g., a separate budget line) that could cover expenditure from court rulings, among others, subject to the aggregate expenditure ceilings. ST \n Amend the executive decree to include a comparison of expenditure growth between the final outturn (accrual basis) at the end of a fiscal year (instead of final budget) and the initial budget of the previous fiscal year (adjusted by an estimate of externally funded expenditure). Ex ante and in-year compliance verification at budget level remains the same, adding the estimate of externally funded expenditure. ST \n Include the best annual estimate of externally funded expenditure in an annex to budget documents provided to the Legislative Assembly. MT \n Modify the escape clause provision_(Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; Article 16 of the LSPF)_ by amending Bill 23330 such that the maximum transition period applies when the escape clause is activated in either one of the conditions (emergency or recession). MT \n Section IV Amend the Law to introduce a medium-term debt anchor in the fiscal rule to ensure debt sustainability. Periodic review (e.g., every 5 years) on the overall fiscal rule framework (including calibrating expenditure rule limits to ensure the consistency after the medium- term debt anchor is established) can help ensure fiscal rules contribute toward debt sustainability. MT \n Section V Integrate the debt anchor in the medium-term fiscal framework. The MTFF would lay out the expenditure growth rate consistent with the expenditure rule and reaching the debt anchor over the medium term. MT \n Amend the law to strengthen fiscal oversight with an operational and independent fiscal council. MT \n\nNote: ‘Short-term’ indicates the recommendations can be completed by end-March 2023, while ‘medium-term’ indicates\nrecommendations to be implemented over the next 2-3 years.\n\n9", "text_characters": 3077}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0012-002"], "markdown": "##### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n**1.** **After a strong rebound in 2021, slowing trading partner growth and tightening of**\n**global financial conditions are weighing on activity in Costa Rica.** Elevated inflationary\npressures--partly because higher international food and energy price were allowed to pass through\nto retail prices—have prompted the central bank to accelerate its move to a neutral policy stance.\n\n\n**2.** **Fiscal performance has exceeded the Fund’s program target in fiscal year 2022 so far**,\ndriven by higher tax revenues and higher than expected yields from 2018 tax reforms (Figure 1).\nExpenditures were restrained by the fiscal rule, contributing to a lower public debt relative to Fund\nprogram targets. The strong fiscal performance provides scope for a modest increase in social\nspending—comprising conditional cash transfers and temporary food vouchers—to support the\nmost vulnerable households. The central government primary surplus is expected to reach 1 percent\nof GDP by end 2022, the highest since 2008.\n\n\n**3.** **Costa Rica’s fiscal rule continues to play a pivotal role in anchoring debt sustainability,**\n**though there is scope for improvements.** The authorities approved an executive decree in July\n2022 and submitted a bill to the Legislative Assembly to address operational constraints in the\nimplementation of fiscal rules and allow for additional spending. The authorities are considering, with\ntechnical support from the Fund, reforms to the fiscal rule. The technical advice aims to help\nauthorities determine an appropriate institutional coverage of the fiscal rule and facilitate a better\nreallocation of resources given the budget fragmentation, while maintaining a broad coverage of the\nrules and essential role in reducing debt. The existing expenditure rule covers a subset of\nexpenditures in the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS), in which the central government accounts for\nless than half of the total expenditures (Figure 2).\n\n\n\n**Figure 1. Recent Fiscal Developments in**\n\n**Costa Rica**\n(Percent of GDP)\n\n\n\n**Figure 2. Nonfinancial Public Sector in**\n\n**Costa Rica**\n(Percent of total consolidated nonfinancial\npublic sector expenditures, average 2017-21)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSources: National authorities, Haver, IMF World Economic Outlook, and IMF staff calculations.\n\n\nNotes: Data for 2022 are projections.\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0486, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(324.8999938964844, 521.3200073242188, 498.8599853515625, 656.8200073242188)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 465, "number": 15, "size": 43704, "transform": [173.9600067138672, 0.0, -0.0, 135.5, 324.8999938964844, 521.3200073242188], "width": 597, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(89.125, 521.3199462890625, 284.64501953125, 638.469970703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 325, "number": 14, "size": 152451, "transform": [195.52000427246094, 0.0, -0.0, 117.1500015258789, 89.125, 521.3199462890625], "width": 543, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. After a strong rebound in 2021, slowing trading partner growth and tightening of\nglobal financial conditions are weighing on activity in Costa Rica. Elevated inflationary\npressures--partly because higher international food and energy price were allowed to pass through\nto retail prices—have prompted the central bank to accelerate its move to a neutral policy stance.\n\n2. Fiscal performance has exceeded the Fund’s program target in fiscal year 2022 so far,\ndriven by higher tax revenues and higher than expected yields from 2018 tax reforms (Figure 1).\nExpenditures were restrained by the fiscal rule, contributing to a lower public debt relative to Fund\nprogram targets. The strong fiscal performance provides scope for a modest increase in social\nspending—comprising conditional cash transfers and temporary food vouchers—to support the\nmost vulnerable households. The central government primary surplus is expected to reach 1 percent\nof GDP by end 2022, the highest since 2008.\n\n3. Costa Rica’s fiscal rule continues to play a pivotal role in anchoring debt sustainability,\nthough there is scope for improvements. The authorities approved an executive decree in July\n2022 and submitted a bill to the Legislative Assembly to address operational constraints in the\nimplementation of fiscal rules and allow for additional spending. The authorities are considering, with\ntechnical support from the Fund, reforms to the fiscal rule. The technical advice aims to help\nauthorities determine an appropriate institutional coverage of the fiscal rule and facilitate a better\nreallocation of resources given the budget fragmentation, while maintaining a broad coverage of the\nrules and essential role in reducing debt. The existing expenditure rule covers a subset of\nexpenditures in the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS), in which the central government accounts for\nless than half of the total expenditures (Figure 2).\n\nFigure 1. Recent Fiscal Developments in\n\nCosta Rica\n(Percent of GDP)\n\nFigure 2. Nonfinancial Public Sector in\n\nCosta Rica\n(Percent of total consolidated nonfinancial\npublic sector expenditures, average 2017-21)\n\nSources: National authorities, Haver, IMF World Economic Outlook, and IMF staff calculations.\n\nNotes: Data for 2022 are projections.\n\n10", "text_characters": 1935}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **II. ASSESSING THE CURRENT FISCAL RULE**\n\n**A.** **The Current Fiscal Rule**\n\n**4.** **The 2018** _**Law to Strengthen Public Finance**_ **(LSPF) introduced a fiscal rule that sets**\n**limits on expenditure growth** . The fiscal rule entered into force in 2020. The rule sets a ceiling on\ncurrent expenditure growth (as well as total expenditure growth if debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP)\nfor the central government and most entities in the Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS). The rule\nestablishes that the growth on current expenditures will be a function of the average nominal GDP\ngrowth over the previous four years, adjusted by a parameter that depends on the government debtto-GDP ratio (Table 1). As central government debt has risen above 60 percent of GDP in 2020, the\ngrowth in current and capital expenditures cannot exceed 65 percent of the average nominal GDP\ngrowth of the previous 4 years, suggesting a tighter expenditure limit in the coming years. The\nexpenditure rule that came into force in 2020 supplements the pre-existing ‘golden rule’, which\nrequires current expenditure cannot be financed by government debt but has not been complied\nsince 2009.\n\n\n**Table 1. Parameters of the Existing Fiscal Rules on Expenditure Growth**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Government Debt-to-GDP Thresholds|Expenditure Growth Limits|\n|---|---|\n|Debt to GDP < 30% or current expenditure
of central government ≤ 17% of GDP|Growth in current expenditures ≤ 100% of average nominal
GDP growth over the previous four years.|\n|30% ≤ Debt to GDP < 45%|Growth in current expenditures ≤ 85% of average nominal
GDP growth over the previous four years.|\n|45% ≤ Debt to GDP <60%|Growth in current expenditures ≤ 75% of average nominal
GDP growth over the previous four years.|\n|Debt to GDP ≥ 60%|Growth capital and current expenditures ≤ 65% of average
nominal GDP growth over the previous four years.|\n\n\nSource: Law to Strengthen Public Finances, 2018.\n\n\n**5.** **Initially, the fiscal rule covered the central government and most entities in the rest of**\n**the NFPS.** Decree 41641-H (Art. 2), that regulates the fiscal rule, states that “The ceiling on\nexpenditures applies to the National Budget of the central government _as a whole_ and _individually_ to\nthe decentralized public bodies in the NFPS”. It means that, in practice, each entity in the NFPS would\nbe subject to the same annual expenditure growth ceiling, although the LSPF did not explicitly\nindicate such application at the individual entity level.\n\n\n**6.** **Some major nonfinancial public sector entities and local governments, however, were**\n**excluded from the fiscal rule** (Table 2) **.** When the 2018 LSPF Law was legislated, some entities were\nexcluded, such as (i) the Social Security (CCSS) regarding expenditures on pensions; (ii) Public\nCorporations (PC) that were classified to carry out commercial activities under market competition\nand whose debt-to-assets ratio is below 50 percent (such as ICE-Telecom); and iii) the national oil\ncompany (RECOPE) on its spending on oil imports. In 2020, Local Governments (LG) were also\nexcluded from the fiscal rule, though transfers from the national budget were subject to the rule. The\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [76.78400421142578, 350.489990234375, 533.43994140625, 501.1499938964844], "columns": 2, "rows": 5}], "text": "II. ASSESSING THE CURRENT FISCAL RULE\n\nA. The Current Fiscal Rule\n\n4. The 2018 _Law to Strengthen Public Finance_ (LSPF) introduced a fiscal rule that sets\nlimits on expenditure growth . The fiscal rule entered into force in 2020. The rule sets a ceiling on\ncurrent expenditure growth (as well as total expenditure growth if debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP)\nfor the central government and most entities in the Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS). The rule\nestablishes that the growth on current expenditures will be a function of the average nominal GDP\ngrowth over the previous four years, adjusted by a parameter that depends on the government debtto-GDP ratio (Table 1). As central government debt has risen above 60 percent of GDP in 2020, the\ngrowth in current and capital expenditures cannot exceed 65 percent of the average nominal GDP\ngrowth of the previous 4 years, suggesting a tighter expenditure limit in the coming years. The\nexpenditure rule that came into force in 2020 supplements the pre-existing ‘golden rule’, which\nrequires current expenditure cannot be financed by government debt but has not been complied\nsince 2009.\n\nTable 1. Parameters of the Existing Fiscal Rules on Expenditure Growth\n\n Government Debt-to-GDP Thresholds Expenditure Growth Limits \n\n Debt to GDP < 30% or current expenditure of central government ≤ 17% of GDP Growth in current expenditures ≤ 100% of average nominal GDP growth over the previous four years. \n 30% ≤ Debt to GDP < 45% Growth in current expenditures ≤ 85% of average nominal GDP growth over the previous four years. \n 45% ≤ Debt to GDP <60% Growth in current expenditures ≤ 75% of average nominal GDP growth over the previous four years. \n Debt to GDP ≥ 60% Growth capital and current expenditures ≤ 65% of average nominal GDP growth over the previous four years. \n\nSource: Law to Strengthen Public Finances, 2018.\n\n5. Initially, the fiscal rule covered the central government and most entities in the rest of\nthe NFPS. Decree 41641-H (Art. 2), that regulates the fiscal rule, states that “The ceiling on\nexpenditures applies to the National Budget of the central government _as a whole_ and _individually_ to\nthe decentralized public bodies in the NFPS”. It means that, in practice, each entity in the NFPS would\nbe subject to the same annual expenditure growth ceiling, although the LSPF did not explicitly\nindicate such application at the individual entity level.\n\n6. Some major nonfinancial public sector entities and local governments, however, were\nexcluded from the fiscal rule (Table 2) . When the 2018 LSPF Law was legislated, some entities were\nexcluded, such as (i) the Social Security (CCSS) regarding expenditures on pensions; (ii) Public\nCorporations (PC) that were classified to carry out commercial activities under market competition\nand whose debt-to-assets ratio is below 50 percent (such as ICE-Telecom); and iii) the national oil\ncompany (RECOPE) on its spending on oil imports. In 2020, Local Governments (LG) were also\nexcluded from the fiscal rule, though transfers from the national budget were subject to the rule. The\n\n11", "text_characters": 2583}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Constitutional interpretations also excluded health in CCSS and the CCSS as a whole from the\nexpenditure rule. In May 2022, several specific expenditure items from selected institutions were\nexcluded, including the Social Development and Family Allowances Fund (FODESAF) (see Section III). [1]\n\n\n**7.** **The LSPF defined ex-ante compliance on a budgetary basis and ex-post compliance on**\n**an execution basis** . The LSPF (Art. 19) establishes that the central government and the NFPS entities\nmust formulate their initial budgets and modifications in compliance with the fiscal rule. Therefore,\ngrowth in current expenditure in the initial budget of year _t_ or in-year modifications could not\nexceed the pre-determined growth ceiling relative to the initial budget of year _t-1_ . Ex-post\ncompliance is also defined in the LSPF Law in terms of outturn expenditure (Art. 21 LSPF\n“ _liquidación_ ”), Compliance with the fiscal rule is monitored on a quarterly and annual basis. The\nGeneral Directorate of the National Budget (DGPN) and the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary\nAuthority (STAP) prepare quarterly reports on the outturns of current and recently of total\nexpenditures. They must also prepare an annual compliance report, based on the previous year's\nbudget execution. This report is submitted to the Comptroller Office (CGR) that, in turn, prepares its\nown report and submits it to the Legislative Assembly (LA). According to the 2018 LSPF, the CGR\nevaluates ex-post compliance based on executed expenditure growth in year _t_ relative to executed\nexpenditure in year _t-1_ . However, in July 2022, the basis of ex-post compliance was revised to\ncomparing the growth rate of expenditure in the final budget relative to the initial budget of the\nprevious year (Executive Decree N° 43589-H) (see Section III).\n\n\n**8.** **The fiscal rule came into force in 2020 budget preparation and the escape clause was**\n**soon activated at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.** In March 2020, the government activated\nthe escape clause for two years by declaring a national emergency (confirmed by the National\nEmergency Commission (CNE)) and communicated that expenditure of the central government and\n16 other decentralized institutions would not be subject to the expenditure ceiling (Table 3). [2] As\ngovernment debt crossed above the 60 percent of GDP threshold in 2020, the growth ceilings would\napply to total expenditures starting from 2022 budget preparation. This also implies that certain\nNFPS expenditure items will be tightened, for example, (i) pensions can only be indexed to the rise in\nthe cost of living, and (ii) the wage bill for public employees will be frozen. Additional restrictions\nalso prohibit that the central government subscribes loans or credits, except to finance the public\ndebt or capital expenditure, and bail-out or subsidies to private entities will need the approval of the\nLegislative Assembly.\n\n\n1 Law to strengthen regional competitiveness and to promote the attraction of investments outside the Greater\nMetropolitan Area. Nº 10234 May 4, 2022.\n\n2 Emergency spending totaled 295 billion colons (or 0.8 percent of GDP) in 2020 and another 137 billion colons in\n2021 (or 0.4 percent of GDP), respectively, on _Bono Proteger_ to families, health supplies, vaccinations, and to CCSS to\nmitigate the minimum contribution base reduction.\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Constitutional interpretations also excluded health in CCSS and the CCSS as a whole from the\nexpenditure rule. In May 2022, several specific expenditure items from selected institutions were\nexcluded, including the Social Development and Family Allowances Fund (FODESAF) (see Section III). [1]\n\n7. The LSPF defined ex-ante compliance on a budgetary basis and ex-post compliance on\nan execution basis . The LSPF (Art. 19) establishes that the central government and the NFPS entities\nmust formulate their initial budgets and modifications in compliance with the fiscal rule. Therefore,\ngrowth in current expenditure in the initial budget of year _t_ or in-year modifications could not\nexceed the pre-determined growth ceiling relative to the initial budget of year _t-1_ . Ex-post\ncompliance is also defined in the LSPF Law in terms of outturn expenditure (Art. 21 LSPF\n“ _liquidación_ ”), Compliance with the fiscal rule is monitored on a quarterly and annual basis. The\nGeneral Directorate of the National Budget (DGPN) and the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary\nAuthority (STAP) prepare quarterly reports on the outturns of current and recently of total\nexpenditures. They must also prepare an annual compliance report, based on the previous year's\nbudget execution. This report is submitted to the Comptroller Office (CGR) that, in turn, prepares its\nown report and submits it to the Legislative Assembly (LA). According to the 2018 LSPF, the CGR\nevaluates ex-post compliance based on executed expenditure growth in year _t_ relative to executed\nexpenditure in year _t-1_ . However, in July 2022, the basis of ex-post compliance was revised to\ncomparing the growth rate of expenditure in the final budget relative to the initial budget of the\nprevious year (Executive Decree N° 43589-H) (see Section III).\n\n8. The fiscal rule came into force in 2020 budget preparation and the escape clause was\nsoon activated at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, the government activated\nthe escape clause for two years by declaring a national emergency (confirmed by the National\nEmergency Commission (CNE)) and communicated that expenditure of the central government and\n16 other decentralized institutions would not be subject to the expenditure ceiling (Table 3). [2] As\ngovernment debt crossed above the 60 percent of GDP threshold in 2020, the growth ceilings would\napply to total expenditures starting from 2022 budget preparation. This also implies that certain\nNFPS expenditure items will be tightened, for example, (i) pensions can only be indexed to the rise in\nthe cost of living, and (ii) the wage bill for public employees will be frozen. Additional restrictions\nalso prohibit that the central government subscribes loans or credits, except to finance the public\ndebt or capital expenditure, and bail-out or subsidies to private entities will need the approval of the\nLegislative Assembly.\n\n1 Law to strengthen regional competitiveness and to promote the attraction of investments outside the Greater\nMetropolitan Area. Nº 10234 May 4, 2022.\n\n2 Emergency spending totaled 295 billion colons (or 0.8 percent of GDP) in 2020 and another 137 billion colons in\n2021 (or 0.4 percent of GDP), respectively, on _Bono Proteger_ to families, health supplies, vaccinations, and to CCSS to\nmitigate the minimum contribution base reduction.\n\n12", "text_characters": 2825}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 2. List of NFPS Entities and Local Governments Excluded from the Fiscal Rules**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Institution|Scope of exclusions|Year of
exclusion|Share NFPS total
expenditures,
2021 (percent)|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Social Security (CCSS)**|All expenditure (pensions by Law,
health spending at a later stage,
not in the LSPF)|2018|20.5|\n|**Public corporation carrying out**
**commercial activities in a**
**competitive market and has debt is**
**less than 50 percent of assets**|Expenditure related to commercial
activities in a competitive market
setting|2018|3.4|\n|**National Oil Company (RECOPE)**|Oil import spending|2018|8.0|\n|**INEC**|Free surplus and financial yields
allocated to national census|2019|-|\n|**Municipalities and district councils**|Transfers from the CG are not
excluded|2020|3.1|\n|**Cantonal Sports Committees**|All expenditure|2020|-|\n|**Fishing Institute (Instituto**
**Costarricense de Pesca y**
**Acuicultura) (*)**|IDB-funded fisheries and
aquaculture sustainable
development project expenditure|2021|0.04|\n|**National Guarantee Fund (*)**|Contributions of the Ministry of
Finance|2022|0.3|\n|**National Fund for Forest Financing**
**(FONAFIFO)**|Payments to forest owners to
finance their environmental
services|2022|-|\n|**National Institute for Women**
**911 Emergency Service**|Financing for the Domestic and
Gender Violence Service|2022|-|\n|**Board of Port Administration and**
**Economic Development of the**
**Atlantic Coast (Japdeva)**|Capital expenditure on regional
and local development plans
financed by the port charges from
Moin Port’s Cargo Terminal|2022|-|\n|**Costa Rican Drug Institute**|Funds seized in counter-narcotics
operations|2022|-|\n|**Fund for Social Development and**
**Family Allowances (FODESAF)**|All expenditure|2022|3.5|\n|** 911 Emergency Service**|Fee on telecommunication
services|2022|0.03|\n\n\nSource: Compiled by the mission team based on national authorities’ documents.\n\n\n(*) Projected expenditure in 2022.\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [77.03399658203125, 93.7640151977539, 553.7100219726562, 615.3160400390625], "columns": 4, "rows": 15}], "text": "Table 2. List of NFPS Entities and Local Governments Excluded from the Fiscal Rules\n\n Institution Scope of exclusions Year of exclusion Share NFPS total expenditures, 2021 (percent) \n\n Social Security (CCSS) All expenditure (pensions by Law, health spending at a later stage, not in the LSPF) 2018 20.5 \n Public corporation carrying out commercial activities in a competitive market and has debt is less than 50 percent of assets Expenditure related to commercial activities in a competitive market setting 2018 3.4 \n National Oil Company (RECOPE) Oil import spending 2018 8.0 \n INEC Free surplus and financial yields allocated to national census 2019 - \n Municipalities and district councils Transfers from the CG are not excluded 2020 3.1 \n Cantonal Sports Committees All expenditure 2020 - \n Fishing Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura) (*) IDB-funded fisheries and aquaculture sustainable development project expenditure 2021 0.04 \n National Guarantee Fund (*) Contributions of the Ministry of Finance 2022 0.3 \n National Fund for Forest Financing (FONAFIFO) Payments to forest owners to finance their environmental services 2022 - \n National Institute for Women 911 Emergency Service Financing for the Domestic and Gender Violence Service 2022 - \n Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Coast (Japdeva) Capital expenditure on regional and local development plans financed by the port charges from Moin Port’s Cargo Terminal 2022 - \n Costa Rican Drug Institute Funds seized in counter-narcotics operations 2022 - \n Fund for Social Development and Family Allowances (FODESAF) All expenditure 2022 3.5 \n 911 Emergency Service Fee on telecommunication services 2022 0.03 \n\nSource: Compiled by the mission team based on national authorities’ documents.\n\n(*) Projected expenditure in 2022.\n\n13", "text_characters": 1545}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 3. Ceilings on Expenditure Growth under the Fiscal Rules, 2020-2023**\n\n(Percent)\n\n|Col1|2020|2021|2022|2023|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Current Expenditure**|4.67|4.13|1.96|2.56|\n|**Total expenditure**|Not-applicable|Not-applicable|1.96|2.56|\n\n\n\nSource: Authorities’ Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks 2021 – 2025 and 2022 -2027.\n\n\nNote: Escape clause was activated during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21. Government debt exceeded 60 percent\nof GDP in 2020.\n\n**B.** **Strengths and Challenges of the Fiscal Rules Framework**\n\n**9.** **The expenditure rule has desirable features supporting fiscal responsibility and has**\n**served Costa Rica well** . The objectives of the rule are explicitly identified in the LSPF, which sets\nclear criteria to assess the functioning of the rule. Second, the expenditure rule is relatively simple\nand transparent, in that the ceilings on expenditure growth are communicated and widely\nrecognized in the budget preparation and implementation. Third, the rule envisages nominal current\nexpenditure growing less than nominal GDP, which helps mitigate expenditure pressures that often\nlead to excessive deficits. Before the expenditure rule came into force in 2020, current expenditure\ngrew at a faster pace than nominal GDP growth by about 2-3 percentage points on average between\n2012 and 2019. The expenditure rule has facilitated fiscal discipline and helped contain expenditure\ngrowth, contributing to the improvement of fiscal balances in 2021-22.\n\n\n**10.** **Several other design features have been in line with good principles of fiscal rules.**\nAccording to the LSPF, the rule must hold both ex-ante in budget preparation, as well as in ex-post\nverification to contain the risk of slippages during budget execution ( _Art. 19 and 21 LSPF_ ). It also has\nan escape clause to provide flexibility in response to severe shocks. Moreover, enforcement of the\nrules is supported by the CGR, a separate entity from the Ministry of Finance. The government is also\nrequired in the Law to specific reporting obligations and information sharing.\n\n\n**11.** **The fiscal rule has been instrumental in Costa Rica’s policy framework.** It does not only\nprovide predictability of fiscal policy, but also coalesced political consensus for fiscal responsibility\nand anchored the public debate on the budget. Policymakers have a general consensus that\nexpenditure rule help contain government spending, making the needs for reducing government\ndebt and improving public financial management more prominent. Compliance with the expenditure\nrule was largely met and the activation of escape clause in 2020-21 was broadly appropriate. The\ncentral government complied with the expenditure rule in 2020 excluding the emergency spending\nunder the escape clause (CGR 2022). [3] The CGR indicated that only 12 institutions out of 154 did not\n\n\n3 According to the Decree 41641–H, the excluded expenditure in one year due to the activation of the escape clause\nmust be subtracted from the base for calculating the ceiling in the next year 2022.\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [76.76399993896484, 102.93997955322266, 513.2999877929688, 176.21998596191406], "columns": 5, "rows": 3}], "text": "Table 3. Ceilings on Expenditure Growth under the Fiscal Rules, 2020-2023\n\n(Percent)\n\n Col1 2020 2021 2022 2023 \n\n Current Expenditure 4.67 4.13 1.96 2.56 \n Total expenditure Not-applicable Not-applicable 1.96 2.56 \n\nSource: Authorities’ Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks 2021 – 2025 and 2022 -2027.\n\nNote: Escape clause was activated during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21. Government debt exceeded 60 percent\nof GDP in 2020.\n\nB. Strengths and Challenges of the Fiscal Rules Framework\n\n9. The expenditure rule has desirable features supporting fiscal responsibility and has\nserved Costa Rica well . The objectives of the rule are explicitly identified in the LSPF, which sets\nclear criteria to assess the functioning of the rule. Second, the expenditure rule is relatively simple\nand transparent, in that the ceilings on expenditure growth are communicated and widely\nrecognized in the budget preparation and implementation. Third, the rule envisages nominal current\nexpenditure growing less than nominal GDP, which helps mitigate expenditure pressures that often\nlead to excessive deficits. Before the expenditure rule came into force in 2020, current expenditure\ngrew at a faster pace than nominal GDP growth by about 2-3 percentage points on average between\n2012 and 2019. The expenditure rule has facilitated fiscal discipline and helped contain expenditure\ngrowth, contributing to the improvement of fiscal balances in 2021-22.\n\n10. Several other design features have been in line with good principles of fiscal rules.\nAccording to the LSPF, the rule must hold both ex-ante in budget preparation, as well as in ex-post\nverification to contain the risk of slippages during budget execution ( _Art. 19 and 21 LSPF_ ). It also has\nan escape clause to provide flexibility in response to severe shocks. Moreover, enforcement of the\nrules is supported by the CGR, a separate entity from the Ministry of Finance. The government is also\nrequired in the Law to specific reporting obligations and information sharing.\n\n11. The fiscal rule has been instrumental in Costa Rica’s policy framework. It does not only\nprovide predictability of fiscal policy, but also coalesced political consensus for fiscal responsibility\nand anchored the public debate on the budget. Policymakers have a general consensus that\nexpenditure rule help contain government spending, making the needs for reducing government\ndebt and improving public financial management more prominent. Compliance with the expenditure\nrule was largely met and the activation of escape clause in 2020-21 was broadly appropriate. The\ncentral government complied with the expenditure rule in 2020 excluding the emergency spending\nunder the escape clause (CGR 2022). [3] The CGR indicated that only 12 institutions out of 154 did not\n\n3 According to the Decree 41641–H, the excluded expenditure in one year due to the activation of the escape clause\nmust be subtracted from the base for calculating the ceiling in the next year 2022.\n\n14", "text_characters": 2511}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-002", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0017-003"], "markdown": "comply with the fiscal rule in 2020, while 22 institutions did not comply in 2021. [4] In terms of\nexecuted current expenditure, non-compliant entities excluding the central government increased\nfrom less than 1 percent in 2020 to nearly 5 percent in 2021. The executed current expenditure for the\ncentral government grew by 5.9 percent in 2021, well above the 4.2 percent ceiling. [5]\n\n\n\n**12.** **As in most countries, including Costa**\n**Rica, the pandemic put the fiscal rules and**\n**frameworks to test.** During the pandemic, over\n80 percent of countries with fiscal rules have\nactivated the escape clauses or suspended\ntemporarily fiscal rules, a much higher\npercentage than during the global financial crisis\n(Figure 3; Davoodi and others 2022). About half\nof countries with fiscal rules have had deficits or\ndebt exceeding the limits of their fiscal rules. As\na result, many countries, including Costa Rica,\nare facing the challenge of how to return to the\nfiscal rules (Davoodi and others 2022; Valencia\nand Ulloa-Suarez 2022) (Figures 4 and 5).\n\n\n**Figure 4. Deviation from the Deficit Rule**\n\n**Limits** (Percent of GDP by income group)\n\n\n\n**Figure 3. Changes in Fiscal Rules during the**\n\n**Pandemic vs Global Financial Crisis**\n(Percentage of countries with fiscal rules)\n\n\nSource: Davoodi and others 2022, IMF Fiscal Rules\nDataset 2021.\n\n\n**Figure 5. Deviation from the Debt Limits**\n\n(Percent of GDP by income group)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSources: Davoodi and others 2022; IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset: 1985-2021; IMF WEO Database.\n\n\n4 According to the CGR report, in 2020, 29 entities did not provide enough information to the CGR to verify their\ncompliance to the fiscal rules. In 2021, only 104 entities were subject to the rule, due to the integration of the\nDeconcentrated Entities (OD) into the national budget. In 2021, 22 entities did not comply with the rule and 25 did\nnot provide enough information.\n\n5 In contrast, the legal requirement on current expenditure being financed only with current revenues (Article 6 of the\nLaw 8131 for Financial Management and Public Budget, passed in June 2000) was not complied with in the last\ndecade.\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0745, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(81.9000015258789, 422.8399963378906, 298.1499938964844, 589.8099975585938)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 464, "number": 12, "size": 50574, "transform": [216.25, 0.0, -0.0, 166.97000122070312, 81.9000015258789, 422.8399963378906], "width": 601, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(308.95001220703125, 422.8399658203125, 522.550048828125, 589.8399658203125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 462, "number": 13, "size": 48684, "transform": [213.60000610351562, 0.0, -0.0, 167.0, 308.95001220703125, 422.8399658203125], "width": 591, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.6000061035156, 197.5900115966797, 538.3499755859375, 346.3900146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 399, "number": 17, "size": 24634, "transform": [219.75, 0.0, -0.0, 148.8000030517578, 318.6000061035156, 197.5900115966797], "width": 657, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "comply with the fiscal rule in 2020, while 22 institutions did not comply in 2021. [4] In terms of\nexecuted current expenditure, non-compliant entities excluding the central government increased\nfrom less than 1 percent in 2020 to nearly 5 percent in 2021. The executed current expenditure for the\ncentral government grew by 5.9 percent in 2021, well above the 4.2 percent ceiling. [5]\n\n12. As in most countries, including Costa\nRica, the pandemic put the fiscal rules and\nframeworks to test. During the pandemic, over\n80 percent of countries with fiscal rules have\nactivated the escape clauses or suspended\ntemporarily fiscal rules, a much higher\npercentage than during the global financial crisis\n(Figure 3; Davoodi and others 2022). About half\nof countries with fiscal rules have had deficits or\ndebt exceeding the limits of their fiscal rules. As\na result, many countries, including Costa Rica,\nare facing the challenge of how to return to the\nfiscal rules (Davoodi and others 2022; Valencia\nand Ulloa-Suarez 2022) (Figures 4 and 5).\n\nFigure 4. Deviation from the Deficit Rule\n\nLimits (Percent of GDP by income group)\n\nFigure 3. Changes in Fiscal Rules during the\n\nPandemic vs Global Financial Crisis\n(Percentage of countries with fiscal rules)\n\nSource: Davoodi and others 2022, IMF Fiscal Rules\nDataset 2021.\n\nFigure 5. Deviation from the Debt Limits\n\n(Percent of GDP by income group)\n\nSources: Davoodi and others 2022; IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset: 1985-2021; IMF WEO Database.\n\n4 According to the CGR report, in 2020, 29 entities did not provide enough information to the CGR to verify their\ncompliance to the fiscal rules. In 2021, only 104 entities were subject to the rule, due to the integration of the\nDeconcentrated Entities (OD) into the national budget. In 2021, 22 entities did not comply with the rule and 25 did\nnot provide enough information.\n\n5 In contrast, the legal requirement on current expenditure being financed only with current revenues (Article 6 of the\nLaw 8131 for Financial Management and Public Budget, passed in June 2000) was not complied with in the last\ndecade.\n\n15", "text_characters": 1743}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "**13.** **While the escape clause provided some flexibility during the pandemic, the**\n**expenditure limits are set to become more binding over the near term.** Out of prudence, the\ngovernment chose not to invoke the recession part of the escape clause even though there was a\nrecession in 2020. The escape clause allowed the government to put in place an additional spending\nof 1.2 percent of GDP in 2020-21 to respond to the pandemic. The government, out of prudential\nreasons, did not invoke the recession provision of the escape clause. This implies that the\ngovernment would need to return to the expenditure ceiling when they exit from the escape clause\nstarting in 2022 rather than having a 3-year transition period (allowed if the escape clause is linked\nto a recession). The specification of the expenditure rule implies tighter limits in the coming 2-3 years\nstarting from 2022 despite nominal GDP growth recovering to pre-pandemic levels. Since the rule\nprescribes that annual expenditure growth ceilings for year T are linked to the 4-year average of\nnominal GDP growth between years T-5 and T-2, the effect of the growth slowdown in 2020 will kick\nin from 2022 to 2025. In addition, the rise in government debt-to-GDP over 60 percent of GDP\nduring the pandemic has triggered a lower debt-linked adjusting factor, from 85 percent in 2018 to\n65 percent starting in 2022, with the expenditure ceilings also applied to total expenditures rather\nthan just current spending. These imply that the expenditure growth ceilings under the fiscal rule\nwould diminish from about 6 percent before the pandemic to less than 4 percent in the coming 2-3\nyears (Figure 6). Ceilings would then be higher from 2026 onwards as the decline in 2020 nominal\nGDP growth will no longer enter the calculation of the expenditure ceilings.\n\n\n**Figure 6. Expenditure Rule Limits Depend on Nominal GDP Growth and Government**\n\n**Debt Levels** (Percent)\n\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.\n\n\nNote: The 4-year moving average of nominal GDP growth for year T is based on years T-5 to T-2, while the\ndebt-linked adjustment factor is based on year T-2, according to the fiscal rule.\n\n**14.** **The tightening of expenditure limits takes place amid high unanticipated inflation.**\nInflation surprises affect public finances through multiple channels, including by reducing real\nexpenditure in the short term (because some items are not fully indexed to inflation), as well as\nlowering the debt-to-GDP ratio given nominal GDP is higher. In 2022, growth in real expenditure is\nprojected to be negative, at the lower part of the distribution across emerging market economies\n(Figure 7), but real growth in social benefits will remain positive (even if deflated with CPI inflation).\n\n\n16\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1385, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(81.9000015258789, 412.6099853515625, 520.25, 565.75)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 467, "number": 8, "size": 140199, "transform": [438.3500061035156, 0.0, -0.0, 153.13999938964844, 81.9000015258789, 412.6099853515625], "width": 1481, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "13. While the escape clause provided some flexibility during the pandemic, the\nexpenditure limits are set to become more binding over the near term. Out of prudence, the\ngovernment chose not to invoke the recession part of the escape clause even though there was a\nrecession in 2020. The escape clause allowed the government to put in place an additional spending\nof 1.2 percent of GDP in 2020-21 to respond to the pandemic. The government, out of prudential\nreasons, did not invoke the recession provision of the escape clause. This implies that the\ngovernment would need to return to the expenditure ceiling when they exit from the escape clause\nstarting in 2022 rather than having a 3-year transition period (allowed if the escape clause is linked\nto a recession). The specification of the expenditure rule implies tighter limits in the coming 2-3 years\nstarting from 2022 despite nominal GDP growth recovering to pre-pandemic levels. Since the rule\nprescribes that annual expenditure growth ceilings for year T are linked to the 4-year average of\nnominal GDP growth between years T-5 and T-2, the effect of the growth slowdown in 2020 will kick\nin from 2022 to 2025. In addition, the rise in government debt-to-GDP over 60 percent of GDP\nduring the pandemic has triggered a lower debt-linked adjusting factor, from 85 percent in 2018 to\n65 percent starting in 2022, with the expenditure ceilings also applied to total expenditures rather\nthan just current spending. These imply that the expenditure growth ceilings under the fiscal rule\nwould diminish from about 6 percent before the pandemic to less than 4 percent in the coming 2-3\nyears (Figure 6). Ceilings would then be higher from 2026 onwards as the decline in 2020 nominal\nGDP growth will no longer enter the calculation of the expenditure ceilings.\n\nFigure 6. Expenditure Rule Limits Depend on Nominal GDP Growth and Government\n\nDebt Levels (Percent)\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.\n\nNote: The 4-year moving average of nominal GDP growth for year T is based on years T-5 to T-2, while the\ndebt-linked adjustment factor is based on year T-2, according to the fiscal rule.\n\n14. The tightening of expenditure limits takes place amid high unanticipated inflation.\nInflation surprises affect public finances through multiple channels, including by reducing real\nexpenditure in the short term (because some items are not fully indexed to inflation), as well as\nlowering the debt-to-GDP ratio given nominal GDP is higher. In 2022, growth in real expenditure is\nprojected to be negative, at the lower part of the distribution across emerging market economies\n(Figure 7), but real growth in social benefits will remain positive (even if deflated with CPI inflation).\n\n16", "text_characters": 2303}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "**15.** **Several limitations of the fiscal rule came to light during its early implementation** .\n\n\n\n\n- _Unintended effects from an under-execution of budgets._ The pandemic has led to an underexecution of the budget of many\n\n**Figure 7. Distribution of Real Government**\n\ndecentralized entities, as their activity was\n\n**Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022**\n\nhampered by lockdown restrictions and social\n\n(Percent of countries)\n\ndistancing. As a result, the expenditure base—\nwhich the expenditure growth limits are\napplied on—was reduced such that some\nentities were constrained with smaller\nexpenditure ceilings and could not undertake\nnormal operations in 2021 and onwards. The\ntighter base given the under-execution of the\nprevious year has imposed an unintended\ntightening on expenditures, giving rise to\nrepeated legislative requests to exclude\ncertain spending or exclude entities from the\n\n\n\n**Figure 7. Distribution of Real Government**\n\n\n\n**Expenditure Growth by Countries, 2022**\n\n\n\n(Percent of countries)\n\n\n\n\n\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.\n\n\n\n\n- _Budget fragmentation._ The long-standing Note: Deflated with GDP deflator.\nfragmentation of the budget has made\nimplementation of the fiscal rules even more challenging. The non-financial public sector (NFPS)\ncomprises the national budget central government, local governments (82), social security\n(CCSS), other decentralized institutions (43), and public corporations (30). The expenditure rule\nlimit, in practice was not applied at the _aggregate level_ for the general government or NFPS but\nindividually applied to entities. Therefore, spending allocation is limited to within the national\nbudget of the central government. The verification of the rules has not provisioned for\ncompensation among those entities. While this reflects a long-standing challenge, the\napplication of the expenditure ceiling at individual level made compliance challenging for some\nbasic services provision (e.g., 911 emergency service). The large needs to expand social spending\nduring the pandemic were constrained, partly because of the ceiling on expenditure growth.\n\n\n- _Lack of a medium-term debt anchor._ The absence of a specific reference to debt in the LSPF has\nmade it difficult to substantiate the objective of fiscal sustainability and assess if the parameters\nof existing expenditure rules is adequately set to achieve the objective. For example, a counterfactual analysis shows that if the existing expenditure rules had been in place since 2013, they\nwould only have led to a small reduction of current spending and debt to GDP relative to the\nactual levels, with debt continuing to rise as a share of GDP (Figure 8). This is because, in the\nreference period, nominal GDP growth was strong and debt low, implying loose expenditure\ngrowth ceilings. The rising debt has cast doubts whether the expenditure rule is sufficient to\nensure debt sustainability and build buffers against protracted shocks. On the other hand, if the\ngovernment had adhered to the requirement not to borrow for current expenditure (stipulated in\nArticle 6 of Law 8131 in 2001) since 2016 (with a transition period starting in 2013), government\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0702, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(323.25, 166.13999938964844, 538.3499755859375, 324.3699951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 448, "number": 11, "size": 53439, "transform": [215.10000610351562, 0.0, -0.0, 158.22999572753906, 323.25, 166.13999938964844], "width": 609, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "15. Several limitations of the fiscal rule came to light during its early implementation .\n\n- _Unintended effects from an under-execution of budgets._ The pandemic has led to an underexecution of the budget of many\n\nFigure 7. Distribution of Real Government\n\ndecentralized entities, as their activity was\n\nExpenditure Growth by Countries, 2022\n\nhampered by lockdown restrictions and social\n\n(Percent of countries)\n\ndistancing. As a result, the expenditure base—\nwhich the expenditure growth limits are\napplied on—was reduced such that some\nentities were constrained with smaller\nexpenditure ceilings and could not undertake\nnormal operations in 2021 and onwards. The\ntighter base given the under-execution of the\nprevious year has imposed an unintended\ntightening on expenditures, giving rise to\nrepeated legislative requests to exclude\ncertain spending or exclude entities from the\n\nFigure 7. Distribution of Real Government\n\nExpenditure Growth by Countries, 2022\n\n(Percent of countries)\n\nSource: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.\n\n- _Budget fragmentation._ The long-standing Note: Deflated with GDP deflator.\nfragmentation of the budget has made\nimplementation of the fiscal rules even more challenging. The non-financial public sector (NFPS)\ncomprises the national budget central government, local governments (82), social security\n(CCSS), other decentralized institutions (43), and public corporations (30). The expenditure rule\nlimit, in practice was not applied at the _aggregate level_ for the general government or NFPS but\nindividually applied to entities. Therefore, spending allocation is limited to within the national\nbudget of the central government. The verification of the rules has not provisioned for\ncompensation among those entities. While this reflects a long-standing challenge, the\napplication of the expenditure ceiling at individual level made compliance challenging for some\nbasic services provision (e.g., 911 emergency service). The large needs to expand social spending\nduring the pandemic were constrained, partly because of the ceiling on expenditure growth.\n\n- _Lack of a medium-term debt anchor._ The absence of a specific reference to debt in the LSPF has\nmade it difficult to substantiate the objective of fiscal sustainability and assess if the parameters\nof existing expenditure rules is adequately set to achieve the objective. For example, a counterfactual analysis shows that if the existing expenditure rules had been in place since 2013, they\nwould only have led to a small reduction of current spending and debt to GDP relative to the\nactual levels, with debt continuing to rise as a share of GDP (Figure 8). This is because, in the\nreference period, nominal GDP growth was strong and debt low, implying loose expenditure\ngrowth ceilings. The rising debt has cast doubts whether the expenditure rule is sufficient to\nensure debt sustainability and build buffers against protracted shocks. On the other hand, if the\ngovernment had adhered to the requirement not to borrow for current expenditure (stipulated in\nArticle 6 of Law 8131 in 2001) since 2016 (with a transition period starting in 2013), government\n\n17", "text_characters": 2672}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0020-001"], "markdown": "debt would have remained broadly stable between 2012 and 2019, but with a decline in current\nexpenditure that would be socially infeasible.\n\n\n**Figure 8. Counterfactual Scenarios: Expenditure Rule and Constraint on Current Budget**\n\n**Balance Applied since 2013**\n\n\nSources: Ministry of Finance, World Economic Outlook, and authors’ calculations.\n\n\nNotes: All variables other than current spending and debt are kept as in the actual data. The current balance scenario\nassumes a 3-year transition period to comply by 2016.\n\n\n- _Limited independent fiscal oversight._ In principle, the monitoring of compliance would require a\nbroader assessment of the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the MTFF and an assessment\nof the debt sustainability beyond just verifying that fiscal outturns meet the expenditure ceilings.\nThe CGR has been transparent and fulfilled its reporting obligations, but its current mandate\ndoes not cover these assessments and has focused on auditing whether expenditures of the\ngovernment and other entities grew within the prescribed limits. The existing fiscal council does\nnot have sufficient resources nor capacity to provide such fiscal oversight.\n\n\n**16.** **It is understandable that some implementation challenges emerged as the rule just**\n**came into force in 2020, at the same time as the pandemic hit the economy.** As the expenditure\nceiling becomes tighter in the near term, the authorities face pressure from both legislative and\nexecutive proposals to exclude certain entities or spending items from the fiscal rule. But some\nproposals would bring permanent changes to the rules and are not well suited to resolve near-term\nchallenges.\n\n##### **III. ADDRESSING IMMEDIATE** **IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES**\n\n\n**17.** **To address the immediate implementation challenges, the government as well as**\n**parliamentary members have presented various proposals to revise the rules.** These proposals\nbroadly include (i) revising the measurement of rule compliance, (ii) excluding certain expenditure\nitems from the fiscal rule, and (iii) excluding non-state public entities and other entities from the\nexpenditure limits. These revisions likely bring permanent changes—some of these exclusions were\n\n\n18\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1536, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(76.5, 145.4499969482422, 534.0, 308.19000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 537, "number": 13, "size": 141945, "transform": [457.5, 0.0, -0.0, 162.74000549316406, 76.5, 145.4499969482422], "width": 1597, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "debt would have remained broadly stable between 2012 and 2019, but with a decline in current\nexpenditure that would be socially infeasible.\n\nFigure 8. Counterfactual Scenarios: Expenditure Rule and Constraint on Current Budget\n\nBalance Applied since 2013\n\nSources: Ministry of Finance, World Economic Outlook, and authors’ calculations.\n\nNotes: All variables other than current spending and debt are kept as in the actual data. The current balance scenario\nassumes a 3-year transition period to comply by 2016.\n\n- _Limited independent fiscal oversight._ In principle, the monitoring of compliance would require a\nbroader assessment of the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the MTFF and an assessment\nof the debt sustainability beyond just verifying that fiscal outturns meet the expenditure ceilings.\nThe CGR has been transparent and fulfilled its reporting obligations, but its current mandate\ndoes not cover these assessments and has focused on auditing whether expenditures of the\ngovernment and other entities grew within the prescribed limits. The existing fiscal council does\nnot have sufficient resources nor capacity to provide such fiscal oversight.\n\n16. It is understandable that some implementation challenges emerged as the rule just\ncame into force in 2020, at the same time as the pandemic hit the economy. As the expenditure\nceiling becomes tighter in the near term, the authorities face pressure from both legislative and\nexecutive proposals to exclude certain entities or spending items from the fiscal rule. But some\nproposals would bring permanent changes to the rules and are not well suited to resolve near-term\nchallenges.\nIII. ADDRESSING IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES\n\n17. To address the immediate implementation challenges, the government as well as\nparliamentary members have presented various proposals to revise the rules. These proposals\nbroadly include (i) revising the measurement of rule compliance, (ii) excluding certain expenditure\nitems from the fiscal rule, and (iii) excluding non-state public entities and other entities from the\nexpenditure limits. These revisions likely bring permanent changes—some of these exclusions were\n\n18", "text_characters": 1852}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "approved without a set of common criteria, while others are under consideration by the Legislative\nAssembly (Table 4). However, ad-hoc or frequent amendments to the fiscal rule may fall short of the\nprinciples of well-designed fiscal rules and could undermine credibility. Those amendments may not\nbe well-suited to address the tighter expenditure limits or constraints arising from entity-level\ncompliance. Since the fiscal rule was put in place, the decree regulating the LSPF has undergone 7\nrevisions and 11 entities were excluded by law. Further revisions to the fiscal rule will need to be\nbased on good principles including maintaining broad coverage to achieve the final objective of\ndebt sustainability, while ensuring enforcement of the fiscal rules.\n\n\n**A.** **Amending the Coverage to Exclude Entities from the Fiscal Rules**\n\n**Proposals by the government and parliamentary members**\n\n**18.** **In September 2022, the government submitted a bill to reform the fiscal rules aiming**\n**to address implementation shortcomings** [. Bill Nº 23330 proposes to further exclude the following](https://delfino.cr/asamblea/proyecto/23330)\nentities from the fiscal rule: i) all public corporations (PC) that carry out commercial activity in a\ncompetitive market, even those with high debt, except for the part of the current transfers from the\ncentral government; ii) non-state public entities except for those receiving transfers from the central\ngovernment. The bill also proposes to exclude various types of expenditure items (Section III.B).\n\n\n**19.** **In parallel, the Legislative Assembly is considering several other amendments to**\n**exclude entities from the fiscal rules.** Twenty draft bills are pending discussion at the Legislative\nAssembly. Various parties have put forward proposals to exclude entities or amend the fiscal rules,\narguing that expenditure limits have imposed constraints on critical spending and investment,\nespecially for entities that under-executed their budgets owing to lockdown restrictions during the\npandemic. In some cases, those entities run a surplus and have adequate resources to invest but\ncannot do so because the fiscal rules are applied at the individual entity level (Table 4). These\namendments often are entity specific without a set of common criteria. Aside from exclusions, the\nbase reference variable was modified in the case of National Tourism Institute (ICT) when applying\nthe ceilings on expenditure growth, thus allowing it to increase actual spending while still complying\nwith the expenditure rule.\n\n\n**20.** **The government proposal aims to enhance flexibility for these excluded entities.** In the\nimminent term, it would relax spending limits and alleviate political pressures from the cost-of-living\ncrisis as expenditure growth ceilings are falling short of headline inflation. Among the entities subject\nto potential exclusion are decentralized institutions, public corporations, and non-state public\nentities that follow different budget procedures owing to the budget fragmentation in Costa Rica.\n\n\n**Assessment and Recommendations**\n\n**21.** **Well-designed fiscal rules tend to have broad institutional coverage, encompassing all**\n**key components of fiscal operations that have significant effects on the economy or on fiscal**\n**sustainability** . In principle, fiscal rules should cover all relevant fiscal and quasi-fiscal operations,\nprovided that reliable data on those operations are available on a timely basis. A broad coverage\nprevents incentives to reallocate expenditure toward entities or activity that are not covered in the\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "approved without a set of common criteria, while others are under consideration by the Legislative\nAssembly (Table 4). However, ad-hoc or frequent amendments to the fiscal rule may fall short of the\nprinciples of well-designed fiscal rules and could undermine credibility. Those amendments may not\nbe well-suited to address the tighter expenditure limits or constraints arising from entity-level\ncompliance. Since the fiscal rule was put in place, the decree regulating the LSPF has undergone 7\nrevisions and 11 entities were excluded by law. Further revisions to the fiscal rule will need to be\nbased on good principles including maintaining broad coverage to achieve the final objective of\ndebt sustainability, while ensuring enforcement of the fiscal rules.\n\nA. Amending the Coverage to Exclude Entities from the Fiscal Rules\n\nProposals by the government and parliamentary members\n\n18. In September 2022, the government submitted a bill to reform the fiscal rules aiming\nto address implementation shortcomings . Bill Nº 23330 proposes to further exclude the following\nentities from the fiscal rule: i) all public corporations (PC) that carry out commercial activity in a\ncompetitive market, even those with high debt, except for the part of the current transfers from the\ncentral government; ii) non-state public entities except for those receiving transfers from the central\ngovernment. The bill also proposes to exclude various types of expenditure items (Section III.B).\n\n19. In parallel, the Legislative Assembly is considering several other amendments to\nexclude entities from the fiscal rules. Twenty draft bills are pending discussion at the Legislative\nAssembly. Various parties have put forward proposals to exclude entities or amend the fiscal rules,\narguing that expenditure limits have imposed constraints on critical spending and investment,\nespecially for entities that under-executed their budgets owing to lockdown restrictions during the\npandemic. In some cases, those entities run a surplus and have adequate resources to invest but\ncannot do so because the fiscal rules are applied at the individual entity level (Table 4). These\namendments often are entity specific without a set of common criteria. Aside from exclusions, the\nbase reference variable was modified in the case of National Tourism Institute (ICT) when applying\nthe ceilings on expenditure growth, thus allowing it to increase actual spending while still complying\nwith the expenditure rule.\n\n20. The government proposal aims to enhance flexibility for these excluded entities. In the\nimminent term, it would relax spending limits and alleviate political pressures from the cost-of-living\ncrisis as expenditure growth ceilings are falling short of headline inflation. Among the entities subject\nto potential exclusion are decentralized institutions, public corporations, and non-state public\nentities that follow different budget procedures owing to the budget fragmentation in Costa Rica.\n\nAssessment and Recommendations\n\n21. Well-designed fiscal rules tend to have broad institutional coverage, encompassing all\nkey components of fiscal operations that have significant effects on the economy or on fiscal\nsustainability . In principle, fiscal rules should cover all relevant fiscal and quasi-fiscal operations,\nprovided that reliable data on those operations are available on a timely basis. A broad coverage\nprevents incentives to reallocate expenditure toward entities or activity that are not covered in the\n\n19", "text_characters": 2979}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0022-001"], "markdown": "fiscal rules, which could undermine the objectives to curb overall spending and reduce government\ndebt.\n\n\n**Table 4. Proposed Amendments to the Fiscal Rule for Specific Institutions Pending**\n\n**Approval by the Legislative Assembly**\n\n\nSources: CGR and authors’ compilation.\n\n\n**22.** **The proposals to exclude further entities and expenditure items in the draft bill (No.**\n**23330) may go against good principles.** The proposed revisions appear to lack common criteria. If\napplied, the exclusions of entities and expenditure items would significantly reduce the coverage of\nthe rule from 60 percent to 44 percent of total NFPS expenditures, according to the final outturn\ndata in 2021 (Figure 9). Similar large reduction of the coverage by the fiscal rules will also happen in\nthe national budget of the central government as well as in the decentralized sector. The fiscal rule\nwould then have covered only two-thirds of central government spending. Some other countries that\nadopt expenditure rules, such as Paraguay and Peru, the coverage of the fiscal rules has reached\nmore than 90 percent of total government expenditures. Therefore, further exclusions of expenditure\nitems and government entities will put the coverage of Costa Rica’s fiscal rule below the typical\ncoverage in Latin America.\n\n\n**23.** **The bill may help ease the imminent expenditure constraints under the fiscal rules but**\n**at a high risk.** As spending in selected entities will not be counted towards the expenditure ceilings,\nthe government may meet imminent spending pressures by scaling up spending in those activities\nwithout breaching the expenditure growth limits. Even if the intention is not to accommodate higher\nspending, there would be considerable pressures to approve budgets at the limit. However, the bill\nwould bring structural changes to the fiscal rules by reducing their coverage significantly.\n\n\n**24.** **As a result, there is an imminent need to identify the coverage and perimeters of the**\n**fiscal rules and establish a sound framework to determine which entities should be included.**\n\n\n20\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2216, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(81.9000015258789, 145.4499969482422, 517.2999877929688, 392.17999267578125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 502, "number": 9, "size": 14403, "transform": [435.3999938964844, 0.0, -0.0, 246.72999572753906, 81.9000015258789, 145.4499969482422], "width": 886, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "fiscal rules, which could undermine the objectives to curb overall spending and reduce government\ndebt.\n\nTable 4. Proposed Amendments to the Fiscal Rule for Specific Institutions Pending\n\nApproval by the Legislative Assembly\n\nSources: CGR and authors’ compilation.\n\n22. The proposals to exclude further entities and expenditure items in the draft bill (No.\n23330) may go against good principles. The proposed revisions appear to lack common criteria. If\napplied, the exclusions of entities and expenditure items would significantly reduce the coverage of\nthe rule from 60 percent to 44 percent of total NFPS expenditures, according to the final outturn\ndata in 2021 (Figure 9). Similar large reduction of the coverage by the fiscal rules will also happen in\nthe national budget of the central government as well as in the decentralized sector. The fiscal rule\nwould then have covered only two-thirds of central government spending. Some other countries that\nadopt expenditure rules, such as Paraguay and Peru, the coverage of the fiscal rules has reached\nmore than 90 percent of total government expenditures. Therefore, further exclusions of expenditure\nitems and government entities will put the coverage of Costa Rica’s fiscal rule below the typical\ncoverage in Latin America.\n\n23. The bill may help ease the imminent expenditure constraints under the fiscal rules but\nat a high risk. As spending in selected entities will not be counted towards the expenditure ceilings,\nthe government may meet imminent spending pressures by scaling up spending in those activities\nwithout breaching the expenditure growth limits. Even if the intention is not to accommodate higher\nspending, there would be considerable pressures to approve budgets at the limit. However, the bill\nwould bring structural changes to the fiscal rules by reducing their coverage significantly.\n\n24. As a result, there is an imminent need to identify the coverage and perimeters of the\nfiscal rules and establish a sound framework to determine which entities should be included.\n\n20", "text_characters": 1725}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-002", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-003", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-004", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-005", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0023-006"], "markdown": "Such a framework will help the government address repeated ad-hoc requests to amend the rules—\nwhich could further undermine credibility—and implementation challenges noted in Section II. Some\ncriteria put forward in various proposals, such as the entities generating own revenues, may not be\nfully aligned with international statistical concepts in GFSM, while some others such as the debt-toasset ratio would help serve as complementary indicators.\n\n\n**Figure 9. Total Expenditures Excluded under Various Proposals**\n\n(Share of Expenditures in Percent)\n\n\n\nCurrent situation\n\n\n\nGovernment’s proposal\n\n\n\nIMF’s proposal\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSources: CGR reports (2022), national authorities’ data, and authors’ calculations.\n\n\n**25.** **The fiscal rules in Costa Rica should ideally cover the general government** . This would\nhave two important implications:\n\n\n1. All fiscal operations classified to be government activities, including those currently\nperformed by decentralized institutions or some nonstate public entities, would be included\nin the fiscal rules, while activities that are not fiscal operations would be excluded.\n\n\n2. Local government spending and spending on social security and healthcare by the CCSS\nwould ideally be covered by the fiscal rules over the medium term.\n\n\n**26.** **Identifying government entities would require an objective set of criteria regarding**\n**decentralized or nonstate public entities.** The IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM)\nclassifies an entity as part of the government if two broad criteria (among others) are met: the entity\nis under government control _and_ a nonmarket producer (Figure 10; full details in GFSM 2014 Figure\n2.4). The use of GFSM is also consistent with other public sector reforms like Hacienda Digital, the\ntransition to IPSAS in accounting, and the technical assistance on the reporting of fiscal statistics\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0362, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(81.9000015258789, 216.89999389648438, 228.1300048828125, 336.8999938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 333, "number": 19, "size": 66387, "transform": [146.22999572753906, 0.0, -0.0, 120.0, 81.9000015258789, 216.89999389648438], "width": 406, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(81.9000015258789, 338.2900085449219, 227.39999389648438, 450.7900085449219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 312, "number": 20, "size": 9688, "transform": [145.5, 0.0, -0.0, 112.5, 81.9000015258789, 338.2900085449219], "width": 404, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(387.0, 216.89999389648438, 524.3099975585938, 334.29998779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 326, "number": 23, "size": 11484, "transform": [137.30999755859375, 0.0, -0.0, 117.4000015258789, 387.0, 216.89999389648438], "width": 381, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(239.32000732421875, 332.5400085449219, 375.82000732421875, 445.0400085449219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 312, "number": 22, "size": 9515, "transform": [136.5, 0.0, -0.0, 112.5, 239.32000732421875, 332.5400085449219], "width": 379, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(387.04998779296875, 345.69000244140625, 524.2999877929688, 450.69000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 291, "number": 24, "size": 7696, "transform": [137.25, 0.0, -0.0, 105.0, 387.04998779296875, 345.69000244140625], "width": 381, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(238.9499969482422, 216.89999389648438, 376.20001220703125, 321.1499938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 289, "number": 21, "size": 9969, "transform": [137.25, 0.0, -0.0, 104.25, 238.9499969482422, 216.89999389648438], "width": 381, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Such a framework will help the government address repeated ad-hoc requests to amend the rules—\nwhich could further undermine credibility—and implementation challenges noted in Section II. Some\ncriteria put forward in various proposals, such as the entities generating own revenues, may not be\nfully aligned with international statistical concepts in GFSM, while some others such as the debt-toasset ratio would help serve as complementary indicators.\n\nFigure 9. Total Expenditures Excluded under Various Proposals\n\n(Share of Expenditures in Percent)\n\nCurrent situation\n\nGovernment’s proposal\n\nIMF’s proposal\n\nSources: CGR reports (2022), national authorities’ data, and authors’ calculations.\n\n25. The fiscal rules in Costa Rica should ideally cover the general government . This would\nhave two important implications:\n\n1. All fiscal operations classified to be government activities, including those currently\nperformed by decentralized institutions or some nonstate public entities, would be included\nin the fiscal rules, while activities that are not fiscal operations would be excluded.\n\n2. Local government spending and spending on social security and healthcare by the CCSS\nwould ideally be covered by the fiscal rules over the medium term.\n\n26. Identifying government entities would require an objective set of criteria regarding\ndecentralized or nonstate public entities. The IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM)\nclassifies an entity as part of the government if two broad criteria (among others) are met: the entity\nis under government control _and_ a nonmarket producer (Figure 10; full details in GFSM 2014 Figure\n2.4). The use of GFSM is also consistent with other public sector reforms like Hacienda Digital, the\ntransition to IPSAS in accounting, and the technical assistance on the reporting of fiscal statistics\n\n21", "text_characters": 1563}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0024-001"], "markdown": "under the Fund EFF program. The authorities commit to gradually report fiscal statistics according to\nthe GFSM by 2025.\n\n\n**Figure 10. GFSM Statistical Principles in Identifying General Government Activity**\n\n\nSource: Authors’ compilation based on Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014.\n\n\n- _**Government control.**_ Government control is defined as the ability to determine the general\npolicy or program of an entity (GFSM 2014). Several indicators can help determine if the entity is\ncontrolled by the government, including (i) the ownership or the rights to control the board or\nappoint or remove key officers; (ii) provisions or existence of a contractual agreement for\ngovernments to determine general policy and program; (iii) high degree of financing by the\ngovernment, including borrowing from the government; and (iv) the government takes on risk\nexposures for the activity of the entity. A single indicator could be sufficient to determine control,\nthough in some cases a consideration of separate indicators may collectively help determine it.\nEntities that are not financially viable and expose government to risks are likely to be classified as\ngovernment entities.\n\n\n- _**Nonmarket producer**_ **.** A nonmarket producer provides its output to others for free or at prices\nthat are not economically significant. This means that prices have little or no influence on how\nmuch the producer is prepared to supply and on the quantity demanded. Private corporations\nare generally market producers. When there is government control, however, prices may be\nmodified for public policy purposes. Even when the sales of public corporations cover a large\nportion of their costs, they may not respond to market conditions like a profit-maximizing firm.\nIn general, an entity is classified as a nonmarket producer if its sales (excluding taxes and\ntransfers) is less than half of the production cost (including wages and investment costs) over a\nsustained multiyear period, although this value is just a reference and a case by case judgement\n\n\n22\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1498, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(141.4499969482422, 130.08999633789062, 479.54998779296875, 344.8699951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 458, "number": 7, "size": 106371, "transform": [338.1000061035156, 0.0, -0.0, 214.77999877929688, 141.4499969482422, 130.08999633789062], "width": 721, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "under the Fund EFF program. The authorities commit to gradually report fiscal statistics according to\nthe GFSM by 2025.\n\nFigure 10. GFSM Statistical Principles in Identifying General Government Activity\n\nSource: Authors’ compilation based on Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014.\n\n- _Government control._ Government control is defined as the ability to determine the general\npolicy or program of an entity (GFSM 2014). Several indicators can help determine if the entity is\ncontrolled by the government, including (i) the ownership or the rights to control the board or\nappoint or remove key officers; (ii) provisions or existence of a contractual agreement for\ngovernments to determine general policy and program; (iii) high degree of financing by the\ngovernment, including borrowing from the government; and (iv) the government takes on risk\nexposures for the activity of the entity. A single indicator could be sufficient to determine control,\nthough in some cases a consideration of separate indicators may collectively help determine it.\nEntities that are not financially viable and expose government to risks are likely to be classified as\ngovernment entities.\n\n- _Nonmarket producer_ . A nonmarket producer provides its output to others for free or at prices\nthat are not economically significant. This means that prices have little or no influence on how\nmuch the producer is prepared to supply and on the quantity demanded. Private corporations\nare generally market producers. When there is government control, however, prices may be\nmodified for public policy purposes. Even when the sales of public corporations cover a large\nportion of their costs, they may not respond to market conditions like a profit-maximizing firm.\nIn general, an entity is classified as a nonmarket producer if its sales (excluding taxes and\ntransfers) is less than half of the production cost (including wages and investment costs) over a\nsustained multiyear period, although this value is just a reference and a case by case judgement\n\n22", "text_characters": 1712}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0025-001"], "markdown": "is needed. [6] It is likely that a corporation receiving substantial government transfers or financial\nsupport, or enjoying risk-reducing factors such as government guarantees, would respond to\nmarket conditions differently because of softer budget constraints and is therefore likely to be a\nnonmarket producer.\n\n\n**27.** **The government should classify all decentralized institutions or public corporations**\n**according to the above GFSM principles to determine whether they should be included in the**\n**fiscal rules.** Entities that are not controlled by the government should be excluded (for example,\nsome professional associations currently classified as non-state public entities) (Figure 11). Entities\nthat are controlled by the government and operate as a nonmarket producer should be included,\nwhereas those operating as a market producer are classified as public corporations and excluded\nfrom the fiscal rules. The GFSM principles of government control and nonmarket producers are\nrelated to but different from the criteria specified in the decree. For example, an entity running on a\ncommercial basis could be a market producer although an entity running at a surplus or profit over\nthe years may rely on government support and therefore not be a market producer. Similarly, a\nnonmarket producer can be receiving or not receiving government transfers or can have high or low\ndebt-to-asset ratios.\n\n\n**Figure 11. Selected GFSM Classification Categories**\n\n\n**28.** **For entities classified as** _**public corporations**_ **outside the fiscal rules, other monitoring**\n**will still be necessary to ensure they do not pose significant fiscal risks.** The Fund has developed\nsome tools for fiscal risks assessment (FRAT and SOE health check) categorizing the level of risk and\n\n\n6 It is necessary to compare between sales value and the production costs when determining an entity is a public\ncorporation (state-owned enterprise) or a government entity (belong to the general government). Sales are measured\nbefore any taxes applicable and exclude all payment receivable from government unless they would be granted to\nany producer of the same activity. Production costs are calculated as the sum of compensation to employees, use of\ngoods and services, consumption of fixed capital, and other taxes on production. The return to capital is included in\nproduction costs. Subsidies receivable on production are not deducted from the production cost.\n\n\n23\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1785, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(91.75, 363.1600341796875, 510.6700134277344, 569.7100219726562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 565, "number": 9, "size": 155301, "transform": [418.9200134277344, 0.0, -0.0, 206.5500030517578, 91.75, 363.1600341796875], "width": 1146, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "is needed. [6] It is likely that a corporation receiving substantial government transfers or financial\nsupport, or enjoying risk-reducing factors such as government guarantees, would respond to\nmarket conditions differently because of softer budget constraints and is therefore likely to be a\nnonmarket producer.\n\n27. The government should classify all decentralized institutions or public corporations\naccording to the above GFSM principles to determine whether they should be included in the\nfiscal rules. Entities that are not controlled by the government should be excluded (for example,\nsome professional associations currently classified as non-state public entities) (Figure 11). Entities\nthat are controlled by the government and operate as a nonmarket producer should be included,\nwhereas those operating as a market producer are classified as public corporations and excluded\nfrom the fiscal rules. The GFSM principles of government control and nonmarket producers are\nrelated to but different from the criteria specified in the decree. For example, an entity running on a\ncommercial basis could be a market producer although an entity running at a surplus or profit over\nthe years may rely on government support and therefore not be a market producer. Similarly, a\nnonmarket producer can be receiving or not receiving government transfers or can have high or low\ndebt-to-asset ratios.\n\nFigure 11. Selected GFSM Classification Categories\n\n28. For entities classified as _public corporations_ outside the fiscal rules, other monitoring\nwill still be necessary to ensure they do not pose significant fiscal risks. The Fund has developed\nsome tools for fiscal risks assessment (FRAT and SOE health check) categorizing the level of risk and\n\n6 It is necessary to compare between sales value and the production costs when determining an entity is a public\ncorporation (state-owned enterprise) or a government entity (belong to the general government). Sales are measured\nbefore any taxes applicable and exclude all payment receivable from government unless they would be granted to\nany producer of the same activity. Production costs are calculated as the sum of compensation to employees, use of\ngoods and services, consumption of fixed capital, and other taxes on production. The return to capital is included in\nproduction costs. Subsidies receivable on production are not deducted from the production cost.\n\n23", "text_characters": 2049}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "[mitigating measures (IMF Fiscal Risk Toolkit). For example, the government should expand the report](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/Fiscal-Risks/Fiscal-Risks-Toolkit)\non their operations, cashflow statements, and balance sheet to monitor their financial viability and\ngovernment exposures. Public corporations should continue to be subject to approval for new\nmaterial borrowings, be audited, and have clear performance indicators. Fiscal risks statements\nshould incorporate public corporations and follow a risk-based approach concentrating the\nmonitoring to high-risk entities. High-risk entities should be subject to enhanced control to be made\nexplicit in the regulations.\n\n\n**29.** **The current debt monitoring and authorization is fragmented among the entities of the**\n**NFPS.** The Law 7010 establishes that only the MoF has borrowing capacity at the central\ngovernment. The annual budget approves the domestic bonds issuance and each new loan requires\napproval by the Legislative Assembly (external loans by qualified majority and internal loans by\nsimple majority). The sovereign guarantee for public entities will undergo the same process.\nHowever, the other entities with “autonomy” such as Universities, local governments and social\nsecurity, and public banks do not need approval, except for sovereign guarantees. Overall the debt\namong those entities is moderate but some are rising rapidly in recent years. In order to mitigate the\nfiscal risks, tighter debt authorization is necessary to scrutinize the financial and debt servicing\nconditions of the borrowing entity, the conditions of the loans, and the final approval of the MoF.\nMany countries have implemented a system of alerts and thresholds plus prudent financial\nconditions are required (Mexico, Spain).\n\n\n**30.** **The expenditure growth ceiling could apply to central government (statistical concept)**\n**including the aggregate of national budget and decentralized institutions.** Applying the\nexpenditure ceilings individually to each decentralized institution creates rigidity in their budgets and\npose challenges on the compliance of the fiscal rule. Ideally, the government should minimize the\nuse of extrabudgetary entities (EBE) and integrate them into the national budget. As this is not\nfeasible at present, at least the fiscal rule could apply to the aggregate of national budget and\ndecentralized institutions. This would allow flexibility to compensate expenditure growth among the\nentities, for instance, higher social spending in some decentralized entity can be compensated by\nless expenditures in others so as to meet the aggregate ceiling (Annex 1). It would need that STAP is\nempowered by law to approve and monitor the compensating activity according to fiscal policy\nguidelines and priorities.\n\n\n**31.** **In the medium term, the authorities should consider including the local governments**\n**and social security (CCSS) in the fiscal rule.** These entities are part of the general government\nunder the statistical principles and therefore should eventually be covered by the fiscal rule. The\nfiscal rule will _not_ affect the autonomy of local governments, as other countries with varying degree\nof intergovernmental relations are able to establish fiscal rules covering the general government or\nadopt subnational fiscal rules (Ralyea and others 2018). Recognizing the inclusion is not feasible at\npresent, the CGR and Ministry of Finance should put in place enhanced monitoring and control to\navoid fiscal slippages, including reflecting them in the fiscal risk report and publishing regularly longterm projections for health and pension spending. The MOF should also require monthly or quarterly\nfinancial information from these entities, require authorization when they incur new debt, and\nenhance information exchange. Incentives can also be applied to encourage prudent public finances,\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "mitigating measures (IMF Fiscal Risk Toolkit). For example, the government should expand the report\non their operations, cashflow statements, and balance sheet to monitor their financial viability and\ngovernment exposures. Public corporations should continue to be subject to approval for new\nmaterial borrowings, be audited, and have clear performance indicators. Fiscal risks statements\nshould incorporate public corporations and follow a risk-based approach concentrating the\nmonitoring to high-risk entities. High-risk entities should be subject to enhanced control to be made\nexplicit in the regulations.\n\n29. The current debt monitoring and authorization is fragmented among the entities of the\nNFPS. The Law 7010 establishes that only the MoF has borrowing capacity at the central\ngovernment. The annual budget approves the domestic bonds issuance and each new loan requires\napproval by the Legislative Assembly (external loans by qualified majority and internal loans by\nsimple majority). The sovereign guarantee for public entities will undergo the same process.\nHowever, the other entities with “autonomy” such as Universities, local governments and social\nsecurity, and public banks do not need approval, except for sovereign guarantees. Overall the debt\namong those entities is moderate but some are rising rapidly in recent years. In order to mitigate the\nfiscal risks, tighter debt authorization is necessary to scrutinize the financial and debt servicing\nconditions of the borrowing entity, the conditions of the loans, and the final approval of the MoF.\nMany countries have implemented a system of alerts and thresholds plus prudent financial\nconditions are required (Mexico, Spain).\n\n30. The expenditure growth ceiling could apply to central government (statistical concept)\nincluding the aggregate of national budget and decentralized institutions. Applying the\nexpenditure ceilings individually to each decentralized institution creates rigidity in their budgets and\npose challenges on the compliance of the fiscal rule. Ideally, the government should minimize the\nuse of extrabudgetary entities (EBE) and integrate them into the national budget. As this is not\nfeasible at present, at least the fiscal rule could apply to the aggregate of national budget and\ndecentralized institutions. This would allow flexibility to compensate expenditure growth among the\nentities, for instance, higher social spending in some decentralized entity can be compensated by\nless expenditures in others so as to meet the aggregate ceiling (Annex 1). It would need that STAP is\nempowered by law to approve and monitor the compensating activity according to fiscal policy\nguidelines and priorities.\n\n31. In the medium term, the authorities should consider including the local governments\nand social security (CCSS) in the fiscal rule. These entities are part of the general government\nunder the statistical principles and therefore should eventually be covered by the fiscal rule. The\nfiscal rule will _not_ affect the autonomy of local governments, as other countries with varying degree\nof intergovernmental relations are able to establish fiscal rules covering the general government or\nadopt subnational fiscal rules (Ralyea and others 2018). Recognizing the inclusion is not feasible at\npresent, the CGR and Ministry of Finance should put in place enhanced monitoring and control to\navoid fiscal slippages, including reflecting them in the fiscal risk report and publishing regularly longterm projections for health and pension spending. The MOF should also require monthly or quarterly\nfinancial information from these entities, require authorization when they incur new debt, and\nenhance information exchange. Incentives can also be applied to encourage prudent public finances,\n\n24", "text_characters": 3231}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0027-002"], "markdown": "such as balanced budget principles for local governments, and good PFM practices. When modifying\nthe legal framework to include them in the fiscal rule over time, however, each local government or\nsocial security (CCSS) should _not_ be subject to a uniform expenditure limit at individual entity levels.\nCertain flexibility needs to be built in, while respecting the overall fiscal envelope under the\nexpenditure limits. For example, bringing the social security and health care spending into the\nnational budget or central government (statistical concept) would give the government flexibility to\nbetter prioritize spending among competing needs.\n\n\n**B.** **Excluding Expenditure Items from the Fiscal Rule**\n\n**Government proposal**\n\n**32.** **The government submitted a bill in September 2022 to exclude several expenditure**\n**items from the fiscal rule.** The proposal (Bill Nº 23330) excludes the following items: capital\nexpenditures (regardless of the debt level), interest expenditure (only for the central government),\nexternally-financed projects (both existing projects that have financing rolling over ( _revalidaciones_ )\nand new international grants and loans), court rulings pending a final judgement, and contractual\nobligations of the airport concessions. These items to be excluded represent about 35 percent of the\ntotal expenditure of the central government (or 17 percent of total NFPS expenditures) (Figures 12\nand 13). The bill is under discussion at the Legislative Assembly.\n\n\n\n**Figure 12. Share of Proposed Exclusions in**\n\n**the Total Expenditure of the Central**\n\n**Government**\n(Share of expenditures in percent)\n\n\n\n**Figure 13. Share of Proposed Exclusions in**\n\n**the Total Expenditure of the NFPS**\n\n(Share of expenditures in percent)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSources: CGR reports (2022), national authorities’ data, and authors’ calculations.\n\n\n**Assessment and recommendations**\n\n**33.** **The fiscal rule would cover a much narrower share of expenditure under the proposed**\n**exclusions.** The exclusions are against the principle that a well-designed fiscal rule should cover all\nmain fiscal aggregates that can affect fiscal policy and debt sustainability (Eyraud and others 2018).\nThey tend to undermine fiscal credibility, as a large share of fiscal activity would not be monitored or\ncovered by the fiscal rule. In such case, even full compliance with the fiscal rule would not guarantee\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0701, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(81.9000015258789, 437.1400146484375, 292.5, 598.3900146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 447, "number": 16, "size": 123594, "transform": [210.60000610351562, 0.0, -0.0, 161.25, 81.9000015258789, 437.1400146484375], "width": 584, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.6499938964844, 437.1400146484375, 522.6300048828125, 590.8900146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 493, "number": 17, "size": 218169, "transform": [215.97999572753906, 0.0, -0.0, 153.75, 306.6499938964844, 437.1400146484375], "width": 661, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "such as balanced budget principles for local governments, and good PFM practices. When modifying\nthe legal framework to include them in the fiscal rule over time, however, each local government or\nsocial security (CCSS) should _not_ be subject to a uniform expenditure limit at individual entity levels.\nCertain flexibility needs to be built in, while respecting the overall fiscal envelope under the\nexpenditure limits. For example, bringing the social security and health care spending into the\nnational budget or central government (statistical concept) would give the government flexibility to\nbetter prioritize spending among competing needs.\n\nB. Excluding Expenditure Items from the Fiscal Rule\n\nGovernment proposal\n\n32. The government submitted a bill in September 2022 to exclude several expenditure\nitems from the fiscal rule. The proposal (Bill Nº 23330) excludes the following items: capital\nexpenditures (regardless of the debt level), interest expenditure (only for the central government),\nexternally-financed projects (both existing projects that have financing rolling over ( _revalidaciones_ )\nand new international grants and loans), court rulings pending a final judgement, and contractual\nobligations of the airport concessions. These items to be excluded represent about 35 percent of the\ntotal expenditure of the central government (or 17 percent of total NFPS expenditures) (Figures 12\nand 13). The bill is under discussion at the Legislative Assembly.\n\nFigure 12. Share of Proposed Exclusions in\n\nthe Total Expenditure of the Central\n\nGovernment\n(Share of expenditures in percent)\n\nFigure 13. Share of Proposed Exclusions in\n\nthe Total Expenditure of the NFPS\n\n(Share of expenditures in percent)\n\nSources: CGR reports (2022), national authorities’ data, and authors’ calculations.\n\nAssessment and recommendations\n\n33. The fiscal rule would cover a much narrower share of expenditure under the proposed\nexclusions. The exclusions are against the principle that a well-designed fiscal rule should cover all\nmain fiscal aggregates that can affect fiscal policy and debt sustainability (Eyraud and others 2018).\nThey tend to undermine fiscal credibility, as a large share of fiscal activity would not be monitored or\ncovered by the fiscal rule. In such case, even full compliance with the fiscal rule would not guarantee\n\n25", "text_characters": 1985}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "reducing debt vulnerabilities. Activity excluded from the rule could pose significant risks to public\nfinances. The exclusion also reduces the counter-cyclical property of the expenditure rule during\nadverse shocks.\n\n\n**34.** **Many countries exclude certain expenditure items in their fiscal rules but the**\n**experience has been mixed** (Box 1 and Table 5). Some spending items are excluded to safeguard\npriority spending such as social protection or public investment for development needs. On the\nother hand, some expenditure items are not easy to monitor, due to the lack of or delays in\ninformation. Although exclusions are common, such exclusions often give rise to implementation\nchallenges, as they make fiscal rules less transparent and harder to monitor. Additional distortions\nare prevalent as those exclusions give incentives for creative accounting to reclassify expenditure to\nother categories not subject to fiscal rules. The latter risk can be mitigated because the Law 9635\nincludes certification from the entities on capital expenditure classification and control from STAP\nand DGPN.\n\n\n**35.** **The proposed exclusions in Costa Rica create limited spending space but present**\n**significant risks.** Although the exclusion of expenditure items could give rise to additional policy\nspace to spend, it could bring risks and undermine fiscal discipline and efforts to control\nexpenditures and fiscal consolidation.\n\n\n- _Capital expenditures._ The existing fiscal rule already has a provision to protect capital\nexpenditures: expenditure growth ceilings only apply to current spending when debt is below 60\npercent of GDP. As capital expenditures often involve multi-year spending, excluding them from\nthe fiscal rules will lead to distortions, less transparency, and give incentives for creative\naccounting with potential undue classification of expenditure items. Over the past few years,\ncapital expenditures were always under-executed relative to the budget amount; it is therefore\nunclear whether the key binding constraint on aggregate public investment is the fiscal rule or\nrather unintended under-execution.\n\n\n- _Externally financed projects._ At present, the government does not include all capital expenditures\nin the initial budget because at the time of budget preparation the nature and size of externallyfinanced projects are uncertain. Externally-financed projects are included through in-year budget\nmodifications, which can be large for some institutions and unrelated to expected annual\nexecution, and are reflected in the final budget. As the government has revised the reference\n(July 2022 decree) to assess the compliance of fiscal rule (Section III.A), it intends to exclude\nexternally-financed projects from the fiscal rule. Excluding externally-financed projects from the\nrule might encourage relying further on external financing.\n\n\n- _Interest bill_ . A key rationale for excluding interest payment from the fiscal rule is that interest\nspending represents the cost of previous deficits (incurred in the form of debt) and is outside the\ndirect control of government. Some countries therefore adopt limits on primary spending or\nprimary balance. However, for countries whose priority is to reduce debt over time, focusing on\noverall expenditure or balance (that is, including the interest bill) in the fiscal rule is appropriate\nas they link directly to the debt dynamics. In Costa Rica, an exclusion of interest bill in the fiscal\nrule might loosen the primary expenditure limit modestly in the near term (by up to 0.4 percent\nof GDP under the authorities’ projection), but the additional space could be offset in the future\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "reducing debt vulnerabilities. Activity excluded from the rule could pose significant risks to public\nfinances. The exclusion also reduces the counter-cyclical property of the expenditure rule during\nadverse shocks.\n\n34. Many countries exclude certain expenditure items in their fiscal rules but the\nexperience has been mixed (Box 1 and Table 5). Some spending items are excluded to safeguard\npriority spending such as social protection or public investment for development needs. On the\nother hand, some expenditure items are not easy to monitor, due to the lack of or delays in\ninformation. Although exclusions are common, such exclusions often give rise to implementation\nchallenges, as they make fiscal rules less transparent and harder to monitor. Additional distortions\nare prevalent as those exclusions give incentives for creative accounting to reclassify expenditure to\nother categories not subject to fiscal rules. The latter risk can be mitigated because the Law 9635\nincludes certification from the entities on capital expenditure classification and control from STAP\nand DGPN.\n\n35. The proposed exclusions in Costa Rica create limited spending space but present\nsignificant risks. Although the exclusion of expenditure items could give rise to additional policy\nspace to spend, it could bring risks and undermine fiscal discipline and efforts to control\nexpenditures and fiscal consolidation.\n\n- _Capital expenditures._ The existing fiscal rule already has a provision to protect capital\nexpenditures: expenditure growth ceilings only apply to current spending when debt is below 60\npercent of GDP. As capital expenditures often involve multi-year spending, excluding them from\nthe fiscal rules will lead to distortions, less transparency, and give incentives for creative\naccounting with potential undue classification of expenditure items. Over the past few years,\ncapital expenditures were always under-executed relative to the budget amount; it is therefore\nunclear whether the key binding constraint on aggregate public investment is the fiscal rule or\nrather unintended under-execution.\n\n- _Externally financed projects._ At present, the government does not include all capital expenditures\nin the initial budget because at the time of budget preparation the nature and size of externallyfinanced projects are uncertain. Externally-financed projects are included through in-year budget\nmodifications, which can be large for some institutions and unrelated to expected annual\nexecution, and are reflected in the final budget. As the government has revised the reference\n(July 2022 decree) to assess the compliance of fiscal rule (Section III.A), it intends to exclude\nexternally-financed projects from the fiscal rule. Excluding externally-financed projects from the\nrule might encourage relying further on external financing.\n\n- _Interest bill_ . A key rationale for excluding interest payment from the fiscal rule is that interest\nspending represents the cost of previous deficits (incurred in the form of debt) and is outside the\ndirect control of government. Some countries therefore adopt limits on primary spending or\nprimary balance. However, for countries whose priority is to reduce debt over time, focusing on\noverall expenditure or balance (that is, including the interest bill) in the fiscal rule is appropriate\nas they link directly to the debt dynamics. In Costa Rica, an exclusion of interest bill in the fiscal\nrule might loosen the primary expenditure limit modestly in the near term (by up to 0.4 percent\nof GDP under the authorities’ projection), but the additional space could be offset in the future\n\n26", "text_characters": 3094}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0029-001"], "markdown": "depending on the macroeconomic outlook (Figure 14). For example, a faster decline in the\ninterest bill would relax primary expenditure growth under the existing rule but would leave it\nunchanged if interest was excluded. Frequent amendments to the rules may also undermine the\ncredibility of fiscal rules, in turn raising the borrowing cost of the government.\n\n\n\n\n- _Contingent liabilities from court rulings and_ **Figure 14. Implications for Primary**\n_contractual obligations on airport concessions_ . **Expenditure of Excluding Interest**\nThe authorities indicated that there are two **Payments from the Fiscal Rules**\ncourt rulings that may incur as an expense to (Percent of GDP)\nthe central government at (0.4 percent of GDP)\nif government loses in the legal cases.\nExcluding such contingent expenses is not\nrecommended. A more appropriate way will be\nto keep a contingency reserve in the budget to\naccount for the court rulings as well as other\npossible spending contingencies. Some other\ncountries maintain a reserve of about 2-3\npercent of annual government expenditures for\nsuch contingencies and the council of ministers\n\nSources: Authors’ estimates.\n\n(or the cabinet) approves its use. Over the\nmedium term, the potential realization of Notes: the path for spending excluding interest (red\ncontingencies should be incorporated through dotted line) is independent of the interest bill\n\nassumptions. A faster decline in the interest bill\n\nbetter fiscal planning under the MTFF fiscal\n\ngenerates more room for primary spending growth\n\npath. The same would apply for the contractual\n\nunder the existing rule projection. The blue line is\n\nobligations with companies operating the indicative as it refers to a specific set of\nconcessions for airports (Juan Santamaría and macroeconomic assumptions.\nDaniel Oduber). The accrued expenditure\nshould be included as part of overall expenditure when assessing compliance with the fiscal rule\nfor the general government.\n\n\n**36.** **Existing proposed amendments represent a departure from good principles of fiscal**\n**rules and could affect the implementation of fiscal rule in a permanent way.** The additional\nspending space from these exclusions in the near term does not seem to outweigh the costs and\nrisks involved, including undermining the credibility of the fiscal rule given it is still at the early stage\nof implementation. To rectify the bills already submitted to the Legislative Assembly, it is\nrecommended to propose a modification in line with principles of well-designed fiscal rules as the\nbill is under review by relevant legislative committees. Further proposals to amend the fiscal rules\nwould benefit from thorough and unified cost-benefit analyses.\n\n\n27\n\n\n\n**Figure 14. Implications for Primary**\n\n\n\n**Expenditure of Excluding Interest**\n\n\n\n**Payments from the Fiscal Rules**\n\n\n\n(Percent of GDP)\n\n\n\n\n\nSources: Authors’ estimates.\n\n\n\nNotes: the path for spending excluding interest (red\ndotted line) is independent of the interest bill\nassumptions. A faster decline in the interest bill\ngenerates more room for primary spending growth\nunder the existing rule projection. The blue line is\nindicative as it refers to a specific set of\nmacroeconomic assumptions.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0614, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(329.1000061035156, 206.9499969482422, 539.0999755859375, 348.6499938964844)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 393, "number": 12, "size": 110211, "transform": [210.0, 0.0, -0.0, 141.6999969482422, 329.1000061035156, 206.9499969482422], "width": 785, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "depending on the macroeconomic outlook (Figure 14). For example, a faster decline in the\ninterest bill would relax primary expenditure growth under the existing rule but would leave it\nunchanged if interest was excluded. Frequent amendments to the rules may also undermine the\ncredibility of fiscal rules, in turn raising the borrowing cost of the government.\n\n- _Contingent liabilities from court rulings and_ Figure 14. Implications for Primary\n_contractual obligations on airport concessions_ . Expenditure of Excluding Interest\nThe authorities indicated that there are two Payments from the Fiscal Rules\ncourt rulings that may incur as an expense to (Percent of GDP)\nthe central government at (0.4 percent of GDP)\nif government loses in the legal cases.\nExcluding such contingent expenses is not\nrecommended. A more appropriate way will be\nto keep a contingency reserve in the budget to\naccount for the court rulings as well as other\npossible spending contingencies. Some other\ncountries maintain a reserve of about 2-3\npercent of annual government expenditures for\nsuch contingencies and the council of ministers\n\nSources: Authors’ estimates.\n\n(or the cabinet) approves its use. Over the\nmedium term, the potential realization of Notes: the path for spending excluding interest (red\ncontingencies should be incorporated through dotted line) is independent of the interest bill\n\nassumptions. A faster decline in the interest bill\n\nbetter fiscal planning under the MTFF fiscal\n\ngenerates more room for primary spending growth\n\npath. The same would apply for the contractual\n\nunder the existing rule projection. The blue line is\n\nobligations with companies operating the indicative as it refers to a specific set of\nconcessions for airports (Juan Santamaría and macroeconomic assumptions.\nDaniel Oduber). The accrued expenditure\nshould be included as part of overall expenditure when assessing compliance with the fiscal rule\nfor the general government.\n\n36. Existing proposed amendments represent a departure from good principles of fiscal\nrules and could affect the implementation of fiscal rule in a permanent way. The additional\nspending space from these exclusions in the near term does not seem to outweigh the costs and\nrisks involved, including undermining the credibility of the fiscal rule given it is still at the early stage\nof implementation. To rectify the bills already submitted to the Legislative Assembly, it is\nrecommended to propose a modification in line with principles of well-designed fiscal rules as the\nbill is under review by relevant legislative committees. Further proposals to amend the fiscal rules\nwould benefit from thorough and unified cost-benefit analyses.\n\n27\n\nFigure 14. Implications for Primary\n\nExpenditure of Excluding Interest\n\nPayments from the Fiscal Rules\n\n(Percent of GDP)\n\nSources: Authors’ estimates.\n\nNotes: the path for spending excluding interest (red\ndotted line) is independent of the interest bill\nassumptions. A faster decline in the interest bill\ngenerates more room for primary spending growth\nunder the existing rule projection. The blue line is\nindicative as it refers to a specific set of\nmacroeconomic assumptions.", "text_characters": 2679}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Box 1. Selected Country Examples of Exclusions from Expenditure Rules**\n\n\nThis Box illustrates the coverage of expenditure rules in selected countries in Central and Latin America.\nWhile a well-designed fiscal rule calls for a broad coverage of key fiscal aggregates, many countries\nexclude certain expenditure items in their expenditure rules. The exclusions arise from several causes. On\nthe one hand, some spending items are excluded to safeguard priority spending such as social\nprotection or public investment. On the other hand, some expenditure items are not easy to monitor,\ndue to the lack of or delay in available information.\n\n\nFrom an economic point view, there are some reasons to exclude specific expenditure items in a fiscal\nrule (Cordes and others 2015). Interest payments are sometimes excluded from fiscal rules as they are\nnot under the direct control of governments. Certain cyclical automatic-stabilizing expenditures, such as\nunemployment benefits, are sometimes excluded in expenditure rules (e.g., in the European Union).\n\n\nExclusions of expenditure items in the fiscal rule vary among countries. Some exclude capital spending\nfrom the expenditure rule or set a floor of capital spending, though that can give rise to implementation\nchallenges (Davoodi and others 2022). Some countries exclude interest payments, pensions, or cyclical\nexpenditure such as unemployment benefits. In some cases, the expenditure rule is directly defined in\nterms of primary (or primary current) expenditure ceilings, excluding interest payments.\n\n\nSeveral Central and Latin American countries have exclusions in their expenditure rules (Table 5). Many\nexpenditures rules in Latin America are usually defined in terms of primary spending, with interest\npayments excluded. Exceptions are Costa Rica and Peru, with the latter including interest payments in\nthe current expenditure rule, but also specifying that the limits on non-financial spending exclude\ninterest payments. Some other countries have budget balance rules (Chile, Mexico, Peru), with a few\ndefining them in terms of structural or primary balances. Several cases (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) also\nhave debt rules in place.\n\n\nPublic investment is often excluded from Central and Latin American expenditure rules. For example, the\nexpenditure rule in Mexico is set on current spending only, thereby excluding all investment spending. In\nArgentina, capital expenditure is excluded from the rule in the jurisdictions that registered a surplus the\nprevious year, while only partially for those jurisdictions with a deficit.\n\n\nSome other exclusions depend on countries’ institutional framework. In countries where subnational\ngovernments get large transfers from the central government, for instance through automatic revenue\nsharing formula, these transfers tend to be excluded from the fiscal rule (Mexico and Argentina).\nCountries with rigid and earmarked expenditures, such as pre-allocations to specific items, sometimes\nexclude them. For example, Ecuador excludes spending items that are specified in the constitution for\npre-allocated expenditure to education, health, and transfers to regional governments. The expenditure\nrule of Mexico excludes expenditure items such as pensions and fuels for electricity generation.\n\n\nEven though exclusions of spending items are common in expenditure rules, such exclusions often give\nrise to implementation challenges. The exclusions make fiscal rules less transparent and harder to\nmonitor. Exclusions also limit the ability to restrain aggregate expenditures, posing more challenges to\nreducing debt vulnerabilities. Additional distortions are prevalent as those exclusions give incentives for\ncreative accounting to reclassify expenditure items not subject to fiscal rules. These challenges are\nparticularly relevant for capital expenditures as it often involves multi-year spending and efficiency\nconcerns. Certain current expenditures may be reclassified to public investment to bypass the rule limits.\nIncluding capital expenditure in the fiscal rule would promote better transparency and use of resources.\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 1. Selected Country Examples of Exclusions from Expenditure Rules\n\nThis Box illustrates the coverage of expenditure rules in selected countries in Central and Latin America.\nWhile a well-designed fiscal rule calls for a broad coverage of key fiscal aggregates, many countries\nexclude certain expenditure items in their expenditure rules. The exclusions arise from several causes. On\nthe one hand, some spending items are excluded to safeguard priority spending such as social\nprotection or public investment. On the other hand, some expenditure items are not easy to monitor,\ndue to the lack of or delay in available information.\n\nFrom an economic point view, there are some reasons to exclude specific expenditure items in a fiscal\nrule (Cordes and others 2015). Interest payments are sometimes excluded from fiscal rules as they are\nnot under the direct control of governments. Certain cyclical automatic-stabilizing expenditures, such as\nunemployment benefits, are sometimes excluded in expenditure rules (e.g., in the European Union).\n\nExclusions of expenditure items in the fiscal rule vary among countries. Some exclude capital spending\nfrom the expenditure rule or set a floor of capital spending, though that can give rise to implementation\nchallenges (Davoodi and others 2022). Some countries exclude interest payments, pensions, or cyclical\nexpenditure such as unemployment benefits. In some cases, the expenditure rule is directly defined in\nterms of primary (or primary current) expenditure ceilings, excluding interest payments.\n\nSeveral Central and Latin American countries have exclusions in their expenditure rules (Table 5). Many\nexpenditures rules in Latin America are usually defined in terms of primary spending, with interest\npayments excluded. Exceptions are Costa Rica and Peru, with the latter including interest payments in\nthe current expenditure rule, but also specifying that the limits on non-financial spending exclude\ninterest payments. Some other countries have budget balance rules (Chile, Mexico, Peru), with a few\ndefining them in terms of structural or primary balances. Several cases (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) also\nhave debt rules in place.\n\nPublic investment is often excluded from Central and Latin American expenditure rules. For example, the\nexpenditure rule in Mexico is set on current spending only, thereby excluding all investment spending. In\nArgentina, capital expenditure is excluded from the rule in the jurisdictions that registered a surplus the\nprevious year, while only partially for those jurisdictions with a deficit.\n\nSome other exclusions depend on countries’ institutional framework. In countries where subnational\ngovernments get large transfers from the central government, for instance through automatic revenue\nsharing formula, these transfers tend to be excluded from the fiscal rule (Mexico and Argentina).\nCountries with rigid and earmarked expenditures, such as pre-allocations to specific items, sometimes\nexclude them. For example, Ecuador excludes spending items that are specified in the constitution for\npre-allocated expenditure to education, health, and transfers to regional governments. The expenditure\nrule of Mexico excludes expenditure items such as pensions and fuels for electricity generation.\n\nEven though exclusions of spending items are common in expenditure rules, such exclusions often give\nrise to implementation challenges. The exclusions make fiscal rules less transparent and harder to\nmonitor. Exclusions also limit the ability to restrain aggregate expenditures, posing more challenges to\nreducing debt vulnerabilities. Additional distortions are prevalent as those exclusions give incentives for\ncreative accounting to reclassify expenditure items not subject to fiscal rules. These challenges are\nparticularly relevant for capital expenditures as it often involves multi-year spending and efficiency\nconcerns. Certain current expenditures may be reclassified to public investment to bypass the rule limits.\nIncluding capital expenditure in the fiscal rule would promote better transparency and use of resources.\n\n28", "text_characters": 3517}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0031-001"], "markdown": "**Table 5. Selected Country Examples on the Use of Expenditure Rules**\n\n\nSources: Authors’ compilation based on IMF Fiscal Rule Dataset 2021.\n\n\n29\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.5163, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(77.4000015258789, 93.3599853515625, 714.1500244140625, 486.3599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 1384, "number": 4, "size": 376347, "transform": [636.75, 0.0, -0.0, 393.0, 77.4000015258789, 93.3599853515625], "width": 1934, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Table 5. Selected Country Examples on the Use of Expenditure Rules\n\nSources: Authors’ compilation based on IMF Fiscal Rule Dataset 2021.\n\n29", "text_characters": 117}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0032-001"], "markdown": "**C.** **Revising the Ex-post Compliance Measurement**\n\n**Government executive decree**\n\n**38.** **The government modified the methodology for verifying compliance with the fiscal**\n**rules in July 2022.** Executive Decree N° 43589-H, enacted in July 2022, changed the reference\nvariable for verification of ex-post compliance to the final budget of a given fiscal year relative to\nthe initial budget of the previous fiscal year (Figure 15). This implies that the compliance is\nassessed based only on budgetary terms rather than final outturn and does not consider the\nexternally funded spending. [7]\n\n\n**Figure 15. Verification of Compliance with the Expenditure Rule**\n\n\nSources: Authors’ compilation of the compliance reference variables based on executive decree N° 43589-H.\n\n\n**Assessment and Recommendations**\n\n**39.** **The revision of the reference variable used to verify compliance was an attempt to**\n**address a shortcoming in the fiscal rule.** Under-execution of the budget had carry-on effects\nfor future limits of expenditure growth and thereby discouraged saving through improving\nspending efficiency. For example, the lower-than-anticipated execution in 2020 owing to\nlockdown restrictions led to a lower base regarding the 2021 expenditure growth limit.\n\n\n**40.** **While the revision may address the unintended effects of budget under-execution,**\n**it brought up other challenges.** First, the monitoring of the final budget becomes less\n\n\n7 A new executive decree (N° 43589-H) was enacted in July 2022, which amended the executive decree 41641-H\nimplementing the LSPF.\n\n\n30\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2347, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(95.4000015258789, 240.80001831054688, 534.7000122070312, 499.7900085449219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 719, "number": 13, "size": 130833, "transform": [439.29998779296875, 0.0, -0.0, 258.989990234375, 95.4000015258789, 240.80001831054688], "width": 1220, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "C. Revising the Ex-post Compliance Measurement\n\nGovernment executive decree\n\n38. The government modified the methodology for verifying compliance with the fiscal\nrules in July 2022. Executive Decree N° 43589-H, enacted in July 2022, changed the reference\nvariable for verification of ex-post compliance to the final budget of a given fiscal year relative to\nthe initial budget of the previous fiscal year (Figure 15). This implies that the compliance is\nassessed based only on budgetary terms rather than final outturn and does not consider the\nexternally funded spending. [7]\n\nFigure 15. Verification of Compliance with the Expenditure Rule\n\nSources: Authors’ compilation of the compliance reference variables based on executive decree N° 43589-H.\n\nAssessment and Recommendations\n\n39. The revision of the reference variable used to verify compliance was an attempt to\naddress a shortcoming in the fiscal rule. Under-execution of the budget had carry-on effects\nfor future limits of expenditure growth and thereby discouraged saving through improving\nspending efficiency. For example, the lower-than-anticipated execution in 2020 owing to\nlockdown restrictions led to a lower base regarding the 2021 expenditure growth limit.\n\n40. While the revision may address the unintended effects of budget under-execution,\nit brought up other challenges. First, the monitoring of the final budget becomes less\n\n7 A new executive decree (N° 43589-H) was enacted in July 2022, which amended the executive decree 41641-H\nimplementing the LSPF.\n\n30", "text_characters": 1298}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "transparent for the public. Monitoring the budget modifications to arrive at the final budget\nwould require frequent access to Information System on Plans and Budgets (SIPP) and dedicated\nwebsites. The final budget often does not have the same comprehensive explanatory notes as\nthe execution data. In general, the use of final budget in verifying compliance deviates from\ncommon practice. The CGR also indicated that compliance based on the final budget cannot be\nsubject to legal sanctions because the final budget remains an estimate and not an outturn. The\nuse of the final budget should still be kept for ex-ante and in-year monitoring and preventive\naction.\n\n\n**41.** **Using the final budget as a base for applying expenditure growth ceilings creates a**\n**challenge related to externally financed projects.** Those projects are included in the final\nbudget through in-year modifications, but are not included in the initial budget. The final budget\nincludes the multi-year funding without annualizing the expected execution. Table 6 contains\nestimates of what would have been the ex-ante and ex-post assessment before and after the\nexecutive decree (Decree 43589-H) over recent years. Externally-financed expenditure accounts\nfor one-fifth of capital expenditure of the national budget of central government. Instead, the\nrest of NFPS entities include the externally-financed expenditure both in the initial budget and\nmodifications. CGR and Ministry of Finance have different interpretations on the inclusion. The\nMinistry of Finance intends to exclude externally financed projects from the final budget to verify\nthe compliance relative to the initial budget, while CGR includes those but do not adjust the\ninitial budget reference with the estimated externally-financed spending.\n\n\n**Table 6. Measuring Compliance with Expenditure Growth Ceilings**\n\n\n**CG spending growth rate (percent)**\n\n**2020** **2021** **2022**\n**Rule**\ntotal spending n.a. n.a. 2.0\ncurrent spending 4.7 4.1 2.0\n**Ex-ante verification (initial (T) vs initial (T-1))**\ntotal spending 5.4 1.1 2.0\ncurrent spending 4.4 2.1 2.1\n**New ex-post verification (final w/ ext. fin. (T) vs initial (T-1))**\ntotal spending 11.5 14.6 14.4\ncurrent spending 4.5 5.2 3.1\n**New ex-post verification (final w/o ext. fin. (T) vs initial (T-1))**\ntotal spending -1.7 -4.4 2.4\ncurrent spending -1.2 -3.0 2.5\n**Old ex-post verification (executed (T) vs executed (T-1))**\ntotal spending -3.3 9.0 n.a.\ncurrent spending 0.7 7.4 n.a.\n\n\nSources: National authorities’ Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks 2021 – 2025 and 2022 -2027 _, Ministerio de_\n_Hacienda_, and authors calculations.\n\n\nNote: Excluding spending covered by the escape clause from the final budget and execution amounts in 2020\nand 2021 (0.8 and 0.4 percent of GDP, respectively). The rule ceiling does not apply to total spending in 2020\nand 2021 (marked as n.a.) as T-2 debt was below 60 percent of GDP.\n\n\n**42.** **A preferred approach to assess ex-post compliance would be to compare the final**\n**outturn relative to the initial budget of the previous year** **while making an estimate of**\n**externally-financed expenditure** . The final outturn is observable and relates directly to debt\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "transparent for the public. Monitoring the budget modifications to arrive at the final budget\nwould require frequent access to Information System on Plans and Budgets (SIPP) and dedicated\nwebsites. The final budget often does not have the same comprehensive explanatory notes as\nthe execution data. In general, the use of final budget in verifying compliance deviates from\ncommon practice. The CGR also indicated that compliance based on the final budget cannot be\nsubject to legal sanctions because the final budget remains an estimate and not an outturn. The\nuse of the final budget should still be kept for ex-ante and in-year monitoring and preventive\naction.\n\n41. Using the final budget as a base for applying expenditure growth ceilings creates a\nchallenge related to externally financed projects. Those projects are included in the final\nbudget through in-year modifications, but are not included in the initial budget. The final budget\nincludes the multi-year funding without annualizing the expected execution. Table 6 contains\nestimates of what would have been the ex-ante and ex-post assessment before and after the\nexecutive decree (Decree 43589-H) over recent years. Externally-financed expenditure accounts\nfor one-fifth of capital expenditure of the national budget of central government. Instead, the\nrest of NFPS entities include the externally-financed expenditure both in the initial budget and\nmodifications. CGR and Ministry of Finance have different interpretations on the inclusion. The\nMinistry of Finance intends to exclude externally financed projects from the final budget to verify\nthe compliance relative to the initial budget, while CGR includes those but do not adjust the\ninitial budget reference with the estimated externally-financed spending.\n\nTable 6. Measuring Compliance with Expenditure Growth Ceilings\n\nCG spending growth rate (percent)\n\n2020 2021 2022\nRule\ntotal spending n.a. n.a. 2.0\ncurrent spending 4.7 4.1 2.0\nEx-ante verification (initial (T) vs initial (T-1))\ntotal spending 5.4 1.1 2.0\ncurrent spending 4.4 2.1 2.1\nNew ex-post verification (final w/ ext. fin. (T) vs initial (T-1))\ntotal spending 11.5 14.6 14.4\ncurrent spending 4.5 5.2 3.1\nNew ex-post verification (final w/o ext. fin. (T) vs initial (T-1))\ntotal spending -1.7 -4.4 2.4\ncurrent spending -1.2 -3.0 2.5\nOld ex-post verification (executed (T) vs executed (T-1))\ntotal spending -3.3 9.0 n.a.\ncurrent spending 0.7 7.4 n.a.\n\nSources: National authorities’ Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks 2021 – 2025 and 2022 -2027 _, Ministerio de_\n_Hacienda_, and authors calculations.\n\nNote: Excluding spending covered by the escape clause from the final budget and execution amounts in 2020\nand 2021 (0.8 and 0.4 percent of GDP, respectively). The rule ceiling does not apply to total spending in 2020\nand 2021 (marked as n.a.) as T-2 debt was below 60 percent of GDP.\n\n42. A preferred approach to assess ex-post compliance would be to compare the final\noutturn relative to the initial budget of the previous year while making an estimate of\nexternally-financed expenditure . The final outturn is observable and relates directly to debt\n\n31", "text_characters": 2647}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "dynamics. The comparison of the final outturn with the initial budget would resolve the underexecution challenges arising when using the final execution of the previous year. The execution\naccounts for all funding sources, including externally-financed projects, but the initial budget\nused as reference does not include those. In that context, one option would be to add the\nestimated annual execution of the externally-financed expenditure to the initial budget such that\nthe reference would be comparable to the final execution. To this end, the budget document (or\na supplementary annex to the budget) can include the list of projects and estimated expenditure\nwith external financing for the next budget year, for information purposes. This would be the\nsame practice as other NFPS entities apply today. [8] It would help improve budget unity on the\ncapital expenditure and strengthen the link between verification of compliance and the fiscal\nsustainability objective.\n\n\n**43.** **However, this approach may involve procedural changes in STAP and DGPN.** It is\nbecause the initial budget only involves domestic financing items, while the external financing of\nprojects is approved in separate procedures. If the preferable option of comparing final outturns\nwith initial budget is not feasible, a closer analysis on the annual execution of externally-financed\nprojects as well as their implications on government debt is necessary. In case the reference base\nis the initial budget of the previous fiscal year without including an estimate of externallyfinanced projects, a separate expenditure control is necessary as externally-financed projects\nrepresent an important part of government expenditures and external loans add to government\ndebt.\n\n\n**44.** **For ex-ante compliance with fiscal rules, the comparison of budgets would still be**\n**useful to avoid large deviations before the final execution (as in Art. 19 LSPF).** The ex-ante\nverification helps prevent large deviations from the rule during the year. The base reference\n(initial budget) would have to be adjusted with the estimate of the annual externally-financed\nexpenditure as noted above. The first time of adjusting the initial budget with an estimate can\napply the effective execution of the previous year to avoid an overestimate.\n\n\n**D.** **Escape Clauses**\n\n**45.** **The fiscal rule includes an escape clause in the event of a national emergency or**\n**sharp economic downturn.** The escape clause can be activated for two years if (i) there is a\nstate of national emergency, which allows emergency spending of at least 0.3 percent of GDP; or\n(ii) there is an economic recession or if GDP growth is projected to fall below 1 percent. In case\n(ii), the suspension of the rule is up to two years if the previous levels of real GDP are not\nrecovered before, and there is a three-year transition period to return to the rule. In periods of\n\n\n8 The Congress would not have to approve the estimate because it had already approved those projects in\nseparate occasions when the government borrowed externally. But the inclusion of such information in the annex\nto the budget would give comprehensive information of the capital expenditure for the year independent of the\nfunding source.\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "dynamics. The comparison of the final outturn with the initial budget would resolve the underexecution challenges arising when using the final execution of the previous year. The execution\naccounts for all funding sources, including externally-financed projects, but the initial budget\nused as reference does not include those. In that context, one option would be to add the\nestimated annual execution of the externally-financed expenditure to the initial budget such that\nthe reference would be comparable to the final execution. To this end, the budget document (or\na supplementary annex to the budget) can include the list of projects and estimated expenditure\nwith external financing for the next budget year, for information purposes. This would be the\nsame practice as other NFPS entities apply today. [8] It would help improve budget unity on the\ncapital expenditure and strengthen the link between verification of compliance and the fiscal\nsustainability objective.\n\n43. However, this approach may involve procedural changes in STAP and DGPN. It is\nbecause the initial budget only involves domestic financing items, while the external financing of\nprojects is approved in separate procedures. If the preferable option of comparing final outturns\nwith initial budget is not feasible, a closer analysis on the annual execution of externally-financed\nprojects as well as their implications on government debt is necessary. In case the reference base\nis the initial budget of the previous fiscal year without including an estimate of externallyfinanced projects, a separate expenditure control is necessary as externally-financed projects\nrepresent an important part of government expenditures and external loans add to government\ndebt.\n\n44. For ex-ante compliance with fiscal rules, the comparison of budgets would still be\nuseful to avoid large deviations before the final execution (as in Art. 19 LSPF). The ex-ante\nverification helps prevent large deviations from the rule during the year. The base reference\n(initial budget) would have to be adjusted with the estimate of the annual externally-financed\nexpenditure as noted above. The first time of adjusting the initial budget with an estimate can\napply the effective execution of the previous year to avoid an overestimate.\n\nD. Escape Clauses\n\n45. The fiscal rule includes an escape clause in the event of a national emergency or\nsharp economic downturn. The escape clause can be activated for two years if (i) there is a\nstate of national emergency, which allows emergency spending of at least 0.3 percent of GDP; or\n(ii) there is an economic recession or if GDP growth is projected to fall below 1 percent. In case\n(ii), the suspension of the rule is up to two years if the previous levels of real GDP are not\nrecovered before, and there is a three-year transition period to return to the rule. In periods of\n\n8 The Congress would not have to approve the estimate because it had already approved those projects in\nseparate occasions when the government borrowed externally. But the inclusion of such information in the annex\nto the budget would give comprehensive information of the capital expenditure for the year independent of the\nfunding source.\n\n32", "text_characters": 2705}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "extraordinary favorable economic growth (real GDP growth over 6 percent for two years) the\nMinistry of Finance (MoF) can raise the current expenditure growth parameter up to 85 percent.\n\n\n**46.** **The escape clause provision could allow for a transition period also after national**\n**emergencies** (Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; Article 16 of the LSPF). A two- to three-year\ntransition appears appropriate when countries exit from national emergencies or recessions,\nwhich may help avoid an abrupt withdrawal of primary spending. A robust procedure to activate\nthe clause and a narrow set of circumstances remain important.\n\n\n**E.** **Recommendations**\n\n**Coverage of the expenditure rule**\n\n- The institutional coverage of the fiscal rule should apply to general government, as defined\nin Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). Over time, the Legislative Assembly should\nconsider including local governments and the social security (CCSS) in the fiscal rule. In the\ninterim, Ministry of Finance will closely monitor them under a risk-based approach.\n\n\n- MOF should develop verifiable and objective criteria to identify which public entities should\nbe included in the fiscal rule, in accordance with GFSM and other indicators.\n\n\n- Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to indicate that the exclusion of\nentities from the fiscal rules should be based on GFSM criteria specified by MOF (or including\nthose criteria in the law). Entities that are under government control and nonmarket\nproducers should be considered as government entities and included in the fiscal rules.\nOther entities need to be monitored under a risk-based approach to be developed by MOF,\nand debt regulations to cover the authorization outside of central government should be\nenhanced.\n\n\n- MoF will present an assessment on legal changes needed to empower the ministry and in\nparticular STAP to make the expenditure limits applicable to the overall central government\n(GFSM) at the aggregate level, including extrabudgetary entities such as Decentralized\nInstitutions, instead of by individual entities.\n\n\n**Excluding expenditure items**\n\n- Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to avoid excluding capital\nexpenditure, court rulings, and interest expenses from the expenditure rules. Create a\ncontingency reserve in the budget (e.g., a separate budget line) that will cover court rulings,\namong others, subject to the aggregate expenditure ceilings.\n\n\n**Verification of compliance**\n\n- Clarify the executive decree to include the comparison of expenditure growth between the\nfinal outturn at the end of a fiscal year relative to the initial budget of the previous fiscal year\nplus an estimate of externally funded expenditure. Ex ante and in-year verification at budget\nlevel remains the same but adding the annual estimate of the externally funded expenditure.\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "extraordinary favorable economic growth (real GDP growth over 6 percent for two years) the\nMinistry of Finance (MoF) can raise the current expenditure growth parameter up to 85 percent.\n\n46. The escape clause provision could allow for a transition period also after national\nemergencies (Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; Article 16 of the LSPF). A two- to three-year\ntransition appears appropriate when countries exit from national emergencies or recessions,\nwhich may help avoid an abrupt withdrawal of primary spending. A robust procedure to activate\nthe clause and a narrow set of circumstances remain important.\n\nE. Recommendations\n\nCoverage of the expenditure rule\n\n- The institutional coverage of the fiscal rule should apply to general government, as defined\nin Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). Over time, the Legislative Assembly should\nconsider including local governments and the social security (CCSS) in the fiscal rule. In the\ninterim, Ministry of Finance will closely monitor them under a risk-based approach.\n\n- MOF should develop verifiable and objective criteria to identify which public entities should\nbe included in the fiscal rule, in accordance with GFSM and other indicators.\n\n- Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to indicate that the exclusion of\nentities from the fiscal rules should be based on GFSM criteria specified by MOF (or including\nthose criteria in the law). Entities that are under government control and nonmarket\nproducers should be considered as government entities and included in the fiscal rules.\nOther entities need to be monitored under a risk-based approach to be developed by MOF,\nand debt regulations to cover the authorization outside of central government should be\nenhanced.\n\n- MoF will present an assessment on legal changes needed to empower the ministry and in\nparticular STAP to make the expenditure limits applicable to the overall central government\n(GFSM) at the aggregate level, including extrabudgetary entities such as Decentralized\nInstitutions, instead of by individual entities.\n\nExcluding expenditure items\n\n- Amend Bill 23330 submitted to the Legislative Assembly to avoid excluding capital\nexpenditure, court rulings, and interest expenses from the expenditure rules. Create a\ncontingency reserve in the budget (e.g., a separate budget line) that will cover court rulings,\namong others, subject to the aggregate expenditure ceilings.\n\nVerification of compliance\n\n- Clarify the executive decree to include the comparison of expenditure growth between the\nfinal outturn at the end of a fiscal year relative to the initial budget of the previous fiscal year\nplus an estimate of externally funded expenditure. Ex ante and in-year verification at budget\nlevel remains the same but adding the annual estimate of the externally funded expenditure.\n\n33", "text_characters": 2398}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0036-002"], "markdown": "- Include the best estimate of annual externally funded expenditure in an annex to budget\ndocuments provided to the Legislative Assembly.\n\n\n**Other provisions**\n\n- Modify the escape clause provision _(_ Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; _Article 16 of the LSPF)_\nsuch that the maximum transition period applies when the escape clause is activated in either\none of the triggering conditions (emergency or recession).\n\n##### **IV. MEDIUM-TERM CONSIDERATIONS OF** **THE FISCAL RULES**\n\n\n**A.** **Risk-Based Approach in Setting a Medium-term Debt Anchor**\n\n**47.** **The annual ceilings on expenditure growth could be supported by an explicit**\n**medium-term debt anchor.** International experience suggests that well-designed fiscal rules\nhave a medium-term anchor linked to the objective of fiscal sustainability and defined in terms\nof a stock variable (typically, gross debt in percent of GDP). Anchoring fiscal policy to a stock\nvariable is appropriate because fiscal sustainability is determined by the government balance\nsheet, and its capacity to meet financing needs and service debt. However, because the debt\nstock is not under the full control of the government, the debt anchor should guide fiscal policy\nover the medium term (Caselli et al. 2018, Caselli and others 2022). One (or a few) operational\nlimit(s) should instead guide near-term fiscal policy and budget preparations. The operational\nlimits such as expenditure rule should have a clear link with the fiscal anchor—in which adhering\nto the expenditure rule over time would ensure a high likelihood of achieving the debt anchor\nand maintain debt sustainability over the medium term. In addition, operational limits such as\ndeficit targets or expenditure limits should contribute to macroeconomic stability over business\ncycles, for example through a countercyclical primary balance.\n\n\n**Figure 16. Fiscal Rules of Worldwide**\n\n\n\n**Types of Fiscal Rules**\n(Number of countries with specific type of fiscal rule)\n\n\nSource: Davoodi and others (2022).\n\n\n34\n\n\n\n**Common Adoption of Fiscal Rules, 2021**\n\n(Number of countries)\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0574, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(97.80000305175781, 547.7880249023438, 290.41998291015625, 692.3380126953125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 287, "number": 15, "size": 34401, "transform": [192.6199951171875, 0.0, -0.0, 144.5500030517578, 97.80000305175781, 547.7880249023438], "width": 381, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(364.8999938964844, 547.7900390625, 545.1500244140625, 688.5800170898438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 391, "number": 16, "size": 20237, "transform": [180.25, 0.0, -0.0, 140.7899932861328, 364.8999938964844, 547.7900390625], "width": 500, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "- Include the best estimate of annual externally funded expenditure in an annex to budget\ndocuments provided to the Legislative Assembly.\n\nOther provisions\n\n- Modify the escape clause provision _(_ Decree N° 41641-H Article 25; _Article 16 of the LSPF)_\nsuch that the maximum transition period applies when the escape clause is activated in either\none of the triggering conditions (emergency or recession).\nIV. MEDIUM-TERM CONSIDERATIONS OF THE FISCAL RULES\n\nA. Risk-Based Approach in Setting a Medium-term Debt Anchor\n\n47. The annual ceilings on expenditure growth could be supported by an explicit\nmedium-term debt anchor. International experience suggests that well-designed fiscal rules\nhave a medium-term anchor linked to the objective of fiscal sustainability and defined in terms\nof a stock variable (typically, gross debt in percent of GDP). Anchoring fiscal policy to a stock\nvariable is appropriate because fiscal sustainability is determined by the government balance\nsheet, and its capacity to meet financing needs and service debt. However, because the debt\nstock is not under the full control of the government, the debt anchor should guide fiscal policy\nover the medium term (Caselli et al. 2018, Caselli and others 2022). One (or a few) operational\nlimit(s) should instead guide near-term fiscal policy and budget preparations. The operational\nlimits such as expenditure rule should have a clear link with the fiscal anchor—in which adhering\nto the expenditure rule over time would ensure a high likelihood of achieving the debt anchor\nand maintain debt sustainability over the medium term. In addition, operational limits such as\ndeficit targets or expenditure limits should contribute to macroeconomic stability over business\ncycles, for example through a countercyclical primary balance.\n\nFigure 16. Fiscal Rules of Worldwide\n\nTypes of Fiscal Rules\n(Number of countries with specific type of fiscal rule)\n\nSource: Davoodi and others (2022).\n\n34\n\nCommon Adoption of Fiscal Rules, 2021\n\n(Number of countries)", "text_characters": 1709}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Note: The Venn diagram (right-hand-side chart) shows the overlap of different rules across the world. For\nexample, there are 5 countries that adopt all four types of fiscal rules and 35 countries that adopt debt rules with\nboth budget balance rules and expenditure rules\n\n\n**48.** **A combination of expenditure rules with a debt rule is common in practice.** As of\n2021, 85 countries adopted fiscal rules that included an explicit ceiling on government debt, and\nthis number has been increasing over time (Figure 16). At the same time, more than 80 percent\nof countries with a debt ceiling have also rules imposing constraints on the (nominal or\nstructural) budget balance, and among those, almost a third has expenditure ceilings (Figure 16).\n\n\n**49.** **A risk-based approach to set the medium-term anchor requires determining a debt**\n**limit and a precautionary buffer:**\n\n\n- _A (maximum) debt limit._ The debt limit is the level debt should not exceed. There is\nconsensus that debt could be in distress with debt dynamics getting out of control when\ndebt surpasses a certain level, and the literature abounds with estimates of this threshold\n(IMF 2016). However, this country-specific threshold is highly uncertain in the post-pandemic\nenvironment, in part because of unanticipated inflation, rapid rises in nominal interest rates,\nuncertainty about the neutral interest rate, and concerns about government efforts in\nundertaking adjustments. The latest literature suggests that the debt limit can be sensitive to\ngrowth and interest rates differentials, as well as to the elasticity of interest rates to debt\n(Caselli and others 2022; Mian, Sufi, and Straub 2022). As a result, considerations other than\nthe risk of debt distress also motivate the choice of a maximum debt limit, for example, the\nadverse impact of higher debt on growth and financing conditions. Debt should not exceed\nthe level that drags growth or that triggers a sharp rise in spreads or ratings downgrade.\n\n\n- _A safety buffer._ Keeping debt close to the limit would not be prudent, as an adverse shock\n(for example, from a tightening of financial conditions) could quickly push debt above the\nlimit and lead to a surge in spreads or debt distress. It would be prudent to maintain a safety\nbuffer such that under normal circumstances, debt would stay sufficiently below the limit.\nThe safety buffer raises the likelihood that debt would remain sustainable (that is, below the\nlimit) even under negative shocks, and that policymakers have space to respond to shocks\nand stabilize the economy. The safety buffer also allows governments time and space to take\ncorrective measures if debt starts trending up.\n\n**B.** **Estimating a Medium-Term Debt Anchor for Costa Rica**\n\n**50.** **The authorities should consider introducing a medium-term anchor on gross**\n**government debt.** The current fiscal rule in Costa Rica has an operational limit—a ceiling on\nexpenditure growth linked to the 4-year moving average of previous nominal GDP growth and\nthe previous debt-to-GDP ratio--but without a debt rule it is uncertain if the expenditure ceilings\nare consistent with the objective of reducing government debt over time and maintaining debt\nsustainability. The following discusses an appropriate government debt anchor based on the IMF\nguidance note on calibrating fiscal rules (Caselli and others 2018). This involves two steps:\n\n\n- **Setting a debt limit** : We consider that an appropriate range for the debt limit would be\nabout 65 to 70 percent of GDP, slightly below the 70 percent threshold applied to emerging\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Note: The Venn diagram (right-hand-side chart) shows the overlap of different rules across the world. For\nexample, there are 5 countries that adopt all four types of fiscal rules and 35 countries that adopt debt rules with\nboth budget balance rules and expenditure rules\n\n48. A combination of expenditure rules with a debt rule is common in practice. As of\n2021, 85 countries adopted fiscal rules that included an explicit ceiling on government debt, and\nthis number has been increasing over time (Figure 16). At the same time, more than 80 percent\nof countries with a debt ceiling have also rules imposing constraints on the (nominal or\nstructural) budget balance, and among those, almost a third has expenditure ceilings (Figure 16).\n\n49. A risk-based approach to set the medium-term anchor requires determining a debt\nlimit and a precautionary buffer:\n\n- _A (maximum) debt limit._ The debt limit is the level debt should not exceed. There is\nconsensus that debt could be in distress with debt dynamics getting out of control when\ndebt surpasses a certain level, and the literature abounds with estimates of this threshold\n(IMF 2016). However, this country-specific threshold is highly uncertain in the post-pandemic\nenvironment, in part because of unanticipated inflation, rapid rises in nominal interest rates,\nuncertainty about the neutral interest rate, and concerns about government efforts in\nundertaking adjustments. The latest literature suggests that the debt limit can be sensitive to\ngrowth and interest rates differentials, as well as to the elasticity of interest rates to debt\n(Caselli and others 2022; Mian, Sufi, and Straub 2022). As a result, considerations other than\nthe risk of debt distress also motivate the choice of a maximum debt limit, for example, the\nadverse impact of higher debt on growth and financing conditions. Debt should not exceed\nthe level that drags growth or that triggers a sharp rise in spreads or ratings downgrade.\n\n- _A safety buffer._ Keeping debt close to the limit would not be prudent, as an adverse shock\n(for example, from a tightening of financial conditions) could quickly push debt above the\nlimit and lead to a surge in spreads or debt distress. It would be prudent to maintain a safety\nbuffer such that under normal circumstances, debt would stay sufficiently below the limit.\nThe safety buffer raises the likelihood that debt would remain sustainable (that is, below the\nlimit) even under negative shocks, and that policymakers have space to respond to shocks\nand stabilize the economy. The safety buffer also allows governments time and space to take\ncorrective measures if debt starts trending up.\n\nB. Estimating a Medium-Term Debt Anchor for Costa Rica\n\n50. The authorities should consider introducing a medium-term anchor on gross\ngovernment debt. The current fiscal rule in Costa Rica has an operational limit—a ceiling on\nexpenditure growth linked to the 4-year moving average of previous nominal GDP growth and\nthe previous debt-to-GDP ratio--but without a debt rule it is uncertain if the expenditure ceilings\nare consistent with the objective of reducing government debt over time and maintaining debt\nsustainability. The following discusses an appropriate government debt anchor based on the IMF\nguidance note on calibrating fiscal rules (Caselli and others 2018). This involves two steps:\n\n- Setting a debt limit : We consider that an appropriate range for the debt limit would be\nabout 65 to 70 percent of GDP, slightly below the 70 percent threshold applied to emerging\n\n35", "text_characters": 2969}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0038-002"], "markdown": "market-access countries in the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework for Market\nAccess Countries (IMF 2013). [9] A level below the 70 percent of GDP benchmark is justified\nbecause sovereign spreads and credit risk in Costa Rica have recently surpassed those of the\naverage emerging-market economy for a similar level of government debt (Figure 17).\nMoreover, spreads for Costa Rica sovereign bonds have been higher than those of 75\npercent of emerging market economies since 2014 (Figures 18 and 19).\n\n\n- **Estimating the debt anchor** : The sustained rise in government debt over the last decade in\nCosta Rica calls for a precautionary approach when setting the debt anchor. Costa Rica\nexperienced a doubling of debt from 34 to 68 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2021 as\nadverse shocks occurred and nominal growth slowed down. We determine a safety buffer\nbased on the stochastic nature of the debt, the tolerance for risks, and the size and likelihood\nof contingent liabilities. [10] The debt anchor is calibrated so that the distribution of debt\ndynamics (a fan chart) starting from the debt anchor stays below the maximum debt limit\nover a 6-year horizon with a high probability. Intuitively, the debt anchor is the highest level\nof debt that the government could reach and still have a relatively low risk of experiencing\nfiscal distress over the medium-term. The methodology is described in Annex II.\n\n\n\n**Figure 17. Debt Levels and Spreads in**\n\n**Emerging Market Economies**\n\n(Percent)\n\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global\nDebt Database, and JPMorgan.\n\n\nNotes: Spreads in log terms. Excludes Venezuela.\n\n\n\n**Figure 18. Spreads in Emerging Market**\n\n**Economies, 2000-21**\n\n(Basis points)\n\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global Debt\nDatabase, and Fitch.\n\n\nNote: Data for sovereign spreads of Costa Rica are not\navailable before 2012.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 The DSA methodology was revised recently (IMF, 2021), but has moved away from homogeneous debt\nthresholds across countries within an income group.\n\n10 In Costa Rica, the possible contingent liabilities arise from government guaranteed debt of public entities,\nnatural disaster risks, pensions, court rulings, local governments, financial sector risks, and public-private\npartnerships. As of mid-2022, the quantified medium-term contingent liabilities were about 9 percent of GDP\nThis is similar to the average in a sample of advanced and emerging market economies (Bova and others 2016),\nwhich finds that the probability that contingent liabilities exceeding 1 percent of GDP materialize in a year is\nabout 6 percent, with the average fiscal cost of these realizations at about 10 percent of GDP.\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0644, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(324.6499938964844, 387.1500244140625, 549.5999755859375, 525.8900146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 460, "number": 18, "size": 154818, "transform": [224.9499969482422, 0.0, -0.0, 138.74000549316406, 324.6499938964844, 387.1500244140625], "width": 715, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(95.4000015258789, 387.1500244140625, 311.3500061035156, 519.9000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 368, "number": 17, "size": 130776, "transform": [215.9499969482422, 0.0, -0.0, 132.75, 95.4000015258789, 387.1500244140625], "width": 599, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "market-access countries in the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework for Market\nAccess Countries (IMF 2013). [9] A level below the 70 percent of GDP benchmark is justified\nbecause sovereign spreads and credit risk in Costa Rica have recently surpassed those of the\naverage emerging-market economy for a similar level of government debt (Figure 17).\nMoreover, spreads for Costa Rica sovereign bonds have been higher than those of 75\npercent of emerging market economies since 2014 (Figures 18 and 19).\n\n- Estimating the debt anchor : The sustained rise in government debt over the last decade in\nCosta Rica calls for a precautionary approach when setting the debt anchor. Costa Rica\nexperienced a doubling of debt from 34 to 68 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2021 as\nadverse shocks occurred and nominal growth slowed down. We determine a safety buffer\nbased on the stochastic nature of the debt, the tolerance for risks, and the size and likelihood\nof contingent liabilities. [10] The debt anchor is calibrated so that the distribution of debt\ndynamics (a fan chart) starting from the debt anchor stays below the maximum debt limit\nover a 6-year horizon with a high probability. Intuitively, the debt anchor is the highest level\nof debt that the government could reach and still have a relatively low risk of experiencing\nfiscal distress over the medium-term. The methodology is described in Annex II.\n\nFigure 17. Debt Levels and Spreads in\n\nEmerging Market Economies\n\n(Percent)\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global\nDebt Database, and JPMorgan.\n\nNotes: Spreads in log terms. Excludes Venezuela.\n\nFigure 18. Spreads in Emerging Market\n\nEconomies, 2000-21\n\n(Basis points)\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global Debt\nDatabase, and Fitch.\n\nNote: Data for sovereign spreads of Costa Rica are not\navailable before 2012.\n\n9 The DSA methodology was revised recently (IMF, 2021), but has moved away from homogeneous debt\nthresholds across countries within an income group.\n\n10 In Costa Rica, the possible contingent liabilities arise from government guaranteed debt of public entities,\nnatural disaster risks, pensions, court rulings, local governments, financial sector risks, and public-private\npartnerships. As of mid-2022, the quantified medium-term contingent liabilities were about 9 percent of GDP\nThis is similar to the average in a sample of advanced and emerging market economies (Bova and others 2016),\nwhich finds that the probability that contingent liabilities exceeding 1 percent of GDP materialize in a year is\nabout 6 percent, with the average fiscal cost of these realizations at about 10 percent of GDP.\n\n36", "text_characters": 2220}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0039-002"], "markdown": "- Based on the historical realization of macroeconomic shocks and contingent liabilities in\nCosta Rica, a prudent gross debt anchor for Costa Rica’s central government is estimated to\nbe between 35 and 50 percent of GDP if policymakers are tolerant of a 10 percent probability\nthat debt may breach the maximum debt limit of 65-70 percent of GDP over the medium\nterm (Figure 20). This would provide a reasonable safety buffer allowing Costa Rica to\nwithstand typical adverse macroeconomic shocks in the medium term. A lower debt limit or a\nlower tolerance for risk would require a lower debt anchor (Table 7).\n\n\n**Figure 19. Debt Levels and Sovereign Ratings in Emerging Market Economies**\n\n(Credit ratings)\n\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global Debt Database, and Fitch Ratings.\n\n\n**Figure 20. Debt Anchor with Sufficient Buffers**\n\n(Percent of GDP)\n\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook and IMF Staff estimates.\n\n\nNotes: using the IMF [Fiscal Rule Calibration Tool] (Eyraud and others, 2018).\nThe chart simulates the evolution of debt from an anchor level under a distribution\nof shocks based on historical data.\n\n\n37\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0913, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(199.8000030517578, 457.36004638671875, 443.6500244140625, 638.9000244140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 670, "number": 12, "size": 118251, "transform": [243.85000610351562, 0.0, -0.0, 181.5399932861328, 199.8000030517578, 457.36004638671875], "width": 900, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(198.85000610351562, 222.25999450683594, 430.6000061035156, 396.7099914550781)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 500, "number": 11, "size": 155601, "transform": [231.75, 0.0, -0.0, 174.4499969482422, 198.85000610351562, 222.25999450683594], "width": 664, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "- Based on the historical realization of macroeconomic shocks and contingent liabilities in\nCosta Rica, a prudent gross debt anchor for Costa Rica’s central government is estimated to\nbe between 35 and 50 percent of GDP if policymakers are tolerant of a 10 percent probability\nthat debt may breach the maximum debt limit of 65-70 percent of GDP over the medium\nterm (Figure 20). This would provide a reasonable safety buffer allowing Costa Rica to\nwithstand typical adverse macroeconomic shocks in the medium term. A lower debt limit or a\nlower tolerance for risk would require a lower debt anchor (Table 7).\n\nFigure 19. Debt Levels and Sovereign Ratings in Emerging Market Economies\n\n(Credit ratings)\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF Global Debt Database, and Fitch Ratings.\n\nFigure 20. Debt Anchor with Sufficient Buffers\n\n(Percent of GDP)\n\nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook and IMF Staff estimates.\n\nNotes: using the IMF [Fiscal Rule Calibration Tool] (Eyraud and others, 2018).\nThe chart simulates the evolution of debt from an anchor level under a distribution\nof shocks based on historical data.\n\n37", "text_characters": 930}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Gross Debt Anchor**\n\n\n\n**Baseline**\n**scenario**\n\n\n\n**Higher risk**\n\n\n\n**tolerance**\n\n\n\n**Lower**\n**debt limit**\n\n\n\n**No Contingent**\n\n\n\n**scenario** **tolerance** **debt limit** **Liabilities**\n\nParameters\nDebt limit (percent of GDP) 70 70 65 70\nRisk tolerance (probability of exceeding 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0\nlimit, percent)\n\n\n\n5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0\n\n\n\nContingent liabilities (percent of GDP) 9.3 9.3 9.3 0.0\nResults\n\n**Debt anchor (percent of GDP)** **45.3** **49.8** **35.4** **61.5**\np10-p90 range at year 5 (percent of 13.8 14.1 13.9 13.0\nGDP)\n\nSource: IMF Staff estimates.\n\n\nNote: Assuming a maximum primary balance of 2.5 percent. The contingent liabilities are estimated by the\nnational authorities. The simulation assumes that about 1.5 percent of contingent liabilities materialize every year,\ncumulating to 9.3 percent of GDP over 6 years.\n\n\n**51.** **Additional considerations of fiscal risks and development needs in Costa Rica will**\n**affect the choice of the debt anchor** . Mapping these spending needs to a medium-term debt\nanchor would require some judgement. For example, public spending on health and social\nprotection (through transfers by central governments to CCSS) are expected to rise over time.\nInvesting in infrastructure (such as education, roads, and climate adaptation) remains a priority. It\ncould increase productive capacity, but also financing needs, so its implications for the debt-toGDP ratio will need to be considered when setting a medium-term debt anchor.\n\n\n**52.** **Complying with the existing expenditure rule is expected to put debt on a path**\n**reaching the debt anchor at about 50 percent of GDP by 2035** . Based on the projections in\nthe IMF 2022 Staff Report for the Third Review under the EFF (IMF 2022) and the application of\nthe existing expenditure rule, current spending would be contained, while debt-to-GDP would\ngradually fall to about 50 percent of GDP by 2035 (Figure 21). However, adhering to the\nexpenditure rule will require a sizeable reduction in total expenditure as a share of GDP by 3\npercentage points of GDP over next 15 years. To the extent cutting expenditure proves\neconomically or politically difficult, additional revenue measures will be needed to finance\nadditional spending needs. Setting a medium-term debt anchor would allow policymakers to\nrecalibrate the expenditure path following structural shocks (e.g., a permanent increase in\nrevenues), and still attain the same debt anchor levels over a similar horizon (Table 8).\n\n\n38", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Gross Debt Anchor\n\nBaseline\nscenario\n\nHigher risk\n\ntolerance\n\nLower\ndebt limit\n\nNo Contingent\n\nscenario tolerance debt limit Liabilities\n\nParameters\nDebt limit (percent of GDP) 70 70 65 70\nRisk tolerance (probability of exceeding 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0\nlimit, percent)\n\n5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0\n\nContingent liabilities (percent of GDP) 9.3 9.3 9.3 0.0\nResults\n\nDebt anchor (percent of GDP) 45.3 49.8 35.4 61.5\np10-p90 range at year 5 (percent of 13.8 14.1 13.9 13.0\nGDP)\n\nSource: IMF Staff estimates.\n\nNote: Assuming a maximum primary balance of 2.5 percent. The contingent liabilities are estimated by the\nnational authorities. The simulation assumes that about 1.5 percent of contingent liabilities materialize every year,\ncumulating to 9.3 percent of GDP over 6 years.\n\n51. Additional considerations of fiscal risks and development needs in Costa Rica will\naffect the choice of the debt anchor . Mapping these spending needs to a medium-term debt\nanchor would require some judgement. For example, public spending on health and social\nprotection (through transfers by central governments to CCSS) are expected to rise over time.\nInvesting in infrastructure (such as education, roads, and climate adaptation) remains a priority. It\ncould increase productive capacity, but also financing needs, so its implications for the debt-toGDP ratio will need to be considered when setting a medium-term debt anchor.\n\n52. Complying with the existing expenditure rule is expected to put debt on a path\nreaching the debt anchor at about 50 percent of GDP by 2035 . Based on the projections in\nthe IMF 2022 Staff Report for the Third Review under the EFF (IMF 2022) and the application of\nthe existing expenditure rule, current spending would be contained, while debt-to-GDP would\ngradually fall to about 50 percent of GDP by 2035 (Figure 21). However, adhering to the\nexpenditure rule will require a sizeable reduction in total expenditure as a share of GDP by 3\npercentage points of GDP over next 15 years. To the extent cutting expenditure proves\neconomically or politically difficult, additional revenue measures will be needed to finance\nadditional spending needs. Setting a medium-term debt anchor would allow policymakers to\nrecalibrate the expenditure path following structural shocks (e.g., a permanent increase in\nrevenues), and still attain the same debt anchor levels over a similar horizon (Table 8).\n\n38", "text_characters": 2039}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0041-001"], "markdown": "**Table 8. Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks under Existing Rule Ceilings, 2024-2035**\n\n\n**Current expenditure growth,** **Debt in 2035,**\n\n**2024-2035 average, percent** **percent of GDP**\n\nBaseline 4.5 52.5\n\nHigher NGDP growth (+1ppt) 5.2 39.6\n\nHigher interest rate (+1ppt) 4.3 56.7\n\nHigher revenue (+1 pct of GDP) 4.7 36.3\n\n \nSources: IMF Staff Estimates.\n\n\nNotes: Each row other than baseline introduces one shock at a time. The shock applies to the entire period\n2024-2035. For reference, the current expenditure growth ceiling in 2022 was 1.96 percent of GDP. The\nprojections assume government expenditures are at the ceilings prescribed under the fiscal rule. If the\ngovernment adopts more ambitious adjustment with expenditures growing within the ceilings, then debt\nlevels would decline further by 2035.\n\n\n**53.** **The debt anchor can be set to cover central government debt (in gross terms), with**\n**an aim to include debt incurred by municipalities and local governments when**\n**consolidated data become timelier and available.** Local government debt remains modest at\n0.2 percent of GDP in 2021 at the aggregate level. The central government is the main source of\nborrowing, contributing 85 percent of the consolidated NFPS debt level in 2021.\n\n\n**Figure 21. Current Spending and Debt Projections under the Fiscal Rule, 2024-2035**\n\n\nSources: IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis.\n\n\nNote: Corresponds to baseline scenario in Table 8. Notes: The Debt Sustainability Analysis extends until 2031.\nBeyond 2031 all macroeconomic variables except for current spending and debt are assumed to remain\nconstant, and the current spending path is determined by the fiscal rule.\n\n\n**54.** **Introducing a debt limit and anchor likely requires an amendment to the current**\n**Fiscal Responsibility Law (Law 9635).** The concept of debt anchor should be described in the\nlaw in terms of its role in contributing to fiscal sustainability, rather than as legally binding\nconstraints on near-term fiscal policies. The constraining role of debt exceeding the anchor level\nwould be formalized in a correction mechanism. The introduction of a medium-term anchor\n\n\n39\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1371, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(95.4000015258789, 401.8699951171875, 538.260009765625, 551.9199829101562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 557, "number": 19, "size": 111576, "transform": [442.8599853515625, 0.0, -0.0, 150.0500030517578, 95.4000015258789, 401.8699951171875], "width": 1644, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Table 8. Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks under Existing Rule Ceilings, 2024-2035\n\nCurrent expenditure growth, Debt in 2035,\n\n2024-2035 average, percent percent of GDP\n\nBaseline 4.5 52.5\n\nHigher NGDP growth (+1ppt) 5.2 39.6\n\nHigher interest rate (+1ppt) 4.3 56.7\n\nHigher revenue (+1 pct of GDP) 4.7 36.3\n\n \nSources: IMF Staff Estimates.\n\nNotes: Each row other than baseline introduces one shock at a time. The shock applies to the entire period\n2024-2035. For reference, the current expenditure growth ceiling in 2022 was 1.96 percent of GDP. The\nprojections assume government expenditures are at the ceilings prescribed under the fiscal rule. If the\ngovernment adopts more ambitious adjustment with expenditures growing within the ceilings, then debt\nlevels would decline further by 2035.\n\n53. The debt anchor can be set to cover central government debt (in gross terms), with\nan aim to include debt incurred by municipalities and local governments when\nconsolidated data become timelier and available. Local government debt remains modest at\n0.2 percent of GDP in 2021 at the aggregate level. The central government is the main source of\nborrowing, contributing 85 percent of the consolidated NFPS debt level in 2021.\n\nFigure 21. Current Spending and Debt Projections under the Fiscal Rule, 2024-2035\n\nSources: IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis.\n\nNote: Corresponds to baseline scenario in Table 8. Notes: The Debt Sustainability Analysis extends until 2031.\nBeyond 2031 all macroeconomic variables except for current spending and debt are assumed to remain\nconstant, and the current spending path is determined by the fiscal rule.\n\n54. Introducing a debt limit and anchor likely requires an amendment to the current\nFiscal Responsibility Law (Law 9635). The concept of debt anchor should be described in the\nlaw in terms of its role in contributing to fiscal sustainability, rather than as legally binding\nconstraints on near-term fiscal policies. The constraining role of debt exceeding the anchor level\nwould be formalized in a correction mechanism. The introduction of a medium-term anchor\n\n39", "text_characters": 1763}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "should be consistent with the fact that expenditure ceilings are the operational constraint on\nnear-term fiscal policy in Costa Rica. The expenditure rule parameters, along with other nonparametric aspects of the fiscal rule framework, would need to be reviewed periodically (e.g.,\nevery 5 years) when the debt anchor is in place to ensure that they remain consistent with\nreaching the debt anchor under the MTFF.\n\n**C.** **Recommendations**\n\n- Include a medium-term debt anchor in the current fiscal rule framework. The government,\nthrough consultation of stakeholders, would propose a gross debt anchor for the central\ngovernment consistent with maintaining fiscal sustainability with high probability and to be\noperationalized through an expenditure rule. The proposal would also specify the\ninstitutional and economic coverage of the debt anchor.\n\n\n- Recalibrate expenditure rule limits periodically (every 5 years) after the debt anchor is\nestablished in the fiscal rule to ensure the consistency with the medium-term debt anchor.\n\n##### **V. STRENGTHENING THE MTFF TO SUPPORT** **THE RULES-BASED FRAMEWORK**\n\n\n**A.** **Reinforcing the MTFF framework**\n\n**The role of the MTFF and its linkage with fiscal rules**\n\n**55.** **The fiscal rule needs to be complemented by a medium-term fiscal framework**\n**(MTFF).** The MTFF sets the fiscal envelope for 3-5 years, guiding the annual budgets, and needs\nto be consistent with the fiscal rules to achieve fiscal sustainability. Many countries, like Costa\nRica, have established numerical fiscal rules on expenditures that impose ceilings on expenditure\ngrowth in a legislation. [11] The expenditure limits need to be consistent with the fiscal path set in\nthe MTFF, converging to the medium-term debt anchor and credibly guiding the annual budgets.\nTo support the credibility of the fiscal path and underlying MTFF projections, countries often (1)\nprepare alternative macroeconomic scenarios that impact the fiscal projections and sensitivity\nanalysis, and (2) empower independent fiscal councils to assess macroeconomic and fiscal\nforecasts.\n\n\n**56.** **MTFFs tend to include fiscal risk assessments not only at the macroeconomic level**\n**but on specific fiscal risks.** The government needs to control for the fiscal risks arising from\nentities or expenditure items that are excluded from the fiscal rules, such as public corporations,\n\n\n11 Some countries with well-established MTFFs can, alternatively, set the operational limits in the MTFF to reach a\nsustainable level of debt and not in the legal framework. The expenditure limits would be binding for the period\nof the MTFF plan (Caselli and others 2022). Then, those parameters of the fiscal rules can be calibrated\nperiodically. How to make those expenditure ceilings binding is still a challenge and will in most cases need legal\nprovisions on corrective action to avoid or correct excessive expenditure or deficits.\n\n\n40", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "should be consistent with the fact that expenditure ceilings are the operational constraint on\nnear-term fiscal policy in Costa Rica. The expenditure rule parameters, along with other nonparametric aspects of the fiscal rule framework, would need to be reviewed periodically (e.g.,\nevery 5 years) when the debt anchor is in place to ensure that they remain consistent with\nreaching the debt anchor under the MTFF.\n\nC. Recommendations\n\n- Include a medium-term debt anchor in the current fiscal rule framework. The government,\nthrough consultation of stakeholders, would propose a gross debt anchor for the central\ngovernment consistent with maintaining fiscal sustainability with high probability and to be\noperationalized through an expenditure rule. The proposal would also specify the\ninstitutional and economic coverage of the debt anchor.\n\n- Recalibrate expenditure rule limits periodically (every 5 years) after the debt anchor is\nestablished in the fiscal rule to ensure the consistency with the medium-term debt anchor.\nV. STRENGTHENING THE MTFF TO SUPPORT THE RULES-BASED FRAMEWORK\n\nA. Reinforcing the MTFF framework\n\nThe role of the MTFF and its linkage with fiscal rules\n\n55. The fiscal rule needs to be complemented by a medium-term fiscal framework\n(MTFF). The MTFF sets the fiscal envelope for 3-5 years, guiding the annual budgets, and needs\nto be consistent with the fiscal rules to achieve fiscal sustainability. Many countries, like Costa\nRica, have established numerical fiscal rules on expenditures that impose ceilings on expenditure\ngrowth in a legislation. [11] The expenditure limits need to be consistent with the fiscal path set in\nthe MTFF, converging to the medium-term debt anchor and credibly guiding the annual budgets.\nTo support the credibility of the fiscal path and underlying MTFF projections, countries often (1)\nprepare alternative macroeconomic scenarios that impact the fiscal projections and sensitivity\nanalysis, and (2) empower independent fiscal councils to assess macroeconomic and fiscal\nforecasts.\n\n56. MTFFs tend to include fiscal risk assessments not only at the macroeconomic level\nbut on specific fiscal risks. The government needs to control for the fiscal risks arising from\nentities or expenditure items that are excluded from the fiscal rules, such as public corporations,\n\n11 Some countries with well-established MTFFs can, alternatively, set the operational limits in the MTFF to reach a\nsustainable level of debt and not in the legal framework. The expenditure limits would be binding for the period\nof the MTFF plan (Caselli and others 2022). Then, those parameters of the fiscal rules can be calibrated\nperiodically. How to make those expenditure ceilings binding is still a challenge and will in most cases need legal\nprovisions on corrective action to avoid or correct excessive expenditure or deficits.\n\n40", "text_characters": 2422}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0043-001"], "markdown": "subnational governments, and pension funds to avoid putting fiscal sustainability at risk. A better\nassessment of fiscal risks includes preparing a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) following a riskbased approach (Table 9). The management of fiscal risks can be divided into four stages:\nidentification, mitigation, provision for risks that cannot be mitigated, and building of fiscal\nbuffers to accommodate residual risks (IMF 2016). Good practices in the management of specific\nfiscal risks are described in Table 9.\n\n\n**Table 9. Fiscal Risks Management Toolkit**\n\n\nSource: Analyzing and Managing fiscal Risks: Best Practices (IMF 2016).\n\n\n**57.** **Strengthening the budget process is critical for a successful implementation of**\n**fiscal rules and a credible MTFF.** The fragmented budget process and non-comprehensive\nbudgets—such as the existence of significant extrabudgetary entities or dual budgets for capital\nand current expenditures, or for external and internal funding—complicate the implementation\nand monitoring of fiscal rules, which could eventually undermine their credibility. The MTFF often\nfaces coordination issues with different entities involved in projections, delays in information\nsharing, and less transparent monitoring if information is not easily available. The lack of a\ncomprehensive budget requires more efforts to coordinate the MTFF that includes the NFPS and\ndifferent sources of fiscal reporting.\n\n\n**58.** **Another pillar of the fiscal rule’s framework is enhancing the transparency of**\n**government finance statistics.** In general, countries with good quality, coverage, and timeliness\n\n\n41\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.3031, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(96.0, 191.3699951171875, 550.5, 514.6199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 744, "number": 7, "size": 339675, "transform": [454.5, 0.0, -0.0, 323.25, 96.0, 191.3699951171875], "width": 1046, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "subnational governments, and pension funds to avoid putting fiscal sustainability at risk. A better\nassessment of fiscal risks includes preparing a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) following a riskbased approach (Table 9). The management of fiscal risks can be divided into four stages:\nidentification, mitigation, provision for risks that cannot be mitigated, and building of fiscal\nbuffers to accommodate residual risks (IMF 2016). Good practices in the management of specific\nfiscal risks are described in Table 9.\n\nTable 9. Fiscal Risks Management Toolkit\n\nSource: Analyzing and Managing fiscal Risks: Best Practices (IMF 2016).\n\n57. Strengthening the budget process is critical for a successful implementation of\nfiscal rules and a credible MTFF. The fragmented budget process and non-comprehensive\nbudgets—such as the existence of significant extrabudgetary entities or dual budgets for capital\nand current expenditures, or for external and internal funding—complicate the implementation\nand monitoring of fiscal rules, which could eventually undermine their credibility. The MTFF often\nfaces coordination issues with different entities involved in projections, delays in information\nsharing, and less transparent monitoring if information is not easily available. The lack of a\ncomprehensive budget requires more efforts to coordinate the MTFF that includes the NFPS and\ndifferent sources of fiscal reporting.\n\n58. Another pillar of the fiscal rule’s framework is enhancing the transparency of\ngovernment finance statistics. In general, countries with good quality, coverage, and timeliness\n\n41", "text_characters": 1373}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "of fiscal reporting will enable the monitoring of fiscal rules. Governments can take early or\npreventive action in case of deviation from the rule limits. At the same time, a broader coverage\nof fiscal rules becomes possible in countries with monthly or quarterly fiscal statistics covering\nthe general government and NFPS, and with timely consolidation of accounts. This enables the\nfiscal rules to better contribute toward the objective of fiscal sustainability. In that context,\ncovering extra-budgetary activities within the central government statistics is crucial for the wellfunctioning of fiscal rules.\n\n\n**59.** **The MTFF includes the policy mix of current spending and investments for the**\n**medium-term.** Instead of excluding capital expenditures in fiscal rules (that is, the golden rules)\nor setting a limit on current expenditure by law, it is more effective and credible to consider the\ncomposition in the government fiscal plans (MTFF) and the cycle for investment execution. In this\nsense, the MTFF should present the most likely investment scenario as the baseline and\ncompliant with the overall expenditure limits, instead of putting public investment as a residual\nvalue or as an optimistic path in national development plans.\n\n**B.** **Recent Progress of the MTFF in Costa Rica**\n\n**60.** **The authorities have made progress in developing an MTFF since 2020 and aligning**\n**their fiscal strategy consistent with the fiscal rules and debt projections** . The development\nof the MTFF has been supported by FAD capacity development during 2020-2022 and led to the\nfulfilment of two Structural Benchmarks of the IMF EFF program, which requires the publication\nof the MTFF for the central government in 2021 and for the NFPS in 2022 (Annex III). The\ndevelopment of the MTFF was also supported by a medium-term debt strategy report (April\n2022). The MTFF report presents the no-policy change scenario, the policy reforms, and the final\nscenario, and assesses the compliance with fiscal rules (expenditure ceilings) of the previous and\nfollowing years. The macro-fiscal model is being enhanced with IMF-ICD support to incorporate\nthe macroeconomic part and be able to do shock scenarios.\n\n\n**61.** **The MTFF in Costa Rica also includes an analysis of fiscal risks, which is deemed**\n**good practice** . This analysis includes macroeconomic risks and specific risks (public corporations,\npensions, natural disasters, court rulings, local governments, private-public partnerships (PPPs),\nfinancial sector and public debt). Most analyses are qualitative but some risks are quantified, and\nmitigation measures are included in some cases.\n\n\n**62.** **The expansion of the MTFF to the NFPS in 2022 has partly overcome the**\n**fragmentation in the fiscal plans between the national budget and rest of the NFPS.** The\nfiscal rules and MTFF follow a top-down approach by setting the fiscal aggregates to guide the\nbudget preparation. However, in Costa Rica, the expenditure rule is based on individual entities,\nwith a rather bottom-up approach except for the budgetary CG. In this case, the MTFF provides a\ntop-down overview of deficit and debt consistent with the expenditure ceilings under the fiscal\nrules, as well as an overall projection with the contribution of the subsectors to the fiscal\nobjectives.\n\n\n**63.** **The MTFF is the link between the fiscal rules and annual budget.** The preparation of\nthe MTFF should guide the budget, and the projection should reflect the envisaged execution.\n\n\n42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "of fiscal reporting will enable the monitoring of fiscal rules. Governments can take early or\npreventive action in case of deviation from the rule limits. At the same time, a broader coverage\nof fiscal rules becomes possible in countries with monthly or quarterly fiscal statistics covering\nthe general government and NFPS, and with timely consolidation of accounts. This enables the\nfiscal rules to better contribute toward the objective of fiscal sustainability. In that context,\ncovering extra-budgetary activities within the central government statistics is crucial for the wellfunctioning of fiscal rules.\n\n59. The MTFF includes the policy mix of current spending and investments for the\nmedium-term. Instead of excluding capital expenditures in fiscal rules (that is, the golden rules)\nor setting a limit on current expenditure by law, it is more effective and credible to consider the\ncomposition in the government fiscal plans (MTFF) and the cycle for investment execution. In this\nsense, the MTFF should present the most likely investment scenario as the baseline and\ncompliant with the overall expenditure limits, instead of putting public investment as a residual\nvalue or as an optimistic path in national development plans.\n\nB. Recent Progress of the MTFF in Costa Rica\n\n60. The authorities have made progress in developing an MTFF since 2020 and aligning\ntheir fiscal strategy consistent with the fiscal rules and debt projections . The development\nof the MTFF has been supported by FAD capacity development during 2020-2022 and led to the\nfulfilment of two Structural Benchmarks of the IMF EFF program, which requires the publication\nof the MTFF for the central government in 2021 and for the NFPS in 2022 (Annex III). The\ndevelopment of the MTFF was also supported by a medium-term debt strategy report (April\n2022). The MTFF report presents the no-policy change scenario, the policy reforms, and the final\nscenario, and assesses the compliance with fiscal rules (expenditure ceilings) of the previous and\nfollowing years. The macro-fiscal model is being enhanced with IMF-ICD support to incorporate\nthe macroeconomic part and be able to do shock scenarios.\n\n61. The MTFF in Costa Rica also includes an analysis of fiscal risks, which is deemed\ngood practice . This analysis includes macroeconomic risks and specific risks (public corporations,\npensions, natural disasters, court rulings, local governments, private-public partnerships (PPPs),\nfinancial sector and public debt). Most analyses are qualitative but some risks are quantified, and\nmitigation measures are included in some cases.\n\n62. The expansion of the MTFF to the NFPS in 2022 has partly overcome the\nfragmentation in the fiscal plans between the national budget and rest of the NFPS. The\nfiscal rules and MTFF follow a top-down approach by setting the fiscal aggregates to guide the\nbudget preparation. However, in Costa Rica, the expenditure rule is based on individual entities,\nwith a rather bottom-up approach except for the budgetary CG. In this case, the MTFF provides a\ntop-down overview of deficit and debt consistent with the expenditure ceilings under the fiscal\nrules, as well as an overall projection with the contribution of the subsectors to the fiscal\nobjectives.\n\n63. The MTFF is the link between the fiscal rules and annual budget. The preparation of\nthe MTFF should guide the budget, and the projection should reflect the envisaged execution.\n\n42", "text_characters": 2901}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The MTFF has to be in line with the expenditure rule in the budget and in execution. Table 10\nshows that the MTFF complies with the annual expenditure growth ceilings for the national\nbudget. However, NFPS expenditure growth exceeds the ceiling because some entities in the\nNFPS are excluded from the rule.\n\n\n**Table 10. Expenditure ceilings and MTFF 2021-2023**\n\n(Percent)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|2021|2022|2023|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Expenditure Rule: Current Expenditure**|4.13|1.96|2.56|\n|MTFF expenditure growth projection CG|5.8|1.25|2.61|\n|MTFF expenditure growth projection NFPS|Non-
applicable|5.22|4.69|\n|**Expenditure Rule: Total expenditure**|Non-
applicable|1.96|2.56|\n|MTFF expenditure growth projection CG|Non-
applicable|1.96|2.56|\n|MTFF expenditure growth projection NFPS|Non-
applicable|5.6|5.0|\n\n\n\nNote: Expenditure growth projections for the CG are actual executed data in 2021 and exclude Covid-19 related\nexpenditure and the excess expenditure over the ceiling of the previous year. For 2022 and 2023 it excludes some\nitems exempted from the rule.\n\n\n**64.** **The calendar of the MTFF publication (April and August each year) reflects the**\n**budget preparation and the budget proposal.** The MTFF requires having final execution data\nof the previous fiscal year that is consolidated by STAP in March each year. It also needs the\ndecision on the expenditure rule in March and the macroeconomic scenario from the central\nbank (BCCR). The MoF has successfully published the MTFF in April in 2021 and 2022 and\nupdated it for the central government in August (Figure 22).\n\n\n**65.** **The projection model of the MTFF needs assumptions on the consolidation of the**\n**NFPS** . The framework developed with FAD capacity development includes a fiscal database and\nthe projection model (for the central and local governments, social security (CCSS), rest of\ndecentralized institutions (ID), and public corporations) to consolidate to the NFPS projections.\nThe model includes the baseline scenario, policy measures, and final scenario in compliance with\nthe fiscal rule by subsector. Some assumptions are needed to project the subsectors as many of\nthose are excluded from the fiscal rule (central government, ID sector (without Social Security)\nand around 50 percent of the expenditure of public corporations are assumed rule-compliant).\nThe rule’s compliance in the model is ensured by adjusting public current transfers (CG), private\ntransfers (ID sector) and good and services expenditure in public corporations. In this exercise,\nthe role of national budget transfers is key as it is used for the consolidation among subsectors,\nensuring compliance with the fiscal rules at each subsector and consolidated levels.\n\n\n43", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [88.0739974975586, 176.37197875976562, 541.9500122070312, 355.177978515625], "columns": 4, "rows": 7}], "text": "The MTFF has to be in line with the expenditure rule in the budget and in execution. Table 10\nshows that the MTFF complies with the annual expenditure growth ceilings for the national\nbudget. However, NFPS expenditure growth exceeds the ceiling because some entities in the\nNFPS are excluded from the rule.\n\nTable 10. Expenditure ceilings and MTFF 2021-2023\n\n(Percent)\n\n Col1 2021 2022 2023 \n\n Expenditure Rule: Current Expenditure 4.13 1.96 2.56 \n MTFF expenditure growth projection CG 5.8 1.25 2.61 \n MTFF expenditure growth projection NFPS Non- applicable 5.22 4.69 \n Expenditure Rule: Total expenditure Non- applicable 1.96 2.56 \n MTFF expenditure growth projection CG Non- applicable 1.96 2.56 \n MTFF expenditure growth projection NFPS Non- applicable 5.6 5.0 \n\nNote: Expenditure growth projections for the CG are actual executed data in 2021 and exclude Covid-19 related\nexpenditure and the excess expenditure over the ceiling of the previous year. For 2022 and 2023 it excludes some\nitems exempted from the rule.\n\n64. The calendar of the MTFF publication (April and August each year) reflects the\nbudget preparation and the budget proposal. The MTFF requires having final execution data\nof the previous fiscal year that is consolidated by STAP in March each year. It also needs the\ndecision on the expenditure rule in March and the macroeconomic scenario from the central\nbank (BCCR). The MoF has successfully published the MTFF in April in 2021 and 2022 and\nupdated it for the central government in August (Figure 22).\n\n65. The projection model of the MTFF needs assumptions on the consolidation of the\nNFPS . The framework developed with FAD capacity development includes a fiscal database and\nthe projection model (for the central and local governments, social security (CCSS), rest of\ndecentralized institutions (ID), and public corporations) to consolidate to the NFPS projections.\nThe model includes the baseline scenario, policy measures, and final scenario in compliance with\nthe fiscal rule by subsector. Some assumptions are needed to project the subsectors as many of\nthose are excluded from the fiscal rule (central government, ID sector (without Social Security)\nand around 50 percent of the expenditure of public corporations are assumed rule-compliant).\nThe rule’s compliance in the model is ensured by adjusting public current transfers (CG), private\ntransfers (ID sector) and good and services expenditure in public corporations. In this exercise,\nthe role of national budget transfers is key as it is used for the consolidation among subsectors,\nensuring compliance with the fiscal rules at each subsector and consolidated levels.\n\n43", "text_characters": 2228}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-001", "cr-2023-097-fig-p0046-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 22. Calendar of the MTFF and National Budgets**\n\n\nSources: Authors’ compilation.\n\n\n**C.** **Pending Issues Regarding the MTFF in Costa Rica**\n\n**66.** **Demands for exclusions from the expenditure rule have complicated the MTFF**\n**projection exercise, making it less transparent** . An increasing number of expenditure items\nand significant entities are excluded from the fiscal rule. Without a medium-term debt anchor, it\nis possible that entities not covered by the rule could overspend and contribute to the debt\nbuildup. The MTFF exercise is important as it brings a transparent discussion of the feasibility of\nthe expenditure ceilings to reach a debt anchor and how the subsectors could contribute or\ncompensate each other. However, the exclusions and difficult coordination in obtaining\ninformation of entities outside the fiscal rules have reduced the transparency.\n\n\n**67.** **The MTFF only reports on central government debt as the rule thresholds apply.** It is\nadvisable to expand the scope of the debt sustainability analysis to cover NFPS debt as there is\npublished data at MoF, including the government guaranteed debt. However, there are\nlimitations to the NFPS consolidated public debt. The debt management office (DGCP) does not\nhave detailed data on public debt holders within the NFPS regarding terms, interest rates, and\ncurrency denomination that are required to calculate the average effective interest rate of the\nconsolidated debt. For this reason, the projection was based on the interest rates of the central\ngovernment non-consolidated debt, which could have overestimated the interest payments.\n\n\n**68.** **The recent decree that established the compliance with the rule at budget level**\n**introduces challenges to the MTFF projections.** The MTFF reflects expenditure projections in\nterms of expected execution and including all expenditure items. Since the introduction of the\nJuly 2022 decree, only the initial and final budgets are considered for the expenditure rule\ncompliance, excluding all externally-financed projects that account for around 20 percent of\n\n\n44\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 22. Calendar of the MTFF and National Budgets\n\nSources: Authors’ compilation.\n\nC. Pending Issues Regarding the MTFF in Costa Rica\n\n66. Demands for exclusions from the expenditure rule have complicated the MTFF\nprojection exercise, making it less transparent . An increasing number of expenditure items\nand significant entities are excluded from the fiscal rule. Without a medium-term debt anchor, it\nis possible that entities not covered by the rule could overspend and contribute to the debt\nbuildup. The MTFF exercise is important as it brings a transparent discussion of the feasibility of\nthe expenditure ceilings to reach a debt anchor and how the subsectors could contribute or\ncompensate each other. However, the exclusions and difficult coordination in obtaining\ninformation of entities outside the fiscal rules have reduced the transparency.\n\n67. The MTFF only reports on central government debt as the rule thresholds apply. It is\nadvisable to expand the scope of the debt sustainability analysis to cover NFPS debt as there is\npublished data at MoF, including the government guaranteed debt. However, there are\nlimitations to the NFPS consolidated public debt. The debt management office (DGCP) does not\nhave detailed data on public debt holders within the NFPS regarding terms, interest rates, and\ncurrency denomination that are required to calculate the average effective interest rate of the\nconsolidated debt. For this reason, the projection was based on the interest rates of the central\ngovernment non-consolidated debt, which could have overestimated the interest payments.\n\n68. The recent decree that established the compliance with the rule at budget level\nintroduces challenges to the MTFF projections. The MTFF reflects expenditure projections in\nterms of expected execution and including all expenditure items. Since the introduction of the\nJuly 2022 decree, only the initial and final budgets are considered for the expenditure rule\ncompliance, excluding all externally-financed projects that account for around 20 percent of\n\n44", "text_characters": 1743}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "central government capital expenditure in 2021, as currently these are not included in the initial\nbudget. The starting point of the MTFF projections is the execution of last fiscal year and not the\nfinal budget of last year for a consistent presentation of the fiscal path, and the projection\nincludes all expenditures irrespective of their financing sources. Therefore, the MTFF includes an\nestimate of expenditures funded across all sources. In order to make it comparable to the initial\nbudget the assumptions on external funding have to be made explicit. Also, the assumptions of\nunder-execution if any should be made explicit. The MTFF should comply with the fiscal rules and\nexplain the deviations and underlying assumptions compared to the budget.\n\n\n**69.** **The operation of the macro fiscal unit (MFU) to improve projections and the MTFF**\n**report remains a challenge.** There are resource constraints in the MoF that limit the ability to\ncarry out NFPS medium-term projections. The MTFF is prepared by a small group of two stable\nstaff at the Minister’s office whose tasks do not allow for full-time dedication to the projections,\nmaking it difficult to sustain in the future. A MFU led by a directorate in charge of macro-fiscal\nissues at MoF with sufficient resources would be needed.\n\n\n**70.** **In the short term, the MTFF could explicitly integrate the debt anchor as the final**\n**objective that guides the fiscal path.** Even if the LSPF could take time to introduce the debt\nanchor, the MTFF could include it as a government long-term objective that is needed to guide\nthe central government and NFPS projections, and its link to the expenditure rule.\n\n**D.** **Independent Fiscal Council**\n\n**71.** **Costa Rica established a Fiscal Council in 2019 but has not been operational.** The\ncouncil was established as an independent body conformed by five members (initially only\nthree). Four of the Fiscal Council members are designated by the Government and the fifth one is\nchosen by the Legislative Assembly. They must be independent professionals with a solid\nknowledge of macroeconomics and public finance. However, members of the Council work adhonorem without renumeration. The establishment of the Fiscal Council was one of the loan\nconditions by Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 2021 for improving fiscal\nsustainability. Currently, the Council only has one member, with two having resigned in 2021 and\nanother two in 2022.\n\n\n**72.** **The Fiscal Council’s main task is to evaluate macro-fiscal developments** . The Fiscal\nCouncil is tasked to be responsible for preparing reports to evaluate the performance of the MoF\nregarding fiscal policy developments, fiscal rule monitoring, and fiscal risk assessment. More\nspecifically, the Fiscal Council should give its opinion on the fiscal projections in the MTFF and on\nthe macro projections in the annual budget, as well as the underlying assumptions and\nmethodologies of those projections. It also should give its opinion on the MoF’s management of\nfiscal risks. Finally, it should comment on the quarterly and annual reports monitoring the fiscal\nrule.\n\n\n**73.** **The Fiscal Council does not have resources to perform its duties** . The Council does\nnot have its own staff to perform its duties such as elaborating the reports. It does not have its\nown communication channel (e.g., a designated website). While recognizing the overall need to\nlimit spending in Costa Rica, it is advisable to have the Fiscal Council to have its own budget line\n\n\n45", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "central government capital expenditure in 2021, as currently these are not included in the initial\nbudget. The starting point of the MTFF projections is the execution of last fiscal year and not the\nfinal budget of last year for a consistent presentation of the fiscal path, and the projection\nincludes all expenditures irrespective of their financing sources. Therefore, the MTFF includes an\nestimate of expenditures funded across all sources. In order to make it comparable to the initial\nbudget the assumptions on external funding have to be made explicit. Also, the assumptions of\nunder-execution if any should be made explicit. The MTFF should comply with the fiscal rules and\nexplain the deviations and underlying assumptions compared to the budget.\n\n69. The operation of the macro fiscal unit (MFU) to improve projections and the MTFF\nreport remains a challenge. There are resource constraints in the MoF that limit the ability to\ncarry out NFPS medium-term projections. The MTFF is prepared by a small group of two stable\nstaff at the Minister’s office whose tasks do not allow for full-time dedication to the projections,\nmaking it difficult to sustain in the future. A MFU led by a directorate in charge of macro-fiscal\nissues at MoF with sufficient resources would be needed.\n\n70. In the short term, the MTFF could explicitly integrate the debt anchor as the final\nobjective that guides the fiscal path. Even if the LSPF could take time to introduce the debt\nanchor, the MTFF could include it as a government long-term objective that is needed to guide\nthe central government and NFPS projections, and its link to the expenditure rule.\n\nD. Independent Fiscal Council\n\n71. Costa Rica established a Fiscal Council in 2019 but has not been operational. The\ncouncil was established as an independent body conformed by five members (initially only\nthree). Four of the Fiscal Council members are designated by the Government and the fifth one is\nchosen by the Legislative Assembly. They must be independent professionals with a solid\nknowledge of macroeconomics and public finance. However, members of the Council work adhonorem without renumeration. The establishment of the Fiscal Council was one of the loan\nconditions by Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 2021 for improving fiscal\nsustainability. Currently, the Council only has one member, with two having resigned in 2021 and\nanother two in 2022.\n\n72. The Fiscal Council’s main task is to evaluate macro-fiscal developments . The Fiscal\nCouncil is tasked to be responsible for preparing reports to evaluate the performance of the MoF\nregarding fiscal policy developments, fiscal rule monitoring, and fiscal risk assessment. More\nspecifically, the Fiscal Council should give its opinion on the fiscal projections in the MTFF and on\nthe macro projections in the annual budget, as well as the underlying assumptions and\nmethodologies of those projections. It also should give its opinion on the MoF’s management of\nfiscal risks. Finally, it should comment on the quarterly and annual reports monitoring the fiscal\nrule.\n\n73. The Fiscal Council does not have resources to perform its duties . The Council does\nnot have its own staff to perform its duties such as elaborating the reports. It does not have its\nown communication channel (e.g., a designated website). While recognizing the overall need to\nlimit spending in Costa Rica, it is advisable to have the Fiscal Council to have its own budget line\n\n45", "text_characters": 2905}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "to secure adequate resources commensurate with its mandate over time. It will need to voice its\nopinion publicly on fiscal issues within its mandate, including the compliance with fiscal rules and\nassessment of debt sustainability. The MoF will also need to share information on a timely basis\nwith the Council so that it can perform its duties. The regulation should clarify the calendar of\ninformation sharing from Ministry of Finance and the timing of fiscal council inputs and reports\nto enhance accountability.\n\n**E.** **Recommendations**\n\n- Continue to strengthen the MTFF that presents the fiscal path consistent with fiscal rules\ncompliance and aligned to a medium-term debt anchor.\n\n\n- Reinforce Hacienda Digital project to allow for timely fiscal reporting on consolidated NFPS\nfiscal accounts and public debt.\n\n\n- The MOF should present to the Ministry of Planning a proposal to create the Macro Fiscal\nUnit (MFU) with a directorate and sufficient personnel and resources.\n\n\n- Amend the law to strengthen independent fiscal oversight with the necessary provisions to\nmake the independent fiscal council operational.\n\n##### **VI. REFERENCES**\n\n\n[Mian, A., L. Straub,L. and A. Sufi (2022). \"A Goldilocks Theory of Fiscal Deficits,\" NBER Working](https://www.nber.org/papers/w29707#:~:text=This%20paper%20proposes%20a%20tractable,primary%20deficit%20unambiguously%20raises%20debt.)\nPapers 29707, National Bureau of Economic Research.\n\n\nCaselli, F., L. Eyraud, A. Hodge, F. Diaz Kalan, Y. Kim, V. Lledó,S. Mbaye, A. Popescu, W. H. Reuter,J.\n[Reynaud, E. Ture, and P. Wingender (2018). “Second Generation Fiscal Rules: Balancing](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2018/04/12/~/media/AB330D5FB8074E7189C986298E0393A7.ashx)\n[Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability” IMF Staff Discussion Note, Technical Background Papers](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2018/04/12/~/media/AB330D5FB8074E7189C986298E0393A7.ashx)\nto SDN/18/04\n\n\nCaselli, F. H. Davoodi, C. Goncalves, G. Hee Hong, A. Lagerborg, P. Medas, A. D. M. Nguyen, and J.\nYoo (2022). “The Return to Fiscal Rules”. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2022/002.\n\n\nCorbacho, A., and T. Ter-Minassian, 2013. “Public Financial Management Requirements for\nEffective Implementation of Fiscal Rules.” In _The International Handbook of Public Financial_\n_Management_, ed. R. Hemming, R. Allen, and B. Potter. London: Palgrave Macmillan.\n\n\nCordes,T., T. Kinda, P. Muthoora and A. Weber (2015).” Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for\nSound Fiscal Policy?”. IMF Working Paper WP/15/29\n\n\nDavoodi H.R., P. Elger, A. Fotiou, D. Garcia-Macia, X. Han, A. Lagerborg, W.R. Lam, and P. Medas.\n[(2022).“Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Councils: Recent Trends and Performance during the Pandemic”,](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2022/English/wpiea2022011-print-pdf.ashx)\nIMF Working Paper No.22/11.\n\n\n46", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 48, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "to secure adequate resources commensurate with its mandate over time. It will need to voice its\nopinion publicly on fiscal issues within its mandate, including the compliance with fiscal rules and\nassessment of debt sustainability. The MoF will also need to share information on a timely basis\nwith the Council so that it can perform its duties. The regulation should clarify the calendar of\ninformation sharing from Ministry of Finance and the timing of fiscal council inputs and reports\nto enhance accountability.\n\nE. Recommendations\n\n- Continue to strengthen the MTFF that presents the fiscal path consistent with fiscal rules\ncompliance and aligned to a medium-term debt anchor.\n\n- Reinforce Hacienda Digital project to allow for timely fiscal reporting on consolidated NFPS\nfiscal accounts and public debt.\n\n- The MOF should present to the Ministry of Planning a proposal to create the Macro Fiscal\nUnit (MFU) with a directorate and sufficient personnel and resources.\n\n- Amend the law to strengthen independent fiscal oversight with the necessary provisions to\nmake the independent fiscal council operational.\nVI. REFERENCES\n\nMian, A., L. Straub,L. and A. Sufi (2022). \"A Goldilocks Theory of Fiscal Deficits,\" NBER Working\nPapers 29707, National Bureau of Economic Research.\n\nCaselli, F., L. Eyraud, A. Hodge, F. Diaz Kalan, Y. Kim, V. Lledó,S. Mbaye, A. Popescu, W. H. Reuter,J.\nReynaud, E. Ture, and P. Wingender (2018). “Second Generation Fiscal Rules: Balancing\nSimplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability” IMF Staff Discussion Note, Technical Background Papers\nto SDN/18/04\n\nCaselli, F. H. Davoodi, C. Goncalves, G. Hee Hong, A. Lagerborg, P. Medas, A. D. M. Nguyen, and J.\nYoo (2022). “The Return to Fiscal Rules”. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2022/002.\n\nCorbacho, A., and T. Ter-Minassian, 2013. “Public Financial Management Requirements for\nEffective Implementation of Fiscal Rules.” In _The International Handbook of Public Financial_\n_Management_, ed. R. Hemming, R. Allen, and B. Potter. London: Palgrave Macmillan.\n\nCordes,T., T. Kinda, P. Muthoora and A. Weber (2015).” Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for\nSound Fiscal Policy?”. IMF Working Paper WP/15/29\n\nDavoodi H.R., P. Elger, A. Fotiou, D. Garcia-Macia, X. Han, A. Lagerborg, W.R. Lam, and P. Medas.\n(2022).“Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Councils: Recent Trends and Performance during the Pandemic”,\nIMF Working Paper No.22/11.\n\n46", "text_characters": 2026}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Debrun, X, J. Ostry, T. Willems, and C. Wyplosz (2019). \"Public Debt Sustainability,\" CEPR\nDiscussion Papers 14010\n\n\n[Eyraud, L., X. Debrun, A. Hodge, V. Leedo, C. Pattillo. 2018. “Second Generation Fiscal Rules:](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2018/sdn1804-on-second-generation-fiscal-rules.ashx)\n[Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability”, IMF Staff Discussion Note, April 2018,](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2018/sdn1804-on-second-generation-fiscal-rules.ashx)\nWashington, D.C.\n\n\n[Gbohoui, W. and P. Medas. 2020. “Fiscal Rules, Escape Clauses, and Large Shocks”, IMF Special](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/enspecial-series-on-covid19fiscal-rules-escape-clauses-and-large-shocks.ashx#:~:text=A%20large%20shock%20may%20put,framework%20that%20is%20too%20inflexible.&text=In%20the%20absence%20of%20escape,pandemic%20or%20other%20large%20shocks.)\nSeries on Fiscal Policies to Respond to COVID-19, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.\n\n\n[IMF. 2016. “Analyzing and Managing Fiscal Risks—Best Practices”, June 2016, International](https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2016/_050416.ashx)\nMonetary Fund Policy Paper, Washington, D.C.\n\n\nIMF, 2021. “Fiscal Rules Database—Technical Note”, IMF Technical Manual, Washington, D.C.\nInternational Monetary Fund.\n\n\nThornton, J. and C. Vasilakis. 2018. “Fiscal Rules and Government Borrowing Costs: International\nEvidence” _Economic Inquiry_ Vol. 56, No. 1, January 2018, 446–459.\n\n\nValencia, O. and C. Ulloa-Suarez. 2022. “Numerical Compliance with Fiscal Rules in Latin America\nand the Carribbean”, IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-1345, Inter-American Development Bank,\nSeptember 2022.\n\n\n47", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 49, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Debrun, X, J. Ostry, T. Willems, and C. Wyplosz (2019). \"Public Debt Sustainability,\" CEPR\nDiscussion Papers 14010\n\nEyraud, L., X. Debrun, A. Hodge, V. Leedo, C. Pattillo. 2018. “Second Generation Fiscal Rules:\nBalancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability”, IMF Staff Discussion Note, April 2018,\nWashington, D.C.\n\nGbohoui, W. and P. Medas. 2020. “Fiscal Rules, Escape Clauses, and Large Shocks”, IMF Special\nSeries on Fiscal Policies to Respond to COVID-19, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.\n\nIMF. 2016. “Analyzing and Managing Fiscal Risks—Best Practices”, June 2016, International\nMonetary Fund Policy Paper, Washington, D.C.\n\nIMF, 2021. “Fiscal Rules Database—Technical Note”, IMF Technical Manual, Washington, D.C.\nInternational Monetary Fund.\n\nThornton, J. and C. Vasilakis. 2018. “Fiscal Rules and Government Borrowing Costs: International\nEvidence” _Economic Inquiry_ Vol. 56, No. 1, January 2018, 446–459.\n\nValencia, O. and C. Ulloa-Suarez. 2022. “Numerical Compliance with Fiscal Rules in Latin America\nand the Carribbean”, IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-1345, Inter-American Development Bank,\nSeptember 2022.\n\n47", "text_characters": 981}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex I. List of Entities Included in STAP Fiscal Statistics, 2021**\n\n|National budget of the central government|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|_Asamblea Legislativa_|ASAMBLEA|\n|_Contraloría General de la República_|CGR|\n|_Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República_|DEFENSORIA|\n|_Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería_|MAG|\n|_Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Telecomunicaciones_|MICITT|\n|_Ministerio de Comercio Exterior_|COMEX|\n|_Ministerio de Cultura y Juventud_|MCJ|\n|_Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio_|MEIC|\n|_Ministerio de Educación Pública_|MEP|\n|_Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía_|MGOBER|\n|_Ministerio de Hacienda_|MHD|\n|_Ministerio de Justicia y Paz_|MJUSTI|\n|_Ministerio de la Presidencia_|MP|\n|_Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes_|MOPT|\n|_Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica_|MIDEPLAN|\n|_Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto_|RE|\n|_Ministerio de Salud_|MSALUD|\n|_Ministerio de Seguridad Pública_|MSP|\n|_Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social_|MTSS|\n|_Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos_|MIVAH|\n|_Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía_|MINAE|\n|_Poder Judicial_|JUDICIAL|\n|_Presidencia de la República_|PREREP|\n|_Regímenes de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto de la República_|REGPEN|\n|_Servicio de la Deuda Pública_|DEUDA|\n|_Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones_|TSE|\n|||\n|**_Decentralized Institutions_**||\n|_Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos_|ARESEP|\n|_Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos de Costa Rica_|BCBCR|\n|_Caja Costarricense Seguro Social_|CCSS|\n|_Comisión de Energía Atómica de Costa Rica_|CEA|\n|_Academia Nacional de Ciencias_|CIENCIAS|\n|_Consejo Nacional de Cooperativas_|CONACOOP|\n|_Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas_|CONAI|\n|_Consejo Nacional de Rectores_|CONARE|\n|_Corporación Arrocera Nacional_|CONARROZ|\n|_Consejo Nacional Investigación Científica y Tecnológico_|CONICIT|\n|_Corporación Ganadera_|CORFOGA|\n|_Colegio Universitario de Cartago_|CUCA|\n|_Colegio Universitario de Limón_|CUNLIMON|\n|_Ente Costarricense de Acreditación_|ECA|\n|_Sistema de Emergencias 9-1-1_|EMERGENCIAS 911|\n|_Instituto Costarricense del Deporte y la Recreación_|ICODER|\n|_Instituto Costarricense de Turismo_|ICT|\n\n\n\n48", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 50, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.25889587402344, 106.1400375366211, 566.2850952148438, 713.4559936523438], "columns": 2, "rows": 46}], "text": "Annex I. List of Entities Included in STAP Fiscal Statistics, 2021\n\n National budget of the central government Col2 \n\n _Asamblea Legislativa_ ASAMBLEA \n _Contraloría General de la República_ CGR \n _Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República_ DEFENSORIA \n _Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería_ MAG \n _Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Telecomunicaciones_ MICITT \n _Ministerio de Comercio Exterior_ COMEX \n _Ministerio de Cultura y Juventud_ MCJ \n _Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio_ MEIC \n _Ministerio de Educación Pública_ MEP \n _Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía_ MGOBER \n _Ministerio de Hacienda_ MHD \n _Ministerio de Justicia y Paz_ MJUSTI \n _Ministerio de la Presidencia_ MP \n _Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes_ MOPT \n _Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica_ MIDEPLAN \n _Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto_ RE \n _Ministerio de Salud_ MSALUD \n _Ministerio de Seguridad Pública_ MSP \n _Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social_ MTSS \n _Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos_ MIVAH \n _Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía_ MINAE \n _Poder Judicial_ JUDICIAL \n _Presidencia de la República_ PREREP \n _Regímenes de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto de la República_ REGPEN \n _Servicio de la Deuda Pública_ DEUDA \n _Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones_ TSE \n \n _Decentralized Institutions_ \n _Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos_ ARESEP \n _Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos de Costa Rica_ BCBCR \n _Caja Costarricense Seguro Social_ CCSS \n _Comisión de Energía Atómica de Costa Rica_ CEA \n _Academia Nacional de Ciencias_ CIENCIAS \n _Consejo Nacional de Cooperativas_ CONACOOP \n _Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas_ CONAI \n _Consejo Nacional de Rectores_ CONARE \n _Corporación Arrocera Nacional_ CONARROZ \n _Consejo Nacional Investigación Científica y Tecnológico_ CONICIT \n _Corporación Ganadera_ CORFOGA \n _Colegio Universitario de Cartago_ CUCA \n _Colegio Universitario de Limón_ CUNLIMON \n _Ente Costarricense de Acreditación_ ECA \n _Sistema de Emergencias 9-1-1_ EMERGENCIAS 911 \n _Instituto Costarricense del Deporte y la Recreación_ ICODER \n _Instituto Costarricense de Turismo_ ICT \n\n48", "text_characters": 1794}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal|IFAM|\n|---|---|\n|_Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social_|IMAS|\n|_Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje_|INA|\n|_Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres_|INAMU|\n|_Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuacultura_|INCOPESCA|\n|_Instituto de Desarrollo Rural_|INDER|\n|_Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Y Censos_|INEC|\n|_Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica_|ITCR|\n|_Junta Administrativa del Colegio San Luis Gonzaga_|JACSLG|\n|_Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur de la Provincia de_
_Puntarenas_|JUDESUR|\n|_Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional_|JUPEMA|\n|_Oficina Nacional Forestal_|ONAFO|\n|_Oficina Nacional de Semillas_|ONS|\n|_Patronato Nacional de Ciegos_|PANACI|\n|_Patronato Nacional de Rehabilitación_|PANARE|\n|_Patronato Nacional de la Infancia_|PANI|\n|_Programa Integral de Mercadeo Agropecuario_|PIMA|\n|_Promotora de Comercio Exterior_|PROCOMER|\n|_Servicio Nacional Aguas Subterráneas Riego Y Avenamiento._|SENARA|\n|_Sistema Nacional de Acreditación de la Educación Superior_|SINAES|\n|_Sistema Nacional de Información Unificado y Registro Unico de_
_Beneficiarios del Estado_|SINURIBE|\n|_Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones_|SUTEL|\n|_Universidad de Costa Rica_|UCR|\n|_Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica_|UNA|\n|_Universidad Estatal a Distancia_|UNED|\n|_Universidad Técnica Nacional_|UTN|\n|||\n|**_Local governments_**||\n|_Gobiernos Locales_|GOBLOCAL|\n|_Federación de Municipalidades Cantones Productores de Banano_|CAPROBA|\n|_Federación de Municipalidades de Cartago_|FEMUCARTAGO|\n|_Federación de Municipalidades de Heredia_|FEDEHEREDIA|\n|_Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José_|FEMETRON|\n|_Federación Occidental de Municipalidades de Alajuela_|FEDOMA|\n|_Junta Administradora del Cementerio General y las Rosas de Alajuela_|JACGRA|\n|_Junta Administrativa de Cementerios de de Goicoechea_|JACGOICOECHEA|\n|_Federación de Consejos Municipales de Distrito de Costa Rica_|FCMDCR|\n|_Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales_|UNGL|\n|||\n|**_Public corporations_**||\n|_BANPROCESA S.R.L_|BANPROCESA|\n|_Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz_|CNFL|\n|_Consejo Nacional de Producción_|CNP|\n|_Correos de Costa Rica S.A._|CORREOS|\n|_Editorial Costa Rica_|ECR|\n|_Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia_|ESPH|\n\n\n49", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 51, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.25889587402344, 72.15999603271484, 566.2850952148438, 711.416015625], "columns": 2, "rows": 46}], "text": "Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal IFAM \n\n _Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social_ IMAS \n _Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje_ INA \n _Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres_ INAMU \n _Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuacultura_ INCOPESCA \n _Instituto de Desarrollo Rural_ INDER \n _Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Y Censos_ INEC \n _Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica_ ITCR \n _Junta Administrativa del Colegio San Luis Gonzaga_ JACSLG \n _Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur de la Provincia de_ _Puntarenas_ JUDESUR \n _Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional_ JUPEMA \n _Oficina Nacional Forestal_ ONAFO \n _Oficina Nacional de Semillas_ ONS \n _Patronato Nacional de Ciegos_ PANACI \n _Patronato Nacional de Rehabilitación_ PANARE \n _Patronato Nacional de la Infancia_ PANI \n _Programa Integral de Mercadeo Agropecuario_ PIMA \n _Promotora de Comercio Exterior_ PROCOMER \n _Servicio Nacional Aguas Subterráneas Riego Y Avenamiento._ SENARA \n _Sistema Nacional de Acreditación de la Educación Superior_ SINAES \n _Sistema Nacional de Información Unificado y Registro Unico de_ _Beneficiarios del Estado_ SINURIBE \n _Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones_ SUTEL \n _Universidad de Costa Rica_ UCR \n _Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica_ UNA \n _Universidad Estatal a Distancia_ UNED \n _Universidad Técnica Nacional_ UTN \n \n _Local governments_ \n _Gobiernos Locales_ GOBLOCAL \n _Federación de Municipalidades Cantones Productores de Banano_ CAPROBA \n _Federación de Municipalidades de Cartago_ FEMUCARTAGO \n _Federación de Municipalidades de Heredia_ FEDEHEREDIA \n _Federación Metropolitana de Municipalidades de San José_ FEMETRON \n _Federación Occidental de Municipalidades de Alajuela_ FEDOMA \n _Junta Administradora del Cementerio General y las Rosas de Alajuela_ JACGRA \n _Junta Administrativa de Cementerios de de Goicoechea_ JACGOICOECHEA \n _Federación de Consejos Municipales de Distrito de Costa Rica_ FCMDCR \n _Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales_ UNGL \n \n _Public corporations_ \n _BANPROCESA S.R.L_ BANPROCESA \n _Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz_ CNFL \n _Consejo Nacional de Producción_ CNP \n _Correos de Costa Rica S.A._ CORREOS \n _Editorial Costa Rica_ ECR \n _Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia_ ESPH \n\n49", "text_characters": 1868}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Empresa Hidroeléctrica los Negros S.A.|EHLN S.A.|\n|---|---|\n|_Gestión Cobro Grupo ICE S.A._|ICE-G COBRO|\n|_Hospital del Trauma_|IRSS (HOSPITAL TRAU)|\n|_Instituto Costarricense Acueductos y Alcantarillado_|ICAA|\n|_Instituto Costarricense Electricidad Energía_|ICE(ENERG)|\n|_Instituto Costarricense Electricidad Telecomunicaciones_|ICE(TELEC)|\n|_Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles_|INCOFER|\n|_Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico_|INCOP|\n|_Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago_|JASEC|\n|_Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo Vertiente Atlántica_|JAPDEVA|\n|_Junta Protección Social de San José_|JPS|\n|_Radiográfica Costarricense S.A._|RACSA|\n|_Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A._|RECOPE S.A|\n|_Sistema Nacional de Radio y Televisión S.A._|SINART S.A.|\n\n\n50", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 52, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.26400756835938, 72.239990234375, 566.280029296875, 256.72998046875], "columns": 2, "rows": 14}], "text": "Empresa Hidroeléctrica los Negros S.A. EHLN S.A. \n\n _Gestión Cobro Grupo ICE S.A._ ICE-G COBRO \n _Hospital del Trauma_ IRSS (HOSPITAL TRAU) \n _Instituto Costarricense Acueductos y Alcantarillado_ ICAA \n _Instituto Costarricense Electricidad Energía_ ICE(ENERG) \n _Instituto Costarricense Electricidad Telecomunicaciones_ ICE(TELEC) \n _Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles_ INCOFER \n _Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico_ INCOP \n _Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago_ JASEC \n _Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo Vertiente Atlántica_ JAPDEVA \n _Junta Protección Social de San José_ JPS \n _Radiográfica Costarricense S.A._ RACSA \n _Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A._ RECOPE S.A \n _Sistema Nacional de Radio y Televisión S.A._ SINART S.A. \n\n50", "text_characters": 673}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex II. Calibrating the Medium-term Debt Anchor**\n\n\nThis Annex describes the methodology to determine a safety buffer and the debt anchor. The\nmethodology first generates stochastic macroeconomic and fiscal shocks based on historical\ndata and an econometric model and subsequently simulates possible paths for government debt\nusing a debt accumulation equation and a fiscal reaction function. The full description of the\nstochastic approach is in IMF (2016) and Debrun and others (2018).\n\n\nFirst, we construct a variance-covariance matrix to account for typical macroeconomic shocks in\nCosta Rica at annual frequency. Data are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook\ndatabase. The variance-covariance matrix obtained from historical data describes the joint\ndynamics of the macroeconomic (non-fiscal) variables needed to project public debt, namely real\ninterest rates, real GDP growth, the exchange rate, debt stock-flow residuals, and terms of trade\nshocks. The results are estimated over a relatively short period starting from 1990 due to data\navailability, and excluding the pandemic period. The estimated variance-covariance matrix is then\nused to generate 5,000 sequences of macroeconomic shocks 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 over the six-year projection\n\nhorizon.\n\n\nFor each of the 5,000 shock simulations, macroeconomic variables are computed over the sixyear horizon, adding the generated shocks each year as the error term. A preferred approach\nwould use a VAR to estimate the underlying shocks and make projections, as the lagged effect of\nmacroeconomic shocks can be taken into account through the autoregressive structure of the\nmodel, but that would require quarterly data.\n\n\nThird, the methodology uses a fiscal reaction function based on a panel estimation of 26\nemerging market economies. The fiscal reaction function links the primary balance to public\ndebt, while also accounting for economic conditions measured by the output gap. More\nspecifically, the estimated equation takes the following form:\n\n\n𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡(1 −𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡\n\n\nwhere 𝑝𝑏 is the ratio of the primary fiscal balance to GDP; 𝑑 is the gross public debt-to-GDP\nratio; 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝 is the contemporaneous output gap; 𝐷 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the output\ngap is nonnegative (actual output above or equal trend) and 0 otherwise to capture the potential\nasymmetric effects of the output gap on the primary balance; and 𝛼 are country fixed effects and\n_t_ refers to the year. To account for the possibility that fiscal policy can itself be a source of\nshocks, the primary balance is subject to a fiscal policy shock 𝜑𝑖, 𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝜑𝑖 ), where 𝜎2𝜑𝑖 is\ncalibrated to the country-specific variance of the residuals of the reaction function.\n\n\nThe reaction function is restricted by assuming that the maximum primary surplus that a country\nis capable of achieving following a shock is capped at 2½ percent of GDP for emerging market\neconomies, following Escolano and others (2014). The fiscal reaction function allows for an\nasymmetric response to the output gap, so that the primary balance may deteriorate more when\nthe output gap is negative than it improves when the gap is positive ( 𝛽3 > 𝛽2 ). The output gap is\nprojected over the forecast horizon using GDP growth forecasts obtained from simulations\n\n\n51", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 53, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Annex II. Calibrating the Medium-term Debt Anchor\n\nThis Annex describes the methodology to determine a safety buffer and the debt anchor. The\nmethodology first generates stochastic macroeconomic and fiscal shocks based on historical\ndata and an econometric model and subsequently simulates possible paths for government debt\nusing a debt accumulation equation and a fiscal reaction function. The full description of the\nstochastic approach is in IMF (2016) and Debrun and others (2018).\n\nFirst, we construct a variance-covariance matrix to account for typical macroeconomic shocks in\nCosta Rica at annual frequency. Data are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook\ndatabase. The variance-covariance matrix obtained from historical data describes the joint\ndynamics of the macroeconomic (non-fiscal) variables needed to project public debt, namely real\ninterest rates, real GDP growth, the exchange rate, debt stock-flow residuals, and terms of trade\nshocks. The results are estimated over a relatively short period starting from 1990 due to data\navailability, and excluding the pandemic period. The estimated variance-covariance matrix is then\nused to generate 5,000 sequences of macroeconomic shocks 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 over the six-year projection\n\nhorizon.\n\nFor each of the 5,000 shock simulations, macroeconomic variables are computed over the sixyear horizon, adding the generated shocks each year as the error term. A preferred approach\nwould use a VAR to estimate the underlying shocks and make projections, as the lagged effect of\nmacroeconomic shocks can be taken into account through the autoregressive structure of the\nmodel, but that would require quarterly data.\n\nThird, the methodology uses a fiscal reaction function based on a panel estimation of 26\nemerging market economies. The fiscal reaction function links the primary balance to public\ndebt, while also accounting for economic conditions measured by the output gap. More\nspecifically, the estimated equation takes the following form:\n\n𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡(1 −𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡\n\nwhere 𝑝𝑏 is the ratio of the primary fiscal balance to GDP; 𝑑 is the gross public debt-to-GDP\nratio; 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝 is the contemporaneous output gap; 𝐷 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the output\ngap is nonnegative (actual output above or equal trend) and 0 otherwise to capture the potential\nasymmetric effects of the output gap on the primary balance; and 𝛼 are country fixed effects and\n_t_ refers to the year. To account for the possibility that fiscal policy can itself be a source of\nshocks, the primary balance is subject to a fiscal policy shock 𝜑𝑖, 𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝜑𝑖 ), where 𝜎2𝜑𝑖 is\ncalibrated to the country-specific variance of the residuals of the reaction function.\n\nThe reaction function is restricted by assuming that the maximum primary surplus that a country\nis capable of achieving following a shock is capped at 2½ percent of GDP for emerging market\neconomies, following Escolano and others (2014). The fiscal reaction function allows for an\nasymmetric response to the output gap, so that the primary balance may deteriorate more when\nthe output gap is negative than it improves when the gap is positive ( 𝛽3 > 𝛽2 ). The output gap is\nprojected over the forecast horizon using GDP growth forecasts obtained from simulations\n\n51", "text_characters": 2774}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "(based on the joint distribution of macroeconomic variables) combined with a Hodrick-Prescott\nfilter to estimate potential output.\n\n\nFourth, the debt trajectories are obtained by combining the shocks with the fiscal policy response\nand debt accumulation equations. A projected debt path is computed for each set of countryspecific shocks, which include shocks to the macroeconomic variables from the variancecovariance matrix, and fiscal specific shocks.\n\n\nFor each projection year, the frequency distribution of the projected debt-to-GDP ratios is\ncalculated and allows for a probabilistic analysis of debt trajectories. In particular, it is possible to\ncalculate the share of the debt paths that cross a given debt limit at a certain year.\n\n\nThe validity of this approach is conditioned on the quality of the shocks generated to produce\nthe forecasts. Some shortcomings include the possibility that relationships estimated using past\ndata may not be relevant for the future or/and the forecasting model does not have a\nsatisfactory goodness-of-fit.\n\n\n52", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 54, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "(based on the joint distribution of macroeconomic variables) combined with a Hodrick-Prescott\nfilter to estimate potential output.\n\nFourth, the debt trajectories are obtained by combining the shocks with the fiscal policy response\nand debt accumulation equations. A projected debt path is computed for each set of countryspecific shocks, which include shocks to the macroeconomic variables from the variancecovariance matrix, and fiscal specific shocks.\n\nFor each projection year, the frequency distribution of the projected debt-to-GDP ratios is\ncalculated and allows for a probabilistic analysis of debt trajectories. In particular, it is possible to\ncalculate the share of the debt paths that cross a given debt limit at a certain year.\n\nThe validity of this approach is conditioned on the quality of the shocks generated to produce\nthe forecasts. Some shortcomings include the possibility that relationships estimated using past\ndata may not be relevant for the future or/and the forecasting model does not have a\nsatisfactory goodness-of-fit.\n\n52", "text_characters": 892}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex III. Progress of MTFF since the Capacity Development**\n\n**Missions in 2020-21**\n\n\n\n\n\n|Main 2020-22 Technical Assistance Mission
Recommendations|Deadline|Preliminary assessment of progress|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Improve fiscal strategy**|||\n|Address the lack of a debt anchor. Change the
legal framework to establish it and define 4-year
debt and deficit sustainable paths in the MTFF.
Clarify the fiscal rule and its monitoring in terms
of budget and execution.|2020|Not met|\n|**Improve the budgetary process**|||\n|Contingency reserve in the budget and the
MTFF for both the CG and other institutions|2021|Not met|\n|**Prepare the MTFF**|||\n|Prepare the MTFF for the NFPS in April, and
update it for the CG in August, focusing on
fiscal policy measures, fiscal risk assessment and
debt paths.|2021 and
2022|Done 2021 and 2022|\n|Develop fiscal projection capacities, by using
and updating the fiscal model and the
databases developed with FAD|2021 and
2022|In progress|\n|Expand debt sustainability analysis in 2022 from
the CG to the NFPS|2022|Not met|\n|**Institutional and legal framework**|||\n|Establish a Macro Fiscal Unit as soon as
possible, with enough human resources to
perform its duties.|2022|Not met|\n|Regulate the process for preparing the MTFF:
information flows between institutions and
MOF, process of approval by the Council of
Ministers, opinion by the Fiscal Council.|2021|Not met|\n|**Fiscal projections**|||\n|Develop macroeconomic projection capacities
and analyze the sensitivity of fiscal projections
to macro shocks|2023|In progress (ICD 2022-2023 technical
assistance)|\n\n\n53", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 55, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [81.00799560546875, 128.1199951171875, 571.93603515625, 664.0], "columns": 3, "rows": 14}], "text": "Annex III. Progress of MTFF since the Capacity Development\n\nMissions in 2020-21\n\n Main 2020-22 Technical Assistance Mission Recommendations Deadline Preliminary assessment of progress \n\n Improve fiscal strategy \n Address the lack of a debt anchor. Change the legal framework to establish it and define 4-year debt and deficit sustainable paths in the MTFF. Clarify the fiscal rule and its monitoring in terms of budget and execution. 2020 Not met \n Improve the budgetary process \n Contingency reserve in the budget and the MTFF for both the CG and other institutions 2021 Not met \n Prepare the MTFF \n Prepare the MTFF for the NFPS in April, and update it for the CG in August, focusing on fiscal policy measures, fiscal risk assessment and debt paths. 2021 and 2022 Done 2021 and 2022 \n Develop fiscal projection capacities, by using and updating the fiscal model and the databases developed with FAD 2021 and 2022 In progress \n Expand debt sustainability analysis in 2022 from the CG to the NFPS 2022 Not met \n Institutional and legal framework \n Establish a Macro Fiscal Unit as soon as possible, with enough human resources to perform its duties. 2022 Not met \n Regulate the process for preparing the MTFF: information flows between institutions and MOF, process of approval by the Council of Ministers, opinion by the Fiscal Council. 2021 Not met \n Fiscal projections \n Develop macroeconomic projection capacities and analyze the sensitivity of fiscal projections to macro shocks 2023 In progress (ICD 2022-2023 technical assistance) \n\n53", "text_characters": 1271}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Fiscal Affairs Department**\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\n[http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment](http://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment)", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 56, "report_id": "cr-2023-097", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Fiscal Affairs Department\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n700 19th Street NW\nWashington, DC 20431\nUSA\nhttp://www.imf.org/capacitydevelopment", "text_characters": 122}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd7eb16c1dc8d77fdc24fffe7c055e8397604bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087
+size 58403
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..504c1f5e162105accd54c1bc8e8858a9f43f1936
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:89025266420223f08283c1a46dde4d7aa5f49818289ee54ef62777f8e7e176c3
+size 296669
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1107a61dad52c8aef8da1ec5498f17499ab45f96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bfe6ec255fd56de82c887a6d02aeca53959c396c4cba7ca8f20c68ea6fe7369c
+size 33663
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0005-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0005-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cee8210b8e6b00051cf4952f0b5f1bd34cb0c281
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0005-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4e7bd62b14d990d41ecd7aad65f5fde0885de6c159226110582ba78a8297b068
+size 2521
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0010-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0010-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3214f090a542907f1ccc043d2a4f1e9f9b1482cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0010-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2faf9c616a78e7d88d6ac418c980a54b8340d677eda61b8418f4e3fe6200d6ca
+size 15497
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..27a61400d0ddc3605bef5df538cc32ce76cedab6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c317694acf4e8dbb550bcededc7e3296531595fefd3d385007ca6780285747da
+size 22216
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..038524b3c446cda2cc1f2593fbab9a1050d9e7ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4fa09e6edeca16c381efdfa55614d2352971ecee1f673a71f32fa4e328678d07
+size 17974
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b8476261e11111b649450cfc614706a22fb1aeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1c6f211d870e7808d783975590f13082598541b208555247986478548199c910
+size 20196
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ecc1672bf07f1a8ebaaf9b373f06e871c83ac3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e4e19051164c31759cd5f931babd5335b3707a84214a16de4819d32cc5da6e12
+size 31703
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7898ea762088d95ccf7b1bbc55325708655073c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a24ba49461fec11df2a3a423c776599063efbe41305addf5c4bc2f9b886481a2
+size 44087
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca1893c96520d598896e2eda4301a9221e308ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f96edc5094b9cc1f84c66552b2acf4233b7ab028438fd5d2791622086cb69de0
+size 22947
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9086113bc168f805ea9c950bfac36b34501ea9b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b79b9b6a14b02a806af0212d3543ee5ce1cbca0e689e48d7a92e4fcd7e6420a3
+size 48281
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01bca1e1b37c935be30b59d35f9419cf8b99dacd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:086584a6579d39bae8bfce8833cc1ef33887ec468e4dcc9f9374cc583f182a0e
+size 38554
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a49937dfc111a8ff449004ea11e83a3d64afe026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:80cbdcee16250d2949cc8037f90287badb690ac98273286fa64dde757af14075
+size 24247
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c2b25baefc9302553b9f562d19e0507e0042bfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:205e6344d88f57ac2158ae85a75e131bfa842b7e159c4c0e8a25640c26d8c5f4
+size 28697
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cda4ba56fdf7827b584d094ef4938606d85e47e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fbec58d9d29cfadbf7bfd16fce9a3197b07dd6fbb613f0b21feb66d9b6ea1df0
+size 60173
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d25728d3be7ef383b9deeb6e44774b34d9c4e888
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8cd9d759444d86cee4fbe9b6b8c0feb9fe87e8fb9abfd92da6f2b5c47d28d844
+size 24482
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d17d31303d6d26a55256723b0e52b40a2b8a259
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e7a8bc22f1beaadfd8609068321ae609d67a8a0048f47df878501a21922e4ce0
+size 18580
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f30829719d603581225fd62c8f266b6a68d720f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f9b8f6d06ef8c9f75ca10e61470ca1faa60ef2fd541be38adbac8ff4a01ecbb5
+size 35039
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0036-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0036-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7c7cc0b3d77da822400ea749e10a80c327e66d40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0036-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:91a27c00ac0516b752befa0a81dc4271fa27b87749997847458b4efb54fbe513
+size 232082
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4e2f03a969ef0ea2be7937823ac8eb9be2b53f94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-109",
+ "title": "Republic of Slovenia: Technical Assistance Report-Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program- Corporate Income Tax Gap",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-109.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "b47792f09efd35ca9784d8f924ef2bc5c09f90c616f096954ea259b36fffaa82",
+ "source_bytes": 1509161,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/03/10/republic-of-slovenia-technical-assistance-report-revenue-administration-gap-analysis-530793",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-22T00:01:53+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 35.557,
+ "page_count": 39,
+ "text_characters": 57340,
+ "table_count": 17,
+ "figure_count": 20,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "ocr_applied_pages": [
+ 2
+ ],
+ "ocr_engine": "Tesseract 5 (eng, 300 DPI)",
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––REVENUE ADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM — CORPORATE INCOME TAX GAP"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "Republic of Slovenia Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program — Corporate Income Tax Gap"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "GLOSSARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "PREFACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "I. BACKGROUND"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "A. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 15,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "B. Revenue Performance of CIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 18,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "II. THE ESTIMATES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 18,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "A. The GOS Gap"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 19,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "B. Actual vs Potential CIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 22,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "C. The Compliance Gap"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 24,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "III. OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 24,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "A. Observations"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 24,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "B. Next Steps"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 25,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 34,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Appendix II. The Model and Methodology used to Estimate the CIT Gap"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Republic of Slovenia: Technical Assistance Report-Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program- Corporate Income Tax Gap; IMF Country Report No. 23/109; February 2023",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Adobe Acrobat Standard (32-bit) 22.3.20310",
+ "producer": "Adobe Acrobat Standard (32-bit) 22.3.20310",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230309171415-05'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230313154051-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4f6f32f384f6793b9ebbceee142f2dfe65a19bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1888 @@
+
+
+
+
+March 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/109**
+# **REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA**
+##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––REVENUE** **ADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM —** **CORPORATE INCOME TAX GAP**
+
+This technical assistance report on Republic of Slovenia was prepared by a staff team of
+the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it
+was completed in February 2023.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FIlS CAL A F F Al R § D EPA RTM EN T
+
+Republic of Slovenia
+
+Revenue Administration
+Gap Analysis Program
+Corporate Income Tax Gap
+
+
+
+###### F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+## **Republic of Slovenia** **Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program** **— Corporate Income Tax Gap**
+
+Eric Hutton
+
+
+**Technical Assistance Report**
+
+
+**February 2023**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff
+of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Slovenia (the
+"TA recipient") in response to their request for technical assistance. This
+report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the
+
+IMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other
+agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to
+World Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with
+legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such
+disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical
+
+Assistance Information—
+[Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)
+of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside
+the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World
+Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate
+
+interest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s
+Fiscal Affairs Department.
+
+
+DM 7329258
+
+
+**This technical assistance (TA) was provided with financial support**
+
+**from the European Union.**
+
+
+2
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ___________________________________________________________________ 4**
+
+
+**GLOSSARY _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+
+**PREFACE ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________________ 7**
+
+
+**I.** **BACKGROUND__________________________________________________________________________________12**
+A. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia _____________________________________________________________________ 12
+B. Revenue Performance of CIT _________________________________________________________________________ 13
+
+
+**II.** **THE ESTIMATES ________________________________________________________________________________16**
+A. The GOS Gap __________________________________________________________________________________________ 16
+B. Actual vs Potential CIT ________________________________________________________________________________ 17
+C. The Compliance Gap __________________________________________________________________________________ 20
+
+
+**III.** **OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS __________________________________________________________22**
+A. Observations ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 22
+B. Next Steps ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 22
+
+
+**FIGURES**
+1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2012–2016 ________________________________________________________________ 8
+
+2. The Assessment Gap, 2012–2017 _____________________________________________________________________ 9
+3. The Assessment Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 __________________________________________________________ 9
+4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia with Comparison to Regional Average _________________ 14
+5. CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional Average _____________________________ 15
+
+6. GOS, and the GOS Gap 20122017____________________________________________________________________ 16
+7. The GOS Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 _________________________________________________________________ 17
+8. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2012–2017 _______________________________________________________________ 18
+9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, 2012–2017 __________________________________________________ 19
+10. The Assessment Gap, 2012–2017 _________________________________________________________________ 20
+
+11. The Assessment Gap by Sector, 2012–2017______________________________________________________ 21
+12. Theoretical Relationship between GOS and CIT Tax Base _____________________________________ 34
+
+
+**APPENDICES**
+
+I. Data Tables for Included Figures ______________________________________________________________________ 23
+II. The Model and Methodology used to _______________________________________________________________ 32
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**
+
+
+
+BEPS
+
+
+CIT
+
+
+EU
+
+
+FAD
+
+
+GDP
+
+
+GOS
+
+
+
+Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
+
+
+Corporate Income Tax
+
+
+European Union
+
+
+Fiscal Affairs Department
+
+
+Gross Domestic Product
+
+
+Gross Operating Surplus
+
+
+
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+
+
+RA-GAP Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+### **GLOSSARY**
+
+_**Terminology and model specific acronyms used in the CIT gap analysis**_
+
+
+Actual CIT The net amount of CIT payments made by taxpayers, net of any refunds
+due to taxpayers, measured on an accrual basis
+
+Assessed CIT The amount of CIT self-assessed by taxpayers as being due, plus any
+additional amounts deemed by the tax authority to be due from
+taxpayers
+
+CIT assessment gap Difference between assessed CIT and potential CIT
+
+CIT base gap Difference between potential C-TB and declared C-TB, presenting how
+much taxpayers underreport their tax base, before considering deduction
+for carried-over losses and tax credits/additions
+
+CIT collection gap Difference between actual CIT and assessed CIT
+
+CIT compliance gap Difference between potential CIT liabilities and actual CIT liabilities
+
+CIT-efficiency ratio Ratio of actually declared CIT liability to gross operating surplus
+multiplied by the statutory rate. It indicates the overall efficiency of the
+CIT system.
+
+CIT productivity Ratio of actually declared CIT liability to GDP multiplied by the CIT
+statutory rate.
+
+C-NTB Current-year net tax base, showing taxable income before considering
+deductions for carried-over losses, netting out current year losses
+calculated for tax purpose
+
+C-TB Current-year tax base, showing taxable income before considering
+deductions for carried-over losses
+
+FAP Financial accounting profit/loss
+
+S11 Non-financial corporation sector
+
+S12 Financial corporation sector
+
+S13 General government sector
+
+S14 Households sector
+
+S15 Non-profit institutions serving households
+
+TB tax base, showing taxable income after deducting carried-over losses
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+### **PREFACE**
+
+In response to a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance (MOF), a capacity development
+(CD) mission from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) began work with the authorities in
+January 2022 and visited Ljubljana in October 2022. The mission’s main purpose was to assist in
+the construction of a tax gap estimate for the Corporate Income Tax (CIT). The October 2022
+mission was led by Mr. Eric Hutton of FAD.
+
+
+During the course of this engagement, Mr. Hutton had productive meetings, virtual and in
+person, with a number of officials of the Republic of Slovenia Financial Administration (SFA), in
+particular Peter Grum, Danuška Bobek Gospodarič, Peter Jenko, Darija Šinkovec, Tomaž Perše,
+Tomaž Lešnik, Marjan Macek, Dušan Šafarič, Jurij Meze, and Dominik Kuzma. The mission also
+had useful discussions with officials from the Slovenia National Accounts office.
+
+
+Mr. Hutton expresses his sincere appreciation for the excellent cooperation and kind hospitality
+that he received from MOF officials throughout his visit. Mr. Hutton also thanks the Slovenian
+National Accounts office for providing data necessary for implementing the analysis in this
+report. Finally, Mr. Hutton thanks the support provided under the EC’s DG REFORM, and the
+coordination and cooperation provided by Ms. Elka Ilyova.
+
+
+The report consists of an Executive Summary and the following three sections: (I) Background; (II)
+The Estimates; and (III) Observations and Next Steps.
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+**This report presents the estimates of tax gaps for corporate income tax (CIT) for non-**
+**financial corporations in Slovenia by applying the methodology of the IMF’s RA-GAP**
+**(Revenue Administration – Gap Analysis Program).** This work is being undertaken under the
+context of the larger project designed to strengthen the administration of corporate income tax
+(CIT) by the Slovenian Financial Administration (SFA). Providing support towards building the
+
+capacity of the SFA to estimate and analyze the CIT gap will assist in achieving the overall goals
+of the project to: (i) strengthen core tax administration functions, and (ii) strengthen revenue
+administration, management, and governance arrangements.
+
+
+**The RA-GAP methodology for CIT gap is based on a top-down approach, which estimates**
+**the potential tax base and liability from macroeconomic data.** The estimation considers first
+
+the theoretical differences between the coverage of statistical macroeconomic data vis a vis the
+actual tax base of CIT, and then compares the estimated results for the potential CIT base and
+liability with actual declarations and revenues. It has the advantage of using available data,
+without the need of gathering additional information/data, to evaluate CIT noncompliance.
+Quality of macroeconomic data and tax records are crucial for the quality of the estimates.
+
+
+**To estimate the CIT gap, the RA-GAP CIT gap methodology was applied to available**
+**macroeconomic data for non-financial corporations from 2011 to 2020** . The potential CIT
+base and liability were estimated from gross operating surplus (GOS) of non-financial
+corporations, with necessary adjustments for conceptual differences between GOS and tax
+base/liability of CIT. The potential CIT liabilities are then and compared with the actual CIT
+
+(accrued net CIT remitted) to determine the compliance gap. The potential CIT base is measured
+using two different approaches, an _absolute method_, and a _relative method_ . The absolute method
+assumes that most non-compliance is related to under-declaration of income, so that all
+deductible expenses have been declared accurately. The relative method assumes that most noncompliance is from non-reporting, and so that both incomes and expenses may not be declared
+
+accurately. These two methods should then serve as “book ends” for the true level of noncompliance, as actual non-compliance is likely a blend of these two types of non-compliant
+activity (under-declaration and non-reporting), as such a final estimate for the compliance gap is
+
+produced by averaging the estimates from these two methods.
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+**Main findings**
+
+
+**Assessed CIT for non-financial**
+**corporations dropped from 2011 to**
+**2012 then rose until 2020; potential**
+**CIT roughly followed the same pattern**
+**(Figure 1).** Assessed CIT liabilities, the
+
+amount of CIT self-assessed due by
+taxpayers plus additional assessment by
+the tax authorities for a given year, as
+measured as a percentage of GDP,
+dropped from just a little below one and
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Figure 1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2011–2020**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+a half percent of GDP in 2011 to one
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and_
+
+percent in 2012, and has since risen to a
+
+_Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+little more than one and a half percent.
+The two methods for estimating the potential CIT show similar trends for 2011 to 2016, with a
+drop from 2011 to 2012, and then a steady increase, from 2016 to 2020 the absolute method
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and_
+_Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+
+then indicates a lot more potential growth, but also with a lot more volatility. In comparing
+assessed CIT to potential CIT here, instead of actual CIT, because there were difficulties in
+compiling an accurate measure of accrued net CIT. If there are not significant amounts of arrears,
+then assessed CIT is a good proxy for actual CIT, however, this means that we can only estimate
+the _assessment gap_ and not the full _compliance gap._ The compliance gap is composed of both an
+
+assessment gap and a collection gap, where the collection gap is the difference between
+assessed and actual CIT, while the assessment gap is the difference between assessed and
+potential CIT.
+
+
+**The estimates for the assessment gap for non-financial corporations indicate there may**
+**have been an increase in 2012, and then a decline back to the 2011 levels (Figure 2).** While
+
+both methods do indicate that the gap has declined from 2012 to 2019, the results for 2020
+indicate a broad divergence. Given the unprecedented change in economic activity in 2020, this
+broad divergence could reflect greater uncertainty, and a higher margin of error, in the national
+accounts estimates as much as they might represent a change in compliance behavior by
+
+taxpayers. COVID-19 related government policies, which included allowing for deferral of CIT
+payments, could also be affecting these results. [1] Looking forward, it is likely that the estimates of
+the trend in taxpayer compliance will be somewhat volatile until 2023 and caution will need to be
+exercised in interpreting any results.
+
+
+[1 The full list of COVID-19 related measures taken can be found in Annex I of the 2021 IMF Article IV Staff Report.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/05/25/Republic-of-Slovenia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-50189)
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+**Figure 2. The Assessment Gap, 2011–2020**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+**Under either method the bulk of the assessment gap appears to be in the manufacturing**
+**sector (Figure 3).** It should be noted that the margin of error for the results from this model are
+probably around 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP, and so the gap for any of the sectors as shown in
+Figure 3 are not significant. That said, there is a general indication that the bulk of the gap is in
+the manufacturing sector, and in particular in the automotive vehicle and vehicle parts sector.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Code** **Description** **Code** **Description**
+
+
+**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade
+
+
+**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality
+
+
+**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication
+
+
+**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate
+
+
+**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services
+
+
+**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education
+
+
+**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+**Comments on the Findings**
+
+
+**Some significant assumptions were needed to enable the RA-GAP estimation of potential**
+**CIT base and liability; therefore, CIT gap estimates should be interpreted with caution.** The
+definition for “non-financial corporations” used in national accounts includes some
+unincorporated enterprises, so there is not a perfect match to the corporate income tax base.
+Some assumptions had to be made as to the impact of these differences, which may be affecting
+
+both the level and trend in the resulting gap estimates. There is also an issue with the tax
+declaration data; the methodology requires being able to fully distinguish between operating
+revenues and costs and other revenues and costs from the declaration data, but the current tax
+declaration has some lines which might be blending operating and capital costs.
+
+
+**Work Needed to Enhance CIT Gap Estimation**
+
+
+**The top-down estimation of the CIT gap provides an initial evaluation of the level and**
+**change in taxpayers’ compliance; however, further work in some areas is needed to**
+
+**improve the application of the methodology and reliability of results.**
+
+
+- **More detailed statistical data.** The gross operating surplus data used in the estimation
+needs to be obtained at a more detailed sector of activity level will help a better sectoral
+estimate of potential and actual bases. In addition, more information on the proportion of
+
+GOS from non-corporate income tax filers will help improve the estimate of potential base.
+
+
+- **Better classification of businesses sector of activity.** Feedback on the classification by
+Statistics Sweden of businesses activity code and institutional sector codes is needed. The
+relative method gap estimates in particular are being biased upwards due to differences in
+
+the classification of activity codes used.
+
+- **Better accounting of accrued tax arrears should be made.** Some simple assumptions
+
+regarding allocations could be made for this purpose.
+
+
+**In addition to the above work, a bottom-up approach to estimate CIT gap is recommended**
+**to complement the top-down RA-GAP approach; work is underway by Fund staff to**
+**produce such an estimate, the results of which will be provided in a follow-up report.** A
+bottom-up approach, which estimates gaps by using results of random/operational audits, will
+
+provide valuable information, and will complement the top-down estimates. It is recommended
+to use both the top-down and the bottom-up results, combined with internal knowledge and
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+information about taxpayers’ compliance, to strengthening compliance risk management in the
+tax administration. Work is underway by Fund staff to analyze operational data provided in order
+to produce a bottom-up estimate.
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+### **I. BACKGROUND**
+
+**1.** **The IMF’s RA-GAP (Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program) provides a**
+**comprehensive quantitative analysis of the tax gap between potential revenues and actual**
+**collections.** The program is conducted by the Revenue Administration Divisions of the Fiscal
+Affairs Department and aims to provide an evaluation of tax gap for a specific tax. This report is
+part of a pilot program to extend this framework to cover Corporate Income Tax (CIT).
+
+
+**2.** **The main purpose of this report is to provide the estimates of the compliance gap**
+**for CIT by applying the methodology of the RA-GAP.** The RA-GAP methodology for CIT gap
+follows a top-down approach by estimating the potential tax base and liability from
+macroeconomic data. The estimation considers first the theoretical differences between the
+coverage of statistical macroeconomic data vis a vis the actual tax base of CIT, and then
+
+compares the estimated results for the potential CIT base and liability with actual declarations
+and revenues. It has the advantage of using available data, without the need of gathering
+additional information/data, to evaluate the overall CIT noncompliance in a country. The basis for
+the model and methodology used in assessing the CIT gap are detailed in Appendix II. [ 2]
+
+
+**3.** **There are several caveats for the top-down estimation of the CIT gaps.** In this report,
+the potential CIT liability is not associated with the concept of ‘tax capacity’ showing the
+maximum level of revenue achieved by changing tax policies, including raising statutory rate. The
+estimated gaps do not consider behavioral changes by taxpayers under different policies and
+administrative measures, assuming a static model, and therefore indicate the efficiency of tax
+administration and policy, rather than show potential additional revenues. It is also important to
+note that the potential CIT base is estimated from national accounts data and does not consider
+the CIT base in a country before the effects of cross-border base erosion and profit shifting
+(BEPS) activities of multinational enterprises unless national accounts data incorporate the
+adjustments for these effects.
+
+###### **A. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia**
+
+
+**4.** **The analysis covers the period 2011-2020 and there were some significant rate**
+**changes for the CIT over this period.** . The rate changed from 20 percent in 2011 to 19 percent
+in 2012, then dropped to 17 percent in 2013, before being increased back to 19 percent in 2017.
+There have been no significant changes in the coverage of the tax base over the period. The
+
+main feature of the CIT policy on corporate profit is outlined below:
+
+
+- **Rate:** Since 2017 a flat rate of 19 percent is applied to taxable income. Prior to that, from
+2013 to 2016, the rate was 17 percent. For 2012 the rate was 18 percent, and it was 20
+
+percent in 2011 (Figure 4).
+
+
+2 For a more complete discussion of the RA-GAP approach to estimating the tax gap for corporate income tax
+[see Ueda, 2018.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2018/09/12/Estimating-the-Corporate-Income-Tax-Gap-The-RA-GAP-Methodology-45890)
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+- **Coverage:** Legal entities carrying out business in Slovenia are liable to corporate income tax.
+Local (resident) legal entities are taxed on their worldwide income, whereas foreign legal
+
+entities are taxed on Slovenia-source income only.
+
+
+- **Tax base:** Taxable income is determined by transforming financial accounting results
+(profit/loss) with adjustments for permanent and temporary differences for tax purposes.
+
+Taxable capital gains are added to the other business income.
+
+
+- **Exemptions:** No exemptions apply. All legal entities are liable to CIT.
+
+
+- **Losses:** Tax losses may be carried forward to be offset against future taxable profits. The
+
+carryback of losses is not allowed. Restrictions apply for change in ownership.
+
+
+- **Threshold:** There is no quantitative threshold for registration.
+
+
+- **Tax period:** The tax period for determining the corporate income tax is depending on when
+
+the company financial year ends. For most companies this aligns with the calendar year.
+
+- **Advance payments:** Taxable legal persons make monthly advance payments for corporate
+
+tax which are determined by a preliminary tax assessment. The preliminary prognosis of tax
+revenue for the current year is based on the latest final tax assessment or on the preliminary
+return filed by the company.
+
+###### **B. Revenue Performance of CIT**
+
+
+**5.** **Reported CIT collection on net basis relative to GDP has been lower than the**
+**average for European countries for the past decade, but it has been getting closer (Figure**
+**4).** The level has been around 2 percent of GDP for most years, although it was a little lower for
+the period 2012 to 2016. The increase in the CIT rate had an effect on revenue performance, with
+the revenue level increasing since 2017.
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+**Figure 4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio, with Comparison to Regional Average**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff Calculations based on data from WEO, Eurostat, OECD_
+
+
+**6.** **CIT productivity has also been lower than the European average for most of the**
+**past decade (Figure 5).** The CIT productivity shows how much one percent point CIT statutory
+rate can generate in CIT revenue relative to GDP, indicating a country’s overall efficiency of CIT
+
+for revenue mobilization. In 2019, the average of the CIT productivity in Slovenia was 0.37
+percent, which was lower than the average of European countries of 0.61 percent. During the first
+few years of the past decade productivity was much lower than the regional average. Since 2017
+productivity has been rising, as has the average level for the region.
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+**Figure 5. CIT Productivity, with Comparison to Regional Average**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from Eurostat_
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+### **II. THE ESTIMATES**
+
+###### **A. The GOS Gap**
+
+**7.** **The GOS gap is the difference between the potential GOS, derived from national**
+**accounts, and the assessed GOS, derived from the tax declarations.** The concept and
+
+measures of GOS are the foundation upon which the compliance gap estimates are built. The
+underlying assumption is that there is a strong relationship between the CIT tax base and GOS. [3]
+Given this relationship, the trends and levels in the GOS are an important indicator of what might
+be influencing the trends and levels of the compliance gap.
+
+
+**8.** **The GOS gap, for non-financial corporations, appears to have declined slightly over**
+
+**the period, as a percent of GDP and as a percent of potential before a sharp uptick in 2020**
+**(Figure 6).** The decline has not been smooth. While there appeared to be a notable decrease
+from 2013 to 2016, the gap then appears to have returned to its 2013 levels before declining
+again. The uptick in 2020 is the result of a divergence in the trend in the assessed GOS and the
+potential GOS, which, as noted above, may not be due to a true change in compliance activity
+
+during the period, but is rather an artifact of the volatile changes in the nature of many economic
+activities during this period.
+
+
+**Figure 6. GOS, and the GOS Gap (non-financial corporations)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+**9.** **The GOS gap appears to be largely concentrated in the manufacturing sector, but**
+**with significant contributions from the Trade sector as well (Figure 7).** The gap appears to
+
+
+3 It would of course be prudent to examine the strength of this relationship statistically, but, unfortunately, a
+sufficient time series of data on the structure of the tax base could not be compiled.
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+be particularly concentrated in the manufacture sector for motor vehicles and motor vehicle
+parts. The negative gap in the utilities sector, sector code “D-E”, could be due to the
+misclassification of taxpayers, and so a comparison of the classification of sector of activity used
+
+by the revenue authority and the codes used for national accounts should be conducted.
+
+
+**Figure 7. The GOS Gap by Sector**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Code** **Description** **Code** **Description**
+
+
+**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade
+
+
+**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation
+
+
+**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality
+
+
+**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication
+
+
+**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate
+
+
+**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services
+
+
+**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education
+
+
+**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+###### **B. Actual vs Potential CIT**
+
+
+**10.** **As the compliance gap is the difference between actual and potential revenue,**
+**where actual revenue is measured on an accrual basis, comparing actual CIT to potential**
+
+**CIT can give an indication where changes in the compliance gap may be arising.** Knowing if
+changes in the compliance gap are being driven by changes in tax being declared and paid by
+taxpayers, or by changes in the economic activity being measured can provide insight into what
+factors might be affecting the change in the gap.
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+**11.** **Values for accrued collections of CIT were not available, and so assessed CIT is**
+**being used instead for comparison against the potential CIT.** Collections could only be
+compiled on a year of collection basis, not a true accruals basis. This is a common issue with CIT
+
+revenues which largely arises due to the fact that filing is typically done based on the fiscal year
+ends of corporations, and these can not only differ from the calendar year, but they will differ
+from corporation to corporation, so a common year of accrual doesn’t exist. A review of the
+arrears data indicates that the accrual values do not differ significantly from the assessed revenue
+values in any case.
+
+
+**12.** **Assessed CIT for non-financial corporations exhibits an overall increasing trend for**
+**the period, while the overall trend for the potential is relative flatter for both approaches**
+**up to 2017, then the absolute method indicates bigger potential growth (Figure 8).** As
+discussed above, in general it would be expected that the absolute method should produce a
+higher estimate than the relative method. In comparing the trends in the series, it is notable that
+
+both the assessed CIT and relative method potential show a fairly flat trend from 2019 to 2020,
+but the potential under the absolute method shows a spike in 2020. In general, the relative
+method presents a more volatile series. The assessed CIT shown here is significantly less than the
+values for CIT collections reviewed in section I.B. because we are only looking at assessed CIT for
+
+non-financial corporations whereas the collections data is for all corporations.
+
+
+**Figure 8. Assessed vs Potential CIT**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+**13.** **Both the potential CIT under the relative method and the absolute method show**
+**that the C5 sector (vehicles etc.) should be producing more revenue than is being assessed**
+**(Figure 9).** The GOS gap in the C5 sector is evident in the results for the estimates for the
+potential CIT, where this sector shows that, due to their economic significance, there should be
+significant revenues. There is, however, very little assessed CIT from the sector. This figure
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+presents the results as a percent of gross operating surplus as opposed to percent of GDP given
+that the share as a percent of GDP by sector is very small.
+
+
+**Figure 9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Code** **Description** **Code** **Description**
+
+
+**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade
+
+
+**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation
+
+
+**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality
+
+
+**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication
+
+
+**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate
+
+
+**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services
+
+
+**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education
+
+
+**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+###### **C. The Compliance Gap**
+
+**14.** **Without data for accrued revenue or accrued arrears, the full compliance gap**
+**cannot be estimated, only the assessment gap.** The compliance gap is composed of both an
+assessment gap and a collection gap, where the collection gap is the difference between
+assessed and actual CIT, while the assessment gap is the difference between assessed and
+potential CIT. As noted above, difficulty in properly determining accrued revenue is not unusual
+
+in the case of the CIT. It should be noted, however, that work is being undertaken by the
+authorities to construct such a series.
+
+
+**15.** **The assessment gap appears to have been falling (Figure 10).** While both methods
+show a jump in the gap in 2012, and a roughly declining trend over the period 2012 to 2019,
+there is a stark difference for 2020, where there is a spike in the value under the absolute
+
+method, and a dip for the relative method. It is notable that if we look back at the regional
+average performance for CIT, as discussed in section I.B., there is a dip for 2020. As mentioned
+before, the unprecedented shift in economic activity that occurred in 2020, in addition to COVID19 related policies such as allowing for a deferment for CIT payments, are likely distorting the
+results for this period, driving these divergent interpretations for potential CIT. Overall, as a
+
+percent of potential, the gap looks to have recovered from the spike it saw in 2012.
+
+
+**Figure 10. The Assessment Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+**16.** **Both methods indicate that the bulk of the assessment gap is in the same sectors**
+**where the GOS gap is appearing; manufacturing, in particular motor vehicle manufacturing**
+**and motor vehicle parts, and trade services (Figure 11).** The breakdown of the average results
+
+for non-financial corporations are presented here as a percent of GOS and as a percent of GDP;
+the former method gives a sense of the relative size across sectors, while the latter gives a sense
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+of the absolute size. As a percent of GOS, the assessment gap follows the same general trend as
+the GOS gap, with the dominance on sectors C5 (motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts
+manufacturing) and G (wholesale and retail trade). There is also the result of a negative gap in
+
+the D-E sector (electricity, water, and other public utilities), which is likely arising to taxpayers
+mistakenly being classified as being part of this sector when they should be in another sector. As
+a percent of GDP, however, we can see that no sector, at this level of aggregation, reaches the
+threshold of significance by having a gap of at least 0.5 percent of GDP; although if the
+manufacturing sector was aggregated into a single sector for this presentation, it would meet
+
+that mark.
+
+
+**Figure 11. The Assessment Gap by Sector**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Code Description Code Description
+
+**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade
+
+
+**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation
+
+
+**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality
+
+
+**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication
+
+
+**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate
+
+
+**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services
+
+
+**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education
+
+
+**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services
+
+
+_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+### **III. OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS**
+
+###### **A. Observations**
+
+**17.** **Some assumptions were needed to be made to enable the RA-GAP estimation of**
+**potential CIT base and liability; therefore, CIT gap estimates should be interpreted with**
+
+**caution.** The definition for “non-financial corporations” used in national accounts includes some
+unincorporated enterprises, so there is not a perfect match to the corporate income tax base.
+Some assumptions had to be made as to the impact of these differences, which may be affecting
+both the level and trend in the resulting gap estimates.
+
+
+**18.** **It is recommended that the top-down estimates be cross-checked against a**
+
+**bottom-up based estimate of the tax gap.** Work is underway to produce this bottom-up based
+estimate, the results of which will be provided in a follow-up report.
+
+###### **B. Next Steps**
+
+**19.** **The following actions are necessary to improve the current estimates:**
+
+
+ - Obtain more information on the value in the national accounts GOS for non-financial
+
+corporations which is coming from entities not required to file or pay CIT.
+
+
+ - Obtain a more detailed and current breakdown of GOS for non-financial corporations by
+
+sector of economic activity.
+
+
+ - Reconcile the sector codes for the main sector of activity being used for tax purposes with
+
+the codes being assigned for national accounts purposes.
+
+
+ - Attempt to construct a measure of either accrued CIT or accrued CIT arrears.
+
+
+**20.** **Going forward, the SFA should be working towards making annual updates to the**
+**CIT gap estimates.** Tracking movements in the level of compliance for the CIT (and other taxes)
+will assist the authorities in gauging how successful they are being at managing compliance risks,
+
+and provide possible insights into where more resources need to be allocated to manage those
+
+compliance risks.
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+#### **Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures**
+
+**Table 1. Data for Figure 1, 8: Assessed vs Potential CIT,**
+
+|Year|Assessed CIT Due|Potential CIT (relative method)|Potential CIT (absolute method)|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|2011|1.36|1.32|1.78|
+|2012|0.99|1.22|1.40|
+|2013|1.02|1.26|1.45|
+|2014
|1.10
|1.35
|1.52
|
+|2015
|1.18
|1.37
|1.57
|
+|2016|1.30|1.42|1.62|
+|2017|1.52|1.68|1.94|
+|2018|1.60|1.65|2.06|
+|2019|1.58|1.61|1.93|
+|2020|1.63|1.56|2.26|
+
+
+
+**Table 2. Data for Figure 2, 10: The Assessment Gap,**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|Relative
Method|Average
Result|Absolute
Method|Relative
Method|Average
Result|Absolute
Method|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|
+|2011|-2.84|12.21|23.41|-0.04|0.19|0.42|
+|2012
|18.72
|24.19
|28.97
|0.23
|0.32
|0.41
|
+|2013
|18.86
|24.59
|29.57
|0.24
|0.33
|0.43
|
+|2014|18.80|23.56|27.79|0.25|0.34|0.42|
+|2015|13.66|19.59|24.76|0.19|0.29|0.39|
+|2016|8.49|14.62|19.98|0.12|0.22|0.32|
+|2017|9.88|16.21|21.71|0.17|0.29|0.42|
+|2018
|3.12
|13.72
|22.23
|0.05
|0.25
|0.46
|
+|2019
|2.01
|10.91
|18.32
|0.03
|0.19
|0.35
|
+|2020|-4.77|14.62|27.96|-0.07|0.28|0.63|
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+**Table 3. Data for Figure 3, 11: The Assessment Gap Absolute Method by Sector,**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Reporting
Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|
+|C1|0.00
|0.01
|0.01
|0.01
|0.01
|0.00
|0.01
|0.01
|0.00
|0.00
|
+|C2|0.01
|0.03
|0.03
|0.02
|0.03
|0.01
|0.01
|0.02
|0.03
|0.03
|
+|C3|0.04
|0.06
|0.06
|0.08
|0.07
|0.04
|0.05
|0.05
|0.05
|0.02
|
+|C4|0.06
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.08
|0.11
|0.08
|0.10
|0.10
|
+|C5|0.19
|0.18
|0.18
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.15
|
+|D-E|-0.11
|-0.08
|-0.12
|-0.06
|-0.06
|-0.08
|-0.05
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.06
|
+|F|-0.11
|-0.04
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.02
|-0.03
|-0.05
|-0.05
|-0.06
|
+|G|0.02
|0.06
|0.06
|0.06
|0.07
|0.09
|0.09
|0.10
|0.06
|0.10
|
+|H|0.06
|-0.02
|-0.01
|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.06
|-0.04
|-0.02
|
+|I|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.01
|
+|J|0.04
|0.06
|0.04
|0.06
|0.04
|0.05
|0.06
|0.04
|0.04
|0.03
|
+|L|0.00
|-0.02
|0.01
|0.01
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.02
|-0.04
|-0.03
|
+|M-N|-0.01
|0.00
|0.01
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|0.01
|-0.02
|0.01
|
+|P-Q1
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|
+|R-S|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.02|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.03|
+
+
+**Table 4. Data for Figure 4: CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia, with Comparison to**
+
+**Regional Average**
+
+|Year|CIT to GDP|CIT to GDP European Countries
Average|CIT Rate|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|2011|1.65|2.53|20|
+|2012|1.23|2.61|18|
+|2013|1.19|2.65|17|
+|2014|1.40|2.63|17|
+|2015|1.46|2.63|17|
+|2016|1.59|2.72|17|
+|2017|1.78|2.84|19|
+|2018|1.93|2.91|19|
+|2019|1.96|2.89|19|
+|2020|1.99|2.44|19|
+|2021|2.47|2.96|19|
+
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+**Table 5. Data for Figure 4: CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia, with Comparison to**
+
+**Regional Average, 2019**
+
+|Year|CIT to GDP|CIT to GDP Region Average|
+|---|---|---|
+|Norway|6.02|2.89|
+|Cyprus|5.67|2.89|
+|Malta|5.50|2.89|
+|Belgium|3.71|2.89|
+|Luxembourg|6.06|2.89|
+|Netherlands|3.69|2.89|
+|Ireland|3.08|2.89|
+|Slovak Republic|3.06|2.89|
+|Portugal|3.12|2.89|
+|Sweden|3.14|2.89|
+|Denmark|3.15|2.89|
+|Austria|2.76|2.89|
+|United Kingdom|2.27|2.89|
+|France|2.82|2.89|
+|Spain|2.07|2.89|
+|Czech Republic|3.32|2.89|
+|Croatia|2.30|2.89|
+|Bulgaria|2.30|2.89|
+|Greece|2.22|2.89|
+|Romania|2.10|2.89|
+|Slovenia|1.96|2.89|
+|Italy|1.95|2.89|
+|Finland|2.53|2.89|
+|Poland|2.21|2.89|
+|Lithuania|1.55|2.89|
+|Hungary|1.14|2.89|
+|Germany|2.65|2.89|
+|Estonia|1.83|2.89|
+
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+**Table 6. Data for Figure 5: CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional**
+
+**Average**
+
+|Year|CIT Productivity|Regional Average CIT Productivity|
+|---|---|---|
+|2011|0.33|0.57|
+|2012|0.22|0.59|
+|2013|0.20|0.61|
+|2014|0.24|0.59|
+|2015|0.25|0.57|
+|2016|0.27|0.60|
+|2017|0.34|0.61|
+|2018|0.37|0.62|
+|2019|0.37|0.61|
+|2020|0.38|0.50|
+|2021|0.47|0.61|
+
+
+
+**Table 8. Data for Figure 5: CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional**
+
+**Average, 2019**
+
+|Year|CIT Productivity|CIT Productivity Region Avg|
+|---|---|---|
+|Norway|1.32|0.61|
+|Cyprus|0.71|0.61|
+|Malta|1.93|0.61|
+|Belgium|1.08|0.61|
+|Luxembourg|1.51|0.61|
+|Netherlands|0.92|0.61|
+|Ireland|0.39|0.61|
+|Slovak Republic|0.64|0.61|
+|Portugal|0.65|0.61|
+|Sweden|0.67|0.61|
+|Denmark|0.69|0.61|
+|Austria|0.69|0.61|
+|United Kingdom|0.43|0.61|
+|France|0.87|0.61|
+|Spain|0.52|0.61|
+|Czech Republic|0.63|0.61|
+|Croatia|0.41|0.61|
+|Bulgaria|0.23|0.61|
+|Greece|0.62|0.61|
+|Romania|0.34|0.61|
+|Slovenia|0.37|0.61|
+|Italy|0.47|0.61|
+|Finland|0.51|0.61|
+
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+|Poland|0.42|0.61|
+|---|---|---|
+|Lithuania|0.23|0.61|
+|Hungary|0.10|0.61|
+|Germany|0.79|0.61|
+|Estonia|0.37|0.61|
+
+
+**Table 9. Data for Figure 6: GOS, and the GOS Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|Assessed GOS|Potential GOS|GOS Gap
(percent of GDP)|GOS Gap
(percent of Potential)|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|2011
|13.9
|16.7
|2.1
|13.0
|
+|2012|14.1|17.1|2.3|13.7|
+|2013|14.7|17.9|2.5|14.7|
+|2014|15.3|18.5|2.5|14.0|
+|2015|15.4|18.3|2.3|13.0|
+|2016
|15.6
|18.2
|1.9
|10.9
|
+|2017
|16.1
|19.0
|2.2
|12.1
|
+|2018|15.7|18.7|2.4|13.3|
+|2019|16.0|18.5|1.9|10.4|
+|2020|15.4|19.4|3.3|17.8|
+
+
+**Table 10. Data for Figure 7: The GOS gap percent of GDP by Sector,**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Reporting
Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|-0.1|0.0|
+|C1|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|C2|0.1
|0.1
|0.2
|0.1
|0.2
|0.0
|0.0
|0.1
|0.2
|0.4
|
+|C3|0.6
|0.5
|0.6
|0.6
|0.6
|0.2
|0.4
|0.4
|0.5
|0.4
|
+|C4|0.4
|0.5
|0.5
|0.4
|0.4
|0.5
|0.6
|0.5
|0.6
|0.8
|
+|C5|1.3|1.4|1.5|1.3|1.1|1.1|1.1|1.0|1.0|1.1|
+|D-E|-0.8|-0.7|-1.0|-0.5|-0.5|-0.7|-0.4|-0.2|-0.3|-0.4|
+|F|-0.8|-0.2|-0.2|-0.3|-0.3|-0.1|-0.1|-0.3|-0.3|-0.3|
+|G|0.5
|0.5
|0.7
|0.7
|0.8
|0.9
|0.9
|1.0
|0.5
|0.9
|
+|H|0.5
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.5
|-0.5
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.2
|
+|I|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.3|-0.3|-0.3|-0.3|0.0|
+|J|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.1|0.1|
+|L|0.0|-0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.0|-0.1|-0.1|-0.2|
+|M-N|0.1|0.1|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.4|0.3|0.3|
+|P-Q1|0.1
|0.1
|0.1
|0.1
|0.1
|0.0
|0.0
|0.0
|0.0
|0.0
|
+|R-S|0.2|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.3|
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+**Table 11. Data for Figure 8: Assessed CIT vs Potential CIT, percent of GDP**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|Assessed CIT|Potential CIT
(absolute method)|Potential CIT
(relative method)|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|2011|1.36
|1.78
|1.32
|
+|2012|0.99|1.40|1.22|
+|2013|1.02|1.45|1.26|
+|2014|
1.10|
1.52|
1.35|
+|2015|1.18|1.57|1.37|
+|2016|1.30|1.62|1.42|
+|2017|1.52|1.94|1.68|
+|2018|1.60|2.06|1.65|
+|2019|1.58|1.93|1.61|
+|2020|1.63|2.26|1.56|
+
+
+
+**Table 12. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Assessed CIT percent of**
+
+**GOS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|0.05
|0.03
|0.03
|0.04
|0.05
|0.07
|0.10
|0.09
|0.09
|0.08
|
+|C1|0.17
|0.12
|0.17
|0.15
|0.17
|0.19
|0.20
|0.23
|0.25
|0.28
|
+|C2|0.46
|0.33
|0.38
|0.52
|0.57
|0.67
|0.77
|0.72
|0.69
|0.69
|
+|C3|1.18
|0.71
|0.77
|0.55
|0.64
|0.53
|0.84
|0.86
|1.01
|1.15
|
+|C4|0.67
|0.51
|0.46
|0.41
|0.46
|0.65
|0.64
|0.61
|0.53
|0.58
|
+|C5|0.12
|0.11
|0.10
|0.13
|0.19
|0.18
|0.18
|0.17
|0.16
|0.16
|
+|D-E|0.64
|0.41
|0.52
|0.52
|0.39
|0.45
|0.38
|0.37
|0.39
|0.50
|
+|F|0.51
|0.31
|0.27
|0.33
|0.39
|0.30
|0.34
|0.44
|0.44
|0.50
|
+|G|2.15
|1.50
|1.47
|1.53
|1.60
|1.79
|2.09
|2.30
|2.17
|2.12
|
+|H|0.37
|0.35
|0.31
|0.47
|0.50
|0.67
|0.74
|0.83
|0.69
|0.48
|
+|I|0.08
|0.07
|0.06
|0.06
|0.08
|0.10
|0.12
|0.14
|0.16
|0.06
|
+|J|0.69
|0.33
|0.29
|0.22
|0.37
|0.30
|0.30
|0.38
|0.38
|0.48
|
+|L|0.18
|0.23
|0.13
|0.15
|0.15
|0.21
|0.22
|0.28
|0.35
|0.26
|
+|M-N|0.78
|0.69
|0.70
|0.76
|0.81
|0.87
|0.94
|0.99
|1.07
|0.94
|
+|P-Q1|0.09
|0.07
|0.07
|0.08
|0.08
|0.08
|0.09
|0.11
|0.12
|0.12
|
+|R-S|0.11|0.10|0.07|0.08|0.08|0.10|0.09|0.09|0.09|0.08|
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+**Table 12. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Potential CIT absolute**
+
+**method percent of GOS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|0.06
|0.04
|0.03
|0.03
|0.05
|0.05
|0.06
|0.06
|0.04
|0.04
|
+|C1|0.18|0.19|0.19|0.21|0.19|0.20|0.19|0.20|0.19|0.18|
+|C2|0.47|0.49|0.52|0.60|0.68|0.72|0.82|0.79|0.82|0.63|
+|C3|0.99
|0.84
|0.96
|0.95
|0.88
|0.74
|1.03
|0.94
|1.05
|0.94
|
+|C4|0.94|0.83|0.80|0.80|0.89|1.08|1.23|1.03|0.98|0.86|
+|C5|0.86|0.80|0.76|0.69|0.70|0.72|0.76|0.71|0.76|0.63|
+|D-E|0.27|0.23|0.13|0.28|0.24|0.20|0.26|0.27|0.26|0.25|
+|F|0.16|0.11|0.14|0.13|0.14|0.16|0.19|0.22|0.19|0.18|
+|G|1.77|1.60|1.52|1.58|1.66|1.92|2.18|2.36|2.30|2.23|
+|H|0.55|0.53|0.51|0.54|0.59|0.60|0.62|0.64|0.63|0.45|
+|I|0.00|-0.01|0.01|0.02|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|0.01|
+|J|0.88
|0.78
|0.64
|0.68
|0.65
|0.64
|0.73
|0.69
|0.77
|0.77
|
+|L|0.15|0.10|0.13|0.14|0.11|0.10|0.11|0.13|0.07|0.10|
+|M-N|0.53|0.54|0.61|0.60|0.59|0.58|0.61|0.71|0.62|0.68|
+|P-Q1|0.02
|0.01
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|
+|R-S|0.19|0.14|0.15|0.15|0.15|0.12|0.11|0.11|0.09|0.09|
+
+
+**Table 13. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Potential CIT relative**
+
+**method percent of GOS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|0.06|0.04|0.03|0.03|0.05|0.05|0.06|0.06|0.04|0.04|
+|C1|0.18
|0.19
|0.19
|0.21
|0.19
|0.20
|0.19
|0.20
|0.19
|0.18
|
+|C2|0.47|0.49|0.52|0.60|0.68|0.72|0.82|0.79|0.82|0.63|
+|C3|0.99|0.84|0.96|0.95|0.88|0.74|1.03|0.94|1.05|0.94|
+|C4|0.94
|0.83
|0.80
|0.80
|0.89
|1.08
|1.23
|1.03
|0.98
|0.86
|
+|C5|0.86|0.80|0.76|0.69|0.70|0.72|0.76|0.71|0.76|0.63|
+|D-E|0.27
|0.23
|0.13
|0.28
|0.24
|0.20
|0.26
|0.27
|0.26
|0.25
|
+|F|0.16|0.11|0.14|0.13|0.14|0.16|0.19|0.22|0.19|0.18|
+|G|1.77
|1.60
|1.52
|1.58
|1.66
|1.92
|2.18
|2.36
|2.30
|2.23
|
+|H|0.55|0.53|0.51|0.54|0.59|0.60|0.62|0.64|0.63|0.45|
+|I|0.00|-0.01|0.01|0.02|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|0.01|
+|J|0.88
|0.78
|0.64
|0.68
|0.65
|0.64
|0.73
|0.69
|0.77
|0.77
|
+|L|0.15|0.10|0.13|0.14|0.11|0.10|0.11|0.13|0.07|0.10|
+|M-N|0.53
|0.54
|0.61
|0.60
|0.59
|0.58
|0.61
|0.71
|0.62
|0.68
|
+|P-Q1|0.02|0.01|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|
+|R-S|0.19|0.14|0.15|0.15|0.15|0.12|0.11|0.11|0.09|0.09|
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+**Table 14. Data for Figure 10: Assessment Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|Absolute
Method|Relative
Method|Average
Result|Absolute
Method|Relative
Method|Average
Result|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|
+|2011|23.41|-2.84|12.21|0.42|-0.04|0.19|
+|2012|
28.97|
18.72|
24.19|
0.41|
0.23|
0.32|
+|2013|
29.57|
18.86|
24.59|
0.43|
0.24|
0.33|
+|2014|27.79|18.80|23.56|0.42|0.25|0.34|
+|2015|
24.76|
13.66|
19.59|
0.39|
0.19|
0.29|
+|2016|19.98|8.49|14.62|0.32|0.12|0.22|
+|2017|
21.71|
9.88|
16.21|
0.42|
0.17|
0.29|
+|2018|
22.23|
3.12|
13.72|
0.46|
0.05|
0.25|
+|2019|18.32|2.01|10.91|0.35|0.03|0.19|
+|2020|
27.96|
-4.77|
14.62|
0.63|
-0.07|
0.28|
+
+
+
+**Table 15. Data for Figure 11: Assessment Gap by Sector, Average Result, percent of GOS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|-0.02|-0.01|-0.02|-0.01|-0.01|-0.04|-0.04|-0.03|-0.05|-0.03|
+|C1|0.01|0.08|0.04|0.05|0.03|0.03|0.04|0.05|0.00|-0.01|
+|C2|0.04|0.15|0.17|0.10|0.14|0.04|0.05|0.09|0.16|0.16|
+|C3|0.26|0.36|0.36|0.46|0.38|0.22|0.29|0.24|0.28|0.08|
+|C4|0.38|0.43|0.42|0.40|0.41|0.45|0.58|0.45|0.53|0.53|
+|C5|1.14|1.07|1.04|0.87|0.78|0.81|0.83|0.77|0.83|0.79|
+|D-E|-0.66|-0.47|-0.67|-0.34|-0.32|-0.44|-0.24|-0.17|-0.22|-0.31|
+|F|-0.66
|-0.23
|-0.14
|-0.25
|-0.25
|-0.11
|-0.15
|-0.24
|-0.29
|-0.30
|
+|G|0.10
|0.34
|0.35
|0.33
|0.40
|0.49
|0.48
|0.54
|0.35
|0.51
|
+|H|0.38
|-0.11
|-0.08
|-0.17
|-0.17
|-0.25
|-0.28
|-0.30
|-0.23
|-0.09
|
+|I|-0.17
|-0.15
|-0.11
|-0.10
|-0.13
|-0.18
|-0.21
|-0.23
|-0.25
|-0.03
|
+|J|0.22
|0.35
|0.25
|0.31
|0.22
|0.25
|0.31
|0.24
|0.22
|0.18
|
+|L|-0.01|-0.09|0.04|0.04|-0.02|-0.07|-0.08|-0.11|-0.21|-0.16|
+|M-N|-0.06|0.00|0.06|0.00|-0.03|-0.05|-0.05|0.05|-0.09|0.04|
+|P-Q1|0.00|0.00|0.01|0.00|0.00|-0.02|-0.02|-0.04|-0.05|-0.04|
+|R-S
|0.18|0.16|0.17|0.15|0.16|0.09|0.05|0.07|0.08|0.13|
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+**Table 16. Data for Figure 11: Assessment Gap by Sector, Average Result, percent of GDP**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A-B|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|
+|C1|0.00|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.00|0.01|0.01|0.00|0.00|
+|C2|0.01|0.03|0.03|0.02|0.03|0.01|0.01|0.02|0.03|0.03|
+|C3|0.04
|0.06
|0.06
|0.08
|0.07
|0.04
|0.05
|0.05
|0.05
|0.02
|
+|C4|0.06
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.08
|0.11
|0.08
|0.10
|0.10
|
+|C5|0.19
|0.18
|0.18
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.15
|
+|D-E|-0.11|-0.08|-0.12|-0.06|-0.06|-0.08|-0.05|-0.03|-0.04|-0.06|
+|F|-0.11|-0.04|-0.03|-0.04|-0.05|-0.02|-0.03|-0.05|-0.05|-0.06|
+|G|0.02|0.06|0.06|0.06|0.07|0.09|0.09|0.10|0.06|0.10|
+|H|0.06
|-0.02
|-0.01
|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.06
|-0.04
|-0.02
|
+|I|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.01
|
+|J|0.04|0.06|0.04|0.06|0.04|0.05|0.06|0.04|0.04|0.03|
+|L|0.00|-0.02|0.01|0.01|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|-0.04|-0.03|
+|M-N|-0.01|0.00|0.01|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|0.01|-0.02|0.01|
+|P-Q1|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|
+|R-S|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.02|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.03|
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+#### **Appendix II. The Model and Methodology used to** **Estimate the CIT Gap**
+
+**1.** **The IMF’s RA-GAP (Revenue Administration – Gap Analysis Program) methodology**
+**for CIT gap is based on the top-down approach.** This aims to estimate the potential CIT base
+and liability from existing macroeconomic data, with thorough considerations for theoretical
+differences between the macroeconomic data and the actual tax base of CIT, and then compare
+
+the estimated results with actual declarations and payments.
+
+
+**2.** **The top-down approach requires a basic condition: that the macroeconomic data**
+**are compiled independently of the assessed tax base and liability.** In Finland, national
+accounts data are compiled by Finland Statistics using various statistical surveys, annual accounts
+of economic units and administrative data. Tax declarations are not the initial source of
+
+determining production, value-added, and operating surplus in the national accounts. As a result,
+the basic condition for conducting the top-down approach is being met.
+
+
+**Theoretical Framework for Estimation**
+
+
+**3.** **The general approach used in the RA-GAP top -down CIT gap estimation involves**
+**using Gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations in national accounts as a starting**
+
+**point for estimating the potential CIT base in a country.** A detailed discussion about how
+GOS from the national accounts can be used to estimate potential CIT is provided in Ueda 2018 [4] .
+
+
+**4.** **The RA-GAP framework applies three different concepts of CIT base to allow**
+**careful consideration of treating the results of loss-making corporations and deductions**
+
+**for carried-over losses.**
+
+
+- _**Current-year net tax base**_ (C-NTB): An aggregated result for the current year reflecting both
+
+profit-making corporations and loss-making corporations.
+
+
+- _**Current-year tax base**_ (C-TB): An aggregated result for the current year of profit-making
+corporations only; this is before deducting carried-over losses. C-TB is generally bigger than
+C-NTB because losses made by loss-making corporations are netted out from aggregate
+
+profits in C-NTB, but not deducted in C-TB.
+
+- _**Tax base**_ (TB): An aggregate result for the current year of profit-making corporations only,
+
+after deducting carried-over losses from previous years. This is the base for calculating
+
+aggregate CIT liability in a year.
+
+**5.** **In theory, estimation of the potential CIT base starts from GOS and would then**
+
+**need to make appropriate adjustments to reflect conceptual differences from the potential**
+
+
+4 Ueda, Junji, 2918, “Estimating the Corporate Income Tax Gap: The RA-GAP Methodology”, IMF Technical Notes
+and Manuals
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+**CIT tax base and liabilities.** There are many conceptual differences between GOS and the actual
+
+tax base (TB) of CIT, that can be classified into three categories D1, D2 and D3 (Figure).
+
+
+- [D1] differences between GOS in national accounts and aggregate financial accounting profit
+
+(FAP) of CIT taxpayers
+
+
+- [D2] differences between aggregate FAP and aggregate current year net tax base (C-NTB)
+
+
+- [D3] differences between aggregate C-NTB and aggregate tax base (TB) due to losses and
+
+deductions for carry-over losses
+
+**6.** **By adjusting GOS by the estimates for D1, D2 and D3, the potential tax base could**
+
+**then be estimated.** The sequence of estimating steps for the potential CIT base and liability is
+shown in the left-side flow in Figure 1, including the concepts of potential FAP, potential C-NTB,
+potential C-TB, and potential TB. Then the potential CIT liability is calculated by applying the
+statutory CIT rate to the potential TB and reflecting tax credits and additional tax liabilities that
+are not proportional to the tax base.
+
+
+**7.** **The framework also limits the scope of the estimation to non-financial**
+**corporations.** The reason for excluding financial corporations is that estimating the potential CIT
+base by using national accounts data is more difficult for financial corporations since their
+income is not as closely associated to the concept of gross operating surplus. [5] As such, the basic
+premise of this framework is not applicable for these types of enterprises.
+
+
+**8.** **It should be noted that the top-down estimates for CIT gaps do not try to directly**
+**measure or include the magnitude of tax avoidance or BEPS (base erosion and profit**
+**shifting) of corporations.** The estimated gap does not show how much national income, that
+should have been sourced in a country, are transferred to other countries by legal means
+because such activities are usually reflected in national accounts data as well. [6] It should be noted
+
+that the top-down approach relies on what is actually measured in national accounts data.
+
+
+5 For financial corporations, the economic value-added, calculated as the financial intermediation services (FISIM)
+and the net insurance premiums, can be significantly different from their taxable incomes reflecting capital
+gains/losses and changes in financial reserves, and therefore a completely different approach would be needed
+to apply a top-down to provide appropriate estimates.
+
+6 See OECD, 2015 in detail.
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+**Figure 12. Theoretical Relationship between GOS and CIT Tax Base**
+
+
+Source: RA-GAP analytical framework for CIT gap.
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Practical Application of the Framework**
+
+
+**9.** **A complete set of Independent data on the values needed to adjust GOS to arrive**
+**at C-NTB are not available.** While some statistics do provide general indications of the values of
+
+some of these items, as described as D1 and D2 above, the definitions used for these statistics
+are not necessarily the same as the definitions of these items for tax purposes. The use of these
+statistics would therefore require many assumptions and adjustments to ensure that their use
+does not result in an overestimation or underestimation of the potential tax base. Furthermore,
+for some of the needed adjustments, no pertinent statistical data is available at all. In such cases,
+
+the only possible source of relevant data would have to come from tax declaration data. As such,
+attempting a direct application of the theoretical framework requires making use of a
+combination of tax record data and statistical data. This then requires that further assumptions
+and adjustments be made to ensure that these two sets of data are consistent with each other, to
+avoid overlap or under-coverage.
+
+
+**10.** **A simplified set of methods for obtaining the gap has been employed in order to**
+**reduce the number of assumptions that need to be made.** Two separate methods have been
+used to arrive at an estimate of the CIT compliance gap; an _absolute_ method, and a _relative_
+method. The rationale for using two different methods is that both methods have their strength
+and weaknesses, but these strengths and weaknesses lie in different areas. Comparing the results
+
+from the two methods should give a better overall indication of the compliance gap. Both
+methods rely solely on tax record data to calculate a value for the _Potential Tax Base_ (P-TB) _._
+
+
+**11.** **The first step under both methods requires obtaining the values for GOS from the**
+**national accounts and computing a value for** _**Assessed Gross Operating Surplus**_ **(A-GOS)** _**.**_
+GOS from the national accounts will need to be adjusted in order to arrive at _Potential Gross_
+
+_Operating Surplus_ (P-GOS). In particular, the GOS for non-financial corporations, by sector of
+economic activity needs to be requested from the national accounts office. Then, because the
+national accounts definition for non-financial corporations may include the activities of some
+entities which are not required to file corporate income tax returns, the GOS from these entities
+needs to be removed. To calculate A-GOS, data from taxpayer declarations is used to compute
+
+each taxpayer’s gross operating surplus; their total operating revenue minus their operating
+costs. Or, as described above, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization.
+
+
+**12.** **The absolute method estimates P-TB by using the difference between A-GOS and**
+**the** _**Assessed Tax Base**_ **(A-TB).** P-TB using the absolute method (P-TBabs) is determined by
+subtracting this difference from P-GOS. In other words, the absolute method uses data solely
+
+sourced from taxpayer’s declarations for the D1-D3 adjustments as described above. This
+measure for the compliance gap is, obviously, limited in scope. However, despite being limited in
+scope, this measure will likely over-estimate the compliance gap, and therefore would represent
+an upper limit for the compliance gap. Implicitly this method assumes that any undeclared
+operating surplus would have no associated capital or other costs associated with it. Taxpayers
+
+under-declaring operating surplus could be expected to be scaling back the size of their
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+operations as they appear on the declaration in general. Taxpayers not filing a declaration at all,
+would also likely have other deductions and inclusions to report in addition to their unreported
+operating surplus.
+
+
+**13.** **The relative method estimates P-TB by using the relative size of the** _**Assessed**_
+_**Current-year Tax Base**_ **(AC-TB) to A-GOS.** Specifically, the method calculates the geometric
+mean of this ratio, using declaration data, for all those taxpayers in a particular sector with both a
+positive AC-TB and a positive A-GOS. A ratio of the A-GOS for this subset of taxpayers in the
+sector to the total A-GOS for the sector is also determined. These two ratios are then applied to
+
+the P-GOS for the sector, to determine the Potential Current-year Tax Base (PC-TB) for the sector
+associated with positive P-GOS. This value must then be adjusted to account for the P-TB that
+would arise from negative P-GOS. Again, declaration data is used to determine the ratio of AC-TB
+for all taxpayers to the AC-TB of those taxpayers with positive A-GOS. Applying this ratio to the
+PC-TB for taxpayers with positive P-GOS yields the estimate for the overall PC-TB. Deductions for
+
+carried-over losses and adjustments for deferred profits obtained from the declarations are then
+applied to arrive at P-TBrel, P-TB using the relative method. This approach is based on a
+simplifying assumption that most taxpayers are compliant, particularly the larger taxpayers. [7] As
+such, the ratio of the AC-TB to A-GOS will be most heavily influenced by compliant taxpayers,
+and so applying the ratio to P-GOS we get an estimate for what the C-TB might be if all
+
+taxpayers reported in a fashion similar to the compliant taxpayers.
+
+
+**14.** **Once P-TB has been estimated, the potential CIT (P-CIT) is determined by applying**
+**the CIT rate** . As there are two values for P-TB, two values for P-CIT are determined; P-CITabs and
+P-CITrel. In addition, if there are any tax credits applicable then under the absolute method, the
+amount of credits claimed by taxpayers is subtracted from P-CITabs. Under the relative method,
+
+P-CITrel is adjusted by the ratio of the tax credits claimed to the assessed tax payable before
+credits.
+
+
+**15.** **The assessment gap is then determined by subtracting assessed CIT (A-CIT) from**
+**P-CIT.** The assessment gap is the component of the compliance gap that results from
+underassessed amounts of tax due.
+
+
+**16.** **To arrive at the compliance gap, the collection gap is added to the assessment gap.**
+The collection gap is the amount of uncollected tax owed for the period in question – in other
+words the CIT collection gap for 2017 is the amount of CIT owed against amounts assessed as
+having been due against 2017 tax declarations, but which has not yet been paid. It is not the
+total amount of CIT owing at the end of 2017, as that could include liabilities which are related to
+
+previous years obligations.
+
+
+7 This is not to say that there are no CIT revenue issues associated with large taxpayers; those issues are more
+generally related to BEPS, which this estimation methodology is not attempting to capture.
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+�� �
+
+
+��
+�!"#�$�%&
+&'#()�*+�, -.!
+/$0
+#12334445675(3818 916
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa0411c23b00cf96ee55984487ced81c0f2be812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2ca2802a9cb4d2da", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1320, "page": 2, "phash_256": "81836e3c6fc390ff367c2fc3586ca1034fb03c4e61999ef01f5e51e49c46e61c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "89025266420223f08283c1a46dde4d7aa5f49818289ee54ef62777f8e7e176c3", "width": 1020}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0003-001", "height": 204, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bb3a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f19e1ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "bfe6ec255fd56de82c887a6d02aeca53959c396c4cba7ca8f20c68ea6fe7369c", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0005-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0141819191910141", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0005-001", "height": 49, "page": 5, "phash_256": "f81807ff07ff7800f00c707cf83007ef8fff7800f018703e8fe30fc7f8387038", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "4e7bd62b14d990d41ecd7aad65f5fde0885de6c159226110582ba78a8297b068", "width": 765}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0010-001.png", "caption": "Figure 1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2011–2020", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "50e31fd8251c9737", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0010-001", "height": 203, "page": 10, "phash_256": "b8fc4ab7cd00970097c3b54034507c1a6a9ecb3ccb87d82bb2ebb479b6176c1e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "2faf9c616a78e7d88d6ac418c980a54b8340d677eda61b8418f4e3fe6200d6ca", "width": 372}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-001.png", "caption": "Figure 2. The Assessment Gap, 2011–2020", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "404099ad2329133b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-001", "height": 333, "page": 11, "phash_256": "ba3c81f89583ce0c2c7c72f11aaf8d5c84f26a17cd556e2f122e915269d1ced5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "c317694acf4e8dbb550bcededc7e3296531595fefd3d385007ca6780285747da", "width": 363}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4040d0c49917233b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-002", "height": 331, "page": 11, "phash_256": "bafd85f0bf006aa095a34e5e78b595a3c6de3814d3a08e5660f59bafc45830b3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "4fa09e6edeca16c381efdfa55614d2352971ecee1f673a71f32fa4e328678d07", "width": 371}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-003.png", "caption": "Figure 3 are not significant. That said, there is a general indication that the bulk of the gap is in", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8100e0909e0c8011", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-003", "height": 405, "page": 11, "phash_256": "b19d8427ce73719831cc86774e3331cc99ccce33743339cc83966e3330cfb98c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "1c6f211d870e7808d783975590f13082598541b208555247986478548199c910", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": "Figure 4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio, with Comparison to Regional Average", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4331abc41071e18", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-001", "height": 258, "page": 16, "phash_256": "b87f4f1ff0c0eea886ab956add087bd26a5c78553e152ca5e52dc580cdb0905a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "e4e19051164c31759cd5f931babd5335b3707a84214a16de4819d32cc5da6e12", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0c8d707f137d2e37", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-002", "height": 258, "page": 16, "phash_256": "bfbe8373e00572077ff01f588f8fc07bd1177cf893cb8c0c4b833c78908508ad", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "a24ba49461fec11df2a3a423c776599063efbe41305addf5c4bc2f9b886481a2", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": "Figure 5. CIT Productivity, with Comparison to Regional Average", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a28dc1c7bcc11796", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-001", "height": 257, "page": 17, "phash_256": "a0bf823ffde09f7eb5556fc0c9f490bc122ea7c54e5068b11a2e3788844a6cf8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "f96edc5094b9cc1f84c66552b2acf4233b7ab028438fd5d2791622086cb69de0", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0c8c606f0b356d65", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-002", "height": 258, "page": 17, "phash_256": "bfa6813fe071703e3fe097068087c8c1f11c1ee2911fccc559db3fe89407c8bd", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "b79b9b6a14b02a806af0212d3543ee5ce1cbca0e689e48d7a92e4fcd7e6420a3", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": "Figure 6. GOS, and the GOS Gap (non-financial corporations)", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c8383cc881013353", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0018-001", "height": 361, "page": 18, "phash_256": "c9f7942a39dee29dc333976a1b416c9c942ea15b6acd85b2172a6a4fe0109fe1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "086584a6579d39bae8bfce8833cc1ef33887ec468e4dcc9f9374cc583f182a0e", "width": 740}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": "Figure 7. The GOS Gap by Sector", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0a4d994144e9113", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0019-001", "height": 369, "page": 19, "phash_256": "b0dd81cecf33763338cc838cc7337ce3b8cde71a473618cd80c96732d90d38c9", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "80cbdcee16250d2949cc8037f90287badb690ac98273286fa64dde757af14075", "width": 765}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": "Figure 8. Assessed vs Potential CIT", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8188c30f3c810941", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0020-001", "height": 361, "page": 20, "phash_256": "aaafc01fc7f0955c3e036a82c9b4983cb64d76cac8bac936b55526d5c0984baf", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "205e6344d88f57ac2158ae85a75e131bfa842b7e159c4c0e8a25640c26d8c5f4", "width": 742}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": "Figure 9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "cc250da535caa737", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0021-001", "height": 671, "page": 21, "phash_256": "be4dc6746665852299ab858ad332386d1a727e75c6743edda44cc7a28d8d958a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "fbec58d9d29cfadbf7bfd16fce9a3197b07dd6fbb613f0b21feb66d9b6ea1df0", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": "Figure 10. The Assessment Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "404498a52139233b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-001", "height": 361, "page": 22, "phash_256": "ba3c81f89582ce806e1d72f831ab89dbc68e6e1685707aab12afbd5a64d0cad5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "8cd9d759444d86cee4fbe9b6b8c0feb9fe87e8fb9abfd92da6f2b5c47d28d844", "width": 372}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4040c0c01b25633b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-002", "height": 361, "page": 22, "phash_256": "faf985e49d006aa0913f87df7abc392097aa6e5471e09f0b84dc3835d3aa86d8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "e7a8bc22f1beaadfd8609068321ae609d67a8a0048f47df878501a21922e4ce0", "width": 364}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": "Figure 11. The Assessment Gap by Sector", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "e9961e2b92a19c13", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0023-001", "height": 422, "page": 23, "phash_256": "b1cf31cc88c6c633cf337731367931cc38cc89cec397c63367316c6938cc98cc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "f9b8f6d06ef8c9f75ca10e61470ca1faa60ef2fd541be38adbac8ff4a01ecbb5", "width": 753}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-109/assets/figures/cr-2023-109-fig-p0036-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "960e07379343e3c3", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-109-fig-p0036-001", "height": 602, "page": 36, "phash_256": "e9f6340987f6db460cfccc29c2124ff6bc2907f6f20325b476094bfe94099713", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "sha256_normalized_png": "91a27c00ac0516b752befa0a81dc4271fa27b87749997847458b4efb54fbe513", "width": 1085}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-109/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5d92d3b5aa278d30abea34c1890d99ec0741bd12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-109/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMarch 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/109**\n# **REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA**\n##### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––REVENUE** **ADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM —** **CORPORATE INCOME TAX GAP**\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Slovenia was prepared by a staff team of\nthe International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed in February 2023.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 1, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "March 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/109\nREPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––REVENUE ADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM — CORPORATE INCOME TAX GAP\n\nThis technical assistance report on Republic of Slovenia was prepared by a staff team of\nthe International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed in February 2023.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 622}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\nFIlS CAL A F F Al R § D EPA RTM EN T\n\nRepublic of Slovenia\n\nRevenue Administration\nGap Analysis Program\nCorporate Income Tax Gap", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 1.0, "needs_ocr": false, "ocr_applied": true, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "FIlS CAL A F F Al R § D EPA RTM EN T\n\nRepublic of Slovenia\n\nRevenue Administration\nGap Analysis Program\nCorporate Income Tax Gap", "text_characters": 102}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "###### F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n## **Republic of Slovenia** **Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program** **— Corporate Income Tax Gap**\n\nEric Hutton\n\n\n**Technical Assistance Report**\n\n\n**February 2023**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.25, 497.8599853515625, 366.0, 619.3599853515625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 209, "number": 5, "size": 66327, "transform": [120.75, 0.0, -0.0, 121.5, 245.25, 497.8599853515625], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nRepublic of Slovenia Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program — Corporate Income Tax Gap\n\nEric Hutton\n\nTechnical Assistance Report\n\nFebruary 2023", "text_characters": 149}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff\nof the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Slovenia (the\n\"TA recipient\") in response to their request for technical assistance. This\nreport (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the\n\nIMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other\nagencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with\nlegitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such\ndisclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical\n\nAssistance Information—\n[Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)\nof this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside\nthe IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World\nBank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\n\ninterest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s\nFiscal Affairs Department.\n\n\nDM 7329258\n\n\n**This technical assistance (TA) was provided with financial support**\n\n**from the European Union.**\n\n\n2", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff\nof the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Slovenia (the\n\"TA recipient\") in response to their request for technical assistance. This\nreport (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the\n\nIMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other\nagencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with\nlegitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such\ndisclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical\n\nAssistance Information—\nStaff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure\nof this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside\nthe IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World\nBank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\n\ninterest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s\nFiscal Affairs Department.\n\nDM 7329258\n\nThis technical assistance (TA) was provided with financial support\n\nfrom the European Union.\n\n2", "text_characters": 1037}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0005-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ___________________________________________________________________ 4**\n\n\n**GLOSSARY _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**PREFACE ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________________ 7**\n\n\n**I.** **BACKGROUND__________________________________________________________________________________12**\nA. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia _____________________________________________________________________ 12\nB. Revenue Performance of CIT _________________________________________________________________________ 13\n\n\n**II.** **THE ESTIMATES ________________________________________________________________________________16**\nA. The GOS Gap __________________________________________________________________________________________ 16\nB. Actual vs Potential CIT ________________________________________________________________________________ 17\nC. The Compliance Gap __________________________________________________________________________________ 20\n\n\n**III.** **OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS __________________________________________________________22**\nA. Observations ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 22\nB. Next Steps ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 22\n\n\n**FIGURES**\n1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2012–2016 ________________________________________________________________ 8\n\n2. The Assessment Gap, 2012–2017 _____________________________________________________________________ 9\n3. The Assessment Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 __________________________________________________________ 9\n4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia with Comparison to Regional Average _________________ 14\n5. CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional Average _____________________________ 15\n\n6. GOS, and the GOS Gap 20122017____________________________________________________________________ 16\n7. The GOS Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 _________________________________________________________________ 17\n8. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2012–2017 _______________________________________________________________ 18\n9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, 2012–2017 __________________________________________________ 19\n10. The Assessment Gap, 2012–2017 _________________________________________________________________ 20\n\n11. The Assessment Gap by Sector, 2012–2017______________________________________________________ 21\n12. Theoretical Relationship between GOS and CIT Tax Base _____________________________________ 34\n\n\n**APPENDICES**\n\nI. Data Tables for Included Figures ______________________________________________________________________ 23\nII. The Model and Methodology used to _______________________________________________________________ 32\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS _ 4\n\nGLOSSARY _ 5\n\nPREFACE _ 6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7\n\nI. BACKGROUND12\nA. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia _ 12\nB. Revenue Performance of CIT _ 13\n\nII. THE ESTIMATES 16\nA. The GOS Gap 16\nB. Actual vs Potential CIT 17\nC. The Compliance Gap 20\n\nIII. OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 22\nA. Observations _ 22\nB. Next Steps 22\n\nFIGURES\n1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2012–2016 8\n\n2. The Assessment Gap, 2012–2017 _ 9\n3. The Assessment Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 9\n4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia with Comparison to Regional Average _ 14\n5. CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional Average _ 15\n\n6. GOS, and the GOS Gap 20122017 16\n7. The GOS Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 _ 17\n8. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2012–2017 _ 18\n9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, 2012–2017 19\n10. The Assessment Gap, 2012–2017 _ 20\n\n11. The Assessment Gap by Sector, 2012–2017 21\n12. Theoretical Relationship between GOS and CIT Tax Base _ 34\n\nAPPENDICES\n\nI. Data Tables for Included Figures 23\nII. The Model and Methodology used to _ 32\n\n3", "text_characters": 849}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**\n\n\n\nBEPS\n\n\nCIT\n\n\nEU\n\n\nFAD\n\n\nGDP\n\n\nGOS\n\n\n\nBase Erosion and Profit Shifting\n\n\nCorporate Income Tax\n\n\nEuropean Union\n\n\nFiscal Affairs Department\n\n\nGross Domestic Product\n\n\nGross Operating Surplus\n\n\n\nIMF International Monetary Fund\n\n\nRA-GAP Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\nBEPS\n\nCIT\n\nEU\n\nFAD\n\nGDP\n\nGOS\n\nBase Erosion and Profit Shifting\n\nCorporate Income Tax\n\nEuropean Union\n\nFiscal Affairs Department\n\nGross Domestic Product\n\nGross Operating Surplus\n\nIMF International Monetary Fund\n\nRA-GAP Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program\n\n4", "text_characters": 239}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **GLOSSARY**\n\n_**Terminology and model specific acronyms used in the CIT gap analysis**_\n\n\nActual CIT The net amount of CIT payments made by taxpayers, net of any refunds\ndue to taxpayers, measured on an accrual basis\n\nAssessed CIT The amount of CIT self-assessed by taxpayers as being due, plus any\nadditional amounts deemed by the tax authority to be due from\ntaxpayers\n\nCIT assessment gap Difference between assessed CIT and potential CIT\n\nCIT base gap Difference between potential C-TB and declared C-TB, presenting how\nmuch taxpayers underreport their tax base, before considering deduction\nfor carried-over losses and tax credits/additions\n\nCIT collection gap Difference between actual CIT and assessed CIT\n\nCIT compliance gap Difference between potential CIT liabilities and actual CIT liabilities\n\nCIT-efficiency ratio Ratio of actually declared CIT liability to gross operating surplus\nmultiplied by the statutory rate. It indicates the overall efficiency of the\nCIT system.\n\nCIT productivity Ratio of actually declared CIT liability to GDP multiplied by the CIT\nstatutory rate.\n\nC-NTB Current-year net tax base, showing taxable income before considering\ndeductions for carried-over losses, netting out current year losses\ncalculated for tax purpose\n\nC-TB Current-year tax base, showing taxable income before considering\ndeductions for carried-over losses\n\nFAP Financial accounting profit/loss\n\nS11 Non-financial corporation sector\n\nS12 Financial corporation sector\n\nS13 General government sector\n\nS14 Households sector\n\nS15 Non-profit institutions serving households\n\nTB tax base, showing taxable income after deducting carried-over losses\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "GLOSSARY\n\n_Terminology and model specific acronyms used in the CIT gap analysis_\n\nActual CIT The net amount of CIT payments made by taxpayers, net of any refunds\ndue to taxpayers, measured on an accrual basis\n\nAssessed CIT The amount of CIT self-assessed by taxpayers as being due, plus any\nadditional amounts deemed by the tax authority to be due from\ntaxpayers\n\nCIT assessment gap Difference between assessed CIT and potential CIT\n\nCIT base gap Difference between potential C-TB and declared C-TB, presenting how\nmuch taxpayers underreport their tax base, before considering deduction\nfor carried-over losses and tax credits/additions\n\nCIT collection gap Difference between actual CIT and assessed CIT\n\nCIT compliance gap Difference between potential CIT liabilities and actual CIT liabilities\n\nCIT-efficiency ratio Ratio of actually declared CIT liability to gross operating surplus\nmultiplied by the statutory rate. It indicates the overall efficiency of the\nCIT system.\n\nCIT productivity Ratio of actually declared CIT liability to GDP multiplied by the CIT\nstatutory rate.\n\nC-NTB Current-year net tax base, showing taxable income before considering\ndeductions for carried-over losses, netting out current year losses\ncalculated for tax purpose\n\nC-TB Current-year tax base, showing taxable income before considering\ndeductions for carried-over losses\n\nFAP Financial accounting profit/loss\n\nS11 Non-financial corporation sector\n\nS12 Financial corporation sector\n\nS13 General government sector\n\nS14 Households sector\n\nS15 Non-profit institutions serving households\n\nTB tax base, showing taxable income after deducting carried-over losses\n\n5", "text_characters": 1392}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **PREFACE**\n\nIn response to a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance (MOF), a capacity development\n(CD) mission from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) began work with the authorities in\nJanuary 2022 and visited Ljubljana in October 2022. The mission’s main purpose was to assist in\nthe construction of a tax gap estimate for the Corporate Income Tax (CIT). The October 2022\nmission was led by Mr. Eric Hutton of FAD.\n\n\nDuring the course of this engagement, Mr. Hutton had productive meetings, virtual and in\nperson, with a number of officials of the Republic of Slovenia Financial Administration (SFA), in\nparticular Peter Grum, Danuška Bobek Gospodarič, Peter Jenko, Darija Šinkovec, Tomaž Perše,\nTomaž Lešnik, Marjan Macek, Dušan Šafarič, Jurij Meze, and Dominik Kuzma. The mission also\nhad useful discussions with officials from the Slovenia National Accounts office.\n\n\nMr. Hutton expresses his sincere appreciation for the excellent cooperation and kind hospitality\nthat he received from MOF officials throughout his visit. Mr. Hutton also thanks the Slovenian\nNational Accounts office for providing data necessary for implementing the analysis in this\nreport. Finally, Mr. Hutton thanks the support provided under the EC’s DG REFORM, and the\ncoordination and cooperation provided by Ms. Elka Ilyova.\n\n\nThe report consists of an Executive Summary and the following three sections: (I) Background; (II)\nThe Estimates; and (III) Observations and Next Steps.\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nIn response to a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance (MOF), a capacity development\n(CD) mission from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) began work with the authorities in\nJanuary 2022 and visited Ljubljana in October 2022. The mission’s main purpose was to assist in\nthe construction of a tax gap estimate for the Corporate Income Tax (CIT). The October 2022\nmission was led by Mr. Eric Hutton of FAD.\n\nDuring the course of this engagement, Mr. Hutton had productive meetings, virtual and in\nperson, with a number of officials of the Republic of Slovenia Financial Administration (SFA), in\nparticular Peter Grum, Danuška Bobek Gospodarič, Peter Jenko, Darija Šinkovec, Tomaž Perše,\nTomaž Lešnik, Marjan Macek, Dušan Šafarič, Jurij Meze, and Dominik Kuzma. The mission also\nhad useful discussions with officials from the Slovenia National Accounts office.\n\nMr. Hutton expresses his sincere appreciation for the excellent cooperation and kind hospitality\nthat he received from MOF officials throughout his visit. Mr. Hutton also thanks the Slovenian\nNational Accounts office for providing data necessary for implementing the analysis in this\nreport. Finally, Mr. Hutton thanks the support provided under the EC’s DG REFORM, and the\ncoordination and cooperation provided by Ms. Elka Ilyova.\n\nThe report consists of an Executive Summary and the following three sections: (I) Background; (II)\nThe Estimates; and (III) Observations and Next Steps.\n\n6", "text_characters": 1241}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**This report presents the estimates of tax gaps for corporate income tax (CIT) for non-**\n**financial corporations in Slovenia by applying the methodology of the IMF’s RA-GAP**\n**(Revenue Administration – Gap Analysis Program).** This work is being undertaken under the\ncontext of the larger project designed to strengthen the administration of corporate income tax\n(CIT) by the Slovenian Financial Administration (SFA). Providing support towards building the\n\ncapacity of the SFA to estimate and analyze the CIT gap will assist in achieving the overall goals\nof the project to: (i) strengthen core tax administration functions, and (ii) strengthen revenue\nadministration, management, and governance arrangements.\n\n\n**The RA-GAP methodology for CIT gap is based on a top-down approach, which estimates**\n**the potential tax base and liability from macroeconomic data.** The estimation considers first\n\nthe theoretical differences between the coverage of statistical macroeconomic data vis a vis the\nactual tax base of CIT, and then compares the estimated results for the potential CIT base and\nliability with actual declarations and revenues. It has the advantage of using available data,\nwithout the need of gathering additional information/data, to evaluate CIT noncompliance.\nQuality of macroeconomic data and tax records are crucial for the quality of the estimates.\n\n\n**To estimate the CIT gap, the RA-GAP CIT gap methodology was applied to available**\n**macroeconomic data for non-financial corporations from 2011 to 2020** . The potential CIT\nbase and liability were estimated from gross operating surplus (GOS) of non-financial\ncorporations, with necessary adjustments for conceptual differences between GOS and tax\nbase/liability of CIT. The potential CIT liabilities are then and compared with the actual CIT\n\n(accrued net CIT remitted) to determine the compliance gap. The potential CIT base is measured\nusing two different approaches, an _absolute method_, and a _relative method_ . The absolute method\nassumes that most non-compliance is related to under-declaration of income, so that all\ndeductible expenses have been declared accurately. The relative method assumes that most noncompliance is from non-reporting, and so that both incomes and expenses may not be declared\n\naccurately. These two methods should then serve as “book ends” for the true level of noncompliance, as actual non-compliance is likely a blend of these two types of non-compliant\nactivity (under-declaration and non-reporting), as such a final estimate for the compliance gap is\n\nproduced by averaging the estimates from these two methods.\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThis report presents the estimates of tax gaps for corporate income tax (CIT) for non-\nfinancial corporations in Slovenia by applying the methodology of the IMF’s RA-GAP\n(Revenue Administration – Gap Analysis Program). This work is being undertaken under the\ncontext of the larger project designed to strengthen the administration of corporate income tax\n(CIT) by the Slovenian Financial Administration (SFA). Providing support towards building the\n\ncapacity of the SFA to estimate and analyze the CIT gap will assist in achieving the overall goals\nof the project to: (i) strengthen core tax administration functions, and (ii) strengthen revenue\nadministration, management, and governance arrangements.\n\nThe RA-GAP methodology for CIT gap is based on a top-down approach, which estimates\nthe potential tax base and liability from macroeconomic data. The estimation considers first\n\nthe theoretical differences between the coverage of statistical macroeconomic data vis a vis the\nactual tax base of CIT, and then compares the estimated results for the potential CIT base and\nliability with actual declarations and revenues. It has the advantage of using available data,\nwithout the need of gathering additional information/data, to evaluate CIT noncompliance.\nQuality of macroeconomic data and tax records are crucial for the quality of the estimates.\n\nTo estimate the CIT gap, the RA-GAP CIT gap methodology was applied to available\nmacroeconomic data for non-financial corporations from 2011 to 2020 . The potential CIT\nbase and liability were estimated from gross operating surplus (GOS) of non-financial\ncorporations, with necessary adjustments for conceptual differences between GOS and tax\nbase/liability of CIT. The potential CIT liabilities are then and compared with the actual CIT\n\n(accrued net CIT remitted) to determine the compliance gap. The potential CIT base is measured\nusing two different approaches, an _absolute method_, and a _relative method_ . The absolute method\nassumes that most non-compliance is related to under-declaration of income, so that all\ndeductible expenses have been declared accurately. The relative method assumes that most noncompliance is from non-reporting, and so that both incomes and expenses may not be declared\n\naccurately. These two methods should then serve as “book ends” for the true level of noncompliance, as actual non-compliance is likely a blend of these two types of non-compliant\nactivity (under-declaration and non-reporting), as such a final estimate for the compliance gap is\n\nproduced by averaging the estimates from these two methods.\n\n7", "text_characters": 2220}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0010-001"], "markdown": "**Main findings**\n\n\n**Assessed CIT for non-financial**\n**corporations dropped from 2011 to**\n**2012 then rose until 2020; potential**\n**CIT roughly followed the same pattern**\n**(Figure 1).** Assessed CIT liabilities, the\n\namount of CIT self-assessed due by\ntaxpayers plus additional assessment by\nthe tax authorities for a given year, as\nmeasured as a percentage of GDP,\ndropped from just a little below one and\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Figure 1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2011–2020**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na half percent of GDP in 2011 to one\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and_\n\npercent in 2012, and has since risen to a\n\n_Slovenia National Accounts_\n\nlittle more than one and a half percent.\nThe two methods for estimating the potential CIT show similar trends for 2011 to 2016, with a\ndrop from 2011 to 2012, and then a steady increase, from 2016 to 2020 the absolute method\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and_\n_Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n\nthen indicates a lot more potential growth, but also with a lot more volatility. In comparing\nassessed CIT to potential CIT here, instead of actual CIT, because there were difficulties in\ncompiling an accurate measure of accrued net CIT. If there are not significant amounts of arrears,\nthen assessed CIT is a good proxy for actual CIT, however, this means that we can only estimate\nthe _assessment gap_ and not the full _compliance gap._ The compliance gap is composed of both an\n\nassessment gap and a collection gap, where the collection gap is the difference between\nassessed and actual CIT, while the assessment gap is the difference between assessed and\npotential CIT.\n\n\n**The estimates for the assessment gap for non-financial corporations indicate there may**\n**have been an increase in 2012, and then a decline back to the 2011 levels (Figure 2).** While\n\nboth methods do indicate that the gap has declined from 2012 to 2019, the results for 2020\nindicate a broad divergence. Given the unprecedented change in economic activity in 2020, this\nbroad divergence could reflect greater uncertainty, and a higher margin of error, in the national\naccounts estimates as much as they might represent a change in compliance behavior by\n\ntaxpayers. COVID-19 related government policies, which included allowing for deferral of CIT\npayments, could also be affecting these results. [1] Looking forward, it is likely that the estimates of\nthe trend in taxpayer compliance will be somewhat volatile until 2023 and caution will need to be\nexercised in interpreting any results.\n\n\n[1 The full list of COVID-19 related measures taken can be found in Annex I of the 2021 IMF Article IV Staff Report.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/05/25/Republic-of-Slovenia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-50189)\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Main findings\n\nAssessed CIT for non-financial\ncorporations dropped from 2011 to\n2012 then rose until 2020; potential\nCIT roughly followed the same pattern\n(Figure 1). Assessed CIT liabilities, the\n\namount of CIT self-assessed due by\ntaxpayers plus additional assessment by\nthe tax authorities for a given year, as\nmeasured as a percentage of GDP,\ndropped from just a little below one and\n\nFigure 1. Assessed vs Potential CIT, 2011–2020\n\na half percent of GDP in 2011 to one\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and_\n\npercent in 2012, and has since risen to a\n\n_Slovenia National Accounts_\n\nlittle more than one and a half percent.\nThe two methods for estimating the potential CIT show similar trends for 2011 to 2016, with a\ndrop from 2011 to 2012, and then a steady increase, from 2016 to 2020 the absolute method\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and_\n_Slovenia National Accounts_\n\nthen indicates a lot more potential growth, but also with a lot more volatility. In comparing\nassessed CIT to potential CIT here, instead of actual CIT, because there were difficulties in\ncompiling an accurate measure of accrued net CIT. If there are not significant amounts of arrears,\nthen assessed CIT is a good proxy for actual CIT, however, this means that we can only estimate\nthe _assessment gap_ and not the full _compliance gap._ The compliance gap is composed of both an\n\nassessment gap and a collection gap, where the collection gap is the difference between\nassessed and actual CIT, while the assessment gap is the difference between assessed and\npotential CIT.\n\nThe estimates for the assessment gap for non-financial corporations indicate there may\nhave been an increase in 2012, and then a decline back to the 2011 levels (Figure 2). While\n\nboth methods do indicate that the gap has declined from 2012 to 2019, the results for 2020\nindicate a broad divergence. Given the unprecedented change in economic activity in 2020, this\nbroad divergence could reflect greater uncertainty, and a higher margin of error, in the national\naccounts estimates as much as they might represent a change in compliance behavior by\n\ntaxpayers. COVID-19 related government policies, which included allowing for deferral of CIT\npayments, could also be affecting these results. [1] Looking forward, it is likely that the estimates of\nthe trend in taxpayer compliance will be somewhat volatile until 2023 and caution will need to be\nexercised in interpreting any results.\n\n1 The full list of COVID-19 related measures taken can be found in Annex I of the 2021 IMF Article IV Staff Report.\n\n8", "text_characters": 2152}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-001", "cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-002", "cr-2023-109-fig-p0011-003"], "markdown": "**Figure 2. The Assessment Gap, 2011–2020**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n**Under either method the bulk of the assessment gap appears to be in the manufacturing**\n**sector (Figure 3).** It should be noted that the margin of error for the results from this model are\nprobably around 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP, and so the gap for any of the sectors as shown in\nFigure 3 are not significant. That said, there is a general indication that the bulk of the gap is in\nthe manufacturing sector, and in particular in the automotive vehicle and vehicle parts sector.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Code** **Description** **Code** **Description**\n\n\n**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\n\n**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 2. The Assessment Gap, 2011–2020\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\nUnder either method the bulk of the assessment gap appears to be in the manufacturing\nsector (Figure 3). It should be noted that the margin of error for the results from this model are\nprobably around 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP, and so the gap for any of the sectors as shown in\nFigure 3 are not significant. That said, there is a general indication that the bulk of the gap is in\nthe manufacturing sector, and in particular in the automotive vehicle and vehicle parts sector.\n\nCode Description Code Description\n\nA-B 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\nC1 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\n9", "text_characters": 627}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\n\n**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\n\n**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\n\n**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\n\n**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\n\n**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n**Comments on the Findings**\n\n\n**Some significant assumptions were needed to enable the RA-GAP estimation of potential**\n**CIT base and liability; therefore, CIT gap estimates should be interpreted with caution.** The\ndefinition for “non-financial corporations” used in national accounts includes some\nunincorporated enterprises, so there is not a perfect match to the corporate income tax base.\nSome assumptions had to be made as to the impact of these differences, which may be affecting\n\nboth the level and trend in the resulting gap estimates. There is also an issue with the tax\ndeclaration data; the methodology requires being able to fully distinguish between operating\nrevenues and costs and other revenues and costs from the declaration data, but the current tax\ndeclaration has some lines which might be blending operating and capital costs.\n\n\n**Work Needed to Enhance CIT Gap Estimation**\n\n\n**The top-down estimation of the CIT gap provides an initial evaluation of the level and**\n**change in taxpayers’ compliance; however, further work in some areas is needed to**\n\n**improve the application of the methodology and reliability of results.**\n\n\n- **More detailed statistical data.** The gross operating surplus data used in the estimation\nneeds to be obtained at a more detailed sector of activity level will help a better sectoral\nestimate of potential and actual bases. In addition, more information on the proportion of\n\nGOS from non-corporate income tax filers will help improve the estimate of potential base.\n\n\n- **Better classification of businesses sector of activity.** Feedback on the classification by\nStatistics Sweden of businesses activity code and institutional sector codes is needed. The\nrelative method gap estimates in particular are being biased upwards due to differences in\n\nthe classification of activity codes used.\n\n- **Better accounting of accrued tax arrears should be made.** Some simple assumptions\n\nregarding allocations could be made for this purpose.\n\n\n**In addition to the above work, a bottom-up approach to estimate CIT gap is recommended**\n**to complement the top-down RA-GAP approach; work is underway by Fund staff to**\n**produce such an estimate, the results of which will be provided in a follow-up report.** A\nbottom-up approach, which estimates gaps by using results of random/operational audits, will\n\nprovide valuable information, and will complement the top-down estimates. It is recommended\nto use both the top-down and the bottom-up results, combined with internal knowledge and\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "C2 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\nC3 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\nC4 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\nC5 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\nD-E 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\nF 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\nComments on the Findings\n\nSome significant assumptions were needed to enable the RA-GAP estimation of potential\nCIT base and liability; therefore, CIT gap estimates should be interpreted with caution. The\ndefinition for “non-financial corporations” used in national accounts includes some\nunincorporated enterprises, so there is not a perfect match to the corporate income tax base.\nSome assumptions had to be made as to the impact of these differences, which may be affecting\n\nboth the level and trend in the resulting gap estimates. There is also an issue with the tax\ndeclaration data; the methodology requires being able to fully distinguish between operating\nrevenues and costs and other revenues and costs from the declaration data, but the current tax\ndeclaration has some lines which might be blending operating and capital costs.\n\nWork Needed to Enhance CIT Gap Estimation\n\nThe top-down estimation of the CIT gap provides an initial evaluation of the level and\nchange in taxpayers’ compliance; however, further work in some areas is needed to\n\nimprove the application of the methodology and reliability of results.\n\n- More detailed statistical data. The gross operating surplus data used in the estimation\nneeds to be obtained at a more detailed sector of activity level will help a better sectoral\nestimate of potential and actual bases. In addition, more information on the proportion of\n\nGOS from non-corporate income tax filers will help improve the estimate of potential base.\n\n- Better classification of businesses sector of activity. Feedback on the classification by\nStatistics Sweden of businesses activity code and institutional sector codes is needed. The\nrelative method gap estimates in particular are being biased upwards due to differences in\n\nthe classification of activity codes used.\n\n- Better accounting of accrued tax arrears should be made. Some simple assumptions\n\nregarding allocations could be made for this purpose.\n\nIn addition to the above work, a bottom-up approach to estimate CIT gap is recommended\nto complement the top-down RA-GAP approach; work is underway by Fund staff to\nproduce such an estimate, the results of which will be provided in a follow-up report. A\nbottom-up approach, which estimates gaps by using results of random/operational audits, will\n\nprovide valuable information, and will complement the top-down estimates. It is recommended\nto use both the top-down and the bottom-up results, combined with internal knowledge and\n\n10", "text_characters": 2522}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "information about taxpayers’ compliance, to strengthening compliance risk management in the\ntax administration. Work is underway by Fund staff to analyze operational data provided in order\nto produce a bottom-up estimate.\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "information about taxpayers’ compliance, to strengthening compliance risk management in the\ntax administration. Work is underway by Fund staff to analyze operational data provided in order\nto produce a bottom-up estimate.\n\n11", "text_characters": 193}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **I. BACKGROUND**\n\n**1.** **The IMF’s RA-GAP (Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program) provides a**\n**comprehensive quantitative analysis of the tax gap between potential revenues and actual**\n**collections.** The program is conducted by the Revenue Administration Divisions of the Fiscal\nAffairs Department and aims to provide an evaluation of tax gap for a specific tax. This report is\npart of a pilot program to extend this framework to cover Corporate Income Tax (CIT).\n\n\n**2.** **The main purpose of this report is to provide the estimates of the compliance gap**\n**for CIT by applying the methodology of the RA-GAP.** The RA-GAP methodology for CIT gap\nfollows a top-down approach by estimating the potential tax base and liability from\nmacroeconomic data. The estimation considers first the theoretical differences between the\ncoverage of statistical macroeconomic data vis a vis the actual tax base of CIT, and then\n\ncompares the estimated results for the potential CIT base and liability with actual declarations\nand revenues. It has the advantage of using available data, without the need of gathering\nadditional information/data, to evaluate the overall CIT noncompliance in a country. The basis for\nthe model and methodology used in assessing the CIT gap are detailed in Appendix II. [ 2]\n\n\n**3.** **There are several caveats for the top-down estimation of the CIT gaps.** In this report,\nthe potential CIT liability is not associated with the concept of ‘tax capacity’ showing the\nmaximum level of revenue achieved by changing tax policies, including raising statutory rate. The\nestimated gaps do not consider behavioral changes by taxpayers under different policies and\nadministrative measures, assuming a static model, and therefore indicate the efficiency of tax\nadministration and policy, rather than show potential additional revenues. It is also important to\nnote that the potential CIT base is estimated from national accounts data and does not consider\nthe CIT base in a country before the effects of cross-border base erosion and profit shifting\n(BEPS) activities of multinational enterprises unless national accounts data incorporate the\nadjustments for these effects.\n\n###### **A. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia**\n\n\n**4.** **The analysis covers the period 2011-2020 and there were some significant rate**\n**changes for the CIT over this period.** . The rate changed from 20 percent in 2011 to 19 percent\nin 2012, then dropped to 17 percent in 2013, before being increased back to 19 percent in 2017.\nThere have been no significant changes in the coverage of the tax base over the period. The\n\nmain feature of the CIT policy on corporate profit is outlined below:\n\n\n- **Rate:** Since 2017 a flat rate of 19 percent is applied to taxable income. Prior to that, from\n2013 to 2016, the rate was 17 percent. For 2012 the rate was 18 percent, and it was 20\n\npercent in 2011 (Figure 4).\n\n\n2 For a more complete discussion of the RA-GAP approach to estimating the tax gap for corporate income tax\n[see Ueda, 2018.](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/TNM/Issues/2018/09/12/Estimating-the-Corporate-Income-Tax-Gap-The-RA-GAP-Methodology-45890)\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. BACKGROUND\n\n1. The IMF’s RA-GAP (Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program) provides a\ncomprehensive quantitative analysis of the tax gap between potential revenues and actual\ncollections. The program is conducted by the Revenue Administration Divisions of the Fiscal\nAffairs Department and aims to provide an evaluation of tax gap for a specific tax. This report is\npart of a pilot program to extend this framework to cover Corporate Income Tax (CIT).\n\n2. The main purpose of this report is to provide the estimates of the compliance gap\nfor CIT by applying the methodology of the RA-GAP. The RA-GAP methodology for CIT gap\nfollows a top-down approach by estimating the potential tax base and liability from\nmacroeconomic data. The estimation considers first the theoretical differences between the\ncoverage of statistical macroeconomic data vis a vis the actual tax base of CIT, and then\n\ncompares the estimated results for the potential CIT base and liability with actual declarations\nand revenues. It has the advantage of using available data, without the need of gathering\nadditional information/data, to evaluate the overall CIT noncompliance in a country. The basis for\nthe model and methodology used in assessing the CIT gap are detailed in Appendix II. [ 2]\n\n3. There are several caveats for the top-down estimation of the CIT gaps. In this report,\nthe potential CIT liability is not associated with the concept of ‘tax capacity’ showing the\nmaximum level of revenue achieved by changing tax policies, including raising statutory rate. The\nestimated gaps do not consider behavioral changes by taxpayers under different policies and\nadministrative measures, assuming a static model, and therefore indicate the efficiency of tax\nadministration and policy, rather than show potential additional revenues. It is also important to\nnote that the potential CIT base is estimated from national accounts data and does not consider\nthe CIT base in a country before the effects of cross-border base erosion and profit shifting\n(BEPS) activities of multinational enterprises unless national accounts data incorporate the\nadjustments for these effects.\nA. Main Features of CIT in Slovenia\n\n4. The analysis covers the period 2011-2020 and there were some significant rate\nchanges for the CIT over this period. . The rate changed from 20 percent in 2011 to 19 percent\nin 2012, then dropped to 17 percent in 2013, before being increased back to 19 percent in 2017.\nThere have been no significant changes in the coverage of the tax base over the period. The\n\nmain feature of the CIT policy on corporate profit is outlined below:\n\n- Rate: Since 2017 a flat rate of 19 percent is applied to taxable income. Prior to that, from\n2013 to 2016, the rate was 17 percent. For 2012 the rate was 18 percent, and it was 20\n\npercent in 2011 (Figure 4).\n\n2 For a more complete discussion of the RA-GAP approach to estimating the tax gap for corporate income tax\nsee Ueda, 2018.\n\n12", "text_characters": 2470}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- **Coverage:** Legal entities carrying out business in Slovenia are liable to corporate income tax.\nLocal (resident) legal entities are taxed on their worldwide income, whereas foreign legal\n\nentities are taxed on Slovenia-source income only.\n\n\n- **Tax base:** Taxable income is determined by transforming financial accounting results\n(profit/loss) with adjustments for permanent and temporary differences for tax purposes.\n\nTaxable capital gains are added to the other business income.\n\n\n- **Exemptions:** No exemptions apply. All legal entities are liable to CIT.\n\n\n- **Losses:** Tax losses may be carried forward to be offset against future taxable profits. The\n\ncarryback of losses is not allowed. Restrictions apply for change in ownership.\n\n\n- **Threshold:** There is no quantitative threshold for registration.\n\n\n- **Tax period:** The tax period for determining the corporate income tax is depending on when\n\nthe company financial year ends. For most companies this aligns with the calendar year.\n\n- **Advance payments:** Taxable legal persons make monthly advance payments for corporate\n\ntax which are determined by a preliminary tax assessment. The preliminary prognosis of tax\nrevenue for the current year is based on the latest final tax assessment or on the preliminary\nreturn filed by the company.\n\n###### **B. Revenue Performance of CIT**\n\n\n**5.** **Reported CIT collection on net basis relative to GDP has been lower than the**\n**average for European countries for the past decade, but it has been getting closer (Figure**\n**4).** The level has been around 2 percent of GDP for most years, although it was a little lower for\nthe period 2012 to 2016. The increase in the CIT rate had an effect on revenue performance, with\nthe revenue level increasing since 2017.\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Coverage: Legal entities carrying out business in Slovenia are liable to corporate income tax.\nLocal (resident) legal entities are taxed on their worldwide income, whereas foreign legal\n\nentities are taxed on Slovenia-source income only.\n\n- Tax base: Taxable income is determined by transforming financial accounting results\n(profit/loss) with adjustments for permanent and temporary differences for tax purposes.\n\nTaxable capital gains are added to the other business income.\n\n- Exemptions: No exemptions apply. All legal entities are liable to CIT.\n\n- Losses: Tax losses may be carried forward to be offset against future taxable profits. The\n\ncarryback of losses is not allowed. Restrictions apply for change in ownership.\n\n- Threshold: There is no quantitative threshold for registration.\n\n- Tax period: The tax period for determining the corporate income tax is depending on when\n\nthe company financial year ends. For most companies this aligns with the calendar year.\n\n- Advance payments: Taxable legal persons make monthly advance payments for corporate\n\ntax which are determined by a preliminary tax assessment. The preliminary prognosis of tax\nrevenue for the current year is based on the latest final tax assessment or on the preliminary\nreturn filed by the company.\nB. Revenue Performance of CIT\n\n5. Reported CIT collection on net basis relative to GDP has been lower than the\naverage for European countries for the past decade, but it has been getting closer (Figure\n4). The level has been around 2 percent of GDP for most years, although it was a little lower for\nthe period 2012 to 2016. The increase in the CIT rate had an effect on revenue performance, with\nthe revenue level increasing since 2017.\n\n13", "text_characters": 1433}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-001", "cr-2023-109-fig-p0016-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio, with Comparison to Regional Average**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff Calculations based on data from WEO, Eurostat, OECD_\n\n\n**6.** **CIT productivity has also been lower than the European average for most of the**\n**past decade (Figure 5).** The CIT productivity shows how much one percent point CIT statutory\nrate can generate in CIT revenue relative to GDP, indicating a country’s overall efficiency of CIT\n\nfor revenue mobilization. In 2019, the average of the CIT productivity in Slovenia was 0.37\npercent, which was lower than the average of European countries of 0.61 percent. During the first\nfew years of the past decade productivity was much lower than the regional average. Since 2017\nproductivity has been rising, as has the average level for the region.\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 4. CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio, with Comparison to Regional Average\n\n_Source: Staff Calculations based on data from WEO, Eurostat, OECD_\n\n6. CIT productivity has also been lower than the European average for most of the\npast decade (Figure 5). The CIT productivity shows how much one percent point CIT statutory\nrate can generate in CIT revenue relative to GDP, indicating a country’s overall efficiency of CIT\n\nfor revenue mobilization. In 2019, the average of the CIT productivity in Slovenia was 0.37\npercent, which was lower than the average of European countries of 0.61 percent. During the first\nfew years of the past decade productivity was much lower than the regional average. Since 2017\nproductivity has been rising, as has the average level for the region.\n\n14", "text_characters": 644}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-001", "cr-2023-109-fig-p0017-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 5. CIT Productivity, with Comparison to Regional Average**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from Eurostat_\n\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 5. CIT Productivity, with Comparison to Regional Average\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from Eurostat_\n\n15", "text_characters": 106}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "### **II. THE ESTIMATES**\n\n###### **A. The GOS Gap**\n\n**7.** **The GOS gap is the difference between the potential GOS, derived from national**\n**accounts, and the assessed GOS, derived from the tax declarations.** The concept and\n\nmeasures of GOS are the foundation upon which the compliance gap estimates are built. The\nunderlying assumption is that there is a strong relationship between the CIT tax base and GOS. [3]\nGiven this relationship, the trends and levels in the GOS are an important indicator of what might\nbe influencing the trends and levels of the compliance gap.\n\n\n**8.** **The GOS gap, for non-financial corporations, appears to have declined slightly over**\n\n**the period, as a percent of GDP and as a percent of potential before a sharp uptick in 2020**\n**(Figure 6).** The decline has not been smooth. While there appeared to be a notable decrease\nfrom 2013 to 2016, the gap then appears to have returned to its 2013 levels before declining\nagain. The uptick in 2020 is the result of a divergence in the trend in the assessed GOS and the\npotential GOS, which, as noted above, may not be due to a true change in compliance activity\n\nduring the period, but is rather an artifact of the volatile changes in the nature of many economic\nactivities during this period.\n\n\n**Figure 6. GOS, and the GOS Gap (non-financial corporations)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n**9.** **The GOS gap appears to be largely concentrated in the manufacturing sector, but**\n**with significant contributions from the Trade sector as well (Figure 7).** The gap appears to\n\n\n3 It would of course be prudent to examine the strength of this relationship statistically, but, unfortunately, a\nsufficient time series of data on the structure of the tax base could not be compiled.\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "II. THE ESTIMATES\nA. The GOS Gap\n\n7. The GOS gap is the difference between the potential GOS, derived from national\naccounts, and the assessed GOS, derived from the tax declarations. The concept and\n\nmeasures of GOS are the foundation upon which the compliance gap estimates are built. The\nunderlying assumption is that there is a strong relationship between the CIT tax base and GOS. [3]\nGiven this relationship, the trends and levels in the GOS are an important indicator of what might\nbe influencing the trends and levels of the compliance gap.\n\n8. The GOS gap, for non-financial corporations, appears to have declined slightly over\n\nthe period, as a percent of GDP and as a percent of potential before a sharp uptick in 2020\n(Figure 6). The decline has not been smooth. While there appeared to be a notable decrease\nfrom 2013 to 2016, the gap then appears to have returned to its 2013 levels before declining\nagain. The uptick in 2020 is the result of a divergence in the trend in the assessed GOS and the\npotential GOS, which, as noted above, may not be due to a true change in compliance activity\n\nduring the period, but is rather an artifact of the volatile changes in the nature of many economic\nactivities during this period.\n\nFigure 6. GOS, and the GOS Gap (non-financial corporations)\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n9. The GOS gap appears to be largely concentrated in the manufacturing sector, but\nwith significant contributions from the Trade sector as well (Figure 7). The gap appears to\n\n3 It would of course be prudent to examine the strength of this relationship statistically, but, unfortunately, a\nsufficient time series of data on the structure of the tax base could not be compiled.\n\n16", "text_characters": 1450}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "be particularly concentrated in the manufacture sector for motor vehicles and motor vehicle\nparts. The negative gap in the utilities sector, sector code “D-E”, could be due to the\nmisclassification of taxpayers, and so a comparison of the classification of sector of activity used\n\nby the revenue authority and the codes used for national accounts should be conducted.\n\n\n**Figure 7. The GOS Gap by Sector**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Code** **Description** **Code** **Description**\n\n\n**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\n\n**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\n\n**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\n\n**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\n\n**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\n\n**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\n\n**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\n\n**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n###### **B. Actual vs Potential CIT**\n\n\n**10.** **As the compliance gap is the difference between actual and potential revenue,**\n**where actual revenue is measured on an accrual basis, comparing actual CIT to potential**\n\n**CIT can give an indication where changes in the compliance gap may be arising.** Knowing if\nchanges in the compliance gap are being driven by changes in tax being declared and paid by\ntaxpayers, or by changes in the economic activity being measured can provide insight into what\nfactors might be affecting the change in the gap.\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "be particularly concentrated in the manufacture sector for motor vehicles and motor vehicle\nparts. The negative gap in the utilities sector, sector code “D-E”, could be due to the\nmisclassification of taxpayers, and so a comparison of the classification of sector of activity used\n\nby the revenue authority and the codes used for national accounts should be conducted.\n\nFigure 7. The GOS Gap by Sector\n\nCode Description Code Description\n\nA-B 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\nC1 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\nC2 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\nC3 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\nC4 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\nC5 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\nD-E 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\nF 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\nB. Actual vs Potential CIT\n\n10. As the compliance gap is the difference between actual and potential revenue,\nwhere actual revenue is measured on an accrual basis, comparing actual CIT to potential\n\nCIT can give an indication where changes in the compliance gap may be arising. Knowing if\nchanges in the compliance gap are being driven by changes in tax being declared and paid by\ntaxpayers, or by changes in the economic activity being measured can provide insight into what\nfactors might be affecting the change in the gap.\n\n17", "text_characters": 1341}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0020-001"], "markdown": "**11.** **Values for accrued collections of CIT were not available, and so assessed CIT is**\n**being used instead for comparison against the potential CIT.** Collections could only be\ncompiled on a year of collection basis, not a true accruals basis. This is a common issue with CIT\n\nrevenues which largely arises due to the fact that filing is typically done based on the fiscal year\nends of corporations, and these can not only differ from the calendar year, but they will differ\nfrom corporation to corporation, so a common year of accrual doesn’t exist. A review of the\narrears data indicates that the accrual values do not differ significantly from the assessed revenue\nvalues in any case.\n\n\n**12.** **Assessed CIT for non-financial corporations exhibits an overall increasing trend for**\n**the period, while the overall trend for the potential is relative flatter for both approaches**\n**up to 2017, then the absolute method indicates bigger potential growth (Figure 8).** As\ndiscussed above, in general it would be expected that the absolute method should produce a\nhigher estimate than the relative method. In comparing the trends in the series, it is notable that\n\nboth the assessed CIT and relative method potential show a fairly flat trend from 2019 to 2020,\nbut the potential under the absolute method shows a spike in 2020. In general, the relative\nmethod presents a more volatile series. The assessed CIT shown here is significantly less than the\nvalues for CIT collections reviewed in section I.B. because we are only looking at assessed CIT for\n\nnon-financial corporations whereas the collections data is for all corporations.\n\n\n**Figure 8. Assessed vs Potential CIT**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n**13.** **Both the potential CIT under the relative method and the absolute method show**\n**that the C5 sector (vehicles etc.) should be producing more revenue than is being assessed**\n**(Figure 9).** The GOS gap in the C5 sector is evident in the results for the estimates for the\npotential CIT, where this sector shows that, due to their economic significance, there should be\nsignificant revenues. There is, however, very little assessed CIT from the sector. This figure\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "11. Values for accrued collections of CIT were not available, and so assessed CIT is\nbeing used instead for comparison against the potential CIT. Collections could only be\ncompiled on a year of collection basis, not a true accruals basis. This is a common issue with CIT\n\nrevenues which largely arises due to the fact that filing is typically done based on the fiscal year\nends of corporations, and these can not only differ from the calendar year, but they will differ\nfrom corporation to corporation, so a common year of accrual doesn’t exist. A review of the\narrears data indicates that the accrual values do not differ significantly from the assessed revenue\nvalues in any case.\n\n12. Assessed CIT for non-financial corporations exhibits an overall increasing trend for\nthe period, while the overall trend for the potential is relative flatter for both approaches\nup to 2017, then the absolute method indicates bigger potential growth (Figure 8). As\ndiscussed above, in general it would be expected that the absolute method should produce a\nhigher estimate than the relative method. In comparing the trends in the series, it is notable that\n\nboth the assessed CIT and relative method potential show a fairly flat trend from 2019 to 2020,\nbut the potential under the absolute method shows a spike in 2020. In general, the relative\nmethod presents a more volatile series. The assessed CIT shown here is significantly less than the\nvalues for CIT collections reviewed in section I.B. because we are only looking at assessed CIT for\n\nnon-financial corporations whereas the collections data is for all corporations.\n\nFigure 8. Assessed vs Potential CIT\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n13. Both the potential CIT under the relative method and the absolute method show\nthat the C5 sector (vehicles etc.) should be producing more revenue than is being assessed\n(Figure 9). The GOS gap in the C5 sector is evident in the results for the estimates for the\npotential CIT, where this sector shows that, due to their economic significance, there should be\nsignificant revenues. There is, however, very little assessed CIT from the sector. This figure\n\n18", "text_characters": 1828}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0021-001"], "markdown": "presents the results as a percent of gross operating surplus as opposed to percent of GDP given\nthat the share as a percent of GDP by sector is very small.\n\n\n**Figure 9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Code** **Description** **Code** **Description**\n\n\n**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\n\n**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\n\n**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\n\n**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\n\n**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\n\n**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\n\n**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\n\n**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "presents the results as a percent of gross operating surplus as opposed to percent of GDP given\nthat the share as a percent of GDP by sector is very small.\n\nFigure 9. Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector\n\nCode Description Code Description\n\nA-B 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\nC1 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\nC2 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\nC3 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\nC4 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\nC5 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\nD-E 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\nF 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n19", "text_characters": 736}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-001", "cr-2023-109-fig-p0022-002"], "markdown": "###### **C. The Compliance Gap**\n\n**14.** **Without data for accrued revenue or accrued arrears, the full compliance gap**\n**cannot be estimated, only the assessment gap.** The compliance gap is composed of both an\nassessment gap and a collection gap, where the collection gap is the difference between\nassessed and actual CIT, while the assessment gap is the difference between assessed and\npotential CIT. As noted above, difficulty in properly determining accrued revenue is not unusual\n\nin the case of the CIT. It should be noted, however, that work is being undertaken by the\nauthorities to construct such a series.\n\n\n**15.** **The assessment gap appears to have been falling (Figure 10).** While both methods\nshow a jump in the gap in 2012, and a roughly declining trend over the period 2012 to 2019,\nthere is a stark difference for 2020, where there is a spike in the value under the absolute\n\nmethod, and a dip for the relative method. It is notable that if we look back at the regional\naverage performance for CIT, as discussed in section I.B., there is a dip for 2020. As mentioned\nbefore, the unprecedented shift in economic activity that occurred in 2020, in addition to COVID19 related policies such as allowing for a deferment for CIT payments, are likely distorting the\nresults for this period, driving these divergent interpretations for potential CIT. Overall, as a\n\npercent of potential, the gap looks to have recovered from the spike it saw in 2012.\n\n\n**Figure 10. The Assessment Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n**16.** **Both methods indicate that the bulk of the assessment gap is in the same sectors**\n**where the GOS gap is appearing; manufacturing, in particular motor vehicle manufacturing**\n**and motor vehicle parts, and trade services (Figure 11).** The breakdown of the average results\n\nfor non-financial corporations are presented here as a percent of GOS and as a percent of GDP;\nthe former method gives a sense of the relative size across sectors, while the latter gives a sense\n\n\n20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "C. The Compliance Gap\n\n14. Without data for accrued revenue or accrued arrears, the full compliance gap\ncannot be estimated, only the assessment gap. The compliance gap is composed of both an\nassessment gap and a collection gap, where the collection gap is the difference between\nassessed and actual CIT, while the assessment gap is the difference between assessed and\npotential CIT. As noted above, difficulty in properly determining accrued revenue is not unusual\n\nin the case of the CIT. It should be noted, however, that work is being undertaken by the\nauthorities to construct such a series.\n\n15. The assessment gap appears to have been falling (Figure 10). While both methods\nshow a jump in the gap in 2012, and a roughly declining trend over the period 2012 to 2019,\nthere is a stark difference for 2020, where there is a spike in the value under the absolute\n\nmethod, and a dip for the relative method. It is notable that if we look back at the regional\naverage performance for CIT, as discussed in section I.B., there is a dip for 2020. As mentioned\nbefore, the unprecedented shift in economic activity that occurred in 2020, in addition to COVID19 related policies such as allowing for a deferment for CIT payments, are likely distorting the\nresults for this period, driving these divergent interpretations for potential CIT. Overall, as a\n\npercent of potential, the gap looks to have recovered from the spike it saw in 2012.\n\nFigure 10. The Assessment Gap\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n16. Both methods indicate that the bulk of the assessment gap is in the same sectors\nwhere the GOS gap is appearing; manufacturing, in particular motor vehicle manufacturing\nand motor vehicle parts, and trade services (Figure 11). The breakdown of the average results\n\nfor non-financial corporations are presented here as a percent of GOS and as a percent of GDP;\nthe former method gives a sense of the relative size across sectors, while the latter gives a sense\n\n20", "text_characters": 1669}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "of the absolute size. As a percent of GOS, the assessment gap follows the same general trend as\nthe GOS gap, with the dominance on sectors C5 (motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts\nmanufacturing) and G (wholesale and retail trade). There is also the result of a negative gap in\n\nthe D-E sector (electricity, water, and other public utilities), which is likely arising to taxpayers\nmistakenly being classified as being part of this sector when they should be in another sector. As\na percent of GDP, however, we can see that no sector, at this level of aggregation, reaches the\nthreshold of significance by having a gap of at least 0.5 percent of GDP; although if the\nmanufacturing sector was aggregated into a single sector for this presentation, it would meet\n\nthat mark.\n\n\n**Figure 11. The Assessment Gap by Sector**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCode Description Code Description\n\n**A-B** 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\n\n**C1** 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\n\n**C2** 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\n\n**C3** 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\n\n**C4** 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\n\n**C5** 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\n\n**D-E** 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\n\n**F** 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "of the absolute size. As a percent of GOS, the assessment gap follows the same general trend as\nthe GOS gap, with the dominance on sectors C5 (motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts\nmanufacturing) and G (wholesale and retail trade). There is also the result of a negative gap in\n\nthe D-E sector (electricity, water, and other public utilities), which is likely arising to taxpayers\nmistakenly being classified as being part of this sector when they should be in another sector. As\na percent of GDP, however, we can see that no sector, at this level of aggregation, reaches the\nthreshold of significance by having a gap of at least 0.5 percent of GDP; although if the\nmanufacturing sector was aggregated into a single sector for this presentation, it would meet\n\nthat mark.\n\nFigure 11. The Assessment Gap by Sector\n\nCode Description Code Description\n\nA-B 01-09. Agriculture, Forestry, Mining G 45-47. Trade\n\nC1 10-15. Food-Textiles Manufacturing H 49-53. Transportation\n\nC2 16-18,23-25. Basic Materials Manufacturing I 55-56. Hospitality\n\nC3 19-22. Chemical, Rubber, Petroleum Manufacturing J 58-63. Information, Communication\n\nC4 26-29. Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing L 68. Real Estate\n\nC5 30-33. Vehicles, Vehicle Parts, Other Manufacturing M-N 69-82. Professional and Support Services\n\nD-E 35-39. Utilities P-Q1 85-87. Health and Education\n\nF 41-43. Construction R-S 90-96. Other Services\n\n_Source: Staff calculations based on data from MOF and Slovenia National Accounts_\n\n21", "text_characters": 1241}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "### **III. OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS**\n\n###### **A. Observations**\n\n**17.** **Some assumptions were needed to be made to enable the RA-GAP estimation of**\n**potential CIT base and liability; therefore, CIT gap estimates should be interpreted with**\n\n**caution.** The definition for “non-financial corporations” used in national accounts includes some\nunincorporated enterprises, so there is not a perfect match to the corporate income tax base.\nSome assumptions had to be made as to the impact of these differences, which may be affecting\nboth the level and trend in the resulting gap estimates.\n\n\n**18.** **It is recommended that the top-down estimates be cross-checked against a**\n\n**bottom-up based estimate of the tax gap.** Work is underway to produce this bottom-up based\nestimate, the results of which will be provided in a follow-up report.\n\n###### **B. Next Steps**\n\n**19.** **The following actions are necessary to improve the current estimates:**\n\n\n - Obtain more information on the value in the national accounts GOS for non-financial\n\ncorporations which is coming from entities not required to file or pay CIT.\n\n\n - Obtain a more detailed and current breakdown of GOS for non-financial corporations by\n\nsector of economic activity.\n\n\n - Reconcile the sector codes for the main sector of activity being used for tax purposes with\n\nthe codes being assigned for national accounts purposes.\n\n\n - Attempt to construct a measure of either accrued CIT or accrued CIT arrears.\n\n\n**20.** **Going forward, the SFA should be working towards making annual updates to the**\n**CIT gap estimates.** Tracking movements in the level of compliance for the CIT (and other taxes)\nwill assist the authorities in gauging how successful they are being at managing compliance risks,\n\nand provide possible insights into where more resources need to be allocated to manage those\n\ncompliance risks.\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. OBSERVATIONS AND NEXT STEPS\nA. Observations\n\n17. Some assumptions were needed to be made to enable the RA-GAP estimation of\npotential CIT base and liability; therefore, CIT gap estimates should be interpreted with\n\ncaution. The definition for “non-financial corporations” used in national accounts includes some\nunincorporated enterprises, so there is not a perfect match to the corporate income tax base.\nSome assumptions had to be made as to the impact of these differences, which may be affecting\nboth the level and trend in the resulting gap estimates.\n\n18. It is recommended that the top-down estimates be cross-checked against a\n\nbottom-up based estimate of the tax gap. Work is underway to produce this bottom-up based\nestimate, the results of which will be provided in a follow-up report.\nB. Next Steps\n\n19. The following actions are necessary to improve the current estimates:\n\n - Obtain more information on the value in the national accounts GOS for non-financial\n\ncorporations which is coming from entities not required to file or pay CIT.\n\n - Obtain a more detailed and current breakdown of GOS for non-financial corporations by\n\nsector of economic activity.\n\n - Reconcile the sector codes for the main sector of activity being used for tax purposes with\n\nthe codes being assigned for national accounts purposes.\n\n - Attempt to construct a measure of either accrued CIT or accrued CIT arrears.\n\n20. Going forward, the SFA should be working towards making annual updates to the\nCIT gap estimates. Tracking movements in the level of compliance for the CIT (and other taxes)\nwill assist the authorities in gauging how successful they are being at managing compliance risks,\n\nand provide possible insights into where more resources need to be allocated to manage those\n\ncompliance risks.\n\n22", "text_characters": 1497}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures**\n\n**Table 1. Data for Figure 1, 8: Assessed vs Potential CIT,**\n\n|Year|Assessed CIT Due|Potential CIT (relative method)|Potential CIT (absolute method)|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|2011|1.36|1.32|1.78|\n|2012|0.99|1.22|1.40|\n|2013|1.02|1.26|1.45|\n|2014
|1.10
|1.35
|1.52
|\n|2015
|1.18
|1.37
|1.57
|\n|2016|1.30|1.42|1.62|\n|2017|1.52|1.68|1.94|\n|2018|1.60|1.65|2.06|\n|2019|1.58|1.61|1.93|\n|2020|1.63|1.56|2.26|\n\n\n\n**Table 2. Data for Figure 2, 10: The Assessment Gap,**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|Relative
Method|Average
Result|Absolute
Method|Relative
Method|Average
Result|Absolute
Method|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|\n|2011|-2.84|12.21|23.41|-0.04|0.19|0.42|\n|2012
|18.72
|24.19
|28.97
|0.23
|0.32
|0.41
|\n|2013
|18.86
|24.59
|29.57
|0.24
|0.33
|0.43
|\n|2014|18.80|23.56|27.79|0.25|0.34|0.42|\n|2015|13.66|19.59|24.76|0.19|0.29|0.39|\n|2016|8.49|14.62|19.98|0.12|0.22|0.32|\n|2017|9.88|16.21|21.71|0.17|0.29|0.42|\n|2018
|3.12
|13.72
|22.23
|0.05
|0.25
|0.46
|\n|2019
|2.01
|10.91
|18.32
|0.03
|0.19
|0.35
|\n|2020|-4.77|14.62|27.96|-0.07|0.28|0.63|\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.09300231933594, 132.4399871826172, 540.33203125, 306.3800048828125], "columns": 4, "rows": 11}, {"bbox": [90.09300231933594, 343.9000244140625, 540.33203125, 549.7999877929688], "columns": 7, "rows": 12}], "text": "Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures\n\nTable 1. Data for Figure 1, 8: Assessed vs Potential CIT,\n\n Year Assessed CIT Due Potential CIT (relative method) Potential CIT (absolute method) \n\n 2011 1.36 1.32 1.78 \n 2012 0.99 1.22 1.40 \n 2013 1.02 1.26 1.45 \n 2014 1.10 1.35 1.52 \n 2015 1.18 1.37 1.57 \n 2016 1.30 1.42 1.62 \n 2017 1.52 1.68 1.94 \n 2018 1.60 1.65 2.06 \n 2019 1.58 1.61 1.93 \n 2020 1.63 1.56 2.26 \n\nTable 2. Data for Figure 2, 10: The Assessment Gap,\n\n Year Relative Method Average Result Absolute Method Relative Method Average Result Absolute Method \n\n (percent of potential) (percent of potential) (percent of potential) (percent of GDP) (percent of GDP) (percent of GDP) \n 2011 -2.84 12.21 23.41 -0.04 0.19 0.42 \n 2012 18.72 24.19 28.97 0.23 0.32 0.41 \n 2013 18.86 24.59 29.57 0.24 0.33 0.43 \n 2014 18.80 23.56 27.79 0.25 0.34 0.42 \n 2015 13.66 19.59 24.76 0.19 0.29 0.39 \n 2016 8.49 14.62 19.98 0.12 0.22 0.32 \n 2017 9.88 16.21 21.71 0.17 0.29 0.42 \n 2018 3.12 13.72 22.23 0.05 0.25 0.46 \n 2019 2.01 10.91 18.32 0.03 0.19 0.35 \n 2020 -4.77 14.62 27.96 -0.07 0.28 0.63 \n\n23", "text_characters": 859}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 3. Data for Figure 3, 11: The Assessment Gap Absolute Method by Sector,**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Reporting
Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|\n|C1|0.00
|0.01
|0.01
|0.01
|0.01
|0.00
|0.01
|0.01
|0.00
|0.00
|\n|C2|0.01
|0.03
|0.03
|0.02
|0.03
|0.01
|0.01
|0.02
|0.03
|0.03
|\n|C3|0.04
|0.06
|0.06
|0.08
|0.07
|0.04
|0.05
|0.05
|0.05
|0.02
|\n|C4|0.06
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.08
|0.11
|0.08
|0.10
|0.10
|\n|C5|0.19
|0.18
|0.18
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.15
|\n|D-E|-0.11
|-0.08
|-0.12
|-0.06
|-0.06
|-0.08
|-0.05
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.06
|\n|F|-0.11
|-0.04
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.02
|-0.03
|-0.05
|-0.05
|-0.06
|\n|G|0.02
|0.06
|0.06
|0.06
|0.07
|0.09
|0.09
|0.10
|0.06
|0.10
|\n|H|0.06
|-0.02
|-0.01
|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.06
|-0.04
|-0.02
|\n|I|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.01
|\n|J|0.04
|0.06
|0.04
|0.06
|0.04
|0.05
|0.06
|0.04
|0.04
|0.03
|\n|L|0.00
|-0.02
|0.01
|0.01
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.02
|-0.04
|-0.03
|\n|M-N|-0.01
|0.00
|0.01
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|0.01
|-0.02
|0.01
|\n|P-Q1
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|0.00
|-0.01
|-0.01
|-0.01
|\n|R-S|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.02|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.03|\n\n\n**Table 4. Data for Figure 4: CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia, with Comparison to**\n\n**Regional Average**\n\n|Year|CIT to GDP|CIT to GDP European Countries
Average|CIT Rate|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|2011|1.65|2.53|20|\n|2012|1.23|2.61|18|\n|2013|1.19|2.65|17|\n|2014|1.40|2.63|17|\n|2015|1.46|2.63|17|\n|2016|1.59|2.72|17|\n|2017|1.78|2.84|19|\n|2018|1.93|2.91|19|\n|2019|1.96|2.89|19|\n|2020|1.99|2.44|19|\n|2021|2.47|2.96|19|\n\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.10277557373047, 94.0666732788086, 540.322265625, 376.8133239746094], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}, {"bbox": [95.69422912597656, 427.9499816894531, 533.1307983398438, 611.510009765625], "columns": 4, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 3. Data for Figure 3, 11: The Assessment Gap Absolute Method by Sector,\n\n Reporting Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 \n C1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 \n C2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 \n C3 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 \n C4 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.10 \n C5 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 \n D-E -0.11 -0.08 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 \n F -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 \n G 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 \n H 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 \n I -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 \n J 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 \n L 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 \n M-N -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 \n P-Q1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 \n R-S 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 \n\nTable 4. Data for Figure 4: CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia, with Comparison to\n\nRegional Average\n\n Year CIT to GDP CIT to GDP European Countries Average CIT Rate \n\n 2011 1.65 2.53 20 \n 2012 1.23 2.61 18 \n 2013 1.19 2.65 17 \n 2014 1.40 2.63 17 \n 2015 1.46 2.63 17 \n 2016 1.59 2.72 17 \n 2017 1.78 2.84 19 \n 2018 1.93 2.91 19 \n 2019 1.96 2.89 19 \n 2020 1.99 2.44 19 \n 2021 2.47 2.96 19 \n\n24", "text_characters": 1144}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 5. Data for Figure 4: CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia, with Comparison to**\n\n**Regional Average, 2019**\n\n|Year|CIT to GDP|CIT to GDP Region Average|\n|---|---|---|\n|Norway|6.02|2.89|\n|Cyprus|5.67|2.89|\n|Malta|5.50|2.89|\n|Belgium|3.71|2.89|\n|Luxembourg|6.06|2.89|\n|Netherlands|3.69|2.89|\n|Ireland|3.08|2.89|\n|Slovak Republic|3.06|2.89|\n|Portugal|3.12|2.89|\n|Sweden|3.14|2.89|\n|Denmark|3.15|2.89|\n|Austria|2.76|2.89|\n|United Kingdom|2.27|2.89|\n|France|2.82|2.89|\n|Spain|2.07|2.89|\n|Czech Republic|3.32|2.89|\n|Croatia|2.30|2.89|\n|Bulgaria|2.30|2.89|\n|Greece|2.22|2.89|\n|Romania|2.10|2.89|\n|Slovenia|1.96|2.89|\n|Italy|1.95|2.89|\n|Finland|2.53|2.89|\n|Poland|2.21|2.89|\n|Lithuania|1.55|2.89|\n|Hungary|1.14|2.89|\n|Germany|2.65|2.89|\n|Estonia|1.83|2.89|\n\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [137.36666870117188, 109.20001983642578, 493.0633239746094, 559.4706420898438], "columns": 3, "rows": 29}], "text": "Table 5. Data for Figure 4: CIT Revenue to GDP Ratio in Slovenia, with Comparison to\n\nRegional Average, 2019\n\n Year CIT to GDP CIT to GDP Region Average \n\n Norway 6.02 2.89 \n Cyprus 5.67 2.89 \n Malta 5.50 2.89 \n Belgium 3.71 2.89 \n Luxembourg 6.06 2.89 \n Netherlands 3.69 2.89 \n Ireland 3.08 2.89 \n Slovak Republic 3.06 2.89 \n Portugal 3.12 2.89 \n Sweden 3.14 2.89 \n Denmark 3.15 2.89 \n Austria 2.76 2.89 \n United Kingdom 2.27 2.89 \n France 2.82 2.89 \n Spain 2.07 2.89 \n Czech Republic 3.32 2.89 \n Croatia 2.30 2.89 \n Bulgaria 2.30 2.89 \n Greece 2.22 2.89 \n Romania 2.10 2.89 \n Slovenia 1.96 2.89 \n Italy 1.95 2.89 \n Finland 2.53 2.89 \n Poland 2.21 2.89 \n Lithuania 1.55 2.89 \n Hungary 1.14 2.89 \n Germany 2.65 2.89 \n Estonia 1.83 2.89 \n\n25", "text_characters": 563}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 6. Data for Figure 5: CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional**\n\n**Average**\n\n|Year|CIT Productivity|Regional Average CIT Productivity|\n|---|---|---|\n|2011|0.33|0.57|\n|2012|0.22|0.59|\n|2013|0.20|0.61|\n|2014|0.24|0.59|\n|2015|0.25|0.57|\n|2016|0.27|0.60|\n|2017|0.34|0.61|\n|2018|0.37|0.62|\n|2019|0.37|0.61|\n|2020|0.38|0.50|\n|2021|0.47|0.61|\n\n\n\n**Table 8. Data for Figure 5: CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional**\n\n**Average, 2019**\n\n|Year|CIT Productivity|CIT Productivity Region Avg|\n|---|---|---|\n|Norway|1.32|0.61|\n|Cyprus|0.71|0.61|\n|Malta|1.93|0.61|\n|Belgium|1.08|0.61|\n|Luxembourg|1.51|0.61|\n|Netherlands|0.92|0.61|\n|Ireland|0.39|0.61|\n|Slovak Republic|0.64|0.61|\n|Portugal|0.65|0.61|\n|Sweden|0.67|0.61|\n|Denmark|0.69|0.61|\n|Austria|0.69|0.61|\n|United Kingdom|0.43|0.61|\n|France|0.87|0.61|\n|Spain|0.52|0.61|\n|Czech Republic|0.63|0.61|\n|Croatia|0.41|0.61|\n|Bulgaria|0.23|0.61|\n|Greece|0.62|0.61|\n|Romania|0.34|0.61|\n|Slovenia|0.37|0.61|\n|Italy|0.47|0.61|\n|Finland|0.51|0.61|\n\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [122.11923217773438, 121.21997833251953, 507.4807434082031, 290.3999938964844], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [137.36399841308594, 341.45001220703125, 493.0660095214844, 714.0250244140625], "columns": 3, "rows": 24}], "text": "Table 6. Data for Figure 5: CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional\n\nAverage\n\n Year CIT Productivity Regional Average CIT Productivity \n\n 2011 0.33 0.57 \n 2012 0.22 0.59 \n 2013 0.20 0.61 \n 2014 0.24 0.59 \n 2015 0.25 0.57 \n 2016 0.27 0.60 \n 2017 0.34 0.61 \n 2018 0.37 0.62 \n 2019 0.37 0.61 \n 2020 0.38 0.50 \n 2021 0.47 0.61 \n\nTable 8. Data for Figure 5: CIT Productivity in Slovenia, with Comparison to Regional\n\nAverage, 2019\n\n Year CIT Productivity CIT Productivity Region Avg \n\n Norway 1.32 0.61 \n Cyprus 0.71 0.61 \n Malta 1.93 0.61 \n Belgium 1.08 0.61 \n Luxembourg 1.51 0.61 \n Netherlands 0.92 0.61 \n Ireland 0.39 0.61 \n Slovak Republic 0.64 0.61 \n Portugal 0.65 0.61 \n Sweden 0.67 0.61 \n Denmark 0.69 0.61 \n Austria 0.69 0.61 \n United Kingdom 0.43 0.61 \n France 0.87 0.61 \n Spain 0.52 0.61 \n Czech Republic 0.63 0.61 \n Croatia 0.41 0.61 \n Bulgaria 0.23 0.61 \n Greece 0.62 0.61 \n Romania 0.34 0.61 \n Slovenia 0.37 0.61 \n Italy 0.47 0.61 \n Finland 0.51 0.61 \n\n26", "text_characters": 752}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Poland|0.42|0.61|\n|---|---|---|\n|Lithuania|0.23|0.61|\n|Hungary|0.10|0.61|\n|Germany|0.79|0.61|\n|Estonia|0.37|0.61|\n\n\n**Table 9. Data for Figure 6: GOS, and the GOS Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|Assessed GOS|Potential GOS|GOS Gap
(percent of GDP)|GOS Gap
(percent of Potential)|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|2011
|13.9
|16.7
|2.1
|13.0
|\n|2012|14.1|17.1|2.3|13.7|\n|2013|14.7|17.9|2.5|14.7|\n|2014|15.3|18.5|2.5|14.0|\n|2015|15.4|18.3|2.3|13.0|\n|2016
|15.6
|18.2
|1.9
|10.9
|\n|2017
|16.1
|19.0
|2.2
|12.1
|\n|2018|15.7|18.7|2.4|13.3|\n|2019|16.0|18.5|1.9|10.4|\n|2020|15.4|19.4|3.3|17.8|\n\n\n**Table 10. Data for Figure 7: The GOS gap percent of GDP by Sector,**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Reporting
Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|-0.1|0.0|\n|C1|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|C2|0.1
|0.1
|0.2
|0.1
|0.2
|0.0
|0.0
|0.1
|0.2
|0.4
|\n|C3|0.6
|0.5
|0.6
|0.6
|0.6
|0.2
|0.4
|0.4
|0.5
|0.4
|\n|C4|0.4
|0.5
|0.5
|0.4
|0.4
|0.5
|0.6
|0.5
|0.6
|0.8
|\n|C5|1.3|1.4|1.5|1.3|1.1|1.1|1.1|1.0|1.0|1.1|\n|D-E|-0.8|-0.7|-1.0|-0.5|-0.5|-0.7|-0.4|-0.2|-0.3|-0.4|\n|F|-0.8|-0.2|-0.2|-0.3|-0.3|-0.1|-0.1|-0.3|-0.3|-0.3|\n|G|0.5
|0.5
|0.7
|0.7
|0.8
|0.9
|0.9
|1.0
|0.5
|0.9
|\n|H|0.5
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.5
|-0.5
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.4
|-0.2
|\n|I|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.3|-0.3|-0.3|-0.3|0.0|\n|J|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.1|0.1|\n|L|0.0|-0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.0|-0.1|-0.1|-0.2|\n|M-N|0.1|0.1|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.4|0.3|0.3|\n|P-Q1|0.1
|0.1
|0.1
|0.1
|0.1
|0.0
|0.0
|0.0
|0.0
|0.0
|\n|R-S|0.2|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.3|\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.09833526611328, 183.7033233642578, 540.32666015625, 372.8466796875], "columns": 5, "rows": 11}, {"bbox": [90.09833526611328, 406.3666687011719, 540.32666015625, 705.1333618164062], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}, {"bbox": [137.87411499023438, 72.37000274658203, 493.11663818359375, 150.25], "columns": 3, "rows": 5}], "text": "Poland 0.42 0.61 \n\n Lithuania 0.23 0.61 \n Hungary 0.10 0.61 \n Germany 0.79 0.61 \n Estonia 0.37 0.61 \n\nTable 9. Data for Figure 6: GOS, and the GOS Gap\n\n Year Assessed GOS Potential GOS GOS Gap (percent of GDP) GOS Gap (percent of Potential) \n\n 2011 13.9 16.7 2.1 13.0 \n 2012 14.1 17.1 2.3 13.7 \n 2013 14.7 17.9 2.5 14.7 \n 2014 15.3 18.5 2.5 14.0 \n 2015 15.4 18.3 2.3 13.0 \n 2016 15.6 18.2 1.9 10.9 \n 2017 16.1 19.0 2.2 12.1 \n 2018 15.7 18.7 2.4 13.3 \n 2019 16.0 18.5 1.9 10.4 \n 2020 15.4 19.4 3.3 17.8 \n\nTable 10. Data for Figure 7: The GOS gap percent of GDP by Sector,\n\n Reporting Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 \n C1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n C2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 \n C3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 \n C4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 \n C5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 \n D-E -0.8 -0.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 \n F -0.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 \n G 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.9 \n H 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 \n I -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 \n J 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 \n L 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 \n M-N 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 \n P-Q1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n R-S 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 \n\n27", "text_characters": 1046}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 11. Data for Figure 8: Assessed CIT vs Potential CIT, percent of GDP**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|Assessed CIT|Potential CIT
(absolute method)|Potential CIT
(relative method)|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|2011|1.36
|1.78
|1.32
|\n|2012|0.99|1.40|1.22|\n|2013|1.02|1.45|1.26|\n|2014|
1.10|
1.52|
1.35|\n|2015|1.18|1.57|1.37|\n|2016|1.30|1.62|1.42|\n|2017|1.52|1.94|1.68|\n|2018|1.60|2.06|1.65|\n|2019|1.58|1.93|1.61|\n|2020|1.63|2.26|1.56|\n\n\n\n**Table 12. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Assessed CIT percent of**\n\n**GOS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|0.05
|0.03
|0.03
|0.04
|0.05
|0.07
|0.10
|0.09
|0.09
|0.08
|\n|C1|0.17
|0.12
|0.17
|0.15
|0.17
|0.19
|0.20
|0.23
|0.25
|0.28
|\n|C2|0.46
|0.33
|0.38
|0.52
|0.57
|0.67
|0.77
|0.72
|0.69
|0.69
|\n|C3|1.18
|0.71
|0.77
|0.55
|0.64
|0.53
|0.84
|0.86
|1.01
|1.15
|\n|C4|0.67
|0.51
|0.46
|0.41
|0.46
|0.65
|0.64
|0.61
|0.53
|0.58
|\n|C5|0.12
|0.11
|0.10
|0.13
|0.19
|0.18
|0.18
|0.17
|0.16
|0.16
|\n|D-E|0.64
|0.41
|0.52
|0.52
|0.39
|0.45
|0.38
|0.37
|0.39
|0.50
|\n|F|0.51
|0.31
|0.27
|0.33
|0.39
|0.30
|0.34
|0.44
|0.44
|0.50
|\n|G|2.15
|1.50
|1.47
|1.53
|1.60
|1.79
|2.09
|2.30
|2.17
|2.12
|\n|H|0.37
|0.35
|0.31
|0.47
|0.50
|0.67
|0.74
|0.83
|0.69
|0.48
|\n|I|0.08
|0.07
|0.06
|0.06
|0.08
|0.10
|0.12
|0.14
|0.16
|0.06
|\n|J|0.69
|0.33
|0.29
|0.22
|0.37
|0.30
|0.30
|0.38
|0.38
|0.48
|\n|L|0.18
|0.23
|0.13
|0.15
|0.15
|0.21
|0.22
|0.28
|0.35
|0.26
|\n|M-N|0.78
|0.69
|0.70
|0.76
|0.81
|0.87
|0.94
|0.99
|1.07
|0.94
|\n|P-Q1|0.09
|0.07
|0.07
|0.08
|0.08
|0.08
|0.09
|0.11
|0.12
|0.12
|\n|R-S|0.11|0.10|0.07|0.08|0.08|0.10|0.09|0.09|0.09|0.08|\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.10277557373047, 319.086669921875, 540.322265625, 589.0333251953125], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}, {"bbox": [95.69166564941406, 94.02000427246094, 533.1333618164062, 269.54998779296875], "columns": 4, "rows": 11}], "text": "Table 11. Data for Figure 8: Assessed CIT vs Potential CIT, percent of GDP\n\n Year Assessed CIT Potential CIT (absolute method) Potential CIT (relative method) \n\n 2011 1.36 1.78 1.32 \n 2012 0.99 1.40 1.22 \n 2013 1.02 1.45 1.26 \n 2014 1.10 1.52 1.35 \n 2015 1.18 1.57 1.37 \n 2016 1.30 1.62 1.42 \n 2017 1.52 1.94 1.68 \n 2018 1.60 2.06 1.65 \n 2019 1.58 1.93 1.61 \n 2020 1.63 2.26 1.56 \n\nTable 12. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Assessed CIT percent of\n\nGOS\n\n Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 \n C1 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.28 \n C2 0.46 0.33 0.38 0.52 0.57 0.67 0.77 0.72 0.69 0.69 \n C3 1.18 0.71 0.77 0.55 0.64 0.53 0.84 0.86 1.01 1.15 \n C4 0.67 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.53 0.58 \n C5 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 \n D-E 0.64 0.41 0.52 0.52 0.39 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.50 \n F 0.51 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.44 0.44 0.50 \n G 2.15 1.50 1.47 1.53 1.60 1.79 2.09 2.30 2.17 2.12 \n H 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.47 0.50 0.67 0.74 0.83 0.69 0.48 \n I 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.06 \n J 0.69 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.38 0.48 \n L 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.26 \n M-N 0.78 0.69 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.87 0.94 0.99 1.07 0.94 \n P-Q1 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 \n R-S 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 \n\n28", "text_characters": 1094}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 12. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Potential CIT absolute**\n\n**method percent of GOS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|0.06
|0.04
|0.03
|0.03
|0.05
|0.05
|0.06
|0.06
|0.04
|0.04
|\n|C1|0.18|0.19|0.19|0.21|0.19|0.20|0.19|0.20|0.19|0.18|\n|C2|0.47|0.49|0.52|0.60|0.68|0.72|0.82|0.79|0.82|0.63|\n|C3|0.99
|0.84
|0.96
|0.95
|0.88
|0.74
|1.03
|0.94
|1.05
|0.94
|\n|C4|0.94|0.83|0.80|0.80|0.89|1.08|1.23|1.03|0.98|0.86|\n|C5|0.86|0.80|0.76|0.69|0.70|0.72|0.76|0.71|0.76|0.63|\n|D-E|0.27|0.23|0.13|0.28|0.24|0.20|0.26|0.27|0.26|0.25|\n|F|0.16|0.11|0.14|0.13|0.14|0.16|0.19|0.22|0.19|0.18|\n|G|1.77|1.60|1.52|1.58|1.66|1.92|2.18|2.36|2.30|2.23|\n|H|0.55|0.53|0.51|0.54|0.59|0.60|0.62|0.64|0.63|0.45|\n|I|0.00|-0.01|0.01|0.02|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|0.01|\n|J|0.88
|0.78
|0.64
|0.68
|0.65
|0.64
|0.73
|0.69
|0.77
|0.77
|\n|L|0.15|0.10|0.13|0.14|0.11|0.10|0.11|0.13|0.07|0.10|\n|M-N|0.53|0.54|0.61|0.60|0.59|0.58|0.61|0.71|0.62|0.68|\n|P-Q1|0.02
|0.01
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|0.02
|\n|R-S|0.19|0.14|0.15|0.15|0.15|0.12|0.11|0.11|0.09|0.09|\n\n\n**Table 13. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Potential CIT relative**\n\n**method percent of GOS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|0.06|0.04|0.03|0.03|0.05|0.05|0.06|0.06|0.04|0.04|\n|C1|0.18
|0.19
|0.19
|0.21
|0.19
|0.20
|0.19
|0.20
|0.19
|0.18
|\n|C2|0.47|0.49|0.52|0.60|0.68|0.72|0.82|0.79|0.82|0.63|\n|C3|0.99|0.84|0.96|0.95|0.88|0.74|1.03|0.94|1.05|0.94|\n|C4|0.94
|0.83
|0.80
|0.80
|0.89
|1.08
|1.23
|1.03
|0.98
|0.86
|\n|C5|0.86|0.80|0.76|0.69|0.70|0.72|0.76|0.71|0.76|0.63|\n|D-E|0.27
|0.23
|0.13
|0.28
|0.24
|0.20
|0.26
|0.27
|0.26
|0.25
|\n|F|0.16|0.11|0.14|0.13|0.14|0.16|0.19|0.22|0.19|0.18|\n|G|1.77
|1.60
|1.52
|1.58
|1.66
|1.92
|2.18
|2.36
|2.30
|2.23
|\n|H|0.55|0.53|0.51|0.54|0.59|0.60|0.62|0.64|0.63|0.45|\n|I|0.00|-0.01|0.01|0.02|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|0.01|\n|J|0.88
|0.78
|0.64
|0.68
|0.65
|0.64
|0.73
|0.69
|0.77
|0.77
|\n|L|0.15|0.10|0.13|0.14|0.11|0.10|0.11|0.13|0.07|0.10|\n|M-N|0.53
|0.54
|0.61
|0.60
|0.59
|0.58
|0.61
|0.71
|0.62
|0.68
|\n|P-Q1|0.02|0.01|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|\n|R-S|0.19|0.14|0.15|0.15|0.15|0.12|0.11|0.11|0.09|0.09|\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [65.65277862548828, 114.89669036865234, 564.7471923828125, 384.0033264160156], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}, {"bbox": [65.65277862548828, 433.586669921875, 564.7471923828125, 686.7332763671875], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}], "text": "Table 12. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Potential CIT absolute\n\nmethod percent of GOS\n\n Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 \n C1 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 \n C2 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.72 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.63 \n C3 0.99 0.84 0.96 0.95 0.88 0.74 1.03 0.94 1.05 0.94 \n C4 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.89 1.08 1.23 1.03 0.98 0.86 \n C5 0.86 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.76 0.71 0.76 0.63 \n D-E 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 \n F 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.18 \n G 1.77 1.60 1.52 1.58 1.66 1.92 2.18 2.36 2.30 2.23 \n H 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.45 \n I 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 \n J 0.88 0.78 0.64 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.73 0.69 0.77 0.77 \n L 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.10 \n M-N 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.71 0.62 0.68 \n P-Q1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 \n R-S 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 \n\nTable 13. Data for Figure 9: Assessed and Potential CIT by Sector, Potential CIT relative\n\nmethod percent of GOS\n\n Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 \n C1 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 \n C2 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.72 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.63 \n C3 0.99 0.84 0.96 0.95 0.88 0.74 1.03 0.94 1.05 0.94 \n C4 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.89 1.08 1.23 1.03 0.98 0.86 \n C5 0.86 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.76 0.71 0.76 0.63 \n D-E 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 \n F 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.18 \n G 1.77 1.60 1.52 1.58 1.66 1.92 2.18 2.36 2.30 2.23 \n H 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.45 \n I 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 \n J 0.88 0.78 0.64 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.73 0.69 0.77 0.77 \n L 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.10 \n M-N 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.71 0.62 0.68 \n P-Q1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 \n R-S 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 \n\n29", "text_characters": 1640}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 14. Data for Figure 10: Assessment Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|Absolute
Method|Relative
Method|Average
Result|Absolute
Method|Relative
Method|Average
Result|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of potential)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|(percent of GDP)|\n|2011|23.41|-2.84|12.21|0.42|-0.04|0.19|\n|2012|
28.97|
18.72|
24.19|
0.41|
0.23|
0.32|\n|2013|
29.57|
18.86|
24.59|
0.43|
0.24|
0.33|\n|2014|27.79|18.80|23.56|0.42|0.25|0.34|\n|2015|
24.76|
13.66|
19.59|
0.39|
0.19|
0.29|\n|2016|19.98|8.49|14.62|0.32|0.12|0.22|\n|2017|
21.71|
9.88|
16.21|
0.42|
0.17|
0.29|\n|2018|
22.23|
3.12|
13.72|
0.46|
0.05|
0.25|\n|2019|18.32|2.01|10.91|0.35|0.03|0.19|\n|2020|
27.96|
-4.77|
14.62|
0.63|
-0.07|
0.28|\n\n\n\n**Table 15. Data for Figure 11: Assessment Gap by Sector, Average Result, percent of GOS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|-0.02|-0.01|-0.02|-0.01|-0.01|-0.04|-0.04|-0.03|-0.05|-0.03|\n|C1|0.01|0.08|0.04|0.05|0.03|0.03|0.04|0.05|0.00|-0.01|\n|C2|0.04|0.15|0.17|0.10|0.14|0.04|0.05|0.09|0.16|0.16|\n|C3|0.26|0.36|0.36|0.46|0.38|0.22|0.29|0.24|0.28|0.08|\n|C4|0.38|0.43|0.42|0.40|0.41|0.45|0.58|0.45|0.53|0.53|\n|C5|1.14|1.07|1.04|0.87|0.78|0.81|0.83|0.77|0.83|0.79|\n|D-E|-0.66|-0.47|-0.67|-0.34|-0.32|-0.44|-0.24|-0.17|-0.22|-0.31|\n|F|-0.66
|-0.23
|-0.14
|-0.25
|-0.25
|-0.11
|-0.15
|-0.24
|-0.29
|-0.30
|\n|G|0.10
|0.34
|0.35
|0.33
|0.40
|0.49
|0.48
|0.54
|0.35
|0.51
|\n|H|0.38
|-0.11
|-0.08
|-0.17
|-0.17
|-0.25
|-0.28
|-0.30
|-0.23
|-0.09
|\n|I|-0.17
|-0.15
|-0.11
|-0.10
|-0.13
|-0.18
|-0.21
|-0.23
|-0.25
|-0.03
|\n|J|0.22
|0.35
|0.25
|0.31
|0.22
|0.25
|0.31
|0.24
|0.22
|0.18
|\n|L|-0.01|-0.09|0.04|0.04|-0.02|-0.07|-0.08|-0.11|-0.21|-0.16|\n|M-N|-0.06|0.00|0.06|0.00|-0.03|-0.05|-0.05|0.05|-0.09|0.04|\n|P-Q1|0.00|0.00|0.01|0.00|0.00|-0.02|-0.02|-0.04|-0.05|-0.04|\n|R-S
|0.18|0.16|0.17|0.15|0.16|0.09|0.05|0.07|0.08|0.13|\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.09918975830078, 106.05000305175781, 540.3258056640625, 291.9499816894531], "columns": 7, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [90.09918975830078, 326.29669189453125, 540.3258056640625, 569.8033447265625], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}], "text": "Table 14. Data for Figure 10: Assessment Gap\n\n Year Absolute Method Relative Method Average Result Absolute Method Relative Method Average Result \n\n (percent of potential) (percent of potential) (percent of potential) (percent of GDP) (percent of GDP) (percent of GDP) \n 2011 23.41 -2.84 12.21 0.42 -0.04 0.19 \n 2012 28.97 18.72 24.19 0.41 0.23 0.32 \n 2013 29.57 18.86 24.59 0.43 0.24 0.33 \n 2014 27.79 18.80 23.56 0.42 0.25 0.34 \n 2015 24.76 13.66 19.59 0.39 0.19 0.29 \n 2016 19.98 8.49 14.62 0.32 0.12 0.22 \n 2017 21.71 9.88 16.21 0.42 0.17 0.29 \n 2018 22.23 3.12 13.72 0.46 0.05 0.25 \n 2019 18.32 2.01 10.91 0.35 0.03 0.19 \n 2020 27.96 -4.77 14.62 0.63 -0.07 0.28 \n\nTable 15. Data for Figure 11: Assessment Gap by Sector, Average Result, percent of GOS\n\n Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 \n C1 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.01 \n C2 0.04 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.16 \n C3 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.38 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.08 \n C4 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.58 0.45 0.53 0.53 \n C5 1.14 1.07 1.04 0.87 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.77 0.83 0.79 \n D-E -0.66 -0.47 -0.67 -0.34 -0.32 -0.44 -0.24 -0.17 -0.22 -0.31 \n F -0.66 -0.23 -0.14 -0.25 -0.25 -0.11 -0.15 -0.24 -0.29 -0.30 \n G 0.10 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.35 0.51 \n H 0.38 -0.11 -0.08 -0.17 -0.17 -0.25 -0.28 -0.30 -0.23 -0.09 \n I -0.17 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.18 -0.21 -0.23 -0.25 -0.03 \n J 0.22 0.35 0.25 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.18 \n L -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.21 -0.16 \n M-N -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.04 \n P-Q1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 \n R-S 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.13 \n\n30", "text_characters": 1397}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 16. Data for Figure 11: Assessment Gap by Sector, Average Result, percent of GDP**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Sector
Code|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A-B|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|\n|C1|0.00|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.00|0.01|0.01|0.00|0.00|\n|C2|0.01|0.03|0.03|0.02|0.03|0.01|0.01|0.02|0.03|0.03|\n|C3|0.04
|0.06
|0.06
|0.08
|0.07
|0.04
|0.05
|0.05
|0.05
|0.02
|\n|C4|0.06
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.07
|0.08
|0.11
|0.08
|0.10
|0.10
|\n|C5|0.19
|0.18
|0.18
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.16
|0.14
|0.15
|0.15
|\n|D-E|-0.11|-0.08|-0.12|-0.06|-0.06|-0.08|-0.05|-0.03|-0.04|-0.06|\n|F|-0.11|-0.04|-0.03|-0.04|-0.05|-0.02|-0.03|-0.05|-0.05|-0.06|\n|G|0.02|0.06|0.06|0.06|0.07|0.09|0.09|0.10|0.06|0.10|\n|H|0.06
|-0.02
|-0.01
|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.06
|-0.04
|-0.02
|\n|I|-0.03
|-0.03
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.02
|-0.03
|-0.04
|-0.04
|-0.05
|-0.01
|\n|J|0.04|0.06|0.04|0.06|0.04|0.05|0.06|0.04|0.04|0.03|\n|L|0.00|-0.02|0.01|0.01|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|-0.04|-0.03|\n|M-N|-0.01|0.00|0.01|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|0.01|-0.02|0.01|\n|P-Q1|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|\n|R-S|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.03|0.02|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.03|\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.125, 94.10000610351562, 540.300048828125, 371.9700012207031], "columns": 11, "rows": 17}], "text": "Table 16. Data for Figure 11: Assessment Gap by Sector, Average Result, percent of GDP\n\n Sector Code 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 \n\n A-B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 \n C1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 \n C2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 \n C3 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 \n C4 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.10 \n C5 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 \n D-E -0.11 -0.08 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 \n F -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 \n G 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 \n H 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 \n I -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 \n J 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 \n L 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 \n M-N -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 \n P-Q1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 \n R-S 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 \n\n31", "text_characters": 854}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Appendix II. The Model and Methodology used to** **Estimate the CIT Gap**\n\n**1.** **The IMF’s RA-GAP (Revenue Administration – Gap Analysis Program) methodology**\n**for CIT gap is based on the top-down approach.** This aims to estimate the potential CIT base\nand liability from existing macroeconomic data, with thorough considerations for theoretical\ndifferences between the macroeconomic data and the actual tax base of CIT, and then compare\n\nthe estimated results with actual declarations and payments.\n\n\n**2.** **The top-down approach requires a basic condition: that the macroeconomic data**\n**are compiled independently of the assessed tax base and liability.** In Finland, national\naccounts data are compiled by Finland Statistics using various statistical surveys, annual accounts\nof economic units and administrative data. Tax declarations are not the initial source of\n\ndetermining production, value-added, and operating surplus in the national accounts. As a result,\nthe basic condition for conducting the top-down approach is being met.\n\n\n**Theoretical Framework for Estimation**\n\n\n**3.** **The general approach used in the RA-GAP top -down CIT gap estimation involves**\n**using Gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations in national accounts as a starting**\n\n**point for estimating the potential CIT base in a country.** A detailed discussion about how\nGOS from the national accounts can be used to estimate potential CIT is provided in Ueda 2018 [4] .\n\n\n**4.** **The RA-GAP framework applies three different concepts of CIT base to allow**\n**careful consideration of treating the results of loss-making corporations and deductions**\n\n**for carried-over losses.**\n\n\n- _**Current-year net tax base**_ (C-NTB): An aggregated result for the current year reflecting both\n\nprofit-making corporations and loss-making corporations.\n\n\n- _**Current-year tax base**_ (C-TB): An aggregated result for the current year of profit-making\ncorporations only; this is before deducting carried-over losses. C-TB is generally bigger than\nC-NTB because losses made by loss-making corporations are netted out from aggregate\n\nprofits in C-NTB, but not deducted in C-TB.\n\n- _**Tax base**_ (TB): An aggregate result for the current year of profit-making corporations only,\n\nafter deducting carried-over losses from previous years. This is the base for calculating\n\naggregate CIT liability in a year.\n\n**5.** **In theory, estimation of the potential CIT base starts from GOS and would then**\n\n**need to make appropriate adjustments to reflect conceptual differences from the potential**\n\n\n4 Ueda, Junji, 2918, “Estimating the Corporate Income Tax Gap: The RA-GAP Methodology”, IMF Technical Notes\nand Manuals\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix II. The Model and Methodology used to Estimate the CIT Gap\n\n1. The IMF’s RA-GAP (Revenue Administration – Gap Analysis Program) methodology\nfor CIT gap is based on the top-down approach. This aims to estimate the potential CIT base\nand liability from existing macroeconomic data, with thorough considerations for theoretical\ndifferences between the macroeconomic data and the actual tax base of CIT, and then compare\n\nthe estimated results with actual declarations and payments.\n\n2. The top-down approach requires a basic condition: that the macroeconomic data\nare compiled independently of the assessed tax base and liability. In Finland, national\naccounts data are compiled by Finland Statistics using various statistical surveys, annual accounts\nof economic units and administrative data. Tax declarations are not the initial source of\n\ndetermining production, value-added, and operating surplus in the national accounts. As a result,\nthe basic condition for conducting the top-down approach is being met.\n\nTheoretical Framework for Estimation\n\n3. The general approach used in the RA-GAP top -down CIT gap estimation involves\nusing Gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations in national accounts as a starting\n\npoint for estimating the potential CIT base in a country. A detailed discussion about how\nGOS from the national accounts can be used to estimate potential CIT is provided in Ueda 2018 [4] .\n\n4. The RA-GAP framework applies three different concepts of CIT base to allow\ncareful consideration of treating the results of loss-making corporations and deductions\n\nfor carried-over losses.\n\n- _Current-year net tax base_ (C-NTB): An aggregated result for the current year reflecting both\n\nprofit-making corporations and loss-making corporations.\n\n- _Current-year tax base_ (C-TB): An aggregated result for the current year of profit-making\ncorporations only; this is before deducting carried-over losses. C-TB is generally bigger than\nC-NTB because losses made by loss-making corporations are netted out from aggregate\n\nprofits in C-NTB, but not deducted in C-TB.\n\n- _Tax base_ (TB): An aggregate result for the current year of profit-making corporations only,\n\nafter deducting carried-over losses from previous years. This is the base for calculating\n\naggregate CIT liability in a year.\n\n5. In theory, estimation of the potential CIT base starts from GOS and would then\n\nneed to make appropriate adjustments to reflect conceptual differences from the potential\n\n4 Ueda, Junji, 2918, “Estimating the Corporate Income Tax Gap: The RA-GAP Methodology”, IMF Technical Notes\nand Manuals\n\n32", "text_characters": 2198}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**CIT tax base and liabilities.** There are many conceptual differences between GOS and the actual\n\ntax base (TB) of CIT, that can be classified into three categories D1, D2 and D3 (Figure).\n\n\n- [D1] differences between GOS in national accounts and aggregate financial accounting profit\n\n(FAP) of CIT taxpayers\n\n\n- [D2] differences between aggregate FAP and aggregate current year net tax base (C-NTB)\n\n\n- [D3] differences between aggregate C-NTB and aggregate tax base (TB) due to losses and\n\ndeductions for carry-over losses\n\n**6.** **By adjusting GOS by the estimates for D1, D2 and D3, the potential tax base could**\n\n**then be estimated.** The sequence of estimating steps for the potential CIT base and liability is\nshown in the left-side flow in Figure 1, including the concepts of potential FAP, potential C-NTB,\npotential C-TB, and potential TB. Then the potential CIT liability is calculated by applying the\nstatutory CIT rate to the potential TB and reflecting tax credits and additional tax liabilities that\nare not proportional to the tax base.\n\n\n**7.** **The framework also limits the scope of the estimation to non-financial**\n**corporations.** The reason for excluding financial corporations is that estimating the potential CIT\nbase by using national accounts data is more difficult for financial corporations since their\nincome is not as closely associated to the concept of gross operating surplus. [5] As such, the basic\npremise of this framework is not applicable for these types of enterprises.\n\n\n**8.** **It should be noted that the top-down estimates for CIT gaps do not try to directly**\n**measure or include the magnitude of tax avoidance or BEPS (base erosion and profit**\n**shifting) of corporations.** The estimated gap does not show how much national income, that\nshould have been sourced in a country, are transferred to other countries by legal means\nbecause such activities are usually reflected in national accounts data as well. [6] It should be noted\n\nthat the top-down approach relies on what is actually measured in national accounts data.\n\n\n5 For financial corporations, the economic value-added, calculated as the financial intermediation services (FISIM)\nand the net insurance premiums, can be significantly different from their taxable incomes reflecting capital\ngains/losses and changes in financial reserves, and therefore a completely different approach would be needed\nto apply a top-down to provide appropriate estimates.\n\n6 See OECD, 2015 in detail.\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "CIT tax base and liabilities. There are many conceptual differences between GOS and the actual\n\ntax base (TB) of CIT, that can be classified into three categories D1, D2 and D3 (Figure).\n\n- [D1] differences between GOS in national accounts and aggregate financial accounting profit\n\n(FAP) of CIT taxpayers\n\n- [D2] differences between aggregate FAP and aggregate current year net tax base (C-NTB)\n\n- [D3] differences between aggregate C-NTB and aggregate tax base (TB) due to losses and\n\ndeductions for carry-over losses\n\n6. By adjusting GOS by the estimates for D1, D2 and D3, the potential tax base could\n\nthen be estimated. The sequence of estimating steps for the potential CIT base and liability is\nshown in the left-side flow in Figure 1, including the concepts of potential FAP, potential C-NTB,\npotential C-TB, and potential TB. Then the potential CIT liability is calculated by applying the\nstatutory CIT rate to the potential TB and reflecting tax credits and additional tax liabilities that\nare not proportional to the tax base.\n\n7. The framework also limits the scope of the estimation to non-financial\ncorporations. The reason for excluding financial corporations is that estimating the potential CIT\nbase by using national accounts data is more difficult for financial corporations since their\nincome is not as closely associated to the concept of gross operating surplus. [5] As such, the basic\npremise of this framework is not applicable for these types of enterprises.\n\n8. It should be noted that the top-down estimates for CIT gaps do not try to directly\nmeasure or include the magnitude of tax avoidance or BEPS (base erosion and profit\nshifting) of corporations. The estimated gap does not show how much national income, that\nshould have been sourced in a country, are transferred to other countries by legal means\nbecause such activities are usually reflected in national accounts data as well. [6] It should be noted\n\nthat the top-down approach relies on what is actually measured in national accounts data.\n\n5 For financial corporations, the economic value-added, calculated as the financial intermediation services (FISIM)\nand the net insurance premiums, can be significantly different from their taxable incomes reflecting capital\ngains/losses and changes in financial reserves, and therefore a completely different approach would be needed\nto apply a top-down to provide appropriate estimates.\n\n6 See OECD, 2015 in detail.\n\n33", "text_characters": 2050}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-109-fig-p0036-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 12. Theoretical Relationship between GOS and CIT Tax Base**\n\n\nSource: RA-GAP analytical framework for CIT gap.\n\n\n34\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.4848, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(72.0, 103.97000122070312, 722.9500122070312, 464.9700012207031)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 752, "number": 3, "size": 83418, "transform": [650.9500122070312, 0.0, -0.0, 361.0, 72.0, 103.97000122070312], "width": 1356, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 12. Theoretical Relationship between GOS and CIT Tax Base\n\nSource: RA-GAP analytical framework for CIT gap.\n\n34", "text_characters": 99}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Practical Application of the Framework**\n\n\n**9.** **A complete set of Independent data on the values needed to adjust GOS to arrive**\n**at C-NTB are not available.** While some statistics do provide general indications of the values of\n\nsome of these items, as described as D1 and D2 above, the definitions used for these statistics\nare not necessarily the same as the definitions of these items for tax purposes. The use of these\nstatistics would therefore require many assumptions and adjustments to ensure that their use\ndoes not result in an overestimation or underestimation of the potential tax base. Furthermore,\nfor some of the needed adjustments, no pertinent statistical data is available at all. In such cases,\n\nthe only possible source of relevant data would have to come from tax declaration data. As such,\nattempting a direct application of the theoretical framework requires making use of a\ncombination of tax record data and statistical data. This then requires that further assumptions\nand adjustments be made to ensure that these two sets of data are consistent with each other, to\navoid overlap or under-coverage.\n\n\n**10.** **A simplified set of methods for obtaining the gap has been employed in order to**\n**reduce the number of assumptions that need to be made.** Two separate methods have been\nused to arrive at an estimate of the CIT compliance gap; an _absolute_ method, and a _relative_\nmethod. The rationale for using two different methods is that both methods have their strength\nand weaknesses, but these strengths and weaknesses lie in different areas. Comparing the results\n\nfrom the two methods should give a better overall indication of the compliance gap. Both\nmethods rely solely on tax record data to calculate a value for the _Potential Tax Base_ (P-TB) _._\n\n\n**11.** **The first step under both methods requires obtaining the values for GOS from the**\n**national accounts and computing a value for** _**Assessed Gross Operating Surplus**_ **(A-GOS)** _**.**_\nGOS from the national accounts will need to be adjusted in order to arrive at _Potential Gross_\n\n_Operating Surplus_ (P-GOS). In particular, the GOS for non-financial corporations, by sector of\neconomic activity needs to be requested from the national accounts office. Then, because the\nnational accounts definition for non-financial corporations may include the activities of some\nentities which are not required to file corporate income tax returns, the GOS from these entities\nneeds to be removed. To calculate A-GOS, data from taxpayer declarations is used to compute\n\neach taxpayer’s gross operating surplus; their total operating revenue minus their operating\ncosts. Or, as described above, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization.\n\n\n**12.** **The absolute method estimates P-TB by using the difference between A-GOS and**\n**the** _**Assessed Tax Base**_ **(A-TB).** P-TB using the absolute method (P-TBabs) is determined by\nsubtracting this difference from P-GOS. In other words, the absolute method uses data solely\n\nsourced from taxpayer’s declarations for the D1-D3 adjustments as described above. This\nmeasure for the compliance gap is, obviously, limited in scope. However, despite being limited in\nscope, this measure will likely over-estimate the compliance gap, and therefore would represent\nan upper limit for the compliance gap. Implicitly this method assumes that any undeclared\noperating surplus would have no associated capital or other costs associated with it. Taxpayers\n\nunder-declaring operating surplus could be expected to be scaling back the size of their\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Practical Application of the Framework\n\n9. A complete set of Independent data on the values needed to adjust GOS to arrive\nat C-NTB are not available. While some statistics do provide general indications of the values of\n\nsome of these items, as described as D1 and D2 above, the definitions used for these statistics\nare not necessarily the same as the definitions of these items for tax purposes. The use of these\nstatistics would therefore require many assumptions and adjustments to ensure that their use\ndoes not result in an overestimation or underestimation of the potential tax base. Furthermore,\nfor some of the needed adjustments, no pertinent statistical data is available at all. In such cases,\n\nthe only possible source of relevant data would have to come from tax declaration data. As such,\nattempting a direct application of the theoretical framework requires making use of a\ncombination of tax record data and statistical data. This then requires that further assumptions\nand adjustments be made to ensure that these two sets of data are consistent with each other, to\navoid overlap or under-coverage.\n\n10. A simplified set of methods for obtaining the gap has been employed in order to\nreduce the number of assumptions that need to be made. Two separate methods have been\nused to arrive at an estimate of the CIT compliance gap; an _absolute_ method, and a _relative_\nmethod. The rationale for using two different methods is that both methods have their strength\nand weaknesses, but these strengths and weaknesses lie in different areas. Comparing the results\n\nfrom the two methods should give a better overall indication of the compliance gap. Both\nmethods rely solely on tax record data to calculate a value for the _Potential Tax Base_ (P-TB) _._\n\n11. The first step under both methods requires obtaining the values for GOS from the\nnational accounts and computing a value for _Assessed Gross Operating Surplus_ (A-GOS) _._\nGOS from the national accounts will need to be adjusted in order to arrive at _Potential Gross_\n\n_Operating Surplus_ (P-GOS). In particular, the GOS for non-financial corporations, by sector of\neconomic activity needs to be requested from the national accounts office. Then, because the\nnational accounts definition for non-financial corporations may include the activities of some\nentities which are not required to file corporate income tax returns, the GOS from these entities\nneeds to be removed. To calculate A-GOS, data from taxpayer declarations is used to compute\n\neach taxpayer’s gross operating surplus; their total operating revenue minus their operating\ncosts. Or, as described above, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization.\n\n12. The absolute method estimates P-TB by using the difference between A-GOS and\nthe _Assessed Tax Base_ (A-TB). P-TB using the absolute method (P-TBabs) is determined by\nsubtracting this difference from P-GOS. In other words, the absolute method uses data solely\n\nsourced from taxpayer’s declarations for the D1-D3 adjustments as described above. This\nmeasure for the compliance gap is, obviously, limited in scope. However, despite being limited in\nscope, this measure will likely over-estimate the compliance gap, and therefore would represent\nan upper limit for the compliance gap. Implicitly this method assumes that any undeclared\noperating surplus would have no associated capital or other costs associated with it. Taxpayers\n\nunder-declaring operating surplus could be expected to be scaling back the size of their\n\n35", "text_characters": 2964}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "operations as they appear on the declaration in general. Taxpayers not filing a declaration at all,\nwould also likely have other deductions and inclusions to report in addition to their unreported\noperating surplus.\n\n\n**13.** **The relative method estimates P-TB by using the relative size of the** _**Assessed**_\n_**Current-year Tax Base**_ **(AC-TB) to A-GOS.** Specifically, the method calculates the geometric\nmean of this ratio, using declaration data, for all those taxpayers in a particular sector with both a\npositive AC-TB and a positive A-GOS. A ratio of the A-GOS for this subset of taxpayers in the\nsector to the total A-GOS for the sector is also determined. These two ratios are then applied to\n\nthe P-GOS for the sector, to determine the Potential Current-year Tax Base (PC-TB) for the sector\nassociated with positive P-GOS. This value must then be adjusted to account for the P-TB that\nwould arise from negative P-GOS. Again, declaration data is used to determine the ratio of AC-TB\nfor all taxpayers to the AC-TB of those taxpayers with positive A-GOS. Applying this ratio to the\nPC-TB for taxpayers with positive P-GOS yields the estimate for the overall PC-TB. Deductions for\n\ncarried-over losses and adjustments for deferred profits obtained from the declarations are then\napplied to arrive at P-TBrel, P-TB using the relative method. This approach is based on a\nsimplifying assumption that most taxpayers are compliant, particularly the larger taxpayers. [7] As\nsuch, the ratio of the AC-TB to A-GOS will be most heavily influenced by compliant taxpayers,\nand so applying the ratio to P-GOS we get an estimate for what the C-TB might be if all\n\ntaxpayers reported in a fashion similar to the compliant taxpayers.\n\n\n**14.** **Once P-TB has been estimated, the potential CIT (P-CIT) is determined by applying**\n**the CIT rate** . As there are two values for P-TB, two values for P-CIT are determined; P-CITabs and\nP-CITrel. In addition, if there are any tax credits applicable then under the absolute method, the\namount of credits claimed by taxpayers is subtracted from P-CITabs. Under the relative method,\n\nP-CITrel is adjusted by the ratio of the tax credits claimed to the assessed tax payable before\ncredits.\n\n\n**15.** **The assessment gap is then determined by subtracting assessed CIT (A-CIT) from**\n**P-CIT.** The assessment gap is the component of the compliance gap that results from\nunderassessed amounts of tax due.\n\n\n**16.** **To arrive at the compliance gap, the collection gap is added to the assessment gap.**\nThe collection gap is the amount of uncollected tax owed for the period in question – in other\nwords the CIT collection gap for 2017 is the amount of CIT owed against amounts assessed as\nhaving been due against 2017 tax declarations, but which has not yet been paid. It is not the\ntotal amount of CIT owing at the end of 2017, as that could include liabilities which are related to\n\nprevious years obligations.\n\n\n7 This is not to say that there are no CIT revenue issues associated with large taxpayers; those issues are more\ngenerally related to BEPS, which this estimation methodology is not attempting to capture.\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "operations as they appear on the declaration in general. Taxpayers not filing a declaration at all,\nwould also likely have other deductions and inclusions to report in addition to their unreported\noperating surplus.\n\n13. The relative method estimates P-TB by using the relative size of the _Assessed_\n_Current-year Tax Base_ (AC-TB) to A-GOS. Specifically, the method calculates the geometric\nmean of this ratio, using declaration data, for all those taxpayers in a particular sector with both a\npositive AC-TB and a positive A-GOS. A ratio of the A-GOS for this subset of taxpayers in the\nsector to the total A-GOS for the sector is also determined. These two ratios are then applied to\n\nthe P-GOS for the sector, to determine the Potential Current-year Tax Base (PC-TB) for the sector\nassociated with positive P-GOS. This value must then be adjusted to account for the P-TB that\nwould arise from negative P-GOS. Again, declaration data is used to determine the ratio of AC-TB\nfor all taxpayers to the AC-TB of those taxpayers with positive A-GOS. Applying this ratio to the\nPC-TB for taxpayers with positive P-GOS yields the estimate for the overall PC-TB. Deductions for\n\ncarried-over losses and adjustments for deferred profits obtained from the declarations are then\napplied to arrive at P-TBrel, P-TB using the relative method. This approach is based on a\nsimplifying assumption that most taxpayers are compliant, particularly the larger taxpayers. [7] As\nsuch, the ratio of the AC-TB to A-GOS will be most heavily influenced by compliant taxpayers,\nand so applying the ratio to P-GOS we get an estimate for what the C-TB might be if all\n\ntaxpayers reported in a fashion similar to the compliant taxpayers.\n\n14. Once P-TB has been estimated, the potential CIT (P-CIT) is determined by applying\nthe CIT rate . As there are two values for P-TB, two values for P-CIT are determined; P-CITabs and\nP-CITrel. In addition, if there are any tax credits applicable then under the absolute method, the\namount of credits claimed by taxpayers is subtracted from P-CITabs. Under the relative method,\n\nP-CITrel is adjusted by the ratio of the tax credits claimed to the assessed tax payable before\ncredits.\n\n15. The assessment gap is then determined by subtracting assessed CIT (A-CIT) from\nP-CIT. The assessment gap is the component of the compliance gap that results from\nunderassessed amounts of tax due.\n\n16. To arrive at the compliance gap, the collection gap is added to the assessment gap.\nThe collection gap is the amount of uncollected tax owed for the period in question – in other\nwords the CIT collection gap for 2017 is the amount of CIT owed against amounts assessed as\nhaving been due against 2017 tax declarations, but which has not yet been paid. It is not the\ntotal amount of CIT owing at the end of 2017, as that could include liabilities which are related to\n\nprevious years obligations.\n\n7 This is not to say that there are no CIT revenue issues associated with large taxpayers; those issues are more\ngenerally related to BEPS, which this estimation methodology is not attempting to capture.\n\n36", "text_characters": 2579}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "�\u0001\u0002\u0003\u0004\u0005�\u0007\b\b\u0004\u0001 \u0002�\n\u000b\f\u0004 \r\u000e\u000b\u000f\n\n\u0010\u0011\u0012\u0013\u0014\u0011\u0015\u0012\u0016\u0017\u0011\u0015\u0018�\u001a\u0017\u0011\u0013\u0012\u0015\u0014\u001b�\u001c\u001d\u0011\n�!\"\u0012#�$\u0012\u0014\u0013\u0013\u0012�%&\n&\u0015'#\u0016\u0011(\u0012\u0017\u0011)�*+�, -.!\n/$0\n#\u0012\u001212334445\u0016675\u0017\u0014(38\u00151\u00158\u0016\u0012\u001b\u001e\u00139\u0013\u0018\u001716\u0013\u0011\u0012", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-109", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "�\u0001\u0002\u0003\u0004\u0005�\u0007\b\b\u0004\u0001 \u0002�\n\u000b\f\u0004 \r\u000e\u000b\u000f\n\n\u0010\u0011\u0012\u0013\u0014\u0011\u0015\u0012\u0016\u0017\u0011\u0015\u0018�\u001a\u0017\u0011\u0013\u0012\u0015\u0014\u001b�\u001c\u001d\u0011\n�!\"\u0012#�$\u0012\u0014\u0013\u0013\u0012�%&\n&\u0015'#\u0016\u0011(\u0012\u0017\u0011)�*+�, -.!\n/$0\n\u0012\u001212334445\u0016675\u0017\u0014(38\u00151\u00158\u0016\u0012\u001b\u001e\u00139\u0013\u0018\u001716\u0013\u0011\u0012", "text_characters": 114}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2acc68feaabeb77a12d221f185831d0659b4a191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7ffa29db4a8c56d2d11b99336a5767597b7a3986c9fc05db455a76e657612f45
+size 145866
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-119/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b30b5af6c2025044a2f27db8cb778d7cc31b58c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-119",
+ "title": "Georgia: Technical Assistance Report-Operationalizing the New Bank Recovery and Resolution Framework",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-119.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "5e4e5c5f14efe3702f452f22876e3d5f86231b1592ddc02a4ec889ef4a8b1eb7",
+ "source_bytes": 494736,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/03/21/georgia-technical-assistance-report-operationalizing-the-new-bank-recovery-and-resolution-531213",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:00+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 5.896,
+ "page_count": 18,
+ "text_characters": 39730,
+ "table_count": 4,
+ "figure_count": 2,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "GEORGIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT— OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Georgia: Technical Assistance Report-Operationalizing the New Bank Recovery and Resolution Framework; IMF Country Report No. 23/119; February 2023 ",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "STA MCM FAD",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230320140158-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230321160713-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-119/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7168c6a696f6e204666d911598451e7038673c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+
+
+
+
+March 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/119**
+### **GEORGIA**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—** **OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW BANK RECOVERY AND** **RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Georgia was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in February 2023.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+2
+
+
+**Content** **Page**
+
+
+Glossary .....................................................................................................................................3
+
+
+Preface........................................................................................................................................4
+
+Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................5
+
+
+I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................7
+
+
+II. Recovery Planning, Early Intervention, Resolution Planning, and Resolution Funding ....10
+A. Recovery Planning .............................................................................................................10
+B. Early Intervention and FOLTF ..........................................................................................11
+C. Resolution Planning and Preparedness ..............................................................................12
+D. Resolution Funding ............................................................................................................14
+
+
+III. Creditor Hierarchy in Liquidation and Resolution ............................................................16
+
+
+IV. Inter-Agency Crisis Preparedness and Coordination .........................................................17
+
+Tables
+1. Second TA Mission Key Recommendations ........................................................................6
+2. Financial Soundness Indicators.............................................................................................7
+3. Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission .........................................................................8
+
+
+
+3
+
+
+**GLOSSARY**
+
+BCL Business Continuity Plan
+BSD Banking Supervision Department
+CCG Crisis Coordination Group
+CoCo Contingent Convertible Bond
+DIA Deposit Insurance Agency
+DIF Deposit Insurance Fund
+EIM Early Intervention Measures
+ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance
+FOLTF Failing or Likely to Fail
+FSB Financial Stability Board
+FSC Financial Stability Committee
+FTE Full Time Equivalent
+GFSR Group of Financial Sector Regulators
+IADI International Association of Deposit Insurers
+ICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process
+IFSC Interagency Financial Stability Committee
+ILAAP Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+ISSA Insurance State Supervision Service
+IT Information Technology
+KA Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions
+LAC Loss-Absorbing Capacity
+MCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department
+MoF Ministry of Finance
+MOU Memorandum of Understanding
+MPE Multiple Points of Entry
+NBG National Bank of Georgia
+NCWO No Credit Worse Off
+NPL Nonperforming Loan
+P&A Purchase and Assumption
+RLD Resolution and Liquidation Division
+SCG Securities Commission of Georgia
+SIB Systemically Important Bank
+SPE Single Point of Entry
+TPF Temporary Public Funding
+TA Technical Assistance
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+**PREFACE**
+
+
+At the request of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG), the Monetary and Capital Markets
+(MCM) Department is providing technical assistance (TA) to the Georgian authorities,
+including the NBG, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA),
+and the Insurance State Supervisory Service (ISSA). This was the second TA mission, which
+took place during September 5–16, 2022, and was preceded by an earlier mission during
+March 17–April 20, 2022. The first mission provided initial assistance to the authorities in
+operationalizing the new bank recovery and resolution framework described in the Financial
+Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Technical Note titled _Financial Safety Net, Resolution_
+_and Crisis Management_, September 17, 2021. This second mission deepened that assistance,
+with respect to operationalizing the key resolution tools. The TA team for both missions
+comprised Alessandro Santoni (Mission Chief, MCM), and Antonio Carrascosa and
+David Scott (both External Experts).
+
+The mission team would like to express its appreciation to Governor Koba Gvenetadze and to
+the staff of the NBG, MoF, DIA, and ISSA for the excellent cooperation and arrangements
+made to facilitate its work, as well as for constructive and open discussions.
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+
+**While challenges remain, the Georgian authorities have made progress in implementing**
+**the recommendations of the first TA mission** . Drafts of resolution playbooks have been
+prepared, including for operationalizing the bail-in, sale of business, and bridge bank
+resolution tools, as well as for the overall resolution process and for resolution funding.
+Second-round resolution plans for systemically important banks (SIBs) are being prepared,
+and a first-round plan for another bank that might become subject to resolution has been
+initiated. At the MoF, an outline and the preliminary contents of a playbook for the
+establishment, operation, and funding of a bridge bank (which would be owned directly or
+indirectly by the MoF) has been developed. The four agencies jointly have made progress in
+establishing the Interagency Financial Stability Committee (IFSC) framework by forming a
+working group to oversee the development of agency-wide and, eventually, a national
+financial crisis contingency plan. [1] The Resolution and Liquidation Division (RLD) of the
+NBG continues to face staffing challenges, however, as unit staff leave the NBG for positions
+elsewhere. A new head of the RLD was recently appointed following the departure of the
+previous incumbent after the first MCM mission.
+
+**The focus of this second MCM mission was to support further development of key**
+**elements of the resolution regime** . This included presentations and discussions on:
+(i) playbooks for use of the sale of business and bridge bank resolution tools; (ii) identifying
+and mitigating impediments to resolution; (iii) data requirements for undertaking the
+valuations necessary to support resolutions; (iv) resolution funding options, including use of
+the new Resolution Fund; (v) the preparation of bilateral playbooks to support interagency
+coordination; and (vi) a simulation exercise on a failing bank.
+
+**In collaboration with the authorities, the mission developed several recommendations**
+(Table 1) regarding the staffing of the RLD; the build-up of an adequate loss-absorbing
+capacity (LAC) to make the preferred resolution tool implementable for the two largest banks
+(bail-in); obtaining certainty on the bail-in-ability of financial instruments issued in foreign
+jurisdictions (United Kingdom and Ireland); finalizing playbooks on bail-in, sale of business
+and bridge banks; continuing work on the operationalization of temporary public funding
+(TPF) and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA); deepening ongoing work on resolution
+planning; and further clarifying the IFSC’s role in individual bank resolution cases.
+
+
+1 See Table 3 for a complete list of actions taken by the authorities after the first mission.
+
+
+
+6
+
+
+**Table 1. Georgia: Second TA Mission Key Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommendations and Authority Responsible for
Implementation|Priority 1|Timeframe2|Authority|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
Increase staffing of RLD while maintaining momentum
on ongoing training.|H|MT|NBG|
+|
The NBG should require banks to build up adequate
levels of LAC.|H|NT|NBG|
+|
Seek certainty on the bail-in-ability of financial
instruments issued in foreign jurisdictions.|H|NT|NBG|
+|
The authorities should hire external legal advice to
facilitate the operationalization of the resolution
strategies.|H|NT|NBG|
+|
Include contractual clauses on bail-in-ability in all new
issuances.|H|NT|NBG|
+|
Continue steps to operationalize TPF and ELA.|H|MT|NBG, MoF|
+|Finalize the authorities’ playbooks on bail-in, sale of
business, and bridge bank.|M|MT|NBG, MoF|
+|
Continue resolution planning, focusing on
operationalization of resolution tools, separability,
operational continuity, and liquidity in resolution.|M|MT|NBG|
+|
Complete revisions to the creditor hierarchy.|H|NT|NBG, MoF|
+|Clarify the role of the IFSC in individual bank resolution
cases.
|M|MT|IFSC|
+
+
+1 H: High, M: Medium.
+2 Near term: < 12 months; Medium term: 12 to 24 months.
+
+
+
+7
+
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+
+**A. Overview of the Georgia Financial System**
+
+1. **The financial sector in Georgia is concentrated, with two commercial banks of**
+**roughly the same size,** **TBC Bank (TBC) and Bank of Georgia (BOG), having a**
+**combined asset market share of about 75 percent** . Both banks are subsidiaries of parent
+nonfinancial legal entities listed on the London Stock Exchange and are deemed SIBs by the
+NBG. Both banks encompass several legal entities licensed and based in Georgia and in a
+few foreign markets (Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan), some of which are subsidiaries
+of the bank and others are subsidiaries of the parent entity (sister entities to the bank). The
+third SIB, Liberty Bank, with a 5 percent share of assets, is a subsidiary of a Georgian
+company that is a subsidiary of an unlisted Netherlands holding company controlled by three
+individuals. It has no significant subsidiaries or sister financial entities. There are 11 other
+commercial banks, including 2 locally owned banks, 7 subsidiaries of foreign banks or
+financial groups (based in Azerbaijan, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Russia, and
+Turkey); and 2 foreign-owned banks (in China and the United Arab Emirates). Overall,
+Georgian banks are well capitalized, liquid, and profitable. See Table 2 for additional details.
+
+
+**Table 2. Georgia: Financial Soundness Indicators**
+
+(As of June 30, 2022)
+(in percent)
+
+**Assets of banks** 1H2022
+
+Loans/total assets 68
+
+Net NPLs/total loans [1] 4.7
+
+FX Loans/total loans 48.6
+
+Securities/total assets 9.4
+
+
+**Liabilities of banks**
+
+Liquid Assets/Total Assets 20.7
+
+Total deposits/total liabilities 71
+
+
+**Capital adequacy**
+
+CET1 14.4
+
+Tier 1 16.5
+
+Total capital ratio 20.3
+
+
+**Profitability**
+
+ROA 2.7
+
+ROE 20.7
+Source: Central Bank of Georgia.
+
+1 Local NPL definition.
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+2. **The economic environment has improved, as COVID-19 has been brought under**
+**control but there are new challenges emerging** . Economic growth is strong, interest rates
+have risen, the exchange rate is historically high, and credit maintains a high growth rate.
+Increasing international commodity prices have contributed to rising inflation and
+inflationary expectations. New challenges are emerging. A sharp inflow of people and funds
+from Russia has put upward pressure on real estate prices. The increasing interest rates trend
+and the continuing high level of foreign currency lending has increased credit risks.
+
+
+**B** . **Authorities’ Progress since the First Mission**
+
+3. **The mission reviewed with the authorities the steps taken after the TA** **mission**
+**that took place during** **March 17–April 20, 2022** . The authorities have made progress in
+implementing the recommendations of the first TA mission. The supervision function agreed
+to take full control of recovery plan assessments, while it started working on the
+identification of early intervention measures (EIMs) and on failing or likely to fail (FOLTF)
+qualitative and quantitative triggers. The resolution function produced drafts of key
+playbooks while second-round resolution plans for systemically important banks (SIBs) are
+being prepared. At the MoF, an outline and the preliminary contents of a playbook for the
+establishment, operation, and funding of a bridge bank (which would be owned directly or
+indirectly by the MoF) has been developed. The IFSC held its first meeting, where it
+reviewed progress in implementing the recovery and resolution regime and formed a working
+group to oversee development of financial crisis contingency plans.
+
+
+**Table 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|First Mission Recommendation1|Authorities’ Actions|
+|---|---|
+|
**_Near-Term Priorities_** (Taken from Table 1 of the First Mission’s Aide-Mémoire.)|
**_Near-Term Priorities_** (Taken from Table 1 of the First Mission’s Aide-Mémoire.)|
+|
Adopt clear separation of responsibility for
recovery and resolution planning between the
supervisory and resolution functions.|
Implemented.|
+|Invest in recruiting and training of resolution
function staff.|New head of the RLD was recruited from within
the NBG, and an additional staff position was
added. Staff are attending relevant training
offered by the Joint Vienna Institute and others.|
+|Establish a small team of senior supervisors
with appropriate experience and knowledge to
lead and coordinate review of all recovery
plans.
|Banks’ lead supervisors have been assigned
lead responsibility for reviewing recovery plans.
The RLD has undertaken a benchmarking
analysis of the plans to provide consistent
feedback to the supervisors.|
+
+
+
+9
+
+
+**Table 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission**
+
+**(continued)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|First Mission Recommendation1|Authorities’ Actions|
+|---|---|
+|
Undertake further work in resolution planning, in
particular the ability to implement the resolution
tools, to ensure operational continuity and
liquidity in resolution, and to enable separability.|
Second-round resolution plans for SIBs are
being prepared, a first-round plan for another
bank is being prepared, and work on playbooks
to operationalize resolution tools is proceeding
(see below).|
+|Adopt formal work programs involving revisiting
key playbooks to identify gaps and
incompleteness, setting priorities for remedying
those, and initiating work on contingency plans.|Analyzed which playbooks, policy and
procedures were most important based on the
first IMF TA mission and the FSAP. Prepared
draft versions of key playbooks/procedures
(bail-in, sale of business, resolution process,
resolution fund, bridge bank). An IFSC Working
Group has been formed and has initiated work
on systemwide crisis management plans.|
+|Introduce a formal playbook and plan testing
programs on an annual cycle.|Not yet commenced.|
+|Redraft the IFSC Charter with sections on its
role in normal times and in crisis times.|Further work pending discussion during second
mission.|
+|**_Medium-Term Priorities_**|**_Medium-Term Priorities_**|
+|
Strengthen the supervisory measures and EIMs
regime by clarifying triggers (qualitative and
quantitative) for a graduated escalation process.|Work in progress by supervisory function.|
+|Clarify the escalation process for adoption of
supervisory measures and EIMs, and for
engagement with the resolution function.|Work in progress by supervisory and resolution
functions.|
+|Adopt a formal communication policy
addressing the use of EIMs.|Relevant departments and divisions have been
identified. Work in progress.|
+|Introduce clear standards or indicators of non-
viability to help guide FOLTF determinations.|Work in progress by supervisory and resolution
functions.|
+|Provide more guidance to banks for preparing
and maintaining up-to-date recovery plans.|Recovery rule amended to require banks to
adopt trigger indicators (ratios) far above
minimum supervisory requirements. Have
maintained ongoing engagement with relevant
units in banks to ensure NBG feedback is
understood and acted upon. Further written
guidance to be developed in the near future.|
+|Analyze alternatives to current TPF policies,
especially to consider the deployment of all TPF
through the resolution fund and to use the DIF
to finance resolution transactions.
|Have explored some options to get a fully
funded resolution fund trying to avoid the use of
TPF.|
+
+
+
+10
+
+
+**Table 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission (concluded)**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|First Mission Recommendation1|Authorities’ Actions|
+|---|---|
+|
Perform stocktaking of contractual clauses in
banks’ current issuances of subordinated and
senior debt to determine whether the bail-in-
ability of the instruments is recognized.|
Have identified potentially bail-in able liabilities
but an assessment of which liabilities can be
bailed-in in practice is a work in progress. Key
challenge is that most relevant liabilities are
issued in foreign jurisdictions. Have initiated
communication with the Central Bank of Ireland
and Bank of England. Will undertake further
analysis to find possible solutions to potential
impediments to foreign debt bail-in-ability.|
+
+
+
+1 Taken from Table 1 of the first mission’s Technical Assistance Report.
+
+
+**II. RECOVERY PLANNING,** **EARLY INTERVENTION,** **RESOLUTION PLANNING, AND**
+
+**RESOLUTION FUNDING**
+
+
+**A.** **Recovery Planning**
+
+
+4. **The mission reviewed steps by the NBG to reinforce its internal procedures for**
+**the supervisory review and assessment of recovery plans** . First-round plans were received
+early in 2022, and the first TA mission made several recommendations to strengthen their
+content. That mission recommended establishing a small team of senior supervisors with the
+appropriate experience and knowledge to lead and coordinate the review of all SIB recovery
+plans. Also, that the NBG develop templates covering, e.g., early warning and escalation
+triggers, recovery options, and scenarios as tools that would help communicate the NBG’s
+expectations. The NBG adopted a clear separation of responsibility for recovery and
+resolution planning between the supervisory and resolution functions. Banks’ lead
+supervisors have been assigned central responsibility for reviewing the recovery plans. The
+RLD has undertaken a benchmarking analysis of the plans to provide consistent feedback to
+the supervisors.
+
+
+5. **The current mission reviewed the benchmarking analysis and acknowledged the**
+**significant work done by the resolution function** . The benchmarking tool allowed a clear
+comparison of recovery options and scenarios among the different recovery plans. This will
+be important for the assessment while providing banks with useful feedback. The mission
+suggested further improvement for the benchmarking tool and advised keeping the
+instrument simple and scalable.
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+**B.** **Early Intervention and FOLTF**
+
+
+6. **The mission reviewed progress on enhancing the early intervention framework** .
+The first mission recommended, as medium-term priorities, clarifying the triggers for a
+graduated escalation process; clarifying the escalation process for adoption of EIMs and for
+engagement with the RLD; and adopting a formal communication policy that addresses the
+use of EIMs. Since the first mission, the supervision function started working on the
+identification of EIM quantitative triggers. The function acknowledged that the current EIMs
+framework is basically limited to the temporary administrator powers and agreed to start
+working on internal guidance to make the instrument more useful for the supervision
+function. The NBG would potentially consider a wider range of early intervention measures
+(even overlapping supervisory measures) that could help give a clear warning to institutions
+that, if they do not change course, they could start the failing or likely to fail procedure.
+
+
+7. **Further progress is required in two areas.** The current mission reiterated the first
+mission’s recommendation to clarify Article 30 of the Banking Law, which explicitly
+mentions only the temporary administrator measure as EIMs. The mission understands that
+the authorities have a more extended view (measures are already included in Article 30, but
+not explicitly mentioned as EIMs [2] ). The NBG also should review its internal supervisory
+early intervention framework to integrate the activation of recovery plans. The first mission
+also observed that the authorities have no clear standards or indicators of nonviability/
+FOLTF to help guide decisions, and recommended they be adopted. Since the first mission,
+the supervision function has started working on the identification of FOLTF quantitative
+triggers.
+
+8. **The mission further discussed the NBG’s internal information-sharing**
+**arrangements** . As the first mission highlighted, the NBG should ensure that robust
+arrangements and procedures for the exchange of information between the supervisory and
+resolution functions are in place. While cooperation is apparently good, it is necessary to
+formalize that cooperation for times of potential stress, especially with respect to
+documentation prepared by the supervisory function (e.g., onsite inspection findings, EIMs
+taken), which will be essential to transmit to the resolution function.
+
+
+2 For example: a) require a bank to implement one or more of the measures set out in the recovery plan;
+b) require a bank to carry out valuation of a bank’s assets and liabilities by an independent valuator approved by
+the NBG; and c) require changes to a bank’s business strategy or to the ownership or to the organizational
+structure of a bank.
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+**C.** **Resolution Planning and Preparedness**
+
+
+9. **The mission delivered a simulation to help the authorities benchmark their**
+**progress on resolution planning and preparedness.** The mission gave the authorities
+stylized information on a failing bank. The authorities were asked to consider: (i) whether the
+bank should go into resolution or liquidation; (ii) the use of the different resolution tools and
+their impact on uninsured domestic and foreign deposits; (iii) challenges posed by a large
+share of retail investors in the subordinated debt issued by the bank; and (iv) the possibility
+of contagion to other domestic banks and the impact of the different options on risks to
+taxpayers. Finally, they had to calculate the amount of temporary public funding needed to
+recapitalize that bank under different scenarios of private burden sharing, and to set
+safeguards if the use of public funds proved necessary to preserve financial stability.
+
+10. **Recommendations made in the first TA mission on setting up the RLD are still**
+**pending** . Within a few months of the first mission, the two highest ranked staff of the
+division have left; indicative of wider problems with staff retention. Relocating the RLD to
+the Financial Stability Department, which reports directly to the governor, is expected during
+the fourth quarter of 2022. As the first TA mission highlighted, the NBG should ensure that
+arrangements and procedures for the exchange of information between the supervisory and
+resolution authorities are in place. While good so far, it is necessary to formalize cooperation,
+especially with respect to documentation prepared by the supervisory function (e.g., onsite
+inspection findings, EIMs taken), as transmission to the resolution function will be essential.
+
+
+11. **The NBG is in the process of preparing second-round resolution plans for the**
+**SIBs and has begun preparing a first-round plan for another bank, following on the**
+**development of first-round plans for the SIBs earlier this year** . The RLD is focused, in its
+resolution planning activity, on the development of stress scenarios to assess the possible
+funding gaps in resolution. This is positive, although some assumptions of that analysis
+should be more realistic, and further work is needed on the implementation of resolution
+tools, operational continuity, separability, and liquidity in resolution. Interaction with banks
+is crucial at this stage, especially on the management of information systems, operational
+continuity, liquidity arrangements, governance, etc. Some (non-substantive) impediments to
+resolvability can be removed through that interaction. The monitoring process by the NBG
+should evolve progressively, using more testing, deep-dive exercises, and onsite inspections.
+
+
+12. **While progress has been made, further steps are needed to implement**
+**resolvability assessments** . These include putting in place a clear framework of the RLD’s
+expectations for banks, issuing operational guidance on relevant topics, establishing a
+phased-in approach to achieving resolvability across the different areas (for example, the
+capacity of absorbing losses and recapitalizing the bank by means of building up LAC) and
+prioritizing the resolvability assessment of some categories of banks (for example, the largest
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+ones). Initial drafts of playbooks for use of the bail-in, bridge bank, and sale of business
+resolution tools have been developed by the NBG and the MoF has identified the contents of
+a playbook for bridge banks and resolution funding (use of TPF).
+
+13. **The mission provided significant inputs and held lengthy discussions on**
+**preparing for the use of the bridge bank tool and related funding requirements** . Both
+the MoF and the NBG need to undertake further work. The MoF’s main tasks relate to its
+role as the direct, or indirect, owner and operator of the bridge bank and as the gatekeeper for
+the use of TPF to support resolution. The MoF should address the modalities of funding the
+bridge bank to ensure meeting its capital and liquidity needs, streamlining the decisionmaking process, and identifying and preparing for steps necessary to pass an amendment of
+the Annual Budget Law. Parliamentary approval of such an amendment would likely be
+required to provide TPF.
+
+
+14. **The NBG’s outstanding tasks pertain to the need to develop a viable resolution**
+**scheme and to estimate potential funding requirements and sources.** Pre-planning is
+required for the valuation and transfer of assets, liabilities, contingent claims, staff, operating
+premises, etc., to the bridge bank. The transfer perimeter—those components of the bank in
+resolution that will be transferred to the bridge bank—will need to be determined, with the
+objective of ensuring the resulting bridge bank is adequately capitalized and liquid, and
+operationally sound and functional. Required structural and operational changes must be
+identified in advance, as certain contracts may need to be amended to enable their transfer,
+and potential litigation risks and tax implications would need to be assessed, etc.
+Arrangements to obtain the MoF’s concurrence for TPF and/or to indemnify NBG funding [3]
+are required. In addition, the RLD will need to prepare a list of pre-selected candidates to
+undertake valuations, [4] ensure continued access to financial market infrastructures, and ensure
+banks’ capabilities to provide accurate and timely information to support resolution planning,
+and at the point of resolution. [5] Other tasks include the Legal Department elaborating
+templates and drafts for all the decisions, addressing the set-up and operation of the bridge
+bank, including the identification of candidates with an adequate technical profile to serve as
+supervisory and management board members (in cooperation with the NBG), the approval of
+internal procedures to specify how various tasks must be completed, and the Communication
+Department developing a communication plan.
+
+
+3 Under the provisions of the NBG Act, the NBG must also obtain a MoF guarantee in order to provide any
+ELA to a bank pending or undergoing resolution.
+
+4 Including a draft Request-for-Proposal.
+
+5 The mission also provided advice on preparing MoF-NBG bilateral playbooks addressing coordination in the
+use of the bridge bank tool and in resolution funding.
+
+
+
+14
+
+
+15. **Requiring banks to build up LAC in a timebound manner will progressively**
+**reduce the potential contingent liability of the MoF to provide TPF for resolution**
+**funding** . The dollarization of the Georgian economy, including the public sector, could
+increase the sovereign/banking loop in some circumstances. To reduce that risk is an
+additional reason to strengthen the banks’ internal capacity to absorb losses. The current
+banking market structure, with two very large banks, raises many resolvability challenges.
+The preferred resolution strategy for these two banks is bail-in, although its application could
+generate financial stability concerns in some circumstances. To reduce those concerns, the
+build-up of adequate LAC is needed. The current high level of bank profitability should
+encourage the authorities to start the process. The mission provided advice on setting LAC
+targets for the SIBs.
+
+16. **The authorities should take further steps to minimize legal uncertainty as to**
+**whether resolution decisions will be sustained by relevant courts** . This is especially the
+case with respect to the feasibility of bailing in the significant volume of SIB debt that has
+been issued in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The NBG has initiated discussions with the
+bank resolution authorities in Ireland and the United Kingdom. However, until such time as
+debt contracts contain contractual clauses stipulating their ability to be bailed in at the NBG’s
+sole discretion, legal uncertainty will remain unacceptably high. The mission recommended
+the NBG seek the advice of external expert counsel and suggested an effective way to obtain
+this advice would be to require issuing banks to obtain expert external legal opinions. The
+authorities agreed with this approach.
+
+17. **The high concentration of the Georgian banking market poses distinct**
+**challenges to applying the sale-of-business tool** . A way to tackle the problem in an asset
+sale transaction is to open the bidding processes to large international investors (especially
+banks) and to make, in general, domestic market more investor friendly.
+
+
+18. **Another potential impediment to resolvability is linked to the banks’ capacity to**
+**provide the necessary data for many resolution purposes in a timely manner** . As
+templates provided by the NBG are crucial to promoting banks’ preparedness, the mission
+provided examples for valuation, preparation of a resolution scheme, and setting up a virtual
+data-room.
+
+
+**D.** **Resolution Funding**
+
+
+19. **The mission discussed resolution funding options with the NBG and the MoF** .
+The first TA mission had suggested that, to the extent practical, all resolution funding by the
+MoF be delivered through the conduit of the new ex post-funded resolution fund, repaid by
+levies on the banking industry following a resolution, and that the authorities explore the
+potential for creating a source of ex ante funding. The MoF’s policy position was that the
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+MoF’s direct funding would only be provided for the purpose of capitalizing a bridge bank, [6]
+and the mission recommended that mechanisms be explored so that even this funding could
+be channeled through the resolution fund, where the banking industry would ultimately be
+responsible for covering any losses incurred. The MoF is considering the options in this
+regard and the NBG has begun exploring the potential of creating an ex ante fund as a
+complement to the resolution fund. Ex ante resolution funds are becoming common in
+several jurisdictions (e.g., in Europe), but there are still some challenges that would need to
+be taken into consideration. [7]
+
+20. **The operationalization of the use of the TPF has institutional implications** . First,
+the MoF and the NBG should develop an internal contingency policy framework that will
+help ensure a shared understanding of situations that might arise and facilitate rapid decision
+making. Second, still to be determined by the MoF are the budget accounting and reporting
+implications of the provisions of TPF, and whether parliamentary approval would be
+required. Third, if the provision of TPF by the MoF is subject to parliamentary approval, the
+MoF should prepare templates for the documentation that would need to be sent to the
+government and to the parliament to secure approval.
+
+21. **The need to ensure adequate funding for liquidity pre- and post-resolution was**
+**discussed** . The NBG can lend to a bank pending or undergoing resolution against a wide
+range of collateral. To do so, it must obtain an MoF guarantee, which is at the MoF’s
+discretion. The MoF can provide liquidity funding directly, too, but also indirectly. Here
+again, the budget accounting and reporting, and parliamentary approval implications, are still
+being assessed. The mission recommended that the MoF should rely as much as possible on
+the NBG’s expertise.
+
+
+22. **The mission emphasized that operationalizing ELA in resolution requires prior**
+**institutional arrangements** . A formal joint agreement between the MoF and the NBG for
+the execution of the MoF guarantee for ELA is needed. This agreement should also address
+the MoF’s expectations regarding the NBG’s additional collateral requirements for ELA. [8]
+The agreement should define in detail the procedures for putting in place the guarantee, and
+
+
+6 The legal framework provides for a broader range of potential uses of direct MoF funding.
+
+7 For example, opportunity costs through lower bank profits (potentially reducing capital or dividends, and
+lending) with resources invested in low return safe assets; it may need to be large to cover systemic risks—
+earmarking a large pool of (scarce) national savings; a paid-in fund may fuel the perception that uninsured
+creditors will be bailed out, increasing moral hazard (more than an ex-post fund). _“Resolution Funding: Who_
+_Pays When Financial Institutions Fail?”_ Oana Croitoru, Marc Dobler, and Johan Molin, Technical Notes and
+Manuals 18/01, 2018, IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
+
+8 As of Art 33.d Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia.
+
+
+
+16
+
+
+for calling upon the guarantee in the event of a default on the ELA and a consequent loss,
+including the roles of both parties in the different steps of the decision process.
+
+
+23. **Another potential source of funding for resolution should be the Deposit**
+**Insurance Fund (DIF)** . There are arguments for using the DIF to support bank resolutions
+and not just for paying out depositors in liquidation; bank resolution and deposit insurance
+have closely aligned roles in preserving financial stability and preventing bank runs. There
+are significant efficiency gains by maximizing value and reducing disruption when
+transferring deposits from the failing bank to another bank. This approach requires robust
+safeguards (e.g., “least cost” test relative to the alternative of bankruptcy and a payout) and
+adequate resourcing.
+
+
+24. **In Georgia, the Deposit Insurance System works as a paybox only, and allowing**
+**alternative uses of the DIF would require a change in legislation** . As noted in the 2021
+FSAP Technical Notes on Financial Safety Notes, the power to transfer assets and liabilities
+to an acquiring bank is explicitly available under the liquidation legal regime. The authorities
+should amend the legal regime to enable the DIF to be able to fund P&A transactions in
+liquidation, if it is a lesser cost for the DIF. In addition, the authorities should consider
+amending the DIA legal regime to make available the P&A/transfer tool for use with smaller
+banks.
+
+
+**III. CREDITOR HIERARCHY IN LIQUIDATION AND RESOLUTION**
+
+
+25. **The authorities provided the first mission with a proposal for a revised legal text**
+**for the creditor hierarchy and the second mission discussed the authorities’ remaining**
+**questions and concerns.** The main concern held over from the first mission was the status of
+the Pension Agency. The Pension Agency collects mandatory pension premiums and is a
+large depositor in the banking system. The authorities raised a new question regarding the
+proper status of nominal accounts, which are single deposit accounts in which the
+accumulated funds of many individual clients are held, for example, by law firms and
+e-money providers. The mission reiterated the view expressed in the first mission that the
+Pension Agency should rank higher in the hierarchy than it does currently. The authorities
+committed to undertake further internal discussions on the matter.
+
+
+26. **The mission discussed the nature of nominal accounts, including their status**
+**under the deposit insurance regime** . [9] While sponsors of nominal accounts are required to
+be able to identify daily the holdings of individual clients, there is no separate deposit
+insurance coverage for the individual clients. The mission recommended, in line with the
+
+
+9 Nominal accounts are the deposit accounts of, for example, a notary, lawyer, law office, securities market
+intermediary, the Pension Agency, or payment service provider, which holds collectively the funds of multiple
+clients.
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+IADI general principles, that nominal accounts not be provided any special treatment in the
+creditor hierarchy. The remedy to the authorities’ concerns is for the owners/sponsors of
+nominal accounts to enter security arrangements with the banks with which they do business,
+to ensure that the funds are collateralized, and to consider arrangements eventually to extend
+deposit insurance protection to the individual clients within a nominal account.
+
+
+**IV. INTER-AGENCY CRISIS PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION**
+
+
+27. **The mission provided additional guidance on the nature and content of the**
+**various bilateral playbooks that were identified during the first mission** . Bilateral
+playbooks are required to address joint NBG-MoF coordination in the context of potential
+use of the bridge bank resolution tool, and in the provision of resolution funding in the form
+of TPF and ELA. The NBG and the MoF should consider whether a broader coordination
+framework addressing a systemic crisis scenario involving, for example, the potential failure
+of several banks simultaneously, should be documented by means of a joint playbook. The
+joint playbooks for bridge banks, TPF, and ELA could potentially be incorporated into such a
+broader coordination framework playbook. The NBG and the DIA require a joint playbook
+for coordination in case a bank might be declared FOLTF and put into liquidation. The DIA
+and the NBG require a joint playbook that addresses the eventuality that the DIA needs to
+liquify the DIF investment portfolio. The DIA and the MoF require a joint playbook for
+coordination in the event the DIA needs to borrow from the MoF to replenish the DIF.
+
+28. **The mission focused on the role of the IFSC in individual bank failure resolution**
+**cases** . The IFSC held its second meeting in June 2022, where it reviewed progress in
+implementing the recovery and resolution framework as well as the recommendations of the
+first TA report, among other agenda items. As recommended in the first TA mission, it
+formed a Working Group to oversee development of individual agency financial crisis
+continency plans, leading eventually to a national plan. The current mission observed that the
+provisions of the NBG Law, the MoF-NBG Joint Regulation on Temporary Public Funding
+and the Resolution Fund, and the IFSC Charter all address a potential IFSC role in individual
+bank resolution cases. We envisage for the IFSC a coordination and consultancy role, rather
+than a decision-making role within the resolution process, as members should retain their
+independent decision-making authorities according to their mandates. The mission
+highlighted the need to consider revisions to the MoF-NBG Joint Regulation and the Charter,
+based on agreements reached by the MoF and the NBG in developing the bilateral
+playbook(s) on resolution funding and bridge banks, which in turn would be based on the
+MoF and NBG internal playbooks.
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-119/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e8863ba89717a53f2ee4e0ee296f4ff3eeb12bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-119-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-119/assets/figures/cr-2023-119-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9599f93660619145", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-119-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1239, "page": 2, "phash_256": "aaaa70fe60bee514bd401c839f83438b4f8bbfc19c003eb0e19e407f507bd87d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "sha256_normalized_png": "7ffa29db4a8c56d2d11b99336a5767597b7a3986c9fc05db455a76e657612f45", "width": 952}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-119/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..985d536399523c53e340b33f40ee8a50dc8be77d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-119/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-119-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMarch 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/119**\n### **GEORGIA**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—** **OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW BANK RECOVERY AND** **RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Georgia was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2023.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "March 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/119\nGEORGIA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT— OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS\n\nThis technical assistance report on Georgia was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2023.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 595}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-119-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL REPORT\n\n GEORGIA\n Operationalizing the Bank Recovery and\n Resolution Framework—Second Mission\n\n March 2023\n\n\n Prepared By\n Alessandro Santoni (Mission Chief, MCM); and Antonio Carrascosa and David Scott\n (External Experts)\n\n\nMonetary and Capital Markets\nDepartment", "text_characters": 229}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "2\n\n\n**Content** **Page**\n\n\nGlossary .....................................................................................................................................3\n\n\nPreface........................................................................................................................................4\n\nExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................................5\n\n\nI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................7\n\n\nII. Recovery Planning, Early Intervention, Resolution Planning, and Resolution Funding ....10\nA. Recovery Planning .............................................................................................................10\nB. Early Intervention and FOLTF ..........................................................................................11\nC. Resolution Planning and Preparedness ..............................................................................12\nD. Resolution Funding ............................................................................................................14\n\n\nIII. Creditor Hierarchy in Liquidation and Resolution ............................................................16\n\n\nIV. Inter-Agency Crisis Preparedness and Coordination .........................................................17\n\nTables\n1. Second TA Mission Key Recommendations ........................................................................6\n2. Financial Soundness Indicators.............................................................................................7\n3. Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission .........................................................................8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "2\n\nContent Page\n\nGlossary .....................................................................................................................................3\n\nPreface........................................................................................................................................4\n\nExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................................5\n\nI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................7\n\nII. Recovery Planning, Early Intervention, Resolution Planning, and Resolution Funding ....10\nA. Recovery Planning .............................................................................................................10\nB. Early Intervention and FOLTF ..........................................................................................11\nC. Resolution Planning and Preparedness ..............................................................................12\nD. Resolution Funding ............................................................................................................14\n\nIII. Creditor Hierarchy in Liquidation and Resolution ............................................................16\n\nIV. Inter-Agency Crisis Preparedness and Coordination .........................................................17\n\nTables\n1. Second TA Mission Key Recommendations ........................................................................6\n2. Financial Soundness Indicators.............................................................................................7\n3. Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission .........................................................................8", "text_characters": 1710}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "3\n\n\n**GLOSSARY**\n\nBCL Business Continuity Plan\nBSD Banking Supervision Department\nCCG Crisis Coordination Group\nCoCo Contingent Convertible Bond\nDIA Deposit Insurance Agency\nDIF Deposit Insurance Fund\nEIM Early Intervention Measures\nELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance\nFOLTF Failing or Likely to Fail\nFSB Financial Stability Board\nFSC Financial Stability Committee\nFTE Full Time Equivalent\nGFSR Group of Financial Sector Regulators\nIADI International Association of Deposit Insurers\nICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process\nIFSC Interagency Financial Stability Committee\nILAAP Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nISSA Insurance State Supervision Service\nIT Information Technology\nKA Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions\nLAC Loss-Absorbing Capacity\nMCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMPE Multiple Points of Entry\nNBG National Bank of Georgia\nNCWO No Credit Worse Off\nNPL Nonperforming Loan\nP&A Purchase and Assumption\nRLD Resolution and Liquidation Division\nSCG Securities Commission of Georgia\nSIB Systemically Important Bank\nSPE Single Point of Entry\nTPF Temporary Public Funding\nTA Technical Assistance", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3\n\nGLOSSARY\n\nBCL Business Continuity Plan\nBSD Banking Supervision Department\nCCG Crisis Coordination Group\nCoCo Contingent Convertible Bond\nDIA Deposit Insurance Agency\nDIF Deposit Insurance Fund\nEIM Early Intervention Measures\nELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance\nFOLTF Failing or Likely to Fail\nFSB Financial Stability Board\nFSC Financial Stability Committee\nFTE Full Time Equivalent\nGFSR Group of Financial Sector Regulators\nIADI International Association of Deposit Insurers\nICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process\nIFSC Interagency Financial Stability Committee\nILAAP Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nISSA Insurance State Supervision Service\nIT Information Technology\nKA Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions\nLAC Loss-Absorbing Capacity\nMCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMPE Multiple Points of Entry\nNBG National Bank of Georgia\nNCWO No Credit Worse Off\nNPL Nonperforming Loan\nP&A Purchase and Assumption\nRLD Resolution and Liquidation Division\nSCG Securities Commission of Georgia\nSIB Systemically Important Bank\nSPE Single Point of Entry\nTPF Temporary Public Funding\nTA Technical Assistance", "text_characters": 1084}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "4\n\n\n**PREFACE**\n\n\nAt the request of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG), the Monetary and Capital Markets\n(MCM) Department is providing technical assistance (TA) to the Georgian authorities,\nincluding the NBG, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA),\nand the Insurance State Supervisory Service (ISSA). This was the second TA mission, which\ntook place during September 5–16, 2022, and was preceded by an earlier mission during\nMarch 17–April 20, 2022. The first mission provided initial assistance to the authorities in\noperationalizing the new bank recovery and resolution framework described in the Financial\nSector Assessment Program (FSAP) Technical Note titled _Financial Safety Net, Resolution_\n_and Crisis Management_, September 17, 2021. This second mission deepened that assistance,\nwith respect to operationalizing the key resolution tools. The TA team for both missions\ncomprised Alessandro Santoni (Mission Chief, MCM), and Antonio Carrascosa and\nDavid Scott (both External Experts).\n\nThe mission team would like to express its appreciation to Governor Koba Gvenetadze and to\nthe staff of the NBG, MoF, DIA, and ISSA for the excellent cooperation and arrangements\nmade to facilitate its work, as well as for constructive and open discussions.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "4\n\nPREFACE\n\nAt the request of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG), the Monetary and Capital Markets\n(MCM) Department is providing technical assistance (TA) to the Georgian authorities,\nincluding the NBG, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA),\nand the Insurance State Supervisory Service (ISSA). This was the second TA mission, which\ntook place during September 5–16, 2022, and was preceded by an earlier mission during\nMarch 17–April 20, 2022. The first mission provided initial assistance to the authorities in\noperationalizing the new bank recovery and resolution framework described in the Financial\nSector Assessment Program (FSAP) Technical Note titled _Financial Safety Net, Resolution_\n_and Crisis Management_, September 17, 2021. This second mission deepened that assistance,\nwith respect to operationalizing the key resolution tools. The TA team for both missions\ncomprised Alessandro Santoni (Mission Chief, MCM), and Antonio Carrascosa and\nDavid Scott (both External Experts).\n\nThe mission team would like to express its appreciation to Governor Koba Gvenetadze and to\nthe staff of the NBG, MoF, DIA, and ISSA for the excellent cooperation and arrangements\nmade to facilitate its work, as well as for constructive and open discussions.", "text_characters": 1081}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "5\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n\n**While challenges remain, the Georgian authorities have made progress in implementing**\n**the recommendations of the first TA mission** . Drafts of resolution playbooks have been\nprepared, including for operationalizing the bail-in, sale of business, and bridge bank\nresolution tools, as well as for the overall resolution process and for resolution funding.\nSecond-round resolution plans for systemically important banks (SIBs) are being prepared,\nand a first-round plan for another bank that might become subject to resolution has been\ninitiated. At the MoF, an outline and the preliminary contents of a playbook for the\nestablishment, operation, and funding of a bridge bank (which would be owned directly or\nindirectly by the MoF) has been developed. The four agencies jointly have made progress in\nestablishing the Interagency Financial Stability Committee (IFSC) framework by forming a\nworking group to oversee the development of agency-wide and, eventually, a national\nfinancial crisis contingency plan. [1] The Resolution and Liquidation Division (RLD) of the\nNBG continues to face staffing challenges, however, as unit staff leave the NBG for positions\nelsewhere. A new head of the RLD was recently appointed following the departure of the\nprevious incumbent after the first MCM mission.\n\n**The focus of this second MCM mission was to support further development of key**\n**elements of the resolution regime** . This included presentations and discussions on:\n(i) playbooks for use of the sale of business and bridge bank resolution tools; (ii) identifying\nand mitigating impediments to resolution; (iii) data requirements for undertaking the\nvaluations necessary to support resolutions; (iv) resolution funding options, including use of\nthe new Resolution Fund; (v) the preparation of bilateral playbooks to support interagency\ncoordination; and (vi) a simulation exercise on a failing bank.\n\n**In collaboration with the authorities, the mission developed several recommendations**\n(Table 1) regarding the staffing of the RLD; the build-up of an adequate loss-absorbing\ncapacity (LAC) to make the preferred resolution tool implementable for the two largest banks\n(bail-in); obtaining certainty on the bail-in-ability of financial instruments issued in foreign\njurisdictions (United Kingdom and Ireland); finalizing playbooks on bail-in, sale of business\nand bridge banks; continuing work on the operationalization of temporary public funding\n(TPF) and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA); deepening ongoing work on resolution\nplanning; and further clarifying the IFSC’s role in individual bank resolution cases.\n\n\n1 See Table 3 for a complete list of actions taken by the authorities after the first mission.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "5\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nWhile challenges remain, the Georgian authorities have made progress in implementing\nthe recommendations of the first TA mission . Drafts of resolution playbooks have been\nprepared, including for operationalizing the bail-in, sale of business, and bridge bank\nresolution tools, as well as for the overall resolution process and for resolution funding.\nSecond-round resolution plans for systemically important banks (SIBs) are being prepared,\nand a first-round plan for another bank that might become subject to resolution has been\ninitiated. At the MoF, an outline and the preliminary contents of a playbook for the\nestablishment, operation, and funding of a bridge bank (which would be owned directly or\nindirectly by the MoF) has been developed. The four agencies jointly have made progress in\nestablishing the Interagency Financial Stability Committee (IFSC) framework by forming a\nworking group to oversee the development of agency-wide and, eventually, a national\nfinancial crisis contingency plan. [1] The Resolution and Liquidation Division (RLD) of the\nNBG continues to face staffing challenges, however, as unit staff leave the NBG for positions\nelsewhere. A new head of the RLD was recently appointed following the departure of the\nprevious incumbent after the first MCM mission.\n\nThe focus of this second MCM mission was to support further development of key\nelements of the resolution regime . This included presentations and discussions on:\n(i) playbooks for use of the sale of business and bridge bank resolution tools; (ii) identifying\nand mitigating impediments to resolution; (iii) data requirements for undertaking the\nvaluations necessary to support resolutions; (iv) resolution funding options, including use of\nthe new Resolution Fund; (v) the preparation of bilateral playbooks to support interagency\ncoordination; and (vi) a simulation exercise on a failing bank.\n\nIn collaboration with the authorities, the mission developed several recommendations\n(Table 1) regarding the staffing of the RLD; the build-up of an adequate loss-absorbing\ncapacity (LAC) to make the preferred resolution tool implementable for the two largest banks\n(bail-in); obtaining certainty on the bail-in-ability of financial instruments issued in foreign\njurisdictions (United Kingdom and Ireland); finalizing playbooks on bail-in, sale of business\nand bridge banks; continuing work on the operationalization of temporary public funding\n(TPF) and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA); deepening ongoing work on resolution\nplanning; and further clarifying the IFSC’s role in individual bank resolution cases.\n\n1 See Table 3 for a complete list of actions taken by the authorities after the first mission.", "text_characters": 2317}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "6\n\n\n**Table 1. Georgia: Second TA Mission Key Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Recommendations and Authority Responsible for
Implementation|Priority 1|Timeframe2|Authority|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
Increase staffing of RLD while maintaining momentum
on ongoing training.|H|MT|NBG|\n|
The NBG should require banks to build up adequate
levels of LAC.|H|NT|NBG|\n|
Seek certainty on the bail-in-ability of financial
instruments issued in foreign jurisdictions.|H|NT|NBG|\n|
The authorities should hire external legal advice to
facilitate the operationalization of the resolution
strategies.|H|NT|NBG|\n|
Include contractual clauses on bail-in-ability in all new
issuances.|H|NT|NBG|\n|
Continue steps to operationalize TPF and ELA.|H|MT|NBG, MoF|\n|Finalize the authorities’ playbooks on bail-in, sale of
business, and bridge bank.|M|MT|NBG, MoF|\n|
Continue resolution planning, focusing on
operationalization of resolution tools, separability,
operational continuity, and liquidity in resolution.|M|MT|NBG|\n|
Complete revisions to the creditor hierarchy.|H|NT|NBG, MoF|\n|Clarify the role of the IFSC in individual bank resolution
cases.
|M|MT|IFSC|\n\n\n1 H: High, M: Medium.\n2 Near term: < 12 months; Medium term: 12 to 24 months.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22000122070312, 101.11141204833984, 553.5800170898438, 434.8079833984375], "columns": 4, "rows": 11}], "text": "6\n\nTable 1. Georgia: Second TA Mission Key Recommendations\n\n Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation Priority 1 Timeframe2 Authority \n\n Increase staffing of RLD while maintaining momentum on ongoing training. H MT NBG \n The NBG should require banks to build up adequate levels of LAC. H NT NBG \n Seek certainty on the bail-in-ability of financial instruments issued in foreign jurisdictions. H NT NBG \n The authorities should hire external legal advice to facilitate the operationalization of the resolution strategies. H NT NBG \n Include contractual clauses on bail-in-ability in all new issuances. H NT NBG \n Continue steps to operationalize TPF and ELA. H MT NBG, MoF \n Finalize the authorities’ playbooks on bail-in, sale of business, and bridge bank. M MT NBG, MoF \n Continue resolution planning, focusing on operationalization of resolution tools, separability, operational continuity, and liquidity in resolution. M MT NBG \n Complete revisions to the creditor hierarchy. H NT NBG, MoF \n Clarify the role of the IFSC in individual bank resolution cases. M MT IFSC \n\n1 H: High, M: Medium.\n2 Near term: < 12 months; Medium term: 12 to 24 months.", "text_characters": 966}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "7\n\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n\n**A. Overview of the Georgia Financial System**\n\n1. **The financial sector in Georgia is concentrated, with two commercial banks of**\n**roughly the same size,** **TBC Bank (TBC) and Bank of Georgia (BOG), having a**\n**combined asset market share of about 75 percent** . Both banks are subsidiaries of parent\nnonfinancial legal entities listed on the London Stock Exchange and are deemed SIBs by the\nNBG. Both banks encompass several legal entities licensed and based in Georgia and in a\nfew foreign markets (Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan), some of which are subsidiaries\nof the bank and others are subsidiaries of the parent entity (sister entities to the bank). The\nthird SIB, Liberty Bank, with a 5 percent share of assets, is a subsidiary of a Georgian\ncompany that is a subsidiary of an unlisted Netherlands holding company controlled by three\nindividuals. It has no significant subsidiaries or sister financial entities. There are 11 other\ncommercial banks, including 2 locally owned banks, 7 subsidiaries of foreign banks or\nfinancial groups (based in Azerbaijan, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Russia, and\nTurkey); and 2 foreign-owned banks (in China and the United Arab Emirates). Overall,\nGeorgian banks are well capitalized, liquid, and profitable. See Table 2 for additional details.\n\n\n**Table 2. Georgia: Financial Soundness Indicators**\n\n(As of June 30, 2022)\n(in percent)\n\n**Assets of banks** 1H2022\n\nLoans/total assets 68\n\nNet NPLs/total loans [1] 4.7\n\nFX Loans/total loans 48.6\n\nSecurities/total assets 9.4\n\n\n**Liabilities of banks**\n\nLiquid Assets/Total Assets 20.7\n\nTotal deposits/total liabilities 71\n\n\n**Capital adequacy**\n\nCET1 14.4\n\nTier 1 16.5\n\nTotal capital ratio 20.3\n\n\n**Profitability**\n\nROA 2.7\n\nROE 20.7\nSource: Central Bank of Georgia.\n\n1 Local NPL definition.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "7\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\n\nA. Overview of the Georgia Financial System\n\n1. The financial sector in Georgia is concentrated, with two commercial banks of\nroughly the same size, TBC Bank (TBC) and Bank of Georgia (BOG), having a\ncombined asset market share of about 75 percent . Both banks are subsidiaries of parent\nnonfinancial legal entities listed on the London Stock Exchange and are deemed SIBs by the\nNBG. Both banks encompass several legal entities licensed and based in Georgia and in a\nfew foreign markets (Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan), some of which are subsidiaries\nof the bank and others are subsidiaries of the parent entity (sister entities to the bank). The\nthird SIB, Liberty Bank, with a 5 percent share of assets, is a subsidiary of a Georgian\ncompany that is a subsidiary of an unlisted Netherlands holding company controlled by three\nindividuals. It has no significant subsidiaries or sister financial entities. There are 11 other\ncommercial banks, including 2 locally owned banks, 7 subsidiaries of foreign banks or\nfinancial groups (based in Azerbaijan, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Russia, and\nTurkey); and 2 foreign-owned banks (in China and the United Arab Emirates). Overall,\nGeorgian banks are well capitalized, liquid, and profitable. See Table 2 for additional details.\n\nTable 2. Georgia: Financial Soundness Indicators\n\n(As of June 30, 2022)\n(in percent)\n\nAssets of banks 1H2022\n\nLoans/total assets 68\n\nNet NPLs/total loans [1] 4.7\n\nFX Loans/total loans 48.6\n\nSecurities/total assets 9.4\n\nLiabilities of banks\n\nLiquid Assets/Total Assets 20.7\n\nTotal deposits/total liabilities 71\n\nCapital adequacy\n\nCET1 14.4\n\nTier 1 16.5\n\nTotal capital ratio 20.3\n\nProfitability\n\nROA 2.7\n\nROE 20.7\nSource: Central Bank of Georgia.\n\n1 Local NPL definition.", "text_characters": 1483}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "8\n\n\n2. **The economic environment has improved, as COVID-19 has been brought under**\n**control but there are new challenges emerging** . Economic growth is strong, interest rates\nhave risen, the exchange rate is historically high, and credit maintains a high growth rate.\nIncreasing international commodity prices have contributed to rising inflation and\ninflationary expectations. New challenges are emerging. A sharp inflow of people and funds\nfrom Russia has put upward pressure on real estate prices. The increasing interest rates trend\nand the continuing high level of foreign currency lending has increased credit risks.\n\n\n**B** . **Authorities’ Progress since the First Mission**\n\n3. **The mission reviewed with the authorities the steps taken after the TA** **mission**\n**that took place during** **March 17–April 20, 2022** . The authorities have made progress in\nimplementing the recommendations of the first TA mission. The supervision function agreed\nto take full control of recovery plan assessments, while it started working on the\nidentification of early intervention measures (EIMs) and on failing or likely to fail (FOLTF)\nqualitative and quantitative triggers. The resolution function produced drafts of key\nplaybooks while second-round resolution plans for systemically important banks (SIBs) are\nbeing prepared. At the MoF, an outline and the preliminary contents of a playbook for the\nestablishment, operation, and funding of a bridge bank (which would be owned directly or\nindirectly by the MoF) has been developed. The IFSC held its first meeting, where it\nreviewed progress in implementing the recovery and resolution regime and formed a working\ngroup to oversee development of financial crisis contingency plans.\n\n\n**Table 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|First Mission Recommendation1|Authorities’ Actions|\n|---|---|\n|
**_Near-Term Priorities_** (Taken from Table 1 of the First Mission’s Aide-Mémoire.)|
**_Near-Term Priorities_** (Taken from Table 1 of the First Mission’s Aide-Mémoire.)|\n|
Adopt clear separation of responsibility for
recovery and resolution planning between the
supervisory and resolution functions.|
Implemented.|\n|Invest in recruiting and training of resolution
function staff.|New head of the RLD was recruited from within
the NBG, and an additional staff position was
added. Staff are attending relevant training
offered by the Joint Vienna Institute and others.|\n|Establish a small team of senior supervisors
with appropriate experience and knowledge to
lead and coordinate review of all recovery
plans.
|Banks’ lead supervisors have been assigned
lead responsibility for reviewing recovery plans.
The RLD has undertaken a benchmarking
analysis of the plans to provide consistent
feedback to the supervisors.|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 462.2799987792969, 539.7999877929688, 671.9600219726562], "columns": 2, "rows": 5}], "text": "8\n\n2. The economic environment has improved, as COVID-19 has been brought under\ncontrol but there are new challenges emerging . Economic growth is strong, interest rates\nhave risen, the exchange rate is historically high, and credit maintains a high growth rate.\nIncreasing international commodity prices have contributed to rising inflation and\ninflationary expectations. New challenges are emerging. A sharp inflow of people and funds\nfrom Russia has put upward pressure on real estate prices. The increasing interest rates trend\nand the continuing high level of foreign currency lending has increased credit risks.\n\nB . Authorities’ Progress since the First Mission\n\n3. The mission reviewed with the authorities the steps taken after the TA mission\nthat took place during March 17–April 20, 2022 . The authorities have made progress in\nimplementing the recommendations of the first TA mission. The supervision function agreed\nto take full control of recovery plan assessments, while it started working on the\nidentification of early intervention measures (EIMs) and on failing or likely to fail (FOLTF)\nqualitative and quantitative triggers. The resolution function produced drafts of key\nplaybooks while second-round resolution plans for systemically important banks (SIBs) are\nbeing prepared. At the MoF, an outline and the preliminary contents of a playbook for the\nestablishment, operation, and funding of a bridge bank (which would be owned directly or\nindirectly by the MoF) has been developed. The IFSC held its first meeting, where it\nreviewed progress in implementing the recovery and resolution regime and formed a working\ngroup to oversee development of financial crisis contingency plans.\n\nTable 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission\n\n First Mission Recommendation1 Authorities’ Actions \n\n _Near-Term Priorities_ (Taken from Table 1 of the First Mission’s Aide-Mémoire.) _Near-Term Priorities_ (Taken from Table 1 of the First Mission’s Aide-Mémoire.) \n Adopt clear separation of responsibility for recovery and resolution planning between the supervisory and resolution functions. Implemented. \n Invest in recruiting and training of resolution function staff. New head of the RLD was recruited from within the NBG, and an additional staff position was added. Staff are attending relevant training offered by the Joint Vienna Institute and others. \n Establish a small team of senior supervisors with appropriate experience and knowledge to lead and coordinate review of all recovery plans. Banks’ lead supervisors have been assigned lead responsibility for reviewing recovery plans. The RLD has undertaken a benchmarking analysis of the plans to provide consistent feedback to the supervisors.", "text_characters": 2308}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "9\n\n\n**Table 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission**\n\n**(continued)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|First Mission Recommendation1|Authorities’ Actions|\n|---|---|\n|
Undertake further work in resolution planning, in
particular the ability to implement the resolution
tools, to ensure operational continuity and
liquidity in resolution, and to enable separability.|
Second-round resolution plans for SIBs are
being prepared, a first-round plan for another
bank is being prepared, and work on playbooks
to operationalize resolution tools is proceeding
(see below).|\n|Adopt formal work programs involving revisiting
key playbooks to identify gaps and
incompleteness, setting priorities for remedying
those, and initiating work on contingency plans.|Analyzed which playbooks, policy and
procedures were most important based on the
first IMF TA mission and the FSAP. Prepared
draft versions of key playbooks/procedures
(bail-in, sale of business, resolution process,
resolution fund, bridge bank). An IFSC Working
Group has been formed and has initiated work
on systemwide crisis management plans.|\n|Introduce a formal playbook and plan testing
programs on an annual cycle.|Not yet commenced.|\n|Redraft the IFSC Charter with sections on its
role in normal times and in crisis times.|Further work pending discussion during second
mission.|\n|**_Medium-Term Priorities_**|**_Medium-Term Priorities_**|\n|
Strengthen the supervisory measures and EIMs
regime by clarifying triggers (qualitative and
quantitative) for a graduated escalation process.|Work in progress by supervisory function.|\n|Clarify the escalation process for adoption of
supervisory measures and EIMs, and for
engagement with the resolution function.|Work in progress by supervisory and resolution
functions.|\n|Adopt a formal communication policy
addressing the use of EIMs.|Relevant departments and divisions have been
identified. Work in progress.|\n|Introduce clear standards or indicators of non-
viability to help guide FOLTF determinations.|Work in progress by supervisory and resolution
functions.|\n|Provide more guidance to banks for preparing
and maintaining up-to-date recovery plans.|Recovery rule amended to require banks to
adopt trigger indicators (ratios) far above
minimum supervisory requirements. Have
maintained ongoing engagement with relevant
units in banks to ensure NBG feedback is
understood and acted upon. Further written
guidance to be developed in the near future.|\n|Analyze alternatives to current TPF policies,
especially to consider the deployment of all TPF
through the resolution fund and to use the DIF
to finance resolution transactions.
|Have explored some options to get a fully
funded resolution fund trying to avoid the use of
TPF.|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.22154235839844, 116.559326171875, 539.7784423828125, 700.6396484375], "columns": 2, "rows": 12}], "text": "9\n\nTable 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission\n\n(continued)\n\n First Mission Recommendation1 Authorities’ Actions \n\n Undertake further work in resolution planning, in particular the ability to implement the resolution tools, to ensure operational continuity and liquidity in resolution, and to enable separability. Second-round resolution plans for SIBs are being prepared, a first-round plan for another bank is being prepared, and work on playbooks to operationalize resolution tools is proceeding (see below). \n Adopt formal work programs involving revisiting key playbooks to identify gaps and incompleteness, setting priorities for remedying those, and initiating work on contingency plans. Analyzed which playbooks, policy and procedures were most important based on the first IMF TA mission and the FSAP. Prepared draft versions of key playbooks/procedures (bail-in, sale of business, resolution process, resolution fund, bridge bank). An IFSC Working Group has been formed and has initiated work on systemwide crisis management plans. \n Introduce a formal playbook and plan testing programs on an annual cycle. Not yet commenced. \n Redraft the IFSC Charter with sections on its role in normal times and in crisis times. Further work pending discussion during second mission. \n _Medium-Term Priorities_ _Medium-Term Priorities_ \n Strengthen the supervisory measures and EIMs regime by clarifying triggers (qualitative and quantitative) for a graduated escalation process. Work in progress by supervisory function. \n Clarify the escalation process for adoption of supervisory measures and EIMs, and for engagement with the resolution function. Work in progress by supervisory and resolution functions. \n Adopt a formal communication policy addressing the use of EIMs. Relevant departments and divisions have been identified. Work in progress. \n Introduce clear standards or indicators of non- viability to help guide FOLTF determinations. Work in progress by supervisory and resolution functions. \n Provide more guidance to banks for preparing and maintaining up-to-date recovery plans. Recovery rule amended to require banks to adopt trigger indicators (ratios) far above minimum supervisory requirements. Have maintained ongoing engagement with relevant units in banks to ensure NBG feedback is understood and acted upon. Further written guidance to be developed in the near future. \n Analyze alternatives to current TPF policies, especially to consider the deployment of all TPF through the resolution fund and to use the DIF to finance resolution transactions. Have explored some options to get a fully funded resolution fund trying to avoid the use of TPF.", "text_characters": 2275}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "10\n\n\n**Table 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission (concluded)**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|First Mission Recommendation1|Authorities’ Actions|\n|---|---|\n|
Perform stocktaking of contractual clauses in
banks’ current issuances of subordinated and
senior debt to determine whether the bail-in-
ability of the instruments is recognized.|
Have identified potentially bail-in able liabilities
but an assessment of which liabilities can be
bailed-in in practice is a work in progress. Key
challenge is that most relevant liabilities are
issued in foreign jurisdictions. Have initiated
communication with the Central Bank of Ireland
and Bank of England. Will undertake further
analysis to find possible solutions to potential
impediments to foreign debt bail-in-ability.|\n\n\n\n1 Taken from Table 1 of the first mission’s Technical Assistance Report.\n\n\n**II. RECOVERY PLANNING,** **EARLY INTERVENTION,** **RESOLUTION PLANNING, AND**\n\n**RESOLUTION FUNDING**\n\n\n**A.** **Recovery Planning**\n\n\n4. **The mission reviewed steps by the NBG to reinforce its internal procedures for**\n**the supervisory review and assessment of recovery plans** . First-round plans were received\nearly in 2022, and the first TA mission made several recommendations to strengthen their\ncontent. That mission recommended establishing a small team of senior supervisors with the\nappropriate experience and knowledge to lead and coordinate the review of all SIB recovery\nplans. Also, that the NBG develop templates covering, e.g., early warning and escalation\ntriggers, recovery options, and scenarios as tools that would help communicate the NBG’s\nexpectations. The NBG adopted a clear separation of responsibility for recovery and\nresolution planning between the supervisory and resolution functions. Banks’ lead\nsupervisors have been assigned central responsibility for reviewing the recovery plans. The\nRLD has undertaken a benchmarking analysis of the plans to provide consistent feedback to\nthe supervisors.\n\n\n5. **The current mission reviewed the benchmarking analysis and acknowledged the**\n**significant work done by the resolution function** . The benchmarking tool allowed a clear\ncomparison of recovery options and scenarios among the different recovery plans. This will\nbe important for the assessment while providing banks with useful feedback. The mission\nsuggested further improvement for the benchmarking tool and advised keeping the\ninstrument simple and scalable.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16000366210938, 99.279296875, 539.8400268554688, 238.99998474121094], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}], "text": "10\n\nTable 3. Georgia: Actions Taken Subsequent to First Mission (concluded)\n\n First Mission Recommendation1 Authorities’ Actions \n\n Perform stocktaking of contractual clauses in banks’ current issuances of subordinated and senior debt to determine whether the bail-in- ability of the instruments is recognized. Have identified potentially bail-in able liabilities but an assessment of which liabilities can be bailed-in in practice is a work in progress. Key challenge is that most relevant liabilities are issued in foreign jurisdictions. Have initiated communication with the Central Bank of Ireland and Bank of England. Will undertake further analysis to find possible solutions to potential impediments to foreign debt bail-in-ability. \n\n1 Taken from Table 1 of the first mission’s Technical Assistance Report.\n\nII. RECOVERY PLANNING, EARLY INTERVENTION, RESOLUTION PLANNING, AND\n\nRESOLUTION FUNDING\n\nA. Recovery Planning\n\n4. The mission reviewed steps by the NBG to reinforce its internal procedures for\nthe supervisory review and assessment of recovery plans . First-round plans were received\nearly in 2022, and the first TA mission made several recommendations to strengthen their\ncontent. That mission recommended establishing a small team of senior supervisors with the\nappropriate experience and knowledge to lead and coordinate the review of all SIB recovery\nplans. Also, that the NBG develop templates covering, e.g., early warning and escalation\ntriggers, recovery options, and scenarios as tools that would help communicate the NBG’s\nexpectations. The NBG adopted a clear separation of responsibility for recovery and\nresolution planning between the supervisory and resolution functions. Banks’ lead\nsupervisors have been assigned central responsibility for reviewing the recovery plans. The\nRLD has undertaken a benchmarking analysis of the plans to provide consistent feedback to\nthe supervisors.\n\n5. The current mission reviewed the benchmarking analysis and acknowledged the\nsignificant work done by the resolution function . The benchmarking tool allowed a clear\ncomparison of recovery options and scenarios among the different recovery plans. This will\nbe important for the assessment while providing banks with useful feedback. The mission\nsuggested further improvement for the benchmarking tool and advised keeping the\ninstrument simple and scalable.", "text_characters": 2022}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "11\n\n\n**B.** **Early Intervention and FOLTF**\n\n\n6. **The mission reviewed progress on enhancing the early intervention framework** .\nThe first mission recommended, as medium-term priorities, clarifying the triggers for a\ngraduated escalation process; clarifying the escalation process for adoption of EIMs and for\nengagement with the RLD; and adopting a formal communication policy that addresses the\nuse of EIMs. Since the first mission, the supervision function started working on the\nidentification of EIM quantitative triggers. The function acknowledged that the current EIMs\nframework is basically limited to the temporary administrator powers and agreed to start\nworking on internal guidance to make the instrument more useful for the supervision\nfunction. The NBG would potentially consider a wider range of early intervention measures\n(even overlapping supervisory measures) that could help give a clear warning to institutions\nthat, if they do not change course, they could start the failing or likely to fail procedure.\n\n\n7. **Further progress is required in two areas.** The current mission reiterated the first\nmission’s recommendation to clarify Article 30 of the Banking Law, which explicitly\nmentions only the temporary administrator measure as EIMs. The mission understands that\nthe authorities have a more extended view (measures are already included in Article 30, but\nnot explicitly mentioned as EIMs [2] ). The NBG also should review its internal supervisory\nearly intervention framework to integrate the activation of recovery plans. The first mission\nalso observed that the authorities have no clear standards or indicators of nonviability/\nFOLTF to help guide decisions, and recommended they be adopted. Since the first mission,\nthe supervision function has started working on the identification of FOLTF quantitative\ntriggers.\n\n8. **The mission further discussed the NBG’s internal information-sharing**\n**arrangements** . As the first mission highlighted, the NBG should ensure that robust\narrangements and procedures for the exchange of information between the supervisory and\nresolution functions are in place. While cooperation is apparently good, it is necessary to\nformalize that cooperation for times of potential stress, especially with respect to\ndocumentation prepared by the supervisory function (e.g., onsite inspection findings, EIMs\ntaken), which will be essential to transmit to the resolution function.\n\n\n2 For example: a) require a bank to implement one or more of the measures set out in the recovery plan;\nb) require a bank to carry out valuation of a bank’s assets and liabilities by an independent valuator approved by\nthe NBG; and c) require changes to a bank’s business strategy or to the ownership or to the organizational\nstructure of a bank.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "11\n\nB. Early Intervention and FOLTF\n\n6. The mission reviewed progress on enhancing the early intervention framework .\nThe first mission recommended, as medium-term priorities, clarifying the triggers for a\ngraduated escalation process; clarifying the escalation process for adoption of EIMs and for\nengagement with the RLD; and adopting a formal communication policy that addresses the\nuse of EIMs. Since the first mission, the supervision function started working on the\nidentification of EIM quantitative triggers. The function acknowledged that the current EIMs\nframework is basically limited to the temporary administrator powers and agreed to start\nworking on internal guidance to make the instrument more useful for the supervision\nfunction. The NBG would potentially consider a wider range of early intervention measures\n(even overlapping supervisory measures) that could help give a clear warning to institutions\nthat, if they do not change course, they could start the failing or likely to fail procedure.\n\n7. Further progress is required in two areas. The current mission reiterated the first\nmission’s recommendation to clarify Article 30 of the Banking Law, which explicitly\nmentions only the temporary administrator measure as EIMs. The mission understands that\nthe authorities have a more extended view (measures are already included in Article 30, but\nnot explicitly mentioned as EIMs [2] ). The NBG also should review its internal supervisory\nearly intervention framework to integrate the activation of recovery plans. The first mission\nalso observed that the authorities have no clear standards or indicators of nonviability/\nFOLTF to help guide decisions, and recommended they be adopted. Since the first mission,\nthe supervision function has started working on the identification of FOLTF quantitative\ntriggers.\n\n8. The mission further discussed the NBG’s internal information-sharing\narrangements . As the first mission highlighted, the NBG should ensure that robust\narrangements and procedures for the exchange of information between the supervisory and\nresolution functions are in place. While cooperation is apparently good, it is necessary to\nformalize that cooperation for times of potential stress, especially with respect to\ndocumentation prepared by the supervisory function (e.g., onsite inspection findings, EIMs\ntaken), which will be essential to transmit to the resolution function.\n\n2 For example: a) require a bank to implement one or more of the measures set out in the recovery plan;\nb) require a bank to carry out valuation of a bank’s assets and liabilities by an independent valuator approved by\nthe NBG; and c) require changes to a bank’s business strategy or to the ownership or to the organizational\nstructure of a bank.", "text_characters": 2340}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "12\n\n\n**C.** **Resolution Planning and Preparedness**\n\n\n9. **The mission delivered a simulation to help the authorities benchmark their**\n**progress on resolution planning and preparedness.** The mission gave the authorities\nstylized information on a failing bank. The authorities were asked to consider: (i) whether the\nbank should go into resolution or liquidation; (ii) the use of the different resolution tools and\ntheir impact on uninsured domestic and foreign deposits; (iii) challenges posed by a large\nshare of retail investors in the subordinated debt issued by the bank; and (iv) the possibility\nof contagion to other domestic banks and the impact of the different options on risks to\ntaxpayers. Finally, they had to calculate the amount of temporary public funding needed to\nrecapitalize that bank under different scenarios of private burden sharing, and to set\nsafeguards if the use of public funds proved necessary to preserve financial stability.\n\n10. **Recommendations made in the first TA mission on setting up the RLD are still**\n**pending** . Within a few months of the first mission, the two highest ranked staff of the\ndivision have left; indicative of wider problems with staff retention. Relocating the RLD to\nthe Financial Stability Department, which reports directly to the governor, is expected during\nthe fourth quarter of 2022. As the first TA mission highlighted, the NBG should ensure that\narrangements and procedures for the exchange of information between the supervisory and\nresolution authorities are in place. While good so far, it is necessary to formalize cooperation,\nespecially with respect to documentation prepared by the supervisory function (e.g., onsite\ninspection findings, EIMs taken), as transmission to the resolution function will be essential.\n\n\n11. **The NBG is in the process of preparing second-round resolution plans for the**\n**SIBs and has begun preparing a first-round plan for another bank, following on the**\n**development of first-round plans for the SIBs earlier this year** . The RLD is focused, in its\nresolution planning activity, on the development of stress scenarios to assess the possible\nfunding gaps in resolution. This is positive, although some assumptions of that analysis\nshould be more realistic, and further work is needed on the implementation of resolution\ntools, operational continuity, separability, and liquidity in resolution. Interaction with banks\nis crucial at this stage, especially on the management of information systems, operational\ncontinuity, liquidity arrangements, governance, etc. Some (non-substantive) impediments to\nresolvability can be removed through that interaction. The monitoring process by the NBG\nshould evolve progressively, using more testing, deep-dive exercises, and onsite inspections.\n\n\n12. **While progress has been made, further steps are needed to implement**\n**resolvability assessments** . These include putting in place a clear framework of the RLD’s\nexpectations for banks, issuing operational guidance on relevant topics, establishing a\nphased-in approach to achieving resolvability across the different areas (for example, the\ncapacity of absorbing losses and recapitalizing the bank by means of building up LAC) and\nprioritizing the resolvability assessment of some categories of banks (for example, the largest", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "12\n\nC. Resolution Planning and Preparedness\n\n9. The mission delivered a simulation to help the authorities benchmark their\nprogress on resolution planning and preparedness. The mission gave the authorities\nstylized information on a failing bank. The authorities were asked to consider: (i) whether the\nbank should go into resolution or liquidation; (ii) the use of the different resolution tools and\ntheir impact on uninsured domestic and foreign deposits; (iii) challenges posed by a large\nshare of retail investors in the subordinated debt issued by the bank; and (iv) the possibility\nof contagion to other domestic banks and the impact of the different options on risks to\ntaxpayers. Finally, they had to calculate the amount of temporary public funding needed to\nrecapitalize that bank under different scenarios of private burden sharing, and to set\nsafeguards if the use of public funds proved necessary to preserve financial stability.\n\n10. Recommendations made in the first TA mission on setting up the RLD are still\npending . Within a few months of the first mission, the two highest ranked staff of the\ndivision have left; indicative of wider problems with staff retention. Relocating the RLD to\nthe Financial Stability Department, which reports directly to the governor, is expected during\nthe fourth quarter of 2022. As the first TA mission highlighted, the NBG should ensure that\narrangements and procedures for the exchange of information between the supervisory and\nresolution authorities are in place. While good so far, it is necessary to formalize cooperation,\nespecially with respect to documentation prepared by the supervisory function (e.g., onsite\ninspection findings, EIMs taken), as transmission to the resolution function will be essential.\n\n11. The NBG is in the process of preparing second-round resolution plans for the\nSIBs and has begun preparing a first-round plan for another bank, following on the\ndevelopment of first-round plans for the SIBs earlier this year . The RLD is focused, in its\nresolution planning activity, on the development of stress scenarios to assess the possible\nfunding gaps in resolution. This is positive, although some assumptions of that analysis\nshould be more realistic, and further work is needed on the implementation of resolution\ntools, operational continuity, separability, and liquidity in resolution. Interaction with banks\nis crucial at this stage, especially on the management of information systems, operational\ncontinuity, liquidity arrangements, governance, etc. Some (non-substantive) impediments to\nresolvability can be removed through that interaction. The monitoring process by the NBG\nshould evolve progressively, using more testing, deep-dive exercises, and onsite inspections.\n\n12. While progress has been made, further steps are needed to implement\nresolvability assessments . These include putting in place a clear framework of the RLD’s\nexpectations for banks, issuing operational guidance on relevant topics, establishing a\nphased-in approach to achieving resolvability across the different areas (for example, the\ncapacity of absorbing losses and recapitalizing the bank by means of building up LAC) and\nprioritizing the resolvability assessment of some categories of banks (for example, the largest", "text_characters": 2787}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "13\n\n\nones). Initial drafts of playbooks for use of the bail-in, bridge bank, and sale of business\nresolution tools have been developed by the NBG and the MoF has identified the contents of\na playbook for bridge banks and resolution funding (use of TPF).\n\n13. **The mission provided significant inputs and held lengthy discussions on**\n**preparing for the use of the bridge bank tool and related funding requirements** . Both\nthe MoF and the NBG need to undertake further work. The MoF’s main tasks relate to its\nrole as the direct, or indirect, owner and operator of the bridge bank and as the gatekeeper for\nthe use of TPF to support resolution. The MoF should address the modalities of funding the\nbridge bank to ensure meeting its capital and liquidity needs, streamlining the decisionmaking process, and identifying and preparing for steps necessary to pass an amendment of\nthe Annual Budget Law. Parliamentary approval of such an amendment would likely be\nrequired to provide TPF.\n\n\n14. **The NBG’s outstanding tasks pertain to the need to develop a viable resolution**\n**scheme and to estimate potential funding requirements and sources.** Pre-planning is\nrequired for the valuation and transfer of assets, liabilities, contingent claims, staff, operating\npremises, etc., to the bridge bank. The transfer perimeter—those components of the bank in\nresolution that will be transferred to the bridge bank—will need to be determined, with the\nobjective of ensuring the resulting bridge bank is adequately capitalized and liquid, and\noperationally sound and functional. Required structural and operational changes must be\nidentified in advance, as certain contracts may need to be amended to enable their transfer,\nand potential litigation risks and tax implications would need to be assessed, etc.\nArrangements to obtain the MoF’s concurrence for TPF and/or to indemnify NBG funding [3]\nare required. In addition, the RLD will need to prepare a list of pre-selected candidates to\nundertake valuations, [4] ensure continued access to financial market infrastructures, and ensure\nbanks’ capabilities to provide accurate and timely information to support resolution planning,\nand at the point of resolution. [5] Other tasks include the Legal Department elaborating\ntemplates and drafts for all the decisions, addressing the set-up and operation of the bridge\nbank, including the identification of candidates with an adequate technical profile to serve as\nsupervisory and management board members (in cooperation with the NBG), the approval of\ninternal procedures to specify how various tasks must be completed, and the Communication\nDepartment developing a communication plan.\n\n\n3 Under the provisions of the NBG Act, the NBG must also obtain a MoF guarantee in order to provide any\nELA to a bank pending or undergoing resolution.\n\n4 Including a draft Request-for-Proposal.\n\n5 The mission also provided advice on preparing MoF-NBG bilateral playbooks addressing coordination in the\nuse of the bridge bank tool and in resolution funding.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "13\n\nones). Initial drafts of playbooks for use of the bail-in, bridge bank, and sale of business\nresolution tools have been developed by the NBG and the MoF has identified the contents of\na playbook for bridge banks and resolution funding (use of TPF).\n\n13. The mission provided significant inputs and held lengthy discussions on\npreparing for the use of the bridge bank tool and related funding requirements . Both\nthe MoF and the NBG need to undertake further work. The MoF’s main tasks relate to its\nrole as the direct, or indirect, owner and operator of the bridge bank and as the gatekeeper for\nthe use of TPF to support resolution. The MoF should address the modalities of funding the\nbridge bank to ensure meeting its capital and liquidity needs, streamlining the decisionmaking process, and identifying and preparing for steps necessary to pass an amendment of\nthe Annual Budget Law. Parliamentary approval of such an amendment would likely be\nrequired to provide TPF.\n\n14. The NBG’s outstanding tasks pertain to the need to develop a viable resolution\nscheme and to estimate potential funding requirements and sources. Pre-planning is\nrequired for the valuation and transfer of assets, liabilities, contingent claims, staff, operating\npremises, etc., to the bridge bank. The transfer perimeter—those components of the bank in\nresolution that will be transferred to the bridge bank—will need to be determined, with the\nobjective of ensuring the resulting bridge bank is adequately capitalized and liquid, and\noperationally sound and functional. Required structural and operational changes must be\nidentified in advance, as certain contracts may need to be amended to enable their transfer,\nand potential litigation risks and tax implications would need to be assessed, etc.\nArrangements to obtain the MoF’s concurrence for TPF and/or to indemnify NBG funding [3]\nare required. In addition, the RLD will need to prepare a list of pre-selected candidates to\nundertake valuations, [4] ensure continued access to financial market infrastructures, and ensure\nbanks’ capabilities to provide accurate and timely information to support resolution planning,\nand at the point of resolution. [5] Other tasks include the Legal Department elaborating\ntemplates and drafts for all the decisions, addressing the set-up and operation of the bridge\nbank, including the identification of candidates with an adequate technical profile to serve as\nsupervisory and management board members (in cooperation with the NBG), the approval of\ninternal procedures to specify how various tasks must be completed, and the Communication\nDepartment developing a communication plan.\n\n3 Under the provisions of the NBG Act, the NBG must also obtain a MoF guarantee in order to provide any\nELA to a bank pending or undergoing resolution.\n\n4 Including a draft Request-for-Proposal.\n\n5 The mission also provided advice on preparing MoF-NBG bilateral playbooks addressing coordination in the\nuse of the bridge bank tool and in resolution funding.", "text_characters": 2541}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "14\n\n\n15. **Requiring banks to build up LAC in a timebound manner will progressively**\n**reduce the potential contingent liability of the MoF to provide TPF for resolution**\n**funding** . The dollarization of the Georgian economy, including the public sector, could\nincrease the sovereign/banking loop in some circumstances. To reduce that risk is an\nadditional reason to strengthen the banks’ internal capacity to absorb losses. The current\nbanking market structure, with two very large banks, raises many resolvability challenges.\nThe preferred resolution strategy for these two banks is bail-in, although its application could\ngenerate financial stability concerns in some circumstances. To reduce those concerns, the\nbuild-up of adequate LAC is needed. The current high level of bank profitability should\nencourage the authorities to start the process. The mission provided advice on setting LAC\ntargets for the SIBs.\n\n16. **The authorities should take further steps to minimize legal uncertainty as to**\n**whether resolution decisions will be sustained by relevant courts** . This is especially the\ncase with respect to the feasibility of bailing in the significant volume of SIB debt that has\nbeen issued in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The NBG has initiated discussions with the\nbank resolution authorities in Ireland and the United Kingdom. However, until such time as\ndebt contracts contain contractual clauses stipulating their ability to be bailed in at the NBG’s\nsole discretion, legal uncertainty will remain unacceptably high. The mission recommended\nthe NBG seek the advice of external expert counsel and suggested an effective way to obtain\nthis advice would be to require issuing banks to obtain expert external legal opinions. The\nauthorities agreed with this approach.\n\n17. **The high concentration of the Georgian banking market poses distinct**\n**challenges to applying the sale-of-business tool** . A way to tackle the problem in an asset\nsale transaction is to open the bidding processes to large international investors (especially\nbanks) and to make, in general, domestic market more investor friendly.\n\n\n18. **Another potential impediment to resolvability is linked to the banks’ capacity to**\n**provide the necessary data for many resolution purposes in a timely manner** . As\ntemplates provided by the NBG are crucial to promoting banks’ preparedness, the mission\nprovided examples for valuation, preparation of a resolution scheme, and setting up a virtual\ndata-room.\n\n\n**D.** **Resolution Funding**\n\n\n19. **The mission discussed resolution funding options with the NBG and the MoF** .\nThe first TA mission had suggested that, to the extent practical, all resolution funding by the\nMoF be delivered through the conduit of the new ex post-funded resolution fund, repaid by\nlevies on the banking industry following a resolution, and that the authorities explore the\npotential for creating a source of ex ante funding. The MoF’s policy position was that the", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "14\n\n15. Requiring banks to build up LAC in a timebound manner will progressively\nreduce the potential contingent liability of the MoF to provide TPF for resolution\nfunding . The dollarization of the Georgian economy, including the public sector, could\nincrease the sovereign/banking loop in some circumstances. To reduce that risk is an\nadditional reason to strengthen the banks’ internal capacity to absorb losses. The current\nbanking market structure, with two very large banks, raises many resolvability challenges.\nThe preferred resolution strategy for these two banks is bail-in, although its application could\ngenerate financial stability concerns in some circumstances. To reduce those concerns, the\nbuild-up of adequate LAC is needed. The current high level of bank profitability should\nencourage the authorities to start the process. The mission provided advice on setting LAC\ntargets for the SIBs.\n\n16. The authorities should take further steps to minimize legal uncertainty as to\nwhether resolution decisions will be sustained by relevant courts . This is especially the\ncase with respect to the feasibility of bailing in the significant volume of SIB debt that has\nbeen issued in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The NBG has initiated discussions with the\nbank resolution authorities in Ireland and the United Kingdom. However, until such time as\ndebt contracts contain contractual clauses stipulating their ability to be bailed in at the NBG’s\nsole discretion, legal uncertainty will remain unacceptably high. The mission recommended\nthe NBG seek the advice of external expert counsel and suggested an effective way to obtain\nthis advice would be to require issuing banks to obtain expert external legal opinions. The\nauthorities agreed with this approach.\n\n17. The high concentration of the Georgian banking market poses distinct\nchallenges to applying the sale-of-business tool . A way to tackle the problem in an asset\nsale transaction is to open the bidding processes to large international investors (especially\nbanks) and to make, in general, domestic market more investor friendly.\n\n18. Another potential impediment to resolvability is linked to the banks’ capacity to\nprovide the necessary data for many resolution purposes in a timely manner . As\ntemplates provided by the NBG are crucial to promoting banks’ preparedness, the mission\nprovided examples for valuation, preparation of a resolution scheme, and setting up a virtual\ndata-room.\n\nD. Resolution Funding\n\n19. The mission discussed resolution funding options with the NBG and the MoF .\nThe first TA mission had suggested that, to the extent practical, all resolution funding by the\nMoF be delivered through the conduit of the new ex post-funded resolution fund, repaid by\nlevies on the banking industry following a resolution, and that the authorities explore the\npotential for creating a source of ex ante funding. The MoF’s policy position was that the", "text_characters": 2473}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "15\n\n\nMoF’s direct funding would only be provided for the purpose of capitalizing a bridge bank, [6]\nand the mission recommended that mechanisms be explored so that even this funding could\nbe channeled through the resolution fund, where the banking industry would ultimately be\nresponsible for covering any losses incurred. The MoF is considering the options in this\nregard and the NBG has begun exploring the potential of creating an ex ante fund as a\ncomplement to the resolution fund. Ex ante resolution funds are becoming common in\nseveral jurisdictions (e.g., in Europe), but there are still some challenges that would need to\nbe taken into consideration. [7]\n\n20. **The operationalization of the use of the TPF has institutional implications** . First,\nthe MoF and the NBG should develop an internal contingency policy framework that will\nhelp ensure a shared understanding of situations that might arise and facilitate rapid decision\nmaking. Second, still to be determined by the MoF are the budget accounting and reporting\nimplications of the provisions of TPF, and whether parliamentary approval would be\nrequired. Third, if the provision of TPF by the MoF is subject to parliamentary approval, the\nMoF should prepare templates for the documentation that would need to be sent to the\ngovernment and to the parliament to secure approval.\n\n21. **The need to ensure adequate funding for liquidity pre- and post-resolution was**\n**discussed** . The NBG can lend to a bank pending or undergoing resolution against a wide\nrange of collateral. To do so, it must obtain an MoF guarantee, which is at the MoF’s\ndiscretion. The MoF can provide liquidity funding directly, too, but also indirectly. Here\nagain, the budget accounting and reporting, and parliamentary approval implications, are still\nbeing assessed. The mission recommended that the MoF should rely as much as possible on\nthe NBG’s expertise.\n\n\n22. **The mission emphasized that operationalizing ELA in resolution requires prior**\n**institutional arrangements** . A formal joint agreement between the MoF and the NBG for\nthe execution of the MoF guarantee for ELA is needed. This agreement should also address\nthe MoF’s expectations regarding the NBG’s additional collateral requirements for ELA. [8]\nThe agreement should define in detail the procedures for putting in place the guarantee, and\n\n\n6 The legal framework provides for a broader range of potential uses of direct MoF funding.\n\n7 For example, opportunity costs through lower bank profits (potentially reducing capital or dividends, and\nlending) with resources invested in low return safe assets; it may need to be large to cover systemic risks—\nearmarking a large pool of (scarce) national savings; a paid-in fund may fuel the perception that uninsured\ncreditors will be bailed out, increasing moral hazard (more than an ex-post fund). _“Resolution Funding: Who_\n_Pays When Financial Institutions Fail?”_ Oana Croitoru, Marc Dobler, and Johan Molin, Technical Notes and\nManuals 18/01, 2018, IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department.\n\n8 As of Art 33.d Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "15\n\nMoF’s direct funding would only be provided for the purpose of capitalizing a bridge bank, [6]\nand the mission recommended that mechanisms be explored so that even this funding could\nbe channeled through the resolution fund, where the banking industry would ultimately be\nresponsible for covering any losses incurred. The MoF is considering the options in this\nregard and the NBG has begun exploring the potential of creating an ex ante fund as a\ncomplement to the resolution fund. Ex ante resolution funds are becoming common in\nseveral jurisdictions (e.g., in Europe), but there are still some challenges that would need to\nbe taken into consideration. [7]\n\n20. The operationalization of the use of the TPF has institutional implications . First,\nthe MoF and the NBG should develop an internal contingency policy framework that will\nhelp ensure a shared understanding of situations that might arise and facilitate rapid decision\nmaking. Second, still to be determined by the MoF are the budget accounting and reporting\nimplications of the provisions of TPF, and whether parliamentary approval would be\nrequired. Third, if the provision of TPF by the MoF is subject to parliamentary approval, the\nMoF should prepare templates for the documentation that would need to be sent to the\ngovernment and to the parliament to secure approval.\n\n21. The need to ensure adequate funding for liquidity pre- and post-resolution was\ndiscussed . The NBG can lend to a bank pending or undergoing resolution against a wide\nrange of collateral. To do so, it must obtain an MoF guarantee, which is at the MoF’s\ndiscretion. The MoF can provide liquidity funding directly, too, but also indirectly. Here\nagain, the budget accounting and reporting, and parliamentary approval implications, are still\nbeing assessed. The mission recommended that the MoF should rely as much as possible on\nthe NBG’s expertise.\n\n22. The mission emphasized that operationalizing ELA in resolution requires prior\ninstitutional arrangements . A formal joint agreement between the MoF and the NBG for\nthe execution of the MoF guarantee for ELA is needed. This agreement should also address\nthe MoF’s expectations regarding the NBG’s additional collateral requirements for ELA. [8]\nThe agreement should define in detail the procedures for putting in place the guarantee, and\n\n6 The legal framework provides for a broader range of potential uses of direct MoF funding.\n\n7 For example, opportunity costs through lower bank profits (potentially reducing capital or dividends, and\nlending) with resources invested in low return safe assets; it may need to be large to cover systemic risks—\nearmarking a large pool of (scarce) national savings; a paid-in fund may fuel the perception that uninsured\ncreditors will be bailed out, increasing moral hazard (more than an ex-post fund). _“Resolution Funding: Who_\n_Pays When Financial Institutions Fail?”_ Oana Croitoru, Marc Dobler, and Johan Molin, Technical Notes and\nManuals 18/01, 2018, IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department.\n\n8 As of Art 33.d Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia.", "text_characters": 2609}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "16\n\n\nfor calling upon the guarantee in the event of a default on the ELA and a consequent loss,\nincluding the roles of both parties in the different steps of the decision process.\n\n\n23. **Another potential source of funding for resolution should be the Deposit**\n**Insurance Fund (DIF)** . There are arguments for using the DIF to support bank resolutions\nand not just for paying out depositors in liquidation; bank resolution and deposit insurance\nhave closely aligned roles in preserving financial stability and preventing bank runs. There\nare significant efficiency gains by maximizing value and reducing disruption when\ntransferring deposits from the failing bank to another bank. This approach requires robust\nsafeguards (e.g., “least cost” test relative to the alternative of bankruptcy and a payout) and\nadequate resourcing.\n\n\n24. **In Georgia, the Deposit Insurance System works as a paybox only, and allowing**\n**alternative uses of the DIF would require a change in legislation** . As noted in the 2021\nFSAP Technical Notes on Financial Safety Notes, the power to transfer assets and liabilities\nto an acquiring bank is explicitly available under the liquidation legal regime. The authorities\nshould amend the legal regime to enable the DIF to be able to fund P&A transactions in\nliquidation, if it is a lesser cost for the DIF. In addition, the authorities should consider\namending the DIA legal regime to make available the P&A/transfer tool for use with smaller\nbanks.\n\n\n**III. CREDITOR HIERARCHY IN LIQUIDATION AND RESOLUTION**\n\n\n25. **The authorities provided the first mission with a proposal for a revised legal text**\n**for the creditor hierarchy and the second mission discussed the authorities’ remaining**\n**questions and concerns.** The main concern held over from the first mission was the status of\nthe Pension Agency. The Pension Agency collects mandatory pension premiums and is a\nlarge depositor in the banking system. The authorities raised a new question regarding the\nproper status of nominal accounts, which are single deposit accounts in which the\naccumulated funds of many individual clients are held, for example, by law firms and\ne-money providers. The mission reiterated the view expressed in the first mission that the\nPension Agency should rank higher in the hierarchy than it does currently. The authorities\ncommitted to undertake further internal discussions on the matter.\n\n\n26. **The mission discussed the nature of nominal accounts, including their status**\n**under the deposit insurance regime** . [9] While sponsors of nominal accounts are required to\nbe able to identify daily the holdings of individual clients, there is no separate deposit\ninsurance coverage for the individual clients. The mission recommended, in line with the\n\n\n9 Nominal accounts are the deposit accounts of, for example, a notary, lawyer, law office, securities market\nintermediary, the Pension Agency, or payment service provider, which holds collectively the funds of multiple\nclients.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "16\n\nfor calling upon the guarantee in the event of a default on the ELA and a consequent loss,\nincluding the roles of both parties in the different steps of the decision process.\n\n23. Another potential source of funding for resolution should be the Deposit\nInsurance Fund (DIF) . There are arguments for using the DIF to support bank resolutions\nand not just for paying out depositors in liquidation; bank resolution and deposit insurance\nhave closely aligned roles in preserving financial stability and preventing bank runs. There\nare significant efficiency gains by maximizing value and reducing disruption when\ntransferring deposits from the failing bank to another bank. This approach requires robust\nsafeguards (e.g., “least cost” test relative to the alternative of bankruptcy and a payout) and\nadequate resourcing.\n\n24. In Georgia, the Deposit Insurance System works as a paybox only, and allowing\nalternative uses of the DIF would require a change in legislation . As noted in the 2021\nFSAP Technical Notes on Financial Safety Notes, the power to transfer assets and liabilities\nto an acquiring bank is explicitly available under the liquidation legal regime. The authorities\nshould amend the legal regime to enable the DIF to be able to fund P&A transactions in\nliquidation, if it is a lesser cost for the DIF. In addition, the authorities should consider\namending the DIA legal regime to make available the P&A/transfer tool for use with smaller\nbanks.\n\nIII. CREDITOR HIERARCHY IN LIQUIDATION AND RESOLUTION\n\n25. The authorities provided the first mission with a proposal for a revised legal text\nfor the creditor hierarchy and the second mission discussed the authorities’ remaining\nquestions and concerns. The main concern held over from the first mission was the status of\nthe Pension Agency. The Pension Agency collects mandatory pension premiums and is a\nlarge depositor in the banking system. The authorities raised a new question regarding the\nproper status of nominal accounts, which are single deposit accounts in which the\naccumulated funds of many individual clients are held, for example, by law firms and\ne-money providers. The mission reiterated the view expressed in the first mission that the\nPension Agency should rank higher in the hierarchy than it does currently. The authorities\ncommitted to undertake further internal discussions on the matter.\n\n26. The mission discussed the nature of nominal accounts, including their status\nunder the deposit insurance regime . [9] While sponsors of nominal accounts are required to\nbe able to identify daily the holdings of individual clients, there is no separate deposit\ninsurance coverage for the individual clients. The mission recommended, in line with the\n\n9 Nominal accounts are the deposit accounts of, for example, a notary, lawyer, law office, securities market\nintermediary, the Pension Agency, or payment service provider, which holds collectively the funds of multiple\nclients.", "text_characters": 2488}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "17\n\n\nIADI general principles, that nominal accounts not be provided any special treatment in the\ncreditor hierarchy. The remedy to the authorities’ concerns is for the owners/sponsors of\nnominal accounts to enter security arrangements with the banks with which they do business,\nto ensure that the funds are collateralized, and to consider arrangements eventually to extend\ndeposit insurance protection to the individual clients within a nominal account.\n\n\n**IV. INTER-AGENCY CRISIS PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION**\n\n\n27. **The mission provided additional guidance on the nature and content of the**\n**various bilateral playbooks that were identified during the first mission** . Bilateral\nplaybooks are required to address joint NBG-MoF coordination in the context of potential\nuse of the bridge bank resolution tool, and in the provision of resolution funding in the form\nof TPF and ELA. The NBG and the MoF should consider whether a broader coordination\nframework addressing a systemic crisis scenario involving, for example, the potential failure\nof several banks simultaneously, should be documented by means of a joint playbook. The\njoint playbooks for bridge banks, TPF, and ELA could potentially be incorporated into such a\nbroader coordination framework playbook. The NBG and the DIA require a joint playbook\nfor coordination in case a bank might be declared FOLTF and put into liquidation. The DIA\nand the NBG require a joint playbook that addresses the eventuality that the DIA needs to\nliquify the DIF investment portfolio. The DIA and the MoF require a joint playbook for\ncoordination in the event the DIA needs to borrow from the MoF to replenish the DIF.\n\n28. **The mission focused on the role of the IFSC in individual bank failure resolution**\n**cases** . The IFSC held its second meeting in June 2022, where it reviewed progress in\nimplementing the recovery and resolution framework as well as the recommendations of the\nfirst TA report, among other agenda items. As recommended in the first TA mission, it\nformed a Working Group to oversee development of individual agency financial crisis\ncontinency plans, leading eventually to a national plan. The current mission observed that the\nprovisions of the NBG Law, the MoF-NBG Joint Regulation on Temporary Public Funding\nand the Resolution Fund, and the IFSC Charter all address a potential IFSC role in individual\nbank resolution cases. We envisage for the IFSC a coordination and consultancy role, rather\nthan a decision-making role within the resolution process, as members should retain their\nindependent decision-making authorities according to their mandates. The mission\nhighlighted the need to consider revisions to the MoF-NBG Joint Regulation and the Charter,\nbased on agreements reached by the MoF and the NBG in developing the bilateral\nplaybook(s) on resolution funding and bridge banks, which in turn would be based on the\nMoF and NBG internal playbooks.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-119", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "17\n\nIADI general principles, that nominal accounts not be provided any special treatment in the\ncreditor hierarchy. The remedy to the authorities’ concerns is for the owners/sponsors of\nnominal accounts to enter security arrangements with the banks with which they do business,\nto ensure that the funds are collateralized, and to consider arrangements eventually to extend\ndeposit insurance protection to the individual clients within a nominal account.\n\nIV. INTER-AGENCY CRISIS PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION\n\n27. The mission provided additional guidance on the nature and content of the\nvarious bilateral playbooks that were identified during the first mission . Bilateral\nplaybooks are required to address joint NBG-MoF coordination in the context of potential\nuse of the bridge bank resolution tool, and in the provision of resolution funding in the form\nof TPF and ELA. The NBG and the MoF should consider whether a broader coordination\nframework addressing a systemic crisis scenario involving, for example, the potential failure\nof several banks simultaneously, should be documented by means of a joint playbook. The\njoint playbooks for bridge banks, TPF, and ELA could potentially be incorporated into such a\nbroader coordination framework playbook. The NBG and the DIA require a joint playbook\nfor coordination in case a bank might be declared FOLTF and put into liquidation. The DIA\nand the NBG require a joint playbook that addresses the eventuality that the DIA needs to\nliquify the DIF investment portfolio. The DIA and the MoF require a joint playbook for\ncoordination in the event the DIA needs to borrow from the MoF to replenish the DIF.\n\n28. The mission focused on the role of the IFSC in individual bank failure resolution\ncases . The IFSC held its second meeting in June 2022, where it reviewed progress in\nimplementing the recovery and resolution framework as well as the recommendations of the\nfirst TA report, among other agenda items. As recommended in the first TA mission, it\nformed a Working Group to oversee development of individual agency financial crisis\ncontinency plans, leading eventually to a national plan. The current mission observed that the\nprovisions of the NBG Law, the MoF-NBG Joint Regulation on Temporary Public Funding\nand the Resolution Fund, and the IFSC Charter all address a potential IFSC role in individual\nbank resolution cases. We envisage for the IFSC a coordination and consultancy role, rather\nthan a decision-making role within the resolution process, as members should retain their\nindependent decision-making authorities according to their mandates. The mission\nhighlighted the need to consider revisions to the MoF-NBG Joint Regulation and the Charter,\nbased on agreements reached by the MoF and the NBG in developing the bilateral\nplaybook(s) on resolution funding and bridge banks, which in turn would be based on the\nMoF and NBG internal playbooks.", "text_characters": 2450}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f4c864b8fbf127f532811597d5940365ec41cdf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f1c029d18afe29340593f0b8ae6505cbbff335b0f49bb9a6d617bc49da95eca7
+size 166779
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7654479c6e21f082d79d9f78fb76d299f4164914
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:27ef6ea7a1e3f045b1afc4051eb7dbfe4191a6fff44b2c98885a2332a8250824
+size 2575
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08e49d9e9c278e48872154a15a23c0cda2252bbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5f8e1980ffff2a1bdd77dff55e25c0beb102113be4a60a65b056f5b33e842cb4
+size 366
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fe3338ebb01a68b91a6e9ce17314784eebb6fc76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7908f5a18b7311383298a34731227f5d3b611bef446b55d90343812eb547dd99
+size 3190
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f268012f5eb2fea09251debbccf58c84fe67c75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7be032e23e5a1aa211fcf6d66b9ef138077ed5cb9ef675cef409c3f9f4dc6468
+size 4176
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c0484312797e056562e62db1c34f18bda9a54172
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:53f942c4686eaab020be6b7cde595ba6c9eea762649bc557aa0d9a3287e31de1
+size 1602
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3723c0b7ffd890967c4b58d033b8d52585b7f930
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f0dbf095b4dc134d573b67521868c6275b6e32f34eafa5a79469e52c9de80768
+size 295
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d9209691bfb6bd6a91486bcb7d328139741fba06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0be767253c46efe34ab85389c77e846dc77bf2abecbaf0bb4976b1c38649eb32
+size 334
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-008.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-008.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e997e5b803ab5502903bf4a50215cce4f1bc535
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-008.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:87b35aaf752f0cb8e1b6ab70217c46bb690805e939b8e77be16a86ca9d3d375e
+size 3220
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-009.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-009.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6ae42a36caa24038d6832ea4325a74a68c3f1302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-009.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:676cb6a3f65cfff9d9d902ed5967f3a3bf5afce092f2ec787c978042ea962f0a
+size 5760
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-010.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-010.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82d170c4e655b62ef1657b9916cedf998f39c178
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-010.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bca36fe02258cb438c40a478a1261c8aa4369c143cf25c7bb79ab0c305344d9f
+size 3734
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-011.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-011.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5c02351828cb4b75eb4ebe359d819342e6f62fe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-011.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:67749bee0f2126d20e7dc2346e5672b91f96ad428dd3010da2318493943affa1
+size 1995
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-012.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-012.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ddbf6304d2e6776273c5af28596051e93594007c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-012.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e223083102c2a2eb53a20418054a0436e691f06923ba07c591550d1b60ab1294
+size 4137
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-013.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-013.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0a48c765874d2b83f43931809432eb1418c5daa4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-013.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8aa77c0289ae502ae1dec0b8687ad3ee3767ea4b363e91e38e6dea028abd75d2
+size 4025
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-014.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-014.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..00c9ad4242df3990c72de76ce504dc5d3549dcae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-014.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:08178b91397c46bd7d2cf19e382ba6b86c71637eea075c555f2992edd4fb4f64
+size 6829
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-015.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-015.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d0eccf88725bcbde2826e70b6c1cb703d382de33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-015.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4780f9e813946c8b08664f96080e14facbb334d8d34e1f25b23b10ae823d3d3e
+size 6871
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-016.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-016.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b653081268a185732ec3b315c97aaca6de041018
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-016.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:20d42e0b84caabcceb11d59efe5e77bbe9ba04a42f6e19ddaa9b4089fb323ff9
+size 2781
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-017.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-017.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1852e4b5e898bf5e10c89ff3b9a2bcc4847b8d02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-017.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:85ebfce5cd4297da3c8b1ba83bc2635638c957524739b5e2bf47588be4993ca8
+size 6038
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-018.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-018.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d81616420c9d7c0917a527840bced416b9f32883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-018.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7461f73aecfa3fdfd1838c803543f7293977dc1c079f8f89d3bf87f9a823d672
+size 15016
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-019.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-019.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..07632939af65eba6ca8225405a4abbab7701dce0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-019.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:919ee41cc984aa51bf5445e0b885bc99481dbc9fe93a3022062958ea82513750
+size 8970
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-020.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-020.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..405e16aac6dbee22f3a4430c1f5429caa245b890
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-020.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9dc2adae0187e3c725b978671252d5f52abd0f342b7eb38dc10114b01248f305
+size 4065
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-021.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-021.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e0f1a51b9bc98b2dd0fb07c71e2bcdc66f791f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-021.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9a15fe9d69982445c0ffedc2cfdfb6369e9dd5fd64f1d2428b374c44b45294c3
+size 4737
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-022.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-022.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4db3cccf7cb2f7d73104a9a172f8b0b3a44c4bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-022.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:57b6211bccab2fd9ed9b91ffdd8e14343fee2a729bf359cdb208eed328f2a683
+size 5229
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-023.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-023.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9eadab20c1644e4ae464fe30e56cdad2f473d401
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-023.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1227539e11bcbfe5e656b7d2368b524c30c873a808b77a1194c64169e6bcdccb
+size 2864
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-024.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-024.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6998bb8517dbbec3378e1156412b8b27c3288232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-024.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3e04b95f48c27b19a28b112b54d31f4452ab1b2de739c18264683d683f22580f
+size 3516
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-025.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-025.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb61cf54dd77168ec11584f7a6249efe61b241f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-025.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0d161f73776c249b1036c7300b19cadf1b6e2bf822a3a48377b4346a9b00707f
+size 240937
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0b43b44b06739f7629308bd3d4f2df0a0c75480d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-124",
+ "title": "Botswana: Technical Assistance Report-National Accounts Statistics Mission",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-124.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "53a86b96f40cd1aa668f738c96aa019320834538c3e6a2dc1cb00326d2ca54e5",
+ "source_bytes": 516165,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/03/27/botswana-technical-assistance-report-national-accounts-statistics-mission-531428",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:20:57+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 3.967,
+ "page_count": 10,
+ "text_characters": 16330,
+ "table_count": 4,
+ "figure_count": 27,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "BOTSWANA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—NATIONAL ACCOUNTS STATISTICS MISSION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Glossary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "ANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Botswana: Technical Assistance Report-National Accounts Statistics Mission; IMF Country Report No. 23/124; October 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "national accounts; rebase; base year ",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230324161426-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230328091923-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..df86e6d2d66910d68cb62e5fb4a4660e915f4a6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+
+
+
+
+March 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/124**
+## **BOTSWANA**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—NATIONAL** **ACCOUNTS STATISTICS MISSION**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance report on Botswana was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed on October 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+##### **CONTENTS**
+
+
+Glossary __________________________________________________________________________________________ 4
+
+
+**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________ 5**
+
+**ANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE ______________________________________________________ 6**
+
+**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________ 8**
+A. Officials Met During the Mission _______________________________________________________________ 9
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Botswana: Priority Recommendations __________________________________________________________ 6
+2. Botswana: Results Based Framework ___________________________________________________________ 8
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+###### **Glossary**
+
+
+_2008 SNA_ _System of National Accounts, 2008_
+AFS IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa - AFRITAC South
+BMTHS Botswana Multi Topic Household Survey
+BURS Botswana Unified Revenue Services
+CEE Census of Economic Establishments
+COICOP Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose
+CPI Consumer Price Index
+GVA Gross Value Added
+HFCE Household Final Consumption Expenditure
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+ISIC, Rev. 4 International Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 4
+SB Statistics Botswana
+SUT Supply and Use Tables
+TA Technical Assistance
+
+
+**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+##### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**1.** **A technical assistance (TA) mission was conducted by IMF’s Regional Technical**
+**Assistance Center for Southern Africa** **(AFS)** **[1]** **during October 2022 to assist Statistics**
+**Botswana (SB) in the development of the strategic plan for the next rebase of the national**
+**accounts statistics** . The SB will be focusing on the rebase over the coming years and has no
+plans to expand on what they currently produce unless adequate resources are obtained.
+
+
+**2.** **The mission reviewed and suggested updates of two strategic documents**
+**pertaining to the rebase with the national accounts team.** The first document broadly
+outlined the main objectives of a rebase and the key tasks. It had been prepared for the previous
+rebase so many of the objectives needed to be updated as they had already been completed,
+e.g., implementing the _System of National Accounts, 2008_ ( _2008 SNA_ ). The second document
+concentrated on the implementation strategy and was more detailed. It was agreed that this
+document needed to be updated significantly as many key milestones and activities were
+missing. These were discussed and SB will update the document accordingly.
+
+
+**3.** **The timeline for the rebasing exercise was reviewed and agreed.** The rebase will
+officially commence in April 2023 and is likely to take four to five years to complete, i.e., finish in
+2028/29. The next base year will be 2024 given the timings of when key surveys will be
+undertaken, namely the Agriculture Census (2024/25), the Botswana Multi Topic Household
+Survey (BMTHS) (2023/24) and the Census of Economic Establishments (CEE) 2024.
+
+
+**4.** **The data input and processing system development will be undertaken during**
+**2023/24, commencing in May 2023.** Therefore, the strategic documents, questionnaire design
+and sample frame need to be close to final by the end of April 2023. The questionnaires used in
+the last rebase were reviewed with the aim of improving the response rate and minimizing costs.
+The mission provided some other examples of questionnaires which should provide some
+guidance. The national accounts team were able to draw on the experience of the issues they
+faced during previous rebase as well. SB are planning to use the tax list to identify the sample
+frame for this rebase. They will commence discussions with the Botswana Unified Revenue
+Services (BURS) to determine the sample frame.
+
+
+**5.** **The following priority recommendations will improve the national accounts**
+**statistics for Botswana:**
+
+
+1 AFS provides TA and training to Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius,
+Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. AFS donors are the European Union,
+Switzerland, Germany, China, Mauritius, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, European Investment Bank, Australia
+and Canada.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+
+
+**Table 1. Botswana: Priority Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|**April 2023**|_Finalize strategic plan for rebasing the national_
_accounts_
|
**SB**|
+|**April 2023**|_Determine sample frame for the rebasing of the_
_national accounts._|**SB**|
+|**April 2023**|_Finalize the questionnaire design for the 2024 CEE_|**SB**|
+
+
+Further details on the priority recommendations and the related actions/milestones can be found
+in the action plan under _Detailed Technical Assessment and Recommendations_ .
+##### **ANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE**
+
+**6.** **SB currently has a base year of 2016 which was released in July 2021.** The
+recommended timeframe between rebases is five years. Therefore, in theory, 2021 may have
+been the next base year. However, with the impacts of Covid19 this is not possible. Many of the
+required censuses and surveys required for a rebase (such as the Census of Population and
+Housing (2022), the BMTHS and CEE) have been delayed thus resulting in a review of the timing
+for the next rebasing of the national accounts. It has been decided that the next base year will be
+2024.
+
+
+**7.** **The 2016 Rebase Strategy Notes document which broadly outlined the objectives**
+**and main activities of the last rebase was reviewed and updated.** Many of the objectives
+remained the same but it was suggested that the focus be on what specific tasks SB is expected
+to undertake in the upcoming rebase, rather than having a generalized document. The main
+activities of the previous rebase were the implementation of the _2008 SNA_ and the International
+Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 4 (ISIC, Rev. 4). Both of these were completed and will
+be removed. Other recommendations were to indicate that there are three main tasks (i.e.,
+estimation of the base year/Supply and Use Tables (SUT); the update to data sources and
+methods of the forward years; and backcast the timeseries) and each should be explained.
+
+**8.** **The rebase relies on data from several irregular surveys and censuses.** Many of these
+will be undertaken by other areas within SB which therefore requires the national accounts team
+to be involved in their developments to ensure their needs are met. The Census of Population
+and Housing is currently being processed. It was recommended that the national accounts team
+articulate their needs while it is still being processed, otherwise it may be difficult to extract the
+required data at a later date.
+
+**9.** **The BMTHS is essential for the estimation of the household final consumption**
+**expenditure (HFCE) estimate as well as updating the consumer price index (CPI).**
+Unfortunately, the data from the previous BMTHS was not of good quality. Significant
+
+
+**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+
+adjustments were made so that it could be used in the previous rebase and the update of the
+CPI. The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP), which
+underpins the HFCE and CPI, has been updated and this needs to be included in the BMTHS.
+Both the national accounts and prices teams need to be involved in the development of this
+BMTHS to ensure the data is usable for both the national accounts as well as the CPI.
+
+**10.** **It is essential that the Agriculture Census provides the data required for the**
+**national accounts rebase.** Typically, it will not collect the economic data necessary to calculate
+gross value added (GVA), unless it is expressly requested. If GVA data are not included in the
+census, then the CEE will have to include agriculture. This can cause irritation with data providers
+as the same agency is collecting similar data using different forms. It is recommended that SB
+ensure that all of the required data is collected only once using the Agriculture Census form.
+Consequently, the national accounts team need to be involved in the development of the
+Agriculture Census form.
+
+**11.** **The CEE is the main survey used to estimate GVA and populate the SUT.** The
+previous CEE had a very low response rate which the SB wants to improve this time. Therefore,
+the questionnaires were reviewed, and many recommendations were provided. The main
+recommendation was to simplify the form by including only what was necessary. There should
+not be any additional sections such as ICT as was included last time. The questions to be
+included should align with business accounts and not use SNA terminology. Keep them simple
+and specific. The previous rebase had 14 different questionnaires and included very specific
+items. The mission recommended that the number of questionnaires should be reduced
+significantly and include “write in” items instead of specifying items. For example, instead of
+asking for the value of the sale of wood products, ask the data provider to write in the product
+they have sold and report its value. This enables a more generic questionnaire be developed for
+the majority of businesses and it also enables the validation of the industry code. Alternate
+questionnaires would only have to be developed where the method of deriving output is
+different, e.g., construction, trade services.
+
+**12.** **The 2016 Implementation Strategy document was also reviewed.** This document is
+more detailed outlining the key milestones and tasks for the rebase. More detail was identified to
+be included in the document as the previous version concentrated on the CEE collection and SUT
+compilation. Considerable discussion was undertaken on what should be done within the next 18
+months especially as they have money dedicated for the rebase in 2023/24. It was decided that
+this money would be best used to develop the CEE data input and processing system. In order to
+commence this exercise in May 2023 it is necessary that the national accounts team will have
+developed the CEE questionnaires and have a sample frame.
+
+**13.** **The sample frame needs to be finalized by May 2023.** It was decided that the tax list
+would be used as the business frame from which a sample will be drawn to undertake the CEE.
+The national accounts team need to commence discussions with the BURS to produce a frame as
+soon as possible. There are likely to be many issues that need to be resolved during this process.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+
+**14.** **The previous data processing system was only a data input system.** Consequently,
+the compilation of the GVA estimates were done manually. The mission strongly recommended
+that the IT system this time is also a data processing system whereby the main aggregates are
+derived. The system should also include several consistency checks. This will reduce errors and
+save time to do the follow ups with businesses in a timely manner. The national accounts team
+will need to start developing the IT data processing system specifications so that in May 2023
+they will have something to provide the IT consultant.
+
+**15.** **The next mission is planned for March 2023.** This timing will enable a review of the
+strategic documents, 2024 CEE questionnaires, sample frame and IT data processing
+specifications before May 2023.
+
+**16.** **The current NA team have the necessary skills to undertake the rebase.** They were
+responsible for the previous rebase so can draw on those experiences to ensure improvements
+are adopted in the next rebase. The mission hopes that SB is able to keep this team together as
+the next rebase exercise progresses.
+
+_**Recommended actions:**_
+
+
+- _The National Accounts team to update the Rebase Strategy Notes and Rebase Implementation_
+_documents._
+
+- _The National Accounts team to be involved in the development of key surveys to ensure the_
+_data required for the rebase is obtained._
+
+- _The National Accounts team develop the 2024 CEE questionnaires._
+
+- _The National Accounts team finalize the sample frame in conjunction with the BURS._
+
+- _The National Accounts team commence develop of the IT data processing system specifications._
+##### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**Table 2. Botswana: Results Based Framework**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Objective: Strengthen compilation and dissemination of data on macroeconomic and financial
statistics decision making according to the relevant internationally accepted statistical standard,
including developing/improving statistical infrastructure, source data, serviceability and/or
metadata.|Col2|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Outcome**
|**Verifiable Indicators**
|**Verifiable Indicators**
|**Verifiable Indicators**
|
+|Data are compiled and disseminated
using the concepts and definitions of the
latest manual/guide|The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly
follow the_2008 SNA._
|The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly
follow the_2008 SNA._
|The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly
follow the_2008 SNA._
|
+|**Milestones**
|**Assumptions**
|**Target Completion**
**Date**|**Comments**
|
+|Strategic plan for 2024 rebase of NA
developed||30 April 2023||
+
+
+**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+BOTSWANA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Milestones|Assumptions|Target Completion
Date|Comments|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|Determine sample frame for the rebasing
of the national accounts.
|
|30 April 2023|
|
+|Finalize the questionnaire design for the
CEE
|
|30 April 2023|
|
+|Commence development of data input
and processing system
|
|1 May 2023|
|
+|Undertake the CEE
|
|FY 2025/26|
|
+|Data gathering and assessment (Analysis
of data; BMTHS, Agric census, CEE etc.)
|
|FY 2026/27|
|
+|Compilation of SUT
|
|FY 2026/27|
|
+|Dissemination of rebased GDP estimates.
|
|FY 2028/29|
|
+|Disseminate back cast series from 1994 to
2024 (the new base year)
||FY 2028/29||
+
+
+**A. Officials Met During the Mission**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Name|Position|
+|---|---|
+|
**Dr Lucky Mokgatle**
|
Deputy Statistician General;
ECOSOC
|
+|**Boitumelo Matlhaga**|
Director: Economic Statistics
|
+|
**Phaladi Labobedi**
|
Manager; National Accounts &
Prices
|
+|**Lekoko Simako**|
Senior Statistician
|
+|
**Winstern Kabo**|
Statistician|
+|**Chandler Madisa**|Statistician|
+|**Boitumelo Kobua**|Statistician|
+|**Godiraone Gaolaolwe**|Statistician|
+|**Phemelo Ntwayapelo**|Statistician|
+|**Michael Andina**
|Statistician|
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3c3f6e6dddcb138dfda3c0f71de9c34b3e1b9321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6064274555656037", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1319, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bfaf842795011b8e62fac27c70f830f0941460f26aff1f0f9b899f0f9c056e23", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "f1c029d18afe29340593f0b8ae6505cbbff335b0f49bb9a6d617bc49da95eca7", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8a9692b0b1b2b90e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-001", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9944e711661b18e6e66cb3499993266c866dcd93b24ccce6b333b399cccca633", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "27ef6ea7a1e3f045b1afc4051eb7dbfe4191a6fff44b2c98885a2332a8250824", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8282828080828282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-002", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "800080008000aaaa2aaa80008000aaaa2aaa80008000aaaa2aaaaaaa2aaa8000", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "5f8e1980ffff2a1bdd77dff55e25c0beb102113be4a60a65b056f5b33e842cb4", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "92cab03a0a8292c2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-003", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9000845543ff608af9c09845fc07c71827ffb9c45fe06c71f0399b9cc0fecee7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "7908f5a18b7311383298a34731227f5d3b611bef446b55d90343812eb547dd99", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9aa4d29898daa49a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-004", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9933cc99e4dcb36612678d9d5992ccc9e649b3369924cccb1993e699666d9126", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "7be032e23e5a1aa211fcf6d66b9ef138077ed5cb9ef675cef409c3f9f4dc6468", "width": 136}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "88908c088c8eb28e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-005", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e66419ae1999e679e6669986e799666119a69999e6799e669116a19918e6a666", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "53f942c4686eaab020be6b7cde595ba6c9eea762649bc557aa0d9a3287e31de1", "width": 136}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9292929292929290", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-006", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "f1c10e1c0e3e71e30e3e0f1c0e3e71e30e3e0f1c0e3e71e30e3e07c70e3e71e3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "f0dbf095b4dc134d573b67521868c6275b6e32f34eafa5a79469e52c9de80768", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8282808082828282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-007", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "80002aaa2aaa80002aaa2aaa80008000aaaa2aaa2aaa80002aaa2aaa80000000", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "0be767253c46efe34ab85389c77e846dc77bf2abecbaf0bb4976b1c38649eb32", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-008.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "82c2f28880f2d292", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-008", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "c0057fab8c600fe0703e87f79e03603f8ff0707878e78f0f8ff870c00f8f7870", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "87b35aaf752f0cb8e1b6ab70217c46bb690805e939b8e77be16a86ca9d3d375e", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-009.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "249993e6c9b264ca", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-009", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "81f130f17e851e0f078f2c2ce9e5633dea05003dff61414fd5595fd088116bfb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "676cb6a3f65cfff9d9d902ed5967f3a3bf5afce092f2ec787c978042ea962f0a", "width": 136}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-010.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f16264cbcf9cf0c6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-010", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "85154f3d5c28b07d23e04e03b06f67c0981f63f85e8371feaf0072ffa780783e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "bca36fe02258cb438c40a478a1261c8aa4369c143cf25c7bb79ab0c305344d9f", "width": 136}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-011.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8292898181818181", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-011", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "cad5952a352a6ad42ad4a656354a9ad94aa94aa9352bb52b75764ad45e9655b6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "67749bee0f2126d20e7dc2346e5672b91f96ad428dd3010da2318493943affa1", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-012.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "526a124a48122a52", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-012", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "f7c00fe09c71601f63bf183f38e3e7c0861f183f8183f1c060700ffe381eff83", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "e223083102c2a2eb53a20418054a0436e691f06923ba07c591550d1b60ab1294", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-013.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "924aa6dadaa64890", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-013", "height": 80, "page": 3, "phash_256": "81559c1f7038c63f31fe601f987c6f0f6e18b1cebb9c4c479d8f622166239998", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "8aa77c0289ae502ae1dec0b8687ad3ee3767ea4b363e91e38e6dea028abd75d2", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-014.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ebad3c391c392b2e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-014", "height": 60, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ba0f807e287e81fe4150e9205ed2b7055a9b85fd133f322f85f5d2aab781d6c0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "08178b91397c46bd7d2cf19e382ba6b86c71637eea075c555f2992edd4fb4f64", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-015.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "76d8c80153587d6e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-015", "height": 62, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9bbf16aa956ebd55ec44ee44d6e5f733e53be3193308c0183596e505c00d320f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "4780f9e813946c8b08664f96080e14facbb334d8d34e1f25b23b10ae823d3d3e", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-016.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d4b26d4c4c4db2d4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-016", "height": 74, "page": 3, "phash_256": "961e7965596166926596c33c661a9965d667ccc99861349b879a692579b99676", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "20d42e0b84caabcceb11d59efe5e77bbe9ba04a42f6e19ddaa9b4089fb323ff9", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-017.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f235d5ce455330f", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-017", "height": 85, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bebf9369e840c496854f1b6b92beca05c7a03c5a9791cb25d686b05b9b5a1f24", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "85ebfce5cd4297da3c8b1ba83bc2635638c957524739b5e2bf47588be4993ca8", "width": 85}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-018.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1771849696ac6117", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-018", "height": 85, "page": 3, "phash_256": "b5ba399dee45c6663113a69824fa790fc3c559e393948618c647594f9e5939b0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "7461f73aecfa3fdfd1838c803543f7293977dc1c079f8f89d3bf87f9a823d672", "width": 85}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-019.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b3cec9ae32a6a6cc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-019", "height": 96, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e467233622baec45f9be3862da49eb9f3c10f4aed2318e307f2edd10548e134a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "919ee41cc984aa51bf5445e0b885bc99481dbc9fe93a3022062958ea82513750", "width": 87}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-020.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0520236379630100", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-020", "height": 49, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ae079578e0787bc397c8643f6c2793d8939c95606af278076fc895f390276a0e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "9dc2adae0187e3c725b978671252d5f52abd0f342b7eb38dc10114b01248f305", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-021.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "004d6e6759670550", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-021", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bf8f37c3c078c83d9137c4f06c1c930b265966dd338f99f2cc659929619a62d4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "9a15fe9d69982445c0ffedc2cfdfb6369e9dd5fd64f1d2428b374c44b45294c3", "width": 120}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-022.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "da9271f6a7673603", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-022", "height": 50, "page": 3, "phash_256": "adff53fdd12c2d7ee0ee91808b094a4e0cb185b3da469c3076237e421e58736e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "57b6211bccab2fd9ed9b91ffdd8e14343fee2a729bf359cdb208eed328f2a683", "width": 108}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-023.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6868686868f3fe68", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-023", "height": 56, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8f0f8fffb3e070028fef70304c4f93276cd0704a962f4dd070628f9f71d08e69", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "1227539e11bcbfe5e656b7d2368b524c30c873a808b77a1194c64169e6bcdccb", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-024.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "42aaaa4ad2a28282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-024", "height": 64, "page": 3, "phash_256": "c01de01f38e71fc00fc00fc03878f87f703ff0384e301e780f7831cf39cf39e7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "3e04b95f48c27b19a28b112b54d31f4452ab1b2de739c18264683d683f22580f", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-124/assets/figures/cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-025.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0530b772f3c536e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-025", "height": 1319, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bf82c07fc5ac32636e938798d06f2f04689b1fe0c1b9c07f3fe00ed2c81d9764", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "sha256_normalized_png": "0d161f73776c249b1036c7300b19cadf1b6e2bf822a3a48377b4346a9b00707f", "width": 1019}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-124/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1203f384d8d23995ee0b1e9fce85e07e2a9009ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-124/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-124-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMarch 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/124**\n## **BOTSWANA**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—NATIONAL** **ACCOUNTS STATISTICS MISSION**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance report on Botswana was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on October 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "March 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/124\nBOTSWANA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—NATIONAL ACCOUNTS STATISTICS MISSION\n\nThis Technical Assistance report on Botswana was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on October 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 572}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-124-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\nBOTSWANA\nReport on the National Accounts Mission\nNOVEMBER 2022\n\n\n\nPREPARED BY\nDonna Grcman\n\n\n\n\n\nMEMBERS\nAngola, Botswana, Comoros, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles,\nSouth Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe\n\nPARTNERS\nEuropean Union, SADC, COMESA, Germany, FCDO, SECO, China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the\nNetherlands, European Investment Bank, Australian Aid, and CCCDI Canada", "text_characters": 376}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-001", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-002", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-003", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-004", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-005", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-006", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-007", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-008", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-009", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-010", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-011", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-012", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-013", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-014", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-015", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-016", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-017", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-018", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-019", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-020", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-021", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-022", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-023", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-024", "cr-2023-124-fig-p0003-025"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0079, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(446.25, 353.39593505859375, 526.8457641601562, 400.7459411621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(21,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 19, "size": 1545, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 446.25, 353.39593505859375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(72.24999237060547, 353.39593505859375, 152.84573364257812, 400.7459411621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(37,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 15, "size": 2358, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 72.24999237060547, 353.39593505859375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(72.24999237060547, 424.2953796386719, 152.84573364257812, 471.6453857421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(7,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 20, "size": 1081, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 72.24999237060547, 424.2953796386719], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(72.24999237060547, 495.1947937011719, 152.84573364257812, 542.5447998046875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(40,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 25, "size": 1461, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 72.24999237060547, 495.1947937011719], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(165.75, 353.39593505859375, 246.34573364257812, 400.7459411621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(5,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 16, "size": 1081, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 165.75, 353.39593505859375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(259.2499694824219, 353.39593505859375, 339.845703125, 400.7459411621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(42,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 17, "size": 2520, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 259.2499694824219, 353.39593505859375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(352.7499694824219, 353.39593505859375, 433.345703125, 400.7459411621094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(146,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 18, "size": 3876, "transform": [80.59574127197266, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 352.7499694824219, 353.39593505859375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(165.75, 424.2953796386719, 246.34567260742188, 471.6453857421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(6,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 21, "size": 1081, "transform": [80.59566497802734, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 165.75, 424.2953796386719], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(259.2499694824219, 424.2953796386719, 339.84564208984375, 471.6453857421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(108,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 22, "size": 3258, "transform": [80.59566497802734, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 259.2499694824219, 424.2953796386719], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(352.7499694824219, 424.2953796386719, 433.34564208984375, 471.6453857421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(56,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 23, "size": 2871, "transform": [80.59566497802734, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 352.7499694824219, 424.2953796386719], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(165.75, 495.1947326660156, 246.34567260742188, 542.5447387695312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(59,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 26, "size": 2187, "transform": [80.59566497802734, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 165.75, 495.1947326660156], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(259.2499694824219, 495.1947326660156, 339.84564208984375, 542.5447387695312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(130,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 27, "size": 3387, "transform": [80.59566497802734, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 259.2499694824219, 495.1947326660156], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(446.25, 424.2953796386719, 526.8456420898438, 471.6453857421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(65,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 24, "size": 2991, "transform": [80.59566497802734, 0.0, -0.0, 47.349998474121094, 446.25, 424.2953796386719], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(392.4499206542969, 627.3239135742188, 444.2499084472656, 684.1600341796875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 115, "number": 32, "size": 22059, "transform": [51.79999542236328, 0.0, -0.0, 56.83613967895508, 392.4499206542969, 627.3239135742188], "width": 105, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(72.24999237060547, 630.8238525390625, 137.01841735839844, 674.7738647460938)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(49,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 109, "number": 28, "size": 3318, "transform": [64.76842498779297, 0.0, -0.0, 43.94999694824219, 72.24999237060547, 630.8238525390625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(223.8500518798828, 693.4738159179688, 295.80035400390625, 729.0238037109375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "ICCBased(RGB,sRGB IEC61966-2.1)", "has-mask": false, "height": 149, "number": 36, "size": 45714, "transform": [71.95030212402344, 0.0, -0.0, 35.54999542236328, 223.8500518798828, 693.4738159179688], "width": 300, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(155.35006713867188, 630.6239624023438, 205.75006103515625, 681.0239868164062)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 115, "number": 29, "size": 7916, "transform": [50.39999771118164, 0.0, -0.0, 50.39999771118164, 155.35006713867188, 630.6239624023438], "width": 115, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(234.650146484375, 630.6239013671875, 285.0501403808594, 681.02392578125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(20,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 117, "number": 30, "size": 5688, "transform": [50.39999771118164, 0.0, -0.0, 50.39999771118164, 234.650146484375, 630.6239013671875], "width": 117, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(72.25, 695.4737548828125, 136.97149658203125, 733.373779296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 34, "size": 3167, "transform": [64.72149658203125, 0.0, -0.0, 37.89999771118164, 72.25, 695.4737548828125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.6498718261719, 637.3239135742188, 371.4079895019531, 673.8239135742188)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 90, "number": 31, "size": 27456, "transform": [64.75811004638672, 0.0, -0.0, 36.5, 306.6498718261719, 637.3239135742188], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(465.24993896484375, 638.1239624023438, 530.0157470703125, 673.5239868164062)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(50,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 88, "number": 33, "size": 7395, "transform": [64.76582336425781, 0.0, -0.0, 35.39999771118164, 465.24993896484375, 638.1239624023438], "width": 161, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(148.05007934570312, 697.848876953125, 212.83030700683594, 731.098876953125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(32,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 82, "number": 35, "size": 3441, "transform": [64.78022766113281, 0.0, -0.0, 33.25, 148.05007934570312, 697.848876953125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(382.44989013671875, 696.9738159179688, 454.44989013671875, 725.7738037109375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 120, "number": 38, "size": 35547, "transform": [71.99999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 28.799997329711914, 382.44989013671875, 696.9738159179688], "width": 300, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(306.64990234375, 699.8988037109375, 371.3628234863281, 729.048828125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(32,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": true, "height": 72, "number": 37, "size": 4545, "transform": [64.7129135131836, 0.0, -0.0, 29.149999618530273, 306.64990234375, 699.8988037109375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "DISCLAIMER\n\nThe contents of this document constitute technical advice provided by the staff of the International\nMonetary Fund to the authorities of Botswana (the \"CD recipient\") in response to their request for\ntechnical assistance. This document (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the\nIMF to the IMF Executive Director for Botswana, to other IMF Executive Directors and members of their\nstaff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities of the CD recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff, and other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest including\nmembers of the Steering Committee of AFRITAC South, unless the CD recipient specifically objects to\nsuch disclosure (see Operational Guidance for the Dissemination of Capacity Development Information ).\nPublication or Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) to parties outside the IMF other than agencies\nor instrumentalities of the CD recipient, World Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors\nwith legitimate interest including members of the Steering Committee of AFRITAC South shall require the\nexplicit consent of the CD recipient and the IMF’s Statistics department.\n\n\n\nMEMBERS\n\n\n\n\n\n Angola Botswana Comoros Eswatini Lesotho\n\n\n\n\n\n Madagascar Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Seychelles\n\n\n\n\n\n South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe\n\n\n\n\nPARTNERS", "text_characters": 1161}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n##### **CONTENTS**\n\n\nGlossary __________________________________________________________________________________________ 4\n\n\n**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________ 5**\n\n**ANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE ______________________________________________________ 6**\n\n**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________ 8**\nA. Officials Met During the Mission _______________________________________________________________ 9\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Botswana: Priority Recommendations __________________________________________________________ 6\n2. Botswana: Results Based Framework ___________________________________________________________ 8\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BOTSWANA\nCONTENTS\n\nGlossary 4\n\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _ 5\n\nANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE 6\n\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8\nA. Officials Met During the Mission _ 9\n\nTABLES\n1. Botswana: Priority Recommendations 6\n2. Botswana: Results Based Framework _ 8\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3", "text_characters": 285}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n###### **Glossary**\n\n\n_2008 SNA_ _System of National Accounts, 2008_\nAFS IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa - AFRITAC South\nBMTHS Botswana Multi Topic Household Survey\nBURS Botswana Unified Revenue Services\nCEE Census of Economic Establishments\nCOICOP Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose\nCPI Consumer Price Index\nGVA Gross Value Added\nHFCE Household Final Consumption Expenditure\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nISIC, Rev. 4 International Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 4\nSB Statistics Botswana\nSUT Supply and Use Tables\nTA Technical Assistance\n\n\n**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BOTSWANA\nGlossary\n\n_2008 SNA_ _System of National Accounts, 2008_\nAFS IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center for Southern Africa - AFRITAC South\nBMTHS Botswana Multi Topic Household Survey\nBURS Botswana Unified Revenue Services\nCEE Census of Economic Establishments\nCOICOP Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose\nCPI Consumer Price Index\nGVA Gross Value Added\nHFCE Household Final Consumption Expenditure\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nISIC, Rev. 4 International Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 4\nSB Statistics Botswana\nSUT Supply and Use Tables\nTA Technical Assistance\n\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 553}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n##### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**1.** **A technical assistance (TA) mission was conducted by IMF’s Regional Technical**\n**Assistance Center for Southern Africa** **(AFS)** **[1]** **during October 2022 to assist Statistics**\n**Botswana (SB) in the development of the strategic plan for the next rebase of the national**\n**accounts statistics** . The SB will be focusing on the rebase over the coming years and has no\nplans to expand on what they currently produce unless adequate resources are obtained.\n\n\n**2.** **The mission reviewed and suggested updates of two strategic documents**\n**pertaining to the rebase with the national accounts team.** The first document broadly\noutlined the main objectives of a rebase and the key tasks. It had been prepared for the previous\nrebase so many of the objectives needed to be updated as they had already been completed,\ne.g., implementing the _System of National Accounts, 2008_ ( _2008 SNA_ ). The second document\nconcentrated on the implementation strategy and was more detailed. It was agreed that this\ndocument needed to be updated significantly as many key milestones and activities were\nmissing. These were discussed and SB will update the document accordingly.\n\n\n**3.** **The timeline for the rebasing exercise was reviewed and agreed.** The rebase will\nofficially commence in April 2023 and is likely to take four to five years to complete, i.e., finish in\n2028/29. The next base year will be 2024 given the timings of when key surveys will be\nundertaken, namely the Agriculture Census (2024/25), the Botswana Multi Topic Household\nSurvey (BMTHS) (2023/24) and the Census of Economic Establishments (CEE) 2024.\n\n\n**4.** **The data input and processing system development will be undertaken during**\n**2023/24, commencing in May 2023.** Therefore, the strategic documents, questionnaire design\nand sample frame need to be close to final by the end of April 2023. The questionnaires used in\nthe last rebase were reviewed with the aim of improving the response rate and minimizing costs.\nThe mission provided some other examples of questionnaires which should provide some\nguidance. The national accounts team were able to draw on the experience of the issues they\nfaced during previous rebase as well. SB are planning to use the tax list to identify the sample\nframe for this rebase. They will commence discussions with the Botswana Unified Revenue\nServices (BURS) to determine the sample frame.\n\n\n**5.** **The following priority recommendations will improve the national accounts**\n**statistics for Botswana:**\n\n\n1 AFS provides TA and training to Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius,\nMozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. AFS donors are the European Union,\nSwitzerland, Germany, China, Mauritius, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, European Investment Bank, Australia\nand Canada.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BOTSWANA\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n1. A technical assistance (TA) mission was conducted by IMF’s Regional Technical\nAssistance Center for Southern Africa (AFS) [1] during October 2022 to assist Statistics\nBotswana (SB) in the development of the strategic plan for the next rebase of the national\naccounts statistics . The SB will be focusing on the rebase over the coming years and has no\nplans to expand on what they currently produce unless adequate resources are obtained.\n\n2. The mission reviewed and suggested updates of two strategic documents\npertaining to the rebase with the national accounts team. The first document broadly\noutlined the main objectives of a rebase and the key tasks. It had been prepared for the previous\nrebase so many of the objectives needed to be updated as they had already been completed,\ne.g., implementing the _System of National Accounts, 2008_ ( _2008 SNA_ ). The second document\nconcentrated on the implementation strategy and was more detailed. It was agreed that this\ndocument needed to be updated significantly as many key milestones and activities were\nmissing. These were discussed and SB will update the document accordingly.\n\n3. The timeline for the rebasing exercise was reviewed and agreed. The rebase will\nofficially commence in April 2023 and is likely to take four to five years to complete, i.e., finish in\n2028/29. The next base year will be 2024 given the timings of when key surveys will be\nundertaken, namely the Agriculture Census (2024/25), the Botswana Multi Topic Household\nSurvey (BMTHS) (2023/24) and the Census of Economic Establishments (CEE) 2024.\n\n4. The data input and processing system development will be undertaken during\n2023/24, commencing in May 2023. Therefore, the strategic documents, questionnaire design\nand sample frame need to be close to final by the end of April 2023. The questionnaires used in\nthe last rebase were reviewed with the aim of improving the response rate and minimizing costs.\nThe mission provided some other examples of questionnaires which should provide some\nguidance. The national accounts team were able to draw on the experience of the issues they\nfaced during previous rebase as well. SB are planning to use the tax list to identify the sample\nframe for this rebase. They will commence discussions with the Botswana Unified Revenue\nServices (BURS) to determine the sample frame.\n\n5. The following priority recommendations will improve the national accounts\nstatistics for Botswana:\n\n1 AFS provides TA and training to Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius,\nMozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. AFS donors are the European Union,\nSwitzerland, Germany, China, Mauritius, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, European Investment Bank, Australia\nand Canada.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5", "text_characters": 2425}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n\n\n**Table 1. Botswana: Priority Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|**April 2023**|_Finalize strategic plan for rebasing the national_
_accounts_
|
**SB**|\n|**April 2023**|_Determine sample frame for the rebasing of the_
_national accounts._|**SB**|\n|**April 2023**|_Finalize the questionnaire design for the 2024 CEE_|**SB**|\n\n\nFurther details on the priority recommendations and the related actions/milestones can be found\nin the action plan under _Detailed Technical Assessment and Recommendations_ .\n##### **ANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE**\n\n**6.** **SB currently has a base year of 2016 which was released in July 2021.** The\nrecommended timeframe between rebases is five years. Therefore, in theory, 2021 may have\nbeen the next base year. However, with the impacts of Covid19 this is not possible. Many of the\nrequired censuses and surveys required for a rebase (such as the Census of Population and\nHousing (2022), the BMTHS and CEE) have been delayed thus resulting in a review of the timing\nfor the next rebasing of the national accounts. It has been decided that the next base year will be\n2024.\n\n\n**7.** **The 2016 Rebase Strategy Notes document which broadly outlined the objectives**\n**and main activities of the last rebase was reviewed and updated.** Many of the objectives\nremained the same but it was suggested that the focus be on what specific tasks SB is expected\nto undertake in the upcoming rebase, rather than having a generalized document. The main\nactivities of the previous rebase were the implementation of the _2008 SNA_ and the International\nStandard Industrial Classification, Revision 4 (ISIC, Rev. 4). Both of these were completed and will\nbe removed. Other recommendations were to indicate that there are three main tasks (i.e.,\nestimation of the base year/Supply and Use Tables (SUT); the update to data sources and\nmethods of the forward years; and backcast the timeseries) and each should be explained.\n\n**8.** **The rebase relies on data from several irregular surveys and censuses.** Many of these\nwill be undertaken by other areas within SB which therefore requires the national accounts team\nto be involved in their developments to ensure their needs are met. The Census of Population\nand Housing is currently being processed. It was recommended that the national accounts team\narticulate their needs while it is still being processed, otherwise it may be difficult to extract the\nrequired data at a later date.\n\n**9.** **The BMTHS is essential for the estimation of the household final consumption**\n**expenditure (HFCE) estimate as well as updating the consumer price index (CPI).**\nUnfortunately, the data from the previous BMTHS was not of good quality. Significant\n\n\n**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.19200134277344, 93.53939056396484, 539.8079833984375, 208.3800048828125], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "BOTSWANA\n\nTable 1. Botswana: Priority Recommendations\n\n Target Date Priority Recommendation Responsible Institutions \n\n April 2023 _Finalize strategic plan for rebasing the national_ _accounts_ SB \n April 2023 _Determine sample frame for the rebasing of the_ _national accounts._ SB \n April 2023 _Finalize the questionnaire design for the 2024 CEE_ SB \n\nFurther details on the priority recommendations and the related actions/milestones can be found\nin the action plan under _Detailed Technical Assessment and Recommendations_ .\nANNUAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS REBASE\n\n6. SB currently has a base year of 2016 which was released in July 2021. The\nrecommended timeframe between rebases is five years. Therefore, in theory, 2021 may have\nbeen the next base year. However, with the impacts of Covid19 this is not possible. Many of the\nrequired censuses and surveys required for a rebase (such as the Census of Population and\nHousing (2022), the BMTHS and CEE) have been delayed thus resulting in a review of the timing\nfor the next rebasing of the national accounts. It has been decided that the next base year will be\n2024.\n\n7. The 2016 Rebase Strategy Notes document which broadly outlined the objectives\nand main activities of the last rebase was reviewed and updated. Many of the objectives\nremained the same but it was suggested that the focus be on what specific tasks SB is expected\nto undertake in the upcoming rebase, rather than having a generalized document. The main\nactivities of the previous rebase were the implementation of the _2008 SNA_ and the International\nStandard Industrial Classification, Revision 4 (ISIC, Rev. 4). Both of these were completed and will\nbe removed. Other recommendations were to indicate that there are three main tasks (i.e.,\nestimation of the base year/Supply and Use Tables (SUT); the update to data sources and\nmethods of the forward years; and backcast the timeseries) and each should be explained.\n\n8. The rebase relies on data from several irregular surveys and censuses. Many of these\nwill be undertaken by other areas within SB which therefore requires the national accounts team\nto be involved in their developments to ensure their needs are met. The Census of Population\nand Housing is currently being processed. It was recommended that the national accounts team\narticulate their needs while it is still being processed, otherwise it may be difficult to extract the\nrequired data at a later date.\n\n9. The BMTHS is essential for the estimation of the household final consumption\nexpenditure (HFCE) estimate as well as updating the consumer price index (CPI).\nUnfortunately, the data from the previous BMTHS was not of good quality. Significant\n\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2268}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n\nadjustments were made so that it could be used in the previous rebase and the update of the\nCPI. The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP), which\nunderpins the HFCE and CPI, has been updated and this needs to be included in the BMTHS.\nBoth the national accounts and prices teams need to be involved in the development of this\nBMTHS to ensure the data is usable for both the national accounts as well as the CPI.\n\n**10.** **It is essential that the Agriculture Census provides the data required for the**\n**national accounts rebase.** Typically, it will not collect the economic data necessary to calculate\ngross value added (GVA), unless it is expressly requested. If GVA data are not included in the\ncensus, then the CEE will have to include agriculture. This can cause irritation with data providers\nas the same agency is collecting similar data using different forms. It is recommended that SB\nensure that all of the required data is collected only once using the Agriculture Census form.\nConsequently, the national accounts team need to be involved in the development of the\nAgriculture Census form.\n\n**11.** **The CEE is the main survey used to estimate GVA and populate the SUT.** The\nprevious CEE had a very low response rate which the SB wants to improve this time. Therefore,\nthe questionnaires were reviewed, and many recommendations were provided. The main\nrecommendation was to simplify the form by including only what was necessary. There should\nnot be any additional sections such as ICT as was included last time. The questions to be\nincluded should align with business accounts and not use SNA terminology. Keep them simple\nand specific. The previous rebase had 14 different questionnaires and included very specific\nitems. The mission recommended that the number of questionnaires should be reduced\nsignificantly and include “write in” items instead of specifying items. For example, instead of\nasking for the value of the sale of wood products, ask the data provider to write in the product\nthey have sold and report its value. This enables a more generic questionnaire be developed for\nthe majority of businesses and it also enables the validation of the industry code. Alternate\nquestionnaires would only have to be developed where the method of deriving output is\ndifferent, e.g., construction, trade services.\n\n**12.** **The 2016 Implementation Strategy document was also reviewed.** This document is\nmore detailed outlining the key milestones and tasks for the rebase. More detail was identified to\nbe included in the document as the previous version concentrated on the CEE collection and SUT\ncompilation. Considerable discussion was undertaken on what should be done within the next 18\nmonths especially as they have money dedicated for the rebase in 2023/24. It was decided that\nthis money would be best used to develop the CEE data input and processing system. In order to\ncommence this exercise in May 2023 it is necessary that the national accounts team will have\ndeveloped the CEE questionnaires and have a sample frame.\n\n**13.** **The sample frame needs to be finalized by May 2023.** It was decided that the tax list\nwould be used as the business frame from which a sample will be drawn to undertake the CEE.\nThe national accounts team need to commence discussions with the BURS to produce a frame as\nsoon as possible. There are likely to be many issues that need to be resolved during this process.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "BOTSWANA\n\nadjustments were made so that it could be used in the previous rebase and the update of the\nCPI. The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP), which\nunderpins the HFCE and CPI, has been updated and this needs to be included in the BMTHS.\nBoth the national accounts and prices teams need to be involved in the development of this\nBMTHS to ensure the data is usable for both the national accounts as well as the CPI.\n\n10. It is essential that the Agriculture Census provides the data required for the\nnational accounts rebase. Typically, it will not collect the economic data necessary to calculate\ngross value added (GVA), unless it is expressly requested. If GVA data are not included in the\ncensus, then the CEE will have to include agriculture. This can cause irritation with data providers\nas the same agency is collecting similar data using different forms. It is recommended that SB\nensure that all of the required data is collected only once using the Agriculture Census form.\nConsequently, the national accounts team need to be involved in the development of the\nAgriculture Census form.\n\n11. The CEE is the main survey used to estimate GVA and populate the SUT. The\nprevious CEE had a very low response rate which the SB wants to improve this time. Therefore,\nthe questionnaires were reviewed, and many recommendations were provided. The main\nrecommendation was to simplify the form by including only what was necessary. There should\nnot be any additional sections such as ICT as was included last time. The questions to be\nincluded should align with business accounts and not use SNA terminology. Keep them simple\nand specific. The previous rebase had 14 different questionnaires and included very specific\nitems. The mission recommended that the number of questionnaires should be reduced\nsignificantly and include “write in” items instead of specifying items. For example, instead of\nasking for the value of the sale of wood products, ask the data provider to write in the product\nthey have sold and report its value. This enables a more generic questionnaire be developed for\nthe majority of businesses and it also enables the validation of the industry code. Alternate\nquestionnaires would only have to be developed where the method of deriving output is\ndifferent, e.g., construction, trade services.\n\n12. The 2016 Implementation Strategy document was also reviewed. This document is\nmore detailed outlining the key milestones and tasks for the rebase. More detail was identified to\nbe included in the document as the previous version concentrated on the CEE collection and SUT\ncompilation. Considerable discussion was undertaken on what should be done within the next 18\nmonths especially as they have money dedicated for the rebase in 2023/24. It was decided that\nthis money would be best used to develop the CEE data input and processing system. In order to\ncommence this exercise in May 2023 it is necessary that the national accounts team will have\ndeveloped the CEE questionnaires and have a sample frame.\n\n13. The sample frame needs to be finalized by May 2023. It was decided that the tax list\nwould be used as the business frame from which a sample will be drawn to undertake the CEE.\nThe national accounts team need to commence discussions with the BURS to produce a frame as\nsoon as possible. There are likely to be many issues that need to be resolved during this process.\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7", "text_characters": 2886}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n\n**14.** **The previous data processing system was only a data input system.** Consequently,\nthe compilation of the GVA estimates were done manually. The mission strongly recommended\nthat the IT system this time is also a data processing system whereby the main aggregates are\nderived. The system should also include several consistency checks. This will reduce errors and\nsave time to do the follow ups with businesses in a timely manner. The national accounts team\nwill need to start developing the IT data processing system specifications so that in May 2023\nthey will have something to provide the IT consultant.\n\n**15.** **The next mission is planned for March 2023.** This timing will enable a review of the\nstrategic documents, 2024 CEE questionnaires, sample frame and IT data processing\nspecifications before May 2023.\n\n**16.** **The current NA team have the necessary skills to undertake the rebase.** They were\nresponsible for the previous rebase so can draw on those experiences to ensure improvements\nare adopted in the next rebase. The mission hopes that SB is able to keep this team together as\nthe next rebase exercise progresses.\n\n_**Recommended actions:**_\n\n\n- _The National Accounts team to update the Rebase Strategy Notes and Rebase Implementation_\n_documents._\n\n- _The National Accounts team to be involved in the development of key surveys to ensure the_\n_data required for the rebase is obtained._\n\n- _The National Accounts team develop the 2024 CEE questionnaires._\n\n- _The National Accounts team finalize the sample frame in conjunction with the BURS._\n\n- _The National Accounts team commence develop of the IT data processing system specifications._\n##### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**Table 2. Botswana: Results Based Framework**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Objective: Strengthen compilation and dissemination of data on macroeconomic and financial
statistics decision making according to the relevant internationally accepted statistical standard,
including developing/improving statistical infrastructure, source data, serviceability and/or
metadata.|Col2|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Outcome**
|**Verifiable Indicators**
|**Verifiable Indicators**
|**Verifiable Indicators**
|\n|Data are compiled and disseminated
using the concepts and definitions of the
latest manual/guide|The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly
follow the_2008 SNA._
|The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly
follow the_2008 SNA._
|The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly
follow the_2008 SNA._
|\n|**Milestones**
|**Assumptions**
|**Target Completion**
**Date**|**Comments**
|\n|Strategic plan for 2024 rebase of NA
developed||30 April 2023||\n\n\n**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.20000457763672, 527.6392822265625, 539.7999877929688, 705.407958984375], "columns": 4, "rows": 5}], "text": "BOTSWANA\n\n14. The previous data processing system was only a data input system. Consequently,\nthe compilation of the GVA estimates were done manually. The mission strongly recommended\nthat the IT system this time is also a data processing system whereby the main aggregates are\nderived. The system should also include several consistency checks. This will reduce errors and\nsave time to do the follow ups with businesses in a timely manner. The national accounts team\nwill need to start developing the IT data processing system specifications so that in May 2023\nthey will have something to provide the IT consultant.\n\n15. The next mission is planned for March 2023. This timing will enable a review of the\nstrategic documents, 2024 CEE questionnaires, sample frame and IT data processing\nspecifications before May 2023.\n\n16. The current NA team have the necessary skills to undertake the rebase. They were\nresponsible for the previous rebase so can draw on those experiences to ensure improvements\nare adopted in the next rebase. The mission hopes that SB is able to keep this team together as\nthe next rebase exercise progresses.\n\n_Recommended actions:_\n\n- _The National Accounts team to update the Rebase Strategy Notes and Rebase Implementation_\n_documents._\n\n- _The National Accounts team to be involved in the development of key surveys to ensure the_\n_data required for the rebase is obtained._\n\n- _The National Accounts team develop the 2024 CEE questionnaires._\n\n- _The National Accounts team finalize the sample frame in conjunction with the BURS._\n\n- _The National Accounts team commence develop of the IT data processing system specifications._\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nTable 2. Botswana: Results Based Framework\n\n Objective: Strengthen compilation and dissemination of data on macroeconomic and financial statistics decision making according to the relevant internationally accepted statistical standard, including developing/improving statistical infrastructure, source data, serviceability and/or metadata. Col2 Col3 Col4 \n\n Outcome Verifiable Indicators Verifiable Indicators Verifiable Indicators \n Data are compiled and disseminated using the concepts and definitions of the latest manual/guide The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly follow the_2008 SNA._ The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly follow the_2008 SNA._ The general framework, concepts and definitions broadly follow the_2008 SNA._ \n Milestones Assumptions Target Completion Date Comments \n Strategic plan for 2024 rebase of NA developed 30 April 2023 \n\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2221}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "BOTSWANA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Milestones|Assumptions|Target Completion
Date|Comments|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|Determine sample frame for the rebasing
of the national accounts.
|
|30 April 2023|
|\n|Finalize the questionnaire design for the
CEE
|
|30 April 2023|
|\n|Commence development of data input
and processing system
|
|1 May 2023|
|\n|Undertake the CEE
|
|FY 2025/26|
|\n|Data gathering and assessment (Analysis
of data; BMTHS, Agric census, CEE etc.)
|
|FY 2026/27|
|\n|Compilation of SUT
|
|FY 2026/27|
|\n|Dissemination of rebased GDP estimates.
|
|FY 2028/29|
|\n|Disseminate back cast series from 1994 to
2024 (the new base year)
||FY 2028/29||\n\n\n**A. Officials Met During the Mission**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Name|Position|\n|---|---|\n|
**Dr Lucky Mokgatle**
|
Deputy Statistician General;
ECOSOC
|\n|**Boitumelo Matlhaga**|
Director: Economic Statistics
|\n|
**Phaladi Labobedi**
|
Manager; National Accounts &
Prices
|\n|**Lekoko Simako**|
Senior Statistician
|\n|
**Winstern Kabo**|
Statistician|\n|**Chandler Madisa**|Statistician|\n|**Boitumelo Kobua**|Statistician|\n|**Godiraone Gaolaolwe**|Statistician|\n|**Phemelo Ntwayapelo**|Statistician|\n|**Michael Andina**
|Statistician|\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-124", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.21818542480469, 72.1919937133789, 539.7817993164062, 301.36761474609375], "columns": 4, "rows": 9}, {"bbox": [90.21818542480469, 349.1193542480469, 539.7817993164062, 563.7200317382812], "columns": 2, "rows": 11}], "text": "BOTSWANA\n\n Milestones Assumptions Target Completion Date Comments \n\n Determine sample frame for the rebasing of the national accounts. 30 April 2023 \n Finalize the questionnaire design for the CEE 30 April 2023 \n Commence development of data input and processing system 1 May 2023 \n Undertake the CEE FY 2025/26 \n Data gathering and assessment (Analysis of data; BMTHS, Agric census, CEE etc.) FY 2026/27 \n Compilation of SUT FY 2026/27 \n Dissemination of rebased GDP estimates. FY 2028/29 \n Disseminate back cast series from 1994 to 2024 (the new base year) FY 2028/29 \n\nA. Officials Met During the Mission\n\n Name Position \n\n Dr Lucky Mokgatle Deputy Statistician General; ECOSOC \n Boitumelo Matlhaga Director: Economic Statistics \n Phaladi Labobedi Manager; National Accounts & Prices \n Lekoko Simako Senior Statistician \n Winstern Kabo Statistician \n Chandler Madisa Statistician \n Boitumelo Kobua Statistician \n Godiraone Gaolaolwe Statistician \n Phemelo Ntwayapelo Statistician \n Michael Andina Statistician \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9", "text_characters": 860}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fa56be780d9b9398efe88e627cba328a8918b43e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7f316144102a1eb873cb3e09f57a82fddb94335bf6e08626233e675c2903b8a7
+size 173024
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0007-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0007-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c0298ff9bdf6b58e3589fab8b986b3c6e9b62273
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0007-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a5759cfa96c4ca053112881949edd8521024f7ef46f92a7b4ce738418045f627
+size 147294
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0011-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0011-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f1507c50d8907320f30b427c8f764b7a9d57d6a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0011-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:71fb9b7426aa04e509170aaad229b761b0cf93bf2bc6250683b7f6ed29550cc2
+size 136387
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0012-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0012-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ecb06f48f63f5a4baf9c54cb5073dec2771aca2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0012-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d43b11b0c220cb303c35c1f044deff15128848738712f46346ea3af8812d4fb5
+size 120237
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8beb60dd9d63454d1c2cb75667deef3ada6c753c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b609077eae8dec6df7da85e9747c76ebe5428cd330c4ac6c85d2ddba4c6ab27b
+size 9113
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..27c898779baab08844139c4b3909005105a58075
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-138",
+ "title": "St. Lucia: Technical Assistance Report-Remote National Accounts Mission",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-138.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "af6f0613ec3a4053f109370139a7b944c6b460d336f93376b4f76b9de6f0e7e7",
+ "source_bytes": 507821,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/04/11/st-532171",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:07+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 13.916,
+ "page_count": 18,
+ "text_characters": 28384,
+ "table_count": 9,
+ "figure_count": 6,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "ST. LUCIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—REMOTE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS MISSION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "CONTENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "GDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "GDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 10,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "STRATEGIC ISSUES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 10,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "St. Lucia: Technical Assistance Report-Remote National Accounts Mission; IMF Country Report No. 23/138; February 2022 ",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "GDP; Expenditure GDP; Quarterly GDP; Constant Prices; Supply and Use Tables",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230404100406-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230411153212-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..57aec431e114906a8cec6bd369bbf155fddaaf63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
+
+
+
+
+April 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/138**
+## **ST. LUCIA**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—REMOTE** **NATIONAL ACCOUNTS MISSION**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on St. Lucia was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in February 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+###### **CONTENTS**
+
+
+**Glossary** __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3
+
+**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________ 4**
+
+**GDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT ___________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+**GDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY __________________________________________________________________ 8**
+
+**STRATEGIC ISSUES ______________________________________________________________________________ 9**
+
+**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________ 9**
+A. Detailed Actions for NAD ____________________________________________________________________ 10
+B. Summary of Training Provided in Mission ___________________________________________________ 10
+C. Officials Met During the Mission _____________________________________________________________ 11
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Priority Recommendations _____________________________________________________________________ 5
+2. High-Level Summary of GDP-E Approach ______________________________________________________ 6
+3. Detailed Recommendations ____________________________________________________________________ 9
+4. Detailed GDP-E Actions for NAD ______________________________________________________________ 10
+5. Training Provided During Mission _____________________________________________________________ 11
+
+**ANNEXES**
+I. Actions Log ____________________________________________________________________________________ 12
+II. Proposed GDP-E Methodology ________________________________________________________________ 13
+
+
+**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+**Glossary**
+
+
+_2008 SNA_ _System of National Accounts 2008_
+_BPM6_ _Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6_ _[th]_ _Edition_
+CARTAC IMF’s Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre
+CII Changes in Inventories
+COFOG Classification of the Functions of Government
+COICOP Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose
+CP Current price
+CPI Consumer price index
+CSO Central Statistics Office of Saint Lucia
+ECCB Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
+EPI Export price index
+GDP Gross domestic product
+GDP-E Gross domestic product by expenditure components
+GDP-P Gross domestic product by economic activities
+GFCE Government final consumption expenditure
+GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
+GFS Government Financial Statistics
+HFCE Household final consumption expenditure
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+MOF Ministry of Finance
+NAD National accounts department
+NPISH FCE Non-profit institutions serving households final consumption expenditure
+PPI Producer price index
+SITC Standard International Trade Classification
+SNA System of National Accounts
+SUT Supply and use tables
+TA Technical assistance
+VAT Value Added Tax
+VM Volume
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+##### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**1.** **A remote technical assistance (TA) mission conducted by STA for the Caribbean**
+**Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) to Saint Lucia during February 14–25, 2022, to**
+**provide** advice to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) on compiling improved estimates of Gross
+Domestic Product by expenditure components (GDP-E), in line with relevant _System of National_
+_Accounts 2008_ ( _SNA 2008_ ) recommendations. The improved estimates will improve the
+understanding of the Saint Lucia economy, notably the needs of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for
+more robust and timely national accounts statistics. This development will also help Saint Lucia meet
+the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standards requirements.
+
+**2.** **Following the compilation of SUT for 2016, estimates of GDP by economic activities**
+**(GDP-P) were benchmarked to the new base year, 2018.** The estimate is compiled annually and
+quarterly in current and constant prices. In contrast, GDP-E is only compiled annually in current
+prices. The mission therefore focused on developing quarterly and annual estimates of GDP-E in
+both current and constant prices, in line with the series for GDP-P. This required developing a set of
+quarterly and annual current and constant price indicators. In addition, the previous approach
+treated private consumption as a residual item and was used to balance with GDP-P. This
+shortcoming will be remedied by developing a complete set of indicators for all expenditure
+transactions.
+
+**3.** **Training was provided on the different components of GDP-E for current price**
+**methods and price and volume measurement.** The theoretical framework was used to identify
+potential indicators based on data sources available to the CSO.
+
+**4.** **A methodology for compiling GDP-E was developed.** This provides the breakdown of the
+expenditure components and the data sources that can be used to compile GDP-E. The mission also
+developed the weights that align to the agreed breakdown. A summary of the proposed
+methodology is set out in the Detailed Technical Assessment section and a full breakdown is
+provided in Annex II.
+
+**5.** **The mission identified some research topics for the national accounts department**
+**(NAD) as part of its development of GDP-E.** This includes checking the quality of some indicators
+and identifying whether some sources are available at a lower level of detail.
+
+**6.** **The CSO will develop the new GDP-E system during 2022 and aim to publish a first set**
+**of results for Q1 2023 in the first half of 2023.** The NAD already has a well-organized spreadsheet
+system for compiling GDP-P and the new approach can be integrated within that system. A period of
+parallel running was recommended.
+
+**7.** **At present, the current price estimates of GDP-E are aligned to GDP-P by deriving**
+**expenditure by private households as a residual.** The re-developed GDP-E will be independent
+
+
+**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+and produce different aggregate estimates to those for GDP-P. Therefore, an approach to balancing
+the two estimates of GDP will need to be developed. In relation to this, training was provided on
+various approaches which can be used. To support the finalization of the estimates of GDP-E and
+prepare the initial results for publication, a further CARTAC mission during 2022–23 would be
+beneficial.
+
+**8.** **The mission also quality assured the current methods used for compiling**
+**accommodation in the production measure of GDP.** Accommodation is a major component of the
+Saint Lucia economy, accounting for over 20 percent of GDP-P. The NAD has recognized a volume
+shift from hotels to self-catering in recent years, which represents a change in the quality mix. At
+present, the indicators do not account for the different qualities of accommodation. This is an area
+where more data will be required to make proper improvements. The mission recommended
+consulting with the Tourist Board in relation to the visitor survey and the Eastern Caribbean Central
+Bank (ECCB) around coordinating data collection.
+
+**9.** **The mission also covered the research agenda of the System of National Accounts**
+**revision.** It is important that the CSO keep abreast of developments around the international
+frameworks. In terms of implementation, this would be an area that would be picked up in future
+rebasing exercises.
+
+**10.** **To support progress towards the above objectives, the mission recommended the**
+**following priority recommendations to make headway in improving Saint Lucia’s national**
+**accounts:**
+
+**Table 1. Priority Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Target Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|
+|---|---|---|
+|July 2022|The CSO to address the GDP-E research issues identified
and update the methodology accordingly|
CSO|
+|October 2022|The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to
incorporate GDP-E|CSO|
+|June 2023
|The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same
publication timetable as the production approach|CSO|
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+##### **GDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT**
+
+**11.** **In 2020, GDP-P for Saint Lucia was updated to reflect the new activity structures and**
+**benchmarked to the latest base year, 2018,** based on the economic structures derived from the
+2016 Supply and Use Table (SUT). The revised data was also aligned with the historic data to produce
+a full time series of backcast data. In contrast, GDP-E has not been published since 2018.
+
+**12.** **This mission focussed on developing an improved methodology for compiling GDP-E in**
+**current and constant prices on a quarterly basis.** This represents a substantial improvement to the
+current situation, whereby GDP-E is only compiled annually in current prices.
+
+**13.** **Training on the concepts related to GDP-E, appropriate data sources and best practice**
+**on price and volume measurement were provided.** This established a good foundation for
+identifying possible current price sources, price deflators and volume indicators for compiling GDP-E.
+
+**14.** **For each expenditure transaction a list of indicators was produced along with a**
+**provisional breakdown of detail.** A high-level summary of the proposed methodology is set out in
+Table 2 below.
+
+**Table 2. High-Level Summary of GDP-E Approach**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+A table containing the full methodology can be found in Annex II of this report.
+
+
+**15.** **The proposed set of indicators identified areas where further research is required to be**
+**undertaken by the NAD.** This covers areas such as reviewing the quality of detailed manufacturing
+establishment survey results, the availability excises data, investigation of detailed CPI series for use
+as deflators, some potential household splits of some volume indicators and backcasting of the
+producer price index (PPI) for hotels. One other key action concerns retail sales as Saint Lucia has one
+dominant retailer which could potentially provide useful product level data. Saint Lucia also has
+several industry regulators who may collect data useful for national accounts purposes – this should
+be reviewed by the CSO.
+
+**16.** **The proposed methodology is data rich and will be based on 91 percent quarterly data.**
+Where annual benchmarks are available, they will be adopted within the methodology using the
+same approach as the GDP-P approach. The indicators have also been assessed against the Eurostat
+Price and Volume Handbook, which provides a useful framework for assessing annual price and
+volume methods. Based on the proposed methodology, over half of the methods are acceptable or
+better. This framework can also be used to identify areas for improvement.
+
+**17.** **The key areas of weakness lie in producer price indices (PPI), trade deflators and high-**
+**level volume indicators.** On producer prices, the NAD regularly collect quantity and value data from
+the formal manufacturing sector. There is scope for generating PPI series from these data. On trade
+deflators, the customs data compiled by the CSO, contains quantity information alongside the value
+data. Whilst there are quality issues with the quantity information, this is an area that should be
+picked up on the prices’ side. The issue of high-level volume indicators is part of the research
+agenda.
+
+**18.** **Aside of the research items, the NAD can start developing the system for compiling**
+**GDP-E.** The NAD already have a well organised Excel based system in place for the production
+measure which can be augmented. The CSO has committed to start developing the new system with
+the aim of having results available later in 2022. The mission recommended conducting a parallel run
+prior to going live as well as reviewing the NAD resource requirements with this additional workload.
+
+**19.** **The CSO are aiming to publish quarterly GDP-E for Q1 2023.** This will be published
+alongside GDP-P. Based on the current publication schedule, this would mean disseminating in the
+second quarter of 2023.
+
+**20.** **The mission also considered options for balancing quarterly GDP in the future.**
+Previously, GDP by was balanced by using private consumption as the residual item. With a full set of
+indicators, this approach is no longer valid. This mission covered the various options that could be
+adopted, with using a statistical discrepancy as the most likely option. This is an area that could be
+reviewed in a subsequent mission.
+
+_**Recommended actions:**_
+
+- _CSO to address the GDP-Eresearch issues identified and update the methodology accordingly._
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+- _The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to incorporate GDP-E._
+
+- _The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same publication timetable as the production_
+_approach._
+
+- _The CSO to investigate compiling unit value price indices with technical assistance support._
+##### **GDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**
+
+**21.** **Whilst the mission focussed on GDP-E, the mission did review two components of the**
+**GDP-P approach.** This focussed on the accommodation and insurance sectors.
+
+**22.** **Accommodation is the largest sector in the Saint Lucia economy, accounting for**
+**22 percent of gross value added.** Most of the data is sourced from the Visitor Expenditure Survey
+and the main volume indicator is the number of bed nights. In recent years, there has been an
+increasing proportion of self-catering accommodation, predominantly via Airbnb. Whilst this is based
+on anecdotal evidence, as no firm data are available, this would represent a change in the quality mix
+of the accommodation product. A switch from higher quality hotels to lower quality self-catering
+accommodation would lead to a lower rate of growth in the volume measure. This was illustrated via
+a hypothetical example provided in the mission.
+
+**23.** **This issue identifies a need for more granular data on the quality of accommodation**
+**products being consumed in Saint Lucia.** There are several potential ways forward on this issue.
+When visitors arrive in Saint Lucia, they normally record their intended location on entering the
+country. If these data are available, they should potentially be used. Another alternative is
+approaching Airbnb to see if aggregate data could be provided. Given the importance of this
+industry in the wider region, it is a subject that could ideally be coordinated for a number of
+countries via the ECCB, perhaps by CARTAC, especially given the impact on the balance of payments.
+
+**24.** **The method used to estimate the value added of the insurance activity was also**
+**reviewed as part of this mission and the current method was ratified.** In terms of the volume
+measure for insurance, the indicators used are appropriate in terms of acting as proxies for the
+underlying items that tend to be insured. However, the current price data is reflated using the CPI for
+insurance, which is not appropriate given the insurance algorithm used to calculate output.
+
+**25.** **Whilst the volume series is reflated to calculate output, the series is also benchmarked**
+**to an annual estimate of the insurance algorithm.** Whilst the NAD do not have all the data
+required to measure insurance fully, assumptions are made on the proportions of claims. As a result,
+the choice of CPI has a minimal impact on the end results. However, this is an area where the
+regulator should be able to provide information to help improve the current price figures.
+
+_**Recommended actions:**_
+
+- _The CSO to investigate additional data sources which can help measure the quality mix of the_
+_accommodation industry_
+
+
+**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+- _CARTAC to raise the issue of coordinating data collection on self-catering accommodation with_
+_the ECCB_
+
+##### **STRATEGIC ISSUES**
+
+**26.** **A business register for Saint Lucia was developed via a project run by Statistics Canada.**
+This project is ending in March 2022, but Statistics Canada has installed the business register
+application and the database is now populated with data form the tax system.
+
+**27.** **In May 2022, the CSO will run an establishment census to update the business register.**
+This improvement will provide a useful framework for using more administrative data (such as VAT)
+as well as the potential for improving and potentially widening establishment surveys. Developing
+retail sales estimates via valued added tax (VAT) data and data from major retailers could provide
+additional quality information for the GDP-E method.
+
+**28.** **The mission also provided an update to the NAD on the development of the new**
+**revision of the System of National Accounts as well as progress on the activity and product**
+**classifications.** Key areas relevant to Saint Lucia were highlighted for information. Implementation of
+the new standards are still several years away but should be factored into future rebasing plans to
+ensure the exercises coincide.
+
+_**Recommended action:**_
+
+- _The CSO to explore potential areas of improvement from the implementation of the business_
+_register_
+##### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+**The following table sets out the actions agreed with the CSO for improving the national**
+**accounts estimates.**
+
+
+**Table 3. Detailed Recommendations**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion Date|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**_Outcome:_** Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide
|
**_Outcome:_** Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide
|
**_Outcome:_** Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide
|
+|M
|The CSO to address the GDP-E research issues identified and
update the methodology accordingly
|July 2022|
+|H
|
The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to
incorporate GDP-E
|October 2022|
+|H
|
The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same
publication timetable as the production approach
|June 2023
|
+|M|
The CSO to investigate compiling unit value price indices with
technical assistance support|December 2022|
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion Date|
+|---|---|---|
+|M
|The CSO to investigate additional data sources which can help
measure the quality mix of the accommodation industry
|
December 2022
|
+|M
|
CARTAC to raise the issue of coordinating data collection on
self-catering accommodation with the ECCB
|June 2022
|
+|M
|
The CSO to explore potential areas of improvement from the
implementation of the business register|December 2022|
+
+
+
+**A.** **Detailed Actions for NAD**
+
+**29.** **The main report summarizes the research areas identified as part of compiling the**
+**GDP-E methodology.** Table 4 provides the detailed list of actions to be researched which are
+covered by one of the main recommendations in the report.
+
+**Table 4. Detailed GDP-E Actions for NAD**
+
+
+**B.** **Summary of Training Provided in Mission**
+
+The following training was provided in this mission focusing mostly on quarterly GDP-E.
+
+
+**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+
+**Table 5. Training Provided During Mission**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**C.** **Officials Met During the Mission**
+
+
+
+|Name|Institution|
+|---|---|
+|
Mr. Sean Mathurin
|
Director, CSO
|
+|
Mr. Richard Harris
|
Deputy Director, CSO
|
+|
Ms. Uranda Xavier
|
Statistician, CSO
|
+|
Mr. Arnold Lafeuillee
|
Statistician, CSO
|
+|
Ms. Stephanie Martial Constantin
|
Statistician, CSO
|
+|
Ms. Abigail Leo
|
Assistant Statistician, CSO|
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**
+
+
+
+SAINT LUCIA
+
+
+
+**Annex I. Actions Log**
+
+
+
+This annex documents the progress made against the recommendations set out in the previous
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|Status|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
+|
H
|Complete checking the formulae in the
compilation workbooks and switch to the
XLPBM add-in in the shared drive.
|02/14/2020|Completed|
+|H
|
Incorporate updated indicator data and price
indices for Q4 2019.
|02/17/2020|Completed|
+|H
|
Compile the GDP-P estimates for Q4 2019 and
initial 2019 estimates.
|02/21/2020|Completed|
+|H
|
Share the updated estimates with the ECCB,
MOF and IMF mission team.
|02/21/2020|Completed|
+|H|
Release the revised current and rebased
constant 2018 price annual and quarterly GDP-P
estimates.|04/03/2020|Completed|
+
+
+
+**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
+
+
+
+**Annex II. Proposed GDP-E Methodology**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|Government Final Consumption
Expenditure
|
13.3%||
||
|
|
|
+|
Government excluding Health &
Education|10.4%|GFS current expenditure|Q|Implied|Q|Public Sector
Employment
|BA|
+|
Health|1.3%|GFS current expenditure|Q|Implied|Q|
Public Sector
Employment
|BA|
+|Education
|1.6%|GFS current expenditure|Q|Implied|Q|
Public Sector
Employment|BA|
+|Household Final Consumption
Expenditure
|61.4%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages
|14.6%|
||
||||
+|
Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages:
Domestic
|
10.1%|
Manufacturing output of
food and non-alcoholic drink|
Q|
CPI for food and non-
alcohol drinks
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|
+|
Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages:
Imports
|4.6%
|
Imports of food goods
|Q
|
CPI for food and non-
alcohol drinks
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|
+|
Alcohol and Tobacco|1.7%|
||
||||
+|
Alcohol and Tobacco: Domestic|
1.5%|
Manufacturing output of
alcohol and tobacco
|
Q|
CPI for alcohol and
tobacco
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|
+|Alcohol and Tobacco: Imports
|0.2%
|
Imports of alcohol and
tobacco
|Q
|
CPI for alcohol and
tobacco
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|
+|Clothing & Footwear|1.3%|
||
||||
+|
Clothing & Footwear: Domestic|
0.9%|
Manufacturing output of
clothing and footwear
|
Q|
CPI for clothing and
footwear
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|
+|Clothing & Footwear: Imports|0.5%|
Imports of clothing and
footwear|Q|
CPI for clothing and
footwear|M|Deflated imports
|Q|
+|Housing|10.9%|
Reflated volume|Q|
CPI for housing|M|Electricity connections
(households)|M|
+
+
+
+|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|Water|
0.7%|Reflated volume|
Q|CPI for water|
M|Volume of water
(gallons) supplied to
households
|
M|
+|Electricity
|2.2%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for electricity
|M
|
Volume of electricity
(kWh) supplied to
households
|M
|
+|Household Goods|5.1%|
||
||
||
+|
Household Goods: Domestic|
3.0%|
Manufacturing output of
household goods|
Q|
CPI for furnishings and
household equipment
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|
+|Household Goods: Imports|2.1%|
Imports of household goods
|Q|
CPI for furnishings and
household equipment
|M|Deflated imports|Q|
+|Medical products, appliances, and
equipment|0.5%|Imports of medical
appliances and
pharmaceuticals|Q|
CPI for medical
appliances and
pharmaceuticals|M|Deflated imports
|Q|
+|Health services
|1.4%
|
Reflated volume
|Q
|
CPI for health services
|M
|Private sector
employees
|Q
|
+|Own transport
|3.4%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for motor vehicles
|M
|
Stock of new vehicles
|Q
|
+|
Land transport|
2.2%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for services|
M|
Population
|
Q|
+|
Air transport
|
1.0%
|
Reflated volume
|
Q
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Passenger arrivals
(residents)
|
M
|
+|Sea transport
|0.3%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for services
|M
|
Port arrivals (residents)
|M
|
+|
Postal services
|
0.0%
|
Reflated volume
|
Q
|
CPI for transport
|
M
|
Employees
|
Q
|
+|
Telephone services and equipment|
3.0%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for communications
|
M|
Employees|
Q|
+|
Recreation & Culture|
1.4%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for recreation and
culture|
M|
Employees
|
Q|
+|Education
|1.6%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|
CPI for education
|M
|Private sector
employees
|Q
|
+|Restaurants|3.3%|Reflated volume|Q|CPI for restaurants
|M|
Population
|Q|
+|
Accommodation services|
0.9%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for restaurants used
to deflate quarterly
expenditure|
M|
Quarterly deflated
expenditure benched to
population|
Q|
+
+
+
+|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|Other miscellaneous goods and
services|
1.9%|Reflated volume|
Q|CPI for services|
M|Employees
|
Q|
+|
Insurance|1.2%|Reflated volume|Q|CPI for insurance|M|Insurance output
volume
|A|
+|Financial services n.e.c.
|2.7%|Direct: Non-interest income
Indirect: FISIM on loans and
deposits|A|Direct: Total CPI
Indirect: Implied deflator
|A|
Direct: Deflated income
Indirect: Stock of loans
and deposits deflated by
total CPI|A|
+|Non-Profit Institutions Serving
Households
|0.8%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for goods and
services
|M
|
Population
|Q
|
+|
Gross Fixed Capital Formation|25.5%|||
||||
+|
Construction|
11.7%|
Construction Output
|
Q|
CPI: Repairs and
Maintenance
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|
+|Transport Equipment
|1.6%
|Imports of transport
equipment
|Q
|
JPN EPI Transportation
Equipment
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|
+|ICT equipment|1.7%|
Imports of ICT equipment
|Q|
US EPI for computers
|M|Deflated imports|Q|
+|
Other machinery and equipment
|
10.5%
|
Imports of other machinery
and equipment
|
Q
|
US EPI Capital Goods
except automotive
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
Q
|
+|Changes in Inventories
|0.0%|
-|-|
-
|-|-|-|
+|
Acquisition less disposals of
valuables
|
0.0%
|
Reflated volume
|
Q
|
CPI for goods and
services
|
M
|
Population
|
Q
|
+|
Exports
|47.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Exports of Goods|
5.0%|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Food, Beverages and Tobacco|
4.1%|
Exports of goods for
SITC00_01_04|
Q|
CPI for food and non-
alcohol drinks
CPI for alcohol and
tobacco
|
M|
Deflated exports|
Q|
+|Crude Materials and Mineral Fuels|0.2%|Exports of goods for
SITC02_03|Q|
CPI for Fuels and
lubricants for personal
transport equipment|M|Deflated exports|Q|
+
+
+
+|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|Chemicals
|
0.2%
|Exports of goods for SITC05
|
Q
|CPI for Non-durable
household goods
|
M
|Deflated exports
|
Q
|
+|Manufactured Goods
|0.1%
|Exports of goods for SITC06
|Q
|
CPI for other goods
|M
|Deflated exports
|Q
|
+|
Machinery & Transport Equipment|
0.2%|
Exports of goods for SITC07
|
Q|
CPI for motor vehicles|
M|
Deflated exports|
Q|
+|
Miscellaneous Goods
|
0.1%
|
Exports of goods for
SITC08_09
|
Q
|
CPI for other goods
|
M
|
Deflated exports
|
Q
|
+|Exports of Services
|42.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Other services
|
2.8%
|
Exports of other services
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated exports
|
A/Q
|
+|
Travel
|
40.2%
|
Exports of travel services
|
A
|
PPI for accommodation
|
Q
|
Deflated exports
|
A/Q
|
+|
Imports
|
-49.0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Imports of Goods|
-34.0%|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Food, Beverages and Tobacco|
-7.9%|
Imports of goods for
SITC00_01_04
|
Q|
US EPI Foods, Feeds and
Beverages
|
M|
Deflated imports|
Q|
+|Crude Materials and Mineral Fuels|-7.5%|
Imports of goods for
SITC02_03|Q|
US EPI Fuels and
Lubricants
|M|Deflated imports|Q|
+|Chemicals|-3.0%|
Imports of goods for SITC05|Q|
US EPI Industrial
Supplies and Materials
|M|Deflated imports|Q|
+|Manufactured Goods|-5.1%|Imports of goods for SITC06|Q|
US EPI Capital Goods
except automotive
|M|Deflated imports|Q|
+|Machinery & Transport Equipment|-6.6%|Imports of goods for SITC07
|Q|
JPN EPI Transportation
Equipment|M|Deflated imports|Q|
+|Miscellaneous Goods
|-4.0%
|Imports of goods for
SITC08_09
|Q
|
US EPI All Commodities
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|
+|Imports of Services
|-15.0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+|
Air transport|
-1.2%|
Exports of air transport
|
A|
CPI for services|
M|
Deflated imports|
A/M|
+|
Other business services
|
-6.6%
|
Exports of other business
services
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
A/M
|
+|Other services
|-2.3%
|
Exports of other services
|A
|CPI for services
|M
|Deflated imports
|A/M
|
+|
Sea transport
|
-2.7%
|
Exports of sea transport
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
A/M
|
+|
Travel
|
-2.2%
|
Exports of travel
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
A/M
|
+|
GDP at market prices
100.0%|
GDP at market prices
100.0%|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..544058b7bbe91857b6aa7abed0e6feddb5b2000a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-138-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6864274145353223", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-138-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1288, "page": 2, "phash_256": "beaf9f079501d1ff6bfac0f8f0f031f0941060e262eecf0f8b8b9e039c0167a4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "sha256_normalized_png": "7f316144102a1eb873cb3e09f57a82fddb94335bf6e08626233e675c2903b8a7", "width": 995}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0007-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "24a78dad8fa78775", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-138-fig-p0007-001", "height": 568, "page": 7, "phash_256": "a42176d05e9c643517fe57444afc594d133f52de4c6968ac4b066b32b455a577", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "sha256_normalized_png": "a5759cfa96c4ca053112881949edd8521024f7ef46f92a7b4ce738418045f627", "width": 780}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0011-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6527656d6727e7c7", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-138-fig-p0011-001", "height": 583, "page": 11, "phash_256": "ee671ac731d91c98775813d61d1a43b578cd56b0616a1396275956ec35ca4aab", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "sha256_normalized_png": "71fb9b7426aa04e509170aaad229b761b0cf93bf2bc6250683b7f6ed29550cc2", "width": 780}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0012-001.png", "caption": "Table 5. Training Provided During Mission", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ce9f9d9b9f9f969e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-138-fig-p0012-001", "height": 533, "page": 12, "phash_256": "b0f84b06658c4f9f5f150792432e568507fe7f980bd2690f7649bb03485fb6c8", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "sha256_normalized_png": "d43b11b0c220cb303c35c1f044deff15128848738712f46346ea3af8812d4fb5", "width": 780}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-138/assets/figures/cr-2023-138-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "968ec88ecccc8e96", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-138-fig-p0018-001", "height": 149, "page": 18, "phash_256": "f571ec716ce1b91938cd9b36131a931c93339a46131b4cce4ccc66d2c73964f3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "sha256_normalized_png": "b609077eae8dec6df7da85e9747c76ebe5428cd330c4ac6c85d2ddba4c6ab27b", "width": 355}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-138/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6481d1404c4483366fc43b482afbd2968b67442a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-138/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-138-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nApril 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/138**\n## **ST. LUCIA**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—REMOTE** **NATIONAL ACCOUNTS MISSION**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on St. Lucia was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "April 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/138\nST. LUCIA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT—REMOTE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS MISSION\n\nThis technical assistance report on St. Lucia was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in February 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 569}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-138-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\nSAINT LUCIA\nRemote National Accounts Mission\nFebruary 14–25, 2022\nFEBRUARY 2022\n\n\nPREPARED BY\nSteve Drew\n\n\n\n\n\nMEMBERS\nAnguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,\nCayman Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,\nSt. Maarten, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands\n\nPARTNERS\nCanada, United Kingdom, European Union, Netherlands, Mexico, USAID, Caribbean Development Bank, Eastern\nCaribbean Central Bank.\n1 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 539}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n###### **CONTENTS**\n\n\n**Glossary** __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3\n\n**SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _________________ 4**\n\n**GDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT ___________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n**GDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY __________________________________________________________________ 8**\n\n**STRATEGIC ISSUES ______________________________________________________________________________ 9**\n\n**DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________ 9**\nA. Detailed Actions for NAD ____________________________________________________________________ 10\nB. Summary of Training Provided in Mission ___________________________________________________ 10\nC. Officials Met During the Mission _____________________________________________________________ 11\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Priority Recommendations _____________________________________________________________________ 5\n2. High-Level Summary of GDP-E Approach ______________________________________________________ 6\n3. Detailed Recommendations ____________________________________________________________________ 9\n4. Detailed GDP-E Actions for NAD ______________________________________________________________ 10\n5. Training Provided During Mission _____________________________________________________________ 11\n\n**ANNEXES**\nI. Actions Log ____________________________________________________________________________________ 12\nII. Proposed GDP-E Methodology ________________________________________________________________ 13\n\n\n**2** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\nCONTENTS\n\nGlossary 3\n\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS _ 4\n\nGDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT _ 6\n\nGDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 8\n\nSTRATEGIC ISSUES 9\n\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9\nA. Detailed Actions for NAD 10\nB. Summary of Training Provided in Mission _ 10\nC. Officials Met During the Mission _ 11\n\nTABLES\n1. Priority Recommendations _ 5\n2. High-Level Summary of GDP-E Approach 6\n3. Detailed Recommendations 9\n4. Detailed GDP-E Actions for NAD 10\n5. Training Provided During Mission _ 11\n\nANNEXES\nI. Actions Log 12\nII. Proposed GDP-E Methodology 13\n\n2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 521}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\n**Glossary**\n\n\n_2008 SNA_ _System of National Accounts 2008_\n_BPM6_ _Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6_ _[th]_ _Edition_\nCARTAC IMF’s Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre\nCII Changes in Inventories\nCOFOG Classification of the Functions of Government\nCOICOP Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose\nCP Current price\nCPI Consumer price index\nCSO Central Statistics Office of Saint Lucia\nECCB Eastern Caribbean Central Bank\nEPI Export price index\nGDP Gross domestic product\nGDP-E Gross domestic product by expenditure components\nGDP-P Gross domestic product by economic activities\nGFCE Government final consumption expenditure\nGFCF Gross fixed capital formation\nGFS Government Financial Statistics\nHFCE Household final consumption expenditure\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nMOF Ministry of Finance\nNAD National accounts department\nNPISH FCE Non-profit institutions serving households final consumption expenditure\nPPI Producer price index\nSITC Standard International Trade Classification\nSNA System of National Accounts\nSUT Supply and use tables\nTA Technical assistance\nVAT Value Added Tax\nVM Volume\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **3**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\nGlossary\n\n_2008 SNA_ _System of National Accounts 2008_\n_BPM6_ _Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6_ _[th]_ _Edition_\nCARTAC IMF’s Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre\nCII Changes in Inventories\nCOFOG Classification of the Functions of Government\nCOICOP Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose\nCP Current price\nCPI Consumer price index\nCSO Central Statistics Office of Saint Lucia\nECCB Eastern Caribbean Central Bank\nEPI Export price index\nGDP Gross domestic product\nGDP-E Gross domestic product by expenditure components\nGDP-P Gross domestic product by economic activities\nGFCE Government final consumption expenditure\nGFCF Gross fixed capital formation\nGFS Government Financial Statistics\nHFCE Household final consumption expenditure\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nMOF Ministry of Finance\nNAD National accounts department\nNPISH FCE Non-profit institutions serving households final consumption expenditure\nPPI Producer price index\nSITC Standard International Trade Classification\nSNA System of National Accounts\nSUT Supply and use tables\nTA Technical assistance\nVAT Value Added Tax\nVM Volume\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3", "text_characters": 1029}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n##### **SUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**1.** **A remote technical assistance (TA) mission conducted by STA for the Caribbean**\n**Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) to Saint Lucia during February 14–25, 2022, to**\n**provide** advice to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) on compiling improved estimates of Gross\nDomestic Product by expenditure components (GDP-E), in line with relevant _System of National_\n_Accounts 2008_ ( _SNA 2008_ ) recommendations. The improved estimates will improve the\nunderstanding of the Saint Lucia economy, notably the needs of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for\nmore robust and timely national accounts statistics. This development will also help Saint Lucia meet\nthe IMF Special Data Dissemination Standards requirements.\n\n**2.** **Following the compilation of SUT for 2016, estimates of GDP by economic activities**\n**(GDP-P) were benchmarked to the new base year, 2018.** The estimate is compiled annually and\nquarterly in current and constant prices. In contrast, GDP-E is only compiled annually in current\nprices. The mission therefore focused on developing quarterly and annual estimates of GDP-E in\nboth current and constant prices, in line with the series for GDP-P. This required developing a set of\nquarterly and annual current and constant price indicators. In addition, the previous approach\ntreated private consumption as a residual item and was used to balance with GDP-P. This\nshortcoming will be remedied by developing a complete set of indicators for all expenditure\ntransactions.\n\n**3.** **Training was provided on the different components of GDP-E for current price**\n**methods and price and volume measurement.** The theoretical framework was used to identify\npotential indicators based on data sources available to the CSO.\n\n**4.** **A methodology for compiling GDP-E was developed.** This provides the breakdown of the\nexpenditure components and the data sources that can be used to compile GDP-E. The mission also\ndeveloped the weights that align to the agreed breakdown. A summary of the proposed\nmethodology is set out in the Detailed Technical Assessment section and a full breakdown is\nprovided in Annex II.\n\n**5.** **The mission identified some research topics for the national accounts department**\n**(NAD) as part of its development of GDP-E.** This includes checking the quality of some indicators\nand identifying whether some sources are available at a lower level of detail.\n\n**6.** **The CSO will develop the new GDP-E system during 2022 and aim to publish a first set**\n**of results for Q1 2023 in the first half of 2023.** The NAD already has a well-organized spreadsheet\nsystem for compiling GDP-P and the new approach can be integrated within that system. A period of\nparallel running was recommended.\n\n**7.** **At present, the current price estimates of GDP-E are aligned to GDP-P by deriving**\n**expenditure by private households as a residual.** The re-developed GDP-E will be independent\n\n\n**4** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\nSUMMARY OF MISSION OUTCOMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n1. A remote technical assistance (TA) mission conducted by STA for the Caribbean\nRegional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) to Saint Lucia during February 14–25, 2022, to\nprovide advice to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) on compiling improved estimates of Gross\nDomestic Product by expenditure components (GDP-E), in line with relevant _System of National_\n_Accounts 2008_ ( _SNA 2008_ ) recommendations. The improved estimates will improve the\nunderstanding of the Saint Lucia economy, notably the needs of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for\nmore robust and timely national accounts statistics. This development will also help Saint Lucia meet\nthe IMF Special Data Dissemination Standards requirements.\n\n2. Following the compilation of SUT for 2016, estimates of GDP by economic activities\n(GDP-P) were benchmarked to the new base year, 2018. The estimate is compiled annually and\nquarterly in current and constant prices. In contrast, GDP-E is only compiled annually in current\nprices. The mission therefore focused on developing quarterly and annual estimates of GDP-E in\nboth current and constant prices, in line with the series for GDP-P. This required developing a set of\nquarterly and annual current and constant price indicators. In addition, the previous approach\ntreated private consumption as a residual item and was used to balance with GDP-P. This\nshortcoming will be remedied by developing a complete set of indicators for all expenditure\ntransactions.\n\n3. Training was provided on the different components of GDP-E for current price\nmethods and price and volume measurement. The theoretical framework was used to identify\npotential indicators based on data sources available to the CSO.\n\n4. A methodology for compiling GDP-E was developed. This provides the breakdown of the\nexpenditure components and the data sources that can be used to compile GDP-E. The mission also\ndeveloped the weights that align to the agreed breakdown. A summary of the proposed\nmethodology is set out in the Detailed Technical Assessment section and a full breakdown is\nprovided in Annex II.\n\n5. The mission identified some research topics for the national accounts department\n(NAD) as part of its development of GDP-E. This includes checking the quality of some indicators\nand identifying whether some sources are available at a lower level of detail.\n\n6. The CSO will develop the new GDP-E system during 2022 and aim to publish a first set\nof results for Q1 2023 in the first half of 2023. The NAD already has a well-organized spreadsheet\nsystem for compiling GDP-P and the new approach can be integrated within that system. A period of\nparallel running was recommended.\n\n7. At present, the current price estimates of GDP-E are aligned to GDP-P by deriving\nexpenditure by private households as a residual. The re-developed GDP-E will be independent\n\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2481}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\nand produce different aggregate estimates to those for GDP-P. Therefore, an approach to balancing\nthe two estimates of GDP will need to be developed. In relation to this, training was provided on\nvarious approaches which can be used. To support the finalization of the estimates of GDP-E and\nprepare the initial results for publication, a further CARTAC mission during 2022–23 would be\nbeneficial.\n\n**8.** **The mission also quality assured the current methods used for compiling**\n**accommodation in the production measure of GDP.** Accommodation is a major component of the\nSaint Lucia economy, accounting for over 20 percent of GDP-P. The NAD has recognized a volume\nshift from hotels to self-catering in recent years, which represents a change in the quality mix. At\npresent, the indicators do not account for the different qualities of accommodation. This is an area\nwhere more data will be required to make proper improvements. The mission recommended\nconsulting with the Tourist Board in relation to the visitor survey and the Eastern Caribbean Central\nBank (ECCB) around coordinating data collection.\n\n**9.** **The mission also covered the research agenda of the System of National Accounts**\n**revision.** It is important that the CSO keep abreast of developments around the international\nframeworks. In terms of implementation, this would be an area that would be picked up in future\nrebasing exercises.\n\n**10.** **To support progress towards the above objectives, the mission recommended the**\n**following priority recommendations to make headway in improving Saint Lucia’s national**\n**accounts:**\n\n**Table 1. Priority Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Target Date|Priority Recommendation|Responsible
Institutions|\n|---|---|---|\n|July 2022|The CSO to address the GDP-E research issues identified
and update the methodology accordingly|
CSO|\n|October 2022|The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to
incorporate GDP-E|CSO|\n|June 2023
|The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same
publication timetable as the production approach|CSO|\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **5**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.19200134277344, 441.17999267578125, 539.8079833984375, 586.02001953125], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\nand produce different aggregate estimates to those for GDP-P. Therefore, an approach to balancing\nthe two estimates of GDP will need to be developed. In relation to this, training was provided on\nvarious approaches which can be used. To support the finalization of the estimates of GDP-E and\nprepare the initial results for publication, a further CARTAC mission during 2022–23 would be\nbeneficial.\n\n8. The mission also quality assured the current methods used for compiling\naccommodation in the production measure of GDP. Accommodation is a major component of the\nSaint Lucia economy, accounting for over 20 percent of GDP-P. The NAD has recognized a volume\nshift from hotels to self-catering in recent years, which represents a change in the quality mix. At\npresent, the indicators do not account for the different qualities of accommodation. This is an area\nwhere more data will be required to make proper improvements. The mission recommended\nconsulting with the Tourist Board in relation to the visitor survey and the Eastern Caribbean Central\nBank (ECCB) around coordinating data collection.\n\n9. The mission also covered the research agenda of the System of National Accounts\nrevision. It is important that the CSO keep abreast of developments around the international\nframeworks. In terms of implementation, this would be an area that would be picked up in future\nrebasing exercises.\n\n10. To support progress towards the above objectives, the mission recommended the\nfollowing priority recommendations to make headway in improving Saint Lucia’s national\naccounts:\n\nTable 1. Priority Recommendations\n\n Target Date Priority Recommendation Responsible Institutions \n\n July 2022 The CSO to address the GDP-E research issues identified and update the methodology accordingly CSO \n October 2022 The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to incorporate GDP-E CSO \n June 2023 The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same publication timetable as the production approach CSO \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5", "text_characters": 1712}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-138-fig-p0007-001"], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n##### **GDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT**\n\n**11.** **In 2020, GDP-P for Saint Lucia was updated to reflect the new activity structures and**\n**benchmarked to the latest base year, 2018,** based on the economic structures derived from the\n2016 Supply and Use Table (SUT). The revised data was also aligned with the historic data to produce\na full time series of backcast data. In contrast, GDP-E has not been published since 2018.\n\n**12.** **This mission focussed on developing an improved methodology for compiling GDP-E in**\n**current and constant prices on a quarterly basis.** This represents a substantial improvement to the\ncurrent situation, whereby GDP-E is only compiled annually in current prices.\n\n**13.** **Training on the concepts related to GDP-E, appropriate data sources and best practice**\n**on price and volume measurement were provided.** This established a good foundation for\nidentifying possible current price sources, price deflators and volume indicators for compiling GDP-E.\n\n**14.** **For each expenditure transaction a list of indicators was produced along with a**\n**provisional breakdown of detail.** A high-level summary of the proposed methodology is set out in\nTable 2 below.\n\n**Table 2. High-Level Summary of GDP-E Approach**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**6** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\nGDP BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENT\n\n11. In 2020, GDP-P for Saint Lucia was updated to reflect the new activity structures and\nbenchmarked to the latest base year, 2018, based on the economic structures derived from the\n2016 Supply and Use Table (SUT). The revised data was also aligned with the historic data to produce\na full time series of backcast data. In contrast, GDP-E has not been published since 2018.\n\n12. This mission focussed on developing an improved methodology for compiling GDP-E in\ncurrent and constant prices on a quarterly basis. This represents a substantial improvement to the\ncurrent situation, whereby GDP-E is only compiled annually in current prices.\n\n13. Training on the concepts related to GDP-E, appropriate data sources and best practice\non price and volume measurement were provided. This established a good foundation for\nidentifying possible current price sources, price deflators and volume indicators for compiling GDP-E.\n\n14. For each expenditure transaction a list of indicators was produced along with a\nprovisional breakdown of detail. A high-level summary of the proposed methodology is set out in\nTable 2 below.\n\nTable 2. High-Level Summary of GDP-E Approach\n\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1037}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\nA table containing the full methodology can be found in Annex II of this report.\n\n\n**15.** **The proposed set of indicators identified areas where further research is required to be**\n**undertaken by the NAD.** This covers areas such as reviewing the quality of detailed manufacturing\nestablishment survey results, the availability excises data, investigation of detailed CPI series for use\nas deflators, some potential household splits of some volume indicators and backcasting of the\nproducer price index (PPI) for hotels. One other key action concerns retail sales as Saint Lucia has one\ndominant retailer which could potentially provide useful product level data. Saint Lucia also has\nseveral industry regulators who may collect data useful for national accounts purposes – this should\nbe reviewed by the CSO.\n\n**16.** **The proposed methodology is data rich and will be based on 91 percent quarterly data.**\nWhere annual benchmarks are available, they will be adopted within the methodology using the\nsame approach as the GDP-P approach. The indicators have also been assessed against the Eurostat\nPrice and Volume Handbook, which provides a useful framework for assessing annual price and\nvolume methods. Based on the proposed methodology, over half of the methods are acceptable or\nbetter. This framework can also be used to identify areas for improvement.\n\n**17.** **The key areas of weakness lie in producer price indices (PPI), trade deflators and high-**\n**level volume indicators.** On producer prices, the NAD regularly collect quantity and value data from\nthe formal manufacturing sector. There is scope for generating PPI series from these data. On trade\ndeflators, the customs data compiled by the CSO, contains quantity information alongside the value\ndata. Whilst there are quality issues with the quantity information, this is an area that should be\npicked up on the prices’ side. The issue of high-level volume indicators is part of the research\nagenda.\n\n**18.** **Aside of the research items, the NAD can start developing the system for compiling**\n**GDP-E.** The NAD already have a well organised Excel based system in place for the production\nmeasure which can be augmented. The CSO has committed to start developing the new system with\nthe aim of having results available later in 2022. The mission recommended conducting a parallel run\nprior to going live as well as reviewing the NAD resource requirements with this additional workload.\n\n**19.** **The CSO are aiming to publish quarterly GDP-E for Q1 2023.** This will be published\nalongside GDP-P. Based on the current publication schedule, this would mean disseminating in the\nsecond quarter of 2023.\n\n**20.** **The mission also considered options for balancing quarterly GDP in the future.**\nPreviously, GDP by was balanced by using private consumption as the residual item. With a full set of\nindicators, this approach is no longer valid. This mission covered the various options that could be\nadopted, with using a statistical discrepancy as the most likely option. This is an area that could be\nreviewed in a subsequent mission.\n\n_**Recommended actions:**_\n\n- _CSO to address the GDP-Eresearch issues identified and update the methodology accordingly._\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **7**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\nA table containing the full methodology can be found in Annex II of this report.\n\n15. The proposed set of indicators identified areas where further research is required to be\nundertaken by the NAD. This covers areas such as reviewing the quality of detailed manufacturing\nestablishment survey results, the availability excises data, investigation of detailed CPI series for use\nas deflators, some potential household splits of some volume indicators and backcasting of the\nproducer price index (PPI) for hotels. One other key action concerns retail sales as Saint Lucia has one\ndominant retailer which could potentially provide useful product level data. Saint Lucia also has\nseveral industry regulators who may collect data useful for national accounts purposes – this should\nbe reviewed by the CSO.\n\n16. The proposed methodology is data rich and will be based on 91 percent quarterly data.\nWhere annual benchmarks are available, they will be adopted within the methodology using the\nsame approach as the GDP-P approach. The indicators have also been assessed against the Eurostat\nPrice and Volume Handbook, which provides a useful framework for assessing annual price and\nvolume methods. Based on the proposed methodology, over half of the methods are acceptable or\nbetter. This framework can also be used to identify areas for improvement.\n\n17. The key areas of weakness lie in producer price indices (PPI), trade deflators and high-\nlevel volume indicators. On producer prices, the NAD regularly collect quantity and value data from\nthe formal manufacturing sector. There is scope for generating PPI series from these data. On trade\ndeflators, the customs data compiled by the CSO, contains quantity information alongside the value\ndata. Whilst there are quality issues with the quantity information, this is an area that should be\npicked up on the prices’ side. The issue of high-level volume indicators is part of the research\nagenda.\n\n18. Aside of the research items, the NAD can start developing the system for compiling\nGDP-E. The NAD already have a well organised Excel based system in place for the production\nmeasure which can be augmented. The CSO has committed to start developing the new system with\nthe aim of having results available later in 2022. The mission recommended conducting a parallel run\nprior to going live as well as reviewing the NAD resource requirements with this additional workload.\n\n19. The CSO are aiming to publish quarterly GDP-E for Q1 2023. This will be published\nalongside GDP-P. Based on the current publication schedule, this would mean disseminating in the\nsecond quarter of 2023.\n\n20. The mission also considered options for balancing quarterly GDP in the future.\nPreviously, GDP by was balanced by using private consumption as the residual item. With a full set of\nindicators, this approach is no longer valid. This mission covered the various options that could be\nadopted, with using a statistical discrepancy as the most likely option. This is an area that could be\nreviewed in a subsequent mission.\n\n_Recommended actions:_\n\n- _CSO to address the GDP-Eresearch issues identified and update the methodology accordingly._\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7", "text_characters": 2693}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\n- _The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to incorporate GDP-E._\n\n- _The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same publication timetable as the production_\n_approach._\n\n- _The CSO to investigate compiling unit value price indices with technical assistance support._\n##### **GDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**\n\n**21.** **Whilst the mission focussed on GDP-E, the mission did review two components of the**\n**GDP-P approach.** This focussed on the accommodation and insurance sectors.\n\n**22.** **Accommodation is the largest sector in the Saint Lucia economy, accounting for**\n**22 percent of gross value added.** Most of the data is sourced from the Visitor Expenditure Survey\nand the main volume indicator is the number of bed nights. In recent years, there has been an\nincreasing proportion of self-catering accommodation, predominantly via Airbnb. Whilst this is based\non anecdotal evidence, as no firm data are available, this would represent a change in the quality mix\nof the accommodation product. A switch from higher quality hotels to lower quality self-catering\naccommodation would lead to a lower rate of growth in the volume measure. This was illustrated via\na hypothetical example provided in the mission.\n\n**23.** **This issue identifies a need for more granular data on the quality of accommodation**\n**products being consumed in Saint Lucia.** There are several potential ways forward on this issue.\nWhen visitors arrive in Saint Lucia, they normally record their intended location on entering the\ncountry. If these data are available, they should potentially be used. Another alternative is\napproaching Airbnb to see if aggregate data could be provided. Given the importance of this\nindustry in the wider region, it is a subject that could ideally be coordinated for a number of\ncountries via the ECCB, perhaps by CARTAC, especially given the impact on the balance of payments.\n\n**24.** **The method used to estimate the value added of the insurance activity was also**\n**reviewed as part of this mission and the current method was ratified.** In terms of the volume\nmeasure for insurance, the indicators used are appropriate in terms of acting as proxies for the\nunderlying items that tend to be insured. However, the current price data is reflated using the CPI for\ninsurance, which is not appropriate given the insurance algorithm used to calculate output.\n\n**25.** **Whilst the volume series is reflated to calculate output, the series is also benchmarked**\n**to an annual estimate of the insurance algorithm.** Whilst the NAD do not have all the data\nrequired to measure insurance fully, assumptions are made on the proportions of claims. As a result,\nthe choice of CPI has a minimal impact on the end results. However, this is an area where the\nregulator should be able to provide information to help improve the current price figures.\n\n_**Recommended actions:**_\n\n- _The CSO to investigate additional data sources which can help measure the quality mix of the_\n_accommodation industry_\n\n\n**8** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n- _The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to incorporate GDP-E._\n\n- _The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same publication timetable as the production_\n_approach._\n\n- _The CSO to investigate compiling unit value price indices with technical assistance support._\nGDP BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY\n\n21. Whilst the mission focussed on GDP-E, the mission did review two components of the\nGDP-P approach. This focussed on the accommodation and insurance sectors.\n\n22. Accommodation is the largest sector in the Saint Lucia economy, accounting for\n22 percent of gross value added. Most of the data is sourced from the Visitor Expenditure Survey\nand the main volume indicator is the number of bed nights. In recent years, there has been an\nincreasing proportion of self-catering accommodation, predominantly via Airbnb. Whilst this is based\non anecdotal evidence, as no firm data are available, this would represent a change in the quality mix\nof the accommodation product. A switch from higher quality hotels to lower quality self-catering\naccommodation would lead to a lower rate of growth in the volume measure. This was illustrated via\na hypothetical example provided in the mission.\n\n23. This issue identifies a need for more granular data on the quality of accommodation\nproducts being consumed in Saint Lucia. There are several potential ways forward on this issue.\nWhen visitors arrive in Saint Lucia, they normally record their intended location on entering the\ncountry. If these data are available, they should potentially be used. Another alternative is\napproaching Airbnb to see if aggregate data could be provided. Given the importance of this\nindustry in the wider region, it is a subject that could ideally be coordinated for a number of\ncountries via the ECCB, perhaps by CARTAC, especially given the impact on the balance of payments.\n\n24. The method used to estimate the value added of the insurance activity was also\nreviewed as part of this mission and the current method was ratified. In terms of the volume\nmeasure for insurance, the indicators used are appropriate in terms of acting as proxies for the\nunderlying items that tend to be insured. However, the current price data is reflated using the CPI for\ninsurance, which is not appropriate given the insurance algorithm used to calculate output.\n\n25. Whilst the volume series is reflated to calculate output, the series is also benchmarked\nto an annual estimate of the insurance algorithm. Whilst the NAD do not have all the data\nrequired to measure insurance fully, assumptions are made on the proportions of claims. As a result,\nthe choice of CPI has a minimal impact on the end results. However, this is an area where the\nregulator should be able to provide information to help improve the current price figures.\n\n_Recommended actions:_\n\n- _The CSO to investigate additional data sources which can help measure the quality mix of the_\n_accommodation industry_\n\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 2500}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\n- _CARTAC to raise the issue of coordinating data collection on self-catering accommodation with_\n_the ECCB_\n\n##### **STRATEGIC ISSUES**\n\n**26.** **A business register for Saint Lucia was developed via a project run by Statistics Canada.**\nThis project is ending in March 2022, but Statistics Canada has installed the business register\napplication and the database is now populated with data form the tax system.\n\n**27.** **In May 2022, the CSO will run an establishment census to update the business register.**\nThis improvement will provide a useful framework for using more administrative data (such as VAT)\nas well as the potential for improving and potentially widening establishment surveys. Developing\nretail sales estimates via valued added tax (VAT) data and data from major retailers could provide\nadditional quality information for the GDP-E method.\n\n**28.** **The mission also provided an update to the NAD on the development of the new**\n**revision of the System of National Accounts as well as progress on the activity and product**\n**classifications.** Key areas relevant to Saint Lucia were highlighted for information. Implementation of\nthe new standards are still several years away but should be factored into future rebasing plans to\nensure the exercises coincide.\n\n_**Recommended action:**_\n\n- _The CSO to explore potential areas of improvement from the implementation of the business_\n_register_\n##### **DETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND** **RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n**The following table sets out the actions agreed with the CSO for improving the national**\n**accounts estimates.**\n\n\n**Table 3. Detailed Recommendations**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion Date|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**_Outcome:_** Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide
|
**_Outcome:_** Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide
|
**_Outcome:_** Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide
|\n|M
|The CSO to address the GDP-E research issues identified and
update the methodology accordingly
|July 2022|\n|H
|
The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to
incorporate GDP-E
|October 2022|\n|H
|
The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same
publication timetable as the production approach
|June 2023
|\n|M|
The CSO to investigate compiling unit value price indices with
technical assistance support|December 2022|\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **9**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.20571899414062, 563.8200073242188, 539.7943115234375, 715.379638671875], "columns": 3, "rows": 6}], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n- _CARTAC to raise the issue of coordinating data collection on self-catering accommodation with_\n_the ECCB_\nSTRATEGIC ISSUES\n\n26. A business register for Saint Lucia was developed via a project run by Statistics Canada.\nThis project is ending in March 2022, but Statistics Canada has installed the business register\napplication and the database is now populated with data form the tax system.\n\n27. In May 2022, the CSO will run an establishment census to update the business register.\nThis improvement will provide a useful framework for using more administrative data (such as VAT)\nas well as the potential for improving and potentially widening establishment surveys. Developing\nretail sales estimates via valued added tax (VAT) data and data from major retailers could provide\nadditional quality information for the GDP-E method.\n\n28. The mission also provided an update to the NAD on the development of the new\nrevision of the System of National Accounts as well as progress on the activity and product\nclassifications. Key areas relevant to Saint Lucia were highlighted for information. Implementation of\nthe new standards are still several years away but should be factored into future rebasing plans to\nensure the exercises coincide.\n\n_Recommended action:_\n\n- _The CSO to explore potential areas of improvement from the implementation of the business_\n_register_\nDETAILED TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nThe following table sets out the actions agreed with the CSO for improving the national\naccounts estimates.\n\nTable 3. Detailed Recommendations\n\n Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date \n\n _Outcome:_ Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide _Outcome:_ Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide _Outcome:_ Data are compiled and disseminated using the latest manual/guide \n M The CSO to address the GDP-E research issues identified and update the methodology accordingly July 2022 \n H The CSO to extend their current GDP compilation system to incorporate GDP-E October 2022 \n H The CSO to publish quarterly results of GDP-E to same publication timetable as the production approach June 2023 \n M The CSO to investigate compiling unit value price indices with technical assistance support December 2022 \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9", "text_characters": 1951}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-138-fig-p0011-001"], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion Date|\n|---|---|---|\n|M
|The CSO to investigate additional data sources which can help
measure the quality mix of the accommodation industry
|
December 2022
|\n|M
|
CARTAC to raise the issue of coordinating data collection on
self-catering accommodation with the ECCB
|June 2022
|\n|M
|
The CSO to explore potential areas of improvement from the
implementation of the business register|December 2022|\n\n\n\n**A.** **Detailed Actions for NAD**\n\n**29.** **The main report summarizes the research areas identified as part of compiling the**\n**GDP-E methodology.** Table 4 provides the detailed list of actions to be researched which are\ncovered by one of the main recommendations in the report.\n\n**Table 4. Detailed GDP-E Actions for NAD**\n\n\n**B.** **Summary of Training Provided in Mission**\n\nThe following training was provided in this mission focusing mostly on quarterly GDP-E.\n\n\n**10** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.21600341796875, 72.17999267578125, 539.7839965820312, 180.77963256835938], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date \n\n M The CSO to investigate additional data sources which can help measure the quality mix of the accommodation industry December 2022 \n M CARTAC to raise the issue of coordinating data collection on self-catering accommodation with the ECCB June 2022 \n M The CSO to explore potential areas of improvement from the implementation of the business register December 2022 \n\nA. Detailed Actions for NAD\n\n29. The main report summarizes the research areas identified as part of compiling the\nGDP-E methodology. Table 4 provides the detailed list of actions to be researched which are\ncovered by one of the main recommendations in the report.\n\nTable 4. Detailed GDP-E Actions for NAD\n\nB. Summary of Training Provided in Mission\n\nThe following training was provided in this mission focusing mostly on quarterly GDP-E.\n\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 750}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-138-fig-p0012-001"], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\n\n**Table 5. Training Provided During Mission**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**C.** **Officials Met During the Mission**\n\n\n\n|Name|Institution|\n|---|---|\n|
Mr. Sean Mathurin
|
Director, CSO
|\n|
Mr. Richard Harris
|
Deputy Director, CSO
|\n|
Ms. Uranda Xavier
|
Statistician, CSO
|\n|
Mr. Arnold Lafeuillee
|
Statistician, CSO
|\n|
Ms. Stephanie Martial Constantin
|
Statistician, CSO
|\n|
Ms. Abigail Leo
|
Assistant Statistician, CSO|\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND **11**", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.21333312988281, 469.47998046875, 539.7866821289062, 566.9600219726562], "columns": 2, "rows": 7}], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\nTable 5. Training Provided During Mission\n\nC. Officials Met During the Mission\n\n Name Institution \n\n Mr. Sean Mathurin Director, CSO \n Mr. Richard Harris Deputy Director, CSO \n Ms. Uranda Xavier Statistician, CSO \n Mr. Arnold Lafeuillee Statistician, CSO \n Ms. Stephanie Martial Constantin Statistician, CSO \n Ms. Abigail Leo Assistant Statistician, CSO \n\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11", "text_characters": 328}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "SAINT LUCIA\n\n\n\n**Annex I. Actions Log**\n\n\n\nThis annex documents the progress made against the recommendations set out in the previous\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Priority|Action/Milestone|Target
Completion
Date|Status|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|
**Outcome**: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including
dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical
outputs
|\n|
H
|Complete checking the formulae in the
compilation workbooks and switch to the
XLPBM add-in in the shared drive.
|02/14/2020|Completed|\n|H
|
Incorporate updated indicator data and price
indices for Q4 2019.
|02/17/2020|Completed|\n|H
|
Compile the GDP-P estimates for Q4 2019 and
initial 2019 estimates.
|02/21/2020|Completed|\n|H
|
Share the updated estimates with the ECCB,
MOF and IMF mission team.
|02/21/2020|Completed|\n|H|
Release the revised current and rebased
constant 2018 price annual and quarterly GDP-P
estimates.|04/03/2020|Completed|\n\n\n\n**12** INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.24000549316406, 132.11947631835938, 539.760009765625, 375.1195068359375], "columns": 4, "rows": 7}], "text": "SAINT LUCIA\n\nAnnex I. Actions Log\n\nThis annex documents the progress made against the recommendations set out in the previous\n\n Priority Action/Milestone Target Completion Date Status \n\n Outcome: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical outputs Outcome: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical outputs Outcome: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical outputs Outcome: Data are compiled and disseminated using appropriate statistical techniques, including dealing with data sources, and/or assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical outputs \n H Complete checking the formulae in the compilation workbooks and switch to the XLPBM add-in in the shared drive. 02/14/2020 Completed \n H Incorporate updated indicator data and price indices for Q4 2019. 02/17/2020 Completed \n H Compile the GDP-P estimates for Q4 2019 and initial 2019 estimates. 02/21/2020 Completed \n H Share the updated estimates with the ECCB, MOF and IMF mission team. 02/21/2020 Completed \n H Release the revised current and rebased constant 2018 price annual and quarterly GDP-P estimates. 04/03/2020 Completed \n\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "text_characters": 1333}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Annex II. Proposed GDP-E Methodology**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|Government Final Consumption
Expenditure
|
13.3%||
||
|
|
|\n|
Government excluding Health &
Education|10.4%|GFS current expenditure|Q|Implied|Q|Public Sector
Employment
|BA|\n|
Health|1.3%|GFS current expenditure|Q|Implied|Q|
Public Sector
Employment
|BA|\n|Education
|1.6%|GFS current expenditure|Q|Implied|Q|
Public Sector
Employment|BA|\n|Household Final Consumption
Expenditure
|61.4%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages
|14.6%|
||
||||\n|
Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages:
Domestic
|
10.1%|
Manufacturing output of
food and non-alcoholic drink|
Q|
CPI for food and non-
alcohol drinks
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|\n|
Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages:
Imports
|4.6%
|
Imports of food goods
|Q
|
CPI for food and non-
alcohol drinks
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|\n|
Alcohol and Tobacco|1.7%|
||
||||\n|
Alcohol and Tobacco: Domestic|
1.5%|
Manufacturing output of
alcohol and tobacco
|
Q|
CPI for alcohol and
tobacco
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|\n|Alcohol and Tobacco: Imports
|0.2%
|
Imports of alcohol and
tobacco
|Q
|
CPI for alcohol and
tobacco
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|\n|Clothing & Footwear|1.3%|
||
||||\n|
Clothing & Footwear: Domestic|
0.9%|
Manufacturing output of
clothing and footwear
|
Q|
CPI for clothing and
footwear
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|\n|Clothing & Footwear: Imports|0.5%|
Imports of clothing and
footwear|Q|
CPI for clothing and
footwear|M|Deflated imports
|Q|\n|Housing|10.9%|
Reflated volume|Q|
CPI for housing|M|Electricity connections
(households)|M|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.22588348388672, 104.2528076171875, 769.6946411132812, 498.02667236328125], "columns": 8, "rows": 16}], "text": "Annex II. Proposed GDP-E Methodology\n\n Transaction and breakdown GDP Weight Current Price CP Freq Deflator Defl Freq Volume Vol Freq \n\n Government Final Consumption Expenditure 13.3% \n Government excluding Health & Education 10.4% GFS current expenditure Q Implied Q Public Sector Employment BA \n Health 1.3% GFS current expenditure Q Implied Q Public Sector Employment BA \n Education 1.6% GFS current expenditure Q Implied Q Public Sector Employment BA \n Household Final Consumption Expenditure 61.4% \n Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages 14.6% \n Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages: Domestic 10.1% Manufacturing output of food and non-alcoholic drink Q CPI for food and non- alcohol drinks M Deflated output Q \n Food And Non-Alcoholic Beverages: Imports 4.6% Imports of food goods Q CPI for food and non- alcohol drinks M Deflated imports Q \n Alcohol and Tobacco 1.7% \n Alcohol and Tobacco: Domestic 1.5% Manufacturing output of alcohol and tobacco Q CPI for alcohol and tobacco M Deflated output Q \n Alcohol and Tobacco: Imports 0.2% Imports of alcohol and tobacco Q CPI for alcohol and tobacco M Deflated imports Q \n Clothing & Footwear 1.3% \n Clothing & Footwear: Domestic 0.9% Manufacturing output of clothing and footwear Q CPI for clothing and footwear M Deflated output Q \n Clothing & Footwear: Imports 0.5% Imports of clothing and footwear Q CPI for clothing and footwear M Deflated imports Q \n Housing 10.9% Reflated volume Q CPI for housing M Electricity connections (households) M", "text_characters": 1230}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|Water|
0.7%|Reflated volume|
Q|CPI for water|
M|Volume of water
(gallons) supplied to
households
|
M|\n|Electricity
|2.2%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for electricity
|M
|
Volume of electricity
(kWh) supplied to
households
|M
|\n|Household Goods|5.1%|
||
||
||\n|
Household Goods: Domestic|
3.0%|
Manufacturing output of
household goods|
Q|
CPI for furnishings and
household equipment
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|\n|Household Goods: Imports|2.1%|
Imports of household goods
|Q|
CPI for furnishings and
household equipment
|M|Deflated imports|Q|\n|Medical products, appliances, and
equipment|0.5%|Imports of medical
appliances and
pharmaceuticals|Q|
CPI for medical
appliances and
pharmaceuticals|M|Deflated imports
|Q|\n|Health services
|1.4%
|
Reflated volume
|Q
|
CPI for health services
|M
|Private sector
employees
|Q
|\n|Own transport
|3.4%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for motor vehicles
|M
|
Stock of new vehicles
|Q
|\n|
Land transport|
2.2%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for services|
M|
Population
|
Q|\n|
Air transport
|
1.0%
|
Reflated volume
|
Q
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Passenger arrivals
(residents)
|
M
|\n|Sea transport
|0.3%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for services
|M
|
Port arrivals (residents)
|M
|\n|
Postal services
|
0.0%
|
Reflated volume
|
Q
|
CPI for transport
|
M
|
Employees
|
Q
|\n|
Telephone services and equipment|
3.0%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for communications
|
M|
Employees|
Q|\n|
Recreation & Culture|
1.4%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for recreation and
culture|
M|
Employees
|
Q|\n|Education
|1.6%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|
CPI for education
|M
|Private sector
employees
|Q
|\n|Restaurants|3.3%|Reflated volume|Q|CPI for restaurants
|M|
Population
|Q|\n|
Accommodation services|
0.9%|
Reflated volume|
Q|
CPI for restaurants used
to deflate quarterly
expenditure|
M|
Quarterly deflated
expenditure benched to
population|
Q|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.22737121582031, 72.2127456665039, 769.6931762695312, 520.2266845703125], "columns": 8, "rows": 18}], "text": "Transaction and breakdown GDP Weight Current Price CP Freq Deflator Defl Freq Volume Vol Freq \n\n Water 0.7% Reflated volume Q CPI for water M Volume of water (gallons) supplied to households M \n Electricity 2.2% Reflated volume Q CPI for electricity M Volume of electricity (kWh) supplied to households M \n Household Goods 5.1% \n Household Goods: Domestic 3.0% Manufacturing output of household goods Q CPI for furnishings and household equipment M Deflated output Q \n Household Goods: Imports 2.1% Imports of household goods Q CPI for furnishings and household equipment M Deflated imports Q \n Medical products, appliances, and equipment 0.5% Imports of medical appliances and pharmaceuticals Q CPI for medical appliances and pharmaceuticals M Deflated imports Q \n Health services 1.4% Reflated volume Q CPI for health services M Private sector employees Q \n Own transport 3.4% Reflated volume Q CPI for motor vehicles M Stock of new vehicles Q \n Land transport 2.2% Reflated volume Q CPI for services M Population Q \n Air transport 1.0% Reflated volume Q CPI for services M Passenger arrivals (residents) M \n Sea transport 0.3% Reflated volume Q CPI for services M Port arrivals (residents) M \n Postal services 0.0% Reflated volume Q CPI for transport M Employees Q \n Telephone services and equipment 3.0% Reflated volume Q CPI for communications M Employees Q \n Recreation & Culture 1.4% Reflated volume Q CPI for recreation and culture M Employees Q \n Education 1.6% Reflated volume Q CPI for education M Private sector employees Q \n Restaurants 3.3% Reflated volume Q CPI for restaurants M Population Q \n Accommodation services 0.9% Reflated volume Q CPI for restaurants used to deflate quarterly expenditure M Quarterly deflated expenditure benched to population Q", "text_characters": 1464}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|Other miscellaneous goods and
services|
1.9%|Reflated volume|
Q|CPI for services|
M|Employees
|
Q|\n|
Insurance|1.2%|Reflated volume|Q|CPI for insurance|M|Insurance output
volume
|A|\n|Financial services n.e.c.
|2.7%|Direct: Non-interest income
Indirect: FISIM on loans and
deposits|A|Direct: Total CPI
Indirect: Implied deflator
|A|
Direct: Deflated income
Indirect: Stock of loans
and deposits deflated by
total CPI|A|\n|Non-Profit Institutions Serving
Households
|0.8%
|Reflated volume
|Q
|CPI for goods and
services
|M
|
Population
|Q
|\n|
Gross Fixed Capital Formation|25.5%|||
||||\n|
Construction|
11.7%|
Construction Output
|
Q|
CPI: Repairs and
Maintenance
|
M|
Deflated output|
Q|\n|Transport Equipment
|1.6%
|Imports of transport
equipment
|Q
|
JPN EPI Transportation
Equipment
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|\n|ICT equipment|1.7%|
Imports of ICT equipment
|Q|
US EPI for computers
|M|Deflated imports|Q|\n|
Other machinery and equipment
|
10.5%
|
Imports of other machinery
and equipment
|
Q
|
US EPI Capital Goods
except automotive
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
Q
|\n|Changes in Inventories
|0.0%|
-|-|
-
|-|-|-|\n|
Acquisition less disposals of
valuables
|
0.0%
|
Reflated volume
|
Q
|
CPI for goods and
services
|
M
|
Population
|
Q
|\n|
Exports
|47.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Exports of Goods|
5.0%|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Food, Beverages and Tobacco|
4.1%|
Exports of goods for
SITC00_01_04|
Q|
CPI for food and non-
alcohol drinks
CPI for alcohol and
tobacco
|
M|
Deflated exports|
Q|\n|Crude Materials and Mineral Fuels|0.2%|Exports of goods for
SITC02_03|Q|
CPI for Fuels and
lubricants for personal
transport equipment|M|Deflated exports|Q|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.22588348388672, 72.2127456665039, 769.6946411132812, 505.9466552734375], "columns": 8, "rows": 16}], "text": "Transaction and breakdown GDP Weight Current Price CP Freq Deflator Defl Freq Volume Vol Freq \n\n Other miscellaneous goods and services 1.9% Reflated volume Q CPI for services M Employees Q \n Insurance 1.2% Reflated volume Q CPI for insurance M Insurance output volume A \n Financial services n.e.c. 2.7% Direct: Non-interest income Indirect: FISIM on loans and deposits A Direct: Total CPI Indirect: Implied deflator A Direct: Deflated income Indirect: Stock of loans and deposits deflated by total CPI A \n Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households 0.8% Reflated volume Q CPI for goods and services M Population Q \n Gross Fixed Capital Formation 25.5% \n Construction 11.7% Construction Output Q CPI: Repairs and Maintenance M Deflated output Q \n Transport Equipment 1.6% Imports of transport equipment Q JPN EPI Transportation Equipment M Deflated imports Q \n ICT equipment 1.7% Imports of ICT equipment Q US EPI for computers M Deflated imports Q \n Other machinery and equipment 10.5% Imports of other machinery and equipment Q US EPI Capital Goods except automotive M Deflated imports Q \n Changes in Inventories 0.0% - - - - - - \n Acquisition less disposals of valuables 0.0% Reflated volume Q CPI for goods and services M Population Q \n Exports 47.9% \n Exports of Goods 5.0% \n Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4.1% Exports of goods for SITC00_01_04 Q CPI for food and non- alcohol drinks CPI for alcohol and tobacco M Deflated exports Q \n Crude Materials and Mineral Fuels 0.2% Exports of goods for SITC02_03 Q CPI for Fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment M Deflated exports Q", "text_characters": 1311}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Transaction and breakdown|GDP
Weight|Current Price|CP
Freq|Deflator|Defl
Freq|Volume|Vol
Freq|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|Chemicals
|
0.2%
|Exports of goods for SITC05
|
Q
|CPI for Non-durable
household goods
|
M
|Deflated exports
|
Q
|\n|Manufactured Goods
|0.1%
|Exports of goods for SITC06
|Q
|
CPI for other goods
|M
|Deflated exports
|Q
|\n|
Machinery & Transport Equipment|
0.2%|
Exports of goods for SITC07
|
Q|
CPI for motor vehicles|
M|
Deflated exports|
Q|\n|
Miscellaneous Goods
|
0.1%
|
Exports of goods for
SITC08_09
|
Q
|
CPI for other goods
|
M
|
Deflated exports
|
Q
|\n|Exports of Services
|42.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Other services
|
2.8%
|
Exports of other services
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated exports
|
A/Q
|\n|
Travel
|
40.2%
|
Exports of travel services
|
A
|
PPI for accommodation
|
Q
|
Deflated exports
|
A/Q
|\n|
Imports
|
-49.0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Imports of Goods|
-34.0%|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Food, Beverages and Tobacco|
-7.9%|
Imports of goods for
SITC00_01_04
|
Q|
US EPI Foods, Feeds and
Beverages
|
M|
Deflated imports|
Q|\n|Crude Materials and Mineral Fuels|-7.5%|
Imports of goods for
SITC02_03|Q|
US EPI Fuels and
Lubricants
|M|Deflated imports|Q|\n|Chemicals|-3.0%|
Imports of goods for SITC05|Q|
US EPI Industrial
Supplies and Materials
|M|Deflated imports|Q|\n|Manufactured Goods|-5.1%|Imports of goods for SITC06|Q|
US EPI Capital Goods
except automotive
|M|Deflated imports|Q|\n|Machinery & Transport Equipment|-6.6%|Imports of goods for SITC07
|Q|
JPN EPI Transportation
Equipment|M|Deflated imports|Q|\n|Miscellaneous Goods
|-4.0%
|Imports of goods for
SITC08_09
|Q
|
US EPI All Commodities
|M
|Deflated imports
|Q
|\n|Imports of Services
|-15.0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|\n|
Air transport|
-1.2%|
Exports of air transport
|
A|
CPI for services|
M|
Deflated imports|
A/M|\n|
Other business services
|
-6.6%
|
Exports of other business
services
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
A/M
|\n|Other services
|-2.3%
|
Exports of other services
|A
|CPI for services
|M
|Deflated imports
|A/M
|\n|
Sea transport
|
-2.7%
|
Exports of sea transport
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
A/M
|\n|
Travel
|
-2.2%
|
Exports of travel
|
A
|
CPI for services
|
M
|
Deflated imports
|
A/M
|\n|
GDP at market prices
100.0%|
GDP at market prices
100.0%|
|
|
|
|
|
|", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.20869445800781, 72.2127456665039, 769.6905517578125, 522.7466430664062], "columns": 8, "rows": 23}], "text": "Transaction and breakdown GDP Weight Current Price CP Freq Deflator Defl Freq Volume Vol Freq \n\n Chemicals 0.2% Exports of goods for SITC05 Q CPI for Non-durable household goods M Deflated exports Q \n Manufactured Goods 0.1% Exports of goods for SITC06 Q CPI for other goods M Deflated exports Q \n Machinery & Transport Equipment 0.2% Exports of goods for SITC07 Q CPI for motor vehicles M Deflated exports Q \n Miscellaneous Goods 0.1% Exports of goods for SITC08_09 Q CPI for other goods M Deflated exports Q \n Exports of Services 42.9% \n Other services 2.8% Exports of other services A CPI for services M Deflated exports A/Q \n Travel 40.2% Exports of travel services A PPI for accommodation Q Deflated exports A/Q \n Imports -49.0% \n Imports of Goods -34.0% \n Food, Beverages and Tobacco -7.9% Imports of goods for SITC00_01_04 Q US EPI Foods, Feeds and Beverages M Deflated imports Q \n Crude Materials and Mineral Fuels -7.5% Imports of goods for SITC02_03 Q US EPI Fuels and Lubricants M Deflated imports Q \n Chemicals -3.0% Imports of goods for SITC05 Q US EPI Industrial Supplies and Materials M Deflated imports Q \n Manufactured Goods -5.1% Imports of goods for SITC06 Q US EPI Capital Goods except automotive M Deflated imports Q \n Machinery & Transport Equipment -6.6% Imports of goods for SITC07 Q JPN EPI Transportation Equipment M Deflated imports Q \n Miscellaneous Goods -4.0% Imports of goods for SITC08_09 Q US EPI All Commodities M Deflated imports Q \n Imports of Services -15.0% \n Air transport -1.2% Exports of air transport A CPI for services M Deflated imports A/M \n Other business services -6.6% Exports of other business services A CPI for services M Deflated imports A/M \n Other services -2.3% Exports of other services A CPI for services M Deflated imports A/M \n Sea transport -2.7% Exports of sea transport A CPI for services M Deflated imports A/M \n Travel -2.2% Exports of travel A CPI for services M Deflated imports A/M \n GDP at market prices 100.0% GDP at market prices 100.0%", "text_characters": 1634}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-138-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-138", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Colour coding:\n Higher-level aggregate\n GFCE\n HFCE\n NPISH FCE\n GCF\n Imports and Exports\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL\nMONETARY\n SAINTFUND\n17 LUCIA", "text_characters": 107}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd7eb16c1dc8d77fdc24fffe7c055e8397604bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087
+size 58403
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..861333bf9c0f207f719fb6f2bdfbeb9d60d402eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b4a9776fe63db7ebe527e7c89016ec018f9c735e1bfefecc3e670a85637b2593
+size 177784
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..22a17495596b571a7792539fbe757769a883efc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e3a870fa1a28d0a63af0ccd6c2fddd6cbd463803377ec749df5fc2f1d2cd0b1f
+size 3893
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48176e7182d1fba6d838a823980f6ba2e06456a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d64308d3cb3d579d8f75676da870d15fcc2bfcbc7aa37cf83cf8b9bce32d0368
+size 1368
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4222855d83f95a95266bb5fcef16833e4230d033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:300d3d880f4dee3785b39b6ea69deca1b0a973a480649822f2e74a7cee6896bd
+size 1441
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..07e8819ea46e1c92b6d39e3637563bea37af758d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:778e7cded24d38897fefc48b3c66268d8bb66172ccd4e2e7eb3e568fc7169e1a
+size 5924
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e35d7ae72cde0281a7123f8bfc07d0456c2c439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fd23e327c2d232d81358de07c5d0e66083b36edd329810b6def566b7cdf45e83
+size 933
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e12066ab1a835f9d48a4ff8f2108916bda6ff64e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d9bf8f8ab69b20290a4ddf01cdfe2495ee1cecb578dd25a6ada52c91ddc11454
+size 2841
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d1a6e4adbff5a77f065ffd6721890859f969d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dc26011404190a86224cd50c8e54144e355467163655469886fd5f1391fa7c86
+size 2436
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-008.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-008.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bcedae17df414ca0ed21a5d72e6abb06a9b474d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-008.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6fe9f049e2f84834d3a7e60018c28998da902f84fa32ee972eb64573250aeddd
+size 3350
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-009.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-009.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b4d1f22d1a9df7d21a5e64bba6cf8ef8a7439df4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-009.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:78bdd56e92175f588ceaca4c09b3cd04c3cb27aa7b3996242fdf3790d064df6b
+size 4877
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-010.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-010.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3889e4f8e4cb707fe13ed360484b3efe66f2640e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-010.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e5e600b24fbbfcf09799fcc7db27dd94a51926c73b4a1b01c3f9008c3e83dbde
+size 5122
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-011.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-011.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcf49452f3a51097dd1140d3157b8ee946718cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-011.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ea49a0e063110b2158fe34322372f8f406685116f9933bb5688fefc29a2421da
+size 5329
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-012.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-012.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b1429d79f72fa127968e4a888ab36711fc1cf1c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-012.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:47559f93ed6062460af6ea4ce7428435c42c612253325aea1c530ad02035fdbf
+size 1044
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-013.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-013.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5ac45a312a2eff5a69158b03f009bda753cda11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-013.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0d003d092262c5d939d69da7884afa337b06d24baffc3fd9eec954a2cb764150
+size 1233
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-014.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-014.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c6299edd3ea30f4b807659b98dcfd65e895fca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-014.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6617421d9a06bf979b8d3fb76220d23b0e72139d2b0cc231adcbf3154ec8a142
+size 8365
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-015.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-015.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e400b4b0f2bb1269d6363cf0c5ecba3cf4dc32df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-015.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:27c6b066fe13a9336888c3acc3f475700e58fb111b81184b04fb87f6c313dfe7
+size 3886
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-016.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-016.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a37562ddd351ab11fb664df3cb6ce41369fa3dca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-016.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:dc1974e1c819d2ded657fb581f6cecabc588ba46b46339df48dd071505d7a31c
+size 2009
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-017.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-017.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd9242805a379441e30838c5984daa367f8db95d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-017.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6c182e0dba376d0e6abd24282cd192a1927a52bb72aba7f9559e96df7399230e
+size 3714
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-018.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-018.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3bcd04738170147f90c9ca4b0019ed624899710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-018.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9dd88a9c19033224426aacd9dcf69fb194d04587127bad0c41927cbf38825270
+size 3275
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-019.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-019.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bdd010c6723ed7735224989c9eb5589ec530d2b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-019.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:885a1b2d7c0cec791f5ab0d4e0d455ef9f5ce2ee8d6f569a744bb77594b046dc
+size 1341
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-020.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-020.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f8b8bed93ded1b7817430879e010a58458c3e443
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-020.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0c09a6c932a04106a6592dbf1db85b810d3064097f720ca189844d709f72b81b
+size 961
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-021.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-021.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f094631ef87991d208bf8e80ea3103308fff5a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-021.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5605365aa1f9fa0ccff27a6a2efac446feed14ad267b36de22e16ca3dc796dd0
+size 3687
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-022.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-022.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd728daa41b082b2564d7085f71ed4a4375cdbeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-022.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:869801645f8108ea71494fe95a6a012eb3c629c36efc79de82995822b9d8b793
+size 4413
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-023.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-023.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b82f4ca9a9a9ac1077b17010f8b52a63fd8e7835
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-023.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:26a3c82b8c6fd46a4ce85b33970ea305380d17912a0dc1e1d9cfdeaebee54360
+size 3891
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-024.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-024.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9eadab20c1644e4ae464fe30e56cdad2f473d401
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-024.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1227539e11bcbfe5e656b7d2368b524c30c873a808b77a1194c64169e6bcdccb
+size 2864
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-025.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-025.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eff38e022ed028788b76368e1370bcb15ee4ec9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-025.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:54f5665e78c45fc3f920e105da90c7cfab2ec5170a0065d0b829bc692d2d920b
+size 7332
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-026.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-026.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0f2263b31e4ccd113893f45177152f0896179bfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-026.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:323af89dc461c8c07d3496fb03959fcf6820d17cf44fbd23b74dc65f80b08e92
+size 3510
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-027.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-027.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4b34045a6378a8f245eff33b9e33ed32b0c7516b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-027.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4d5320bae461780115ad9e7ea2e31abfb275edd8cb265b26b829d2cc2b671e89
+size 10058
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-028.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-028.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81f664e0891ee4e934d6de19c72916b6ac66da3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-028.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:64de0a11bea9b71f2a9a10c42772ebed5d84e42f0890fd3c6a7876c30afb4a08
+size 5756
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-029.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-029.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7f2e4f0d29010d035bb57f53582125cd1028e20e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-029.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ac9d2fa93e7bbad904d836126b329160feb9f784c915f6f136d5d806414d284c
+size 289975
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2548e2f46947933dc7e31d85122967a0ce5dd79e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:210bececb083ab96d439a880646c8c4323a42a269fab7b3df9510f8cec6eb0c3
+size 54438
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78204698b979fd45ecb9d07cb2d76c1cb92e144d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7399e9391b20ddb512313507cab6ed43017dca29ba41af76c7aa61b250c955b6
+size 59204
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..64fff7377777f750172eec77bba529fa924c03cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-144",
+ "title": "Suriname: Technical Assistance Report-Medium-Term Macro-Fiscal Forecasting",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-144.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "d6e3ad823268f015a4aa421abeb5436b9452ae45f6c309b15ca2661b1fbf0a88",
+ "source_bytes": 836945,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/04/20/suriname-technical-assistance-report-medium-term-macro-fiscal-forecasting-532703",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:01+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 8.787,
+ "page_count": 18,
+ "text_characters": 45207,
+ "table_count": 4,
+ "figure_count": 33,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "SURINAME"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––MEDIUM-TERM MACRO-FISCAL FORECASTING"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Table of Contents"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Executive Summary"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Acronyms and Abbreviations"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "I. Background: Genesis of the Project"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "II. Existing Capacities and Tools"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 12,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "III. Action Plan for TA Support"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 17,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Appendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.6",
+ "title": "Suriname: Technical Assistance Report-Medium-Term Macro-Fiscal Forecasting; IMF Country Report No. 23/144; November 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Macro-fiscal forecasting; MTFF; Fiscal revenues; Technical Assistance Training",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230417134335-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230420190030-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3da97c7b7edc553a9aa67eacc6a558b78753a6e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,913 @@
+
+
+
+
+April 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/144**
+### **SURINAME**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––MEDIUM-TERM** **MACRO-FISCAL FORECASTING**
+
+This technical assistance report on Suriname was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in November 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+##### **Table of Contents**
+
+**Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................................2**
+
+
+**Acronyms and Abbreviations...........................................................................................................................3**
+
+
+**I. Background: Genesis of the Project ......................................................................................................... 4**
+
+Macroeconomic and Fiscal Context ........................................................................................................................ 4
+
+TA Request.............................................................................................................................................................. 4
+
+Integration with Program Priorities .......................................................................................................................... 4
+
+
+**II. Existing Capacities and Tools .................................................................................................................. 5**
+
+Remit and Outputs of the TA Recipient ................................................................................................................... 5
+
+Existing Human Resources and their Technical Capacity ...................................................................................... 6
+
+The Existing Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework ............................................................................................. 7
+
+Collaboration Arrangements with Other Entities and Any Additional TA Needs ..................................................... 7
+
+Overall Needs Assessment ..................................................................................................................................... 8
+
+
+**III. Action Plan for TA Support ...................................................................................................................... 9**
+
+Workplan, Tasks, and Next Steps ........................................................................................................................... 9
+
+Risks….. ................................................................................................................................................................ 11
+
+
+**Appendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)................................................................................... 14**
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 1
+
+
+
+##### **Executive Summary**
+
+**A scoping mission between CARTAC’s Macroeconomics Program and Suriname’s Ministry of Finance**
+**and Planning was held during November 7-10** **[th]** **, 2022 in Paramaribo, Suriname.** This TA report summarizes
+the context, mission findings, and way forward for CARTAC’s provision of TA support to Suriname’s Economic
+Affairs Department (within the Ministry of Finance and Planning).
+
+
+**The Economic Affairs Department recognizes the desirability of creating a new medium-term macro-**
+**fiscal forecasting framework (MTFF).** Such a tool will be developed via several TA missions, and betweenmission work by EAD staff members, and will focus on linking high-level revenue and expenditure projections to
+projections of macroeconomic determinants. In addition, a clear and transparent method of entering the effect of
+policy changes on these projections, and the contribution of any ‘one-off’ factors to projected revenues or
+expenditures, will be a key feature of the tool.
+
+
+**Existing technical capacity relating to forecasting among most EAD staff is at a basic level** . Training,
+through hands-on exercises using Surinamese data, will play an important role in supporting the development
+and ultimate adoption of the MTFF. The number of staff in the EAD appears to be sufficient, though sustained
+engagement with the same core group of persons will be vital to ensuring that the project reaches its ultimate
+outcome, of having EAD staff implement an MTFF as part of their macro-fiscal projection process.
+
+
+**There are several risks to the project’s success, including regarding data quality and availability, as well**
+**as competing demands on EAD staff time** . Limited data, and weak relationships between predictors
+(economic activity) and fiscal variables (e.g. tax revenues) would limit the forecast accuracy of the MTFF,
+though it would still allow for more rigorous and transparent projections than is current practice. Regarding staff
+time, it is understood that EAD staff have a strong interest in the development and usage of an MTFF, hopefully
+ensuring sufficient time by a core group of persons is devoted to receiving TA support to develop the tool.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 2
+
+
+
+##### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**
+
+CARTAC . Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre
+
+
+CBVS ...... Central Bank of Suriname
+
+
+CD .......... Capacity Development
+
+
+CPI .......... Consumer Price Inflation
+
+
+DDT ........ Public Debt Dynamics Tool
+
+
+EAD ........ Economic Affairs Department
+
+
+ETR ........ Effective Tax Rate
+
+
+FAD ........ Fiscal Affairs Department
+
+
+FPWG ..... Financial Programming Working Group
+
+
+GDP ........ Gross Domestic Product
+
+
+ICD ......... Institute for Capacity Development
+
+
+MFP ........ Ministry of Finance and Planning
+
+
+MoF ........ Ministry of Finance
+
+
+MTFF ...... Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework
+
+
+RBM ........ Results Based Management
+
+
+SDMO ..... Suriname Debt Management Office
+
+
+SRD ........ Suriname Dollar
+
+
+TA ........... Technical Assistance
+
+
+VAT ......... Value Added Tax
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 3
+
+
+
+##### **I. Background: Genesis of the Project**
+
+**Macroeconomic and Fiscal Context**
+
+
+**On December 22, 2021, Suriname entered into a 36-month arrangement under the IMF’s Extended Fund**
+**Facility** . Under this arrangement, the Surinamese authorities’ homegrown economic recovery plan aims to
+address systemic fiscal and external imbalances and chart a course toward debt sustainability, declining
+inflation, and economic recovery while maintaining social stability. [1]
+
+
+**TA Request**
+
+
+**On June 8, 2022, The Economic Affairs Department (EAD) within the Ministry of Finance and Planning**
+**(MFP) requested CARTAC support for the development of a medium-term macro-fiscal framework**
+**(MTFF)** . Subsequent discussions between CARTAC, Ms. Tine Tjalim (Head of the Economics Affairs
+Department), Ms. Iris Sandel (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning), the InterAmerican
+Development Bank, and the Suriname IMF country team were held in July and August 2022, during which it was
+agreed that CARTAC’s Macroeconomics program would hold a scoping mission to chart the best course for
+support in this area (scheduled for November, 2022). Assessing existing capacity to analyze fiscal risks was
+added as an area of interest during these discussions.
+
+
+**Integration with Program Priorities**
+
+
+**Development of macro-fiscal forecasting capacity and a new MTFF linking revenue and expenditure**
+**projections to macroeconomic and policy determinants will support Suriname’s ability to conduct**
+**sound medium-term fiscal planning.** Macro-fiscal forecasts will be more accurate and transparent following
+TA support to develop an MTFF. If successfully integrated into the policy process, a sound MTFF would imply
+smaller and unbiased errors in revenue and expenditure forecasts, thereby underpinning more precise fiscal
+decision making.
+
+
+**Three TA workstreams closely related to the current engagement on MTFF development are expected to**
+**be undertaken (or have been undertaken) by other partners.** First, CARTAC’s Public Financial Management
+workstream has provided support relating to Suriname’s Chart of Accounts, and is also likely to provide support
+to the Budget Office regarding budget processes. The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department is in discussions with
+Suriname to provide TA support relating to forecasting likely revenues under the to-be-implemented new value
+added tax (VAT). The development of an MTFF would enhance the budget process, by increasing the
+consistency, transparency, and technical rigor of macro-fiscal projections. However, when faced with new
+revenue streams (such as from the adoption of a VAT), projected revenues would be compiled most accurately
+using detailed techniques which may be elaborated through engagement with the IMF’s FAD.
+
+
+1 First Review under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility, and Financing Assurances Review,
+
+International Monetary Fund, March 9, 2022.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 4
+
+
+
+##### **II. Existing Capacities and Tools**
+
+**Remit and Outputs of the TA Recipient**
+
+
+**The Economic Affairs Dept (EAD) within MFP is the beneficiary of CARTAC technical assistance**, having
+
+|responsibility for producing the fiscal projections for the B set out below. Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million)|Col2|Budget document a|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million)**
|**Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million)**
||
+||
**2022**
**Budget**|**2023**
**Draft**
**Budget**|
+|**Total revenues**
Current revenues
Tax Revenues
Direct taxes
Indirect taxes
Non-tax revenues
Grants
**Total expenditures**
Current expenditures
Wages and salaries
Goods and services
Subsidies and transfers
Interest
Capital expenditures
**Primary balance**
**Total balance**
BBP*
**Primary balance (% GDP)**
**Total balance (% GDP)**
_Memorantum items_
_Disbursements_
_Amortizations_|**22,320**
21,770
14,735
9,089
5,646
7,035
550
**23,185**
20,880
5,784
5,932
6,888
2,276
2,305
**1,411**
**-865**
77,811
**1.8**
**-1.1**
_5,607_
_6,060_|
**26,085**
25,585
17,646
7,888
9,758
7,939
500
**27,077**
25,057
7,542
5,856
8,236
3,422
2,020
**2,430**
**-992**
99,290
**2.4**
**-1.0**
_7,837_
_10,164_|
+|* projections macro-framework|||
+
+
+
+**The remit of EAD to support the annual Suriname Budget includes finalising the in-year and year-ahead**
+**fiscal projections.** This requires them to work closely with not only other MFP departments but several other
+independent institutions that, with the exception of the central bank, fall under MFP:
+
+
+Revenue Department - Provide in-year receipts data along with not only in-year forecasts but medium-term
+forecasts. Currently, Revenue Department and EAD forecasts inform the final budget forecast, with iterative
+discussions between the two departments serving to eliminate any discrepancy between the projections.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 5
+
+
+
+Budget Department - While the Budget department manages departmental spending requests, EAD is
+responsible for finalising the fiscal spending envelope forecast in the budget.
+
+
+Suriname Debt Management Office (SDMO) – Have a remit to provide debt-interest forecasts, but at present the
+simultaneity between any changes to the fiscal deficit through the budget ‘round’ and debt interest costs is handled
+separately and iteratively between EAD and SDMO.
+
+
+Statistics Office – Produce the output measure of GDP, in real and nominal terms, but do not produce wider GDP
+statistics e.g. income and expenditure measures.
+
+
+Planning Office/Bureau (SPS) - Have a remit to supply the macroeconomic forecast, including a wider set of
+estimates than the Statistics Office publish (e.g. growth in real consumption and net real wages). This is done
+using a Financial Programming spreadsheet, understood to cover all four sectors of the economy. [2] The
+macroeconomic forecast—which is a key input into the macro-fiscal forecast process of the EAD—is the
+responsibility of the Planning Office. However, under the IMF program EAD staff have been relying upon the IMF
+country team’s forecast for Suriname. Alternatively, the publicly available bi-annual IMF forecast for real GDP
+could be used as an input by the EAD in its macro-fiscal projection process.
+
+
+Central Bank (CBVS) – Is understood to have a macroeconomic model that is believed to be very similar to that
+used by SPS. Economic forecasts are produced, but not published. CBVS does publish a Monthly Activity Index
+
+- as of mid-November the last index value was for July.
+
+
+**Existing Human Resources and their Technical Capacity**
+
+
+**Staff within EAD have competing demands on their time, but the department is well staffed (8+ staff**
+**members)** . The EAD is currently heavily committed to weekly reporting of fiscal data to help Suriname address
+monthly reporting under the IMF program. There is a modest risk that there is not enough capacity for individual
+members of staff to take on the additional work with the TA, and more junior staff have little experience with
+forecasting, implying a strong need for training as part of the TA engagement. The mission also noted that more
+senior staff who have stronger capacity in macro-fiscal forecasting will tend to be charged with more
+responsibilities under the IMF program, and thus less able to absorb TA in this area.
+
+
+**For the TA project to succeed, the mission team made clear that a core team of at least 3 EAD staff need**
+**to engage with the project**, receiving all TA and training, to ensure sufficient development of in-house
+capacity. This would help mitigate against project failure due to staff turnover, and ideally help to ensure that the
+TA is embedded within EAD and becomes part of the institution’s capital.
+
+
+**All EAD staff use Excel, though one of the spreadsheets shared with the mission team indicates skills at**
+**a basic level** . This assessment may reflect the work of whichever staff member most recently worked with the
+existing macro-fiscal spreadsheet: it should be taken as indicative of competency in the staff assigned to lead on
+the TA.
+
+
+**Most EAD staff are generally not well versed with statistics training and any basic econometrics**
+**required for simple regression analysis** . That said, the regressions required to build an MTFF can be
+implemented in Excel, and EAD staff should be able to use the tools developed and update or innovate the
+MTFF over time.
+
+
+2 This spreadsheet was not reviewed by the mission team, and so any related conclusions are speculative and based on discussions held
+on mission.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 6
+
+
+
+**The Existing Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework**
+
+
+**The current revenue and expenditure forecasting framework is very basic**, with forecasts generally linked
+to past growth rates, and/or incremental judgmental adjustments—the basis for these adjustments was not clear
+to the mission team. Importantly, fiscal projections are not explicitly linked to any macroeconomic projections,
+such as those produced by the MFP’s Planning Bureau, despite these being regularly shared and updated twice
+annually. EAD receive revenue forecasts from the Revenue Department that they challenge with their own
+judgement, using what appear to be relatively simple (round-number) ‘add factors’ to reach a considered
+forecast.
+
+
+**Previously a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) was built up jointly in a Financial Programming**
+**Working Group (FPWG)** between EAD, Central Bank, Planning Bureau and SDMO with contributions from
+each. For example, real or monetary sector data and projections were collated through a portal developed by
+the central bank. It is understood that the portal was more than simply a database and may even have been
+able to produce 4-sector analysis. [3]
+
+
+**The FPWG has not been active in recent years** and while there appears to be goodwill at a working level,
+collaboration is now more informal and there is no updating through the portal. Data sharing within the MFP is
+assessed as being good, but outside of the MFP data sharing practices are more limited and operate less
+smoothly. However, the role of the central bank in the policy process is primarily related to the monetary and
+external sectors, and thus less they need not be centrally involved with the fiscal sector analysis and its links to
+the real sector, which is the focus of the present CARTAC TA engagement.
+
+
+**Collaboration Arrangements with Other Entities and any Additional TA needs**
+
+
+**It was not established whether there are formal collaboration arrangements relating to data sharing**
+**between the independent (statutory basis) institutions that support EAD in compiling the macro-fiscal**
+**projections and budget statement** . This will be investigated and assessed as the project proceeds. The
+mission’s initial read is that collaboration seems effective. The MFP’s Revenue department is expected to join
+EAD colleagues in the TA engagement on revenue and expenditure forecasting, which will allow for knowledge
+sharing, and the mission will discuss whether forecast duplication between the Revenue and EA Departments is
+necessary.
+
+
+**Following the scoping mission, the Planning Office supplied a fuller set of results from their**
+**macroeconomic forecast model, and there appears to exist a well-structured collaboration**, with the
+Statistics Bureau providing the data and Planning Office the forecast. The key Capacity Development (CD) gap
+remains in revenue and expenditure forecasting—linking with macroeconomic and policy determinants. Some
+refinement of in-year forecasting techniques (linking monthly outturns to annual projections) would also be
+desirable.
+
+
+**Additional areas where counterparts raised needs for TA support:**
+
+
+**1.** _**VAT forecasting**_ **.** VAT will replace a sales tax in 2023, and this is an area where the IMF’s FAD is best
+placed to provide TA;
+
+
+**2. Following the delivery of the MTFF, it would be desirable to** _**build capacity with a debt dynamics tool**_ **,**
+such as the IMF-ICD public debt dynamics tool (DDT)—this may be done jointly with the SDMO;
+
+
+3 This portal and apparatus were not the focus of the mission, and were not reviewed. However, the renewal of this FPWG and supporting
+apparatus could be considered as an area for future TA support.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 7
+
+
+
+**3. Augmenting capacity to conduct** _**risk analyses**_ **has also been requested by the MFP, and would**
+**naturally follow once both an MTFF and DDT (and related capacity) has been developed.** Such tools would
+allow simulations quantifying responses to various stylised shocks (impact of shocks on fiscal variables). The
+mission notes that depending on the nature of the shocks to be considered, this could require augmentations to
+the macroeconomic frameworks (Planning Office; Central Bank) that provide fiscal determinants. It appears that
+capability for some modelling of shocks exists already within both the Central Bank and the Planning Office.
+
+
+**Overall Needs Assessment**
+
+
+**The scoping mission identified a relatively low baseline capacity regarding macro-fiscal forecasting and**
+**analysis, and thus a high need for training in this area, including the development of a new MTFF for**
+**revenue and expenditure forecasts.** Such a tool will be developed via a sustained TA engagement with
+CARTAC (following the action plan elaborated in section III), which will focus on providing training, and linking
+revenue and expenditure projections to macroeconomic and policy determinants. Once completed,
+consideration will be given to developing capacity (and a spreadsheet tool – the DDT) relating to public debt
+dynamics. Once developed, the MTFF and DDT can be used to support risk- and/or policy-scenario analyses,
+though the latter is an area with the Planning Office and Central Bank are likely to have a comparative
+advantage, having already some baseline capacity and tools in this area.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 8
+
+
+
+##### **III. Action Plan for TA Support**
+
+**Workplan, Tasks, and Next Steps**
+
+
+**Through a series of four missions, CARTAC proposes to develop two tools which will support macro-**
+**fiscal projections and analysis in Suriname** . Both will take the form of Excel-based spreadsheets. The first tool
+(medium-term macro-fiscal forecasting framework – MTFF) will link revenue and expenditure projections to
+economic determinants. This will be ‘static’ (macro fiscal, without feedbacks). For revenues, the primary
+determinant will be changes in (proxy) tax bases (which are themselves closely linked to macroeconomic
+projections) as well as known changes in tax policies. For expenditures, determinants may relate to the business
+cycle, or other factors (policy changes). Such a tool will allow for a thorough accounting of the role of policy
+changes (tax rate or base changes) or other (one-off) factors, though these will rely primarily on the judgment of
+tool users.4 The TA engagement will go through the exercise of building up macro-fiscal projections jointly with
+EAD staff—including emphasizing the vital role played by judgment, and information from outside of the MTFF
+(including in the areas of future oil and gas sector development and fiscal revenues; changes in grants and
+electricity subsidies; etc)—though ultimately it is beyond the scope of this TA engagement to perform detailed
+‘costings’ of changes in tax policy (e.g. a change in the level of exemption from personal income taxes).
+
+
+Used properly, this MTFF will ensure that revenue and expenditure projections are transparent, and driven by
+plausible assumptions. The MF tool can also be used to assess the impact of ‘basic’ macroeconomic shocks
+(including those relating to natural disasters emanating from climate change) on the fiscal projections—essentially,
+risk analyses. However, the size/nature of the shocks, and the projected path of the macroeconomy under such
+scenarios, should be informed by analysis conducted by the MFP’s Planning Office and/or the Central Bank, both
+of which are understood to have the necessary tools in place to conduct such shocks/scenarios for the
+macroeconomy.
+
+
+Once the MTFF has been completed and successfully adopted by the MFP’s EAD (expected to take 2-3 missions,
+with a tentative expectation that it would fully support EAD forecasts starting in ~September, 2023), a second tool
+known as the ‘Public Debt Dynamics Tool’ (DDT) will be further tailored to the Suriname economy. Already partly
+developed as a result of past CARTAC/IMF training, this tool can be used to assess medium-term implications of
+macroeconomic and fiscal shocks on Suriname’s debt trajectory, and inform fiscal-sustainability assessments.5
+Final development and promoting usage of this tool would be expected to take 1-2 missions (beginning from
+September 2023 onwards).
+
+
+Finally, MFP Counterparts have expressed a desire to: (i) build capacity on ‘bottom-up’ expenditure forecasting,
+and it is expected that any such capacity development project would be via engagements on the budget process,
+led by CARTAC’s Public Financial Management Advisors; and (ii) receive support on current-year revenue and
+expenditure forecasting, based on high-frequency data. The latter request (ii) will be addressed via the presently
+outlined engagement on the MTFF tool.
+
+**Tasks:**
+
+A description of the project’s main actions (deliverables), and an associated timeline, is as follows:
+
+
+Pre-scoping action (1): Compilation of relevant macroeconomic and fiscal data (MFP team). By early October,
+2022 [ _completed_ ]
+
+
+4 Capacity to generate projections of revenues associated with new taxes (e.g. VAT) or revenue streams (e.g. oil and gas) would be built
+through engagements with the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD). A workshop on VAT revenue analysis and forecasting is expected
+to be held by IMF-FAD with Suriname during 2023.
+
+5 Based upon the IMF Institute for Capacity Development’s template, a version of this tool was tailored to Suriname during a March 2022
+CARTAC/IMF-ICD course.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 9
+
+
+
+ Revenue and expenditure components (monthly and annual frequencies), covering as much of the historical
+
+period as possible some follow ups will be needed, e.g. relating to direct revenues by mining and nonmining sectors
+
+
+ Economic indicators (monthly and annual frequencies). These could include electricity generation and
+
+consumption; imports; oil and gas production; industrial production; construction permits; real estate
+transactions; etc scoping mission identified that a Monthly Activity Indicator is compiled and published by
+the central bank;
+
+
+ GDP, from both expenditure and production sides, in both real (constant-price) and nominal (current-price)
+
+terms. some follow ups will be needed, e.g. relating to expenditure-side GDP and projections
+
+
+ CPI inflation, with breakdown by major components (monthly and annual)
+
+
+ Interest and exchange rates (monthly and annual)
+
+**Pre-scoping action (2):** Identification of an MFP team (at least 3 persons) who will be dedicated to the tooldevelopment phase of the project (which could last up to 18 months). By early October, 2022. This has been
+completed, and a core team of 4 persons identified.
+
+**First mission (CARTAC scoping):** review existing macro-fiscal forecasting methodology, and comparison with
+best practice. November 7-11, 2022 [ _completed_ ]. Mission objectives:
+
+
+ Review existing macro-fiscal forecasting methodology and institutional framework
+
+
+ More accurately understand the MFP’s baseline capacity, and development needs regarding macro-fiscal
+
+forecasting
+
+
+ Meet with the MFP’s identified team (pre-mission (2), above) and understand their backgrounds and
+
+experience with macro-fiscal analysis and forecasting
+
+
+ Review and discuss data assembled, identifying any major gaps and issues these gaps may present (pre
+mission (1), above)
+
+
+ Determine the gap between MFP’s current macro-fiscal projection and analysis methodology and best
+
+practice
+
+
+ Provide initial training on macro-fiscal forecasting techniques (using economic indicators to inform near-term
+
+GDP projections; tax buoyancy, elasticity, and effective-tax-rate (ETR) approaches for revenue forecasting)
+
+
+ Begin preliminary analysis of linkages between proxy tax bases and tax revenue headings, using Suriname’s
+
+data
+
+**Second mission (macro-fiscal forecasting):** support construction of the excel-based tool. January 23-27, 2023.
+Mission objectives:
+
+
+ - The spreadsheet template has been assembled (by CARTAC), and shared with the MFP team ahead of the
+mission this will require follow ups pre-mission, between CARTAC and EAD Staff.
+
+
+ - Training on GDP and tax/expenditure forecasting is conducted, for staff of the Economic Affairs Department
+and the Tax Department. Hands-on exercises with Suriname’s data will anchor the training
+
+
+ - Data are organized into the MTFF spreadsheet (done jointly on mission)
+
+
+ - Macroeconomic forecasts are expected to be taken from the Planning Office, and/or IMF team
+
+
+ - Analysis is conducted to determine which proxy tax base(s) are most related (in the sense of providing the
+best prediction) to each revenue heading
+
+
+ - Decisions taken regarding preferred approach to forecasting revenues—tax buoyancy, elasticity, and
+effective-tax-rate (ETR) approaches will all be considered
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 10
+
+
+
+- Decisions taken regarding the forecasting of each revenue heading—those which are unrelated to proxy tax
+bases will be projected using simple rules of thumb (past historical average growth, etc)
+
+
+ - Hands-on work by MFP team to familiarize themselves with the tool, and conduct exercises to promote
+familiarity with the tool
+
+
+ - Discuss techniques for current-year forecasting of revenues and expenditures
+
+
+ - High-level discussions regarding VAT and oil-and-gas revenue forecasting will be held. The mission will
+emphasize the role played by these headings in the MTFF tool, highlighting substantial uncertainty
+surrounding revenues from new economic activity streams (oil and gas) or taxes (VAT). In-depth TA would
+be needed to help counterparts construct forecasts for both headings, with such support ideally being
+provided by the IMF’s FAD (one such engagement is already prospectively planned).
+
+**Third mission: (macro-fiscal forecasting):** Conclude construction of the excel-based tool on macro-fiscal
+forecasting, and begin integrating it to support the April forecast process. Tentatively March/April 2023 (one week).
+Mission objectives:
+
+
+ - Ensure The Economic Affairs Department (EAD) team is comfortable will all aspects of the macro-fiscal
+forecasting tool, and demonstrates an ability to use it for generating fiscal projections
+
+
+ - Conduct exercises (EAD-led) to ensure a sufficient level of staff familiarity and comfort with the tool
+
+
+ - Perform any necessary adjustments to the MTFF tool
+
+
+ - Use the tool to generate the April (budget) baseline forecasts for revenues and expenditures.
+
+
+ - Continue discussions regarding current-year forecasting of revenue and expenditure data
+
+
+ - Develop a timeline for the production/collection of key (data) inputs ahead of a forecast update. This would
+enhance liaising with other departments (e.g. Tax and Planning Offices) of the MFP, as well as other
+government entities (e.g. Central Bank and Statistics Office).
+
+
+ - Discuss a framework for thinking about tax revenue collections from future activity in the oil and gas sector
+
+**Fourth mission (macro-fiscal risk analysis):** Work to use the MTFF tool for simple risk analyses, and work to
+tailor the DDT, and widen staff understanding of the tool, including also staff from the SDMO. Tentatively
+July/August/September 2023. Mission objectives:
+
+
+ - Provide background training, and review of the DDT (already partly tailored to Suriname by EAD staff),
+including liaison and support from debt office
+
+
+ - Ensure EAD team is comfortable with all aspects of the DDT, and displays strong knowledge of how to use
+the tool for risk analysis
+
+
+ - Conduct exercises (EAD and SDMO-led) to ensure a sufficient level of staff familiarity and comfort with the
+tool
+
+
+ - Discuss how these tools will be integrated into the policy process, especially as it relates to budgeting, and
+medium-term fiscal planning documents (coordination with CARTAC’s Public Financial Management
+workstream will be vital)
+
+
+**Risks**
+
+
+**There are several factors which could delay or disrupt the execution of the project, as it is envisaged in**
+**this action plan** . These include:
+
+**Staffing.** The smaller the number of EAD staff devoted to the project, the greater the risk that knowledge will be
+lost in the event of staff turnover (which is a reality in all institutions). For this reason, it is vital that at least 3 staff
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 11
+
+
+
+members (and ideally more) be fully involved with the project from its inception, and that EAD commits that these
+same persons remain involved with the project for its duration. Based on the scoping mission, the baseline
+capacity for forecasting of most EAD staff (those below management level) is judged to be quite limited—the tasks
+they are responsible for on a regular basis are primarily related to data gathering, and historically they have not
+had much role in forecasting. This implies a need to train staff on forecasting, which will only be feasible if these
+are fully engaged throughout the project. The scoping mission established that the revenue departments make
+both in-year forecasts and medium-term projections for tax headings. However, these projections are based solely
+on revenue data (e.g. past growth rates are not informed by economic determinants). It was agreed with MFP that
+it would be useful for revenue to be included in training on revenue forecasts, which may help mitigate against
+capacity loss in the event of staff turnover.
+
+**Data.** Data limitations exist regarding the level of detail, quality, timeliness, and frequency of macroeconomic and
+fiscal data. One specific issue relates to the categorization of revenue data, with a large ‘residual’ component
+existing in most years. Although data issues are unlikely to hamper the development of an MTFF tool, they will
+almost certainly imply that the projections of the tool will be less accurate than what could be achieved given more
+timely, detailed, and high-quality data.
+
+
+A preliminary investigation during the scoping mission suggests that empirical (predictive) relationships between
+economic activity and fiscal revenues are ‘sensible’ in Suriname (positive relationship between GDP and
+revenues, with an elasticity near unity), indicating that the MTFF will allow for a more accurate revenue forecast
+relative to simple level or trend-based techniques—see Figures 1, 2 and 3 below. Post-mission work identified
+further improvements with the inclusion of the main corporation tax rate that included the post-covid ‘solidarity’ tax
+and using sub-sectors within GDP e.g. mining.
+
+
+However, not all revenue and expenditure heading projections will be equally accurate—this is a reality of any
+such tool in any country. Irrespective of the strength of predictive relationships, the MTFF will increase
+transparency and consistency in macro-fiscal forecasting, not least because all judgment added to projections will
+be documented and justified by MFP staff.
+
+
+_**Units**_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars;_ _**Source**_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 12
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_**Units**_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars;_ _**Source**_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_
+
+
+
+
+
+|Figure 3: Summary of Forecast Errors for 2014-21 - see footnote on method.|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+||||||
+|||Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts|Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts|Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts|
+|||
Tax growth|
GDP growth|
Regression|
+||||||
+|Individual Income tax:|Individual Income tax:||||
+||
Mean Absolute Error, cash|+/- 352|+/- 263|+/- 131|
+||
Mean Absolute Error, %|
+/- 23%|
+/- 21%|
+/- 12%|
+||||||
+|Corporate Income tax:|Corporate Income tax:||||
+||
Mean Absolute Error, cash|+/- 798|+/- 611|+/- 379|
+||
Mean Absolute Error, %|
+/- 58%|
+/- 46%|
+/- 38%|
+||||||
+||||||
+|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|
+
+
+_**Units**_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars (cash);_ _**Source**_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_
+
+**Competing priorities** . Suriname is engaged in an IMF program, and MFP staff (particularly more senior staff)
+must carry a large workload, with regular monitoring of revenue and expenditure reports, and weekly/monthly
+reporting of same. Being able to dedicate time to building capacity and developing tools will be a major challenge,
+for senior staff especially. It is imperative that the management team protects staff time, allowing them to invest
+fully in developing and learning the MF and DDT tools which the project aims to build.
+
+
+Language. Dutch is the working language of the MFP, with most documents produced in Dutch (though some are
+also released in parallel in English). Although many staff are fluent in English, the necessity to translate documents
+(including data labels in tables and spreadsheets) into English for the benefit of the CARTAC CD team could
+marginally slow the delivery of TA.
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 13
+
+
+
+##### **Appendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)**
+
+This logical framework (logframe) sets out the: (i) objectives; (ii) outcome indicators; and (iii) milestones which
+will be used to track progress throughout the project. An objective is what the project ultimately aims to achieve,
+and outcome indicators and milestones are measurable guideposts which are set out to track the progress of
+the project towards achievement of its objective. The logframe allows for an accounting of the project’s
+progress, including areas where additional focus may be needed as the project progresses, and is the core
+element of the IMF and CARTAC’s results-based management (RBM) framework. RBM plays an important role
+in the institution’s governance process, including accountability of usage of development partner funding.
+
+
+**ANNEX 1:** **RESULTS FRAMEWORK**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Objective:
Stronger analytical skills and better macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis at the Ministry / central bank / or other governmental agency(ies) feeds into the economic
policymaking process - ANS|Col2|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|
+|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|
+|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|
+|**Outcome Indicator**
|**Baseline Value**
|**Target Value**
|**Current Assessment**
**Value**|
+|Number of staff have successfully completed agreed training offered via various
delivery modalities
|Staff not trained in macro-fiscal
forecasting
|At least 4 Economic Affairs
Department (MoF) staff members
trained in basic macro-fiscal
forecasting techniques
||
+|A stable core group of relevant staff, tasked with spearheading capacity
development in macroeconomic policy analysis & forecasting at the institution, & a
group coordinator, is functional (including a macroeconomic or fiscal policy unit at
MoF)
|No core group exists
|A core group of EAD staff has been
put in place, and is actively involved
with receiving and implementing TA
support
||
+|Key staff of the core group demonstrates capability to independently operate the
tools developed as part of capacity building in macroeconomic policy analysis and
forecasting
|No tool exists
|Tool has been developed and staff
demonstrate capacity to utilize for
medium-term macro-fiscal
forecasting
||
+|**Milestone Name**
|**Target Completion Date**
|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**|**Milestone Rating**|
+|Core group within EAD has been identified as is actively involved in receiving TA
|2/25/2022
|||
+|Training in macro-fiscal forecasting has been received, with absorption of basic
techniques demonstrated through hands-on exercises
|2/25/2022
|||
+|Core team demonstrates ability to utilize the MTFF which will be developed jointly
with the Suriname's EAD
|9/30/2022|||
+|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|
+|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|
+|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 14
+
+
+
+|Outcome Indicator|Baseline Value|Target Value|Col4|Current Assessment
Value|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|An MPT tool has been developed in the form of: A basic (Excel) framework for
forecasting and policy analysis, respecting accounting relationships (Pillar 1)
|The existing MTFF has no
macro-fiscal linkages
|MTFF developed, with macro-fiscal
linkages (including policy changes)
and transparent usage of judgment
and
|MTFF developed, with macro-fiscal
linkages (including policy changes)
and transparent usage of judgment
and
||
+|**Milestone Name**
|**Target Completion Date**
|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**|**Milestone Rating**|
+|MTFF has been developed, with linkages between fiscal and macro projections and
transparent incorporation of policy changes and/or judgment
|9/30/2022||||
+|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|
+|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|
+|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|
+|**Outcome Indicator**
|**Baseline Value**
|**Target Value**
|**Current Assessment**
**Value**
|**Current Assessment**
**Value**
|
+|Diagnostic/scoping produced an overview of existing (baseline) capacities and
opportunities for improvement supported by an action plan and desired CD
outcomes.
|No understanding of how
baseline capacities compare to
best practice
|Authorities understand what is
needed to bring macro-fiscal
forecasting and analytical capacity in
line with best practice
|Completed as of
11/10/2022
|Completed as of
11/10/2022
|
+|**Milestone Name**
|**Target Completion Date**
|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**
|**Milestone Rating**
|**Milestone Rating**
|
+|Scoping discussions have revealed areas for CARTAC TA support
|11/30/2022
|11/10/2022
|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022
|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022
|
+|An action plan has been developed, focusing on CARTAC TA support to develop
macro-fiscal forecasting and analytical capacity.|1/31/2023|11/10/2022|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022|
+
+
+
+IMF | CARTAC Country | 15
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c67c5afb2ad5cda51caebe79ed4b7862cd14bd29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6873334d45352223", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1317, "page": 2, "phash_256": "beab9f079505c0be63fac0f0b8f878c090506a5a63fe9f0f9f879e079c012f03", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "b4a9776fe63db7ebe527e7c89016ec018f9c735e1bfefecc3e670a85637b2593", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "34a1a464cc848480", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-001", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d4cacc484b3439a5b5cabfc0f48033183b9c3bc43fcab630c238c4bccdfc4b77", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "e3a870fa1a28d0a63af0ccd6c2fddd6cbd463803377ec749df5fc2f1d2cd0b1f", "width": 106}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "92ca76baba76ead2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-002", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8955e2226222b9ccb88c4e635e23738877888ce31de26338777879ce7dde9633", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "d64308d3cb3d579d8f75676da870d15fcc2bfcbc7aa37cf83cf8b9bce32d0368", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f1f1e96969e9f9f1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-003", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9a61799a99a686656799699e6666666519679999679961966196666664e69999", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "300d3d880f4dee3785b39b6ea69deca1b0a973a480649822f2e74a7cee6896bd", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "92b0696d6969b0b2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-004", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9e5964c679a793366796649966589a669669699a4c67999e1b671319499664ce", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "778e7cded24d38897fefc48b3c66268d8bb66172ccd4e2e7eb3e568fc7169e1a", "width": 104}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a09292a282828282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-005", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d015703f78aa8f170fbf841f083f6fe06fc0cfc06fe02faa801f083f0c3f841f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "fd23e327c2d232d81358de07c5d0e66083b36edd329810b6def566b7cdf45e83", "width": 91}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "553333f0e8b0b292", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-006", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "99857e667d99966b661991f69a65599f65a69699668679e51866961966818619", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "d9bf8f8ab69b20290a4ddf01cdfe2495ee1cecb578dd25a6ada52c91ddc11454", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b2b28ecc8cccb2b2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-007", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "911619b719b6e64ce64c19b3e659e4c61966e79be798186d1865e69ce6981963", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "dc26011404190a86224cd50c8e54144e355467163655469886fd5f1391fa7c86", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-008.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d4d4e8b2b2e8c4d4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-008", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d01e6fa527887874689f9e671f42c1f1c29da56785666859c8797e0626663fa1", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "6fe9f049e2f84834d3a7e60018c28998da902f84fa32ee972eb64573250aeddd", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-009.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "23a4ac6e5cac928a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-009", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d449e44b489408b459e0ef41368935c93dec3fe437b06b1c491cc6ff6f7b2331", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "78bdd56e92175f588ceaca4c09b3cd04c3cb27aa7b3996242fdf3790d064df6b", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-010.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c4a4a4c454ac8c81", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-010", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d4c4cc444b4b31eb29b697c331691cb41fcb39c334b5c35eec0eccb40b4a33bb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "e5e600b24fbbfcf09799fcc7db27dd94a51926c73b4a1b01c3f9008c3e83dbde", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-011.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "26a4a46454acac83", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-011", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d480cc44694411cb5dc3ffc03b08399c1dec3fe077b0e318c09ccffe6b7b3331", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "ea49a0e063110b2158fe34322372f8f406685116f9933bb5688fefc29a2421da", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-012.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a020d09020828080", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-012", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e04170013e0f9e0f1fbf03f8c1f003f89f1f9e0f7e0ff001f001700ffe0f1f3e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "47559f93ed6062460af6ea4ce7428435c42c612253325aea1c530ad02035fdbf", "width": 91}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-013.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "908cb2b2aa8c9282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-013", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "986619a66799e659986699a667996659666699a619e6e6796699659919669866", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "0d003d092262c5d939d69da7884afa337b06d24baffc3fd9eec954a2cb764150", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-014.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "98c670989870c298", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-014", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "911566716222b9943119ce665c22a7912f11d3e257c2a9792bf0d4be55fcea77", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "6617421d9a06bf979b8d3fb76220d23b0e72139d2b0cc231adcbf3154ec8a142", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-015.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a891a54e8c6a76ee", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-015", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d618c0c319a6f33c25e7af4b925838c36f982d3f7de885133576157c61412dbc", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "27c6b066fe13a9336888c3acc3f475700e58fb111b81184b04fb87f6c313dfe7", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-016.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9292aaacccd4e8e8", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-016", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e64166669998d99966658666799a86196666999a1999d986666e79e55d9a6665", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "dc1974e1c819d2ded657fb581f6cecabc588ba46b46339df48dd071505d7a31c", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-017.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "24a424648c8c9488", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-017", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "c44acc4048b439a53dc3bfc2f7803b183b9c3bcc3fc0b730e238c03cc4fccffe", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "6c182e0dba376d0e6abd24282cd192a1927a52bb72aba7f9559e96df7399230e", "width": 105}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-018.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2b96cc7171ec9633", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-018", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8445ff95e1115ee7786557bb569921ef55a7885f117f228500079ae900217fde", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "9dd88a9c19033224426aacd9dcf69fb194d04587127bad0c41927cbf38825270", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-019.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6868684c4c686868", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-019", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8616999959666666619966665866999e60e6de6670f9199978669b1978e9d999", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "885a1b2d7c0cec791f5ab0d4e0d455ef9f5ce2ee8d6f569a744bb77594b046dc", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-020.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "80aa94b2b2b28ca2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-020", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "9991667966669996199b66616667d99999445e66659967991ae6996666996619", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "0c09a6c932a04106a6592dbf1db85b810d3064097f720ca189844d709f72b81b", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-021.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6aa4924aadb6daa9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-021", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "b81074205a188c205618ab204598aac475e8aafc65f6a2fb75f7aafb7575aafb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "5605365aa1f9fa0ccff27a6a2efac446feed14ad267b36de22e16ca3dc796dd0", "width": 103}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-022.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "27a4ac6c4ca4948a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-022", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d449c448693439b51b4bef40b69431c91de43ff46b58631cc09ccdffb6b13239", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "869801645f8108ea71494fe95a6a012eb3c629c36efc79de82995822b9d8b793", "width": 121}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-023.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4222124a4a122242", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-023", "height": 61, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ff9d85451ce3603e07ffbf8101e76419c03fbfc6030f4ff04003f1dc20106e7f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "26a3c82b8c6fd46a4ce85b33970ea305380d17912a0dc1e1d9cfdeaebee54360", "width": 91}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-024.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6868686868f3fe68", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-024", "height": 56, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8f0f8fffb3e070028fef70304c4f93276cd0704a962f4dd070628f9f71d08e69", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "1227539e11bcbfe5e656b7d2368b524c30c873a808b77a1194c64169e6bcdccb", "width": 109}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-025.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f0f47331b51310f", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-025", "height": 66, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ebfa663cb40591c2a53f9c0fc7e86734939460b8c652964c5919d9e39c473c67", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "54f5665e78c45fc3f920e105da90c7cfab2ec5170a0065d0b829bc692d2d920b", "width": 66}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-026.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "55714d456d715929", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-026", "height": 68, "page": 3, "phash_256": "ffef6ffb90406df9a006b087c738924d67b89865853458488835674a929fc7da", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "323af89dc461c8c07d3496fb03959fcf6820d17cf44fbd23b74dc65f80b08e92", "width": 82}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-027.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0f3371e8a2f17317", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-027", "height": 68, "page": 3, "phash_256": "aabdcf33bd53b0e3b42ec34cb0f4cd30d3c31c63cb4d318cdb242250ccc3598f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "4d5320bae461780115ad9e7ea2e31abfb275edd8cb265b26b829d2cc2b671e89", "width": 73}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-028.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b3cecdae33a6a5cc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-028", "height": 68, "page": 3, "phash_256": "a02223362298ec45f9be3862da49ebdd3c10f4aed2719e717faefd10568e134a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "64de0a11bea9b71f2a9a10c42772ebed5d84e42f0890fd3c6a7876c30afb4a08", "width": 62}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-029.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4103632b3f673119", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-029", "height": 1319, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bfe1c756d09f25097af198e6c50890ffa71e6ac1c8742f09919fc47f3d814314", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "ac9d2fa93e7bbad904d836126b329160feb9f784c915f6f136d5d806414d284c", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9631393385186109", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0015-001", "height": 477, "page": 15, "phash_256": "b854681497ad35a965fa49723964665dcc9b3936e6240ec9f9dbe3738e641898", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "210bececb083ab96d439a880646c8c4323a42a269fab7b3df9510f8cec6eb0c3", "width": 729}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-144/assets/figures/cr-2023-144-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "table_or_graphic", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96b131b981631f5b", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-144-fig-p0016-001", "height": 482, "page": 16, "phash_256": "b85ad8be35a5656de1db3c204ca8729a2e24699d3a556fccd1aa4662d589bb70", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "sha256_normalized_png": "7399e9391b20ddb512313507cab6ed43017dca29ba41af76c7aa61b250c955b6", "width": 737}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-144/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..97980f317e3a44131f83c67f6ac6994d63d25bd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-144/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-144-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nApril 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/144**\n### **SURINAME**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––MEDIUM-TERM** **MACRO-FISCAL FORECASTING**\n\nThis technical assistance report on Suriname was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in November 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org Web:](mailto:publications@imf.org) [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 1, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "April 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/144\nSURINAME\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––MEDIUM-TERM MACRO-FISCAL FORECASTING\n\nThis technical assistance report on Suriname was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in November 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 575}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-144-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "FOR OFFIAL USE ONLY\n\n\n\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\n\nSURINAME\nMedium-Term Macro-Fiscal Forecasting\nFEBRUARY 2023\n\n\n\nPrepared By\nPatrick Blagrave and Nicholas Vaughan\n\n\n\n\n\nMEMBERS\nAnguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,\nCayman Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,\nSt. Maarten, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands\n\nPARTNERS\nCanada, United Kingdom, European Union, Netherlands, Mexico, USAID, Caribbean Development Bank, Eastern\nCaribbean Central Bank", "text_characters": 537}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-001", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-002", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-003", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-004", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-005", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-006", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-007", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-008", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-009", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-010", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-011", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-012", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-013", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-014", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-015", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-016", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-017", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-018", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-019", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-020", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-021", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-022", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-023", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-024", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-025", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-026", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-027", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-028", "cr-2023-144-fig-p0003-029"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0053, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(66.75, 383.56982421875, 138.75, 419.56982421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 34, "size": 8820, "transform": [71.99999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 35.999996185302734, 66.75, 383.56982421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(232.5, 383.56982421875, 304.5, 419.56982421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 36, "size": 9759, "transform": [71.99999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 35.999996185302734, 232.5, 383.56982421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(394.550048828125, 538.4862670898438, 466.550048828125, 574.4862670898438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(226,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 50, "size": 3630, "transform": [71.99999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 35.999996185302734, 394.550048828125, 538.4862670898438], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(149.6999053955078, 383.56982421875, 221.69989013671875, 419.56982421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 80, "number": 35, "size": 9537, "transform": [71.99999237060547, 0.0, -0.0, 35.999996185302734, 149.6999053955078, 383.56982421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(71.25000762939453, 306.11151123046875, 133.90000915527344, 342.0887451171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(80,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 93, "number": 28, "size": 3138, "transform": [62.64999771118164, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97724151611328, 71.25000762939453, 306.11151123046875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.0248718261719, 461.028076171875, 380.67486572265625, 497.00531005859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(231,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 93, "number": 43, "size": 3741, "transform": [62.64999771118164, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97724151611328, 318.0248718261719, 461.028076171875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.5248107910156, 306.111572265625, 380.12481689453125, 342.0956726074219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(38,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 31, "size": 1596, "transform": [61.599998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 35.984092712402344, 318.5248107910156, 306.111572265625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(399.550048828125, 306.111572265625, 461.1500549316406, 342.0956726074219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(24,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 32, "size": 1599, "transform": [61.599998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 35.984092712402344, 399.550048828125, 306.111572265625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(477.3500061035156, 306.111572265625, 538.9500122070312, 342.0956726074219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 33, "size": 22515, "transform": [61.599998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 35.984092712402344, 477.3500061035156, 306.111572265625], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(72.0500717163086, 461.0281066894531, 133.4500732421875, 496.9998474121094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 40, "size": 5370, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 72.0500717163086, 461.0281066894531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(399.8500061035156, 383.56982421875, 461.25, 419.54156494140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(200,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 38, "size": 3852, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 399.8500061035156, 383.56982421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(477.6501159667969, 383.56982421875, 539.0501098632812, 419.54156494140625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(57,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 39, "size": 3855, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 477.6501159667969, 383.56982421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(399.8500061035156, 461.0281066894531, 461.25, 496.9998474121094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(65,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 44, "size": 3000, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 399.8500061035156, 461.0281066894531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(477.6501159667969, 461.0281066894531, 539.0501098632812, 496.9998474121094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(70,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 45, "size": 2745, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 477.6501159667969, 461.0281066894531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(154.99998474121094, 538.4862670898438, 216.3999786376953, 574.4580078125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(15,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 47, "size": 1758, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 154.99998474121094, 538.4862670898438], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(237.800048828125, 538.4862670898438, 299.2000427246094, 574.4580078125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(21,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 48, "size": 1311, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 237.800048828125, 538.4862670898438], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(318.82489013671875, 538.4862670898438, 380.2248840332031, 574.4580078125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(33,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 49, "size": 2193, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.97172927856445, 318.82489013671875, 538.4862670898438], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(154.99998474121094, 461.0281066894531, 216.3999786376953, 496.999755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(249,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 41, "size": 2325, "transform": [61.399993896484375, 0.0, -0.0, 35.971649169921875, 154.99998474121094, 461.0281066894531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(237.87503051757812, 461.0281066894531, 299.1250305175781, 497.01251220703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(38,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 42, "size": 3423, "transform": [61.249996185302734, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98440933227539, 237.87503051757812, 461.0281066894531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(155.19993591308594, 306.11151123046875, 216.19993591308594, 342.10150146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(71,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 29, "size": 3414, "transform": [61.0, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98999786376953, 155.19993591308594, 306.11151123046875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(246.19992065429688, 666.2933959960938, 310.9607849121094, 699.3933715820312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(32,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 82, "number": 54, "size": 3441, "transform": [64.7608642578125, 0.0, -0.0, 33.099998474121094, 246.19992065429688, 666.2933959960938], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(241.37503051757812, 306.1115417480469, 295.6250305175781, 342.09918212890625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(35,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 107, "number": 30, "size": 1584, "transform": [54.249996185302734, 0.0, -0.0, 35.98763656616211, 241.37503051757812, 306.1115417480469], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(182.59982299804688, 662.593505859375, 231.0198974609375, 702.7435302734375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 168, "number": 53, "size": 26796, "transform": [48.42007827758789, 0.0, -0.0, 40.14999771118164, 182.59982299804688, 662.593505859375], "width": 202, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(322.5248718261719, 383.56982421875, 376.5248718261719, 419.56982421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(180,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 107, "number": 37, "size": 2322, "transform": [53.999996185302734, 0.0, -0.0, 36.0, 322.5248718261719, 383.56982421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(75.75, 539.4862670898438, 129.6999969482422, 575.4656372070312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 150, "number": 46, "size": 5788, "transform": [53.94999694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 35.9793701171875, 75.75, 539.4862670898438], "width": 225, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(510.9748229980469, 662.79345703125, 554.224853515625, 702.8855590820312)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 168, "number": 58, "size": 164388, "transform": [43.25, 0.0, -0.0, 40.092124938964844, 510.9748229980469, 662.79345703125], "width": 181, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(448.62469482421875, 663.343505859375, 487.32470703125, 702.0435180664062)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(179,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 130, "number": 57, "size": 14241, "transform": [38.70000076293945, 0.0, -0.0, 38.70000076293945, 448.62469482421875, 663.343505859375], "width": 130, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(129.27487182617188, 662.79345703125, 165.61550903320312, 702.8934326171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 115, "number": 52, "size": 22059, "transform": [36.34062957763672, 0.0, -0.0, 40.099998474121094, 129.27487182617188, 662.79345703125], "width": 105, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "DISCLAIMER\n “The contents of this document constitute technical advice provided by the staff of the International Monetary\n Fund to the authorities of the Ministry of Finance and Planning (the \"CD recipient\") in response to their request for\n technical assistance. This document (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to\n the IMF Executive Director for Suriname to other IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as\n to other agencies or instrumentalities of the CD recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff, and\n other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest including members of the Steering\n Committee of CARTAC, unless the CD recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see Operational\n Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance Information). Publication or Disclosure of this report (in\n whole or in part) to parties outside the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the CD recipient, World\n Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest including members of the\n Steering Committee of CARTAC shall require the explicit consent of the CD recipient and the IMF’s Western\n Hemisphere Department.”\n\nMEMBERS\n\n\n\n\n Anguilla Antigua and Aruba The Bahamas Barbados Belize\n Barbuda\n\n\n\n\n Bermuda British Virgin Cayman Islands Curaçao Dominica Grenada\n Islands\n\n\n\n\n Guyana Haiti Jamaica Montserrat St. Kitts and St. Lucia\n Nevis\n\n\n\n\n\n St. Maarten St. Vincent and Suriname Trinidad and Turks and Caicos\n the Grenadines Tobago Islands\n\n\nPARTNERS\n\n\n\n\n Canada UK aid European Ministry of Secretaría de USA AID Caribbean Eastern\n Union Foreign Affairs Hacienda y Development Caribbean\n of the Crédito Bank Central Bank\n Netherlands Público\n M i", "text_characters": 1483}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Table of Contents**\n\n**Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................................2**\n\n\n**Acronyms and Abbreviations...........................................................................................................................3**\n\n\n**I. Background: Genesis of the Project ......................................................................................................... 4**\n\nMacroeconomic and Fiscal Context ........................................................................................................................ 4\n\nTA Request.............................................................................................................................................................. 4\n\nIntegration with Program Priorities .......................................................................................................................... 4\n\n\n**II. Existing Capacities and Tools .................................................................................................................. 5**\n\nRemit and Outputs of the TA Recipient ................................................................................................................... 5\n\nExisting Human Resources and their Technical Capacity ...................................................................................... 6\n\nThe Existing Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework ............................................................................................. 7\n\nCollaboration Arrangements with Other Entities and Any Additional TA Needs ..................................................... 7\n\nOverall Needs Assessment ..................................................................................................................................... 8\n\n\n**III. Action Plan for TA Support ...................................................................................................................... 9**\n\nWorkplan, Tasks, and Next Steps ........................................................................................................................... 9\n\nRisks….. ................................................................................................................................................................ 11\n\n\n**Appendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)................................................................................... 14**\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 1", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Table of Contents\n\nExecutive Summary.........................................................................................................................................2\n\nAcronyms and Abbreviations...........................................................................................................................3\n\nI. Background: Genesis of the Project ......................................................................................................... 4\n\nMacroeconomic and Fiscal Context ........................................................................................................................ 4\n\nTA Request.............................................................................................................................................................. 4\n\nIntegration with Program Priorities .......................................................................................................................... 4\n\nII. Existing Capacities and Tools .................................................................................................................. 5\n\nRemit and Outputs of the TA Recipient ................................................................................................................... 5\n\nExisting Human Resources and their Technical Capacity ...................................................................................... 6\n\nThe Existing Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework ............................................................................................. 7\n\nCollaboration Arrangements with Other Entities and Any Additional TA Needs ..................................................... 7\n\nOverall Needs Assessment ..................................................................................................................................... 8\n\nIII. Action Plan for TA Support ...................................................................................................................... 9\n\nWorkplan, Tasks, and Next Steps ........................................................................................................................... 9\n\nRisks….. ................................................................................................................................................................ 11\n\nAppendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)................................................................................... 14\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 1", "text_characters": 2375}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Executive Summary**\n\n**A scoping mission between CARTAC’s Macroeconomics Program and Suriname’s Ministry of Finance**\n**and Planning was held during November 7-10** **[th]** **, 2022 in Paramaribo, Suriname.** This TA report summarizes\nthe context, mission findings, and way forward for CARTAC’s provision of TA support to Suriname’s Economic\nAffairs Department (within the Ministry of Finance and Planning).\n\n\n**The Economic Affairs Department recognizes the desirability of creating a new medium-term macro-**\n**fiscal forecasting framework (MTFF).** Such a tool will be developed via several TA missions, and betweenmission work by EAD staff members, and will focus on linking high-level revenue and expenditure projections to\nprojections of macroeconomic determinants. In addition, a clear and transparent method of entering the effect of\npolicy changes on these projections, and the contribution of any ‘one-off’ factors to projected revenues or\nexpenditures, will be a key feature of the tool.\n\n\n**Existing technical capacity relating to forecasting among most EAD staff is at a basic level** . Training,\nthrough hands-on exercises using Surinamese data, will play an important role in supporting the development\nand ultimate adoption of the MTFF. The number of staff in the EAD appears to be sufficient, though sustained\nengagement with the same core group of persons will be vital to ensuring that the project reaches its ultimate\noutcome, of having EAD staff implement an MTFF as part of their macro-fiscal projection process.\n\n\n**There are several risks to the project’s success, including regarding data quality and availability, as well**\n**as competing demands on EAD staff time** . Limited data, and weak relationships between predictors\n(economic activity) and fiscal variables (e.g. tax revenues) would limit the forecast accuracy of the MTFF,\nthough it would still allow for more rigorous and transparent projections than is current practice. Regarding staff\ntime, it is understood that EAD staff have a strong interest in the development and usage of an MTFF, hopefully\nensuring sufficient time by a core group of persons is devoted to receiving TA support to develop the tool.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 2", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Executive Summary\n\nA scoping mission between CARTAC’s Macroeconomics Program and Suriname’s Ministry of Finance\nand Planning was held during November 7-10 [th] , 2022 in Paramaribo, Suriname. This TA report summarizes\nthe context, mission findings, and way forward for CARTAC’s provision of TA support to Suriname’s Economic\nAffairs Department (within the Ministry of Finance and Planning).\n\nThe Economic Affairs Department recognizes the desirability of creating a new medium-term macro-\nfiscal forecasting framework (MTFF). Such a tool will be developed via several TA missions, and betweenmission work by EAD staff members, and will focus on linking high-level revenue and expenditure projections to\nprojections of macroeconomic determinants. In addition, a clear and transparent method of entering the effect of\npolicy changes on these projections, and the contribution of any ‘one-off’ factors to projected revenues or\nexpenditures, will be a key feature of the tool.\n\nExisting technical capacity relating to forecasting among most EAD staff is at a basic level . Training,\nthrough hands-on exercises using Surinamese data, will play an important role in supporting the development\nand ultimate adoption of the MTFF. The number of staff in the EAD appears to be sufficient, though sustained\nengagement with the same core group of persons will be vital to ensuring that the project reaches its ultimate\noutcome, of having EAD staff implement an MTFF as part of their macro-fiscal projection process.\n\nThere are several risks to the project’s success, including regarding data quality and availability, as well\nas competing demands on EAD staff time . Limited data, and weak relationships between predictors\n(economic activity) and fiscal variables (e.g. tax revenues) would limit the forecast accuracy of the MTFF,\nthough it would still allow for more rigorous and transparent projections than is current practice. Regarding staff\ntime, it is understood that EAD staff have a strong interest in the development and usage of an MTFF, hopefully\nensuring sufficient time by a core group of persons is devoted to receiving TA support to develop the tool.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 2", "text_characters": 1838}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**\n\nCARTAC . Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre\n\n\nCBVS ...... Central Bank of Suriname\n\n\nCD .......... Capacity Development\n\n\nCPI .......... Consumer Price Inflation\n\n\nDDT ........ Public Debt Dynamics Tool\n\n\nEAD ........ Economic Affairs Department\n\n\nETR ........ Effective Tax Rate\n\n\nFAD ........ Fiscal Affairs Department\n\n\nFPWG ..... Financial Programming Working Group\n\n\nGDP ........ Gross Domestic Product\n\n\nICD ......... Institute for Capacity Development\n\n\nMFP ........ Ministry of Finance and Planning\n\n\nMoF ........ Ministry of Finance\n\n\nMTFF ...... Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework\n\n\nRBM ........ Results Based Management\n\n\nSDMO ..... Suriname Debt Management Office\n\n\nSRD ........ Suriname Dollar\n\n\nTA ........... Technical Assistance\n\n\nVAT ......... Value Added Tax\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Acronyms and Abbreviations\n\nCARTAC . Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre\n\nCBVS ...... Central Bank of Suriname\n\nCD .......... Capacity Development\n\nCPI .......... Consumer Price Inflation\n\nDDT ........ Public Debt Dynamics Tool\n\nEAD ........ Economic Affairs Department\n\nETR ........ Effective Tax Rate\n\nFAD ........ Fiscal Affairs Department\n\nFPWG ..... Financial Programming Working Group\n\nGDP ........ Gross Domestic Product\n\nICD ......... Institute for Capacity Development\n\nMFP ........ Ministry of Finance and Planning\n\nMoF ........ Ministry of Finance\n\nMTFF ...... Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework\n\nRBM ........ Results Based Management\n\nSDMO ..... Suriname Debt Management Office\n\nSRD ........ Suriname Dollar\n\nTA ........... Technical Assistance\n\nVAT ......... Value Added Tax\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 3", "text_characters": 693}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **I. Background: Genesis of the Project**\n\n**Macroeconomic and Fiscal Context**\n\n\n**On December 22, 2021, Suriname entered into a 36-month arrangement under the IMF’s Extended Fund**\n**Facility** . Under this arrangement, the Surinamese authorities’ homegrown economic recovery plan aims to\naddress systemic fiscal and external imbalances and chart a course toward debt sustainability, declining\ninflation, and economic recovery while maintaining social stability. [1]\n\n\n**TA Request**\n\n\n**On June 8, 2022, The Economic Affairs Department (EAD) within the Ministry of Finance and Planning**\n**(MFP) requested CARTAC support for the development of a medium-term macro-fiscal framework**\n**(MTFF)** . Subsequent discussions between CARTAC, Ms. Tine Tjalim (Head of the Economics Affairs\nDepartment), Ms. Iris Sandel (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning), the InterAmerican\nDevelopment Bank, and the Suriname IMF country team were held in July and August 2022, during which it was\nagreed that CARTAC’s Macroeconomics program would hold a scoping mission to chart the best course for\nsupport in this area (scheduled for November, 2022). Assessing existing capacity to analyze fiscal risks was\nadded as an area of interest during these discussions.\n\n\n**Integration with Program Priorities**\n\n\n**Development of macro-fiscal forecasting capacity and a new MTFF linking revenue and expenditure**\n**projections to macroeconomic and policy determinants will support Suriname’s ability to conduct**\n**sound medium-term fiscal planning.** Macro-fiscal forecasts will be more accurate and transparent following\nTA support to develop an MTFF. If successfully integrated into the policy process, a sound MTFF would imply\nsmaller and unbiased errors in revenue and expenditure forecasts, thereby underpinning more precise fiscal\ndecision making.\n\n\n**Three TA workstreams closely related to the current engagement on MTFF development are expected to**\n**be undertaken (or have been undertaken) by other partners.** First, CARTAC’s Public Financial Management\nworkstream has provided support relating to Suriname’s Chart of Accounts, and is also likely to provide support\nto the Budget Office regarding budget processes. The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department is in discussions with\nSuriname to provide TA support relating to forecasting likely revenues under the to-be-implemented new value\nadded tax (VAT). The development of an MTFF would enhance the budget process, by increasing the\nconsistency, transparency, and technical rigor of macro-fiscal projections. However, when faced with new\nrevenue streams (such as from the adoption of a VAT), projected revenues would be compiled most accurately\nusing detailed techniques which may be elaborated through engagement with the IMF’s FAD.\n\n\n1 First Review under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility, and Financing Assurances Review,\n\nInternational Monetary Fund, March 9, 2022.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. Background: Genesis of the Project\n\nMacroeconomic and Fiscal Context\n\nOn December 22, 2021, Suriname entered into a 36-month arrangement under the IMF’s Extended Fund\nFacility . Under this arrangement, the Surinamese authorities’ homegrown economic recovery plan aims to\naddress systemic fiscal and external imbalances and chart a course toward debt sustainability, declining\ninflation, and economic recovery while maintaining social stability. [1]\n\nTA Request\n\nOn June 8, 2022, The Economic Affairs Department (EAD) within the Ministry of Finance and Planning\n(MFP) requested CARTAC support for the development of a medium-term macro-fiscal framework\n(MTFF) . Subsequent discussions between CARTAC, Ms. Tine Tjalim (Head of the Economics Affairs\nDepartment), Ms. Iris Sandel (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning), the InterAmerican\nDevelopment Bank, and the Suriname IMF country team were held in July and August 2022, during which it was\nagreed that CARTAC’s Macroeconomics program would hold a scoping mission to chart the best course for\nsupport in this area (scheduled for November, 2022). Assessing existing capacity to analyze fiscal risks was\nadded as an area of interest during these discussions.\n\nIntegration with Program Priorities\n\nDevelopment of macro-fiscal forecasting capacity and a new MTFF linking revenue and expenditure\nprojections to macroeconomic and policy determinants will support Suriname’s ability to conduct\nsound medium-term fiscal planning. Macro-fiscal forecasts will be more accurate and transparent following\nTA support to develop an MTFF. If successfully integrated into the policy process, a sound MTFF would imply\nsmaller and unbiased errors in revenue and expenditure forecasts, thereby underpinning more precise fiscal\ndecision making.\n\nThree TA workstreams closely related to the current engagement on MTFF development are expected to\nbe undertaken (or have been undertaken) by other partners. First, CARTAC’s Public Financial Management\nworkstream has provided support relating to Suriname’s Chart of Accounts, and is also likely to provide support\nto the Budget Office regarding budget processes. The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department is in discussions with\nSuriname to provide TA support relating to forecasting likely revenues under the to-be-implemented new value\nadded tax (VAT). The development of an MTFF would enhance the budget process, by increasing the\nconsistency, transparency, and technical rigor of macro-fiscal projections. However, when faced with new\nrevenue streams (such as from the adoption of a VAT), projected revenues would be compiled most accurately\nusing detailed techniques which may be elaborated through engagement with the IMF’s FAD.\n\n1 First Review under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility, and Financing Assurances Review,\n\nInternational Monetary Fund, March 9, 2022.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 4", "text_characters": 2478}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **II. Existing Capacities and Tools**\n\n**Remit and Outputs of the TA Recipient**\n\n\n**The Economic Affairs Dept (EAD) within MFP is the beneficiary of CARTAC technical assistance**, having\n\n|responsibility for producing the fiscal projections for the B set out below. Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million)|Col2|Budget document a|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million)**
|**Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million)**
||\n||
**2022**
**Budget**|**2023**
**Draft**
**Budget**|\n|**Total revenues**
Current revenues
Tax Revenues
Direct taxes
Indirect taxes
Non-tax revenues
Grants
**Total expenditures**
Current expenditures
Wages and salaries
Goods and services
Subsidies and transfers
Interest
Capital expenditures
**Primary balance**
**Total balance**
BBP*
**Primary balance (% GDP)**
**Total balance (% GDP)**
_Memorantum items_
_Disbursements_
_Amortizations_|**22,320**
21,770
14,735
9,089
5,646
7,035
550
**23,185**
20,880
5,784
5,932
6,888
2,276
2,305
**1,411**
**-865**
77,811
**1.8**
**-1.1**
_5,607_
_6,060_|
**26,085**
25,585
17,646
7,888
9,758
7,939
500
**27,077**
25,057
7,542
5,856
8,236
3,422
2,020
**2,430**
**-992**
99,290
**2.4**
**-1.0**
_7,837_
_10,164_|\n|* projections macro-framework|||\n\n\n\n**The remit of EAD to support the annual Suriname Budget includes finalising the in-year and year-ahead**\n**fiscal projections.** This requires them to work closely with not only other MFP departments but several other\nindependent institutions that, with the exception of the central bank, fall under MFP:\n\n\nRevenue Department - Provide in-year receipts data along with not only in-year forecasts but medium-term\nforecasts. Currently, Revenue Department and EAD forecasts inform the final budget forecast, with iterative\ndiscussions between the two departments serving to eliminate any discrepancy between the projections.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.680267333984375, 171.32183837890625, 389.69451904296875, 644.556884765625], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "II. Existing Capacities and Tools\n\nRemit and Outputs of the TA Recipient\n\nThe Economic Affairs Dept (EAD) within MFP is the beneficiary of CARTAC technical assistance, having\n\n responsibility for producing the fiscal projections for the B set out below. Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million) Col2 Budget document a \n\n Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million) Table: Budget 2022 and 2023 (SRD million) \n 2022 Budget 2023 Draft Budget \n Total revenues Current revenues Tax Revenues Direct taxes Indirect taxes Non-tax revenues Grants Total expenditures Current expenditures Wages and salaries Goods and services Subsidies and transfers Interest Capital expenditures Primary balance Total balance BBP* Primary balance (% GDP) Total balance (% GDP) _Memorantum items_ _Disbursements_ _Amortizations_ 22,320 21,770 14,735 9,089 5,646 7,035 550 23,185 20,880 5,784 5,932 6,888 2,276 2,305 1,411 -865 77,811 1.8 -1.1 _5,607_ _6,060_ 26,085 25,585 17,646 7,888 9,758 7,939 500 27,077 25,057 7,542 5,856 8,236 3,422 2,020 2,430 -992 99,290 2.4 -1.0 _7,837_ _10,164_ \n * projections macro-framework \n\nThe remit of EAD to support the annual Suriname Budget includes finalising the in-year and year-ahead\nfiscal projections. This requires them to work closely with not only other MFP departments but several other\nindependent institutions that, with the exception of the central bank, fall under MFP:\n\nRevenue Department - Provide in-year receipts data along with not only in-year forecasts but medium-term\nforecasts. Currently, Revenue Department and EAD forecasts inform the final budget forecast, with iterative\ndiscussions between the two departments serving to eliminate any discrepancy between the projections.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 5", "text_characters": 1463}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Budget Department - While the Budget department manages departmental spending requests, EAD is\nresponsible for finalising the fiscal spending envelope forecast in the budget.\n\n\nSuriname Debt Management Office (SDMO) – Have a remit to provide debt-interest forecasts, but at present the\nsimultaneity between any changes to the fiscal deficit through the budget ‘round’ and debt interest costs is handled\nseparately and iteratively between EAD and SDMO.\n\n\nStatistics Office – Produce the output measure of GDP, in real and nominal terms, but do not produce wider GDP\nstatistics e.g. income and expenditure measures.\n\n\nPlanning Office/Bureau (SPS) - Have a remit to supply the macroeconomic forecast, including a wider set of\nestimates than the Statistics Office publish (e.g. growth in real consumption and net real wages). This is done\nusing a Financial Programming spreadsheet, understood to cover all four sectors of the economy. [2] The\nmacroeconomic forecast—which is a key input into the macro-fiscal forecast process of the EAD—is the\nresponsibility of the Planning Office. However, under the IMF program EAD staff have been relying upon the IMF\ncountry team’s forecast for Suriname. Alternatively, the publicly available bi-annual IMF forecast for real GDP\ncould be used as an input by the EAD in its macro-fiscal projection process.\n\n\nCentral Bank (CBVS) – Is understood to have a macroeconomic model that is believed to be very similar to that\nused by SPS. Economic forecasts are produced, but not published. CBVS does publish a Monthly Activity Index\n\n- as of mid-November the last index value was for July.\n\n\n**Existing Human Resources and their Technical Capacity**\n\n\n**Staff within EAD have competing demands on their time, but the department is well staffed (8+ staff**\n**members)** . The EAD is currently heavily committed to weekly reporting of fiscal data to help Suriname address\nmonthly reporting under the IMF program. There is a modest risk that there is not enough capacity for individual\nmembers of staff to take on the additional work with the TA, and more junior staff have little experience with\nforecasting, implying a strong need for training as part of the TA engagement. The mission also noted that more\nsenior staff who have stronger capacity in macro-fiscal forecasting will tend to be charged with more\nresponsibilities under the IMF program, and thus less able to absorb TA in this area.\n\n\n**For the TA project to succeed, the mission team made clear that a core team of at least 3 EAD staff need**\n**to engage with the project**, receiving all TA and training, to ensure sufficient development of in-house\ncapacity. This would help mitigate against project failure due to staff turnover, and ideally help to ensure that the\nTA is embedded within EAD and becomes part of the institution’s capital.\n\n\n**All EAD staff use Excel, though one of the spreadsheets shared with the mission team indicates skills at**\n**a basic level** . This assessment may reflect the work of whichever staff member most recently worked with the\nexisting macro-fiscal spreadsheet: it should be taken as indicative of competency in the staff assigned to lead on\nthe TA.\n\n\n**Most EAD staff are generally not well versed with statistics training and any basic econometrics**\n**required for simple regression analysis** . That said, the regressions required to build an MTFF can be\nimplemented in Excel, and EAD staff should be able to use the tools developed and update or innovate the\nMTFF over time.\n\n\n2 This spreadsheet was not reviewed by the mission team, and so any related conclusions are speculative and based on discussions held\non mission.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Budget Department - While the Budget department manages departmental spending requests, EAD is\nresponsible for finalising the fiscal spending envelope forecast in the budget.\n\nSuriname Debt Management Office (SDMO) – Have a remit to provide debt-interest forecasts, but at present the\nsimultaneity between any changes to the fiscal deficit through the budget ‘round’ and debt interest costs is handled\nseparately and iteratively between EAD and SDMO.\n\nStatistics Office – Produce the output measure of GDP, in real and nominal terms, but do not produce wider GDP\nstatistics e.g. income and expenditure measures.\n\nPlanning Office/Bureau (SPS) - Have a remit to supply the macroeconomic forecast, including a wider set of\nestimates than the Statistics Office publish (e.g. growth in real consumption and net real wages). This is done\nusing a Financial Programming spreadsheet, understood to cover all four sectors of the economy. [2] The\nmacroeconomic forecast—which is a key input into the macro-fiscal forecast process of the EAD—is the\nresponsibility of the Planning Office. However, under the IMF program EAD staff have been relying upon the IMF\ncountry team’s forecast for Suriname. Alternatively, the publicly available bi-annual IMF forecast for real GDP\ncould be used as an input by the EAD in its macro-fiscal projection process.\n\nCentral Bank (CBVS) – Is understood to have a macroeconomic model that is believed to be very similar to that\nused by SPS. Economic forecasts are produced, but not published. CBVS does publish a Monthly Activity Index\n\n- as of mid-November the last index value was for July.\n\nExisting Human Resources and their Technical Capacity\n\nStaff within EAD have competing demands on their time, but the department is well staffed (8+ staff\nmembers) . The EAD is currently heavily committed to weekly reporting of fiscal data to help Suriname address\nmonthly reporting under the IMF program. There is a modest risk that there is not enough capacity for individual\nmembers of staff to take on the additional work with the TA, and more junior staff have little experience with\nforecasting, implying a strong need for training as part of the TA engagement. The mission also noted that more\nsenior staff who have stronger capacity in macro-fiscal forecasting will tend to be charged with more\nresponsibilities under the IMF program, and thus less able to absorb TA in this area.\n\nFor the TA project to succeed, the mission team made clear that a core team of at least 3 EAD staff need\nto engage with the project, receiving all TA and training, to ensure sufficient development of in-house\ncapacity. This would help mitigate against project failure due to staff turnover, and ideally help to ensure that the\nTA is embedded within EAD and becomes part of the institution’s capital.\n\nAll EAD staff use Excel, though one of the spreadsheets shared with the mission team indicates skills at\na basic level . This assessment may reflect the work of whichever staff member most recently worked with the\nexisting macro-fiscal spreadsheet: it should be taken as indicative of competency in the staff assigned to lead on\nthe TA.\n\nMost EAD staff are generally not well versed with statistics training and any basic econometrics\nrequired for simple regression analysis . That said, the regressions required to build an MTFF can be\nimplemented in Excel, and EAD staff should be able to use the tools developed and update or innovate the\nMTFF over time.\n\n2 This spreadsheet was not reviewed by the mission team, and so any related conclusions are speculative and based on discussions held\non mission.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 6", "text_characters": 3028}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**The Existing Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework**\n\n\n**The current revenue and expenditure forecasting framework is very basic**, with forecasts generally linked\nto past growth rates, and/or incremental judgmental adjustments—the basis for these adjustments was not clear\nto the mission team. Importantly, fiscal projections are not explicitly linked to any macroeconomic projections,\nsuch as those produced by the MFP’s Planning Bureau, despite these being regularly shared and updated twice\nannually. EAD receive revenue forecasts from the Revenue Department that they challenge with their own\njudgement, using what appear to be relatively simple (round-number) ‘add factors’ to reach a considered\nforecast.\n\n\n**Previously a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) was built up jointly in a Financial Programming**\n**Working Group (FPWG)** between EAD, Central Bank, Planning Bureau and SDMO with contributions from\neach. For example, real or monetary sector data and projections were collated through a portal developed by\nthe central bank. It is understood that the portal was more than simply a database and may even have been\nable to produce 4-sector analysis. [3]\n\n\n**The FPWG has not been active in recent years** and while there appears to be goodwill at a working level,\ncollaboration is now more informal and there is no updating through the portal. Data sharing within the MFP is\nassessed as being good, but outside of the MFP data sharing practices are more limited and operate less\nsmoothly. However, the role of the central bank in the policy process is primarily related to the monetary and\nexternal sectors, and thus less they need not be centrally involved with the fiscal sector analysis and its links to\nthe real sector, which is the focus of the present CARTAC TA engagement.\n\n\n**Collaboration Arrangements with Other Entities and any Additional TA needs**\n\n\n**It was not established whether there are formal collaboration arrangements relating to data sharing**\n**between the independent (statutory basis) institutions that support EAD in compiling the macro-fiscal**\n**projections and budget statement** . This will be investigated and assessed as the project proceeds. The\nmission’s initial read is that collaboration seems effective. The MFP’s Revenue department is expected to join\nEAD colleagues in the TA engagement on revenue and expenditure forecasting, which will allow for knowledge\nsharing, and the mission will discuss whether forecast duplication between the Revenue and EA Departments is\nnecessary.\n\n\n**Following the scoping mission, the Planning Office supplied a fuller set of results from their**\n**macroeconomic forecast model, and there appears to exist a well-structured collaboration**, with the\nStatistics Bureau providing the data and Planning Office the forecast. The key Capacity Development (CD) gap\nremains in revenue and expenditure forecasting—linking with macroeconomic and policy determinants. Some\nrefinement of in-year forecasting techniques (linking monthly outturns to annual projections) would also be\ndesirable.\n\n\n**Additional areas where counterparts raised needs for TA support:**\n\n\n**1.** _**VAT forecasting**_ **.** VAT will replace a sales tax in 2023, and this is an area where the IMF’s FAD is best\nplaced to provide TA;\n\n\n**2. Following the delivery of the MTFF, it would be desirable to** _**build capacity with a debt dynamics tool**_ **,**\nsuch as the IMF-ICD public debt dynamics tool (DDT)—this may be done jointly with the SDMO;\n\n\n3 This portal and apparatus were not the focus of the mission, and were not reviewed. However, the renewal of this FPWG and supporting\napparatus could be considered as an area for future TA support.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The Existing Medium-term Macro-Fiscal Framework\n\nThe current revenue and expenditure forecasting framework is very basic, with forecasts generally linked\nto past growth rates, and/or incremental judgmental adjustments—the basis for these adjustments was not clear\nto the mission team. Importantly, fiscal projections are not explicitly linked to any macroeconomic projections,\nsuch as those produced by the MFP’s Planning Bureau, despite these being regularly shared and updated twice\nannually. EAD receive revenue forecasts from the Revenue Department that they challenge with their own\njudgement, using what appear to be relatively simple (round-number) ‘add factors’ to reach a considered\nforecast.\n\nPreviously a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) was built up jointly in a Financial Programming\nWorking Group (FPWG) between EAD, Central Bank, Planning Bureau and SDMO with contributions from\neach. For example, real or monetary sector data and projections were collated through a portal developed by\nthe central bank. It is understood that the portal was more than simply a database and may even have been\nable to produce 4-sector analysis. [3]\n\nThe FPWG has not been active in recent years and while there appears to be goodwill at a working level,\ncollaboration is now more informal and there is no updating through the portal. Data sharing within the MFP is\nassessed as being good, but outside of the MFP data sharing practices are more limited and operate less\nsmoothly. However, the role of the central bank in the policy process is primarily related to the monetary and\nexternal sectors, and thus less they need not be centrally involved with the fiscal sector analysis and its links to\nthe real sector, which is the focus of the present CARTAC TA engagement.\n\nCollaboration Arrangements with Other Entities and any Additional TA needs\n\nIt was not established whether there are formal collaboration arrangements relating to data sharing\nbetween the independent (statutory basis) institutions that support EAD in compiling the macro-fiscal\nprojections and budget statement . This will be investigated and assessed as the project proceeds. The\nmission’s initial read is that collaboration seems effective. The MFP’s Revenue department is expected to join\nEAD colleagues in the TA engagement on revenue and expenditure forecasting, which will allow for knowledge\nsharing, and the mission will discuss whether forecast duplication between the Revenue and EA Departments is\nnecessary.\n\nFollowing the scoping mission, the Planning Office supplied a fuller set of results from their\nmacroeconomic forecast model, and there appears to exist a well-structured collaboration, with the\nStatistics Bureau providing the data and Planning Office the forecast. The key Capacity Development (CD) gap\nremains in revenue and expenditure forecasting—linking with macroeconomic and policy determinants. Some\nrefinement of in-year forecasting techniques (linking monthly outturns to annual projections) would also be\ndesirable.\n\nAdditional areas where counterparts raised needs for TA support:\n\n1. _VAT forecasting_ . VAT will replace a sales tax in 2023, and this is an area where the IMF’s FAD is best\nplaced to provide TA;\n\n2. Following the delivery of the MTFF, it would be desirable to _build capacity with a debt dynamics tool_ ,\nsuch as the IMF-ICD public debt dynamics tool (DDT)—this may be done jointly with the SDMO;\n\n3 This portal and apparatus were not the focus of the mission, and were not reviewed. However, the renewal of this FPWG and supporting\napparatus could be considered as an area for future TA support.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 7", "text_characters": 3068}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**3. Augmenting capacity to conduct** _**risk analyses**_ **has also been requested by the MFP, and would**\n**naturally follow once both an MTFF and DDT (and related capacity) has been developed.** Such tools would\nallow simulations quantifying responses to various stylised shocks (impact of shocks on fiscal variables). The\nmission notes that depending on the nature of the shocks to be considered, this could require augmentations to\nthe macroeconomic frameworks (Planning Office; Central Bank) that provide fiscal determinants. It appears that\ncapability for some modelling of shocks exists already within both the Central Bank and the Planning Office.\n\n\n**Overall Needs Assessment**\n\n\n**The scoping mission identified a relatively low baseline capacity regarding macro-fiscal forecasting and**\n**analysis, and thus a high need for training in this area, including the development of a new MTFF for**\n**revenue and expenditure forecasts.** Such a tool will be developed via a sustained TA engagement with\nCARTAC (following the action plan elaborated in section III), which will focus on providing training, and linking\nrevenue and expenditure projections to macroeconomic and policy determinants. Once completed,\nconsideration will be given to developing capacity (and a spreadsheet tool – the DDT) relating to public debt\ndynamics. Once developed, the MTFF and DDT can be used to support risk- and/or policy-scenario analyses,\nthough the latter is an area with the Planning Office and Central Bank are likely to have a comparative\nadvantage, having already some baseline capacity and tools in this area.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3. Augmenting capacity to conduct _risk analyses_ has also been requested by the MFP, and would\nnaturally follow once both an MTFF and DDT (and related capacity) has been developed. Such tools would\nallow simulations quantifying responses to various stylised shocks (impact of shocks on fiscal variables). The\nmission notes that depending on the nature of the shocks to be considered, this could require augmentations to\nthe macroeconomic frameworks (Planning Office; Central Bank) that provide fiscal determinants. It appears that\ncapability for some modelling of shocks exists already within both the Central Bank and the Planning Office.\n\nOverall Needs Assessment\n\nThe scoping mission identified a relatively low baseline capacity regarding macro-fiscal forecasting and\nanalysis, and thus a high need for training in this area, including the development of a new MTFF for\nrevenue and expenditure forecasts. Such a tool will be developed via a sustained TA engagement with\nCARTAC (following the action plan elaborated in section III), which will focus on providing training, and linking\nrevenue and expenditure projections to macroeconomic and policy determinants. Once completed,\nconsideration will be given to developing capacity (and a spreadsheet tool – the DDT) relating to public debt\ndynamics. Once developed, the MTFF and DDT can be used to support risk- and/or policy-scenario analyses,\nthough the latter is an area with the Planning Office and Central Bank are likely to have a comparative\nadvantage, having already some baseline capacity and tools in this area.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 8", "text_characters": 1350}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **III. Action Plan for TA Support**\n\n**Workplan, Tasks, and Next Steps**\n\n\n**Through a series of four missions, CARTAC proposes to develop two tools which will support macro-**\n**fiscal projections and analysis in Suriname** . Both will take the form of Excel-based spreadsheets. The first tool\n(medium-term macro-fiscal forecasting framework – MTFF) will link revenue and expenditure projections to\neconomic determinants. This will be ‘static’ (macro fiscal, without feedbacks). For revenues, the primary\ndeterminant will be changes in (proxy) tax bases (which are themselves closely linked to macroeconomic\nprojections) as well as known changes in tax policies. For expenditures, determinants may relate to the business\ncycle, or other factors (policy changes). Such a tool will allow for a thorough accounting of the role of policy\nchanges (tax rate or base changes) or other (one-off) factors, though these will rely primarily on the judgment of\ntool users.4 The TA engagement will go through the exercise of building up macro-fiscal projections jointly with\nEAD staff—including emphasizing the vital role played by judgment, and information from outside of the MTFF\n(including in the areas of future oil and gas sector development and fiscal revenues; changes in grants and\nelectricity subsidies; etc)—though ultimately it is beyond the scope of this TA engagement to perform detailed\n‘costings’ of changes in tax policy (e.g. a change in the level of exemption from personal income taxes).\n\n\nUsed properly, this MTFF will ensure that revenue and expenditure projections are transparent, and driven by\nplausible assumptions. The MF tool can also be used to assess the impact of ‘basic’ macroeconomic shocks\n(including those relating to natural disasters emanating from climate change) on the fiscal projections—essentially,\nrisk analyses. However, the size/nature of the shocks, and the projected path of the macroeconomy under such\nscenarios, should be informed by analysis conducted by the MFP’s Planning Office and/or the Central Bank, both\nof which are understood to have the necessary tools in place to conduct such shocks/scenarios for the\nmacroeconomy.\n\n\nOnce the MTFF has been completed and successfully adopted by the MFP’s EAD (expected to take 2-3 missions,\nwith a tentative expectation that it would fully support EAD forecasts starting in ~September, 2023), a second tool\nknown as the ‘Public Debt Dynamics Tool’ (DDT) will be further tailored to the Suriname economy. Already partly\ndeveloped as a result of past CARTAC/IMF training, this tool can be used to assess medium-term implications of\nmacroeconomic and fiscal shocks on Suriname’s debt trajectory, and inform fiscal-sustainability assessments.5\nFinal development and promoting usage of this tool would be expected to take 1-2 missions (beginning from\nSeptember 2023 onwards).\n\n\nFinally, MFP Counterparts have expressed a desire to: (i) build capacity on ‘bottom-up’ expenditure forecasting,\nand it is expected that any such capacity development project would be via engagements on the budget process,\nled by CARTAC’s Public Financial Management Advisors; and (ii) receive support on current-year revenue and\nexpenditure forecasting, based on high-frequency data. The latter request (ii) will be addressed via the presently\noutlined engagement on the MTFF tool.\n\n**Tasks:**\n\nA description of the project’s main actions (deliverables), and an associated timeline, is as follows:\n\n\nPre-scoping action (1): Compilation of relevant macroeconomic and fiscal data (MFP team). By early October,\n2022 [ _completed_ ]\n\n\n4 Capacity to generate projections of revenues associated with new taxes (e.g. VAT) or revenue streams (e.g. oil and gas) would be built\nthrough engagements with the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD). A workshop on VAT revenue analysis and forecasting is expected\nto be held by IMF-FAD with Suriname during 2023.\n\n5 Based upon the IMF Institute for Capacity Development’s template, a version of this tool was tailored to Suriname during a March 2022\nCARTAC/IMF-ICD course.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. Action Plan for TA Support\n\nWorkplan, Tasks, and Next Steps\n\nThrough a series of four missions, CARTAC proposes to develop two tools which will support macro-\nfiscal projections and analysis in Suriname . Both will take the form of Excel-based spreadsheets. The first tool\n(medium-term macro-fiscal forecasting framework – MTFF) will link revenue and expenditure projections to\neconomic determinants. This will be ‘static’ (macro fiscal, without feedbacks). For revenues, the primary\ndeterminant will be changes in (proxy) tax bases (which are themselves closely linked to macroeconomic\nprojections) as well as known changes in tax policies. For expenditures, determinants may relate to the business\ncycle, or other factors (policy changes). Such a tool will allow for a thorough accounting of the role of policy\nchanges (tax rate or base changes) or other (one-off) factors, though these will rely primarily on the judgment of\ntool users.4 The TA engagement will go through the exercise of building up macro-fiscal projections jointly with\nEAD staff—including emphasizing the vital role played by judgment, and information from outside of the MTFF\n(including in the areas of future oil and gas sector development and fiscal revenues; changes in grants and\nelectricity subsidies; etc)—though ultimately it is beyond the scope of this TA engagement to perform detailed\n‘costings’ of changes in tax policy (e.g. a change in the level of exemption from personal income taxes).\n\nUsed properly, this MTFF will ensure that revenue and expenditure projections are transparent, and driven by\nplausible assumptions. The MF tool can also be used to assess the impact of ‘basic’ macroeconomic shocks\n(including those relating to natural disasters emanating from climate change) on the fiscal projections—essentially,\nrisk analyses. However, the size/nature of the shocks, and the projected path of the macroeconomy under such\nscenarios, should be informed by analysis conducted by the MFP’s Planning Office and/or the Central Bank, both\nof which are understood to have the necessary tools in place to conduct such shocks/scenarios for the\nmacroeconomy.\n\nOnce the MTFF has been completed and successfully adopted by the MFP’s EAD (expected to take 2-3 missions,\nwith a tentative expectation that it would fully support EAD forecasts starting in ~September, 2023), a second tool\nknown as the ‘Public Debt Dynamics Tool’ (DDT) will be further tailored to the Suriname economy. Already partly\ndeveloped as a result of past CARTAC/IMF training, this tool can be used to assess medium-term implications of\nmacroeconomic and fiscal shocks on Suriname’s debt trajectory, and inform fiscal-sustainability assessments.5\nFinal development and promoting usage of this tool would be expected to take 1-2 missions (beginning from\nSeptember 2023 onwards).\n\nFinally, MFP Counterparts have expressed a desire to: (i) build capacity on ‘bottom-up’ expenditure forecasting,\nand it is expected that any such capacity development project would be via engagements on the budget process,\nled by CARTAC’s Public Financial Management Advisors; and (ii) receive support on current-year revenue and\nexpenditure forecasting, based on high-frequency data. The latter request (ii) will be addressed via the presently\noutlined engagement on the MTFF tool.\n\nTasks:\n\nA description of the project’s main actions (deliverables), and an associated timeline, is as follows:\n\nPre-scoping action (1): Compilation of relevant macroeconomic and fiscal data (MFP team). By early October,\n2022 [ _completed_ ]\n\n4 Capacity to generate projections of revenues associated with new taxes (e.g. VAT) or revenue streams (e.g. oil and gas) would be built\nthrough engagements with the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD). A workshop on VAT revenue analysis and forecasting is expected\nto be held by IMF-FAD with Suriname during 2023.\n\n5 Based upon the IMF Institute for Capacity Development’s template, a version of this tool was tailored to Suriname during a March 2022\nCARTAC/IMF-ICD course.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 9", "text_characters": 3435}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": " Revenue and expenditure components (monthly and annual frequencies), covering as much of the historical\n\nperiod as possible some follow ups will be needed, e.g. relating to direct revenues by mining and nonmining sectors\n\n\n Economic indicators (monthly and annual frequencies). These could include electricity generation and\n\nconsumption; imports; oil and gas production; industrial production; construction permits; real estate\ntransactions; etc scoping mission identified that a Monthly Activity Indicator is compiled and published by\nthe central bank;\n\n\n GDP, from both expenditure and production sides, in both real (constant-price) and nominal (current-price)\n\nterms. some follow ups will be needed, e.g. relating to expenditure-side GDP and projections\n\n\n CPI inflation, with breakdown by major components (monthly and annual)\n\n\n Interest and exchange rates (monthly and annual)\n\n**Pre-scoping action (2):** Identification of an MFP team (at least 3 persons) who will be dedicated to the tooldevelopment phase of the project (which could last up to 18 months). By early October, 2022. This has been\ncompleted, and a core team of 4 persons identified.\n\n**First mission (CARTAC scoping):** review existing macro-fiscal forecasting methodology, and comparison with\nbest practice. November 7-11, 2022 [ _completed_ ]. Mission objectives:\n\n\n Review existing macro-fiscal forecasting methodology and institutional framework\n\n\n More accurately understand the MFP’s baseline capacity, and development needs regarding macro-fiscal\n\nforecasting\n\n\n Meet with the MFP’s identified team (pre-mission (2), above) and understand their backgrounds and\n\nexperience with macro-fiscal analysis and forecasting\n\n\n Review and discuss data assembled, identifying any major gaps and issues these gaps may present (pre\nmission (1), above)\n\n\n Determine the gap between MFP’s current macro-fiscal projection and analysis methodology and best\n\npractice\n\n\n Provide initial training on macro-fiscal forecasting techniques (using economic indicators to inform near-term\n\nGDP projections; tax buoyancy, elasticity, and effective-tax-rate (ETR) approaches for revenue forecasting)\n\n\n Begin preliminary analysis of linkages between proxy tax bases and tax revenue headings, using Suriname’s\n\ndata\n\n**Second mission (macro-fiscal forecasting):** support construction of the excel-based tool. January 23-27, 2023.\nMission objectives:\n\n\n - The spreadsheet template has been assembled (by CARTAC), and shared with the MFP team ahead of the\nmission this will require follow ups pre-mission, between CARTAC and EAD Staff.\n\n\n - Training on GDP and tax/expenditure forecasting is conducted, for staff of the Economic Affairs Department\nand the Tax Department. Hands-on exercises with Suriname’s data will anchor the training\n\n\n - Data are organized into the MTFF spreadsheet (done jointly on mission)\n\n\n - Macroeconomic forecasts are expected to be taken from the Planning Office, and/or IMF team\n\n\n - Analysis is conducted to determine which proxy tax base(s) are most related (in the sense of providing the\nbest prediction) to each revenue heading\n\n\n - Decisions taken regarding preferred approach to forecasting revenues—tax buoyancy, elasticity, and\neffective-tax-rate (ETR) approaches will all be considered\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": " Revenue and expenditure components (monthly and annual frequencies), covering as much of the historical\n\nperiod as possible some follow ups will be needed, e.g. relating to direct revenues by mining and nonmining sectors\n\n Economic indicators (monthly and annual frequencies). These could include electricity generation and\n\nconsumption; imports; oil and gas production; industrial production; construction permits; real estate\ntransactions; etc scoping mission identified that a Monthly Activity Indicator is compiled and published by\nthe central bank;\n\n GDP, from both expenditure and production sides, in both real (constant-price) and nominal (current-price)\n\nterms. some follow ups will be needed, e.g. relating to expenditure-side GDP and projections\n\n CPI inflation, with breakdown by major components (monthly and annual)\n\n Interest and exchange rates (monthly and annual)\n\nPre-scoping action (2): Identification of an MFP team (at least 3 persons) who will be dedicated to the tooldevelopment phase of the project (which could last up to 18 months). By early October, 2022. This has been\ncompleted, and a core team of 4 persons identified.\n\nFirst mission (CARTAC scoping): review existing macro-fiscal forecasting methodology, and comparison with\nbest practice. November 7-11, 2022 [ _completed_ ]. Mission objectives:\n\n Review existing macro-fiscal forecasting methodology and institutional framework\n\n More accurately understand the MFP’s baseline capacity, and development needs regarding macro-fiscal\n\nforecasting\n\n Meet with the MFP’s identified team (pre-mission (2), above) and understand their backgrounds and\n\nexperience with macro-fiscal analysis and forecasting\n\n Review and discuss data assembled, identifying any major gaps and issues these gaps may present (pre\nmission (1), above)\n\n Determine the gap between MFP’s current macro-fiscal projection and analysis methodology and best\n\npractice\n\n Provide initial training on macro-fiscal forecasting techniques (using economic indicators to inform near-term\n\nGDP projections; tax buoyancy, elasticity, and effective-tax-rate (ETR) approaches for revenue forecasting)\n\n Begin preliminary analysis of linkages between proxy tax bases and tax revenue headings, using Suriname’s\n\ndata\n\nSecond mission (macro-fiscal forecasting): support construction of the excel-based tool. January 23-27, 2023.\nMission objectives:\n\n - The spreadsheet template has been assembled (by CARTAC), and shared with the MFP team ahead of the\nmission this will require follow ups pre-mission, between CARTAC and EAD Staff.\n\n - Training on GDP and tax/expenditure forecasting is conducted, for staff of the Economic Affairs Department\nand the Tax Department. Hands-on exercises with Suriname’s data will anchor the training\n\n - Data are organized into the MTFF spreadsheet (done jointly on mission)\n\n - Macroeconomic forecasts are expected to be taken from the Planning Office, and/or IMF team\n\n - Analysis is conducted to determine which proxy tax base(s) are most related (in the sense of providing the\nbest prediction) to each revenue heading\n\n - Decisions taken regarding preferred approach to forecasting revenues—tax buoyancy, elasticity, and\neffective-tax-rate (ETR) approaches will all be considered\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 10", "text_characters": 2790}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Decisions taken regarding the forecasting of each revenue heading—those which are unrelated to proxy tax\nbases will be projected using simple rules of thumb (past historical average growth, etc)\n\n\n - Hands-on work by MFP team to familiarize themselves with the tool, and conduct exercises to promote\nfamiliarity with the tool\n\n\n - Discuss techniques for current-year forecasting of revenues and expenditures\n\n\n - High-level discussions regarding VAT and oil-and-gas revenue forecasting will be held. The mission will\nemphasize the role played by these headings in the MTFF tool, highlighting substantial uncertainty\nsurrounding revenues from new economic activity streams (oil and gas) or taxes (VAT). In-depth TA would\nbe needed to help counterparts construct forecasts for both headings, with such support ideally being\nprovided by the IMF’s FAD (one such engagement is already prospectively planned).\n\n**Third mission: (macro-fiscal forecasting):** Conclude construction of the excel-based tool on macro-fiscal\nforecasting, and begin integrating it to support the April forecast process. Tentatively March/April 2023 (one week).\nMission objectives:\n\n\n - Ensure The Economic Affairs Department (EAD) team is comfortable will all aspects of the macro-fiscal\nforecasting tool, and demonstrates an ability to use it for generating fiscal projections\n\n\n - Conduct exercises (EAD-led) to ensure a sufficient level of staff familiarity and comfort with the tool\n\n\n - Perform any necessary adjustments to the MTFF tool\n\n\n - Use the tool to generate the April (budget) baseline forecasts for revenues and expenditures.\n\n\n - Continue discussions regarding current-year forecasting of revenue and expenditure data\n\n\n - Develop a timeline for the production/collection of key (data) inputs ahead of a forecast update. This would\nenhance liaising with other departments (e.g. Tax and Planning Offices) of the MFP, as well as other\ngovernment entities (e.g. Central Bank and Statistics Office).\n\n\n - Discuss a framework for thinking about tax revenue collections from future activity in the oil and gas sector\n\n**Fourth mission (macro-fiscal risk analysis):** Work to use the MTFF tool for simple risk analyses, and work to\ntailor the DDT, and widen staff understanding of the tool, including also staff from the SDMO. Tentatively\nJuly/August/September 2023. Mission objectives:\n\n\n - Provide background training, and review of the DDT (already partly tailored to Suriname by EAD staff),\nincluding liaison and support from debt office\n\n\n - Ensure EAD team is comfortable with all aspects of the DDT, and displays strong knowledge of how to use\nthe tool for risk analysis\n\n\n - Conduct exercises (EAD and SDMO-led) to ensure a sufficient level of staff familiarity and comfort with the\ntool\n\n\n - Discuss how these tools will be integrated into the policy process, especially as it relates to budgeting, and\nmedium-term fiscal planning documents (coordination with CARTAC’s Public Financial Management\nworkstream will be vital)\n\n\n**Risks**\n\n\n**There are several factors which could delay or disrupt the execution of the project, as it is envisaged in**\n**this action plan** . These include:\n\n**Staffing.** The smaller the number of EAD staff devoted to the project, the greater the risk that knowledge will be\nlost in the event of staff turnover (which is a reality in all institutions). For this reason, it is vital that at least 3 staff\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Decisions taken regarding the forecasting of each revenue heading—those which are unrelated to proxy tax\nbases will be projected using simple rules of thumb (past historical average growth, etc)\n\n - Hands-on work by MFP team to familiarize themselves with the tool, and conduct exercises to promote\nfamiliarity with the tool\n\n - Discuss techniques for current-year forecasting of revenues and expenditures\n\n - High-level discussions regarding VAT and oil-and-gas revenue forecasting will be held. The mission will\nemphasize the role played by these headings in the MTFF tool, highlighting substantial uncertainty\nsurrounding revenues from new economic activity streams (oil and gas) or taxes (VAT). In-depth TA would\nbe needed to help counterparts construct forecasts for both headings, with such support ideally being\nprovided by the IMF’s FAD (one such engagement is already prospectively planned).\n\nThird mission: (macro-fiscal forecasting): Conclude construction of the excel-based tool on macro-fiscal\nforecasting, and begin integrating it to support the April forecast process. Tentatively March/April 2023 (one week).\nMission objectives:\n\n - Ensure The Economic Affairs Department (EAD) team is comfortable will all aspects of the macro-fiscal\nforecasting tool, and demonstrates an ability to use it for generating fiscal projections\n\n - Conduct exercises (EAD-led) to ensure a sufficient level of staff familiarity and comfort with the tool\n\n - Perform any necessary adjustments to the MTFF tool\n\n - Use the tool to generate the April (budget) baseline forecasts for revenues and expenditures.\n\n - Continue discussions regarding current-year forecasting of revenue and expenditure data\n\n - Develop a timeline for the production/collection of key (data) inputs ahead of a forecast update. This would\nenhance liaising with other departments (e.g. Tax and Planning Offices) of the MFP, as well as other\ngovernment entities (e.g. Central Bank and Statistics Office).\n\n - Discuss a framework for thinking about tax revenue collections from future activity in the oil and gas sector\n\nFourth mission (macro-fiscal risk analysis): Work to use the MTFF tool for simple risk analyses, and work to\ntailor the DDT, and widen staff understanding of the tool, including also staff from the SDMO. Tentatively\nJuly/August/September 2023. Mission objectives:\n\n - Provide background training, and review of the DDT (already partly tailored to Suriname by EAD staff),\nincluding liaison and support from debt office\n\n - Ensure EAD team is comfortable with all aspects of the DDT, and displays strong knowledge of how to use\nthe tool for risk analysis\n\n - Conduct exercises (EAD and SDMO-led) to ensure a sufficient level of staff familiarity and comfort with the\ntool\n\n - Discuss how these tools will be integrated into the policy process, especially as it relates to budgeting, and\nmedium-term fiscal planning documents (coordination with CARTAC’s Public Financial Management\nworkstream will be vital)\n\nRisks\n\nThere are several factors which could delay or disrupt the execution of the project, as it is envisaged in\nthis action plan . These include:\n\nStaffing. The smaller the number of EAD staff devoted to the project, the greater the risk that knowledge will be\nlost in the event of staff turnover (which is a reality in all institutions). For this reason, it is vital that at least 3 staff\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 11", "text_characters": 2854}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-144-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "members (and ideally more) be fully involved with the project from its inception, and that EAD commits that these\nsame persons remain involved with the project for its duration. Based on the scoping mission, the baseline\ncapacity for forecasting of most EAD staff (those below management level) is judged to be quite limited—the tasks\nthey are responsible for on a regular basis are primarily related to data gathering, and historically they have not\nhad much role in forecasting. This implies a need to train staff on forecasting, which will only be feasible if these\nare fully engaged throughout the project. The scoping mission established that the revenue departments make\nboth in-year forecasts and medium-term projections for tax headings. However, these projections are based solely\non revenue data (e.g. past growth rates are not informed by economic determinants). It was agreed with MFP that\nit would be useful for revenue to be included in training on revenue forecasts, which may help mitigate against\ncapacity loss in the event of staff turnover.\n\n**Data.** Data limitations exist regarding the level of detail, quality, timeliness, and frequency of macroeconomic and\nfiscal data. One specific issue relates to the categorization of revenue data, with a large ‘residual’ component\nexisting in most years. Although data issues are unlikely to hamper the development of an MTFF tool, they will\nalmost certainly imply that the projections of the tool will be less accurate than what could be achieved given more\ntimely, detailed, and high-quality data.\n\n\nA preliminary investigation during the scoping mission suggests that empirical (predictive) relationships between\neconomic activity and fiscal revenues are ‘sensible’ in Suriname (positive relationship between GDP and\nrevenues, with an elasticity near unity), indicating that the MTFF will allow for a more accurate revenue forecast\nrelative to simple level or trend-based techniques—see Figures 1, 2 and 3 below. Post-mission work identified\nfurther improvements with the inclusion of the main corporation tax rate that included the post-covid ‘solidarity’ tax\nand using sub-sectors within GDP e.g. mining.\n\n\nHowever, not all revenue and expenditure heading projections will be equally accurate—this is a reality of any\nsuch tool in any country. Irrespective of the strength of predictive relationships, the MTFF will increase\ntransparency and consistency in macro-fiscal forecasting, not least because all judgment added to projections will\nbe documented and justified by MFP staff.\n\n\n_**Units**_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars;_ _**Source**_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 12\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2578, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(57.60007095336914, 420.24505615234375, 494.9500427246094, 705.9823608398438)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 999, "number": 6, "size": 190233, "transform": [437.3499755859375, 0.0, -0.0, 285.7373046875, 57.60007095336914, 420.24505615234375], "width": 1529, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "members (and ideally more) be fully involved with the project from its inception, and that EAD commits that these\nsame persons remain involved with the project for its duration. Based on the scoping mission, the baseline\ncapacity for forecasting of most EAD staff (those below management level) is judged to be quite limited—the tasks\nthey are responsible for on a regular basis are primarily related to data gathering, and historically they have not\nhad much role in forecasting. This implies a need to train staff on forecasting, which will only be feasible if these\nare fully engaged throughout the project. The scoping mission established that the revenue departments make\nboth in-year forecasts and medium-term projections for tax headings. However, these projections are based solely\non revenue data (e.g. past growth rates are not informed by economic determinants). It was agreed with MFP that\nit would be useful for revenue to be included in training on revenue forecasts, which may help mitigate against\ncapacity loss in the event of staff turnover.\n\nData. Data limitations exist regarding the level of detail, quality, timeliness, and frequency of macroeconomic and\nfiscal data. One specific issue relates to the categorization of revenue data, with a large ‘residual’ component\nexisting in most years. Although data issues are unlikely to hamper the development of an MTFF tool, they will\nalmost certainly imply that the projections of the tool will be less accurate than what could be achieved given more\ntimely, detailed, and high-quality data.\n\nA preliminary investigation during the scoping mission suggests that empirical (predictive) relationships between\neconomic activity and fiscal revenues are ‘sensible’ in Suriname (positive relationship between GDP and\nrevenues, with an elasticity near unity), indicating that the MTFF will allow for a more accurate revenue forecast\nrelative to simple level or trend-based techniques—see Figures 1, 2 and 3 below. Post-mission work identified\nfurther improvements with the inclusion of the main corporation tax rate that included the post-covid ‘solidarity’ tax\nand using sub-sectors within GDP e.g. mining.\n\nHowever, not all revenue and expenditure heading projections will be equally accurate—this is a reality of any\nsuch tool in any country. Irrespective of the strength of predictive relationships, the MTFF will increase\ntransparency and consistency in macro-fiscal forecasting, not least because all judgment added to projections will\nbe documented and justified by MFP staff.\n\n_Units_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars;_ _Source_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 12", "text_characters": 2263}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-144-fig-p0016-001"], "markdown": "\n\n_**Units**_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars;_ _**Source**_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_\n\n\n\n\n\n|Figure 3: Summary of Forecast Errors for 2014-21 - see footnote on method.|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n||||||\n|||Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts|Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts|Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts|\n|||
Tax growth|
GDP growth|
Regression|\n||||||\n|Individual Income tax:|Individual Income tax:||||\n||
Mean Absolute Error, cash|+/- 352|+/- 263|+/- 131|\n||
Mean Absolute Error, %|
+/- 23%|
+/- 21%|
+/- 12%|\n||||||\n|Corporate Income tax:|Corporate Income tax:||||\n||
Mean Absolute Error, cash|+/- 798|+/- 611|+/- 379|\n||
Mean Absolute Error, %|
+/- 58%|
+/- 46%|
+/- 38%|\n||||||\n||||||\n|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2|\n\n\n_**Units**_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars (cash);_ _**Source**_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_\n\n**Competing priorities** . Suriname is engaged in an IMF program, and MFP staff (particularly more senior staff)\nmust carry a large workload, with regular monitoring of revenue and expenditure reports, and weekly/monthly\nreporting of same. Being able to dedicate time to building capacity and developing tools will be a major challenge,\nfor senior staff especially. It is imperative that the management team protects staff time, allowing them to invest\nfully in developing and learning the MF and DDT tools which the project aims to build.\n\n\nLanguage. Dutch is the working language of the MFP, with most documents produced in Dutch (though some are\nalso released in parallel in English). Although many staff are fluent in English, the necessity to translate documents\n(including data labels in tables and spreadsheets) into English for the benefit of the CARTAC CD team could\nmarginally slow the delivery of TA.\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.2633, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(57.60007095336914, 57.60009765625, 499.5500183105469, 346.3427429199219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 999, "number": 8, "size": 201054, "transform": [441.949951171875, 0.0, -0.0, 288.7426452636719, 57.60007095336914, 57.60009765625], "width": 1529, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.70184326171875, 396.36517333984375, 439.2322082519531, 589.00439453125], "columns": 5, "rows": 15}], "text": "_Units_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars;_ _Source_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_\n\n Figure 3: Summary of Forecast Errors for 2014-21 - see footnote on method. Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 \n\n \n Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts Forecast models for year ahead tax receipts \n Tax growth GDP growth Regression \n \n Individual Income tax: Individual Income tax: \n Mean Absolute Error, cash +/- 352 +/- 263 +/- 131 \n Mean Absolute Error, % +/- 23% +/- 21% +/- 12% \n \n Corporate Income tax: Corporate Income tax: \n Mean Absolute Error, cash +/- 798 +/- 611 +/- 379 \n Mean Absolute Error, % +/- 58% +/- 46% +/- 38% \n \n \n Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2 Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2 Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2 Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2 Note: Average (mean) error of +10 and -10 is zero but average absolute error is 10 = (10+10)/2 \n\n_Units_ _: Millions of Suriname dollars (cash);_ _Source_ _: Mission team calculations and Suriname MFP tax data_\n\nCompeting priorities . Suriname is engaged in an IMF program, and MFP staff (particularly more senior staff)\nmust carry a large workload, with regular monitoring of revenue and expenditure reports, and weekly/monthly\nreporting of same. Being able to dedicate time to building capacity and developing tools will be a major challenge,\nfor senior staff especially. It is imperative that the management team protects staff time, allowing them to invest\nfully in developing and learning the MF and DDT tools which the project aims to build.\n\nLanguage. Dutch is the working language of the MFP, with most documents produced in Dutch (though some are\nalso released in parallel in English). Although many staff are fluent in English, the necessity to translate documents\n(including data labels in tables and spreadsheets) into English for the benefit of the CARTAC CD team could\nmarginally slow the delivery of TA.\n\nIMF CARTAC Country 13", "text_characters": 1801}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **Appendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)**\n\nThis logical framework (logframe) sets out the: (i) objectives; (ii) outcome indicators; and (iii) milestones which\nwill be used to track progress throughout the project. An objective is what the project ultimately aims to achieve,\nand outcome indicators and milestones are measurable guideposts which are set out to track the progress of\nthe project towards achievement of its objective. The logframe allows for an accounting of the project’s\nprogress, including areas where additional focus may be needed as the project progresses, and is the core\nelement of the IMF and CARTAC’s results-based management (RBM) framework. RBM plays an important role\nin the institution’s governance process, including accountability of usage of development partner funding.\n\n\n**ANNEX 1:** **RESULTS FRAMEWORK**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Objective:
Stronger analytical skills and better macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis at the Ministry / central bank / or other governmental agency(ies) feeds into the economic
policymaking process - ANS|Col2|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|**Outcome:**
**Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking**
|\n|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|\n|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**
|\n|**Outcome Indicator**
|**Baseline Value**
|**Target Value**
|**Current Assessment**
**Value**|\n|Number of staff have successfully completed agreed training offered via various
delivery modalities
|Staff not trained in macro-fiscal
forecasting
|At least 4 Economic Affairs
Department (MoF) staff members
trained in basic macro-fiscal
forecasting techniques
||\n|A stable core group of relevant staff, tasked with spearheading capacity
development in macroeconomic policy analysis & forecasting at the institution, & a
group coordinator, is functional (including a macroeconomic or fiscal policy unit at
MoF)
|No core group exists
|A core group of EAD staff has been
put in place, and is actively involved
with receiving and implementing TA
support
||\n|Key staff of the core group demonstrates capability to independently operate the
tools developed as part of capacity building in macroeconomic policy analysis and
forecasting
|No tool exists
|Tool has been developed and staff
demonstrate capacity to utilize for
medium-term macro-fiscal
forecasting
||\n|**Milestone Name**
|**Target Completion Date**
|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**|**Milestone Rating**|\n|Core group within EAD has been identified as is actively involved in receiving TA
|2/25/2022
|||\n|Training in macro-fiscal forecasting has been received, with absorption of basic
techniques demonstrated through hands-on exercises
|2/25/2022
|||\n|Core team demonstrates ability to utilize the MTFF which will be developed jointly
with the Suriname's EAD
|9/30/2022|||\n|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|**Outcome:**
**Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates)**
|\n|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|**Annual Assessment Rating:**
|\n|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|**Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022**|\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.82499694824219, 254.0392608642578, 566.6550903320312, 739.1997680664062], "columns": 4, "rows": 15}], "text": "Appendix: Project Logical Framework (LogFrame)\n\nThis logical framework (logframe) sets out the: (i) objectives; (ii) outcome indicators; and (iii) milestones which\nwill be used to track progress throughout the project. An objective is what the project ultimately aims to achieve,\nand outcome indicators and milestones are measurable guideposts which are set out to track the progress of\nthe project towards achievement of its objective. The logframe allows for an accounting of the project’s\nprogress, including areas where additional focus may be needed as the project progresses, and is the core\nelement of the IMF and CARTAC’s results-based management (RBM) framework. RBM plays an important role\nin the institution’s governance process, including accountability of usage of development partner funding.\n\nANNEX 1: RESULTS FRAMEWORK\n\n Objective: Stronger analytical skills and better macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis at the Ministry / central bank / or other governmental agency(ies) feeds into the economic policymaking process - ANS Col2 Col3 Col4 \n\n Outcome: Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking Outcome: Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking Outcome: Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking Outcome: Strong institutional structures for macroeconomic policymaking \n Annual Assessment Rating: Annual Assessment Rating: Annual Assessment Rating: Annual Assessment Rating: \n Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 \n Outcome Indicator Baseline Value Target Value Current Assessment Value \n Number of staff have successfully completed agreed training offered via various delivery modalities Staff not trained in macro-fiscal forecasting At least 4 Economic Affairs Department (MoF) staff members trained in basic macro-fiscal forecasting techniques \n A stable core group of relevant staff, tasked with spearheading capacity development in macroeconomic policy analysis & forecasting at the institution, & a group coordinator, is functional (including a macroeconomic or fiscal policy unit at MoF) No core group exists A core group of EAD staff has been put in place, and is actively involved with receiving and implementing TA support \n Key staff of the core group demonstrates capability to independently operate the tools developed as part of capacity building in macroeconomic policy analysis and forecasting No tool exists Tool has been developed and staff demonstrate capacity to utilize for medium-term macro-fiscal forecasting \n Milestone Name Target Completion Date Milestone Actual Completion Date Milestone Rating \n Core group within EAD has been identified as is actively involved in receiving TA 2/25/2022 \n Training in macro-fiscal forecasting has been received, with absorption of basic techniques demonstrated through hands-on exercises 2/25/2022 \n Core team demonstrates ability to utilize the MTFF which will be developed jointly with the Suriname's EAD 9/30/2022 \n Outcome: Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates) Outcome: Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates) Outcome: Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates) Outcome: Sound medium-term macroeconomic framework (inclusive of GDP and inflation, commodity prices, the external and monetary sectors, and fiscal aggregates) \n Annual Assessment Rating: Annual Assessment Rating: Annual Assessment Rating: Annual Assessment Rating: \n Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 12/7/2022 \n\nIMF CARTAC Country 14", "text_characters": 3386}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Outcome Indicator|Baseline Value|Target Value|Col4|Current Assessment
Value|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|An MPT tool has been developed in the form of: A basic (Excel) framework for
forecasting and policy analysis, respecting accounting relationships (Pillar 1)
|The existing MTFF has no
macro-fiscal linkages
|MTFF developed, with macro-fiscal
linkages (including policy changes)
and transparent usage of judgment
and
|MTFF developed, with macro-fiscal
linkages (including policy changes)
and transparent usage of judgment
and
||\n|**Milestone Name**
|**Target Completion Date**
|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**|**Milestone Rating**|\n|MTFF has been developed, with linkages between fiscal and macro projections and
transparent incorporation of policy changes and/or judgment
|9/30/2022||||\n|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|**Outcome:**
**Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement**
|\n|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|**Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved**
|\n|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|**Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022**
|\n|**Outcome Indicator**
|**Baseline Value**
|**Target Value**
|**Current Assessment**
**Value**
|**Current Assessment**
**Value**
|\n|Diagnostic/scoping produced an overview of existing (baseline) capacities and
opportunities for improvement supported by an action plan and desired CD
outcomes.
|No understanding of how
baseline capacities compare to
best practice
|Authorities understand what is
needed to bring macro-fiscal
forecasting and analytical capacity in
line with best practice
|Completed as of
11/10/2022
|Completed as of
11/10/2022
|\n|**Milestone Name**
|**Target Completion Date**
|**Milestone Actual Completion Date**
|**Milestone Rating**
|**Milestone Rating**
|\n|Scoping discussions have revealed areas for CARTAC TA support
|11/30/2022
|11/10/2022
|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022
|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022
|\n|An action plan has been developed, focusing on CARTAC TA support to develop
macro-fiscal forecasting and analytical capacity.|1/31/2023|11/10/2022|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022|4 Fully Achieved as of
11/10/2022|\n\n\n\nIMF | CARTAC Country | 15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-144", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [57.821537017822266, 57.792030334472656, 566.363037109375, 437.3279724121094], "columns": 5, "rows": 12}], "text": "Outcome Indicator Baseline Value Target Value Col4 Current Assessment Value \n\n An MPT tool has been developed in the form of: A basic (Excel) framework for forecasting and policy analysis, respecting accounting relationships (Pillar 1) The existing MTFF has no macro-fiscal linkages MTFF developed, with macro-fiscal linkages (including policy changes) and transparent usage of judgment and MTFF developed, with macro-fiscal linkages (including policy changes) and transparent usage of judgment and \n Milestone Name Target Completion Date Milestone Actual Completion Date Milestone Actual Completion Date Milestone Rating \n MTFF has been developed, with linkages between fiscal and macro projections and transparent incorporation of policy changes and/or judgment 9/30/2022 \n Outcome: Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement Outcome: Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement Outcome: Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement Outcome: Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement Outcome: Authorities have a baseline understanding of their existing forecasting and analytical capabilities and opportunities for improvement \n Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved Annual Assessment Rating: 4 Fully Achieved \n Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022 Outcome Rating Date: 11/10/2022 \n Outcome Indicator Baseline Value Target Value Current Assessment Value Current Assessment Value \n Diagnostic/scoping produced an overview of existing (baseline) capacities and opportunities for improvement supported by an action plan and desired CD outcomes. No understanding of how baseline capacities compare to best practice Authorities understand what is needed to bring macro-fiscal forecasting and analytical capacity in line with best practice Completed as of 11/10/2022 Completed as of 11/10/2022 \n Milestone Name Target Completion Date Milestone Actual Completion Date Milestone Rating Milestone Rating \n Scoping discussions have revealed areas for CARTAC TA support 11/30/2022 11/10/2022 4 Fully Achieved as of 11/10/2022 4 Fully Achieved as of 11/10/2022 \n An action plan has been developed, focusing on CARTAC TA support to develop macro-fiscal forecasting and analytical capacity. 1/31/2023 11/10/2022 4 Fully Achieved as of 11/10/2022 4 Fully Achieved as of 11/10/2022 \n\nIMF CARTAC Country 15", "text_characters": 2475}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..30a3aa56e1e289efa80817ab8fc568e7e057b4ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7965f4ab7a295db95a141800096c67869d28d10c747c776ccf227b84530d8a89
+size 147443
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..56d5ec15d29f8f37f5e5e3de41282962afeff347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0d1ecfb643306026e936d97f086151f6f369c98dd4fb125e38d7bc54dac18696
+size 2497
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0012-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0012-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cf91e858a72253c0b40a4ab62db53b6c10918d4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0012-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d5e68b928704bd0a0c1ab84c003884ad4a111d5b44037ba33539f16505016d41
+size 66981
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..21424f457a69e79dd39f6cac6a98070f3532a868
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f495126d0892ac031c2866e7edf55e1f762d05176fd3cd232103d064e1a31be7
+size 17612
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38f9db2dbf055918ff6079667d2731bc6016abe4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6378ad537ce7e481b790834d93e1660252320d50242e36a6d65487ee8cefccb0
+size 66049
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8700aa8513a72d459be2dbcdec43b939112646d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:829298cea96beef97408c6ebd1c2d5d4a427ffcba50ec01a97a2a7c4dd0712cb
+size 40516
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff6241d1ce340d401dafb6d996aca89431d10e08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:9cf5ff9c8a0ba8443c4cb3954eba7a028ac99a8954c483d5ec76d8073dd71957
+size 96915
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5cda388331f3291c8b81b90d3fae2b6e76435f07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:23105cb607d2376f773acb7ec9ab3a4fd46447a98d08041977c733b438664939
+size 53480
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0024-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0024-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..47f5c5d5c8e34b04fd533d4f8dfe56700a46aae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0024-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5fef25b2b040d43e05192ff82dfe01fcc58a7a1ae82af60f40cde844d405a5e9
+size 31931
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d09d1fb88f5542c34d399e29d57cc93604a9ec2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:00ee573627838d104673d728018dc2ec9443f8cac9259a26663421dfde13fc43
+size 17774
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4317d554832bf1d4a484dc4986887ef0c900ea78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:780b3cdde33a37b04591a13ede20b099b10eb9208f3d108c345fbb662fdecaab
+size 65592
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0041-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0041-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4edc80ff18b46ca23f541144d6213575bf4d2c37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0041-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e1669ed0a76fe6e9fa96c0822519014faf570a5794ec04225be0fb115f2f4af1
+size 26325
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a371c5c720f30ed5ad29932bd8bee83520cec0fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:551f6641a67e4f4a22e49963155f6b44ed508bcc1af0ccb0353429b95cf3e82c
+size 22978
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8750202d31e028800b9cd22da1df48445bc2512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ca33ed6933cd2fff8c357e7c9e867d1b0586fa3bfc8f659e0784e103a24e1989
+size 47179
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..03b43316e408145649f36e10271ce13755f9a805
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6678fd20b748d832994632af2440d014fe2ed021f2bc3866a60a96f54d17339e
+size 110102
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0043-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0043-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..850a5d38a7c2e899ea0d95d2ae46eb1fe03b1f80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0043-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6d6a37e509ccb0a4ee8d9c8049eca731536ff675bd26a5a74e300c6a7a349543
+size 228017
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0072-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0072-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6d08d627dd40701f0aa79f6e811761840100e058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0072-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6e82ae1f6830ba5aeed77eff26205d10bd7b25d48e72b51f5c8f873b36f5b7de
+size 25742
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8ee40303cfb1bf343118264472aa0117e558a265
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e4242e02d5a87a1e83d2b5e8404b77c90c7e7111467210ce438b653f8f04f1cd
+size 13304
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76f2d7024aa7c4f8556b2965bb816566e17d1ad7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2b6b532e149afe945b50ac61f5ab87d4731332ff5e26f52efcfbd4ee8d2bc867
+size 12504
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6e813115ea1d095b882e307a69fab5a3ea1d254f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-145",
+ "title": "Guatemala: Technical Assistance Report-International Taxation Challenges and Options",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-145.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "8a8bb2afbd53a38069975b3260753261b28da661c4f796ebbd04b9e8f3cd46bc",
+ "source_bytes": 882606,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/04/24/guatemala-technical-assistance-report-international-taxation-challenges-and-options-532733",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:15+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 23.88,
+ "page_count": 73,
+ "text_characters": 192385,
+ "table_count": 1,
+ "figure_count": 20,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "GUATEMALA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-INTERNATIONAL TAXATION CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "PREFACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "I. INTRODUCTION"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 12,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "II. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 19,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME TAX LAW (LISR)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 27,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "IV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 38,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "V. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 44,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "VI. TRANSFER PRICES"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 58,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "VII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL TAX ARCHITECTURE"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 70,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "REFERENCES"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Guatemala: Technical Assistance Report-International Taxation Challenges and Options; IMF Country Report No. 23/145; April 2022. ",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "Foreign-direct investment; double-taxation avoidance treaties; transfer-pricing; base erosion and profit-shifting. \r\n",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230413171643-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230424154605-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d228714e3d32234b8be16c9981b03d610b52269c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3883 @@
+
+
+
+
+April 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/145**
+### **GUATEMALA**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-INTERNATIONAL** **TAXATION CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance Report on Guatemala was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed in April 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ______________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+
+**PREFACE____________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________________________ 7**
+
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION ________________________________________________________________________________ 11**
+
+
+**II. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE ___________________________________________________________________ 12**
+
+Total Tax Revenue Compared___________________________________________________________________ 12
+Tax Revenue Composition ______________________________________________________________________ 13
+Special Regimes _________________________________________________________________________________ 15
+
+Tax Expenditure _________________________________________________________________________________ 16
+
+
+**III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME TAX LAW (LISR) _____________________________ 19**
+
+Territorial Regime Versus Global Income _______________________________________________________ 19
+Definition of Source _____________________________________________________________________________ 20
+Definition of Residence _________________________________________________________________________ 22
+
+Definition of Permanent Establishment _________________________________________________________ 23
+Withholding Rates on the Income of Non-Residents ___________________________________________ 24
+Deductions ______________________________________________________________________________________ 25
+
+
+**IV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA __________________________________________________________ 27**
+
+Introduction _____________________________________________________________________________________ 27
+Treaty Benefits and Drawbacks _________________________________________________________________ 27
+Precautions Ahead of Treaty Negotiation ______________________________________________________ 29
+
+Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation _____________________________________ 29
+Power to Tax Certain Income Under Treaties ___________________________________________________ 30
+Arbitration (Article 25)___________________________________________________________________________ 35
+
+Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (Article 29) ______________________________________________________ 36
+Non-Discrimination (Article 24) _________________________________________________________________ 36
+
+
+**V. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT _____________________________________________ 38**
+
+Foreign Direct Investment in Guatemala _______________________________________________________ 38
+Key FDI Determinants ___________________________________________________________________________ 38
+Double-Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment ______________________________________ 39
+
+Empirical Evidence ______________________________________________________________________________ 39
+
+
+**VI. TRANSFER PRICES ____________________________________________________________________________ 44**
+
+The Arm’s Length Principle _____________________________________________________________________ 44
+Burden of Proof _________________________________________________________________________________ 44
+Scope of the Transfer Pricing Regime __________________________________________________________ 45
+
+Definition and Presumption of Related Parties _________________________________________________ 46
+Methods _________________________________________________________________________________________ 48
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+Rules for Specific Transactions __________________________________________________________________ 49
+
+Documentation _________________________________________________________________________________ 55
+
+
+
+**VII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL**
+**TAX ARCHITECTURE ______________________________________________________________________________ 58**
+
+
+
+Introduction _____________________________________________________________________________________ 58
+Action 5: Combating Harmful Tax Practices ____________________________________________________ 59
+BEPS Minimum Standards and Treaties (Actions 6 and 14) _____________________________________ 62
+
+
+
+Transfer Pricing Documentation: Country-by-Country Reporting (Action 13) _________________ 65
+New Changes to the International Tax System __________________________________________________ 66
+
+**BOXES**
+1. Preliminary Estimates of the Effect of the TADT with Mexico ___________________________________ 43
+2. Preferential Regimes That Could Be Harmful ___________________________________________________ 61
+
+**FIGURES**
+1. General Government Revenue __________________________________________________________________ 12
+2. Tax Revenue Buoyancy __________________________________________________________________________ 12
+3. Tax Revenue Including Social Security, 2019 ____________________________________________________ 13
+4. Tax Revenue Composition, 2019 ________________________________________________________________ 13
+5. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America _____________________________________________________ 38
+6. Correlation between the Number of TADTs and FDI in Latin America __________________________ 42
+7. FDI in Latin American, by Investing Country ____________________________________________________ 42
+
+**TABLES**
+1. Tax Collection in Low-Income Latin American Countries, 2019 _________________________________ 13
+2. Income Tax Collection (Natural Persons) in Low-Income Latin American Countries, 2019 _____ 13
+3. Corporate Income Tax___________________________________________________________________________ 15
+4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020 ______________________________________ 17
+5. Withholding Rate on Income Earned by Foreign Residents ____________________________________ 24
+6. FDI Stock ________________________________________________________________________________________ 38
+7. Number of Treaties for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, 2021 ______________________________ 41
+
+**REFERENCES ______________________________________________________________________________________ 70**
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+##### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**
+
+BEPS Base erosion and profit shifting
+
+
+CbC Country-by-country report
+
+
+CDIS Coordinated Direct Investment Survey
+
+
+EUR Euro
+
+
+FAD Fiscal Affairs Department
+
+
+FDI Foreign direct investment
+
+
+FHTP Forum on Harmful Tax Practices
+
+
+GDP Gross domestic product
+
+
+GLoBE Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal
+
+
+IIR Income inclusion rule
+
+
+IMF International Monetary Fund
+
+
+ISR Income tax
+
+
+LOB Limitation of benefits
+
+
+MAP Mutual Agreement Procedure
+
+
+MLA Multilateral Agreement
+
+
+MNE Multinational enterprise
+
+
+OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
+
+
+PPT Principal purpose test
+
+
+SAT Superintendency of Tax Administration
+
+
+STTR Subject to tax rule
+
+
+TADT Treaty for the avoidance of double taxation
+
+
+UN United Nations
+
+
+UTPR Undertaxed payments rule
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+##### **PREFACE**
+
+In response to a request by the Ministry of Public Finance (MFP) of Guatemala, a remote
+technical assistance mission was carried out by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the
+International Monetary Fund (IMF) from March 7 to 21, 2022, to analyze certain international
+aspects of the country’s tax regime. Discussions focused on the policy regarding treaties for the
+avoidance of double taxation and their effectiveness in attracting foreign direct investment,
+transfer pricing regulations, and the implications for Guatemala of the minimum standards
+agreed by the tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project backed by the G20 and the
+Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The mission comprised
+Roberto Schatan (FAD and head of mission), Carolina Osorio (FAD), and Armando Lara and Jose
+Madariaga (external advisors).
+
+
+The mission met with the Vice-Minister of Public Finance, Mr. Saul Figueroa, and held multiple
+meetings with MFP technical teams led by Juan Blas and Jorge Lope, Director and Deputy
+Director, respectively, of Tax Policy and Analysis. Various meetings were also attended by officials
+from different areas of the Tax Administration Superintendency (SAT), headed by Alex Gonzalez,
+Chief of the Inspection Unit, and Emilio Pacay, Assistant to the Intendant. The mission also met
+with Vice-Minister of Economy Lisandro Bolaños from the Ministry of Economy and Trade. Lastly,
+the mission met with directors of business associations, AmCham Guatemala, the Coffee
+Exporters Association ( _Asociación de Exportadores de Café_ - ADEC), and the Apparel and Textile
+Association of Guatemala ( _Asociación de la Industria del Vestuario y Textiles de Guatemala_ Vestex) as well as with executives of research institutions, ICEFI, and FUNDESA and with EY and
+PwC tax specialists.
+
+
+The mission is grateful to all the authorities for their extensive and kind cooperation and for the
+efficient support provided by the IMF representative office and especially to Carol Cruz
+Alavarado for the assistance in preparing the mission agenda.
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+##### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+**This report discusses three topics central to international taxation in Guatemala:** (i) the
+factors that the government must consider to establish a position on treaties for the avoidance
+of double taxation; (ii) the strengthening of the transfer pricing regime; and (iii) the potential
+effects that BEPS minimum standards might have on Guatemala and the likely changes in
+international tax architecture recently agreed upon by the community of countries under the
+OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework.
+
+
+**Treaties**
+
+
+**The topic of treaties has garnered special attention in Guatemala as of late**, requiring a
+strategy to be devised. Guatemala does not have treaties in force, despite signing one with
+Mexico in 2015 that it has not ratified. The decision that the Government of Guatemala must
+make is whether to promote the ratification of the treaty with Mexico and open the door to the
+negotiation of others. Treaties certainly have advantages, the main one being, in principle, the
+encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the contracting countries. However,
+treaties also entail costs because they typically reduce income source taxing powers, which has a
+particular impact on net capital importers such as Guatemala. The decision must ultimately
+respond to the treaty cost-benefit balance, and this partly depends on how and with whom they
+are negotiated and on the tax context within which they fall.
+
+
+**The Guatemalan context is of no help.** First, tax collection is low, one of the lowest in Latin
+America, leaving very little room for additional tax sacrifices. The general tax regime for income
+from lucrative activities, including the simplified option based on gross income, is already
+competitive internationally. Second, the country offers considerable investment incentives, such
+as free-trade zones and the maquila regime, whose benefits are not clearly quantified, while
+reporting potentially understated tax expenditure.
+
+
+**To their credit, treaties foster a better business climate** and can encourage FDI in sectors
+other than those already benefiting from special regimes. This would be welcome in Guatemala
+because its FDI quota is low, even for the Central American region. Treaties can also promote the
+expansion of certain businesses operating from Guatemala, especially export services, which can
+currently be subject to double taxation.
+
+
+**Nevertheless, the many empirical studies that have been conducted offer no conclusive**
+**results** . The economic literature could not confirm a meaningful causal relationship between
+signed treaties and FDI, particularly for developing countries. The same applies to studies on
+Latin America.
+
+
+**A preliminary study estimates that the entry into force of the treaty with Mexico will have**
+**a positive effect.** However, the results must be interpreted with caution: (i) FDI data are not the
+most reliable; (ii) the experience of other countries that signed treaties with Mexico, used as a
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+basis for modeling this exercise, are not necessarily comparable; (iii) the periods before or after
+the treaty are very short for enacting change in the investment growth trend; and (iv) the
+investment level is virtually nil at the beginning, which is why very small amounts of capital can
+represent a very high but analytically irrelevant percentage increase. The effect that the treaty
+could have on foreign investment can therefore be severely overestimated.
+
+
+**The literature points out that a key variable behind FDI flows is the countries’ institutional**
+**stability and health.** Guatemala ranks poorly in that regard on an international scale, which
+indicates that much remains to be done. To be successful, Guatemala may need to rethink its tax
+system to increase collection significantly, thus improving its institutions, infrastructure, and
+social spending. Treaties, which have a higher legal hierarchy than domestic legislation, can limit
+flexibility for a potential future tax reform. The decision to enter treaties should therefore be
+made in the context of a broader tax strategy.
+
+
+**At present, to enter into treaties, Guatemala requires the development of an own model**
+that protects the right to tax income at source and to sign treaties with countries where a
+potential double-taxation problem might inhibit a likely flow of investment. Countries that have
+no income tax or even those that have territorial systems, such as Guatemala, with reduced
+withholding rates would be excluded.
+
+
+**The report explains the main differences between the OECD and UN model treaties** and
+recommends that Guatemala use the UN model as its primary reference, which favors tax on the
+source of income. It is important for Guatemala to maintain the right to tax the payment of
+royalties to residents abroad and for the concept of royalty to include software use, specialized
+technical services, and equipment and machinery leasing. Various payments made abroad with a
+source in the paying country (royalties, dividends, and interest) normally have a limited definition
+in the treaty. For this reason, reference must be made to the definition of dividend and interest in
+domestic legislation. Legislation must support treaties with broad definitions. For example, the
+definition of interest must include financial operations derived from debt. For royalties, some
+concepts must be added in the treaty itself. Treaties must also include taxation at source for
+“other income” paid to residents of the other contracting state that is not business profit, since
+such profits are usually taxed only in the country of residence.
+
+
+**The treaty signed with Mexico basically follows the guidelines recommended in this report**
+and is therefore very close to the model that Guatemala could adopt for its future negotiations
+should it opt to enter into treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. The treaty with Mexico
+also excludes an arbitration clause, which is the position that most developing countries have
+preferred. However, this treaty does not include the anti-abuse measures agreed in BEPS
+Actions 6 and 7 on treaty shopping and the circumvention of the concept of permanent
+establishment. This is why the treaty with Mexico should not be ratified under the current terms.
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+**Domestic Legislation**
+
+
+**Taxing power borders are defined, first and foremost, in domestic legislation.** The
+definitions of source, residence, and permanent establishment, among other concepts, are key in
+that respect. The report examines some of these definitions, focusing on those issues that could
+potentially lead to double taxation or, conversely, weaken the country’s tax base.
+
+
+**One important consideration is that Guatemala has a tax regime that is (almost) strictly**
+**territorial in nature;** by definition, this regime exempts all income that resident persons earn
+abroad. This not only reduces the tax base that Guatemala can claim, but also potentially gives
+rise to an equity issue since higher earners will be those with access to this exemption. Moreover,
+personal income tax rates in Guatemala are very low, which could largely explain why Guatemala
+has the lowest collection of this tax in the region at less than half a percentage point of GDP.
+Extending the tax to foreign passive income of resident persons in the country and granting the
+corresponding credit for taxes paid abroad is a policy option that Guatemala could reconsider.
+With such an approach, a treaty would offer a more practical solution.
+
+
+**The legislation is cautious in defining source with regard to services provided by residents**
+**abroad** since taxes are charged only when these services are used in Guatemala. Many countries
+charge taxes when the paying source is in the country, avoiding interpretation issues as to the
+place of use of the service. In such cases, potential double taxation would be resolved with a
+treaty. Other aspects of the legislation that could be modified to align with potential treaties are:
+(i) excluding activities of a purely preparatory or auxiliary nature as assumptions of permanent
+establishment; (ii) regulating the implementation of tax on indirect disposals of assets located in
+Guatemala; and (iii) eliminating the full exemption on interest paid to financial sector entities
+abroad (even when the tax incidence falls mainly to domestic debtors).
+
+
+**Transfer Prices**
+
+
+**The regulation on transfer prices needs to be modernized** . Treaties facilitate transfer pricing
+control because they allow the counterparty to change its prices in response to an adjustment by
+a taxpayer in Guatemala, thus avoiding double taxation. Many countries would not accept the
+adjustment from a country without a treaty. Taxpayers will be more willing to self-correct if the
+tax is shifted from one jurisdiction to another without increasing the overall corporate tax
+burden. However, for this mechanism to work, the legislation must prevent the SAT from only
+authorizing price adjustments if they are in favor of the Treasury.
+
+
+**The scope of the regulation must be widened.** The obligation to comply with the arm’s length
+principle (free competition) must also apply to domestic related parties, albeit in a simplified way,
+keeping the burden of proof with the authority. What must also be included is the related party
+presumption and the duty to comply with the same principle when taxpayers conduct operations
+with residents in low- or no-tax jurisdictions, especially if they are not very cooperative (in
+respect of which Guatemala will have to resolve its own problems to exchange information).
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+**The regime for imports and exports must be replaced with a more functional one.** As stated
+in the legislation, goods exporters and importers are currently required to apply the so-called
+“sixth method,” the implementation of which is unclear because the regulation does not clearly
+define the reference price to be used or the permitted adjustments. Taxpayers understand the
+method to be optional. This poses a potential dilemma for the SAT since, in theory, it must
+oversee a basically ineffective method. It is recommended that this method be replaced so that
+the legislation gives priority to the comparable uncontrolled price method and that this method
+be made compulsory only for a few commodities listed on stock exchanges or in organized
+markets.
+
+
+**The restrictions on interest deductions must be simplified.** The legislation currently penalizes
+interest deductions in three ways: (i) through a thin cap rule, which is very lax; (ii) by prohibiting
+the deduction of interest paid to residents abroad other than regulated financial entities, which is
+very strict and discriminatory; and (iii) by limiting the deductible interest rate to the one
+determined by the Monetary Board for tax purposes, which is a very lax default rate. All of these
+rules can be replaced by a single one, in accordance with the international best practices
+identified by the draft BEPS project under Action 4, limiting deductions for total interest paid to a
+percentage of the taxpayer’s profit measure, for example, 30 percent of earnings before interest,
+taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
+
+
+**Other measures are also necessary to protect the tax base.** For example, conditions must be
+established for the deduction of intra-group services for compliance with the “effective profit
+test” for the taxpayer, in addition to regulating the market valuation of royalties paid for the use
+or exploitation of intangible assets with more elements.
+
+
+**BEPS Minimum Standards**
+
+
+**Lastly, the report discusses the BEPS minimum standards, highlighting Action 5 on harmful**
+**tax practices.** This standard requires countries to eliminate regimes offering tax privileges to
+taxpayers that do not have much corporate substance and that encourage the shifting of profits
+generated in other jurisdictions. These harmful regimes generally attract financial activities or
+services (or the registration of intangible assets) in locations that are not very cooperative in
+exchanging information or very transparent about the benefits they provide. The latest agreed
+changes to the international tax system architecture, introducing a minimum global tax of
+15 percent for multinational enterprises (Pillar 2), show that the countries’ sense of community is
+leaning toward banishing full exemption regimes for non-transparent businesses. The increase in
+special regimes in Guatemala might eventually risk running into this international trend.
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+##### **I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+1. **The Guatemalan Ministry of Public Finance asked the IMF mission to review three**
+**international taxation topics:** (i) the policy and model treaties for the avoidance of double
+taxation appropriate for Guatemala; (ii) the strengthening of the transfer pricing regime; and
+(iii) the consequences for Guatemala of the minimum standards on base erosion and profit
+shifting (BEPS) adopted by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
+Development (OECD). These topics are discussed in the following manner.
+
+
+2. **Chapter II of this report analyzes the tax revenue structure in Guatemala** to
+determine the context surrounding the discussion on international taxation as well as the (little)
+flexibility the country has to negotiate treaties, which can cost tax resources. The chapter also
+examines current preferential regimes to encourage investment in Guatemala and the tax
+expenditure involved.
+
+
+3. **Chapter III reviews some basic concepts contained in domestic legislation on**
+**international taxation**, such as the definitions of source, residence, and permanent
+establishment, which determine the scope of the country’s taxing power, focusing on aspects
+that could give rise to double taxation.
+
+
+4. **Chapter IV of the report discusses which treaty model would strike the right**
+**balance for a net capital importing country like Guatemala.** FAD policy is not to intervene in
+treaty negotiations between the institution’s member countries. Guatemala does not have
+current treaties, although it did sign but not ratify a treaty with Mexico, whose entry into force is
+still being discussed in the country. This chapter analyzes treaties in a general sense from the
+perspective of a developing country, without directly referring to the clauses negotiated with
+Mexico, except when comparing BEPS standards.
+
+
+5. **Chapter V contains a summary of the extensive literature on** **the empirical**
+**relationship between treaties and foreign direct investment (FDI).** This is important
+background for guiding expectations that could arise from the potential signing of treaties,
+informing decisions in that regard. Some considerations specific to Guatemala are discussed.
+
+
+6. **Chapter VI explores how the country’s tax base can be strengthened by adopting**
+**international best practices on transfer pricing.** The chapter alludes to ways in which treaties
+facilitate the implementation of transfer prices. It also considers certain anti-abuse measures for
+cases where transfer pricing has difficulty yielding results.
+
+
+7. **Chapter VII explains the BEPS minimum standards** and comments on their
+appropriateness for Guatemala, especially concerning preferential tax regimes. Lastly, it contains
+a brief explanation of the most recent Inclusive Framework agreements on international tax
+architecture reforms (Pillars 1 and 2) and offers some thoughts on how this could affect
+Guatemala.
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+##### **II. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE**
+
+**Total Tax Revenue Compared**
+
+
+8. **Guatemala’s tax revenue has lagged over the past decade.** The general
+government’s total net collection, not including social security, accounted for 10.6 percent of
+GDP in 2019, which is lower than the average collection over the seven years preceding the
+2008–09 financial crisis (Figure 1). Tax revenue in Guatemala did not keep pace with economic
+growth in general (Figure 2). [1] This temporarily worsened with the effects of the pandemic; tax
+revenue fell to 10 percent of GDP in 2020, but increased to 11.7 percent in 2021, mainly as a
+result of the economic rebound. [2] It has been said before that tax collection must be
+strengthened in Guatemala, particularly through measures that broaden the tax base, in order to
+create fiscal space for raising social and infrastructure spending. [3]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+9. **Tax revenue in Guatemala is one of the lowest on the continent.** Collection has been
+roughly half of the Latin American average (Figure 3). Although tax revenue as a percentage of
+GDP is normally lower when per capita income is smaller, Guatemala has one of the lowest
+collection rates even among countries in the lower range of per capita income (Table 1). The
+
+
+1 The correlation between tax revenue growth and economic growth, called tax buoyancy, has been below 1 in
+Guatemala since 2011.
+
+2 Rising fuel prices influenced the 2021 figures, as did the payment of taxes for the sale of a telephone company,
+which alone meant a collection increase of 0.3 percent of GDP.
+
+3 See IMF (2021).
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+weaker performance relative to the region is another indicator that Guatemala must make a
+greater effort to increase tax collection.
+
+
+
+
+
+**Tax Revenue Composition**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+10. **As is common in Latin America, the main taxes in Guatemala are value-added**
+**tax (VAT) and income tax (** _**Impuesto Sobre la Renta**_ **– ISR) for legal persons.** These two
+taxes account for 77 percent of the country’s tax revenue (Figure 4). The most notable deficiency
+in Guatemala is in personal ISR, which in 2019 accounted for barely half a percentage point of
+GDP, one of the lowest in Latin America (Table 2). The average is four times this percentage for
+the region and double that if only low-income countries are considered.
+
+
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+11. **VAT is the most widely collected tax in Guatemala.** However, compared to other
+countries in the region, where VAT is also typically the largest tax, [4] what Guatemala collects is
+fairly low. Average VAT collection in the region was just above 6 percent of GDP in 2019,
+compared to 5 percent in Guatemala. The weaker performance partly reflects a relatively low
+statutory rate of 12 percent, but also poor tax productivity. [5]
+
+
+12. **VAT collection and the weak performance of personal ISR in Guatemala are**
+**connected to some extent.** Guatemala’s tax regime has a unique feature that exists in few
+countries: up to a certain amount, the VAT paid by natural persons is deductible from (and partly
+creditable against) their ISR. [6] This encourages the payment of VAT and reduces the ISR base. [7]
+Although a limit has been in place on the deductible (and creditable) amount since 2012, the
+regime continues to be in effect and introduces a bias against personal ISR.
+
+
+13. **The revenue collected in Guatemala through corporate ISR is comparable to the**
+**region’s average.** In 2019, collection amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP, a couple of tenths below
+the regional average (Table 4). The general regime rate (25 percent) is competitive, falling within
+the lower limit of the range of rates prevailing in Latin America, except Paraguay (Table 4).
+
+
+4 With the exception of Mexico (which has a significant portion of the base subject to a rate of zero) and Panama
+(the only country with a single-digit VAT rate).
+
+5 VAT efficiency in Guatemala is 0.43, which is low compared to most countries in the region and below the
+average (0.66) of Latin American countries with a comparable per capita income level.
+
+6 There is a “blind” per-person deduction of Q 48,000 (LISR, Art. 72, para. (a)). The tax paid at a rate of 5 percent,
+applied to an additional amount of up to Q 12,000 (that is, Q 600), is creditable against the ISR. The mechanics of
+this second limitation are not established in law, but are derived from the SAT-1431 employee forms and the
+SAT-1111 VAT spreadsheet, which must be filled out to access the benefit.
+
+7 See FAD reports (2016, 2017). It is worth noting that, despite the introduction of the upper limit to the
+creditable amount, ISR collection from natural persons has not improved substantially. It rose from 0.40 percent
+of GDP in 2012 to 0.46 percent of GDP in 2019. A detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this report,
+which focuses on international taxation.
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+
+
+**Special Regimes**
+
+
+14. **Guatemala has various special ISR regimes.** All ISR taxpayers have the option of paying
+the tax through an alternative arrangement called “simplified optional” for lucrative activities,
+with a maximum rate of 7 percent on gross income (LISR, Art. 43–44) [8] and an exemption from
+the Solidarity Tax ( _Impuesto de Solidaridad_ - ISO). [9] It is difficult to estimate whether a regime of
+this type (with a relatively low rate that taxes gross income) puts more or less tax pressure than
+the general regime (which taxes profits at a higher rate) since the incidence will change from one
+taxpayer to another depending on their profit margin. Nevertheless, in the case of an optional
+(annual) regime, the taxpayer can be assumed to choose the regime with the lower tax burden.
+This means that the option will imply a decrease in collection, as long as the third option is not
+informality. [10]
+
+
+8 Income up to Q 30,000 is taxed at 5 percent, whereas any income above that is taxed at 7 percent.
+
+9 The ISO is a minimum direct tax on the gross income of natural or legal persons that carry out commercial or
+agricultural activities in Guatemala. The tax is 1 percent on a fourth of the gross income reported and is
+creditable against the ISR. It is understood to be an “advance” of the ISR.
+
+10 In 2021, the simplified optional regime collected Q 6,359 million, representing a little under 50 percent of what
+was collected by the ISR in total. In previous years, 2015 to 2020, this regime contributed on average 56 percent
+of corporate ISR collection (lucrative activities). In 2020, 245,000 taxpayers paid tax under the optional regime,
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+15. **Guatemala also has special regimes** **for promoting investment** . The top ones are the
+free-trade zone, free zone, and maquiladora regimes. [11] The main benefits are: (i) _temporary_
+_suspension_ (for one year) of import tax, including VAT, on inputs used in the manufacture
+(assembly or repair) of goods intended for export and goods imported for re-export;
+(ii) _exemption_ from import tax, including VAT, on machinery and equipment as well as from
+special consumption taxes on fuel imports; [12] and (iii) _full exemption_ from ISR for 10 years. [13] In
+addition, the purchase of domestic inputs by maquila entities and free-trade zone users is
+_exempt from VAT_ . [14]
+
+
+16. **This class of tax benefits is common in the zone.** However, these preferential regimes
+carry certain risks: one, collection favoring investment that would have happened anyway is lost [15]
+and, two, the regime is exploited by transnational companies to conceal income actually derived
+from activities that take place in another territory (with higher taxation). This latter situation
+could result in preferential regimes being classified as harmful by the Forum on Harmful Tax
+Practices [16] and their beneficiaries being potentially subject to defensive measures by the affected
+countries (for example, increase in withholding rates for payments to regime beneficiaries).
+
+
+**Tax Expenditure**
+
+
+17. **Tax expenditure is the amount of revenue that the government fails to collect as a**
+**result of the preferential treatment it grants to a group of taxpayers.** The expenditure is
+normally estimated based on the amount of tax the group of benefiting taxpayers would have
+
+
+which accounted for a little over 60 percent of the total. This option for defraying the ISR from lucrative activities
+is a preferential regime insofar as it captures taxpayers who could be paying tax under the general regime.
+Nevertheless, the regime could be considered to collect tax if those who opt for it would otherwise have been
+informal. There is no clear answers to this question, but it should be noted that informality in Guatemala is high
+compared to the region. The percentage of employment in the informal sector is estimated to be greater than
+70 percent for 2017, above the Latin American average of 50 percent. See FAD (2017) and World Bank (2021).
+
+11 Decree 22-73 (Santo Tomas de Castilla Industry and Commerce Free Zone), Decree 29-89 (Law for the
+Promotion and Development of Export and Maquila Activities), and Decree 65-89 (Free-Trade Zone Law). The ISR
+exemption for maquilas is limited to the textile and apparel industry and to “information” and “communication”
+services. At present, the list of admitted specific services includes call or contact centers, software development,
+and digital content development, as long as their services are provided to non-residents (Government
+Agreement 3-2017, Art. 5). Free-trade zones admit a broader range of services. The provision of financial,
+telephony, television, and radio services is prohibited. In 2022, the criterion was relaxed (Government
+Agreement 65-22) to include new activities, such as hospital services.
+
+12 The benefit is only for fuels used in production located in the free-trade zone or authorized under the maquila
+program.
+
+13 The benefit does not apply to entities domiciled abroad with branches, agencies, or permanent establishments
+in Guatemala, which receive a credit for ISR paid in Guatemala.
+
+14 Free-trade zone _administrators_ enjoy similar tax benefits to those of _users_ .
+
+15 See PCT (2015).
+
+16 Forum sponsored by the OECD responsible for verifying compliance with BEPS Action 5 to combat harmful tax
+practices considering the transparency and substance of the activities accessing tax privileges. See Chapter VII of
+this report.
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+paid under the general regime. Every year, the SAT calculates the tax expenditure for the various
+tax privileges that exist in Guatemala, according to the type of tax and the beneficiary. For 2020,
+the SAT estimated a total tax expenditure of 2.7 percent of GDP, two thirds of which came from
+consumption taxes (Q 10.6 billion – Table 5). The tax sacrifice that special maquila, free-trade
+zone, and free zone regimes would entail would be relatively minor, representing 6 percent of
+the total tax expenditure for this year, equivalent to 0.16 percent of GDP. These regimes would
+mainly benefit from a direct tax exemption, adding a benefit of a little over Q 500 million that
+year, barely 10 percent of the total tax expenditure in direct taxes.
+
+
+18. **The estimated tax expenditure from preferential regimes to encourage investment**
+**seems modest.** However, the amount could be underestimated. Assuming that all garment
+exports originate from maquila benefiting from the special regime and that, in the absence of
+such a regime, the industry would pay the simplified optional ISR, the proceeds would have
+totaled around Q 650 million in 2020, [17] approximately 30 percent more tax expenditure in direct
+taxes estimated for all the beneficiaries of the three special regimes. [18]
+
+|Table 4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020
(in millions of quetzals)
Structure
ISR ISO Direct VAT TOTAL % GDP
(% total)
Beneficiaries D 29-89 (maquila)* 330 55 385 471 856 5.3 0.1
Beneficiaries D 65-89 (free-trade zones)* 87 33 120 0 120 0.7 0.0
Regime subtotal 417 88 505 471 975 6.0 0.2
Other 3937 480 4417 10174 15195 94.0 2.5
TOTAL 4354 568 4922 10644 16170 100.0 2.7
Source: SAT,* includes Zolic.|Col2|
+|---|---|
+|**Table 4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020**
**(in millions of quetzals)**
Source: SAT,* includes Zolic.
**ISR**
**ISO**
**Direct**
**VAT**
**TOTAL**
**Structure**
**(% total)**
**% GDP**
Beneficiaries D 29-89 (maquila)*
330
55
385
471
856
5.3
0.1
Beneficiaries D 65-89 (free-trade zones)*
87
33
120
0
120
0.7
0.0
Regime subtotal
417
88
505
471
975
6.0
0.2
Other
3937
480
4417
10174
15195
94.0
2.5
** TOTAL**
**4354**
**568**
**4922**
**10644**
**16170**
**100.0**
**2.7**||
+
+
+
+19. **In sum, the current ISR general regime in Guatemala is, at first glance,**
+**internationally competitive and has comparable collection.** One question is whether there is
+room to sign treaties for the avoidance of double taxation that might reduce this collection. In
+principle, there is no space for Guatemala to lose even more ground in its tax revenue. It also
+seems unlikely that a loss in corporate ISR collection could be easily replaced with higher
+collection of other taxes.
+
+
+20. **Guatemala’s tax system offers very generous special regimes.** These regimes can not
+only make other FDI promotion instruments redundant, but can also constitute harmful
+
+
+17 7% X (2020 clothing category export value) US$1.2 billion X 7.72 (2020 parity) = Q 655 million.
+
+18 The SAT estimates this tax expenditure using as a reference the profit margin of comparable companies that
+file taxes under the general regime. It applies this margin to the maquila cost and expense base to obtain the
+exempt ISR base, which provides the sector’s tax expenditure after being multiplied by 25 percent. However, this
+method may undervalue the estimate since maquila typically operates with inputs and assets in consignment,
+property of the purchaser of maquila services, which is why they are not included in the cost and expense base. If
+the maquila cost and expense bases and the base of maquila comparables were standardized, the forgone tax
+base would likely be considerably higher.
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+preferential regimes. This report discusses ways of bolstering safeguards for corporate ISR
+internationally to protect the tax base and the treaty model that could minimize the sacrifice of
+the said base, without neglecting the objective of promoting FDI.
+
+
+**Recommendations**
+
+
+- Conduct a more comprehensive assessment to establish a long-term policy for strengthening
+tax revenue in Guatemala.
+
+
+- Reconsider the methodology for calculating the tax expenditure associated with special
+regimes.
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+##### **III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME** **TAX LAW (LISR)**
+
+21. **This chapter reviews how the local ISR standard ties to some aspects of**
+**international taxation.** This review places special attention on situations with the potential for
+double taxation and double non-taxation and some situations that may conflict with the eventual
+application of conventions for the avoidance of double taxation that Guatemala might enter into.
+
+
+**Territorial Regime Versus Global Income**
+
+
+22. **Guatemala has a territorial system that taxes only local source income.** It covers all
+income generated in the territory of Guatemala, including interest, royalties, services, and capital
+gains (LISR, Articles 3 and 4 of Decree 10 of 2012). The alternative to this system is a tax regime
+that taxes the worldwide income of its residents, in addition to domestic source income
+generated by residents abroad operating in the country.
+
+
+23. **The territorial system has various advantages, especially for developing countries** .
+This system is simpler since taxpayers are not required to report, and the Treasury to control,
+foreign source income. The territorial system also does not require the implementation of
+measures to avoid international double taxation as a mechanism for crediting taxes paid abroad.
+Cases of international double taxation can nevertheless exist (as is the case with services,
+explained later).
+
+
+24. **Territorial regimes also have significant weaknesses.** The tax base is smaller because
+all resident incomes generated outside the country are not affected by the ISR (in the country of
+residence). For the same reason, the regime can be more contentious regarding the
+interpretation of the meaning of local source and limits information to what the tax authority can
+access.
+
+
+25. **Although a territorial system seems appropriate for a country with limited**
+**administrative resources and low capital exports, it also raises an equity issue.** This is a
+major consideration for developing countries. Higher earners could more easily take advantage
+of opportunities to relocate their income sources and be ISR-exempt. This, coupled with the
+benefits offered by low- or no-tax countries, can produce conditions conducive to double
+non-taxation of income.
+
+
+26. **Many countries that have moved toward a territorial regime did not completely**
+**abandon the global income regime they originally had.** **[19]** World income rules are often kept
+for personal ISR, whereby passive income (dividends, interest, royalties, or capital gains) earned
+
+
+19 Worldwide income regimes were not absolute either in practice. The profits of subsidiaries abroad are normally
+taxed when they are repatriated, deferring the tax indefinitely.
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+abroad is taxed, for example. It is also common for countries to maintain taxation of passive
+income earned abroad by entities controlled by a resident legal person. In both cases, the regime
+provides credit for tax paid abroad up to the domestic tax limit. This is a standard recommended
+by Action 3 of the BEPS project (OECD 2015a).
+
+
+27. **In the end, the most appropriate regime is the one that strikes the best balance**
+**between the advantages and drawbacks of each regime.** For the time being, Guatemala has
+preferred a territorial system, assuming the costs this entails, one of which is that personal
+ISR collection is very low. However, this system generally eliminates double taxation for its
+residents (one of the reasons for negotiating treaties for the avoidance of double taxation).
+
+
+**Definition of Source**
+
+
+28. **The definition of source establishes Guatemala’s taxing right over resident and**
+**non-resident incomes generated in the national territory.** As is common, domestic source
+income is defined as income generated by the production, sale, and marketing of goods and
+services in Guatemala and the export of goods and derivatives of capital and capital gains
+generated in Guatemala. Dividends, withdrawals from permanent establishments, interest, and
+royalties paid from Guatemala to a resident abroad are also considered to be sourced in the
+country. The source of payments abroad for services follows a similar fate, but has one
+peculiarity.
+
+
+**Services**
+
+
+29. **Services provided by a resident abroad are locally sourced when they are provided**
+**in Guatemala or when they are provided abroad but used in Guatemala.** **[20]** This means that
+services paid for in Guatemala but not used in the country are not locally sourced, leaving room
+for circumvention since the concept of service use in the country is debatable. [21] Royalties, for
+example, are considered locally sourced when they are _paid or used_ in the national territory. [22] The
+standard on services makes double taxation of residents abroad less likely and therefore makes a
+treaty to achieve this result less necessary. However, in the absence of a treaty, double taxation in
+the opposite case is not avoided if the other country, the source country in this example, taxes
+services as long as they are paid for in its jurisdiction.
+
+
+20 LISR, Article 4, paragraph (f). “Legal, technical, financial, administrative, and other assistance services used in the
+national territory that are provided from abroad to any individual or legal person, entity, or estate residing in the
+country as well as the permanent establishments of non-resident entities.”
+
+21 A service provided abroad but used in the country could apply to company employees participating in a
+training course in another country (paid for in Guatemala) and returning to the country to make use of their new
+knowledge. Payment for the training service would be subject to withholding in Guatemala in this case.
+Conversely, a Guatemalan visitor to a neighboring country who pays for repairs to his car (and does so with his
+credit card, such that the payment is made from Guatemala) may be a case of a service paid for in Guatemala but
+used abroad and therefore not sourced in Guatemala.
+
+22 The definition of royalties under No. 3 of Article 4, paragraph (c), No. II, encompasses rights or licenses for
+computer programs or their upgrades and, under No. IV, information relating to industrial, commercial or
+scientific knowledge or experience (know-how).
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+**Interest**
+
+
+30. **The definition of interest source adheres to the strict logic of a territorial system**
+**and, in practice, entails certain risks.** Exempting financial returns in Guatemala that were
+obtained abroad creates an incentive to export capital and, although the territorial regime is
+based on the premise that these returns will be taxed in the source country (or where the payer
+of the interest resides), many countries that are major financial centers exempt from tax the
+financial investments of non-residents. This is a situation of double non-taxation. There is also a
+lack of clarity in the law as to whether payments made by residents for derivative financial
+transactions (debt instruments) are subject to interest treatment [23] and whether they are
+Guatemalan source income. Clarifying their treatment would broaden the tax base and would
+help to apply the tax conventions that might be signed.
+
+
+**Dividends**
+
+
+31. **The territorial regime can also encourage evasion.** A company residing in Guatemala
+that distributes dividends must withhold from the shareholder a 5-percent tax (whether the
+person is a resident or non-resident of Guatemala). However, the company can instead make a
+loan to an entity abroad (owned by the same shareholder) and thus evade the withholding. The
+first line of defense against this scheme (which would operate the same way in a global income
+regime) is for loans to shareholders to be marked as dividends and be made subject to the
+corresponding withholding. Many countries take the precaution of adopting a specific anti-abuse
+rule on the presumption of profit (dividend) withdrawals. Guatemala does not have one.
+Guatemala only has an anti-abuse rule of substance over form, the application of which is more
+complex and applicable in the context of transfer prices (LISR, Art. 61). The second line of defense
+in a global income regime scenario is for interest generated by such a loan to be taxed in
+Guatemala, whereas in a territorial system, this interest could be paid to a resident tax-free. [24]
+
+
+**Capital Gains**
+
+
+32. **The law establishes a general rule whereby capital gains and income derived from**
+**movable and immovable property in Guatemala are considered to be locally sourced.** This
+includes income and capital gains derived from the disposal of shares (rights or interests) in a
+resident or non-resident entity whose assets consist of immovable property located in
+Guatemala. [25] This is a broadening of the definition of own source under a strict territorial system
+since it taxes the earnings of a resident abroad from the disposal of shares of a non-resident
+company when related to the enjoyment of assets located in the country (indirect sale of assets).
+
+
+23 Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (b).
+
+24 The opposite can also be problematic when investment funding from abroad is presented as a loan, even if it
+has the characteristics of a capital contribution, such that the return paid abroad is a deductible interest instead
+of a dividend which is not. This is discussed in Chapter VI.
+
+25 LISR, Article 4, paragraph (f). The definition does not include financial operations derived from capital.
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+33. **Taxing indirect sales closes a major avenue of tax avoidance.** However, this is a
+complex provision to implement and requires detailed definitions of how the tax should be
+calculated and charged. The first consideration is to determine the taxable base when assets
+located in Guatemala are only part of the assets of the non-resident company subject to the
+indirect sale. The entity responsible for paying the tax must also be identified. There are different
+mechanisms for this, one being that the selling company is responsible, even if it is not a local
+resident. This option is very difficult to control and makes collection of the tax highly unlikely. For
+that reason, when a local company is alienated through an indirect sale, the buying company can
+alternatively be subjected to the tax (under the obligation to withhold tax at the time of
+acquisition) and the obligation can be made effective through the alienated company residing in
+the country. [26] None of this is regulated in the local regulation taxing the indirect sale of
+immovable property located in Guatemala.
+
+
+34. **One particularity in the application of the territorial regime to the receipt of**
+**dividends from foreign sources is that the effect varies depending on when the dividend is**
+**received by the resident.** The direct or immediate (resident) recipient of the dividend is exempt
+from such income. If this person is the ultimate shareholder of the foreign entity, the territorial
+system functions as expected (exemption). However, if the immediate shareholder is another
+entity that redistributes the dividend to the ultimate shareholder (resident), such distribution will
+be taxed since it will be considered to be a distribution from a domestic source, despite the
+entirely foreign origin of the income. This prompts residents to have holdings outside the
+country in order to control their investments abroad. Such situations would disappear if
+Guatemala were to adopt the standard under BEPS Action 3 and tax passive income earned
+abroad by domestic residents.
+
+
+**Definition of Residence**
+
+
+35. **The legislation defines residents as natural persons who spend more than 183 days**
+**during a calendar year in the national territory** or when their center of economic interests is
+located in Guatemala. In this latter case, taxpayers who prove their residence or tax domicile to
+be in another country by way of a certificate issued by the tax authorities of that country are
+exempt. [27]
+
+
+36. **In general terms, this definition of resident for natural persons is consistent with**
+**international practice, with one important caveat.** The exemption granted when the person
+has a residence certificate issued by another country could cause control problems, especially
+when there are difficulties exchanging information. The door remains open for a taxpayer to
+obtain a certificate from a lower-tax country where the requirements to obtain residence are
+
+
+26 See Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2019).
+
+27 Article 6 of the Law.
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+more lax. [28] The problem is exacerbated in circumstances involving a convention because it would
+affect the taxing powers under the convention.
+
+
+37. **The calculation of days in the country during a calendar year can be manipulated.**
+Staying one of the 183 days during the year immediately before or after would be enough for
+someone to be declared a non-resident. That is why the rule established by many countries is
+that a person is considered a resident if they spend this number of days in any 12-month
+period. [29]
+
+
+38. **The definition of residence for legal persons** **under the LISR** **follows the**
+**international standard** . Entities established in the country, those that have their registered office
+or tax address in the national territory, or those that have their center of effective management in
+the national territory are considered residents. Both are criteria accepted in international
+conventions.
+
+
+**Definition of Permanent Establishment**
+
+
+39. **The definition of permanent establishment in the Law** **[30]** **is consistent with that of**
+**the OECD and UN Model Conventions,** **[31]** **except for one situation.** A permanent
+establishment occurs when a resident abroad has a place of business in Guatemala or is
+presumed to have one through the relations the resident maintains with dependent or, in some
+case, independent agents. Guatemala’s rule is standard up to there, but the provision departs
+from the international norm by not excluding from the definition of permanent establishment
+activities of a preparatory or auxiliary character. [32] This could result in double taxation, with the
+additional complexity of having to attribute an income to such activities. A treaty would likely
+remedy the problem, but only for residents of the contracting State. Amending the law would
+correct this for all investors.
+
+
+40. **Permanent establishments are taxed according to general rules.** Permanent
+establishments in Guatemala are taxed on local source income attributable to them; there is no
+“force of attraction” rule for a permanent establishment that allows income earned directly in the
+country by the non-resident person associated with the permanent establishment to be
+attributed to that permanent establishment. Moreover, the expenditures of permanent
+establishments with their parent companies are deductible pursuant to general rules, including
+
+
+28 The risk is likely lower due to the low ISR rates in Guatemala for natural persons.
+
+29 The person would be a resident during the calendar year in which he or she spent the 183 days.
+
+30 Article 7 of the Law.
+
+31 Article 5, OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions.
+
+32 In accordance with the OECD Model Convention (Article 5, paragraph 4), the definition of permanent
+establishment excludes the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery of goods or
+merchandise belonging to the enterprise as well as various circumstances considered to be more of a preparatory
+or auxiliary character.
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+royalties and interest, which can be difficult to oversee as these are transfers within the same
+legal entity.
+
+
+**Withholding Rates on the Income of Non-Residents**
+
+
+41. **Non-residents without a permanent establishment are taxed on certain income**
+**generated in Guatemala.** The rates range from zero (financial sector interest) to 25 percent
+(“other income”), depending on the nature of the income (Table 5). [33] The non-resident’s gross
+income is taxed, but if the payment represents foreign marginal income, the rate taxes the profit
+for practical purposes. Therefore, the rates on interest, royalties, and technical services are
+advantageous relative to the tax rate used for income of the same nature earned by residents.
+However, there is equal treatment for capital gains, since the same 10-percent (preferential) rate
+applies to both residents and non-residents.
+
+
+(1) Financial entities / other interest
+(2) Financial entities and bonds / financial entities foreign states / reinsurers
+(3) Machinery and equipment suppliers / general / tax havens
+(4) Public listed companies / tax havens
+(5) Gross income / earnings
+(6) Bank deposit payments / other / tax havens
+(7) Payments for intangible assets / other / tax havens
+(8) Payments outside tax havens / tax havens
+(9) Dividends paid by public listed and registered companies / tax havens
+(10) Payments to bilateral or government entities / payments to others
+(11) Reduced rate for earnings under certain thresholds / agreed statutory rate
+
+42. **Tax withholding rates in Guatemala are relatively low compared to other countries.**
+The rates established in the domestic law of countries in the region are normally 5 to
+10 percentage points higher. This leaves these countries room to reduce rates if they sign any
+treaties. Guatemala has much less room to do so. As a matter of fact, the treaty with Mexico
+(signed in 2015 but not yet ratified) kept the rates established in the Guatemalan domestic law.
+The withholding rates in Guatemalan law are similar to those agreed in treaties by the region’s
+countries. [34]
+
+
+33 Table 5 does not include withholding on other income.
+
+34 For example, the lowest withholding rates agreed by El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica for
+interest and royalties is 10 percent, except that Costa Rica negotiated 5 percent for financial sector interest, which
+is anyway higher than the prevailing rate in the Guatemalan law.
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+43. **Entering into tax conventions without reducing the withholding rates established in**
+**the law should not result in a revenue loss for Guatemala, if the definition of source is**
+**protected.** However, signing conventions with the same withholding rates as those already
+enshrined in domestic law also does not serve as a major incentive for foreign investment in the
+country.
+
+
+44. **The Guatemalan law unilaterally grants (regulated) financial sector entities a full**
+**exemption from withholding on interest payments.** Although lower withholding on interest
+reduces the cost of financing for a capital importer, fully exempting the latter seems like an
+excessive and uncommon benefit. In the region, only Costa Rica has a similar treatment. This also
+creates an incentive for the performance of back-to-back operations, which are difficult to
+control. [ 35]
+
+
+**Deductions**
+
+
+45. **Guatemala only allows for the deduction of interest paid abroad when loans are**
+**granted by banks or financial institutions recognized in the country of residence.** This
+limitation is discriminatory according to the Conventions (Article 24 of the Model) [36] because the
+same transaction with a domestic counterparty is deductible, even if the creditor is not a financial
+institution. It would, however, be advisable to limit the deduction of interest paid abroad when
+dealing with back-to-back arrangements intermediated by financial entities.
+
+
+46. **The deduction of payments abroad for technical services is limited to 5 percent of**
+**the taxpayer’s gross income.** **[37]** This is also contrary to the non-discrimination clause of the
+Conventions. These types of caps on deductions are not an efficient mechanism for protecting
+the country’s tax base because they can be very lenient and allow for significant profit shifting in
+some cases and very strict in others. What is appropriate is for the deduction to be consistent
+with the arm’s length principle. However, in countries with low administrative capacity, the limit
+may be advisable and its elimination may involve a revenue loss if a convention is signed. Some
+countries have managed to protect this restriction by incorporating grandfathering [38] rules into
+their conventions, safeguarding their right to maintain them despite the non-discrimination
+clause.
+
+
+35 A back-to-back arrangement is, for example, when a parent company abroad deposits funds in a foreign bank
+so that the bank can use them to grant a loan to a company in Guatemala. The interest can be reclassified as
+dividend distribution, which is non-deductible and subject to 5-percent withholding. The comprehensive
+treatment of the deduction of interest is discussed in Chapter VI.
+
+36 See paragraph 4 of Article 24 of the OECD and UN Model Conventions.
+
+37 See No. 23 of Article 21 of the Law.
+
+38 See, for example, the Chile–Norway treaty.
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+**Recommendations**
+
+
+- Tax financial income from abroad earned by resident companies and natural persons,
+including dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains received either directly or through
+foreign companies controlled from Guatemala.
+
+
+- Expand the source of services to include all those provided abroad but paid for in Guatemala,
+avoiding the need for interpretation as to whether or not they are used in the country.
+
+
+- Define in the law the tax treatment of derivative financial operations so that they follow the
+fate of their underlying, that is, debt or capital.
+
+
+- Define in the law the applicable regime and the parties subject to tax on capital gains from
+indirect sales abroad of immovable assets in Guatemala.
+
+
+- Consider loans to partners (or relatives) as dividend distribution.
+
+
+- Determine residence based on location of stay over the course of 12 calendar months.
+
+
+- Eliminate proof of residence abroad with a certificate issued by a foreign authority.
+
+
+- Align the definition of permanent establishment with international practice, excluding merely
+preparatory or auxiliary activities.
+
+
+- Introduce in the law a force of attraction option for income obtained in the country directly
+by a non-resident that also has a permanent establishment in Guatemala.
+
+
+- Reclassify back-to-back operations as profit sharing, not deductible and subject to dividend
+withholding.
+
+
+- Consider maintaining deduction limits by incorporating grandfathering rules into
+conventions.
+
+
+- Reconsider the zero percent withholding rate on the payment of interest to resident financial
+entities abroad.
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+##### **IV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA**
+
+**Introduction**
+
+
+47. **The key objective of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation is to assign**
+**taxing powers** on income generated by persons or entities operating in more than one State.
+Double taxation results from an uncoordinated international distribution of income (or wealth)
+tax that impedes the movement of capital, persons, and services, affecting investment and
+potential economic growth.
+
+
+48. **The global network of treaties is very extensive and includes a large number of**
+**developing countries.** **[39]** Guatemala currently has no treaty in force and signed only one with
+Mexico in 2015, which has not been ratified by the Guatemalan congress. At present, there is
+significant pressure on the government to negotiate new treaties based on the argument that
+this would help attract more foreign investment to the country. However, the decision is not an
+easy one because the various pros and cons of treaties, which differ depending on the
+counterparty and terms, must be weighed.
+
+
+49. **These treaties also have costs, especially in terms of tax revenue.** The negotiation of
+treaties without full regard for their consequences could create harmful effects for collection.
+Treaties limit a State’s taxing power and might create situations in which some income benefits
+for no reason from a fiscal policy standpoint or even situations of double non-taxation of a
+resident abroad. [40] To justify interest in a treaty, the possibility that residents of one State will be
+subject to double taxation on their income sourced in another State will have to be analyzed. A
+country with a territorial regime, such as Guatemala, does not expose its residents to double
+taxation. There is also an administrative cost; the authority must employ and train a team of
+experts to not only negotiate treaties, but also maintain them (oversight of the correct
+application of the convention, consultations, mutual agreements, litigation, etc.). [41]
+
+
+**Treaty Benefits and Drawbacks**
+
+
+50. **No answer can be provided beforehand as to the benefits and drawbacks of signing**
+**treaties to avoid double taxation.** One key question is the collection cost of entering into such
+agreements. The tax impact can be immediate and significant where there is a considerable,
+regular flow of payments to residents in the other contracting State and where the treaty reduces
+
+
+39 At end-2014, there were approximately 3,000 signed treaties, two thirds of which included a developing
+country. See M. Hearson (2015), _Introductory Note on the Action Aid Tax Treaty Data Set_, available at
+[11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf (un.org). The database for 2022 reports 3,500 signed treaties, with the same](https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf?msclkid=2cd7d6a1a64f11ec8b5b31c33a8b360d)
+proportion of developing countries.
+
+40 Double non-taxation could arise for activities exempt in free-trade zones, for example, because ISR is not
+charged and dividend distribution is not taxed for residents abroad.
+
+41 This report does not delve into the administrative aspect of treaties, which would require a specific mission on
+that topic.
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+the withholding rates. This first effect can, however, be offset over time if FDI in the country
+increases enough.
+
+
+51. **Treaties have the following main benefits:**
+
+
+- _Legal certainty_ - International treaties normally have a higher hierarchy than ordinary country
+laws, protecting the tax treatment of income or gains covered by the treaty. Unilateral
+changes in the law would not affect it.
+
+
+- _Reduction of double taxation_ - They guarantee lower withholding rates and exemptions not
+provided for in domestic legislation, reducing the possibility of double taxation.
+
+
+- _Administrative cooperation_ - They lay the foundations for cooperation between tax
+authorities to combat tax evasion and avoidance through clauses on information exchange
+and tax collection assistance.
+
+
+- _Dispute resolution_ - They offer an additional layer of defense besides those provided for in
+internal legislation. Taxpayers can request the initiation of a Mutual Agreement
+Procedure (MAP), which allows the competent authorities to discuss and resolve matters
+relating to the application or interpretation of the treaty.
+
+
+- _Elimination of discriminatory treatment_ - They prohibit discriminatory treatment that may
+exist in local legislation by reason of nationality or residence, such as the treatment of
+residents in connection with permanent establishment or discriminatory treatment of
+subsidiaries of foreign companies compared to domestic companies.
+
+
+52. **There are also arguments against treaties.** The main one is the potential collection loss
+for capital importing countries due to lower withholding rates and ISR base limitations if the
+effect is not offset by higher FDI. It is also important to note that preferential regimes could wipe
+out much of the positive effect that FDI has on collection.
+
+
+53. **Treaties should not be negotiated with countries that have an insignificant ISR.** It is
+common for countries to seek these types of treaties when there is no double taxation to avoid.
+At times, the beneficiaries of the treaties are a few public entities of the requesting country, for
+example, some sovereign wealth funds, which are not normally subject to taxation. These
+therefore claim a double benefit.
+
+
+54. **A poorly negotiated treaty triggers aggressive planning schemes that are much**
+**more difficult to root out.** Terminating an existing treaty can have undesirable repercussions
+for bilateral relations. Tools to fight tax evasion and avoidance, such as information exchange
+and tax collection assistance, are contained in specific treaties on the subject, which is why this
+section of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation can be repetitive. [42]
+
+
+42 Guatemala is a signatory to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+**Precautions Ahead of Treaty Negotiation**
+
+
+55. **Before the treaty negotiation process is initiated, a precise diagnostic assessment**
+**must be carried out on the real needs for treaty adoption.** The country must determine the
+cost it is willing to accept in exchange for receiving the estimated benefits. It is therefore crucial
+to understand the interaction between the treaty and the domestic laws of the states involved
+and to measure the consequences and limitations that a treaty imposes. Carefully selecting the
+countries with which to negotiate is also important insofar as the treaty resolves situations of
+double taxation.
+
+
+56. **Major payments to residents abroad and foreign investment flows must be**
+**identified.** The starting point is to determine the major payments being made abroad, the
+countries to which they are being made, and whether they are being made to related parties.
+These details help measure the initial impacts that a treaty might have. What must also be
+determined is the origin of the foreign investment and the sectors for which it is intended, taking
+account of the fact that simple statistical projections can be unreliable (this is discussed in Box 1).
+
+
+57. **Once the decision has been made to initiate the negotiation of a treaty with a**
+**certain State,** **it is necessary to gain an understanding of the latter’s tax system** and how a
+tax treaty would interact with its legislation and to review the history of other treaties it had
+negotiated to strengthen Guatemala’s position at the negotiating table.
+
+
+**Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation**
+
+
+58. **Two model conventions are most commonly used by countries.** The first is the OECD
+Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) and the second is the United
+Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries
+(UN Model).
+
+
+**OECD Model**
+
+
+59. **The OECD Model establishes residence as the primary** **criterion** **for determining**
+**what State must tax** foreign source income earned by a resident. This is the principle by which
+double taxation would be eliminated. The Model Convention establishes that, as a general rule,
+income such as international traffic, royalties, capital gains from the alienation of shares,
+technical assistance, technical services, pensions, and other income can only be taxed in the State
+where the recipient of the income resides, limiting the possibility of taxing such income to the
+State where the income originates (the source State). Only in the case of dividends, interest,
+capital gains derived from the sale of shares representing immovables, real estate income, and
+proceeds from the sale of real estate is the tax established in the source State. Independent
+personal services receive the business profits treatment and can only be taxed if they are
+provided through a permanent establishment. Also, the assumptions for constituting a
+permanent establishment in a State have limitations.
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+60. **The OECD Model provides means of dispute resolution and includes mandatory**
+**arbitration for authorities.** The first is governed by mandatory minimum standards on MAP to
+ensure that they are agile, do not prevent access to the means of defense provided for in
+domestic legislation, and require the contracting states to resolve disputes within specified
+timeframes, suggested to be two years in the OECD Model commentary. The model also includes
+tools to combat tax evasion and avoidance, such as information exchange and tax collection
+assistance.
+
+
+**UN Model**
+
+
+61. **The UN Model establishes the source as the primary criterion for determining what**
+**State must tax the income earned by a resident abroad.** This model leans toward protecting
+the taxing rights of countries where the income is generated, as is the case of royalties, capital
+gains from the alienation of shares, technical assistance, technical services, international ship
+traffic, and other income. The UN Model has a regime applicable to independent services under
+Article 14 and allows for easier constitution of a permanent establishment in the source country.
+
+
+62. **The definition** **of royalties is broad**, potentially expanding the tax base in the source
+country. It includes, for example, payment for the use (or the concession for use) of industrial,
+commercial, or scientific equipment. The commentary in the Model even clarifies that the use of
+satellites can be treated as royalties, the opposite of what is established in the OECD Model.
+
+
+63. **The UN Model has a specific article on income from technical services** that
+establishes the right to tax at source income obtained by a resident abroad from the provision of
+such services, as detailed below.
+
+
+**Power to Tax Certain Income Under Treaties**
+
+
+64. **The most relevant income from cross-border operations in terms of conventions is**
+interest, royalties, dividends, capital gains, independent personal services, and technical
+assistance and services. Business profits and the related concept of permanent establishment are
+also very important.
+
+
+**Interest (Article 11)** **[43]**
+
+
+65. **Both Model Conventions stipulate that the source State can tax interest paid by its**
+**residents abroad.** Treaties normally establish this and define the applicable tax rate (or rates).
+The prevailing logic, especially for developing countries that are capital importers, is that a
+relatively low rate is preferable in order to avoid making credit more expensive. The cost of the
+tax is normally absorbed by the debtor country since the international creditor typically has the
+market power to raise the interest rate by the withholding percentage.
+
+
+43 The article in parentheses refers to the OECD Model.
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+66. **The second discussion is whether the withholding rate must be uniform for all**
+**types of interest or whether there should be different treatment for different types of**
+**interest.** Imposing higher rates on interest paid to entities other than banks or to holders of
+bonds placed in international markets might follow the reasoning that there is more room to
+absorb a higher tax in such cases; however, the downside for the tax administration (in terms of
+how it is to exercise supervision in such cases) probably does not justify this approach. Such
+methods are even less appropriate for a tax administration with scarce resources.
+
+
+67. **A very important aspect of the treaty is the definition of interest.** The UN and OECD
+models have a traditional definition (credit income of any kind) but restrict what is meant by
+interest income. They leave out a significant number of financial operations, such as financial
+leasing, factoring, the sale of credits at a discount, income from the alienation of credits, and
+income from some derivative financial operations, concepts that are, for the most part, included
+in the definition of interest contained in Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (b), of the Law. Consequently,
+many states include a provision in treaties establishing that interest income is to be understood
+as that defined in accordance with their domestic legislation. This is the most appropriate
+position for a net capital importing country. The recommendation is to confirm the source tax for
+interest in the treaty, adopt a single withholding rate (not zero), and make reference in the
+definition of interest to concepts established in domestic legislation.
+
+
+**Royalties (Article 12)**
+
+
+68. **To determine the power to tax royalties, treaties must first define royalties and**
+**then identify the place where they are to be taxed,** both of which pose challenges. The
+definition of royalties in the OECD and UN models is traditional: income derived from the use (or
+concession for use) of intellectual property protected by laws (trademarks, patents, trade names,
+and copyrights, among others). There are two positions as to where they should be taxed: (i) only
+by the State of residence; or (ii) also by the source State, when the payer is a resident of that
+State or the intellectual property is used in that State. [44]
+
+
+69. **The UN Model adds the use of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment under**
+**royalties.** This has a broad connotation, as established by the commentary in the Model. It
+clarifies that a royalty is the payment for the commercial (and not personal) use of a piece of
+equipment, whatever it may be. This is the case of satellite use, which involves the provision of a
+service according to the OECD Model because the person who needs their signal to be
+transmitted cannot manipulate the satellite. Under the UN Model, this constitutes use of
+commercial, industrial, or scientific equipment because the satellite is being leased for the
+purpose of such a transmission.
+
+
+44 Article 4, paragraph (c), of the Law follows the criterion of taxing at source when the payer is a resident or when
+the items for which royalties are paid are used in Guatemala, which should be reflected in the treaties the country
+enters into in the future.
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+70. **There are also differences of opinion regarding payment for software use that**
+**should be included in the concept of royalties.** The commentary in the OECD Model
+concludes that software payments are not copyright royalties; rather, they are a transfer of
+copyright on the economic exploitation of software. However, various countries do not agree
+with this interpretation, pointing out (in line with their domestic legislation) that payments for
+software use are also royalties when all the software ownership rights are not transferred, the
+software is not completely standardized, and the software is adapted in some form to the user.
+
+
+71. **The OECD Model excludes from the concept of royalties income derived from**
+**technical services.** According to this model, technical services must be treated as business
+profits and can only be taxed if they are provided through a permanent establishment. By
+contrast, the UN Model includes a specific article (12A) that grants taxing rights to the State from
+which the payment for technical services originates, as long as these are specialized services.
+The main argument for incorporating this article is to combat the erosion of the ISR base in
+developing countries, which face a significant amount of deductions for payments made under
+this concept. The commentary in the UN Model adds an alternative provision for taxing technical
+services, limiting it to situations in which the service provider has a physical presence in that
+State, except when the payments are made to related parties. Many countries in Latin America
+and Asia follow the UN Model in this regard.
+
+
+72. **It is recommended that the definition of source in the Guatemalan model treaty**
+**maintain the concept of royalties as per the terms established in the legislation.** It should
+also include payments for the use of industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment, currently
+taxed as other income under the law. This change would reduce the rate from 25 percent to the
+rate negotiated in the treaty. If this income is not included in the concept of royalties under the
+treaty, income from this equipment would fall under the concept of business profits and would
+only be taxed if attributed to a permanent establishment located in Guatemala. It is also advised
+for software payments to be taxed as royalties, except in cases where the software was
+standardized and its commercial use was limited. [45] Having source rights for technical assistance
+payments is recommended as well.
+
+
+**Capital Gains (Article 13)**
+
+
+73. **Both the UN and the OECD models provide that the alienation of shares that derive**
+**more than 50 percent of their value from immovable property** situated in the State is taxed
+at source. This is regardless of whether or not the company that issued them is a resident. In the
+UN Model and in various countries, gains from the direct or indirect alienation of a certain
+percentage of share ownership issued by a resident company, even if the alienation takes place
+abroad, are taxed at source. The gains are taxable in the State in which the company issuing the
+
+
+45 Leasing of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment is not included in the definition and is treated as
+other income taxed under Article 104, No. 4. As for software, all cases in which software use is granted are taxed,
+in accordance with Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (c).
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+shares is a resident. Other countries tax at a reduced withholding rate when any percentage of
+shares issued by resident entities is alienated.
+
+
+74. **Much discussion has also occurred on whether countries should also tax the**
+**indirect sale of enterprises** when more than 50 percent of the value of foreign company shares
+is derived from the shares of a resident company of another State, irrespective of the real estate
+component. Oversight of such alienation is particularly complex, as control and reporting
+mechanisms are necessary to inform tax authorities that such share transfers have occurred.
+Making it mandatory for resident companies to inform the tax administration through specific
+formats can be useful. It is recommended that gains derived from the alienation of shares of
+resident enterprises be taxed at source under certain conditions, as established in the UN Model,
+as well as the sale of shares when their value is derived from immovable property in Guatemala.
+However, to be practicable, this must be clearly set forth in Guatemalan legislation as well.
+
+
+**Dividends (Article 10)**
+
+
+75. **It is common for dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a State to be**
+**taxed at source.** The OECD and UN models suggest establishing two applicable withholding
+rates. One is a reduced rate in cases where a certain share percentage exists (usually 25 percent
+of the shareholding). In this case, both models add an anti-abuse provision establishing that
+access to the reduced rate is only granted if the shares were held for 365 days before the
+dividends were distributed (including the day of their distribution). [46] The other rate is higher and
+applies to smaller shareholdings where portfolio investments are situated.
+
+
+76. **A broad definition of dividends is necessary.** Many states include in their treaties a
+reference to the definition of dividends from their domestic legislation not only for commercial,
+but also for tax matters. The objective is to include certain types of income reclassified as such
+for the purposes of the treaty (and the agreed withholding) when applying anti-abuse rules. [47] It
+is also important for the same withholding rules to apply to the distribution of profits from the
+permanent establishment to its central office.
+
+
+**Business Profits (Article 7)**
+
+
+77. **Treaties assign the power to tax business profits, but do not define the concept.** The
+Model Conventions indicate that domestic legislation must be consulted to give the concept
+context. This usually includes commercial, industrial, agricultural, forestry, livestock, and fishery
+activities. The OECD Model also includes independent services.
+
+
+78. **Business profits are only taxed in the State of residence, except when they are**
+**attributable to a permanent establishment of another State.** The UN Model includes the
+
+
+46 The planning this seeks to prevent is artificial compliance with the shareholding days before the dividend
+distribution and the lowering of this shareholding once the dividends are distributed.
+
+47 These types of rules could not be identified in Guatemalan legislation.
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+possibility of attributing income to a permanent establishment if its parent company directly
+engages in the same activities in the State where the said permanent establishment is located
+(force of attraction rule).
+
+
+79. **The manner in which the taxable base of a permanent establishment is determined**
+**in the OECD and UN models differs.** The OECD allows for the deduction of virtual payments
+made between the permanent establishment and its parent company for interest, royalties, and
+services, whereas the UN Model does not. This approach was adopted by the OECD in 2010
+(OECD 2010) based on the assumption that the permanent establishment is, for profit (and tax
+base) attribution purposes between countries, a distinct and separate entity from its parent
+company and that such payments must have all the corresponding tax effects, such as
+deductibility. However, this approach was rejected by many countries because they were legally
+unable to make at-source withholdings for virtual payments. Neither domestic legislation nor
+existing treaties allow for this.
+
+
+80. **The LISR does not limit permanent establishment deductions for payments to its**
+**parent company.** In the absence of a restriction in treaties, the provisions of domestic legislation
+would apply. Symmetry would be restored if these virtual payments were subject to withholding.
+One way of doing this is to adjust the payment by the amount of corresponding withholding if
+the payment were made between independent parties. However, it is unclear whether the LISR
+formally permits this adjustment.
+
+
+81. **The constitution of a permanent establishment in the OECD Model is more difficult**
+**than under the UN Model.** There are two essential criteria for constituting a permanent
+establishment: (i) the existence of a fixed place of business where all or some of the business
+activities are carried out; and (ii) when dependent agents located in one State enter into
+contracts on behalf of the resident abroad or when the said agent usually plays the primary role
+of entering into routinely concluded contracts without substantial modifications by the resident
+abroad for the transfer of ownership of goods, rights of use, or service delivery. The UN Model
+includes a third assumption for constituting a permanent establishment when an insurer collects
+insurance premiums in the territory of a foreign State. Treaties should include these three
+assumptions.
+
+
+82. **Under the OECD Model, the permanent establishment as the fixed place of business**
+**must prove that it conducts** **business activities in a geographic location.** This is the case of
+construction, installation, or assembly works, which must also have a duration of at least
+12 months. Under the UN Model, the permanent establishment for the stated activities does not
+have to prove the existence of a fixed place of business, as it is in itself considered to meet this
+condition. The duration for constituting it is six months. Guatemala incorporated the UN criterion
+into the negotiation of the treaty it signed.
+
+
+83. **According to the OECD Model, independent services follow the same source**
+**taxation principles as business profits.** This position is not shared by the UN Committee of
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. According to this Committee, it is advisable
+to maintain the option of taxing at source income from independent services based simply on
+183 days of physical presence, without the need for a fixed place of business. This position
+protects the tax base of a net capital importing country and is the one adopted by the LISR and
+the treaty that was signed by Guatemala.
+
+
+**International Traffic (Article 8)**
+
+
+84. **International traffic has been traditionally taxed exclusively in the State of**
+**residence of the company operating the ships or aircraft.** Treaties normally reflect this
+position. Some countries (Greece and Panama) have a strict policy of preserving taxing rights if
+ships are registered in their territory. Pursuant to its legislation, Guatemala reserves the right to
+partially tax income attributable to the source. Signing a treaty under the terms explained would
+mean a loss of the tax base. [48]
+
+
+**Other Income (Article 21)**
+
+
+85. **Treaties normally include an article on “other income” applicable to a series of**
+**relevant items that do not fit under any other articles.** This is the case of income earned for
+free, such as donations, raffles, or lotteries, as well as income obtained through inheritance or
+legacies, the application of penal or civil clauses derived from the breach of contracts, the
+payment of damages, and some derivative financial operations that do not qualify as interest and
+that are not made in the regular course of business or as part of the corporate purpose of
+companies. The OECD Model grants exclusive taxing rights to the country of residence for this
+type of income, whereas the UN Model provides the taxing option to the source State from
+which the payments originate. Domestic legislation establishes a withholding rate of 25 percent
+on such payments, which would obviously be negotiated down in a treaty. However, it is
+important that the payments be subject to withholding.
+
+
+**Arbitration (Article 25)**
+
+
+86. **Access to arbitration is compulsory under the OECD Model.** The process would start
+at the request of the taxpayer if the MAP provided for in the Convention has not been resolved
+in two years. The UN Model considers arbitration as an alternative, but in a different way. The
+process would be initiated at the request of any of the tax authorities once three years have
+elapsed since the initiation of the MAP and grants the authorities of the states involved the
+possibility of changing the decision of the arbitration panel if they reach an agreement within six
+months of the issuance of the panel’s resolution. Many developing countries have favored the
+protection of their sovereignty and have not included compulsory arbitration in their treaties.
+This is besides the technical training deficiencies they might have in administering such
+arbitration.
+
+
+48 Articles 21 Bis 104, (a), 1 of the LISR would cease applying.
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+**Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (Article 29)**
+
+
+87. **In the recent update of the OECD and UN models, new provisions were**
+**incorporated to prevent the misuse of treaties.** These provisions reflect the agreements
+established in BEPS Action 6 (minimum standard, see Chapter VII), which eliminates treaty
+benefits when one of the main purposes of the operation is to obtain a tax benefit from the
+convention. The treaty with Mexico includes a benefit limitation clause that defines the persons
+residing in the other State who qualify for treaty benefits, excluding those with preferential
+treaties that are not of general application. This clause would not comply with the minimum
+standard established in BEPS Action 6 because it does not include a rule against intermediary
+companies [49] or a provision on the primary purpose of the operation. This means that the treaty
+must be renegotiated.
+
+
+**Non-Discrimination (Article 24)**
+
+
+88. **Non-discrimination is a principle that treaties contain** by virtue of which differential
+treatment between residents and non-residents is prohibited in various situations. The two most
+relevant situations are: (i) where the permanent establishment of a resident abroad must pay
+taxes under the same conditions as the company which is a resident of the State in which it is
+formed; and (ii) where the payments made by Guatemalans to residents of the other State must
+be deductible under the same conditions as would be applicable to residents of Guatemala,
+except that those payments abroad do not meet market prices. A treaty that includes these
+principles would result in the limitations on deductions in the legislation not being applicable to
+payments made to residents of the other contracting State given that international treaties are
+hierarchically superior to domestic legislation. This would be the case of the non-deduction of
+interest paid to foreign residents other than financial institutions (LISR, Art. 24) or the deduction
+limitations established for technical services paid abroad (LISR, Art. 21). A treaty would have this
+collection cost for Guatemala.
+
+
+**Recommendations**
+
+
+- Ensure that the decision to negotiate a treaty includes a cost-benefit study.
+
+
+- Do not enter into treaties with countries that do not have income tax because the risk of
+double taxation, the reason for such treaties, is non-existent.
+
+
+- When entering into treaties, minimize collection costs—especially with respect to higher
+withholdings—and do not accept withholding rates of zero.
+
+
+- Use the UN Model, which favors taxation at source, as an initial reference for building a
+Guatemalan model treaty.
+
+
+49 The rule denies treaty benefits when a resident company forms an enterprise in another country that has a treaty
+with a third country and the intermediary enterprise receives a payment from the third country in order to transfer
+it to the company located in the first State, with which the country from which the first payment originates does
+not have a treaty (or has a more onerous treaty).
+
+
+36
+
+
+
+- Including at-source tax on royalties
+
+
+- Agree in the treaty that the terms “interest,” “royalties,” and “dividends” are those defined in
+the domestic legislation, allowing, for example:
+
+
+ - Income from financial operations derived from debt to be treated as interest
+
+
+ - Royalty treatment to be applied to:
+
+
+ - Income from the use of standardized software
+
+
+ - Payments for specialized technical services (Art. 12A of the UN Model)
+
+
+ - The leasing of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment
+
+
+- Confirm the at-source taxation of “other income.”
+
+
+- Incorporate into treaties the permanent establishment cases defined in the legislation, except
+for preparatory or auxiliary activities.
+
+
+- Include the “force of attraction” rule for permanent establishments in respect of income
+obtained by the parent company.
+
+
+- Incorporate anti-abuse rules into treaties, in accordance with BEPS Actions 6 and 7.
+
+
+- Do not include compulsory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
+
+
+- Consider the treaty with Mexico as a good example of a treaty with a high at-source tax
+content.
+
+
+37
+
+
+
+##### **V. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT** **INVESTMENT**
+
+**Foreign Direct Investment in Guatemala**
+
+
+89. **FDI flows to Guatemala are modest, including compared to other countries in the**
+**region.** In 2019, FDI stock in Guatemala amounted to US$16.6 billion, equivalent to 20 percent of
+GDP, well below the regional average (50 percent) and even the average of low-income countries
+in Latin America (40 percent). FDI flows in recent years have followed the same pattern,
+representing less than 2 percent of GDP (2012–2019), half of the region’s average and two thirds
+of the percentage of low-income countries in Latin America.
+
+
+
+
+
+**Key FDI Determinants**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+90. **The extensive economic literature studying the factors that determine FDI flows**
+finds that tax pressure is a relevant factor, but not the most significant one. Other factors are
+frequently more prominent in explaining FDI, such as income level, market size, physical and
+human capital availability, political stability, institutional strength, and tax regime stability. [50] One
+factor in particular discussed in the literature is the potential effect of treaties for the avoidance
+of double taxation (TADT).
+
+
+50 On FDI and the level of economic development, see Eaton and Tamura (1994); Carr et al. (2001); and
+Bergstrand and Egger (2007); on institutional strength, see Globerman and Shapiro (2002); Aizenman and Spiegel
+(2002); and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007); on corruption levels, see Wei (2000); and on the development of the
+financial system, see diGiovanni (2005); Head and Ries (2008) find the development of the financial system
+significant.
+
+
+38
+
+
+
+**Double-Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment**
+
+
+91. **More and more literature has been produced in recent years on the specific impact**
+**of TADTs and FDI flows** with the understanding that, in most cases, these treaties have the
+double effect of providing legal certainty to foreign investors and reducing the tax burden in the
+host country. [51] This would, in principle, have a positive effect on FDI. The tax policy argument is
+that these treaties also have collection costs for net capital importing countries, in addition to
+administration costs, as explained earlier. It is therefore important to know how successful these
+treaties have been in increasing FDI and offsetting the adverse effect on tax revenue. The answer
+to this question is an empirical one.
+
+
+92. **TADTs can directly reduce tax revenue due to concessions on rates and the tax**
+**base.** This is particularly significant for developing countries that are net capital importers and
+normally have a fragile tax collection structure, like Guatemala (see Chapter II). Various studies
+show that TADTs reduce tax collection in developing countries (Easson 2000; Lewis 2013;
+ActionAid 2015 and 2016; Hearson and Kangave 2016; Beer and Loeprick 2018; Jansky and
+Sedivy 2018). However, the cost may be higher through indirect means since treaties, although
+bilateral by definition, open the door for third-country investors to conduct business through
+entities residing in the contracting State of the convention (Milchesen and Leduc 2021).
+Additionally, the proliferation and variety of TADTs have created a set of inconsistent rules
+allowing multinational enterprises to use opportunistic treaty shopping strategies, that is,
+intermediate investments through the most profitable treaties (Zucman 2014). For this reason,
+caution in considering the negotiation of TADTs is commonly advised (IMF 2014).
+
+
+**Empirical Evidence**
+
+
+**Literature**
+
+
+93. **Early empirical studies found that treaties have a positive effect on FDI, but the**
+**results were questioned shortly thereafter.** One of the first studies examined FDI flows to and
+from the United States for the period 1966–1992 and found that those flows are higher for
+countries with which a treaty was signed (Blonigen and Davies 2000). However, the same authors
+reconsider their results in stating that the positive effect was noticeably diluted in the more
+recent years of their study. The explanation is that the United States entered into its first treaties
+with advanced countries, whereas in subsequent years, treaties were primarily signed with
+developing countries, clearly indicating a difference in the impact treaties had depending on the
+counterparty’s level of development. A second study by the same authors, focused on
+investigating the effect of U.S. TADTs with developing countries, shows that there is no
+
+
+51 Works by Hines (1988), Janeba (1996), and Edmiston et al. (2003) show that tax complexity and uncertainty
+inhibit FDI because transaction and compliance costs rise. Lower effective tax rates have been associated with
+larger FDI flows in the empirical works of Gordon and Hines (2002) and of Mooij and Ederveen (2003).
+
+
+39
+
+
+
+significant increase in FDI flows to these economies. However, the study surprisingly finds that
+TADTs increase FDI flows _to the United States_ (Blonigen and Davies 2004).
+
+
+94. **Later studies generally have unclear or negative results.** Blonigen and Davies (2005)
+expand and update the sample of countries studied. The authors examine country pairs
+consisting of not only the United States, but also all OECD member countries and their respective
+counterparts, both advanced and developing economies, with or without a treaty, for the period
+1982–1992. Estimates indicate that treaties between an advanced country and a developing one
+are irrelevant for FDI and can even have a negative impact. More recent studies also find that
+TADTs do not affect FDI flows from advanced countries to less developed economies (Baker
+2014). In the case of the United States in particular, treaties are found to have a negative effect
+on FDI flows to those economies (Daniels and Ruhr 2015). Studies that analyze the determinants
+of FDI stock (instead of flows) tend to find that TADTs have a positive effect (Barthel et al. 2010;
+Lejour 2014). However, these estimates include FDI that may have occurred before the treaties
+entered into force.
+
+
+95. **Changes in the estimation methodology did not yield more conclusive results.**
+Estimates can sometimes be biased because they do not adequately isolate the effects that other
+policies or events, simultaneous to the ratification of the treaty, can have on FDI. To isolate this
+effect, Egger et al. (2006) compares changes in FDI between countries two years before and after
+the ratification of a TADT and the same changes between countries that did not enter into
+treaties during those same years. The results again show that the entry into force of new treaties
+has a negative effect on FDI. A study by Neumayer (2007) suggests that the number of TADTs
+signed by a country is associated with higher FDI levels, but the effect is not significant for
+poorer countries. The author notes that developing countries that sign treaties with advanced
+economies also tend to grant considerable tax incentives, separate from the treaty, which could
+distort the results.
+
+
+96. **The institutional aspect is confirmed as a determining factor of FDI.** Based on the
+income tax returns of U.S. multinational enterprises in the 1990s, Louie and Roussland (2008)
+examine FDI in foreign subsidiaries based on the TADTs in force and the indicators of corruption,
+political instability, and bureaucratic inefficiency in the host country. The results show that good
+governance simultaneously promotes FDI and the conclusion of TADTs, whereas treaties alone
+have no impact on FDI. This is especially relevant for Guatemala, which ranks very poorly on
+international indexes regarding the perception of corruption and political stability. [52]
+
+
+97. **Regional studies also generally do not establish a connection between TADT and**
+**FDI.** Assuming that countries in the same region tend to have similar development levels,
+institutional characteristics, and governance standards, these variables have a less significant
+effect in explaining FDI differences and make econometric estimates of the effect of treaties on
+
+
+52 Transparency International, _Corruption Perceptions Index 2020_ (129th out of 180 countries); Corporation for
+Excellence in Justice, _Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index 2020_ (147th out of 213 countries).
+
+
+40
+
+
+
+FDI more “pure.” In Asia’s case, Yue (2018) analyzes FDI flows to 10 ASEAN Group countries, with
+the results showing that, on average, treaties have a negative effect on FDI flows. Murthy and
+Bhasin (2015) examine the case of India and conclude that treaties do not have significant effects
+on FDI flows. Beer and Loeprick (2018) study the effect of TADTs in 41 African economies during
+the period 1985–2015 and find that treaties with countries that are considered to be financial
+centers (with low taxation) do not promote FDI, but significantly reduce tax collection in the FDI
+recipient country.
+
+
+**Some Data for Latin America**
+
+
+
+98. **The number of TADTs in force in each Latin**
+**American country does not appear to be associated**
+**with FDI amounts.** The number of current treaties for this
+group of countries varies widely, as shown in Table 7.
+Figure 6 shows the correlation between the number of
+treaties in the region’s various countries (horizontal axis)
+and the FDI stock (2019) in each one (vertical axis). The
+coefficient (measured by the slope of the red line) is very
+close to zero, suggesting that there is no major
+relationship between the two. Figure 7 shows that FDI
+mostly originates from countries without current TADTs
+(except Bolivia). This is explained in part by the fact that
+the principal investor in the zone is the United States,
+whose policy has been reluctant to enter into treaties with
+Latin American countries. [53]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+53 The United States has treaties in force with Mexico, Venezuela, and three Caribbean jurisdictions.
+
+
+41
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+99. **A recent study for Latin America concludes that treaties do not lead to greater FDI**
+**in signatory countries.** Shah and Qayyum (2015) study 15 countries in Latin America and the
+Caribbean between 1983 and 2013. The empirical model includes traditional determinants of
+FDI flows, such as the size and level of development of the economies, their degree of trade
+openness, and the level of human capital. The results show that FDI flows to the region’s
+countries are not affected by the number of signed TADTs or the ratification of new treaties.
+
+
+100. **One argument is that treaty benefits are marginal relative to the tax privileges that**
+**countries in the region offer unilaterally.** Like Guatemala, the countries studied generally offer
+relatively low withholding rates and very generous special regimes. Another explanation is that
+many Latin American countries have abundant natural resources that attract foreign investment
+regardless of the tax regime, much less a treaty. Various countries even offer (or offered) foreign
+investors tax stability agreements.
+
+
+**Recent Studies**
+
+
+101. **More recent studies, with sophisticated statistical techniques, also do not provide**
+**conclusive evidence that treaties encourage FDI in developing countries.** The methodologies
+explore data for individual enterprises or examine the effect of a treaty network. In the case of
+Swedish multinationals, the data indicate that treaties do not increase the investment of
+subsidiaries already established abroad (since before the treaty), but do raise the likelihood that
+new enterprises will enter the host country (Davies et al. 2009). A more in-depth study finds that
+TADTs can have different effects depending on the economic sector. The hypothesis is that
+TADTs are less relevant for multinationals that trade in homogenous products for which the
+transfer price is clearer and the risk of double taxation lower (Blonigen et al. 2014). However,
+
+
+42
+
+
+
+when a country with a low tax regime (including low withholding rates) stands between two
+countries with TADTs, FDI flows between these two economies increase considerably, but this
+would be due to the effect of treaty shopping (Van’t Riet and Lejour 2018; Petkova et al. 2020).
+
+
+102. **In summary**, the empirical literature suggests caution in assuming that entering into a
+TADT will have considerable effects on FDI. Box 1 supports this caution.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+43
+
+
+
+##### **VI. TRANSFER PRICES**
+
+**The Arm’s Length Principle**
+
+
+103. **The international practice is to establish in law the obligation for intra-group**
+**operations to be agreed at market prices.** The underlying risk is that conglomerate companies,
+especially transnational ones, will manipulate the value of their internal transactions to shift their
+profits to an entity subject to a lower tax burden. Both the OECD and the UN have issued
+detailed guides for determining transfer prices to prevent tax avoidance via this route (OECD
+2017a; UN 2017).
+
+
+104. **The basic principle is established in Guatemala under the Income Tax Law as the**
+**principle of “unimpeded competition” (** _libre competencia_ **)** (LISR, Art. 54). In short, it stipulates
+that, for tax purposes, the price or consideration of transactions between entities from the same
+group must be determined in the manner that would have been agreed by independent parties
+under comparable conditions, meaning at market prices. The relevant market in this context is
+that which matches the conditions in which the taxpayer in question operates and which is not
+necessarily one of “unimpeded competition.” If the taxpayer operates in oligopolistic conditions,
+for example, the transfer price that complies with the principle is one that independent parties
+would agree on in this type of market, which in this case is different from a market characterized
+by unimpeded competition. The translation of the English term “arm’s length principle” in
+Article 54, which follows the language of the Spanish OECD guidelines, is not the most
+appropriate; this report therefore refers to “ _principio de independencia_ ” in Spanish, which seems
+like a more suitable translation.
+
+
+**Burden of Proof**
+
+
+105. **The principle can operate in two ways, depending on who has the burden of**
+**proving that the principle has been met.** The legal framework can empower the tax authority
+to verify that the taxpayer complies with the arm’s length principle and, where applicable, rectify
+or adjust the taxpayer’s tax returns when it finds non-compliance. This is set forth in Article 55 of
+the LISR, but this wording places the burden of proof with the authority. Another approach is for
+the law to expressly impose on the taxpayer the obligation to comply with the arm’s length
+principle, empowering the authority to adjust the taxpayer’s tax returns if that is not the case. The
+LISR (Art. 65) requires the taxpayer to meet a documentation requirement demonstrating
+compliance with the arm’s length principle. This is an indirect way of ensuring that the taxpayer
+complies with that principle, but it is preferable for the obligation to be explicit and for the
+documentation to be an additional requirement, with its own penalties in case of
+non-compliance. [54]
+
+
+54 The recommendations in this section refer to amendments to legislation, unless it is expressly stated that the
+regulatory change can be made in the regulations to the law.
+
+
+44
+
+
+
+106. **The tax authority should be empowered to adjust the taxable income and**
+**deductions declared by the taxpayer according to the arm’s length principle.** This is
+different from the authority being able to determine or directly modify the prices of commercial
+transactions, as can be interpreted from the LISR (Art. 55). The right to free trade should prevent
+this. The recommendation is to modify the text of the Law to make it clear that the authority’s
+power is to adjust the ISR base (income less deductions) based on the market prices applicable
+to related transactions, without altering the prices agreed in contracts entered into under the
+provisions of common law.
+
+
+**Scope of the Transfer Pricing Regime**
+
+
+107. **The obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle applies in Guatemala only**
+**to transnational related operations** (LISR, Art. 56, A). This combats the higher risk of profits
+being shifted abroad and ultimately being removed from the domestic tax base. The principle
+does not apply to transactions between domestic related parties. The main reason is because the
+profits are shifted through transfer pricing between two national treasury taxpayers. The
+possibility of tax planning is thus reduced substantially but does not disappear altogether. A
+company from the domestic group can be a beneficiary of a special tax regime or may have
+losses that could be leveraged by shifting profits from related companies that are profitable. [55]
+
+
+108. **Exempting domestic businesses from the arm’s length principle opens the door to**
+**price manipulation in connection with international related operations.** One example is an
+exporting company that brings in another domestic company to sell to a related party abroad.
+The planning is done in two steps: (i) the first company sells at a transfer price below cost,
+nullifying its ISR base in Guatemala and, although this transaction is not at market price, escaping
+SAT scrutiny; and (ii) the second company, the official exporter, uses tax planning to reduce its
+cost (by buying at a low price), which serves as the basis for the “market” profit margin it must
+apply to comply with the arm’s length principle. This artificially reduces the ISR base in
+Guatemala but meets the transfer price requirements established in the Law. [56]
+
+
+109. **Some countries establish the obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle**
+**for transactions between domestic related parties.** This normally entails a high administrative
+cost for many companies, including small ones, without a major effect on total tax collection.
+Certain considerations therefore come into play. For example, the burden of proof for domestic
+related operations can be reverted to the tax authority, exempting companies from the
+obligation to provide documentation on transfer prices. This facility can be limited only to small
+
+
+55 This can be common given that Guatemala does not allow for loss carryover to be deducted in subsequent
+fiscal years.
+
+56 Tax planning can have two players. First, the biggest “value chain” risks in Guatemala shift to the first company,
+the one generating losses, meaning that the market profit margin for the second company, a low-risk,
+low-function distributor, is reduced to a very modest one. Second, the base to which the (already reduced) profit
+margin (of an independent comparable) is applied is also artificially reduced, and it is not the same to tax a profit
+of, for example, 5 percent on costs and expenses of 100 as the same percentage on 50 or 20.
+
+
+45
+
+
+
+companies that pay taxes under a simplified regime, for example, or that have annual sales below
+a certain amount. Small operations can also be exempted, regardless of the size of the company
+performing them. [57]
+
+
+**Definition and Presumption of Related Parties**
+
+
+110. **The definition of related parties in Guatemala in large part follows the international**
+**standard.** Parties are considered related when they have ownership or control linkages with a
+25-percent share threshold (LISR, Art. 56). This percentage is relatively high, but likely has no
+major consequence. [58]
+
+
+111. **The LISR deviates from the standard in limiting the Treasury’s power to adjust**
+**transfer prices only when these mean higher taxation for the taxpayer (Art. 55).** Obviously,
+the Treasury does not audit taxpayers to correct errors in their favor. The person concerned can
+correct such errors and request reimbursement of the undue payment. Nevertheless, when it
+comes to transfer prices, what must be taken into consideration is that the tax authority of the
+other country, where the operation’s related counterparty resides, can also exercise its power and
+correct transfer prices in its favor. To avoid double taxation, [59] in principle, a correlative
+adjustment should be allowed in the valuation of the related operation in the first country (if it is
+in line with the arm’s length principle), a situation that must be authorized by its tax authority. In
+Guatemala, the SAT would be unable to do this without violating the letter of Article 55 of the
+LISR. [60] This can be expected to change if a TADT comes into force.
+
+
+112. **Legislation on transfer prices normally presumes that a commercial counterparty**
+**which is a resident in a low-tax territory is a related party.** This means that these operations
+must comply with all the obligations associated with the arm’s length principle. This is a
+defensive provision to protect the country’s tax base, especially when jurisdictions that do not
+fully cooperate in exchanging information are involved. Although the international community
+has made significant progress in that respect, [61] many countries maintain this type of legal
+
+
+57 In Mexico, companies with sales under MEX$13 million (and MEX$3 million for the provision of independent
+personal services – Art. 76, Section IX, of the Mexican LISR) are not required to document transfer prices. This
+system is vulnerable to companies deciding to subdivide their operations in order to stay below the exemption
+threshold. However, this practice can be countered through general anti-abuse rules contained in Guatemala’s
+domestic legislation (LISR, Art. 61).
+
+58 The LISR (Art. 179) defines related parties without establishing a minimum share threshold. The World Trade
+Organization (Agreement on Custom Valuation) sets a 5-percent threshold, whereas the FDI classification is
+10 percent (Mesias 2015).
+
+59 This is economic double taxation, where the same income is taxed for two separate persons.
+
+60 Article 57 of the LISR, which defines the transfer pricing scope, does not contain this restriction.
+
+61 The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters backed by the OECD and the Council of
+Europe, has allowed for the exchange of information at the request of a party since 1988. In 2010, the Convention
+opened to all countries and currently has 144 signatories. More recently, a new standard was developed for the
+automatic exchange of information through the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for
+
+
+46
+
+
+
+presumption. Guatemala does not have one. [62]
+
+
+113. **This measure can be implemented in various ways.** First, it must be defined as a
+low-tax jurisdiction. This can be done based on the ISR rate of the statutory tax regime of the
+foreign country (or a percentage difference with respect to the rate of the general regime in
+force in Guatemala) or the effective rate that the company in question pays in that country. The
+first method is simpler, but may not capture the company’s real tax burden. The second is more
+precise, but also more complex because a comparison of effective tax rates requires a
+recalculation of the foreign entity’s ISR in accordance with the accounting standard and
+Guatemala’s ISR regime. Some countries simply opt for listing the countries they consider to be
+low-tax (and uncooperative), even though this strategy also has its limitations. [63] In principle, the
+presumption could admit proof to the contrary, that is, documentation on the effective
+beneficiaries of the resident entity abroad showing the lack of relationship with the resident
+entity.
+
+
+114. **In Guatemala’s case, the simpler parameter is preferable.** For example, a threshold
+could be defined for the statutory rate of a territory below which it would qualify as
+low-income. [64] One challenge in applying this presumption in Guatemala is if the taxpayer is
+subject to the simplified optional ISR regime because this might sometimes represent a very low
+effective rate on profits, whereupon the exercise loses relevance. Defining another jurisdiction as
+low-tax makes sense as long as it is a qualification relative to the regime itself. In any case, those
+subject to this optional regime also have incentives to manipulate transfer prices since their sales
+to related parties comprise the tax base in Guatemala. While the residence of a counterparty
+offers more favorable tax conditions, there will be an incentive to shift profits by undervaluing
+exports.
+
+
+115. **The combination of rules on the presumption of relationship, documentation, and**
+**deduction requirements is an important tool against profit shifting to tax havens.**
+Multinational enterprises often use tax havens with zero taxation in which to locate subsidiaries
+that market commodities produced in developing countries. This triangulation is designed to
+leave a wide profit margin in the intermediary’s country, reducing the tax base of the producing
+company by the same extent. Insofar as the exchange of information is difficult, the multinational
+enterprise can report the transaction as being between independent parties such that the
+
+
+Tax Purposes. Guatemala signed this Convention in 2012 (in force since 2017), but is classified as
+“non-compliant.”
+
+62 Article 56.B.1 of the LISR presumes that a resident and their exclusive agent or distributor abroad are related
+parties. This excludes the (most common) case of when the foreign company is the regional or global distributor
+of a set of the group’s subsidiaries.
+
+63 The list must be updated daily and runs the risk of always lagging behind and therefore being incomplete. The
+country in turn may be subject to diplomatic pressure.
+
+64 For example, if the statutory rate is lower than the rate that would represent 60 or 50 percent of Guatemala’s
+general ISR regime rate on profits from lucrative activities.
+
+
+47
+
+
+
+producing country’s Treasury cannot question the (reduced) income from foreign sales.
+Therefore, the possibility of presuming that they are related parties is important in order to
+empower the Treasury to adjust transfer prices in the event of non-compliance with the arm’s
+length principle. Furthermore, the Treasury can also determine which of the parties taking part in
+the transaction is the tested party, that is, the one required to demonstrate that, according to the
+transfer pricing method selected, its profit margin is comparable to a company with similar
+functions. [65] This would require the multinational enterprise to disclose its operations in the tax
+haven, which, if lesser as is normally the suspicion, would be remunerated accordingly, reverting
+the tax base to the producing country. In the event of a refusal to provide the corresponding
+documentation and its inaccessibility to the tax authority through country-by-country reporting
+as per BEPS Action 14 (see Chapter VI), [66] legislation can include a provision stating that
+documentation on transfer prices is a requirement for the deduction of payments to related
+non-residents.
+
+
+**Methods**
+
+
+116. **The LISR includes the five methods for assessing transfer prices contained in the**
+**applicable international guides.** **[67]** The LISR (Art. 59, 2) also establishes precedence when more
+than one method is applicable. It favors the first three methods, that is, the “traditional” ones
+(comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, and resale price), that OECD guides also formerly
+favored. This changed in 2010 when the OECD’s approach shifted to the use of the _most_
+_appropriate_ method based on the circumstances of the case. The argument is that one method is
+not better than another in the abstract, but one is more appropriate than another depending on
+the facts. The two additional methods, based on a profit indicator (transactional profit split and
+transactional net margin), have remained hierarchically equal to the traditional methods since
+then. This approach is more flexible, but also allows multinational enterprises to use the most
+efficient method for reducing the tax base as their first option.
+
+
+117. **Guatemala could keep a method hierarchy that favors only the “comparable**
+**uncontrolled price” method** limited to commodities. This is a more direct method that works
+more efficiently with homogeneous products whose price formation is transparent in
+international markets that generate public information, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
+London Metal Exchange, or Intercontinental Coffee Exchange.
+
+
+65 Normally, the party subject to this test is that which conducts the simplest activities, with fewer functions or
+assets, as is generally the case with commercial intermediaries; see OECD (2017a), paras. 3.18 and 3.19.
+
+66 Guatemala does not receive _country-by-country reports_ since it is not a member of the Inclusive Framework.
+
+67 The five methods are: comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, resale price, transactional profit split, and
+transactional net margin. The methods are sufficiently explained in the (OECD and UN) guides themselves and in
+the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2017), with a special focus on their application in developing countries.
+Some countries mention the OECD guides in their laws as a source of interpretation of their legislation on
+transfer prices. This can be appropriate for OECD member countries, which Guatemala is not. Guatemala also
+does not participate in the Inclusive Framework supported by the OECD.
+
+
+48
+
+
+
+118. **A triangulation risk is thus avoided.** It is common for the multinational enterprise to
+establish an intermediary in a low-tax jurisdiction that buys at a low price from the subsidiary in
+the producing country and resells at market price to the end customer, keeping a significant
+profit margin from the operation. One argument is that the intermediary performs sophisticated
+and risky trading (which is difficult to verify) and that the producing subsidiary is a routine,
+low-risk business because the financial arrangements with the multinational enterprise ensure
+stable and predetermined performance, such that the residual profit (the economic income of
+the business) is captured by the intermediary outside the country. These arrangements often
+have no substance and are valued using the transactional net margin method. Recording the
+aforementioned hierarchy of methods for commodities in the LISR does not mean designing a
+special or different method for them, as it seems Guatemala has done by introducing a sixth
+exclusive method for imports and exports, discussed below. [68]
+
+
+119. **The BEPS Action 10 report states that this method is generally adequate for**
+**commodities** (OECD 2015e) _._ [69] This suggests that such a method hierarchy may be useful, but as
+long as the valuation mechanics reflect the logic of the arm’s length principle, that is, that
+comparability between the reference market transaction and the related transaction is favored
+and, where applicable, the necessary adjustments are permitted to achieve comparability (OECD
+2015e, p. 51).
+
+
+**Rules for Specific Transactions**
+
+
+**Commodities**
+
+
+120. **The LISR (Art. 60) establishes a special valuation method for goods imports and**
+**exports that is (seemingly) mandatory.** **[70]** Although it is understood that the standard could
+have been introduced to regulate the (bound) commodity trade price only, [71] it applies strictly to
+all (intra-group) foreign trade in goods, overemphasizing its scope. It would have been thus even
+if it had been limited to commodities because not all are listed on an organized stock exchange
+or are significant in Guatemala’s trade. [ 72]
+
+
+68 Mexico, for instance, gives the comparable uncontrolled price method priority for all goods (LISRM, Art. 180).
+Other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador, have been stricter (albeit with
+variations) by imposing a specific reference price to valuate some commodity transactions. Argentina’s version,
+from which the name “sixth method” originates, has been criticized by those who support the traditional
+approach of the arm’s length principle. See, for example, Ariel Efraim (2013), “Argentina and the so-called ‘sixth
+method,’” _BDO Transfer Pricing News_, No. 16.
+
+69 The content of this report was reflected in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines (2017a).
+
+70 The letter of the law leaves little doubt that the method is compulsory for goods imports and exports. In
+practice, taxpayers and the authority understand that it is an additional, optional method.
+
+71 Commodity exports, which typically account for a high percentage of the total exports of low-income
+countries, are particularly vulnerable to transfer price manipulation.
+
+72 In 2021, three commodities (banana, coffee, and cardamom) accounted for 17 percent of total exports in
+Guatemala (source: Bank of Guatemala).
+
+
+49
+
+
+
+121. **The method is confusing.** It imposes a maximum price on imports in line with an
+undefined “international parameter” and establishes that the price of exports must be calculated
+according to an “international price investigation,” which is not explained. This article of the Law
+contains no decipherable method because it cannot be inferred how the price that taxpayers
+must agree to in order to comply with the law is determined.
+
+
+122. **The regulation contains some details on how to apply this transfer pricing**
+**method,** **[73]** **but these seem insufficient to provide legal certainty.** It states that, for exports,
+the reference price can be a “known listing on the international market” or “on stock exchanges.”
+These concepts could be explained in greater detail, providing examples for Guatemala’s top
+commodities (banana, coffee).
+
+
+123. **The special method under Article 60 outlines the two anti-abuse measures.** The first
+refers to transactions between related intermediaries for an independent party that only serves
+as a cover for the non-resident related party (a back-to-back type of operation) to make it seem
+like the transactions are between independent parties, free from transfer pricing obligations. The
+second refers to the listing date of the good, which should serve as a reference. [74]
+
+
+124. **Both anti-abuse measures should be reviewed.** A problem with the first rule (Art. 60,
+fourth paragraph) is that it affects every independent intermediary, without differentiating the tax
+regime of the territory in which the intermediary resides, as long as it does not have a substantial
+activity or activities there independent of the business with the Guatemalan exporter. Countries
+generally protect their taxpayers’ tax base, assuming that the non-resident counterparty is
+related when the tax regime that applies to it is one of low or zero taxation and the jurisdiction is
+not fully cooperative in disclosing the effective beneficiary of the said counterparty. These are
+easier conditions to verify compared to determining whether the third parties with which the
+intermediary transacts are related parties of the first exporter or identifying the substantial
+activity carried out by the intermediary. Another problem, by no means minor, is that the
+provision leaves out of its scope all related intermediaries that triangulate from tax havens
+operations with independent third parties, which can be a much more common situation.
+
+
+125. **The price of commodities listed on global markets fluctuates from day to day**, which
+is why the precise date on which the operation is agreed is important for determining the price
+of a transaction. [75] This can potentially be manipulated between related parties. Some countries
+have adopted a strict rule to avoid this: the reference price that must be considered is that which
+is listed on the market the day the good is shipped. Article 60 allows for some flexibility in this
+rule, since it admits a different quoted price if “...it is proven that the operation was closed on
+
+
+73 Government Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 53 and 54.
+
+74 “…will be considered as market value: 1. In the case of goods with a known international listing on the
+international market, stock exchanges...the said list value on the last day of the shipment...” (Government
+Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 54).
+
+75 The reference price can also be the average or a range during a given period.
+
+
+50
+
+
+
+another date.” The problem is whether the contract alone is proof of the date on which the price
+was agreed. The regulation provides this clarification: the price in the contract may be considered
+when it is presented, notarized, to the SAT not more than three business days after the date
+(Government Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 54). The OECD approach allows for the imposition of
+the quoted price on the shipment date when there is no evidence of the date on which the price
+was agreed (BEPS Action 8–10, p. 54).
+
+
+126. **The authority’s approach could be clearer and simpler.** First, it could make the
+comparable uncontrolled price method compulsory for some commodities only (banana, coffee,
+and fuel, for example) and eliminate the special method for goods exports and imports. Second,
+it could introduce in the standard the types of permitted comparability adjustments, which
+should reflect the price formation practices in the export or import market. To define the
+permitted adjustments, following the practices of each market, it may be worthwhile to form
+technical working groups with representatives of exporter associations, especially independent
+traders and brokers.
+
+
+**Interest**
+
+
+127. **Multinational enterprises often inflate interest payments abroad to shift profits to**
+**another destination, normally low-tax territories.** Two mechanisms can be used: (i) rates that
+are higher than market rates; or (ii) the over-indebtedness of the company subject to tax
+planning. For this reason, many countries have developed special rules to prevent abuse, besides
+transfer pricing instruments. [76] BEPS Action 4 agreed on a common strategy to combat the
+problem, recommending that countries adopt in their domestic legislations a limit on the
+deduction of interest (earnings stripping rule) of up to 30 percent of the company profits
+(EBITDA). [77] This measure would simultaneously attack the different paths to reducing the tax
+base through debt instruments and would replace separate strategies focused on limiting rates
+and the amount of debt. [78] This is a better protection mechanism than the different instruments
+the LISR provides in Guatemala.
+
+
+128. **Guatemala has various special rules for limiting the deduction of interest** (LISR,
+Art. 24). Its first “thin cap” rule limits interest deductions for any debt that is three times higher
+than the value of the taxpayer’s assets. The rule applies to all of the taxpayer’s debt, whether or
+not it is with a related party. The restriction is broad, but steers clear of circumventing the
+
+
+76 The application of the arm’s length principle to control profit shifting through debt instruments is particularly
+complex because multinational enterprises are free to establish the contractual conditions in pursuit of a desired
+tax outcome. For example, an internal loan between group subsidiaries can be arranged without a guarantee,
+whose comparable in the market attracts a high rate of interest, but this results in an artificial arrangement since
+the debt is with itself. See the Chevron Australia (2107) case: [Chevron case: ATO wins landmark transfer pricing](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)
+[case - The Tax Institute.](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)
+
+77 See OECD (2015b).
+
+78 Countries traditionally tackled this problem by regulating the interest rate through transfer pricing rules and
+the debt amount through thin cap rules.
+
+
+51
+
+
+
+provision via loans backed by a related party (back-to-back). International practice varies. For
+example, in some countries, the rule considers only long-term debt, while in others, it considers
+only debt with related parties. The rule in Guatemala is also particular because the debt-to-equity
+ratio basis is “net asset,” in principle, which in practice would allow for debt to be up to one time
+the asset amount. [79] The rule does not permit carryover of interest that is not deducted during
+the fiscal year. Various countries have abandoned this thin cap system in favor of an earnings
+stripping rule or have substantially reduced the initial debt-to-equity ratio from 3 to 1, like
+Guatemala has today (Canada, for instance, reduced it from 1.5 to 1).
+
+
+129. **The legislation also limits the maximum deductible interest rate** (LISR, Art. 24,
+second paragraph). This measure complements the thin cap regime, which only heads off
+planning by means of the excess debt amount. The limit applies to all debt operations, including
+between independent parties, and is equal to “the maximum annual simple rate determined by
+the Monetary Board for tax purposes.” The rule is excessive because it applies to market
+operations. For the purpose of related operations, although the rule is straightforward, it is also
+potentially arbitrary because it does not necessarily represent market conditions. The rule can
+also be lenient because the punitive (default) interest for debts with the Treasury is normally
+considerably higher than the interest for comparable (normal) financing operations between
+independent parties.
+
+
+130. **Another restriction in Guatemala is that interest payments abroad are deductible**
+**only if the creditor is a bank or a financial institution** regulated in the country of residence.
+All interest on loans contracted with companies residing outside the country, whether or not they
+are related, is therefore non-deductible. This is unusual. Countries typically allow for
+inter-company interest deductions and impose a tax withholding on the payment. A highly
+restrictive policy in this regard can affect FDI, which is typically financed in part with debt
+contracted with the investor group. [80] It is also true that debt between related companies is, to a
+certain extent, an invention (lending to itself) that grants tax advantages with respect to the
+contribution of capital and the payment of dividends, which are not deductible. [81]
+
+
+131. **In short, the arm’s length principle is a weak system for controlling tax planning**
+**through intra-group debt.** The international consensus is that anti-abuse rules must be
+introduced, but the ones Guatemala has in its LISR are not adequate. It would be preferable to
+replace them all with just one that simultaneously controls the abuse of rates and
+
+
+79 The definition of net asset in the LISR nevertheless seems to differ because it refers to the “book value of all
+assets owned by the taxpayer” (LISR, Art. 24, fourth paragraph).
+
+80 In 2019, around 12 percent of FDI originating from Latin America was financed through debt. For Guatemala,
+this component represented just 5 percent; see ECLAC (2021).
+
+81 Attempts to define debt versus equity for tax purposes had already been declared a failure in the 1980s in the
+United States; see Bulow et al. (1990). Difficulties in differentiating one concept from the other continue to this
+day.
+
+
+52
+
+
+
+over-indebtedness (earnings stripping rule), limiting the total interest deduction amount to
+30 percent of EBITDA, as recommended in the BEPS Action 4 report.
+
+
+**Royalties**
+
+
+132. **One of the main concerns in BEPS works was the manipulation of transfer prices in**
+**relation to intangible operations.** The valuation of intangible assets (intellectual property) is
+particularly complex because these are usually unique assets without comparables in the market.
+It is even more difficult to valuate them when they are transferred before their development
+process is complete, as is often the case inside a multinational group. Expectations of success in
+this case can be very speculative and difficult for the Treasury to verify. It is especially difficult to
+valuate an isolated intangible asset relative to the rest of the knowledge accumulated by the
+company with which intellectual property in particular can be developed. These issues enabled
+high-tech companies to shift many of their intangible assets to low-tax countries through
+intra-group transactions agreed at notoriously undervalued prices. [82] Income (royalties) from the
+use of these assets then flowed to those low-tax countries. However, this is a problem faced
+mainly by developed countries.
+
+
+133. **Developing countries also create some intangible assets**, but normally find
+themselves on the other side of the operation, as those paying the royalties. Intangible assets
+developed in countries such as Guatemala are typically national brands or other elements
+associated with a product that set it apart and give it a competitive advantage in the market (for
+example, relationship with clients). On occasion, the local subsidiary may invest its own resources
+in the development of a foreign brand, meaning that, for transfer pricing purposes, it would have
+“economic ownership” over the intangible asset, with a partial entitlement to benefits from its
+use, despite not being the legal owner of the intangible asset. In accordance with the new
+OECD guides on this topic (OECD 2015e; OECD 2018), the benefits of using an intangible asset
+must not rest solely with the legal owner, but rather be distributed between the group’s entities
+that contributed to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and
+exploitation (DEMPE) of that intangible asset.
+
+
+134. **Contributions to the development of an intangible asset registered abroad can be**
+**reflected, for example, in a lower royalty rate** that a subsidiary in Guatemala must pay to its
+parent company. This also means that if, for example, a multinational enterprise registers an
+intangible asset in Guatemala and intends to use a tax advantage without Guatemala having
+made an economic contribution to its development or administration, the other countries where
+the intangible asset’s DEMPE is verified may require income to be reallocated according to their
+
+
+82 Intellectual property was also relocated through cost-sharing agreements, by way of which the multinational
+enterprise financed the development of the intangible asset from a subsidiary residing in a low-tax country,
+whereupon the subsidiary also shared ownership and usufruct of the intangible asset (generally the right of use
+in a geographical area).
+
+
+53
+
+
+
+respective contribution, denying Guatemala the intended tax base (and the multinational
+enterprise the intended tax planning).
+
+
+135. **A frequent situation in developing countries is the intra-group disposal of national**
+**brands.** It is common for domestic capital companies with traditional brands in the domestic
+market to be acquired by multinational enterprises and for their brands to be sold to a subsidiary
+abroad. From that point forward, the resident company will pay royalties abroad, thereby
+reducing the tax base in the country of origin. Irrespective of the asymmetry that this operation
+represents in Guatemala due to the fact that capital gains are taxed at 10 percent (LISR, Art. 92)
+and profits at 25 percent (general regime), tax planning occurs if the brand selling price is lower
+than its market value at the same time as royalties are at market value. To prevent this type of
+planning, additional rules can be considered, such as favoring the financial valuation method that
+requires the net present value of the flow of royalties generated by the intangible asset to match
+the value in which the intangible asset was transferred. [83]
+
+
+136. **The restriction on royalty deductions is fairly lax (LISR, Art. 21, No. 25).** The
+standard imposes a deduction limit for this of up to 5 percent of the taxpayer’s gross income,
+without restricting the generation of this income to royalty payments. This means that the royalty
+deduction can fully eliminate the tax base for businesses that earn up to 20 percent profit from
+sales, without considering DEMPE aspects and the possible domestic origin of the intangible
+asset as well as the price at which it was transferred abroad. It is therefore recommended to
+strengthen the standard with limitations that consider these factors.
+
+
+**Services**
+
+
+137. **Intra-group services are typically subject to particular scrutiny by tax authorities.**
+From a logistical standpoint, they are a fairly straightforward way of shifting profits. The OECD
+transfer pricing guides therefore include special rules for valuating these types of transactions.
+First, it must be demonstrated that the service was actually provided. In addition, it must be
+proven that the service is a benefit for the acquiring entity and that, if the entity were
+independent, it would be willing to pay for it. Proving the above requires more than an invoice
+on the part of the service provider. Services that are not remunerable, for example, are those
+provided by the parent company to its shareholders. Once these conditions are met, the logic of
+the arm’s length principle applies like to any other related operation. Article 62 of the LISR
+imposes the charge (or price) directly on the personalized service, as would be done by
+independent parties.
+
+
+138. **The application of the arm’s length principle is hindered mainly when the service**
+**received cannot be personalized.** When the functions of an entity are supposed to be for the
+benefit or support of the group as a whole, without personalizing a particular service, the OECD
+
+
+83 Some countries have stricter measures, such as not permitting deductions for royalties paid abroad if the
+intangible asset was originally developed in the country.
+
+
+54
+
+
+
+guides accept the use of an “indirect-charge” method. This means that the operator’s costs can
+be apportioned among the group’s other entities based on the extent to which they benefit from
+its services. This method is supposed to be valid only in exceptional cases. Article 62 of the LISR
+authorizes it as long as the total consideration is distributed among the beneficiaries according
+to reasonable distribution rules (a concept that remains undefined). Given the difficulties
+traditionally encountered in verifying the expenses incurred abroad by a non-resident entity and,
+particularly, in establishing that these expenses were applicable to the resident subsidiary, some
+countries introduced rules preventing deduction of such apportioned expenses in the country. [84]
+It is particularly important in this case to apply the profit test as a defensive measure.
+
+
+139. **OECD works on BEPS offer a mechanism for simplifying compliance with the arm’s**
+**length principle in connection with some services.** The possibility of implementing a safe
+harbor for low value-added services was introduced in transfer pricing guides [85] so that such
+services could be considered valued according to this principle if the stated profit margin on
+costs and expenses did not exceed 5 percent. This simplification seems reasonable in principle,
+but, in the case of non-personalized services, expenses incurred abroad may end up being
+deductible in the country without a clear benefit for the domestic taxpayer. Introducing this
+option is not recommended for now.
+
+
+**Documentation**
+
+
+140. **The taxpayer must document compliance with the arm’s length principle.** This is
+established in Article 65 of the LISR, but has been subject to an OECD minimum standard (BEPS
+Action 13) since 2017. [86] The standard requires large multinational enterprises (with global sales
+above EUR 750 million) to provide the authority with three types of documents, namely a local
+file showing that the taxpayer’s related operations comply with the arm’s length principle, a
+master file explaining the global operations of the multinational enterprise, and a
+country-by-country report providing certain accounting details about its worldwide operations
+country by country. This latter report is a new component of the standard now available to all tax
+administrations where the multinational enterprise operates (see Chapter VII on BEPS minimum
+standards). Guatemalan legislation only mentions the first document. The country-by-country
+information could be very useful for the SAT in analyzing the risk of tax evasion by multinational
+enterprises operating in the country, information that, without the minimum standard,
+multinational enterprises did not normally agree to share with authorities other than that of the
+country of residence of their parent company.
+
+
+141. **Besides the technical study on transfer prices, the taxpayer must provide an annex**
+**to the annual affidavit containing details on transactions with related parties abroad.**
+
+
+84 Mexico had this rule in its LISR until 2014, when it was declared unconstitutional by the judicial authority.
+
+85 Such services must not be the company’s primary business, support the business, or use valuable intangible
+assets.
+
+86 OECD (2015f).
+
+
+55
+
+
+
+However, this annex does not include information on the counterparty’s country of residence,
+information that could be very useful in conducting risk analyses and guiding auditors, with a
+focus on transactions with low-tax countries. The affidavit must also include the amount of debt
+contracted with third parties and within the group, specifying the residence of the debt issuer.
+
+
+**Recommendations**
+
+
+- Introduce an explicit requirement in the law for the taxpayer to comply with the arm’s length
+principle, clearly placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer.
+
+
+- Replace the tax authority’s power to adjust the prices of related operations with the power to
+adjust taxable income and deductions according to market prices.
+
+
+- Eliminate the condition whereby the SAT can adjust transfer prices only if this increases the
+tax, while permitting the authorization of correlative adjustments that have the opposite
+effect.
+
+
+- Extend the obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle to related operations
+between resident companies, but with the burden of proof resting with the authority.
+
+
+- Alternatively consider ensuring that the option of not documenting compliance with transfer
+pricing (burden of proof) is limited to small businesses and to transactions below a certain
+value, specified in the regulation.
+
+
+- Presume that operations with low- or no-tax jurisdictions are with related parties.
+
+
+- Define low- or no-tax jurisdictions for transfer pricing purposes as those tax jurisdictions
+whose statutory ISR rate represents 60 percent or less of Guatemala’s general statutory rate.
+
+
+- Specify that the party residing in the low-tax jurisdiction is the tested party.
+
+
+- Do not allow the deduction of payments to low-tax jurisdictions unless the taxpayer provides
+documentation to comply with transfer pricing obligations.
+
+
+- Introduce higher hierarchy only for the comparable uncontrolled price method and only for
+commodities listed on a global organized market.
+
+
+- Eliminate the compulsory special method for imports and exports.
+
+
+- Permit the use of any other method aside from the five listed, as long as its results comply
+with the arm’s length principle.
+
+
+- Reformulate anti-abuse measures regarding intermediation for exports:
+
+
+ - Assume that the independent counterparty participates in the back-to-back operation
+when it resides in a low-tax jurisdiction.
+
+
+ - Assume that it is a related party when it resides in that jurisdiction, even when
+intermediating with independent clients.
+
+
+- Specify that the quoted price of the commodity will be that in effect on the shipment date in
+the absence of evidence that it was agreed on a different date.
+
+
+56
+
+
+
+- Replace the thin cap rule with a maximum interest deduction as a percentage of EBITDA
+(30 percent).
+
+
+- Eliminate the deductible interest rate limit as determined by the Monetary Board for tax
+purposes and establish that the deductible rate is that which is determined by transfer prices,
+as long as the deduction does not exceed 30 percent of EBITDA.
+
+
+- Limit the royalty deduction so that the net present value of the payment flow is consistent
+with the value at which the intangible asset was alienated, as applicable.
+
+
+- Include in the standard the DEMPE components carried out by the parties in order to
+determine the consideration for the use or exploitation of an intangible property of a
+subsidiary.
+
+
+- Do not include a safe harbor to comply with the arm’s length principle in transactions
+involving low value-added services.
+
+
+- As a condition for deducting payment for related services, introduce the profit test in the law
+stating that the service must be a taxpayer benefit and that, if the taxpayer were
+independent, it would be willing to pay for it.
+
+
+- Reformulate the transfer pricing annex to the annual affidavit so that it includes information
+on the country of residence of the related counterparty and the amount of debt with related
+parties (in addition to the interest paid).
+
+
+57
+
+
+
+##### **VII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND** **RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE** **INTERNATIONAL TAX ARCHITECTURE**
+
+**Introduction**
+
+
+142. **The international tax system inherited from the beginning of the last century**
+**proved to have major loopholes** that made it possible for multinational enterprises to avoid
+taxes on a large scale by concentrating their income in low-tax jurisdictions (OECD 2013a; IMF
+2014). The weaknesses in the concept of source and the arm’s length principle—pillars of this
+system—that allowed multinational enterprises to shift profits and erode the corporate ISR base
+(BEPS) eventually made it clear that the system needed to be repaired. The G20 therefore
+endorsed an action plan agreed within the OECD in September 2013 containing 15 specific
+actions to curb BEPS (OECD 2013b). Four of these actions or measures are compulsory for
+countries party to the agreement. These are the BEPS minimum standards. The other actions,
+although not compulsory, were introduced in the OECD guidelines or were recommended as
+best practices toward which countries should converge. A large number of countries have
+adopted them since then, as they have proven to be valuable tools in protecting the domestic tax
+base.
+
+
+143. **A large part of the analytical work on BEPS was completed in 2015,** and reports were
+published with specific recommendations for each of the 15 actions. To broaden the community
+of countries participating in the adoption of the recommended measures and in the discussion
+on pending issues, especially regarding the digital economy and the international tax system, the
+OECD backed the creation of the Inclusive Framework, a group of countries open to all those
+interested. Participation is under conditions equal to those of OECD or G20 members, with voice
+and vote on pending issues related to BEPS, but also entails the obligation to adopt minimum
+standards and consent to prior agreements on BEPS (OECD 2017b).
+
+
+144. **At present, 140 countries belong to the OECD Inclusive Framework; Guatemala is**
+**not a member.** This means that the country is kept out of discussions and decision-making on
+international taxation, while also being exempt from the obligation to adopt the BEPS minimum
+standards. In principle, this is a counterproductive position because the BEPS measures are
+designed to protect countries’ tax base. Otherwise, that is to say, where a country is a BEPS
+beneficiary that promotes harmful tax competition, that country is exposed not only to being
+identified as such, but also to potentially facing defensive measures from the rest of the
+countries (higher withholding rates, for example). Isolation in the tax community does not seem
+to be a sustainable position in the long run. This is even more true with the agreements reached
+under the Inclusive Framework in October 2021 adding additional measures to the international
+tax architecture, the so-called Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, as explained below (OECD 2020a; OECD
+2020b).
+
+
+58
+
+
+
+145. **Adopting the OECD minimum standards involves implementing four specific**
+**actions from the BEPS package, which would require Guatemala to join the Inclusive**
+**Framework.** These are as follows: Action 5, eliminating harmful special regimes and
+transparency; Action 6, introducing anti-abuse measures in treaties; Action 13,
+country-by-country reporting on multinational enterprises; and Action 14, introducing the
+mutual agreement clause in TADTs and facilitating the procedure in practice. These measures
+entail changes to domestic legislation, especially treaties. Since Guatemala does not have treaties
+in force and is not the country of residence of the parent companies of large multinational
+enterprises for the purposes of Action 14, only Action 5 could have substantial consequences in
+the short term if the OECD minimum standards were to be adopted. The minimum standards are
+analyzed in the next section, with particular attention on Action 5 regarding special regimes and
+transparency. The second section of this chapter briefly discusses the new agreed changes to the
+international tax architecture (known as Pillars 1 and 2).
+
+
+**Action 5: Combating Harmful Tax Practices**
+
+
+146. **A key concern of the OECD BEPS plan is combating aggressive tax planning by**
+**multinational enterprises**, which take advantage of loopholes in the international tax regime to
+artificially shift their income to low-tax jurisdictions. Action 5 of the BEPS plan (OECD 2015c)
+addresses the concern for two particular situations that may be harmful:
+
+
+- Tax regimes that offer advantageous conditions for companies conducting high transnational
+mobility activities and that are an incentive for artificial profit shifting;
+
+
+- Special tax treaties granted through confidential tax rulings.
+
+
+147. **The purpose of Action 5 is to establish rules for eliminating abusive tax practices**
+**encouraged by unfair tax competition between countries, which ultimately ends up being**
+**negative for the set of countries.** **[87 ]** This does not mean eliminating preferential tax regimes, but
+rather creating conditions that will prevent them from being an incentive to engage in harmful
+tax practices. The two key concepts used to distinguish harmful regimes are: (i) substantial
+activity, where the company benefiting from a preferential tax regime has a substantial economic
+activity in the country granting preferential treatment; and (ii) transparency, where the
+preferential tax regimes granted to companies, even those contained in tax rulings, are known to
+other tax administrations.
+
+
+148. **Action 5 is subject to a review by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP).** This
+peer review examines whether current regimes comply with these two aspects of the minimum
+standard, that is, that they are not harmful and that they are transparent, both in the design of
+
+
+87 Some analysts argue that tax competition between countries is healthy to a certain point and promotes
+efficiency with states providing their services. In other words, it would help keep the tax burden closer to optimal
+levels because governments would have a natural tendency to tax and spend more; see, for example, P. Kehoe
+(1989).
+
+
+59
+
+
+
+the rules and in their practical application. [88] When the regime is not compliant, it is
+called “non-compliant” or “largely non-compliant.” In that case, the country must commit to
+eliminating the regime or modifying it so that it stops being harmful (or ultimately expose itself
+to defensive measures taken by the community of countries). Although Guatemala is not a
+member of the Inclusive Framework, it can also be subject to review by the FHTP if a member
+country reports that it is a “relevant” jurisdiction for the Forum’s work (OECD 2019, p. 11).
+
+
+149. **The Action 5 report establishes the criterion for determining cases in which a tax**
+**regime should be considered preferential and potentially harmful.** **[89]** Special tax regimes can
+be harmful based on five key factors: [90]
+
+
+- Reduced or no effective tax on geographically mobile activities or services
+
+
+- Access to the regime only for residents abroad (ring-fencing)
+
+
+- Lack of transparency regarding regime conditions
+
+
+- Lack of an effective exchange of information in relation to the regime and its beneficiaries
+
+
+- The regime does not require substantial activity in the territory
+
+
+150. **The main concern under Action 5 is that these regimes can benefit “geographically**
+**mobile” activities, such as service or financial businesses.** In other words, the tax benefit is
+available for activities that can be formally shifted from one territory to another at a low cost and
+that do not need an extensive business structure to operate. The mere registration of the legal
+ownership of an intangible asset would also qualify as such.
+
+
+151. **The risk is that an entity from a multinational group with little physical presence in**
+**a country will record disproportionate income there.** This would violate the basic principle of
+the current international tax system where income is reported (and taxes are paid) in a manner
+aligned with the business activities of those who generate that income. Therefore, to rule out the
+harmful effects of a regime, the “nexus” condition must be met, which requires substantial
+economic activity in the territory in which the multinational enterprise reports its income, such
+
+
+88 The FHTP has reviewed close to 300 special regimes in more than 70 countries. A good number of them have
+been abolished or modified. OECD (2022).
+
+89 The criterion stems from the OECD (1988) _._
+
+90 Five other factors would also help determine whether a tax regime is harmful: (i) an artificial definition of the
+tax base; (ii) failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; (iii) foreign source income exempt from
+residence country tax; (iv) negotiable tax rate or tax base; and (v) existence of secrecy provisions. The concept is
+applicable to a preferential regime for a group of taxpayers or to the general regime of a territory, where it
+charges low or no tax and has any of the additional features.
+
+
+60
+
+
+
+that the tax bases cannot be artificially shifted from countries where the value is created to other
+countries with lower tax pressure. [91]
+
+
+152. **The tax benefits for manufacturing activities would normally not be referred to as**
+**harmful.** These activities involve moving fixed assets and production capacity from one country
+to another, meaning that they would not normally qualify as geographically mobile activities.
+These activities would by definition meet the condition of substantial activity. In sum, the OECD
+does not intend for countries to abandon their preferential regimes, but rather to apply them
+only when entities conduct a substantial economic activity in the territory in question that
+justifies the income they report there.
+
+
+**Box 2. Preferential Regimes That Could Be Harmful**
+
+- _Headquarters regimes_ . The main activity is the managerial control or coordination of a group of resident
+enterprises in different countries. The substance test must indicate key actions in the generation of income and in
+decision-making on the management of expenses and investments on behalf of the rest of the group’s entities.
+This is a particularly complex test to oversee.
+
+
+- _Distribution regimes_ for group enterprises. The activity could also be the centralized distribution of finished
+products to end customers.
+
+
+- _Service center regimes_ for other group enterprises or the provision of support and administrative services. The
+substance test in these cases must consider the existence of product transportation and storage activities and the
+management of stocks and orders.
+
+
+- _Financing or leasing regimes_ . The substantial activity must demonstrate that the following are carried out in the
+territory: the negotiation of financing terms, the identification and acquisition of assets to be financed, the
+determination of financing terms, agreement monitoring and review, and risk management.
+
+
+153. **Another concern under BEPS Action 5 is that countries grant tax benefits to**
+**taxpayers individually in a confidential manner.** This usually occurs through the issuance of a
+tax ruling that has the force of law, despite being applicable only to the benefited taxpayer (or
+group of taxpayers). The lack of transparency in granting such benefits is considered to be a
+harmful tax practice that will have to be eliminated in accordance with the minimum standard
+established by the BEPS Action. This would be eliminated through the spontaneous exchange of
+information on relevant tax rulings. These rulings include the following:
+
+
+- Advance pricing arrangements (APAs), which establish what criteria should be applied to the
+arm’s length principle to valuate related transactions that a taxpayer performs during a
+period of time.
+
+
+91 One type of harmful preferential regime to which the BEPS report draws special attention is related to
+intellectual property (such as patents or software; brands, however, cannot benefit from such preferential
+regimes). This regime imposes a low tax rate on income generated from the use of an intangible asset registered
+in the jurisdiction in which the owner resides, without that asset having been developed in the territory. To verify
+the nexus in this case, the taxpayer’s expenses for the development and administration of these intellectual
+property assets must be identified. In the absence of significant expenses, the registration is opportunistic for the
+sole purpose of taking advantage of the tax benefit (called “patent boxes”).
+
+
+61
+
+
+
+- Rulings on permanent establishments, that is, if the activities of a non-resident in the country
+meet (or do not meet) the assumptions for consideration as a permanent establishment.
+
+
+154. **As explained in Chapter II, Guatemala has various significant preferential regimes.**
+These include the free-trade zone, free zone, and maquiladora regimes. All grant a full ISR
+exemption for 10 years, among other tax benefits. [92] Most of the beneficiaries are commercial
+companies or manufacturers operating with employees, assets, and inventories, thus fulfilling the
+condition of substantial activity and the nexus principle. However, the regulation enables the
+benefits to cover a wide range of services, [93] which are not always strictly defined, and the control
+and monitoring mechanisms deployed by the authorities, although improved, are still deficient.
+This can be problematic.
+
+
+155. **Guatemala’s SAT is empowered to issue both types of rulings that, under Action 5,**
+**should be subject to exchange with other administrations.** In both cases, these rulings are
+confidential and binding on the authority, which the SAT should make known through the
+spontaneous exchange of information with the authorities in the place of residence of the related
+parties with which the taxpaying entity in Guatemala transacts. [94] If it fails to meet this standard
+set forth in Action 5, Guatemala could be subject to defensive measures taken by the community
+of countries (OECD 2015c). One way of meeting it, however, is to make the rulings public.
+
+
+**BEPS Minimum Standards and Treaties (Actions 6 and 14)** **[95]**
+
+
+**Prevention of Treaty Abuse (Action 6)**
+
+
+156. **BEPS Action 6 is designed to prevent certain types of abuse of TADTs** (OECD 2015d).
+The benefits granted by a bilateral treaty can be (unduly) extended to residents of third countries
+through investments that they make in one of the contracting countries. Such investments are
+typically located in low-tax countries, especially as concerns withholdings on payments abroad,
+for the express purpose of brokering flows to the ultimate beneficiary, an entity or person
+residing in another country without a treaty.
+
+
+157. **A large number of countries traditionally protected their network of treaties with**
+**anti-abuse clauses.** They did not always do this, however, and many others, especially
+developing countries, did not take the precaution of doing so to ensure that the ultimate
+beneficiary of the payment that originated from and was sourced in one of the contracting
+
+
+92 Decree 22 – 73 (ZOLIC), Art. 32; Decree 29 – 89 (Maquila), Art. 12bis(d); Decree 65 – 89, Art. 22(b). Companies
+are suspected of renewing the exemption by changing their business name when the first exemption period
+expires.
+
+93 Only the free-trade zone decree prohibits financial services; Decree 65 – 89, Art. 41(aa); see footnote 11.
+
+94 In 2015, Action 5 made it a requirement to exchange rulings issued from 2010 onwards that were in force in
+2014. Something similar can be expected if the rule were to be applied to Guatemala, that is, having to share
+rulings in force that were issued up to five years before the country agreed to apply the measure.
+
+95 This topic was already discussed to some extent in Chapter IV on treaties. However, this chapter is presented
+such that it can be read in isolation from the rest of the report.
+
+
+62
+
+
+
+countries was actually a resident of the other contracting country. The BEPS minimum standard
+allows the gap in existing treaties to be filled. The origin of FDI is an indicator of intermediation
+and a sign of caution. In a low-tax territory with large FDI inflows and outflows representing a
+very high proportion of domestic GDP (e.g., Cyprus, Luxembourg, Holland, or Switzerland), the
+risk is that the investment may actually originate from another country and the treaty is being
+misused. [96]
+
+
+_**The Minimum Standard**_
+
+
+158. **The BEPS report recommends that countries use a three-pronged strategy to**
+**combat treaty abuse.** This recommendation draws on the countries’ best practices and includes:
+
+
+- The inclusion of text in the preamble of treaties stating that the intention of the contracting
+countries is to prevent tax avoidance or evasion opportunities;
+
+
+- The use of the limitation on benefits (LOB) test to ensure that treaty privileges are limited
+only to residents of the contracting countries that meet certain requirements; and
+
+
+- The use of the principal purpose test (PPT), which denies treaty benefits if one of the
+principal purposes of the investor’s trade arrangement is to obtain the said benefits (OECD
+2015d, p. 18, para. 19).
+
+
+159. **The PPT and LOB methods have their strengths and weaknesses.** The main advantage
+of the LOB is that it provides greater certainty and is easier to administer. This method entails a
+specific criterion for determining whether the taxpayer qualifies for treaty benefits, such as the
+taxpayer’s legal nature and the activities the taxpayer carries out in the other contracting State.
+The weakness of this approach is that it does not anticipate all types of treaty abuse schemes.
+The PPT, meanwhile, examines the purpose of a business arrangement, whose interpretation is
+largely discretionary. This means that there is greater flexibility, but also the risk of
+inconsistencies in the analysis of various countries. By the same token, a transnational trade
+arrangement could pass one test and fail the other (Herzfeld 2016).
+
+
+160. **The LOB has various advantages over the PPT in terms of simplicity and**
+**administration.** The burden of proof rests with the authority in the case of the PPT. With the
+LOB, the tax authority only needs information from the payor of the dividends, interest, or
+royalties to determine whether the non-resident qualifies as a treaty beneficiary. The authority
+should then be able to confirm the information directly with the competent authority of the
+other country. The LOB is generally more appropriate for developing countries with few
+administrative resources.
+
+
+96 Treaty abuse can include round-tripping, when the country’s residents register a business abroad to make
+investments from there in their own country and thus obtain the treaty benefits as if though they were residents
+of the other contracting State; see Balabushko et al. (2019).
+
+
+63
+
+
+
+**Better Dispute Resolution Effectiveness (Action 14)**
+
+
+_**Mutual Agreement Procedure**_
+
+
+161. **Treaties normally contain a clause on the mutual agreement procedure to resolve**
+**differences in the interpretation of the treaty.** The problem that arises in these procedures is
+that, in practice, it takes a long time to resolve them. The BEPS project planned to solve the
+uncertainty that these lengthy procedures cause. The measures recommended in the BEPS report
+promote expeditious resolutions so that the procedure is effective (OECD 2015g).
+
+
+162. **The minimum standard requires countries to include Article 25(1)–(3) of the**
+**OECD Model in their treaties.** This article offers a mechanism for the competent authorities of
+the contracting countries to resolve differences in the interpretation or application of the same
+treaty. The main objective of the procedure is to ensure that taxpayers entitled to treaty benefits
+are not taxed under terms that differ from those set forth in the treaty. This minimum standard is
+reviewed by panels comprising representatives of authorities from other countries that are
+members of the Inclusive Framework (peer reviews). [97]
+
+
+_**Arbitration**_
+
+
+163. **Action 14 also proposes compulsory arbitration as an option for expeditious**
+
+**dispute resolution.** However, there is no consensus among OECD and G20 countries as to the
+
+use of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism between contracting states as concerns
+
+double taxation. [98] Although arbitration may be very beneficial for countries in which proceedings
+
+have remained unresolved for a long time, other countries have had some success in resolving
+
+them relatively quickly. For a country without experience, such as Guatemala, arguments can be
+
+made for either. For now, there are no problems to resolve, but once the first challenging cases
+
+arise, the country’s lack of experience can weigh against it and investors will demand arbitration.
+
+
+164. **Some analysts have reservations about the use of compulsory arbitration because it**
+
+**can be a limitation on the scope of national sovereignty.** **[99]** Arbitral rulings are also
+
+confidential and do not set a legal precedent, which is why they do not necessarily provide legal
+
+certainty to the resolution system. One option is to allow SAT staff to gain experience and take
+
+training first by negotiating mutual agreements with counterparties and to defer the adoption of
+
+an arbitration clause until future treaties. This minimum standard would require the SAT unit in
+
+charge of international taxation to be strengthened.
+
+
+97 Examples of aspects measured during the reviews include the number of MAPs submitted, resolved, rejected,
+and pending resolution as well as the required resolution time. Country reports resulting from these reviews are
+published by the OECD.
+
+98 Tax Certainty, IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers, March 2017, p. 57.
+
+99 BEPS Monitoring Group, Explanation and Analysis of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty.
+
+
+64
+
+
+
+**Transfer Pricing Documentation: Country-by-Country Reporting**
+**(Action 13)**
+
+
+**Who and What**
+
+
+165. **The new documentation requirements for multinational enterprises to report some**
+**of their accounting figures country by country are instrumental in the BEPS project** (OECD
+2015f). By participating in the project, Guatemala would receive worldwide information from
+multinationals operating in the country with global sales of more than EUR 750 million annually,
+which would have to collect and exchange similar information from multinationals whose parent
+company resides in the country (probably none that meet the threshold). The information
+exchanged would be in country-by-country (CbC) format and would include details such as
+income, earnings before taxes, income tax payable and paid, number of employees, declared
+capital, retained earnings, and tangible assets.
+
+
+166. **The model legislation drafted to this end requires the parent company of the**
+**multinational enterprise to provide CbC information in the jurisdiction in which it resides.**
+Countries participating in this arrangement have developed a package of measures to
+
+automatically exchange information from CbC reports. [100] Their implementation entails meeting
+confidentiality requirements. [101]
+
+
+**Surrogate Parent Company**
+
+
+167. **Under the rules, the parent company of the multinational enterprise can designate**
+**another group entity, which is a resident in another country, as that which is responsible**
+**for submitting CbC documentation on behalf of the global company.** **[102]** This option prevents
+the multinational enterprise from having to provide information in multiple countries if the
+parent company resides in a country that does not require this documentation. The “surrogate
+parent entity” is a group entity appointed by the parent company as the sole surrogate for
+CbC reporting purposes.
+
+
+**Implementation and Monitoring**
+
+
+168. **Countries must legislate to require their taxpayers to provide the authority with a**
+**CbC report if they are the parent company of a global operation with sales greater than**
+**the established threshold.** This must be legislated even when there are no taxpayers in the
+jurisdiction that meet that condition. Moreover, countries must sign the Multilateral Competent
+Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports requiring them to
+
+
+100 Ibid., p. 23.
+
+101 Ibid, p. 23, para. 60. Guatemala will have to undergo a review by the OECD to ensure that the reporting
+systems used by the tax authority meet the confidentiality requirements.
+
+102 Ibid., p. 39.
+
+
+65
+
+
+
+exchange the information obtained with other tax authorities. Inclusive Framework countries are
+subject to an annual peer review to verify the correct implementation of the standard. The review
+covers three main areas: regulations and administrative systems through which CbC obligations
+are put into practice, the mechanics of exchanging CbC reports, and report confidentiality and
+appropriate use.
+
+
+**New Changes to the International Tax System**
+
+
+169. **The Inclusive Framework coordinated by the OECD has identified serious challenges**
+**due to the digitalization of the global economy past the BEPS project.** To overcome those
+challenges, this community of countries has agreed to introduce new international taxation rules
+based on two fundamental pillars, namely Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. A timeline has also been
+established for adopting this strategy between 2023 and 2024.
+
+
+170. **The international tax system reform contained in Pillar 1 would redistribute a**
+**portion of the tax base for income earned by multinational enterprises.** In general, this pillar
+will expand taxing rights to jurisdictions with a market presence, even if dealt with remotely,
+instead of attributing that right solely to jurisdictions of residence or source according to
+traditional international tax principles. Although the initial concern of Pillar 1 were automated
+digital services and remote consumer-oriented businesses, the scope of the new system has
+been expanded to include most businesses, excluding some financial institutions and extractive
+companies. The new regime will apply to companies of a certain global size.
+
+
+171. **Pillar 2 is focused more directly on tax competition in the broader sense, putting a**
+**floor on the IRS rate that countries could allow their taxpayers.** Irrespective of the challenges
+and pressures caused by many factors leading to the erosion of the tax base and profit shifting,
+Pillar 2 would ensure that multinational enterprises with income above EUR 750 million pay at
+least a minimum level of tax, most importantly, in each of the countries in which they operate,
+even when the domestic regime does not impose them.
+
+
+**Pillar 1**
+
+
+172. **The objective of Pillar 1 is to assign some of the income earned by large**
+**multinational enterprises to jurisdictions where they have a significant market presence.**
+The target are multinational enterprises with global turnover greater than EUR 20 billion annually
+and profitability above 10 percent. The agreement is for the first threshold to be reduced to
+EUR 10 billion eight years after the entry into force of the regime. For now, in its initial phase,
+Pillar 1 is estimated to affect around 100 international companies, [103] a large number of them in
+the high-tech sector. The reallocation of the ISR base is also projected to benefit mainly
+high-income countries where the largest markets are located. In any case, developing countries
+
+
+103 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Addressing the tax challenges arising from the
+digitalisation of the economy, July 2021; p. 14; in [Highlights brochure: Addressing the tax challenges arising from](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-addressing-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf)
+[the digitalisation of the economy, July 2021 (oecd.org).](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-addressing-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf)
+
+
+66
+
+
+
+could see their tax base expanded insofar as they are also the final destination market for remote
+digital services, which are not currently subject to ISR.
+
+
+173. **Pillar 1 establishes three types of income (amounts) that can be reallocated for**
+**taxation in market jurisdictions:**
+
+
+- _**Amount A**_ **:** This is the amount of operating profit that would be allocated to market
+jurisdictions, even if the multinational enterprise has no physical presence. This exercise
+therefore introduces a new assumption on granting a country taxing power that differs from
+the traditional concepts of residence and source. A jurisdiction is eligible (qualified) to receive
+an allocation of Amount A if the multinational enterprise earns income there above
+US$1 million. This threshold is reduced to EUR 250,000 for jurisdictions whose GDP is below
+EUR 40 billion. Amount A subject to redistribution between all group entities (and countries
+in which it operates) will be 25 percent of the multinational enterprise’s global “residual”
+profits, that is, profits exceeding 10 percent of income. Amount A allocated to each country
+will be determined in accordance with a formula (still under discussion) likely based largely
+on the value of sales in each jurisdiction.
+
+
+- _**Amount B**_ **:** This is remuneration to the qualified market jurisdiction for marketing and
+distribution by multinational enterprises in that jurisdiction. In some cases, Amount B would
+provide remuneration to distributors (subsidiaries or permanent establishments) when
+dealers purchase merchandise from related parties for resale. How Amount A and B
+allocations will interact has not been finalized yet. This allocation (as well as from Amount C)
+will follow current transfer pricing rules under the traditional principles of source according
+to physical presence.
+
+
+- _**Amount C**_ **:** Discussions to define Pillar 1 acknowledged the possibility of windfall profits
+(those additional to routine profits) for marketing and distribution activities carried out in a
+qualified market jurisdiction. These additional profits are identified as amounts that would
+arise in the context of dispute resolution between the jurisdiction of residence of a
+multinational enterprise and a qualified market jurisdiction.
+
+
+174. **The implementation of Pillar 1 will require changes to domestic legislation and**
+**international treaties.** A multilateral agreement (MLA) is proposed for such changes to
+simultaneously implement Amount A in treaties and avoid countless bilateral negotiations. This
+involves introducing new rules for the identification of qualified market jurisdictions, eliminating
+double taxation with respect to Amount A, and facilitating the exchange of information, thus
+coordinating the resolution of disputes related to Pillar 1. The MLA would require signatory
+jurisdictions to eliminate all income taxes (on gross income or equivalent) on digital services and
+similar unilateral measures (which is not the case for Guatemala). Failing this (and if no
+commitment is made to adopt this type of tax in the future), the multinational enterprises would
+be outside the scope of Amount A in the country in question.
+
+
+67
+
+
+
+**Pillar 2**
+
+
+175. **Generally speaking, Pillar 2 establishes a global minimum tax threshold of**
+**15 percent, applicable to multinational enterprises with consolidated income above**
+**EUR 750 million** (according to consolidated financial statements). The global minimum tax rules
+(Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal – GLoBE) would also provide a _de minimis_ exclusion in
+jurisdictions where the multinational enterprise has income of less than EUR 10 million and
+profits of less than a million.
+
+
+176. **The new global minimum tax standard would be implemented under three types of**
+**rules. The following list shows the order in which they would apply:**
+
+
+_(i) Subject to tax rule (STTR):_ would allow developing countries (World Bank definition) to
+eliminate benefits granted under a treaty (reduction of withholding rates) to non-residents if they
+tax income paid to their residents at a rate below 9 percent.
+
+
+_(ii)_ _Income inclusion rule (IIR):_ allows the jurisdiction of residence of the parent entity of the
+multinational enterprise to impose an additional tax on the income of a constituent entity
+(subsidiary or permanent establishment) when they are subject to an effective ISR rate below
+15 percent in the country in which they operate. This additional tax applies in the fiscal year in
+which the profit is generated, regardless of when it is repatriated to the parent company.
+Moreover, the tax would follow the individual country-by-country rate and not be based on the
+rate the multinational enterprise pays on average.
+
+
+_(iii)_ _Undertaxed payments rule (UTPR):_ would make it possible to deny deductions in a jurisdiction
+in which resides a constituent entity of a multinational enterprise that makes a payment to
+another subject to low taxes (less than the minimum), provided that its parent company (or
+intermediate holding company) does not charge an additional tax (top-up tax) under the IIR
+because the jurisdiction of the parent company (or intermediate holding company) has not
+adopted Pillar 2 in its legislation.
+
+177. **The GloBE rules provide an exception.** Subsidiary profits representing up to 10 percent
+of the payroll and 8 percent of the tangible assets of the subsidiaries are excluded from the
+minimum tax base. These percentages will be reduced annually to a margin of 5 percent for both
+in ten years. This exclusion follows the idea of protecting the flexibility of the tax policy (up to a
+limit) in countries that host investments representing substantial economic activity,
+demonstrated for purposes of this rule by the use of tangible assets and the employee payroll.
+Taxes on income in excess of those margins (and taxed at a rate below 15 percent) interact as
+follows: the jurisdiction of the parent company would collect first (IIR), followed by the
+jurisdiction that hosts the related entities with which it does business if the country were to waive
+
+
+68
+
+
+
+its claim to the difference between the minimum and the current tax in the entity of the affected
+subsidiary (UTPR). [104]
+
+
+**Effects on Guatemala of the Entry into Force of Pillar 2**
+
+
+178. **The implementation of Pillar 2 in Inclusive Framework countries can have an impact**
+**on Guatemala.** If the subsidiaries of the multinational enterprise with income above
+EUR 750 million do not pay 15 percent effective ISR, the difference would be collected by the
+jurisdictions in which the parent company resides or, in second place, the countries in which the
+group’s other subsidiaries reside if they had regional control over the subsidiary in Guatemala. In
+other words, if Guatemala does not charge multinational enterprises 15 percent ISR, other
+countries will for income generated (and declared) in the country. [105]
+
+
+179. **In principle, this reduces the advantages of Guatemalan free-trade zones and other**
+**tax incentives designed to attract investment from multinational enterprises with income**
+**above EUR 750 million.** These advantages would be reduced or even eliminated if the country
+where the parent company resides had to pay that difference. This would affect not only
+companies benefiting from exemptions, but possibly also companies opting for the simplified
+optional regime. The FDI promotion strategy used by Guatemala would therefore have to be
+rethought. However, as explained, the global minimum tax applies from a certain profit margin
+onward. If the profit margin declared by foreign investors in Guatemala is usually less than
+5 percent on payroll and tangible assets, the rule will not affect it. It will also not affect
+international investors whose global income is below EUR 750 million. [106]
+
+
+**Recommendations**
+
+
+- Participate in the Inclusive Framework.
+
+
+- Adopt BEPS minimum standards.
+
+
+- Consider establishing a minimum tax of 15 percent on activities affected, where applicable,
+by the implementation of Pillar 2 agreed under the Inclusive Framework.
+
+
+104 The right to charge tax based on the UTPR would require coordinating the different authorities of the
+countries that host subsidiaries of the company subject to the minimum tax, which would be achieved through
+an allocation formula according to the proportion of assets and personnel employed in each country. This rule
+continues to be under discussion as part of the Inclusive Framework.
+
+105 If Guatemala establishes a “differential tax” between the tax charged and the 15-percent minimum tax, the IIR
+and UTPR will not be applicable.
+
+106 There is no record for Guatemala in the aggregated database of country-by-country reports for 2017 (last
+available). See: [https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=CBCR_REQ. The database has some limitations, as](https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fqdd.oecd.org%2Fsubject.aspx%3FSubject%3DCBCR_REQ&data=05%7C01%7CRSchatan%40imf.org%7C59afe2bce478433d731d08da1e2b2484%7C8085fa43302e45bdb171a6648c3b6be7%7C0%7C0%7C637855467886790290%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=6pukLa%2Fx0oRO34poGw0KA84T80tvwjxTrHQpR2dNM2s%3D&reserved=0)
+explained at: _[Important disclaimer regarding the limitations of the Country-by-Country report statistics](https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/anonymised-and-aggregated-cbcr-statistics-disclaimer.pdf)_ (oecd.org).
+
+
+69
+
+
+
+##### **REFERENCES**
+
+ActionAid (2015). Levelling Up: Ensuring a fairer share of corporate tax for developing countries.
+ActionAid (2016). Mistreated: The tax treaties that are depriving the world’s poorest countries of
+
+vital revenue.
+Aizenman, J. and M. M. Spiegel (2002). Institutional Efficiency, Monitoring Costs, and the
+
+Investment Share of FDI, NBER Working Paper No. 9324.
+Baker P.L. (2014). An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct
+
+Investment. _Int J Econ Bus_ 21(3):341–77.
+Balabushko, O., S. Beer, J. Loeprick, F. Vallada (2019). The Direct and Indirect Costs of Tax Treaty
+
+Policy, Policy Research Working Paper 7982, World Bank Group.
+World Bank (2021). Informal Economy Database.
+
+[https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/informal-economy-database](https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/informal-economy-database)
+Barthel F., Busse M., Neumayer E. (2010). The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign
+
+Direct Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data. _Contemp Econ Policy_
+28(3):366–77.
+Bénassy-Quéré, A., Coupet, M., Mayer, T. (2007). in press. Institutional determinants of foreign
+
+direct investment. World Economy.
+Beer, S., Loeprick, J. (2018). The Cost and Benefits of Tax Treaties with Investment Hubs: Findings
+
+from Sub-Saharan Africa. IMF Working Paper.
+Bergstrand, J.H., Egger, P., (2007). A knowledge-and-physical-capital model of international trade
+
+flows, foreign direct investment, and multinational enterprises. _Journal of International_
+_Economics_, 73(2), 278–308.
+Blonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2000). The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity, NBER
+
+Working Paper. No. 7929.
+Blonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2004). The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity.
+
+_International Tax and Public Finance_ 11(5):601–22.
+Blonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2005). Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? In:
+
+Choi EK, Hartigan JC (eds) Handbook of International Trade, Vol. II. Blackwell, London, pp.
+526–46.
+Blonigen B.A., Wang M.G. (2004). Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries in
+
+Empirical FDI Studies. NBER Working Paper, No. 10378.
+Blonigen B.A., Oldensky L., Sly N. (2014). The Differential Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties. _Am Econ_
+
+_J Econ Pol_ 6(2):1–18.
+Bulow, I. Jeremy, Lawrence H. Summers and Victoria P. Summers (1990). Distinguishing Debt
+
+from Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in John B. Shoven et al. (eds.), Debt, Taxes and
+Corporate Restructuring, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
+Carr D., Markusen J.R., Maskus K.E. (2001). Testing the knowledge capital model of the
+
+multinational enterprise. _Am Econ Rev_ 91:693–708.
+[The Tax Institute (2017). Chevron case: ATO wins landmark transfer pricing case Chevron case:](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)
+
+[ATO wins landmark transfer pricing case - The Tax Institute](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)
+
+
+70
+
+
+
+Daniels J.P., Ruhr M.B. (2015). Tax Treaties, Tax Holidays, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
+
+Financing Modes. _Int Tax Public Finance_ 22(6):999–1027.
+Davies R.B., Pehr-Johan N., Tekin-Korun A. (2009). The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational
+
+Firms: New Evidence from Microdata. _World Econ_ 32(1):77–110.
+de Mooij R.A., Ederveen S. (2003). Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of
+
+Empirical Research. _Int Tax Public Finance_ 10:673–93.
+diGiovanni J. (2005). What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A activity and
+
+financial deepening. _J Int Econ_ 65:127–49.
+Easson A. (2000). Do we still need tax treaties? _Bull Int Fiscal Doc_ 54:619–25.
+Eaton, J., Tamura, A., (1994). Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japanese and U.S. Trade and Direct
+
+Foreign Investment Patterns. _Journal of the Japanese and International Economies_ 8, 478–
+510.
+Edmiston K., Mudd S., Valev N. (2003). Tax Structures and FDI: The Deterrent Effects of
+
+Complexity and Uncertainty. _Fiscal Stud_ 24:341–59.
+Egger P., Larch M., Pfaffermayr M., Winner H. (2006). The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on
+
+Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence. _Can J Econ_ 39:901–31.
+FAD (2016). Guatemala. Improving Collection with Equity and Efficiency. Ricardo Fenochietto,
+
+Valentina Flamini, Edgar Morales, and Carlos Pérez Trejo.
+FAD (2017). Guatemala. Sector Informal, Programación de Ingresos, Incentivos Tributarios y
+
+Recaudación del Agro. Ricardo Fenochietto, Mauricio Soto, Antonio Ansón, Carlos Pérez
+Trejo, and María Concepción Carrera.
+IMF (2014). Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation. International Monetary Fund,
+
+Washington D.C.
+IMF (2021). Guatemala. 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement
+
+by the Executive Director for Guatemala.
+[https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GTMEA2021001.ashx](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GTMEA2021001.ashx)
+Gordon R., Hines J.R. (2002). International taxation. In: Auerbach AJ, Feldstein M (eds) Handbook
+
+of Public Economics, vol. 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
+Globerman, S., Shapiro, D. (2002), Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of
+
+Governance Infrastructure, World Development, 30, 11, 1899–919.
+Head, K., Mayer, T., & Ries, J. (2008). FDI: as an outcome of the market for corporate control.
+
+_Journal of International Economics_, 74, 2–20.
+Hearson M., Kangave J. (2016). A Review of Uganda’s Tax Treaties and Recommendations for
+
+Action. International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper No. 50. Institute of
+Development Studies, Brighton.
+Hearson M. (2015). Introductory Note on the Action Aid Tax Treaty Data Set.
+
+11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf (un.org)
+Herzfeld M. (2016). Treaty Abuse – The Principal Purpose Test, Tax Notes International. pp. 388–
+
+91.
+Hines J.R. (1988). Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment. In: Summers L (ed) Tax policy and
+
+the economy. MIT Press, Cambridge.
+
+
+71
+
+
+
+Janeba E. (1996). Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing? _J_
+
+_Public Econ_ 60:423–45.
+Janský P., Šedivý M. (2018). Estimating the revenue costs of tax treaties in developing countries.
+
+IES Working Paper. Charles University.
+Kehoe P.J. (1989). Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable. _The_
+
+_Review of Economic Studies_ (56).
+Leduc S. Michielse G. (2021). Are Tax Treaties Worth It for Developing Economies? In de Mooij,
+
+et al. Corporate Income Taxes Under Pressure. Washington, DC: International Monetary
+Fund.
+Lejour A. (2014). The Foreign Investment Effect of Tax Treaties. CPB Netherlands Bureau for
+
+Economic Analysis, I-26.
+Lewis M. (2013). Sweet nothings: The human cost of a British sugar giant avoiding taxes in
+
+southern Africa. ActionAid, London.
+
+
+Murthy K.V., Bhasin N. (2015). The impact of bilateral tax treaties: A multi-country analysis of FDI
+
+inflows into India. _J Int Trade Econ Dev_ 24(6):751–66.
+Neumayer E (2007). Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to
+
+Developing Countries? _J Development Studies_ 43:1501–19.
+OECD (1988). Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2010). Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, Centre for Tax
+
+Policy and Administration (July 22, 2010). [45689524.pdf (oecd.org)](https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/45689524.pdf)
+OECD (2013a). Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2013b), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris
+OECD (2015a). Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, Action 3 – Final Report:
+
+OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2015b), Limiting base erosion limiting interest deductions and other financial payments,
+
+Action 4 – Final Report: OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2015c). Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account
+
+Transparency and Substance: Action 5 – Final Report: OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2015d). Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances: Action
+
+6 – Final Report: OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2015e). Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation: Actions 8-10 –Final
+
+Reports, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD/G20 (2015f).Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting:
+
+Action 13 –Final Report, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2015g). Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective: Action 14 – Final Report,
+
+OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OCDE (2017a). OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
+
+Administrations. OECD Publishing, Paris.
+
+
+72
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[OECD (2017b). Background Brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS; in OECD.](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf)
+OECD (2018). Guidance for Tax Administrations on the Application of the Approach to Hard to
+
+Value Intangibles – BEPS Action 8, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2019). Harmful Tax Practices-2018 Reviews results, Inclusive Framework on BEPS –
+
+Action 5, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2020a). Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization – Report on Pillar One Blueprint –
+
+Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris.
+OECD (2020b). Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization – Report on Pillar Two Blueprint –
+
+Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris
+OECD (2022). Harmful Tax Practices Peer Reviews Results, Inclusive Framework on BEPS –
+
+[Action 5 Update (as of January 2022); see Action 5 – OECD BEPS](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action5/)
+UN (2013). United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. United
+
+Nations, NY.
+Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2015). Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and
+
+Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. IMF, World Bank, OECD, and UN, in:
+[https://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/100757-Tax-Incentives-Backgro](https://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/100757-Tax-Incentives-Background-paper-PUBLIC.pdf)
+
+
+Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses _,_ [IMF, OECD, UN, and WBG, in: Addressing](https://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-difficulties-in-accessing-comparables-data-for-transfer-pricing-analyses.htm)
+
+
+https://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/PCT_Toolkit_The_Taxation_of_Of
+
+
+Shah M.H., Qayyum S. (2015). Impact of double taxation treaties on inward FDI in Latin America
+
+and Caribbean developing countries. Bus Econ Rev 7(1):1–18.
+[Tax treaties explorer (2022). Available at: https://www.treaties.tax/en/](https://www.treaties.tax/en/) .
+Van’t Riet M., Lejour A. (2018). Optimal tax routing: network analysis of FDI diversion. Int Tax
+
+Public Finance 25(5):1321–1370. Springer; International Institute of Public Finance.
+Wei S.J. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review of Economics and
+
+Statistics 82 (1), 1–11.
+Yue D. (2018) The impact of double tax treaties on inward FDI in ASEAN countries. Journal of
+
+Business and Finance in Emerging Markets (S.I.) 1(2):127–152
+Zucman G. (2014). Taxing across borders: tracking personal wealth and corporate profits. Journal
+
+of Economic Perspectives 28(4):121–148. American Economic Association.
+
+
+73
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6e64b03922102f115c8c4358bcca742ba6a0d00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9398cc3b746cc2c2", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1240, "page": 2, "phash_256": "c0bf707e407fbff0bfc04a03c70747871f819f83af406dc078dc407fc03f9039", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "7965f4ab7a295db95a141800096c67869d28d10c747c776ccf227b84530d8a89", "width": 939}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "00c020202020c000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0003-001", "height": 49, "page": 3, "phash_256": "f80e000007f17ffcf806780ff83e03e083e17ffeff00700ff81f07e087e0783f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "0d1ecfb643306026e936d97f086151f6f369c98dd4fb125e38d7bc54dac18696", "width": 772}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0012-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "31a6e7238a7373e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0012-001", "height": 424, "page": 12, "phash_256": "ecc5648916739b1710296b8b4d93e2ad193d609e52dae355216db32d62ae5afa", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "d5e68b928704bd0a0c1ab84c003884ad4a111d5b44037ba33539f16505016d41", "width": 744}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "00c1c9e98d2d2d2d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-001", "height": 257, "page": 13, "phash_256": "eaab81ecb5542613c11c5ae3c2ae62bb1c6391d46693b4155aebca0c7eeb661b", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "f495126d0892ac031c2866e7edf55e1f762d05176fd3cd232103d064e1a31be7", "width": 320}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3323a89e1e3a7eb0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-002", "height": 359, "page": 13, "phash_256": "b9ccc223ce3139dce18707e85c3fc23313ccf00f3cccc7e0bc373c4cc1c3b98e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "6378ad537ce7e481b790834d93e1660252320d50242e36a6d65487ee8cefccb0", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8489b189492d2d33", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-003", "height": 242, "page": 13, "phash_256": "ca49c1aeb5963639c1eed9963e21c1965ae96a4995963d30a55f6be85a09c1d6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "829298cea96beef97408c6ebd1c2d5d4a427ffcba50ec01a97a2a7c4dd0712cb", "width": 351}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "3123db9a1e7ee4a4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-004", "height": 358, "page": 13, "phash_256": "b9cce987ce733ef8399ce1831bf1167cb187631c0ff0c223318c39dc4603ce33", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "9cf5ff9c8a0ba8443c4cb3954eba7a028ac99a8954c483d5ec76d8073dd71957", "width": 775}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0763426352437333", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0015-001", "height": 535, "page": 15, "phash_256": "8f85e652305ae0d6605f3f85e07b31a1c1e3b1a717a5b43f1fa4647a3e942f03", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "23105cb607d2376f773acb7ec9ab3a4fd46447a98d08041977c733b438664939", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0024-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2ba58c848798c0a1", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0024-001", "height": 166, "page": 24, "phash_256": "a0bb7eb93ee4bf446f4687c41347815b54bbd01b0559805f95c481c675c697e6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "5fef25b2b040d43e05192ff82dfe01fcc58a7a1ae82af60f40cde844d405a5e9", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "80c9e1c30d114b1e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-001", "height": 247, "page": 38, "phash_256": "eaa5c2ad954a3fe0e15bcd5a2952d15733c52694c4b769a18b07e2287ee994cb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "00ee573627838d104673d728018dc2ec9443f8cac9259a26663421dfde13fc43", "width": 341}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "19a94b991939b1b9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-002", "height": 366, "page": 38, "phash_256": "b333e372cccc1c8c399de3fd47033e33cc76c3c33f8cc51c04703d6346c7c01e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "780b3cdde33a37b04591a13ede20b099b10eb9208f3d108c345fbb662fdecaab", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0041-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5b16323232322222", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0041-001", "height": 419, "page": 41, "phash_256": "bc1573c363d863d143f8cf081ae95c2f86e93c2e10eb70a301fbe5bb06f9c4b0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "e1669ed0a76fe6e9fa96c0822519014faf570a5794ec04225be0fb115f2f4af1", "width": 287}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "82c0c0c1852d5315", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-001", "height": 232, "page": 42, "phash_256": "caead1abb50926d4ca555b29742af49297903b6c69f14f98b666a0d74d98582f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "551f6641a67e4f4a22e49963155f6b44ed508bcc1af0ccb0353429b95cf3e82c", "width": 320}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4c5c733b6d787906", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-002", "height": 344, "page": 42, "phash_256": "8f0081e5f5e297dc627e59b88c3fce43971e19bde1f159ce9817b00e278dc860", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "ca33ed6933cd2fff8c357e7c9e867d1b0586fa3bfc8f659e0784e103a24e1989", "width": 395}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "11b2c4d0f16323b7", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-003", "height": 445, "page": 42, "phash_256": "ceaa13aaad552b555aaa56aa956d6d532b5692ad12ade4711352a656b40da3a7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "6678fd20b748d832994632af2440d014fe2ed021f2bc3866a60a96f54d17339e", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0043-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "19f13dbd7a3175fa", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0043-001", "height": 858, "page": 43, "phash_256": "caaab545eca15a92a5554eba9272ad4d5abab3576d999246e5056db192526c8d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "6d6a37e509ccb0a4ee8d9c8049eca731536ff675bd26a5a74e300c6a7a349543", "width": 751}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0072-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "314b5c4c92b440c0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0072-001", "height": 101, "page": 72, "phash_256": "bef83a01c8f548229ffcb7de7452c15ec017167e3f08afc960016348af8933bb", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "6e82ae1f6830ba5aeed77eff26205d10bd7b25d48e72b51f5c8f873b36f5b7de", "width": 744}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "23d4e36a00387838", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-001", "height": 54, "page": 73, "phash_256": "bfc46203bbe8bbf8ea253fe46a353b882bd83bc06b823aa06ab52ed52e742e80", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "e4242e02d5a87a1e83d2b5e8404b77c90c7e7111467210ce438b653f8f04f1cd", "width": 739}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-145/assets/figures/cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "349aa22300606860", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-002", "height": 55, "page": 73, "phash_256": "9f7870439fe29fffb8e31ef03c431ee099a21d8c1dec1e431c630ee01c511dc3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "sha256_normalized_png": "2b6b532e149afe945b50ac61f5ab87d4731332ff5e26f52efcfbd4ee8d2bc867", "width": 736}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-145/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f763d25760e30b91fb3bf1040023df3ee71d150
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-145/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nApril 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/145**\n### **GUATEMALA**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-INTERNATIONAL** **TAXATION CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Guatemala was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in April 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "April 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/145\nGUATEMALA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-INTERNATIONAL TAXATION CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Guatemala was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted in April 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 580}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\n\n\nGUATEMALA\n\nInternational Taxation Challenges and\nOptions\nApril 2022\n\n\nPrepared By\nRoberto Schatan, Carolina Osorio Buitrón, Armando Lara Yaffar, and Jose Madariaga\n\n\n\n\n\nAuthoring Departments:\nFiscal Affairs Department", "text_characters": 209}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ______________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**PREFACE____________________________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________________________ 7**\n\n\n**I. INTRODUCTION ________________________________________________________________________________ 11**\n\n\n**II. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE ___________________________________________________________________ 12**\n\nTotal Tax Revenue Compared___________________________________________________________________ 12\nTax Revenue Composition ______________________________________________________________________ 13\nSpecial Regimes _________________________________________________________________________________ 15\n\nTax Expenditure _________________________________________________________________________________ 16\n\n\n**III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME TAX LAW (LISR) _____________________________ 19**\n\nTerritorial Regime Versus Global Income _______________________________________________________ 19\nDefinition of Source _____________________________________________________________________________ 20\nDefinition of Residence _________________________________________________________________________ 22\n\nDefinition of Permanent Establishment _________________________________________________________ 23\nWithholding Rates on the Income of Non-Residents ___________________________________________ 24\nDeductions ______________________________________________________________________________________ 25\n\n\n**IV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA __________________________________________________________ 27**\n\nIntroduction _____________________________________________________________________________________ 27\nTreaty Benefits and Drawbacks _________________________________________________________________ 27\nPrecautions Ahead of Treaty Negotiation ______________________________________________________ 29\n\nModel Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation _____________________________________ 29\nPower to Tax Certain Income Under Treaties ___________________________________________________ 30\nArbitration (Article 25)___________________________________________________________________________ 35\n\nEntitlement to Treaty Benefits (Article 29) ______________________________________________________ 36\nNon-Discrimination (Article 24) _________________________________________________________________ 36\n\n\n**V. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT _____________________________________________ 38**\n\nForeign Direct Investment in Guatemala _______________________________________________________ 38\nKey FDI Determinants ___________________________________________________________________________ 38\nDouble-Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment ______________________________________ 39\n\nEmpirical Evidence ______________________________________________________________________________ 39\n\n\n**VI. TRANSFER PRICES ____________________________________________________________________________ 44**\n\nThe Arm’s Length Principle _____________________________________________________________________ 44\nBurden of Proof _________________________________________________________________________________ 44\nScope of the Transfer Pricing Regime __________________________________________________________ 45\n\nDefinition and Presumption of Related Parties _________________________________________________ 46\nMethods _________________________________________________________________________________________ 48\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 5\n\nPREFACE 6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7\n\nI. INTRODUCTION 11\n\nII. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE _ 12\n\nTotal Tax Revenue Compared_ 12\nTax Revenue Composition 13\nSpecial Regimes _ 15\n\nTax Expenditure _ 16\n\nIII. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME TAX LAW (LISR) _ 19\n\nTerritorial Regime Versus Global Income _ 19\nDefinition of Source _ 20\nDefinition of Residence _ 22\n\nDefinition of Permanent Establishment _ 23\nWithholding Rates on the Income of Non-Residents _ 24\nDeductions 25\n\nIV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA 27\n\nIntroduction _ 27\nTreaty Benefits and Drawbacks _ 27\nPrecautions Ahead of Treaty Negotiation 29\n\nModel Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation _ 29\nPower to Tax Certain Income Under Treaties _ 30\nArbitration (Article 25)_ 35\n\nEntitlement to Treaty Benefits (Article 29) 36\nNon-Discrimination (Article 24) _ 36\n\nV. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT _ 38\n\nForeign Direct Investment in Guatemala _ 38\nKey FDI Determinants _ 38\nDouble-Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment 39\n\nEmpirical Evidence 39\n\nVI. TRANSFER PRICES 44\n\nThe Arm’s Length Principle _ 44\nBurden of Proof _ 44\nScope of the Transfer Pricing Regime 45\n\nDefinition and Presumption of Related Parties _ 46\nMethods _ 48\n\n3", "text_characters": 1010}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Rules for Specific Transactions __________________________________________________________________ 49\n\nDocumentation _________________________________________________________________________________ 55\n\n\n\n**VII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL**\n**TAX ARCHITECTURE ______________________________________________________________________________ 58**\n\n\n\nIntroduction _____________________________________________________________________________________ 58\nAction 5: Combating Harmful Tax Practices ____________________________________________________ 59\nBEPS Minimum Standards and Treaties (Actions 6 and 14) _____________________________________ 62\n\n\n\nTransfer Pricing Documentation: Country-by-Country Reporting (Action 13) _________________ 65\nNew Changes to the International Tax System __________________________________________________ 66\n\n**BOXES**\n1. Preliminary Estimates of the Effect of the TADT with Mexico ___________________________________ 43\n2. Preferential Regimes That Could Be Harmful ___________________________________________________ 61\n\n**FIGURES**\n1. General Government Revenue __________________________________________________________________ 12\n2. Tax Revenue Buoyancy __________________________________________________________________________ 12\n3. Tax Revenue Including Social Security, 2019 ____________________________________________________ 13\n4. Tax Revenue Composition, 2019 ________________________________________________________________ 13\n5. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America _____________________________________________________ 38\n6. Correlation between the Number of TADTs and FDI in Latin America __________________________ 42\n7. FDI in Latin American, by Investing Country ____________________________________________________ 42\n\n**TABLES**\n1. Tax Collection in Low-Income Latin American Countries, 2019 _________________________________ 13\n2. Income Tax Collection (Natural Persons) in Low-Income Latin American Countries, 2019 _____ 13\n3. Corporate Income Tax___________________________________________________________________________ 15\n4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020 ______________________________________ 17\n5. Withholding Rate on Income Earned by Foreign Residents ____________________________________ 24\n6. FDI Stock ________________________________________________________________________________________ 38\n7. Number of Treaties for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, 2021 ______________________________ 41\n\n**REFERENCES ______________________________________________________________________________________ 70**\n\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Rules for Specific Transactions 49\n\nDocumentation _ 55\n\nVII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL\nTAX ARCHITECTURE 58\n\nIntroduction _ 58\nAction 5: Combating Harmful Tax Practices 59\nBEPS Minimum Standards and Treaties (Actions 6 and 14) _ 62\n\nTransfer Pricing Documentation: Country-by-Country Reporting (Action 13) _ 65\nNew Changes to the International Tax System 66\n\nBOXES\n1. Preliminary Estimates of the Effect of the TADT with Mexico _ 43\n2. Preferential Regimes That Could Be Harmful _ 61\n\nFIGURES\n1. General Government Revenue 12\n2. Tax Revenue Buoyancy 12\n3. Tax Revenue Including Social Security, 2019 13\n4. Tax Revenue Composition, 2019 13\n5. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America _ 38\n6. Correlation between the Number of TADTs and FDI in Latin America 42\n7. FDI in Latin American, by Investing Country 42\n\nTABLES\n1. Tax Collection in Low-Income Latin American Countries, 2019 _ 13\n2. Income Tax Collection (Natural Persons) in Low-Income Latin American Countries, 2019 _ 13\n3. Corporate Income Tax_ 15\n4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020 17\n5. Withholding Rate on Income Earned by Foreign Residents 24\n6. FDI Stock 38\n7. Number of Treaties for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, 2021 41\n\nREFERENCES 70\n\n4", "text_characters": 1053}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**\n\nBEPS Base erosion and profit shifting\n\n\nCbC Country-by-country report\n\n\nCDIS Coordinated Direct Investment Survey\n\n\nEUR Euro\n\n\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\n\n\nFDI Foreign direct investment\n\n\nFHTP Forum on Harmful Tax Practices\n\n\nGDP Gross domestic product\n\n\nGLoBE Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal\n\n\nIIR Income inclusion rule\n\n\nIMF International Monetary Fund\n\n\nISR Income tax\n\n\nLOB Limitation of benefits\n\n\nMAP Mutual Agreement Procedure\n\n\nMLA Multilateral Agreement\n\n\nMNE Multinational enterprise\n\n\nOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development\n\n\nPPT Principal purpose test\n\n\nSAT Superintendency of Tax Administration\n\n\nSTTR Subject to tax rule\n\n\nTADT Treaty for the avoidance of double taxation\n\n\nUN United Nations\n\n\nUTPR Undertaxed payments rule\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\nBEPS Base erosion and profit shifting\n\nCbC Country-by-country report\n\nCDIS Coordinated Direct Investment Survey\n\nEUR Euro\n\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\n\nFDI Foreign direct investment\n\nFHTP Forum on Harmful Tax Practices\n\nGDP Gross domestic product\n\nGLoBE Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal\n\nIIR Income inclusion rule\n\nIMF International Monetary Fund\n\nISR Income tax\n\nLOB Limitation of benefits\n\nMAP Mutual Agreement Procedure\n\nMLA Multilateral Agreement\n\nMNE Multinational enterprise\n\nOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development\n\nPPT Principal purpose test\n\nSAT Superintendency of Tax Administration\n\nSTTR Subject to tax rule\n\nTADT Treaty for the avoidance of double taxation\n\nUN United Nations\n\nUTPR Undertaxed payments rule\n\n5", "text_characters": 645}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **PREFACE**\n\nIn response to a request by the Ministry of Public Finance (MFP) of Guatemala, a remote\ntechnical assistance mission was carried out by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) from March 7 to 21, 2022, to analyze certain international\naspects of the country’s tax regime. Discussions focused on the policy regarding treaties for the\navoidance of double taxation and their effectiveness in attracting foreign direct investment,\ntransfer pricing regulations, and the implications for Guatemala of the minimum standards\nagreed by the tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project backed by the G20 and the\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The mission comprised\nRoberto Schatan (FAD and head of mission), Carolina Osorio (FAD), and Armando Lara and Jose\nMadariaga (external advisors).\n\n\nThe mission met with the Vice-Minister of Public Finance, Mr. Saul Figueroa, and held multiple\nmeetings with MFP technical teams led by Juan Blas and Jorge Lope, Director and Deputy\nDirector, respectively, of Tax Policy and Analysis. Various meetings were also attended by officials\nfrom different areas of the Tax Administration Superintendency (SAT), headed by Alex Gonzalez,\nChief of the Inspection Unit, and Emilio Pacay, Assistant to the Intendant. The mission also met\nwith Vice-Minister of Economy Lisandro Bolaños from the Ministry of Economy and Trade. Lastly,\nthe mission met with directors of business associations, AmCham Guatemala, the Coffee\nExporters Association ( _Asociación de Exportadores de Café_ - ADEC), and the Apparel and Textile\nAssociation of Guatemala ( _Asociación de la Industria del Vestuario y Textiles de Guatemala_ Vestex) as well as with executives of research institutions, ICEFI, and FUNDESA and with EY and\nPwC tax specialists.\n\n\nThe mission is grateful to all the authorities for their extensive and kind cooperation and for the\nefficient support provided by the IMF representative office and especially to Carol Cruz\nAlavarado for the assistance in preparing the mission agenda.\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nIn response to a request by the Ministry of Public Finance (MFP) of Guatemala, a remote\ntechnical assistance mission was carried out by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) from March 7 to 21, 2022, to analyze certain international\naspects of the country’s tax regime. Discussions focused on the policy regarding treaties for the\navoidance of double taxation and their effectiveness in attracting foreign direct investment,\ntransfer pricing regulations, and the implications for Guatemala of the minimum standards\nagreed by the tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project backed by the G20 and the\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The mission comprised\nRoberto Schatan (FAD and head of mission), Carolina Osorio (FAD), and Armando Lara and Jose\nMadariaga (external advisors).\n\nThe mission met with the Vice-Minister of Public Finance, Mr. Saul Figueroa, and held multiple\nmeetings with MFP technical teams led by Juan Blas and Jorge Lope, Director and Deputy\nDirector, respectively, of Tax Policy and Analysis. Various meetings were also attended by officials\nfrom different areas of the Tax Administration Superintendency (SAT), headed by Alex Gonzalez,\nChief of the Inspection Unit, and Emilio Pacay, Assistant to the Intendant. The mission also met\nwith Vice-Minister of Economy Lisandro Bolaños from the Ministry of Economy and Trade. Lastly,\nthe mission met with directors of business associations, AmCham Guatemala, the Coffee\nExporters Association ( _Asociación de Exportadores de Café_ - ADEC), and the Apparel and Textile\nAssociation of Guatemala ( _Asociación de la Industria del Vestuario y Textiles de Guatemala_ Vestex) as well as with executives of research institutions, ICEFI, and FUNDESA and with EY and\nPwC tax specialists.\n\nThe mission is grateful to all the authorities for their extensive and kind cooperation and for the\nefficient support provided by the IMF representative office and especially to Carol Cruz\nAlavarado for the assistance in preparing the mission agenda.\n\n6", "text_characters": 1764}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**This report discusses three topics central to international taxation in Guatemala:** (i) the\nfactors that the government must consider to establish a position on treaties for the avoidance\nof double taxation; (ii) the strengthening of the transfer pricing regime; and (iii) the potential\neffects that BEPS minimum standards might have on Guatemala and the likely changes in\ninternational tax architecture recently agreed upon by the community of countries under the\nOECD/G20 Inclusive Framework.\n\n\n**Treaties**\n\n\n**The topic of treaties has garnered special attention in Guatemala as of late**, requiring a\nstrategy to be devised. Guatemala does not have treaties in force, despite signing one with\nMexico in 2015 that it has not ratified. The decision that the Government of Guatemala must\nmake is whether to promote the ratification of the treaty with Mexico and open the door to the\nnegotiation of others. Treaties certainly have advantages, the main one being, in principle, the\nencouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the contracting countries. However,\ntreaties also entail costs because they typically reduce income source taxing powers, which has a\nparticular impact on net capital importers such as Guatemala. The decision must ultimately\nrespond to the treaty cost-benefit balance, and this partly depends on how and with whom they\nare negotiated and on the tax context within which they fall.\n\n\n**The Guatemalan context is of no help.** First, tax collection is low, one of the lowest in Latin\nAmerica, leaving very little room for additional tax sacrifices. The general tax regime for income\nfrom lucrative activities, including the simplified option based on gross income, is already\ncompetitive internationally. Second, the country offers considerable investment incentives, such\nas free-trade zones and the maquila regime, whose benefits are not clearly quantified, while\nreporting potentially understated tax expenditure.\n\n\n**To their credit, treaties foster a better business climate** and can encourage FDI in sectors\nother than those already benefiting from special regimes. This would be welcome in Guatemala\nbecause its FDI quota is low, even for the Central American region. Treaties can also promote the\nexpansion of certain businesses operating from Guatemala, especially export services, which can\ncurrently be subject to double taxation.\n\n\n**Nevertheless, the many empirical studies that have been conducted offer no conclusive**\n**results** . The economic literature could not confirm a meaningful causal relationship between\nsigned treaties and FDI, particularly for developing countries. The same applies to studies on\nLatin America.\n\n\n**A preliminary study estimates that the entry into force of the treaty with Mexico will have**\n**a positive effect.** However, the results must be interpreted with caution: (i) FDI data are not the\nmost reliable; (ii) the experience of other countries that signed treaties with Mexico, used as a\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThis report discusses three topics central to international taxation in Guatemala: (i) the\nfactors that the government must consider to establish a position on treaties for the avoidance\nof double taxation; (ii) the strengthening of the transfer pricing regime; and (iii) the potential\neffects that BEPS minimum standards might have on Guatemala and the likely changes in\ninternational tax architecture recently agreed upon by the community of countries under the\nOECD/G20 Inclusive Framework.\n\nTreaties\n\nThe topic of treaties has garnered special attention in Guatemala as of late, requiring a\nstrategy to be devised. Guatemala does not have treaties in force, despite signing one with\nMexico in 2015 that it has not ratified. The decision that the Government of Guatemala must\nmake is whether to promote the ratification of the treaty with Mexico and open the door to the\nnegotiation of others. Treaties certainly have advantages, the main one being, in principle, the\nencouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the contracting countries. However,\ntreaties also entail costs because they typically reduce income source taxing powers, which has a\nparticular impact on net capital importers such as Guatemala. The decision must ultimately\nrespond to the treaty cost-benefit balance, and this partly depends on how and with whom they\nare negotiated and on the tax context within which they fall.\n\nThe Guatemalan context is of no help. First, tax collection is low, one of the lowest in Latin\nAmerica, leaving very little room for additional tax sacrifices. The general tax regime for income\nfrom lucrative activities, including the simplified option based on gross income, is already\ncompetitive internationally. Second, the country offers considerable investment incentives, such\nas free-trade zones and the maquila regime, whose benefits are not clearly quantified, while\nreporting potentially understated tax expenditure.\n\nTo their credit, treaties foster a better business climate and can encourage FDI in sectors\nother than those already benefiting from special regimes. This would be welcome in Guatemala\nbecause its FDI quota is low, even for the Central American region. Treaties can also promote the\nexpansion of certain businesses operating from Guatemala, especially export services, which can\ncurrently be subject to double taxation.\n\nNevertheless, the many empirical studies that have been conducted offer no conclusive\nresults . The economic literature could not confirm a meaningful causal relationship between\nsigned treaties and FDI, particularly for developing countries. The same applies to studies on\nLatin America.\n\nA preliminary study estimates that the entry into force of the treaty with Mexico will have\na positive effect. However, the results must be interpreted with caution: (i) FDI data are not the\nmost reliable; (ii) the experience of other countries that signed treaties with Mexico, used as a\n\n7", "text_characters": 2503}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "basis for modeling this exercise, are not necessarily comparable; (iii) the periods before or after\nthe treaty are very short for enacting change in the investment growth trend; and (iv) the\ninvestment level is virtually nil at the beginning, which is why very small amounts of capital can\nrepresent a very high but analytically irrelevant percentage increase. The effect that the treaty\ncould have on foreign investment can therefore be severely overestimated.\n\n\n**The literature points out that a key variable behind FDI flows is the countries’ institutional**\n**stability and health.** Guatemala ranks poorly in that regard on an international scale, which\nindicates that much remains to be done. To be successful, Guatemala may need to rethink its tax\nsystem to increase collection significantly, thus improving its institutions, infrastructure, and\nsocial spending. Treaties, which have a higher legal hierarchy than domestic legislation, can limit\nflexibility for a potential future tax reform. The decision to enter treaties should therefore be\nmade in the context of a broader tax strategy.\n\n\n**At present, to enter into treaties, Guatemala requires the development of an own model**\nthat protects the right to tax income at source and to sign treaties with countries where a\npotential double-taxation problem might inhibit a likely flow of investment. Countries that have\nno income tax or even those that have territorial systems, such as Guatemala, with reduced\nwithholding rates would be excluded.\n\n\n**The report explains the main differences between the OECD and UN model treaties** and\nrecommends that Guatemala use the UN model as its primary reference, which favors tax on the\nsource of income. It is important for Guatemala to maintain the right to tax the payment of\nroyalties to residents abroad and for the concept of royalty to include software use, specialized\ntechnical services, and equipment and machinery leasing. Various payments made abroad with a\nsource in the paying country (royalties, dividends, and interest) normally have a limited definition\nin the treaty. For this reason, reference must be made to the definition of dividend and interest in\ndomestic legislation. Legislation must support treaties with broad definitions. For example, the\ndefinition of interest must include financial operations derived from debt. For royalties, some\nconcepts must be added in the treaty itself. Treaties must also include taxation at source for\n“other income” paid to residents of the other contracting state that is not business profit, since\nsuch profits are usually taxed only in the country of residence.\n\n\n**The treaty signed with Mexico basically follows the guidelines recommended in this report**\nand is therefore very close to the model that Guatemala could adopt for its future negotiations\nshould it opt to enter into treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. The treaty with Mexico\nalso excludes an arbitration clause, which is the position that most developing countries have\npreferred. However, this treaty does not include the anti-abuse measures agreed in BEPS\nActions 6 and 7 on treaty shopping and the circumvention of the concept of permanent\nestablishment. This is why the treaty with Mexico should not be ratified under the current terms.\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "basis for modeling this exercise, are not necessarily comparable; (iii) the periods before or after\nthe treaty are very short for enacting change in the investment growth trend; and (iv) the\ninvestment level is virtually nil at the beginning, which is why very small amounts of capital can\nrepresent a very high but analytically irrelevant percentage increase. The effect that the treaty\ncould have on foreign investment can therefore be severely overestimated.\n\nThe literature points out that a key variable behind FDI flows is the countries’ institutional\nstability and health. Guatemala ranks poorly in that regard on an international scale, which\nindicates that much remains to be done. To be successful, Guatemala may need to rethink its tax\nsystem to increase collection significantly, thus improving its institutions, infrastructure, and\nsocial spending. Treaties, which have a higher legal hierarchy than domestic legislation, can limit\nflexibility for a potential future tax reform. The decision to enter treaties should therefore be\nmade in the context of a broader tax strategy.\n\nAt present, to enter into treaties, Guatemala requires the development of an own model\nthat protects the right to tax income at source and to sign treaties with countries where a\npotential double-taxation problem might inhibit a likely flow of investment. Countries that have\nno income tax or even those that have territorial systems, such as Guatemala, with reduced\nwithholding rates would be excluded.\n\nThe report explains the main differences between the OECD and UN model treaties and\nrecommends that Guatemala use the UN model as its primary reference, which favors tax on the\nsource of income. It is important for Guatemala to maintain the right to tax the payment of\nroyalties to residents abroad and for the concept of royalty to include software use, specialized\ntechnical services, and equipment and machinery leasing. Various payments made abroad with a\nsource in the paying country (royalties, dividends, and interest) normally have a limited definition\nin the treaty. For this reason, reference must be made to the definition of dividend and interest in\ndomestic legislation. Legislation must support treaties with broad definitions. For example, the\ndefinition of interest must include financial operations derived from debt. For royalties, some\nconcepts must be added in the treaty itself. Treaties must also include taxation at source for\n“other income” paid to residents of the other contracting state that is not business profit, since\nsuch profits are usually taxed only in the country of residence.\n\nThe treaty signed with Mexico basically follows the guidelines recommended in this report\nand is therefore very close to the model that Guatemala could adopt for its future negotiations\nshould it opt to enter into treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. The treaty with Mexico\nalso excludes an arbitration clause, which is the position that most developing countries have\npreferred. However, this treaty does not include the anti-abuse measures agreed in BEPS\nActions 6 and 7 on treaty shopping and the circumvention of the concept of permanent\nestablishment. This is why the treaty with Mexico should not be ratified under the current terms.\n\n8", "text_characters": 2748}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Domestic Legislation**\n\n\n**Taxing power borders are defined, first and foremost, in domestic legislation.** The\ndefinitions of source, residence, and permanent establishment, among other concepts, are key in\nthat respect. The report examines some of these definitions, focusing on those issues that could\npotentially lead to double taxation or, conversely, weaken the country’s tax base.\n\n\n**One important consideration is that Guatemala has a tax regime that is (almost) strictly**\n**territorial in nature;** by definition, this regime exempts all income that resident persons earn\nabroad. This not only reduces the tax base that Guatemala can claim, but also potentially gives\nrise to an equity issue since higher earners will be those with access to this exemption. Moreover,\npersonal income tax rates in Guatemala are very low, which could largely explain why Guatemala\nhas the lowest collection of this tax in the region at less than half a percentage point of GDP.\nExtending the tax to foreign passive income of resident persons in the country and granting the\ncorresponding credit for taxes paid abroad is a policy option that Guatemala could reconsider.\nWith such an approach, a treaty would offer a more practical solution.\n\n\n**The legislation is cautious in defining source with regard to services provided by residents**\n**abroad** since taxes are charged only when these services are used in Guatemala. Many countries\ncharge taxes when the paying source is in the country, avoiding interpretation issues as to the\nplace of use of the service. In such cases, potential double taxation would be resolved with a\ntreaty. Other aspects of the legislation that could be modified to align with potential treaties are:\n(i) excluding activities of a purely preparatory or auxiliary nature as assumptions of permanent\nestablishment; (ii) regulating the implementation of tax on indirect disposals of assets located in\nGuatemala; and (iii) eliminating the full exemption on interest paid to financial sector entities\nabroad (even when the tax incidence falls mainly to domestic debtors).\n\n\n**Transfer Prices**\n\n\n**The regulation on transfer prices needs to be modernized** . Treaties facilitate transfer pricing\ncontrol because they allow the counterparty to change its prices in response to an adjustment by\na taxpayer in Guatemala, thus avoiding double taxation. Many countries would not accept the\nadjustment from a country without a treaty. Taxpayers will be more willing to self-correct if the\ntax is shifted from one jurisdiction to another without increasing the overall corporate tax\nburden. However, for this mechanism to work, the legislation must prevent the SAT from only\nauthorizing price adjustments if they are in favor of the Treasury.\n\n\n**The scope of the regulation must be widened.** The obligation to comply with the arm’s length\nprinciple (free competition) must also apply to domestic related parties, albeit in a simplified way,\nkeeping the burden of proof with the authority. What must also be included is the related party\npresumption and the duty to comply with the same principle when taxpayers conduct operations\nwith residents in low- or no-tax jurisdictions, especially if they are not very cooperative (in\nrespect of which Guatemala will have to resolve its own problems to exchange information).\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Domestic Legislation\n\nTaxing power borders are defined, first and foremost, in domestic legislation. The\ndefinitions of source, residence, and permanent establishment, among other concepts, are key in\nthat respect. The report examines some of these definitions, focusing on those issues that could\npotentially lead to double taxation or, conversely, weaken the country’s tax base.\n\nOne important consideration is that Guatemala has a tax regime that is (almost) strictly\nterritorial in nature; by definition, this regime exempts all income that resident persons earn\nabroad. This not only reduces the tax base that Guatemala can claim, but also potentially gives\nrise to an equity issue since higher earners will be those with access to this exemption. Moreover,\npersonal income tax rates in Guatemala are very low, which could largely explain why Guatemala\nhas the lowest collection of this tax in the region at less than half a percentage point of GDP.\nExtending the tax to foreign passive income of resident persons in the country and granting the\ncorresponding credit for taxes paid abroad is a policy option that Guatemala could reconsider.\nWith such an approach, a treaty would offer a more practical solution.\n\nThe legislation is cautious in defining source with regard to services provided by residents\nabroad since taxes are charged only when these services are used in Guatemala. Many countries\ncharge taxes when the paying source is in the country, avoiding interpretation issues as to the\nplace of use of the service. In such cases, potential double taxation would be resolved with a\ntreaty. Other aspects of the legislation that could be modified to align with potential treaties are:\n(i) excluding activities of a purely preparatory or auxiliary nature as assumptions of permanent\nestablishment; (ii) regulating the implementation of tax on indirect disposals of assets located in\nGuatemala; and (iii) eliminating the full exemption on interest paid to financial sector entities\nabroad (even when the tax incidence falls mainly to domestic debtors).\n\nTransfer Prices\n\nThe regulation on transfer prices needs to be modernized . Treaties facilitate transfer pricing\ncontrol because they allow the counterparty to change its prices in response to an adjustment by\na taxpayer in Guatemala, thus avoiding double taxation. Many countries would not accept the\nadjustment from a country without a treaty. Taxpayers will be more willing to self-correct if the\ntax is shifted from one jurisdiction to another without increasing the overall corporate tax\nburden. However, for this mechanism to work, the legislation must prevent the SAT from only\nauthorizing price adjustments if they are in favor of the Treasury.\n\nThe scope of the regulation must be widened. The obligation to comply with the arm’s length\nprinciple (free competition) must also apply to domestic related parties, albeit in a simplified way,\nkeeping the burden of proof with the authority. What must also be included is the related party\npresumption and the duty to comply with the same principle when taxpayers conduct operations\nwith residents in low- or no-tax jurisdictions, especially if they are not very cooperative (in\nrespect of which Guatemala will have to resolve its own problems to exchange information).\n\n9", "text_characters": 2769}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**The regime for imports and exports must be replaced with a more functional one.** As stated\nin the legislation, goods exporters and importers are currently required to apply the so-called\n“sixth method,” the implementation of which is unclear because the regulation does not clearly\ndefine the reference price to be used or the permitted adjustments. Taxpayers understand the\nmethod to be optional. This poses a potential dilemma for the SAT since, in theory, it must\noversee a basically ineffective method. It is recommended that this method be replaced so that\nthe legislation gives priority to the comparable uncontrolled price method and that this method\nbe made compulsory only for a few commodities listed on stock exchanges or in organized\nmarkets.\n\n\n**The restrictions on interest deductions must be simplified.** The legislation currently penalizes\ninterest deductions in three ways: (i) through a thin cap rule, which is very lax; (ii) by prohibiting\nthe deduction of interest paid to residents abroad other than regulated financial entities, which is\nvery strict and discriminatory; and (iii) by limiting the deductible interest rate to the one\ndetermined by the Monetary Board for tax purposes, which is a very lax default rate. All of these\nrules can be replaced by a single one, in accordance with the international best practices\nidentified by the draft BEPS project under Action 4, limiting deductions for total interest paid to a\npercentage of the taxpayer’s profit measure, for example, 30 percent of earnings before interest,\ntaxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).\n\n\n**Other measures are also necessary to protect the tax base.** For example, conditions must be\nestablished for the deduction of intra-group services for compliance with the “effective profit\ntest” for the taxpayer, in addition to regulating the market valuation of royalties paid for the use\nor exploitation of intangible assets with more elements.\n\n\n**BEPS Minimum Standards**\n\n\n**Lastly, the report discusses the BEPS minimum standards, highlighting Action 5 on harmful**\n**tax practices.** This standard requires countries to eliminate regimes offering tax privileges to\ntaxpayers that do not have much corporate substance and that encourage the shifting of profits\ngenerated in other jurisdictions. These harmful regimes generally attract financial activities or\nservices (or the registration of intangible assets) in locations that are not very cooperative in\nexchanging information or very transparent about the benefits they provide. The latest agreed\nchanges to the international tax system architecture, introducing a minimum global tax of\n15 percent for multinational enterprises (Pillar 2), show that the countries’ sense of community is\nleaning toward banishing full exemption regimes for non-transparent businesses. The increase in\nspecial regimes in Guatemala might eventually risk running into this international trend.\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The regime for imports and exports must be replaced with a more functional one. As stated\nin the legislation, goods exporters and importers are currently required to apply the so-called\n“sixth method,” the implementation of which is unclear because the regulation does not clearly\ndefine the reference price to be used or the permitted adjustments. Taxpayers understand the\nmethod to be optional. This poses a potential dilemma for the SAT since, in theory, it must\noversee a basically ineffective method. It is recommended that this method be replaced so that\nthe legislation gives priority to the comparable uncontrolled price method and that this method\nbe made compulsory only for a few commodities listed on stock exchanges or in organized\nmarkets.\n\nThe restrictions on interest deductions must be simplified. The legislation currently penalizes\ninterest deductions in three ways: (i) through a thin cap rule, which is very lax; (ii) by prohibiting\nthe deduction of interest paid to residents abroad other than regulated financial entities, which is\nvery strict and discriminatory; and (iii) by limiting the deductible interest rate to the one\ndetermined by the Monetary Board for tax purposes, which is a very lax default rate. All of these\nrules can be replaced by a single one, in accordance with the international best practices\nidentified by the draft BEPS project under Action 4, limiting deductions for total interest paid to a\npercentage of the taxpayer’s profit measure, for example, 30 percent of earnings before interest,\ntaxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).\n\nOther measures are also necessary to protect the tax base. For example, conditions must be\nestablished for the deduction of intra-group services for compliance with the “effective profit\ntest” for the taxpayer, in addition to regulating the market valuation of royalties paid for the use\nor exploitation of intangible assets with more elements.\n\nBEPS Minimum Standards\n\nLastly, the report discusses the BEPS minimum standards, highlighting Action 5 on harmful\ntax practices. This standard requires countries to eliminate regimes offering tax privileges to\ntaxpayers that do not have much corporate substance and that encourage the shifting of profits\ngenerated in other jurisdictions. These harmful regimes generally attract financial activities or\nservices (or the registration of intangible assets) in locations that are not very cooperative in\nexchanging information or very transparent about the benefits they provide. The latest agreed\nchanges to the international tax system architecture, introducing a minimum global tax of\n15 percent for multinational enterprises (Pillar 2), show that the countries’ sense of community is\nleaning toward banishing full exemption regimes for non-transparent businesses. The increase in\nspecial regimes in Guatemala might eventually risk running into this international trend.\n\n10", "text_characters": 2464}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. **The Guatemalan Ministry of Public Finance asked the IMF mission to review three**\n**international taxation topics:** (i) the policy and model treaties for the avoidance of double\ntaxation appropriate for Guatemala; (ii) the strengthening of the transfer pricing regime; and\n(iii) the consequences for Guatemala of the minimum standards on base erosion and profit\nshifting (BEPS) adopted by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and\nDevelopment (OECD). These topics are discussed in the following manner.\n\n\n2. **Chapter II of this report analyzes the tax revenue structure in Guatemala** to\ndetermine the context surrounding the discussion on international taxation as well as the (little)\nflexibility the country has to negotiate treaties, which can cost tax resources. The chapter also\nexamines current preferential regimes to encourage investment in Guatemala and the tax\nexpenditure involved.\n\n\n3. **Chapter III reviews some basic concepts contained in domestic legislation on**\n**international taxation**, such as the definitions of source, residence, and permanent\nestablishment, which determine the scope of the country’s taxing power, focusing on aspects\nthat could give rise to double taxation.\n\n\n4. **Chapter IV of the report discusses which treaty model would strike the right**\n**balance for a net capital importing country like Guatemala.** FAD policy is not to intervene in\ntreaty negotiations between the institution’s member countries. Guatemala does not have\ncurrent treaties, although it did sign but not ratify a treaty with Mexico, whose entry into force is\nstill being discussed in the country. This chapter analyzes treaties in a general sense from the\nperspective of a developing country, without directly referring to the clauses negotiated with\nMexico, except when comparing BEPS standards.\n\n\n5. **Chapter V contains a summary of the extensive literature on** **the empirical**\n**relationship between treaties and foreign direct investment (FDI).** This is important\nbackground for guiding expectations that could arise from the potential signing of treaties,\ninforming decisions in that regard. Some considerations specific to Guatemala are discussed.\n\n\n6. **Chapter VI explores how the country’s tax base can be strengthened by adopting**\n**international best practices on transfer pricing.** The chapter alludes to ways in which treaties\nfacilitate the implementation of transfer prices. It also considers certain anti-abuse measures for\ncases where transfer pricing has difficulty yielding results.\n\n\n7. **Chapter VII explains the BEPS minimum standards** and comments on their\nappropriateness for Guatemala, especially concerning preferential tax regimes. Lastly, it contains\na brief explanation of the most recent Inclusive Framework agreements on international tax\narchitecture reforms (Pillars 1 and 2) and offers some thoughts on how this could affect\nGuatemala.\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. The Guatemalan Ministry of Public Finance asked the IMF mission to review three\ninternational taxation topics: (i) the policy and model treaties for the avoidance of double\ntaxation appropriate for Guatemala; (ii) the strengthening of the transfer pricing regime; and\n(iii) the consequences for Guatemala of the minimum standards on base erosion and profit\nshifting (BEPS) adopted by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and\nDevelopment (OECD). These topics are discussed in the following manner.\n\n2. Chapter II of this report analyzes the tax revenue structure in Guatemala to\ndetermine the context surrounding the discussion on international taxation as well as the (little)\nflexibility the country has to negotiate treaties, which can cost tax resources. The chapter also\nexamines current preferential regimes to encourage investment in Guatemala and the tax\nexpenditure involved.\n\n3. Chapter III reviews some basic concepts contained in domestic legislation on\ninternational taxation, such as the definitions of source, residence, and permanent\nestablishment, which determine the scope of the country’s taxing power, focusing on aspects\nthat could give rise to double taxation.\n\n4. Chapter IV of the report discusses which treaty model would strike the right\nbalance for a net capital importing country like Guatemala. FAD policy is not to intervene in\ntreaty negotiations between the institution’s member countries. Guatemala does not have\ncurrent treaties, although it did sign but not ratify a treaty with Mexico, whose entry into force is\nstill being discussed in the country. This chapter analyzes treaties in a general sense from the\nperspective of a developing country, without directly referring to the clauses negotiated with\nMexico, except when comparing BEPS standards.\n\n5. Chapter V contains a summary of the extensive literature on the empirical\nrelationship between treaties and foreign direct investment (FDI). This is important\nbackground for guiding expectations that could arise from the potential signing of treaties,\ninforming decisions in that regard. Some considerations specific to Guatemala are discussed.\n\n6. Chapter VI explores how the country’s tax base can be strengthened by adopting\ninternational best practices on transfer pricing. The chapter alludes to ways in which treaties\nfacilitate the implementation of transfer prices. It also considers certain anti-abuse measures for\ncases where transfer pricing has difficulty yielding results.\n\n7. Chapter VII explains the BEPS minimum standards and comments on their\nappropriateness for Guatemala, especially concerning preferential tax regimes. Lastly, it contains\na brief explanation of the most recent Inclusive Framework agreements on international tax\narchitecture reforms (Pillars 1 and 2) and offers some thoughts on how this could affect\nGuatemala.\n\n11", "text_characters": 2448}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0012-001"], "markdown": "##### **II. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE**\n\n**Total Tax Revenue Compared**\n\n\n8. **Guatemala’s tax revenue has lagged over the past decade.** The general\ngovernment’s total net collection, not including social security, accounted for 10.6 percent of\nGDP in 2019, which is lower than the average collection over the seven years preceding the\n2008–09 financial crisis (Figure 1). Tax revenue in Guatemala did not keep pace with economic\ngrowth in general (Figure 2). [1] This temporarily worsened with the effects of the pandemic; tax\nrevenue fell to 10 percent of GDP in 2020, but increased to 11.7 percent in 2021, mainly as a\nresult of the economic rebound. [2] It has been said before that tax collection must be\nstrengthened in Guatemala, particularly through measures that broaden the tax base, in order to\ncreate fiscal space for raising social and infrastructure spending. [3]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9. **Tax revenue in Guatemala is one of the lowest on the continent.** Collection has been\nroughly half of the Latin American average (Figure 3). Although tax revenue as a percentage of\nGDP is normally lower when per capita income is smaller, Guatemala has one of the lowest\ncollection rates even among countries in the lower range of per capita income (Table 1). The\n\n\n1 The correlation between tax revenue growth and economic growth, called tax buoyancy, has been below 1 in\nGuatemala since 2011.\n\n2 Rising fuel prices influenced the 2021 figures, as did the payment of taxes for the sale of a telephone company,\nwhich alone meant a collection increase of 0.3 percent of GDP.\n\n3 See IMF (2021).\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "II. TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE\n\nTotal Tax Revenue Compared\n\n8. Guatemala’s tax revenue has lagged over the past decade. The general\ngovernment’s total net collection, not including social security, accounted for 10.6 percent of\nGDP in 2019, which is lower than the average collection over the seven years preceding the\n2008–09 financial crisis (Figure 1). Tax revenue in Guatemala did not keep pace with economic\ngrowth in general (Figure 2). [1] This temporarily worsened with the effects of the pandemic; tax\nrevenue fell to 10 percent of GDP in 2020, but increased to 11.7 percent in 2021, mainly as a\nresult of the economic rebound. [2] It has been said before that tax collection must be\nstrengthened in Guatemala, particularly through measures that broaden the tax base, in order to\ncreate fiscal space for raising social and infrastructure spending. [3]\n\n9. Tax revenue in Guatemala is one of the lowest on the continent. Collection has been\nroughly half of the Latin American average (Figure 3). Although tax revenue as a percentage of\nGDP is normally lower when per capita income is smaller, Guatemala has one of the lowest\ncollection rates even among countries in the lower range of per capita income (Table 1). The\n\n1 The correlation between tax revenue growth and economic growth, called tax buoyancy, has been below 1 in\nGuatemala since 2011.\n\n2 Rising fuel prices influenced the 2021 figures, as did the payment of taxes for the sale of a telephone company,\nwhich alone meant a collection increase of 0.3 percent of GDP.\n\n3 See IMF (2021).\n\n12", "text_characters": 1285}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-001", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-002", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-003", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0013-004"], "markdown": "weaker performance relative to the region is another indicator that Guatemala must make a\ngreater effort to increase tax collection.\n\n\n\n\n\n**Tax Revenue Composition**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n10. **As is common in Latin America, the main taxes in Guatemala are value-added**\n**tax (VAT) and income tax (** _**Impuesto Sobre la Renta**_ **– ISR) for legal persons.** These two\ntaxes account for 77 percent of the country’s tax revenue (Figure 4). The most notable deficiency\nin Guatemala is in personal ISR, which in 2019 accounted for barely half a percentage point of\nGDP, one of the lowest in Latin America (Table 2). The average is four times this percentage for\nthe region and double that if only low-income countries are considered.\n\n\n\n\n\n13\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0628, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(100.81999969482422, 501.8799743652344, 311.1199951171875, 646.5999755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 295, "number": 31, "size": 15191, "transform": [210.3000030517578, 0.0, -0.0, 144.72000122070312, 100.81999969482422, 501.8799743652344], "width": 392, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(103.7699966430664, 161.30999755859375, 294.91998291015625, 314.42999267578125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 314, "number": 19, "size": 10002, "transform": [191.14999389648438, 0.0, -0.0, 153.1199951171875, 103.7699966430664, 161.30999755859375], "width": 392, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "weaker performance relative to the region is another indicator that Guatemala must make a\ngreater effort to increase tax collection.\n\nTax Revenue Composition\n\n10. As is common in Latin America, the main taxes in Guatemala are value-added\ntax (VAT) and income tax ( _Impuesto Sobre la Renta_ – ISR) for legal persons. These two\ntaxes account for 77 percent of the country’s tax revenue (Figure 4). The most notable deficiency\nin Guatemala is in personal ISR, which in 2019 accounted for barely half a percentage point of\nGDP, one of the lowest in Latin America (Table 2). The average is four times this percentage for\nthe region and double that if only low-income countries are considered.\n\n13", "text_characters": 573}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "11. **VAT is the most widely collected tax in Guatemala.** However, compared to other\ncountries in the region, where VAT is also typically the largest tax, [4] what Guatemala collects is\nfairly low. Average VAT collection in the region was just above 6 percent of GDP in 2019,\ncompared to 5 percent in Guatemala. The weaker performance partly reflects a relatively low\nstatutory rate of 12 percent, but also poor tax productivity. [5]\n\n\n12. **VAT collection and the weak performance of personal ISR in Guatemala are**\n**connected to some extent.** Guatemala’s tax regime has a unique feature that exists in few\ncountries: up to a certain amount, the VAT paid by natural persons is deductible from (and partly\ncreditable against) their ISR. [6] This encourages the payment of VAT and reduces the ISR base. [7]\nAlthough a limit has been in place on the deductible (and creditable) amount since 2012, the\nregime continues to be in effect and introduces a bias against personal ISR.\n\n\n13. **The revenue collected in Guatemala through corporate ISR is comparable to the**\n**region’s average.** In 2019, collection amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP, a couple of tenths below\nthe regional average (Table 4). The general regime rate (25 percent) is competitive, falling within\nthe lower limit of the range of rates prevailing in Latin America, except Paraguay (Table 4).\n\n\n4 With the exception of Mexico (which has a significant portion of the base subject to a rate of zero) and Panama\n(the only country with a single-digit VAT rate).\n\n5 VAT efficiency in Guatemala is 0.43, which is low compared to most countries in the region and below the\naverage (0.66) of Latin American countries with a comparable per capita income level.\n\n6 There is a “blind” per-person deduction of Q 48,000 (LISR, Art. 72, para. (a)). The tax paid at a rate of 5 percent,\napplied to an additional amount of up to Q 12,000 (that is, Q 600), is creditable against the ISR. The mechanics of\nthis second limitation are not established in law, but are derived from the SAT-1431 employee forms and the\nSAT-1111 VAT spreadsheet, which must be filled out to access the benefit.\n\n7 See FAD reports (2016, 2017). It is worth noting that, despite the introduction of the upper limit to the\ncreditable amount, ISR collection from natural persons has not improved substantially. It rose from 0.40 percent\nof GDP in 2012 to 0.46 percent of GDP in 2019. A detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this report,\nwhich focuses on international taxation.\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "11. VAT is the most widely collected tax in Guatemala. However, compared to other\ncountries in the region, where VAT is also typically the largest tax, [4] what Guatemala collects is\nfairly low. Average VAT collection in the region was just above 6 percent of GDP in 2019,\ncompared to 5 percent in Guatemala. The weaker performance partly reflects a relatively low\nstatutory rate of 12 percent, but also poor tax productivity. [5]\n\n12. VAT collection and the weak performance of personal ISR in Guatemala are\nconnected to some extent. Guatemala’s tax regime has a unique feature that exists in few\ncountries: up to a certain amount, the VAT paid by natural persons is deductible from (and partly\ncreditable against) their ISR. [6] This encourages the payment of VAT and reduces the ISR base. [7]\nAlthough a limit has been in place on the deductible (and creditable) amount since 2012, the\nregime continues to be in effect and introduces a bias against personal ISR.\n\n13. The revenue collected in Guatemala through corporate ISR is comparable to the\nregion’s average. In 2019, collection amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP, a couple of tenths below\nthe regional average (Table 4). The general regime rate (25 percent) is competitive, falling within\nthe lower limit of the range of rates prevailing in Latin America, except Paraguay (Table 4).\n\n4 With the exception of Mexico (which has a significant portion of the base subject to a rate of zero) and Panama\n(the only country with a single-digit VAT rate).\n\n5 VAT efficiency in Guatemala is 0.43, which is low compared to most countries in the region and below the\naverage (0.66) of Latin American countries with a comparable per capita income level.\n\n6 There is a “blind” per-person deduction of Q 48,000 (LISR, Art. 72, para. (a)). The tax paid at a rate of 5 percent,\napplied to an additional amount of up to Q 12,000 (that is, Q 600), is creditable against the ISR. The mechanics of\nthis second limitation are not established in law, but are derived from the SAT-1431 employee forms and the\nSAT-1111 VAT spreadsheet, which must be filled out to access the benefit.\n\n7 See FAD reports (2016, 2017). It is worth noting that, despite the introduction of the upper limit to the\ncreditable amount, ISR collection from natural persons has not improved substantially. It rose from 0.40 percent\nof GDP in 2012 to 0.46 percent of GDP in 2019. A detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this report,\nwhich focuses on international taxation.\n\n14", "text_characters": 2062}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "\n\n**Special Regimes**\n\n\n14. **Guatemala has various special ISR regimes.** All ISR taxpayers have the option of paying\nthe tax through an alternative arrangement called “simplified optional” for lucrative activities,\nwith a maximum rate of 7 percent on gross income (LISR, Art. 43–44) [8] and an exemption from\nthe Solidarity Tax ( _Impuesto de Solidaridad_ - ISO). [9] It is difficult to estimate whether a regime of\nthis type (with a relatively low rate that taxes gross income) puts more or less tax pressure than\nthe general regime (which taxes profits at a higher rate) since the incidence will change from one\ntaxpayer to another depending on their profit margin. Nevertheless, in the case of an optional\n(annual) regime, the taxpayer can be assumed to choose the regime with the lower tax burden.\nThis means that the option will imply a decrease in collection, as long as the third option is not\ninformality. [10]\n\n\n8 Income up to Q 30,000 is taxed at 5 percent, whereas any income above that is taxed at 7 percent.\n\n9 The ISO is a minimum direct tax on the gross income of natural or legal persons that carry out commercial or\nagricultural activities in Guatemala. The tax is 1 percent on a fourth of the gross income reported and is\ncreditable against the ISR. It is understood to be an “advance” of the ISR.\n\n10 In 2021, the simplified optional regime collected Q 6,359 million, representing a little under 50 percent of what\nwas collected by the ISR in total. In previous years, 2015 to 2020, this regime contributed on average 56 percent\nof corporate ISR collection (lucrative activities). In 2020, 245,000 taxpayers paid tax under the optional regime,\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Special Regimes\n\n14. Guatemala has various special ISR regimes. All ISR taxpayers have the option of paying\nthe tax through an alternative arrangement called “simplified optional” for lucrative activities,\nwith a maximum rate of 7 percent on gross income (LISR, Art. 43–44) [8] and an exemption from\nthe Solidarity Tax ( _Impuesto de Solidaridad_ - ISO). [9] It is difficult to estimate whether a regime of\nthis type (with a relatively low rate that taxes gross income) puts more or less tax pressure than\nthe general regime (which taxes profits at a higher rate) since the incidence will change from one\ntaxpayer to another depending on their profit margin. Nevertheless, in the case of an optional\n(annual) regime, the taxpayer can be assumed to choose the regime with the lower tax burden.\nThis means that the option will imply a decrease in collection, as long as the third option is not\ninformality. [10]\n\n8 Income up to Q 30,000 is taxed at 5 percent, whereas any income above that is taxed at 7 percent.\n\n9 The ISO is a minimum direct tax on the gross income of natural or legal persons that carry out commercial or\nagricultural activities in Guatemala. The tax is 1 percent on a fourth of the gross income reported and is\ncreditable against the ISR. It is understood to be an “advance” of the ISR.\n\n10 In 2021, the simplified optional regime collected Q 6,359 million, representing a little under 50 percent of what\nwas collected by the ISR in total. In previous years, 2015 to 2020, this regime contributed on average 56 percent\nof corporate ISR collection (lucrative activities). In 2020, 245,000 taxpayers paid tax under the optional regime,\n\n15", "text_characters": 1367}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "15. **Guatemala also has special regimes** **for promoting investment** . The top ones are the\nfree-trade zone, free zone, and maquiladora regimes. [11] The main benefits are: (i) _temporary_\n_suspension_ (for one year) of import tax, including VAT, on inputs used in the manufacture\n(assembly or repair) of goods intended for export and goods imported for re-export;\n(ii) _exemption_ from import tax, including VAT, on machinery and equipment as well as from\nspecial consumption taxes on fuel imports; [12] and (iii) _full exemption_ from ISR for 10 years. [13] In\naddition, the purchase of domestic inputs by maquila entities and free-trade zone users is\n_exempt from VAT_ . [14]\n\n\n16. **This class of tax benefits is common in the zone.** However, these preferential regimes\ncarry certain risks: one, collection favoring investment that would have happened anyway is lost [15]\nand, two, the regime is exploited by transnational companies to conceal income actually derived\nfrom activities that take place in another territory (with higher taxation). This latter situation\ncould result in preferential regimes being classified as harmful by the Forum on Harmful Tax\nPractices [16] and their beneficiaries being potentially subject to defensive measures by the affected\ncountries (for example, increase in withholding rates for payments to regime beneficiaries).\n\n\n**Tax Expenditure**\n\n\n17. **Tax expenditure is the amount of revenue that the government fails to collect as a**\n**result of the preferential treatment it grants to a group of taxpayers.** The expenditure is\nnormally estimated based on the amount of tax the group of benefiting taxpayers would have\n\n\nwhich accounted for a little over 60 percent of the total. This option for defraying the ISR from lucrative activities\nis a preferential regime insofar as it captures taxpayers who could be paying tax under the general regime.\nNevertheless, the regime could be considered to collect tax if those who opt for it would otherwise have been\ninformal. There is no clear answers to this question, but it should be noted that informality in Guatemala is high\ncompared to the region. The percentage of employment in the informal sector is estimated to be greater than\n70 percent for 2017, above the Latin American average of 50 percent. See FAD (2017) and World Bank (2021).\n\n11 Decree 22-73 (Santo Tomas de Castilla Industry and Commerce Free Zone), Decree 29-89 (Law for the\nPromotion and Development of Export and Maquila Activities), and Decree 65-89 (Free-Trade Zone Law). The ISR\nexemption for maquilas is limited to the textile and apparel industry and to “information” and “communication”\nservices. At present, the list of admitted specific services includes call or contact centers, software development,\nand digital content development, as long as their services are provided to non-residents (Government\nAgreement 3-2017, Art. 5). Free-trade zones admit a broader range of services. The provision of financial,\ntelephony, television, and radio services is prohibited. In 2022, the criterion was relaxed (Government\nAgreement 65-22) to include new activities, such as hospital services.\n\n12 The benefit is only for fuels used in production located in the free-trade zone or authorized under the maquila\nprogram.\n\n13 The benefit does not apply to entities domiciled abroad with branches, agencies, or permanent establishments\nin Guatemala, which receive a credit for ISR paid in Guatemala.\n\n14 Free-trade zone _administrators_ enjoy similar tax benefits to those of _users_ .\n\n15 See PCT (2015).\n\n16 Forum sponsored by the OECD responsible for verifying compliance with BEPS Action 5 to combat harmful tax\npractices considering the transparency and substance of the activities accessing tax privileges. See Chapter VII of\nthis report.\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "15. Guatemala also has special regimes for promoting investment . The top ones are the\nfree-trade zone, free zone, and maquiladora regimes. [11] The main benefits are: (i) _temporary_\n_suspension_ (for one year) of import tax, including VAT, on inputs used in the manufacture\n(assembly or repair) of goods intended for export and goods imported for re-export;\n(ii) _exemption_ from import tax, including VAT, on machinery and equipment as well as from\nspecial consumption taxes on fuel imports; [12] and (iii) _full exemption_ from ISR for 10 years. [13] In\naddition, the purchase of domestic inputs by maquila entities and free-trade zone users is\n_exempt from VAT_ . [14]\n\n16. This class of tax benefits is common in the zone. However, these preferential regimes\ncarry certain risks: one, collection favoring investment that would have happened anyway is lost [15]\nand, two, the regime is exploited by transnational companies to conceal income actually derived\nfrom activities that take place in another territory (with higher taxation). This latter situation\ncould result in preferential regimes being classified as harmful by the Forum on Harmful Tax\nPractices [16] and their beneficiaries being potentially subject to defensive measures by the affected\ncountries (for example, increase in withholding rates for payments to regime beneficiaries).\n\nTax Expenditure\n\n17. Tax expenditure is the amount of revenue that the government fails to collect as a\nresult of the preferential treatment it grants to a group of taxpayers. The expenditure is\nnormally estimated based on the amount of tax the group of benefiting taxpayers would have\n\nwhich accounted for a little over 60 percent of the total. This option for defraying the ISR from lucrative activities\nis a preferential regime insofar as it captures taxpayers who could be paying tax under the general regime.\nNevertheless, the regime could be considered to collect tax if those who opt for it would otherwise have been\ninformal. There is no clear answers to this question, but it should be noted that informality in Guatemala is high\ncompared to the region. The percentage of employment in the informal sector is estimated to be greater than\n70 percent for 2017, above the Latin American average of 50 percent. See FAD (2017) and World Bank (2021).\n\n11 Decree 22-73 (Santo Tomas de Castilla Industry and Commerce Free Zone), Decree 29-89 (Law for the\nPromotion and Development of Export and Maquila Activities), and Decree 65-89 (Free-Trade Zone Law). The ISR\nexemption for maquilas is limited to the textile and apparel industry and to “information” and “communication”\nservices. At present, the list of admitted specific services includes call or contact centers, software development,\nand digital content development, as long as their services are provided to non-residents (Government\nAgreement 3-2017, Art. 5). Free-trade zones admit a broader range of services. The provision of financial,\ntelephony, television, and radio services is prohibited. In 2022, the criterion was relaxed (Government\nAgreement 65-22) to include new activities, such as hospital services.\n\n12 The benefit is only for fuels used in production located in the free-trade zone or authorized under the maquila\nprogram.\n\n13 The benefit does not apply to entities domiciled abroad with branches, agencies, or permanent establishments\nin Guatemala, which receive a credit for ISR paid in Guatemala.\n\n14 Free-trade zone _administrators_ enjoy similar tax benefits to those of _users_ .\n\n15 See PCT (2015).\n\n16 Forum sponsored by the OECD responsible for verifying compliance with BEPS Action 5 to combat harmful tax\npractices considering the transparency and substance of the activities accessing tax privileges. See Chapter VII of\nthis report.\n\n16", "text_characters": 3177}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "paid under the general regime. Every year, the SAT calculates the tax expenditure for the various\ntax privileges that exist in Guatemala, according to the type of tax and the beneficiary. For 2020,\nthe SAT estimated a total tax expenditure of 2.7 percent of GDP, two thirds of which came from\nconsumption taxes (Q 10.6 billion – Table 5). The tax sacrifice that special maquila, free-trade\nzone, and free zone regimes would entail would be relatively minor, representing 6 percent of\nthe total tax expenditure for this year, equivalent to 0.16 percent of GDP. These regimes would\nmainly benefit from a direct tax exemption, adding a benefit of a little over Q 500 million that\nyear, barely 10 percent of the total tax expenditure in direct taxes.\n\n\n18. **The estimated tax expenditure from preferential regimes to encourage investment**\n**seems modest.** However, the amount could be underestimated. Assuming that all garment\nexports originate from maquila benefiting from the special regime and that, in the absence of\nsuch a regime, the industry would pay the simplified optional ISR, the proceeds would have\ntotaled around Q 650 million in 2020, [17] approximately 30 percent more tax expenditure in direct\ntaxes estimated for all the beneficiaries of the three special regimes. [18]\n\n|Table 4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020
(in millions of quetzals)
Structure
ISR ISO Direct VAT TOTAL % GDP
(% total)
Beneficiaries D 29-89 (maquila)* 330 55 385 471 856 5.3 0.1
Beneficiaries D 65-89 (free-trade zones)* 87 33 120 0 120 0.7 0.0
Regime subtotal 417 88 505 471 975 6.0 0.2
Other 3937 480 4417 10174 15195 94.0 2.5
TOTAL 4354 568 4922 10644 16170 100.0 2.7
Source: SAT,* includes Zolic.|Col2|\n|---|---|\n|**Table 4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020**
**(in millions of quetzals)**
Source: SAT,* includes Zolic.
**ISR**
**ISO**
**Direct**
**VAT**
**TOTAL**
**Structure**
**(% total)**
**% GDP**
Beneficiaries D 29-89 (maquila)*
330
55
385
471
856
5.3
0.1
Beneficiaries D 65-89 (free-trade zones)*
87
33
120
0
120
0.7
0.0
Regime subtotal
417
88
505
471
975
6.0
0.2
Other
3937
480
4417
10174
15195
94.0
2.5
** TOTAL**
**4354**
**568**
**4922**
**10644**
**16170**
**100.0**
**2.7**||\n\n\n\n19. **In sum, the current ISR general regime in Guatemala is, at first glance,**\n**internationally competitive and has comparable collection.** One question is whether there is\nroom to sign treaties for the avoidance of double taxation that might reduce this collection. In\nprinciple, there is no space for Guatemala to lose even more ground in its tax revenue. It also\nseems unlikely that a loss in corporate ISR collection could be easily replaced with higher\ncollection of other taxes.\n\n\n20. **Guatemala’s tax system offers very generous special regimes.** These regimes can not\nonly make other FDI promotion instruments redundant, but can also constitute harmful\n\n\n17 7% X (2020 clothing category export value) US$1.2 billion X 7.72 (2020 parity) = Q 655 million.\n\n18 The SAT estimates this tax expenditure using as a reference the profit margin of comparable companies that\nfile taxes under the general regime. It applies this margin to the maquila cost and expense base to obtain the\nexempt ISR base, which provides the sector’s tax expenditure after being multiplied by 25 percent. However, this\nmethod may undervalue the estimate since maquila typically operates with inputs and assets in consignment,\nproperty of the purchaser of maquila services, which is why they are not included in the cost and expense base. If\nthe maquila cost and expense bases and the base of maquila comparables were standardized, the forgone tax\nbase would likely be considerably higher.\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.16799926757812, 311.260009765625, 545.3212890625, 447.1199951171875], "columns": 2, "rows": 2}], "text": "paid under the general regime. Every year, the SAT calculates the tax expenditure for the various\ntax privileges that exist in Guatemala, according to the type of tax and the beneficiary. For 2020,\nthe SAT estimated a total tax expenditure of 2.7 percent of GDP, two thirds of which came from\nconsumption taxes (Q 10.6 billion – Table 5). The tax sacrifice that special maquila, free-trade\nzone, and free zone regimes would entail would be relatively minor, representing 6 percent of\nthe total tax expenditure for this year, equivalent to 0.16 percent of GDP. These regimes would\nmainly benefit from a direct tax exemption, adding a benefit of a little over Q 500 million that\nyear, barely 10 percent of the total tax expenditure in direct taxes.\n\n18. The estimated tax expenditure from preferential regimes to encourage investment\nseems modest. However, the amount could be underestimated. Assuming that all garment\nexports originate from maquila benefiting from the special regime and that, in the absence of\nsuch a regime, the industry would pay the simplified optional ISR, the proceeds would have\ntotaled around Q 650 million in 2020, [17] approximately 30 percent more tax expenditure in direct\ntaxes estimated for all the beneficiaries of the three special regimes. [18]\n\n Table 4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020 (in millions of quetzals) Structure ISR ISO Direct VAT TOTAL % GDP (% total) Beneficiaries D 29-89 (maquila)* 330 55 385 471 856 5.3 0.1 Beneficiaries D 65-89 (free-trade zones)* 87 33 120 0 120 0.7 0.0 Regime subtotal 417 88 505 471 975 6.0 0.2 Other 3937 480 4417 10174 15195 94.0 2.5 TOTAL 4354 568 4922 10644 16170 100.0 2.7 Source: SAT,* includes Zolic. Col2 \n\n Table 4. Tax Expenditure of Key Taxes Administered by SAT, 2020 (in millions of quetzals) Source: SAT,* includes Zolic. ISR ISO Direct VAT TOTAL Structure (% total) % GDP Beneficiaries D 29-89 (maquila)* 330 55 385 471 856 5.3 0.1 Beneficiaries D 65-89 (free-trade zones)* 87 33 120 0 120 0.7 0.0 Regime subtotal 417 88 505 471 975 6.0 0.2 Other 3937 480 4417 10174 15195 94.0 2.5 TOTAL 4354 568 4922 10644 16170 100.0 2.7 \n\n19. In sum, the current ISR general regime in Guatemala is, at first glance,\ninternationally competitive and has comparable collection. One question is whether there is\nroom to sign treaties for the avoidance of double taxation that might reduce this collection. In\nprinciple, there is no space for Guatemala to lose even more ground in its tax revenue. It also\nseems unlikely that a loss in corporate ISR collection could be easily replaced with higher\ncollection of other taxes.\n\n20. Guatemala’s tax system offers very generous special regimes. These regimes can not\nonly make other FDI promotion instruments redundant, but can also constitute harmful\n\n17 7% X (2020 clothing category export value) US$1.2 billion X 7.72 (2020 parity) = Q 655 million.\n\n18 The SAT estimates this tax expenditure using as a reference the profit margin of comparable companies that\nfile taxes under the general regime. It applies this margin to the maquila cost and expense base to obtain the\nexempt ISR base, which provides the sector’s tax expenditure after being multiplied by 25 percent. However, this\nmethod may undervalue the estimate since maquila typically operates with inputs and assets in consignment,\nproperty of the purchaser of maquila services, which is why they are not included in the cost and expense base. If\nthe maquila cost and expense bases and the base of maquila comparables were standardized, the forgone tax\nbase would likely be considerably higher.\n\n17", "text_characters": 2987}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "preferential regimes. This report discusses ways of bolstering safeguards for corporate ISR\ninternationally to protect the tax base and the treaty model that could minimize the sacrifice of\nthe said base, without neglecting the objective of promoting FDI.\n\n\n**Recommendations**\n\n\n- Conduct a more comprehensive assessment to establish a long-term policy for strengthening\ntax revenue in Guatemala.\n\n\n- Reconsider the methodology for calculating the tax expenditure associated with special\nregimes.\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "preferential regimes. This report discusses ways of bolstering safeguards for corporate ISR\ninternationally to protect the tax base and the treaty model that could minimize the sacrifice of\nthe said base, without neglecting the objective of promoting FDI.\n\nRecommendations\n\n- Conduct a more comprehensive assessment to establish a long-term policy for strengthening\ntax revenue in Guatemala.\n\n- Reconsider the methodology for calculating the tax expenditure associated with special\nregimes.\n\n18", "text_characters": 421}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME** **TAX LAW (LISR)**\n\n21. **This chapter reviews how the local ISR standard ties to some aspects of**\n**international taxation.** This review places special attention on situations with the potential for\ndouble taxation and double non-taxation and some situations that may conflict with the eventual\napplication of conventions for the avoidance of double taxation that Guatemala might enter into.\n\n\n**Territorial Regime Versus Global Income**\n\n\n22. **Guatemala has a territorial system that taxes only local source income.** It covers all\nincome generated in the territory of Guatemala, including interest, royalties, services, and capital\ngains (LISR, Articles 3 and 4 of Decree 10 of 2012). The alternative to this system is a tax regime\nthat taxes the worldwide income of its residents, in addition to domestic source income\ngenerated by residents abroad operating in the country.\n\n\n23. **The territorial system has various advantages, especially for developing countries** .\nThis system is simpler since taxpayers are not required to report, and the Treasury to control,\nforeign source income. The territorial system also does not require the implementation of\nmeasures to avoid international double taxation as a mechanism for crediting taxes paid abroad.\nCases of international double taxation can nevertheless exist (as is the case with services,\nexplained later).\n\n\n24. **Territorial regimes also have significant weaknesses.** The tax base is smaller because\nall resident incomes generated outside the country are not affected by the ISR (in the country of\nresidence). For the same reason, the regime can be more contentious regarding the\ninterpretation of the meaning of local source and limits information to what the tax authority can\naccess.\n\n\n25. **Although a territorial system seems appropriate for a country with limited**\n**administrative resources and low capital exports, it also raises an equity issue.** This is a\nmajor consideration for developing countries. Higher earners could more easily take advantage\nof opportunities to relocate their income sources and be ISR-exempt. This, coupled with the\nbenefits offered by low- or no-tax countries, can produce conditions conducive to double\nnon-taxation of income.\n\n\n26. **Many countries that have moved toward a territorial regime did not completely**\n**abandon the global income regime they originally had.** **[19]** World income rules are often kept\nfor personal ISR, whereby passive income (dividends, interest, royalties, or capital gains) earned\n\n\n19 Worldwide income regimes were not absolute either in practice. The profits of subsidiaries abroad are normally\ntaxed when they are repatriated, deferring the tax indefinitely.\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE INCOME TAX LAW (LISR)\n\n21. This chapter reviews how the local ISR standard ties to some aspects of\ninternational taxation. This review places special attention on situations with the potential for\ndouble taxation and double non-taxation and some situations that may conflict with the eventual\napplication of conventions for the avoidance of double taxation that Guatemala might enter into.\n\nTerritorial Regime Versus Global Income\n\n22. Guatemala has a territorial system that taxes only local source income. It covers all\nincome generated in the territory of Guatemala, including interest, royalties, services, and capital\ngains (LISR, Articles 3 and 4 of Decree 10 of 2012). The alternative to this system is a tax regime\nthat taxes the worldwide income of its residents, in addition to domestic source income\ngenerated by residents abroad operating in the country.\n\n23. The territorial system has various advantages, especially for developing countries .\nThis system is simpler since taxpayers are not required to report, and the Treasury to control,\nforeign source income. The territorial system also does not require the implementation of\nmeasures to avoid international double taxation as a mechanism for crediting taxes paid abroad.\nCases of international double taxation can nevertheless exist (as is the case with services,\nexplained later).\n\n24. Territorial regimes also have significant weaknesses. The tax base is smaller because\nall resident incomes generated outside the country are not affected by the ISR (in the country of\nresidence). For the same reason, the regime can be more contentious regarding the\ninterpretation of the meaning of local source and limits information to what the tax authority can\naccess.\n\n25. Although a territorial system seems appropriate for a country with limited\nadministrative resources and low capital exports, it also raises an equity issue. This is a\nmajor consideration for developing countries. Higher earners could more easily take advantage\nof opportunities to relocate their income sources and be ISR-exempt. This, coupled with the\nbenefits offered by low- or no-tax countries, can produce conditions conducive to double\nnon-taxation of income.\n\n26. Many countries that have moved toward a territorial regime did not completely\nabandon the global income regime they originally had. [19] World income rules are often kept\nfor personal ISR, whereby passive income (dividends, interest, royalties, or capital gains) earned\n\n19 Worldwide income regimes were not absolute either in practice. The profits of subsidiaries abroad are normally\ntaxed when they are repatriated, deferring the tax indefinitely.\n\n19", "text_characters": 2276}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "abroad is taxed, for example. It is also common for countries to maintain taxation of passive\nincome earned abroad by entities controlled by a resident legal person. In both cases, the regime\nprovides credit for tax paid abroad up to the domestic tax limit. This is a standard recommended\nby Action 3 of the BEPS project (OECD 2015a).\n\n\n27. **In the end, the most appropriate regime is the one that strikes the best balance**\n**between the advantages and drawbacks of each regime.** For the time being, Guatemala has\npreferred a territorial system, assuming the costs this entails, one of which is that personal\nISR collection is very low. However, this system generally eliminates double taxation for its\nresidents (one of the reasons for negotiating treaties for the avoidance of double taxation).\n\n\n**Definition of Source**\n\n\n28. **The definition of source establishes Guatemala’s taxing right over resident and**\n**non-resident incomes generated in the national territory.** As is common, domestic source\nincome is defined as income generated by the production, sale, and marketing of goods and\nservices in Guatemala and the export of goods and derivatives of capital and capital gains\ngenerated in Guatemala. Dividends, withdrawals from permanent establishments, interest, and\nroyalties paid from Guatemala to a resident abroad are also considered to be sourced in the\ncountry. The source of payments abroad for services follows a similar fate, but has one\npeculiarity.\n\n\n**Services**\n\n\n29. **Services provided by a resident abroad are locally sourced when they are provided**\n**in Guatemala or when they are provided abroad but used in Guatemala.** **[20]** This means that\nservices paid for in Guatemala but not used in the country are not locally sourced, leaving room\nfor circumvention since the concept of service use in the country is debatable. [21] Royalties, for\nexample, are considered locally sourced when they are _paid or used_ in the national territory. [22] The\nstandard on services makes double taxation of residents abroad less likely and therefore makes a\ntreaty to achieve this result less necessary. However, in the absence of a treaty, double taxation in\nthe opposite case is not avoided if the other country, the source country in this example, taxes\nservices as long as they are paid for in its jurisdiction.\n\n\n20 LISR, Article 4, paragraph (f). “Legal, technical, financial, administrative, and other assistance services used in the\nnational territory that are provided from abroad to any individual or legal person, entity, or estate residing in the\ncountry as well as the permanent establishments of non-resident entities.”\n\n21 A service provided abroad but used in the country could apply to company employees participating in a\ntraining course in another country (paid for in Guatemala) and returning to the country to make use of their new\nknowledge. Payment for the training service would be subject to withholding in Guatemala in this case.\nConversely, a Guatemalan visitor to a neighboring country who pays for repairs to his car (and does so with his\ncredit card, such that the payment is made from Guatemala) may be a case of a service paid for in Guatemala but\nused abroad and therefore not sourced in Guatemala.\n\n22 The definition of royalties under No. 3 of Article 4, paragraph (c), No. II, encompasses rights or licenses for\ncomputer programs or their upgrades and, under No. IV, information relating to industrial, commercial or\nscientific knowledge or experience (know-how).\n\n\n20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "abroad is taxed, for example. It is also common for countries to maintain taxation of passive\nincome earned abroad by entities controlled by a resident legal person. In both cases, the regime\nprovides credit for tax paid abroad up to the domestic tax limit. This is a standard recommended\nby Action 3 of the BEPS project (OECD 2015a).\n\n27. In the end, the most appropriate regime is the one that strikes the best balance\nbetween the advantages and drawbacks of each regime. For the time being, Guatemala has\npreferred a territorial system, assuming the costs this entails, one of which is that personal\nISR collection is very low. However, this system generally eliminates double taxation for its\nresidents (one of the reasons for negotiating treaties for the avoidance of double taxation).\n\nDefinition of Source\n\n28. The definition of source establishes Guatemala’s taxing right over resident and\nnon-resident incomes generated in the national territory. As is common, domestic source\nincome is defined as income generated by the production, sale, and marketing of goods and\nservices in Guatemala and the export of goods and derivatives of capital and capital gains\ngenerated in Guatemala. Dividends, withdrawals from permanent establishments, interest, and\nroyalties paid from Guatemala to a resident abroad are also considered to be sourced in the\ncountry. The source of payments abroad for services follows a similar fate, but has one\npeculiarity.\n\nServices\n\n29. Services provided by a resident abroad are locally sourced when they are provided\nin Guatemala or when they are provided abroad but used in Guatemala. [20] This means that\nservices paid for in Guatemala but not used in the country are not locally sourced, leaving room\nfor circumvention since the concept of service use in the country is debatable. [21] Royalties, for\nexample, are considered locally sourced when they are _paid or used_ in the national territory. [22] The\nstandard on services makes double taxation of residents abroad less likely and therefore makes a\ntreaty to achieve this result less necessary. However, in the absence of a treaty, double taxation in\nthe opposite case is not avoided if the other country, the source country in this example, taxes\nservices as long as they are paid for in its jurisdiction.\n\n20 LISR, Article 4, paragraph (f). “Legal, technical, financial, administrative, and other assistance services used in the\nnational territory that are provided from abroad to any individual or legal person, entity, or estate residing in the\ncountry as well as the permanent establishments of non-resident entities.”\n\n21 A service provided abroad but used in the country could apply to company employees participating in a\ntraining course in another country (paid for in Guatemala) and returning to the country to make use of their new\nknowledge. Payment for the training service would be subject to withholding in Guatemala in this case.\nConversely, a Guatemalan visitor to a neighboring country who pays for repairs to his car (and does so with his\ncredit card, such that the payment is made from Guatemala) may be a case of a service paid for in Guatemala but\nused abroad and therefore not sourced in Guatemala.\n\n22 The definition of royalties under No. 3 of Article 4, paragraph (c), No. II, encompasses rights or licenses for\ncomputer programs or their upgrades and, under No. IV, information relating to industrial, commercial or\nscientific knowledge or experience (know-how).\n\n20", "text_characters": 2912}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Interest**\n\n\n30. **The definition of interest source adheres to the strict logic of a territorial system**\n**and, in practice, entails certain risks.** Exempting financial returns in Guatemala that were\nobtained abroad creates an incentive to export capital and, although the territorial regime is\nbased on the premise that these returns will be taxed in the source country (or where the payer\nof the interest resides), many countries that are major financial centers exempt from tax the\nfinancial investments of non-residents. This is a situation of double non-taxation. There is also a\nlack of clarity in the law as to whether payments made by residents for derivative financial\ntransactions (debt instruments) are subject to interest treatment [23] and whether they are\nGuatemalan source income. Clarifying their treatment would broaden the tax base and would\nhelp to apply the tax conventions that might be signed.\n\n\n**Dividends**\n\n\n31. **The territorial regime can also encourage evasion.** A company residing in Guatemala\nthat distributes dividends must withhold from the shareholder a 5-percent tax (whether the\nperson is a resident or non-resident of Guatemala). However, the company can instead make a\nloan to an entity abroad (owned by the same shareholder) and thus evade the withholding. The\nfirst line of defense against this scheme (which would operate the same way in a global income\nregime) is for loans to shareholders to be marked as dividends and be made subject to the\ncorresponding withholding. Many countries take the precaution of adopting a specific anti-abuse\nrule on the presumption of profit (dividend) withdrawals. Guatemala does not have one.\nGuatemala only has an anti-abuse rule of substance over form, the application of which is more\ncomplex and applicable in the context of transfer prices (LISR, Art. 61). The second line of defense\nin a global income regime scenario is for interest generated by such a loan to be taxed in\nGuatemala, whereas in a territorial system, this interest could be paid to a resident tax-free. [24]\n\n\n**Capital Gains**\n\n\n32. **The law establishes a general rule whereby capital gains and income derived from**\n**movable and immovable property in Guatemala are considered to be locally sourced.** This\nincludes income and capital gains derived from the disposal of shares (rights or interests) in a\nresident or non-resident entity whose assets consist of immovable property located in\nGuatemala. [25] This is a broadening of the definition of own source under a strict territorial system\nsince it taxes the earnings of a resident abroad from the disposal of shares of a non-resident\ncompany when related to the enjoyment of assets located in the country (indirect sale of assets).\n\n\n23 Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (b).\n\n24 The opposite can also be problematic when investment funding from abroad is presented as a loan, even if it\nhas the characteristics of a capital contribution, such that the return paid abroad is a deductible interest instead\nof a dividend which is not. This is discussed in Chapter VI.\n\n25 LISR, Article 4, paragraph (f). The definition does not include financial operations derived from capital.\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Interest\n\n30. The definition of interest source adheres to the strict logic of a territorial system\nand, in practice, entails certain risks. Exempting financial returns in Guatemala that were\nobtained abroad creates an incentive to export capital and, although the territorial regime is\nbased on the premise that these returns will be taxed in the source country (or where the payer\nof the interest resides), many countries that are major financial centers exempt from tax the\nfinancial investments of non-residents. This is a situation of double non-taxation. There is also a\nlack of clarity in the law as to whether payments made by residents for derivative financial\ntransactions (debt instruments) are subject to interest treatment [23] and whether they are\nGuatemalan source income. Clarifying their treatment would broaden the tax base and would\nhelp to apply the tax conventions that might be signed.\n\nDividends\n\n31. The territorial regime can also encourage evasion. A company residing in Guatemala\nthat distributes dividends must withhold from the shareholder a 5-percent tax (whether the\nperson is a resident or non-resident of Guatemala). However, the company can instead make a\nloan to an entity abroad (owned by the same shareholder) and thus evade the withholding. The\nfirst line of defense against this scheme (which would operate the same way in a global income\nregime) is for loans to shareholders to be marked as dividends and be made subject to the\ncorresponding withholding. Many countries take the precaution of adopting a specific anti-abuse\nrule on the presumption of profit (dividend) withdrawals. Guatemala does not have one.\nGuatemala only has an anti-abuse rule of substance over form, the application of which is more\ncomplex and applicable in the context of transfer prices (LISR, Art. 61). The second line of defense\nin a global income regime scenario is for interest generated by such a loan to be taxed in\nGuatemala, whereas in a territorial system, this interest could be paid to a resident tax-free. [24]\n\nCapital Gains\n\n32. The law establishes a general rule whereby capital gains and income derived from\nmovable and immovable property in Guatemala are considered to be locally sourced. This\nincludes income and capital gains derived from the disposal of shares (rights or interests) in a\nresident or non-resident entity whose assets consist of immovable property located in\nGuatemala. [25] This is a broadening of the definition of own source under a strict territorial system\nsince it taxes the earnings of a resident abroad from the disposal of shares of a non-resident\ncompany when related to the enjoyment of assets located in the country (indirect sale of assets).\n\n23 Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (b).\n\n24 The opposite can also be problematic when investment funding from abroad is presented as a loan, even if it\nhas the characteristics of a capital contribution, such that the return paid abroad is a deductible interest instead\nof a dividend which is not. This is discussed in Chapter VI.\n\n25 LISR, Article 4, paragraph (f). The definition does not include financial operations derived from capital.\n\n21", "text_characters": 2631}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "33. **Taxing indirect sales closes a major avenue of tax avoidance.** However, this is a\ncomplex provision to implement and requires detailed definitions of how the tax should be\ncalculated and charged. The first consideration is to determine the taxable base when assets\nlocated in Guatemala are only part of the assets of the non-resident company subject to the\nindirect sale. The entity responsible for paying the tax must also be identified. There are different\nmechanisms for this, one being that the selling company is responsible, even if it is not a local\nresident. This option is very difficult to control and makes collection of the tax highly unlikely. For\nthat reason, when a local company is alienated through an indirect sale, the buying company can\nalternatively be subjected to the tax (under the obligation to withhold tax at the time of\nacquisition) and the obligation can be made effective through the alienated company residing in\nthe country. [26] None of this is regulated in the local regulation taxing the indirect sale of\nimmovable property located in Guatemala.\n\n\n34. **One particularity in the application of the territorial regime to the receipt of**\n**dividends from foreign sources is that the effect varies depending on when the dividend is**\n**received by the resident.** The direct or immediate (resident) recipient of the dividend is exempt\nfrom such income. If this person is the ultimate shareholder of the foreign entity, the territorial\nsystem functions as expected (exemption). However, if the immediate shareholder is another\nentity that redistributes the dividend to the ultimate shareholder (resident), such distribution will\nbe taxed since it will be considered to be a distribution from a domestic source, despite the\nentirely foreign origin of the income. This prompts residents to have holdings outside the\ncountry in order to control their investments abroad. Such situations would disappear if\nGuatemala were to adopt the standard under BEPS Action 3 and tax passive income earned\nabroad by domestic residents.\n\n\n**Definition of Residence**\n\n\n35. **The legislation defines residents as natural persons who spend more than 183 days**\n**during a calendar year in the national territory** or when their center of economic interests is\nlocated in Guatemala. In this latter case, taxpayers who prove their residence or tax domicile to\nbe in another country by way of a certificate issued by the tax authorities of that country are\nexempt. [27]\n\n\n36. **In general terms, this definition of resident for natural persons is consistent with**\n**international practice, with one important caveat.** The exemption granted when the person\nhas a residence certificate issued by another country could cause control problems, especially\nwhen there are difficulties exchanging information. The door remains open for a taxpayer to\nobtain a certificate from a lower-tax country where the requirements to obtain residence are\n\n\n26 See Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2019).\n\n27 Article 6 of the Law.\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "33. Taxing indirect sales closes a major avenue of tax avoidance. However, this is a\ncomplex provision to implement and requires detailed definitions of how the tax should be\ncalculated and charged. The first consideration is to determine the taxable base when assets\nlocated in Guatemala are only part of the assets of the non-resident company subject to the\nindirect sale. The entity responsible for paying the tax must also be identified. There are different\nmechanisms for this, one being that the selling company is responsible, even if it is not a local\nresident. This option is very difficult to control and makes collection of the tax highly unlikely. For\nthat reason, when a local company is alienated through an indirect sale, the buying company can\nalternatively be subjected to the tax (under the obligation to withhold tax at the time of\nacquisition) and the obligation can be made effective through the alienated company residing in\nthe country. [26] None of this is regulated in the local regulation taxing the indirect sale of\nimmovable property located in Guatemala.\n\n34. One particularity in the application of the territorial regime to the receipt of\ndividends from foreign sources is that the effect varies depending on when the dividend is\nreceived by the resident. The direct or immediate (resident) recipient of the dividend is exempt\nfrom such income. If this person is the ultimate shareholder of the foreign entity, the territorial\nsystem functions as expected (exemption). However, if the immediate shareholder is another\nentity that redistributes the dividend to the ultimate shareholder (resident), such distribution will\nbe taxed since it will be considered to be a distribution from a domestic source, despite the\nentirely foreign origin of the income. This prompts residents to have holdings outside the\ncountry in order to control their investments abroad. Such situations would disappear if\nGuatemala were to adopt the standard under BEPS Action 3 and tax passive income earned\nabroad by domestic residents.\n\nDefinition of Residence\n\n35. The legislation defines residents as natural persons who spend more than 183 days\nduring a calendar year in the national territory or when their center of economic interests is\nlocated in Guatemala. In this latter case, taxpayers who prove their residence or tax domicile to\nbe in another country by way of a certificate issued by the tax authorities of that country are\nexempt. [27]\n\n36. In general terms, this definition of resident for natural persons is consistent with\ninternational practice, with one important caveat. The exemption granted when the person\nhas a residence certificate issued by another country could cause control problems, especially\nwhen there are difficulties exchanging information. The door remains open for a taxpayer to\nobtain a certificate from a lower-tax country where the requirements to obtain residence are\n\n26 See Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2019).\n\n27 Article 6 of the Law.\n\n22", "text_characters": 2511}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "more lax. [28] The problem is exacerbated in circumstances involving a convention because it would\naffect the taxing powers under the convention.\n\n\n37. **The calculation of days in the country during a calendar year can be manipulated.**\nStaying one of the 183 days during the year immediately before or after would be enough for\nsomeone to be declared a non-resident. That is why the rule established by many countries is\nthat a person is considered a resident if they spend this number of days in any 12-month\nperiod. [29]\n\n\n38. **The definition of residence for legal persons** **under the LISR** **follows the**\n**international standard** . Entities established in the country, those that have their registered office\nor tax address in the national territory, or those that have their center of effective management in\nthe national territory are considered residents. Both are criteria accepted in international\nconventions.\n\n\n**Definition of Permanent Establishment**\n\n\n39. **The definition of permanent establishment in the Law** **[30]** **is consistent with that of**\n**the OECD and UN Model Conventions,** **[31]** **except for one situation.** A permanent\nestablishment occurs when a resident abroad has a place of business in Guatemala or is\npresumed to have one through the relations the resident maintains with dependent or, in some\ncase, independent agents. Guatemala’s rule is standard up to there, but the provision departs\nfrom the international norm by not excluding from the definition of permanent establishment\nactivities of a preparatory or auxiliary character. [32] This could result in double taxation, with the\nadditional complexity of having to attribute an income to such activities. A treaty would likely\nremedy the problem, but only for residents of the contracting State. Amending the law would\ncorrect this for all investors.\n\n\n40. **Permanent establishments are taxed according to general rules.** Permanent\nestablishments in Guatemala are taxed on local source income attributable to them; there is no\n“force of attraction” rule for a permanent establishment that allows income earned directly in the\ncountry by the non-resident person associated with the permanent establishment to be\nattributed to that permanent establishment. Moreover, the expenditures of permanent\nestablishments with their parent companies are deductible pursuant to general rules, including\n\n\n28 The risk is likely lower due to the low ISR rates in Guatemala for natural persons.\n\n29 The person would be a resident during the calendar year in which he or she spent the 183 days.\n\n30 Article 7 of the Law.\n\n31 Article 5, OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions.\n\n32 In accordance with the OECD Model Convention (Article 5, paragraph 4), the definition of permanent\nestablishment excludes the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery of goods or\nmerchandise belonging to the enterprise as well as various circumstances considered to be more of a preparatory\nor auxiliary character.\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "more lax. [28] The problem is exacerbated in circumstances involving a convention because it would\naffect the taxing powers under the convention.\n\n37. The calculation of days in the country during a calendar year can be manipulated.\nStaying one of the 183 days during the year immediately before or after would be enough for\nsomeone to be declared a non-resident. That is why the rule established by many countries is\nthat a person is considered a resident if they spend this number of days in any 12-month\nperiod. [29]\n\n38. The definition of residence for legal persons under the LISR follows the\ninternational standard . Entities established in the country, those that have their registered office\nor tax address in the national territory, or those that have their center of effective management in\nthe national territory are considered residents. Both are criteria accepted in international\nconventions.\n\nDefinition of Permanent Establishment\n\n39. The definition of permanent establishment in the Law [30] is consistent with that of\nthe OECD and UN Model Conventions, [31] except for one situation. A permanent\nestablishment occurs when a resident abroad has a place of business in Guatemala or is\npresumed to have one through the relations the resident maintains with dependent or, in some\ncase, independent agents. Guatemala’s rule is standard up to there, but the provision departs\nfrom the international norm by not excluding from the definition of permanent establishment\nactivities of a preparatory or auxiliary character. [32] This could result in double taxation, with the\nadditional complexity of having to attribute an income to such activities. A treaty would likely\nremedy the problem, but only for residents of the contracting State. Amending the law would\ncorrect this for all investors.\n\n40. Permanent establishments are taxed according to general rules. Permanent\nestablishments in Guatemala are taxed on local source income attributable to them; there is no\n“force of attraction” rule for a permanent establishment that allows income earned directly in the\ncountry by the non-resident person associated with the permanent establishment to be\nattributed to that permanent establishment. Moreover, the expenditures of permanent\nestablishments with their parent companies are deductible pursuant to general rules, including\n\n28 The risk is likely lower due to the low ISR rates in Guatemala for natural persons.\n\n29 The person would be a resident during the calendar year in which he or she spent the 183 days.\n\n30 Article 7 of the Law.\n\n31 Article 5, OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions.\n\n32 In accordance with the OECD Model Convention (Article 5, paragraph 4), the definition of permanent\nestablishment excludes the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery of goods or\nmerchandise belonging to the enterprise as well as various circumstances considered to be more of a preparatory\nor auxiliary character.\n\n23", "text_characters": 2482}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0024-001"], "markdown": "royalties and interest, which can be difficult to oversee as these are transfers within the same\nlegal entity.\n\n\n**Withholding Rates on the Income of Non-Residents**\n\n\n41. **Non-residents without a permanent establishment are taxed on certain income**\n**generated in Guatemala.** The rates range from zero (financial sector interest) to 25 percent\n(“other income”), depending on the nature of the income (Table 5). [33] The non-resident’s gross\nincome is taxed, but if the payment represents foreign marginal income, the rate taxes the profit\nfor practical purposes. Therefore, the rates on interest, royalties, and technical services are\nadvantageous relative to the tax rate used for income of the same nature earned by residents.\nHowever, there is equal treatment for capital gains, since the same 10-percent (preferential) rate\napplies to both residents and non-residents.\n\n\n(1) Financial entities / other interest\n(2) Financial entities and bonds / financial entities foreign states / reinsurers\n(3) Machinery and equipment suppliers / general / tax havens\n(4) Public listed companies / tax havens\n(5) Gross income / earnings\n(6) Bank deposit payments / other / tax havens\n(7) Payments for intangible assets / other / tax havens\n(8) Payments outside tax havens / tax havens\n(9) Dividends paid by public listed and registered companies / tax havens\n(10) Payments to bilateral or government entities / payments to others\n(11) Reduced rate for earnings under certain thresholds / agreed statutory rate\n\n42. **Tax withholding rates in Guatemala are relatively low compared to other countries.**\nThe rates established in the domestic law of countries in the region are normally 5 to\n10 percentage points higher. This leaves these countries room to reduce rates if they sign any\ntreaties. Guatemala has much less room to do so. As a matter of fact, the treaty with Mexico\n(signed in 2015 but not yet ratified) kept the rates established in the Guatemalan domestic law.\nThe withholding rates in Guatemalan law are similar to those agreed in treaties by the region’s\ncountries. [34]\n\n\n33 Table 5 does not include withholding on other income.\n\n34 For example, the lowest withholding rates agreed by El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica for\ninterest and royalties is 10 percent, except that Costa Rica negotiated 5 percent for financial sector interest, which\nis anyway higher than the prevailing rate in the Guatemalan law.\n\n\n24\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "royalties and interest, which can be difficult to oversee as these are transfers within the same\nlegal entity.\n\nWithholding Rates on the Income of Non-Residents\n\n41. Non-residents without a permanent establishment are taxed on certain income\ngenerated in Guatemala. The rates range from zero (financial sector interest) to 25 percent\n(“other income”), depending on the nature of the income (Table 5). [33] The non-resident’s gross\nincome is taxed, but if the payment represents foreign marginal income, the rate taxes the profit\nfor practical purposes. Therefore, the rates on interest, royalties, and technical services are\nadvantageous relative to the tax rate used for income of the same nature earned by residents.\nHowever, there is equal treatment for capital gains, since the same 10-percent (preferential) rate\napplies to both residents and non-residents.\n\n(1) Financial entities / other interest\n(2) Financial entities and bonds / financial entities foreign states / reinsurers\n(3) Machinery and equipment suppliers / general / tax havens\n(4) Public listed companies / tax havens\n(5) Gross income / earnings\n(6) Bank deposit payments / other / tax havens\n(7) Payments for intangible assets / other / tax havens\n(8) Payments outside tax havens / tax havens\n(9) Dividends paid by public listed and registered companies / tax havens\n(10) Payments to bilateral or government entities / payments to others\n(11) Reduced rate for earnings under certain thresholds / agreed statutory rate\n\n42. Tax withholding rates in Guatemala are relatively low compared to other countries.\nThe rates established in the domestic law of countries in the region are normally 5 to\n10 percentage points higher. This leaves these countries room to reduce rates if they sign any\ntreaties. Guatemala has much less room to do so. As a matter of fact, the treaty with Mexico\n(signed in 2015 but not yet ratified) kept the rates established in the Guatemalan domestic law.\nThe withholding rates in Guatemalan law are similar to those agreed in treaties by the region’s\ncountries. [34]\n\n33 Table 5 does not include withholding on other income.\n\n34 For example, the lowest withholding rates agreed by El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica for\ninterest and royalties is 10 percent, except that Costa Rica negotiated 5 percent for financial sector interest, which\nis anyway higher than the prevailing rate in the Guatemalan law.\n\n24", "text_characters": 2025}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "43. **Entering into tax conventions without reducing the withholding rates established in**\n**the law should not result in a revenue loss for Guatemala, if the definition of source is**\n**protected.** However, signing conventions with the same withholding rates as those already\nenshrined in domestic law also does not serve as a major incentive for foreign investment in the\ncountry.\n\n\n44. **The Guatemalan law unilaterally grants (regulated) financial sector entities a full**\n**exemption from withholding on interest payments.** Although lower withholding on interest\nreduces the cost of financing for a capital importer, fully exempting the latter seems like an\nexcessive and uncommon benefit. In the region, only Costa Rica has a similar treatment. This also\ncreates an incentive for the performance of back-to-back operations, which are difficult to\ncontrol. [ 35]\n\n\n**Deductions**\n\n\n45. **Guatemala only allows for the deduction of interest paid abroad when loans are**\n**granted by banks or financial institutions recognized in the country of residence.** This\nlimitation is discriminatory according to the Conventions (Article 24 of the Model) [36] because the\nsame transaction with a domestic counterparty is deductible, even if the creditor is not a financial\ninstitution. It would, however, be advisable to limit the deduction of interest paid abroad when\ndealing with back-to-back arrangements intermediated by financial entities.\n\n\n46. **The deduction of payments abroad for technical services is limited to 5 percent of**\n**the taxpayer’s gross income.** **[37]** This is also contrary to the non-discrimination clause of the\nConventions. These types of caps on deductions are not an efficient mechanism for protecting\nthe country’s tax base because they can be very lenient and allow for significant profit shifting in\nsome cases and very strict in others. What is appropriate is for the deduction to be consistent\nwith the arm’s length principle. However, in countries with low administrative capacity, the limit\nmay be advisable and its elimination may involve a revenue loss if a convention is signed. Some\ncountries have managed to protect this restriction by incorporating grandfathering [38] rules into\ntheir conventions, safeguarding their right to maintain them despite the non-discrimination\nclause.\n\n\n35 A back-to-back arrangement is, for example, when a parent company abroad deposits funds in a foreign bank\nso that the bank can use them to grant a loan to a company in Guatemala. The interest can be reclassified as\ndividend distribution, which is non-deductible and subject to 5-percent withholding. The comprehensive\ntreatment of the deduction of interest is discussed in Chapter VI.\n\n36 See paragraph 4 of Article 24 of the OECD and UN Model Conventions.\n\n37 See No. 23 of Article 21 of the Law.\n\n38 See, for example, the Chile–Norway treaty.\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "43. Entering into tax conventions without reducing the withholding rates established in\nthe law should not result in a revenue loss for Guatemala, if the definition of source is\nprotected. However, signing conventions with the same withholding rates as those already\nenshrined in domestic law also does not serve as a major incentive for foreign investment in the\ncountry.\n\n44. The Guatemalan law unilaterally grants (regulated) financial sector entities a full\nexemption from withholding on interest payments. Although lower withholding on interest\nreduces the cost of financing for a capital importer, fully exempting the latter seems like an\nexcessive and uncommon benefit. In the region, only Costa Rica has a similar treatment. This also\ncreates an incentive for the performance of back-to-back operations, which are difficult to\ncontrol. [ 35]\n\nDeductions\n\n45. Guatemala only allows for the deduction of interest paid abroad when loans are\ngranted by banks or financial institutions recognized in the country of residence. This\nlimitation is discriminatory according to the Conventions (Article 24 of the Model) [36] because the\nsame transaction with a domestic counterparty is deductible, even if the creditor is not a financial\ninstitution. It would, however, be advisable to limit the deduction of interest paid abroad when\ndealing with back-to-back arrangements intermediated by financial entities.\n\n46. The deduction of payments abroad for technical services is limited to 5 percent of\nthe taxpayer’s gross income. [37] This is also contrary to the non-discrimination clause of the\nConventions. These types of caps on deductions are not an efficient mechanism for protecting\nthe country’s tax base because they can be very lenient and allow for significant profit shifting in\nsome cases and very strict in others. What is appropriate is for the deduction to be consistent\nwith the arm’s length principle. However, in countries with low administrative capacity, the limit\nmay be advisable and its elimination may involve a revenue loss if a convention is signed. Some\ncountries have managed to protect this restriction by incorporating grandfathering [38] rules into\ntheir conventions, safeguarding their right to maintain them despite the non-discrimination\nclause.\n\n35 A back-to-back arrangement is, for example, when a parent company abroad deposits funds in a foreign bank\nso that the bank can use them to grant a loan to a company in Guatemala. The interest can be reclassified as\ndividend distribution, which is non-deductible and subject to 5-percent withholding. The comprehensive\ntreatment of the deduction of interest is discussed in Chapter VI.\n\n36 See paragraph 4 of Article 24 of the OECD and UN Model Conventions.\n\n37 See No. 23 of Article 21 of the Law.\n\n38 See, for example, the Chile–Norway treaty.\n\n25", "text_characters": 2380}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Recommendations**\n\n\n- Tax financial income from abroad earned by resident companies and natural persons,\nincluding dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains received either directly or through\nforeign companies controlled from Guatemala.\n\n\n- Expand the source of services to include all those provided abroad but paid for in Guatemala,\navoiding the need for interpretation as to whether or not they are used in the country.\n\n\n- Define in the law the tax treatment of derivative financial operations so that they follow the\nfate of their underlying, that is, debt or capital.\n\n\n- Define in the law the applicable regime and the parties subject to tax on capital gains from\nindirect sales abroad of immovable assets in Guatemala.\n\n\n- Consider loans to partners (or relatives) as dividend distribution.\n\n\n- Determine residence based on location of stay over the course of 12 calendar months.\n\n\n- Eliminate proof of residence abroad with a certificate issued by a foreign authority.\n\n\n- Align the definition of permanent establishment with international practice, excluding merely\npreparatory or auxiliary activities.\n\n\n- Introduce in the law a force of attraction option for income obtained in the country directly\nby a non-resident that also has a permanent establishment in Guatemala.\n\n\n- Reclassify back-to-back operations as profit sharing, not deductible and subject to dividend\nwithholding.\n\n\n- Consider maintaining deduction limits by incorporating grandfathering rules into\nconventions.\n\n\n- Reconsider the zero percent withholding rate on the payment of interest to resident financial\nentities abroad.\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Recommendations\n\n- Tax financial income from abroad earned by resident companies and natural persons,\nincluding dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains received either directly or through\nforeign companies controlled from Guatemala.\n\n- Expand the source of services to include all those provided abroad but paid for in Guatemala,\navoiding the need for interpretation as to whether or not they are used in the country.\n\n- Define in the law the tax treatment of derivative financial operations so that they follow the\nfate of their underlying, that is, debt or capital.\n\n- Define in the law the applicable regime and the parties subject to tax on capital gains from\nindirect sales abroad of immovable assets in Guatemala.\n\n- Consider loans to partners (or relatives) as dividend distribution.\n\n- Determine residence based on location of stay over the course of 12 calendar months.\n\n- Eliminate proof of residence abroad with a certificate issued by a foreign authority.\n\n- Align the definition of permanent establishment with international practice, excluding merely\npreparatory or auxiliary activities.\n\n- Introduce in the law a force of attraction option for income obtained in the country directly\nby a non-resident that also has a permanent establishment in Guatemala.\n\n- Reclassify back-to-back operations as profit sharing, not deductible and subject to dividend\nwithholding.\n\n- Consider maintaining deduction limits by incorporating grandfathering rules into\nconventions.\n\n- Reconsider the zero percent withholding rate on the payment of interest to resident financial\nentities abroad.\n\n26", "text_characters": 1350}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **IV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA**\n\n**Introduction**\n\n\n47. **The key objective of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation is to assign**\n**taxing powers** on income generated by persons or entities operating in more than one State.\nDouble taxation results from an uncoordinated international distribution of income (or wealth)\ntax that impedes the movement of capital, persons, and services, affecting investment and\npotential economic growth.\n\n\n48. **The global network of treaties is very extensive and includes a large number of**\n**developing countries.** **[39]** Guatemala currently has no treaty in force and signed only one with\nMexico in 2015, which has not been ratified by the Guatemalan congress. At present, there is\nsignificant pressure on the government to negotiate new treaties based on the argument that\nthis would help attract more foreign investment to the country. However, the decision is not an\neasy one because the various pros and cons of treaties, which differ depending on the\ncounterparty and terms, must be weighed.\n\n\n49. **These treaties also have costs, especially in terms of tax revenue.** The negotiation of\ntreaties without full regard for their consequences could create harmful effects for collection.\nTreaties limit a State’s taxing power and might create situations in which some income benefits\nfor no reason from a fiscal policy standpoint or even situations of double non-taxation of a\nresident abroad. [40] To justify interest in a treaty, the possibility that residents of one State will be\nsubject to double taxation on their income sourced in another State will have to be analyzed. A\ncountry with a territorial regime, such as Guatemala, does not expose its residents to double\ntaxation. There is also an administrative cost; the authority must employ and train a team of\nexperts to not only negotiate treaties, but also maintain them (oversight of the correct\napplication of the convention, consultations, mutual agreements, litigation, etc.). [41]\n\n\n**Treaty Benefits and Drawbacks**\n\n\n50. **No answer can be provided beforehand as to the benefits and drawbacks of signing**\n**treaties to avoid double taxation.** One key question is the collection cost of entering into such\nagreements. The tax impact can be immediate and significant where there is a considerable,\nregular flow of payments to residents in the other contracting State and where the treaty reduces\n\n\n39 At end-2014, there were approximately 3,000 signed treaties, two thirds of which included a developing\ncountry. See M. Hearson (2015), _Introductory Note on the Action Aid Tax Treaty Data Set_, available at\n[11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf (un.org). The database for 2022 reports 3,500 signed treaties, with the same](https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf?msclkid=2cd7d6a1a64f11ec8b5b31c33a8b360d)\nproportion of developing countries.\n\n40 Double non-taxation could arise for activities exempt in free-trade zones, for example, because ISR is not\ncharged and dividend distribution is not taxed for residents abroad.\n\n41 This report does not delve into the administrative aspect of treaties, which would require a specific mission on\nthat topic.\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "IV. MODEL TREATY FOR GUATEMALA\n\nIntroduction\n\n47. The key objective of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation is to assign\ntaxing powers on income generated by persons or entities operating in more than one State.\nDouble taxation results from an uncoordinated international distribution of income (or wealth)\ntax that impedes the movement of capital, persons, and services, affecting investment and\npotential economic growth.\n\n48. The global network of treaties is very extensive and includes a large number of\ndeveloping countries. [39] Guatemala currently has no treaty in force and signed only one with\nMexico in 2015, which has not been ratified by the Guatemalan congress. At present, there is\nsignificant pressure on the government to negotiate new treaties based on the argument that\nthis would help attract more foreign investment to the country. However, the decision is not an\neasy one because the various pros and cons of treaties, which differ depending on the\ncounterparty and terms, must be weighed.\n\n49. These treaties also have costs, especially in terms of tax revenue. The negotiation of\ntreaties without full regard for their consequences could create harmful effects for collection.\nTreaties limit a State’s taxing power and might create situations in which some income benefits\nfor no reason from a fiscal policy standpoint or even situations of double non-taxation of a\nresident abroad. [40] To justify interest in a treaty, the possibility that residents of one State will be\nsubject to double taxation on their income sourced in another State will have to be analyzed. A\ncountry with a territorial regime, such as Guatemala, does not expose its residents to double\ntaxation. There is also an administrative cost; the authority must employ and train a team of\nexperts to not only negotiate treaties, but also maintain them (oversight of the correct\napplication of the convention, consultations, mutual agreements, litigation, etc.). [41]\n\nTreaty Benefits and Drawbacks\n\n50. No answer can be provided beforehand as to the benefits and drawbacks of signing\ntreaties to avoid double taxation. One key question is the collection cost of entering into such\nagreements. The tax impact can be immediate and significant where there is a considerable,\nregular flow of payments to residents in the other contracting State and where the treaty reduces\n\n39 At end-2014, there were approximately 3,000 signed treaties, two thirds of which included a developing\ncountry. See M. Hearson (2015), _Introductory Note on the Action Aid Tax Treaty Data Set_, available at\n11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf (un.org). The database for 2022 reports 3,500 signed treaties, with the same\nproportion of developing countries.\n\n40 Double non-taxation could arise for activities exempt in free-trade zones, for example, because ISR is not\ncharged and dividend distribution is not taxed for residents abroad.\n\n41 This report does not delve into the administrative aspect of treaties, which would require a specific mission on\nthat topic.\n\n27", "text_characters": 2547}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "the withholding rates. This first effect can, however, be offset over time if FDI in the country\nincreases enough.\n\n\n51. **Treaties have the following main benefits:**\n\n\n- _Legal certainty_ - International treaties normally have a higher hierarchy than ordinary country\nlaws, protecting the tax treatment of income or gains covered by the treaty. Unilateral\nchanges in the law would not affect it.\n\n\n- _Reduction of double taxation_ - They guarantee lower withholding rates and exemptions not\nprovided for in domestic legislation, reducing the possibility of double taxation.\n\n\n- _Administrative cooperation_ - They lay the foundations for cooperation between tax\nauthorities to combat tax evasion and avoidance through clauses on information exchange\nand tax collection assistance.\n\n\n- _Dispute resolution_ - They offer an additional layer of defense besides those provided for in\ninternal legislation. Taxpayers can request the initiation of a Mutual Agreement\nProcedure (MAP), which allows the competent authorities to discuss and resolve matters\nrelating to the application or interpretation of the treaty.\n\n\n- _Elimination of discriminatory treatment_ - They prohibit discriminatory treatment that may\nexist in local legislation by reason of nationality or residence, such as the treatment of\nresidents in connection with permanent establishment or discriminatory treatment of\nsubsidiaries of foreign companies compared to domestic companies.\n\n\n52. **There are also arguments against treaties.** The main one is the potential collection loss\nfor capital importing countries due to lower withholding rates and ISR base limitations if the\neffect is not offset by higher FDI. It is also important to note that preferential regimes could wipe\nout much of the positive effect that FDI has on collection.\n\n\n53. **Treaties should not be negotiated with countries that have an insignificant ISR.** It is\ncommon for countries to seek these types of treaties when there is no double taxation to avoid.\nAt times, the beneficiaries of the treaties are a few public entities of the requesting country, for\nexample, some sovereign wealth funds, which are not normally subject to taxation. These\ntherefore claim a double benefit.\n\n\n54. **A poorly negotiated treaty triggers aggressive planning schemes that are much**\n**more difficult to root out.** Terminating an existing treaty can have undesirable repercussions\nfor bilateral relations. Tools to fight tax evasion and avoidance, such as information exchange\nand tax collection assistance, are contained in specific treaties on the subject, which is why this\nsection of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation can be repetitive. [42]\n\n\n42 Guatemala is a signatory to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "the withholding rates. This first effect can, however, be offset over time if FDI in the country\nincreases enough.\n\n51. Treaties have the following main benefits:\n\n- _Legal certainty_ - International treaties normally have a higher hierarchy than ordinary country\nlaws, protecting the tax treatment of income or gains covered by the treaty. Unilateral\nchanges in the law would not affect it.\n\n- _Reduction of double taxation_ - They guarantee lower withholding rates and exemptions not\nprovided for in domestic legislation, reducing the possibility of double taxation.\n\n- _Administrative cooperation_ - They lay the foundations for cooperation between tax\nauthorities to combat tax evasion and avoidance through clauses on information exchange\nand tax collection assistance.\n\n- _Dispute resolution_ - They offer an additional layer of defense besides those provided for in\ninternal legislation. Taxpayers can request the initiation of a Mutual Agreement\nProcedure (MAP), which allows the competent authorities to discuss and resolve matters\nrelating to the application or interpretation of the treaty.\n\n- _Elimination of discriminatory treatment_ - They prohibit discriminatory treatment that may\nexist in local legislation by reason of nationality or residence, such as the treatment of\nresidents in connection with permanent establishment or discriminatory treatment of\nsubsidiaries of foreign companies compared to domestic companies.\n\n52. There are also arguments against treaties. The main one is the potential collection loss\nfor capital importing countries due to lower withholding rates and ISR base limitations if the\neffect is not offset by higher FDI. It is also important to note that preferential regimes could wipe\nout much of the positive effect that FDI has on collection.\n\n53. Treaties should not be negotiated with countries that have an insignificant ISR. It is\ncommon for countries to seek these types of treaties when there is no double taxation to avoid.\nAt times, the beneficiaries of the treaties are a few public entities of the requesting country, for\nexample, some sovereign wealth funds, which are not normally subject to taxation. These\ntherefore claim a double benefit.\n\n54. A poorly negotiated treaty triggers aggressive planning schemes that are much\nmore difficult to root out. Terminating an existing treaty can have undesirable repercussions\nfor bilateral relations. Tools to fight tax evasion and avoidance, such as information exchange\nand tax collection assistance, are contained in specific treaties on the subject, which is why this\nsection of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation can be repetitive. [42]\n\n42 Guatemala is a signatory to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.\n\n28", "text_characters": 2328}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Precautions Ahead of Treaty Negotiation**\n\n\n55. **Before the treaty negotiation process is initiated, a precise diagnostic assessment**\n**must be carried out on the real needs for treaty adoption.** The country must determine the\ncost it is willing to accept in exchange for receiving the estimated benefits. It is therefore crucial\nto understand the interaction between the treaty and the domestic laws of the states involved\nand to measure the consequences and limitations that a treaty imposes. Carefully selecting the\ncountries with which to negotiate is also important insofar as the treaty resolves situations of\ndouble taxation.\n\n\n56. **Major payments to residents abroad and foreign investment flows must be**\n**identified.** The starting point is to determine the major payments being made abroad, the\ncountries to which they are being made, and whether they are being made to related parties.\nThese details help measure the initial impacts that a treaty might have. What must also be\ndetermined is the origin of the foreign investment and the sectors for which it is intended, taking\naccount of the fact that simple statistical projections can be unreliable (this is discussed in Box 1).\n\n\n57. **Once the decision has been made to initiate the negotiation of a treaty with a**\n**certain State,** **it is necessary to gain an understanding of the latter’s tax system** and how a\ntax treaty would interact with its legislation and to review the history of other treaties it had\nnegotiated to strengthen Guatemala’s position at the negotiating table.\n\n\n**Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation**\n\n\n58. **Two model conventions are most commonly used by countries.** The first is the OECD\nModel Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) and the second is the United\nNations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries\n(UN Model).\n\n\n**OECD Model**\n\n\n59. **The OECD Model establishes residence as the primary** **criterion** **for determining**\n**what State must tax** foreign source income earned by a resident. This is the principle by which\ndouble taxation would be eliminated. The Model Convention establishes that, as a general rule,\nincome such as international traffic, royalties, capital gains from the alienation of shares,\ntechnical assistance, technical services, pensions, and other income can only be taxed in the State\nwhere the recipient of the income resides, limiting the possibility of taxing such income to the\nState where the income originates (the source State). Only in the case of dividends, interest,\ncapital gains derived from the sale of shares representing immovables, real estate income, and\nproceeds from the sale of real estate is the tax established in the source State. Independent\npersonal services receive the business profits treatment and can only be taxed if they are\nprovided through a permanent establishment. Also, the assumptions for constituting a\npermanent establishment in a State have limitations.\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Precautions Ahead of Treaty Negotiation\n\n55. Before the treaty negotiation process is initiated, a precise diagnostic assessment\nmust be carried out on the real needs for treaty adoption. The country must determine the\ncost it is willing to accept in exchange for receiving the estimated benefits. It is therefore crucial\nto understand the interaction between the treaty and the domestic laws of the states involved\nand to measure the consequences and limitations that a treaty imposes. Carefully selecting the\ncountries with which to negotiate is also important insofar as the treaty resolves situations of\ndouble taxation.\n\n56. Major payments to residents abroad and foreign investment flows must be\nidentified. The starting point is to determine the major payments being made abroad, the\ncountries to which they are being made, and whether they are being made to related parties.\nThese details help measure the initial impacts that a treaty might have. What must also be\ndetermined is the origin of the foreign investment and the sectors for which it is intended, taking\naccount of the fact that simple statistical projections can be unreliable (this is discussed in Box 1).\n\n57. Once the decision has been made to initiate the negotiation of a treaty with a\ncertain State, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the latter’s tax system and how a\ntax treaty would interact with its legislation and to review the history of other treaties it had\nnegotiated to strengthen Guatemala’s position at the negotiating table.\n\nModel Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation\n\n58. Two model conventions are most commonly used by countries. The first is the OECD\nModel Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) and the second is the United\nNations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries\n(UN Model).\n\nOECD Model\n\n59. The OECD Model establishes residence as the primary criterion for determining\nwhat State must tax foreign source income earned by a resident. This is the principle by which\ndouble taxation would be eliminated. The Model Convention establishes that, as a general rule,\nincome such as international traffic, royalties, capital gains from the alienation of shares,\ntechnical assistance, technical services, pensions, and other income can only be taxed in the State\nwhere the recipient of the income resides, limiting the possibility of taxing such income to the\nState where the income originates (the source State). Only in the case of dividends, interest,\ncapital gains derived from the sale of shares representing immovables, real estate income, and\nproceeds from the sale of real estate is the tax established in the source State. Independent\npersonal services receive the business profits treatment and can only be taxed if they are\nprovided through a permanent establishment. Also, the assumptions for constituting a\npermanent establishment in a State have limitations.\n\n29", "text_characters": 2469}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "60. **The OECD Model provides means of dispute resolution and includes mandatory**\n**arbitration for authorities.** The first is governed by mandatory minimum standards on MAP to\nensure that they are agile, do not prevent access to the means of defense provided for in\ndomestic legislation, and require the contracting states to resolve disputes within specified\ntimeframes, suggested to be two years in the OECD Model commentary. The model also includes\ntools to combat tax evasion and avoidance, such as information exchange and tax collection\nassistance.\n\n\n**UN Model**\n\n\n61. **The UN Model establishes the source as the primary criterion for determining what**\n**State must tax the income earned by a resident abroad.** This model leans toward protecting\nthe taxing rights of countries where the income is generated, as is the case of royalties, capital\ngains from the alienation of shares, technical assistance, technical services, international ship\ntraffic, and other income. The UN Model has a regime applicable to independent services under\nArticle 14 and allows for easier constitution of a permanent establishment in the source country.\n\n\n62. **The definition** **of royalties is broad**, potentially expanding the tax base in the source\ncountry. It includes, for example, payment for the use (or the concession for use) of industrial,\ncommercial, or scientific equipment. The commentary in the Model even clarifies that the use of\nsatellites can be treated as royalties, the opposite of what is established in the OECD Model.\n\n\n63. **The UN Model has a specific article on income from technical services** that\nestablishes the right to tax at source income obtained by a resident abroad from the provision of\nsuch services, as detailed below.\n\n\n**Power to Tax Certain Income Under Treaties**\n\n\n64. **The most relevant income from cross-border operations in terms of conventions is**\ninterest, royalties, dividends, capital gains, independent personal services, and technical\nassistance and services. Business profits and the related concept of permanent establishment are\nalso very important.\n\n\n**Interest (Article 11)** **[43]**\n\n\n65. **Both Model Conventions stipulate that the source State can tax interest paid by its**\n**residents abroad.** Treaties normally establish this and define the applicable tax rate (or rates).\nThe prevailing logic, especially for developing countries that are capital importers, is that a\nrelatively low rate is preferable in order to avoid making credit more expensive. The cost of the\ntax is normally absorbed by the debtor country since the international creditor typically has the\nmarket power to raise the interest rate by the withholding percentage.\n\n\n43 The article in parentheses refers to the OECD Model.\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "60. The OECD Model provides means of dispute resolution and includes mandatory\narbitration for authorities. The first is governed by mandatory minimum standards on MAP to\nensure that they are agile, do not prevent access to the means of defense provided for in\ndomestic legislation, and require the contracting states to resolve disputes within specified\ntimeframes, suggested to be two years in the OECD Model commentary. The model also includes\ntools to combat tax evasion and avoidance, such as information exchange and tax collection\nassistance.\n\nUN Model\n\n61. The UN Model establishes the source as the primary criterion for determining what\nState must tax the income earned by a resident abroad. This model leans toward protecting\nthe taxing rights of countries where the income is generated, as is the case of royalties, capital\ngains from the alienation of shares, technical assistance, technical services, international ship\ntraffic, and other income. The UN Model has a regime applicable to independent services under\nArticle 14 and allows for easier constitution of a permanent establishment in the source country.\n\n62. The definition of royalties is broad, potentially expanding the tax base in the source\ncountry. It includes, for example, payment for the use (or the concession for use) of industrial,\ncommercial, or scientific equipment. The commentary in the Model even clarifies that the use of\nsatellites can be treated as royalties, the opposite of what is established in the OECD Model.\n\n63. The UN Model has a specific article on income from technical services that\nestablishes the right to tax at source income obtained by a resident abroad from the provision of\nsuch services, as detailed below.\n\nPower to Tax Certain Income Under Treaties\n\n64. The most relevant income from cross-border operations in terms of conventions is\ninterest, royalties, dividends, capital gains, independent personal services, and technical\nassistance and services. Business profits and the related concept of permanent establishment are\nalso very important.\n\nInterest (Article 11) [43]\n\n65. Both Model Conventions stipulate that the source State can tax interest paid by its\nresidents abroad. Treaties normally establish this and define the applicable tax rate (or rates).\nThe prevailing logic, especially for developing countries that are capital importers, is that a\nrelatively low rate is preferable in order to avoid making credit more expensive. The cost of the\ntax is normally absorbed by the debtor country since the international creditor typically has the\nmarket power to raise the interest rate by the withholding percentage.\n\n43 The article in parentheses refers to the OECD Model.\n\n30", "text_characters": 2268}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "66. **The second discussion is whether the withholding rate must be uniform for all**\n**types of interest or whether there should be different treatment for different types of**\n**interest.** Imposing higher rates on interest paid to entities other than banks or to holders of\nbonds placed in international markets might follow the reasoning that there is more room to\nabsorb a higher tax in such cases; however, the downside for the tax administration (in terms of\nhow it is to exercise supervision in such cases) probably does not justify this approach. Such\nmethods are even less appropriate for a tax administration with scarce resources.\n\n\n67. **A very important aspect of the treaty is the definition of interest.** The UN and OECD\nmodels have a traditional definition (credit income of any kind) but restrict what is meant by\ninterest income. They leave out a significant number of financial operations, such as financial\nleasing, factoring, the sale of credits at a discount, income from the alienation of credits, and\nincome from some derivative financial operations, concepts that are, for the most part, included\nin the definition of interest contained in Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (b), of the Law. Consequently,\nmany states include a provision in treaties establishing that interest income is to be understood\nas that defined in accordance with their domestic legislation. This is the most appropriate\nposition for a net capital importing country. The recommendation is to confirm the source tax for\ninterest in the treaty, adopt a single withholding rate (not zero), and make reference in the\ndefinition of interest to concepts established in domestic legislation.\n\n\n**Royalties (Article 12)**\n\n\n68. **To determine the power to tax royalties, treaties must first define royalties and**\n**then identify the place where they are to be taxed,** both of which pose challenges. The\ndefinition of royalties in the OECD and UN models is traditional: income derived from the use (or\nconcession for use) of intellectual property protected by laws (trademarks, patents, trade names,\nand copyrights, among others). There are two positions as to where they should be taxed: (i) only\nby the State of residence; or (ii) also by the source State, when the payer is a resident of that\nState or the intellectual property is used in that State. [44]\n\n\n69. **The UN Model adds the use of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment under**\n**royalties.** This has a broad connotation, as established by the commentary in the Model. It\nclarifies that a royalty is the payment for the commercial (and not personal) use of a piece of\nequipment, whatever it may be. This is the case of satellite use, which involves the provision of a\nservice according to the OECD Model because the person who needs their signal to be\ntransmitted cannot manipulate the satellite. Under the UN Model, this constitutes use of\ncommercial, industrial, or scientific equipment because the satellite is being leased for the\npurpose of such a transmission.\n\n\n44 Article 4, paragraph (c), of the Law follows the criterion of taxing at source when the payer is a resident or when\nthe items for which royalties are paid are used in Guatemala, which should be reflected in the treaties the country\nenters into in the future.\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "66. The second discussion is whether the withholding rate must be uniform for all\ntypes of interest or whether there should be different treatment for different types of\ninterest. Imposing higher rates on interest paid to entities other than banks or to holders of\nbonds placed in international markets might follow the reasoning that there is more room to\nabsorb a higher tax in such cases; however, the downside for the tax administration (in terms of\nhow it is to exercise supervision in such cases) probably does not justify this approach. Such\nmethods are even less appropriate for a tax administration with scarce resources.\n\n67. A very important aspect of the treaty is the definition of interest. The UN and OECD\nmodels have a traditional definition (credit income of any kind) but restrict what is meant by\ninterest income. They leave out a significant number of financial operations, such as financial\nleasing, factoring, the sale of credits at a discount, income from the alienation of credits, and\nincome from some derivative financial operations, concepts that are, for the most part, included\nin the definition of interest contained in Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (b), of the Law. Consequently,\nmany states include a provision in treaties establishing that interest income is to be understood\nas that defined in accordance with their domestic legislation. This is the most appropriate\nposition for a net capital importing country. The recommendation is to confirm the source tax for\ninterest in the treaty, adopt a single withholding rate (not zero), and make reference in the\ndefinition of interest to concepts established in domestic legislation.\n\nRoyalties (Article 12)\n\n68. To determine the power to tax royalties, treaties must first define royalties and\nthen identify the place where they are to be taxed, both of which pose challenges. The\ndefinition of royalties in the OECD and UN models is traditional: income derived from the use (or\nconcession for use) of intellectual property protected by laws (trademarks, patents, trade names,\nand copyrights, among others). There are two positions as to where they should be taxed: (i) only\nby the State of residence; or (ii) also by the source State, when the payer is a resident of that\nState or the intellectual property is used in that State. [44]\n\n69. The UN Model adds the use of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment under\nroyalties. This has a broad connotation, as established by the commentary in the Model. It\nclarifies that a royalty is the payment for the commercial (and not personal) use of a piece of\nequipment, whatever it may be. This is the case of satellite use, which involves the provision of a\nservice according to the OECD Model because the person who needs their signal to be\ntransmitted cannot manipulate the satellite. Under the UN Model, this constitutes use of\ncommercial, industrial, or scientific equipment because the satellite is being leased for the\npurpose of such a transmission.\n\n44 Article 4, paragraph (c), of the Law follows the criterion of taxing at source when the payer is a resident or when\nthe items for which royalties are paid are used in Guatemala, which should be reflected in the treaties the country\nenters into in the future.\n\n31", "text_characters": 2712}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "70. **There are also differences of opinion regarding payment for software use that**\n**should be included in the concept of royalties.** The commentary in the OECD Model\nconcludes that software payments are not copyright royalties; rather, they are a transfer of\ncopyright on the economic exploitation of software. However, various countries do not agree\nwith this interpretation, pointing out (in line with their domestic legislation) that payments for\nsoftware use are also royalties when all the software ownership rights are not transferred, the\nsoftware is not completely standardized, and the software is adapted in some form to the user.\n\n\n71. **The OECD Model excludes from the concept of royalties income derived from**\n**technical services.** According to this model, technical services must be treated as business\nprofits and can only be taxed if they are provided through a permanent establishment. By\ncontrast, the UN Model includes a specific article (12A) that grants taxing rights to the State from\nwhich the payment for technical services originates, as long as these are specialized services.\nThe main argument for incorporating this article is to combat the erosion of the ISR base in\ndeveloping countries, which face a significant amount of deductions for payments made under\nthis concept. The commentary in the UN Model adds an alternative provision for taxing technical\nservices, limiting it to situations in which the service provider has a physical presence in that\nState, except when the payments are made to related parties. Many countries in Latin America\nand Asia follow the UN Model in this regard.\n\n\n72. **It is recommended that the definition of source in the Guatemalan model treaty**\n**maintain the concept of royalties as per the terms established in the legislation.** It should\nalso include payments for the use of industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment, currently\ntaxed as other income under the law. This change would reduce the rate from 25 percent to the\nrate negotiated in the treaty. If this income is not included in the concept of royalties under the\ntreaty, income from this equipment would fall under the concept of business profits and would\nonly be taxed if attributed to a permanent establishment located in Guatemala. It is also advised\nfor software payments to be taxed as royalties, except in cases where the software was\nstandardized and its commercial use was limited. [45] Having source rights for technical assistance\npayments is recommended as well.\n\n\n**Capital Gains (Article 13)**\n\n\n73. **Both the UN and the OECD models provide that the alienation of shares that derive**\n**more than 50 percent of their value from immovable property** situated in the State is taxed\nat source. This is regardless of whether or not the company that issued them is a resident. In the\nUN Model and in various countries, gains from the direct or indirect alienation of a certain\npercentage of share ownership issued by a resident company, even if the alienation takes place\nabroad, are taxed at source. The gains are taxable in the State in which the company issuing the\n\n\n45 Leasing of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment is not included in the definition and is treated as\nother income taxed under Article 104, No. 4. As for software, all cases in which software use is granted are taxed,\nin accordance with Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (c).\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "70. There are also differences of opinion regarding payment for software use that\nshould be included in the concept of royalties. The commentary in the OECD Model\nconcludes that software payments are not copyright royalties; rather, they are a transfer of\ncopyright on the economic exploitation of software. However, various countries do not agree\nwith this interpretation, pointing out (in line with their domestic legislation) that payments for\nsoftware use are also royalties when all the software ownership rights are not transferred, the\nsoftware is not completely standardized, and the software is adapted in some form to the user.\n\n71. The OECD Model excludes from the concept of royalties income derived from\ntechnical services. According to this model, technical services must be treated as business\nprofits and can only be taxed if they are provided through a permanent establishment. By\ncontrast, the UN Model includes a specific article (12A) that grants taxing rights to the State from\nwhich the payment for technical services originates, as long as these are specialized services.\nThe main argument for incorporating this article is to combat the erosion of the ISR base in\ndeveloping countries, which face a significant amount of deductions for payments made under\nthis concept. The commentary in the UN Model adds an alternative provision for taxing technical\nservices, limiting it to situations in which the service provider has a physical presence in that\nState, except when the payments are made to related parties. Many countries in Latin America\nand Asia follow the UN Model in this regard.\n\n72. It is recommended that the definition of source in the Guatemalan model treaty\nmaintain the concept of royalties as per the terms established in the legislation. It should\nalso include payments for the use of industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment, currently\ntaxed as other income under the law. This change would reduce the rate from 25 percent to the\nrate negotiated in the treaty. If this income is not included in the concept of royalties under the\ntreaty, income from this equipment would fall under the concept of business profits and would\nonly be taxed if attributed to a permanent establishment located in Guatemala. It is also advised\nfor software payments to be taxed as royalties, except in cases where the software was\nstandardized and its commercial use was limited. [45] Having source rights for technical assistance\npayments is recommended as well.\n\nCapital Gains (Article 13)\n\n73. Both the UN and the OECD models provide that the alienation of shares that derive\nmore than 50 percent of their value from immovable property situated in the State is taxed\nat source. This is regardless of whether or not the company that issued them is a resident. In the\nUN Model and in various countries, gains from the direct or indirect alienation of a certain\npercentage of share ownership issued by a resident company, even if the alienation takes place\nabroad, are taxed at source. The gains are taxable in the State in which the company issuing the\n\n45 Leasing of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment is not included in the definition and is treated as\nother income taxed under Article 104, No. 4. As for software, all cases in which software use is granted are taxed,\nin accordance with Article 4, No. 3, paragraph (c).\n\n32", "text_characters": 2811}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "shares is a resident. Other countries tax at a reduced withholding rate when any percentage of\nshares issued by resident entities is alienated.\n\n\n74. **Much discussion has also occurred on whether countries should also tax the**\n**indirect sale of enterprises** when more than 50 percent of the value of foreign company shares\nis derived from the shares of a resident company of another State, irrespective of the real estate\ncomponent. Oversight of such alienation is particularly complex, as control and reporting\nmechanisms are necessary to inform tax authorities that such share transfers have occurred.\nMaking it mandatory for resident companies to inform the tax administration through specific\nformats can be useful. It is recommended that gains derived from the alienation of shares of\nresident enterprises be taxed at source under certain conditions, as established in the UN Model,\nas well as the sale of shares when their value is derived from immovable property in Guatemala.\nHowever, to be practicable, this must be clearly set forth in Guatemalan legislation as well.\n\n\n**Dividends (Article 10)**\n\n\n75. **It is common for dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a State to be**\n**taxed at source.** The OECD and UN models suggest establishing two applicable withholding\nrates. One is a reduced rate in cases where a certain share percentage exists (usually 25 percent\nof the shareholding). In this case, both models add an anti-abuse provision establishing that\naccess to the reduced rate is only granted if the shares were held for 365 days before the\ndividends were distributed (including the day of their distribution). [46] The other rate is higher and\napplies to smaller shareholdings where portfolio investments are situated.\n\n\n76. **A broad definition of dividends is necessary.** Many states include in their treaties a\nreference to the definition of dividends from their domestic legislation not only for commercial,\nbut also for tax matters. The objective is to include certain types of income reclassified as such\nfor the purposes of the treaty (and the agreed withholding) when applying anti-abuse rules. [47] It\nis also important for the same withholding rules to apply to the distribution of profits from the\npermanent establishment to its central office.\n\n\n**Business Profits (Article 7)**\n\n\n77. **Treaties assign the power to tax business profits, but do not define the concept.** The\nModel Conventions indicate that domestic legislation must be consulted to give the concept\ncontext. This usually includes commercial, industrial, agricultural, forestry, livestock, and fishery\nactivities. The OECD Model also includes independent services.\n\n\n78. **Business profits are only taxed in the State of residence, except when they are**\n**attributable to a permanent establishment of another State.** The UN Model includes the\n\n\n46 The planning this seeks to prevent is artificial compliance with the shareholding days before the dividend\ndistribution and the lowering of this shareholding once the dividends are distributed.\n\n47 These types of rules could not be identified in Guatemalan legislation.\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "shares is a resident. Other countries tax at a reduced withholding rate when any percentage of\nshares issued by resident entities is alienated.\n\n74. Much discussion has also occurred on whether countries should also tax the\nindirect sale of enterprises when more than 50 percent of the value of foreign company shares\nis derived from the shares of a resident company of another State, irrespective of the real estate\ncomponent. Oversight of such alienation is particularly complex, as control and reporting\nmechanisms are necessary to inform tax authorities that such share transfers have occurred.\nMaking it mandatory for resident companies to inform the tax administration through specific\nformats can be useful. It is recommended that gains derived from the alienation of shares of\nresident enterprises be taxed at source under certain conditions, as established in the UN Model,\nas well as the sale of shares when their value is derived from immovable property in Guatemala.\nHowever, to be practicable, this must be clearly set forth in Guatemalan legislation as well.\n\nDividends (Article 10)\n\n75. It is common for dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a State to be\ntaxed at source. The OECD and UN models suggest establishing two applicable withholding\nrates. One is a reduced rate in cases where a certain share percentage exists (usually 25 percent\nof the shareholding). In this case, both models add an anti-abuse provision establishing that\naccess to the reduced rate is only granted if the shares were held for 365 days before the\ndividends were distributed (including the day of their distribution). [46] The other rate is higher and\napplies to smaller shareholdings where portfolio investments are situated.\n\n76. A broad definition of dividends is necessary. Many states include in their treaties a\nreference to the definition of dividends from their domestic legislation not only for commercial,\nbut also for tax matters. The objective is to include certain types of income reclassified as such\nfor the purposes of the treaty (and the agreed withholding) when applying anti-abuse rules. [47] It\nis also important for the same withholding rules to apply to the distribution of profits from the\npermanent establishment to its central office.\n\nBusiness Profits (Article 7)\n\n77. Treaties assign the power to tax business profits, but do not define the concept. The\nModel Conventions indicate that domestic legislation must be consulted to give the concept\ncontext. This usually includes commercial, industrial, agricultural, forestry, livestock, and fishery\nactivities. The OECD Model also includes independent services.\n\n78. Business profits are only taxed in the State of residence, except when they are\nattributable to a permanent establishment of another State. The UN Model includes the\n\n46 The planning this seeks to prevent is artificial compliance with the shareholding days before the dividend\ndistribution and the lowering of this shareholding once the dividends are distributed.\n\n47 These types of rules could not be identified in Guatemalan legislation.\n\n33", "text_characters": 2597}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "possibility of attributing income to a permanent establishment if its parent company directly\nengages in the same activities in the State where the said permanent establishment is located\n(force of attraction rule).\n\n\n79. **The manner in which the taxable base of a permanent establishment is determined**\n**in the OECD and UN models differs.** The OECD allows for the deduction of virtual payments\nmade between the permanent establishment and its parent company for interest, royalties, and\nservices, whereas the UN Model does not. This approach was adopted by the OECD in 2010\n(OECD 2010) based on the assumption that the permanent establishment is, for profit (and tax\nbase) attribution purposes between countries, a distinct and separate entity from its parent\ncompany and that such payments must have all the corresponding tax effects, such as\ndeductibility. However, this approach was rejected by many countries because they were legally\nunable to make at-source withholdings for virtual payments. Neither domestic legislation nor\nexisting treaties allow for this.\n\n\n80. **The LISR does not limit permanent establishment deductions for payments to its**\n**parent company.** In the absence of a restriction in treaties, the provisions of domestic legislation\nwould apply. Symmetry would be restored if these virtual payments were subject to withholding.\nOne way of doing this is to adjust the payment by the amount of corresponding withholding if\nthe payment were made between independent parties. However, it is unclear whether the LISR\nformally permits this adjustment.\n\n\n81. **The constitution of a permanent establishment in the OECD Model is more difficult**\n**than under the UN Model.** There are two essential criteria for constituting a permanent\nestablishment: (i) the existence of a fixed place of business where all or some of the business\nactivities are carried out; and (ii) when dependent agents located in one State enter into\ncontracts on behalf of the resident abroad or when the said agent usually plays the primary role\nof entering into routinely concluded contracts without substantial modifications by the resident\nabroad for the transfer of ownership of goods, rights of use, or service delivery. The UN Model\nincludes a third assumption for constituting a permanent establishment when an insurer collects\ninsurance premiums in the territory of a foreign State. Treaties should include these three\nassumptions.\n\n\n82. **Under the OECD Model, the permanent establishment as the fixed place of business**\n**must prove that it conducts** **business activities in a geographic location.** This is the case of\nconstruction, installation, or assembly works, which must also have a duration of at least\n12 months. Under the UN Model, the permanent establishment for the stated activities does not\nhave to prove the existence of a fixed place of business, as it is in itself considered to meet this\ncondition. The duration for constituting it is six months. Guatemala incorporated the UN criterion\ninto the negotiation of the treaty it signed.\n\n\n83. **According to the OECD Model, independent services follow the same source**\n**taxation principles as business profits.** This position is not shared by the UN Committee of\n\n\n34", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "possibility of attributing income to a permanent establishment if its parent company directly\nengages in the same activities in the State where the said permanent establishment is located\n(force of attraction rule).\n\n79. The manner in which the taxable base of a permanent establishment is determined\nin the OECD and UN models differs. The OECD allows for the deduction of virtual payments\nmade between the permanent establishment and its parent company for interest, royalties, and\nservices, whereas the UN Model does not. This approach was adopted by the OECD in 2010\n(OECD 2010) based on the assumption that the permanent establishment is, for profit (and tax\nbase) attribution purposes between countries, a distinct and separate entity from its parent\ncompany and that such payments must have all the corresponding tax effects, such as\ndeductibility. However, this approach was rejected by many countries because they were legally\nunable to make at-source withholdings for virtual payments. Neither domestic legislation nor\nexisting treaties allow for this.\n\n80. The LISR does not limit permanent establishment deductions for payments to its\nparent company. In the absence of a restriction in treaties, the provisions of domestic legislation\nwould apply. Symmetry would be restored if these virtual payments were subject to withholding.\nOne way of doing this is to adjust the payment by the amount of corresponding withholding if\nthe payment were made between independent parties. However, it is unclear whether the LISR\nformally permits this adjustment.\n\n81. The constitution of a permanent establishment in the OECD Model is more difficult\nthan under the UN Model. There are two essential criteria for constituting a permanent\nestablishment: (i) the existence of a fixed place of business where all or some of the business\nactivities are carried out; and (ii) when dependent agents located in one State enter into\ncontracts on behalf of the resident abroad or when the said agent usually plays the primary role\nof entering into routinely concluded contracts without substantial modifications by the resident\nabroad for the transfer of ownership of goods, rights of use, or service delivery. The UN Model\nincludes a third assumption for constituting a permanent establishment when an insurer collects\ninsurance premiums in the territory of a foreign State. Treaties should include these three\nassumptions.\n\n82. Under the OECD Model, the permanent establishment as the fixed place of business\nmust prove that it conducts business activities in a geographic location. This is the case of\nconstruction, installation, or assembly works, which must also have a duration of at least\n12 months. Under the UN Model, the permanent establishment for the stated activities does not\nhave to prove the existence of a fixed place of business, as it is in itself considered to meet this\ncondition. The duration for constituting it is six months. Guatemala incorporated the UN criterion\ninto the negotiation of the treaty it signed.\n\n83. According to the OECD Model, independent services follow the same source\ntaxation principles as business profits. This position is not shared by the UN Committee of\n\n34", "text_characters": 2687}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. According to this Committee, it is advisable\nto maintain the option of taxing at source income from independent services based simply on\n183 days of physical presence, without the need for a fixed place of business. This position\nprotects the tax base of a net capital importing country and is the one adopted by the LISR and\nthe treaty that was signed by Guatemala.\n\n\n**International Traffic (Article 8)**\n\n\n84. **International traffic has been traditionally taxed exclusively in the State of**\n**residence of the company operating the ships or aircraft.** Treaties normally reflect this\nposition. Some countries (Greece and Panama) have a strict policy of preserving taxing rights if\nships are registered in their territory. Pursuant to its legislation, Guatemala reserves the right to\npartially tax income attributable to the source. Signing a treaty under the terms explained would\nmean a loss of the tax base. [48]\n\n\n**Other Income (Article 21)**\n\n\n85. **Treaties normally include an article on “other income” applicable to a series of**\n**relevant items that do not fit under any other articles.** This is the case of income earned for\nfree, such as donations, raffles, or lotteries, as well as income obtained through inheritance or\nlegacies, the application of penal or civil clauses derived from the breach of contracts, the\npayment of damages, and some derivative financial operations that do not qualify as interest and\nthat are not made in the regular course of business or as part of the corporate purpose of\ncompanies. The OECD Model grants exclusive taxing rights to the country of residence for this\ntype of income, whereas the UN Model provides the taxing option to the source State from\nwhich the payments originate. Domestic legislation establishes a withholding rate of 25 percent\non such payments, which would obviously be negotiated down in a treaty. However, it is\nimportant that the payments be subject to withholding.\n\n\n**Arbitration (Article 25)**\n\n\n86. **Access to arbitration is compulsory under the OECD Model.** The process would start\nat the request of the taxpayer if the MAP provided for in the Convention has not been resolved\nin two years. The UN Model considers arbitration as an alternative, but in a different way. The\nprocess would be initiated at the request of any of the tax authorities once three years have\nelapsed since the initiation of the MAP and grants the authorities of the states involved the\npossibility of changing the decision of the arbitration panel if they reach an agreement within six\nmonths of the issuance of the panel’s resolution. Many developing countries have favored the\nprotection of their sovereignty and have not included compulsory arbitration in their treaties.\nThis is besides the technical training deficiencies they might have in administering such\narbitration.\n\n\n48 Articles 21 Bis 104, (a), 1 of the LISR would cease applying.\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. According to this Committee, it is advisable\nto maintain the option of taxing at source income from independent services based simply on\n183 days of physical presence, without the need for a fixed place of business. This position\nprotects the tax base of a net capital importing country and is the one adopted by the LISR and\nthe treaty that was signed by Guatemala.\n\nInternational Traffic (Article 8)\n\n84. International traffic has been traditionally taxed exclusively in the State of\nresidence of the company operating the ships or aircraft. Treaties normally reflect this\nposition. Some countries (Greece and Panama) have a strict policy of preserving taxing rights if\nships are registered in their territory. Pursuant to its legislation, Guatemala reserves the right to\npartially tax income attributable to the source. Signing a treaty under the terms explained would\nmean a loss of the tax base. [48]\n\nOther Income (Article 21)\n\n85. Treaties normally include an article on “other income” applicable to a series of\nrelevant items that do not fit under any other articles. This is the case of income earned for\nfree, such as donations, raffles, or lotteries, as well as income obtained through inheritance or\nlegacies, the application of penal or civil clauses derived from the breach of contracts, the\npayment of damages, and some derivative financial operations that do not qualify as interest and\nthat are not made in the regular course of business or as part of the corporate purpose of\ncompanies. The OECD Model grants exclusive taxing rights to the country of residence for this\ntype of income, whereas the UN Model provides the taxing option to the source State from\nwhich the payments originate. Domestic legislation establishes a withholding rate of 25 percent\non such payments, which would obviously be negotiated down in a treaty. However, it is\nimportant that the payments be subject to withholding.\n\nArbitration (Article 25)\n\n86. Access to arbitration is compulsory under the OECD Model. The process would start\nat the request of the taxpayer if the MAP provided for in the Convention has not been resolved\nin two years. The UN Model considers arbitration as an alternative, but in a different way. The\nprocess would be initiated at the request of any of the tax authorities once three years have\nelapsed since the initiation of the MAP and grants the authorities of the states involved the\npossibility of changing the decision of the arbitration panel if they reach an agreement within six\nmonths of the issuance of the panel’s resolution. Many developing countries have favored the\nprotection of their sovereignty and have not included compulsory arbitration in their treaties.\nThis is besides the technical training deficiencies they might have in administering such\narbitration.\n\n48 Articles 21 Bis 104, (a), 1 of the LISR would cease applying.\n\n35", "text_characters": 2439}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (Article 29)**\n\n\n87. **In the recent update of the OECD and UN models, new provisions were**\n**incorporated to prevent the misuse of treaties.** These provisions reflect the agreements\nestablished in BEPS Action 6 (minimum standard, see Chapter VII), which eliminates treaty\nbenefits when one of the main purposes of the operation is to obtain a tax benefit from the\nconvention. The treaty with Mexico includes a benefit limitation clause that defines the persons\nresiding in the other State who qualify for treaty benefits, excluding those with preferential\ntreaties that are not of general application. This clause would not comply with the minimum\nstandard established in BEPS Action 6 because it does not include a rule against intermediary\ncompanies [49] or a provision on the primary purpose of the operation. This means that the treaty\nmust be renegotiated.\n\n\n**Non-Discrimination (Article 24)**\n\n\n88. **Non-discrimination is a principle that treaties contain** by virtue of which differential\ntreatment between residents and non-residents is prohibited in various situations. The two most\nrelevant situations are: (i) where the permanent establishment of a resident abroad must pay\ntaxes under the same conditions as the company which is a resident of the State in which it is\nformed; and (ii) where the payments made by Guatemalans to residents of the other State must\nbe deductible under the same conditions as would be applicable to residents of Guatemala,\nexcept that those payments abroad do not meet market prices. A treaty that includes these\nprinciples would result in the limitations on deductions in the legislation not being applicable to\npayments made to residents of the other contracting State given that international treaties are\nhierarchically superior to domestic legislation. This would be the case of the non-deduction of\ninterest paid to foreign residents other than financial institutions (LISR, Art. 24) or the deduction\nlimitations established for technical services paid abroad (LISR, Art. 21). A treaty would have this\ncollection cost for Guatemala.\n\n\n**Recommendations**\n\n\n- Ensure that the decision to negotiate a treaty includes a cost-benefit study.\n\n\n- Do not enter into treaties with countries that do not have income tax because the risk of\ndouble taxation, the reason for such treaties, is non-existent.\n\n\n- When entering into treaties, minimize collection costs—especially with respect to higher\nwithholdings—and do not accept withholding rates of zero.\n\n\n- Use the UN Model, which favors taxation at source, as an initial reference for building a\nGuatemalan model treaty.\n\n\n49 The rule denies treaty benefits when a resident company forms an enterprise in another country that has a treaty\nwith a third country and the intermediary enterprise receives a payment from the third country in order to transfer\nit to the company located in the first State, with which the country from which the first payment originates does\nnot have a treaty (or has a more onerous treaty).\n\n\n36", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (Article 29)\n\n87. In the recent update of the OECD and UN models, new provisions were\nincorporated to prevent the misuse of treaties. These provisions reflect the agreements\nestablished in BEPS Action 6 (minimum standard, see Chapter VII), which eliminates treaty\nbenefits when one of the main purposes of the operation is to obtain a tax benefit from the\nconvention. The treaty with Mexico includes a benefit limitation clause that defines the persons\nresiding in the other State who qualify for treaty benefits, excluding those with preferential\ntreaties that are not of general application. This clause would not comply with the minimum\nstandard established in BEPS Action 6 because it does not include a rule against intermediary\ncompanies [49] or a provision on the primary purpose of the operation. This means that the treaty\nmust be renegotiated.\n\nNon-Discrimination (Article 24)\n\n88. Non-discrimination is a principle that treaties contain by virtue of which differential\ntreatment between residents and non-residents is prohibited in various situations. The two most\nrelevant situations are: (i) where the permanent establishment of a resident abroad must pay\ntaxes under the same conditions as the company which is a resident of the State in which it is\nformed; and (ii) where the payments made by Guatemalans to residents of the other State must\nbe deductible under the same conditions as would be applicable to residents of Guatemala,\nexcept that those payments abroad do not meet market prices. A treaty that includes these\nprinciples would result in the limitations on deductions in the legislation not being applicable to\npayments made to residents of the other contracting State given that international treaties are\nhierarchically superior to domestic legislation. This would be the case of the non-deduction of\ninterest paid to foreign residents other than financial institutions (LISR, Art. 24) or the deduction\nlimitations established for technical services paid abroad (LISR, Art. 21). A treaty would have this\ncollection cost for Guatemala.\n\nRecommendations\n\n- Ensure that the decision to negotiate a treaty includes a cost-benefit study.\n\n- Do not enter into treaties with countries that do not have income tax because the risk of\ndouble taxation, the reason for such treaties, is non-existent.\n\n- When entering into treaties, minimize collection costs—especially with respect to higher\nwithholdings—and do not accept withholding rates of zero.\n\n- Use the UN Model, which favors taxation at source, as an initial reference for building a\nGuatemalan model treaty.\n\n49 The rule denies treaty benefits when a resident company forms an enterprise in another country that has a treaty\nwith a third country and the intermediary enterprise receives a payment from the third country in order to transfer\nit to the company located in the first State, with which the country from which the first payment originates does\nnot have a treaty (or has a more onerous treaty).\n\n36", "text_characters": 2532}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Including at-source tax on royalties\n\n\n- Agree in the treaty that the terms “interest,” “royalties,” and “dividends” are those defined in\nthe domestic legislation, allowing, for example:\n\n\n - Income from financial operations derived from debt to be treated as interest\n\n\n - Royalty treatment to be applied to:\n\n\n - Income from the use of standardized software\n\n\n - Payments for specialized technical services (Art. 12A of the UN Model)\n\n\n - The leasing of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment\n\n\n- Confirm the at-source taxation of “other income.”\n\n\n- Incorporate into treaties the permanent establishment cases defined in the legislation, except\nfor preparatory or auxiliary activities.\n\n\n- Include the “force of attraction” rule for permanent establishments in respect of income\nobtained by the parent company.\n\n\n- Incorporate anti-abuse rules into treaties, in accordance with BEPS Actions 6 and 7.\n\n\n- Do not include compulsory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.\n\n\n- Consider the treaty with Mexico as a good example of a treaty with a high at-source tax\ncontent.\n\n\n37", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Including at-source tax on royalties\n\n- Agree in the treaty that the terms “interest,” “royalties,” and “dividends” are those defined in\nthe domestic legislation, allowing, for example:\n\n - Income from financial operations derived from debt to be treated as interest\n\n - Royalty treatment to be applied to:\n\n - Income from the use of standardized software\n\n - Payments for specialized technical services (Art. 12A of the UN Model)\n\n - The leasing of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment\n\n- Confirm the at-source taxation of “other income.”\n\n- Incorporate into treaties the permanent establishment cases defined in the legislation, except\nfor preparatory or auxiliary activities.\n\n- Include the “force of attraction” rule for permanent establishments in respect of income\nobtained by the parent company.\n\n- Incorporate anti-abuse rules into treaties, in accordance with BEPS Actions 6 and 7.\n\n- Do not include compulsory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.\n\n- Consider the treaty with Mexico as a good example of a treaty with a high at-source tax\ncontent.\n\n37", "text_characters": 899}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-001", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0038-002"], "markdown": "##### **V. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT** **INVESTMENT**\n\n**Foreign Direct Investment in Guatemala**\n\n\n89. **FDI flows to Guatemala are modest, including compared to other countries in the**\n**region.** In 2019, FDI stock in Guatemala amounted to US$16.6 billion, equivalent to 20 percent of\nGDP, well below the regional average (50 percent) and even the average of low-income countries\nin Latin America (40 percent). FDI flows in recent years have followed the same pattern,\nrepresenting less than 2 percent of GDP (2012–2019), half of the region’s average and two thirds\nof the percentage of low-income countries in Latin America.\n\n\n\n\n\n**Key FDI Determinants**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n90. **The extensive economic literature studying the factors that determine FDI flows**\nfinds that tax pressure is a relevant factor, but not the most significant one. Other factors are\nfrequently more prominent in explaining FDI, such as income level, market size, physical and\nhuman capital availability, political stability, institutional strength, and tax regime stability. [50] One\nfactor in particular discussed in the literature is the potential effect of treaties for the avoidance\nof double taxation (TADT).\n\n\n50 On FDI and the level of economic development, see Eaton and Tamura (1994); Carr et al. (2001); and\nBergstrand and Egger (2007); on institutional strength, see Globerman and Shapiro (2002); Aizenman and Spiegel\n(2002); and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007); on corruption levels, see Wei (2000); and on the development of the\nfinancial system, see diGiovanni (2005); Head and Ries (2008) find the development of the financial system\nsignificant.\n\n\n38", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0621, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(134.76548767089844, 296.53326416015625, 338.901611328125, 444.0438232421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": true, "height": 409, "number": 17, "size": 29475, "transform": [204.1361083984375, 0.0, -0.0, 147.5105743408203, 134.76548767089844, 296.53326416015625], "width": 567, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "V. TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT\n\nForeign Direct Investment in Guatemala\n\n89. FDI flows to Guatemala are modest, including compared to other countries in the\nregion. In 2019, FDI stock in Guatemala amounted to US$16.6 billion, equivalent to 20 percent of\nGDP, well below the regional average (50 percent) and even the average of low-income countries\nin Latin America (40 percent). FDI flows in recent years have followed the same pattern,\nrepresenting less than 2 percent of GDP (2012–2019), half of the region’s average and two thirds\nof the percentage of low-income countries in Latin America.\n\nKey FDI Determinants\n\n90. The extensive economic literature studying the factors that determine FDI flows\nfinds that tax pressure is a relevant factor, but not the most significant one. Other factors are\nfrequently more prominent in explaining FDI, such as income level, market size, physical and\nhuman capital availability, political stability, institutional strength, and tax regime stability. [50] One\nfactor in particular discussed in the literature is the potential effect of treaties for the avoidance\nof double taxation (TADT).\n\n50 On FDI and the level of economic development, see Eaton and Tamura (1994); Carr et al. (2001); and\nBergstrand and Egger (2007); on institutional strength, see Globerman and Shapiro (2002); Aizenman and Spiegel\n(2002); and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007); on corruption levels, see Wei (2000); and on the development of the\nfinancial system, see diGiovanni (2005); Head and Ries (2008) find the development of the financial system\nsignificant.\n\n38", "text_characters": 1337}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Double-Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment**\n\n\n91. **More and more literature has been produced in recent years on the specific impact**\n**of TADTs and FDI flows** with the understanding that, in most cases, these treaties have the\ndouble effect of providing legal certainty to foreign investors and reducing the tax burden in the\nhost country. [51] This would, in principle, have a positive effect on FDI. The tax policy argument is\nthat these treaties also have collection costs for net capital importing countries, in addition to\nadministration costs, as explained earlier. It is therefore important to know how successful these\ntreaties have been in increasing FDI and offsetting the adverse effect on tax revenue. The answer\nto this question is an empirical one.\n\n\n92. **TADTs can directly reduce tax revenue due to concessions on rates and the tax**\n**base.** This is particularly significant for developing countries that are net capital importers and\nnormally have a fragile tax collection structure, like Guatemala (see Chapter II). Various studies\nshow that TADTs reduce tax collection in developing countries (Easson 2000; Lewis 2013;\nActionAid 2015 and 2016; Hearson and Kangave 2016; Beer and Loeprick 2018; Jansky and\nSedivy 2018). However, the cost may be higher through indirect means since treaties, although\nbilateral by definition, open the door for third-country investors to conduct business through\nentities residing in the contracting State of the convention (Milchesen and Leduc 2021).\nAdditionally, the proliferation and variety of TADTs have created a set of inconsistent rules\nallowing multinational enterprises to use opportunistic treaty shopping strategies, that is,\nintermediate investments through the most profitable treaties (Zucman 2014). For this reason,\ncaution in considering the negotiation of TADTs is commonly advised (IMF 2014).\n\n\n**Empirical Evidence**\n\n\n**Literature**\n\n\n93. **Early empirical studies found that treaties have a positive effect on FDI, but the**\n**results were questioned shortly thereafter.** One of the first studies examined FDI flows to and\nfrom the United States for the period 1966–1992 and found that those flows are higher for\ncountries with which a treaty was signed (Blonigen and Davies 2000). However, the same authors\nreconsider their results in stating that the positive effect was noticeably diluted in the more\nrecent years of their study. The explanation is that the United States entered into its first treaties\nwith advanced countries, whereas in subsequent years, treaties were primarily signed with\ndeveloping countries, clearly indicating a difference in the impact treaties had depending on the\ncounterparty’s level of development. A second study by the same authors, focused on\ninvestigating the effect of U.S. TADTs with developing countries, shows that there is no\n\n\n51 Works by Hines (1988), Janeba (1996), and Edmiston et al. (2003) show that tax complexity and uncertainty\ninhibit FDI because transaction and compliance costs rise. Lower effective tax rates have been associated with\nlarger FDI flows in the empirical works of Gordon and Hines (2002) and of Mooij and Ederveen (2003).\n\n\n39", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 39, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Double-Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment\n\n91. More and more literature has been produced in recent years on the specific impact\nof TADTs and FDI flows with the understanding that, in most cases, these treaties have the\ndouble effect of providing legal certainty to foreign investors and reducing the tax burden in the\nhost country. [51] This would, in principle, have a positive effect on FDI. The tax policy argument is\nthat these treaties also have collection costs for net capital importing countries, in addition to\nadministration costs, as explained earlier. It is therefore important to know how successful these\ntreaties have been in increasing FDI and offsetting the adverse effect on tax revenue. The answer\nto this question is an empirical one.\n\n92. TADTs can directly reduce tax revenue due to concessions on rates and the tax\nbase. This is particularly significant for developing countries that are net capital importers and\nnormally have a fragile tax collection structure, like Guatemala (see Chapter II). Various studies\nshow that TADTs reduce tax collection in developing countries (Easson 2000; Lewis 2013;\nActionAid 2015 and 2016; Hearson and Kangave 2016; Beer and Loeprick 2018; Jansky and\nSedivy 2018). However, the cost may be higher through indirect means since treaties, although\nbilateral by definition, open the door for third-country investors to conduct business through\nentities residing in the contracting State of the convention (Milchesen and Leduc 2021).\nAdditionally, the proliferation and variety of TADTs have created a set of inconsistent rules\nallowing multinational enterprises to use opportunistic treaty shopping strategies, that is,\nintermediate investments through the most profitable treaties (Zucman 2014). For this reason,\ncaution in considering the negotiation of TADTs is commonly advised (IMF 2014).\n\nEmpirical Evidence\n\nLiterature\n\n93. Early empirical studies found that treaties have a positive effect on FDI, but the\nresults were questioned shortly thereafter. One of the first studies examined FDI flows to and\nfrom the United States for the period 1966–1992 and found that those flows are higher for\ncountries with which a treaty was signed (Blonigen and Davies 2000). However, the same authors\nreconsider their results in stating that the positive effect was noticeably diluted in the more\nrecent years of their study. The explanation is that the United States entered into its first treaties\nwith advanced countries, whereas in subsequent years, treaties were primarily signed with\ndeveloping countries, clearly indicating a difference in the impact treaties had depending on the\ncounterparty’s level of development. A second study by the same authors, focused on\ninvestigating the effect of U.S. TADTs with developing countries, shows that there is no\n\n51 Works by Hines (1988), Janeba (1996), and Edmiston et al. (2003) show that tax complexity and uncertainty\ninhibit FDI because transaction and compliance costs rise. Lower effective tax rates have been associated with\nlarger FDI flows in the empirical works of Gordon and Hines (2002) and of Mooij and Ederveen (2003).\n\n39", "text_characters": 2658}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "significant increase in FDI flows to these economies. However, the study surprisingly finds that\nTADTs increase FDI flows _to the United States_ (Blonigen and Davies 2004).\n\n\n94. **Later studies generally have unclear or negative results.** Blonigen and Davies (2005)\nexpand and update the sample of countries studied. The authors examine country pairs\nconsisting of not only the United States, but also all OECD member countries and their respective\ncounterparts, both advanced and developing economies, with or without a treaty, for the period\n1982–1992. Estimates indicate that treaties between an advanced country and a developing one\nare irrelevant for FDI and can even have a negative impact. More recent studies also find that\nTADTs do not affect FDI flows from advanced countries to less developed economies (Baker\n2014). In the case of the United States in particular, treaties are found to have a negative effect\non FDI flows to those economies (Daniels and Ruhr 2015). Studies that analyze the determinants\nof FDI stock (instead of flows) tend to find that TADTs have a positive effect (Barthel et al. 2010;\nLejour 2014). However, these estimates include FDI that may have occurred before the treaties\nentered into force.\n\n\n95. **Changes in the estimation methodology did not yield more conclusive results.**\nEstimates can sometimes be biased because they do not adequately isolate the effects that other\npolicies or events, simultaneous to the ratification of the treaty, can have on FDI. To isolate this\neffect, Egger et al. (2006) compares changes in FDI between countries two years before and after\nthe ratification of a TADT and the same changes between countries that did not enter into\ntreaties during those same years. The results again show that the entry into force of new treaties\nhas a negative effect on FDI. A study by Neumayer (2007) suggests that the number of TADTs\nsigned by a country is associated with higher FDI levels, but the effect is not significant for\npoorer countries. The author notes that developing countries that sign treaties with advanced\neconomies also tend to grant considerable tax incentives, separate from the treaty, which could\ndistort the results.\n\n\n96. **The institutional aspect is confirmed as a determining factor of FDI.** Based on the\nincome tax returns of U.S. multinational enterprises in the 1990s, Louie and Roussland (2008)\nexamine FDI in foreign subsidiaries based on the TADTs in force and the indicators of corruption,\npolitical instability, and bureaucratic inefficiency in the host country. The results show that good\ngovernance simultaneously promotes FDI and the conclusion of TADTs, whereas treaties alone\nhave no impact on FDI. This is especially relevant for Guatemala, which ranks very poorly on\ninternational indexes regarding the perception of corruption and political stability. [52]\n\n\n97. **Regional studies also generally do not establish a connection between TADT and**\n**FDI.** Assuming that countries in the same region tend to have similar development levels,\ninstitutional characteristics, and governance standards, these variables have a less significant\neffect in explaining FDI differences and make econometric estimates of the effect of treaties on\n\n\n52 Transparency International, _Corruption Perceptions Index 2020_ (129th out of 180 countries); Corporation for\nExcellence in Justice, _Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index 2020_ (147th out of 213 countries).\n\n\n40", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 40, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "significant increase in FDI flows to these economies. However, the study surprisingly finds that\nTADTs increase FDI flows _to the United States_ (Blonigen and Davies 2004).\n\n94. Later studies generally have unclear or negative results. Blonigen and Davies (2005)\nexpand and update the sample of countries studied. The authors examine country pairs\nconsisting of not only the United States, but also all OECD member countries and their respective\ncounterparts, both advanced and developing economies, with or without a treaty, for the period\n1982–1992. Estimates indicate that treaties between an advanced country and a developing one\nare irrelevant for FDI and can even have a negative impact. More recent studies also find that\nTADTs do not affect FDI flows from advanced countries to less developed economies (Baker\n2014). In the case of the United States in particular, treaties are found to have a negative effect\non FDI flows to those economies (Daniels and Ruhr 2015). Studies that analyze the determinants\nof FDI stock (instead of flows) tend to find that TADTs have a positive effect (Barthel et al. 2010;\nLejour 2014). However, these estimates include FDI that may have occurred before the treaties\nentered into force.\n\n95. Changes in the estimation methodology did not yield more conclusive results.\nEstimates can sometimes be biased because they do not adequately isolate the effects that other\npolicies or events, simultaneous to the ratification of the treaty, can have on FDI. To isolate this\neffect, Egger et al. (2006) compares changes in FDI between countries two years before and after\nthe ratification of a TADT and the same changes between countries that did not enter into\ntreaties during those same years. The results again show that the entry into force of new treaties\nhas a negative effect on FDI. A study by Neumayer (2007) suggests that the number of TADTs\nsigned by a country is associated with higher FDI levels, but the effect is not significant for\npoorer countries. The author notes that developing countries that sign treaties with advanced\neconomies also tend to grant considerable tax incentives, separate from the treaty, which could\ndistort the results.\n\n96. The institutional aspect is confirmed as a determining factor of FDI. Based on the\nincome tax returns of U.S. multinational enterprises in the 1990s, Louie and Roussland (2008)\nexamine FDI in foreign subsidiaries based on the TADTs in force and the indicators of corruption,\npolitical instability, and bureaucratic inefficiency in the host country. The results show that good\ngovernance simultaneously promotes FDI and the conclusion of TADTs, whereas treaties alone\nhave no impact on FDI. This is especially relevant for Guatemala, which ranks very poorly on\ninternational indexes regarding the perception of corruption and political stability. [52]\n\n97. Regional studies also generally do not establish a connection between TADT and\nFDI. Assuming that countries in the same region tend to have similar development levels,\ninstitutional characteristics, and governance standards, these variables have a less significant\neffect in explaining FDI differences and make econometric estimates of the effect of treaties on\n\n52 Transparency International, _Corruption Perceptions Index 2020_ (129th out of 180 countries); Corporation for\nExcellence in Justice, _Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index 2020_ (147th out of 213 countries).\n\n40", "text_characters": 2902}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0041-001"], "markdown": "FDI more “pure.” In Asia’s case, Yue (2018) analyzes FDI flows to 10 ASEAN Group countries, with\nthe results showing that, on average, treaties have a negative effect on FDI flows. Murthy and\nBhasin (2015) examine the case of India and conclude that treaties do not have significant effects\non FDI flows. Beer and Loeprick (2018) study the effect of TADTs in 41 African economies during\nthe period 1985–2015 and find that treaties with countries that are considered to be financial\ncenters (with low taxation) do not promote FDI, but significantly reduce tax collection in the FDI\nrecipient country.\n\n\n**Some Data for Latin America**\n\n\n\n98. **The number of TADTs in force in each Latin**\n**American country does not appear to be associated**\n**with FDI amounts.** The number of current treaties for this\ngroup of countries varies widely, as shown in Table 7.\nFigure 6 shows the correlation between the number of\ntreaties in the region’s various countries (horizontal axis)\nand the FDI stock (2019) in each one (vertical axis). The\ncoefficient (measured by the slope of the red line) is very\nclose to zero, suggesting that there is no major\nrelationship between the two. Figure 7 shows that FDI\nmostly originates from countries without current TADTs\n(except Bolivia). This is explained in part by the fact that\nthe principal investor in the zone is the United States,\nwhose policy has been reluctant to enter into treaties with\nLatin American countries. [53]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n53 The United States has treaties in force with Mexico, Venezuela, and three Caribbean jurisdictions.\n\n\n41", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 41, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "FDI more “pure.” In Asia’s case, Yue (2018) analyzes FDI flows to 10 ASEAN Group countries, with\nthe results showing that, on average, treaties have a negative effect on FDI flows. Murthy and\nBhasin (2015) examine the case of India and conclude that treaties do not have significant effects\non FDI flows. Beer and Loeprick (2018) study the effect of TADTs in 41 African economies during\nthe period 1985–2015 and find that treaties with countries that are considered to be financial\ncenters (with low taxation) do not promote FDI, but significantly reduce tax collection in the FDI\nrecipient country.\n\nSome Data for Latin America\n\n98. The number of TADTs in force in each Latin\nAmerican country does not appear to be associated\nwith FDI amounts. The number of current treaties for this\ngroup of countries varies widely, as shown in Table 7.\nFigure 6 shows the correlation between the number of\ntreaties in the region’s various countries (horizontal axis)\nand the FDI stock (2019) in each one (vertical axis). The\ncoefficient (measured by the slope of the red line) is very\nclose to zero, suggesting that there is no major\nrelationship between the two. Figure 7 shows that FDI\nmostly originates from countries without current TADTs\n(except Bolivia). This is explained in part by the fact that\nthe principal investor in the zone is the United States,\nwhose policy has been reluctant to enter into treaties with\nLatin American countries. [53]\n\n53 The United States has treaties in force with Mexico, Venezuela, and three Caribbean jurisdictions.\n\n41", "text_characters": 1285}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-001", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-002", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0042-003"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n99. **A recent study for Latin America concludes that treaties do not lead to greater FDI**\n**in signatory countries.** Shah and Qayyum (2015) study 15 countries in Latin America and the\nCaribbean between 1983 and 2013. The empirical model includes traditional determinants of\nFDI flows, such as the size and level of development of the economies, their degree of trade\nopenness, and the level of human capital. The results show that FDI flows to the region’s\ncountries are not affected by the number of signed TADTs or the ratification of new treaties.\n\n\n100. **One argument is that treaty benefits are marginal relative to the tax privileges that**\n**countries in the region offer unilaterally.** Like Guatemala, the countries studied generally offer\nrelatively low withholding rates and very generous special regimes. Another explanation is that\nmany Latin American countries have abundant natural resources that attract foreign investment\nregardless of the tax regime, much less a treaty. Various countries even offer (or offered) foreign\ninvestors tax stability agreements.\n\n\n**Recent Studies**\n\n\n101. **More recent studies, with sophisticated statistical techniques, also do not provide**\n**conclusive evidence that treaties encourage FDI in developing countries.** The methodologies\nexplore data for individual enterprises or examine the effect of a treaty network. In the case of\nSwedish multinationals, the data indicate that treaties do not increase the investment of\nsubsidiaries already established abroad (since before the treaty), but do raise the likelihood that\nnew enterprises will enter the host country (Davies et al. 2009). A more in-depth study finds that\nTADTs can have different effects depending on the economic sector. The hypothesis is that\nTADTs are less relevant for multinationals that trade in homogenous products for which the\ntransfer price is clearer and the risk of double taxation lower (Blonigen et al. 2014). However,\n\n\n42", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1006, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 42, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(95.6500015258789, 103.22000122070312, 331.8900146484375, 309.57000732421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 504, "number": 12, "size": 23014, "transform": [236.24000549316406, 0.0, -0.0, 206.35000610351562, 95.6500015258789, 103.22000122070312], "width": 577, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(342.95001220703125, 118.58003234863281, 534.0999755859375, 257.280029296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 428, "number": 13, "size": 18516, "transform": [191.14999389648438, 0.0, -0.0, 138.6999969482422, 342.95001220703125, 118.58003234863281], "width": 590, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "99. A recent study for Latin America concludes that treaties do not lead to greater FDI\nin signatory countries. Shah and Qayyum (2015) study 15 countries in Latin America and the\nCaribbean between 1983 and 2013. The empirical model includes traditional determinants of\nFDI flows, such as the size and level of development of the economies, their degree of trade\nopenness, and the level of human capital. The results show that FDI flows to the region’s\ncountries are not affected by the number of signed TADTs or the ratification of new treaties.\n\n100. One argument is that treaty benefits are marginal relative to the tax privileges that\ncountries in the region offer unilaterally. Like Guatemala, the countries studied generally offer\nrelatively low withholding rates and very generous special regimes. Another explanation is that\nmany Latin American countries have abundant natural resources that attract foreign investment\nregardless of the tax regime, much less a treaty. Various countries even offer (or offered) foreign\ninvestors tax stability agreements.\n\nRecent Studies\n\n101. More recent studies, with sophisticated statistical techniques, also do not provide\nconclusive evidence that treaties encourage FDI in developing countries. The methodologies\nexplore data for individual enterprises or examine the effect of a treaty network. In the case of\nSwedish multinationals, the data indicate that treaties do not increase the investment of\nsubsidiaries already established abroad (since before the treaty), but do raise the likelihood that\nnew enterprises will enter the host country (Davies et al. 2009). A more in-depth study finds that\nTADTs can have different effects depending on the economic sector. The hypothesis is that\nTADTs are less relevant for multinationals that trade in homogenous products for which the\ntransfer price is clearer and the risk of double taxation lower (Blonigen et al. 2014). However,\n\n42", "text_characters": 1628}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0043-001"], "markdown": "when a country with a low tax regime (including low withholding rates) stands between two\ncountries with TADTs, FDI flows between these two economies increase considerably, but this\nwould be due to the effect of treaty shopping (Van’t Riet and Lejour 2018; Petkova et al. 2020).\n\n\n102. **In summary**, the empirical literature suggests caution in assuming that entering into a\nTADT will have considerable effects on FDI. Box 1 supports this caution.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n43", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 43, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "when a country with a low tax regime (including low withholding rates) stands between two\ncountries with TADTs, FDI flows between these two economies increase considerably, but this\nwould be due to the effect of treaty shopping (Van’t Riet and Lejour 2018; Petkova et al. 2020).\n\n102. In summary, the empirical literature suggests caution in assuming that entering into a\nTADT will have considerable effects on FDI. Box 1 supports this caution.\n\n43", "text_characters": 374}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **VI. TRANSFER PRICES**\n\n**The Arm’s Length Principle**\n\n\n103. **The international practice is to establish in law the obligation for intra-group**\n**operations to be agreed at market prices.** The underlying risk is that conglomerate companies,\nespecially transnational ones, will manipulate the value of their internal transactions to shift their\nprofits to an entity subject to a lower tax burden. Both the OECD and the UN have issued\ndetailed guides for determining transfer prices to prevent tax avoidance via this route (OECD\n2017a; UN 2017).\n\n\n104. **The basic principle is established in Guatemala under the Income Tax Law as the**\n**principle of “unimpeded competition” (** _libre competencia_ **)** (LISR, Art. 54). In short, it stipulates\nthat, for tax purposes, the price or consideration of transactions between entities from the same\ngroup must be determined in the manner that would have been agreed by independent parties\nunder comparable conditions, meaning at market prices. The relevant market in this context is\nthat which matches the conditions in which the taxpayer in question operates and which is not\nnecessarily one of “unimpeded competition.” If the taxpayer operates in oligopolistic conditions,\nfor example, the transfer price that complies with the principle is one that independent parties\nwould agree on in this type of market, which in this case is different from a market characterized\nby unimpeded competition. The translation of the English term “arm’s length principle” in\nArticle 54, which follows the language of the Spanish OECD guidelines, is not the most\nappropriate; this report therefore refers to “ _principio de independencia_ ” in Spanish, which seems\nlike a more suitable translation.\n\n\n**Burden of Proof**\n\n\n105. **The principle can operate in two ways, depending on who has the burden of**\n**proving that the principle has been met.** The legal framework can empower the tax authority\nto verify that the taxpayer complies with the arm’s length principle and, where applicable, rectify\nor adjust the taxpayer’s tax returns when it finds non-compliance. This is set forth in Article 55 of\nthe LISR, but this wording places the burden of proof with the authority. Another approach is for\nthe law to expressly impose on the taxpayer the obligation to comply with the arm’s length\nprinciple, empowering the authority to adjust the taxpayer’s tax returns if that is not the case. The\nLISR (Art. 65) requires the taxpayer to meet a documentation requirement demonstrating\ncompliance with the arm’s length principle. This is an indirect way of ensuring that the taxpayer\ncomplies with that principle, but it is preferable for the obligation to be explicit and for the\ndocumentation to be an additional requirement, with its own penalties in case of\nnon-compliance. [54]\n\n\n54 The recommendations in this section refer to amendments to legislation, unless it is expressly stated that the\nregulatory change can be made in the regulations to the law.\n\n\n44", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 44, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "VI. TRANSFER PRICES\n\nThe Arm’s Length Principle\n\n103. The international practice is to establish in law the obligation for intra-group\noperations to be agreed at market prices. The underlying risk is that conglomerate companies,\nespecially transnational ones, will manipulate the value of their internal transactions to shift their\nprofits to an entity subject to a lower tax burden. Both the OECD and the UN have issued\ndetailed guides for determining transfer prices to prevent tax avoidance via this route (OECD\n2017a; UN 2017).\n\n104. The basic principle is established in Guatemala under the Income Tax Law as the\nprinciple of “unimpeded competition” ( _libre competencia_ ) (LISR, Art. 54). In short, it stipulates\nthat, for tax purposes, the price or consideration of transactions between entities from the same\ngroup must be determined in the manner that would have been agreed by independent parties\nunder comparable conditions, meaning at market prices. The relevant market in this context is\nthat which matches the conditions in which the taxpayer in question operates and which is not\nnecessarily one of “unimpeded competition.” If the taxpayer operates in oligopolistic conditions,\nfor example, the transfer price that complies with the principle is one that independent parties\nwould agree on in this type of market, which in this case is different from a market characterized\nby unimpeded competition. The translation of the English term “arm’s length principle” in\nArticle 54, which follows the language of the Spanish OECD guidelines, is not the most\nappropriate; this report therefore refers to “ _principio de independencia_ ” in Spanish, which seems\nlike a more suitable translation.\n\nBurden of Proof\n\n105. The principle can operate in two ways, depending on who has the burden of\nproving that the principle has been met. The legal framework can empower the tax authority\nto verify that the taxpayer complies with the arm’s length principle and, where applicable, rectify\nor adjust the taxpayer’s tax returns when it finds non-compliance. This is set forth in Article 55 of\nthe LISR, but this wording places the burden of proof with the authority. Another approach is for\nthe law to expressly impose on the taxpayer the obligation to comply with the arm’s length\nprinciple, empowering the authority to adjust the taxpayer’s tax returns if that is not the case. The\nLISR (Art. 65) requires the taxpayer to meet a documentation requirement demonstrating\ncompliance with the arm’s length principle. This is an indirect way of ensuring that the taxpayer\ncomplies with that principle, but it is preferable for the obligation to be explicit and for the\ndocumentation to be an additional requirement, with its own penalties in case of\nnon-compliance. [54]\n\n54 The recommendations in this section refer to amendments to legislation, unless it is expressly stated that the\nregulatory change can be made in the regulations to the law.\n\n44", "text_characters": 2469}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "106. **The tax authority should be empowered to adjust the taxable income and**\n**deductions declared by the taxpayer according to the arm’s length principle.** This is\ndifferent from the authority being able to determine or directly modify the prices of commercial\ntransactions, as can be interpreted from the LISR (Art. 55). The right to free trade should prevent\nthis. The recommendation is to modify the text of the Law to make it clear that the authority’s\npower is to adjust the ISR base (income less deductions) based on the market prices applicable\nto related transactions, without altering the prices agreed in contracts entered into under the\nprovisions of common law.\n\n\n**Scope of the Transfer Pricing Regime**\n\n\n107. **The obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle applies in Guatemala only**\n**to transnational related operations** (LISR, Art. 56, A). This combats the higher risk of profits\nbeing shifted abroad and ultimately being removed from the domestic tax base. The principle\ndoes not apply to transactions between domestic related parties. The main reason is because the\nprofits are shifted through transfer pricing between two national treasury taxpayers. The\npossibility of tax planning is thus reduced substantially but does not disappear altogether. A\ncompany from the domestic group can be a beneficiary of a special tax regime or may have\nlosses that could be leveraged by shifting profits from related companies that are profitable. [55]\n\n\n108. **Exempting domestic businesses from the arm’s length principle opens the door to**\n**price manipulation in connection with international related operations.** One example is an\nexporting company that brings in another domestic company to sell to a related party abroad.\nThe planning is done in two steps: (i) the first company sells at a transfer price below cost,\nnullifying its ISR base in Guatemala and, although this transaction is not at market price, escaping\nSAT scrutiny; and (ii) the second company, the official exporter, uses tax planning to reduce its\ncost (by buying at a low price), which serves as the basis for the “market” profit margin it must\napply to comply with the arm’s length principle. This artificially reduces the ISR base in\nGuatemala but meets the transfer price requirements established in the Law. [56]\n\n\n109. **Some countries establish the obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle**\n**for transactions between domestic related parties.** This normally entails a high administrative\ncost for many companies, including small ones, without a major effect on total tax collection.\nCertain considerations therefore come into play. For example, the burden of proof for domestic\nrelated operations can be reverted to the tax authority, exempting companies from the\nobligation to provide documentation on transfer prices. This facility can be limited only to small\n\n\n55 This can be common given that Guatemala does not allow for loss carryover to be deducted in subsequent\nfiscal years.\n\n56 Tax planning can have two players. First, the biggest “value chain” risks in Guatemala shift to the first company,\nthe one generating losses, meaning that the market profit margin for the second company, a low-risk,\nlow-function distributor, is reduced to a very modest one. Second, the base to which the (already reduced) profit\nmargin (of an independent comparable) is applied is also artificially reduced, and it is not the same to tax a profit\nof, for example, 5 percent on costs and expenses of 100 as the same percentage on 50 or 20.\n\n\n45", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 45, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "106. The tax authority should be empowered to adjust the taxable income and\ndeductions declared by the taxpayer according to the arm’s length principle. This is\ndifferent from the authority being able to determine or directly modify the prices of commercial\ntransactions, as can be interpreted from the LISR (Art. 55). The right to free trade should prevent\nthis. The recommendation is to modify the text of the Law to make it clear that the authority’s\npower is to adjust the ISR base (income less deductions) based on the market prices applicable\nto related transactions, without altering the prices agreed in contracts entered into under the\nprovisions of common law.\n\nScope of the Transfer Pricing Regime\n\n107. The obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle applies in Guatemala only\nto transnational related operations (LISR, Art. 56, A). This combats the higher risk of profits\nbeing shifted abroad and ultimately being removed from the domestic tax base. The principle\ndoes not apply to transactions between domestic related parties. The main reason is because the\nprofits are shifted through transfer pricing between two national treasury taxpayers. The\npossibility of tax planning is thus reduced substantially but does not disappear altogether. A\ncompany from the domestic group can be a beneficiary of a special tax regime or may have\nlosses that could be leveraged by shifting profits from related companies that are profitable. [55]\n\n108. Exempting domestic businesses from the arm’s length principle opens the door to\nprice manipulation in connection with international related operations. One example is an\nexporting company that brings in another domestic company to sell to a related party abroad.\nThe planning is done in two steps: (i) the first company sells at a transfer price below cost,\nnullifying its ISR base in Guatemala and, although this transaction is not at market price, escaping\nSAT scrutiny; and (ii) the second company, the official exporter, uses tax planning to reduce its\ncost (by buying at a low price), which serves as the basis for the “market” profit margin it must\napply to comply with the arm’s length principle. This artificially reduces the ISR base in\nGuatemala but meets the transfer price requirements established in the Law. [56]\n\n109. Some countries establish the obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle\nfor transactions between domestic related parties. This normally entails a high administrative\ncost for many companies, including small ones, without a major effect on total tax collection.\nCertain considerations therefore come into play. For example, the burden of proof for domestic\nrelated operations can be reverted to the tax authority, exempting companies from the\nobligation to provide documentation on transfer prices. This facility can be limited only to small\n\n55 This can be common given that Guatemala does not allow for loss carryover to be deducted in subsequent\nfiscal years.\n\n56 Tax planning can have two players. First, the biggest “value chain” risks in Guatemala shift to the first company,\nthe one generating losses, meaning that the market profit margin for the second company, a low-risk,\nlow-function distributor, is reduced to a very modest one. Second, the base to which the (already reduced) profit\nmargin (of an independent comparable) is applied is also artificially reduced, and it is not the same to tax a profit\nof, for example, 5 percent on costs and expenses of 100 as the same percentage on 50 or 20.\n\n45", "text_characters": 2943}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "companies that pay taxes under a simplified regime, for example, or that have annual sales below\na certain amount. Small operations can also be exempted, regardless of the size of the company\nperforming them. [57]\n\n\n**Definition and Presumption of Related Parties**\n\n\n110. **The definition of related parties in Guatemala in large part follows the international**\n**standard.** Parties are considered related when they have ownership or control linkages with a\n25-percent share threshold (LISR, Art. 56). This percentage is relatively high, but likely has no\nmajor consequence. [58]\n\n\n111. **The LISR deviates from the standard in limiting the Treasury’s power to adjust**\n**transfer prices only when these mean higher taxation for the taxpayer (Art. 55).** Obviously,\nthe Treasury does not audit taxpayers to correct errors in their favor. The person concerned can\ncorrect such errors and request reimbursement of the undue payment. Nevertheless, when it\ncomes to transfer prices, what must be taken into consideration is that the tax authority of the\nother country, where the operation’s related counterparty resides, can also exercise its power and\ncorrect transfer prices in its favor. To avoid double taxation, [59] in principle, a correlative\nadjustment should be allowed in the valuation of the related operation in the first country (if it is\nin line with the arm’s length principle), a situation that must be authorized by its tax authority. In\nGuatemala, the SAT would be unable to do this without violating the letter of Article 55 of the\nLISR. [60] This can be expected to change if a TADT comes into force.\n\n\n112. **Legislation on transfer prices normally presumes that a commercial counterparty**\n**which is a resident in a low-tax territory is a related party.** This means that these operations\nmust comply with all the obligations associated with the arm’s length principle. This is a\ndefensive provision to protect the country’s tax base, especially when jurisdictions that do not\nfully cooperate in exchanging information are involved. Although the international community\nhas made significant progress in that respect, [61] many countries maintain this type of legal\n\n\n57 In Mexico, companies with sales under MEX$13 million (and MEX$3 million for the provision of independent\npersonal services – Art. 76, Section IX, of the Mexican LISR) are not required to document transfer prices. This\nsystem is vulnerable to companies deciding to subdivide their operations in order to stay below the exemption\nthreshold. However, this practice can be countered through general anti-abuse rules contained in Guatemala’s\ndomestic legislation (LISR, Art. 61).\n\n58 The LISR (Art. 179) defines related parties without establishing a minimum share threshold. The World Trade\nOrganization (Agreement on Custom Valuation) sets a 5-percent threshold, whereas the FDI classification is\n10 percent (Mesias 2015).\n\n59 This is economic double taxation, where the same income is taxed for two separate persons.\n\n60 Article 57 of the LISR, which defines the transfer pricing scope, does not contain this restriction.\n\n61 The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters backed by the OECD and the Council of\nEurope, has allowed for the exchange of information at the request of a party since 1988. In 2010, the Convention\nopened to all countries and currently has 144 signatories. More recently, a new standard was developed for the\nautomatic exchange of information through the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for\n\n\n46", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 46, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "companies that pay taxes under a simplified regime, for example, or that have annual sales below\na certain amount. Small operations can also be exempted, regardless of the size of the company\nperforming them. [57]\n\nDefinition and Presumption of Related Parties\n\n110. The definition of related parties in Guatemala in large part follows the international\nstandard. Parties are considered related when they have ownership or control linkages with a\n25-percent share threshold (LISR, Art. 56). This percentage is relatively high, but likely has no\nmajor consequence. [58]\n\n111. The LISR deviates from the standard in limiting the Treasury’s power to adjust\ntransfer prices only when these mean higher taxation for the taxpayer (Art. 55). Obviously,\nthe Treasury does not audit taxpayers to correct errors in their favor. The person concerned can\ncorrect such errors and request reimbursement of the undue payment. Nevertheless, when it\ncomes to transfer prices, what must be taken into consideration is that the tax authority of the\nother country, where the operation’s related counterparty resides, can also exercise its power and\ncorrect transfer prices in its favor. To avoid double taxation, [59] in principle, a correlative\nadjustment should be allowed in the valuation of the related operation in the first country (if it is\nin line with the arm’s length principle), a situation that must be authorized by its tax authority. In\nGuatemala, the SAT would be unable to do this without violating the letter of Article 55 of the\nLISR. [60] This can be expected to change if a TADT comes into force.\n\n112. Legislation on transfer prices normally presumes that a commercial counterparty\nwhich is a resident in a low-tax territory is a related party. This means that these operations\nmust comply with all the obligations associated with the arm’s length principle. This is a\ndefensive provision to protect the country’s tax base, especially when jurisdictions that do not\nfully cooperate in exchanging information are involved. Although the international community\nhas made significant progress in that respect, [61] many countries maintain this type of legal\n\n57 In Mexico, companies with sales under MEX$13 million (and MEX$3 million for the provision of independent\npersonal services – Art. 76, Section IX, of the Mexican LISR) are not required to document transfer prices. This\nsystem is vulnerable to companies deciding to subdivide their operations in order to stay below the exemption\nthreshold. However, this practice can be countered through general anti-abuse rules contained in Guatemala’s\ndomestic legislation (LISR, Art. 61).\n\n58 The LISR (Art. 179) defines related parties without establishing a minimum share threshold. The World Trade\nOrganization (Agreement on Custom Valuation) sets a 5-percent threshold, whereas the FDI classification is\n10 percent (Mesias 2015).\n\n59 This is economic double taxation, where the same income is taxed for two separate persons.\n\n60 Article 57 of the LISR, which defines the transfer pricing scope, does not contain this restriction.\n\n61 The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters backed by the OECD and the Council of\nEurope, has allowed for the exchange of information at the request of a party since 1988. In 2010, the Convention\nopened to all countries and currently has 144 signatories. More recently, a new standard was developed for the\nautomatic exchange of information through the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for\n\n46", "text_characters": 2960}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "presumption. Guatemala does not have one. [62]\n\n\n113. **This measure can be implemented in various ways.** First, it must be defined as a\nlow-tax jurisdiction. This can be done based on the ISR rate of the statutory tax regime of the\nforeign country (or a percentage difference with respect to the rate of the general regime in\nforce in Guatemala) or the effective rate that the company in question pays in that country. The\nfirst method is simpler, but may not capture the company’s real tax burden. The second is more\nprecise, but also more complex because a comparison of effective tax rates requires a\nrecalculation of the foreign entity’s ISR in accordance with the accounting standard and\nGuatemala’s ISR regime. Some countries simply opt for listing the countries they consider to be\nlow-tax (and uncooperative), even though this strategy also has its limitations. [63] In principle, the\npresumption could admit proof to the contrary, that is, documentation on the effective\nbeneficiaries of the resident entity abroad showing the lack of relationship with the resident\nentity.\n\n\n114. **In Guatemala’s case, the simpler parameter is preferable.** For example, a threshold\ncould be defined for the statutory rate of a territory below which it would qualify as\nlow-income. [64] One challenge in applying this presumption in Guatemala is if the taxpayer is\nsubject to the simplified optional ISR regime because this might sometimes represent a very low\neffective rate on profits, whereupon the exercise loses relevance. Defining another jurisdiction as\nlow-tax makes sense as long as it is a qualification relative to the regime itself. In any case, those\nsubject to this optional regime also have incentives to manipulate transfer prices since their sales\nto related parties comprise the tax base in Guatemala. While the residence of a counterparty\noffers more favorable tax conditions, there will be an incentive to shift profits by undervaluing\nexports.\n\n\n115. **The combination of rules on the presumption of relationship, documentation, and**\n**deduction requirements is an important tool against profit shifting to tax havens.**\nMultinational enterprises often use tax havens with zero taxation in which to locate subsidiaries\nthat market commodities produced in developing countries. This triangulation is designed to\nleave a wide profit margin in the intermediary’s country, reducing the tax base of the producing\ncompany by the same extent. Insofar as the exchange of information is difficult, the multinational\nenterprise can report the transaction as being between independent parties such that the\n\n\nTax Purposes. Guatemala signed this Convention in 2012 (in force since 2017), but is classified as\n“non-compliant.”\n\n62 Article 56.B.1 of the LISR presumes that a resident and their exclusive agent or distributor abroad are related\nparties. This excludes the (most common) case of when the foreign company is the regional or global distributor\nof a set of the group’s subsidiaries.\n\n63 The list must be updated daily and runs the risk of always lagging behind and therefore being incomplete. The\ncountry in turn may be subject to diplomatic pressure.\n\n64 For example, if the statutory rate is lower than the rate that would represent 60 or 50 percent of Guatemala’s\ngeneral ISR regime rate on profits from lucrative activities.\n\n\n47", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 47, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "presumption. Guatemala does not have one. [62]\n\n113. This measure can be implemented in various ways. First, it must be defined as a\nlow-tax jurisdiction. This can be done based on the ISR rate of the statutory tax regime of the\nforeign country (or a percentage difference with respect to the rate of the general regime in\nforce in Guatemala) or the effective rate that the company in question pays in that country. The\nfirst method is simpler, but may not capture the company’s real tax burden. The second is more\nprecise, but also more complex because a comparison of effective tax rates requires a\nrecalculation of the foreign entity’s ISR in accordance with the accounting standard and\nGuatemala’s ISR regime. Some countries simply opt for listing the countries they consider to be\nlow-tax (and uncooperative), even though this strategy also has its limitations. [63] In principle, the\npresumption could admit proof to the contrary, that is, documentation on the effective\nbeneficiaries of the resident entity abroad showing the lack of relationship with the resident\nentity.\n\n114. In Guatemala’s case, the simpler parameter is preferable. For example, a threshold\ncould be defined for the statutory rate of a territory below which it would qualify as\nlow-income. [64] One challenge in applying this presumption in Guatemala is if the taxpayer is\nsubject to the simplified optional ISR regime because this might sometimes represent a very low\neffective rate on profits, whereupon the exercise loses relevance. Defining another jurisdiction as\nlow-tax makes sense as long as it is a qualification relative to the regime itself. In any case, those\nsubject to this optional regime also have incentives to manipulate transfer prices since their sales\nto related parties comprise the tax base in Guatemala. While the residence of a counterparty\noffers more favorable tax conditions, there will be an incentive to shift profits by undervaluing\nexports.\n\n115. The combination of rules on the presumption of relationship, documentation, and\ndeduction requirements is an important tool against profit shifting to tax havens.\nMultinational enterprises often use tax havens with zero taxation in which to locate subsidiaries\nthat market commodities produced in developing countries. This triangulation is designed to\nleave a wide profit margin in the intermediary’s country, reducing the tax base of the producing\ncompany by the same extent. Insofar as the exchange of information is difficult, the multinational\nenterprise can report the transaction as being between independent parties such that the\n\nTax Purposes. Guatemala signed this Convention in 2012 (in force since 2017), but is classified as\n“non-compliant.”\n\n62 Article 56.B.1 of the LISR presumes that a resident and their exclusive agent or distributor abroad are related\nparties. This excludes the (most common) case of when the foreign company is the regional or global distributor\nof a set of the group’s subsidiaries.\n\n63 The list must be updated daily and runs the risk of always lagging behind and therefore being incomplete. The\ncountry in turn may be subject to diplomatic pressure.\n\n64 For example, if the statutory rate is lower than the rate that would represent 60 or 50 percent of Guatemala’s\ngeneral ISR regime rate on profits from lucrative activities.\n\n47", "text_characters": 2792}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "producing country’s Treasury cannot question the (reduced) income from foreign sales.\nTherefore, the possibility of presuming that they are related parties is important in order to\nempower the Treasury to adjust transfer prices in the event of non-compliance with the arm’s\nlength principle. Furthermore, the Treasury can also determine which of the parties taking part in\nthe transaction is the tested party, that is, the one required to demonstrate that, according to the\ntransfer pricing method selected, its profit margin is comparable to a company with similar\nfunctions. [65] This would require the multinational enterprise to disclose its operations in the tax\nhaven, which, if lesser as is normally the suspicion, would be remunerated accordingly, reverting\nthe tax base to the producing country. In the event of a refusal to provide the corresponding\ndocumentation and its inaccessibility to the tax authority through country-by-country reporting\nas per BEPS Action 14 (see Chapter VI), [66] legislation can include a provision stating that\ndocumentation on transfer prices is a requirement for the deduction of payments to related\nnon-residents.\n\n\n**Methods**\n\n\n116. **The LISR includes the five methods for assessing transfer prices contained in the**\n**applicable international guides.** **[67]** The LISR (Art. 59, 2) also establishes precedence when more\nthan one method is applicable. It favors the first three methods, that is, the “traditional” ones\n(comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, and resale price), that OECD guides also formerly\nfavored. This changed in 2010 when the OECD’s approach shifted to the use of the _most_\n_appropriate_ method based on the circumstances of the case. The argument is that one method is\nnot better than another in the abstract, but one is more appropriate than another depending on\nthe facts. The two additional methods, based on a profit indicator (transactional profit split and\ntransactional net margin), have remained hierarchically equal to the traditional methods since\nthen. This approach is more flexible, but also allows multinational enterprises to use the most\nefficient method for reducing the tax base as their first option.\n\n\n117. **Guatemala could keep a method hierarchy that favors only the “comparable**\n**uncontrolled price” method** limited to commodities. This is a more direct method that works\nmore efficiently with homogeneous products whose price formation is transparent in\ninternational markets that generate public information, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,\nLondon Metal Exchange, or Intercontinental Coffee Exchange.\n\n\n65 Normally, the party subject to this test is that which conducts the simplest activities, with fewer functions or\nassets, as is generally the case with commercial intermediaries; see OECD (2017a), paras. 3.18 and 3.19.\n\n66 Guatemala does not receive _country-by-country reports_ since it is not a member of the Inclusive Framework.\n\n67 The five methods are: comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, resale price, transactional profit split, and\ntransactional net margin. The methods are sufficiently explained in the (OECD and UN) guides themselves and in\nthe Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2017), with a special focus on their application in developing countries.\nSome countries mention the OECD guides in their laws as a source of interpretation of their legislation on\ntransfer prices. This can be appropriate for OECD member countries, which Guatemala is not. Guatemala also\ndoes not participate in the Inclusive Framework supported by the OECD.\n\n\n48", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 48, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "producing country’s Treasury cannot question the (reduced) income from foreign sales.\nTherefore, the possibility of presuming that they are related parties is important in order to\nempower the Treasury to adjust transfer prices in the event of non-compliance with the arm’s\nlength principle. Furthermore, the Treasury can also determine which of the parties taking part in\nthe transaction is the tested party, that is, the one required to demonstrate that, according to the\ntransfer pricing method selected, its profit margin is comparable to a company with similar\nfunctions. [65] This would require the multinational enterprise to disclose its operations in the tax\nhaven, which, if lesser as is normally the suspicion, would be remunerated accordingly, reverting\nthe tax base to the producing country. In the event of a refusal to provide the corresponding\ndocumentation and its inaccessibility to the tax authority through country-by-country reporting\nas per BEPS Action 14 (see Chapter VI), [66] legislation can include a provision stating that\ndocumentation on transfer prices is a requirement for the deduction of payments to related\nnon-residents.\n\nMethods\n\n116. The LISR includes the five methods for assessing transfer prices contained in the\napplicable international guides. [67] The LISR (Art. 59, 2) also establishes precedence when more\nthan one method is applicable. It favors the first three methods, that is, the “traditional” ones\n(comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, and resale price), that OECD guides also formerly\nfavored. This changed in 2010 when the OECD’s approach shifted to the use of the _most_\n_appropriate_ method based on the circumstances of the case. The argument is that one method is\nnot better than another in the abstract, but one is more appropriate than another depending on\nthe facts. The two additional methods, based on a profit indicator (transactional profit split and\ntransactional net margin), have remained hierarchically equal to the traditional methods since\nthen. This approach is more flexible, but also allows multinational enterprises to use the most\nefficient method for reducing the tax base as their first option.\n\n117. Guatemala could keep a method hierarchy that favors only the “comparable\nuncontrolled price” method limited to commodities. This is a more direct method that works\nmore efficiently with homogeneous products whose price formation is transparent in\ninternational markets that generate public information, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,\nLondon Metal Exchange, or Intercontinental Coffee Exchange.\n\n65 Normally, the party subject to this test is that which conducts the simplest activities, with fewer functions or\nassets, as is generally the case with commercial intermediaries; see OECD (2017a), paras. 3.18 and 3.19.\n\n66 Guatemala does not receive _country-by-country reports_ since it is not a member of the Inclusive Framework.\n\n67 The five methods are: comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, resale price, transactional profit split, and\ntransactional net margin. The methods are sufficiently explained in the (OECD and UN) guides themselves and in\nthe Platform for Collaboration on Tax (2017), with a special focus on their application in developing countries.\nSome countries mention the OECD guides in their laws as a source of interpretation of their legislation on\ntransfer prices. This can be appropriate for OECD member countries, which Guatemala is not. Guatemala also\ndoes not participate in the Inclusive Framework supported by the OECD.\n\n48", "text_characters": 3004}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "118. **A triangulation risk is thus avoided.** It is common for the multinational enterprise to\nestablish an intermediary in a low-tax jurisdiction that buys at a low price from the subsidiary in\nthe producing country and resells at market price to the end customer, keeping a significant\nprofit margin from the operation. One argument is that the intermediary performs sophisticated\nand risky trading (which is difficult to verify) and that the producing subsidiary is a routine,\nlow-risk business because the financial arrangements with the multinational enterprise ensure\nstable and predetermined performance, such that the residual profit (the economic income of\nthe business) is captured by the intermediary outside the country. These arrangements often\nhave no substance and are valued using the transactional net margin method. Recording the\naforementioned hierarchy of methods for commodities in the LISR does not mean designing a\nspecial or different method for them, as it seems Guatemala has done by introducing a sixth\nexclusive method for imports and exports, discussed below. [68]\n\n\n119. **The BEPS Action 10 report states that this method is generally adequate for**\n**commodities** (OECD 2015e) _._ [69] This suggests that such a method hierarchy may be useful, but as\nlong as the valuation mechanics reflect the logic of the arm’s length principle, that is, that\ncomparability between the reference market transaction and the related transaction is favored\nand, where applicable, the necessary adjustments are permitted to achieve comparability (OECD\n2015e, p. 51).\n\n\n**Rules for Specific Transactions**\n\n\n**Commodities**\n\n\n120. **The LISR (Art. 60) establishes a special valuation method for goods imports and**\n**exports that is (seemingly) mandatory.** **[70]** Although it is understood that the standard could\nhave been introduced to regulate the (bound) commodity trade price only, [71] it applies strictly to\nall (intra-group) foreign trade in goods, overemphasizing its scope. It would have been thus even\nif it had been limited to commodities because not all are listed on an organized stock exchange\nor are significant in Guatemala’s trade. [ 72]\n\n\n68 Mexico, for instance, gives the comparable uncontrolled price method priority for all goods (LISRM, Art. 180).\nOther Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador, have been stricter (albeit with\nvariations) by imposing a specific reference price to valuate some commodity transactions. Argentina’s version,\nfrom which the name “sixth method” originates, has been criticized by those who support the traditional\napproach of the arm’s length principle. See, for example, Ariel Efraim (2013), “Argentina and the so-called ‘sixth\nmethod,’” _BDO Transfer Pricing News_, No. 16.\n\n69 The content of this report was reflected in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines (2017a).\n\n70 The letter of the law leaves little doubt that the method is compulsory for goods imports and exports. In\npractice, taxpayers and the authority understand that it is an additional, optional method.\n\n71 Commodity exports, which typically account for a high percentage of the total exports of low-income\ncountries, are particularly vulnerable to transfer price manipulation.\n\n72 In 2021, three commodities (banana, coffee, and cardamom) accounted for 17 percent of total exports in\nGuatemala (source: Bank of Guatemala).\n\n\n49", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 49, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "118. A triangulation risk is thus avoided. It is common for the multinational enterprise to\nestablish an intermediary in a low-tax jurisdiction that buys at a low price from the subsidiary in\nthe producing country and resells at market price to the end customer, keeping a significant\nprofit margin from the operation. One argument is that the intermediary performs sophisticated\nand risky trading (which is difficult to verify) and that the producing subsidiary is a routine,\nlow-risk business because the financial arrangements with the multinational enterprise ensure\nstable and predetermined performance, such that the residual profit (the economic income of\nthe business) is captured by the intermediary outside the country. These arrangements often\nhave no substance and are valued using the transactional net margin method. Recording the\naforementioned hierarchy of methods for commodities in the LISR does not mean designing a\nspecial or different method for them, as it seems Guatemala has done by introducing a sixth\nexclusive method for imports and exports, discussed below. [68]\n\n119. The BEPS Action 10 report states that this method is generally adequate for\ncommodities (OECD 2015e) _._ [69] This suggests that such a method hierarchy may be useful, but as\nlong as the valuation mechanics reflect the logic of the arm’s length principle, that is, that\ncomparability between the reference market transaction and the related transaction is favored\nand, where applicable, the necessary adjustments are permitted to achieve comparability (OECD\n2015e, p. 51).\n\nRules for Specific Transactions\n\nCommodities\n\n120. The LISR (Art. 60) establishes a special valuation method for goods imports and\nexports that is (seemingly) mandatory. [70] Although it is understood that the standard could\nhave been introduced to regulate the (bound) commodity trade price only, [71] it applies strictly to\nall (intra-group) foreign trade in goods, overemphasizing its scope. It would have been thus even\nif it had been limited to commodities because not all are listed on an organized stock exchange\nor are significant in Guatemala’s trade. [ 72]\n\n68 Mexico, for instance, gives the comparable uncontrolled price method priority for all goods (LISRM, Art. 180).\nOther Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador, have been stricter (albeit with\nvariations) by imposing a specific reference price to valuate some commodity transactions. Argentina’s version,\nfrom which the name “sixth method” originates, has been criticized by those who support the traditional\napproach of the arm’s length principle. See, for example, Ariel Efraim (2013), “Argentina and the so-called ‘sixth\nmethod,’” _BDO Transfer Pricing News_, No. 16.\n\n69 The content of this report was reflected in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines (2017a).\n\n70 The letter of the law leaves little doubt that the method is compulsory for goods imports and exports. In\npractice, taxpayers and the authority understand that it is an additional, optional method.\n\n71 Commodity exports, which typically account for a high percentage of the total exports of low-income\ncountries, are particularly vulnerable to transfer price manipulation.\n\n72 In 2021, three commodities (banana, coffee, and cardamom) accounted for 17 percent of total exports in\nGuatemala (source: Bank of Guatemala).\n\n49", "text_characters": 2837}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "121. **The method is confusing.** It imposes a maximum price on imports in line with an\nundefined “international parameter” and establishes that the price of exports must be calculated\naccording to an “international price investigation,” which is not explained. This article of the Law\ncontains no decipherable method because it cannot be inferred how the price that taxpayers\nmust agree to in order to comply with the law is determined.\n\n\n122. **The regulation contains some details on how to apply this transfer pricing**\n**method,** **[73]** **but these seem insufficient to provide legal certainty.** It states that, for exports,\nthe reference price can be a “known listing on the international market” or “on stock exchanges.”\nThese concepts could be explained in greater detail, providing examples for Guatemala’s top\ncommodities (banana, coffee).\n\n\n123. **The special method under Article 60 outlines the two anti-abuse measures.** The first\nrefers to transactions between related intermediaries for an independent party that only serves\nas a cover for the non-resident related party (a back-to-back type of operation) to make it seem\nlike the transactions are between independent parties, free from transfer pricing obligations. The\nsecond refers to the listing date of the good, which should serve as a reference. [74]\n\n\n124. **Both anti-abuse measures should be reviewed.** A problem with the first rule (Art. 60,\nfourth paragraph) is that it affects every independent intermediary, without differentiating the tax\nregime of the territory in which the intermediary resides, as long as it does not have a substantial\nactivity or activities there independent of the business with the Guatemalan exporter. Countries\ngenerally protect their taxpayers’ tax base, assuming that the non-resident counterparty is\nrelated when the tax regime that applies to it is one of low or zero taxation and the jurisdiction is\nnot fully cooperative in disclosing the effective beneficiary of the said counterparty. These are\neasier conditions to verify compared to determining whether the third parties with which the\nintermediary transacts are related parties of the first exporter or identifying the substantial\nactivity carried out by the intermediary. Another problem, by no means minor, is that the\nprovision leaves out of its scope all related intermediaries that triangulate from tax havens\noperations with independent third parties, which can be a much more common situation.\n\n\n125. **The price of commodities listed on global markets fluctuates from day to day**, which\nis why the precise date on which the operation is agreed is important for determining the price\nof a transaction. [75] This can potentially be manipulated between related parties. Some countries\nhave adopted a strict rule to avoid this: the reference price that must be considered is that which\nis listed on the market the day the good is shipped. Article 60 allows for some flexibility in this\nrule, since it admits a different quoted price if “...it is proven that the operation was closed on\n\n\n73 Government Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 53 and 54.\n\n74 “…will be considered as market value: 1. In the case of goods with a known international listing on the\ninternational market, stock exchanges...the said list value on the last day of the shipment...” (Government\nAgreement 213 – 2013, Art. 54).\n\n75 The reference price can also be the average or a range during a given period.\n\n\n50", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 50, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "121. The method is confusing. It imposes a maximum price on imports in line with an\nundefined “international parameter” and establishes that the price of exports must be calculated\naccording to an “international price investigation,” which is not explained. This article of the Law\ncontains no decipherable method because it cannot be inferred how the price that taxpayers\nmust agree to in order to comply with the law is determined.\n\n122. The regulation contains some details on how to apply this transfer pricing\nmethod, [73] but these seem insufficient to provide legal certainty. It states that, for exports,\nthe reference price can be a “known listing on the international market” or “on stock exchanges.”\nThese concepts could be explained in greater detail, providing examples for Guatemala’s top\ncommodities (banana, coffee).\n\n123. The special method under Article 60 outlines the two anti-abuse measures. The first\nrefers to transactions between related intermediaries for an independent party that only serves\nas a cover for the non-resident related party (a back-to-back type of operation) to make it seem\nlike the transactions are between independent parties, free from transfer pricing obligations. The\nsecond refers to the listing date of the good, which should serve as a reference. [74]\n\n124. Both anti-abuse measures should be reviewed. A problem with the first rule (Art. 60,\nfourth paragraph) is that it affects every independent intermediary, without differentiating the tax\nregime of the territory in which the intermediary resides, as long as it does not have a substantial\nactivity or activities there independent of the business with the Guatemalan exporter. Countries\ngenerally protect their taxpayers’ tax base, assuming that the non-resident counterparty is\nrelated when the tax regime that applies to it is one of low or zero taxation and the jurisdiction is\nnot fully cooperative in disclosing the effective beneficiary of the said counterparty. These are\neasier conditions to verify compared to determining whether the third parties with which the\nintermediary transacts are related parties of the first exporter or identifying the substantial\nactivity carried out by the intermediary. Another problem, by no means minor, is that the\nprovision leaves out of its scope all related intermediaries that triangulate from tax havens\noperations with independent third parties, which can be a much more common situation.\n\n125. The price of commodities listed on global markets fluctuates from day to day, which\nis why the precise date on which the operation is agreed is important for determining the price\nof a transaction. [75] This can potentially be manipulated between related parties. Some countries\nhave adopted a strict rule to avoid this: the reference price that must be considered is that which\nis listed on the market the day the good is shipped. Article 60 allows for some flexibility in this\nrule, since it admits a different quoted price if “...it is proven that the operation was closed on\n\n73 Government Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 53 and 54.\n\n74 “…will be considered as market value: 1. In the case of goods with a known international listing on the\ninternational market, stock exchanges...the said list value on the last day of the shipment...” (Government\nAgreement 213 – 2013, Art. 54).\n\n75 The reference price can also be the average or a range during a given period.\n\n50", "text_characters": 2861}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "another date.” The problem is whether the contract alone is proof of the date on which the price\nwas agreed. The regulation provides this clarification: the price in the contract may be considered\nwhen it is presented, notarized, to the SAT not more than three business days after the date\n(Government Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 54). The OECD approach allows for the imposition of\nthe quoted price on the shipment date when there is no evidence of the date on which the price\nwas agreed (BEPS Action 8–10, p. 54).\n\n\n126. **The authority’s approach could be clearer and simpler.** First, it could make the\ncomparable uncontrolled price method compulsory for some commodities only (banana, coffee,\nand fuel, for example) and eliminate the special method for goods exports and imports. Second,\nit could introduce in the standard the types of permitted comparability adjustments, which\nshould reflect the price formation practices in the export or import market. To define the\npermitted adjustments, following the practices of each market, it may be worthwhile to form\ntechnical working groups with representatives of exporter associations, especially independent\ntraders and brokers.\n\n\n**Interest**\n\n\n127. **Multinational enterprises often inflate interest payments abroad to shift profits to**\n**another destination, normally low-tax territories.** Two mechanisms can be used: (i) rates that\nare higher than market rates; or (ii) the over-indebtedness of the company subject to tax\nplanning. For this reason, many countries have developed special rules to prevent abuse, besides\ntransfer pricing instruments. [76] BEPS Action 4 agreed on a common strategy to combat the\nproblem, recommending that countries adopt in their domestic legislations a limit on the\ndeduction of interest (earnings stripping rule) of up to 30 percent of the company profits\n(EBITDA). [77] This measure would simultaneously attack the different paths to reducing the tax\nbase through debt instruments and would replace separate strategies focused on limiting rates\nand the amount of debt. [78] This is a better protection mechanism than the different instruments\nthe LISR provides in Guatemala.\n\n\n128. **Guatemala has various special rules for limiting the deduction of interest** (LISR,\nArt. 24). Its first “thin cap” rule limits interest deductions for any debt that is three times higher\nthan the value of the taxpayer’s assets. The rule applies to all of the taxpayer’s debt, whether or\nnot it is with a related party. The restriction is broad, but steers clear of circumventing the\n\n\n76 The application of the arm’s length principle to control profit shifting through debt instruments is particularly\ncomplex because multinational enterprises are free to establish the contractual conditions in pursuit of a desired\ntax outcome. For example, an internal loan between group subsidiaries can be arranged without a guarantee,\nwhose comparable in the market attracts a high rate of interest, but this results in an artificial arrangement since\nthe debt is with itself. See the Chevron Australia (2107) case: [Chevron case: ATO wins landmark transfer pricing](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)\n[case - The Tax Institute.](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)\n\n77 See OECD (2015b).\n\n78 Countries traditionally tackled this problem by regulating the interest rate through transfer pricing rules and\nthe debt amount through thin cap rules.\n\n\n51", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 51, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "another date.” The problem is whether the contract alone is proof of the date on which the price\nwas agreed. The regulation provides this clarification: the price in the contract may be considered\nwhen it is presented, notarized, to the SAT not more than three business days after the date\n(Government Agreement 213 – 2013, Art. 54). The OECD approach allows for the imposition of\nthe quoted price on the shipment date when there is no evidence of the date on which the price\nwas agreed (BEPS Action 8–10, p. 54).\n\n126. The authority’s approach could be clearer and simpler. First, it could make the\ncomparable uncontrolled price method compulsory for some commodities only (banana, coffee,\nand fuel, for example) and eliminate the special method for goods exports and imports. Second,\nit could introduce in the standard the types of permitted comparability adjustments, which\nshould reflect the price formation practices in the export or import market. To define the\npermitted adjustments, following the practices of each market, it may be worthwhile to form\ntechnical working groups with representatives of exporter associations, especially independent\ntraders and brokers.\n\nInterest\n\n127. Multinational enterprises often inflate interest payments abroad to shift profits to\nanother destination, normally low-tax territories. Two mechanisms can be used: (i) rates that\nare higher than market rates; or (ii) the over-indebtedness of the company subject to tax\nplanning. For this reason, many countries have developed special rules to prevent abuse, besides\ntransfer pricing instruments. [76] BEPS Action 4 agreed on a common strategy to combat the\nproblem, recommending that countries adopt in their domestic legislations a limit on the\ndeduction of interest (earnings stripping rule) of up to 30 percent of the company profits\n(EBITDA). [77] This measure would simultaneously attack the different paths to reducing the tax\nbase through debt instruments and would replace separate strategies focused on limiting rates\nand the amount of debt. [78] This is a better protection mechanism than the different instruments\nthe LISR provides in Guatemala.\n\n128. Guatemala has various special rules for limiting the deduction of interest (LISR,\nArt. 24). Its first “thin cap” rule limits interest deductions for any debt that is three times higher\nthan the value of the taxpayer’s assets. The rule applies to all of the taxpayer’s debt, whether or\nnot it is with a related party. The restriction is broad, but steers clear of circumventing the\n\n76 The application of the arm’s length principle to control profit shifting through debt instruments is particularly\ncomplex because multinational enterprises are free to establish the contractual conditions in pursuit of a desired\ntax outcome. For example, an internal loan between group subsidiaries can be arranged without a guarantee,\nwhose comparable in the market attracts a high rate of interest, but this results in an artificial arrangement since\nthe debt is with itself. See the Chevron Australia (2107) case: Chevron case: ATO wins landmark transfer pricing\ncase - The Tax Institute.\n\n77 See OECD (2015b).\n\n78 Countries traditionally tackled this problem by regulating the interest rate through transfer pricing rules and\nthe debt amount through thin cap rules.\n\n51", "text_characters": 2789}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "provision via loans backed by a related party (back-to-back). International practice varies. For\nexample, in some countries, the rule considers only long-term debt, while in others, it considers\nonly debt with related parties. The rule in Guatemala is also particular because the debt-to-equity\nratio basis is “net asset,” in principle, which in practice would allow for debt to be up to one time\nthe asset amount. [79] The rule does not permit carryover of interest that is not deducted during\nthe fiscal year. Various countries have abandoned this thin cap system in favor of an earnings\nstripping rule or have substantially reduced the initial debt-to-equity ratio from 3 to 1, like\nGuatemala has today (Canada, for instance, reduced it from 1.5 to 1).\n\n\n129. **The legislation also limits the maximum deductible interest rate** (LISR, Art. 24,\nsecond paragraph). This measure complements the thin cap regime, which only heads off\nplanning by means of the excess debt amount. The limit applies to all debt operations, including\nbetween independent parties, and is equal to “the maximum annual simple rate determined by\nthe Monetary Board for tax purposes.” The rule is excessive because it applies to market\noperations. For the purpose of related operations, although the rule is straightforward, it is also\npotentially arbitrary because it does not necessarily represent market conditions. The rule can\nalso be lenient because the punitive (default) interest for debts with the Treasury is normally\nconsiderably higher than the interest for comparable (normal) financing operations between\nindependent parties.\n\n\n130. **Another restriction in Guatemala is that interest payments abroad are deductible**\n**only if the creditor is a bank or a financial institution** regulated in the country of residence.\nAll interest on loans contracted with companies residing outside the country, whether or not they\nare related, is therefore non-deductible. This is unusual. Countries typically allow for\ninter-company interest deductions and impose a tax withholding on the payment. A highly\nrestrictive policy in this regard can affect FDI, which is typically financed in part with debt\ncontracted with the investor group. [80] It is also true that debt between related companies is, to a\ncertain extent, an invention (lending to itself) that grants tax advantages with respect to the\ncontribution of capital and the payment of dividends, which are not deductible. [81]\n\n\n131. **In short, the arm’s length principle is a weak system for controlling tax planning**\n**through intra-group debt.** The international consensus is that anti-abuse rules must be\nintroduced, but the ones Guatemala has in its LISR are not adequate. It would be preferable to\nreplace them all with just one that simultaneously controls the abuse of rates and\n\n\n79 The definition of net asset in the LISR nevertheless seems to differ because it refers to the “book value of all\nassets owned by the taxpayer” (LISR, Art. 24, fourth paragraph).\n\n80 In 2019, around 12 percent of FDI originating from Latin America was financed through debt. For Guatemala,\nthis component represented just 5 percent; see ECLAC (2021).\n\n81 Attempts to define debt versus equity for tax purposes had already been declared a failure in the 1980s in the\nUnited States; see Bulow et al. (1990). Difficulties in differentiating one concept from the other continue to this\nday.\n\n\n52", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 52, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "provision via loans backed by a related party (back-to-back). International practice varies. For\nexample, in some countries, the rule considers only long-term debt, while in others, it considers\nonly debt with related parties. The rule in Guatemala is also particular because the debt-to-equity\nratio basis is “net asset,” in principle, which in practice would allow for debt to be up to one time\nthe asset amount. [79] The rule does not permit carryover of interest that is not deducted during\nthe fiscal year. Various countries have abandoned this thin cap system in favor of an earnings\nstripping rule or have substantially reduced the initial debt-to-equity ratio from 3 to 1, like\nGuatemala has today (Canada, for instance, reduced it from 1.5 to 1).\n\n129. The legislation also limits the maximum deductible interest rate (LISR, Art. 24,\nsecond paragraph). This measure complements the thin cap regime, which only heads off\nplanning by means of the excess debt amount. The limit applies to all debt operations, including\nbetween independent parties, and is equal to “the maximum annual simple rate determined by\nthe Monetary Board for tax purposes.” The rule is excessive because it applies to market\noperations. For the purpose of related operations, although the rule is straightforward, it is also\npotentially arbitrary because it does not necessarily represent market conditions. The rule can\nalso be lenient because the punitive (default) interest for debts with the Treasury is normally\nconsiderably higher than the interest for comparable (normal) financing operations between\nindependent parties.\n\n130. Another restriction in Guatemala is that interest payments abroad are deductible\nonly if the creditor is a bank or a financial institution regulated in the country of residence.\nAll interest on loans contracted with companies residing outside the country, whether or not they\nare related, is therefore non-deductible. This is unusual. Countries typically allow for\ninter-company interest deductions and impose a tax withholding on the payment. A highly\nrestrictive policy in this regard can affect FDI, which is typically financed in part with debt\ncontracted with the investor group. [80] It is also true that debt between related companies is, to a\ncertain extent, an invention (lending to itself) that grants tax advantages with respect to the\ncontribution of capital and the payment of dividends, which are not deductible. [81]\n\n131. In short, the arm’s length principle is a weak system for controlling tax planning\nthrough intra-group debt. The international consensus is that anti-abuse rules must be\nintroduced, but the ones Guatemala has in its LISR are not adequate. It would be preferable to\nreplace them all with just one that simultaneously controls the abuse of rates and\n\n79 The definition of net asset in the LISR nevertheless seems to differ because it refers to the “book value of all\nassets owned by the taxpayer” (LISR, Art. 24, fourth paragraph).\n\n80 In 2019, around 12 percent of FDI originating from Latin America was financed through debt. For Guatemala,\nthis component represented just 5 percent; see ECLAC (2021).\n\n81 Attempts to define debt versus equity for tax purposes had already been declared a failure in the 1980s in the\nUnited States; see Bulow et al. (1990). Difficulties in differentiating one concept from the other continue to this\nday.\n\n52", "text_characters": 2850}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "over-indebtedness (earnings stripping rule), limiting the total interest deduction amount to\n30 percent of EBITDA, as recommended in the BEPS Action 4 report.\n\n\n**Royalties**\n\n\n132. **One of the main concerns in BEPS works was the manipulation of transfer prices in**\n**relation to intangible operations.** The valuation of intangible assets (intellectual property) is\nparticularly complex because these are usually unique assets without comparables in the market.\nIt is even more difficult to valuate them when they are transferred before their development\nprocess is complete, as is often the case inside a multinational group. Expectations of success in\nthis case can be very speculative and difficult for the Treasury to verify. It is especially difficult to\nvaluate an isolated intangible asset relative to the rest of the knowledge accumulated by the\ncompany with which intellectual property in particular can be developed. These issues enabled\nhigh-tech companies to shift many of their intangible assets to low-tax countries through\nintra-group transactions agreed at notoriously undervalued prices. [82] Income (royalties) from the\nuse of these assets then flowed to those low-tax countries. However, this is a problem faced\nmainly by developed countries.\n\n\n133. **Developing countries also create some intangible assets**, but normally find\nthemselves on the other side of the operation, as those paying the royalties. Intangible assets\ndeveloped in countries such as Guatemala are typically national brands or other elements\nassociated with a product that set it apart and give it a competitive advantage in the market (for\nexample, relationship with clients). On occasion, the local subsidiary may invest its own resources\nin the development of a foreign brand, meaning that, for transfer pricing purposes, it would have\n“economic ownership” over the intangible asset, with a partial entitlement to benefits from its\nuse, despite not being the legal owner of the intangible asset. In accordance with the new\nOECD guides on this topic (OECD 2015e; OECD 2018), the benefits of using an intangible asset\nmust not rest solely with the legal owner, but rather be distributed between the group’s entities\nthat contributed to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and\nexploitation (DEMPE) of that intangible asset.\n\n\n134. **Contributions to the development of an intangible asset registered abroad can be**\n**reflected, for example, in a lower royalty rate** that a subsidiary in Guatemala must pay to its\nparent company. This also means that if, for example, a multinational enterprise registers an\nintangible asset in Guatemala and intends to use a tax advantage without Guatemala having\nmade an economic contribution to its development or administration, the other countries where\nthe intangible asset’s DEMPE is verified may require income to be reallocated according to their\n\n\n82 Intellectual property was also relocated through cost-sharing agreements, by way of which the multinational\nenterprise financed the development of the intangible asset from a subsidiary residing in a low-tax country,\nwhereupon the subsidiary also shared ownership and usufruct of the intangible asset (generally the right of use\nin a geographical area).\n\n\n53", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 53, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "over-indebtedness (earnings stripping rule), limiting the total interest deduction amount to\n30 percent of EBITDA, as recommended in the BEPS Action 4 report.\n\nRoyalties\n\n132. One of the main concerns in BEPS works was the manipulation of transfer prices in\nrelation to intangible operations. The valuation of intangible assets (intellectual property) is\nparticularly complex because these are usually unique assets without comparables in the market.\nIt is even more difficult to valuate them when they are transferred before their development\nprocess is complete, as is often the case inside a multinational group. Expectations of success in\nthis case can be very speculative and difficult for the Treasury to verify. It is especially difficult to\nvaluate an isolated intangible asset relative to the rest of the knowledge accumulated by the\ncompany with which intellectual property in particular can be developed. These issues enabled\nhigh-tech companies to shift many of their intangible assets to low-tax countries through\nintra-group transactions agreed at notoriously undervalued prices. [82] Income (royalties) from the\nuse of these assets then flowed to those low-tax countries. However, this is a problem faced\nmainly by developed countries.\n\n133. Developing countries also create some intangible assets, but normally find\nthemselves on the other side of the operation, as those paying the royalties. Intangible assets\ndeveloped in countries such as Guatemala are typically national brands or other elements\nassociated with a product that set it apart and give it a competitive advantage in the market (for\nexample, relationship with clients). On occasion, the local subsidiary may invest its own resources\nin the development of a foreign brand, meaning that, for transfer pricing purposes, it would have\n“economic ownership” over the intangible asset, with a partial entitlement to benefits from its\nuse, despite not being the legal owner of the intangible asset. In accordance with the new\nOECD guides on this topic (OECD 2015e; OECD 2018), the benefits of using an intangible asset\nmust not rest solely with the legal owner, but rather be distributed between the group’s entities\nthat contributed to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and\nexploitation (DEMPE) of that intangible asset.\n\n134. Contributions to the development of an intangible asset registered abroad can be\nreflected, for example, in a lower royalty rate that a subsidiary in Guatemala must pay to its\nparent company. This also means that if, for example, a multinational enterprise registers an\nintangible asset in Guatemala and intends to use a tax advantage without Guatemala having\nmade an economic contribution to its development or administration, the other countries where\nthe intangible asset’s DEMPE is verified may require income to be reallocated according to their\n\n82 Intellectual property was also relocated through cost-sharing agreements, by way of which the multinational\nenterprise financed the development of the intangible asset from a subsidiary residing in a low-tax country,\nwhereupon the subsidiary also shared ownership and usufruct of the intangible asset (generally the right of use\nin a geographical area).\n\n53", "text_characters": 2741}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "respective contribution, denying Guatemala the intended tax base (and the multinational\nenterprise the intended tax planning).\n\n\n135. **A frequent situation in developing countries is the intra-group disposal of national**\n**brands.** It is common for domestic capital companies with traditional brands in the domestic\nmarket to be acquired by multinational enterprises and for their brands to be sold to a subsidiary\nabroad. From that point forward, the resident company will pay royalties abroad, thereby\nreducing the tax base in the country of origin. Irrespective of the asymmetry that this operation\nrepresents in Guatemala due to the fact that capital gains are taxed at 10 percent (LISR, Art. 92)\nand profits at 25 percent (general regime), tax planning occurs if the brand selling price is lower\nthan its market value at the same time as royalties are at market value. To prevent this type of\nplanning, additional rules can be considered, such as favoring the financial valuation method that\nrequires the net present value of the flow of royalties generated by the intangible asset to match\nthe value in which the intangible asset was transferred. [83]\n\n\n136. **The restriction on royalty deductions is fairly lax (LISR, Art. 21, No. 25).** The\nstandard imposes a deduction limit for this of up to 5 percent of the taxpayer’s gross income,\nwithout restricting the generation of this income to royalty payments. This means that the royalty\ndeduction can fully eliminate the tax base for businesses that earn up to 20 percent profit from\nsales, without considering DEMPE aspects and the possible domestic origin of the intangible\nasset as well as the price at which it was transferred abroad. It is therefore recommended to\nstrengthen the standard with limitations that consider these factors.\n\n\n**Services**\n\n\n137. **Intra-group services are typically subject to particular scrutiny by tax authorities.**\nFrom a logistical standpoint, they are a fairly straightforward way of shifting profits. The OECD\ntransfer pricing guides therefore include special rules for valuating these types of transactions.\nFirst, it must be demonstrated that the service was actually provided. In addition, it must be\nproven that the service is a benefit for the acquiring entity and that, if the entity were\nindependent, it would be willing to pay for it. Proving the above requires more than an invoice\non the part of the service provider. Services that are not remunerable, for example, are those\nprovided by the parent company to its shareholders. Once these conditions are met, the logic of\nthe arm’s length principle applies like to any other related operation. Article 62 of the LISR\nimposes the charge (or price) directly on the personalized service, as would be done by\nindependent parties.\n\n\n138. **The application of the arm’s length principle is hindered mainly when the service**\n**received cannot be personalized.** When the functions of an entity are supposed to be for the\nbenefit or support of the group as a whole, without personalizing a particular service, the OECD\n\n\n83 Some countries have stricter measures, such as not permitting deductions for royalties paid abroad if the\nintangible asset was originally developed in the country.\n\n\n54", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 54, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "respective contribution, denying Guatemala the intended tax base (and the multinational\nenterprise the intended tax planning).\n\n135. A frequent situation in developing countries is the intra-group disposal of national\nbrands. It is common for domestic capital companies with traditional brands in the domestic\nmarket to be acquired by multinational enterprises and for their brands to be sold to a subsidiary\nabroad. From that point forward, the resident company will pay royalties abroad, thereby\nreducing the tax base in the country of origin. Irrespective of the asymmetry that this operation\nrepresents in Guatemala due to the fact that capital gains are taxed at 10 percent (LISR, Art. 92)\nand profits at 25 percent (general regime), tax planning occurs if the brand selling price is lower\nthan its market value at the same time as royalties are at market value. To prevent this type of\nplanning, additional rules can be considered, such as favoring the financial valuation method that\nrequires the net present value of the flow of royalties generated by the intangible asset to match\nthe value in which the intangible asset was transferred. [83]\n\n136. The restriction on royalty deductions is fairly lax (LISR, Art. 21, No. 25). The\nstandard imposes a deduction limit for this of up to 5 percent of the taxpayer’s gross income,\nwithout restricting the generation of this income to royalty payments. This means that the royalty\ndeduction can fully eliminate the tax base for businesses that earn up to 20 percent profit from\nsales, without considering DEMPE aspects and the possible domestic origin of the intangible\nasset as well as the price at which it was transferred abroad. It is therefore recommended to\nstrengthen the standard with limitations that consider these factors.\n\nServices\n\n137. Intra-group services are typically subject to particular scrutiny by tax authorities.\nFrom a logistical standpoint, they are a fairly straightforward way of shifting profits. The OECD\ntransfer pricing guides therefore include special rules for valuating these types of transactions.\nFirst, it must be demonstrated that the service was actually provided. In addition, it must be\nproven that the service is a benefit for the acquiring entity and that, if the entity were\nindependent, it would be willing to pay for it. Proving the above requires more than an invoice\non the part of the service provider. Services that are not remunerable, for example, are those\nprovided by the parent company to its shareholders. Once these conditions are met, the logic of\nthe arm’s length principle applies like to any other related operation. Article 62 of the LISR\nimposes the charge (or price) directly on the personalized service, as would be done by\nindependent parties.\n\n138. The application of the arm’s length principle is hindered mainly when the service\nreceived cannot be personalized. When the functions of an entity are supposed to be for the\nbenefit or support of the group as a whole, without personalizing a particular service, the OECD\n\n83 Some countries have stricter measures, such as not permitting deductions for royalties paid abroad if the\nintangible asset was originally developed in the country.\n\n54", "text_characters": 2689}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "guides accept the use of an “indirect-charge” method. This means that the operator’s costs can\nbe apportioned among the group’s other entities based on the extent to which they benefit from\nits services. This method is supposed to be valid only in exceptional cases. Article 62 of the LISR\nauthorizes it as long as the total consideration is distributed among the beneficiaries according\nto reasonable distribution rules (a concept that remains undefined). Given the difficulties\ntraditionally encountered in verifying the expenses incurred abroad by a non-resident entity and,\nparticularly, in establishing that these expenses were applicable to the resident subsidiary, some\ncountries introduced rules preventing deduction of such apportioned expenses in the country. [84]\nIt is particularly important in this case to apply the profit test as a defensive measure.\n\n\n139. **OECD works on BEPS offer a mechanism for simplifying compliance with the arm’s**\n**length principle in connection with some services.** The possibility of implementing a safe\nharbor for low value-added services was introduced in transfer pricing guides [85] so that such\nservices could be considered valued according to this principle if the stated profit margin on\ncosts and expenses did not exceed 5 percent. This simplification seems reasonable in principle,\nbut, in the case of non-personalized services, expenses incurred abroad may end up being\ndeductible in the country without a clear benefit for the domestic taxpayer. Introducing this\noption is not recommended for now.\n\n\n**Documentation**\n\n\n140. **The taxpayer must document compliance with the arm’s length principle.** This is\nestablished in Article 65 of the LISR, but has been subject to an OECD minimum standard (BEPS\nAction 13) since 2017. [86] The standard requires large multinational enterprises (with global sales\nabove EUR 750 million) to provide the authority with three types of documents, namely a local\nfile showing that the taxpayer’s related operations comply with the arm’s length principle, a\nmaster file explaining the global operations of the multinational enterprise, and a\ncountry-by-country report providing certain accounting details about its worldwide operations\ncountry by country. This latter report is a new component of the standard now available to all tax\nadministrations where the multinational enterprise operates (see Chapter VII on BEPS minimum\nstandards). Guatemalan legislation only mentions the first document. The country-by-country\ninformation could be very useful for the SAT in analyzing the risk of tax evasion by multinational\nenterprises operating in the country, information that, without the minimum standard,\nmultinational enterprises did not normally agree to share with authorities other than that of the\ncountry of residence of their parent company.\n\n\n141. **Besides the technical study on transfer prices, the taxpayer must provide an annex**\n**to the annual affidavit containing details on transactions with related parties abroad.**\n\n\n84 Mexico had this rule in its LISR until 2014, when it was declared unconstitutional by the judicial authority.\n\n85 Such services must not be the company’s primary business, support the business, or use valuable intangible\nassets.\n\n86 OECD (2015f).\n\n\n55", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 55, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "guides accept the use of an “indirect-charge” method. This means that the operator’s costs can\nbe apportioned among the group’s other entities based on the extent to which they benefit from\nits services. This method is supposed to be valid only in exceptional cases. Article 62 of the LISR\nauthorizes it as long as the total consideration is distributed among the beneficiaries according\nto reasonable distribution rules (a concept that remains undefined). Given the difficulties\ntraditionally encountered in verifying the expenses incurred abroad by a non-resident entity and,\nparticularly, in establishing that these expenses were applicable to the resident subsidiary, some\ncountries introduced rules preventing deduction of such apportioned expenses in the country. [84]\nIt is particularly important in this case to apply the profit test as a defensive measure.\n\n139. OECD works on BEPS offer a mechanism for simplifying compliance with the arm’s\nlength principle in connection with some services. The possibility of implementing a safe\nharbor for low value-added services was introduced in transfer pricing guides [85] so that such\nservices could be considered valued according to this principle if the stated profit margin on\ncosts and expenses did not exceed 5 percent. This simplification seems reasonable in principle,\nbut, in the case of non-personalized services, expenses incurred abroad may end up being\ndeductible in the country without a clear benefit for the domestic taxpayer. Introducing this\noption is not recommended for now.\n\nDocumentation\n\n140. The taxpayer must document compliance with the arm’s length principle. This is\nestablished in Article 65 of the LISR, but has been subject to an OECD minimum standard (BEPS\nAction 13) since 2017. [86] The standard requires large multinational enterprises (with global sales\nabove EUR 750 million) to provide the authority with three types of documents, namely a local\nfile showing that the taxpayer’s related operations comply with the arm’s length principle, a\nmaster file explaining the global operations of the multinational enterprise, and a\ncountry-by-country report providing certain accounting details about its worldwide operations\ncountry by country. This latter report is a new component of the standard now available to all tax\nadministrations where the multinational enterprise operates (see Chapter VII on BEPS minimum\nstandards). Guatemalan legislation only mentions the first document. The country-by-country\ninformation could be very useful for the SAT in analyzing the risk of tax evasion by multinational\nenterprises operating in the country, information that, without the minimum standard,\nmultinational enterprises did not normally agree to share with authorities other than that of the\ncountry of residence of their parent company.\n\n141. Besides the technical study on transfer prices, the taxpayer must provide an annex\nto the annual affidavit containing details on transactions with related parties abroad.\n\n84 Mexico had this rule in its LISR until 2014, when it was declared unconstitutional by the judicial authority.\n\n85 Such services must not be the company’s primary business, support the business, or use valuable intangible\nassets.\n\n86 OECD (2015f).\n\n55", "text_characters": 2755}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "However, this annex does not include information on the counterparty’s country of residence,\ninformation that could be very useful in conducting risk analyses and guiding auditors, with a\nfocus on transactions with low-tax countries. The affidavit must also include the amount of debt\ncontracted with third parties and within the group, specifying the residence of the debt issuer.\n\n\n**Recommendations**\n\n\n- Introduce an explicit requirement in the law for the taxpayer to comply with the arm’s length\nprinciple, clearly placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer.\n\n\n- Replace the tax authority’s power to adjust the prices of related operations with the power to\nadjust taxable income and deductions according to market prices.\n\n\n- Eliminate the condition whereby the SAT can adjust transfer prices only if this increases the\ntax, while permitting the authorization of correlative adjustments that have the opposite\neffect.\n\n\n- Extend the obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle to related operations\nbetween resident companies, but with the burden of proof resting with the authority.\n\n\n- Alternatively consider ensuring that the option of not documenting compliance with transfer\npricing (burden of proof) is limited to small businesses and to transactions below a certain\nvalue, specified in the regulation.\n\n\n- Presume that operations with low- or no-tax jurisdictions are with related parties.\n\n\n- Define low- or no-tax jurisdictions for transfer pricing purposes as those tax jurisdictions\nwhose statutory ISR rate represents 60 percent or less of Guatemala’s general statutory rate.\n\n\n- Specify that the party residing in the low-tax jurisdiction is the tested party.\n\n\n- Do not allow the deduction of payments to low-tax jurisdictions unless the taxpayer provides\ndocumentation to comply with transfer pricing obligations.\n\n\n- Introduce higher hierarchy only for the comparable uncontrolled price method and only for\ncommodities listed on a global organized market.\n\n\n- Eliminate the compulsory special method for imports and exports.\n\n\n- Permit the use of any other method aside from the five listed, as long as its results comply\nwith the arm’s length principle.\n\n\n- Reformulate anti-abuse measures regarding intermediation for exports:\n\n\n - Assume that the independent counterparty participates in the back-to-back operation\nwhen it resides in a low-tax jurisdiction.\n\n\n - Assume that it is a related party when it resides in that jurisdiction, even when\nintermediating with independent clients.\n\n\n- Specify that the quoted price of the commodity will be that in effect on the shipment date in\nthe absence of evidence that it was agreed on a different date.\n\n\n56", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 56, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "However, this annex does not include information on the counterparty’s country of residence,\ninformation that could be very useful in conducting risk analyses and guiding auditors, with a\nfocus on transactions with low-tax countries. The affidavit must also include the amount of debt\ncontracted with third parties and within the group, specifying the residence of the debt issuer.\n\nRecommendations\n\n- Introduce an explicit requirement in the law for the taxpayer to comply with the arm’s length\nprinciple, clearly placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer.\n\n- Replace the tax authority’s power to adjust the prices of related operations with the power to\nadjust taxable income and deductions according to market prices.\n\n- Eliminate the condition whereby the SAT can adjust transfer prices only if this increases the\ntax, while permitting the authorization of correlative adjustments that have the opposite\neffect.\n\n- Extend the obligation to comply with the arm’s length principle to related operations\nbetween resident companies, but with the burden of proof resting with the authority.\n\n- Alternatively consider ensuring that the option of not documenting compliance with transfer\npricing (burden of proof) is limited to small businesses and to transactions below a certain\nvalue, specified in the regulation.\n\n- Presume that operations with low- or no-tax jurisdictions are with related parties.\n\n- Define low- or no-tax jurisdictions for transfer pricing purposes as those tax jurisdictions\nwhose statutory ISR rate represents 60 percent or less of Guatemala’s general statutory rate.\n\n- Specify that the party residing in the low-tax jurisdiction is the tested party.\n\n- Do not allow the deduction of payments to low-tax jurisdictions unless the taxpayer provides\ndocumentation to comply with transfer pricing obligations.\n\n- Introduce higher hierarchy only for the comparable uncontrolled price method and only for\ncommodities listed on a global organized market.\n\n- Eliminate the compulsory special method for imports and exports.\n\n- Permit the use of any other method aside from the five listed, as long as its results comply\nwith the arm’s length principle.\n\n- Reformulate anti-abuse measures regarding intermediation for exports:\n\n - Assume that the independent counterparty participates in the back-to-back operation\nwhen it resides in a low-tax jurisdiction.\n\n - Assume that it is a related party when it resides in that jurisdiction, even when\nintermediating with independent clients.\n\n- Specify that the quoted price of the commodity will be that in effect on the shipment date in\nthe absence of evidence that it was agreed on a different date.\n\n56", "text_characters": 2236}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Replace the thin cap rule with a maximum interest deduction as a percentage of EBITDA\n(30 percent).\n\n\n- Eliminate the deductible interest rate limit as determined by the Monetary Board for tax\npurposes and establish that the deductible rate is that which is determined by transfer prices,\nas long as the deduction does not exceed 30 percent of EBITDA.\n\n\n- Limit the royalty deduction so that the net present value of the payment flow is consistent\nwith the value at which the intangible asset was alienated, as applicable.\n\n\n- Include in the standard the DEMPE components carried out by the parties in order to\ndetermine the consideration for the use or exploitation of an intangible property of a\nsubsidiary.\n\n\n- Do not include a safe harbor to comply with the arm’s length principle in transactions\ninvolving low value-added services.\n\n\n- As a condition for deducting payment for related services, introduce the profit test in the law\nstating that the service must be a taxpayer benefit and that, if the taxpayer were\nindependent, it would be willing to pay for it.\n\n\n- Reformulate the transfer pricing annex to the annual affidavit so that it includes information\non the country of residence of the related counterparty and the amount of debt with related\nparties (in addition to the interest paid).\n\n\n57", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 57, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Replace the thin cap rule with a maximum interest deduction as a percentage of EBITDA\n(30 percent).\n\n- Eliminate the deductible interest rate limit as determined by the Monetary Board for tax\npurposes and establish that the deductible rate is that which is determined by transfer prices,\nas long as the deduction does not exceed 30 percent of EBITDA.\n\n- Limit the royalty deduction so that the net present value of the payment flow is consistent\nwith the value at which the intangible asset was alienated, as applicable.\n\n- Include in the standard the DEMPE components carried out by the parties in order to\ndetermine the consideration for the use or exploitation of an intangible property of a\nsubsidiary.\n\n- Do not include a safe harbor to comply with the arm’s length principle in transactions\ninvolving low value-added services.\n\n- As a condition for deducting payment for related services, introduce the profit test in the law\nstating that the service must be a taxpayer benefit and that, if the taxpayer were\nindependent, it would be willing to pay for it.\n\n- Reformulate the transfer pricing annex to the annual affidavit so that it includes information\non the country of residence of the related counterparty and the amount of debt with related\nparties (in addition to the interest paid).\n\n57", "text_characters": 1076}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **VII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND** **RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE** **INTERNATIONAL TAX ARCHITECTURE**\n\n**Introduction**\n\n\n142. **The international tax system inherited from the beginning of the last century**\n**proved to have major loopholes** that made it possible for multinational enterprises to avoid\ntaxes on a large scale by concentrating their income in low-tax jurisdictions (OECD 2013a; IMF\n2014). The weaknesses in the concept of source and the arm’s length principle—pillars of this\nsystem—that allowed multinational enterprises to shift profits and erode the corporate ISR base\n(BEPS) eventually made it clear that the system needed to be repaired. The G20 therefore\nendorsed an action plan agreed within the OECD in September 2013 containing 15 specific\nactions to curb BEPS (OECD 2013b). Four of these actions or measures are compulsory for\ncountries party to the agreement. These are the BEPS minimum standards. The other actions,\nalthough not compulsory, were introduced in the OECD guidelines or were recommended as\nbest practices toward which countries should converge. A large number of countries have\nadopted them since then, as they have proven to be valuable tools in protecting the domestic tax\nbase.\n\n\n143. **A large part of the analytical work on BEPS was completed in 2015,** and reports were\npublished with specific recommendations for each of the 15 actions. To broaden the community\nof countries participating in the adoption of the recommended measures and in the discussion\non pending issues, especially regarding the digital economy and the international tax system, the\nOECD backed the creation of the Inclusive Framework, a group of countries open to all those\ninterested. Participation is under conditions equal to those of OECD or G20 members, with voice\nand vote on pending issues related to BEPS, but also entails the obligation to adopt minimum\nstandards and consent to prior agreements on BEPS (OECD 2017b).\n\n\n144. **At present, 140 countries belong to the OECD Inclusive Framework; Guatemala is**\n**not a member.** This means that the country is kept out of discussions and decision-making on\ninternational taxation, while also being exempt from the obligation to adopt the BEPS minimum\nstandards. In principle, this is a counterproductive position because the BEPS measures are\ndesigned to protect countries’ tax base. Otherwise, that is to say, where a country is a BEPS\nbeneficiary that promotes harmful tax competition, that country is exposed not only to being\nidentified as such, but also to potentially facing defensive measures from the rest of the\ncountries (higher withholding rates, for example). Isolation in the tax community does not seem\nto be a sustainable position in the long run. This is even more true with the agreements reached\nunder the Inclusive Framework in October 2021 adding additional measures to the international\ntax architecture, the so-called Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, as explained below (OECD 2020a; OECD\n2020b).\n\n\n58", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 58, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "VII. BEPS MINIMUM STANDARDS AND RECENT AGREEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL TAX ARCHITECTURE\n\nIntroduction\n\n142. The international tax system inherited from the beginning of the last century\nproved to have major loopholes that made it possible for multinational enterprises to avoid\ntaxes on a large scale by concentrating their income in low-tax jurisdictions (OECD 2013a; IMF\n2014). The weaknesses in the concept of source and the arm’s length principle—pillars of this\nsystem—that allowed multinational enterprises to shift profits and erode the corporate ISR base\n(BEPS) eventually made it clear that the system needed to be repaired. The G20 therefore\nendorsed an action plan agreed within the OECD in September 2013 containing 15 specific\nactions to curb BEPS (OECD 2013b). Four of these actions or measures are compulsory for\ncountries party to the agreement. These are the BEPS minimum standards. The other actions,\nalthough not compulsory, were introduced in the OECD guidelines or were recommended as\nbest practices toward which countries should converge. A large number of countries have\nadopted them since then, as they have proven to be valuable tools in protecting the domestic tax\nbase.\n\n143. A large part of the analytical work on BEPS was completed in 2015, and reports were\npublished with specific recommendations for each of the 15 actions. To broaden the community\nof countries participating in the adoption of the recommended measures and in the discussion\non pending issues, especially regarding the digital economy and the international tax system, the\nOECD backed the creation of the Inclusive Framework, a group of countries open to all those\ninterested. Participation is under conditions equal to those of OECD or G20 members, with voice\nand vote on pending issues related to BEPS, but also entails the obligation to adopt minimum\nstandards and consent to prior agreements on BEPS (OECD 2017b).\n\n144. At present, 140 countries belong to the OECD Inclusive Framework; Guatemala is\nnot a member. This means that the country is kept out of discussions and decision-making on\ninternational taxation, while also being exempt from the obligation to adopt the BEPS minimum\nstandards. In principle, this is a counterproductive position because the BEPS measures are\ndesigned to protect countries’ tax base. Otherwise, that is to say, where a country is a BEPS\nbeneficiary that promotes harmful tax competition, that country is exposed not only to being\nidentified as such, but also to potentially facing defensive measures from the rest of the\ncountries (higher withholding rates, for example). Isolation in the tax community does not seem\nto be a sustainable position in the long run. This is even more true with the agreements reached\nunder the Inclusive Framework in October 2021 adding additional measures to the international\ntax architecture, the so-called Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, as explained below (OECD 2020a; OECD\n2020b).\n\n58", "text_characters": 2478}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "145. **Adopting the OECD minimum standards involves implementing four specific**\n**actions from the BEPS package, which would require Guatemala to join the Inclusive**\n**Framework.** These are as follows: Action 5, eliminating harmful special regimes and\ntransparency; Action 6, introducing anti-abuse measures in treaties; Action 13,\ncountry-by-country reporting on multinational enterprises; and Action 14, introducing the\nmutual agreement clause in TADTs and facilitating the procedure in practice. These measures\nentail changes to domestic legislation, especially treaties. Since Guatemala does not have treaties\nin force and is not the country of residence of the parent companies of large multinational\nenterprises for the purposes of Action 14, only Action 5 could have substantial consequences in\nthe short term if the OECD minimum standards were to be adopted. The minimum standards are\nanalyzed in the next section, with particular attention on Action 5 regarding special regimes and\ntransparency. The second section of this chapter briefly discusses the new agreed changes to the\ninternational tax architecture (known as Pillars 1 and 2).\n\n\n**Action 5: Combating Harmful Tax Practices**\n\n\n146. **A key concern of the OECD BEPS plan is combating aggressive tax planning by**\n**multinational enterprises**, which take advantage of loopholes in the international tax regime to\nartificially shift their income to low-tax jurisdictions. Action 5 of the BEPS plan (OECD 2015c)\naddresses the concern for two particular situations that may be harmful:\n\n\n- Tax regimes that offer advantageous conditions for companies conducting high transnational\nmobility activities and that are an incentive for artificial profit shifting;\n\n\n- Special tax treaties granted through confidential tax rulings.\n\n\n147. **The purpose of Action 5 is to establish rules for eliminating abusive tax practices**\n**encouraged by unfair tax competition between countries, which ultimately ends up being**\n**negative for the set of countries.** **[87 ]** This does not mean eliminating preferential tax regimes, but\nrather creating conditions that will prevent them from being an incentive to engage in harmful\ntax practices. The two key concepts used to distinguish harmful regimes are: (i) substantial\nactivity, where the company benefiting from a preferential tax regime has a substantial economic\nactivity in the country granting preferential treatment; and (ii) transparency, where the\npreferential tax regimes granted to companies, even those contained in tax rulings, are known to\nother tax administrations.\n\n\n148. **Action 5 is subject to a review by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP).** This\npeer review examines whether current regimes comply with these two aspects of the minimum\nstandard, that is, that they are not harmful and that they are transparent, both in the design of\n\n\n87 Some analysts argue that tax competition between countries is healthy to a certain point and promotes\nefficiency with states providing their services. In other words, it would help keep the tax burden closer to optimal\nlevels because governments would have a natural tendency to tax and spend more; see, for example, P. Kehoe\n(1989).\n\n\n59", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 59, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "145. Adopting the OECD minimum standards involves implementing four specific\nactions from the BEPS package, which would require Guatemala to join the Inclusive\nFramework. These are as follows: Action 5, eliminating harmful special regimes and\ntransparency; Action 6, introducing anti-abuse measures in treaties; Action 13,\ncountry-by-country reporting on multinational enterprises; and Action 14, introducing the\nmutual agreement clause in TADTs and facilitating the procedure in practice. These measures\nentail changes to domestic legislation, especially treaties. Since Guatemala does not have treaties\nin force and is not the country of residence of the parent companies of large multinational\nenterprises for the purposes of Action 14, only Action 5 could have substantial consequences in\nthe short term if the OECD minimum standards were to be adopted. The minimum standards are\nanalyzed in the next section, with particular attention on Action 5 regarding special regimes and\ntransparency. The second section of this chapter briefly discusses the new agreed changes to the\ninternational tax architecture (known as Pillars 1 and 2).\n\nAction 5: Combating Harmful Tax Practices\n\n146. A key concern of the OECD BEPS plan is combating aggressive tax planning by\nmultinational enterprises, which take advantage of loopholes in the international tax regime to\nartificially shift their income to low-tax jurisdictions. Action 5 of the BEPS plan (OECD 2015c)\naddresses the concern for two particular situations that may be harmful:\n\n- Tax regimes that offer advantageous conditions for companies conducting high transnational\nmobility activities and that are an incentive for artificial profit shifting;\n\n- Special tax treaties granted through confidential tax rulings.\n\n147. The purpose of Action 5 is to establish rules for eliminating abusive tax practices\nencouraged by unfair tax competition between countries, which ultimately ends up being\nnegative for the set of countries. [87 ] This does not mean eliminating preferential tax regimes, but\nrather creating conditions that will prevent them from being an incentive to engage in harmful\ntax practices. The two key concepts used to distinguish harmful regimes are: (i) substantial\nactivity, where the company benefiting from a preferential tax regime has a substantial economic\nactivity in the country granting preferential treatment; and (ii) transparency, where the\npreferential tax regimes granted to companies, even those contained in tax rulings, are known to\nother tax administrations.\n\n148. Action 5 is subject to a review by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP). This\npeer review examines whether current regimes comply with these two aspects of the minimum\nstandard, that is, that they are not harmful and that they are transparent, both in the design of\n\n87 Some analysts argue that tax competition between countries is healthy to a certain point and promotes\nefficiency with states providing their services. In other words, it would help keep the tax burden closer to optimal\nlevels because governments would have a natural tendency to tax and spend more; see, for example, P. Kehoe\n(1989).\n\n59", "text_characters": 2675}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "the rules and in their practical application. [88] When the regime is not compliant, it is\ncalled “non-compliant” or “largely non-compliant.” In that case, the country must commit to\neliminating the regime or modifying it so that it stops being harmful (or ultimately expose itself\nto defensive measures taken by the community of countries). Although Guatemala is not a\nmember of the Inclusive Framework, it can also be subject to review by the FHTP if a member\ncountry reports that it is a “relevant” jurisdiction for the Forum’s work (OECD 2019, p. 11).\n\n\n149. **The Action 5 report establishes the criterion for determining cases in which a tax**\n**regime should be considered preferential and potentially harmful.** **[89]** Special tax regimes can\nbe harmful based on five key factors: [90]\n\n\n- Reduced or no effective tax on geographically mobile activities or services\n\n\n- Access to the regime only for residents abroad (ring-fencing)\n\n\n- Lack of transparency regarding regime conditions\n\n\n- Lack of an effective exchange of information in relation to the regime and its beneficiaries\n\n\n- The regime does not require substantial activity in the territory\n\n\n150. **The main concern under Action 5 is that these regimes can benefit “geographically**\n**mobile” activities, such as service or financial businesses.** In other words, the tax benefit is\navailable for activities that can be formally shifted from one territory to another at a low cost and\nthat do not need an extensive business structure to operate. The mere registration of the legal\nownership of an intangible asset would also qualify as such.\n\n\n151. **The risk is that an entity from a multinational group with little physical presence in**\n**a country will record disproportionate income there.** This would violate the basic principle of\nthe current international tax system where income is reported (and taxes are paid) in a manner\naligned with the business activities of those who generate that income. Therefore, to rule out the\nharmful effects of a regime, the “nexus” condition must be met, which requires substantial\neconomic activity in the territory in which the multinational enterprise reports its income, such\n\n\n88 The FHTP has reviewed close to 300 special regimes in more than 70 countries. A good number of them have\nbeen abolished or modified. OECD (2022).\n\n89 The criterion stems from the OECD (1988) _._\n\n90 Five other factors would also help determine whether a tax regime is harmful: (i) an artificial definition of the\ntax base; (ii) failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; (iii) foreign source income exempt from\nresidence country tax; (iv) negotiable tax rate or tax base; and (v) existence of secrecy provisions. The concept is\napplicable to a preferential regime for a group of taxpayers or to the general regime of a territory, where it\ncharges low or no tax and has any of the additional features.\n\n\n60", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 60, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "the rules and in their practical application. [88] When the regime is not compliant, it is\ncalled “non-compliant” or “largely non-compliant.” In that case, the country must commit to\neliminating the regime or modifying it so that it stops being harmful (or ultimately expose itself\nto defensive measures taken by the community of countries). Although Guatemala is not a\nmember of the Inclusive Framework, it can also be subject to review by the FHTP if a member\ncountry reports that it is a “relevant” jurisdiction for the Forum’s work (OECD 2019, p. 11).\n\n149. The Action 5 report establishes the criterion for determining cases in which a tax\nregime should be considered preferential and potentially harmful. [89] Special tax regimes can\nbe harmful based on five key factors: [90]\n\n- Reduced or no effective tax on geographically mobile activities or services\n\n- Access to the regime only for residents abroad (ring-fencing)\n\n- Lack of transparency regarding regime conditions\n\n- Lack of an effective exchange of information in relation to the regime and its beneficiaries\n\n- The regime does not require substantial activity in the territory\n\n150. The main concern under Action 5 is that these regimes can benefit “geographically\nmobile” activities, such as service or financial businesses. In other words, the tax benefit is\navailable for activities that can be formally shifted from one territory to another at a low cost and\nthat do not need an extensive business structure to operate. The mere registration of the legal\nownership of an intangible asset would also qualify as such.\n\n151. The risk is that an entity from a multinational group with little physical presence in\na country will record disproportionate income there. This would violate the basic principle of\nthe current international tax system where income is reported (and taxes are paid) in a manner\naligned with the business activities of those who generate that income. Therefore, to rule out the\nharmful effects of a regime, the “nexus” condition must be met, which requires substantial\neconomic activity in the territory in which the multinational enterprise reports its income, such\n\n88 The FHTP has reviewed close to 300 special regimes in more than 70 countries. A good number of them have\nbeen abolished or modified. OECD (2022).\n\n89 The criterion stems from the OECD (1988) _._\n\n90 Five other factors would also help determine whether a tax regime is harmful: (i) an artificial definition of the\ntax base; (ii) failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; (iii) foreign source income exempt from\nresidence country tax; (iv) negotiable tax rate or tax base; and (v) existence of secrecy provisions. The concept is\napplicable to a preferential regime for a group of taxpayers or to the general regime of a territory, where it\ncharges low or no tax and has any of the additional features.\n\n60", "text_characters": 2403}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "that the tax bases cannot be artificially shifted from countries where the value is created to other\ncountries with lower tax pressure. [91]\n\n\n152. **The tax benefits for manufacturing activities would normally not be referred to as**\n**harmful.** These activities involve moving fixed assets and production capacity from one country\nto another, meaning that they would not normally qualify as geographically mobile activities.\nThese activities would by definition meet the condition of substantial activity. In sum, the OECD\ndoes not intend for countries to abandon their preferential regimes, but rather to apply them\nonly when entities conduct a substantial economic activity in the territory in question that\njustifies the income they report there.\n\n\n**Box 2. Preferential Regimes That Could Be Harmful**\n\n- _Headquarters regimes_ . The main activity is the managerial control or coordination of a group of resident\nenterprises in different countries. The substance test must indicate key actions in the generation of income and in\ndecision-making on the management of expenses and investments on behalf of the rest of the group’s entities.\nThis is a particularly complex test to oversee.\n\n\n- _Distribution regimes_ for group enterprises. The activity could also be the centralized distribution of finished\nproducts to end customers.\n\n\n- _Service center regimes_ for other group enterprises or the provision of support and administrative services. The\nsubstance test in these cases must consider the existence of product transportation and storage activities and the\nmanagement of stocks and orders.\n\n\n- _Financing or leasing regimes_ . The substantial activity must demonstrate that the following are carried out in the\nterritory: the negotiation of financing terms, the identification and acquisition of assets to be financed, the\ndetermination of financing terms, agreement monitoring and review, and risk management.\n\n\n153. **Another concern under BEPS Action 5 is that countries grant tax benefits to**\n**taxpayers individually in a confidential manner.** This usually occurs through the issuance of a\ntax ruling that has the force of law, despite being applicable only to the benefited taxpayer (or\ngroup of taxpayers). The lack of transparency in granting such benefits is considered to be a\nharmful tax practice that will have to be eliminated in accordance with the minimum standard\nestablished by the BEPS Action. This would be eliminated through the spontaneous exchange of\ninformation on relevant tax rulings. These rulings include the following:\n\n\n- Advance pricing arrangements (APAs), which establish what criteria should be applied to the\narm’s length principle to valuate related transactions that a taxpayer performs during a\nperiod of time.\n\n\n91 One type of harmful preferential regime to which the BEPS report draws special attention is related to\nintellectual property (such as patents or software; brands, however, cannot benefit from such preferential\nregimes). This regime imposes a low tax rate on income generated from the use of an intangible asset registered\nin the jurisdiction in which the owner resides, without that asset having been developed in the territory. To verify\nthe nexus in this case, the taxpayer’s expenses for the development and administration of these intellectual\nproperty assets must be identified. In the absence of significant expenses, the registration is opportunistic for the\nsole purpose of taking advantage of the tax benefit (called “patent boxes”).\n\n\n61", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 61, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "that the tax bases cannot be artificially shifted from countries where the value is created to other\ncountries with lower tax pressure. [91]\n\n152. The tax benefits for manufacturing activities would normally not be referred to as\nharmful. These activities involve moving fixed assets and production capacity from one country\nto another, meaning that they would not normally qualify as geographically mobile activities.\nThese activities would by definition meet the condition of substantial activity. In sum, the OECD\ndoes not intend for countries to abandon their preferential regimes, but rather to apply them\nonly when entities conduct a substantial economic activity in the territory in question that\njustifies the income they report there.\n\nBox 2. Preferential Regimes That Could Be Harmful\n\n- _Headquarters regimes_ . The main activity is the managerial control or coordination of a group of resident\nenterprises in different countries. The substance test must indicate key actions in the generation of income and in\ndecision-making on the management of expenses and investments on behalf of the rest of the group’s entities.\nThis is a particularly complex test to oversee.\n\n- _Distribution regimes_ for group enterprises. The activity could also be the centralized distribution of finished\nproducts to end customers.\n\n- _Service center regimes_ for other group enterprises or the provision of support and administrative services. The\nsubstance test in these cases must consider the existence of product transportation and storage activities and the\nmanagement of stocks and orders.\n\n- _Financing or leasing regimes_ . The substantial activity must demonstrate that the following are carried out in the\nterritory: the negotiation of financing terms, the identification and acquisition of assets to be financed, the\ndetermination of financing terms, agreement monitoring and review, and risk management.\n\n153. Another concern under BEPS Action 5 is that countries grant tax benefits to\ntaxpayers individually in a confidential manner. This usually occurs through the issuance of a\ntax ruling that has the force of law, despite being applicable only to the benefited taxpayer (or\ngroup of taxpayers). The lack of transparency in granting such benefits is considered to be a\nharmful tax practice that will have to be eliminated in accordance with the minimum standard\nestablished by the BEPS Action. This would be eliminated through the spontaneous exchange of\ninformation on relevant tax rulings. These rulings include the following:\n\n- Advance pricing arrangements (APAs), which establish what criteria should be applied to the\narm’s length principle to valuate related transactions that a taxpayer performs during a\nperiod of time.\n\n91 One type of harmful preferential regime to which the BEPS report draws special attention is related to\nintellectual property (such as patents or software; brands, however, cannot benefit from such preferential\nregimes). This regime imposes a low tax rate on income generated from the use of an intangible asset registered\nin the jurisdiction in which the owner resides, without that asset having been developed in the territory. To verify\nthe nexus in this case, the taxpayer’s expenses for the development and administration of these intellectual\nproperty assets must be identified. In the absence of significant expenses, the registration is opportunistic for the\nsole purpose of taking advantage of the tax benefit (called “patent boxes”).\n\n61", "text_characters": 2945}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- Rulings on permanent establishments, that is, if the activities of a non-resident in the country\nmeet (or do not meet) the assumptions for consideration as a permanent establishment.\n\n\n154. **As explained in Chapter II, Guatemala has various significant preferential regimes.**\nThese include the free-trade zone, free zone, and maquiladora regimes. All grant a full ISR\nexemption for 10 years, among other tax benefits. [92] Most of the beneficiaries are commercial\ncompanies or manufacturers operating with employees, assets, and inventories, thus fulfilling the\ncondition of substantial activity and the nexus principle. However, the regulation enables the\nbenefits to cover a wide range of services, [93] which are not always strictly defined, and the control\nand monitoring mechanisms deployed by the authorities, although improved, are still deficient.\nThis can be problematic.\n\n\n155. **Guatemala’s SAT is empowered to issue both types of rulings that, under Action 5,**\n**should be subject to exchange with other administrations.** In both cases, these rulings are\nconfidential and binding on the authority, which the SAT should make known through the\nspontaneous exchange of information with the authorities in the place of residence of the related\nparties with which the taxpaying entity in Guatemala transacts. [94] If it fails to meet this standard\nset forth in Action 5, Guatemala could be subject to defensive measures taken by the community\nof countries (OECD 2015c). One way of meeting it, however, is to make the rulings public.\n\n\n**BEPS Minimum Standards and Treaties (Actions 6 and 14)** **[95]**\n\n\n**Prevention of Treaty Abuse (Action 6)**\n\n\n156. **BEPS Action 6 is designed to prevent certain types of abuse of TADTs** (OECD 2015d).\nThe benefits granted by a bilateral treaty can be (unduly) extended to residents of third countries\nthrough investments that they make in one of the contracting countries. Such investments are\ntypically located in low-tax countries, especially as concerns withholdings on payments abroad,\nfor the express purpose of brokering flows to the ultimate beneficiary, an entity or person\nresiding in another country without a treaty.\n\n\n157. **A large number of countries traditionally protected their network of treaties with**\n**anti-abuse clauses.** They did not always do this, however, and many others, especially\ndeveloping countries, did not take the precaution of doing so to ensure that the ultimate\nbeneficiary of the payment that originated from and was sourced in one of the contracting\n\n\n92 Decree 22 – 73 (ZOLIC), Art. 32; Decree 29 – 89 (Maquila), Art. 12bis(d); Decree 65 – 89, Art. 22(b). Companies\nare suspected of renewing the exemption by changing their business name when the first exemption period\nexpires.\n\n93 Only the free-trade zone decree prohibits financial services; Decree 65 – 89, Art. 41(aa); see footnote 11.\n\n94 In 2015, Action 5 made it a requirement to exchange rulings issued from 2010 onwards that were in force in\n2014. Something similar can be expected if the rule were to be applied to Guatemala, that is, having to share\nrulings in force that were issued up to five years before the country agreed to apply the measure.\n\n95 This topic was already discussed to some extent in Chapter IV on treaties. However, this chapter is presented\nsuch that it can be read in isolation from the rest of the report.\n\n\n62", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 62, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "- Rulings on permanent establishments, that is, if the activities of a non-resident in the country\nmeet (or do not meet) the assumptions for consideration as a permanent establishment.\n\n154. As explained in Chapter II, Guatemala has various significant preferential regimes.\nThese include the free-trade zone, free zone, and maquiladora regimes. All grant a full ISR\nexemption for 10 years, among other tax benefits. [92] Most of the beneficiaries are commercial\ncompanies or manufacturers operating with employees, assets, and inventories, thus fulfilling the\ncondition of substantial activity and the nexus principle. However, the regulation enables the\nbenefits to cover a wide range of services, [93] which are not always strictly defined, and the control\nand monitoring mechanisms deployed by the authorities, although improved, are still deficient.\nThis can be problematic.\n\n155. Guatemala’s SAT is empowered to issue both types of rulings that, under Action 5,\nshould be subject to exchange with other administrations. In both cases, these rulings are\nconfidential and binding on the authority, which the SAT should make known through the\nspontaneous exchange of information with the authorities in the place of residence of the related\nparties with which the taxpaying entity in Guatemala transacts. [94] If it fails to meet this standard\nset forth in Action 5, Guatemala could be subject to defensive measures taken by the community\nof countries (OECD 2015c). One way of meeting it, however, is to make the rulings public.\n\nBEPS Minimum Standards and Treaties (Actions 6 and 14) [95]\n\nPrevention of Treaty Abuse (Action 6)\n\n156. BEPS Action 6 is designed to prevent certain types of abuse of TADTs (OECD 2015d).\nThe benefits granted by a bilateral treaty can be (unduly) extended to residents of third countries\nthrough investments that they make in one of the contracting countries. Such investments are\ntypically located in low-tax countries, especially as concerns withholdings on payments abroad,\nfor the express purpose of brokering flows to the ultimate beneficiary, an entity or person\nresiding in another country without a treaty.\n\n157. A large number of countries traditionally protected their network of treaties with\nanti-abuse clauses. They did not always do this, however, and many others, especially\ndeveloping countries, did not take the precaution of doing so to ensure that the ultimate\nbeneficiary of the payment that originated from and was sourced in one of the contracting\n\n92 Decree 22 – 73 (ZOLIC), Art. 32; Decree 29 – 89 (Maquila), Art. 12bis(d); Decree 65 – 89, Art. 22(b). Companies\nare suspected of renewing the exemption by changing their business name when the first exemption period\nexpires.\n\n93 Only the free-trade zone decree prohibits financial services; Decree 65 – 89, Art. 41(aa); see footnote 11.\n\n94 In 2015, Action 5 made it a requirement to exchange rulings issued from 2010 onwards that were in force in\n2014. Something similar can be expected if the rule were to be applied to Guatemala, that is, having to share\nrulings in force that were issued up to five years before the country agreed to apply the measure.\n\n95 This topic was already discussed to some extent in Chapter IV on treaties. However, this chapter is presented\nsuch that it can be read in isolation from the rest of the report.\n\n62", "text_characters": 2799}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "countries was actually a resident of the other contracting country. The BEPS minimum standard\nallows the gap in existing treaties to be filled. The origin of FDI is an indicator of intermediation\nand a sign of caution. In a low-tax territory with large FDI inflows and outflows representing a\nvery high proportion of domestic GDP (e.g., Cyprus, Luxembourg, Holland, or Switzerland), the\nrisk is that the investment may actually originate from another country and the treaty is being\nmisused. [96]\n\n\n_**The Minimum Standard**_\n\n\n158. **The BEPS report recommends that countries use a three-pronged strategy to**\n**combat treaty abuse.** This recommendation draws on the countries’ best practices and includes:\n\n\n- The inclusion of text in the preamble of treaties stating that the intention of the contracting\ncountries is to prevent tax avoidance or evasion opportunities;\n\n\n- The use of the limitation on benefits (LOB) test to ensure that treaty privileges are limited\nonly to residents of the contracting countries that meet certain requirements; and\n\n\n- The use of the principal purpose test (PPT), which denies treaty benefits if one of the\nprincipal purposes of the investor’s trade arrangement is to obtain the said benefits (OECD\n2015d, p. 18, para. 19).\n\n\n159. **The PPT and LOB methods have their strengths and weaknesses.** The main advantage\nof the LOB is that it provides greater certainty and is easier to administer. This method entails a\nspecific criterion for determining whether the taxpayer qualifies for treaty benefits, such as the\ntaxpayer’s legal nature and the activities the taxpayer carries out in the other contracting State.\nThe weakness of this approach is that it does not anticipate all types of treaty abuse schemes.\nThe PPT, meanwhile, examines the purpose of a business arrangement, whose interpretation is\nlargely discretionary. This means that there is greater flexibility, but also the risk of\ninconsistencies in the analysis of various countries. By the same token, a transnational trade\narrangement could pass one test and fail the other (Herzfeld 2016).\n\n\n160. **The LOB has various advantages over the PPT in terms of simplicity and**\n**administration.** The burden of proof rests with the authority in the case of the PPT. With the\nLOB, the tax authority only needs information from the payor of the dividends, interest, or\nroyalties to determine whether the non-resident qualifies as a treaty beneficiary. The authority\nshould then be able to confirm the information directly with the competent authority of the\nother country. The LOB is generally more appropriate for developing countries with few\nadministrative resources.\n\n\n96 Treaty abuse can include round-tripping, when the country’s residents register a business abroad to make\ninvestments from there in their own country and thus obtain the treaty benefits as if though they were residents\nof the other contracting State; see Balabushko et al. (2019).\n\n\n63", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 63, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "countries was actually a resident of the other contracting country. The BEPS minimum standard\nallows the gap in existing treaties to be filled. The origin of FDI is an indicator of intermediation\nand a sign of caution. In a low-tax territory with large FDI inflows and outflows representing a\nvery high proportion of domestic GDP (e.g., Cyprus, Luxembourg, Holland, or Switzerland), the\nrisk is that the investment may actually originate from another country and the treaty is being\nmisused. [96]\n\n_The Minimum Standard_\n\n158. The BEPS report recommends that countries use a three-pronged strategy to\ncombat treaty abuse. This recommendation draws on the countries’ best practices and includes:\n\n- The inclusion of text in the preamble of treaties stating that the intention of the contracting\ncountries is to prevent tax avoidance or evasion opportunities;\n\n- The use of the limitation on benefits (LOB) test to ensure that treaty privileges are limited\nonly to residents of the contracting countries that meet certain requirements; and\n\n- The use of the principal purpose test (PPT), which denies treaty benefits if one of the\nprincipal purposes of the investor’s trade arrangement is to obtain the said benefits (OECD\n2015d, p. 18, para. 19).\n\n159. The PPT and LOB methods have their strengths and weaknesses. The main advantage\nof the LOB is that it provides greater certainty and is easier to administer. This method entails a\nspecific criterion for determining whether the taxpayer qualifies for treaty benefits, such as the\ntaxpayer’s legal nature and the activities the taxpayer carries out in the other contracting State.\nThe weakness of this approach is that it does not anticipate all types of treaty abuse schemes.\nThe PPT, meanwhile, examines the purpose of a business arrangement, whose interpretation is\nlargely discretionary. This means that there is greater flexibility, but also the risk of\ninconsistencies in the analysis of various countries. By the same token, a transnational trade\narrangement could pass one test and fail the other (Herzfeld 2016).\n\n160. The LOB has various advantages over the PPT in terms of simplicity and\nadministration. The burden of proof rests with the authority in the case of the PPT. With the\nLOB, the tax authority only needs information from the payor of the dividends, interest, or\nroyalties to determine whether the non-resident qualifies as a treaty beneficiary. The authority\nshould then be able to confirm the information directly with the competent authority of the\nother country. The LOB is generally more appropriate for developing countries with few\nadministrative resources.\n\n96 Treaty abuse can include round-tripping, when the country’s residents register a business abroad to make\ninvestments from there in their own country and thus obtain the treaty benefits as if though they were residents\nof the other contracting State; see Balabushko et al. (2019).\n\n63", "text_characters": 2452}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Better Dispute Resolution Effectiveness (Action 14)**\n\n\n_**Mutual Agreement Procedure**_\n\n\n161. **Treaties normally contain a clause on the mutual agreement procedure to resolve**\n**differences in the interpretation of the treaty.** The problem that arises in these procedures is\nthat, in practice, it takes a long time to resolve them. The BEPS project planned to solve the\nuncertainty that these lengthy procedures cause. The measures recommended in the BEPS report\npromote expeditious resolutions so that the procedure is effective (OECD 2015g).\n\n\n162. **The minimum standard requires countries to include Article 25(1)–(3) of the**\n**OECD Model in their treaties.** This article offers a mechanism for the competent authorities of\nthe contracting countries to resolve differences in the interpretation or application of the same\ntreaty. The main objective of the procedure is to ensure that taxpayers entitled to treaty benefits\nare not taxed under terms that differ from those set forth in the treaty. This minimum standard is\nreviewed by panels comprising representatives of authorities from other countries that are\nmembers of the Inclusive Framework (peer reviews). [97]\n\n\n_**Arbitration**_\n\n\n163. **Action 14 also proposes compulsory arbitration as an option for expeditious**\n\n**dispute resolution.** However, there is no consensus among OECD and G20 countries as to the\n\nuse of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism between contracting states as concerns\n\ndouble taxation. [98] Although arbitration may be very beneficial for countries in which proceedings\n\nhave remained unresolved for a long time, other countries have had some success in resolving\n\nthem relatively quickly. For a country without experience, such as Guatemala, arguments can be\n\nmade for either. For now, there are no problems to resolve, but once the first challenging cases\n\narise, the country’s lack of experience can weigh against it and investors will demand arbitration.\n\n\n164. **Some analysts have reservations about the use of compulsory arbitration because it**\n\n**can be a limitation on the scope of national sovereignty.** **[99]** Arbitral rulings are also\n\nconfidential and do not set a legal precedent, which is why they do not necessarily provide legal\n\ncertainty to the resolution system. One option is to allow SAT staff to gain experience and take\n\ntraining first by negotiating mutual agreements with counterparties and to defer the adoption of\n\nan arbitration clause until future treaties. This minimum standard would require the SAT unit in\n\ncharge of international taxation to be strengthened.\n\n\n97 Examples of aspects measured during the reviews include the number of MAPs submitted, resolved, rejected,\nand pending resolution as well as the required resolution time. Country reports resulting from these reviews are\npublished by the OECD.\n\n98 Tax Certainty, IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers, March 2017, p. 57.\n\n99 BEPS Monitoring Group, Explanation and Analysis of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty.\n\n\n64", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 64, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Better Dispute Resolution Effectiveness (Action 14)\n\n_Mutual Agreement Procedure_\n\n161. Treaties normally contain a clause on the mutual agreement procedure to resolve\ndifferences in the interpretation of the treaty. The problem that arises in these procedures is\nthat, in practice, it takes a long time to resolve them. The BEPS project planned to solve the\nuncertainty that these lengthy procedures cause. The measures recommended in the BEPS report\npromote expeditious resolutions so that the procedure is effective (OECD 2015g).\n\n162. The minimum standard requires countries to include Article 25(1)–(3) of the\nOECD Model in their treaties. This article offers a mechanism for the competent authorities of\nthe contracting countries to resolve differences in the interpretation or application of the same\ntreaty. The main objective of the procedure is to ensure that taxpayers entitled to treaty benefits\nare not taxed under terms that differ from those set forth in the treaty. This minimum standard is\nreviewed by panels comprising representatives of authorities from other countries that are\nmembers of the Inclusive Framework (peer reviews). [97]\n\n_Arbitration_\n\n163. Action 14 also proposes compulsory arbitration as an option for expeditious\n\ndispute resolution. However, there is no consensus among OECD and G20 countries as to the\n\nuse of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism between contracting states as concerns\n\ndouble taxation. [98] Although arbitration may be very beneficial for countries in which proceedings\n\nhave remained unresolved for a long time, other countries have had some success in resolving\n\nthem relatively quickly. For a country without experience, such as Guatemala, arguments can be\n\nmade for either. For now, there are no problems to resolve, but once the first challenging cases\n\narise, the country’s lack of experience can weigh against it and investors will demand arbitration.\n\n164. Some analysts have reservations about the use of compulsory arbitration because it\n\ncan be a limitation on the scope of national sovereignty. [99] Arbitral rulings are also\n\nconfidential and do not set a legal precedent, which is why they do not necessarily provide legal\n\ncertainty to the resolution system. One option is to allow SAT staff to gain experience and take\n\ntraining first by negotiating mutual agreements with counterparties and to defer the adoption of\n\nan arbitration clause until future treaties. This minimum standard would require the SAT unit in\n\ncharge of international taxation to be strengthened.\n\n97 Examples of aspects measured during the reviews include the number of MAPs submitted, resolved, rejected,\nand pending resolution as well as the required resolution time. Country reports resulting from these reviews are\npublished by the OECD.\n\n98 Tax Certainty, IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers, March 2017, p. 57.\n\n99 BEPS Monitoring Group, Explanation and Analysis of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty.\n\n64", "text_characters": 2517}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Transfer Pricing Documentation: Country-by-Country Reporting**\n**(Action 13)**\n\n\n**Who and What**\n\n\n165. **The new documentation requirements for multinational enterprises to report some**\n**of their accounting figures country by country are instrumental in the BEPS project** (OECD\n2015f). By participating in the project, Guatemala would receive worldwide information from\nmultinationals operating in the country with global sales of more than EUR 750 million annually,\nwhich would have to collect and exchange similar information from multinationals whose parent\ncompany resides in the country (probably none that meet the threshold). The information\nexchanged would be in country-by-country (CbC) format and would include details such as\nincome, earnings before taxes, income tax payable and paid, number of employees, declared\ncapital, retained earnings, and tangible assets.\n\n\n166. **The model legislation drafted to this end requires the parent company of the**\n**multinational enterprise to provide CbC information in the jurisdiction in which it resides.**\nCountries participating in this arrangement have developed a package of measures to\n\nautomatically exchange information from CbC reports. [100] Their implementation entails meeting\nconfidentiality requirements. [101]\n\n\n**Surrogate Parent Company**\n\n\n167. **Under the rules, the parent company of the multinational enterprise can designate**\n**another group entity, which is a resident in another country, as that which is responsible**\n**for submitting CbC documentation on behalf of the global company.** **[102]** This option prevents\nthe multinational enterprise from having to provide information in multiple countries if the\nparent company resides in a country that does not require this documentation. The “surrogate\nparent entity” is a group entity appointed by the parent company as the sole surrogate for\nCbC reporting purposes.\n\n\n**Implementation and Monitoring**\n\n\n168. **Countries must legislate to require their taxpayers to provide the authority with a**\n**CbC report if they are the parent company of a global operation with sales greater than**\n**the established threshold.** This must be legislated even when there are no taxpayers in the\njurisdiction that meet that condition. Moreover, countries must sign the Multilateral Competent\nAuthority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports requiring them to\n\n\n100 Ibid., p. 23.\n\n101 Ibid, p. 23, para. 60. Guatemala will have to undergo a review by the OECD to ensure that the reporting\nsystems used by the tax authority meet the confidentiality requirements.\n\n102 Ibid., p. 39.\n\n\n65", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0003, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 65, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Transfer Pricing Documentation: Country-by-Country Reporting\n(Action 13)\n\nWho and What\n\n165. The new documentation requirements for multinational enterprises to report some\nof their accounting figures country by country are instrumental in the BEPS project (OECD\n2015f). By participating in the project, Guatemala would receive worldwide information from\nmultinationals operating in the country with global sales of more than EUR 750 million annually,\nwhich would have to collect and exchange similar information from multinationals whose parent\ncompany resides in the country (probably none that meet the threshold). The information\nexchanged would be in country-by-country (CbC) format and would include details such as\nincome, earnings before taxes, income tax payable and paid, number of employees, declared\ncapital, retained earnings, and tangible assets.\n\n166. The model legislation drafted to this end requires the parent company of the\nmultinational enterprise to provide CbC information in the jurisdiction in which it resides.\nCountries participating in this arrangement have developed a package of measures to\n\nautomatically exchange information from CbC reports. [100] Their implementation entails meeting\nconfidentiality requirements. [101]\n\nSurrogate Parent Company\n\n167. Under the rules, the parent company of the multinational enterprise can designate\nanother group entity, which is a resident in another country, as that which is responsible\nfor submitting CbC documentation on behalf of the global company. [102] This option prevents\nthe multinational enterprise from having to provide information in multiple countries if the\nparent company resides in a country that does not require this documentation. The “surrogate\nparent entity” is a group entity appointed by the parent company as the sole surrogate for\nCbC reporting purposes.\n\nImplementation and Monitoring\n\n168. Countries must legislate to require their taxpayers to provide the authority with a\nCbC report if they are the parent company of a global operation with sales greater than\nthe established threshold. This must be legislated even when there are no taxpayers in the\njurisdiction that meet that condition. Moreover, countries must sign the Multilateral Competent\nAuthority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports requiring them to\n\n100 Ibid., p. 23.\n\n101 Ibid, p. 23, para. 60. Guatemala will have to undergo a review by the OECD to ensure that the reporting\nsystems used by the tax authority meet the confidentiality requirements.\n\n102 Ibid., p. 39.\n\n65", "text_characters": 2170}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "exchange the information obtained with other tax authorities. Inclusive Framework countries are\nsubject to an annual peer review to verify the correct implementation of the standard. The review\ncovers three main areas: regulations and administrative systems through which CbC obligations\nare put into practice, the mechanics of exchanging CbC reports, and report confidentiality and\nappropriate use.\n\n\n**New Changes to the International Tax System**\n\n\n169. **The Inclusive Framework coordinated by the OECD has identified serious challenges**\n**due to the digitalization of the global economy past the BEPS project.** To overcome those\nchallenges, this community of countries has agreed to introduce new international taxation rules\nbased on two fundamental pillars, namely Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. A timeline has also been\nestablished for adopting this strategy between 2023 and 2024.\n\n\n170. **The international tax system reform contained in Pillar 1 would redistribute a**\n**portion of the tax base for income earned by multinational enterprises.** In general, this pillar\nwill expand taxing rights to jurisdictions with a market presence, even if dealt with remotely,\ninstead of attributing that right solely to jurisdictions of residence or source according to\ntraditional international tax principles. Although the initial concern of Pillar 1 were automated\ndigital services and remote consumer-oriented businesses, the scope of the new system has\nbeen expanded to include most businesses, excluding some financial institutions and extractive\ncompanies. The new regime will apply to companies of a certain global size.\n\n\n171. **Pillar 2 is focused more directly on tax competition in the broader sense, putting a**\n**floor on the IRS rate that countries could allow their taxpayers.** Irrespective of the challenges\nand pressures caused by many factors leading to the erosion of the tax base and profit shifting,\nPillar 2 would ensure that multinational enterprises with income above EUR 750 million pay at\nleast a minimum level of tax, most importantly, in each of the countries in which they operate,\neven when the domestic regime does not impose them.\n\n\n**Pillar 1**\n\n\n172. **The objective of Pillar 1 is to assign some of the income earned by large**\n**multinational enterprises to jurisdictions where they have a significant market presence.**\nThe target are multinational enterprises with global turnover greater than EUR 20 billion annually\nand profitability above 10 percent. The agreement is for the first threshold to be reduced to\nEUR 10 billion eight years after the entry into force of the regime. For now, in its initial phase,\nPillar 1 is estimated to affect around 100 international companies, [103] a large number of them in\nthe high-tech sector. The reallocation of the ISR base is also projected to benefit mainly\nhigh-income countries where the largest markets are located. In any case, developing countries\n\n\n103 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Addressing the tax challenges arising from the\ndigitalisation of the economy, July 2021; p. 14; in [Highlights brochure: Addressing the tax challenges arising from](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-addressing-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf)\n[the digitalisation of the economy, July 2021 (oecd.org).](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-addressing-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf)\n\n\n66", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0002, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 66, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "exchange the information obtained with other tax authorities. Inclusive Framework countries are\nsubject to an annual peer review to verify the correct implementation of the standard. The review\ncovers three main areas: regulations and administrative systems through which CbC obligations\nare put into practice, the mechanics of exchanging CbC reports, and report confidentiality and\nappropriate use.\n\nNew Changes to the International Tax System\n\n169. The Inclusive Framework coordinated by the OECD has identified serious challenges\ndue to the digitalization of the global economy past the BEPS project. To overcome those\nchallenges, this community of countries has agreed to introduce new international taxation rules\nbased on two fundamental pillars, namely Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. A timeline has also been\nestablished for adopting this strategy between 2023 and 2024.\n\n170. The international tax system reform contained in Pillar 1 would redistribute a\nportion of the tax base for income earned by multinational enterprises. In general, this pillar\nwill expand taxing rights to jurisdictions with a market presence, even if dealt with remotely,\ninstead of attributing that right solely to jurisdictions of residence or source according to\ntraditional international tax principles. Although the initial concern of Pillar 1 were automated\ndigital services and remote consumer-oriented businesses, the scope of the new system has\nbeen expanded to include most businesses, excluding some financial institutions and extractive\ncompanies. The new regime will apply to companies of a certain global size.\n\n171. Pillar 2 is focused more directly on tax competition in the broader sense, putting a\nfloor on the IRS rate that countries could allow their taxpayers. Irrespective of the challenges\nand pressures caused by many factors leading to the erosion of the tax base and profit shifting,\nPillar 2 would ensure that multinational enterprises with income above EUR 750 million pay at\nleast a minimum level of tax, most importantly, in each of the countries in which they operate,\neven when the domestic regime does not impose them.\n\nPillar 1\n\n172. The objective of Pillar 1 is to assign some of the income earned by large\nmultinational enterprises to jurisdictions where they have a significant market presence.\nThe target are multinational enterprises with global turnover greater than EUR 20 billion annually\nand profitability above 10 percent. The agreement is for the first threshold to be reduced to\nEUR 10 billion eight years after the entry into force of the regime. For now, in its initial phase,\nPillar 1 is estimated to affect around 100 international companies, [103] a large number of them in\nthe high-tech sector. The reallocation of the ISR base is also projected to benefit mainly\nhigh-income countries where the largest markets are located. In any case, developing countries\n\n103 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Addressing the tax challenges arising from the\ndigitalisation of the economy, July 2021; p. 14; in Highlights brochure: Addressing the tax challenges arising from\nthe digitalisation of the economy, July 2021 (oecd.org).\n\n66", "text_characters": 2669}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "could see their tax base expanded insofar as they are also the final destination market for remote\ndigital services, which are not currently subject to ISR.\n\n\n173. **Pillar 1 establishes three types of income (amounts) that can be reallocated for**\n**taxation in market jurisdictions:**\n\n\n- _**Amount A**_ **:** This is the amount of operating profit that would be allocated to market\njurisdictions, even if the multinational enterprise has no physical presence. This exercise\ntherefore introduces a new assumption on granting a country taxing power that differs from\nthe traditional concepts of residence and source. A jurisdiction is eligible (qualified) to receive\nan allocation of Amount A if the multinational enterprise earns income there above\nUS$1 million. This threshold is reduced to EUR 250,000 for jurisdictions whose GDP is below\nEUR 40 billion. Amount A subject to redistribution between all group entities (and countries\nin which it operates) will be 25 percent of the multinational enterprise’s global “residual”\nprofits, that is, profits exceeding 10 percent of income. Amount A allocated to each country\nwill be determined in accordance with a formula (still under discussion) likely based largely\non the value of sales in each jurisdiction.\n\n\n- _**Amount B**_ **:** This is remuneration to the qualified market jurisdiction for marketing and\ndistribution by multinational enterprises in that jurisdiction. In some cases, Amount B would\nprovide remuneration to distributors (subsidiaries or permanent establishments) when\ndealers purchase merchandise from related parties for resale. How Amount A and B\nallocations will interact has not been finalized yet. This allocation (as well as from Amount C)\nwill follow current transfer pricing rules under the traditional principles of source according\nto physical presence.\n\n\n- _**Amount C**_ **:** Discussions to define Pillar 1 acknowledged the possibility of windfall profits\n(those additional to routine profits) for marketing and distribution activities carried out in a\nqualified market jurisdiction. These additional profits are identified as amounts that would\narise in the context of dispute resolution between the jurisdiction of residence of a\nmultinational enterprise and a qualified market jurisdiction.\n\n\n174. **The implementation of Pillar 1 will require changes to domestic legislation and**\n**international treaties.** A multilateral agreement (MLA) is proposed for such changes to\nsimultaneously implement Amount A in treaties and avoid countless bilateral negotiations. This\ninvolves introducing new rules for the identification of qualified market jurisdictions, eliminating\ndouble taxation with respect to Amount A, and facilitating the exchange of information, thus\ncoordinating the resolution of disputes related to Pillar 1. The MLA would require signatory\njurisdictions to eliminate all income taxes (on gross income or equivalent) on digital services and\nsimilar unilateral measures (which is not the case for Guatemala). Failing this (and if no\ncommitment is made to adopt this type of tax in the future), the multinational enterprises would\nbe outside the scope of Amount A in the country in question.\n\n\n67", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 67, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "could see their tax base expanded insofar as they are also the final destination market for remote\ndigital services, which are not currently subject to ISR.\n\n173. Pillar 1 establishes three types of income (amounts) that can be reallocated for\ntaxation in market jurisdictions:\n\n- _Amount A_ : This is the amount of operating profit that would be allocated to market\njurisdictions, even if the multinational enterprise has no physical presence. This exercise\ntherefore introduces a new assumption on granting a country taxing power that differs from\nthe traditional concepts of residence and source. A jurisdiction is eligible (qualified) to receive\nan allocation of Amount A if the multinational enterprise earns income there above\nUS$1 million. This threshold is reduced to EUR 250,000 for jurisdictions whose GDP is below\nEUR 40 billion. Amount A subject to redistribution between all group entities (and countries\nin which it operates) will be 25 percent of the multinational enterprise’s global “residual”\nprofits, that is, profits exceeding 10 percent of income. Amount A allocated to each country\nwill be determined in accordance with a formula (still under discussion) likely based largely\non the value of sales in each jurisdiction.\n\n- _Amount B_ : This is remuneration to the qualified market jurisdiction for marketing and\ndistribution by multinational enterprises in that jurisdiction. In some cases, Amount B would\nprovide remuneration to distributors (subsidiaries or permanent establishments) when\ndealers purchase merchandise from related parties for resale. How Amount A and B\nallocations will interact has not been finalized yet. This allocation (as well as from Amount C)\nwill follow current transfer pricing rules under the traditional principles of source according\nto physical presence.\n\n- _Amount C_ : Discussions to define Pillar 1 acknowledged the possibility of windfall profits\n(those additional to routine profits) for marketing and distribution activities carried out in a\nqualified market jurisdiction. These additional profits are identified as amounts that would\narise in the context of dispute resolution between the jurisdiction of residence of a\nmultinational enterprise and a qualified market jurisdiction.\n\n174. The implementation of Pillar 1 will require changes to domestic legislation and\ninternational treaties. A multilateral agreement (MLA) is proposed for such changes to\nsimultaneously implement Amount A in treaties and avoid countless bilateral negotiations. This\ninvolves introducing new rules for the identification of qualified market jurisdictions, eliminating\ndouble taxation with respect to Amount A, and facilitating the exchange of information, thus\ncoordinating the resolution of disputes related to Pillar 1. The MLA would require signatory\njurisdictions to eliminate all income taxes (on gross income or equivalent) on digital services and\nsimilar unilateral measures (which is not the case for Guatemala). Failing this (and if no\ncommitment is made to adopt this type of tax in the future), the multinational enterprises would\nbe outside the scope of Amount A in the country in question.\n\n67", "text_characters": 2671}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Pillar 2**\n\n\n175. **Generally speaking, Pillar 2 establishes a global minimum tax threshold of**\n**15 percent, applicable to multinational enterprises with consolidated income above**\n**EUR 750 million** (according to consolidated financial statements). The global minimum tax rules\n(Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal – GLoBE) would also provide a _de minimis_ exclusion in\njurisdictions where the multinational enterprise has income of less than EUR 10 million and\nprofits of less than a million.\n\n\n176. **The new global minimum tax standard would be implemented under three types of**\n**rules. The following list shows the order in which they would apply:**\n\n\n_(i) Subject to tax rule (STTR):_ would allow developing countries (World Bank definition) to\neliminate benefits granted under a treaty (reduction of withholding rates) to non-residents if they\ntax income paid to their residents at a rate below 9 percent.\n\n\n_(ii)_ _Income inclusion rule (IIR):_ allows the jurisdiction of residence of the parent entity of the\nmultinational enterprise to impose an additional tax on the income of a constituent entity\n(subsidiary or permanent establishment) when they are subject to an effective ISR rate below\n15 percent in the country in which they operate. This additional tax applies in the fiscal year in\nwhich the profit is generated, regardless of when it is repatriated to the parent company.\nMoreover, the tax would follow the individual country-by-country rate and not be based on the\nrate the multinational enterprise pays on average.\n\n\n_(iii)_ _Undertaxed payments rule (UTPR):_ would make it possible to deny deductions in a jurisdiction\nin which resides a constituent entity of a multinational enterprise that makes a payment to\nanother subject to low taxes (less than the minimum), provided that its parent company (or\nintermediate holding company) does not charge an additional tax (top-up tax) under the IIR\nbecause the jurisdiction of the parent company (or intermediate holding company) has not\nadopted Pillar 2 in its legislation.\n\n177. **The GloBE rules provide an exception.** Subsidiary profits representing up to 10 percent\nof the payroll and 8 percent of the tangible assets of the subsidiaries are excluded from the\nminimum tax base. These percentages will be reduced annually to a margin of 5 percent for both\nin ten years. This exclusion follows the idea of protecting the flexibility of the tax policy (up to a\nlimit) in countries that host investments representing substantial economic activity,\ndemonstrated for purposes of this rule by the use of tangible assets and the employee payroll.\nTaxes on income in excess of those margins (and taxed at a rate below 15 percent) interact as\nfollows: the jurisdiction of the parent company would collect first (IIR), followed by the\njurisdiction that hosts the related entities with which it does business if the country were to waive\n\n\n68", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 68, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Pillar 2\n\n175. Generally speaking, Pillar 2 establishes a global minimum tax threshold of\n15 percent, applicable to multinational enterprises with consolidated income above\nEUR 750 million (according to consolidated financial statements). The global minimum tax rules\n(Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal – GLoBE) would also provide a _de minimis_ exclusion in\njurisdictions where the multinational enterprise has income of less than EUR 10 million and\nprofits of less than a million.\n\n176. The new global minimum tax standard would be implemented under three types of\nrules. The following list shows the order in which they would apply:\n\n_(i) Subject to tax rule (STTR):_ would allow developing countries (World Bank definition) to\neliminate benefits granted under a treaty (reduction of withholding rates) to non-residents if they\ntax income paid to their residents at a rate below 9 percent.\n\n_(ii)_ _Income inclusion rule (IIR):_ allows the jurisdiction of residence of the parent entity of the\nmultinational enterprise to impose an additional tax on the income of a constituent entity\n(subsidiary or permanent establishment) when they are subject to an effective ISR rate below\n15 percent in the country in which they operate. This additional tax applies in the fiscal year in\nwhich the profit is generated, regardless of when it is repatriated to the parent company.\nMoreover, the tax would follow the individual country-by-country rate and not be based on the\nrate the multinational enterprise pays on average.\n\n_(iii)_ _Undertaxed payments rule (UTPR):_ would make it possible to deny deductions in a jurisdiction\nin which resides a constituent entity of a multinational enterprise that makes a payment to\nanother subject to low taxes (less than the minimum), provided that its parent company (or\nintermediate holding company) does not charge an additional tax (top-up tax) under the IIR\nbecause the jurisdiction of the parent company (or intermediate holding company) has not\nadopted Pillar 2 in its legislation.\n\n177. The GloBE rules provide an exception. Subsidiary profits representing up to 10 percent\nof the payroll and 8 percent of the tangible assets of the subsidiaries are excluded from the\nminimum tax base. These percentages will be reduced annually to a margin of 5 percent for both\nin ten years. This exclusion follows the idea of protecting the flexibility of the tax policy (up to a\nlimit) in countries that host investments representing substantial economic activity,\ndemonstrated for purposes of this rule by the use of tangible assets and the employee payroll.\nTaxes on income in excess of those margins (and taxed at a rate below 15 percent) interact as\nfollows: the jurisdiction of the parent company would collect first (IIR), followed by the\njurisdiction that hosts the related entities with which it does business if the country were to waive\n\n68", "text_characters": 2413}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "its claim to the difference between the minimum and the current tax in the entity of the affected\nsubsidiary (UTPR). [104]\n\n\n**Effects on Guatemala of the Entry into Force of Pillar 2**\n\n\n178. **The implementation of Pillar 2 in Inclusive Framework countries can have an impact**\n**on Guatemala.** If the subsidiaries of the multinational enterprise with income above\nEUR 750 million do not pay 15 percent effective ISR, the difference would be collected by the\njurisdictions in which the parent company resides or, in second place, the countries in which the\ngroup’s other subsidiaries reside if they had regional control over the subsidiary in Guatemala. In\nother words, if Guatemala does not charge multinational enterprises 15 percent ISR, other\ncountries will for income generated (and declared) in the country. [105]\n\n\n179. **In principle, this reduces the advantages of Guatemalan free-trade zones and other**\n**tax incentives designed to attract investment from multinational enterprises with income**\n**above EUR 750 million.** These advantages would be reduced or even eliminated if the country\nwhere the parent company resides had to pay that difference. This would affect not only\ncompanies benefiting from exemptions, but possibly also companies opting for the simplified\noptional regime. The FDI promotion strategy used by Guatemala would therefore have to be\nrethought. However, as explained, the global minimum tax applies from a certain profit margin\nonward. If the profit margin declared by foreign investors in Guatemala is usually less than\n5 percent on payroll and tangible assets, the rule will not affect it. It will also not affect\ninternational investors whose global income is below EUR 750 million. [106]\n\n\n**Recommendations**\n\n\n- Participate in the Inclusive Framework.\n\n\n- Adopt BEPS minimum standards.\n\n\n- Consider establishing a minimum tax of 15 percent on activities affected, where applicable,\nby the implementation of Pillar 2 agreed under the Inclusive Framework.\n\n\n104 The right to charge tax based on the UTPR would require coordinating the different authorities of the\ncountries that host subsidiaries of the company subject to the minimum tax, which would be achieved through\nan allocation formula according to the proportion of assets and personnel employed in each country. This rule\ncontinues to be under discussion as part of the Inclusive Framework.\n\n105 If Guatemala establishes a “differential tax” between the tax charged and the 15-percent minimum tax, the IIR\nand UTPR will not be applicable.\n\n106 There is no record for Guatemala in the aggregated database of country-by-country reports for 2017 (last\navailable). See: [https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=CBCR_REQ. The database has some limitations, as](https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fqdd.oecd.org%2Fsubject.aspx%3FSubject%3DCBCR_REQ&data=05%7C01%7CRSchatan%40imf.org%7C59afe2bce478433d731d08da1e2b2484%7C8085fa43302e45bdb171a6648c3b6be7%7C0%7C0%7C637855467886790290%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=6pukLa%2Fx0oRO34poGw0KA84T80tvwjxTrHQpR2dNM2s%3D&reserved=0)\nexplained at: _[Important disclaimer regarding the limitations of the Country-by-Country report statistics](https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/anonymised-and-aggregated-cbcr-statistics-disclaimer.pdf)_ (oecd.org).\n\n\n69", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 69, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "its claim to the difference between the minimum and the current tax in the entity of the affected\nsubsidiary (UTPR). [104]\n\nEffects on Guatemala of the Entry into Force of Pillar 2\n\n178. The implementation of Pillar 2 in Inclusive Framework countries can have an impact\non Guatemala. If the subsidiaries of the multinational enterprise with income above\nEUR 750 million do not pay 15 percent effective ISR, the difference would be collected by the\njurisdictions in which the parent company resides or, in second place, the countries in which the\ngroup’s other subsidiaries reside if they had regional control over the subsidiary in Guatemala. In\nother words, if Guatemala does not charge multinational enterprises 15 percent ISR, other\ncountries will for income generated (and declared) in the country. [105]\n\n179. In principle, this reduces the advantages of Guatemalan free-trade zones and other\ntax incentives designed to attract investment from multinational enterprises with income\nabove EUR 750 million. These advantages would be reduced or even eliminated if the country\nwhere the parent company resides had to pay that difference. This would affect not only\ncompanies benefiting from exemptions, but possibly also companies opting for the simplified\noptional regime. The FDI promotion strategy used by Guatemala would therefore have to be\nrethought. However, as explained, the global minimum tax applies from a certain profit margin\nonward. If the profit margin declared by foreign investors in Guatemala is usually less than\n5 percent on payroll and tangible assets, the rule will not affect it. It will also not affect\ninternational investors whose global income is below EUR 750 million. [106]\n\nRecommendations\n\n- Participate in the Inclusive Framework.\n\n- Adopt BEPS minimum standards.\n\n- Consider establishing a minimum tax of 15 percent on activities affected, where applicable,\nby the implementation of Pillar 2 agreed under the Inclusive Framework.\n\n104 The right to charge tax based on the UTPR would require coordinating the different authorities of the\ncountries that host subsidiaries of the company subject to the minimum tax, which would be achieved through\nan allocation formula according to the proportion of assets and personnel employed in each country. This rule\ncontinues to be under discussion as part of the Inclusive Framework.\n\n105 If Guatemala establishes a “differential tax” between the tax charged and the 15-percent minimum tax, the IIR\nand UTPR will not be applicable.\n\n106 There is no record for Guatemala in the aggregated database of country-by-country reports for 2017 (last\navailable). See: https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=CBCR_REQ. The database has some limitations, as\nexplained at: _Important disclaimer regarding the limitations of the Country-by-Country report statistics_ (oecd.org).\n\n69", "text_characters": 2404}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **REFERENCES**\n\nActionAid (2015). Levelling Up: Ensuring a fairer share of corporate tax for developing countries.\nActionAid (2016). Mistreated: The tax treaties that are depriving the world’s poorest countries of\n\nvital revenue.\nAizenman, J. and M. M. Spiegel (2002). Institutional Efficiency, Monitoring Costs, and the\n\nInvestment Share of FDI, NBER Working Paper No. 9324.\nBaker P.L. (2014). An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct\n\nInvestment. _Int J Econ Bus_ 21(3):341–77.\nBalabushko, O., S. Beer, J. Loeprick, F. Vallada (2019). The Direct and Indirect Costs of Tax Treaty\n\nPolicy, Policy Research Working Paper 7982, World Bank Group.\nWorld Bank (2021). Informal Economy Database.\n\n[https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/informal-economy-database](https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/informal-economy-database)\nBarthel F., Busse M., Neumayer E. (2010). The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign\n\nDirect Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data. _Contemp Econ Policy_\n28(3):366–77.\nBénassy-Quéré, A., Coupet, M., Mayer, T. (2007). in press. Institutional determinants of foreign\n\ndirect investment. World Economy.\nBeer, S., Loeprick, J. (2018). The Cost and Benefits of Tax Treaties with Investment Hubs: Findings\n\nfrom Sub-Saharan Africa. IMF Working Paper.\nBergstrand, J.H., Egger, P., (2007). A knowledge-and-physical-capital model of international trade\n\nflows, foreign direct investment, and multinational enterprises. _Journal of International_\n_Economics_, 73(2), 278–308.\nBlonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2000). The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity, NBER\n\nWorking Paper. No. 7929.\nBlonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2004). The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity.\n\n_International Tax and Public Finance_ 11(5):601–22.\nBlonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2005). Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? In:\n\nChoi EK, Hartigan JC (eds) Handbook of International Trade, Vol. II. Blackwell, London, pp.\n526–46.\nBlonigen B.A., Wang M.G. (2004). Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries in\n\nEmpirical FDI Studies. NBER Working Paper, No. 10378.\nBlonigen B.A., Oldensky L., Sly N. (2014). The Differential Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties. _Am Econ_\n\n_J Econ Pol_ 6(2):1–18.\nBulow, I. Jeremy, Lawrence H. Summers and Victoria P. Summers (1990). Distinguishing Debt\n\nfrom Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in John B. Shoven et al. (eds.), Debt, Taxes and\nCorporate Restructuring, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.\nCarr D., Markusen J.R., Maskus K.E. (2001). Testing the knowledge capital model of the\n\nmultinational enterprise. _Am Econ Rev_ 91:693–708.\n[The Tax Institute (2017). Chevron case: ATO wins landmark transfer pricing case Chevron case:](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)\n\n[ATO wins landmark transfer pricing case - The Tax Institute](https://www.taxinstitute.com.au/news/chevron-case-ato-wins-landmark-transfer-pricing-case)\n\n\n70", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 70, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "REFERENCES\n\nActionAid (2015). Levelling Up: Ensuring a fairer share of corporate tax for developing countries.\nActionAid (2016). Mistreated: The tax treaties that are depriving the world’s poorest countries of\n\nvital revenue.\nAizenman, J. and M. M. Spiegel (2002). Institutional Efficiency, Monitoring Costs, and the\n\nInvestment Share of FDI, NBER Working Paper No. 9324.\nBaker P.L. (2014). An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct\n\nInvestment. _Int J Econ Bus_ 21(3):341–77.\nBalabushko, O., S. Beer, J. Loeprick, F. Vallada (2019). The Direct and Indirect Costs of Tax Treaty\n\nPolicy, Policy Research Working Paper 7982, World Bank Group.\nWorld Bank (2021). Informal Economy Database.\n\nhttps://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/informal-economy-database\nBarthel F., Busse M., Neumayer E. (2010). The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign\n\nDirect Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data. _Contemp Econ Policy_\n28(3):366–77.\nBénassy-Quéré, A., Coupet, M., Mayer, T. (2007). in press. Institutional determinants of foreign\n\ndirect investment. World Economy.\nBeer, S., Loeprick, J. (2018). The Cost and Benefits of Tax Treaties with Investment Hubs: Findings\n\nfrom Sub-Saharan Africa. IMF Working Paper.\nBergstrand, J.H., Egger, P., (2007). A knowledge-and-physical-capital model of international trade\n\nflows, foreign direct investment, and multinational enterprises. _Journal of International_\n_Economics_, 73(2), 278–308.\nBlonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2000). The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity, NBER\n\nWorking Paper. No. 7929.\nBlonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2004). The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity.\n\n_International Tax and Public Finance_ 11(5):601–22.\nBlonigen B.A., Davies R.B. (2005). Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? In:\n\nChoi EK, Hartigan JC (eds) Handbook of International Trade, Vol. II. Blackwell, London, pp.\n526–46.\nBlonigen B.A., Wang M.G. (2004). Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries in\n\nEmpirical FDI Studies. NBER Working Paper, No. 10378.\nBlonigen B.A., Oldensky L., Sly N. (2014). The Differential Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties. _Am Econ_\n\n_J Econ Pol_ 6(2):1–18.\nBulow, I. Jeremy, Lawrence H. Summers and Victoria P. Summers (1990). Distinguishing Debt\n\nfrom Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in John B. Shoven et al. (eds.), Debt, Taxes and\nCorporate Restructuring, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.\nCarr D., Markusen J.R., Maskus K.E. (2001). Testing the knowledge capital model of the\n\nmultinational enterprise. _Am Econ Rev_ 91:693–708.\nThe Tax Institute (2017). Chevron case: ATO wins landmark transfer pricing case Chevron case:\n\nATO wins landmark transfer pricing case - The Tax Institute\n\n70", "text_characters": 2358}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Daniels J.P., Ruhr M.B. (2015). Tax Treaties, Tax Holidays, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment\n\nFinancing Modes. _Int Tax Public Finance_ 22(6):999–1027.\nDavies R.B., Pehr-Johan N., Tekin-Korun A. (2009). The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational\n\nFirms: New Evidence from Microdata. _World Econ_ 32(1):77–110.\nde Mooij R.A., Ederveen S. (2003). Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of\n\nEmpirical Research. _Int Tax Public Finance_ 10:673–93.\ndiGiovanni J. (2005). What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A activity and\n\nfinancial deepening. _J Int Econ_ 65:127–49.\nEasson A. (2000). Do we still need tax treaties? _Bull Int Fiscal Doc_ 54:619–25.\nEaton, J., Tamura, A., (1994). Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japanese and U.S. Trade and Direct\n\nForeign Investment Patterns. _Journal of the Japanese and International Economies_ 8, 478–\n510.\nEdmiston K., Mudd S., Valev N. (2003). Tax Structures and FDI: The Deterrent Effects of\n\nComplexity and Uncertainty. _Fiscal Stud_ 24:341–59.\nEgger P., Larch M., Pfaffermayr M., Winner H. (2006). The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on\n\nForeign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence. _Can J Econ_ 39:901–31.\nFAD (2016). Guatemala. Improving Collection with Equity and Efficiency. Ricardo Fenochietto,\n\nValentina Flamini, Edgar Morales, and Carlos Pérez Trejo.\nFAD (2017). Guatemala. Sector Informal, Programación de Ingresos, Incentivos Tributarios y\n\nRecaudación del Agro. Ricardo Fenochietto, Mauricio Soto, Antonio Ansón, Carlos Pérez\nTrejo, and María Concepción Carrera.\nIMF (2014). Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation. International Monetary Fund,\n\nWashington D.C.\nIMF (2021). Guatemala. 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement\n\nby the Executive Director for Guatemala.\n[https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GTMEA2021001.ashx](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GTMEA2021001.ashx)\nGordon R., Hines J.R. (2002). International taxation. In: Auerbach AJ, Feldstein M (eds) Handbook\n\nof Public Economics, vol. 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam.\nGloberman, S., Shapiro, D. (2002), Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of\n\nGovernance Infrastructure, World Development, 30, 11, 1899–919.\nHead, K., Mayer, T., & Ries, J. (2008). FDI: as an outcome of the market for corporate control.\n\n_Journal of International Economics_, 74, 2–20.\nHearson M., Kangave J. (2016). A Review of Uganda’s Tax Treaties and Recommendations for\n\nAction. International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper No. 50. Institute of\nDevelopment Studies, Brighton.\nHearson M. (2015). Introductory Note on the Action Aid Tax Treaty Data Set.\n\n11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf (un.org)\nHerzfeld M. (2016). Treaty Abuse – The Principal Purpose Test, Tax Notes International. pp. 388–\n\n91.\nHines J.R. (1988). Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment. In: Summers L (ed) Tax policy and\n\nthe economy. MIT Press, Cambridge.\n\n\n71", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 71, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Daniels J.P., Ruhr M.B. (2015). Tax Treaties, Tax Holidays, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment\n\nFinancing Modes. _Int Tax Public Finance_ 22(6):999–1027.\nDavies R.B., Pehr-Johan N., Tekin-Korun A. (2009). The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational\n\nFirms: New Evidence from Microdata. _World Econ_ 32(1):77–110.\nde Mooij R.A., Ederveen S. (2003). Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of\n\nEmpirical Research. _Int Tax Public Finance_ 10:673–93.\ndiGiovanni J. (2005). What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A activity and\n\nfinancial deepening. _J Int Econ_ 65:127–49.\nEasson A. (2000). Do we still need tax treaties? _Bull Int Fiscal Doc_ 54:619–25.\nEaton, J., Tamura, A., (1994). Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japanese and U.S. Trade and Direct\n\nForeign Investment Patterns. _Journal of the Japanese and International Economies_ 8, 478–\n510.\nEdmiston K., Mudd S., Valev N. (2003). Tax Structures and FDI: The Deterrent Effects of\n\nComplexity and Uncertainty. _Fiscal Stud_ 24:341–59.\nEgger P., Larch M., Pfaffermayr M., Winner H. (2006). The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on\n\nForeign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence. _Can J Econ_ 39:901–31.\nFAD (2016). Guatemala. Improving Collection with Equity and Efficiency. Ricardo Fenochietto,\n\nValentina Flamini, Edgar Morales, and Carlos Pérez Trejo.\nFAD (2017). Guatemala. Sector Informal, Programación de Ingresos, Incentivos Tributarios y\n\nRecaudación del Agro. Ricardo Fenochietto, Mauricio Soto, Antonio Ansón, Carlos Pérez\nTrejo, and María Concepción Carrera.\nIMF (2014). Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation. International Monetary Fund,\n\nWashington D.C.\nIMF (2021). Guatemala. 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement\n\nby the Executive Director for Guatemala.\nhttps://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GTMEA2021001.ashx\nGordon R., Hines J.R. (2002). International taxation. In: Auerbach AJ, Feldstein M (eds) Handbook\n\nof Public Economics, vol. 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam.\nGloberman, S., Shapiro, D. (2002), Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of\n\nGovernance Infrastructure, World Development, 30, 11, 1899–919.\nHead, K., Mayer, T., & Ries, J. (2008). FDI: as an outcome of the market for corporate control.\n\n_Journal of International Economics_, 74, 2–20.\nHearson M., Kangave J. (2016). A Review of Uganda’s Tax Treaties and Recommendations for\n\nAction. International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper No. 50. Institute of\nDevelopment Studies, Brighton.\nHearson M. (2015). Introductory Note on the Action Aid Tax Treaty Data Set.\n\n11STM_Note_Hearson.pdf (un.org)\nHerzfeld M. (2016). Treaty Abuse – The Principal Purpose Test, Tax Notes International. pp. 388–\n\n91.\nHines J.R. (1988). Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment. In: Summers L (ed) Tax policy and\n\nthe economy. MIT Press, Cambridge.\n\n71", "text_characters": 2463}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0072-001"], "markdown": "Janeba E. (1996). Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing? _J_\n\n_Public Econ_ 60:423–45.\nJanský P., Šedivý M. (2018). Estimating the revenue costs of tax treaties in developing countries.\n\nIES Working Paper. Charles University.\nKehoe P.J. (1989). Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable. _The_\n\n_Review of Economic Studies_ (56).\nLeduc S. Michielse G. (2021). Are Tax Treaties Worth It for Developing Economies? In de Mooij,\n\net al. Corporate Income Taxes Under Pressure. Washington, DC: International Monetary\nFund.\nLejour A. (2014). The Foreign Investment Effect of Tax Treaties. CPB Netherlands Bureau for\n\nEconomic Analysis, I-26.\nLewis M. (2013). Sweet nothings: The human cost of a British sugar giant avoiding taxes in\n\nsouthern Africa. ActionAid, London.\n\n\nMurthy K.V., Bhasin N. (2015). The impact of bilateral tax treaties: A multi-country analysis of FDI\n\ninflows into India. _J Int Trade Econ Dev_ 24(6):751–66.\nNeumayer E (2007). Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to\n\nDeveloping Countries? _J Development Studies_ 43:1501–19.\nOECD (1988). Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2010). Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, Centre for Tax\n\nPolicy and Administration (July 22, 2010). [45689524.pdf (oecd.org)](https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/45689524.pdf)\nOECD (2013a). Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2013b), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris\nOECD (2015a). Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, Action 3 – Final Report:\n\nOECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015b), Limiting base erosion limiting interest deductions and other financial payments,\n\nAction 4 – Final Report: OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015c). Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account\n\nTransparency and Substance: Action 5 – Final Report: OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015d). Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances: Action\n\n6 – Final Report: OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015e). Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation: Actions 8-10 –Final\n\nReports, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD/G20 (2015f).Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting:\n\nAction 13 –Final Report, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015g). Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective: Action 14 – Final Report,\n\nOECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOCDE (2017a). OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax\n\nAdministrations. OECD Publishing, Paris.\n\n\n72\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 72, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Janeba E. (1996). Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing? _J_\n\n_Public Econ_ 60:423–45.\nJanský P., Šedivý M. (2018). Estimating the revenue costs of tax treaties in developing countries.\n\nIES Working Paper. Charles University.\nKehoe P.J. (1989). Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable. _The_\n\n_Review of Economic Studies_ (56).\nLeduc S. Michielse G. (2021). Are Tax Treaties Worth It for Developing Economies? In de Mooij,\n\net al. Corporate Income Taxes Under Pressure. Washington, DC: International Monetary\nFund.\nLejour A. (2014). The Foreign Investment Effect of Tax Treaties. CPB Netherlands Bureau for\n\nEconomic Analysis, I-26.\nLewis M. (2013). Sweet nothings: The human cost of a British sugar giant avoiding taxes in\n\nsouthern Africa. ActionAid, London.\n\nMurthy K.V., Bhasin N. (2015). The impact of bilateral tax treaties: A multi-country analysis of FDI\n\ninflows into India. _J Int Trade Econ Dev_ 24(6):751–66.\nNeumayer E (2007). Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to\n\nDeveloping Countries? _J Development Studies_ 43:1501–19.\nOECD (1988). Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2010). Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, Centre for Tax\n\nPolicy and Administration (July 22, 2010). 45689524.pdf (oecd.org)\nOECD (2013a). Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2013b), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris\nOECD (2015a). Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, Action 3 – Final Report:\n\nOECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015b), Limiting base erosion limiting interest deductions and other financial payments,\n\nAction 4 – Final Report: OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015c). Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account\n\nTransparency and Substance: Action 5 – Final Report: OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015d). Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances: Action\n\n6 – Final Report: OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015e). Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation: Actions 8-10 –Final\n\nReports, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD/G20 (2015f).Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting:\n\nAction 13 –Final Report, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2015g). Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective: Action 14 – Final Report,\n\nOECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOCDE (2017a). OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax\n\nAdministrations. OECD Publishing, Paris.\n\n72", "text_characters": 2368}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-001", "cr-2023-145-fig-p0073-002"], "markdown": "[OECD (2017b). Background Brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS; in OECD.](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf)\nOECD (2018). Guidance for Tax Administrations on the Application of the Approach to Hard to\n\nValue Intangibles – BEPS Action 8, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2019). Harmful Tax Practices-2018 Reviews results, Inclusive Framework on BEPS –\n\nAction 5, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2020a). Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization – Report on Pillar One Blueprint –\n\nInclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2020b). Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization – Report on Pillar Two Blueprint –\n\nInclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris\nOECD (2022). Harmful Tax Practices Peer Reviews Results, Inclusive Framework on BEPS –\n\n[Action 5 Update (as of January 2022); see Action 5 – OECD BEPS](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action5/)\nUN (2013). United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. United\n\nNations, NY.\nPlatform for Collaboration on Tax (2015). Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and\n\nEfficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. IMF, World Bank, OECD, and UN, in:\n[https://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/100757-Tax-Incentives-Backgro](https://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/100757-Tax-Incentives-Background-paper-PUBLIC.pdf)\n\n\nComparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses _,_ [IMF, OECD, UN, and WBG, in: Addressing](https://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-difficulties-in-accessing-comparables-data-for-transfer-pricing-analyses.htm)\n\n\nhttps://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/PCT_Toolkit_The_Taxation_of_Of\n\n\nShah M.H., Qayyum S. (2015). Impact of double taxation treaties on inward FDI in Latin America\n\nand Caribbean developing countries. Bus Econ Rev 7(1):1–18.\n[Tax treaties explorer (2022). Available at: https://www.treaties.tax/en/](https://www.treaties.tax/en/) .\nVan’t Riet M., Lejour A. (2018). Optimal tax routing: network analysis of FDI diversion. Int Tax\n\nPublic Finance 25(5):1321–1370. Springer; International Institute of Public Finance.\nWei S.J. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review of Economics and\n\nStatistics 82 (1), 1–11.\nYue D. (2018) The impact of double tax treaties on inward FDI in ASEAN countries. Journal of\n\nBusiness and Finance in Emerging Markets (S.I.) 1(2):127–152\nZucman G. (2014). Taxing across borders: tracking personal wealth and corporate profits. Journal\n\nof Economic Perspectives 28(4):121–148. American Economic Association.\n\n\n73\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 73, "report_id": "cr-2023-145", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "OECD (2017b). Background Brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS; in OECD.\nOECD (2018). Guidance for Tax Administrations on the Application of the Approach to Hard to\n\nValue Intangibles – BEPS Action 8, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2019). Harmful Tax Practices-2018 Reviews results, Inclusive Framework on BEPS –\n\nAction 5, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2020a). Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization – Report on Pillar One Blueprint –\n\nInclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris.\nOECD (2020b). Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization – Report on Pillar Two Blueprint –\n\nInclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris\nOECD (2022). Harmful Tax Practices Peer Reviews Results, Inclusive Framework on BEPS –\n\nAction 5 Update (as of January 2022); see Action 5 – OECD BEPS\nUN (2013). United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. United\n\nNations, NY.\nPlatform for Collaboration on Tax (2015). Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and\n\nEfficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. IMF, World Bank, OECD, and UN, in:\nhttps://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/100757-Tax-Incentives-Backgro\n\nComparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses _,_ IMF, OECD, UN, and WBG, in: Addressing\n\nhttps://www.tax-platform.org/sites/pct/files/publications/PCT_Toolkit_The_Taxation_of_Of\n\nShah M.H., Qayyum S. (2015). Impact of double taxation treaties on inward FDI in Latin America\n\nand Caribbean developing countries. Bus Econ Rev 7(1):1–18.\nTax treaties explorer (2022). Available at: https://www.treaties.tax/en/ .\nVan’t Riet M., Lejour A. (2018). Optimal tax routing: network analysis of FDI diversion. Int Tax\n\nPublic Finance 25(5):1321–1370. Springer; International Institute of Public Finance.\nWei S.J. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review of Economics and\n\nStatistics 82 (1), 1–11.\nYue D. (2018) The impact of double tax treaties on inward FDI in ASEAN countries. Journal of\n\nBusiness and Finance in Emerging Markets (S.I.) 1(2):127–152\nZucman G. (2014). Taxing across borders: tracking personal wealth and corporate profits. Journal\n\nof Economic Perspectives 28(4):121–148. American Economic Association.\n\n73", "text_characters": 1888}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e21ec737a175366e5adeed9cc6aaa6a100e3923
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4e141da5d0f0759668be7df6bcaca5786d191b01756af2e1234e3e2cd6ab209a
+size 29471
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8c5412fdfd4d7d538f20f52122c31c4a9898cb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:24dcb3586123b79aa431b7069c4c9504b17cefa1125794c6feae1184d661bab9
+size 160449
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..432c2799faeb8cd082e41843e90fafd9af13ffdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:33bf3170878f6df6e82a5ed7d8c3ba464e479b9f24d500ff2aca9e3a296c00e4
+size 4868
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55877d8135ca1007a4261ac74df55889a776da5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:44d856ebdd8bacba3b6df3e241d6b9cca9e6619c47c3f26ff6cb3892b85ee2fc
+size 321
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..91327fad8b6f00e72a634533d9c0170e637fff05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3c0bce69c8d26894fda053c16277448a95a01b0b7b89b5cb8bdac8ad61cd4eff
+size 2569
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb18279c5d02e84b19ee6bab2f5cc85be5422dbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f77d191f7ad721129546581af92dde5f6a0f3556f5a6f205bc18a3d299b65b4a
+size 7022
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..21ee044fe57416e132278c581b7ea9e44b6f0f48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7d0b54482de3a3183a95fd06a0f7b5d0662914de209fc7fb26c6179cc3adf0ed
+size 1795
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2c91801b6d16e8abfbf09f92d068ae7b01a7f17e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c04998c73d072a05bfa77e2a9839a4dff2cad8cfcebe9836c979c84dd7e1e5d
+size 2106
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a4ddda65a95b10315e9a3b607a85d5c72019668c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e88d443388eadc658f5d6bdd0834a9b4edd87812a0d5d224c65943c5eec7c042
+size 1876
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-008.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-008.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e73d9f56d8f6a71ad0ba26d45f0a9c9b2c81b273
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-008.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:ea1122f7d468a79ae98e248e5a4a48c80b6b93e91c4520aa32058b1188926d3a
+size 2330
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-009.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-009.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f71034bc076bdbc3486e6d9ed33a36059de9a68d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-009.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6dc92587fa2715cd4c76985cd3bdc90f1562e865ec321bafd612cd02e6e87738
+size 6577
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-010.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-010.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c5388318f6b59be4328a46b2d366a06fdc2c9d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-010.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:2a182f10826cc1faaeaafe1ec5a7368fdd90402f72fae8929c0c95dcbf48a8f7
+size 9990
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-011.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-011.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46804757c2e76d5baab7819c2e8d159c4a4dfbfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-011.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7ea1a0f439c099f65334993609533b5ed1ebdf0e9c3490d2ed711fcb79e956e0
+size 659
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-012.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-012.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..de4b9709db1f36c751d896b1760523cd34d88eeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-012.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:63b373bf4bbad372433d7d9710afc2cc56de9e342d39e37c18836327000353a0
+size 4066
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-013.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-013.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c7e9df83d1d46db0095158baaea0548478e7f1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-013.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:4d371bda027db1548f3bdb9737117594bfe0f4fca554de5b4c1b10e7fe49fd3c
+size 2366
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-014.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-014.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f264a9a80f0e0758418c455347f3821d3e02bdd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-014.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fdfcbc11ab01fa4709d0f7e91db9be7013716f5ba09c85a8e0abec35b9381ceb
+size 5543
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-015.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-015.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..72c60903f15b7f73573b0f2ea535c5950e84b4fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-015.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:17b7224a28c398f56e3cf4fe12d9f7bc583ee912278ceb02c8cb15ad7872c24f
+size 7671
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-016.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-016.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e11f517179169da03423d584cc742f487fbd273
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-016.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:41e1528c9889d0bb29447a012b0dc13d3b28a8265e40d031cfb556ff315a79ff
+size 269780
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0007-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0007-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac146aa8c071d375a829daa7188629781a99bd8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0007-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c7958ef674337c362d4c2fcd43dd517bbb1631e4db653aac7e57470ae2143927
+size 43835
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ae4d9488b4b11984a1c1094c6f7c2d2ec875d01c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f16c7d97d94c86c8052f443252032da551527dfb16b84e249df9c8434249b805
+size 277772
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ddb4ee52b040c2e8b57014f8cecf0c9513f8c613
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56071c16fdb1d9aea59e975eb468bcbdb9cd563ba9f32bd7165f40b75a31a207
+size 90048
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..893a3f7a31b564ebda1742cb80962cb174785cec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:06904d1425ae6177ff78a031b6b0119638de443d03a2ea0b67604946bfe9e7ab
+size 172757
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..41f0e0fe438ad0b2fc43b5e9d903a2285eaa257d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:00a1fd6eeab3021cee45324829309888d4278fb9cda94e773d54ed509ec0176f
+size 66493
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..956e1ce55cde45665c0000d05f02ac4c030af127
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:cfd9f0ed02c12d2ee4d66d9adcd5fed992ed9296f3713d019668d4579d346df5
+size 255230
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a0c6e4a1e05f2dd8eb1754995728b7a786abd458
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5d0d921a2528ddf9a2c065a6be54b1c7974522ed6c37742ef97f5fe382b6e162
+size 273035
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5728d2d5337c6bac17544684baa58bdf1b9dd4c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f2b30936358473594720abe9ace42cf5e2bffef1783ed906963f46a80e7a93ab
+size 238649
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0023-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0023-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6eb71cd31442f72defabd21953ab43d3c06b79fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0023-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:45d176b13c860325caf9bba51c6d391efd74b3b2df57fa2a6bcddc13f6409a4c
+size 193013
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0024-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0024-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b077208943b4ad8fe475982deb56f474e148bcf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0024-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:12e02a66fd63361a20c9a10813dab093b2b03acf2569dc6a206b4544d1d4d719
+size 234953
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0025-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0025-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2b9b5e748aee80608b55c9603fa579de489cca39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0025-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:7255031058da639538dd1e5466b1a2b302c3f2d352939082ac91f1d49f5ce2bc
+size 232885
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0026-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0026-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..77f495ae7ea4397af26f500ad17258e8817d71dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0026-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:eeded429bd4ea98c9bd4efbdc22860c53ed9227dde07b78b5d5bc2402e4208c3
+size 112651
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0027-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0027-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dfc50481160b8f7e55b967f97486b45cd36de5e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0027-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:525c8785970ea0ed104ae8674e01ec22405972270e69cac0ac4bbfd6467895f9
+size 319036
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0028-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0028-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d5f1c47488f43b4527e0f39ec69597c6e9219b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0028-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3595f972b5e82baef74d7b40904e9980602d59f5af961f6a765021c5364709e9
+size 268485
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb001b81ea8ec91c99662f8eadad61658bebd608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-148",
+ "title": "Republic of Kazakhstan: Technical Assistance Report-Government Finance Statistics (October 10-21, 2022)",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-148.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "53bed4e7bc495176c2b60d033da4e9d8cc73d91e5478f3c71fa8ea10fcce5b00",
+ "source_bytes": 636959,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/04/25/republic-of-kazakhstan-technical-assistance-report-government-finance-statistics-october-10-532775",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:06+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 15.608,
+ "page_count": 28,
+ "text_characters": 41198,
+ "table_count": 0,
+ "figure_count": 32,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "КАЗАХСТАН"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "ДОКЛАД О РАБОТЕ МИССИИ ПО СТАТИСТИКЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ФИНАНСОВ В РАМКАХ ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО СОДЕЙСТВИЯ (10–21 ОКТЯБРЯ 2022 ГОДА)"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Международный валютный фонд Вашингтон, округ Колумбия"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Содержание"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Акронимы и сокращения"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 6,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Резюме результатов миссии и приоритетных рекомендаций"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "ПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 18,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Приложения"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "КАЗАХСТАН: ДОКЛАД О РАБОТЕ МИССИИ ПО СТАТИСТИКЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ФИНАНСОВ В РАМКАХ ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО СОДЕЙСТВИЯ (10–21 ОКТЯБРЯ 2022 ГОДА; Доклад МВФ по стране № 23/148; ЯНВАРЬ 2023 ГОДА",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230421095049-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230425120056-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d0aea63ed401230a1503a5b3c5aeec2db7a9b8dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1297 @@
+
+
+
+
+АПРЕЛЬ 2023 ГОДА
+
+
+
+**Доклад МВФ по стране № 23/148**
+
+### **КАЗАХСТАН**
+##### **ДОКЛАД О РАБОТЕ МИССИИ ПО СТАТИСТИКЕ** **ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ФИНАНСОВ В РАМКАХ ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО** **СОДЕЙСТВИЯ (10–21 ОКТЯБРЯ 2022 ГОДА)**
+
+
+Настоящий доклад по Республике Казахстан был подготовлен группой сотрудников
+Международного валютного фонда. Он основан на информации, имевшейся на
+момент завершения его подготовки в октябре 2022 года.
+
+
+Экземпляры доклада можно заказать по адресу:
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Телефон: (202) 623-7430 • Факс: (202) 623-7201
+Эл. почта: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) [Веб-сайт: http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Цена: 18,00 долл. США за печатный экземпляр
+
+###### **Международный валютный фонд** **Вашингтон, округ Колумбия**
+
+
+© 2023 Международный валютный фонд
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+#### **Содержание**
+
+**Акронимы и сокращения ................................................................................................................... 2**
+
+
+**Резюме результатов миссии и приоритетных рекомендаций ................................................... 3**
+
+
+**ПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ......................................................... 5**
+
+A. Укрепление институциональных основ СГФ.................................................................................. 5
+B. Определение границ СГУ и ГС ....................................................................................................... 7
+C. Улучшение исходных данных для составления СГФ ................................................................. 11
+D. План действий по дальнейшему развитию СГФ ......................................................................... 13
+
+
+**Приложения ........................................................................................................................................ 15**
+
+Приложение А. Должностные лица, с которыми встречалась миссия ........................................... 15
+Приложение B. Статус выполнения рекомендаций предыдущей миссии МВФ по СГФ и СДГС . 17
+Приложение C. Рекомендации миссий МВФ по СГФ в части ЕБК и ЕПС ...................................... 24
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 1
+
+
+
+#### **Акронимы и сокращения**
+
+БЦД Департамент стран Ближнего Востока и Центральной Азии МВФ
+
+
+Бюро национальной статистики Агентства по стратегическому
+БНС
+планированию и реформам Республики Казахстан
+
+
+ГС Государственный сектор
+
+
+ГФСС Государственный фонд социального страхования
+
+
+ДБЗ Департамент бюджетного законодательства МФ
+
+
+ДГЗ Департамент государственного заимствования МФ
+
+
+ДОС Департамент отчетности и СГФ МФ
+
+
+ЕБК Единая бюджетная классификация
+
+
+ЕПС Единый план счетов
+
+
+КГС Квазигосударственный сектор
+
+
+КСЭ Классификатор секторов экономики
+
+
+МИО Местные исполнительные органы
+
+
+МР Методические рекомендации
+
+
+МНЭ Министерство национальной экономики Республики Казахстан
+
+
+МФ Министерство финансов Республики Казахстан
+
+
+НБК Национальный банк Республики Казахстан
+
+
+НФРК Национальный фонд Республики Казахстан
+
+
+ПБ Платежный баланс
+
+
+РК Республика Казахстан
+
+
+РБ Республиканский бюджет
+
+
+_РСГФ 2014_ _Руководство по статистике государственных финансов 2014 года_
+
+
+_Статистика долга государственного сектора. Руководство для_
+_РСДГС_
+_составителей и пользователей_
+
+
+СГУ Сектор государственного управления
+
+
+СГФ Статистика государственных финансов
+
+
+СДГС Статистика долга государственного сектора
+
+
+СД МВФ Статистический департамент МВФ
+
+
+_СНС 2008_ _Система национальных счетов 2008 года_
+
+
+_СОКД_ _Система оценки качества данных_
+
+
+УГФ Управление государственными финансами
+
+
+ФКП Фонд компенсации потерпевшим
+
+
+ФСМС Фонд социального медицинского страхования
+
+
+ФПК Фонд проблемных кредитов
+
+
+Региональный центр развития потенциала для стран Кавказа,
+ЦТП-КЦАМ
+Центральной Азии и Монголии
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 2
+
+
+
+#### **Резюме результатов миссии и приоритетных** **рекомендаций**
+
+**1. Миссия технической помощи (ТП) по статистике государственных финансов**
+**(СГФ) состоялась в Астане в период с 10 по 21 октября 2022 года.** Миссия проведена
+Статистическим департаментом МВФ (СД МВФ) в соответствии с запросом Министерства
+финансов (МФ) Республики Казахстан (РК) и по согласованию с Департаментом стран
+Ближнего Востока и Центральной Азии (БЦД) МВФ в рамках реализации рабочего
+направления по развитию потенциала СГФ-Статистика долга государственного сектора
+(СГДС) в ЦТП-КЦАМ. Миссия благодарит руководство и сотрудников МФ, Министерства
+экономики РК (МНЭ), Национального банка РК (НБК), Бюро национальной статистики (БНС)
+и Фонда проблемных кредитов (ФПК) за сотрудничество и продуктивное взаимодействие.
+Перечень должностных лиц, с которыми встречалась миссия, приведен в Приложении A.
+
+**2. Основная цель миссии заключалась в оказании поддержки Департаменту**
+**отчетности и СГФ (ДОС) МФ по вопросам формировании СГФ** . В связи с этим миссия
+сосредоточилась на рассмотрении и доработке годовой отчетности по СГФ за 2021 год.
+Особое внимание миссия уделила обучению нового составителя СГФ и провайдеров
+исходных данных базовым основам СГФ, учетным принципам, классификациям
+_Руководства по статистике государственных финансов 2014 года (РСГФ 2014)_,
+переходным таблицам и процедурам контроля качества данных. Дополнительно миссия
+представила рекомендации по вопросам разграничения сектора государственного
+управления (СГУ) и государственного сектора (ГС). В заключение миссия разработала и
+план действий по дальнейшему совершенствованию СГФ/СДГС.
+
+**3. Миссия отметила прогресс в укреплении институциональных основ**
+**формирования налогово-бюджетной отчетности, в том числе СГФ.** Новая Концепция
+управления государственными финансами РК до 2030 года (Концепция УГФ) предполагает
+гармонизацию классификации операций СГУ с требованиями международных стандартов
+СГФ и системы национальных счетов (СНС) к 2029 году. Cогласно БК [1] и Концепции УГФ с
+1 января 2024 года вводится в действие Единый план счетов (ЕПС), объединяющий коды
+счетов бухгалтерского учета, бюджетного учета и единой бюджетной классификации
+(ЕБК), а также кассовые и начисленные данные.
+
+**4. Годовая отчетность по СГФ РК за 2021 год частично охватывает операции и**
+**балансовые позиции по активам и обязательствам СГУ.** Миссия оказала содействие в
+доработке отчета по СГФ за 2021 год, включая данные ФПК, который относится к СГУ в
+соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ [2] . Однако в декабре 2022 года ДОС МФ проинформировал
+миссию о решении (i) не включать ФПК в публикуемую СГФ за 2021 год и (ii)
+скорректировать ранее представленные в МВФ данные отчетности по СГФ за 2020 год. Как
+сообщил ДОС, это решение связано с тем, что понятие консолидированного бюджета в
+соответствии с БК не включает ФПК. Миссия отметила, что в международной практике,
+описание которой содержится в Руководстве МВФ по налогово-бюджетной прозрачности [3],
+отчетность об исполнении консолидированного бюджета в соответствии с национальным
+законодательством и отчетность по международным стандартам дополняют друг друга
+
+
+1 В соответствии с Законом РК от 31.12.2021 № 100 Глава 22 Бюджетного кодекса РК дополнена статьей 116-1, которая
+вводится в действие с 01.01.2024.
+
+2 Более подробные рекомендации в отношении институциональной классификации ФПК в составе СГУ и отражения
+данных ФПК согласно _РСГФ 2014_ см. в Докладе о работе миссии по ТП в области СГФ (2–13 сентября 2019), Докладе о
+работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года) и Докладе о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ и
+СДГС (15-26 ноября 2021 года).
+
+[3 IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency)
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 3
+
+
+
+для обеспечения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности правительства, и рекомендовала
+включать ФПК в публикуемую отчетность по СГФ.
+
+**5. В соответствии с** _**РСГФ 2014 года**_ **СГФ должна охватывать не только СГУ, но и**
+**государственные предприятия и организации, ориентированные на получение**
+**прибыли.** Миссия отметила что в настоящее время ни одно из ведомств, участвующих в
+формировании макроэкономической статистики, не публикует перечень
+институциональных единиц ГС, определяемых в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС_ . Миссия
+рекомендует усилить межведомственное взаимодействие для обеспечения
+единообразного подхода к определению границ СГУ и ГС РК с учетом _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС_, а
+также согласовать и опубликовать перечень соответствующих институциональных единиц.
+В ходе совместной встречи миссии с МФ и БНС ДОС заявил о готовности выступить в роли
+координатора в согласовании соответствующих межведомственных вопросов со стороны
+МФ.
+
+**6. Наличие необходимых институциональных условий является одной из важных**
+**предпосылок качества СГФ.** Так, в Рекомендациях по применению Системы оценки
+качества данных СГФ и СДГС (СОКД) отмечается, что обязанности по сбору, обработке и
+распространению статистики должны выполняться квалифицированными специалистами и
+быть четко определены и закреплены за конкретным ведомством законом или иным
+официальным документом. С учетом необходимости реализации Концепции УГФ,
+повышения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности и обеспечения качества статистических
+данных миссия отметила целесообразность создания в ДОС отдельного подразделения,
+которое бы более предметно занималось вопросами СГФ, а также закрепления на
+законодательном уровне (например, в БК) полномочий МФ по сбору, обработке и
+распространению СГФ и СДГС в соответствии с международными стандартами.
+
+
+**Для содействия продвижению в указанных выше областях миссия рекомендовала**
+**подробный план действий со следующими приоритетными рекомендациями:**
+
+
+**TABLE 1.** Приоритетные рекомендации
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Дополнительные сведения о рекомендациях и соответствующих мерах имеются в плане**
+**действий в разделе «Подробная техническая оценка и рекомендации».**
+
+
+4 Годовой отчет по СГФ за 2021 год (за исключением ФПК) направлен в МВФ 15.11.2022. В связи с решением,
+принятым МФ в декабре 2022 (см. пояснения в параграфе 4), годовой отчет по СГФ не включает ФПК.
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 4
+
+
+
+#### **ПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И** **РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ**
+
+**A. УКРЕПЛЕНИЕ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ОСНОВ СГФ**
+
+
+**7. Передовая международная практика, представленная в Руководстве по**
+**налогово-бюджетной прозрачности, предусматривает три основных категории**
+**отчетности:** отчетность об исполнении бюджета, налогово-бюджетная статистика и
+финансовая отчетность [5] . Отчетность об исполнении бюджета соответствует формату
+бюджета и классификациям, установленным национальным законодательством. Налоговобюджетная статистика формируется согласно национальным или международным
+статистическим стандартам и обобщает информацию о влиянии государственных
+финансов на экономику в целом. Финансовая отчетность государства составляются в
+соответствии с национальными или международными стандартами и характеризует
+финансовое положение и результаты финансовой деятельности правительства.
+Указанные категории отчетности дополняют друг друга, обеспечивая налогово-бюджетную
+прозрачность и информационную основу для эффективного управления
+государственными финансами.
+
+
+**8. Реализация Концепции УГФ** **[6]** **будет способствовать укреплению**
+**институциональных основ налогово-бюджетной отчетности, в том числе СГФ.** В
+целях обеспечения подотчетности и подконтрольности бюджетных расходов Концепция
+УГФ предполагает дальнейшую гармонизацию классификации операций СГУ с
+требованиями международных стандартов СГФ и СНС, а также установление единых
+требований к применению такого вида классификации для ведения бюджетного
+(бухгалтерского) учета, составления бюджетной (бухгалтерской) и иной финансовой
+отчетности. План действий по реализации Концепции УГФ предполагает разработку
+проекта Закона РК по внесению изменений в БК в целях гармонизации классификации
+операций СГУ с требованиями международных стандартов по СГФ к январю 2029 года.
+
+
+**9. Концепция УГФ предусматривает переход на КФО в соответствии с**
+**международными стандартами.** В настоящее время КФО составляется отдельно для
+республиканского бюджета и консолидированных бюджетов местных исполнительных
+органов (МИО). Поэтапный переход к составлению КФО РК в соответствии с Концепцией
+УГФ предполагает расширение периметра консолидации и консолидируемых показателей
+бухгалтерской отчетности, а также формирование отчетности по сегментам. Согласно
+Концепции УГФ, КФО будет включать ГС и КГС на республиканском и местном уровне, а
+также Национальный фонд Республики Казахстан (НФ) и внебюджетные фонды. В
+соответствии с Планом действий по реализации Концепции УГФ разработка проекта
+Закона РК, предусматривающего поэтапный переход на КФО, составленную в
+соответствии с международными стандартами, предусмотрена к январю 2028 года.
+
+
+**10. Наличие необходимых правовых и институциональных условий является**
+**одной из важных предпосылок качества СГФ.** Согласно Рекомендациям МВФ по
+
+
+5 [IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency)
+
+6 Указ Президента РК от 10.09.2022 № 1005 «Об утверждении Концепции управления государственными
+финансами Республики Казахстан до 2030 года»
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 5
+
+
+
+применению Системы оценки качества данных СГФ и СДГС (СОКД) [7 ] правовая и
+институциональная среда рассматриваются с точки зрения следующих индикаторов: (i)
+обязанности по сбору, обработке и распространению статистики четко определены; (ii)
+надлежащим образом осуществляется обмен данными и координация между
+ведомствами, производящими данные; (iii) данные индивидуальных респондентов
+являются конфиденциальными и используются исключительно в статистических целях; (iv)
+статистическая отчетность обеспечивается правовым мандатом и/или мерами,
+способствующими представлению данных.
+
+
+**11. В БК закреплены основы формирования и представления финансовой и**
+**бюджетной отчетности, однако отсутствуют положения в отношении СГФ и СДГС.**
+Согласно БК порядок ведения бюджетного (бухгалтерского) учета, формы и порядок
+составления и представления финансовой отчетности, а также порядок составления и
+представления большинства видов бюджетной отчетности определяются МФ. Статья 1161 БК [8] предусматривает введение в действие с 1 января 2024 года ЕПС, разработка и
+утверждение которого также закреплены за МФ. При этом в БК отсутствуют какие-либо
+положения в отношении формирования и представления СГФ и СГС. Задача МФ по
+выработке предложений по СГФ и функции МФ по ведению СГФ закреплены лишь на
+уровне Положения о МФ, утвержденного Правительством РК [9] . Миссия отметила, что
+обязанности по представлению исходных данных, необходимых для составления СГФ по
+СГУ и ГС, а также требования к форматам, содержанию и срокам представления таких
+исходных данных до настоящего времени не формализованы.
+
+
+**12. В Рекомендациях МВФ по применению СОКД подчеркивается необходимость**
+**привлечения и удержания квалифицированного персонала для составления СГФ.**
+Особенно важно, чтобы штатное расписание и соответствующие меры стимулирования
+позволяли поддерживать «критическую массу» кадровых ресурсов для СГФ. Как
+отмечается в СОКД, составители СГФ должны иметь возможность дополнительного
+обучения методологии СГФ, включая участие в международных тренингах. При этом
+составители СГФ должны обеспечивать максимально широкое распространение
+полученных знаний о концепциях и методологии СГФ, в том числе среди специалистов,
+вовлеченных в работу по мониторингу и анализу эффективности налогово-бюджетной
+политики, обеспечению прозрачности информации о государственных финансах.
+
+
+**13. Миссия отметила, что в ДОС отсутствует отдельное подразделение, которое**
+**бы целенаправленно занималось вопросами СГФ.** В частности, к таким вопросам
+относятся развитие методологии формирования СГФ и соответствующих исходных данных
+в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_, включая вопросы секторизации, обеспечение внутренней
+согласованности СГФ и сопоставимости с данными по СГУ в других подсистемах
+макроэкономической статистики, своевременной публикации статистических данных.
+Создание отдельного подразделения по СГФ представляется целесообразным с учетом
+необходимости реализации Концепции УГФ, повышения налогово-бюджетной
+прозрачности и обеспечения качества статистических данных РК, расширения
+информационной базы для анализа устойчивости государственных финансов и разработки
+бюджетной политики в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе.
+
+
+[7IMF Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF) for GFS and PSDS: https://dsbb.imf.org/content/pdfs/dqrs_gfs.pdf](https://dsbb.imf.org/content/pdfs/dqrs_gfs.pdf)
+
+
+8 В соответствии с Законом РК от 31.12.2021 № 100 Глава 22 БК дополнена статьей 116-1 (вводится в действие с
+01.01.2024).
+
+
+9
+Постановление Правительства РК от 24.04.2008 № 387 «О некоторых вопросах Министерства финансов Республики
+Казахстан», пп. 13 (1) и 15 (22).
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 6
+
+
+
+**14. Миссия приветствует начатую ДОС работу по описанию Методики**
+**составления и представления годового отчета по СГФ.** Методика включает требования
+о периодичности и сроках представления СГФ в МВФ, описание состава годового отчета
+по СГФ и перечень источников информации для его составления, порядок заполнения
+вспомогательных таблиц в Классификационном помощнике, примеры контрольных
+соотношений. Рекомендуется дополнить Методику более подробными пояснениями в
+отношении исходных данных, особенностей составления данных по подсекторам СГУ,
+контроля (валидации) отчетности при поступлении в ДОС, применения контрольных
+соотношений внутри и между таблицами и др. Аналогичные пояснения рекомендуется
+сформулировать в части квартальной отчетности по СГФ, а также соотношения СГФ и
+других форматов налогово-бюджетной отчетности, публикуемых ДОС. Кроме того,
+представляется целесообразным утвердить Методику соответствующим приказом МФ.
+
+
+_**Рекомендации:**_
+
+
+ - _Завершить разработку технической документации по методологии и_
+_процедурам составления и распространения квартальной и годовой СГФ/СДГС –_
+приоритетная рекомендация _._
+
+
+ - _Регламентировать (например, совместными приказами) требования к_
+_форматам, содержанию и срокам представления исходных данных, необходимых_
+_для составления СГФ по консолидированному СГУ._
+
+
+ - _Рассмотреть вопрос о закреплении на законодательном уровне (например, в БК)_
+_полномочий по формированию и распространению СГФ и СДГС в соответствии_
+_с международными стандартами._
+
+
+**B. ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ГРАНИЦ СГУ И ГС**
+
+
+**15. Охват институциональных единиц СГУ и ГС имеет решающее значение с**
+**точки зрения оценки качества СГФ и в целом налогово-бюджетной прозрачности РК.**
+Согласно Принципу 1.1.1. «Охват организаций» Кодекса прозрачности в налоговобюджетной сфере (Кодекс прозрачности МВФ) [10] налогово-бюджетная отчетность должна
+охватывать все структуры, вовлеченные в деятельность государства. Как отмечается в
+_РСГФ 2014_, статистика должна составляться по СГУ и ГС, а также по всем подсекторам
+СГУ и подсектора государственных корпораций ГС. При этом СГУ должен включать все
+контролируемые государством предприятия и организации, деятельность которых имеет
+нерыночный характер. В свою очередь, ГС включает СГУ и все рыночные предприятия и
+организации, контролируемые СГУ или другими государственными предприятиями и
+организациями. В рамках реализации Концепции УГФ вопросы классификации
+институциональных единиц СГУ и ГС приобретают особую актуальность в связи с
+необходимостью обеспечить наиболее полное применение методологии _РСГФ 2014_ .
+
+
+**16. В международных стандартах макроэкономической статистики**
+**подчеркивается преимущество экономического содержания над юридической**
+**формой.** Например, некоторые предприятия и организации, созданные государством в
+форме коммерческих компаний, на протяжении многих лет фактически ведут себя как
+нерыночные производители. Такие организации должны быть отнесены к СГУ независимо
+от их организационно-правовой формы. Если организация учреждается государственным
+органом как отдельное юридическое лицо, но по факту не может действовать независимо,
+такая организация должна классифицироваться вместе со своей головной структурой в
+
+
+[10 Pillar I, IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/Code2019.pdf](https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/Code2019.pdf)
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 7
+
+
+
+СГУ. Также государственные предприятия и организации должны классифицироваться как
+единицы СГУ, если их деятельность существенно зависит от регулярной финансовой
+поддержки со стороны государства в виде заимствований, реструктуризации долгов,
+предоставления субсидий, трансфертов или государственных гарантий.
+
+
+**17. С точки зрения** _**РСГФ 2014**_ **ФПК является внебюджетной единицей подсектора**
+**центрального правительства СГУ, данные по которой должны быть включены в**
+**СГФ** **[11]** **.** ФПК реализует государственную политику по освобождению банковского сектора от
+проблемных кредитов и подчиняется непосредственно Правительству РК, которое несет
+все риски и убытки от деятельности ФПК и оказывает ФПК финансовую поддержку за счет
+средств РБ. Основная часть поддержки банковского сектора со стороны ФПК
+осуществляется путем приобретения у банков активов по цене, значительно выше их
+рыночной/справедливой стоимости, а также размещения депозитов в банках на
+нерыночных условиях. Включение ФПК в СГФ по СГУ обеспечивает более полный охват
+мер государственной политики, направленных на достижение общенациональных целей, а
+также более полную картину финансовой деятельности и финансового положения СГУ.
+Статистика по СГУ, включая ФПК, предоставляет дополнительные аналитические
+возможности, в том числе в отношении фискальных рисков и долгосрочной устойчивости,
+и в целом способствует улучшению налогово-бюджетной прозрачности РК.
+
+
+**18. Однако в декабре 2022 года МФ принял решение о том, что данные ФПК не**
+**подлежат раскрытию в СГФ РК в связи с отсутствием необходимой**
+**законодательной основы.** При этом МФ ссылается на закрепленное в статье 6 БК
+определение консолидированного бюджета, который объединяет РБ, местные бюджеты,
+поступления и расходы НФ, поступления и выплаты ФКП, поступления и расходы
+Государственного фонда социального страхования (ГФСС), поступления и расходы Фонда
+социального медицинского страхования (ФСМС), без учета взаимопогашаемых операций
+между ними. В этой связи консолидация ФПК в годовой отчетности по СГФ за 2020 и 2021
+год рассматривается ДОС МФ как пилотная работа, результаты которой не подлежат
+раскрытию. Миссия отметила, что в международной практике отчетность об исполнении
+консолидированного бюджета в соответствии с национальным законодательством и
+финансовая и статистическая отчетность по международным стандартам дополняют друг
+друга для обеспечения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности правительства, и
+рекомендовала включать ФПК в публикуемую СГФ по СГУ.
+
+
+**19. В законодательстве РК отсутствует определение СГУ и ГС, однако БК**
+**устанавливает перечень субъектов КГС.** К таким субъектам относятся государственные
+предприятия (ГП), товарищества с ограниченной ответственностью (ТОО), акционерные
+общества (АО), в том числе национальные управляющие холдинги (НУХ), национальные
+холдинги, национальные компании, учредителем, участником или акционером которых
+является государство, а также дочерние, зависимые и иные юридические лица,
+являющиеся аффилированными с ними. С точки зрения _СНС 2008_ и _РСГФ 2014_ субъекты
+КГС в зависимости от характера их деятельности (рыночная или нерыночная) могут
+относиться к СГУ (наряду с государственными учреждениями и внебюджетными фондами),
+государственным корпорациям или частным корпорациям.
+
+
+**20. Как отмечается в Концепции УГФ, по состоянию на 2021 год в РК**
+**функционирует порядка 6 400 организаций КГС.** Законодательство определяет для
+субъектов КГС три вида организационно-правовых форм: АО, ТОО, республиканское и
+
+
+11 Более подробные рекомендации в отношении институциональной классификации ФПК в составе СГУ и отражения
+данных ФПК согласно _РСГФ 2014_ см. в Докладе о работе миссии по ТП в области СГФ (2–13 сентября 2019), Докладе о
+работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года) и Докладе о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ и
+СДГС (15-26 ноября 2021 года).
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 8
+
+
+
+коммунальное предприятие. При этом значительная часть организаций КГС (80 %)
+относятся к социальным организациям сфер здравоохранения, образования, культуры и
+спорта, которые в основном функционируют как казенные предприятия (4,2 тыс.) и ГП на
+праве хозяйственного ведения (1,3 тыс.). Кроме того, КГС включает 300 АО и 600 ТОО (с
+учетом организаций, входящих в группу компаний АО «Фонд национального
+благосостояния «Самрук-Казына» и АО «НУХ «Байтерек»). Данные о государственных
+учреждениях (ГУ), которые в соответствии с БК не относятся к субъектам КГС, содержатся
+в Реестре государственного имущества (около 15 тыс. ГУ по состоянию на ноябрь 2022
+года) [12] .
+
+
+**21. Правительство РК уделяет существенное внимание вопросам эффективности**
+**деятельности КГС и управления государственным имуществом.** Как отмечается в
+Концепции УГФ, а также в Концепции развития государственного управления в РК до 2030
+года (Концепция развития ГУ) [13], сохраняются значительная доля участия государства в
+экономике и большое количество субъектов КГС. При этом наблюдаются низкая
+эффективность КГС, его зависимость от государственного бюджета, слабое корпоративное
+управление, отсутствие стратегической взаимоувязки деятельности юридических лиц с
+участием государства с общестрановыми целями. Сохраняется информационная
+закрытость КГС – в открытом доступе отсутствуют данные о структурах компаний,
+результатах финансовой деятельности, выплачиваемых дивидендах и других аспектах
+деятельности юридических лиц с участием государства.
+
+
+**22. В рамках реализации Национального плана развития РК до 2025 года** **[14]** **,**
+**Концепции развития ГУ и Концепции УГФ МНЭ разрабатывает классификацию**
+**субъектов КГС** **[15]** . Классификация формируется для последующей подготовки
+предложений по сокращению доли прямого участия государства в экономике, повышению
+эффективности управления государственным имуществом, улучшению конкурентной
+среды и обеспечению прозрачности деятельности КГС. Применяемый в классификации
+подход предполагает деление субъектов КГС на экономические (коммерческие) и
+неэкономические (некоммерческие) организации. К неэкономическим относятся школы,
+ясли, больницы и иные организации социального характера, пожарные части, научные
+организации, осуществляющие фундаментальные исследования, организации,
+оказывающие информационно-аналитическую поддержку государственным органам, а
+также национальные институты развития. Экономические организации КГС
+подразделяются на инфраструктурные (100% участие государства в капитале) и
+производственно-финансовые (доля участия государства от 30%).
+
+
+**23. Одновременно МНЭ продолжает формировать перечень государственных**
+**корпораций для определения доли участия государства в экономике РК.** Перечень
+составляется с 2019 года в соответствии с утвержденными МНЭ Методическими
+рекомендациями (МР) [16] . Как следует из МР МНЭ, ГС представляет собой часть субъектов
+КГС, которые прямо или косвенно контролируются государством, и исключает
+
+
+12 [Статистика по данным Реестра государственного имущества https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-](https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-details)
+[details.](https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-details)
+
+
+13 Утверждена указом Президента РК от 26.02.2021 № 522.
+
+14 Указ Президента РК от 15.02.2018 № 636 «Об утверждении Национального плана развития РК до 2025
+года и признании утратившими силу некоторых указов Президента РК».
+
+15 См. Постановление Правительства РК от 06.09.2022 № 654 «Об утверждении Аналитического доклада
+по реформированию квазигосударственного сектора в РК и Плана мероприятий по его реализации».
+
+16 Приказ МНЭ от 03.08.2017 № 392 «Об утверждении Методических рекомендаций по определению
+участия государства в экономике РК» (в редакции приказа МНЭ от 17.05.2019 № 125).
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 9
+
+
+
+государственные учреждения. Прямой контроль подразумевает владение государством
+более 50% голосующих прав, косвенный – от 10% до 50% голосующих прав. В свою
+очередь, СГУ охватывает только государственные учреждения. Таким образом, согласно
+МР МНЭ все субъекты ГС относятся к рыночным производителям, вне зависимости от
+реального характера их деятельности (рыночная или нерыночная). Миссия отметила, что
+подобный подход не полностью соответствует рекомендациям СНС и СГФ, согласно
+которым нерыночные организации под контролем государства относятся к СГУ, а также
+отличается от разрабатываемой МНЭ классификации субъектов КГС.
+
+
+**24. Помимо МНЭ, разработку подходов к классификации институциональных**
+**единиц СГУ и ГС осуществляет БНС** . В 2019 году утвержден Классификатор секторов
+экономики (КСЭ) [17], подготовленный БНС на основе _СНС 2008_ . Кроме прочего, КСЭ
+содержит определение СГУ и других секторов экономики. С целью внедрения КСЭ БНС с
+2020 года разрабатывает Алгоритм по присвоению кодов КСЭ институциональным
+единицам в Статистическом бизнес-регистре путем сочетания кодов других
+классификаторов, применяемых в РК. Кроме прочего, Алгоритм предусматривает
+определение характера деятельности (рыночный или нерыночный) институциональных
+единиц на основе анализа основных показателей финансово-хозяйственной деятельности,
+представленных в годовых формах общегосударственного статистического наблюдения, и
+процентного соотношения доходов и затрат.
+
+
+**25. Миссия отметила различия в подходах, применяемых МНЭ и БНС для**
+**определения охвата СГУ и ГС** . Согласованный на межведомственном уровне перечень
+институциональных единиц СГУ и ГС в определении _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС 2008_ отсутствует.
+Какая-либо формализованная взаимосвязь между утвержденными МР МНЭ и КСЭ,
+разработанным БНС, также отсутствует. БНС проинформировало миссию о том, что до
+утверждения Алгоритма предполагается провести тестирование предприятий и
+организаций, входящих в перечень единиц ГС, который формируется в соответствии с МР
+МНЭ, на предмет соответствия указанным в проекте Алгоритма критериям. Также БНС
+планирует рассмотреть вопрос о возможности использования перечня МНЭ для
+классификации единиц ГС в пограничных случаях теста на нерыночность (если
+соотношение доходов и затрат колеблется в районе 40-60% из года в год).
+
+
+**26. Миссия обсудила предлагаемые БНС подходы на совместной встрече с МФ,**
+**БНС и параллельной миссией ЦТП-КЦАМ по статистике реального сектора (СРС).** В
+контексте отнесения предприятий и организаций к ГС миссия обратила внимание на
+необходимость предусмотреть в Алгоритме БНС критерии контроля не только со стороны
+СГУ, но и со стороны государственных корпораций. Также миссия отметила, что Алгоритм
+должен быть дополнен пояснениями в отношении исходных данных для анализа таких
+критериев классификации единиц СГУ, как контроль в качестве доминирующего клиента, в
+том числе оказание государственным органам вспомогательных услуг (бухгалтерский учет,
+обработка данных, транспортные услуги, уборка и чистка, обеспечение безопасности и др.)
+а также контроль, связанный с заимствованием и другими видами финансовой поддержки
+со стороны органов государственного управления.
+
+
+**27. По определению, алгоритм должен предусматривать последовательность**
+**шагов с целью решения поставленной задачи.** В этой связи миссия ЦТП-КЦАМ по СРС
+рекомендовала дополнить разработанный БНС проект Алгоритма иерархическим
+перечнем действий (возможно, в виде «дерева решений»), которые должны быть
+предприняты для классификации единиц СГУ и ГС. Обе миссии подчеркнули
+
+
+17 Классификатор секторов экономики (НК РК 13-2019) утвержден приказом Комитета технического
+регулирования и метрологии Министерства торговли и интеграции РК от 13 декабря 2019 года № 465-од.
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 10
+
+
+
+необходимость укрепления межведомственного взаимодействия (БНС, МФ, МНЭ, НБК) по
+вопросам определения охвата СГУ и ГС и согласования классификации соответствующих
+единиц. При этом ДОС МФ выразил готовность взять на себя роль координатора в
+рассмотрении и согласовании соответствующих вопросов со стороны МФ.
+
+
+_**Рекомендация:**_
+
+
+ - _Усилить межведомственное взаимодействие для обеспечения единообразного_
+_подхода к определению границ СГУ и ГС РК с учетом РСГФ 2014 и СНС, а также_
+_согласовать и опубликовать перечень соответствующих институциональных_
+_единиц._
+
+
+**C. УЛУЧШЕНИЕ ИСХОДНЫХ ДАННЫХ ДЛЯ СОСТАВЛЕНИЯ СГФ**
+
+
+**28. Данные налогово-бюджетной отчетности должны представлять**
+**всестороннюю и сопоставимую информацию о государственных финансах.** Как
+отмечается в Руководстве МВФ по налогово-бюджетной прозрачности, бюджетная
+классификация должна быть интегрирована с планом счетов, который содержит структуру
+кодов для классификации и регистрации соответствующей финансовой информации (как
+потоков, так и запасов). Бюджетные классификации определяют структуру кодов и
+субкодов плана счетов, относящихся к доходам, расходам и финансовым операциям.
+Помимо экономической и функциональной классификации, операции и балансовые
+позиции по финансовым активам и обязательствам в СГФ могут классифицироваться в
+соответствии с резидентной принадлежностью и институциональными секторами, к
+которым относятся контрагенты по финансовым инструментам, а также по видам
+финансовых инструментов.
+
+
+**29.** **СГФ в соответствии с** _**РСГФ 2014**_ **способствует улучшению налогово-**
+**бюджетной прозрачности и подотчетности Правительства РК.** В соответствии с
+запросом Правительства РК в январе 2023 года будет проведена оценка соответствия РК
+Кодексу прозрачности МВФ. Одним из элементов такой оценки станет подробный анализ
+отчетности об исполнении бюджетов, КФО и отчетности по СГФ. В дополнение к охвату
+единиц ГС будут оцениваться такие параметры, как охват балансовых позиций, операций
+и других экономических потоков, налоговых расходов, частота и своевременность
+публикации отчетных данных, применяемые классификации, внутренняя согласованность
+данных, порядок исправления ошибок в данных за предыдущие отчетные периоды,
+соответствие международным стандартам, внешний аудит, сопоставимость бюджетных
+прогнозов, бюджетов и налогово-бюджетной отчетности.
+
+
+**30. Миссия отметила начатую ДОС работу по контролю качества исходных**
+**данных для СГФ, передаваемых в МФ НБК, ФПК, ГФСС, ФСМС.** Так, в части активов
+НФ и ГФСС осуществляется проверка согласованности сумм изменений балансовых
+позиций с суммами соответствующих операций и других экономических потоков.
+Аналогичную проверку рекомендуется распространить на все балансовые позиции СГУ.
+Как отмечалось в отчете предыдущей миссии по СГФ (состоявшейся в ноябре 2021 года),
+в отсутствие централизованной базы данных МФ рекомендуется запрашивать исходные
+данные для составления СГФ в формате Отчета об операциях и соответствующих
+детализированных таблиц, подготовленных с использованием Классификационного
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 11
+
+
+
+помощника по СГФ [18] . В дальнейшем рекомендуется составлять квартальную и годовую
+отчетность по СГФ с использованием автоматизированной системы МФ.
+
+
+**31. МФ продолжает работу по подготовке к внедрению с 1 января 2024 года**
+**Единого плана счетов (ЕПС).** Действующие в настоящее время план счетов бюджетного
+учета и ЕБК обеспечивают возможность составления отчетности о кассовом исполнении
+бюджета. Одновременно консолидированная финансовая отчетность по методу
+начислений формируется с использованием плана счетов бухгалтерского учета для
+бюджетных учреждений республиканского и местного уровней. ЕПС призван объединить
+коды счетов бухгалтерского учета, бюджетного учета и ЕБК, а также соответствующие
+потоки кассовых и начисленных данных. Проект ЕПС в виде систематизированного
+перечня кодов счетов с описанием их содержания передан миссии Департаментом
+методологии бухгалтерского учета, аудита и оценки МФ. Однако в связи с ограничениями
+по времени и необходимостью решения ранее согласованных с МФ приоритетных задач
+детальное рассмотрение проекта ЕПС с точки зрения _РСГФ 2014_ осталось за рамками
+работы миссии.
+
+
+**32.** **Возможности нынешней версии ЕПС по формированию исходных данных**
+**для составления СГФ в соответствии с** _**РСГФ 2014**_ **требуют дополнительного**
+**анализа.** Миссия отметила, что в отчетах предыдущих миссий по СГФ представлен ряд
+рекомендаций по совершенствованию ЕБК и плана счетов в соответствии _с РСГФ 2014_
+(см. Приложение C к данному отчету). Передовая зарубежная практика в сфере налоговобюджетной прозрачности [19] свидетельствует о важности интеграции бюджетной
+классификации с планом счетов для создания согласованной и прозрачной системы
+группировки экономических потоков и запасов, обеспечивающей, в том числе,
+возможность формирования СГФ в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ . В рамках рассмотрения
+возможностей нынешней версии ЕПС по формированию исходных данных для СГФ
+полезно, кроме прочего, провести анализ того, насколько учтены рекомендации
+предыдущих миссий. Кроме того, представляется целесообразным дополнить ЕПС более
+подробными рекомендациями по применению счетов и корреспонденцией счетов. Миссия
+подчеркнула необходимость укрепления сотрудничества департаментов МФ, вовлеченных
+в работ по совершенствованию ЕПС и ЕБК.
+
+
+_**Рекомендации:**_
+
+
+ - _Инициировать работу по рассмотрению возможностей автоматизации_
+_формирования квартальной и годовой отчетности по СГФ._
+
+
+ - _Ежеквартально и ежегодно проводить проверку и валидацию (подтверждение)_
+_данных СГФ, составленных специалистами НБК, ФПК, ГФСС._
+
+
+ - _При отражении финансовых активов и обязательств в СГФ сверять_
+_согласованность сумм изменений балансовых позиций с суммами_
+_соответствующих операций и других экономических потоков._
+
+
+18 Классификационный помощник по СГФ – инструмент Excel, разработанный СД МВФ для содействия
+национальным составителям статистики в соотнесении административных данных с классификациями
+_РСГФ 2014_ .
+
+19 [IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency)
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 12
+
+
+
+**D. ПЛАН ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕМУ РАЗВИТИЮ СГФ**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+20 Подробные пояснения см. в Докладе миссии по СГФ и СДГС, проведенной в период с 15 по 26 ноября 2021 года
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 13
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 14
+
+
+
+#### **Приложения**
+
+**ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ А. ДОЛЖНОСТНЫЕ ЛИЦА, С КОТОРЫМИ ВСТРЕЧАЛАСЬ МИССИЯ**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 15
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 16
+
+
+
+**ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ B. СТАТУС ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИЙ ПРЕДЫДУЩЕЙ МИССИИ МВФ**
+**ПО СГФ И СДГС**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+21 Годовые формы отчетности по СГФ за 2020 г. направлены в МВФ 03.12.2021.
+
+
+22 Письмо БНС № 16-2-18/306 от 10.11.2021.
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 17
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+23 Утвержден приказом руководителя БНС от 18.05.2022 года №55.
+
+
+24 Письмо БНС № 24068 от 30.06.2022.
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 18
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+25 См. Доклад о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года)
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 19
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 20
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 21
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 22
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 23
+
+
+
+**ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ C. РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ МИССИЙ МВФ ПО СГФ В ЧАСТИ ЕБК И ЕПС**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 24
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+МВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 25
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e6092e8e3dd6f18cbe1ffd398243337eff2117e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0402023445442c0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0001-001", "height": 147, "page": 1, "phash_256": "df80381e007f87e501ff7d00de80803f297fd7d0ff30a827fe00ff0081f780df", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "4e141da5d0f0759668be7df6bcaca5786d191b01756af2e1234e3e2cd6ab209a", "width": 894}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "5f51553e30511545", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1319, "page": 2, "phash_256": "bafa35d22efeb55595053dff85151e9fb4d39505d15068eec10568e8d908d80c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "24dcb3586123b79aa431b7069c4c9504b17cefa1125794c6feae1184d661bab9", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "aa96b2b0f0b2928a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-001", "height": 88, "page": 3, "phash_256": "99656666679e9999466999661986659967986666367999994d66673619996665", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "33bf3170878f6df6e82a5ed7d8c3ba464e479b9f24d500ff2aca9e3a296c00e4", "width": 134}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8282828080828282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-002", "height": 88, "page": 3, "phash_256": "80002aaa80002aaa2aaa80002aaa2aaa80002aaa2aaa80002aaa800080002aaa", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "44d856ebdd8bacba3b6df3e241d6b9cca9e6619c47c3f26ff6cb3892b85ee2fc", "width": 147}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-003.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4d694d4d4d4d694d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-003", "height": 88, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e666e761e65601a901a9e665a5e15a1e199b5a155a1de7667e61019e199ee676", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "3c0bce69c8d26894fda053c16277448a95a01b0b7b89b5cb8bdac8ad61cd4eff", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-004.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "220c32327032122c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-004", "height": 88, "page": 3, "phash_256": "dd000cdf2277333d0cdd89970177266d099f0866027fd9986e67333309ff466d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "f77d191f7ad721129546581af92dde5f6a0f3556f5a6f205bc18a3d299b65b4a", "width": 134}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-005.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a28ab4a2a2b48a92", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-005", "height": 88, "page": 3, "phash_256": "cc63739cb39c4c734e33f4cc64cc9333b3334ccc4cccb3311b38e6676663198c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "7d0b54482de3a3183a95fd06a0f7b5d0662914de209fc7fb26c6179cc3adf0ed", "width": 134}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-006.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "f0b0b0b0b0b0b070", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-006", "height": 87, "page": 3, "phash_256": "c8711f7e1f8ee0813f811ffe607e1f7e63811f7e207ee0013783e0013f8e1f81", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c04998c73d072a05bfa77e2a9839a4dff2cad8cfcebe9836c979c84dd7e1e5d", "width": 148}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-007.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "82928a808c8cb282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-007", "height": 88, "page": 3, "phash_256": "c4441bae1bbbe659e1069991e6593be619e666193bb99846e664239e99962679", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "e88d443388eadc658f5d6bdd0834a9b4edd87812a0d5d224c65943c5eec7c042", "width": 134}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-008.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a6a6a6d080808282", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-008", "height": 87, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d00578077a2f9c7c95fc03fe03fe01ff62ffd7809f801fc01fe00fe007e0e183", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "ea1122f7d468a79ae98e248e5a4a48c80b6b93e91c4520aa32058b1188926d3a", "width": 134}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-009.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96d292164a429292", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-009", "height": 87, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e1ff9c99e1f33626366660ec1e0cc1f91f1b63333e078ec648e88dc8318b3333", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "6dc92587fa2715cd4c76985cd3bdc90f1562e865ec321bafd612cd02e6e87738", "width": 135}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-010.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "95f3e32473600060", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-010", "height": 63, "page": 3, "phash_256": "8c000000800ab1ba5ffa60cf80298311ea576ef7dff7b33fb13f1e726ec06f7d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "2a182f10826cc1faaeaafe1ec5a7368fdd90402f72fae8929c0c95dcbf48a8f7", "width": 219}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-011.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8000808080808080", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-011", "height": 73, "page": 3, "phash_256": "d5558000d555aa007fff7aaa7fff8000d555aa007fff7eaa7fff8000d555a000", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "7ea1a0f439c099f65334993609533b5ed1ebdf0e9c3490d2ed711fcb79e956e0", "width": 133}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-012.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "68a484a468944000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-012", "height": 74, "page": 3, "phash_256": "e07ee07ebf881f808f8038e3f0e7707fe0631ce39ce3173cb39c339cce414621", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "63b373bf4bbad372433d7d9710afc2cc56de9e342d39e37c18836327000353a0", "width": 133}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-013.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "008040b68c646699", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-013", "height": 74, "page": 3, "phash_256": "844579ba7b1a864590f15d3ae60f72eb8d348a34758bdf086a75d5b29d026acd", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "4d371bda027db1548f3bdb9737117594bfe0f4fca554de5b4c1b10e7fe49fd3c", "width": 73}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-014.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6060400000e05cec", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-014", "height": 74, "page": 3, "phash_256": "878fcff7b60d481e7043f138c7f37bf007ffc800f1784c889370f1c94e3032c9", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "fdfcbc11ab01fa4709d0f7e91db9be7013716f5ba09c85a8e0abec35b9381ceb", "width": 133}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-015.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "b5b6b5b534000100", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-015", "height": 73, "page": 3, "phash_256": "98c618c66739e739673918c66738e739673981006338e739673998c69ce71ce7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "17b7224a28c398f56e3cf4fe12d9f7bc583ee912278ceb02c8cb15ad7872c24f", "width": 133}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-016.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "1e2b2b33332e061e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-016", "height": 1319, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bf82c978d0e93636dac7c0b996266ad3c87cb523e0d81bc7673898636b983e06", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "41e1528c9889d0bb29447a012b0dc13d3b28a8265e40d031cfb556ff315a79ff", "width": 1019}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0007-001.png", "caption": "TABLE 1. Приоритетные рекомендации", "classification": "table_snapshot", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "33231f2ea6b6179c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0007-001", "height": 186, "page": 7, "phash_256": "ad2f4f105f500c3ed2b3ad2fd2aad2c0257c30eb0b4ab0e3a4bfd2d1c2983caf", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "c7958ef674337c362d4c2fcd43dd517bbb1631e4db653aac7e57470ae2143927", "width": 771}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "267e764e5e564e5e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0016-001", "height": 1037, "page": 16, "phash_256": "bfee486d1256485b724644d2494d4e102b536b694b6a61b931f78fc99a7f4c9a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "f16c7d97d94c86c8052f443252032da551527dfb16b84e249df9c8434249b805", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "63234e4e465c566c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0017-001", "height": 353, "page": 17, "phash_256": "bfea4853484c48543692f79b92fbe5a48154169a528d5aaf496fa7709df4ae48", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "56071c16fdb1d9aea59e975eb468bcbdb9cd563ba9f32bd7165f40b75a31a207", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9bdededddf9e9fcc", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0018-001", "height": 977, "page": 18, "phash_256": "a1c74d3c4e697e3a5e19783e30fe4c1f5e2c126942fa4e785ae813833187cfb0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "06904d1425ae6177ff78a031b6b0119638de443d03a2ea0b67604946bfe9e7ab", "width": 714}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a9deded646de9ed6", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0019-001", "height": 412, "page": 19, "phash_256": "a1c74838583c5e395c385e69196ccd19f87881f6f4c9a3f78f06dc01db24b1db", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "00a1fd6eeab3021cee45324829309888d4278fb9cda94e773d54ed509ec0176f", "width": 714}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ec67474747676767", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0020-001", "height": 1007, "page": 20, "phash_256": "cff77071381f151d6220101c7028503a4f7b217c91186e3f70694fbf6fa30bff", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "cfd9f0ed02c12d2ee4d66d9adcd5fed992ed9296f3713d019668d4579d346df5", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ec45470767636705", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0021-001", "height": 1059, "page": 21, "phash_256": "eee715bb123d1fff30187038355d301c5152463d1ffd1549603813f65aabb954", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "5d0d921a2528ddf9a2c065a6be54b1c7974522ed6c37742ef97f5fe382b6e162", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ad47654747646767", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0022-001", "height": 1094, "page": 22, "phash_256": "c7ff6022181d101d70316e3f1ffd077f11583d1e550611dd3458743b4eb39b8d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "f2b30936358473594720abe9ace42cf5e2bffef1783ed906963f46a80e7a93ab", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0023-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ec656c70c5c76d67", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0023-001", "height": 1162, "page": 23, "phash_256": "87ff151d3438603360781d1d6070743f70393d171f8f6ab6195d663b6fe76048", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "45d176b13c860325caf9bba51c6d391efd74b3b2df57fa2a6bcddc13f6409a4c", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0024-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6d4767656c526767", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0024-001", "height": 1164, "page": 24, "phash_256": "8fff6223603711fd1f1d17ba117d7011701119186a2f107837ff951d9f1c66a6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "12e02a66fd63361a20c9a10813dab093b2b03acf2569dc6a206b4544d1d4d719", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0025-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6e67656c67666763", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0025-001", "height": 1134, "page": 25, "phash_256": "8fff7421707b1539151f7038712562361159315e7409501895151ddf1fff95dd", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "7255031058da639538dd1e5466b1a2b302c3f2d352939082ac91f1d49f5ce2bc", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0026-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ac6c786c6c704c7c", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0026-001", "height": 738, "page": 26, "phash_256": "8fff743970307038703070f1199e267843e11fcfce39b0cef08199dfc661d98e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "eeded429bd4ea98c9bd4efbdc22860c53ed9227dde07b78b5d5bc2402e4208c3", "width": 781}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0027-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6f5d79794d7d594d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0027-001", "height": 1112, "page": 27, "phash_256": "bbff45076514351f257749234557410445164598373d054435d76bbba5b7dd3a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "525c8785970ea0ed104ae8674e01ec22405972270e69cac0ac4bbfd6467895f9", "width": 745}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-148/assets/figures/cr-2023-148-fig-p0028-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "6e495d5d59194949", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-148-fig-p0028-001", "height": 1052, "page": 28, "phash_256": "bbed35fe4c054d24357644934d0935d335165b0537fc75264bb94829c536a4d7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "sha256_normalized_png": "3595f972b5e82baef74d7b40904e9980602d59f5af961f6a765021c5364709e9", "width": 745}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-148/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65161896a7ec1b6f836d99ffdaded2b4d80cf785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-148/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nАПРЕЛЬ 2023 ГОДА\n\n\n\n**Доклад МВФ по стране № 23/148**\n\n### **КАЗАХСТАН**\n##### **ДОКЛАД О РАБОТЕ МИССИИ ПО СТАТИСТИКЕ** **ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ФИНАНСОВ В РАМКАХ ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО** **СОДЕЙСТВИЯ (10–21 ОКТЯБРЯ 2022 ГОДА)**\n\n\nНастоящий доклад по Республике Казахстан был подготовлен группой сотрудников\nМеждународного валютного фонда. Он основан на информации, имевшейся на\nмомент завершения его подготовки в октябре 2022 года.\n\n\nЭкземпляры доклада можно заказать по адресу:\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nТелефон: (202) 623-7430 • Факс: (202) 623-7201\nЭл. почта: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) [Веб-сайт: http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nЦена: 18,00 долл. США за печатный экземпляр\n\n###### **Международный валютный фонд** **Вашингтон, округ Колумбия**\n\n\n© 2023 Международный валютный фонд", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0974, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(13.5, -2.288818359375e-05, 549.5, 88.0999755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 164, "number": 2, "size": 63222, "transform": [536.0, 0.0, -0.0, 88.0999984741211, 13.5, -2.288818359375e-05], "width": 997, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "АПРЕЛЬ 2023 ГОДА\n\nДоклад МВФ по стране № 23/148\nКАЗАХСТАН\nДОКЛАД О РАБОТЕ МИССИИ ПО СТАТИСТИКЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ФИНАНСОВ В РАМКАХ ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО СОДЕЙСТВИЯ (10–21 ОКТЯБРЯ 2022 ГОДА)\n\nНастоящий доклад по Республике Казахстан был подготовлен группой сотрудников\nМеждународного валютного фонда. Он основан на информации, имевшейся на\nмомент завершения его подготовки в октябре 2022 года.\n\nЭкземпляры доклада можно заказать по адресу:\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nТелефон: (202) 623-7430 • Факс: (202) 623-7201\nЭл. почта: publications@imf.org Веб-сайт: http://www.imf.org\n\nЦена: 18,00 долл. США за печатный экземпляр\nМеждународный валютный фонд Вашингтон, округ Колумбия\n\n© 2023 Международный валютный фонд", "text_characters": 654}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ТЕХНИЧЕСКИЙ ОТЧЕТ\n\n\n\nКАЗАХСТАН\nОтчет о работе миссии по статистике\nгосударственных финансов\n\nЯНВАРЬ 2023 ГОДА\n\n\n\nАвтор:\nИрина Дубинина\n\n\n\n\n\nЧЛЕНЫ\nАрмения, Азербайджан, Грузия, Казахстан, Кыргызская Республика, Монголия, Таджикистан,\nТуркменистан, Узбекистан\n\nПАРТНЕРЫ\nШвейцария, Россия, Китай, Корея, Соединенные Штаты Америки, Азиатский банк развития, Польша", "text_characters": 307}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-001", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-002", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-003", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-004", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-005", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-006", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-007", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-008", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-009", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-010", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-011", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-012", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-013", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-014", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-015", "cr-2023-148-fig-p0003-016"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0099, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(84.59100341796875, 640.6240234375, 214.8610076904297, 677.4300537109375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 102, "number": 18, "size": 48879, "transform": [130.27000427246094, 0.0, -0.0, 36.805999755859375, 84.59100341796875, 640.6240234375], "width": 361, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(78.7020034790039, 412.8240051269531, 166.69900512695312, 465.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 9, "size": 1081, "transform": [87.99700164794922, 0.0, -0.0, 52.29600143432617, 78.7020034790039, 412.8240051269531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(78.7030029296875, 501.7200012207031, 167.04299926757812, 553.6199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 94, "number": 14, "size": 7368, "transform": [88.33999633789062, 0.0, -0.0, 51.900001525878906, 78.7030029296875, 501.7200012207031], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(179.14999389648438, 413.32000732421875, 259.1499938964844, 465.32000732421875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 10, "size": 5355, "transform": [80.0, 0.0, -0.0, 52.0, 179.14999389648438, 413.32000732421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(269.95001220703125, 502.219970703125, 349.95001220703125, 554.219970703125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 16, "size": 26637, "transform": [80.0, 0.0, -0.0, 52.0, 269.95001220703125, 502.219970703125], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(269.95001220703125, 413.32000732421875, 349.8080139160156, 465.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 11, "size": 8043, "transform": [79.85800170898438, 0.0, -0.0, 51.79999923706055, 269.95001220703125, 413.32000732421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(360.75, 413.32000732421875, 440.6080017089844, 465.1199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 12, "size": 25827, "transform": [79.85800170898438, 0.0, -0.0, 51.79999923706055, 360.75, 413.32000732421875], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(360.75, 502.22503662109375, 440.6000061035156, 554.02001953125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 17, "size": 6774, "transform": [79.8499984741211, 0.0, -0.0, 51.79499816894531, 360.75, 502.22503662109375], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(454.04998779296875, 413.2980041503906, 533.8499755859375, 465.05999755859375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 13, "size": 18216, "transform": [79.80000305175781, 0.0, -0.0, 51.762001037597656, 454.04998779296875, 413.2980041503906], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(179.14999389648438, 502.1980285644531, 258.9490051269531, 553.9600219726562)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 104, "number": 15, "size": 5601, "transform": [79.79900360107422, 0.0, -0.0, 51.762001037597656, 179.14999389648438, 502.1980285644531], "width": 160, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(230.3099822998047, 639.6470336914062, 309.3599853515625, 683.280029296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 121, "number": 19, "size": 4779, "transform": [-79.05000305175781, -0.0, -0.0, 43.632999420166016, 309.3599853515625, 639.6470336914062], "width": 300, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(322.42999267578125, 640.9970092773438, 401.47998046875, 684.6300048828125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 121, "number": 20, "size": 2671, "transform": [79.05000305175781, 0.0, -0.0, 43.632999420166016, 322.42999267578125, 640.9970092773438], "width": 300, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(261.20001220703125, 698.3759765625, 340.25, 742.0089721679688)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 121, "number": 24, "size": 26751, "transform": [79.05000305175781, 0.0, -0.0, 43.632999420166016, 261.20001220703125, 698.3759765625], "width": 219, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(83.97799682617188, 698.5260009765625, 162.97799682617188, 742.0260009765625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 120, "number": 22, "size": 11162, "transform": [79.0, 0.0, -0.0, 43.5, 83.97799682617188, 698.5260009765625], "width": 300, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}, {"bbox": "Rect(189.1999969482422, 698.3759765625, 232.54998779296875, 742.0089721679688)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 121, "number": 23, "size": 5103, "transform": [43.349998474121094, 0.0, -0.0, 43.632999420166016, 189.1999969482422, 698.3759765625], "width": 120, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ОБ ОТКАЗЕ ОТ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ\n«В настоящем документе изложены рекомендации технического характера,\nпредоставленные сотрудниками Международного валютного фонда официальным органам\nРеспублики Казахстан («получателю ПОР») в ответ на их запрос о предоставлении\nтехнической помощи. Настоящий документ (полностью или частично) или его резюме\nмогут быть предоставлены МВФ исполнительному директору МВФ от Республики\nКазахстан, другим исполнительным директорам МВФ и сотрудникам их аппарата, а также\nдругим учреждениям или органам получателя ПОР, а по их просьбе — сотрудникам\nВсемирного банка и другим организациям, предоставляющим техническую помощь, и\nдонорам, имеющим обоснованную заинтересованность в получении такой информации,\nчленам Координационного комитета Региональном центре развития потенциала в\nстранах Кавказа, Центральной Азии и Монголии (ЦТП-КЦАМ), если получатель ПОР прямо\nне возражает против такого раскрытия информации (см. «Операционное руководство по\nраспространению информации о профессиональном и организационном развитии». Для\nпубликации или раскрытия настоящего отчета (полностью или частично) сторонам вне\nМВФ, помимо учреждений или органов получателя ПОР, сотрудников Всемирного банка,\nдругих организаций, предоставляющих техническую помощь, и доноров, имеющих\nобоснованную заинтересованность в получении такой информации, членов\nКоординационного комитета ЦТП-КЦАМ требуется прямое согласие получателя ПОР и\nСтатистического департамента МВФ».\n\n\n\nЧЛЕНЫ\n\n\n\n\n\n Армения Азербайджан Грузия Казахстан Кыргызская\n Республика\n\n\n\n\n\n Монголия Таджикистан Туркменистан Узбекистан\n\n\n\nПАРТНЕРЫ ПО РАЗВИТИЮ (ДОНОРЫ)", "text_characters": 1425}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Содержание**\n\n**Акронимы и сокращения ................................................................................................................... 2**\n\n\n**Резюме результатов миссии и приоритетных рекомендаций ................................................... 3**\n\n\n**ПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ......................................................... 5**\n\nA. Укрепление институциональных основ СГФ.................................................................................. 5\nB. Определение границ СГУ и ГС ....................................................................................................... 7\nC. Улучшение исходных данных для составления СГФ ................................................................. 11\nD. План действий по дальнейшему развитию СГФ ......................................................................... 13\n\n\n**Приложения ........................................................................................................................................ 15**\n\nПриложение А. Должностные лица, с которыми встречалась миссия ........................................... 15\nПриложение B. Статус выполнения рекомендаций предыдущей миссии МВФ по СГФ и СДГС . 17\nПриложение C. Рекомендации миссий МВФ по СГФ в части ЕБК и ЕПС ...................................... 24\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 1", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Содержание\n\nАкронимы и сокращения ................................................................................................................... 2\n\nРезюме результатов миссии и приоритетных рекомендаций ................................................... 3\n\nПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ......................................................... 5\n\nA. Укрепление институциональных основ СГФ.................................................................................. 5\nB. Определение границ СГУ и ГС ....................................................................................................... 7\nC. Улучшение исходных данных для составления СГФ ................................................................. 11\nD. План действий по дальнейшему развитию СГФ ......................................................................... 13\n\nПриложения ........................................................................................................................................ 15\n\nПриложение А. Должностные лица, с которыми встречалась миссия ........................................... 15\nПриложение B. Статус выполнения рекомендаций предыдущей миссии МВФ по СГФ и СДГС . 17\nПриложение C. Рекомендации миссий МВФ по СГФ в части ЕБК и ЕПС ...................................... 24\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 1", "text_characters": 1276}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Акронимы и сокращения**\n\nБЦД Департамент стран Ближнего Востока и Центральной Азии МВФ\n\n\nБюро национальной статистики Агентства по стратегическому\nБНС\nпланированию и реформам Республики Казахстан\n\n\nГС Государственный сектор\n\n\nГФСС Государственный фонд социального страхования\n\n\nДБЗ Департамент бюджетного законодательства МФ\n\n\nДГЗ Департамент государственного заимствования МФ\n\n\nДОС Департамент отчетности и СГФ МФ\n\n\nЕБК Единая бюджетная классификация\n\n\nЕПС Единый план счетов\n\n\nКГС Квазигосударственный сектор\n\n\nКСЭ Классификатор секторов экономики\n\n\nМИО Местные исполнительные органы\n\n\nМР Методические рекомендации\n\n\nМНЭ Министерство национальной экономики Республики Казахстан\n\n\nМФ Министерство финансов Республики Казахстан\n\n\nНБК Национальный банк Республики Казахстан\n\n\nНФРК Национальный фонд Республики Казахстан\n\n\nПБ Платежный баланс\n\n\nРК Республика Казахстан\n\n\nРБ Республиканский бюджет\n\n\n_РСГФ 2014_ _Руководство по статистике государственных финансов 2014 года_\n\n\n_Статистика долга государственного сектора. Руководство для_\n_РСДГС_\n_составителей и пользователей_\n\n\nСГУ Сектор государственного управления\n\n\nСГФ Статистика государственных финансов\n\n\nСДГС Статистика долга государственного сектора\n\n\nСД МВФ Статистический департамент МВФ\n\n\n_СНС 2008_ _Система национальных счетов 2008 года_\n\n\n_СОКД_ _Система оценки качества данных_\n\n\nУГФ Управление государственными финансами\n\n\nФКП Фонд компенсации потерпевшим\n\n\nФСМС Фонд социального медицинского страхования\n\n\nФПК Фонд проблемных кредитов\n\n\nРегиональный центр развития потенциала для стран Кавказа,\nЦТП-КЦАМ\nЦентральной Азии и Монголии\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 2", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Акронимы и сокращения\n\nБЦД Департамент стран Ближнего Востока и Центральной Азии МВФ\n\nБюро национальной статистики Агентства по стратегическому\nБНС\nпланированию и реформам Республики Казахстан\n\nГС Государственный сектор\n\nГФСС Государственный фонд социального страхования\n\nДБЗ Департамент бюджетного законодательства МФ\n\nДГЗ Департамент государственного заимствования МФ\n\nДОС Департамент отчетности и СГФ МФ\n\nЕБК Единая бюджетная классификация\n\nЕПС Единый план счетов\n\nКГС Квазигосударственный сектор\n\nКСЭ Классификатор секторов экономики\n\nМИО Местные исполнительные органы\n\nМР Методические рекомендации\n\nМНЭ Министерство национальной экономики Республики Казахстан\n\nМФ Министерство финансов Республики Казахстан\n\nНБК Национальный банк Республики Казахстан\n\nНФРК Национальный фонд Республики Казахстан\n\nПБ Платежный баланс\n\nРК Республика Казахстан\n\nРБ Республиканский бюджет\n\n_РСГФ 2014_ _Руководство по статистике государственных финансов 2014 года_\n\n_Статистика долга государственного сектора. Руководство для_\n_РСДГС_\n_составителей и пользователей_\n\nСГУ Сектор государственного управления\n\nСГФ Статистика государственных финансов\n\nСДГС Статистика долга государственного сектора\n\nСД МВФ Статистический департамент МВФ\n\n_СНС 2008_ _Система национальных счетов 2008 года_\n\n_СОКД_ _Система оценки качества данных_\n\nУГФ Управление государственными финансами\n\nФКП Фонд компенсации потерпевшим\n\nФСМС Фонд социального медицинского страхования\n\nФПК Фонд проблемных кредитов\n\nРегиональный центр развития потенциала для стран Кавказа,\nЦТП-КЦАМ\nЦентральной Азии и Монголии\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 2", "text_characters": 1405}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **Резюме результатов миссии и приоритетных** **рекомендаций**\n\n**1. Миссия технической помощи (ТП) по статистике государственных финансов**\n**(СГФ) состоялась в Астане в период с 10 по 21 октября 2022 года.** Миссия проведена\nСтатистическим департаментом МВФ (СД МВФ) в соответствии с запросом Министерства\nфинансов (МФ) Республики Казахстан (РК) и по согласованию с Департаментом стран\nБлижнего Востока и Центральной Азии (БЦД) МВФ в рамках реализации рабочего\nнаправления по развитию потенциала СГФ-Статистика долга государственного сектора\n(СГДС) в ЦТП-КЦАМ. Миссия благодарит руководство и сотрудников МФ, Министерства\nэкономики РК (МНЭ), Национального банка РК (НБК), Бюро национальной статистики (БНС)\nи Фонда проблемных кредитов (ФПК) за сотрудничество и продуктивное взаимодействие.\nПеречень должностных лиц, с которыми встречалась миссия, приведен в Приложении A.\n\n**2. Основная цель миссии заключалась в оказании поддержки Департаменту**\n**отчетности и СГФ (ДОС) МФ по вопросам формировании СГФ** . В связи с этим миссия\nсосредоточилась на рассмотрении и доработке годовой отчетности по СГФ за 2021 год.\nОсобое внимание миссия уделила обучению нового составителя СГФ и провайдеров\nисходных данных базовым основам СГФ, учетным принципам, классификациям\n_Руководства по статистике государственных финансов 2014 года (РСГФ 2014)_,\nпереходным таблицам и процедурам контроля качества данных. Дополнительно миссия\nпредставила рекомендации по вопросам разграничения сектора государственного\nуправления (СГУ) и государственного сектора (ГС). В заключение миссия разработала и\nплан действий по дальнейшему совершенствованию СГФ/СДГС.\n\n**3. Миссия отметила прогресс в укреплении институциональных основ**\n**формирования налогово-бюджетной отчетности, в том числе СГФ.** Новая Концепция\nуправления государственными финансами РК до 2030 года (Концепция УГФ) предполагает\nгармонизацию классификации операций СГУ с требованиями международных стандартов\nСГФ и системы национальных счетов (СНС) к 2029 году. Cогласно БК [1] и Концепции УГФ с\n1 января 2024 года вводится в действие Единый план счетов (ЕПС), объединяющий коды\nсчетов бухгалтерского учета, бюджетного учета и единой бюджетной классификации\n(ЕБК), а также кассовые и начисленные данные.\n\n**4. Годовая отчетность по СГФ РК за 2021 год частично охватывает операции и**\n**балансовые позиции по активам и обязательствам СГУ.** Миссия оказала содействие в\nдоработке отчета по СГФ за 2021 год, включая данные ФПК, который относится к СГУ в\nсоответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ [2] . Однако в декабре 2022 года ДОС МФ проинформировал\nмиссию о решении (i) не включать ФПК в публикуемую СГФ за 2021 год и (ii)\nскорректировать ранее представленные в МВФ данные отчетности по СГФ за 2020 год. Как\nсообщил ДОС, это решение связано с тем, что понятие консолидированного бюджета в\nсоответствии с БК не включает ФПК. Миссия отметила, что в международной практике,\nописание которой содержится в Руководстве МВФ по налогово-бюджетной прозрачности [3],\nотчетность об исполнении консолидированного бюджета в соответствии с национальным\nзаконодательством и отчетность по международным стандартам дополняют друг друга\n\n\n1 В соответствии с Законом РК от 31.12.2021 № 100 Глава 22 Бюджетного кодекса РК дополнена статьей 116-1, которая\nвводится в действие с 01.01.2024.\n\n2 Более подробные рекомендации в отношении институциональной классификации ФПК в составе СГУ и отражения\nданных ФПК согласно _РСГФ 2014_ см. в Докладе о работе миссии по ТП в области СГФ (2–13 сентября 2019), Докладе о\nработе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года) и Докладе о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ и\nСДГС (15-26 ноября 2021 года).\n\n[3 IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency)\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Резюме результатов миссии и приоритетных рекомендаций\n\n1. Миссия технической помощи (ТП) по статистике государственных финансов\n(СГФ) состоялась в Астане в период с 10 по 21 октября 2022 года. Миссия проведена\nСтатистическим департаментом МВФ (СД МВФ) в соответствии с запросом Министерства\nфинансов (МФ) Республики Казахстан (РК) и по согласованию с Департаментом стран\nБлижнего Востока и Центральной Азии (БЦД) МВФ в рамках реализации рабочего\nнаправления по развитию потенциала СГФ-Статистика долга государственного сектора\n(СГДС) в ЦТП-КЦАМ. Миссия благодарит руководство и сотрудников МФ, Министерства\nэкономики РК (МНЭ), Национального банка РК (НБК), Бюро национальной статистики (БНС)\nи Фонда проблемных кредитов (ФПК) за сотрудничество и продуктивное взаимодействие.\nПеречень должностных лиц, с которыми встречалась миссия, приведен в Приложении A.\n\n2. Основная цель миссии заключалась в оказании поддержки Департаменту\nотчетности и СГФ (ДОС) МФ по вопросам формировании СГФ . В связи с этим миссия\nсосредоточилась на рассмотрении и доработке годовой отчетности по СГФ за 2021 год.\nОсобое внимание миссия уделила обучению нового составителя СГФ и провайдеров\nисходных данных базовым основам СГФ, учетным принципам, классификациям\n_Руководства по статистике государственных финансов 2014 года (РСГФ 2014)_,\nпереходным таблицам и процедурам контроля качества данных. Дополнительно миссия\nпредставила рекомендации по вопросам разграничения сектора государственного\nуправления (СГУ) и государственного сектора (ГС). В заключение миссия разработала и\nплан действий по дальнейшему совершенствованию СГФ/СДГС.\n\n3. Миссия отметила прогресс в укреплении институциональных основ\nформирования налогово-бюджетной отчетности, в том числе СГФ. Новая Концепция\nуправления государственными финансами РК до 2030 года (Концепция УГФ) предполагает\nгармонизацию классификации операций СГУ с требованиями международных стандартов\nСГФ и системы национальных счетов (СНС) к 2029 году. Cогласно БК [1] и Концепции УГФ с\n1 января 2024 года вводится в действие Единый план счетов (ЕПС), объединяющий коды\nсчетов бухгалтерского учета, бюджетного учета и единой бюджетной классификации\n(ЕБК), а также кассовые и начисленные данные.\n\n4. Годовая отчетность по СГФ РК за 2021 год частично охватывает операции и\nбалансовые позиции по активам и обязательствам СГУ. Миссия оказала содействие в\nдоработке отчета по СГФ за 2021 год, включая данные ФПК, который относится к СГУ в\nсоответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ [2] . Однако в декабре 2022 года ДОС МФ проинформировал\nмиссию о решении (i) не включать ФПК в публикуемую СГФ за 2021 год и (ii)\nскорректировать ранее представленные в МВФ данные отчетности по СГФ за 2020 год. Как\nсообщил ДОС, это решение связано с тем, что понятие консолидированного бюджета в\nсоответствии с БК не включает ФПК. Миссия отметила, что в международной практике,\nописание которой содержится в Руководстве МВФ по налогово-бюджетной прозрачности [3],\nотчетность об исполнении консолидированного бюджета в соответствии с национальным\nзаконодательством и отчетность по международным стандартам дополняют друг друга\n\n1 В соответствии с Законом РК от 31.12.2021 № 100 Глава 22 Бюджетного кодекса РК дополнена статьей 116-1, которая\nвводится в действие с 01.01.2024.\n\n2 Более подробные рекомендации в отношении институциональной классификации ФПК в составе СГУ и отражения\nданных ФПК согласно _РСГФ 2014_ см. в Докладе о работе миссии по ТП в области СГФ (2–13 сентября 2019), Докладе о\nработе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года) и Докладе о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ и\nСДГС (15-26 ноября 2021 года).\n\n3 IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 3", "text_characters": 3258}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0007-001"], "markdown": "для обеспечения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности правительства, и рекомендовала\nвключать ФПК в публикуемую отчетность по СГФ.\n\n**5. В соответствии с** _**РСГФ 2014 года**_ **СГФ должна охватывать не только СГУ, но и**\n**государственные предприятия и организации, ориентированные на получение**\n**прибыли.** Миссия отметила что в настоящее время ни одно из ведомств, участвующих в\nформировании макроэкономической статистики, не публикует перечень\nинституциональных единиц ГС, определяемых в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС_ . Миссия\nрекомендует усилить межведомственное взаимодействие для обеспечения\nединообразного подхода к определению границ СГУ и ГС РК с учетом _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС_, а\nтакже согласовать и опубликовать перечень соответствующих институциональных единиц.\nВ ходе совместной встречи миссии с МФ и БНС ДОС заявил о готовности выступить в роли\nкоординатора в согласовании соответствующих межведомственных вопросов со стороны\nМФ.\n\n**6. Наличие необходимых институциональных условий является одной из важных**\n**предпосылок качества СГФ.** Так, в Рекомендациях по применению Системы оценки\nкачества данных СГФ и СДГС (СОКД) отмечается, что обязанности по сбору, обработке и\nраспространению статистики должны выполняться квалифицированными специалистами и\nбыть четко определены и закреплены за конкретным ведомством законом или иным\nофициальным документом. С учетом необходимости реализации Концепции УГФ,\nповышения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности и обеспечения качества статистических\nданных миссия отметила целесообразность создания в ДОС отдельного подразделения,\nкоторое бы более предметно занималось вопросами СГФ, а также закрепления на\nзаконодательном уровне (например, в БК) полномочий МФ по сбору, обработке и\nраспространению СГФ и СДГС в соответствии с международными стандартами.\n\n\n**Для содействия продвижению в указанных выше областях миссия рекомендовала**\n**подробный план действий со следующими приоритетными рекомендациями:**\n\n\n**TABLE 1.** Приоритетные рекомендации\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Дополнительные сведения о рекомендациях и соответствующих мерах имеются в плане**\n**действий в разделе «Подробная техническая оценка и рекомендации».**\n\n\n4 Годовой отчет по СГФ за 2021 год (за исключением ФПК) направлен в МВФ 15.11.2022. В связи с решением,\nпринятым МФ в декабре 2022 (см. пояснения в параграфе 4), годовой отчет по СГФ не включает ФПК.\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "для обеспечения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности правительства, и рекомендовала\nвключать ФПК в публикуемую отчетность по СГФ.\n\n5. В соответствии с _РСГФ 2014 года_ СГФ должна охватывать не только СГУ, но и\nгосударственные предприятия и организации, ориентированные на получение\nприбыли. Миссия отметила что в настоящее время ни одно из ведомств, участвующих в\nформировании макроэкономической статистики, не публикует перечень\nинституциональных единиц ГС, определяемых в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС_ . Миссия\nрекомендует усилить межведомственное взаимодействие для обеспечения\nединообразного подхода к определению границ СГУ и ГС РК с учетом _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС_, а\nтакже согласовать и опубликовать перечень соответствующих институциональных единиц.\nВ ходе совместной встречи миссии с МФ и БНС ДОС заявил о готовности выступить в роли\nкоординатора в согласовании соответствующих межведомственных вопросов со стороны\nМФ.\n\n6. Наличие необходимых институциональных условий является одной из важных\nпредпосылок качества СГФ. Так, в Рекомендациях по применению Системы оценки\nкачества данных СГФ и СДГС (СОКД) отмечается, что обязанности по сбору, обработке и\nраспространению статистики должны выполняться квалифицированными специалистами и\nбыть четко определены и закреплены за конкретным ведомством законом или иным\nофициальным документом. С учетом необходимости реализации Концепции УГФ,\nповышения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности и обеспечения качества статистических\nданных миссия отметила целесообразность создания в ДОС отдельного подразделения,\nкоторое бы более предметно занималось вопросами СГФ, а также закрепления на\nзаконодательном уровне (например, в БК) полномочий МФ по сбору, обработке и\nраспространению СГФ и СДГС в соответствии с международными стандартами.\n\nДля содействия продвижению в указанных выше областях миссия рекомендовала\nподробный план действий со следующими приоритетными рекомендациями:\n\nTABLE 1. Приоритетные рекомендации\n\nДополнительные сведения о рекомендациях и соответствующих мерах имеются в плане\nдействий в разделе «Подробная техническая оценка и рекомендации».\n\n4 Годовой отчет по СГФ за 2021 год (за исключением ФПК) направлен в МВФ 15.11.2022. В связи с решением,\nпринятым МФ в декабре 2022 (см. пояснения в параграфе 4), годовой отчет по СГФ не включает ФПК.\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 4", "text_characters": 2046}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "#### **ПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И** **РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ**\n\n**A. УКРЕПЛЕНИЕ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ОСНОВ СГФ**\n\n\n**7. Передовая международная практика, представленная в Руководстве по**\n**налогово-бюджетной прозрачности, предусматривает три основных категории**\n**отчетности:** отчетность об исполнении бюджета, налогово-бюджетная статистика и\nфинансовая отчетность [5] . Отчетность об исполнении бюджета соответствует формату\nбюджета и классификациям, установленным национальным законодательством. Налоговобюджетная статистика формируется согласно национальным или международным\nстатистическим стандартам и обобщает информацию о влиянии государственных\nфинансов на экономику в целом. Финансовая отчетность государства составляются в\nсоответствии с национальными или международными стандартами и характеризует\nфинансовое положение и результаты финансовой деятельности правительства.\nУказанные категории отчетности дополняют друг друга, обеспечивая налогово-бюджетную\nпрозрачность и информационную основу для эффективного управления\nгосударственными финансами.\n\n\n**8. Реализация Концепции УГФ** **[6]** **будет способствовать укреплению**\n**институциональных основ налогово-бюджетной отчетности, в том числе СГФ.** В\nцелях обеспечения подотчетности и подконтрольности бюджетных расходов Концепция\nУГФ предполагает дальнейшую гармонизацию классификации операций СГУ с\nтребованиями международных стандартов СГФ и СНС, а также установление единых\nтребований к применению такого вида классификации для ведения бюджетного\n(бухгалтерского) учета, составления бюджетной (бухгалтерской) и иной финансовой\nотчетности. План действий по реализации Концепции УГФ предполагает разработку\nпроекта Закона РК по внесению изменений в БК в целях гармонизации классификации\nопераций СГУ с требованиями международных стандартов по СГФ к январю 2029 года.\n\n\n**9. Концепция УГФ предусматривает переход на КФО в соответствии с**\n**международными стандартами.** В настоящее время КФО составляется отдельно для\nреспубликанского бюджета и консолидированных бюджетов местных исполнительных\nорганов (МИО). Поэтапный переход к составлению КФО РК в соответствии с Концепцией\nУГФ предполагает расширение периметра консолидации и консолидируемых показателей\nбухгалтерской отчетности, а также формирование отчетности по сегментам. Согласно\nКонцепции УГФ, КФО будет включать ГС и КГС на республиканском и местном уровне, а\nтакже Национальный фонд Республики Казахстан (НФ) и внебюджетные фонды. В\nсоответствии с Планом действий по реализации Концепции УГФ разработка проекта\nЗакона РК, предусматривающего поэтапный переход на КФО, составленную в\nсоответствии с международными стандартами, предусмотрена к январю 2028 года.\n\n\n**10. Наличие необходимых правовых и институциональных условий является**\n**одной из важных предпосылок качества СГФ.** Согласно Рекомендациям МВФ по\n\n\n5 [IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency)\n\n6 Указ Президента РК от 10.09.2022 № 1005 «Об утверждении Концепции управления государственными\nфинансами Республики Казахстан до 2030 года»\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ПОДРОБНАЯ ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА И РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ\n\nA. УКРЕПЛЕНИЕ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ОСНОВ СГФ\n\n7. Передовая международная практика, представленная в Руководстве по\nналогово-бюджетной прозрачности, предусматривает три основных категории\nотчетности: отчетность об исполнении бюджета, налогово-бюджетная статистика и\nфинансовая отчетность [5] . Отчетность об исполнении бюджета соответствует формату\nбюджета и классификациям, установленным национальным законодательством. Налоговобюджетная статистика формируется согласно национальным или международным\nстатистическим стандартам и обобщает информацию о влиянии государственных\nфинансов на экономику в целом. Финансовая отчетность государства составляются в\nсоответствии с национальными или международными стандартами и характеризует\nфинансовое положение и результаты финансовой деятельности правительства.\nУказанные категории отчетности дополняют друг друга, обеспечивая налогово-бюджетную\nпрозрачность и информационную основу для эффективного управления\nгосударственными финансами.\n\n8. Реализация Концепции УГФ [6] будет способствовать укреплению\nинституциональных основ налогово-бюджетной отчетности, в том числе СГФ. В\nцелях обеспечения подотчетности и подконтрольности бюджетных расходов Концепция\nУГФ предполагает дальнейшую гармонизацию классификации операций СГУ с\nтребованиями международных стандартов СГФ и СНС, а также установление единых\nтребований к применению такого вида классификации для ведения бюджетного\n(бухгалтерского) учета, составления бюджетной (бухгалтерской) и иной финансовой\nотчетности. План действий по реализации Концепции УГФ предполагает разработку\nпроекта Закона РК по внесению изменений в БК в целях гармонизации классификации\nопераций СГУ с требованиями международных стандартов по СГФ к январю 2029 года.\n\n9. Концепция УГФ предусматривает переход на КФО в соответствии с\nмеждународными стандартами. В настоящее время КФО составляется отдельно для\nреспубликанского бюджета и консолидированных бюджетов местных исполнительных\nорганов (МИО). Поэтапный переход к составлению КФО РК в соответствии с Концепцией\nУГФ предполагает расширение периметра консолидации и консолидируемых показателей\nбухгалтерской отчетности, а также формирование отчетности по сегментам. Согласно\nКонцепции УГФ, КФО будет включать ГС и КГС на республиканском и местном уровне, а\nтакже Национальный фонд Республики Казахстан (НФ) и внебюджетные фонды. В\nсоответствии с Планом действий по реализации Концепции УГФ разработка проекта\nЗакона РК, предусматривающего поэтапный переход на КФО, составленную в\nсоответствии с международными стандартами, предусмотрена к январю 2028 года.\n\n10. Наличие необходимых правовых и институциональных условий является\nодной из важных предпосылок качества СГФ. Согласно Рекомендациям МВФ по\n\n5 IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency\n\n6 Указ Президента РК от 10.09.2022 № 1005 «Об утверждении Концепции управления государственными\nфинансами Республики Казахстан до 2030 года»\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 5", "text_characters": 2716}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "применению Системы оценки качества данных СГФ и СДГС (СОКД) [7 ] правовая и\nинституциональная среда рассматриваются с точки зрения следующих индикаторов: (i)\nобязанности по сбору, обработке и распространению статистики четко определены; (ii)\nнадлежащим образом осуществляется обмен данными и координация между\nведомствами, производящими данные; (iii) данные индивидуальных респондентов\nявляются конфиденциальными и используются исключительно в статистических целях; (iv)\nстатистическая отчетность обеспечивается правовым мандатом и/или мерами,\nспособствующими представлению данных.\n\n\n**11. В БК закреплены основы формирования и представления финансовой и**\n**бюджетной отчетности, однако отсутствуют положения в отношении СГФ и СДГС.**\nСогласно БК порядок ведения бюджетного (бухгалтерского) учета, формы и порядок\nсоставления и представления финансовой отчетности, а также порядок составления и\nпредставления большинства видов бюджетной отчетности определяются МФ. Статья 1161 БК [8] предусматривает введение в действие с 1 января 2024 года ЕПС, разработка и\nутверждение которого также закреплены за МФ. При этом в БК отсутствуют какие-либо\nположения в отношении формирования и представления СГФ и СГС. Задача МФ по\nвыработке предложений по СГФ и функции МФ по ведению СГФ закреплены лишь на\nуровне Положения о МФ, утвержденного Правительством РК [9] . Миссия отметила, что\nобязанности по представлению исходных данных, необходимых для составления СГФ по\nСГУ и ГС, а также требования к форматам, содержанию и срокам представления таких\nисходных данных до настоящего времени не формализованы.\n\n\n**12. В Рекомендациях МВФ по применению СОКД подчеркивается необходимость**\n**привлечения и удержания квалифицированного персонала для составления СГФ.**\nОсобенно важно, чтобы штатное расписание и соответствующие меры стимулирования\nпозволяли поддерживать «критическую массу» кадровых ресурсов для СГФ. Как\nотмечается в СОКД, составители СГФ должны иметь возможность дополнительного\nобучения методологии СГФ, включая участие в международных тренингах. При этом\nсоставители СГФ должны обеспечивать максимально широкое распространение\nполученных знаний о концепциях и методологии СГФ, в том числе среди специалистов,\nвовлеченных в работу по мониторингу и анализу эффективности налогово-бюджетной\nполитики, обеспечению прозрачности информации о государственных финансах.\n\n\n**13. Миссия отметила, что в ДОС отсутствует отдельное подразделение, которое**\n**бы целенаправленно занималось вопросами СГФ.** В частности, к таким вопросам\nотносятся развитие методологии формирования СГФ и соответствующих исходных данных\nв соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_, включая вопросы секторизации, обеспечение внутренней\nсогласованности СГФ и сопоставимости с данными по СГУ в других подсистемах\nмакроэкономической статистики, своевременной публикации статистических данных.\nСоздание отдельного подразделения по СГФ представляется целесообразным с учетом\nнеобходимости реализации Концепции УГФ, повышения налогово-бюджетной\nпрозрачности и обеспечения качества статистических данных РК, расширения\nинформационной базы для анализа устойчивости государственных финансов и разработки\nбюджетной политики в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе.\n\n\n[7IMF Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF) for GFS and PSDS: https://dsbb.imf.org/content/pdfs/dqrs_gfs.pdf](https://dsbb.imf.org/content/pdfs/dqrs_gfs.pdf)\n\n\n8 В соответствии с Законом РК от 31.12.2021 № 100 Глава 22 БК дополнена статьей 116-1 (вводится в действие с\n01.01.2024).\n\n\n9\nПостановление Правительства РК от 24.04.2008 № 387 «О некоторых вопросах Министерства финансов Республики\nКазахстан», пп. 13 (1) и 15 (22).\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "применению Системы оценки качества данных СГФ и СДГС (СОКД) [7 ] правовая и\nинституциональная среда рассматриваются с точки зрения следующих индикаторов: (i)\nобязанности по сбору, обработке и распространению статистики четко определены; (ii)\nнадлежащим образом осуществляется обмен данными и координация между\nведомствами, производящими данные; (iii) данные индивидуальных респондентов\nявляются конфиденциальными и используются исключительно в статистических целях; (iv)\nстатистическая отчетность обеспечивается правовым мандатом и/или мерами,\nспособствующими представлению данных.\n\n11. В БК закреплены основы формирования и представления финансовой и\nбюджетной отчетности, однако отсутствуют положения в отношении СГФ и СДГС.\nСогласно БК порядок ведения бюджетного (бухгалтерского) учета, формы и порядок\nсоставления и представления финансовой отчетности, а также порядок составления и\nпредставления большинства видов бюджетной отчетности определяются МФ. Статья 1161 БК [8] предусматривает введение в действие с 1 января 2024 года ЕПС, разработка и\nутверждение которого также закреплены за МФ. При этом в БК отсутствуют какие-либо\nположения в отношении формирования и представления СГФ и СГС. Задача МФ по\nвыработке предложений по СГФ и функции МФ по ведению СГФ закреплены лишь на\nуровне Положения о МФ, утвержденного Правительством РК [9] . Миссия отметила, что\nобязанности по представлению исходных данных, необходимых для составления СГФ по\nСГУ и ГС, а также требования к форматам, содержанию и срокам представления таких\nисходных данных до настоящего времени не формализованы.\n\n12. В Рекомендациях МВФ по применению СОКД подчеркивается необходимость\nпривлечения и удержания квалифицированного персонала для составления СГФ.\nОсобенно важно, чтобы штатное расписание и соответствующие меры стимулирования\nпозволяли поддерживать «критическую массу» кадровых ресурсов для СГФ. Как\nотмечается в СОКД, составители СГФ должны иметь возможность дополнительного\nобучения методологии СГФ, включая участие в международных тренингах. При этом\nсоставители СГФ должны обеспечивать максимально широкое распространение\nполученных знаний о концепциях и методологии СГФ, в том числе среди специалистов,\nвовлеченных в работу по мониторингу и анализу эффективности налогово-бюджетной\nполитики, обеспечению прозрачности информации о государственных финансах.\n\n13. Миссия отметила, что в ДОС отсутствует отдельное подразделение, которое\nбы целенаправленно занималось вопросами СГФ. В частности, к таким вопросам\nотносятся развитие методологии формирования СГФ и соответствующих исходных данных\nв соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_, включая вопросы секторизации, обеспечение внутренней\nсогласованности СГФ и сопоставимости с данными по СГУ в других подсистемах\nмакроэкономической статистики, своевременной публикации статистических данных.\nСоздание отдельного подразделения по СГФ представляется целесообразным с учетом\nнеобходимости реализации Концепции УГФ, повышения налогово-бюджетной\nпрозрачности и обеспечения качества статистических данных РК, расширения\nинформационной базы для анализа устойчивости государственных финансов и разработки\nбюджетной политики в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе.\n\n7IMF Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF) for GFS and PSDS: https://dsbb.imf.org/content/pdfs/dqrs_gfs.pdf\n\n8 В соответствии с Законом РК от 31.12.2021 № 100 Глава 22 БК дополнена статьей 116-1 (вводится в действие с\n01.01.2024).\n\n9\nПостановление Правительства РК от 24.04.2008 № 387 «О некоторых вопросах Министерства финансов Республики\nКазахстан», пп. 13 (1) и 15 (22).\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 6", "text_characters": 3164}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**14. Миссия приветствует начатую ДОС работу по описанию Методики**\n**составления и представления годового отчета по СГФ.** Методика включает требования\nо периодичности и сроках представления СГФ в МВФ, описание состава годового отчета\nпо СГФ и перечень источников информации для его составления, порядок заполнения\nвспомогательных таблиц в Классификационном помощнике, примеры контрольных\nсоотношений. Рекомендуется дополнить Методику более подробными пояснениями в\nотношении исходных данных, особенностей составления данных по подсекторам СГУ,\nконтроля (валидации) отчетности при поступлении в ДОС, применения контрольных\nсоотношений внутри и между таблицами и др. Аналогичные пояснения рекомендуется\nсформулировать в части квартальной отчетности по СГФ, а также соотношения СГФ и\nдругих форматов налогово-бюджетной отчетности, публикуемых ДОС. Кроме того,\nпредставляется целесообразным утвердить Методику соответствующим приказом МФ.\n\n\n_**Рекомендации:**_\n\n\n - _Завершить разработку технической документации по методологии и_\n_процедурам составления и распространения квартальной и годовой СГФ/СДГС –_\nприоритетная рекомендация _._\n\n\n - _Регламентировать (например, совместными приказами) требования к_\n_форматам, содержанию и срокам представления исходных данных, необходимых_\n_для составления СГФ по консолидированному СГУ._\n\n\n - _Рассмотреть вопрос о закреплении на законодательном уровне (например, в БК)_\n_полномочий по формированию и распространению СГФ и СДГС в соответствии_\n_с международными стандартами._\n\n\n**B. ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ГРАНИЦ СГУ И ГС**\n\n\n**15. Охват институциональных единиц СГУ и ГС имеет решающее значение с**\n**точки зрения оценки качества СГФ и в целом налогово-бюджетной прозрачности РК.**\nСогласно Принципу 1.1.1. «Охват организаций» Кодекса прозрачности в налоговобюджетной сфере (Кодекс прозрачности МВФ) [10] налогово-бюджетная отчетность должна\nохватывать все структуры, вовлеченные в деятельность государства. Как отмечается в\n_РСГФ 2014_, статистика должна составляться по СГУ и ГС, а также по всем подсекторам\nСГУ и подсектора государственных корпораций ГС. При этом СГУ должен включать все\nконтролируемые государством предприятия и организации, деятельность которых имеет\nнерыночный характер. В свою очередь, ГС включает СГУ и все рыночные предприятия и\nорганизации, контролируемые СГУ или другими государственными предприятиями и\nорганизациями. В рамках реализации Концепции УГФ вопросы классификации\nинституциональных единиц СГУ и ГС приобретают особую актуальность в связи с\nнеобходимостью обеспечить наиболее полное применение методологии _РСГФ 2014_ .\n\n\n**16. В международных стандартах макроэкономической статистики**\n**подчеркивается преимущество экономического содержания над юридической**\n**формой.** Например, некоторые предприятия и организации, созданные государством в\nформе коммерческих компаний, на протяжении многих лет фактически ведут себя как\nнерыночные производители. Такие организации должны быть отнесены к СГУ независимо\nот их организационно-правовой формы. Если организация учреждается государственным\nорганом как отдельное юридическое лицо, но по факту не может действовать независимо,\nтакая организация должна классифицироваться вместе со своей головной структурой в\n\n\n[10 Pillar I, IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/Code2019.pdf](https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/Code2019.pdf)\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "14. Миссия приветствует начатую ДОС работу по описанию Методики\nсоставления и представления годового отчета по СГФ. Методика включает требования\nо периодичности и сроках представления СГФ в МВФ, описание состава годового отчета\nпо СГФ и перечень источников информации для его составления, порядок заполнения\nвспомогательных таблиц в Классификационном помощнике, примеры контрольных\nсоотношений. Рекомендуется дополнить Методику более подробными пояснениями в\nотношении исходных данных, особенностей составления данных по подсекторам СГУ,\nконтроля (валидации) отчетности при поступлении в ДОС, применения контрольных\nсоотношений внутри и между таблицами и др. Аналогичные пояснения рекомендуется\nсформулировать в части квартальной отчетности по СГФ, а также соотношения СГФ и\nдругих форматов налогово-бюджетной отчетности, публикуемых ДОС. Кроме того,\nпредставляется целесообразным утвердить Методику соответствующим приказом МФ.\n\n_Рекомендации:_\n\n - _Завершить разработку технической документации по методологии и_\n_процедурам составления и распространения квартальной и годовой СГФ/СДГС –_\nприоритетная рекомендация _._\n\n - _Регламентировать (например, совместными приказами) требования к_\n_форматам, содержанию и срокам представления исходных данных, необходимых_\n_для составления СГФ по консолидированному СГУ._\n\n - _Рассмотреть вопрос о закреплении на законодательном уровне (например, в БК)_\n_полномочий по формированию и распространению СГФ и СДГС в соответствии_\n_с международными стандартами._\n\nB. ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ГРАНИЦ СГУ И ГС\n\n15. Охват институциональных единиц СГУ и ГС имеет решающее значение с\nточки зрения оценки качества СГФ и в целом налогово-бюджетной прозрачности РК.\nСогласно Принципу 1.1.1. «Охват организаций» Кодекса прозрачности в налоговобюджетной сфере (Кодекс прозрачности МВФ) [10] налогово-бюджетная отчетность должна\nохватывать все структуры, вовлеченные в деятельность государства. Как отмечается в\n_РСГФ 2014_, статистика должна составляться по СГУ и ГС, а также по всем подсекторам\nСГУ и подсектора государственных корпораций ГС. При этом СГУ должен включать все\nконтролируемые государством предприятия и организации, деятельность которых имеет\nнерыночный характер. В свою очередь, ГС включает СГУ и все рыночные предприятия и\nорганизации, контролируемые СГУ или другими государственными предприятиями и\nорганизациями. В рамках реализации Концепции УГФ вопросы классификации\nинституциональных единиц СГУ и ГС приобретают особую актуальность в связи с\nнеобходимостью обеспечить наиболее полное применение методологии _РСГФ 2014_ .\n\n16. В международных стандартах макроэкономической статистики\nподчеркивается преимущество экономического содержания над юридической\nформой. Например, некоторые предприятия и организации, созданные государством в\nформе коммерческих компаний, на протяжении многих лет фактически ведут себя как\nнерыночные производители. Такие организации должны быть отнесены к СГУ независимо\nот их организационно-правовой формы. Если организация учреждается государственным\nорганом как отдельное юридическое лицо, но по факту не может действовать независимо,\nтакая организация должна классифицироваться вместе со своей головной структурой в\n\n10 Pillar I, IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/Code2019.pdf\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 7", "text_characters": 2928}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "СГУ. Также государственные предприятия и организации должны классифицироваться как\nединицы СГУ, если их деятельность существенно зависит от регулярной финансовой\nподдержки со стороны государства в виде заимствований, реструктуризации долгов,\nпредоставления субсидий, трансфертов или государственных гарантий.\n\n\n**17. С точки зрения** _**РСГФ 2014**_ **ФПК является внебюджетной единицей подсектора**\n**центрального правительства СГУ, данные по которой должны быть включены в**\n**СГФ** **[11]** **.** ФПК реализует государственную политику по освобождению банковского сектора от\nпроблемных кредитов и подчиняется непосредственно Правительству РК, которое несет\nвсе риски и убытки от деятельности ФПК и оказывает ФПК финансовую поддержку за счет\nсредств РБ. Основная часть поддержки банковского сектора со стороны ФПК\nосуществляется путем приобретения у банков активов по цене, значительно выше их\nрыночной/справедливой стоимости, а также размещения депозитов в банках на\nнерыночных условиях. Включение ФПК в СГФ по СГУ обеспечивает более полный охват\nмер государственной политики, направленных на достижение общенациональных целей, а\nтакже более полную картину финансовой деятельности и финансового положения СГУ.\nСтатистика по СГУ, включая ФПК, предоставляет дополнительные аналитические\nвозможности, в том числе в отношении фискальных рисков и долгосрочной устойчивости,\nи в целом способствует улучшению налогово-бюджетной прозрачности РК.\n\n\n**18. Однако в декабре 2022 года МФ принял решение о том, что данные ФПК не**\n**подлежат раскрытию в СГФ РК в связи с отсутствием необходимой**\n**законодательной основы.** При этом МФ ссылается на закрепленное в статье 6 БК\nопределение консолидированного бюджета, который объединяет РБ, местные бюджеты,\nпоступления и расходы НФ, поступления и выплаты ФКП, поступления и расходы\nГосударственного фонда социального страхования (ГФСС), поступления и расходы Фонда\nсоциального медицинского страхования (ФСМС), без учета взаимопогашаемых операций\nмежду ними. В этой связи консолидация ФПК в годовой отчетности по СГФ за 2020 и 2021\nгод рассматривается ДОС МФ как пилотная работа, результаты которой не подлежат\nраскрытию. Миссия отметила, что в международной практике отчетность об исполнении\nконсолидированного бюджета в соответствии с национальным законодательством и\nфинансовая и статистическая отчетность по международным стандартам дополняют друг\nдруга для обеспечения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности правительства, и\nрекомендовала включать ФПК в публикуемую СГФ по СГУ.\n\n\n**19. В законодательстве РК отсутствует определение СГУ и ГС, однако БК**\n**устанавливает перечень субъектов КГС.** К таким субъектам относятся государственные\nпредприятия (ГП), товарищества с ограниченной ответственностью (ТОО), акционерные\nобщества (АО), в том числе национальные управляющие холдинги (НУХ), национальные\nхолдинги, национальные компании, учредителем, участником или акционером которых\nявляется государство, а также дочерние, зависимые и иные юридические лица,\nявляющиеся аффилированными с ними. С точки зрения _СНС 2008_ и _РСГФ 2014_ субъекты\nКГС в зависимости от характера их деятельности (рыночная или нерыночная) могут\nотноситься к СГУ (наряду с государственными учреждениями и внебюджетными фондами),\nгосударственным корпорациям или частным корпорациям.\n\n\n**20. Как отмечается в Концепции УГФ, по состоянию на 2021 год в РК**\n**функционирует порядка 6 400 организаций КГС.** Законодательство определяет для\nсубъектов КГС три вида организационно-правовых форм: АО, ТОО, республиканское и\n\n\n11 Более подробные рекомендации в отношении институциональной классификации ФПК в составе СГУ и отражения\nданных ФПК согласно _РСГФ 2014_ см. в Докладе о работе миссии по ТП в области СГФ (2–13 сентября 2019), Докладе о\nработе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года) и Докладе о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ и\nСДГС (15-26 ноября 2021 года).\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "СГУ. Также государственные предприятия и организации должны классифицироваться как\nединицы СГУ, если их деятельность существенно зависит от регулярной финансовой\nподдержки со стороны государства в виде заимствований, реструктуризации долгов,\nпредоставления субсидий, трансфертов или государственных гарантий.\n\n17. С точки зрения _РСГФ 2014_ ФПК является внебюджетной единицей подсектора\nцентрального правительства СГУ, данные по которой должны быть включены в\nСГФ [11] . ФПК реализует государственную политику по освобождению банковского сектора от\nпроблемных кредитов и подчиняется непосредственно Правительству РК, которое несет\nвсе риски и убытки от деятельности ФПК и оказывает ФПК финансовую поддержку за счет\nсредств РБ. Основная часть поддержки банковского сектора со стороны ФПК\nосуществляется путем приобретения у банков активов по цене, значительно выше их\nрыночной/справедливой стоимости, а также размещения депозитов в банках на\nнерыночных условиях. Включение ФПК в СГФ по СГУ обеспечивает более полный охват\nмер государственной политики, направленных на достижение общенациональных целей, а\nтакже более полную картину финансовой деятельности и финансового положения СГУ.\nСтатистика по СГУ, включая ФПК, предоставляет дополнительные аналитические\nвозможности, в том числе в отношении фискальных рисков и долгосрочной устойчивости,\nи в целом способствует улучшению налогово-бюджетной прозрачности РК.\n\n18. Однако в декабре 2022 года МФ принял решение о том, что данные ФПК не\nподлежат раскрытию в СГФ РК в связи с отсутствием необходимой\nзаконодательной основы. При этом МФ ссылается на закрепленное в статье 6 БК\nопределение консолидированного бюджета, который объединяет РБ, местные бюджеты,\nпоступления и расходы НФ, поступления и выплаты ФКП, поступления и расходы\nГосударственного фонда социального страхования (ГФСС), поступления и расходы Фонда\nсоциального медицинского страхования (ФСМС), без учета взаимопогашаемых операций\nмежду ними. В этой связи консолидация ФПК в годовой отчетности по СГФ за 2020 и 2021\nгод рассматривается ДОС МФ как пилотная работа, результаты которой не подлежат\nраскрытию. Миссия отметила, что в международной практике отчетность об исполнении\nконсолидированного бюджета в соответствии с национальным законодательством и\nфинансовая и статистическая отчетность по международным стандартам дополняют друг\nдруга для обеспечения налогово-бюджетной прозрачности правительства, и\nрекомендовала включать ФПК в публикуемую СГФ по СГУ.\n\n19. В законодательстве РК отсутствует определение СГУ и ГС, однако БК\nустанавливает перечень субъектов КГС. К таким субъектам относятся государственные\nпредприятия (ГП), товарищества с ограниченной ответственностью (ТОО), акционерные\nобщества (АО), в том числе национальные управляющие холдинги (НУХ), национальные\nхолдинги, национальные компании, учредителем, участником или акционером которых\nявляется государство, а также дочерние, зависимые и иные юридические лица,\nявляющиеся аффилированными с ними. С точки зрения _СНС 2008_ и _РСГФ 2014_ субъекты\nКГС в зависимости от характера их деятельности (рыночная или нерыночная) могут\nотноситься к СГУ (наряду с государственными учреждениями и внебюджетными фондами),\nгосударственным корпорациям или частным корпорациям.\n\n20. Как отмечается в Концепции УГФ, по состоянию на 2021 год в РК\nфункционирует порядка 6 400 организаций КГС. Законодательство определяет для\nсубъектов КГС три вида организационно-правовых форм: АО, ТОО, республиканское и\n\n11 Более подробные рекомендации в отношении институциональной классификации ФПК в составе СГУ и отражения\nданных ФПК согласно _РСГФ 2014_ см. в Докладе о работе миссии по ТП в области СГФ (2–13 сентября 2019), Докладе о\nработе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года) и Докладе о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ и\nСДГС (15-26 ноября 2021 года).\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 8", "text_characters": 3371}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "коммунальное предприятие. При этом значительная часть организаций КГС (80 %)\nотносятся к социальным организациям сфер здравоохранения, образования, культуры и\nспорта, которые в основном функционируют как казенные предприятия (4,2 тыс.) и ГП на\nправе хозяйственного ведения (1,3 тыс.). Кроме того, КГС включает 300 АО и 600 ТОО (с\nучетом организаций, входящих в группу компаний АО «Фонд национального\nблагосостояния «Самрук-Казына» и АО «НУХ «Байтерек»). Данные о государственных\nучреждениях (ГУ), которые в соответствии с БК не относятся к субъектам КГС, содержатся\nв Реестре государственного имущества (около 15 тыс. ГУ по состоянию на ноябрь 2022\nгода) [12] .\n\n\n**21. Правительство РК уделяет существенное внимание вопросам эффективности**\n**деятельности КГС и управления государственным имуществом.** Как отмечается в\nКонцепции УГФ, а также в Концепции развития государственного управления в РК до 2030\nгода (Концепция развития ГУ) [13], сохраняются значительная доля участия государства в\nэкономике и большое количество субъектов КГС. При этом наблюдаются низкая\nэффективность КГС, его зависимость от государственного бюджета, слабое корпоративное\nуправление, отсутствие стратегической взаимоувязки деятельности юридических лиц с\nучастием государства с общестрановыми целями. Сохраняется информационная\nзакрытость КГС – в открытом доступе отсутствуют данные о структурах компаний,\nрезультатах финансовой деятельности, выплачиваемых дивидендах и других аспектах\nдеятельности юридических лиц с участием государства.\n\n\n**22. В рамках реализации Национального плана развития РК до 2025 года** **[14]** **,**\n**Концепции развития ГУ и Концепции УГФ МНЭ разрабатывает классификацию**\n**субъектов КГС** **[15]** . Классификация формируется для последующей подготовки\nпредложений по сокращению доли прямого участия государства в экономике, повышению\nэффективности управления государственным имуществом, улучшению конкурентной\nсреды и обеспечению прозрачности деятельности КГС. Применяемый в классификации\nподход предполагает деление субъектов КГС на экономические (коммерческие) и\nнеэкономические (некоммерческие) организации. К неэкономическим относятся школы,\nясли, больницы и иные организации социального характера, пожарные части, научные\nорганизации, осуществляющие фундаментальные исследования, организации,\nоказывающие информационно-аналитическую поддержку государственным органам, а\nтакже национальные институты развития. Экономические организации КГС\nподразделяются на инфраструктурные (100% участие государства в капитале) и\nпроизводственно-финансовые (доля участия государства от 30%).\n\n\n**23. Одновременно МНЭ продолжает формировать перечень государственных**\n**корпораций для определения доли участия государства в экономике РК.** Перечень\nсоставляется с 2019 года в соответствии с утвержденными МНЭ Методическими\nрекомендациями (МР) [16] . Как следует из МР МНЭ, ГС представляет собой часть субъектов\nКГС, которые прямо или косвенно контролируются государством, и исключает\n\n\n12 [Статистика по данным Реестра государственного имущества https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-](https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-details)\n[details.](https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-details)\n\n\n13 Утверждена указом Президента РК от 26.02.2021 № 522.\n\n14 Указ Президента РК от 15.02.2018 № 636 «Об утверждении Национального плана развития РК до 2025\nгода и признании утратившими силу некоторых указов Президента РК».\n\n15 См. Постановление Правительства РК от 06.09.2022 № 654 «Об утверждении Аналитического доклада\nпо реформированию квазигосударственного сектора в РК и Плана мероприятий по его реализации».\n\n16 Приказ МНЭ от 03.08.2017 № 392 «Об утверждении Методических рекомендаций по определению\nучастия государства в экономике РК» (в редакции приказа МНЭ от 17.05.2019 № 125).\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "коммунальное предприятие. При этом значительная часть организаций КГС (80 %)\nотносятся к социальным организациям сфер здравоохранения, образования, культуры и\nспорта, которые в основном функционируют как казенные предприятия (4,2 тыс.) и ГП на\nправе хозяйственного ведения (1,3 тыс.). Кроме того, КГС включает 300 АО и 600 ТОО (с\nучетом организаций, входящих в группу компаний АО «Фонд национального\nблагосостояния «Самрук-Казына» и АО «НУХ «Байтерек»). Данные о государственных\nучреждениях (ГУ), которые в соответствии с БК не относятся к субъектам КГС, содержатся\nв Реестре государственного имущества (около 15 тыс. ГУ по состоянию на ноябрь 2022\nгода) [12] .\n\n21. Правительство РК уделяет существенное внимание вопросам эффективности\nдеятельности КГС и управления государственным имуществом. Как отмечается в\nКонцепции УГФ, а также в Концепции развития государственного управления в РК до 2030\nгода (Концепция развития ГУ) [13], сохраняются значительная доля участия государства в\nэкономике и большое количество субъектов КГС. При этом наблюдаются низкая\nэффективность КГС, его зависимость от государственного бюджета, слабое корпоративное\nуправление, отсутствие стратегической взаимоувязки деятельности юридических лиц с\nучастием государства с общестрановыми целями. Сохраняется информационная\nзакрытость КГС – в открытом доступе отсутствуют данные о структурах компаний,\nрезультатах финансовой деятельности, выплачиваемых дивидендах и других аспектах\nдеятельности юридических лиц с участием государства.\n\n22. В рамках реализации Национального плана развития РК до 2025 года [14] ,\nКонцепции развития ГУ и Концепции УГФ МНЭ разрабатывает классификацию\nсубъектов КГС [15] . Классификация формируется для последующей подготовки\nпредложений по сокращению доли прямого участия государства в экономике, повышению\nэффективности управления государственным имуществом, улучшению конкурентной\nсреды и обеспечению прозрачности деятельности КГС. Применяемый в классификации\nподход предполагает деление субъектов КГС на экономические (коммерческие) и\nнеэкономические (некоммерческие) организации. К неэкономическим относятся школы,\nясли, больницы и иные организации социального характера, пожарные части, научные\nорганизации, осуществляющие фундаментальные исследования, организации,\nоказывающие информационно-аналитическую поддержку государственным органам, а\nтакже национальные институты развития. Экономические организации КГС\nподразделяются на инфраструктурные (100% участие государства в капитале) и\nпроизводственно-финансовые (доля участия государства от 30%).\n\n23. Одновременно МНЭ продолжает формировать перечень государственных\nкорпораций для определения доли участия государства в экономике РК. Перечень\nсоставляется с 2019 года в соответствии с утвержденными МНЭ Методическими\nрекомендациями (МР) [16] . Как следует из МР МНЭ, ГС представляет собой часть субъектов\nКГС, которые прямо или косвенно контролируются государством, и исключает\n\n12 Статистика по данным Реестра государственного имущества https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/ru/gr-statistic/ple-\ndetails.\n\n13 Утверждена указом Президента РК от 26.02.2021 № 522.\n\n14 Указ Президента РК от 15.02.2018 № 636 «Об утверждении Национального плана развития РК до 2025\nгода и признании утратившими силу некоторых указов Президента РК».\n\n15 См. Постановление Правительства РК от 06.09.2022 № 654 «Об утверждении Аналитического доклада\nпо реформированию квазигосударственного сектора в РК и Плана мероприятий по его реализации».\n\n16 Приказ МНЭ от 03.08.2017 № 392 «Об утверждении Методических рекомендаций по определению\nучастия государства в экономике РК» (в редакции приказа МНЭ от 17.05.2019 № 125).\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 9", "text_characters": 3238}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "государственные учреждения. Прямой контроль подразумевает владение государством\nболее 50% голосующих прав, косвенный – от 10% до 50% голосующих прав. В свою\nочередь, СГУ охватывает только государственные учреждения. Таким образом, согласно\nМР МНЭ все субъекты ГС относятся к рыночным производителям, вне зависимости от\nреального характера их деятельности (рыночная или нерыночная). Миссия отметила, что\nподобный подход не полностью соответствует рекомендациям СНС и СГФ, согласно\nкоторым нерыночные организации под контролем государства относятся к СГУ, а также\nотличается от разрабатываемой МНЭ классификации субъектов КГС.\n\n\n**24. Помимо МНЭ, разработку подходов к классификации институциональных**\n**единиц СГУ и ГС осуществляет БНС** . В 2019 году утвержден Классификатор секторов\nэкономики (КСЭ) [17], подготовленный БНС на основе _СНС 2008_ . Кроме прочего, КСЭ\nсодержит определение СГУ и других секторов экономики. С целью внедрения КСЭ БНС с\n2020 года разрабатывает Алгоритм по присвоению кодов КСЭ институциональным\nединицам в Статистическом бизнес-регистре путем сочетания кодов других\nклассификаторов, применяемых в РК. Кроме прочего, Алгоритм предусматривает\nопределение характера деятельности (рыночный или нерыночный) институциональных\nединиц на основе анализа основных показателей финансово-хозяйственной деятельности,\nпредставленных в годовых формах общегосударственного статистического наблюдения, и\nпроцентного соотношения доходов и затрат.\n\n\n**25. Миссия отметила различия в подходах, применяемых МНЭ и БНС для**\n**определения охвата СГУ и ГС** . Согласованный на межведомственном уровне перечень\nинституциональных единиц СГУ и ГС в определении _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС 2008_ отсутствует.\nКакая-либо формализованная взаимосвязь между утвержденными МР МНЭ и КСЭ,\nразработанным БНС, также отсутствует. БНС проинформировало миссию о том, что до\nутверждения Алгоритма предполагается провести тестирование предприятий и\nорганизаций, входящих в перечень единиц ГС, который формируется в соответствии с МР\nМНЭ, на предмет соответствия указанным в проекте Алгоритма критериям. Также БНС\nпланирует рассмотреть вопрос о возможности использования перечня МНЭ для\nклассификации единиц ГС в пограничных случаях теста на нерыночность (если\nсоотношение доходов и затрат колеблется в районе 40-60% из года в год).\n\n\n**26. Миссия обсудила предлагаемые БНС подходы на совместной встрече с МФ,**\n**БНС и параллельной миссией ЦТП-КЦАМ по статистике реального сектора (СРС).** В\nконтексте отнесения предприятий и организаций к ГС миссия обратила внимание на\nнеобходимость предусмотреть в Алгоритме БНС критерии контроля не только со стороны\nСГУ, но и со стороны государственных корпораций. Также миссия отметила, что Алгоритм\nдолжен быть дополнен пояснениями в отношении исходных данных для анализа таких\nкритериев классификации единиц СГУ, как контроль в качестве доминирующего клиента, в\nтом числе оказание государственным органам вспомогательных услуг (бухгалтерский учет,\nобработка данных, транспортные услуги, уборка и чистка, обеспечение безопасности и др.)\nа также контроль, связанный с заимствованием и другими видами финансовой поддержки\nсо стороны органов государственного управления.\n\n\n**27. По определению, алгоритм должен предусматривать последовательность**\n**шагов с целью решения поставленной задачи.** В этой связи миссия ЦТП-КЦАМ по СРС\nрекомендовала дополнить разработанный БНС проект Алгоритма иерархическим\nперечнем действий (возможно, в виде «дерева решений»), которые должны быть\nпредприняты для классификации единиц СГУ и ГС. Обе миссии подчеркнули\n\n\n17 Классификатор секторов экономики (НК РК 13-2019) утвержден приказом Комитета технического\nрегулирования и метрологии Министерства торговли и интеграции РК от 13 декабря 2019 года № 465-од.\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "государственные учреждения. Прямой контроль подразумевает владение государством\nболее 50% голосующих прав, косвенный – от 10% до 50% голосующих прав. В свою\nочередь, СГУ охватывает только государственные учреждения. Таким образом, согласно\nМР МНЭ все субъекты ГС относятся к рыночным производителям, вне зависимости от\nреального характера их деятельности (рыночная или нерыночная). Миссия отметила, что\nподобный подход не полностью соответствует рекомендациям СНС и СГФ, согласно\nкоторым нерыночные организации под контролем государства относятся к СГУ, а также\nотличается от разрабатываемой МНЭ классификации субъектов КГС.\n\n24. Помимо МНЭ, разработку подходов к классификации институциональных\nединиц СГУ и ГС осуществляет БНС . В 2019 году утвержден Классификатор секторов\nэкономики (КСЭ) [17], подготовленный БНС на основе _СНС 2008_ . Кроме прочего, КСЭ\nсодержит определение СГУ и других секторов экономики. С целью внедрения КСЭ БНС с\n2020 года разрабатывает Алгоритм по присвоению кодов КСЭ институциональным\nединицам в Статистическом бизнес-регистре путем сочетания кодов других\nклассификаторов, применяемых в РК. Кроме прочего, Алгоритм предусматривает\nопределение характера деятельности (рыночный или нерыночный) институциональных\nединиц на основе анализа основных показателей финансово-хозяйственной деятельности,\nпредставленных в годовых формах общегосударственного статистического наблюдения, и\nпроцентного соотношения доходов и затрат.\n\n25. Миссия отметила различия в подходах, применяемых МНЭ и БНС для\nопределения охвата СГУ и ГС . Согласованный на межведомственном уровне перечень\nинституциональных единиц СГУ и ГС в определении _РСГФ 2014_ и _СНС 2008_ отсутствует.\nКакая-либо формализованная взаимосвязь между утвержденными МР МНЭ и КСЭ,\nразработанным БНС, также отсутствует. БНС проинформировало миссию о том, что до\nутверждения Алгоритма предполагается провести тестирование предприятий и\nорганизаций, входящих в перечень единиц ГС, который формируется в соответствии с МР\nМНЭ, на предмет соответствия указанным в проекте Алгоритма критериям. Также БНС\nпланирует рассмотреть вопрос о возможности использования перечня МНЭ для\nклассификации единиц ГС в пограничных случаях теста на нерыночность (если\nсоотношение доходов и затрат колеблется в районе 40-60% из года в год).\n\n26. Миссия обсудила предлагаемые БНС подходы на совместной встрече с МФ,\nБНС и параллельной миссией ЦТП-КЦАМ по статистике реального сектора (СРС). В\nконтексте отнесения предприятий и организаций к ГС миссия обратила внимание на\nнеобходимость предусмотреть в Алгоритме БНС критерии контроля не только со стороны\nСГУ, но и со стороны государственных корпораций. Также миссия отметила, что Алгоритм\nдолжен быть дополнен пояснениями в отношении исходных данных для анализа таких\nкритериев классификации единиц СГУ, как контроль в качестве доминирующего клиента, в\nтом числе оказание государственным органам вспомогательных услуг (бухгалтерский учет,\nобработка данных, транспортные услуги, уборка и чистка, обеспечение безопасности и др.)\nа также контроль, связанный с заимствованием и другими видами финансовой поддержки\nсо стороны органов государственного управления.\n\n27. По определению, алгоритм должен предусматривать последовательность\nшагов с целью решения поставленной задачи. В этой связи миссия ЦТП-КЦАМ по СРС\nрекомендовала дополнить разработанный БНС проект Алгоритма иерархическим\nперечнем действий (возможно, в виде «дерева решений»), которые должны быть\nпредприняты для классификации единиц СГУ и ГС. Обе миссии подчеркнули\n\n17 Классификатор секторов экономики (НК РК 13-2019) утвержден приказом Комитета технического\nрегулирования и метрологии Министерства торговли и интеграции РК от 13 декабря 2019 года № 465-од.\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 10", "text_characters": 3288}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "необходимость укрепления межведомственного взаимодействия (БНС, МФ, МНЭ, НБК) по\nвопросам определения охвата СГУ и ГС и согласования классификации соответствующих\nединиц. При этом ДОС МФ выразил готовность взять на себя роль координатора в\nрассмотрении и согласовании соответствующих вопросов со стороны МФ.\n\n\n_**Рекомендация:**_\n\n\n - _Усилить межведомственное взаимодействие для обеспечения единообразного_\n_подхода к определению границ СГУ и ГС РК с учетом РСГФ 2014 и СНС, а также_\n_согласовать и опубликовать перечень соответствующих институциональных_\n_единиц._\n\n\n**C. УЛУЧШЕНИЕ ИСХОДНЫХ ДАННЫХ ДЛЯ СОСТАВЛЕНИЯ СГФ**\n\n\n**28. Данные налогово-бюджетной отчетности должны представлять**\n**всестороннюю и сопоставимую информацию о государственных финансах.** Как\nотмечается в Руководстве МВФ по налогово-бюджетной прозрачности, бюджетная\nклассификация должна быть интегрирована с планом счетов, который содержит структуру\nкодов для классификации и регистрации соответствующей финансовой информации (как\nпотоков, так и запасов). Бюджетные классификации определяют структуру кодов и\nсубкодов плана счетов, относящихся к доходам, расходам и финансовым операциям.\nПомимо экономической и функциональной классификации, операции и балансовые\nпозиции по финансовым активам и обязательствам в СГФ могут классифицироваться в\nсоответствии с резидентной принадлежностью и институциональными секторами, к\nкоторым относятся контрагенты по финансовым инструментам, а также по видам\nфинансовых инструментов.\n\n\n**29.** **СГФ в соответствии с** _**РСГФ 2014**_ **способствует улучшению налогово-**\n**бюджетной прозрачности и подотчетности Правительства РК.** В соответствии с\nзапросом Правительства РК в январе 2023 года будет проведена оценка соответствия РК\nКодексу прозрачности МВФ. Одним из элементов такой оценки станет подробный анализ\nотчетности об исполнении бюджетов, КФО и отчетности по СГФ. В дополнение к охвату\nединиц ГС будут оцениваться такие параметры, как охват балансовых позиций, операций\nи других экономических потоков, налоговых расходов, частота и своевременность\nпубликации отчетных данных, применяемые классификации, внутренняя согласованность\nданных, порядок исправления ошибок в данных за предыдущие отчетные периоды,\nсоответствие международным стандартам, внешний аудит, сопоставимость бюджетных\nпрогнозов, бюджетов и налогово-бюджетной отчетности.\n\n\n**30. Миссия отметила начатую ДОС работу по контролю качества исходных**\n**данных для СГФ, передаваемых в МФ НБК, ФПК, ГФСС, ФСМС.** Так, в части активов\nНФ и ГФСС осуществляется проверка согласованности сумм изменений балансовых\nпозиций с суммами соответствующих операций и других экономических потоков.\nАналогичную проверку рекомендуется распространить на все балансовые позиции СГУ.\nКак отмечалось в отчете предыдущей миссии по СГФ (состоявшейся в ноябре 2021 года),\nв отсутствие централизованной базы данных МФ рекомендуется запрашивать исходные\nданные для составления СГФ в формате Отчета об операциях и соответствующих\nдетализированных таблиц, подготовленных с использованием Классификационного\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "необходимость укрепления межведомственного взаимодействия (БНС, МФ, МНЭ, НБК) по\nвопросам определения охвата СГУ и ГС и согласования классификации соответствующих\nединиц. При этом ДОС МФ выразил готовность взять на себя роль координатора в\nрассмотрении и согласовании соответствующих вопросов со стороны МФ.\n\n_Рекомендация:_\n\n - _Усилить межведомственное взаимодействие для обеспечения единообразного_\n_подхода к определению границ СГУ и ГС РК с учетом РСГФ 2014 и СНС, а также_\n_согласовать и опубликовать перечень соответствующих институциональных_\n_единиц._\n\nC. УЛУЧШЕНИЕ ИСХОДНЫХ ДАННЫХ ДЛЯ СОСТАВЛЕНИЯ СГФ\n\n28. Данные налогово-бюджетной отчетности должны представлять\nвсестороннюю и сопоставимую информацию о государственных финансах. Как\nотмечается в Руководстве МВФ по налогово-бюджетной прозрачности, бюджетная\nклассификация должна быть интегрирована с планом счетов, который содержит структуру\nкодов для классификации и регистрации соответствующей финансовой информации (как\nпотоков, так и запасов). Бюджетные классификации определяют структуру кодов и\nсубкодов плана счетов, относящихся к доходам, расходам и финансовым операциям.\nПомимо экономической и функциональной классификации, операции и балансовые\nпозиции по финансовым активам и обязательствам в СГФ могут классифицироваться в\nсоответствии с резидентной принадлежностью и институциональными секторами, к\nкоторым относятся контрагенты по финансовым инструментам, а также по видам\nфинансовых инструментов.\n\n29. СГФ в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ способствует улучшению налогово-\nбюджетной прозрачности и подотчетности Правительства РК. В соответствии с\nзапросом Правительства РК в январе 2023 года будет проведена оценка соответствия РК\nКодексу прозрачности МВФ. Одним из элементов такой оценки станет подробный анализ\nотчетности об исполнении бюджетов, КФО и отчетности по СГФ. В дополнение к охвату\nединиц ГС будут оцениваться такие параметры, как охват балансовых позиций, операций\nи других экономических потоков, налоговых расходов, частота и своевременность\nпубликации отчетных данных, применяемые классификации, внутренняя согласованность\nданных, порядок исправления ошибок в данных за предыдущие отчетные периоды,\nсоответствие международным стандартам, внешний аудит, сопоставимость бюджетных\nпрогнозов, бюджетов и налогово-бюджетной отчетности.\n\n30. Миссия отметила начатую ДОС работу по контролю качества исходных\nданных для СГФ, передаваемых в МФ НБК, ФПК, ГФСС, ФСМС. Так, в части активов\nНФ и ГФСС осуществляется проверка согласованности сумм изменений балансовых\nпозиций с суммами соответствующих операций и других экономических потоков.\nАналогичную проверку рекомендуется распространить на все балансовые позиции СГУ.\nКак отмечалось в отчете предыдущей миссии по СГФ (состоявшейся в ноябре 2021 года),\nв отсутствие централизованной базы данных МФ рекомендуется запрашивать исходные\nданные для составления СГФ в формате Отчета об операциях и соответствующих\nдетализированных таблиц, подготовленных с использованием Классификационного\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 11", "text_characters": 2687}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "помощника по СГФ [18] . В дальнейшем рекомендуется составлять квартальную и годовую\nотчетность по СГФ с использованием автоматизированной системы МФ.\n\n\n**31. МФ продолжает работу по подготовке к внедрению с 1 января 2024 года**\n**Единого плана счетов (ЕПС).** Действующие в настоящее время план счетов бюджетного\nучета и ЕБК обеспечивают возможность составления отчетности о кассовом исполнении\nбюджета. Одновременно консолидированная финансовая отчетность по методу\nначислений формируется с использованием плана счетов бухгалтерского учета для\nбюджетных учреждений республиканского и местного уровней. ЕПС призван объединить\nкоды счетов бухгалтерского учета, бюджетного учета и ЕБК, а также соответствующие\nпотоки кассовых и начисленных данных. Проект ЕПС в виде систематизированного\nперечня кодов счетов с описанием их содержания передан миссии Департаментом\nметодологии бухгалтерского учета, аудита и оценки МФ. Однако в связи с ограничениями\nпо времени и необходимостью решения ранее согласованных с МФ приоритетных задач\nдетальное рассмотрение проекта ЕПС с точки зрения _РСГФ 2014_ осталось за рамками\nработы миссии.\n\n\n**32.** **Возможности нынешней версии ЕПС по формированию исходных данных**\n**для составления СГФ в соответствии с** _**РСГФ 2014**_ **требуют дополнительного**\n**анализа.** Миссия отметила, что в отчетах предыдущих миссий по СГФ представлен ряд\nрекомендаций по совершенствованию ЕБК и плана счетов в соответствии _с РСГФ 2014_\n(см. Приложение C к данному отчету). Передовая зарубежная практика в сфере налоговобюджетной прозрачности [19] свидетельствует о важности интеграции бюджетной\nклассификации с планом счетов для создания согласованной и прозрачной системы\nгруппировки экономических потоков и запасов, обеспечивающей, в том числе,\nвозможность формирования СГФ в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ . В рамках рассмотрения\nвозможностей нынешней версии ЕПС по формированию исходных данных для СГФ\nполезно, кроме прочего, провести анализ того, насколько учтены рекомендации\nпредыдущих миссий. Кроме того, представляется целесообразным дополнить ЕПС более\nподробными рекомендациями по применению счетов и корреспонденцией счетов. Миссия\nподчеркнула необходимость укрепления сотрудничества департаментов МФ, вовлеченных\nв работ по совершенствованию ЕПС и ЕБК.\n\n\n_**Рекомендации:**_\n\n\n - _Инициировать работу по рассмотрению возможностей автоматизации_\n_формирования квартальной и годовой отчетности по СГФ._\n\n\n - _Ежеквартально и ежегодно проводить проверку и валидацию (подтверждение)_\n_данных СГФ, составленных специалистами НБК, ФПК, ГФСС._\n\n\n - _При отражении финансовых активов и обязательств в СГФ сверять_\n_согласованность сумм изменений балансовых позиций с суммами_\n_соответствующих операций и других экономических потоков._\n\n\n18 Классификационный помощник по СГФ – инструмент Excel, разработанный СД МВФ для содействия\nнациональным составителям статистики в соотнесении административных данных с классификациями\n_РСГФ 2014_ .\n\n19 [IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency)\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "помощника по СГФ [18] . В дальнейшем рекомендуется составлять квартальную и годовую\nотчетность по СГФ с использованием автоматизированной системы МФ.\n\n31. МФ продолжает работу по подготовке к внедрению с 1 января 2024 года\nЕдиного плана счетов (ЕПС). Действующие в настоящее время план счетов бюджетного\nучета и ЕБК обеспечивают возможность составления отчетности о кассовом исполнении\nбюджета. Одновременно консолидированная финансовая отчетность по методу\nначислений формируется с использованием плана счетов бухгалтерского учета для\nбюджетных учреждений республиканского и местного уровней. ЕПС призван объединить\nкоды счетов бухгалтерского учета, бюджетного учета и ЕБК, а также соответствующие\nпотоки кассовых и начисленных данных. Проект ЕПС в виде систематизированного\nперечня кодов счетов с описанием их содержания передан миссии Департаментом\nметодологии бухгалтерского учета, аудита и оценки МФ. Однако в связи с ограничениями\nпо времени и необходимостью решения ранее согласованных с МФ приоритетных задач\nдетальное рассмотрение проекта ЕПС с точки зрения _РСГФ 2014_ осталось за рамками\nработы миссии.\n\n32. Возможности нынешней версии ЕПС по формированию исходных данных\nдля составления СГФ в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ требуют дополнительного\nанализа. Миссия отметила, что в отчетах предыдущих миссий по СГФ представлен ряд\nрекомендаций по совершенствованию ЕБК и плана счетов в соответствии _с РСГФ 2014_\n(см. Приложение C к данному отчету). Передовая зарубежная практика в сфере налоговобюджетной прозрачности [19] свидетельствует о важности интеграции бюджетной\nклассификации с планом счетов для создания согласованной и прозрачной системы\nгруппировки экономических потоков и запасов, обеспечивающей, в том числе,\nвозможность формирования СГФ в соответствии с _РСГФ 2014_ . В рамках рассмотрения\nвозможностей нынешней версии ЕПС по формированию исходных данных для СГФ\nполезно, кроме прочего, провести анализ того, насколько учтены рекомендации\nпредыдущих миссий. Кроме того, представляется целесообразным дополнить ЕПС более\nподробными рекомендациями по применению счетов и корреспонденцией счетов. Миссия\nподчеркнула необходимость укрепления сотрудничества департаментов МФ, вовлеченных\nв работ по совершенствованию ЕПС и ЕБК.\n\n_Рекомендации:_\n\n - _Инициировать работу по рассмотрению возможностей автоматизации_\n_формирования квартальной и годовой отчетности по СГФ._\n\n - _Ежеквартально и ежегодно проводить проверку и валидацию (подтверждение)_\n_данных СГФ, составленных специалистами НБК, ФПК, ГФСС._\n\n - _При отражении финансовых активов и обязательств в СГФ сверять_\n_согласованность сумм изменений балансовых позиций с суммами_\n_соответствующих операций и других экономических потоков._\n\n18 Классификационный помощник по СГФ – инструмент Excel, разработанный СД МВФ для содействия\nнациональным составителям статистики в соотнесении административных данных с классификациями\n_РСГФ 2014_ .\n\n19 IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-transparency\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 12", "text_characters": 2688}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0016-001"], "markdown": "**D. ПЛАН ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕМУ РАЗВИТИЮ СГФ**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n20 Подробные пояснения см. в Докладе миссии по СГФ и СДГС, проведенной в период с 15 по 26 ноября 2021 года\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. ПЛАН ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕМУ РАЗВИТИЮ СГФ\n\n20 Подробные пояснения см. в Докладе миссии по СГФ и СДГС, проведенной в период с 15 по 26 ноября 2021 года\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 13", "text_characters": 179}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 14", "text_characters": 54}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "#### **Приложения**\n\n**ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ А. ДОЛЖНОСТНЫЕ ЛИЦА, С КОТОРЫМИ ВСТРЕЧАЛАСЬ МИССИЯ**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Приложения\n\nПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ А. ДОЛЖНОСТНЫЕ ЛИЦА, С КОТОРЫМИ ВСТРЕЧАЛАСЬ МИССИЯ\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 15", "text_characters": 118}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 16", "text_characters": 54}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0020-001"], "markdown": "**ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ B. СТАТУС ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИЙ ПРЕДЫДУЩЕЙ МИССИИ МВФ**\n**ПО СГФ И СДГС**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n21 Годовые формы отчетности по СГФ за 2020 г. направлены в МВФ 03.12.2021.\n\n\n22 Письмо БНС № 16-2-18/306 от 10.11.2021.\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ B. СТАТУС ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИЙ ПРЕДЫДУЩЕЙ МИССИИ МВФ\nПО СГФ И СДГС\n\n21 Годовые формы отчетности по СГФ за 2020 г. направлены в МВФ 03.12.2021.\n\n22 Письмо БНС № 16-2-18/306 от 10.11.2021.\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 17", "text_characters": 221}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0021-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n23 Утвержден приказом руководителя БНС от 18.05.2022 года №55.\n\n\n24 Письмо БНС № 24068 от 30.06.2022.\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "23 Утвержден приказом руководителя БНС от 18.05.2022 года №55.\n\n24 Письмо БНС № 24068 от 30.06.2022.\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 18", "text_characters": 138}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0022-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n25 См. Доклад о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года)\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "25 См. Доклад о работе дистанционной миссии по СГФ (11-22 января 2021 года)\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 19", "text_characters": 117}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0023-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 20", "text_characters": 54}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0024-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 21", "text_characters": 54}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0025-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 22", "text_characters": 54}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0026-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 23", "text_characters": 54}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0027-001"], "markdown": "**ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ C. РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ МИССИЙ МВФ ПО СГФ В ЧАСТИ ЕБК И ЕПС**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ C. РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ МИССИЙ МВФ ПО СГФ В ЧАСТИ ЕБК И ЕПС\n\nМВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 24", "text_characters": 105}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-148-fig-p0028-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nМВФ | Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ | 25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-148", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "МВФ Технический отчет – Казахстан Отчет о работе миссии по СГФ 25", "text_characters": 54}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-151/assets/figures/cr-2023-151-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/assets/figures/cr-2023-151-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/assets/figures/cr-2023-151-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-151/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3546b0e515247e42a3b47712875759bc00dcd3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-151",
+ "title": "Vietnam: Technical Assistance Report-Taxpayer Compliance Risk Management–Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-151.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "e10e2d0a0baa0062b3f6a9459ccb378ff3c43188efb234dc4eb18ddeed441da2",
+ "source_bytes": 467684,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/04/28/vietnam-technical-assistance-report-taxpayer-compliance-risk-managementtourism-compliance-532908",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:20:52+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 3.675,
+ "page_count": 17,
+ "text_characters": 27497,
+ "table_count": 7,
+ "figure_count": 1,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "VIETNAM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT – TOURISM COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "VIETNAM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Taxpayer Compliance Risk Management – Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "January 2023"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Fiscal Affairs Department"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "I. BACKGROUND"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 4,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 5,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "III. SUMMARY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 9,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "IV. RECOMMENDED KEY ACTIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 10,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "V. MATERIALS PROVIDED"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "Appendix I. Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template, November 2022."
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Vietnam: Technical Assistance Report-Taxpayer Compliance Risk Management–Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan; IMF Country Report No. 23/151; January 2023",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Adobe Acrobat Standard (32-bit) 23.1.20143",
+ "producer": "Adobe Acrobat Standard (32-bit) 23.1.20143",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230427163820-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230428125832-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-151/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74684af488863abefdbc73fbde904c822cb9aa88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,764 @@
+
+
+
+
+April 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/151**
+### **VIETNAM**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––TAXPAYER** **COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT – TOURISM** **COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN**
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Vietnam was prepared by an expert of the
+
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+
+completed in January 2023.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+# TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT
+
+## VIETNAM
+#### Taxpayer Compliance Risk Management – Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan
+###### January 2023
+
+Prepared By
+
+_Andy Ditchfield, Stephen Howlin and Joshua Aslett_
+
+
+Authoring Departments:
+##### Fiscal Affairs Department
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff
+of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of a Vietnam in
+response to their request for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in
+part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive
+Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or
+instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank
+staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate
+interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see
+Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance
+Information—
+[Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)
+of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside
+the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World
+Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate
+interest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s
+Fiscal Affairs Department.
+
+
+**This technical assistance (TA) was provided with financial support**
+
+**from the Government of Japan.**
+
+
+2
+
+
+
+##### **I. BACKGROUND**
+
+**1.** **This is a summary report concerning a remotely delivered capacity development (CD)**
+**activity by Mr. Joshua Aslett (IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD), Mr. Andy Ditchfield and**
+**Mr. Steve Howlin (FAD Short Term Experts (STX)) to the General Department of Taxation**
+**(GDT) of Vietnam during the period September 22 to December 15, 2022.** The purpose of this
+CD was to consolidate and build on the compliance risk management (CRM) theory training
+delivered in June 2021 [1] by practically applying those CRM principles to the tourism sector to create a
+tourism sector compliance improvement plan (CIP). This remotely delivered activity will be followed
+by onsite assistance in February 2023 at which time the tourism CIP will be completed.
+
+
+**2.** **The CD activity focused on identifying risks in the tourism sector and identifying**
+**information and data sources to enable completion of the tourism CIP in February 2023.** The
+specific tasks of the assignment include:
+
+
+ - Building on previous CRM support by assisting the GDT to develop actionable CIPs for the
+tourism industry and e-commerce, commencing with tourism;
+
+
+ - Providing international good practices on CRM using IMF technical notes (particularly
+“Revenue Administration - Compliance Risk Management Framework to Drive Revenue
+Performance”; “Compliance Risk Management for Tax Administration leaders”, and
+“Compliance Risk Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans”), the IMF
+revenue portal, and experiences from other tax jurisdictions; and
+
+
+ - Providing background information on various issues identified by the GDT during earlier
+assistance, such as legal provisions required to use data; and centralized versus decentralized
+ways of organizing CRM activities.
+
+##### **II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**
+
+
+**3.** **The Risk Management Board (RMB) has a good knowledge of the CRM framework and**
+**has drafted internal guidance on CRM.** This internal guidance aligns with the theoretical CRM
+training provided in June 2021 which focused on laying the foundations of CRM principles.
+
+
+**4.** **This CD activity focused on providing GDT with practical assistance on the application**
+**of CRM processes and data required for each key step in building a tourism CIP** . Following this
+assistance, the GDT will gather the data which will be used in onsite assistance in February 2023.
+
+
+1 Vietnam – Enhancing Compliance Risk Management in Tax Administration – Brondolo et. al., August 2021
+
+
+
+##### **III. SUMMARY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED**
+
+**Introduction**
+
+
+**5.** **Four three-hour video conference workshops were conducted on November 7 to 10,**
+**2022.** The workshop material used and provided to GDT is described in section V below. The
+workshop participants were provided with practical guidance on each stage of the CRM process in
+relation to tourism in Vietnam, as follows:
+
+
+**A.** Risk Intelligence scan that identifies the risk hypotheses for the tourism sector
+
+
+**B.** Risk assessment that assesses all risks in the tourism sector and provides a consistent risk
+matrix to assess risks and create a risk register
+
+
+**C.** Risk treatment plan that sets out the high-level treatment strategies to address behaviors
+that drive the risks
+
+
+**D.** Compliance improvement plan that sets the context for the risks, the treatment strategies
+and details the treatment activities that are to be delivered, including reporting
+requirements and measures of efficiency and effectiveness.
+
+
+**6.** **To supplement these activities, an additional three remote seminars on the use of data**
+**analytics for risk analysis were delivered between December 12 and 15.** As part of the seminars,
+the concept of a Risk Differentiation Framework (RDF) was introduced, along with the templates and
+guided instruction needed to produce an analysis.
+
+
+**7.** **All of the workshops focused on identifying potential risks within the tourism sector**
+**and the information/data that GDT needs to gather before the onsite assistance in February**
+**2023** . GDT was provided with a detailed “Tourism - Information and data gathering template”. The
+document is provided in Appendix I.
+
+
+**8.** **GDT should establish and implement a plan to obtain and analyze information and**
+**data.** The completion of a CIP will require a significant amount of information and data to complete
+the CIP and establish the risks, the priorities and treatment strategies. GDT should establish an
+information and data needs plan that identifies what needs to be gathered, when the information is
+required, by who and how the data will be analyzed.
+
+
+**9.** **The following subsections (A to D) describe how the information and data will be used**
+**in February 2023 to complete a Vietnamese Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan.**
+Subsection E describes some of the organizational matters that will need to be addressed before
+implementing the CIP.
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+**A.** **Risk Intelligence Scan**
+
+
+**10.** **As a first step to building the CIP, a risk intelligence scan for the tourism sector will be**
+**drafted during the February, 2022 onsite assistance.** This will set out the environmental factors for
+tourism within Vietnam, along with tax performance in the sector and will identify the risk
+hypotheses.
+
+
+**11.** **The risk intelligence scan will set out fundamental information, data and analysis that**
+**enables identification of risks.** This will include:
+
+
+ - A clear definition of the tourism sector that enables GDT to identify the taxpayers and other
+parties that are within the sector, including any relevant sub-sectors.
+
+
+ - Information relating to the general environment of tourism within Vietnam, including
+economic factors, political and regulatory issues, industry issues, general environmental
+matters such health, infrastructure, climate change, technology developments and other
+relevant matters.
+
+
+ - Information and analysis of tax performance for the sector by tax type and the four pillars of
+core obligations (registering, filing, reporting and payment).
+
+
+ - A brief explanation of how the tax laws apply in the sector.
+
+
+ - Identified risk hypotheses.
+
+
+**12.** **A number of potential risks were identified during the workshop.** These will be discussed
+further during the February assistance and include:
+
+
+ - Cash payments
+
+
+ - Complex and invisible supply chains involving online sales, payment by WeChat Quick Pay,
+non-resident tour operators, pre-paid sales, non-issue of receipts, transfer pricing issues,
+
+
+ - Tourist outlets
+
+
+ - Overstated salaries
+
+
+ - Household businesses and presumptive tax
+
+
+ - Poor record keeping
+
+
+ - Debt, bankruptcy and “missing trader”
+
+
+ - Poor access to banking information
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+**B.** **Risk Assessment**
+
+
+**13.** **A risk assessment will be drafted for the tourism sector in February 2023.** The risk
+assessment will include a detailed description of the risks, the risk matrix used to assess the risks and
+a risk register identifying the risk rating for each risk.
+
+
+**14.** **The risk assessment document and risk register will set out the fundamental risk**
+**information, data and analysis.** This will include the following:
+
+
+ - A clear description of the identified risks by tax type and the four pillars of obligations
+(registration, filing, reporting and payment)
+
+
+ - Using an RDF analysis, detailed review of the population at risk (including sub-sector analysis)
+and which subsectors in the tourism industry comprise the risk
+
+
+ - A summary of the drivers and behaviors for each risk
+
+
+ - How the tax law applies to the risks
+
+
+ - The risk matrix used to assess risk, including assessment of risk consequence and likelihood
+
+
+ - The rating for each risk
+
+
+ - A risk register showing the respective risk ratings
+
+
+ - Relevant risk clusters (by sub-sector, tax type, tax obligation (four pillars of obligations),
+geographical location, market segment (large, medium and small) and other risk clusters
+appropriate to the tourism industry)
+
+
+**C.** **Risk Treatment Plan**
+
+
+**15.** **The risk treatment plan will be developed in February 2023.** This will include analysis of
+the behaviors and drivers behind the observed risks, a summary of the treatment strategies to
+address the risks and baseline measures of success to monitor the treatment strategies.
+
+
+**16.** **The treatment plan will set out fundamental information and analysis which will**
+**include**
+
+
+ - Further research and analysis of the risks to clearly describe the drivers and behaviors
+
+
+ - Identification of the treatment strategies by general activities (under the themes of enforcing
+and/or facilitating compliance and in context of each of four RDF “quadrants”) that are
+designed to change taxpayer behavior
+
+
+ - Case selection methodology for identifying taxpayers to be treated
+
+
+ - Details of capability improvements required to enable GDT staff to deliver strategies
+
+
+ - Baseline measures of success for monitoring the effectiveness of strategies in changing
+taxpayer behavior
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+**D.** **Compliance Improvement Plan**
+
+
+**17.** **The final step is the development of the CIP during the onsite assistance in February**
+**2023** . The CIP will include a summary of the risk intelligence scan, risk assessment and treatment
+plan. It will also include a high-level plan of the numbers of treatment activities to be undertaken and
+the expected outcomes, supported by a workflow plan. It will also include the baseline measures of
+success.
+
+
+**18.** **The CIP will set out fundamental information, data, analysis, conclusions and the**
+**treatment strategies that will encourage and compel taxpayers to voluntarily comply.** The CIP
+will include the following:
+
+
+ - The context to the risks as set out in the risk intelligence scan, assessment and treatment plan.
+
+
+ - A high-level plan of treatment activities to be undertaken.
+
+
+ - A workflow plan identifying the numbers of each type of treatment activity by period along
+with the expected additional revenue collections, resources required and capacity for
+reporting on what has been delivered against the plan.
+
+
+ - Research and analysis of the risks to clearly describe the drivers and behaviors
+
+
+ - Treatment strategies (educate, facilitate and enforce) that will change taxpayer behavior and
+improve voluntary compliance
+
+
+ - Capability improvements required to enable GDT staff to deliver strategies
+
+
+ - Baseline measures of success for monitoring the effectiveness of strategies in changing
+taxpayer behavior
+
+
+**E.** **Implementing the CIP**
+
+
+**19.** **GDT should establish governance, reporting and workflow processes to enable GDT**
+**staff to deliver the treatment activities and report on outcomes.** Implementation of the CIP
+requires the engagement and support of staff across all of GDT to deliver and report on the many
+components in the CIP. The RMB should develop processes to enable this, including:
+
+
+ - Meetings/workshops with GDT staff to explain, discuss and obtain feedback on the CIP. These
+should occur before the CIP is finalized.
+
+
+ - Establish a CIP Steering Committee consisting of RMB and other senior GDT staff involved in
+delivering the CIP. This would be chaired by the General Director or Deputy General Director
+of GDT. The CIP Steering Committee would be responsible for endorsing the CIP, monitoring
+progress on delivery of the CIP and endorsing significant changes.
+
+
+ - GDT should consider appointing a project manager to monitor the delivery and effectiveness
+of the CIP and provide reports to the CIP Steering Committee
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+- The RMB should establish processes and timelines for creating cases for GDT staff and
+supporting documents to inform GDT staff of the risks identified in the cases selected and
+what staff are required to do in completing the cases.
+
+
+ - The RMB should consider what capability improvements may be required for staff to deliver
+cases and determine who will provide training and when it will be delivered to GDT staff.
+
+
+ - A suite of effectiveness measures should be established to measure the effectiveness of the
+treatment strategies.
+
+
+**F.** **Promote the use of VITARA modules, the IMF Revenue-Portal and**
+**material**
+
+
+**20.** **The Vitara modules and IMF Revenue Portal materials were discussed.** GDT has access to
+a translated copy of the IMF document “Compliance risk management - Developing compliance
+improvement plans – IMF Technical note 2022”.
+
+##### **IV. RECOMMENDED KEY ACTIONS**
+
+
+
+
+
+|Objectives|Key Actions|Timelines|
+|---|---|---|
+|Information and data gathering
(Paragraph 6)|•
Commence information and data
gathering
•
Complete Appendix I.|By 31 December
2022|
+|Establish an information and data needs
plan (Paragraph 7)|Establish an information and data needs plan
that identifies:
•
What data needs to be gathered,
•
When the data is required
•
Who will analyze the data
•
How the data will be analyzed.|By 30 November
2022|
+|Governance, reporting and workflow
processes (Paragraph 18)|Commence establishing governance,
reporting and workflow processes|By 31 January
2023|
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+##### **V. MATERIALS PROVIDED**
+
+**21.** **The following is a list of workshop materials and other documents provided during the**
+**CD activity:**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|#|Document number, aim and description
(Translated into Vietnamese unless stated otherwise)|Workshop
(W)
Document
(D)|
+|---|---|---|
+|V1.0|CRM Introduction, Video conference, September 2022|W|
+|V2.0|Day 1_Risk Identification_7 November|W|
+|V3.0|Day 2_Risk Assessment_8 November|W|
+|V3.1|Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template. November 2022.|D|
+|V4.0|Day 3_Risk Treatment_9 November|W|
+|V5.0|Day 4_Compliance Improvement Plan_10 November|W|
+|V5.1|Day 4. Example - Overview diagram of treatment strategy cafe and restaurant
project- revised|D|
+|**Other documents provided on November 19, 2022**|**Other documents provided on November 19, 2022**|**Other documents provided on November 19, 2022**|
+||Australian Taxation Office (ATO) - data plan||
+||Australian government guidance-data-sharing-Australian-govt-entities||
+||Aust._govt_public_data_policy_statement_1||
+||Australian government- guidelines on data matching in Australian Government||
+||ATO data matching||
+||Australian-privacy-principles||
+||Data matching programs||
+||Third party data sources||
+||Use of data and analytics||
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+###### **Appendix I. Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template,** **November 2022.**
+
+_Document V3.1 - Vietnam Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template. November 2022._
+
+
+**Purpose of this template**
+
+
+**1.** **This template is to be used by GDT as a guide to the areas of research and data needed to carry out a risk assessment of the**
+**tourism industry in Vietnam**
+
+
+**Background**
+
+
+**2.** **In 2021 GDT received instruction from the IMF about the principles of contemporary compliance risk management (CRM).**
+**GDT has prepared a draft document that sets out its approach to CRM.**
+
+
+**3.** **In November 2022 GDT received remote IMF assistance to provide further guidance on how to complete a risk assessment,**
+**treatment strategy and a Compliance Improvement Plan (CIP) for the tourism industry.** This template will assist GDT to research and
+gather data to assist with completing the risk assessment.
+
+
+**4.** **In February 2023, IMF will provide GDT with on-site assistance to review the research and data gathered by GDT.** This
+information will be used to assess (likelihood and consequence) and prioritise the risks in the tourism sector. The information will also be
+used in developing treatment strategies.
+
+
+**Data Sources**
+
+
+**5.** **There are two major sources of data:**
+
+
+ - GDT internal data. For example, taxpayer registration, filing, returns and payment. This is the richest and most easily available data.
+
+
+ - External data. For example, data held or created by third parties (such as Immigration and Customs data), macro-economic data,
+industry data, academic research data, consultant and marketing data.
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+**How to use this templat** e
+
+
+**6.** **The template below sets out the information and data required using internal and external data sources.** The template is
+based on the many perspectives of risk which were discussed in the video conference meetings of November 7 to 10. The aim is to gather
+information and data about the many perspectives so that the many different risks can be risk assessed and prioritised.
+
+
+**7.** **GDT may find that some of the information and data is not available.** It is okay to make assumptions/hypothesis about missing
+information and estimates of data that is not available so long as this is clearly marked/noted as such.
+
+
+**8.** **Some of the categories of information requested may not be relevant or applicable to Vietnam and should be marked as**
+**“not applicable”.**
+
+
+**9.** **The major source of internal GDT data will be returns relating to VAT, income tax, wages withholding and personal income.**
+
+
+**10.** **The tax return data should include the following for each tax type:**
+
+
+ - Sales data for all taxes plus VAT output tax
+
+
+ - Distribution analysis of taxpayers by sales/turnover. For example, horizontal axis records value of sales in increments of 10 000 value,
+the vertical axis records the frequency of each sales value amongst the population
+
+
+ - Purchases data for all taxes, plus VAT input tax
+
+
+ - Profit data, plus net VAT (output VAT minus input VAT)
+
+
+ - VAT refunds by number of returns and value
+
+
+ - Employee numbers, wages withholding, social contributions
+
+
+ - Other relevant data contained in returns
+
+
+**11.** **The timespan of the data should be the last three years. For example, sales data and VAT output tax data should be**
+**provided for the last three years.**
+
+
+**12.** **The data should be in aggregate form and not data for each taxpayer.**
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+**About the template**
+
+
+**13.** **The template has three columns:**
+
+
+ - Area of risk – This is a description of each risk perspective.
+
+
+ - Explanation/description – This is a more detailed description of the risk perspective
+
+
+ - Comments/conclusions/attachments – This column will be used by GDT to record its conclusions or attach documents or links to the
+requested data.
+
+|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|
+|---|---|---|
+|**Analysis of tourists **|**Analysis of tourists **|**Analysis of tourists **|
+|Domestic tourists -|Number of tourists||
+||Estimated tourist spend||
+|International tourists inbound -|Number of tourists.
Source could be immigration department, industry
associations, university research, google.||
+||Estimated tourist spend||
+|International tourists -country of origin|Number of tourists by country||
+|Method of arrival|Numbers arriving by land, sea, air||
+|Duration of visit|Number of days total and average per tourist||
+|International tourist outbound -|Number of tourists||
+|Immigration data|Any other relevant immigration data||
+|Department of Tourism – regional offices|Any relevant data||
+|**Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location.**|**Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location.**|**Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location.**|
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Domestic air travel||
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|International air travel||
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|International sea travel (For example, cruise ships)||
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Domestic road||
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Domestic rail||
+|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Other||
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|
+|---|---|---|
+|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following,
including occupancy rates:||
+|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Hotels - domestic owned||
+|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Hotels – foreign owned||
+|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Hostels||
+|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Airbnb||
+|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Other||
+|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||
+|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Bars||
+|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Restaurants – business type||
+|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Restaurants – household type||
+|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Café||
+|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Other||
+|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||
+|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Disco||
+|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Sporting and recreation||
+|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Other||
+|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||
+|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Retail shops||
+|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Tourist gift shops||
+|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Tourist retail malls||
+|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Other||
+|**Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) **|**Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) **|**Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) **|
+|Large taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||
+|Medium taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||
+|Small taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||
+|Micro taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||
+|Other market type|||
+|**Registration – pillar of compliance **|**Registration – pillar of compliance **|**Registration – pillar of compliance **|
+|Number registered|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|Number registered|Geographic location||
+|Number registered|Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||
+|Number not registered but required to be registered|||
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|
+|---|---|---|
+|Number of passive taxpayers (taxpayers not trading)|||
+|Number of deregistrations per year|||
+|Any special registration rules for specific sectors or
groups of taxpayers|||
+|**Filing – pillar of compliance **|**Filing – pillar of compliance **|**Filing – pillar of compliance **|
+|Number expected to file|Tax type (VAT, income tax etc)||
+||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|Number filed on-time/late|Tax type||
+||Market segment||
+|Number of non-filers|Tax type||
+|Number of non-filers|Market segment||
+|Estimated value of late filers and non-filers|Late filers value||
+|Estimated value of late filers and non-filers|Non-filers value||
+|**Correct reporting – pillar of compliance **|**Correct reporting – pillar of compliance **|**Correct reporting – pillar of compliance **|
+|Number of audit adjustments|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+||Geographic location||
+||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||
+||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|Value of audit adjustments|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+||Geographic location||
+||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||
+||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|Reasons for adjustments|||
+|Penalties imposed, number and value|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+||Geographic location||
+||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||
+||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|**Payment/debt – pillar of compliance **|**Payment/debt – pillar of compliance **|**Payment/debt – pillar of compliance **|
+|Number of taxpayers with debt|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+||Geographic location||
+||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||
+||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|Value of debt|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|
+|---|---|---|
+||Geographic location||
+||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||
+||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||
+|Value of debt by age|3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years||
+|Value of debt written off in the last three years|||
+|Number and value of bankruptcies|||
+|Number of missing taxpayers that cannot be found|||
+|**Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants **|**Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants **|**Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants **|
+|GDT internal stakeholders|Risk unit||
+||Steering committee||
+||Media and communications||
+||Regional offices managers||
+||Regional offices auditors||
+||Other?||
+|External stakeholders/participants|Tourists (inbound, outbound, domestic)||
+|Taxpayers – within Vietnam|List all types of taxpayers||
+|Taxpayers outside Vietnam|||
+|Intermediaries|||
+|On-line platforms|||
+|Banks|||
+|Others?|||
+|On-line payment methods (WeChat and Paypal)|||
+|Taxpayer advocates|Lawyers and accountants||
+|Taxpayer associations|||
+|Academic researchers|||
+|Industry bodies|||
+|Government departments relevant to tourism|||
+|Government regulators of the industry|||
+|Other government departments that hold information|||
+|**Research relevant law **|**Research relevant law **|**Research relevant law **|
+|List all law relating to tourism|||
+|Are there any special tax rules (eg presumptive tax,
reduced VAT rates, zero-rate, VAT exemption?|||
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|
+|---|---|---|
+|Are there any proposed law changes in the tourism
sector?|||
+|What law changes would you like to see?|||
+
+
+**Next Steps After the Data Is Captured**
+
+
+**14.** **The information and data should be critically examined by GDT.**
+
+
+ - Is the data consistent with what you thought was the risk?
+
+
+ - Is there an indication of a specific area of risk?
+
+
+ - What is the highest risk perspective based on the data?
+
+
+ - What is the lowest risk perspective?
+
+
+ - What further information do you need?
+
+
+16
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-151/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..606d7368510a887c9bbdcd3c58cbe361efa1f42c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-151/assets/figures/cr-2023-151-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-151-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-151/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..62509cea16086571be04d5c34b3ba42f29b403fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-151/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-151-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nApril 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/151**\n### **VIETNAM**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––TAXPAYER** **COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT – TOURISM** **COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN**\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Vietnam was prepared by an expert of the\n\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\n\ncompleted in January 2023.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 1, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "April 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/151\nVIETNAM\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT––TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT – TOURISM COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN\n\nThis technical assistance report on Vietnam was prepared by an expert of the\n\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\n\ncompleted in January 2023.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 601}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "# TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT\n\n## VIETNAM\n#### Taxpayer Compliance Risk Management – Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan\n###### January 2023\n\nPrepared By\n\n_Andy Ditchfield, Stephen Howlin and Joshua Aslett_\n\n\nAuthoring Departments:\n##### Fiscal Affairs Department", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT\nVIETNAM\nTaxpayer Compliance Risk Management – Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan\nJanuary 2023\n\nPrepared By\n\n_Andy Ditchfield, Stephen Howlin and Joshua Aslett_\n\nAuthoring Departments:\nFiscal Affairs Department", "text_characters": 207}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff\nof the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of a Vietnam in\nresponse to their request for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in\npart) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank\nstaff and other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see\nOperational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance\nInformation—\n[Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2022/04/25/staff-operational-guidance-on-the-dissemination-of-capacity-development-information-517227)\nof this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside\nthe IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World\nBank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s\nFiscal Affairs Department.\n\n\n**This technical assistance (TA) was provided with financial support**\n\n**from the Government of Japan.**\n\n\n2", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff\nof the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of a Vietnam in\nresponse to their request for technical assistance. This report (in whole or in\npart) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF Executive\nDirectors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or\ninstrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank\nstaff and other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such disclosure (see\nOperational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance\nInformation—\nStaff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure\nof this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside\nthe IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World\nBank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s\nFiscal Affairs Department.\n\nThis technical assistance (TA) was provided with financial support\n\nfrom the Government of Japan.\n\n2", "text_characters": 1014}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **I. BACKGROUND**\n\n**1.** **This is a summary report concerning a remotely delivered capacity development (CD)**\n**activity by Mr. Joshua Aslett (IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD), Mr. Andy Ditchfield and**\n**Mr. Steve Howlin (FAD Short Term Experts (STX)) to the General Department of Taxation**\n**(GDT) of Vietnam during the period September 22 to December 15, 2022.** The purpose of this\nCD was to consolidate and build on the compliance risk management (CRM) theory training\ndelivered in June 2021 [1] by practically applying those CRM principles to the tourism sector to create a\ntourism sector compliance improvement plan (CIP). This remotely delivered activity will be followed\nby onsite assistance in February 2023 at which time the tourism CIP will be completed.\n\n\n**2.** **The CD activity focused on identifying risks in the tourism sector and identifying**\n**information and data sources to enable completion of the tourism CIP in February 2023.** The\nspecific tasks of the assignment include:\n\n\n - Building on previous CRM support by assisting the GDT to develop actionable CIPs for the\ntourism industry and e-commerce, commencing with tourism;\n\n\n - Providing international good practices on CRM using IMF technical notes (particularly\n“Revenue Administration - Compliance Risk Management Framework to Drive Revenue\nPerformance”; “Compliance Risk Management for Tax Administration leaders”, and\n“Compliance Risk Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans”), the IMF\nrevenue portal, and experiences from other tax jurisdictions; and\n\n\n - Providing background information on various issues identified by the GDT during earlier\nassistance, such as legal provisions required to use data; and centralized versus decentralized\nways of organizing CRM activities.\n\n##### **II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**\n\n\n**3.** **The Risk Management Board (RMB) has a good knowledge of the CRM framework and**\n**has drafted internal guidance on CRM.** This internal guidance aligns with the theoretical CRM\ntraining provided in June 2021 which focused on laying the foundations of CRM principles.\n\n\n**4.** **This CD activity focused on providing GDT with practical assistance on the application**\n**of CRM processes and data required for each key step in building a tourism CIP** . Following this\nassistance, the GDT will gather the data which will be used in onsite assistance in February 2023.\n\n\n1 Vietnam – Enhancing Compliance Risk Management in Tax Administration – Brondolo et. al., August 2021", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. BACKGROUND\n\n1. This is a summary report concerning a remotely delivered capacity development (CD)\nactivity by Mr. Joshua Aslett (IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD), Mr. Andy Ditchfield and\nMr. Steve Howlin (FAD Short Term Experts (STX)) to the General Department of Taxation\n(GDT) of Vietnam during the period September 22 to December 15, 2022. The purpose of this\nCD was to consolidate and build on the compliance risk management (CRM) theory training\ndelivered in June 2021 [1] by practically applying those CRM principles to the tourism sector to create a\ntourism sector compliance improvement plan (CIP). This remotely delivered activity will be followed\nby onsite assistance in February 2023 at which time the tourism CIP will be completed.\n\n2. The CD activity focused on identifying risks in the tourism sector and identifying\ninformation and data sources to enable completion of the tourism CIP in February 2023. The\nspecific tasks of the assignment include:\n\n - Building on previous CRM support by assisting the GDT to develop actionable CIPs for the\ntourism industry and e-commerce, commencing with tourism;\n\n - Providing international good practices on CRM using IMF technical notes (particularly\n“Revenue Administration - Compliance Risk Management Framework to Drive Revenue\nPerformance”; “Compliance Risk Management for Tax Administration leaders”, and\n“Compliance Risk Management: Developing Compliance Improvement Plans”), the IMF\nrevenue portal, and experiences from other tax jurisdictions; and\n\n - Providing background information on various issues identified by the GDT during earlier\nassistance, such as legal provisions required to use data; and centralized versus decentralized\nways of organizing CRM activities.\nII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS\n\n3. The Risk Management Board (RMB) has a good knowledge of the CRM framework and\nhas drafted internal guidance on CRM. This internal guidance aligns with the theoretical CRM\ntraining provided in June 2021 which focused on laying the foundations of CRM principles.\n\n4. This CD activity focused on providing GDT with practical assistance on the application\nof CRM processes and data required for each key step in building a tourism CIP . Following this\nassistance, the GDT will gather the data which will be used in onsite assistance in February 2023.\n\n1 Vietnam – Enhancing Compliance Risk Management in Tax Administration – Brondolo et. al., August 2021", "text_characters": 2039}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **III. SUMMARY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED**\n\n**Introduction**\n\n\n**5.** **Four three-hour video conference workshops were conducted on November 7 to 10,**\n**2022.** The workshop material used and provided to GDT is described in section V below. The\nworkshop participants were provided with practical guidance on each stage of the CRM process in\nrelation to tourism in Vietnam, as follows:\n\n\n**A.** Risk Intelligence scan that identifies the risk hypotheses for the tourism sector\n\n\n**B.** Risk assessment that assesses all risks in the tourism sector and provides a consistent risk\nmatrix to assess risks and create a risk register\n\n\n**C.** Risk treatment plan that sets out the high-level treatment strategies to address behaviors\nthat drive the risks\n\n\n**D.** Compliance improvement plan that sets the context for the risks, the treatment strategies\nand details the treatment activities that are to be delivered, including reporting\nrequirements and measures of efficiency and effectiveness.\n\n\n**6.** **To supplement these activities, an additional three remote seminars on the use of data**\n**analytics for risk analysis were delivered between December 12 and 15.** As part of the seminars,\nthe concept of a Risk Differentiation Framework (RDF) was introduced, along with the templates and\nguided instruction needed to produce an analysis.\n\n\n**7.** **All of the workshops focused on identifying potential risks within the tourism sector**\n**and the information/data that GDT needs to gather before the onsite assistance in February**\n**2023** . GDT was provided with a detailed “Tourism - Information and data gathering template”. The\ndocument is provided in Appendix I.\n\n\n**8.** **GDT should establish and implement a plan to obtain and analyze information and**\n**data.** The completion of a CIP will require a significant amount of information and data to complete\nthe CIP and establish the risks, the priorities and treatment strategies. GDT should establish an\ninformation and data needs plan that identifies what needs to be gathered, when the information is\nrequired, by who and how the data will be analyzed.\n\n\n**9.** **The following subsections (A to D) describe how the information and data will be used**\n**in February 2023 to complete a Vietnamese Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan.**\nSubsection E describes some of the organizational matters that will need to be addressed before\nimplementing the CIP.\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. SUMMARY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED\n\nIntroduction\n\n5. Four three-hour video conference workshops were conducted on November 7 to 10,\n2022. The workshop material used and provided to GDT is described in section V below. The\nworkshop participants were provided with practical guidance on each stage of the CRM process in\nrelation to tourism in Vietnam, as follows:\n\nA. Risk Intelligence scan that identifies the risk hypotheses for the tourism sector\n\nB. Risk assessment that assesses all risks in the tourism sector and provides a consistent risk\nmatrix to assess risks and create a risk register\n\nC. Risk treatment plan that sets out the high-level treatment strategies to address behaviors\nthat drive the risks\n\nD. Compliance improvement plan that sets the context for the risks, the treatment strategies\nand details the treatment activities that are to be delivered, including reporting\nrequirements and measures of efficiency and effectiveness.\n\n6. To supplement these activities, an additional three remote seminars on the use of data\nanalytics for risk analysis were delivered between December 12 and 15. As part of the seminars,\nthe concept of a Risk Differentiation Framework (RDF) was introduced, along with the templates and\nguided instruction needed to produce an analysis.\n\n7. All of the workshops focused on identifying potential risks within the tourism sector\nand the information/data that GDT needs to gather before the onsite assistance in February\n2023 . GDT was provided with a detailed “Tourism - Information and data gathering template”. The\ndocument is provided in Appendix I.\n\n8. GDT should establish and implement a plan to obtain and analyze information and\ndata. The completion of a CIP will require a significant amount of information and data to complete\nthe CIP and establish the risks, the priorities and treatment strategies. GDT should establish an\ninformation and data needs plan that identifies what needs to be gathered, when the information is\nrequired, by who and how the data will be analyzed.\n\n9. The following subsections (A to D) describe how the information and data will be used\nin February 2023 to complete a Vietnamese Tourism Compliance Improvement Plan.\nSubsection E describes some of the organizational matters that will need to be addressed before\nimplementing the CIP.\n\n4", "text_characters": 1943}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**A.** **Risk Intelligence Scan**\n\n\n**10.** **As a first step to building the CIP, a risk intelligence scan for the tourism sector will be**\n**drafted during the February, 2022 onsite assistance.** This will set out the environmental factors for\ntourism within Vietnam, along with tax performance in the sector and will identify the risk\nhypotheses.\n\n\n**11.** **The risk intelligence scan will set out fundamental information, data and analysis that**\n**enables identification of risks.** This will include:\n\n\n - A clear definition of the tourism sector that enables GDT to identify the taxpayers and other\nparties that are within the sector, including any relevant sub-sectors.\n\n\n - Information relating to the general environment of tourism within Vietnam, including\neconomic factors, political and regulatory issues, industry issues, general environmental\nmatters such health, infrastructure, climate change, technology developments and other\nrelevant matters.\n\n\n - Information and analysis of tax performance for the sector by tax type and the four pillars of\ncore obligations (registering, filing, reporting and payment).\n\n\n - A brief explanation of how the tax laws apply in the sector.\n\n\n - Identified risk hypotheses.\n\n\n**12.** **A number of potential risks were identified during the workshop.** These will be discussed\nfurther during the February assistance and include:\n\n\n - Cash payments\n\n\n - Complex and invisible supply chains involving online sales, payment by WeChat Quick Pay,\nnon-resident tour operators, pre-paid sales, non-issue of receipts, transfer pricing issues,\n\n\n - Tourist outlets\n\n\n - Overstated salaries\n\n\n - Household businesses and presumptive tax\n\n\n - Poor record keeping\n\n\n - Debt, bankruptcy and “missing trader”\n\n\n - Poor access to banking information\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "A. Risk Intelligence Scan\n\n10. As a first step to building the CIP, a risk intelligence scan for the tourism sector will be\ndrafted during the February, 2022 onsite assistance. This will set out the environmental factors for\ntourism within Vietnam, along with tax performance in the sector and will identify the risk\nhypotheses.\n\n11. The risk intelligence scan will set out fundamental information, data and analysis that\nenables identification of risks. This will include:\n\n - A clear definition of the tourism sector that enables GDT to identify the taxpayers and other\nparties that are within the sector, including any relevant sub-sectors.\n\n - Information relating to the general environment of tourism within Vietnam, including\neconomic factors, political and regulatory issues, industry issues, general environmental\nmatters such health, infrastructure, climate change, technology developments and other\nrelevant matters.\n\n - Information and analysis of tax performance for the sector by tax type and the four pillars of\ncore obligations (registering, filing, reporting and payment).\n\n - A brief explanation of how the tax laws apply in the sector.\n\n - Identified risk hypotheses.\n\n12. A number of potential risks were identified during the workshop. These will be discussed\nfurther during the February assistance and include:\n\n - Cash payments\n\n - Complex and invisible supply chains involving online sales, payment by WeChat Quick Pay,\nnon-resident tour operators, pre-paid sales, non-issue of receipts, transfer pricing issues,\n\n - Tourist outlets\n\n - Overstated salaries\n\n - Household businesses and presumptive tax\n\n - Poor record keeping\n\n - Debt, bankruptcy and “missing trader”\n\n - Poor access to banking information\n\n5", "text_characters": 1447}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**B.** **Risk Assessment**\n\n\n**13.** **A risk assessment will be drafted for the tourism sector in February 2023.** The risk\nassessment will include a detailed description of the risks, the risk matrix used to assess the risks and\na risk register identifying the risk rating for each risk.\n\n\n**14.** **The risk assessment document and risk register will set out the fundamental risk**\n**information, data and analysis.** This will include the following:\n\n\n - A clear description of the identified risks by tax type and the four pillars of obligations\n(registration, filing, reporting and payment)\n\n\n - Using an RDF analysis, detailed review of the population at risk (including sub-sector analysis)\nand which subsectors in the tourism industry comprise the risk\n\n\n - A summary of the drivers and behaviors for each risk\n\n\n - How the tax law applies to the risks\n\n\n - The risk matrix used to assess risk, including assessment of risk consequence and likelihood\n\n\n - The rating for each risk\n\n\n - A risk register showing the respective risk ratings\n\n\n - Relevant risk clusters (by sub-sector, tax type, tax obligation (four pillars of obligations),\ngeographical location, market segment (large, medium and small) and other risk clusters\nappropriate to the tourism industry)\n\n\n**C.** **Risk Treatment Plan**\n\n\n**15.** **The risk treatment plan will be developed in February 2023.** This will include analysis of\nthe behaviors and drivers behind the observed risks, a summary of the treatment strategies to\naddress the risks and baseline measures of success to monitor the treatment strategies.\n\n\n**16.** **The treatment plan will set out fundamental information and analysis which will**\n**include**\n\n\n - Further research and analysis of the risks to clearly describe the drivers and behaviors\n\n\n - Identification of the treatment strategies by general activities (under the themes of enforcing\nand/or facilitating compliance and in context of each of four RDF “quadrants”) that are\ndesigned to change taxpayer behavior\n\n\n - Case selection methodology for identifying taxpayers to be treated\n\n\n - Details of capability improvements required to enable GDT staff to deliver strategies\n\n\n - Baseline measures of success for monitoring the effectiveness of strategies in changing\ntaxpayer behavior\n\n\n6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Risk Assessment\n\n13. A risk assessment will be drafted for the tourism sector in February 2023. The risk\nassessment will include a detailed description of the risks, the risk matrix used to assess the risks and\na risk register identifying the risk rating for each risk.\n\n14. The risk assessment document and risk register will set out the fundamental risk\ninformation, data and analysis. This will include the following:\n\n - A clear description of the identified risks by tax type and the four pillars of obligations\n(registration, filing, reporting and payment)\n\n - Using an RDF analysis, detailed review of the population at risk (including sub-sector analysis)\nand which subsectors in the tourism industry comprise the risk\n\n - A summary of the drivers and behaviors for each risk\n\n - How the tax law applies to the risks\n\n - The risk matrix used to assess risk, including assessment of risk consequence and likelihood\n\n - The rating for each risk\n\n - A risk register showing the respective risk ratings\n\n - Relevant risk clusters (by sub-sector, tax type, tax obligation (four pillars of obligations),\ngeographical location, market segment (large, medium and small) and other risk clusters\nappropriate to the tourism industry)\n\nC. Risk Treatment Plan\n\n15. The risk treatment plan will be developed in February 2023. This will include analysis of\nthe behaviors and drivers behind the observed risks, a summary of the treatment strategies to\naddress the risks and baseline measures of success to monitor the treatment strategies.\n\n16. The treatment plan will set out fundamental information and analysis which will\ninclude\n\n - Further research and analysis of the risks to clearly describe the drivers and behaviors\n\n - Identification of the treatment strategies by general activities (under the themes of enforcing\nand/or facilitating compliance and in context of each of four RDF “quadrants”) that are\ndesigned to change taxpayer behavior\n\n - Case selection methodology for identifying taxpayers to be treated\n\n - Details of capability improvements required to enable GDT staff to deliver strategies\n\n - Baseline measures of success for monitoring the effectiveness of strategies in changing\ntaxpayer behavior\n\n6", "text_characters": 1841}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**D.** **Compliance Improvement Plan**\n\n\n**17.** **The final step is the development of the CIP during the onsite assistance in February**\n**2023** . The CIP will include a summary of the risk intelligence scan, risk assessment and treatment\nplan. It will also include a high-level plan of the numbers of treatment activities to be undertaken and\nthe expected outcomes, supported by a workflow plan. It will also include the baseline measures of\nsuccess.\n\n\n**18.** **The CIP will set out fundamental information, data, analysis, conclusions and the**\n**treatment strategies that will encourage and compel taxpayers to voluntarily comply.** The CIP\nwill include the following:\n\n\n - The context to the risks as set out in the risk intelligence scan, assessment and treatment plan.\n\n\n - A high-level plan of treatment activities to be undertaken.\n\n\n - A workflow plan identifying the numbers of each type of treatment activity by period along\nwith the expected additional revenue collections, resources required and capacity for\nreporting on what has been delivered against the plan.\n\n\n - Research and analysis of the risks to clearly describe the drivers and behaviors\n\n\n - Treatment strategies (educate, facilitate and enforce) that will change taxpayer behavior and\nimprove voluntary compliance\n\n\n - Capability improvements required to enable GDT staff to deliver strategies\n\n\n - Baseline measures of success for monitoring the effectiveness of strategies in changing\ntaxpayer behavior\n\n\n**E.** **Implementing the CIP**\n\n\n**19.** **GDT should establish governance, reporting and workflow processes to enable GDT**\n**staff to deliver the treatment activities and report on outcomes.** Implementation of the CIP\nrequires the engagement and support of staff across all of GDT to deliver and report on the many\ncomponents in the CIP. The RMB should develop processes to enable this, including:\n\n\n - Meetings/workshops with GDT staff to explain, discuss and obtain feedback on the CIP. These\nshould occur before the CIP is finalized.\n\n\n - Establish a CIP Steering Committee consisting of RMB and other senior GDT staff involved in\ndelivering the CIP. This would be chaired by the General Director or Deputy General Director\nof GDT. The CIP Steering Committee would be responsible for endorsing the CIP, monitoring\nprogress on delivery of the CIP and endorsing significant changes.\n\n\n - GDT should consider appointing a project manager to monitor the delivery and effectiveness\nof the CIP and provide reports to the CIP Steering Committee\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "D. Compliance Improvement Plan\n\n17. The final step is the development of the CIP during the onsite assistance in February\n2023 . The CIP will include a summary of the risk intelligence scan, risk assessment and treatment\nplan. It will also include a high-level plan of the numbers of treatment activities to be undertaken and\nthe expected outcomes, supported by a workflow plan. It will also include the baseline measures of\nsuccess.\n\n18. The CIP will set out fundamental information, data, analysis, conclusions and the\ntreatment strategies that will encourage and compel taxpayers to voluntarily comply. The CIP\nwill include the following:\n\n - The context to the risks as set out in the risk intelligence scan, assessment and treatment plan.\n\n - A high-level plan of treatment activities to be undertaken.\n\n - A workflow plan identifying the numbers of each type of treatment activity by period along\nwith the expected additional revenue collections, resources required and capacity for\nreporting on what has been delivered against the plan.\n\n - Research and analysis of the risks to clearly describe the drivers and behaviors\n\n - Treatment strategies (educate, facilitate and enforce) that will change taxpayer behavior and\nimprove voluntary compliance\n\n - Capability improvements required to enable GDT staff to deliver strategies\n\n - Baseline measures of success for monitoring the effectiveness of strategies in changing\ntaxpayer behavior\n\nE. Implementing the CIP\n\n19. GDT should establish governance, reporting and workflow processes to enable GDT\nstaff to deliver the treatment activities and report on outcomes. Implementation of the CIP\nrequires the engagement and support of staff across all of GDT to deliver and report on the many\ncomponents in the CIP. The RMB should develop processes to enable this, including:\n\n - Meetings/workshops with GDT staff to explain, discuss and obtain feedback on the CIP. These\nshould occur before the CIP is finalized.\n\n - Establish a CIP Steering Committee consisting of RMB and other senior GDT staff involved in\ndelivering the CIP. This would be chaired by the General Director or Deputy General Director\nof GDT. The CIP Steering Committee would be responsible for endorsing the CIP, monitoring\nprogress on delivery of the CIP and endorsing significant changes.\n\n - GDT should consider appointing a project manager to monitor the delivery and effectiveness\nof the CIP and provide reports to the CIP Steering Committee\n\n7", "text_characters": 2059}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "- The RMB should establish processes and timelines for creating cases for GDT staff and\nsupporting documents to inform GDT staff of the risks identified in the cases selected and\nwhat staff are required to do in completing the cases.\n\n\n - The RMB should consider what capability improvements may be required for staff to deliver\ncases and determine who will provide training and when it will be delivered to GDT staff.\n\n\n - A suite of effectiveness measures should be established to measure the effectiveness of the\ntreatment strategies.\n\n\n**F.** **Promote the use of VITARA modules, the IMF Revenue-Portal and**\n**material**\n\n\n**20.** **The Vitara modules and IMF Revenue Portal materials were discussed.** GDT has access to\na translated copy of the IMF document “Compliance risk management - Developing compliance\nimprovement plans – IMF Technical note 2022”.\n\n##### **IV. RECOMMENDED KEY ACTIONS**\n\n\n\n\n\n|Objectives|Key Actions|Timelines|\n|---|---|---|\n|Information and data gathering
(Paragraph 6)|•
Commence information and data
gathering
•
Complete Appendix I.|By 31 December
2022|\n|Establish an information and data needs
plan (Paragraph 7)|Establish an information and data needs plan
that identifies:
•
What data needs to be gathered,
•
When the data is required
•
Who will analyze the data
•
How the data will be analyzed.|By 30 November
2022|\n|Governance, reporting and workflow
processes (Paragraph 18)|Commence establishing governance,
reporting and workflow processes|By 31 January
2023|\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.19200134277344, 352.7599792480469, 539.8679809570312, 552.9400024414062], "columns": 3, "rows": 4}], "text": "- The RMB should establish processes and timelines for creating cases for GDT staff and\nsupporting documents to inform GDT staff of the risks identified in the cases selected and\nwhat staff are required to do in completing the cases.\n\n - The RMB should consider what capability improvements may be required for staff to deliver\ncases and determine who will provide training and when it will be delivered to GDT staff.\n\n - A suite of effectiveness measures should be established to measure the effectiveness of the\ntreatment strategies.\n\nF. Promote the use of VITARA modules, the IMF Revenue-Portal and\nmaterial\n\n20. The Vitara modules and IMF Revenue Portal materials were discussed. GDT has access to\na translated copy of the IMF document “Compliance risk management - Developing compliance\nimprovement plans – IMF Technical note 2022”.\nIV. RECOMMENDED KEY ACTIONS\n\n Objectives Key Actions Timelines \n\n Information and data gathering (Paragraph 6) • Commence information and data gathering • Complete Appendix I. By 31 December 2022 \n Establish an information and data needs plan (Paragraph 7) Establish an information and data needs plan that identifies: • What data needs to be gathered, • When the data is required • Who will analyze the data • How the data will be analyzed. By 30 November 2022 \n Governance, reporting and workflow processes (Paragraph 18) Commence establishing governance, reporting and workflow processes By 31 January 2023 \n\n8", "text_characters": 1205}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "##### **V. MATERIALS PROVIDED**\n\n**21.** **The following is a list of workshop materials and other documents provided during the**\n**CD activity:**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|#|Document number, aim and description
(Translated into Vietnamese unless stated otherwise)|Workshop
(W)
Document
(D)|\n|---|---|---|\n|V1.0|CRM Introduction, Video conference, September 2022|W|\n|V2.0|Day 1_Risk Identification_7 November|W|\n|V3.0|Day 2_Risk Assessment_8 November|W|\n|V3.1|Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template. November 2022.|D|\n|V4.0|Day 3_Risk Treatment_9 November|W|\n|V5.0|Day 4_Compliance Improvement Plan_10 November|W|\n|V5.1|Day 4. Example - Overview diagram of treatment strategy cafe and restaurant
project- revised|D|\n|**Other documents provided on November 19, 2022**|**Other documents provided on November 19, 2022**|**Other documents provided on November 19, 2022**|\n||Australian Taxation Office (ATO) - data plan||\n||Australian government guidance-data-sharing-Australian-govt-entities||\n||Aust._govt_public_data_policy_statement_1||\n||Australian government- guidelines on data matching in Australian Government||\n||ATO data matching||\n||Australian-privacy-principles||\n||Data matching programs||\n||Third party data sources||\n||Use of data and analytics||\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.22737121582031, 152.9000244140625, 539.8326416015625, 467.8600158691406], "columns": 3, "rows": 18}], "text": "V. MATERIALS PROVIDED\n\n21. The following is a list of workshop materials and other documents provided during the\nCD activity:\n\n # Document number, aim and description (Translated into Vietnamese unless stated otherwise) Workshop (W) Document (D) \n\n V1.0 CRM Introduction, Video conference, September 2022 W \n V2.0 Day 1_Risk Identification_7 November W \n V3.0 Day 2_Risk Assessment_8 November W \n V3.1 Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template. November 2022. D \n V4.0 Day 3_Risk Treatment_9 November W \n V5.0 Day 4_Compliance Improvement Plan_10 November W \n V5.1 Day 4. Example - Overview diagram of treatment strategy cafe and restaurant project- revised D \n Other documents provided on November 19, 2022 Other documents provided on November 19, 2022 Other documents provided on November 19, 2022 \n Australian Taxation Office (ATO) - data plan \n Australian government guidance-data-sharing-Australian-govt-entities \n Aust._govt_public_data_policy_statement_1 \n Australian government- guidelines on data matching in Australian Government \n ATO data matching \n Australian-privacy-principles \n Data matching programs \n Third party data sources \n Use of data and analytics \n\n9", "text_characters": 1001}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **Appendix I. Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template,** **November 2022.**\n\n_Document V3.1 - Vietnam Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template. November 2022._\n\n\n**Purpose of this template**\n\n\n**1.** **This template is to be used by GDT as a guide to the areas of research and data needed to carry out a risk assessment of the**\n**tourism industry in Vietnam**\n\n\n**Background**\n\n\n**2.** **In 2021 GDT received instruction from the IMF about the principles of contemporary compliance risk management (CRM).**\n**GDT has prepared a draft document that sets out its approach to CRM.**\n\n\n**3.** **In November 2022 GDT received remote IMF assistance to provide further guidance on how to complete a risk assessment,**\n**treatment strategy and a Compliance Improvement Plan (CIP) for the tourism industry.** This template will assist GDT to research and\ngather data to assist with completing the risk assessment.\n\n\n**4.** **In February 2023, IMF will provide GDT with on-site assistance to review the research and data gathered by GDT.** This\ninformation will be used to assess (likelihood and consequence) and prioritise the risks in the tourism sector. The information will also be\nused in developing treatment strategies.\n\n\n**Data Sources**\n\n\n**5.** **There are two major sources of data:**\n\n\n - GDT internal data. For example, taxpayer registration, filing, returns and payment. This is the richest and most easily available data.\n\n\n - External data. For example, data held or created by third parties (such as Immigration and Customs data), macro-economic data,\nindustry data, academic research data, consultant and marketing data.\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix I. Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template, November 2022.\n\n_Document V3.1 - Vietnam Tourism Risk Assessment – Research and data gathering template. November 2022._\n\nPurpose of this template\n\n1. This template is to be used by GDT as a guide to the areas of research and data needed to carry out a risk assessment of the\ntourism industry in Vietnam\n\nBackground\n\n2. In 2021 GDT received instruction from the IMF about the principles of contemporary compliance risk management (CRM).\nGDT has prepared a draft document that sets out its approach to CRM.\n\n3. In November 2022 GDT received remote IMF assistance to provide further guidance on how to complete a risk assessment,\ntreatment strategy and a Compliance Improvement Plan (CIP) for the tourism industry. This template will assist GDT to research and\ngather data to assist with completing the risk assessment.\n\n4. In February 2023, IMF will provide GDT with on-site assistance to review the research and data gathered by GDT. This\ninformation will be used to assess (likelihood and consequence) and prioritise the risks in the tourism sector. The information will also be\nused in developing treatment strategies.\n\nData Sources\n\n5. There are two major sources of data:\n\n - GDT internal data. For example, taxpayer registration, filing, returns and payment. This is the richest and most easily available data.\n\n - External data. For example, data held or created by third parties (such as Immigration and Customs data), macro-economic data,\nindustry data, academic research data, consultant and marketing data.\n\n10", "text_characters": 1329}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**How to use this templat** e\n\n\n**6.** **The template below sets out the information and data required using internal and external data sources.** The template is\nbased on the many perspectives of risk which were discussed in the video conference meetings of November 7 to 10. The aim is to gather\ninformation and data about the many perspectives so that the many different risks can be risk assessed and prioritised.\n\n\n**7.** **GDT may find that some of the information and data is not available.** It is okay to make assumptions/hypothesis about missing\ninformation and estimates of data that is not available so long as this is clearly marked/noted as such.\n\n\n**8.** **Some of the categories of information requested may not be relevant or applicable to Vietnam and should be marked as**\n**“not applicable”.**\n\n\n**9.** **The major source of internal GDT data will be returns relating to VAT, income tax, wages withholding and personal income.**\n\n\n**10.** **The tax return data should include the following for each tax type:**\n\n\n - Sales data for all taxes plus VAT output tax\n\n\n - Distribution analysis of taxpayers by sales/turnover. For example, horizontal axis records value of sales in increments of 10 000 value,\nthe vertical axis records the frequency of each sales value amongst the population\n\n\n - Purchases data for all taxes, plus VAT input tax\n\n\n - Profit data, plus net VAT (output VAT minus input VAT)\n\n\n - VAT refunds by number of returns and value\n\n\n - Employee numbers, wages withholding, social contributions\n\n\n - Other relevant data contained in returns\n\n\n**11.** **The timespan of the data should be the last three years. For example, sales data and VAT output tax data should be**\n**provided for the last three years.**\n\n\n**12.** **The data should be in aggregate form and not data for each taxpayer.**\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "How to use this templat e\n\n6. The template below sets out the information and data required using internal and external data sources. The template is\nbased on the many perspectives of risk which were discussed in the video conference meetings of November 7 to 10. The aim is to gather\ninformation and data about the many perspectives so that the many different risks can be risk assessed and prioritised.\n\n7. GDT may find that some of the information and data is not available. It is okay to make assumptions/hypothesis about missing\ninformation and estimates of data that is not available so long as this is clearly marked/noted as such.\n\n8. Some of the categories of information requested may not be relevant or applicable to Vietnam and should be marked as\n“not applicable”.\n\n9. The major source of internal GDT data will be returns relating to VAT, income tax, wages withholding and personal income.\n\n10. The tax return data should include the following for each tax type:\n\n - Sales data for all taxes plus VAT output tax\n\n - Distribution analysis of taxpayers by sales/turnover. For example, horizontal axis records value of sales in increments of 10 000 value,\nthe vertical axis records the frequency of each sales value amongst the population\n\n - Purchases data for all taxes, plus VAT input tax\n\n - Profit data, plus net VAT (output VAT minus input VAT)\n\n - VAT refunds by number of returns and value\n\n - Employee numbers, wages withholding, social contributions\n\n - Other relevant data contained in returns\n\n11. The timespan of the data should be the last three years. For example, sales data and VAT output tax data should be\nprovided for the last three years.\n\n12. The data should be in aggregate form and not data for each taxpayer.\n\n11", "text_characters": 1428}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**About the template**\n\n\n**13.** **The template has three columns:**\n\n\n - Area of risk – This is a description of each risk perspective.\n\n\n - Explanation/description – This is a more detailed description of the risk perspective\n\n\n - Comments/conclusions/attachments – This column will be used by GDT to record its conclusions or attach documents or links to the\nrequested data.\n\n|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|\n|---|---|---|\n|**Analysis of tourists **|**Analysis of tourists **|**Analysis of tourists **|\n|Domestic tourists -|Number of tourists||\n||Estimated tourist spend||\n|International tourists inbound -|Number of tourists.
Source could be immigration department, industry
associations, university research, google.||\n||Estimated tourist spend||\n|International tourists -country of origin|Number of tourists by country||\n|Method of arrival|Numbers arriving by land, sea, air||\n|Duration of visit|Number of days total and average per tourist||\n|International tourist outbound -|Number of tourists||\n|Immigration data|Any other relevant immigration data||\n|Department of Tourism – regional offices|Any relevant data||\n|**Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location.**|**Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location.**|**Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location.**|\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Domestic air travel||\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|International air travel||\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|International sea travel (For example, cruise ships)||\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Domestic road||\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Domestic rail||\n|Transport
Source: internal and external data|Other||\n\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.84097290039062, 213.60311889648438, 719.35546875, 515.8599853515625], "columns": 3, "rows": 20}], "text": "About the template\n\n13. The template has three columns:\n\n - Area of risk – This is a description of each risk perspective.\n\n - Explanation/description – This is a more detailed description of the risk perspective\n\n - Comments/conclusions/attachments – This column will be used by GDT to record its conclusions or attach documents or links to the\nrequested data.\n\n 1, Area of risk 2, Explanation/description 3, Comments/conclusions/attachments \n\n Analysis of tourists Analysis of tourists Analysis of tourists \n Domestic tourists - Number of tourists \n Estimated tourist spend \n International tourists inbound - Number of tourists. Source could be immigration department, industry associations, university research, google. \n Estimated tourist spend \n International tourists -country of origin Number of tourists by country \n Method of arrival Numbers arriving by land, sea, air \n Duration of visit Number of days total and average per tourist \n International tourist outbound - Number of tourists \n Immigration data Any other relevant immigration data \n Department of Tourism – regional offices Any relevant data \n Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location. Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location. Tourism Sub-sectors. This section can be further subdivided by geographic location. \n Transport Source: internal and external data Tax return data and external data for the following: \n Transport Source: internal and external data Domestic air travel \n Transport Source: internal and external data International air travel \n Transport Source: internal and external data International sea travel (For example, cruise ships) \n Transport Source: internal and external data Domestic road \n Transport Source: internal and external data Domestic rail \n Transport Source: internal and external data Other \n\n12", "text_characters": 1576}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|\n|---|---|---|\n|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following,
including occupancy rates:||\n|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Hotels - domestic owned||\n|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Hotels – foreign owned||\n|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Hostels||\n|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Airbnb||\n|Accommodation
Source: internal and external data|Other||\n|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||\n|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Bars||\n|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Restaurants – business type||\n|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Restaurants – household type||\n|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Café||\n|Restaurants
Source: internal and external data|Other||\n|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||\n|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Disco||\n|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Sporting and recreation||\n|Entertainment
Source: internal and external data|Other||\n|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Tax return data and external data for the following:||\n|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Retail shops||\n|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Tourist gift shops||\n|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Tourist retail malls||\n|Retail
Source: internal and external data|Other||\n|**Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) **|**Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) **|**Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) **|\n|Large taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||\n|Medium taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||\n|Small taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||\n|Micro taxpayers|Tax return data – all taxes||\n|Other market type|||\n|**Registration – pillar of compliance **|**Registration – pillar of compliance **|**Registration – pillar of compliance **|\n|Number registered|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|Number registered|Geographic location||\n|Number registered|Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||\n|Number not registered but required to be registered|||\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.82295989990234, 72.703125, 719.3507080078125, 532.1199951171875], "columns": 3, "rows": 33}], "text": "1, Area of risk 2, Explanation/description 3, Comments/conclusions/attachments \n\n Accommodation Source: internal and external data Tax return data and external data for the following, including occupancy rates: \n Accommodation Source: internal and external data Hotels - domestic owned \n Accommodation Source: internal and external data Hotels – foreign owned \n Accommodation Source: internal and external data Hostels \n Accommodation Source: internal and external data Airbnb \n Accommodation Source: internal and external data Other \n Restaurants Source: internal and external data Tax return data and external data for the following: \n Restaurants Source: internal and external data Bars \n Restaurants Source: internal and external data Restaurants – business type \n Restaurants Source: internal and external data Restaurants – household type \n Restaurants Source: internal and external data Café \n Restaurants Source: internal and external data Other \n Entertainment Source: internal and external data Tax return data and external data for the following: \n Entertainment Source: internal and external data Disco \n Entertainment Source: internal and external data Sporting and recreation \n Entertainment Source: internal and external data Other \n Retail Source: internal and external data Tax return data and external data for the following: \n Retail Source: internal and external data Retail shops \n Retail Source: internal and external data Tourist gift shops \n Retail Source: internal and external data Tourist retail malls \n Retail Source: internal and external data Other \n Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) Taxpayer market segment (large, medium and small and any other type) \n Large taxpayers Tax return data – all taxes \n Medium taxpayers Tax return data – all taxes \n Small taxpayers Tax return data – all taxes \n Micro taxpayers Tax return data – all taxes \n Other market type \n Registration – pillar of compliance Registration – pillar of compliance Registration – pillar of compliance \n Number registered Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Number registered Geographic location \n Number registered Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.) \n Number not registered but required to be registered \n\n13", "text_characters": 1946}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|\n|---|---|---|\n|Number of passive taxpayers (taxpayers not trading)|||\n|Number of deregistrations per year|||\n|Any special registration rules for specific sectors or
groups of taxpayers|||\n|**Filing – pillar of compliance **|**Filing – pillar of compliance **|**Filing – pillar of compliance **|\n|Number expected to file|Tax type (VAT, income tax etc)||\n||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|Number filed on-time/late|Tax type||\n||Market segment||\n|Number of non-filers|Tax type||\n|Number of non-filers|Market segment||\n|Estimated value of late filers and non-filers|Late filers value||\n|Estimated value of late filers and non-filers|Non-filers value||\n|**Correct reporting – pillar of compliance **|**Correct reporting – pillar of compliance **|**Correct reporting – pillar of compliance **|\n|Number of audit adjustments|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n||Geographic location||\n||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||\n||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|Value of audit adjustments|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n||Geographic location||\n||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||\n||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|Reasons for adjustments|||\n|Penalties imposed, number and value|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n||Geographic location||\n||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||\n||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|**Payment/debt – pillar of compliance **|**Payment/debt – pillar of compliance **|**Payment/debt – pillar of compliance **|\n|Number of taxpayers with debt|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n||Geographic location||\n||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||\n||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|Value of debt|Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.82295989990234, 72.703125, 719.3507080078125, 532.1199951171875], "columns": 3, "rows": 33}], "text": "1, Area of risk 2, Explanation/description 3, Comments/conclusions/attachments \n\n Number of passive taxpayers (taxpayers not trading) \n Number of deregistrations per year \n Any special registration rules for specific sectors or groups of taxpayers \n Filing – pillar of compliance Filing – pillar of compliance Filing – pillar of compliance \n Number expected to file Tax type (VAT, income tax etc) \n Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Number filed on-time/late Tax type \n Market segment \n Number of non-filers Tax type \n Number of non-filers Market segment \n Estimated value of late filers and non-filers Late filers value \n Estimated value of late filers and non-filers Non-filers value \n Correct reporting – pillar of compliance Correct reporting – pillar of compliance Correct reporting – pillar of compliance \n Number of audit adjustments Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Geographic location \n Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.) \n Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Value of audit adjustments Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Geographic location \n Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.) \n Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Reasons for adjustments \n Penalties imposed, number and value Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Geographic location \n Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.) \n Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Payment/debt – pillar of compliance Payment/debt – pillar of compliance Payment/debt – pillar of compliance \n Number of taxpayers with debt Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Geographic location \n Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.) \n Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Value of debt Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n\n14", "text_characters": 1498}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|\n|---|---|---|\n||Geographic location||\n||Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.)||\n||Market segment (large, medium, small, micro)||\n|Value of debt by age|3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years||\n|Value of debt written off in the last three years|||\n|Number and value of bankruptcies|||\n|Number of missing taxpayers that cannot be found|||\n|**Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants **|**Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants **|**Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants **|\n|GDT internal stakeholders|Risk unit||\n||Steering committee||\n||Media and communications||\n||Regional offices managers||\n||Regional offices auditors||\n||Other?||\n|External stakeholders/participants|Tourists (inbound, outbound, domestic)||\n|Taxpayers – within Vietnam|List all types of taxpayers||\n|Taxpayers outside Vietnam|||\n|Intermediaries|||\n|On-line platforms|||\n|Banks|||\n|Others?|||\n|On-line payment methods (WeChat and Paypal)|||\n|Taxpayer advocates|Lawyers and accountants||\n|Taxpayer associations|||\n|Academic researchers|||\n|Industry bodies|||\n|Government departments relevant to tourism|||\n|Government regulators of the industry|||\n|Other government departments that hold information|||\n|**Research relevant law **|**Research relevant law **|**Research relevant law **|\n|List all law relating to tourism|||\n|Are there any special tax rules (eg presumptive tax,
reduced VAT rates, zero-rate, VAT exemption?|||\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.82295989990234, 72.703125, 719.3507080078125, 532.1199951171875], "columns": 3, "rows": 33}], "text": "1, Area of risk 2, Explanation/description 3, Comments/conclusions/attachments \n\n Geographic location \n Sub-sector (accommodation, restaurants etc.) \n Market segment (large, medium, small, micro) \n Value of debt by age 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years \n Value of debt written off in the last three years \n Number and value of bankruptcies \n Number of missing taxpayers that cannot be found \n Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants Stakeholder/participants analysis – Identify all stakeholders and participants, including supply change participants \n GDT internal stakeholders Risk unit \n Steering committee \n Media and communications \n Regional offices managers \n Regional offices auditors \n Other? \n External stakeholders/participants Tourists (inbound, outbound, domestic) \n Taxpayers – within Vietnam List all types of taxpayers \n Taxpayers outside Vietnam \n Intermediaries \n On-line platforms \n Banks \n Others? \n On-line payment methods (WeChat and Paypal) \n Taxpayer advocates Lawyers and accountants \n Taxpayer associations \n Academic researchers \n Industry bodies \n Government departments relevant to tourism \n Government regulators of the industry \n Other government departments that hold information \n Research relevant law Research relevant law Research relevant law \n List all law relating to tourism \n Are there any special tax rules (eg presumptive tax, reduced VAT rates, zero-rate, VAT exemption? \n\n15", "text_characters": 1366}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|1, Area of risk|2, Explanation/description|3,
Comments/conclusions/attachments|\n|---|---|---|\n|Are there any proposed law changes in the tourism
sector?|||\n|What law changes would you like to see?|||\n\n\n**Next Steps After the Data Is Captured**\n\n\n**14.** **The information and data should be critically examined by GDT.**\n\n\n - Is the data consistent with what you thought was the risk?\n\n\n - Is there an indication of a specific area of risk?\n\n\n - What is the highest risk perspective based on the data?\n\n\n - What is the lowest risk perspective?\n\n\n - What further information do you need?\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-151", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [72.98538208007812, 72.75, 719.3154296875, 137.9600067138672], "columns": 3, "rows": 3}], "text": "1, Area of risk 2, Explanation/description 3, Comments/conclusions/attachments \n\n Are there any proposed law changes in the tourism sector? \n What law changes would you like to see? \n\nNext Steps After the Data Is Captured\n\n14. The information and data should be critically examined by GDT.\n\n - Is the data consistent with what you thought was the risk?\n\n - Is there an indication of a specific area of risk?\n\n - What is the highest risk perspective based on the data?\n\n - What is the lowest risk perspective?\n\n - What further information do you need?\n\n16", "text_characters": 443}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef5e6be0943b23a01873bac41eb59e99127e418c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:338156de6c7c1b3edd86cadbf6ad82f3efad740fbe03769d650bb8bff60d645f
+size 155009
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-161/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7fc6cecea5859481641d89c703b46d5c0fd869ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-161",
+ "title": "Trinidad and Tobago: Technical Assistance Report-Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-161.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "d434062100704af79a66df8b409cc9d34e337b8597c8b009a819e75e7b657f89",
+ "source_bytes": 413430,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/05/08/trinidad-and-tobago-technical-assistance-report-strengthening-cybersecurity-in-financial-533191",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:20:53+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 5.95,
+ "page_count": 23,
+ "text_characters": 57269,
+ "table_count": 3,
+ "figure_count": 2,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-STRENGTHENING CYBERSECURITY IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Trinidad and Tobago: Technical Assistance Report-Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions; IMF Country Report No. 23/161; February 2023",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "",
+ "producer": "",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230403133023-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230508132744-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-161/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67edb960df52774ecb5a498d890e51b9c1e61f4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@
+
+
+
+
+May 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/161**
+### **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-STRENGTHENING** **CYBERSECURITY IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance Report on Trinidad and Tobago was prepared by a staff team of
+the International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it
+was completed in February 2023.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Contents** **Page**
+
+
+Glossary .......................................................................................................................................3
+
+
+Preface..........................................................................................................................................4
+
+
+Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................5
+
+
+I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................9
+
+
+II. Seminar on Cybersecurity Regulation .....................................................................................9
+
+
+III. Financial Sector Cybersecurity Guideline Development and Assessment of Supervisory
+Capacity .......................................................................................................................................10
+
+A. Assessment ..................................................................................................................10
+B. Recommendations ............................................................................................................12
+
+
+IV. Cybersecurity Governance ...................................................................................................15
+
+A. Assessment ..................................................................................................................15
+B. Recommendations ............................................................................................................16
+
+
+V. Identity and Access Management Project ...............................................................................17
+
+A. Assessment ..................................................................................................................17
+B. Recommendations ............................................................................................................18
+
+Tables
+
+
+Table 1. Key Recommendations ..................................................................................................7
+
+Annexes
+
+
+I. Selected Good IAM Project Practices ......................................................................................20
+II. Agenda – Seminar on Regulation...........................................................................................22
+
+
+
+**GLOSSARY**
+
+
+Acronym Details
+
+
+ACH Automated Clearing House
+
+
+BCP Business Continuity Plan
+
+
+CBTT Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago
+
+
+CSP Customer Security Program
+
+
+DR Disaster Recovery
+
+
+FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
+
+
+FISD Financial Institutions Supervision Department
+
+
+FIUTT Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago
+
+
+FTE Full Time Equivalent
+
+
+IAM Identity and Access Management
+
+
+ICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process
+
+
+ICT Information and Communication Technology
+
+
+IT Information Technology
+
+
+MCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department
+
+
+Ministry of Youth and National Development - Cooperative
+MYND-CDD
+Development Division
+
+
+RBS Risk Based Supervision
+
+
+RFI Request for Information
+
+
+RFP Request for Proposal
+
+
+TTSEC Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission
+
+
+TA Technical Assistance
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 3
+
+
+
+**PREFACE**
+
+
+At the request of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT), the Monetary and Capital
+Markets Department (MCM) provided a field based technical assistance (TA) mission on
+strengthening cybersecurity in financial institutions during October 31 to November 4, 2022.
+
+
+The purpose of the mission was to (i) strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions
+under the supervisory ambit of CBTT and build supervisory capacity for the effective
+supervision of cybersecurity and (ii) strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Central Bank.
+
+
+The mission had met the Governor on the first day. The mission met Patrick Solomon
+(Inspector), Michelle Francis-Pantor (Deputy Inspector) from Financial Institutions Supervision
+Department (FISD) and Frances Correa (IT Consultant) and their team members.
+
+
+This report presents the mission’s assessment and main conclusions. The mission wishes to thank
+the officials of the CBTT for their excellent cooperation and productive discussions.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 4
+
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+
+**At the request of the CBTT, a TA mission on strengthening cybersecurity in financial**
+**institutions was delivered during the period October 31–November 4, 2022.** The Governor
+requested the TA during the 2022 Spring Meetings and the deliverables for the mission and the
+milestones were identified by having a dialogue with the authority. The mission had two
+objectives: (i) to strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions under the supervisory
+ambit of CBTT and (ii) to improve the cybersecurity stance of the CBTT. For the project for
+strengthening cybersecurity of the Central Bank an internal project team has been constituted.
+For strengthening cybersecurity of financial institutions, the CBTT has established a working
+group comprising all the financial regulators (namely, the CBTT, Trinidad and Tobago Securities
+and Exchange Commission (TTSEC), the Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago
+(FIUTT), and the Office of the Commission of Cooperative Development (CCD) to draft a
+cybersecurity guideline for financial institutions and a supervisory manual.
+
+
+**The deliverables included a capacity building seminar on regulation of cyber risk.** The
+seminar was delivered during November 1–3, 2022 covering cyber threat landscape, cyber risk
+and financial stability, impact of new technologies on cyber risk, international regulatory
+practices, cyber risk governance and management best practices, third party risk management,
+incident reporting, business continuity planning, response and recovery, information sharing, and
+testing. The seminar was attended in person and remotely by supervisory officials from all the
+regulatory authorities, although at this time, the CBTT is the only regulator that intends to draft a
+guideline on the subject.
+
+
+**The CBTT identified the need for filling regulatory gaps and desires to issue a focused**
+**guideline on cybersecurity covering governance, risk management, incident reporting, and**
+**cyber hygiene, and intends to develop a draft guideline for consultation with its regulated**
+**institutions in the first quarter of 2023.** Currently, there are no Information and
+Communication Technology (ICT) or Cyber risk guidelines issued by the CBTT. These aspects
+are governed indirectly by the extant instructions on corporate governance, market conduct,
+security systems for safeguarding customer information, Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment
+Process (ICAAP), and outsourcing. Discussions with a couple of banks indicate that the
+regulated entities may perceive it differently and do not consider these instructions to be directly
+applicable to ICT/cyber risk management underlining the need for a separate regulatory
+guidance. The mission had multiple rounds of discussion with the intra-agency working group
+constituted for the purpose of providing guidance in developing the guideline.
+
+
+**Supervisory arrangements for ICT/cyber risks need further improvements and resource**
+**constraints within FISD need to be addressed urgently.** The organizational structure of the
+FISD indicates responsibilities for supervising banks and nonbanks was entrusted to one division
+and insurance and pension firms to another. There is no practice of assigning a dedicated
+supervisor even in the case of top five banks. Similar arrangements were there for insurance and
+pension firms. CBTT recognizes the importance of cyber risks and have taken some steps
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 5
+
+
+
+including conducting thematic reviews of banks periodically on cyber related topics, carrying out
+cyber risk assessments for banks and sensitizing the financial sector participants on the need for
+enhanced cybersecurity. It is important to increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber
+examinations particularly for large banks. This would require the resources to be augmented
+urgently. To date, insurance and pension firms have not been subjected to any survey on cyber
+related topics and regulatory/supervisory initiatives to address ICT/cyber risks are limited.
+
+
+**To help improve the cybersecurity posture of the CBTT, the mission performed a high-**
+**level assessment of the cybersecurity governance and the Identity and Access Management**
+**(IAM) project.** Both assessments were based on reviewing the relevant organizational and
+project structures, policies and procedures, and interviews with selected members of CBTT
+management and staff.
+
+
+**Key findings of the cybersecurity governance assessment are as follows:**
+
+
+(i) Cybersecurity governance at CBTT is set up according to generally accepted practices in
+the financial sector, with some minor differences and resource constraints;
+(ii) The information security function in the first line [1] is subordinated to the Head of IT, which
+
+calls for compensating controls;
+(iii) Unusually, the second line of defense–risk management–has a formal responsibility in
+
+driving IT governance, a first-line role;
+(iv) Cybersecurity policies and procedures cover most of the important topics and have been
+
+recently updated;
+(v) Policies governing the cybersecurity of payment systems are uneven in terms of the
+
+technical controls required. The SWIFT cybersecurity control environment is more
+comprehensive due to the formalized requirements of the Customer Security Program
+(CSP); and
+(vi) There is not a separate Cyber Risk Committee or similar at the Board level, but the existing
+
+IT Committee assumes this function.
+
+
+**The IAM project has been formally set up and is now in Phase 1, which is considered**
+**preparatory.** The governance of the project, the high-level roadmap, and the deliverables for
+Phase 1 are generally in line with good practices. The mission drew the attention of the project
+team to some key tasks in the near future, including getting input from the business functions, to
+do a roles and access rights review, and to develop formal requirements, among others. A
+summary of the recommended actions is given in Appendix I.
+
+
+1 In terms of three lines model articulated by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (The IIA’s Three Lines Model –
+published by IIA), First line roles: Provision of products/services to clients; managing risk. Second line roles:
+Expertise, support, monitoring and challenge on risk-related matters. Third line roles: Independent and objective
+assurance and advice on all matters related to the achievement of objectives.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 6
+
+
+
+**TABLE 1.** **KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Recommendation|Priority|Time
frame*|Reference
Paragraph|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**_Organization and capacity_**|**_Organization and capacity_**|**_Organization and capacity_**|**_Organization and capacity_**|
+|Augment the resources in ICT/cyber risk supervision|High|Immediate|15|
+|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|
+|Draft the guideline on ICT/cyber risk covering banks,
insurance companies and pension firms on the basis of various
inputs provided in the Seminar on Regulations, striking an
appropriate balance between general principles and specific
details having regard to the local environment and digital
landscape|High|Near
Term|16|
+|Include a provision in the guideline to conduct an independent
periodic assessment of cyber preparedness of banks, insurance
companies and pension firms by qualified external
professionals|Medium|Near
Term|17|
+|Incorporate a requirement for the Board to identify the
regulatory gaps, draw an implementation plan with appropriate
milestones and submit to the CBTT as part of the guideline|High|Near
Term|18|
+|Prepare a cyber incident reporting template and require
supervised entities to report cyber incidents in keeping with
the requirements as defined in the guideline or template.|High|Near
Term|20|
+|Sensitize the regulated entities on the need for strengthening
cybersecurity through speeches, interviews, etc., and impress
upon the need for a separate guideline, cyber incident reporting
and information sharing among banks|High|Near
Term|21|
+|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|
+|Plan and conduct ICT/cyber preparedness surveys among
insurance companies and pension firms|High|Medium
Term|22|
+|Increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk
assessments, to start with for major banks.|High|Medium
Term|23|
+|Plan and augment supervisory resources to ensure a self-
sufficient supervision function covering banks, insurance
companies and pension firms|High|Medium
Term|24|
+|Consider setting up an offsite supervision function for
ICT/cyber risks|Medium|Medium
Term|25|
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 7
+
+
+
+|Recommendation|Priority|Timeframe|Reference
Paragraph|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|
+|Assess the workload of the IT Security unit and increase
resources as needed.|High|Medium
term|32|
+|Remove IT governance from the responsibilities of the risk
function.|High|Near term|33|
+|Establish regular cybersecurity meetings and reporting
regime at the Board level with the participation of the Head
of IT Security.|High|Near term|34|
+|Develop a secure application development policy and
security hardening baselines.|High|Near term|35|
+|Develop a policy to bring the cybersecurity controls of the
ACH and RTGS systems more in line with the SWIF CSP.|High|Near term|36|
+|Regularly commission security reviews and tests of the
payment systems.|High|Near term|37|
+|Disaster recovery tests should include simulating a
complete failure in the primary data center.|High|Medium
term|38|
+|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|
+|Plan out Phase 2 of the IAM project and include
requirements definition and roles and access rights review
as key tasks, among others.|
High|Near term|44|
+|Analyze the projected workload and expertise vs internal
resources and skills to determine the type and extent of
third-party support needed.|
High|Near term|45|
+|Adopt a phased approach to IAM deployment.|High|Near term|46|
+|Adopt good IAM implementation practices listed in the
Appendix as deemed necessary.|Medium|Near term|47|
+
+
+
+_* Immediate: less than three months; Near term (NT):_ 3–6 months _; Medium term (MT):_ 6–12 months _; Long term (LT):_ more
+than 12 months _._
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 8
+
+
+
+**I.** **INTRODUCTION**
+
+
+1. **The mission focused on (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial institutions**
+**by providing guidance to draft a regulatory guideline, and (ii) helping improve the**
+**cybersecurity stance of CBTT by assessing the cybersecurity governance and the IAM**
+**project** . The mission conducted a seminar on cybersecurity regulation to build capacity within
+CBTT to draft a regulatory guideline and by way of discussion with stakeholders and analyzing
+the information provided by the CBTT assessed the supervisory capacity. To assess the
+cybersecurity governance the mission reviewed CBTT’s relevant organizational structure,
+policies, and procedures. The documentation used for this work included organizational charts
+and approved policies and procedures, risk assessments, and other internal information security
+documents. The mission interviewed senior staff to understand the current cybersecurity
+governance practices. The IAM project was assessed in similar approach, focusing on the project
+charter, project plan, and planned deliverables. Due to the limited time available the mission
+relied on the information and documents as provided and did not seek independent corroboration.
+
+
+2. **This report is divided in five sections.** Section II addresses the seminar on cyber risk
+regulation; Section III covers the financial sector cybersecurity guideline development and
+assessment of supervisory capacity; Section IV outlines the results of the cybersecurity
+governance; and Section V addresses the IAM project.
+
+
+**II.** **SEMINAR ON CYBERSECURITY REGULATION**
+
+
+3. **Delivering a seminar on cybersecurity regulation was an important component of**
+**the mission.** One of the objectives of the mission was to strengthen the cybersecurity in financial
+institutions by assisting the authorities in drafting and issuing a regulatory guideline. To facilitate
+the drafting work CBTT has constituted a working group comprising all financial sector
+regulators. The CBTT will take the lead on drafting the proposed guideline with input from the
+other regulators and the guideline will be issued only to those entities regulated by CBTT at the
+present time. In building capacity among supervisory staff of CBTT and other regulators, a
+seminar was organized covering important topics. The seminar spanned three days with three
+sessions each day. The agenda is given in Annex I. The seminar was received well as reflected in
+the feedback.
+
+
+4. **The first day of the seminar covered Cyber Risk and Financial Sector – An**
+**Introduction, Implications for Financial Stability, Cyber Security – An Overarching**
+**Framework, and Cyber Security and New Technologies including Cloud Regulation.** First
+day’s session introduced the importance of managing cyber risk within the financial sector by
+discussing emerging cyber threat landscape, evolution of banking technology, pace of
+digitalization, increasing intensity of cyberattacks and the transmission channels through which
+cyber risk could pose financial stability concerns. Arrangements at various countries in
+managing cybersecurity with a few country examples was discussed to provide a context to the
+financial regulators. The risks arising out of adoption of newer technologies like Artificial
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 9
+
+
+
+Intelligence/Machine Learning, Application Programming Interface, and Cloud Technologies
+were discussed with specific focus on building regulatory guideline on these emerging areas of
+interest.
+
+
+5. **An overview of the International Guidance on Cyber Risk and Global Regulatory**
+**Practices and third-party risk management were covered during the second day.**
+International guidance on cyber risk and global regulatory practices were covered to provide an
+overview of such arrangement covering the work of standard setting bodies and major regulators.
+By way of example, the regulations issued by two jurisdictions were discussed. Subsequently
+governance and risk management aspects were covered in depth. Session on third-party risk
+management highlighted the increased use of third parties within the financial sector, growing
+dependencies, regulatory best practices, and supervisory focus in assessing such arrangements.
+
+
+6. **Incident reporting, information sharing, business continuity and response and**
+**recovery capabilities were discussed on the third day.** The third day’s session focused on
+cyber incident reporting by discussing the ongoing work by standard setting bodies in this area
+and highlighting the usefulness of collecting such information. The need for the financial
+institutions to share information among themselves voluntarily on threat intelligence and best
+practices observed in this regard were also discussed. With the focus of the standard setting
+bodies on delivering critical financial services through disruption, business continuity and
+response and recovery capabilities within the financial institutions assume importance. This topic
+was covered extensively during the seminar.
+
+
+**III.** **FINANCIAL SECTOR CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF**
+
+**SUPERVISORY CAPACITY**
+
+
+**A.** **Assessment**
+
+
+7. **CBTT does not currently have a cybersecurity guideline in place applicable to its**
+**supervised entities.** The Corporate Governance Guideline, Guideline for the Management of
+Outsourcing Risks, Guideline for the Security Systems for Safeguarding Customer Information,
+Market Conduct Guideline and ICAAP Guideline cover certain aspects of ICT or cyber risk
+management including (i) Board having special skills including information technology, (ii) risk
+management framework to include provisions to evaluate the risks and materiality of all existing
+and prospective outsourcing arrangements and the inherent risks associated with outsourcing
+which includes cyber risk, (iii) management to be responsible for developing and documenting
+an operating manual of the policies, procedures and processes of the institution’s information
+security program, (iv) reporting of material incidents to the CBTT, and (v) need to conduct stress
+tests with severe cyberattack as one of the scenarios. The current regulatory guidelines on the
+subject are fragmented and do not comprehensively address the issues given the growing
+importance of cybersecurity.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 10
+
+
+
+8. **CBTT has identified the regulatory gap and has constituted a working group duly**
+**represented by all financial sector regulators to draft a guideline on the topic.** CBTT is
+responsible for supervising banks, non-banks, insurance companies, pension firms, bureaux de
+change, and payment systems. The Trinidad and Tobago Security and Exchange Commission
+(TTSEC) supervises the securities market and intermediaries, and the Cooperative Development
+Division within the Ministry of Youth and National Development is responsible for supervision
+of credit unions. The Financial Intelligence Unit has jurisdiction over Anti Money
+Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism cutting across various nonfinancial sectors. Only
+CBTT proposes to draft a guideline while other regulators felt lessons learnt in the drafting
+exercise would be beneficial to introduce a similar guideline at an appropriate time.
+
+
+9. **Among the CBTT supervised entities, banks appear to be better informed on**
+**ICT/cyber risks compared to other entities like insurance and pension firms.** Banks’ IT
+systems have been under the focus of FISD for some time now and some of the guidelines make
+it incumbent on banks to manage the IT risks. Periodic surveys carried out by the CBTT has also
+played a role in sensitizing them on this important topic. Risk-Based Supervision (RBS) Manual
+also covers assessment of IT risks as part of operational risk and provides some guidance to
+supervisors, though the Manual is outdated (version shared with the mission is dated 2003) and
+due for revision in 2023. Desk-based reviews through virtual engagement with banks also are
+good initiatives. FISD used current best practice frameworks (Federal Financial Institutions
+Examination Council's (FFIEC) cybersecurity assessment tool) in assessing the exposures of the
+banking sector to cyber risk. However, insurance firms have not been subjected to such
+engagements leaving a gap in their preparedness in addressing ICT/cyber risks. The proposed
+guideline is intended to address both banks as well as insurance firms.
+
+
+10. **Discussion with select banks helped in understanding their preparedness and**
+**perception about the extant guidelines.** As part of the mission, to appreciate the banks’ view, a
+meeting was arranged with two major banks—one locally owned and the other owned by a
+foreign parent. The discussions revealed that banks are considering ICT/cyber risks carefully and
+have taken various steps to mitigate those risks. It is also seen that one of the banks
+headquartered at Trinidad and Tobago has several subsidiaries in multiple countries, even
+beyond Caribbean countries, having to face additional burden of managing the IT services for
+subsidiaries as well. A foreign bank subsidiary operating locally indicated that most of their IT
+services are outsourced to their parent located in another country, leaving limited capacity to
+address such issues locally. Both banks could not recollect the range of regulatory guidelines
+already applicable to them as these were fragmented. There was willingness to report cyber
+incidents to the CBTT, but there was reservation in sharing information among peers. This is an
+area where CBTT can build awareness further.
+
+
+11. **Discussions with the working group provided key inputs in the preparation of a**
+**draft guideline.** As part of the mission discussions were held with the working group to
+understand the approach being adopted in developing the guideline. In addition to the seminar on
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 11
+
+
+
+regulation as referred above, guidance also was provided during the meeting on areas like scope
+and applicability of the guideline, proportionality issue, need to elaborate the instructions where
+needed based on the local needs, developing technology neutral guideline, and making the
+guideline outcome focused. It is observed that the burden of developing the guideline is
+primarily on CBTT team, considering the expertise available with other financial regulators.
+
+
+12. **Resource constraint is acute in ICT/cyber risk supervision with only one junior**
+**examiner earmarked partially for banks and none for insurance and pension firms** . The
+organizational structure of the FISD indicates responsibilities for supervising banks and
+nonbanks was entrusted to one division and insurance and pension firms to another. Within
+banks & nonbanks division, supervised entities are allocated among three teams which are
+collectively responsible. The practice of assigning a dedicated supervisor even in the case of top
+five banks is not in vogue. Similar arrangements were there for insurance and pension firms. As
+per the organizational chart shared with the mission, the number of supervisory staff allocated to
+the supervision of banks / nonbanks at 16 (includes the manager and administrative assistant) is
+less than the number of staff available for insurance and pension firm supervision. Among the
+bank / nonbank supervisors only one Junior Examiner is an IT qualified resource partially
+marked for such work. Among insurance supervisors, no such resource is available. To provide a
+perspective, discussions reveal that banks/insurance / pension firms have a share in total assets of
+60/20/20 percent respectively.
+
+
+13. **Leveraging the capacity available at ‘Risk Management’ and ‘Audit’ functions of**
+**the CBTT for supervisory purposes is useful in the short term.** The current practice of
+involving ICT/cyber expertise available in staff attached to risk management and audit function
+is very useful, given the acute shortage of resources within supervision. Such arrangements tend
+to bring forth several coordination issues and may potentially lead to lack of ownership and
+control.
+
+
+14. **Supervisory practices in assessing cyber risk are yet to evolve fully. Currently**
+**thematic reviews and surveys play an important role, though such exercises are infrequent.**
+In respect of banks, FISD has engaged with the banks as part of the regular supervision efforts in
+assessing IT risks leveraging both external and internal audit work. There are no prescribed
+testing requirements. RBS manual is dated and requires an update urgently to focus on the
+ICT/cyber risks, which will be given priority upon completion of the cybersecurity guideline.
+Periodical surveys (four conducted in the past eight years) provide some input but are not
+sufficient to appreciate the risk profile of the banking institutions. Onsite supervision focusing
+specially on ICT/cyber risk and offsite capabilities are very limited.
+
+
+**B.** **Recommendations**
+
+
+15. **Augment the resources in ICT/cyber risk supervision.** Digitalization of financial
+services has progressed rapidly, and financial institutions are adopting newer technologies more
+frequently. Consumer demand for digital services is increasing, propelling financial institutions
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 12
+
+
+
+to expand their digital landscape. It is therefore necessary to have adequate supervisory resources
+to focus on this area. Drafting a guideline, consulting with the industry, finalizing the guideline
+and issuing it will take serious effort. Subsequently, assessing the compliance with the guideline
+will increase the supervisory burden. The current complement of only one Junior Examiner
+earmarked for this purpose in respect of banks/nonbanks and no staff for insurance/pension firms
+suggests that there is an urgent need to augment supervisory resources in ICT/cyber risk
+supervision.
+
+
+16. **Draft the guideline on ICT/cyber risk covering banks, insurance companies and**
+**pension firms on the basis of various inputs provided in the Seminar on Regulations.**
+Though banks, insurers, and pension firms are at different stages of maturity when it comes to
+managing ICT/cyber risks, it would be ideal to include all of them under the scope of the new
+guideline. If needed, more flexibility could be provided in terms of implementation in respect of
+insurance and pension firms.
+
+
+17. **Include a provision in the guideline to conduct an independent periodic assessment**
+**of cyber preparedness of banks, insurance companies and pension firms by qualified**
+**external professionals.** Given the acute shortage of supervisory resources, in the initial days it
+will be beneficial to leverage the work of external audit firms. Many jurisdictions require
+financial institutions to periodically assess their ICT/cyber preparedness with the help of external
+audit firms and to submit such reports for central bank’s perusal.
+
+
+18. **Incorporate in the guideline a requirement for the Board to identify the regulatory**
+**gaps, draw an implementation plan with appropriate milestones, and submit to the CBTT.**
+The guideline, when issued, will mandate certain new requirements on the part of financial
+institutions and may need to provide an implementation period given additional investments it
+may warrant. It is a good practice to require Boards of supervised entities to make an assessment
+of gaps and draw an implementation plan with milestones to bridge those gaps. CBTT could also
+consider including requirement for institutions to conduct a gap analysis as a standard
+requirement for all recently issued guidelines. Such information would be very useful for
+supervisors in their assessment and when collected on regular intervals will provide an
+understanding of the progress made by various institutions.
+
+
+19. **Determine the level of details to be provided in the draft guideline considering the**
+**local environment and digital landscape.** Regulatory guideline needs to meet the style and
+usage expectations of the local environment. While principle-based guideline is welcome, the
+level of details will depend on the expertise available within the Boards of supervised entities
+and other local factors. Consider providing sufficient details in the guideline so that the
+implementation of the provisions of the guideline is facilitated.
+
+
+20. **Prepare a cyber incident reporting template and require supervised entities to**
+**report cyber incidents regularly.** As part of ICT/cyber risk management, it is important to
+collect information on cyber incidents regularly. Cyber incident reporting offers several benefits
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 13
+
+
+
+both to the supervisor as well as supervised entities. It is a good practice to integrate such
+requirements in the guideline.
+
+
+21. **Sensitize the regulated entities on the need for strengthening cybersecurity through**
+**speeches, interviews, etc., and impress upon them the need for cyber incident reporting and**
+**information sharing among banks.** The process of drafting the guideline, review, obtaining
+industry views, finalization, and approval can take up to six months. It is important to prepare the
+industry for such a guideline as the demands of such regulatory guideline will be substantial on
+the part of supervised entities. It is often a good practice to sensitize them well in advance by
+way of top management speeches, interviews to reputed financial dailies, etc.
+
+
+22. **Plan and conduct ICT/cyber preparedness surveys among insurance companies and**
+**pension firms** . The level of preparedness among supervised entities differs. While banks are
+subjected to thematic reviews, surveys, and virtual assessments on their ICT/cyber preparedness,
+insurance and pension firms have not been exposed to such supervisory engagements. It is
+therefore necessary to initiate such exercises for insurance and pension firms. To start with,
+surveys on ICT/cyber preparedness could be attempted.
+
+
+23. **Increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk assessments, starting with**
+**major banks.** Banks are the dominant set of institutions within Trinidad and Tobago in terms of
+their share of financial system assets and they tend to adopt technology faster. Some of the banks
+are large entities having many customers and offering various digital services. It is important to
+increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk supervision at least for top banks in the
+near term.
+
+
+24. **Plan and augment supervisory resources to ensure a self-sufficient supervision**
+**function covering banks, insurance companies, and pension firms.** Considering the varying
+level of digital maturity of the supervised entities and the number and size of such entities, it is
+necessary to have sufficient resources within supervision unit to address the emerging ICT/cyber
+risks. Supervisors also have the responsibility to have a macro perspective, looking at various
+interdependencies, interconnections, concentration risk, and financial stability implications. The
+work involved in bringing insurance and pension firms will be daunting as lot of efforts will go
+in educating and building awareness. Therefore, it is urgent and necessary to augment
+supervisory resources. This could be seen as an investment rather than expenditure as qualified
+supervisors would lead to operationally resilient financial institutions in the long run.
+
+
+25. **Consider setting up an offsite supervision function for ICT/cyber risks.** Basel core
+principles require supervisors to have a combination of onsite and offsite supervision to
+effectively supervise banks. ICT/cyber risk supervision also requires offsite supervision
+capabilities as supervisors need to collect various key performance indicators, cyber incidents—
+both individual major incidents and summary level information, organizational structure of the
+supervised entities, digital products, list of third-party arrangements, various test reports and
+policy documents so that a risk profile or dashboard could be prepared for each of the supervised
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 14
+
+
+
+entity. Such an arrangement would further facilitate in obtaining a macro picture of the sector.
+Well-structured offsite capabilities will facilitate more efficient onsite supervision as well.
+
+
+**IV.** **CYBERSECURITY GOVERNANCE**
+
+
+**A.** **Assessment**
+
+
+26. **Cybersecurity governance at CBTT is set up according to generally accepted good**
+**practices in the financial sector, with some minor differences.** All three lines of defense—that
+is, management control, risk management, and internal audit—have cybersecurity capabilities.
+Resource constraints are apparent in the first line, while those in the second and third lines are
+less strained.
+
+
+27. **Unusually, the second line of defense—risk management—has a formal**
+**responsibility in driving IT governance.** Most financial institutions have their second line
+focusing on risk data collection, consolidation, analysis, and reporting, and do not expect it to be
+operationally involved in IT Governance because IT Governance involves setting up
+organizational structures and policies and procedures to ensure effective and controlled IT
+operations. The second line usually does not have this responsibility.
+
+
+28. **The information security function in the first line is subordinated to the Head of IT.**
+This arrangement is losing ground in the industry because of the growing importance of
+cybersecurity and increased risk of conflicts of interest. However, it still has advantages [2] and
+with appropriate compensating controls, the conflict of interest risk can be mitigated.
+
+
+29. **Cybersecurity policies and procedures cover the most important topics and have**
+**been recently updated.** Missing areas include secure application development standards and
+security hardening baselines.
+
+
+30. **Policies governing the cybersecurity of payment systems are uneven in terms of the**
+**technical controls required.** The SWIFT cybersecurity control environment is more
+comprehensive due to the formalized requirements of the CSP.
+
+
+31. **Regular recovery tests of critical systems are not performed.** Testing to date has been
+limited to tabletop exercises and has not incorporated tests using services from the disaster
+recovery site to conduct business operations. In the event the primary site services become
+inaccessible, the recovery site is presently configured to provide selected services deemed to be
+critical.
+
+
+2 Most notably, closeness to IT operations, which has the largest influence on cybersecurity in an organization.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 15
+
+
+
+**B.** **Recommendations**
+
+
+32. **Assess the workload of the IT Security unit and increase resources as needed.** In
+order to determine the nature and extent of additional resources, an analysis of the unit’s current
+workload should be performed, including operations and project work. CBTT’s commitment to
+improving its cyber resilience will result in additional workload on top of an already stretched
+agenda, which needs to be estimated and the necessary resource development plans drawn up in
+advance, as there is a general shortage of available skills. The mission’s scope did not include a
+deeper dive in this area and thus cannot make more specific recommendations. A rule of thumb
+that might be used to check the reasonableness of resource allocation is that in banking the
+information security workforce Full Time Equivalent (FTE) is typically in the 10-15 percent
+range of the IT workforce FTE. Given that the CBTT operates critical infrastructure for the
+financial sector, the actual ratio may be closer to the upper bound.
+
+
+33. **Remove IT governance from the responsibilities of the risk function.** The risk
+function should focus on risk data collection, consolidation, analysis, and reporting and not be
+involved operationally in governance matters, including IT and cybersecurity. [3] IT and
+cybersecurity governance is best assigned to the IT department and the IT Security unit
+respectively, under the direction and oversight of senior management, and subject to review by
+internal audit. Senior management should require that IT and cybersecurity governance is set
+according to the broad governance principles adopted by the CBTT and obtain assurance thereof
+through internal audit.
+
+
+34. **Establish regular cybersecurity meetings and reporting regime at the Board level**
+**with the participation of the Head of IT Security.** This “dotted line” reporting arrangement
+will act as a compensating control that mitigates the risk from potential conflicts of interest
+between IT and IT Security management. For example, without such an arrangement IT Security
+management that is subordinated to IT management might find it difficult to voice opposition to
+decisions detrimental to cybersecurity. Alternatively, the cybersecurity function could be
+elevated to the same level in the organization as the IT function.
+
+
+35. **Develop a secure application development policy and security hardening baselines.**
+The CBTT does internal (in-house) application development, including security sensitive
+functionalities. Security vulnerabilities in software often occur because of insufficient focus on
+secure development practices. A secure application development policy helps reducing the
+number and severity of such vulnerabilities by mandating, among others, development methods
+and coding approaches that promote security by design, code reviews, testing for exploitable
+bugs, and secure configuration of the development toolchain. A related area that needs attention
+is the strict separation of the development, test and production environments and restricting
+
+
+3 The risk function has not been actively pursuing operational involvement in IT or cybersecurity governance in
+recent times, so the recommendation will not result in any disruption; it will only align the de jure roles and
+responsibilities with the de facto situation (and good practice).
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 16
+
+
+
+access of developers to production systems. Finally, security hardening baselines help improving
+security by mandating configuration settings on servers, workstations, networking devices, etc.,
+that decrease the attack surface.
+
+
+36. **Develop a policy to bring the cybersecurity controls of the ACH and RTGS systems**
+**more in line with the SWIF CSP.** The SWIFT CSP encapsulates the best practice in payment
+system related cybersecurity control and thus can form a strong basis for improving the
+cybersecurity of other payment systems as well.
+
+
+37. **Regularly commission security reviews and tests of the payment systems.** CBTT uses
+a scanning tool to mitigate the risk posed by unpatched vulnerabilities in its IT environment.
+Indeed, frequent vulnerability scans and timely patching of the vulnerabilities found are the
+foundations of effective defense against malicious attacks. For high-risk systems, such as
+payment systems, this should be augmented with security configuration reviews, including
+access rights reviews and network security reviews because vulnerabilities may exist that cannot
+be detected by remote scans. Furthermore, security testing, such as penetration tests, convey
+additional needed assurance over the effectiveness of cyber defense. The frequency of the
+reviews and tests should be determined based on the risk tolerance and budgets available.
+Typically, penetration tests and security reviews of payment systems are done annually, with
+more frequent (e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly) vulnerability scans in between. The minimum
+requirement for scanning frequency should be quarterly and after any significant changes.
+
+
+38. **Disaster recovery tests should progress beyond tabletop exercises and include**
+**simulating a complete failure in the primary data center** . This would necessitate performing
+a full recovery using the offsite resources as far as possible. More disruptive tests could be
+considered after gaining experience, whereby the data center is shut down. Such tests will require
+extensive preparation and planning and will typically be performed less frequently.
+
+
+**V.** **IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT PROJECT**
+
+
+**A.** **Assessment**
+
+
+39. **The IAM project is set up according to good project management practices.** There is
+a project charter in place, which documents the goals, stakeholders, sponsors, outline, and
+deliverables for Phase 1. A project plan is available as well.
+
+
+40. **The project is in a very early stage; thus, the mission could not meaningfully assess**
+**performance and delivery against plans.** A follow-up mission in the first quarter of 2023
+would be in a better position to carry out such an assessment. Therefore, the mission focused on
+sharing experience and good practices and answering specific questions raised during
+discussions.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 17
+
+
+
+41. **The core project team consists of staff** **from the IT and IT security departments.** The
+project charter does not specify the time commitments needed form staff, for example in FTEs.
+The mission cautioned that the workload can be high, and involvement of the business functions
+is required, especially in the initial stages of the project.
+
+
+42. **The deliverables for Phase 1 are clearly identified and creating them within the**
+**deadline seems feasible.** Phase 1 ends on January 31, 2022. As a key activity in Phase 1 some of
+the potential vendors have been contacted for general information. A review of the IAM policy is
+scheduled, as well as work on the authoritative source for identity information.
+
+
+43. **It is unlikely that the budget of TTD 100,000 (approximately USD 14,700) set aside**
+**for IAM advisory services will be sufficient.** External advisors are often brought in to benefit
+from IAM-specific subject matter knowledge, methodology and tools, assist in requirements
+definition, role review and reengineering, solution design, vendor selection, and do quality
+assurance and post-implementation review. Given the size and complexity of the project, and the
+going rates for relevant services, the budget could be exhausted by just one of these tasks.
+
+
+**B.** **Recommendations**
+
+
+44. **Plan out Phase 2 of the IAM project and include requirements definition and roles**
+**and access rights review and reengineering as key tasks, among others.** The mission supports
+the phased approach and suggests that the November 2022 timeframe is ideal to start planning
+for Phase 2 that should commence in February 2023 and ideally finish in a few months’ time. [4]
+The requirements definition should include functional and non-functional requirements as well.
+Among the functional requirements, special attention should be paid to those addressing
+workflow and policy management, interfacing and integration, and search and analytics. Key
+non-functional requirements include those addressing performance, availability, usability, and
+security. Security requirements should address logical access and data security controls, and
+logging and monitoring. The roles and access rights review are necessary to identify inconsistent,
+conflicting, or missing role definitions, cases of access rights non-compliance with policy. The
+review also serves as an input to role reengineering, which aims to reduce the number of roles
+and fine-tune the associated access rights so that the principles of least privilege and need-toknow based data access are adhered to. It is important that the business functions are involved in
+the role review and reengineering work as they are responsible for setting out the rules for
+system access within their organizational units, in compliance with applicable policies.
+
+
+45. **Analyze the projected workload and expertise required vs internal resources and**
+**skills to determine the type and extent of third-party support that needs to be sourced.** The
+total effort needed to deliver the project should be estimated in terms of FTEs (or man-days or
+
+
+4 Experience shows that project phases of durations from 3 to 6 months are conducive to a successful project,
+especially if each phase has clearly identifiable benefits, as frequent delivery of results keep the up the momentum
+and motivation of the project team.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 18
+
+
+
+work hours, whichever is deemed more suitable). The expertise required should be identified as
+well. Comparing these with the project timeline, the internally available skills, and resources will
+enable CBTT to better estimate the external support needed, and consequently, the expected
+outlays. Typically, internal skills in short supply in an IAM project include role reengineering,
+access rights review, interface development, and system integration.
+
+
+46. **Adopt a phased approach to IAM deployment.** It is advisable to do the deployment of
+the selected IAM solution over several phases. This reduces the risk of widespread disruption
+should unexpected errors occur. The first phase of the deployment (which is not the same as the
+first phase of the IAM project itself) could be considered a pilot and could include Active
+Directory and one or two internally developed applications. In this way, operational experience
+could be gained in a live but limited environment.
+
+
+47. **Adopt good IAM implementation practices listed in this report as deemed necessary.**
+Given the early stage of the IAM project several options how to structure and run it are still
+open. The good practices listed in the Appendix can be used as a guide when making decisions
+on the actual course of action.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 19
+
+
+
+**ANNEXES**
+
+
+**ANNEX I.** **SELECTED GOOD IAM** **PROJECT PRACTICES**
+
+
+The following is a non-exhaustive list of good practices that in the experience of the mission
+team can significantly contribute to the success of an IAM project. CBTT is advised to decide on
+the adoption, adaptation, or rejection of any of these based on professional judgment, considering
+the circumstances of the institution in general, and the project in particular.
+
+**1.** **Requirements and vendor selection**
+
+
+a. Both functional and non-functional requirements are developed, involving representatives
+
+of key stakeholders, e.g., IT, information security, and business units.
+
+
+b. Requirements regarding workflow, interfacing, integration (e.g., with the service desk
+
+application), batch processing, analytics, search, and security are prioritized. All
+requirements are assigned a priority level, e.g., must-have, negotiable, and nice-to-have.
+
+
+c. Requirements for IAM related services, both from vendors and independent advisors are
+
+defined and prioritized. Typical services for consideration include role reengineering,
+quality assurance, security testing, and post-implementation review.
+
+
+d. An initial market research is done to identify not more than three to four IAM potentially
+
+suitable IAM products/vendors (candidates).
+
+
+e. A more detailed analysis is done to reduce the number of candidates to (typically) three.
+
+At this stage the capabilities, references and reputation of vendors is informally checked.
+
+
+f. A formal Request for Information (RFI) is issued. Candidates are asked to give
+
+presentations, provide test or demonstration licenses, and support a “test drive” of the
+product.
+
+
+g. The test drive includes, among others, experimenting with the product features that fulfill
+
+the prioritized requirements, and the full identity lifecycle.
+
+
+h. A formal Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued. Candidates are asked to show not just
+
+one-off costs but also the total cost of ownership for several years. Costs are required to
+be shown according to a template to facilitate comparative analysis.
+
+
+i. Financial and technical information in the proposal is assessed separately according to
+
+predefined and weighted criteria.
+
+
+j. A similar, preferably simplified process for selecting independent advisors is in place.
+
+E.g., it is rarely necessary to go for separate RFI and RFP phases.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 20
+
+
+
+**2.** **Implementation**
+
+
+a. The IAM project raises awareness among, and getting buy-in from, key stakeholders. The
+
+project sponsors lend their support and use their authority to promote this effort.
+
+
+b. The IAM project is treated equally as a business and IT endeavor. The messaging
+
+emphasizes the need for the business units to participate, especially in the planning, role
+review and reengineering, and testing activities.
+
+
+c. Types of user identities are identified, e.g., human, non-human (service accounts),
+
+employee, contractor, supplier, etc. The initial set is consolidated to the minimum
+necessary. e.g., are there meaningful differences that require separate treatment of fulltime and part-time users? Is there a need to differentiate between various types of
+external (non-employee) users?
+
+
+d. All systems that users have access to are identified, irrespective of the initial scope of the
+
+IAM implementation.
+
+
+e. An identity and access review are done, at a minimum for the systems in scope for the
+
+pilot and the first phase of deployment, preferably including systems in subsequent
+deployment phases as well.
+
+
+f. The authoritative source of identity information is identified early in the planning phase.
+
+Interfacing and synchronization possibilities are explored as well.
+
+
+g. If external advisors are used for quality assurance, then they are involved early in the
+
+planning phase.
+
+
+h. A pilot phase is defined, with a limited scope and time span, but including a “difficult”
+
+system (typically, an in-house development that has no standard connector to the IAM).
+
+
+i. Deployment is done in a phased approach and according to a roll-out plan.
+
+
+j. A roll-back plan is in place.
+
+
+k. Roll-out and rollback is tested before live deployment.
+
+
+l. A segregation of duties matrix is used for the IAM system access rights set-up.
+
+
+m. The IAM infrastructure is security hardened and tested before deployment.
+
+
+n. A knowledge base is developed as the project progresses towards deployment. Focus is
+
+on solutions to issues in the provisioning and lifecycle management process.
+
+
+o. A post-implementation review is done after the first or second phase of deployment.
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 21
+
+
+
+**ANNEX II.** **AGENDA –** **SEMINAR ON REGULATION**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Tuesday, November 1, 2022 – DAY 1 OF TRAINING (in person)|Col2|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|9.00 am – 9.15 am
(Local time)
|**L-0**|**Welcome and Introduction**
_CBTT - Mr. Patrick Solomon, Inspector of Financial Institutions_
_IMF Staff (Rangachary Ravikumar, Tamas Gaidosch, Mission_
_Chief)_||
+|9.15 – 10.30|L-1|Cyber Risk and Financial Sector – An Introduction.
Cyber Risk and Financial Stability
Growing digitalization and interconnectedness, attacks becoming frequent and
sophisticated, renewed focus on operational and cyber resilience. Cyber terms
explained. Cyber risk and its impact on financial stability, transmission channels|_Tamas_
_Gaidosch_|
+|10:30 – 10:45||
**BREAK**||
+|10.45 – 11.25|L-2|Cyber Security - Overarching Framework
National level policy and institutional arrangements, arrangements within central
banks and emerging best practices like DORA, etc.|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|
+|11.25 – 12.00|L-3|Cyber Security and New Technologies; Cloud Regulation
Adoption of new technologies growing, posing unique challenges for cyber
security. Discuss cyber risk implications of adopting AI/ML, fintech, etc. To
discuss the importance of cloud and how to regulate.|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|
+|
**Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|
**Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|
**Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
||
+|9.00 – 9.50|L-4|International Guidance on Cyber Risk and Global Regulatory
Practices – An overview
An overview of work on cyber and related topics by standard setters and major
regulators|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|
+|9.50-10.45|L-5|
Core components of Cyber Risk Regulation – Governance, Risk
Management
Components of cyber risk regulation and focused discussion on governance
arrangements and risk management practices|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|
+|10.45-11.00||
**BREAK**||
+|11. 005 – 12.00|L-6|Outsourcing / Third Party Risk Management / Vendor Risk
Management
Outsourcing policies, oversight, and best practices|_Tamas_
_Gaidosch_|
+|**Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|**Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|**Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
||
+|9.00 – 10.00|L-7|Cyber Incident Reporting
Cyber incident reporting best practices, reporting frameworks and need for
convergence|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|
+|10.00 – 11.00|L-8|
Business Continuity & Response and Recovery – Emerging best
practices
Business continuity management – issues and challenges. Discuss FSB paper on
best practices on cyber incident response and recovery, importance of response
and recovery within the financial sector.|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|
+|11.00 – 11.15||
**BREAK**||
+|11.15 – 12.15|L-9|Information sharing / testing frameworks – how are they handled
in regulations
Benefits of gathering threat intelligence and information sharing, examples of best
practices|_Tamas_
_Gaidosch_|
+|Wrap Up/ Closing
Remarks
12. 15 – 12.30||
IMF
CBTT||
+
+
+
+**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 22
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-161/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6134823a84c3678a00f9ba14da7c3c83a581108a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-161-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-161/assets/figures/cr-2023-161-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4f1d4d073c614945", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-161-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1319, "page": 2, "phash_256": "affe34f22afeb455b401279f9515179f9f07bd01c1416aeac15c4bfad021d820", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "sha256_normalized_png": "338156de6c7c1b3edd86cadbf6ad82f3efad740fbe03769d650bb8bff60d645f", "width": 1019}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-161/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d18c81fc4c5309ed7fa221e653d130d332daff52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-161/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-161-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMay 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/161**\n### **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-STRENGTHENING** **CYBERSECURITY IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Trinidad and Tobago was prepared by a staff team of\nthe International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed in February 2023.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "May 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/161\nTRINIDAD AND TOBAGO\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT-STRENGTHENING CYBERSECURITY IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Trinidad and Tobago was prepared by a staff team of\nthe International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\nwas completed in February 2023.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 605}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-161-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\nTRINIDAD AND TOBAGO\n\nSTRENGTHENING CYBERSECURITY IN\nFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS\n\nFebruary 2023\n\n\nPrepared By\nRangachary Ravikumar\nTamas Gaidosch\n\n\n\nAuthoring Departments:\nMonetary and Capital Markets\nDepartment", "text_characters": 201}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Contents** **Page**\n\n\nGlossary .......................................................................................................................................3\n\n\nPreface..........................................................................................................................................4\n\n\nExecutive Summary .....................................................................................................................5\n\n\nI. Introduction .............................................................................................................................9\n\n\nII. Seminar on Cybersecurity Regulation .....................................................................................9\n\n\nIII. Financial Sector Cybersecurity Guideline Development and Assessment of Supervisory\nCapacity .......................................................................................................................................10\n\nA. Assessment ..................................................................................................................10\nB. Recommendations ............................................................................................................12\n\n\nIV. Cybersecurity Governance ...................................................................................................15\n\nA. Assessment ..................................................................................................................15\nB. Recommendations ............................................................................................................16\n\n\nV. Identity and Access Management Project ...............................................................................17\n\nA. Assessment ..................................................................................................................17\nB. Recommendations ............................................................................................................18\n\nTables\n\n\nTable 1. Key Recommendations ..................................................................................................7\n\nAnnexes\n\n\nI. Selected Good IAM Project Practices ......................................................................................20\nII. Agenda – Seminar on Regulation...........................................................................................22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Contents Page\n\nGlossary .......................................................................................................................................3\n\nPreface..........................................................................................................................................4\n\nExecutive Summary .....................................................................................................................5\n\nI. Introduction .............................................................................................................................9\n\nII. Seminar on Cybersecurity Regulation .....................................................................................9\n\nIII. Financial Sector Cybersecurity Guideline Development and Assessment of Supervisory\nCapacity .......................................................................................................................................10\n\nA. Assessment ..................................................................................................................10\nB. Recommendations ............................................................................................................12\n\nIV. Cybersecurity Governance ...................................................................................................15\n\nA. Assessment ..................................................................................................................15\nB. Recommendations ............................................................................................................16\n\nV. Identity and Access Management Project ...............................................................................17\n\nA. Assessment ..................................................................................................................17\nB. Recommendations ............................................................................................................18\n\nTables\n\nTable 1. Key Recommendations ..................................................................................................7\n\nAnnexes\n\nI. Selected Good IAM Project Practices ......................................................................................20\nII. Agenda – Seminar on Regulation...........................................................................................22", "text_characters": 2309}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**GLOSSARY**\n\n\nAcronym Details\n\n\nACH Automated Clearing House\n\n\nBCP Business Continuity Plan\n\n\nCBTT Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago\n\n\nCSP Customer Security Program\n\n\nDR Disaster Recovery\n\n\nFFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council\n\n\nFISD Financial Institutions Supervision Department\n\n\nFIUTT Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago\n\n\nFTE Full Time Equivalent\n\n\nIAM Identity and Access Management\n\n\nICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process\n\n\nICT Information and Communication Technology\n\n\nIT Information Technology\n\n\nMCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department\n\n\nMinistry of Youth and National Development - Cooperative\nMYND-CDD\nDevelopment Division\n\n\nRBS Risk Based Supervision\n\n\nRFI Request for Information\n\n\nRFP Request for Proposal\n\n\nTTSEC Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission\n\n\nTA Technical Assistance\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "GLOSSARY\n\nAcronym Details\n\nACH Automated Clearing House\n\nBCP Business Continuity Plan\n\nCBTT Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago\n\nCSP Customer Security Program\n\nDR Disaster Recovery\n\nFFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council\n\nFISD Financial Institutions Supervision Department\n\nFIUTT Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago\n\nFTE Full Time Equivalent\n\nIAM Identity and Access Management\n\nICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process\n\nICT Information and Communication Technology\n\nIT Information Technology\n\nMCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department\n\nMinistry of Youth and National Development - Cooperative\nMYND-CDD\nDevelopment Division\n\nRBS Risk Based Supervision\n\nRFI Request for Information\n\nRFP Request for Proposal\n\nTTSEC Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission\n\nTA Technical Assistance\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 3", "text_characters": 781}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**PREFACE**\n\n\nAt the request of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT), the Monetary and Capital\nMarkets Department (MCM) provided a field based technical assistance (TA) mission on\nstrengthening cybersecurity in financial institutions during October 31 to November 4, 2022.\n\n\nThe purpose of the mission was to (i) strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions\nunder the supervisory ambit of CBTT and build supervisory capacity for the effective\nsupervision of cybersecurity and (ii) strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Central Bank.\n\n\nThe mission had met the Governor on the first day. The mission met Patrick Solomon\n(Inspector), Michelle Francis-Pantor (Deputy Inspector) from Financial Institutions Supervision\nDepartment (FISD) and Frances Correa (IT Consultant) and their team members.\n\n\nThis report presents the mission’s assessment and main conclusions. The mission wishes to thank\nthe officials of the CBTT for their excellent cooperation and productive discussions.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "PREFACE\n\nAt the request of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT), the Monetary and Capital\nMarkets Department (MCM) provided a field based technical assistance (TA) mission on\nstrengthening cybersecurity in financial institutions during October 31 to November 4, 2022.\n\nThe purpose of the mission was to (i) strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions\nunder the supervisory ambit of CBTT and build supervisory capacity for the effective\nsupervision of cybersecurity and (ii) strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Central Bank.\n\nThe mission had met the Governor on the first day. The mission met Patrick Solomon\n(Inspector), Michelle Francis-Pantor (Deputy Inspector) from Financial Institutions Supervision\nDepartment (FISD) and Frances Correa (IT Consultant) and their team members.\n\nThis report presents the mission’s assessment and main conclusions. The mission wishes to thank\nthe officials of the CBTT for their excellent cooperation and productive discussions.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 4", "text_characters": 920}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n\n**At the request of the CBTT, a TA mission on strengthening cybersecurity in financial**\n**institutions was delivered during the period October 31–November 4, 2022.** The Governor\nrequested the TA during the 2022 Spring Meetings and the deliverables for the mission and the\nmilestones were identified by having a dialogue with the authority. The mission had two\nobjectives: (i) to strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions under the supervisory\nambit of CBTT and (ii) to improve the cybersecurity stance of the CBTT. For the project for\nstrengthening cybersecurity of the Central Bank an internal project team has been constituted.\nFor strengthening cybersecurity of financial institutions, the CBTT has established a working\ngroup comprising all the financial regulators (namely, the CBTT, Trinidad and Tobago Securities\nand Exchange Commission (TTSEC), the Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago\n(FIUTT), and the Office of the Commission of Cooperative Development (CCD) to draft a\ncybersecurity guideline for financial institutions and a supervisory manual.\n\n\n**The deliverables included a capacity building seminar on regulation of cyber risk.** The\nseminar was delivered during November 1–3, 2022 covering cyber threat landscape, cyber risk\nand financial stability, impact of new technologies on cyber risk, international regulatory\npractices, cyber risk governance and management best practices, third party risk management,\nincident reporting, business continuity planning, response and recovery, information sharing, and\ntesting. The seminar was attended in person and remotely by supervisory officials from all the\nregulatory authorities, although at this time, the CBTT is the only regulator that intends to draft a\nguideline on the subject.\n\n\n**The CBTT identified the need for filling regulatory gaps and desires to issue a focused**\n**guideline on cybersecurity covering governance, risk management, incident reporting, and**\n**cyber hygiene, and intends to develop a draft guideline for consultation with its regulated**\n**institutions in the first quarter of 2023.** Currently, there are no Information and\nCommunication Technology (ICT) or Cyber risk guidelines issued by the CBTT. These aspects\nare governed indirectly by the extant instructions on corporate governance, market conduct,\nsecurity systems for safeguarding customer information, Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment\nProcess (ICAAP), and outsourcing. Discussions with a couple of banks indicate that the\nregulated entities may perceive it differently and do not consider these instructions to be directly\napplicable to ICT/cyber risk management underlining the need for a separate regulatory\nguidance. The mission had multiple rounds of discussion with the intra-agency working group\nconstituted for the purpose of providing guidance in developing the guideline.\n\n\n**Supervisory arrangements for ICT/cyber risks need further improvements and resource**\n**constraints within FISD need to be addressed urgently.** The organizational structure of the\nFISD indicates responsibilities for supervising banks and nonbanks was entrusted to one division\nand insurance and pension firms to another. There is no practice of assigning a dedicated\nsupervisor even in the case of top five banks. Similar arrangements were there for insurance and\npension firms. CBTT recognizes the importance of cyber risks and have taken some steps\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nAt the request of the CBTT, a TA mission on strengthening cybersecurity in financial\ninstitutions was delivered during the period October 31–November 4, 2022. The Governor\nrequested the TA during the 2022 Spring Meetings and the deliverables for the mission and the\nmilestones were identified by having a dialogue with the authority. The mission had two\nobjectives: (i) to strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions under the supervisory\nambit of CBTT and (ii) to improve the cybersecurity stance of the CBTT. For the project for\nstrengthening cybersecurity of the Central Bank an internal project team has been constituted.\nFor strengthening cybersecurity of financial institutions, the CBTT has established a working\ngroup comprising all the financial regulators (namely, the CBTT, Trinidad and Tobago Securities\nand Exchange Commission (TTSEC), the Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago\n(FIUTT), and the Office of the Commission of Cooperative Development (CCD) to draft a\ncybersecurity guideline for financial institutions and a supervisory manual.\n\nThe deliverables included a capacity building seminar on regulation of cyber risk. The\nseminar was delivered during November 1–3, 2022 covering cyber threat landscape, cyber risk\nand financial stability, impact of new technologies on cyber risk, international regulatory\npractices, cyber risk governance and management best practices, third party risk management,\nincident reporting, business continuity planning, response and recovery, information sharing, and\ntesting. The seminar was attended in person and remotely by supervisory officials from all the\nregulatory authorities, although at this time, the CBTT is the only regulator that intends to draft a\nguideline on the subject.\n\nThe CBTT identified the need for filling regulatory gaps and desires to issue a focused\nguideline on cybersecurity covering governance, risk management, incident reporting, and\ncyber hygiene, and intends to develop a draft guideline for consultation with its regulated\ninstitutions in the first quarter of 2023. Currently, there are no Information and\nCommunication Technology (ICT) or Cyber risk guidelines issued by the CBTT. These aspects\nare governed indirectly by the extant instructions on corporate governance, market conduct,\nsecurity systems for safeguarding customer information, Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment\nProcess (ICAAP), and outsourcing. Discussions with a couple of banks indicate that the\nregulated entities may perceive it differently and do not consider these instructions to be directly\napplicable to ICT/cyber risk management underlining the need for a separate regulatory\nguidance. The mission had multiple rounds of discussion with the intra-agency working group\nconstituted for the purpose of providing guidance in developing the guideline.\n\nSupervisory arrangements for ICT/cyber risks need further improvements and resource\nconstraints within FISD need to be addressed urgently. The organizational structure of the\nFISD indicates responsibilities for supervising banks and nonbanks was entrusted to one division\nand insurance and pension firms to another. There is no practice of assigning a dedicated\nsupervisor even in the case of top five banks. Similar arrangements were there for insurance and\npension firms. CBTT recognizes the importance of cyber risks and have taken some steps\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 5", "text_characters": 2984}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "including conducting thematic reviews of banks periodically on cyber related topics, carrying out\ncyber risk assessments for banks and sensitizing the financial sector participants on the need for\nenhanced cybersecurity. It is important to increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber\nexaminations particularly for large banks. This would require the resources to be augmented\nurgently. To date, insurance and pension firms have not been subjected to any survey on cyber\nrelated topics and regulatory/supervisory initiatives to address ICT/cyber risks are limited.\n\n\n**To help improve the cybersecurity posture of the CBTT, the mission performed a high-**\n**level assessment of the cybersecurity governance and the Identity and Access Management**\n**(IAM) project.** Both assessments were based on reviewing the relevant organizational and\nproject structures, policies and procedures, and interviews with selected members of CBTT\nmanagement and staff.\n\n\n**Key findings of the cybersecurity governance assessment are as follows:**\n\n\n(i) Cybersecurity governance at CBTT is set up according to generally accepted practices in\nthe financial sector, with some minor differences and resource constraints;\n(ii) The information security function in the first line [1] is subordinated to the Head of IT, which\n\ncalls for compensating controls;\n(iii) Unusually, the second line of defense–risk management–has a formal responsibility in\n\ndriving IT governance, a first-line role;\n(iv) Cybersecurity policies and procedures cover most of the important topics and have been\n\nrecently updated;\n(v) Policies governing the cybersecurity of payment systems are uneven in terms of the\n\ntechnical controls required. The SWIFT cybersecurity control environment is more\ncomprehensive due to the formalized requirements of the Customer Security Program\n(CSP); and\n(vi) There is not a separate Cyber Risk Committee or similar at the Board level, but the existing\n\nIT Committee assumes this function.\n\n\n**The IAM project has been formally set up and is now in Phase 1, which is considered**\n**preparatory.** The governance of the project, the high-level roadmap, and the deliverables for\nPhase 1 are generally in line with good practices. The mission drew the attention of the project\nteam to some key tasks in the near future, including getting input from the business functions, to\ndo a roles and access rights review, and to develop formal requirements, among others. A\nsummary of the recommended actions is given in Appendix I.\n\n\n1 In terms of three lines model articulated by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (The IIA’s Three Lines Model –\npublished by IIA), First line roles: Provision of products/services to clients; managing risk. Second line roles:\nExpertise, support, monitoring and challenge on risk-related matters. Third line roles: Independent and objective\nassurance and advice on all matters related to the achievement of objectives.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 6", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "including conducting thematic reviews of banks periodically on cyber related topics, carrying out\ncyber risk assessments for banks and sensitizing the financial sector participants on the need for\nenhanced cybersecurity. It is important to increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber\nexaminations particularly for large banks. This would require the resources to be augmented\nurgently. To date, insurance and pension firms have not been subjected to any survey on cyber\nrelated topics and regulatory/supervisory initiatives to address ICT/cyber risks are limited.\n\nTo help improve the cybersecurity posture of the CBTT, the mission performed a high-\nlevel assessment of the cybersecurity governance and the Identity and Access Management\n(IAM) project. Both assessments were based on reviewing the relevant organizational and\nproject structures, policies and procedures, and interviews with selected members of CBTT\nmanagement and staff.\n\nKey findings of the cybersecurity governance assessment are as follows:\n\n(i) Cybersecurity governance at CBTT is set up according to generally accepted practices in\nthe financial sector, with some minor differences and resource constraints;\n(ii) The information security function in the first line [1] is subordinated to the Head of IT, which\n\ncalls for compensating controls;\n(iii) Unusually, the second line of defense–risk management–has a formal responsibility in\n\ndriving IT governance, a first-line role;\n(iv) Cybersecurity policies and procedures cover most of the important topics and have been\n\nrecently updated;\n(v) Policies governing the cybersecurity of payment systems are uneven in terms of the\n\ntechnical controls required. The SWIFT cybersecurity control environment is more\ncomprehensive due to the formalized requirements of the Customer Security Program\n(CSP); and\n(vi) There is not a separate Cyber Risk Committee or similar at the Board level, but the existing\n\nIT Committee assumes this function.\n\nThe IAM project has been formally set up and is now in Phase 1, which is considered\npreparatory. The governance of the project, the high-level roadmap, and the deliverables for\nPhase 1 are generally in line with good practices. The mission drew the attention of the project\nteam to some key tasks in the near future, including getting input from the business functions, to\ndo a roles and access rights review, and to develop formal requirements, among others. A\nsummary of the recommended actions is given in Appendix I.\n\n1 In terms of three lines model articulated by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (The IIA’s Three Lines Model –\npublished by IIA), First line roles: Provision of products/services to clients; managing risk. Second line roles:\nExpertise, support, monitoring and challenge on risk-related matters. Third line roles: Independent and objective\nassurance and advice on all matters related to the achievement of objectives.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 6", "text_characters": 2536}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**TABLE 1.** **KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Recommendation|Priority|Time
frame*|Reference
Paragraph|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**_Organization and capacity_**|**_Organization and capacity_**|**_Organization and capacity_**|**_Organization and capacity_**|\n|Augment the resources in ICT/cyber risk supervision|High|Immediate|15|\n|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|**_Cyber Risk Regulation_**|\n|Draft the guideline on ICT/cyber risk covering banks,
insurance companies and pension firms on the basis of various
inputs provided in the Seminar on Regulations, striking an
appropriate balance between general principles and specific
details having regard to the local environment and digital
landscape|High|Near
Term|16|\n|Include a provision in the guideline to conduct an independent
periodic assessment of cyber preparedness of banks, insurance
companies and pension firms by qualified external
professionals|Medium|Near
Term|17|\n|Incorporate a requirement for the Board to identify the
regulatory gaps, draw an implementation plan with appropriate
milestones and submit to the CBTT as part of the guideline|High|Near
Term|18|\n|Prepare a cyber incident reporting template and require
supervised entities to report cyber incidents in keeping with
the requirements as defined in the guideline or template.|High|Near
Term|20|\n|Sensitize the regulated entities on the need for strengthening
cybersecurity through speeches, interviews, etc., and impress
upon the need for a separate guideline, cyber incident reporting
and information sharing among banks|High|Near
Term|21|\n|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|**_Cyber Risk Supervision_**|\n|Plan and conduct ICT/cyber preparedness surveys among
insurance companies and pension firms|High|Medium
Term|22|\n|Increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk
assessments, to start with for major banks.|High|Medium
Term|23|\n|Plan and augment supervisory resources to ensure a self-
sufficient supervision function covering banks, insurance
companies and pension firms|High|Medium
Term|24|\n|Consider setting up an offsite supervision function for
ICT/cyber risks|Medium|Medium
Term|25|\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [54.12799835205078, 99.3320083618164, 558.0159912109375, 682.8280029296875], "columns": 4, "rows": 14}], "text": "TABLE 1. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n Recommendation Priority Time frame* Reference Paragraph \n\n _Organization and capacity_ _Organization and capacity_ _Organization and capacity_ _Organization and capacity_ \n Augment the resources in ICT/cyber risk supervision High Immediate 15 \n _Cyber Risk Regulation_ _Cyber Risk Regulation_ _Cyber Risk Regulation_ _Cyber Risk Regulation_ \n Draft the guideline on ICT/cyber risk covering banks, insurance companies and pension firms on the basis of various inputs provided in the Seminar on Regulations, striking an appropriate balance between general principles and specific details having regard to the local environment and digital landscape High Near Term 16 \n Include a provision in the guideline to conduct an independent periodic assessment of cyber preparedness of banks, insurance companies and pension firms by qualified external professionals Medium Near Term 17 \n Incorporate a requirement for the Board to identify the regulatory gaps, draw an implementation plan with appropriate milestones and submit to the CBTT as part of the guideline High Near Term 18 \n Prepare a cyber incident reporting template and require supervised entities to report cyber incidents in keeping with the requirements as defined in the guideline or template. High Near Term 20 \n Sensitize the regulated entities on the need for strengthening cybersecurity through speeches, interviews, etc., and impress upon the need for a separate guideline, cyber incident reporting and information sharing among banks High Near Term 21 \n _Cyber Risk Supervision_ _Cyber Risk Supervision_ _Cyber Risk Supervision_ _Cyber Risk Supervision_ \n Plan and conduct ICT/cyber preparedness surveys among insurance companies and pension firms High Medium Term 22 \n Increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk assessments, to start with for major banks. High Medium Term 23 \n Plan and augment supervisory resources to ensure a self- sufficient supervision function covering banks, insurance companies and pension firms High Medium Term 24 \n Consider setting up an offsite supervision function for ICT/cyber risks Medium Medium Term 25 \n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 7", "text_characters": 1882}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "|Recommendation|Priority|Timeframe|Reference
Paragraph|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|**_Cybersecurity governance_**|\n|Assess the workload of the IT Security unit and increase
resources as needed.|High|Medium
term|32|\n|Remove IT governance from the responsibilities of the risk
function.|High|Near term|33|\n|Establish regular cybersecurity meetings and reporting
regime at the Board level with the participation of the Head
of IT Security.|High|Near term|34|\n|Develop a secure application development policy and
security hardening baselines.|High|Near term|35|\n|Develop a policy to bring the cybersecurity controls of the
ACH and RTGS systems more in line with the SWIF CSP.|High|Near term|36|\n|Regularly commission security reviews and tests of the
payment systems.|High|Near term|37|\n|Disaster recovery tests should include simulating a
complete failure in the primary data center.|High|Medium
term|38|\n|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|**_Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_**|\n|Plan out Phase 2 of the IAM project and include
requirements definition and roles and access rights review
as key tasks, among others.|
High|Near term|44|\n|Analyze the projected workload and expertise vs internal
resources and skills to determine the type and extent of
third-party support needed.|
High|Near term|45|\n|Adopt a phased approach to IAM deployment.|High|Near term|46|\n|Adopt good IAM implementation practices listed in the
Appendix as deemed necessary.|Medium|Near term|47|\n\n\n\n_* Immediate: less than three months; Near term (NT):_ 3–6 months _; Medium term (MT):_ 6–12 months _; Long term (LT):_ more\nthan 12 months _._\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [49.54399871826172, 72.1919937133789, 562.4559936523438, 558.3579711914062], "columns": 4, "rows": 14}], "text": "Recommendation Priority Timeframe Reference Paragraph \n\n _Cybersecurity governance_ _Cybersecurity governance_ _Cybersecurity governance_ _Cybersecurity governance_ \n Assess the workload of the IT Security unit and increase resources as needed. High Medium term 32 \n Remove IT governance from the responsibilities of the risk function. High Near term 33 \n Establish regular cybersecurity meetings and reporting regime at the Board level with the participation of the Head of IT Security. High Near term 34 \n Develop a secure application development policy and security hardening baselines. High Near term 35 \n Develop a policy to bring the cybersecurity controls of the ACH and RTGS systems more in line with the SWIF CSP. High Near term 36 \n Regularly commission security reviews and tests of the payment systems. High Near term 37 \n Disaster recovery tests should include simulating a complete failure in the primary data center. High Medium term 38 \n _Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_ _Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_ _Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_ _Identity and Access Management (IAM) project_ \n Plan out Phase 2 of the IAM project and include requirements definition and roles and access rights review as key tasks, among others. High Near term 44 \n Analyze the projected workload and expertise vs internal resources and skills to determine the type and extent of third-party support needed. High Near term 45 \n Adopt a phased approach to IAM deployment. High Near term 46 \n Adopt good IAM implementation practices listed in the Appendix as deemed necessary. Medium Near term 47 \n\n_* Immediate: less than three months; Near term (NT):_ 3–6 months _; Medium term (MT):_ 6–12 months _; Long term (LT):_ more\nthan 12 months _._\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 8", "text_characters": 1547}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**I.** **INTRODUCTION**\n\n\n1. **The mission focused on (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial institutions**\n**by providing guidance to draft a regulatory guideline, and (ii) helping improve the**\n**cybersecurity stance of CBTT by assessing the cybersecurity governance and the IAM**\n**project** . The mission conducted a seminar on cybersecurity regulation to build capacity within\nCBTT to draft a regulatory guideline and by way of discussion with stakeholders and analyzing\nthe information provided by the CBTT assessed the supervisory capacity. To assess the\ncybersecurity governance the mission reviewed CBTT’s relevant organizational structure,\npolicies, and procedures. The documentation used for this work included organizational charts\nand approved policies and procedures, risk assessments, and other internal information security\ndocuments. The mission interviewed senior staff to understand the current cybersecurity\ngovernance practices. The IAM project was assessed in similar approach, focusing on the project\ncharter, project plan, and planned deliverables. Due to the limited time available the mission\nrelied on the information and documents as provided and did not seek independent corroboration.\n\n\n2. **This report is divided in five sections.** Section II addresses the seminar on cyber risk\nregulation; Section III covers the financial sector cybersecurity guideline development and\nassessment of supervisory capacity; Section IV outlines the results of the cybersecurity\ngovernance; and Section V addresses the IAM project.\n\n\n**II.** **SEMINAR ON CYBERSECURITY REGULATION**\n\n\n3. **Delivering a seminar on cybersecurity regulation was an important component of**\n**the mission.** One of the objectives of the mission was to strengthen the cybersecurity in financial\ninstitutions by assisting the authorities in drafting and issuing a regulatory guideline. To facilitate\nthe drafting work CBTT has constituted a working group comprising all financial sector\nregulators. The CBTT will take the lead on drafting the proposed guideline with input from the\nother regulators and the guideline will be issued only to those entities regulated by CBTT at the\npresent time. In building capacity among supervisory staff of CBTT and other regulators, a\nseminar was organized covering important topics. The seminar spanned three days with three\nsessions each day. The agenda is given in Annex I. The seminar was received well as reflected in\nthe feedback.\n\n\n4. **The first day of the seminar covered Cyber Risk and Financial Sector – An**\n**Introduction, Implications for Financial Stability, Cyber Security – An Overarching**\n**Framework, and Cyber Security and New Technologies including Cloud Regulation.** First\nday’s session introduced the importance of managing cyber risk within the financial sector by\ndiscussing emerging cyber threat landscape, evolution of banking technology, pace of\ndigitalization, increasing intensity of cyberattacks and the transmission channels through which\ncyber risk could pose financial stability concerns. Arrangements at various countries in\nmanaging cybersecurity with a few country examples was discussed to provide a context to the\nfinancial regulators. The risks arising out of adoption of newer technologies like Artificial\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\n\n1. The mission focused on (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial institutions\nby providing guidance to draft a regulatory guideline, and (ii) helping improve the\ncybersecurity stance of CBTT by assessing the cybersecurity governance and the IAM\nproject . The mission conducted a seminar on cybersecurity regulation to build capacity within\nCBTT to draft a regulatory guideline and by way of discussion with stakeholders and analyzing\nthe information provided by the CBTT assessed the supervisory capacity. To assess the\ncybersecurity governance the mission reviewed CBTT’s relevant organizational structure,\npolicies, and procedures. The documentation used for this work included organizational charts\nand approved policies and procedures, risk assessments, and other internal information security\ndocuments. The mission interviewed senior staff to understand the current cybersecurity\ngovernance practices. The IAM project was assessed in similar approach, focusing on the project\ncharter, project plan, and planned deliverables. Due to the limited time available the mission\nrelied on the information and documents as provided and did not seek independent corroboration.\n\n2. This report is divided in five sections. Section II addresses the seminar on cyber risk\nregulation; Section III covers the financial sector cybersecurity guideline development and\nassessment of supervisory capacity; Section IV outlines the results of the cybersecurity\ngovernance; and Section V addresses the IAM project.\n\nII. SEMINAR ON CYBERSECURITY REGULATION\n\n3. Delivering a seminar on cybersecurity regulation was an important component of\nthe mission. One of the objectives of the mission was to strengthen the cybersecurity in financial\ninstitutions by assisting the authorities in drafting and issuing a regulatory guideline. To facilitate\nthe drafting work CBTT has constituted a working group comprising all financial sector\nregulators. The CBTT will take the lead on drafting the proposed guideline with input from the\nother regulators and the guideline will be issued only to those entities regulated by CBTT at the\npresent time. In building capacity among supervisory staff of CBTT and other regulators, a\nseminar was organized covering important topics. The seminar spanned three days with three\nsessions each day. The agenda is given in Annex I. The seminar was received well as reflected in\nthe feedback.\n\n4. The first day of the seminar covered Cyber Risk and Financial Sector – An\nIntroduction, Implications for Financial Stability, Cyber Security – An Overarching\nFramework, and Cyber Security and New Technologies including Cloud Regulation. First\nday’s session introduced the importance of managing cyber risk within the financial sector by\ndiscussing emerging cyber threat landscape, evolution of banking technology, pace of\ndigitalization, increasing intensity of cyberattacks and the transmission channels through which\ncyber risk could pose financial stability concerns. Arrangements at various countries in\nmanaging cybersecurity with a few country examples was discussed to provide a context to the\nfinancial regulators. The risks arising out of adoption of newer technologies like Artificial\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 9", "text_characters": 2824}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Intelligence/Machine Learning, Application Programming Interface, and Cloud Technologies\nwere discussed with specific focus on building regulatory guideline on these emerging areas of\ninterest.\n\n\n5. **An overview of the International Guidance on Cyber Risk and Global Regulatory**\n**Practices and third-party risk management were covered during the second day.**\nInternational guidance on cyber risk and global regulatory practices were covered to provide an\noverview of such arrangement covering the work of standard setting bodies and major regulators.\nBy way of example, the regulations issued by two jurisdictions were discussed. Subsequently\ngovernance and risk management aspects were covered in depth. Session on third-party risk\nmanagement highlighted the increased use of third parties within the financial sector, growing\ndependencies, regulatory best practices, and supervisory focus in assessing such arrangements.\n\n\n6. **Incident reporting, information sharing, business continuity and response and**\n**recovery capabilities were discussed on the third day.** The third day’s session focused on\ncyber incident reporting by discussing the ongoing work by standard setting bodies in this area\nand highlighting the usefulness of collecting such information. The need for the financial\ninstitutions to share information among themselves voluntarily on threat intelligence and best\npractices observed in this regard were also discussed. With the focus of the standard setting\nbodies on delivering critical financial services through disruption, business continuity and\nresponse and recovery capabilities within the financial institutions assume importance. This topic\nwas covered extensively during the seminar.\n\n\n**III.** **FINANCIAL SECTOR CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF**\n\n**SUPERVISORY CAPACITY**\n\n\n**A.** **Assessment**\n\n\n7. **CBTT does not currently have a cybersecurity guideline in place applicable to its**\n**supervised entities.** The Corporate Governance Guideline, Guideline for the Management of\nOutsourcing Risks, Guideline for the Security Systems for Safeguarding Customer Information,\nMarket Conduct Guideline and ICAAP Guideline cover certain aspects of ICT or cyber risk\nmanagement including (i) Board having special skills including information technology, (ii) risk\nmanagement framework to include provisions to evaluate the risks and materiality of all existing\nand prospective outsourcing arrangements and the inherent risks associated with outsourcing\nwhich includes cyber risk, (iii) management to be responsible for developing and documenting\nan operating manual of the policies, procedures and processes of the institution’s information\nsecurity program, (iv) reporting of material incidents to the CBTT, and (v) need to conduct stress\ntests with severe cyberattack as one of the scenarios. The current regulatory guidelines on the\nsubject are fragmented and do not comprehensively address the issues given the growing\nimportance of cybersecurity.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Intelligence/Machine Learning, Application Programming Interface, and Cloud Technologies\nwere discussed with specific focus on building regulatory guideline on these emerging areas of\ninterest.\n\n5. An overview of the International Guidance on Cyber Risk and Global Regulatory\nPractices and third-party risk management were covered during the second day.\nInternational guidance on cyber risk and global regulatory practices were covered to provide an\noverview of such arrangement covering the work of standard setting bodies and major regulators.\nBy way of example, the regulations issued by two jurisdictions were discussed. Subsequently\ngovernance and risk management aspects were covered in depth. Session on third-party risk\nmanagement highlighted the increased use of third parties within the financial sector, growing\ndependencies, regulatory best practices, and supervisory focus in assessing such arrangements.\n\n6. Incident reporting, information sharing, business continuity and response and\nrecovery capabilities were discussed on the third day. The third day’s session focused on\ncyber incident reporting by discussing the ongoing work by standard setting bodies in this area\nand highlighting the usefulness of collecting such information. The need for the financial\ninstitutions to share information among themselves voluntarily on threat intelligence and best\npractices observed in this regard were also discussed. With the focus of the standard setting\nbodies on delivering critical financial services through disruption, business continuity and\nresponse and recovery capabilities within the financial institutions assume importance. This topic\nwas covered extensively during the seminar.\n\nIII. FINANCIAL SECTOR CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF\n\nSUPERVISORY CAPACITY\n\nA. Assessment\n\n7. CBTT does not currently have a cybersecurity guideline in place applicable to its\nsupervised entities. The Corporate Governance Guideline, Guideline for the Management of\nOutsourcing Risks, Guideline for the Security Systems for Safeguarding Customer Information,\nMarket Conduct Guideline and ICAAP Guideline cover certain aspects of ICT or cyber risk\nmanagement including (i) Board having special skills including information technology, (ii) risk\nmanagement framework to include provisions to evaluate the risks and materiality of all existing\nand prospective outsourcing arrangements and the inherent risks associated with outsourcing\nwhich includes cyber risk, (iii) management to be responsible for developing and documenting\nan operating manual of the policies, procedures and processes of the institution’s information\nsecurity program, (iv) reporting of material incidents to the CBTT, and (v) need to conduct stress\ntests with severe cyberattack as one of the scenarios. The current regulatory guidelines on the\nsubject are fragmented and do not comprehensively address the issues given the growing\nimportance of cybersecurity.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 10", "text_characters": 2616}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "8. **CBTT has identified the regulatory gap and has constituted a working group duly**\n**represented by all financial sector regulators to draft a guideline on the topic.** CBTT is\nresponsible for supervising banks, non-banks, insurance companies, pension firms, bureaux de\nchange, and payment systems. The Trinidad and Tobago Security and Exchange Commission\n(TTSEC) supervises the securities market and intermediaries, and the Cooperative Development\nDivision within the Ministry of Youth and National Development is responsible for supervision\nof credit unions. The Financial Intelligence Unit has jurisdiction over Anti Money\nLaundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism cutting across various nonfinancial sectors. Only\nCBTT proposes to draft a guideline while other regulators felt lessons learnt in the drafting\nexercise would be beneficial to introduce a similar guideline at an appropriate time.\n\n\n9. **Among the CBTT supervised entities, banks appear to be better informed on**\n**ICT/cyber risks compared to other entities like insurance and pension firms.** Banks’ IT\nsystems have been under the focus of FISD for some time now and some of the guidelines make\nit incumbent on banks to manage the IT risks. Periodic surveys carried out by the CBTT has also\nplayed a role in sensitizing them on this important topic. Risk-Based Supervision (RBS) Manual\nalso covers assessment of IT risks as part of operational risk and provides some guidance to\nsupervisors, though the Manual is outdated (version shared with the mission is dated 2003) and\ndue for revision in 2023. Desk-based reviews through virtual engagement with banks also are\ngood initiatives. FISD used current best practice frameworks (Federal Financial Institutions\nExamination Council's (FFIEC) cybersecurity assessment tool) in assessing the exposures of the\nbanking sector to cyber risk. However, insurance firms have not been subjected to such\nengagements leaving a gap in their preparedness in addressing ICT/cyber risks. The proposed\nguideline is intended to address both banks as well as insurance firms.\n\n\n10. **Discussion with select banks helped in understanding their preparedness and**\n**perception about the extant guidelines.** As part of the mission, to appreciate the banks’ view, a\nmeeting was arranged with two major banks—one locally owned and the other owned by a\nforeign parent. The discussions revealed that banks are considering ICT/cyber risks carefully and\nhave taken various steps to mitigate those risks. It is also seen that one of the banks\nheadquartered at Trinidad and Tobago has several subsidiaries in multiple countries, even\nbeyond Caribbean countries, having to face additional burden of managing the IT services for\nsubsidiaries as well. A foreign bank subsidiary operating locally indicated that most of their IT\nservices are outsourced to their parent located in another country, leaving limited capacity to\naddress such issues locally. Both banks could not recollect the range of regulatory guidelines\nalready applicable to them as these were fragmented. There was willingness to report cyber\nincidents to the CBTT, but there was reservation in sharing information among peers. This is an\narea where CBTT can build awareness further.\n\n\n11. **Discussions with the working group provided key inputs in the preparation of a**\n**draft guideline.** As part of the mission discussions were held with the working group to\nunderstand the approach being adopted in developing the guideline. In addition to the seminar on\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "8. CBTT has identified the regulatory gap and has constituted a working group duly\nrepresented by all financial sector regulators to draft a guideline on the topic. CBTT is\nresponsible for supervising banks, non-banks, insurance companies, pension firms, bureaux de\nchange, and payment systems. The Trinidad and Tobago Security and Exchange Commission\n(TTSEC) supervises the securities market and intermediaries, and the Cooperative Development\nDivision within the Ministry of Youth and National Development is responsible for supervision\nof credit unions. The Financial Intelligence Unit has jurisdiction over Anti Money\nLaundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism cutting across various nonfinancial sectors. Only\nCBTT proposes to draft a guideline while other regulators felt lessons learnt in the drafting\nexercise would be beneficial to introduce a similar guideline at an appropriate time.\n\n9. Among the CBTT supervised entities, banks appear to be better informed on\nICT/cyber risks compared to other entities like insurance and pension firms. Banks’ IT\nsystems have been under the focus of FISD for some time now and some of the guidelines make\nit incumbent on banks to manage the IT risks. Periodic surveys carried out by the CBTT has also\nplayed a role in sensitizing them on this important topic. Risk-Based Supervision (RBS) Manual\nalso covers assessment of IT risks as part of operational risk and provides some guidance to\nsupervisors, though the Manual is outdated (version shared with the mission is dated 2003) and\ndue for revision in 2023. Desk-based reviews through virtual engagement with banks also are\ngood initiatives. FISD used current best practice frameworks (Federal Financial Institutions\nExamination Council's (FFIEC) cybersecurity assessment tool) in assessing the exposures of the\nbanking sector to cyber risk. However, insurance firms have not been subjected to such\nengagements leaving a gap in their preparedness in addressing ICT/cyber risks. The proposed\nguideline is intended to address both banks as well as insurance firms.\n\n10. Discussion with select banks helped in understanding their preparedness and\nperception about the extant guidelines. As part of the mission, to appreciate the banks’ view, a\nmeeting was arranged with two major banks—one locally owned and the other owned by a\nforeign parent. The discussions revealed that banks are considering ICT/cyber risks carefully and\nhave taken various steps to mitigate those risks. It is also seen that one of the banks\nheadquartered at Trinidad and Tobago has several subsidiaries in multiple countries, even\nbeyond Caribbean countries, having to face additional burden of managing the IT services for\nsubsidiaries as well. A foreign bank subsidiary operating locally indicated that most of their IT\nservices are outsourced to their parent located in another country, leaving limited capacity to\naddress such issues locally. Both banks could not recollect the range of regulatory guidelines\nalready applicable to them as these were fragmented. There was willingness to report cyber\nincidents to the CBTT, but there was reservation in sharing information among peers. This is an\narea where CBTT can build awareness further.\n\n11. Discussions with the working group provided key inputs in the preparation of a\ndraft guideline. As part of the mission discussions were held with the working group to\nunderstand the approach being adopted in developing the guideline. In addition to the seminar on\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 11", "text_characters": 3023}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "regulation as referred above, guidance also was provided during the meeting on areas like scope\nand applicability of the guideline, proportionality issue, need to elaborate the instructions where\nneeded based on the local needs, developing technology neutral guideline, and making the\nguideline outcome focused. It is observed that the burden of developing the guideline is\nprimarily on CBTT team, considering the expertise available with other financial regulators.\n\n\n12. **Resource constraint is acute in ICT/cyber risk supervision with only one junior**\n**examiner earmarked partially for banks and none for insurance and pension firms** . The\norganizational structure of the FISD indicates responsibilities for supervising banks and\nnonbanks was entrusted to one division and insurance and pension firms to another. Within\nbanks & nonbanks division, supervised entities are allocated among three teams which are\ncollectively responsible. The practice of assigning a dedicated supervisor even in the case of top\nfive banks is not in vogue. Similar arrangements were there for insurance and pension firms. As\nper the organizational chart shared with the mission, the number of supervisory staff allocated to\nthe supervision of banks / nonbanks at 16 (includes the manager and administrative assistant) is\nless than the number of staff available for insurance and pension firm supervision. Among the\nbank / nonbank supervisors only one Junior Examiner is an IT qualified resource partially\nmarked for such work. Among insurance supervisors, no such resource is available. To provide a\nperspective, discussions reveal that banks/insurance / pension firms have a share in total assets of\n60/20/20 percent respectively.\n\n\n13. **Leveraging the capacity available at ‘Risk Management’ and ‘Audit’ functions of**\n**the CBTT for supervisory purposes is useful in the short term.** The current practice of\ninvolving ICT/cyber expertise available in staff attached to risk management and audit function\nis very useful, given the acute shortage of resources within supervision. Such arrangements tend\nto bring forth several coordination issues and may potentially lead to lack of ownership and\ncontrol.\n\n\n14. **Supervisory practices in assessing cyber risk are yet to evolve fully. Currently**\n**thematic reviews and surveys play an important role, though such exercises are infrequent.**\nIn respect of banks, FISD has engaged with the banks as part of the regular supervision efforts in\nassessing IT risks leveraging both external and internal audit work. There are no prescribed\ntesting requirements. RBS manual is dated and requires an update urgently to focus on the\nICT/cyber risks, which will be given priority upon completion of the cybersecurity guideline.\nPeriodical surveys (four conducted in the past eight years) provide some input but are not\nsufficient to appreciate the risk profile of the banking institutions. Onsite supervision focusing\nspecially on ICT/cyber risk and offsite capabilities are very limited.\n\n\n**B.** **Recommendations**\n\n\n15. **Augment the resources in ICT/cyber risk supervision.** Digitalization of financial\nservices has progressed rapidly, and financial institutions are adopting newer technologies more\nfrequently. Consumer demand for digital services is increasing, propelling financial institutions\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "regulation as referred above, guidance also was provided during the meeting on areas like scope\nand applicability of the guideline, proportionality issue, need to elaborate the instructions where\nneeded based on the local needs, developing technology neutral guideline, and making the\nguideline outcome focused. It is observed that the burden of developing the guideline is\nprimarily on CBTT team, considering the expertise available with other financial regulators.\n\n12. Resource constraint is acute in ICT/cyber risk supervision with only one junior\nexaminer earmarked partially for banks and none for insurance and pension firms . The\norganizational structure of the FISD indicates responsibilities for supervising banks and\nnonbanks was entrusted to one division and insurance and pension firms to another. Within\nbanks & nonbanks division, supervised entities are allocated among three teams which are\ncollectively responsible. The practice of assigning a dedicated supervisor even in the case of top\nfive banks is not in vogue. Similar arrangements were there for insurance and pension firms. As\nper the organizational chart shared with the mission, the number of supervisory staff allocated to\nthe supervision of banks / nonbanks at 16 (includes the manager and administrative assistant) is\nless than the number of staff available for insurance and pension firm supervision. Among the\nbank / nonbank supervisors only one Junior Examiner is an IT qualified resource partially\nmarked for such work. Among insurance supervisors, no such resource is available. To provide a\nperspective, discussions reveal that banks/insurance / pension firms have a share in total assets of\n60/20/20 percent respectively.\n\n13. Leveraging the capacity available at ‘Risk Management’ and ‘Audit’ functions of\nthe CBTT for supervisory purposes is useful in the short term. The current practice of\ninvolving ICT/cyber expertise available in staff attached to risk management and audit function\nis very useful, given the acute shortage of resources within supervision. Such arrangements tend\nto bring forth several coordination issues and may potentially lead to lack of ownership and\ncontrol.\n\n14. Supervisory practices in assessing cyber risk are yet to evolve fully. Currently\nthematic reviews and surveys play an important role, though such exercises are infrequent.\nIn respect of banks, FISD has engaged with the banks as part of the regular supervision efforts in\nassessing IT risks leveraging both external and internal audit work. There are no prescribed\ntesting requirements. RBS manual is dated and requires an update urgently to focus on the\nICT/cyber risks, which will be given priority upon completion of the cybersecurity guideline.\nPeriodical surveys (four conducted in the past eight years) provide some input but are not\nsufficient to appreciate the risk profile of the banking institutions. Onsite supervision focusing\nspecially on ICT/cyber risk and offsite capabilities are very limited.\n\nB. Recommendations\n\n15. Augment the resources in ICT/cyber risk supervision. Digitalization of financial\nservices has progressed rapidly, and financial institutions are adopting newer technologies more\nfrequently. Consumer demand for digital services is increasing, propelling financial institutions\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 12", "text_characters": 2872}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "to expand their digital landscape. It is therefore necessary to have adequate supervisory resources\nto focus on this area. Drafting a guideline, consulting with the industry, finalizing the guideline\nand issuing it will take serious effort. Subsequently, assessing the compliance with the guideline\nwill increase the supervisory burden. The current complement of only one Junior Examiner\nearmarked for this purpose in respect of banks/nonbanks and no staff for insurance/pension firms\nsuggests that there is an urgent need to augment supervisory resources in ICT/cyber risk\nsupervision.\n\n\n16. **Draft the guideline on ICT/cyber risk covering banks, insurance companies and**\n**pension firms on the basis of various inputs provided in the Seminar on Regulations.**\nThough banks, insurers, and pension firms are at different stages of maturity when it comes to\nmanaging ICT/cyber risks, it would be ideal to include all of them under the scope of the new\nguideline. If needed, more flexibility could be provided in terms of implementation in respect of\ninsurance and pension firms.\n\n\n17. **Include a provision in the guideline to conduct an independent periodic assessment**\n**of cyber preparedness of banks, insurance companies and pension firms by qualified**\n**external professionals.** Given the acute shortage of supervisory resources, in the initial days it\nwill be beneficial to leverage the work of external audit firms. Many jurisdictions require\nfinancial institutions to periodically assess their ICT/cyber preparedness with the help of external\naudit firms and to submit such reports for central bank’s perusal.\n\n\n18. **Incorporate in the guideline a requirement for the Board to identify the regulatory**\n**gaps, draw an implementation plan with appropriate milestones, and submit to the CBTT.**\nThe guideline, when issued, will mandate certain new requirements on the part of financial\ninstitutions and may need to provide an implementation period given additional investments it\nmay warrant. It is a good practice to require Boards of supervised entities to make an assessment\nof gaps and draw an implementation plan with milestones to bridge those gaps. CBTT could also\nconsider including requirement for institutions to conduct a gap analysis as a standard\nrequirement for all recently issued guidelines. Such information would be very useful for\nsupervisors in their assessment and when collected on regular intervals will provide an\nunderstanding of the progress made by various institutions.\n\n\n19. **Determine the level of details to be provided in the draft guideline considering the**\n**local environment and digital landscape.** Regulatory guideline needs to meet the style and\nusage expectations of the local environment. While principle-based guideline is welcome, the\nlevel of details will depend on the expertise available within the Boards of supervised entities\nand other local factors. Consider providing sufficient details in the guideline so that the\nimplementation of the provisions of the guideline is facilitated.\n\n\n20. **Prepare a cyber incident reporting template and require supervised entities to**\n**report cyber incidents regularly.** As part of ICT/cyber risk management, it is important to\ncollect information on cyber incidents regularly. Cyber incident reporting offers several benefits\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "to expand their digital landscape. It is therefore necessary to have adequate supervisory resources\nto focus on this area. Drafting a guideline, consulting with the industry, finalizing the guideline\nand issuing it will take serious effort. Subsequently, assessing the compliance with the guideline\nwill increase the supervisory burden. The current complement of only one Junior Examiner\nearmarked for this purpose in respect of banks/nonbanks and no staff for insurance/pension firms\nsuggests that there is an urgent need to augment supervisory resources in ICT/cyber risk\nsupervision.\n\n16. Draft the guideline on ICT/cyber risk covering banks, insurance companies and\npension firms on the basis of various inputs provided in the Seminar on Regulations.\nThough banks, insurers, and pension firms are at different stages of maturity when it comes to\nmanaging ICT/cyber risks, it would be ideal to include all of them under the scope of the new\nguideline. If needed, more flexibility could be provided in terms of implementation in respect of\ninsurance and pension firms.\n\n17. Include a provision in the guideline to conduct an independent periodic assessment\nof cyber preparedness of banks, insurance companies and pension firms by qualified\nexternal professionals. Given the acute shortage of supervisory resources, in the initial days it\nwill be beneficial to leverage the work of external audit firms. Many jurisdictions require\nfinancial institutions to periodically assess their ICT/cyber preparedness with the help of external\naudit firms and to submit such reports for central bank’s perusal.\n\n18. Incorporate in the guideline a requirement for the Board to identify the regulatory\ngaps, draw an implementation plan with appropriate milestones, and submit to the CBTT.\nThe guideline, when issued, will mandate certain new requirements on the part of financial\ninstitutions and may need to provide an implementation period given additional investments it\nmay warrant. It is a good practice to require Boards of supervised entities to make an assessment\nof gaps and draw an implementation plan with milestones to bridge those gaps. CBTT could also\nconsider including requirement for institutions to conduct a gap analysis as a standard\nrequirement for all recently issued guidelines. Such information would be very useful for\nsupervisors in their assessment and when collected on regular intervals will provide an\nunderstanding of the progress made by various institutions.\n\n19. Determine the level of details to be provided in the draft guideline considering the\nlocal environment and digital landscape. Regulatory guideline needs to meet the style and\nusage expectations of the local environment. While principle-based guideline is welcome, the\nlevel of details will depend on the expertise available within the Boards of supervised entities\nand other local factors. Consider providing sufficient details in the guideline so that the\nimplementation of the provisions of the guideline is facilitated.\n\n20. Prepare a cyber incident reporting template and require supervised entities to\nreport cyber incidents regularly. As part of ICT/cyber risk management, it is important to\ncollect information on cyber incidents regularly. Cyber incident reporting offers several benefits\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 13", "text_characters": 2856}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "both to the supervisor as well as supervised entities. It is a good practice to integrate such\nrequirements in the guideline.\n\n\n21. **Sensitize the regulated entities on the need for strengthening cybersecurity through**\n**speeches, interviews, etc., and impress upon them the need for cyber incident reporting and**\n**information sharing among banks.** The process of drafting the guideline, review, obtaining\nindustry views, finalization, and approval can take up to six months. It is important to prepare the\nindustry for such a guideline as the demands of such regulatory guideline will be substantial on\nthe part of supervised entities. It is often a good practice to sensitize them well in advance by\nway of top management speeches, interviews to reputed financial dailies, etc.\n\n\n22. **Plan and conduct ICT/cyber preparedness surveys among insurance companies and**\n**pension firms** . The level of preparedness among supervised entities differs. While banks are\nsubjected to thematic reviews, surveys, and virtual assessments on their ICT/cyber preparedness,\ninsurance and pension firms have not been exposed to such supervisory engagements. It is\ntherefore necessary to initiate such exercises for insurance and pension firms. To start with,\nsurveys on ICT/cyber preparedness could be attempted.\n\n\n23. **Increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk assessments, starting with**\n**major banks.** Banks are the dominant set of institutions within Trinidad and Tobago in terms of\ntheir share of financial system assets and they tend to adopt technology faster. Some of the banks\nare large entities having many customers and offering various digital services. It is important to\nincrease the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk supervision at least for top banks in the\nnear term.\n\n\n24. **Plan and augment supervisory resources to ensure a self-sufficient supervision**\n**function covering banks, insurance companies, and pension firms.** Considering the varying\nlevel of digital maturity of the supervised entities and the number and size of such entities, it is\nnecessary to have sufficient resources within supervision unit to address the emerging ICT/cyber\nrisks. Supervisors also have the responsibility to have a macro perspective, looking at various\ninterdependencies, interconnections, concentration risk, and financial stability implications. The\nwork involved in bringing insurance and pension firms will be daunting as lot of efforts will go\nin educating and building awareness. Therefore, it is urgent and necessary to augment\nsupervisory resources. This could be seen as an investment rather than expenditure as qualified\nsupervisors would lead to operationally resilient financial institutions in the long run.\n\n\n25. **Consider setting up an offsite supervision function for ICT/cyber risks.** Basel core\nprinciples require supervisors to have a combination of onsite and offsite supervision to\neffectively supervise banks. ICT/cyber risk supervision also requires offsite supervision\ncapabilities as supervisors need to collect various key performance indicators, cyber incidents—\nboth individual major incidents and summary level information, organizational structure of the\nsupervised entities, digital products, list of third-party arrangements, various test reports and\npolicy documents so that a risk profile or dashboard could be prepared for each of the supervised\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "both to the supervisor as well as supervised entities. It is a good practice to integrate such\nrequirements in the guideline.\n\n21. Sensitize the regulated entities on the need for strengthening cybersecurity through\nspeeches, interviews, etc., and impress upon them the need for cyber incident reporting and\ninformation sharing among banks. The process of drafting the guideline, review, obtaining\nindustry views, finalization, and approval can take up to six months. It is important to prepare the\nindustry for such a guideline as the demands of such regulatory guideline will be substantial on\nthe part of supervised entities. It is often a good practice to sensitize them well in advance by\nway of top management speeches, interviews to reputed financial dailies, etc.\n\n22. Plan and conduct ICT/cyber preparedness surveys among insurance companies and\npension firms . The level of preparedness among supervised entities differs. While banks are\nsubjected to thematic reviews, surveys, and virtual assessments on their ICT/cyber preparedness,\ninsurance and pension firms have not been exposed to such supervisory engagements. It is\ntherefore necessary to initiate such exercises for insurance and pension firms. To start with,\nsurveys on ICT/cyber preparedness could be attempted.\n\n23. Increase the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk assessments, starting with\nmajor banks. Banks are the dominant set of institutions within Trinidad and Tobago in terms of\ntheir share of financial system assets and they tend to adopt technology faster. Some of the banks\nare large entities having many customers and offering various digital services. It is important to\nincrease the frequency and intensity of ICT/cyber risk supervision at least for top banks in the\nnear term.\n\n24. Plan and augment supervisory resources to ensure a self-sufficient supervision\nfunction covering banks, insurance companies, and pension firms. Considering the varying\nlevel of digital maturity of the supervised entities and the number and size of such entities, it is\nnecessary to have sufficient resources within supervision unit to address the emerging ICT/cyber\nrisks. Supervisors also have the responsibility to have a macro perspective, looking at various\ninterdependencies, interconnections, concentration risk, and financial stability implications. The\nwork involved in bringing insurance and pension firms will be daunting as lot of efforts will go\nin educating and building awareness. Therefore, it is urgent and necessary to augment\nsupervisory resources. This could be seen as an investment rather than expenditure as qualified\nsupervisors would lead to operationally resilient financial institutions in the long run.\n\n25. Consider setting up an offsite supervision function for ICT/cyber risks. Basel core\nprinciples require supervisors to have a combination of onsite and offsite supervision to\neffectively supervise banks. ICT/cyber risk supervision also requires offsite supervision\ncapabilities as supervisors need to collect various key performance indicators, cyber incidents—\nboth individual major incidents and summary level information, organizational structure of the\nsupervised entities, digital products, list of third-party arrangements, various test reports and\npolicy documents so that a risk profile or dashboard could be prepared for each of the supervised\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 14", "text_characters": 2937}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "entity. Such an arrangement would further facilitate in obtaining a macro picture of the sector.\nWell-structured offsite capabilities will facilitate more efficient onsite supervision as well.\n\n\n**IV.** **CYBERSECURITY GOVERNANCE**\n\n\n**A.** **Assessment**\n\n\n26. **Cybersecurity governance at CBTT is set up according to generally accepted good**\n**practices in the financial sector, with some minor differences.** All three lines of defense—that\nis, management control, risk management, and internal audit—have cybersecurity capabilities.\nResource constraints are apparent in the first line, while those in the second and third lines are\nless strained.\n\n\n27. **Unusually, the second line of defense—risk management—has a formal**\n**responsibility in driving IT governance.** Most financial institutions have their second line\nfocusing on risk data collection, consolidation, analysis, and reporting, and do not expect it to be\noperationally involved in IT Governance because IT Governance involves setting up\norganizational structures and policies and procedures to ensure effective and controlled IT\noperations. The second line usually does not have this responsibility.\n\n\n28. **The information security function in the first line is subordinated to the Head of IT.**\nThis arrangement is losing ground in the industry because of the growing importance of\ncybersecurity and increased risk of conflicts of interest. However, it still has advantages [2] and\nwith appropriate compensating controls, the conflict of interest risk can be mitigated.\n\n\n29. **Cybersecurity policies and procedures cover the most important topics and have**\n**been recently updated.** Missing areas include secure application development standards and\nsecurity hardening baselines.\n\n\n30. **Policies governing the cybersecurity of payment systems are uneven in terms of the**\n**technical controls required.** The SWIFT cybersecurity control environment is more\ncomprehensive due to the formalized requirements of the CSP.\n\n\n31. **Regular recovery tests of critical systems are not performed.** Testing to date has been\nlimited to tabletop exercises and has not incorporated tests using services from the disaster\nrecovery site to conduct business operations. In the event the primary site services become\ninaccessible, the recovery site is presently configured to provide selected services deemed to be\ncritical.\n\n\n2 Most notably, closeness to IT operations, which has the largest influence on cybersecurity in an organization.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "entity. Such an arrangement would further facilitate in obtaining a macro picture of the sector.\nWell-structured offsite capabilities will facilitate more efficient onsite supervision as well.\n\nIV. CYBERSECURITY GOVERNANCE\n\nA. Assessment\n\n26. Cybersecurity governance at CBTT is set up according to generally accepted good\npractices in the financial sector, with some minor differences. All three lines of defense—that\nis, management control, risk management, and internal audit—have cybersecurity capabilities.\nResource constraints are apparent in the first line, while those in the second and third lines are\nless strained.\n\n27. Unusually, the second line of defense—risk management—has a formal\nresponsibility in driving IT governance. Most financial institutions have their second line\nfocusing on risk data collection, consolidation, analysis, and reporting, and do not expect it to be\noperationally involved in IT Governance because IT Governance involves setting up\norganizational structures and policies and procedures to ensure effective and controlled IT\noperations. The second line usually does not have this responsibility.\n\n28. The information security function in the first line is subordinated to the Head of IT.\nThis arrangement is losing ground in the industry because of the growing importance of\ncybersecurity and increased risk of conflicts of interest. However, it still has advantages [2] and\nwith appropriate compensating controls, the conflict of interest risk can be mitigated.\n\n29. Cybersecurity policies and procedures cover the most important topics and have\nbeen recently updated. Missing areas include secure application development standards and\nsecurity hardening baselines.\n\n30. Policies governing the cybersecurity of payment systems are uneven in terms of the\ntechnical controls required. The SWIFT cybersecurity control environment is more\ncomprehensive due to the formalized requirements of the CSP.\n\n31. Regular recovery tests of critical systems are not performed. Testing to date has been\nlimited to tabletop exercises and has not incorporated tests using services from the disaster\nrecovery site to conduct business operations. In the event the primary site services become\ninaccessible, the recovery site is presently configured to provide selected services deemed to be\ncritical.\n\n2 Most notably, closeness to IT operations, which has the largest influence on cybersecurity in an organization.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 15", "text_characters": 2150}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**B.** **Recommendations**\n\n\n32. **Assess the workload of the IT Security unit and increase resources as needed.** In\norder to determine the nature and extent of additional resources, an analysis of the unit’s current\nworkload should be performed, including operations and project work. CBTT’s commitment to\nimproving its cyber resilience will result in additional workload on top of an already stretched\nagenda, which needs to be estimated and the necessary resource development plans drawn up in\nadvance, as there is a general shortage of available skills. The mission’s scope did not include a\ndeeper dive in this area and thus cannot make more specific recommendations. A rule of thumb\nthat might be used to check the reasonableness of resource allocation is that in banking the\ninformation security workforce Full Time Equivalent (FTE) is typically in the 10-15 percent\nrange of the IT workforce FTE. Given that the CBTT operates critical infrastructure for the\nfinancial sector, the actual ratio may be closer to the upper bound.\n\n\n33. **Remove IT governance from the responsibilities of the risk function.** The risk\nfunction should focus on risk data collection, consolidation, analysis, and reporting and not be\ninvolved operationally in governance matters, including IT and cybersecurity. [3] IT and\ncybersecurity governance is best assigned to the IT department and the IT Security unit\nrespectively, under the direction and oversight of senior management, and subject to review by\ninternal audit. Senior management should require that IT and cybersecurity governance is set\naccording to the broad governance principles adopted by the CBTT and obtain assurance thereof\nthrough internal audit.\n\n\n34. **Establish regular cybersecurity meetings and reporting regime at the Board level**\n**with the participation of the Head of IT Security.** This “dotted line” reporting arrangement\nwill act as a compensating control that mitigates the risk from potential conflicts of interest\nbetween IT and IT Security management. For example, without such an arrangement IT Security\nmanagement that is subordinated to IT management might find it difficult to voice opposition to\ndecisions detrimental to cybersecurity. Alternatively, the cybersecurity function could be\nelevated to the same level in the organization as the IT function.\n\n\n35. **Develop a secure application development policy and security hardening baselines.**\nThe CBTT does internal (in-house) application development, including security sensitive\nfunctionalities. Security vulnerabilities in software often occur because of insufficient focus on\nsecure development practices. A secure application development policy helps reducing the\nnumber and severity of such vulnerabilities by mandating, among others, development methods\nand coding approaches that promote security by design, code reviews, testing for exploitable\nbugs, and secure configuration of the development toolchain. A related area that needs attention\nis the strict separation of the development, test and production environments and restricting\n\n\n3 The risk function has not been actively pursuing operational involvement in IT or cybersecurity governance in\nrecent times, so the recommendation will not result in any disruption; it will only align the de jure roles and\nresponsibilities with the de facto situation (and good practice).\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Recommendations\n\n32. Assess the workload of the IT Security unit and increase resources as needed. In\norder to determine the nature and extent of additional resources, an analysis of the unit’s current\nworkload should be performed, including operations and project work. CBTT’s commitment to\nimproving its cyber resilience will result in additional workload on top of an already stretched\nagenda, which needs to be estimated and the necessary resource development plans drawn up in\nadvance, as there is a general shortage of available skills. The mission’s scope did not include a\ndeeper dive in this area and thus cannot make more specific recommendations. A rule of thumb\nthat might be used to check the reasonableness of resource allocation is that in banking the\ninformation security workforce Full Time Equivalent (FTE) is typically in the 10-15 percent\nrange of the IT workforce FTE. Given that the CBTT operates critical infrastructure for the\nfinancial sector, the actual ratio may be closer to the upper bound.\n\n33. Remove IT governance from the responsibilities of the risk function. The risk\nfunction should focus on risk data collection, consolidation, analysis, and reporting and not be\ninvolved operationally in governance matters, including IT and cybersecurity. [3] IT and\ncybersecurity governance is best assigned to the IT department and the IT Security unit\nrespectively, under the direction and oversight of senior management, and subject to review by\ninternal audit. Senior management should require that IT and cybersecurity governance is set\naccording to the broad governance principles adopted by the CBTT and obtain assurance thereof\nthrough internal audit.\n\n34. Establish regular cybersecurity meetings and reporting regime at the Board level\nwith the participation of the Head of IT Security. This “dotted line” reporting arrangement\nwill act as a compensating control that mitigates the risk from potential conflicts of interest\nbetween IT and IT Security management. For example, without such an arrangement IT Security\nmanagement that is subordinated to IT management might find it difficult to voice opposition to\ndecisions detrimental to cybersecurity. Alternatively, the cybersecurity function could be\nelevated to the same level in the organization as the IT function.\n\n35. Develop a secure application development policy and security hardening baselines.\nThe CBTT does internal (in-house) application development, including security sensitive\nfunctionalities. Security vulnerabilities in software often occur because of insufficient focus on\nsecure development practices. A secure application development policy helps reducing the\nnumber and severity of such vulnerabilities by mandating, among others, development methods\nand coding approaches that promote security by design, code reviews, testing for exploitable\nbugs, and secure configuration of the development toolchain. A related area that needs attention\nis the strict separation of the development, test and production environments and restricting\n\n3 The risk function has not been actively pursuing operational involvement in IT or cybersecurity governance in\nrecent times, so the recommendation will not result in any disruption; it will only align the de jure roles and\nresponsibilities with the de facto situation (and good practice).\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 16", "text_characters": 2907}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "access of developers to production systems. Finally, security hardening baselines help improving\nsecurity by mandating configuration settings on servers, workstations, networking devices, etc.,\nthat decrease the attack surface.\n\n\n36. **Develop a policy to bring the cybersecurity controls of the ACH and RTGS systems**\n**more in line with the SWIF CSP.** The SWIFT CSP encapsulates the best practice in payment\nsystem related cybersecurity control and thus can form a strong basis for improving the\ncybersecurity of other payment systems as well.\n\n\n37. **Regularly commission security reviews and tests of the payment systems.** CBTT uses\na scanning tool to mitigate the risk posed by unpatched vulnerabilities in its IT environment.\nIndeed, frequent vulnerability scans and timely patching of the vulnerabilities found are the\nfoundations of effective defense against malicious attacks. For high-risk systems, such as\npayment systems, this should be augmented with security configuration reviews, including\naccess rights reviews and network security reviews because vulnerabilities may exist that cannot\nbe detected by remote scans. Furthermore, security testing, such as penetration tests, convey\nadditional needed assurance over the effectiveness of cyber defense. The frequency of the\nreviews and tests should be determined based on the risk tolerance and budgets available.\nTypically, penetration tests and security reviews of payment systems are done annually, with\nmore frequent (e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly) vulnerability scans in between. The minimum\nrequirement for scanning frequency should be quarterly and after any significant changes.\n\n\n38. **Disaster recovery tests should progress beyond tabletop exercises and include**\n**simulating a complete failure in the primary data center** . This would necessitate performing\na full recovery using the offsite resources as far as possible. More disruptive tests could be\nconsidered after gaining experience, whereby the data center is shut down. Such tests will require\nextensive preparation and planning and will typically be performed less frequently.\n\n\n**V.** **IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT PROJECT**\n\n\n**A.** **Assessment**\n\n\n39. **The IAM project is set up according to good project management practices.** There is\na project charter in place, which documents the goals, stakeholders, sponsors, outline, and\ndeliverables for Phase 1. A project plan is available as well.\n\n\n40. **The project is in a very early stage; thus, the mission could not meaningfully assess**\n**performance and delivery against plans.** A follow-up mission in the first quarter of 2023\nwould be in a better position to carry out such an assessment. Therefore, the mission focused on\nsharing experience and good practices and answering specific questions raised during\ndiscussions.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "access of developers to production systems. Finally, security hardening baselines help improving\nsecurity by mandating configuration settings on servers, workstations, networking devices, etc.,\nthat decrease the attack surface.\n\n36. Develop a policy to bring the cybersecurity controls of the ACH and RTGS systems\nmore in line with the SWIF CSP. The SWIFT CSP encapsulates the best practice in payment\nsystem related cybersecurity control and thus can form a strong basis for improving the\ncybersecurity of other payment systems as well.\n\n37. Regularly commission security reviews and tests of the payment systems. CBTT uses\na scanning tool to mitigate the risk posed by unpatched vulnerabilities in its IT environment.\nIndeed, frequent vulnerability scans and timely patching of the vulnerabilities found are the\nfoundations of effective defense against malicious attacks. For high-risk systems, such as\npayment systems, this should be augmented with security configuration reviews, including\naccess rights reviews and network security reviews because vulnerabilities may exist that cannot\nbe detected by remote scans. Furthermore, security testing, such as penetration tests, convey\nadditional needed assurance over the effectiveness of cyber defense. The frequency of the\nreviews and tests should be determined based on the risk tolerance and budgets available.\nTypically, penetration tests and security reviews of payment systems are done annually, with\nmore frequent (e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly) vulnerability scans in between. The minimum\nrequirement for scanning frequency should be quarterly and after any significant changes.\n\n38. Disaster recovery tests should progress beyond tabletop exercises and include\nsimulating a complete failure in the primary data center . This would necessitate performing\na full recovery using the offsite resources as far as possible. More disruptive tests could be\nconsidered after gaining experience, whereby the data center is shut down. Such tests will require\nextensive preparation and planning and will typically be performed less frequently.\n\nV. IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT PROJECT\n\nA. Assessment\n\n39. The IAM project is set up according to good project management practices. There is\na project charter in place, which documents the goals, stakeholders, sponsors, outline, and\ndeliverables for Phase 1. A project plan is available as well.\n\n40. The project is in a very early stage; thus, the mission could not meaningfully assess\nperformance and delivery against plans. A follow-up mission in the first quarter of 2023\nwould be in a better position to carry out such an assessment. Therefore, the mission focused on\nsharing experience and good practices and answering specific questions raised during\ndiscussions.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 17", "text_characters": 2430}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "41. **The core project team consists of staff** **from the IT and IT security departments.** The\nproject charter does not specify the time commitments needed form staff, for example in FTEs.\nThe mission cautioned that the workload can be high, and involvement of the business functions\nis required, especially in the initial stages of the project.\n\n\n42. **The deliverables for Phase 1 are clearly identified and creating them within the**\n**deadline seems feasible.** Phase 1 ends on January 31, 2022. As a key activity in Phase 1 some of\nthe potential vendors have been contacted for general information. A review of the IAM policy is\nscheduled, as well as work on the authoritative source for identity information.\n\n\n43. **It is unlikely that the budget of TTD 100,000 (approximately USD 14,700) set aside**\n**for IAM advisory services will be sufficient.** External advisors are often brought in to benefit\nfrom IAM-specific subject matter knowledge, methodology and tools, assist in requirements\ndefinition, role review and reengineering, solution design, vendor selection, and do quality\nassurance and post-implementation review. Given the size and complexity of the project, and the\ngoing rates for relevant services, the budget could be exhausted by just one of these tasks.\n\n\n**B.** **Recommendations**\n\n\n44. **Plan out Phase 2 of the IAM project and include requirements definition and roles**\n**and access rights review and reengineering as key tasks, among others.** The mission supports\nthe phased approach and suggests that the November 2022 timeframe is ideal to start planning\nfor Phase 2 that should commence in February 2023 and ideally finish in a few months’ time. [4]\nThe requirements definition should include functional and non-functional requirements as well.\nAmong the functional requirements, special attention should be paid to those addressing\nworkflow and policy management, interfacing and integration, and search and analytics. Key\nnon-functional requirements include those addressing performance, availability, usability, and\nsecurity. Security requirements should address logical access and data security controls, and\nlogging and monitoring. The roles and access rights review are necessary to identify inconsistent,\nconflicting, or missing role definitions, cases of access rights non-compliance with policy. The\nreview also serves as an input to role reengineering, which aims to reduce the number of roles\nand fine-tune the associated access rights so that the principles of least privilege and need-toknow based data access are adhered to. It is important that the business functions are involved in\nthe role review and reengineering work as they are responsible for setting out the rules for\nsystem access within their organizational units, in compliance with applicable policies.\n\n\n45. **Analyze the projected workload and expertise required vs internal resources and**\n**skills to determine the type and extent of third-party support that needs to be sourced.** The\ntotal effort needed to deliver the project should be estimated in terms of FTEs (or man-days or\n\n\n4 Experience shows that project phases of durations from 3 to 6 months are conducive to a successful project,\nespecially if each phase has clearly identifiable benefits, as frequent delivery of results keep the up the momentum\nand motivation of the project team.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "41. The core project team consists of staff from the IT and IT security departments. The\nproject charter does not specify the time commitments needed form staff, for example in FTEs.\nThe mission cautioned that the workload can be high, and involvement of the business functions\nis required, especially in the initial stages of the project.\n\n42. The deliverables for Phase 1 are clearly identified and creating them within the\ndeadline seems feasible. Phase 1 ends on January 31, 2022. As a key activity in Phase 1 some of\nthe potential vendors have been contacted for general information. A review of the IAM policy is\nscheduled, as well as work on the authoritative source for identity information.\n\n43. It is unlikely that the budget of TTD 100,000 (approximately USD 14,700) set aside\nfor IAM advisory services will be sufficient. External advisors are often brought in to benefit\nfrom IAM-specific subject matter knowledge, methodology and tools, assist in requirements\ndefinition, role review and reengineering, solution design, vendor selection, and do quality\nassurance and post-implementation review. Given the size and complexity of the project, and the\ngoing rates for relevant services, the budget could be exhausted by just one of these tasks.\n\nB. Recommendations\n\n44. Plan out Phase 2 of the IAM project and include requirements definition and roles\nand access rights review and reengineering as key tasks, among others. The mission supports\nthe phased approach and suggests that the November 2022 timeframe is ideal to start planning\nfor Phase 2 that should commence in February 2023 and ideally finish in a few months’ time. [4]\nThe requirements definition should include functional and non-functional requirements as well.\nAmong the functional requirements, special attention should be paid to those addressing\nworkflow and policy management, interfacing and integration, and search and analytics. Key\nnon-functional requirements include those addressing performance, availability, usability, and\nsecurity. Security requirements should address logical access and data security controls, and\nlogging and monitoring. The roles and access rights review are necessary to identify inconsistent,\nconflicting, or missing role definitions, cases of access rights non-compliance with policy. The\nreview also serves as an input to role reengineering, which aims to reduce the number of roles\nand fine-tune the associated access rights so that the principles of least privilege and need-toknow based data access are adhered to. It is important that the business functions are involved in\nthe role review and reengineering work as they are responsible for setting out the rules for\nsystem access within their organizational units, in compliance with applicable policies.\n\n45. Analyze the projected workload and expertise required vs internal resources and\nskills to determine the type and extent of third-party support that needs to be sourced. The\ntotal effort needed to deliver the project should be estimated in terms of FTEs (or man-days or\n\n4 Experience shows that project phases of durations from 3 to 6 months are conducive to a successful project,\nespecially if each phase has clearly identifiable benefits, as frequent delivery of results keep the up the momentum\nand motivation of the project team.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 18", "text_characters": 2868}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "work hours, whichever is deemed more suitable). The expertise required should be identified as\nwell. Comparing these with the project timeline, the internally available skills, and resources will\nenable CBTT to better estimate the external support needed, and consequently, the expected\noutlays. Typically, internal skills in short supply in an IAM project include role reengineering,\naccess rights review, interface development, and system integration.\n\n\n46. **Adopt a phased approach to IAM deployment.** It is advisable to do the deployment of\nthe selected IAM solution over several phases. This reduces the risk of widespread disruption\nshould unexpected errors occur. The first phase of the deployment (which is not the same as the\nfirst phase of the IAM project itself) could be considered a pilot and could include Active\nDirectory and one or two internally developed applications. In this way, operational experience\ncould be gained in a live but limited environment.\n\n\n47. **Adopt good IAM implementation practices listed in this report as deemed necessary.**\nGiven the early stage of the IAM project several options how to structure and run it are still\nopen. The good practices listed in the Appendix can be used as a guide when making decisions\non the actual course of action.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "work hours, whichever is deemed more suitable). The expertise required should be identified as\nwell. Comparing these with the project timeline, the internally available skills, and resources will\nenable CBTT to better estimate the external support needed, and consequently, the expected\noutlays. Typically, internal skills in short supply in an IAM project include role reengineering,\naccess rights review, interface development, and system integration.\n\n46. Adopt a phased approach to IAM deployment. It is advisable to do the deployment of\nthe selected IAM solution over several phases. This reduces the risk of widespread disruption\nshould unexpected errors occur. The first phase of the deployment (which is not the same as the\nfirst phase of the IAM project itself) could be considered a pilot and could include Active\nDirectory and one or two internally developed applications. In this way, operational experience\ncould be gained in a live but limited environment.\n\n47. Adopt good IAM implementation practices listed in this report as deemed necessary.\nGiven the early stage of the IAM project several options how to structure and run it are still\nopen. The good practices listed in the Appendix can be used as a guide when making decisions\non the actual course of action.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 19", "text_characters": 1146}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**ANNEXES**\n\n\n**ANNEX I.** **SELECTED GOOD IAM** **PROJECT PRACTICES**\n\n\nThe following is a non-exhaustive list of good practices that in the experience of the mission\nteam can significantly contribute to the success of an IAM project. CBTT is advised to decide on\nthe adoption, adaptation, or rejection of any of these based on professional judgment, considering\nthe circumstances of the institution in general, and the project in particular.\n\n**1.** **Requirements and vendor selection**\n\n\na. Both functional and non-functional requirements are developed, involving representatives\n\nof key stakeholders, e.g., IT, information security, and business units.\n\n\nb. Requirements regarding workflow, interfacing, integration (e.g., with the service desk\n\napplication), batch processing, analytics, search, and security are prioritized. All\nrequirements are assigned a priority level, e.g., must-have, negotiable, and nice-to-have.\n\n\nc. Requirements for IAM related services, both from vendors and independent advisors are\n\ndefined and prioritized. Typical services for consideration include role reengineering,\nquality assurance, security testing, and post-implementation review.\n\n\nd. An initial market research is done to identify not more than three to four IAM potentially\n\nsuitable IAM products/vendors (candidates).\n\n\ne. A more detailed analysis is done to reduce the number of candidates to (typically) three.\n\nAt this stage the capabilities, references and reputation of vendors is informally checked.\n\n\nf. A formal Request for Information (RFI) is issued. Candidates are asked to give\n\npresentations, provide test or demonstration licenses, and support a “test drive” of the\nproduct.\n\n\ng. The test drive includes, among others, experimenting with the product features that fulfill\n\nthe prioritized requirements, and the full identity lifecycle.\n\n\nh. A formal Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued. Candidates are asked to show not just\n\none-off costs but also the total cost of ownership for several years. Costs are required to\nbe shown according to a template to facilitate comparative analysis.\n\n\ni. Financial and technical information in the proposal is assessed separately according to\n\npredefined and weighted criteria.\n\n\nj. A similar, preferably simplified process for selecting independent advisors is in place.\n\nE.g., it is rarely necessary to go for separate RFI and RFP phases.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ANNEXES\n\nANNEX I. SELECTED GOOD IAM PROJECT PRACTICES\n\nThe following is a non-exhaustive list of good practices that in the experience of the mission\nteam can significantly contribute to the success of an IAM project. CBTT is advised to decide on\nthe adoption, adaptation, or rejection of any of these based on professional judgment, considering\nthe circumstances of the institution in general, and the project in particular.\n\n1. Requirements and vendor selection\n\na. Both functional and non-functional requirements are developed, involving representatives\n\nof key stakeholders, e.g., IT, information security, and business units.\n\nb. Requirements regarding workflow, interfacing, integration (e.g., with the service desk\n\napplication), batch processing, analytics, search, and security are prioritized. All\nrequirements are assigned a priority level, e.g., must-have, negotiable, and nice-to-have.\n\nc. Requirements for IAM related services, both from vendors and independent advisors are\n\ndefined and prioritized. Typical services for consideration include role reengineering,\nquality assurance, security testing, and post-implementation review.\n\nd. An initial market research is done to identify not more than three to four IAM potentially\n\nsuitable IAM products/vendors (candidates).\n\ne. A more detailed analysis is done to reduce the number of candidates to (typically) three.\n\nAt this stage the capabilities, references and reputation of vendors is informally checked.\n\nf. A formal Request for Information (RFI) is issued. Candidates are asked to give\n\npresentations, provide test or demonstration licenses, and support a “test drive” of the\nproduct.\n\ng. The test drive includes, among others, experimenting with the product features that fulfill\n\nthe prioritized requirements, and the full identity lifecycle.\n\nh. A formal Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued. Candidates are asked to show not just\n\none-off costs but also the total cost of ownership for several years. Costs are required to\nbe shown according to a template to facilitate comparative analysis.\n\ni. Financial and technical information in the proposal is assessed separately according to\n\npredefined and weighted criteria.\n\nj. A similar, preferably simplified process for selecting independent advisors is in place.\n\nE.g., it is rarely necessary to go for separate RFI and RFP phases.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 20", "text_characters": 2065}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**2.** **Implementation**\n\n\na. The IAM project raises awareness among, and getting buy-in from, key stakeholders. The\n\nproject sponsors lend their support and use their authority to promote this effort.\n\n\nb. The IAM project is treated equally as a business and IT endeavor. The messaging\n\nemphasizes the need for the business units to participate, especially in the planning, role\nreview and reengineering, and testing activities.\n\n\nc. Types of user identities are identified, e.g., human, non-human (service accounts),\n\nemployee, contractor, supplier, etc. The initial set is consolidated to the minimum\nnecessary. e.g., are there meaningful differences that require separate treatment of fulltime and part-time users? Is there a need to differentiate between various types of\nexternal (non-employee) users?\n\n\nd. All systems that users have access to are identified, irrespective of the initial scope of the\n\nIAM implementation.\n\n\ne. An identity and access review are done, at a minimum for the systems in scope for the\n\npilot and the first phase of deployment, preferably including systems in subsequent\ndeployment phases as well.\n\n\nf. The authoritative source of identity information is identified early in the planning phase.\n\nInterfacing and synchronization possibilities are explored as well.\n\n\ng. If external advisors are used for quality assurance, then they are involved early in the\n\nplanning phase.\n\n\nh. A pilot phase is defined, with a limited scope and time span, but including a “difficult”\n\nsystem (typically, an in-house development that has no standard connector to the IAM).\n\n\ni. Deployment is done in a phased approach and according to a roll-out plan.\n\n\nj. A roll-back plan is in place.\n\n\nk. Roll-out and rollback is tested before live deployment.\n\n\nl. A segregation of duties matrix is used for the IAM system access rights set-up.\n\n\nm. The IAM infrastructure is security hardened and tested before deployment.\n\n\nn. A knowledge base is developed as the project progresses towards deployment. Focus is\n\non solutions to issues in the provisioning and lifecycle management process.\n\n\no. A post-implementation review is done after the first or second phase of deployment.\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "2. Implementation\n\na. The IAM project raises awareness among, and getting buy-in from, key stakeholders. The\n\nproject sponsors lend their support and use their authority to promote this effort.\n\nb. The IAM project is treated equally as a business and IT endeavor. The messaging\n\nemphasizes the need for the business units to participate, especially in the planning, role\nreview and reengineering, and testing activities.\n\nc. Types of user identities are identified, e.g., human, non-human (service accounts),\n\nemployee, contractor, supplier, etc. The initial set is consolidated to the minimum\nnecessary. e.g., are there meaningful differences that require separate treatment of fulltime and part-time users? Is there a need to differentiate between various types of\nexternal (non-employee) users?\n\nd. All systems that users have access to are identified, irrespective of the initial scope of the\n\nIAM implementation.\n\ne. An identity and access review are done, at a minimum for the systems in scope for the\n\npilot and the first phase of deployment, preferably including systems in subsequent\ndeployment phases as well.\n\nf. The authoritative source of identity information is identified early in the planning phase.\n\nInterfacing and synchronization possibilities are explored as well.\n\ng. If external advisors are used for quality assurance, then they are involved early in the\n\nplanning phase.\n\nh. A pilot phase is defined, with a limited scope and time span, but including a “difficult”\n\nsystem (typically, an in-house development that has no standard connector to the IAM).\n\ni. Deployment is done in a phased approach and according to a roll-out plan.\n\nj. A roll-back plan is in place.\n\nk. Roll-out and rollback is tested before live deployment.\n\nl. A segregation of duties matrix is used for the IAM system access rights set-up.\n\nm. The IAM infrastructure is security hardened and tested before deployment.\n\nn. A knowledge base is developed as the project progresses towards deployment. Focus is\n\non solutions to issues in the provisioning and lifecycle management process.\n\no. A post-implementation review is done after the first or second phase of deployment.\n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 21", "text_characters": 1879}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**ANNEX II.** **AGENDA –** **SEMINAR ON REGULATION**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Tuesday, November 1, 2022 – DAY 1 OF TRAINING (in person)|Col2|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|9.00 am – 9.15 am
(Local time)
|**L-0**|**Welcome and Introduction**
_CBTT - Mr. Patrick Solomon, Inspector of Financial Institutions_
_IMF Staff (Rangachary Ravikumar, Tamas Gaidosch, Mission_
_Chief)_||\n|9.15 – 10.30|L-1|Cyber Risk and Financial Sector – An Introduction.
Cyber Risk and Financial Stability
Growing digitalization and interconnectedness, attacks becoming frequent and
sophisticated, renewed focus on operational and cyber resilience. Cyber terms
explained. Cyber risk and its impact on financial stability, transmission channels|_Tamas_
_Gaidosch_|\n|10:30 – 10:45||
**BREAK**||\n|10.45 – 11.25|L-2|Cyber Security - Overarching Framework
National level policy and institutional arrangements, arrangements within central
banks and emerging best practices like DORA, etc.|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|\n|11.25 – 12.00|L-3|Cyber Security and New Technologies; Cloud Regulation
Adoption of new technologies growing, posing unique challenges for cyber
security. Discuss cyber risk implications of adopting AI/ML, fintech, etc. To
discuss the importance of cloud and how to regulate.|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|\n|
**Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|
**Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|
**Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
||\n|9.00 – 9.50|L-4|International Guidance on Cyber Risk and Global Regulatory
Practices – An overview
An overview of work on cyber and related topics by standard setters and major
regulators|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|\n|9.50-10.45|L-5|
Core components of Cyber Risk Regulation – Governance, Risk
Management
Components of cyber risk regulation and focused discussion on governance
arrangements and risk management practices|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|\n|10.45-11.00||
**BREAK**||\n|11. 005 – 12.00|L-6|Outsourcing / Third Party Risk Management / Vendor Risk
Management
Outsourcing policies, oversight, and best practices|_Tamas_
_Gaidosch_|\n|**Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|**Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
|**Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (****_in person_) **
||\n|9.00 – 10.00|L-7|Cyber Incident Reporting
Cyber incident reporting best practices, reporting frameworks and need for
convergence|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|\n|10.00 – 11.00|L-8|
Business Continuity & Response and Recovery – Emerging best
practices
Business continuity management – issues and challenges. Discuss FSB paper on
best practices on cyber incident response and recovery, importance of response
and recovery within the financial sector.|_Rangachary_
_Ravikumar_|\n|11.00 – 11.15||
**BREAK**||\n|11.15 – 12.15|L-9|Information sharing / testing frameworks – how are they handled
in regulations
Benefits of gathering threat intelligence and information sharing, examples of best
practices|_Tamas_
_Gaidosch_|\n|Wrap Up/ Closing
Remarks
12. 15 – 12.30||
IMF
CBTT||\n\n\n\n**IMF** | **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions | 22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-161", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [66.85066986083984, 99.30001068115234, 540.13330078125, 673.468017578125], "columns": 4, "rows": 17}], "text": "ANNEX II. AGENDA – SEMINAR ON REGULATION\n\n Tuesday, November 1, 2022 – DAY 1 OF TRAINING (in person) Col2 Col3 Col4 \n\n 9.00 am – 9.15 am (Local time) L-0 Welcome and Introduction _CBTT - Mr. Patrick Solomon, Inspector of Financial Institutions_ _IMF Staff (Rangachary Ravikumar, Tamas Gaidosch, Mission_ _Chief)_ \n 9.15 – 10.30 L-1 Cyber Risk and Financial Sector – An Introduction. Cyber Risk and Financial Stability Growing digitalization and interconnectedness, attacks becoming frequent and sophisticated, renewed focus on operational and cyber resilience. Cyber terms explained. Cyber risk and its impact on financial stability, transmission channels _Tamas_ _Gaidosch_ \n 10:30 – 10:45 BREAK \n 10.45 – 11.25 L-2 Cyber Security - Overarching Framework National level policy and institutional arrangements, arrangements within central banks and emerging best practices like DORA, etc. _Rangachary_ _Ravikumar_ \n 11.25 – 12.00 L-3 Cyber Security and New Technologies; Cloud Regulation Adoption of new technologies growing, posing unique challenges for cyber security. Discuss cyber risk implications of adopting AI/ML, fintech, etc. To discuss the importance of cloud and how to regulate. _Rangachary_ _Ravikumar_ \n Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (_in person_) Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (_in person_) Wednesday, November 2, 2022 – DAY 2 OF TRAINING (_in person_) \n 9.00 – 9.50 L-4 International Guidance on Cyber Risk and Global Regulatory Practices – An overview An overview of work on cyber and related topics by standard setters and major regulators _Rangachary_ _Ravikumar_ \n 9.50-10.45 L-5 Core components of Cyber Risk Regulation – Governance, Risk Management Components of cyber risk regulation and focused discussion on governance arrangements and risk management practices _Rangachary_ _Ravikumar_ \n 10.45-11.00 BREAK \n 11. 005 – 12.00 L-6 Outsourcing / Third Party Risk Management / Vendor Risk Management Outsourcing policies, oversight, and best practices _Tamas_ _Gaidosch_ \n Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (_in person_) Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (_in person_) Thursday, November 3, 2022 - DAY 3 OF TRAINING (_in person_) \n 9.00 – 10.00 L-7 Cyber Incident Reporting Cyber incident reporting best practices, reporting frameworks and need for convergence _Rangachary_ _Ravikumar_ \n 10.00 – 11.00 L-8 Business Continuity & Response and Recovery – Emerging best practices Business continuity management – issues and challenges. Discuss FSB paper on best practices on cyber incident response and recovery, importance of response and recovery within the financial sector. _Rangachary_ _Ravikumar_ \n 11.00 – 11.15 BREAK \n 11.15 – 12.15 L-9 Information sharing / testing frameworks – how are they handled in regulations Benefits of gathering threat intelligence and information sharing, examples of best practices _Tamas_ _Gaidosch_ \n Wrap Up/ Closing Remarks 12. 15 – 12.30 IMF CBTT \n\nIMF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Strengthening Cybersecurity in Financial Institutions 22", "text_characters": 2570}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd7eb16c1dc8d77fdc24fffe7c055e8397604bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087
+size 58403
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55f76af5702fbc2b31a09f0c2503a9f0b7eae736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb
+size 33384
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0005-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0005-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1dfa9602547cf7644302eb5b107089ad1cdf4e71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0005-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:3d3d3402600310beba84e158b8f6602b0c9f3d21a8bc8dd878e1d259cb23ae92
+size 2511
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0008-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0008-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6fb14e8596fec0c6f1276bf1864a1de16f386051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0008-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a587aca40f56c03bdae8dcdd6302f94e4476ff62f9ce14f50f420faaf6f63a59
+size 33764
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9e2c55677b957dd7863a3e19e1fd20a73c04f58f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:448a0f54186b9573970d683ab28004bedcd57d3aa933024ff7147d1c5c43ea3b
+size 30854
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..93d3c758c6329f6176c37c0349d86e88831c0549
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:887fbd1b6dd67a94f584359a525e2bd460813b853960c69f98cd3bf3dfd5b94a
+size 16166
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0011-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0011-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e71a176bd7b8afe0aee80d68cbd8203b6719676a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0011-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:85f214964dd64911773537eede5e328643fa0215a9a809ae0137106e94b4ce56
+size 16345
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0012-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0012-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..79faa8d0bd2972e95a998ff225df65455345bab1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0012-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:143c762a0b1a7368b877703ce0f2022ba42e61f23fcef26f6248bbe5c3c7955e
+size 19327
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0013-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0013-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..757a1746a07de82afbd28be0dbf0ad6f000b11f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0013-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:32a0bf8e8cbf3b9eb350f0f542ffe77223877fe050e0471cf02e17693058c727
+size 32125
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0ba82ec46cb58f762bb423ce5d9378e39c6723d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c78354237a474bb081135d8b3ebfefb355238587143959f5ff070fe15f97dfe7
+size 36903
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3c3bb2236d51978bac071848c551bbf273c3a88c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:bf681d451312441a1cb251c4bfdfa4b45dbfe5f207b416b70ed453f9630a5d88
+size 18217
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f5934138966c1734cc65b703cbe7de50ff03a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:705a5f38473b175e53be0460f143dc37aab9d7102dbe652dbc19e1830bf287c5
+size 18339
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0017-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0017-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cec3f27c329e0d58417a54ccdea5cdccbc14346e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0017-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:42be6b2462909cc9d782d8bf47a992622b5abf2ded4937edfaf5e53ef9ac3218
+size 27359
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0b4d9f9e70bb7d46bd3873addb70af9a52c9c96c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:fb790b25856a347c8bf04ab653cc22c803f61c9742b3e9d674ba29c6a7bffd19
+size 30468
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..374c5ae99fcb00461097c112a23d7187edd816e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:f8f9dbd822139774f53710dab57d249cb05fc1d93982f20e87e87fb7d12b58a6
+size 33606
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..25667e6970f9a554680bb2d1b014190c0280eef4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:e0ba6e88d00b3af0595f3e586f0858c0debf253dff86acd0ba62b1fae08151b8
+size 25521
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13e1aa4e234367ca9a542172079e4656f9064b84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5d5ce9f49dc7b94322e1b3f31b0362431db82ab4e05255e40f6e43d5b136d1ef
+size 21223
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c4cf4a5d3b27f9cbb2f528c346e5b90cb9e191a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8a1e9f66d3f295f68d71e661591200adbfdd91e4710d9aa87ccedb73f973bb7b
+size 31938
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0021-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0021-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a30747a605c267fea9bb036d12d65f9c1e3dc234
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0021-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:61a3649706524785d641b259af979d6e7a0072f77974dc10685e55dca5b0ef6e
+size 183956
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0022-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0022-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a66ab6ceb4069db1c5812a10c4df1e205eecc997
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0022-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:351aba754c4426e2e066da2290e8c2fc0d87150b22535917a2b3ff4a56d3f6fe
+size 38330
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..40bbad5ab65e2d3d75f9aec6520a54394a6f7ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-166",
+ "title": "Belgium: Technical Assistance Report-Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program–The Value Added Tax",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-166.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "6ca531fe28e896691c8891874dbe55da229e0a8596970a8cd6dc609b5f1f00a4",
+ "source_bytes": 896175,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/05/17/belgium-technical-assistance-report-revenue-administration-gap-analysis-programthe-value-533507",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:21:09+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 21.591,
+ "page_count": 38,
+ "text_characters": 55006,
+ "table_count": 24,
+ "figure_count": 20,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "BELGIUM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 1,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 2,
+ "title": "BELGIUM"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program – The Value Added Tax"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 2,
+ "level": 5,
+ "title": "Fiscal Affairs Department"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 3,
+ "level": 4,
+ "title": "Belgium Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program – The Value Added Tax"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 7,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 8,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 11,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "I. BACKGROUND"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 14,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "II. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 22,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "III. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 25,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "IV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 28,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "V. APPENDIXES"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.6",
+ "title": "Belgium: Technical Assistance Report-Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program–The Value Added Tax; IMF Country Report No. 23/166; April 2023",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Adobe Acrobat Standard (32-bit) 23.1.20143",
+ "producer": "Adobe Acrobat Standard (32-bit) 23.1.20143",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230515101654-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230517111546-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..79e43c813abc3d12ea56086877ef830e626a5597
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1704 @@
+
+
+
+
+May 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/166**
+### **BELGIUM**
+
+**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT- REVENUE**
+**ADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM – THE**
+**VALUE ADDED TAX**
+
+
+
+This technical assistance report on Belgium was prepared by a staff team of the
+
+
+
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it
+
+
+
+was completed in April 2023.
+
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+[Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201](http://www.imf.org/)
+[E-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org)
+
+
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+# TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT
+
+## BELGIUM
+#### Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program – The Value Added Tax
+
+April 2023
+
+
+Prepared By
+
+_Eric Hutton, Polina Prokof’yeva_
+
+
+Authoring Departments:
+##### Fiscal Affairs Department
+
+
+
+F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T
+
+#### **Belgium** **Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program –** **The Value Added Tax**
+
+
+Eric Hutton, Polina Prokof’yeva
+
+
+**Technical Assistance Report**
+
+
+**April 2023**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff
+of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Belgium (the
+"TA recipient") in response to their request for technical assistance. This
+report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the
+IMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other
+agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to
+World Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with
+legitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such
+disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical
+Assistance Information—
+Staff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure
+of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside
+the IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World
+Bank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate
+interest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s
+Fiscal Affairs Department.
+
+
+DM 7360948
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS ________________________________________________________________ 5**
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 6**
+
+
+**I. BACKGROUND _________________________________________________________________________________ 9**
+A. Value-Added Tax Revenue Performance ________________________________________________________9
+B. Relative VAT Performance _____________________________________________________________________ 10
+
+
+**II. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP ______________________________________________ 12**
+A. The Compliance Gap __________________________________________________________________________ 12
+B. The Policy Gap _________________________________________________________________________________ 14
+C. The Overall Value-Added Tax Gap _____________________________________________________________ 16
+
+
+**III. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP __________________________________________ 20**
+A. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax ________________________________________________________ 20
+B. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector ______________________________________________ 20
+C. The Compliance Gap by Sector ________________________________________________________________ 22
+
+
+**IV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS ___________________________________________________ 23**
+A. Tax Expenditure Estimates _____________________________________________________________________ 23
+B. Other Observations and Remarks. _____________________________________________________________ 24
+
+
+**V. APPENDIXES __________________________________________________________________________________ 26**
+
+**BOXES**
+Box 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax_________________________________________________ 19
+
+**FIGURES**
+Figure 1. Value-Added Tax Revenues ______________________________________________________________6
+Figure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance Gap _______________________________________________________7
+Figure 3. Value-Added Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap _________________________________7
+Figure 4. The Compliance Gap by Sector ___________________________________________________________8
+Figure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues ______________________________________________________________9
+Figure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries ______________ 10
+Figure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020 __________________________ 11
+Figure 8. The Compliance Gap ___________________________________________________________________ 13
+Figure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap ____________________________________________________ 14
+Figure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap ______________________________________________ 15
+Figure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap ___________________________________________________ 16
+Figure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap _______________________________ 17
+Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap ________________________________ 17
+Figure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio __________________ 18
+
+
+3
+
+
+
+Figure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency __________________________________ 18
+Figure 16. RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value-Added Tax _____________ 19
+Figure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax ________________________________________________ 20
+Figure 18. Trends in Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector ___________________________ 21
+Figure 19. The Compliance Gap by Sector _______________________________________________________ 22
+
+**TABLES**
+Table 1. Estimated Cost of Tax Expenditure Categories for 2021 _________________________________ 24
+
+**APPENDICES**
+Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures ____________________________________________________ 26
+Appendix II. Definitions of VAT Gap terms _______________________________________________________ 35
+
+**APPENDIX TABLES**
+Table 1. Data for Figures 1 and 5: Value-Added Tax Revenues ___________________________________ 26
+Table 2. Data for Figure 6: C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European ________ 26
+Table 3. Data for Figure 7: Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2010-2020 ________ 27
+Table 4. Data for Figures 2 and 8: Compliance Gap ______________________________________________ 28
+Table 5. Data for Figure 9: The Assessment and Collection Gap _________________________________ 28
+Table 6. Data for Figures 3, 10 & 12: The Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap ____________ 29
+Table 7. Data for Figure 11: The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap _________________________________ 29
+Table 8. Data for Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap ______________ 30
+Table 9. Data for Figure 14: One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap and C-efficiency Ratio _______ 30
+Table 10. Data for Figure 15: Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency _______________ 31
+Table 11. Data for Figure 16: RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value ______ 31
+Table 12. Data for Figure 17: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax_____________________________ 32
+Table 13. Data for Figure 18: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector __________________ 33
+Table 14. Data for Figures 4 and 19: The Compliance Gap by Sector ____________________________ 34
+Table 15. National Accounts Statistics Summary over the period 2011-2021 ____________________ 34
+
+
+4
+
+
+
+###### **ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS**
+
+**FAD** Fiscal Affairs Department
+**IMF** International Monetary Fund
+**RA-GAP** Revenue Administration GAP Analysis Program
+**VAT** Value-added Tax
+**V-GEM** VAT – Gap Estimation Model
+
+
+5
+
+
+
+###### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+**This report presents the results of applying the RA-GAP VAT gap estimation methodology**
+**to Belgium for the period 2011-2021** . The Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program (RAGAP) methodology employs a top-down approach for estimating the potential Value-Added Tax
+(VAT) base, using statistical data on value-added generated in each sector. There are two main
+components to this methodology for estimating the VAT gap: 1) estimate the potential VAT
+collections for a given period; and 2) determine the accrued VAT collections for that period.
+The difference between the two values is the VAT gap.
+
+
+**RA-GAP provides estimates of the two components of the tax gap: the compliance gap and**
+**the policy gap.** The compliance gap is the difference between the potential VAT that could have
+been collected given the current policy framework and actual accrued VAT collections. The policy
+gap is the difference between the overall tax gap and the compliance gap. In order to put the
+level and trends of the compliance gap into context, it is also necessary to analyze the level and
+trends of the overall tax gap and the policy gap. [1]
+
+
+**Main Findings**
+
+
+**VAT collections have, on average, remained relatively stable in real terms over the period**
+**2011 through 2021, the period under review for this report, at around 7 percent of GDP**
+**(Figure 1).** There was a slight decline between 2012 and 2015, which coincides with a period
+during which some minor policy adjustments were made, and there was a drop in revenue in
+2020 related to the pandemic. Revenues in 2021 were, however, back to roughly the same level
+they were in 2011.
+
+**Figure 1. Value-Added Tax Revenues**
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+1 The compliance gap is further broken down into a collection and assessment gap, while the policy gap is
+broken down into an expenditure and efficiency gap. The measure for the compliance gap is also compared
+against estimates using other methodologies.
+
+
+6
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**Like the VAT revenues, the compliance**
+**gap, as a percent of GDP, has appeared to**
+**be largely stable over the period 2011 to**
+**2021 at around 2 percent of GDP (Figure**
+**2).** The compliance gap as a percent of
+potential shows a bit more volatility, with
+perhaps just a slight upward trend, starting
+off the period at around 21 percent, then
+ending the period at around 22 percent. The
+peak that appears in 2015 corresponds with a
+change in the series of the statistical data
+used to estimate the potential VAT base, and
+so this change could be related to that. The
+more significant increase that occurs in 2019
+and 2020 is related to the cash effect of some
+of the relief provisions provided to taxpayers
+which resulted in deferred payments, in
+particular advance payments were made nonobligational in December 2020, shifting those
+revenues to January 2021. [2]
+
+
+**The total VAT gap, including the policy gap,**
+**has also been mostly stable, apart from an**
+**apparent sharp drop in 2021 from around 8**
+**percent of GDP to a level closer to 7 percent**
+**(Figure 3).** This drop in 2021 is the result of
+reductions in both the policy and compliance gaps
+for this period. It is of interest that the policy gap
+shows an increase in 2019 to 2020 and then a
+decrease from 2020 to 2021 because during this
+period the only policy change of significance was a
+decrease in the VAT rate for restaurant and
+catering services, which would have a positive
+increase in the policy gap, so this was offset by the
+negative effect of an increase in the overall
+proportion of the taxable portion of the potential
+tax base—for example a decrease between 2020
+and 2021 in the relative size of the public sector.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations_
+
+
+
+**Figure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance**
+
+
+
+**Figure 3. Value-Added Tax Gap,**
+**Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap**
+
+
+
+2 In December 2019 these advance payments consisted of 3.1-3.4 billion euros. In December 2020 some
+taxpayers still paid these advance payments (±800 million euros).
+
+
+7
+
+
+
+**The compliance gap appears to be largely concentrated in the Professional and Managerial**
+**Services sector (Figure 4).** The data on the sector of activity for taxpayers came from two
+different sources for this chart—the years 2011to 2014 draw upon the information in the
+taxpayer registry, while the data for years 2015-2021 uses information provided by the statistics
+office. A further differentiation between the two periods is that a breakdown of collections at
+customs by sector was not available for the 2011 to 2014, and so these collections all had to be
+lumped into the “Z: unknown” sector. Due to these issues, the inferences about the sectoral
+allocation are largely based on the results for the period 2015-2021. This data points to a
+compliance issue in professional and management services (lawyers, accounts, head office
+activities, etc.) and then also a possible issue in manufacturing. The results on the distribution of
+the compliance gap by sector are not to be considered definitive, only suggestive, and so further
+analysis needs to be conducted (review of the distribution of audit results for example) to
+corroborate or refute these findings and to find possible causes for the noncompliance in these
+sectors—this analysis on its own cannot determine the cause of the noncompliance.
+
+
+**Figure 4. The Compliance Gap by Sector**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|2.0
1.5
GDP
1.0
of
0.5
Percent
0.0
A B C D‐E F G H I J K‐L M‐N O P‐Q R‐U Z
‐0.5
‐1.0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021|Col2|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|
**Sector Description**|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description **
Information, Communication
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Professional/Management
Public Sector
Education, Health Care
Other Services
Unknown/unprovided
|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing|**J **|**J **|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Mining, Extraction|**K-L**|**K-L**|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **||||
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Manufacturing|**M-N**|**M-N**|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Utilities|**O **|**O **|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Construction|**P-Q**|**P-Q**|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Trade|**R-U**|**R-U**|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Transportation|**Z **|**Z **|
+|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Hospitality|||
+
+
+_Sources: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+###### **I. BACKGROUND**
+
+**1.** **The IMF RA-GAP program provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the**
+**gap between potential revenues and actual collections, known as the compliance gap.** The
+program is conducted by the Revenue Administration Divisions of the Fiscal Affairs Department,
+initially focusing on gap analysis of the value-added tax (VAT). The RA-GAP model uses an
+approach that allows for a breakdown of the compliance gap by sector of economic activity,
+thereby helping revenue administrations monitor and identify what is contributing to this gap. [3]
+
+
+**2.** **This report presents an estimate of the level and recent trends of the tax gap for**
+**VAT in Belgium using the RA-GAP approach.** Available national account data was used to
+estimate the potential revenues under the current VAT legislation. These potential VAT revenues
+are then compared with collection data. The difference between potential revenue and actual
+collections represents the compliance gap—the degree of non-compliance of taxpayers.
+
+
+**A. Value-Added Tax Revenue Performance**
+
+
+**3.** **Belgium has had a fairly stable VAT policy framework over the past decade.** The VAT
+was first introduced in 1971 at a standard rate of 18 percent. Currently, the standard rate is 21
+percent with special rates of 6 and 12 percent that are applied to select goods and services.
+There have only been a few minor changes to the policy framework over this period, most
+recently, as a response to the pandemic, changes to the rates for certain pandemic related
+products such as face masks and vaccines were made, nothing that would significantly impact
+revenues. [4]
+
+
+
+**4.** **VAT collections as a percent of GDP**
+**have remained relatively stable over the**
+**period 2011 to 2021. (Figure 5).** Measured as a
+percent of GDP, revenues were at around 6.9
+percent in 2011, were at their lowest at 6.5
+percent in 2020, but then rebounded back to 6.9
+percent in 2021. Nominal VAT collections were
+increasing over the period except for 2020. VAT
+revenues increased from 26.0 billion euros in
+2011 to 32.2 billion euros in 2019. In 2020, VAT
+collections declined by 2.4 billion euros, but then
+were back up to 34.8 billion in 2021. [5]
+
+
+
+**Figure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+
+3 A list of definitions for a number of the conceptual and practical terms related to the VAT gap used in this
+report are laid out in Appendix II.
+
+4 Some more significant changes have been made since 2021, notably in regards to the treatment of electricity
+and gas, but these, of course, do not affect the results for the periods considered in this report.
+
+5 Data for all charts in this report is contained in Appendix I
+
+
+9
+
+
+
+**B. Relative VAT Performance**
+
+
+**5.** **The c-efficiency ratio can be used to analyze the relative performance of VAT**
+**revenues while accounting for differences in the standard rate.** The c-efficiency ratio is
+calculated from VAT revenues, the VAT standard rate, and final consumption aggregates to
+indicate the overall performance of VAT revenues. It presents the ratio of actual VAT collections
+to the theoretical revenues under a perfectly enforced tax levied at the standard rate on all final
+consumption without any exemptions. The yearly changes in c-efficiency ratio can be
+decomposed into several factors: changes in the compliance gap, changes in the effects of VAT
+expenditures (deviations from the application of the standard rate), changes in the share of total
+final consumption represented by nontaxable consumption, and timing effects of cash payments
+and refunds.
+
+
+**6.** **C-efficiency in Belgium was lower than the average for the European** **[6]** **countries**
+**over the period 2010-2020 (Figure 6 and 7).** The average c-efficiency for European countries
+was relatively stable from 2011 to 2015 but showed a moderate increase between 2016 and
+2019. C-efficiency in Belgium remained relatively unchanged. Over the period 2011-2021, the
+average c-efficiency in Belgium was 0.48 compared to the region’s average of 0.58. C-efficiency
+in Belgium is negatively affected due to the large size of the public sector in the country;
+countries with large public sectors in general will tend to have lower c-efficiency levels all else
+being equal, as the large public sector results in a higher proportion of final consumption which
+is not subject to VAT.
+
+
+**Figure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries**
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+6 Based on data for countries within the IMF Europe Area Department’s administrative region.
+
+
+10
+
+
+
+**Figure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**7.** **The purpose of a comprehensive tax gap analysis is to account for factors that may**
+**affect c-efficiency** . Multiple factors can affect the level, and changes to the level, of c-efficiency
+and therefore, while the c-efficiency indicator is useful for comparative performance analysis, it
+has limitations as a diagnostic indicator. A low level of c-efficiency is not necessarily an indicator
+of VAT performance problems. The factors that affect the level, and changes to the level, include
+compliance, and the VAT policy framework, but it is also affected by the composition of the tax
+base – as mentioned above a country with a very high level of public expenditures would tend to
+have a lower c-efficiency value. Tax gap analysis allows for a more nuanced examination into tax
+revenue performance and the factors that are affecting that performance.
+
+
+11
+
+
+
+###### **II. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP**
+
+**8.** **The VAT gap for a particular year is the difference between revenues collected for a**
+**given year and the potential revenues that could have been collected given the economic**
+**activity that took place during that year.** The RA-GAP approach was used to estimate the VAT
+gap for the years 2011-2021 in this report. Potential VAT revenues were estimated using detailed
+national accounts data published by the national statistics agency.
+
+
+**A. The Compliance Gap**
+
+
+**9.** **The** _**compliance gap**_ **is the difference between the potential VAT given the current**
+**policy framework and actual VAT revenue.** The compliance gap thus directly measures the
+performance of a revenue administration in collecting the tax due from taxpayers. As estimates
+for the compliance gap must rely on statistical data to determine the level of Potential VAT, the
+estimates will have an error margin similar to that for the underlying statistics. It is therefore
+generally more useful to use estimates of the compliance gap to assess _trends_ in compliance,
+rather than the _level_ .
+
+
+**10.** **The compliance gap has fluctuated over the period, but on average has remained**
+**relatively constant at just over 20 percent of potential (Figure 8).** This has translated into a
+gap of around two percent of GDP. There have been two periods where the compliance gap has
+increased: in 2015 and in 2020. The apparent increase in the compliance gap in 2015
+corresponds with the timing of a change in the methods used to generate the statistical data
+used in estimating the potential VAT, so this one-time, short-lived increase could be an artefact
+of the change in the statistical methodology. The large increase in the estimated compliance gap
+in 2020, reaching close to 30 percent of potential, of course coincides with the COVID pandemic.
+This apparent spike in the compliance gap could be partially due to a “cash” effect, where
+taxpayers might have taken advantage of deferred payment schemes introduced to reduce the
+impact on business of the pandemic. While the RA-GAP method dictates using accruals based
+measures of VAT collections, limitations in the IT systems prevented the production of such a
+measure and so the compliance gap is being measured using reported collections, which are not
+fully on an accruals basis, as a proxy for accrued collections.
+
+
+12
+
+
+
+**Figure 8. The Compliance Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations._
+
+**The Assessment and Collection Gaps**
+
+
+**11.** **The compliance gap can be broken down into an** _**assessment gap**_ **and a** _**collection**_
+_**gap**_ **.** The assessment gap is the difference between the estimated VAT that should have been
+declared (i.e., potential VAT collections under existing VAT policies) and the VAT which has been
+declared or assessed. The collections gap is the difference between VAT declared or assessed
+and the VAT actually paid. The collections gap, in other words, represents known outstanding
+debt by taxpayers, while the assessment gap represents taxable activity that the administration
+has not assessed. These two gaps are also sometimes referred to as the known portion of the
+compliance gap (the collections gap) and the unknown portion of the compliance gap (the
+assessment gap). [7]
+
+
+**12.** **The great majority of the overall compliance gap was attributable to the**
+**assessment gap - but the collection gap could not be properly measured (Figure 9).** It is
+generally the case in most countries that the assessment gap is much higher than the collection
+gap – the latter represents identified liabilities that can be subject to enforcement action,
+whereas the former represents unidentified liabilities. This was found to be the case in Belgium.
+2020 is notable in these charts in that in this case there is an apparent spike in the collection gap,
+indicating that the collections fell off even though the assessed VAT due did not. As discussed
+earlier, this is in part a cash effect, wherein deferred payments that were allowed to be made for
+obligations from 2020 are not able to be correctly aligned with the period of accrual – this would
+be a direct result of the relaxation of the obligations to make advance payments that occurred in
+December 2020, shifting those collections into 2021. This also appears to have partially been the
+
+
+7 These basic measures, with compliance gaps in general, do not take into account uncollectible arrears. This
+would include arrears written off for cases of bankrupt businesses for example. As such, the collections gap will
+tend to overstate the amount of potential gain to be achieved from further closing the identified portion of the
+tax gap. In other words, there might be some normal, or even optimal, nonzero state for the collections gap.
+
+
+13
+
+
+
+case in 2015-2016, where we can see in the chart on the right in Figure 9 that the collection gap
+rises slightly in 2015 and 2016, but then goes _negative_ for 2017, indicating that more payments
+were received than were assessed, which is typically the result of an issue in comparing cash
+collections (payments less refunds) against the accrued obligations (tax declared and assessed).
+To properly measure the collection gap data on the collections on an accrual basis is necessary,
+but this data could not be produced at this time due to system reporting limitations.
+
+
+**Figure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**B. The Policy Gap**
+
+
+**13.** **The** _**policy gap**_ **is the difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption**
+**were taxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT given the current policy**
+**framework.** The size of the policy gap is affected by two factors: changes in the policy structure,
+and changes in the composition of the tax base. In other words, the policy gap may increase or
+decrease without any explicit changes in policy; if there is a shift in final consumption from items
+subject to standard-rated VAT to exempt or reduced rate items the policy gap will increase.
+
+
+**14.** **While the policy gap dropped slightly in 2015 it was not significant and has**
+**remained fairly constant at around 6 per cent of GDP (Figure 10).** While there have been a
+few adjustments in VAT policy over the period, these have for the most part been rather small
+adjustments to the treatment of small categories of goods or services, nothing which has results
+in too significant a change in the potential yield for the VAT.
+
+
+14
+
+
+
+**Figure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**The Expenditure and Efficiency Gap**
+
+
+**15.** **The policy gap can be broken down into an** _**expenditure gap**_ **and an** _**efficiency gap**_ **.**
+The expenditure gap is the difference between the potential VAT where most of final
+consumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of minimal standard exemptions are
+maintained, and the potential VAT given the current policy framework. In other words, the
+expenditure gap is the component of the policy gap due to tax expenditure decisions. The
+efficiency gap is the difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were taxed at
+the current standard rate and the potential VAT where most of final consumption is taxed at the
+standard rate, but where a set of minimal standard exemptions are maintained. [8] In other words,
+the efficiency gap is the portion of the policy gap that results from the typical VAT exemptions
+necessary due to pragmatic considerations in the design of a VAT. Another way to look at these
+two measures is that these two components divide the policy gap into the portion where
+revenue mobilization opportunities exist (the expenditure gap) and the portion where there is
+little opportunity for revenue mobilization (the efficiency gap).
+
+
+8 The set of minimum exemptions includes: maintaining the exemption for financial services, which is typical of
+almost all VATs in the world; retaining the current treatment of the public sector, since changes to the treatment
+of the public sector might yield revenue changes in the VAT model but would actually be netted out by
+equivalent changes to public expenditures; and maintaining the exemption for housing, as this is a common
+characteristic of almost all VATs in the world, and the measurement of housing in national accounts includes
+imputed rents which are not actual market transactions and so would not be subject to VAT in any case. It should
+be noted that the EU’s sixth directive prescribes a broader set of exemptions than the list included here; this
+normative structure is not meant to be a policy prescription but is simply an attempt to establish a baseline value
+in line with international norms.
+
+
+15
+
+
+
+**Figure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**16.** **The changes in the policy gap might have had more to do with changes in the**
+**efficiency gap over the period (Figure 11).** Changes in the efficiency gap generally come
+about due to changes in the relative size of the public sector than they do from explicit changes
+to tax policy. The model shows that there was a definite contraction in the size of the efficiency
+gap in 2014 and 2015, which corresponds to the initial slight drop in the overall policy gap. This
+corroborates the conclusion that the small changes in VAT policy that have occurred over the
+period have not themselves significantly affected potential VAT revenues.
+
+
+**C. The Overall Value-Added Tax Gap**
+
+
+**17.** **Combining the policy gap and the compliance gap into the overall VAT gap yields**
+**an indicator of overall revenue performance.** The overall VAT gap can either be measured
+directly, as being difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were taxed at the
+current standard rate and actual VAT revenue or derived by combining the policy and
+compliance gaps.
+
+
+**18.** **The overall VAT gap has remained constant at around 8 percent of GDP for the**
+**period, with perhaps a slight drop in 2021 (Figure 12).** The slight increase in the compliance
+gap in 2015 is offset by the slight decrease in the policy gap, leading to a relatively level overall
+value.
+
+
+16
+
+
+
+**Figure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**19.** **The largest component of the overall VAT gap is the expenditure gap, but the**
+**efficiency and assessment gaps are also significant contributors (Figure 13).** Of these, only
+the assessment and expenditure gaps present revenue mobilization opportunities, as the
+exemptions behind the efficiency gap cannot realistically be removed. As noted above, the
+collection gap was generally nonexistent throughout the period examined.
+
+
+**Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+_Sources: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**20.** **The trends and changes to the level of the estimated VAT gap are consistent with**
+**the observed c-efficiency ratio (Figure 14).** Observed c-efficiency should equal to one minus
+
+
+17
+
+
+
+the total VAT gap, i.e. (1 - VAT gap) or (1 - policy gap) x ((1 – compliance gap) [9] . This serves as a
+measure of assurance that the overall VAT gap estimates have been estimated correctly. In this
+case there is a strong level of consistency between the two measures, apart from the year 2020.
+
+
+**Figure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+**21.** **There have been minor fluctuations in c-efficiency as compared to the 2011 value**
+**(Figure 15).** For the most part these variations have been small, largely less than two percent,
+with the changes to the compliance gap tending to decrease the level of c-efficiency, but with
+that influence being offset by the minor differences between the levels of official VAT and the
+level of VAT collections arrived at using the micro data (a rough approximation of the impact of
+cash versus accruals-based measures for revenue).
+
+
+**Figure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Sources: IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+9 See _The Anatomy of the VAT, Michael Keen, IMF, 2013._ Link:
+https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13111.pdf
+
+
+18
+
+
+
+**Box 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+19
+
+
+
+###### **III. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP**
+
+**A. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax**
+
+
+**22.** **It is not enough to understand how compliance has been changing, it is also**
+**necessary to understand why it may have been changing.** While an understanding of how the
+compliance gap has been changing over time is useful in evaluating the overall performance of a
+revenue administration, it does not necessarily assist an administration in understanding how to
+address any compliance issues. This section of the report includes some additional breakdowns
+of factors which affect the compliance gap in order to better understand what might be
+contributing to the changes in the compliance gap.
+
+
+**23.** **Potential VAT dropped slightly from 2012 to 2013, then remained constant until a**
+**big drop in 2020 (Figure 17).** Potential VAT dropped from slightly over 9 percent of GDP in
+20011 and 2012, to slightly under in 2013. Final consumption, which is a major component of the
+potential VAT base also fell slightly in this period. There was a slight recover of potential VAT in
+2018 and 2019, even though there was no similar recovery in final consumption, which indicates
+that there could have been a shift in the relative consumption of taxable vs exempt supplies. In
+2020 the drop in potential VAT that occurred, which is not reflected in a drop in final
+consumption, is an indicator that final consumption was being buoyed up by components not in
+the VAT base, e.g., public goods.
+
+
+**Figure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+**B. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector**
+
+
+**24.** **The largest component of potential VAT is in the trade sector, but this is closely**
+**followed by the professional and managerial services sector, both of which also**
+**contributes the bulk of actual VAT (Figure 18).** For the actual VAT series, the breakdown by
+
+
+20
+
+
+
+sector is based on different sources for the sector codes for taxpayers for the periods 2011-2014
+and for 2015-2021. For the latter period data on the sector codes of taxpayers as codified by the
+statistical authorities was available to use, providing a more reliable linkage to the breakdown of
+economic activity by economic sector as estimated for the national accounts. In addition, for the
+period 2011-2014, as microdata for Customs collections was not available, aggregate collections
+could only be attributed to the “Z” sector (taxpayers for which a sector code was not available)
+which significantly contributes to the difference in the sectoral allocation between the two
+periods.
+
+
+**Figure 18. Trends in Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||
+|||||||||||||||
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+
+
+
+|Potential VAT by Sector
5
4
GDP
3
2 of
percent
1
0
-1 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021|Col2|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|
+|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description**|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description **
Information, Communication
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Professional/Management
Public Sector
Education, Health Care
Other Services
Unknown/unprovided
|
+|**A **|Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing|**J **|**J **|
+|**B **|Mining, Extraction|**K-L**|**K-L**|
+|**C **|Manufacturing|**M-N**|**M-N**|
+|**D-E**|Utilities|**O **|**O **|
+|**F **|Construction|**P-Q**|**P-Q**|
+|**G **|Trade|**R-U**|**R-U**|
+|**H **|Transportation|**Z **|**Z **|
+|**I **|Hospitality|||
+
+
+_Source: staff calculations_
+
+
+21
+
+
+
+**C. The Compliance Gap by Sector**
+
+
+**25.** **The compliance gap appears to be the highest in the professional and managerial**
+**services sector (Figure 19).** The inclusion of a lot of white space in this chart is intentional, it is
+there to illustrate the size of these gaps relative to potential and actual VAT. As stated above,
+the sectoral distribution of actual VAT is more reliable for the period 2015-2021, and so the focus
+should be on these results. For this period, the gap is clearly the highest in the M-N sector,
+which would include accountancy services, legal services, and corporate head office functions.
+These activities do tend to have issues with non-compliance in many countries (the other
+common sectors being construction, retail trade, and hospitality services). Due to the
+imprecision in the gap estimation exercise, results are only considered significant when they
+exceed a half percent of GDP, indicating that the gap is not all that significant in any other sector,
+although the manufacturing sector comes close to this threshold. For the M-N sector, the gap
+becomes significant due to the relatively large size of this sector in the Belgian economy (which
+is related to Belgium’s position as being the seat of the European Commission and so attracts a
+lot of these type services), and so any level of non-compliance in the sector quickly becomes
+notable. These results are not a sufficient indicator of a compliance issue in a particular sector,
+they only are intended to provide an indication that further investigation is warranted.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+||||||||||||||||
+|A|B|C|D-E|F|G|H|I|J|K-L|M-N|O|P-Q|R-U|Z|
+
+
+
+|Figure 19. The Compliance Gap by Sector|Col2|Col3|Col4|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|
+|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description**|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description **
Information, Communication
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Professional/Management
Public Sector
Education, Health Care
Other Services
Unknown/unprovided
|
+|**A **|Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing|**J **|**J **|
+|**B **|Mining, Extraction|**K-L**|**K-L**|
+|**C **|Manufacturing|**M-N**|**M-N**|
+|**D-E**|Utilities|**O **|**O **|
+|**F **|Construction|**P-Q**|**P-Q**|
+|**G **|Trade|**R-U**|**R-U**|
+|**H **|Transportation|**Z **|**Z **|
+|**I **
|Hospitality
|
|
|
+
+
+_Sources:_ _IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+22
+
+
+
+###### **IV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS**
+
+**A. Tax Expenditure Estimates**
+
+
+**26.** **The RA-GAP VAT Gap Estimation Model (V-GEM) can be used to produce tax**
+**expenditure estimates (Table 1).** To produce the VAT gap estimates, and the breakdown of
+those estimates into the constituent gap components (policy gap and compliance gap) the VGEM is designed to estimate the revenue potential from various policy frameworks; the policy
+gap, for instance compares the difference in revenue potential between a “comprehensive” policy
+structure and the current policy structure. This framework can then be used to compare the
+difference in revenue potential between any two possible policy structures, as such it can be used
+to compare the revenue potential for the current structure against a structure where one aspect
+of the current structure is removed, a particular exemption for instance. This provides a cost
+estimate for that policy measure, which is what constitutes a tax expenditure estimate. While
+typically a tax expenditure estimate report, or budget, might provide estimates of policy
+measures at a highly granular level, the expenditure estimates produced here will be at a level
+aggregated related to the type of policy treatment in question (e.g., exemptions, versus reduced
+rates) and the general area of the tax base affected (e.g., food stuffs versus hospitality services. In
+addition, two estimates for each tax expenditure element are provided; one where the cost of the
+measure is calculated assuming an environment of full compliance, and one where the current
+average level of compliance is applied to the estimate; this secondary estimate is provided in
+acknowledgement that removing a particular tax expenditure would yield less revenue in reality
+than modelling might suggest, as the current cost of the expenditure is likely already being
+reduced due to non-compliance. As with any tax expenditure estimate, the individual elements
+cannot be added together to produce the overall policy gap, as this would result in some double
+counting of costs; for example, the cost associated with having a general threshold under which
+businesses are not required to register for the VAT would overlap with the costs of most of the
+other expenditures.
+
+
+**27.** **The costliest tax expenditure is the reduced rates for foods, coming in between 0.8**
+**and 1.0 per cent of GDP (Table 1).** Food items are typically one of the highest costing tax
+expenditures under a VAT, given the importance of their value in final consumption. The next
+costliest tax expenditures are also rather typical, being those related to construction real estate
+and housing, which, again, is to be expected due to the importance of these purchases in final
+consumption. At around the same level of this though is the combined cost of the reduced rates
+all the “other goods and services”, which is largely comprised of agricultural inputs, medical
+devices, and transportation services. The next largest expenditure would then be the reduced
+rate for hospitality services (hotels and restaurants).
+
+
+23
+
+
+
+**Table 1. Estimated Cost of Tax Expenditure Categories for 2021**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Policy Gap Policy Tax Base Component Tax Expenditures Tax Expenditures (current
Component Structure (full compliance, avg compliance, % of
Type % of GDP) GDP)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Input Tax Credit Restrictions|(0.1)|(0.1)|(0.1)|(0.1)|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Capital Goods Credit
Restrictions|‐|‐|‐|‐|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Presumptive Input Credits|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Withholding|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Food|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Hospitality Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Construction, Real Estate,
Real Estate Services|0.6|0.6|0.4|0.4|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Non‐margin‐based
Insurance, Finance|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.2|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Private Education, Health
Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Other Goods & Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Food|1.0|1.0|0.8|0.8|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Utilities/Energy|0.2|0.2|0.1|0.1|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Hospitality Services|0.5|0.5|0.4|0.4|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Construction, Real Estate,
Real Estate Services|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.2|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Private Education, Health
Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Other Goods & Services|0.6|0.6|0.5|0.5|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Export/Import of Services to
Non‐Residents/Residents|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Threshold|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Margin‐Based Finance, Life
Insurance|0.6|0.6|0.5|0.5|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Public Services|3.6|3.6|2.8|2.8|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Other Non‐Market Services
(Religious Orgs, Unions, etc)|0.4|0.4|0.3|0.3|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Other Non‐Market Output|‐|‐|‐|‐|
+|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|International Transport|0.2|0.2|0.1|0.1|
+|
|
||||||
+
+
+_Sources:_ _IMF staff calculations._
+
+
+24
+
+
+
+**B. Other Observations and Remarks.**
+
+
+**28.** **The study was limited due to the unavailability of historical customs collections**
+**data.** To manage data storage costs a decision had been made to delete older customs record
+data from all systems, and no archival record was maintained. To partially reduce the impact of
+this issue, aggregated data was used for the period 2011-2014 and included in the results with
+data for taxpayers without a known sector code. A review of data retention policies should be
+conducted because the loss of this data has ramifications beyond the impact on this limited
+study, it severely limits the ability of the revenue authority, and the Ministry of Finance, in
+engaging in other studies on taxpayer behavior, such as is required in developing certain
+compliance risk management models. A modern revenue administration should consider data as
+a critical resource, and should have management, retention, and protection policies which
+properly reflect the value (current and potential) of this data.
+
+
+**29.** **The collection gap could not be assessed due to limitations in the revenue**
+**administration’s data systems** . To properly assess the collection gap, or the level of taxpayer
+arrears at a given point in time, the information technology systems and databases need to be
+able to produce a proper accruals-based measurement of tax collections. This can be a challenge
+in system that use a rolling taxpayer account balance system unless that system also
+methodologically records and stores the nature of each adjustment to that balance. While the
+system can provide information on the amount of taxes in arrears, it cannot currently report on
+the age of those arrears. In considering the design of any possible new data platform, or in
+considering possible significant reforms to the current system, this aspect of the design should
+be part of the consideration.
+
+
+25
+
+
+
+###### **V. APPENDIXES**
+
+**Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures**
+
+
+**Table 1. Data for Figures 1 and 5: Value-Added Tax Revenues**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|VAT Revenue
Billions (LCU)|VAT to GDP
(percentage)|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2010**|25.26|6.96|
+|**2011**|25.98|6.91|
+|**2012**|27.42|7.10|
+|**2013**|27.74|7.06|
+|**2014**|27.80|6.90|
+|**2015**|27.95|6.71|
+|**2016**|29.18|6.78|
+|**2017**|30.25|6.80|
+|**2018**|31.55|6.86|
+|**2019**|32.18|6.73|
+|**2020**|29.76|6.52|
+|**2021**|34.78|6.87|
+
+
+
+**Table 2. Data for Figure 6: C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European**
+
+**Countries**
+
+|Year|C-Efficiency Ratio|Average Ratio for Region|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2010**|0.49|0.58|
+|**2011**|0.48|0.58|
+|**2012**|0.49|0.57|
+|**2013**|0.48|0.57|
+|**2014**|0.48|0.58|
+|**2015**|0.47|0.58|
+|**2016**|0.48|0.59|
+|**2017**|0.48|0.60|
+|**2018**|0.48|0.61|
+|**2019**|0.47|0.59|
+|**2020**|0.46|0.56|
+|**2021**|0.50|0.60|
+
+
+
+26
+
+
+
+**Table 3. Data for Figure 7: Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2010-2020**
+
+|Country|C-Efficiency Ratio|
+|---|---|
+|Albania|0.53|
+|Austria|0.59|
+|Belarus|0.60|
+|Belgium|0.48|
+|Bulgaria|0.64|
+|Croatia|0.75|
+|Cyprus|0.63|
+|Czech Republic|0.58|
+|Denmark|0.61|
+|Estonia|0.73|
+|Finland|0.56|
+|France|0.49|
+|FYR Macedonia|0.56|
+|Germany|0.56|
+|Greece|0.40|
+|Hungary|0.56|
+|Iceland|0.48|
+|Ireland|0.47|
+|Italy|0.38|
+|Kosovo|0.78|
+|Latvia|0.52|
+|Lithuania|0.52|
+|Malta|0.63|
+|Moldova|0.52|
+|Montenegro|0.82|
+|Netherlands|0.51|
+|Norway|0.57|
+|Poland|0.47|
+|Portugal|0.49|
+|Romania|0.47|
+|Serbia|0.62|
+|Slovak Republic|0.49|
+|Slovenia|0.59|
+|Spain|0.41|
+|Sweden|0.57|
+|Switzerland|0.68|
+|Turkey|0.40|
+|Ukraine|0.61|
+|United Kingdom|0.43|
+
+
+
+27
+
+
+
+**Table 4. Data for Figures 2 and 8: Compliance Gap**
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|Compliance Gap
(percent of Potential)|Compliance Gap (percent
of GDP)|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|21.64|1.96|
+|**2012**|21.89|2.00|
+|**2013**|21.76|1.93|
+|**2014**|22.81|2.01|
+|**2015**|25.40|2.24|
+|**2016**|24.14|2.12|
+|**2017**|23.28|2.05|
+|**2018**|24.10|2.15|
+|**2019**|26.24|2.34|
+|**2020**|28.30|2.33|
+|**2021**|22.28|1.91|
+
+
+
+**Table 5. Data for Figure 9: The Assessment and Collection Gap**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|Year|Accrued Net VAT|Collection Gap|Assessment Gap|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|7.11|0.00|1.96|
+|**2012**|7.13|0.00|2.00|
+|**2013**|6.95|0.00|1.93|
+|**2014**|6.79|0.00|2.01|
+|**2015**|6.59|0.04|2.21|
+|**2016**|6.65|0.05|2.07|
+|**2017**|6.76|-0.04|2.09|
+|**2018**|6.76|-0.01|2.16|
+|**2019**|6.58|0.05|2.29|
+|**2020**|5.91|0.59|1.74|
+|**2021**|6.66|0.05|1.86|
+
+
+
+_(In Percent of Compliance Gap)_
+
+|Year|Collection Gap|Assessment Gap|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|0|100|
+|**2012**|0|100|
+|**2013**|0|100|
+|**2014**|0|100|
+|**2015**|1.6|98.4|
+|**2016**|2.41|97.59|
+|**2017**|-2.14|102.14|
+|**2018**|-0.5|100.5|
+|**2019**|2.2|97.8|
+|**2020**|25.3|74.7|
+|**2021**|2.38|97.62|
+
+
+
+28
+
+
+
+**Table 6. Data for Figures 3, 10 & 12: The Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|Year|Total VAT Gap|Policy Gap|Compliance Gap|
+|---|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|7.86|5.89|1.96|
+|**2012**|7.88|5.88|2.00|
+|**2013**|8.02|6.09|1.93|
+|**2014**|7.98|5.97|2.01|
+|**2015**|7.88|5.63|2.24|
+|**2016**|7.92|5.81|2.12|
+|**2017**|7.78|5.73|2.05|
+|**2018**|7.84|5.69|2.15|
+|**2019**|7.93|5.58|2.34|
+|**2020**|8.17|5.84|2.33|
+|**2021**|7.47|5.56|1.91|
+
+
+
+**Table 7. Data for Figure 11: The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|Year|Accrued Net VAT|Col3|Expenditure Gap|Efficiency Gap|
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|**2011**|7.11|3.21|2.68|
+|**2012**|**2012**|7.13|3.19|2.69|
+|**2013**|**2013**|6.95|3.47|2.62|
+|**2014**|**2014**|6.79|3.90|2.07|
+|**2015**|**2015**|6.59|3.59|2.05|
+|**2016**|**2016**|6.65|3.20|2.61|
+|**2017**|**2017**|6.76|3.13|2.60|
+|**2018**|**2018**|6.76|3.15|2.54|
+|**2019**|**2019**|6.58|3.15|2.43|
+|**2020**|**2020**|5.91|3.15|2.69|
+|**2021**|**2021**|6.66|3.10|2.46|
+
+
+
+_(In percent of policy gap)_
+
+|Year|Expenditure Gap|Efficiency Gap|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|54.48|45.52|
+|**2012**|54.26|45.74|
+|**2013**|57.01|42.99|
+|**2014**|65.32|34.68|
+|**2015**|63.70|36.30|
+|**2016**|55.09|44.91|
+|**2017**|54.63|45.37|
+|**2018**|55.35|44.65|
+|**2019**|56.42|43.58|
+|**2020**|53.93|46.07|
+|**2021**|55.73|44.27|
+
+
+
+29
+
+
+
+**Table 8. Data for Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|Year|Accrued Net VAT|Collection Gap|Col4|Assessment Gap|Expenditure Gap|Efficiency Gap|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|7.11|7.11|0.00|1.96|3.21|2.68|
+|**2012**|7.13|7.13|0.00|2.00|3.19|2.69|
+|**2013**|6.95|6.95|0.00|1.93|3.47|2.62|
+|**2014**|6.79|6.79|0.00|2.01|3.90|2.07|
+|**2015**|6.59|6.59|0.04|2.21|3.59|2.05|
+|**2016**|6.65|6.65|0.05|2.07|3.20|2.61|
+|**2017**|6.76|6.76|-0.04|2.09|3.13|2.60|
+|**2018**|6.76|6.76|-0.01|2.16|3.15|2.54|
+|**2019**|6.58|6.58|0.05|2.29|3.15|2.43|
+|**2020**|5.91|5.91|0.59|1.74|3.15|2.69|
+|**2021**|6.66|6.66|0.05|1.86|3.10|2.46|
+
+
+
+**Table 9. Data for Figure 14: One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap and C-efficiency Ratio**
+
+|Year|Inverse VAT Gap|C-Efficiency|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|0.48|0.49|
+|**2012**|0.48|0.49|
+|**2013**|0.46|0.48|
+|**2014**|0.46|0.48|
+|**2015**|0.46|0.47|
+|**2016**|0.46|0.48|
+|**2017**|0.46|0.48|
+|**2018**|0.46|0.48|
+|**2019**|0.45|0.47|
+|**2020**|0.42|0.46|
+|**2021**|0.47|0.50|
+
+
+
+30
+
+
+
+**Table 10. Data for Figure 15: Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency**
+
+_(In percent of change over previous year)_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Year|Change due
to Cash vs
Accrual|Change due to
Compliance Gap
Changes|Change due to
Expenditure Gap
Changes|Change due to
Efficiency Gap
Changes|Total Change
in C-
Efficiency|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
+|**2012**|0.21|-0.15|0.15|0.00|-0.08|
+|**2013**|1.15|-0.08|-1.27|0.25|-0.75|
+|**2014**|1.22|-0.73|-2.96|2.11|-1.46|
+|**2015**|1.26|-2.32|-1.72|2.04|-2.17|
+|**2016**|1.39|-1.55|-0.39|0.01|-1.30|
+|**2017**|0.72|-1.00|-0.05|0.02|-1.16|
+|**2018**|1.10|-1.52|0.00|0.29|-1.00|
+|**2019**|1.42|-2.85|0.03|0.64|-1.64|
+|**2020**|4.91|-4.42|-0.97|-0.67|-3.30|
+|**2021**|2.32|-0.41|-0.30|0.29|0.97|
+
+
+
+**Table 11. Data for Figure 16: RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value-**
+
+**Added Tax Collections**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|Year|AV1 – Accrued Net VAT|AV5 - Official VAT|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|7.11|7.05|
+|**2012**|7.13|7.10|
+|**2013**|6.95|7.06|
+|**2014**|6.79|6.90|
+|**2015**|6.59|6.71|
+|**2016**|6.65|6.78|
+|**2017**|6.76|6.80|
+|**2018**|6.76|6.86|
+|**2019**|6.58|6.72|
+|**2020**|5.91|6.47|
+|**2021**|6.66|6.92|
+
+
+
+31
+
+
+
+**Table 12. Data for Figure 17: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax**
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Potential VAT (current
Year policy structure)|Col2|Actual VAT
(accruals)|
+|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|9.08|7.11|
+|**2012**|9.13|7.13|
+|**2013**|8.89|6.95|
+|**2014**|8.79|6.79|
+|**2015**|8.83|6.59|
+|**2016**|8.76|6.65|
+|**2017**|8.81|6.76|
+|**2018**|8.91|6.76|
+|**2019**|8.93|6.58|
+|**2020**|8.25|5.91|
+|**2021**|8.57|6.66|
+
+
+
+32
+
+
+
+**Table 13. Data for Figure 18: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|PV1% Potential
VAT - Current
Policy Structure
(% of GDP)|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|2021|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
+|B|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
+|C|0.60|0.70|0.80|0.80|0.70|0.60|0.60|0.60|0.50|0.30|0.40|
+|D-E|0.70|0.60|0.30|0.30|0.60|0.60|0.60|0.50|0.50|0.60|0.60|
+|F|0.00|0.00|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.00|-0.10|-0.10|-0.10|-0.10|0.00|
+|G|3.30|3.40|3.40|3.50|3.40|3.40|3.50|3.50|3.50|3.10|3.40|
+|H|0.30|0.30|0.40|0.40|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|
+|I|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.10|0.10|
+|J|0.60|0.60|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.60|0.60|0.60|
+|K-L|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|
+|M-N|2.20|2.10|2.00|1.90|2.00|2.10|2.20|2.30|2.30|2.30|2.20|
+|O|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|
+|P-Q|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|
+|R-U|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.10|
+|**AV1% Accrued**
**Net VAT (% of**
**GDP)**|**2011**|** 2012**|**2013**|**2014**|**2015**|**2016**|**2017**|**2018**|**2019**|**2020**|**2021**|
+|A|-0.03|-0.03|-0.03|-0.02|-0.02|-0.02|-0.01|-0.02|-0.02|-0.02|-0.02|
+|B|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.00|0.01|
+|C|0.22|0.21|0.21|0.26|0.10|0.10|0.19|0.09|0.10|0.09|0.17|
+|D-E|0.60|0.52|0.60|0.40|0.15|0.28|0.27|0.30|0.26|0.12|0.36|
+|F|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|0.02|-0.06|-0.09|-0.09|-0.12|-0.13|-0.14|-0.16|
+|G|3.20|2.84|2.81|2.79|3.60|3.60|3.56|3.61|3.51|3.25|3.46|
+|H|-0.01|-0.01|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.03|0.00|0.00|-0.02|-0.04|-0.04|
+|I|0.15|0.16|0.17|0.17|0.15|0.16|0.16|0.16|0.16|0.06|0.01|
+|J|0.53|0.54|0.52|0.51|0.54|0.55|0.54|0.56|0.57|0.57|0.58|
+|K-L|0.36|0.48|0.48|0.52|0.55|0.41|0.41|0.42|0.41|0.43|0.46|
+|M-N|1.34|1.72|1.66|1.68|1.30|1.30|1.38|1.40|1.38|1.29|1.42|
+|O|0.02|0.02|0.03|0.03|0.06|0.05|0.06|0.08|0.08|0.07|0.07|
+|P-Q|0.04|0.05|0.06|0.06|0.08|0.08|0.09|0.09|0.09|0.08|0.08|
+|R-U|0.10|0.09|0.10|0.10|0.13|0.13|0.14|0.14|0.12|0.09|0.09|
+|Z|0.60|0.56|0.34|0.24|0.00|0.06|0.05|0.04|0.06|0.06|0.16|
+
+
+
+33
+
+
+
+**Table 14. Data for Figures 4 and 19: The Compliance Gap by Sector**
+
+_(In percent of GDP)_
+
+|Sector|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|2021|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|A|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|B|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|C|0.4|0.5|0.6|0.5|0.6|0.5|0.4|0.5|0.4|0.2|0.2|
+|D-E|0.1|0.1|-0.3|-0.1|0.4|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.3|0.5|0.3|
+|F|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|G|0.1|0.6|0.6|0.7|-0.2|-0.2|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|0.0|
+|H|0.3|0.4|0.4|0.4|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|
+|I|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.2|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|
+|J|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|K-L|0.0|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|
+|M-N|0.9|0.4|0.4|0.2|0.7|0.8|0.8|0.9|0.9|1.0|0.8|
+|O|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.3|0.2|0.1|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|
+|P-Q|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|
+|R-U|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
+|Z|-0.6|-0.6|-0.3|-0.2|0.0|-0.1|0.0|0.0|-0.1|-0.1|-0.2|
+
+
+
+**Table 15. National Accounts Statistics Summary over the period 2011-2021**
+
+_(Millions lcu)_
+
+|Year|Gross Domestic Product|Final Consumption|GFCF|Imports|Exports|
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+|**2011**|375,967.80|284,201.80|86,511.60|303,768.30|303,396.10|
+|**2012**|386,174.70|294,447.10|88,673.00|310,258.70|310,501.80|
+|**2013**|392,880.00|301,629.50|87,113.30|308,514.90|311,649.50|
+|**2014**|403,003.30|306,463.90|91,908.30|318,300.90|321,600.70|
+|**2015**|416,701.40|312,334.50|95,688.90|318,306.80|324,215.70|
+|**2016**|430,085.30|320,644.00|100,114.20|336,479.00|341,615.10|
+|**2017**|445,050.10|331,582.80|103,601.00|365,579.40|370,203.40|
+|**2018**|460,050.80|344,668.00|108,676.30|383,752.10|382,208.50|
+|**2019**|478,645.00|355,916.30|116,213.90|391,408.90|394,415.70|
+|**2020**|459,826.30|340,051.70|111,258.50|357,441.30|365,317.00|
+|**2021**|502,311.60|366,385.20|121,497.30|431,041.10|436,322.70|
+
+
+
+_Source: OECD._
+
+
+34
+
+
+
+**Appendix II. Definitions of VAT Gap terms**
+
+
+**Components of the VAT gap**
+
+
+**The total VAT gap is the sum of the compliance and policy gaps, which measure**
+**revenue losses due to taxpayer non-compliance and policy reliefs respectively.** The RAGAP approach uses the same analytical model to estimate both components, which can be
+broken down as shown below. The components of the VAT gap are illustrated in the
+subsequent chart.
+
+**Overall VAT gap** The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were
+taxed at the current standard rate and actual VAT revenue. The overall
+VAT gap is the sum of the _compliance_ gap and the _policy_ gap.
+
+
+**Compliance gap** The difference between the potential VAT given the current policy
+framework and actual VAT revenue. The compliance gap is the sum of
+the _assessment_ gap and the _collection_ gap.
+
+**Assessment gap** The difference between potential collections, given the current policy
+framework, and the VAT declared or assessed.
+
+
+**Collection gap** The difference between VAT declared or assessed and actual VAT
+revenue collected.
+
+
+**Policy gap** The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were
+
+taxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT given the
+current policy framework. The policy gap is the sum of the _expenditure_
+gap and the _non-taxable_ gap.
+
+
+**Expenditure gap** The difference between the potential VAT where most of final
+consumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of minimal
+standard exemptions are maintained, and the potential VAT given the
+current policy framework.
+
+
+**Non-taxable gap** The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were
+
+taxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT where most of
+final consumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of
+minimal standard exemptions are maintained. Also known as the
+_efficiency_ gap.
+
+
+**C-efficiency** The ratio of actual VAT to potential VAT if all final consumption were
+taxed at the current standard rate. C-efficiency can be expressed as:
+
+
+𝑐�𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦��1 �𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝���1 �𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝�
+
+
+35
+
+
+
+�� �
+
+
+��
+�!"#�$�%&
+&'#()�*+�, -.!
+/$0
+#12334445675(3818 916
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2dcec036ba3f91230b0365bf5f51b2f8883dcfa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1aca8e5", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087582fe0f01ff01f2be08fc1f00f78fed43ff00f0fe00ff0875c", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "56339dd6a188ac245711c6df0b9849be4b9fa3ef18ccdfa57b948bba5e3a8087", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0003-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "96332f3b2b170f8e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0003-001", "height": 203, "page": 3, "phash_256": "bb7a681ae4c5c5e4907bb09367b8466ece4538f1961ec393ce69ce78982c7131", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "8c16016173e387c7c8f66859b041855db434a48b11372f51b370df1d9c75a5fb", "width": 202}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0005-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "8060909090904000", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0005-001", "height": 49, "page": 5, "phash_256": "f00007ff0fff7c00f01c707cf0200fff8fff7c00fc00707ef0380fc78fc77030", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "3d3d3402600310beba84e158b8f6602b0c9f3d21a8bc8dd878e1d259cb23ae92", "width": 763}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0008-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0b4869ac082026d", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0008-001", "height": 347, "page": 8, "phash_256": "b540d5fa6a80829593f7213f69686d685cda96d2901f2365652f6f6eb81a387a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "a587aca40f56c03bdae8dcdd6302f94e4476ff62f9ce14f50f420faaf6f63a59", "width": 475}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0c0c2a686a32ac0", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-001", "height": 434, "page": 9, "phash_256": "8145c3fe9e813e0130f43f2b43ba07a9697f84fe1ec370586d0bc3b596ae3c4a", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "448a0f54186b9573970d683ab28004bedcd57d3aa933024ff7147d1c5c43ea3b", "width": 322}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-002.png", "caption": "Figure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c081a5888421968e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-002", "height": 372, "page": 9, "phash_256": "a0158a7e75c0ffa087f285f74e2fb5f1482d728f85e07e097a25eb501692b5c4", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "887fbd1b6dd67a94f584359a525e2bd460813b853960c69f98cd3bf3dfd5b94a", "width": 285}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0011-001.png", "caption": "Figure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4186cae002362f23", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0011-001", "height": 224, "page": 11, "phash_256": "acaa63e82c75be01cbc39e5693d73b0031b0393d61ef3c3fc2c2c6c38c1ec3c3", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "85f214964dd64911773537eede5e328643fa0215a9a809ae0137106e94b4ce56", "width": 353}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0012-001.png", "caption": "Figure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "4980033d80400107", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0012-001", "height": 355, "page": 12, "phash_256": "eaaf839ff56097d0304d7a8b6c0fc578817db2743a8b382e439b656ed500bc64", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "143c762a0b1a7368b877703ce0f2022ba42e61f23fcef26f6248bbe5c3c7955e", "width": 677}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0013-001.png", "caption": "Figure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "d22635312d331236", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0013-001", "height": 352, "page": 13, "phash_256": "fea20eae8075c15d7be15b983c897ea87eaea46781572df1839430f05b8a7e20", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "32a0bf8e8cbf3b9eb350f0f542ffe77223877fe050e0471cf02e17693058c727", "width": 725}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": "Figure 8. The Compliance Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0e083371b29335a", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0015-001", "height": 310, "page": 15, "phash_256": "bbd6c17f95a8eaf53f332e84a33b6b58c12b94a914857b10694e917a5ec03e81", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "c78354237a474bb081135d8b3ebfefb355238587143959f5ff070fe15f97dfe7", "width": 724}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-001.png", "caption": "Figure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "2233352925252949", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-001", "height": 325, "page": 16, "phash_256": "fa3f783f8540850087f085c07abd82f587f47abfc3c06a2a680f2d6a3c1e3c3f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "bf681d451312441a1cb251c4bfdfa4b45dbfe5f207b416b70ed453f9630a5d88", "width": 360}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-002.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "0515151519176133", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-002", "height": 325, "page": 16, "phash_256": "fabd7abd854087029558874385fe874185c285fe87c385d297f7954987c2781f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "705a5f38473b175e53be0460f143dc37aab9d7102dbe652dbc19e1830bf287c5", "width": 360}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0017-001.png", "caption": "Figure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c1d501c925083137", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0017-001", "height": 245, "page": 17, "phash_256": "eaaf83ff8d54d7e0815ffb00d7a03c867aa1a854817d7c0a6b236a293cc494f5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "42be6b2462909cc9d782d8bf47a992622b5abf2ded4937edfaf5e53ef9ac3218", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": "Figure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c131191911013061", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0018-001", "height": 262, "page": 18, "phash_256": "dba85ba88457c477c27fb5d1b455b4dc3511b791944ccea7b5514f80c2661fc0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "fb790b25856a347c8bf04ab653cc22c803f61c9742b3e9d674ba29c6a7bffd19", "width": 710}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": "Figure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c135218916295149", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-001", "height": 269, "page": 19, "phash_256": "eabf20ff97d0dd00857e83d0c70085fa7c0b7aaa85550bfaa5056a3f6a955255", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "f8f9dbd822139774f53710dab57d249cb05fc1d93982f20e87e87fb7d12b58a6", "width": 556}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-002.png", "caption": "Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "333b2d25272d2144", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-002", "height": 403, "page": 19, "phash_256": "fa8b3c0f85747e08857c81f462b5c1787f0b81f442b56aab654a6e87c2547eab", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "e0ba6e88d00b3af0595f3e586f0858c0debf253dff86acd0ba62b1fae08151b8", "width": 663}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-001.png", "caption": "Figure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c0c02109c0291596", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-001", "height": 272, "page": 20, "phash_256": "eaef827fa5409750a1d57a8b7e0b85549750a1f55a0b7caa855b85f482d56aa5", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "5d5ce9f49dc7b94322e1b3f31b0362431db82ab4e05255e40f6e43d5b136d1ef", "width": 737}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-002.png", "caption": "Figure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "62c98989c0673338", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-002", "height": 269, "page": 20, "phash_256": "faa552bd9d408d5295787a027aea71aa84a596b562b52c4e6d4a9daad666b313", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "8a1e9f66d3f295f68d71e661591200adbfdd91e4710d9aa87ccedb73f973bb7b", "width": 646}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0021-001.png", "caption": "Box 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax", "classification": "box", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c18d094033210161", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0021-001", "height": 996, "page": 21, "phash_256": "aaaaf27502af38ab95d0d1c00be0f815f20795e387f968fecac528bd9d15f4a0", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "61a3649706524785d641b259af979d6e7a0072f77974dc10685e55dca5b0ef6e", "width": 750}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-166/assets/figures/cr-2023-166-fig-p0022-001.png", "caption": "Figure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax", "classification": "figure", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "c03b27238bc40941", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-166-fig-p0022-001", "height": 340, "page": 22, "phash_256": "ab563d0294add0bb4a5a7ed094afc12f6b5a2ad03c8194ebc11a6baf941586f7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "sha256_normalized_png": "351aba754c4426e2e066da2290e8c2fc0d87150b22535917a2b3ff4a56d3f6fe", "width": 747}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-166/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0be299edc9576624bf5df87e6cdef15d1766778f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-166/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMay 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/166**\n### **BELGIUM**\n\n**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT- REVENUE**\n**ADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM – THE**\n**VALUE ADDED TAX**\n\n\n\nThis technical assistance report on Belgium was prepared by a staff team of the\n\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\n\n\n\nwas completed in April 2023.\n\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\n\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\n[Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201](http://www.imf.org/)\n[E-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org)\n\n\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, -4.57763671875e-05, 540.0, 82.49993896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 1, "size": 13218, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.49998474121094, 1.5, -4.57763671875e-05], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "May 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/166\nBELGIUM\n\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT- REVENUE\nADMINISTRATION GAP ANALYSIS PROGRAM – THE\nVALUE ADDED TAX\n\nThis technical assistance report on Belgium was prepared by a staff team of the\n\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it\n\nwas completed in April 2023.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 589}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "# TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT\n\n## BELGIUM\n#### Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program – The Value Added Tax\n\nApril 2023\n\n\nPrepared By\n\n_Eric Hutton, Polina Prokof’yeva_\n\n\nAuthoring Departments:\n##### Fiscal Affairs Department", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT\nBELGIUM\nRevenue Administration Gap Analysis Program – The Value Added Tax\n\nApril 2023\n\nPrepared By\n\n_Eric Hutton, Polina Prokof’yeva_\n\nAuthoring Departments:\nFiscal Affairs Department", "text_characters": 181}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0003-001"], "markdown": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\n\n#### **Belgium** **Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program –** **The Value Added Tax**\n\n\nEric Hutton, Polina Prokof’yeva\n\n\n**Technical Assistance Report**\n\n\n**April 2023**\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0303, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(245.27999877929688, 486.1199951171875, 366.0, 607.6199951171875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(255,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 209, "number": 6, "size": 37296, "transform": [120.72000122070312, 0.0, -0.0, 121.5, 245.27999877929688, 486.1199951171875], "width": 211, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "F I S C A L A F F A I R S D E P A R T M E N T\nBelgium Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program – The Value Added Tax\n\nEric Hutton, Polina Prokof’yeva\n\nTechnical Assistance Report\n\nApril 2023", "text_characters": 148}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff\nof the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Belgium (the\n\"TA recipient\") in response to their request for technical assistance. This\nreport (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the\nIMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other\nagencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with\nlegitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such\ndisclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical\nAssistance Information—\nStaff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure\nof this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside\nthe IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World\nBank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s\nFiscal Affairs Department.\n\n\nDM 7360948", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff\nof the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Belgium (the\n\"TA recipient\") in response to their request for technical assistance. This\nreport (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the\nIMF to IMF Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other\nagencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, and upon their request, to\nWorld Bank staff and other technical assistance providers and donors with\nlegitimate interest, unless the TA recipient specifically objects to such\ndisclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical\nAssistance Information—\nStaff Operational Guidance on Dissemination of CD Information). Disclosure\nof this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside\nthe IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World\nBank staff, other technical assistance providers and donors with legitimate\ninterest shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s\nFiscal Affairs Department.\n\nDM 7360948", "text_characters": 956}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0005-001"], "markdown": "\n\n\n\n**ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS ________________________________________________________________ 5**\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 6**\n\n\n**I. BACKGROUND _________________________________________________________________________________ 9**\nA. Value-Added Tax Revenue Performance ________________________________________________________9\nB. Relative VAT Performance _____________________________________________________________________ 10\n\n\n**II. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP ______________________________________________ 12**\nA. The Compliance Gap __________________________________________________________________________ 12\nB. The Policy Gap _________________________________________________________________________________ 14\nC. The Overall Value-Added Tax Gap _____________________________________________________________ 16\n\n\n**III. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP __________________________________________ 20**\nA. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax ________________________________________________________ 20\nB. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector ______________________________________________ 20\nC. The Compliance Gap by Sector ________________________________________________________________ 22\n\n\n**IV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS ___________________________________________________ 23**\nA. Tax Expenditure Estimates _____________________________________________________________________ 23\nB. Other Observations and Remarks. _____________________________________________________________ 24\n\n\n**V. APPENDIXES __________________________________________________________________________________ 26**\n\n**BOXES**\nBox 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax_________________________________________________ 19\n\n**FIGURES**\nFigure 1. Value-Added Tax Revenues ______________________________________________________________6\nFigure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance Gap _______________________________________________________7\nFigure 3. Value-Added Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap _________________________________7\nFigure 4. The Compliance Gap by Sector ___________________________________________________________8\nFigure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues ______________________________________________________________9\nFigure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries ______________ 10\nFigure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020 __________________________ 11\nFigure 8. The Compliance Gap ___________________________________________________________________ 13\nFigure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap ____________________________________________________ 14\nFigure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap ______________________________________________ 15\nFigure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap ___________________________________________________ 16\nFigure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap _______________________________ 17\nFigure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap ________________________________ 17\nFigure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio __________________ 18\n\n\n3", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 5\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY _ 6\n\nI. BACKGROUND _ 9\nA. Value-Added Tax Revenue Performance 9\nB. Relative VAT Performance _ 10\n\nII. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP 12\nA. The Compliance Gap 12\nB. The Policy Gap _ 14\nC. The Overall Value-Added Tax Gap _ 16\n\nIII. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP 20\nA. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax 20\nB. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector 20\nC. The Compliance Gap by Sector 22\n\nIV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS _ 23\nA. Tax Expenditure Estimates _ 23\nB. Other Observations and Remarks. _ 24\n\nV. APPENDIXES 26\n\nBOXES\nBox 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax_ 19\n\nFIGURES\nFigure 1. Value-Added Tax Revenues 6\nFigure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance Gap _7\nFigure 3. Value-Added Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap _7\nFigure 4. The Compliance Gap by Sector _8\nFigure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues 9\nFigure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries 10\nFigure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020 11\nFigure 8. The Compliance Gap _ 13\nFigure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap 14\nFigure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap 15\nFigure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap _ 16\nFigure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap _ 17\nFigure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap 17\nFigure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio 18\n\n3", "text_characters": 1170}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "Figure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency __________________________________ 18\nFigure 16. RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value-Added Tax _____________ 19\nFigure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax ________________________________________________ 20\nFigure 18. Trends in Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector ___________________________ 21\nFigure 19. The Compliance Gap by Sector _______________________________________________________ 22\n\n**TABLES**\nTable 1. Estimated Cost of Tax Expenditure Categories for 2021 _________________________________ 24\n\n**APPENDICES**\nAppendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures ____________________________________________________ 26\nAppendix II. Definitions of VAT Gap terms _______________________________________________________ 35\n\n**APPENDIX TABLES**\nTable 1. Data for Figures 1 and 5: Value-Added Tax Revenues ___________________________________ 26\nTable 2. Data for Figure 6: C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European ________ 26\nTable 3. Data for Figure 7: Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2010-2020 ________ 27\nTable 4. Data for Figures 2 and 8: Compliance Gap ______________________________________________ 28\nTable 5. Data for Figure 9: The Assessment and Collection Gap _________________________________ 28\nTable 6. Data for Figures 3, 10 & 12: The Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap ____________ 29\nTable 7. Data for Figure 11: The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap _________________________________ 29\nTable 8. Data for Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap ______________ 30\nTable 9. Data for Figure 14: One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap and C-efficiency Ratio _______ 30\nTable 10. Data for Figure 15: Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency _______________ 31\nTable 11. Data for Figure 16: RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value ______ 31\nTable 12. Data for Figure 17: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax_____________________________ 32\nTable 13. Data for Figure 18: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector __________________ 33\nTable 14. Data for Figures 4 and 19: The Compliance Gap by Sector ____________________________ 34\nTable 15. National Accounts Statistics Summary over the period 2011-2021 ____________________ 34\n\n\n4", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency 18\nFigure 16. RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value-Added Tax _ 19\nFigure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax 20\nFigure 18. Trends in Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector _ 21\nFigure 19. The Compliance Gap by Sector _ 22\n\nTABLES\nTable 1. Estimated Cost of Tax Expenditure Categories for 2021 _ 24\n\nAPPENDICES\nAppendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures 26\nAppendix II. Definitions of VAT Gap terms _ 35\n\nAPPENDIX TABLES\nTable 1. Data for Figures 1 and 5: Value-Added Tax Revenues _ 26\nTable 2. Data for Figure 6: C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European 26\nTable 3. Data for Figure 7: Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2010-2020 27\nTable 4. Data for Figures 2 and 8: Compliance Gap 28\nTable 5. Data for Figure 9: The Assessment and Collection Gap _ 28\nTable 6. Data for Figures 3, 10 & 12: The Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap 29\nTable 7. Data for Figure 11: The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap _ 29\nTable 8. Data for Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap 30\nTable 9. Data for Figure 14: One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap and C-efficiency Ratio _ 30\nTable 10. Data for Figure 15: Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency _ 31\nTable 11. Data for Figure 16: RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value 31\nTable 12. Data for Figure 17: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax_ 32\nTable 13. Data for Figure 18: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector 33\nTable 14. Data for Figures 4 and 19: The Compliance Gap by Sector 34\nTable 15. National Accounts Statistics Summary over the period 2011-2021 34\n\n4", "text_characters": 1374}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS**\n\n**FAD** Fiscal Affairs Department\n**IMF** International Monetary Fund\n**RA-GAP** Revenue Administration GAP Analysis Program\n**VAT** Value-added Tax\n**V-GEM** VAT – Gap Estimation Model\n\n\n5", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS\n\nFAD Fiscal Affairs Department\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nRA-GAP Revenue Administration GAP Analysis Program\nVAT Value-added Tax\nV-GEM VAT – Gap Estimation Model\n\n5", "text_characters": 166}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0008-001"], "markdown": "###### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n**This report presents the results of applying the RA-GAP VAT gap estimation methodology**\n**to Belgium for the period 2011-2021** . The Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program (RAGAP) methodology employs a top-down approach for estimating the potential Value-Added Tax\n(VAT) base, using statistical data on value-added generated in each sector. There are two main\ncomponents to this methodology for estimating the VAT gap: 1) estimate the potential VAT\ncollections for a given period; and 2) determine the accrued VAT collections for that period.\nThe difference between the two values is the VAT gap.\n\n\n**RA-GAP provides estimates of the two components of the tax gap: the compliance gap and**\n**the policy gap.** The compliance gap is the difference between the potential VAT that could have\nbeen collected given the current policy framework and actual accrued VAT collections. The policy\ngap is the difference between the overall tax gap and the compliance gap. In order to put the\nlevel and trends of the compliance gap into context, it is also necessary to analyze the level and\ntrends of the overall tax gap and the policy gap. [1]\n\n\n**Main Findings**\n\n\n**VAT collections have, on average, remained relatively stable in real terms over the period**\n**2011 through 2021, the period under review for this report, at around 7 percent of GDP**\n**(Figure 1).** There was a slight decline between 2012 and 2015, which coincides with a period\nduring which some minor policy adjustments were made, and there was a drop in revenue in\n2020 related to the pandemic. Revenues in 2021 were, however, back to roughly the same level\nthey were in 2011.\n\n**Figure 1. Value-Added Tax Revenues**\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n1 The compliance gap is further broken down into a collection and assessment gap, while the policy gap is\nbroken down into an expenditure and efficiency gap. The measure for the compliance gap is also compared\nagainst estimates using other methodologies.\n\n\n6\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.122, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(172.32000732421875, 445.6800231933594, 457.20001220703125, 653.280029296875)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 865, "number": 11, "size": 386991, "transform": [284.8800048828125, 0.0, -0.0, 207.60000610351562, 172.32000732421875, 445.6800231933594], "width": 1187, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThis report presents the results of applying the RA-GAP VAT gap estimation methodology\nto Belgium for the period 2011-2021 . The Revenue Administration Gap Analysis Program (RAGAP) methodology employs a top-down approach for estimating the potential Value-Added Tax\n(VAT) base, using statistical data on value-added generated in each sector. There are two main\ncomponents to this methodology for estimating the VAT gap: 1) estimate the potential VAT\ncollections for a given period; and 2) determine the accrued VAT collections for that period.\nThe difference between the two values is the VAT gap.\n\nRA-GAP provides estimates of the two components of the tax gap: the compliance gap and\nthe policy gap. The compliance gap is the difference between the potential VAT that could have\nbeen collected given the current policy framework and actual accrued VAT collections. The policy\ngap is the difference between the overall tax gap and the compliance gap. In order to put the\nlevel and trends of the compliance gap into context, it is also necessary to analyze the level and\ntrends of the overall tax gap and the policy gap. [1]\n\nMain Findings\n\nVAT collections have, on average, remained relatively stable in real terms over the period\n2011 through 2021, the period under review for this report, at around 7 percent of GDP\n(Figure 1). There was a slight decline between 2012 and 2015, which coincides with a period\nduring which some minor policy adjustments were made, and there was a drop in revenue in\n2020 related to the pandemic. Revenues in 2021 were, however, back to roughly the same level\nthey were in 2011.\n\nFigure 1. Value-Added Tax Revenues\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n1 The compliance gap is further broken down into a collection and assessment gap, while the policy gap is\nbroken down into an expenditure and efficiency gap. The measure for the compliance gap is also compared\nagainst estimates using other methodologies.\n\n6", "text_characters": 1632}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-001", "cr-2023-166-fig-p0009-002"], "markdown": "**Like the VAT revenues, the compliance**\n**gap, as a percent of GDP, has appeared to**\n**be largely stable over the period 2011 to**\n**2021 at around 2 percent of GDP (Figure**\n**2).** The compliance gap as a percent of\npotential shows a bit more volatility, with\nperhaps just a slight upward trend, starting\noff the period at around 21 percent, then\nending the period at around 22 percent. The\npeak that appears in 2015 corresponds with a\nchange in the series of the statistical data\nused to estimate the potential VAT base, and\nso this change could be related to that. The\nmore significant increase that occurs in 2019\nand 2020 is related to the cash effect of some\nof the relief provisions provided to taxpayers\nwhich resulted in deferred payments, in\nparticular advance payments were made nonobligational in December 2020, shifting those\nrevenues to January 2021. [2]\n\n\n**The total VAT gap, including the policy gap,**\n**has also been mostly stable, apart from an**\n**apparent sharp drop in 2021 from around 8**\n**percent of GDP to a level closer to 7 percent**\n**(Figure 3).** This drop in 2021 is the result of\nreductions in both the policy and compliance gaps\nfor this period. It is of interest that the policy gap\nshows an increase in 2019 to 2020 and then a\ndecrease from 2020 to 2021 because during this\nperiod the only policy change of significance was a\ndecrease in the VAT rate for restaurant and\ncatering services, which would have a positive\nincrease in the policy gap, so this was offset by the\nnegative effect of an increase in the overall\nproportion of the taxable portion of the potential\ntax base—for example a decrease between 2020\nand 2021 in the relative size of the public sector.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations_\n\n\n\n**Figure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance**\n\n\n\n**Figure 3. Value-Added Tax Gap,**\n**Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap**\n\n\n\n2 In December 2019 these advance payments consisted of 3.1-3.4 billion euros. In December 2020 some\ntaxpayers still paid these advance payments (±800 million euros).\n\n\n7", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1034, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(328.79998779296875, 108.96002197265625, 521.760009765625, 368.6400146484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 1082, "number": 8, "size": 337392, "transform": [192.9600067138672, 0.0, -0.0, 259.67999267578125, 328.79998779296875, 108.96002197265625], "width": 804, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "Like the VAT revenues, the compliance\ngap, as a percent of GDP, has appeared to\nbe largely stable over the period 2011 to\n2021 at around 2 percent of GDP (Figure\n2). The compliance gap as a percent of\npotential shows a bit more volatility, with\nperhaps just a slight upward trend, starting\noff the period at around 21 percent, then\nending the period at around 22 percent. The\npeak that appears in 2015 corresponds with a\nchange in the series of the statistical data\nused to estimate the potential VAT base, and\nso this change could be related to that. The\nmore significant increase that occurs in 2019\nand 2020 is related to the cash effect of some\nof the relief provisions provided to taxpayers\nwhich resulted in deferred payments, in\nparticular advance payments were made nonobligational in December 2020, shifting those\nrevenues to January 2021. [2]\n\nThe total VAT gap, including the policy gap,\nhas also been mostly stable, apart from an\napparent sharp drop in 2021 from around 8\npercent of GDP to a level closer to 7 percent\n(Figure 3). This drop in 2021 is the result of\nreductions in both the policy and compliance gaps\nfor this period. It is of interest that the policy gap\nshows an increase in 2019 to 2020 and then a\ndecrease from 2020 to 2021 because during this\nperiod the only policy change of significance was a\ndecrease in the VAT rate for restaurant and\ncatering services, which would have a positive\nincrease in the policy gap, so this was offset by the\nnegative effect of an increase in the overall\nproportion of the taxable portion of the potential\ntax base—for example a decrease between 2020\nand 2021 in the relative size of the public sector.\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations_\n\nFigure 2. Value-Added Tax Compliance\n\nFigure 3. Value-Added Tax Gap,\nCompliance Gap, and Policy Gap\n\n2 In December 2019 these advance payments consisted of 3.1-3.4 billion euros. In December 2020 some\ntaxpayers still paid these advance payments (±800 million euros).\n\n7", "text_characters": 1622}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**The compliance gap appears to be largely concentrated in the Professional and Managerial**\n**Services sector (Figure 4).** The data on the sector of activity for taxpayers came from two\ndifferent sources for this chart—the years 2011to 2014 draw upon the information in the\ntaxpayer registry, while the data for years 2015-2021 uses information provided by the statistics\noffice. A further differentiation between the two periods is that a breakdown of collections at\ncustoms by sector was not available for the 2011 to 2014, and so these collections all had to be\nlumped into the “Z: unknown” sector. Due to these issues, the inferences about the sectoral\nallocation are largely based on the results for the period 2015-2021. This data points to a\ncompliance issue in professional and management services (lawyers, accounts, head office\nactivities, etc.) and then also a possible issue in manufacturing. The results on the distribution of\nthe compliance gap by sector are not to be considered definitive, only suggestive, and so further\nanalysis needs to be conducted (review of the distribution of audit results for example) to\ncorroborate or refute these findings and to find possible causes for the noncompliance in these\nsectors—this analysis on its own cannot determine the cause of the noncompliance.\n\n\n**Figure 4. The Compliance Gap by Sector**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|2.0
1.5
GDP
1.0
of
0.5
Percent
0.0
A B C D‐E F G H I J K‐L M‐N O P‐Q R‐U Z
‐0.5
‐1.0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021|Col2|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|
**Sector Description**|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description **
Information, Communication
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Professional/Management
Public Sector
Education, Health Care
Other Services
Unknown/unprovided
|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing|**J **|**J **|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Mining, Extraction|**K-L**|**K-L**|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **||||\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Manufacturing|**M-N**|**M-N**|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Utilities|**O **|**O **|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Construction|**P-Q**|**P-Q**|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Trade|**R-U**|**R-U**|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Transportation|**Z **|**Z **|\n|**Sector Code**
**A **
**B **
**C **
**D-E**
**F **
**G **
**H **
**I **|Hospitality|||\n\n\n_Sources: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n8", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [95.27999877929688, 319.0799865722656, 533.8800048828125, 629.0999755859375], "columns": 4, "rows": 11}], "text": "The compliance gap appears to be largely concentrated in the Professional and Managerial\nServices sector (Figure 4). The data on the sector of activity for taxpayers came from two\ndifferent sources for this chart—the years 2011to 2014 draw upon the information in the\ntaxpayer registry, while the data for years 2015-2021 uses information provided by the statistics\noffice. A further differentiation between the two periods is that a breakdown of collections at\ncustoms by sector was not available for the 2011 to 2014, and so these collections all had to be\nlumped into the “Z: unknown” sector. Due to these issues, the inferences about the sectoral\nallocation are largely based on the results for the period 2015-2021. This data points to a\ncompliance issue in professional and management services (lawyers, accounts, head office\nactivities, etc.) and then also a possible issue in manufacturing. The results on the distribution of\nthe compliance gap by sector are not to be considered definitive, only suggestive, and so further\nanalysis needs to be conducted (review of the distribution of audit results for example) to\ncorroborate or refute these findings and to find possible causes for the noncompliance in these\nsectors—this analysis on its own cannot determine the cause of the noncompliance.\n\nFigure 4. The Compliance Gap by Sector\n\n 2.0 1.5 GDP 1.0 of 0.5 Percent 0.0 A B C D‐E F G H I J K‐L M‐N O P‐Q R‐U Z ‐0.5 ‐1.0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Col2 Col3 Col4 \n\n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Sector Description Sector Code Sector Description Information, Communication Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Professional/Management Public Sector Education, Health Care Other Services Unknown/unprovided \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing J J \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Mining, Extraction K-L K-L \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Manufacturing M-N M-N \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Utilities O O \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Construction P-Q P-Q \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Trade R-U R-U \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Transportation Z Z \n Sector Code A B C D-E F G H I Hospitality \n\n_Sources: IMF staff calculations._\n\n8", "text_characters": 1797}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0011-001"], "markdown": "###### **I. BACKGROUND**\n\n**1.** **The IMF RA-GAP program provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the**\n**gap between potential revenues and actual collections, known as the compliance gap.** The\nprogram is conducted by the Revenue Administration Divisions of the Fiscal Affairs Department,\ninitially focusing on gap analysis of the value-added tax (VAT). The RA-GAP model uses an\napproach that allows for a breakdown of the compliance gap by sector of economic activity,\nthereby helping revenue administrations monitor and identify what is contributing to this gap. [3]\n\n\n**2.** **This report presents an estimate of the level and recent trends of the tax gap for**\n**VAT in Belgium using the RA-GAP approach.** Available national account data was used to\nestimate the potential revenues under the current VAT legislation. These potential VAT revenues\nare then compared with collection data. The difference between potential revenue and actual\ncollections represents the compliance gap—the degree of non-compliance of taxpayers.\n\n\n**A. Value-Added Tax Revenue Performance**\n\n\n**3.** **Belgium has had a fairly stable VAT policy framework over the past decade.** The VAT\nwas first introduced in 1971 at a standard rate of 18 percent. Currently, the standard rate is 21\npercent with special rates of 6 and 12 percent that are applied to select goods and services.\nThere have only been a few minor changes to the policy framework over this period, most\nrecently, as a response to the pandemic, changes to the rates for certain pandemic related\nproducts such as face masks and vaccines were made, nothing that would significantly impact\nrevenues. [4]\n\n\n\n**4.** **VAT collections as a percent of GDP**\n**have remained relatively stable over the**\n**period 2011 to 2021. (Figure 5).** Measured as a\npercent of GDP, revenues were at around 6.9\npercent in 2011, were at their lowest at 6.5\npercent in 2020, but then rebounded back to 6.9\npercent in 2021. Nominal VAT collections were\nincreasing over the period except for 2020. VAT\nrevenues increased from 26.0 billion euros in\n2011 to 32.2 billion euros in 2019. In 2020, VAT\ncollections declined by 2.4 billion euros, but then\nwere back up to 34.8 billion in 2021. [5]\n\n\n\n**Figure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n\n3 A list of definitions for a number of the conceptual and practical terms related to the VAT gap used in this\nreport are laid out in Appendix II.\n\n4 Some more significant changes have been made since 2021, notably in regards to the treatment of electricity\nand gas, but these, of course, do not affect the results for the periods considered in this report.\n\n5 Data for all charts in this report is contained in Appendix I\n\n\n9", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "I. BACKGROUND\n\n1. The IMF RA-GAP program provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the\ngap between potential revenues and actual collections, known as the compliance gap. The\nprogram is conducted by the Revenue Administration Divisions of the Fiscal Affairs Department,\ninitially focusing on gap analysis of the value-added tax (VAT). The RA-GAP model uses an\napproach that allows for a breakdown of the compliance gap by sector of economic activity,\nthereby helping revenue administrations monitor and identify what is contributing to this gap. [3]\n\n2. This report presents an estimate of the level and recent trends of the tax gap for\nVAT in Belgium using the RA-GAP approach. Available national account data was used to\nestimate the potential revenues under the current VAT legislation. These potential VAT revenues\nare then compared with collection data. The difference between potential revenue and actual\ncollections represents the compliance gap—the degree of non-compliance of taxpayers.\n\nA. Value-Added Tax Revenue Performance\n\n3. Belgium has had a fairly stable VAT policy framework over the past decade. The VAT\nwas first introduced in 1971 at a standard rate of 18 percent. Currently, the standard rate is 21\npercent with special rates of 6 and 12 percent that are applied to select goods and services.\nThere have only been a few minor changes to the policy framework over this period, most\nrecently, as a response to the pandemic, changes to the rates for certain pandemic related\nproducts such as face masks and vaccines were made, nothing that would significantly impact\nrevenues. [4]\n\n4. VAT collections as a percent of GDP\nhave remained relatively stable over the\nperiod 2011 to 2021. (Figure 5). Measured as a\npercent of GDP, revenues were at around 6.9\npercent in 2011, were at their lowest at 6.5\npercent in 2020, but then rebounded back to 6.9\npercent in 2021. Nominal VAT collections were\nincreasing over the period except for 2020. VAT\nrevenues increased from 26.0 billion euros in\n2011 to 32.2 billion euros in 2019. In 2020, VAT\ncollections declined by 2.4 billion euros, but then\nwere back up to 34.8 billion in 2021. [5]\n\nFigure 5. Value-Added Tax Revenues\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n3 A list of definitions for a number of the conceptual and practical terms related to the VAT gap used in this\nreport are laid out in Appendix II.\n\n4 Some more significant changes have been made since 2021, notably in regards to the treatment of electricity\nand gas, but these, of course, do not affect the results for the periods considered in this report.\n\n5 Data for all charts in this report is contained in Appendix I\n\n9", "text_characters": 2203}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0012-001"], "markdown": "**B. Relative VAT Performance**\n\n\n**5.** **The c-efficiency ratio can be used to analyze the relative performance of VAT**\n**revenues while accounting for differences in the standard rate.** The c-efficiency ratio is\ncalculated from VAT revenues, the VAT standard rate, and final consumption aggregates to\nindicate the overall performance of VAT revenues. It presents the ratio of actual VAT collections\nto the theoretical revenues under a perfectly enforced tax levied at the standard rate on all final\nconsumption without any exemptions. The yearly changes in c-efficiency ratio can be\ndecomposed into several factors: changes in the compliance gap, changes in the effects of VAT\nexpenditures (deviations from the application of the standard rate), changes in the share of total\nfinal consumption represented by nontaxable consumption, and timing effects of cash payments\nand refunds.\n\n\n**6.** **C-efficiency in Belgium was lower than the average for the European** **[6]** **countries**\n**over the period 2010-2020 (Figure 6 and 7).** The average c-efficiency for European countries\nwas relatively stable from 2011 to 2015 but showed a moderate increase between 2016 and\n2019. C-efficiency in Belgium remained relatively unchanged. Over the period 2011-2021, the\naverage c-efficiency in Belgium was 0.48 compared to the region’s average of 0.58. C-efficiency\nin Belgium is negatively affected due to the large size of the public sector in the country;\ncountries with large public sectors in general will tend to have lower c-efficiency levels all else\nbeing equal, as the large public sector results in a higher proportion of final consumption which\nis not subject to VAT.\n\n\n**Figure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries**\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n6 Based on data for countries within the IMF Europe Area Department’s administrative region.\n\n\n10", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Relative VAT Performance\n\n5. The c-efficiency ratio can be used to analyze the relative performance of VAT\nrevenues while accounting for differences in the standard rate. The c-efficiency ratio is\ncalculated from VAT revenues, the VAT standard rate, and final consumption aggregates to\nindicate the overall performance of VAT revenues. It presents the ratio of actual VAT collections\nto the theoretical revenues under a perfectly enforced tax levied at the standard rate on all final\nconsumption without any exemptions. The yearly changes in c-efficiency ratio can be\ndecomposed into several factors: changes in the compliance gap, changes in the effects of VAT\nexpenditures (deviations from the application of the standard rate), changes in the share of total\nfinal consumption represented by nontaxable consumption, and timing effects of cash payments\nand refunds.\n\n6. C-efficiency in Belgium was lower than the average for the European [6] countries\nover the period 2010-2020 (Figure 6 and 7). The average c-efficiency for European countries\nwas relatively stable from 2011 to 2015 but showed a moderate increase between 2016 and\n2019. C-efficiency in Belgium remained relatively unchanged. Over the period 2011-2021, the\naverage c-efficiency in Belgium was 0.48 compared to the region’s average of 0.58. C-efficiency\nin Belgium is negatively affected due to the large size of the public sector in the country;\ncountries with large public sectors in general will tend to have lower c-efficiency levels all else\nbeing equal, as the large public sector results in a higher proportion of final consumption which\nis not subject to VAT.\n\nFigure 6. C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European Countries\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n6 Based on data for countries within the IMF Europe Area Department’s administrative region.\n\n10", "text_characters": 1561}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0013-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**7.** **The purpose of a comprehensive tax gap analysis is to account for factors that may**\n**affect c-efficiency** . Multiple factors can affect the level, and changes to the level, of c-efficiency\nand therefore, while the c-efficiency indicator is useful for comparative performance analysis, it\nhas limitations as a diagnostic indicator. A low level of c-efficiency is not necessarily an indicator\nof VAT performance problems. The factors that affect the level, and changes to the level, include\ncompliance, and the VAT policy framework, but it is also affected by the composition of the tax\nbase – as mentioned above a country with a very high level of public expenditures would tend to\nhave a lower c-efficiency value. Tax gap analysis allows for a more nuanced examination into tax\nrevenue performance and the factors that are affecting that performance.\n\n\n11", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 7. Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2011-2020\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n7. The purpose of a comprehensive tax gap analysis is to account for factors that may\naffect c-efficiency . Multiple factors can affect the level, and changes to the level, of c-efficiency\nand therefore, while the c-efficiency indicator is useful for comparative performance analysis, it\nhas limitations as a diagnostic indicator. A low level of c-efficiency is not necessarily an indicator\nof VAT performance problems. The factors that affect the level, and changes to the level, include\ncompliance, and the VAT policy framework, but it is also affected by the composition of the tax\nbase – as mentioned above a country with a very high level of public expenditures would tend to\nhave a lower c-efficiency value. Tax gap analysis allows for a more nuanced examination into tax\nrevenue performance and the factors that are affecting that performance.\n\n11", "text_characters": 804}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **II. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP**\n\n**8.** **The VAT gap for a particular year is the difference between revenues collected for a**\n**given year and the potential revenues that could have been collected given the economic**\n**activity that took place during that year.** The RA-GAP approach was used to estimate the VAT\ngap for the years 2011-2021 in this report. Potential VAT revenues were estimated using detailed\nnational accounts data published by the national statistics agency.\n\n\n**A. The Compliance Gap**\n\n\n**9.** **The** _**compliance gap**_ **is the difference between the potential VAT given the current**\n**policy framework and actual VAT revenue.** The compliance gap thus directly measures the\nperformance of a revenue administration in collecting the tax due from taxpayers. As estimates\nfor the compliance gap must rely on statistical data to determine the level of Potential VAT, the\nestimates will have an error margin similar to that for the underlying statistics. It is therefore\ngenerally more useful to use estimates of the compliance gap to assess _trends_ in compliance,\nrather than the _level_ .\n\n\n**10.** **The compliance gap has fluctuated over the period, but on average has remained**\n**relatively constant at just over 20 percent of potential (Figure 8).** This has translated into a\ngap of around two percent of GDP. There have been two periods where the compliance gap has\nincreased: in 2015 and in 2020. The apparent increase in the compliance gap in 2015\ncorresponds with the timing of a change in the methods used to generate the statistical data\nused in estimating the potential VAT, so this one-time, short-lived increase could be an artefact\nof the change in the statistical methodology. The large increase in the estimated compliance gap\nin 2020, reaching close to 30 percent of potential, of course coincides with the COVID pandemic.\nThis apparent spike in the compliance gap could be partially due to a “cash” effect, where\ntaxpayers might have taken advantage of deferred payment schemes introduced to reduce the\nimpact on business of the pandemic. While the RA-GAP method dictates using accruals based\nmeasures of VAT collections, limitations in the IT systems prevented the production of such a\nmeasure and so the compliance gap is being measured using reported collections, which are not\nfully on an accruals basis, as a proxy for accrued collections.\n\n\n12", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "II. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX GAP\n\n8. The VAT gap for a particular year is the difference between revenues collected for a\ngiven year and the potential revenues that could have been collected given the economic\nactivity that took place during that year. The RA-GAP approach was used to estimate the VAT\ngap for the years 2011-2021 in this report. Potential VAT revenues were estimated using detailed\nnational accounts data published by the national statistics agency.\n\nA. The Compliance Gap\n\n9. The _compliance gap_ is the difference between the potential VAT given the current\npolicy framework and actual VAT revenue. The compliance gap thus directly measures the\nperformance of a revenue administration in collecting the tax due from taxpayers. As estimates\nfor the compliance gap must rely on statistical data to determine the level of Potential VAT, the\nestimates will have an error margin similar to that for the underlying statistics. It is therefore\ngenerally more useful to use estimates of the compliance gap to assess _trends_ in compliance,\nrather than the _level_ .\n\n10. The compliance gap has fluctuated over the period, but on average has remained\nrelatively constant at just over 20 percent of potential (Figure 8). This has translated into a\ngap of around two percent of GDP. There have been two periods where the compliance gap has\nincreased: in 2015 and in 2020. The apparent increase in the compliance gap in 2015\ncorresponds with the timing of a change in the methods used to generate the statistical data\nused in estimating the potential VAT, so this one-time, short-lived increase could be an artefact\nof the change in the statistical methodology. The large increase in the estimated compliance gap\nin 2020, reaching close to 30 percent of potential, of course coincides with the COVID pandemic.\nThis apparent spike in the compliance gap could be partially due to a “cash” effect, where\ntaxpayers might have taken advantage of deferred payment schemes introduced to reduce the\nimpact on business of the pandemic. While the RA-GAP method dictates using accruals based\nmeasures of VAT collections, limitations in the IT systems prevented the production of such a\nmeasure and so the compliance gap is being measured using reported collections, which are not\nfully on an accruals basis, as a proxy for accrued collections.\n\n12", "text_characters": 1963}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 8. The Compliance Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n**The Assessment and Collection Gaps**\n\n\n**11.** **The compliance gap can be broken down into an** _**assessment gap**_ **and a** _**collection**_\n_**gap**_ **.** The assessment gap is the difference between the estimated VAT that should have been\ndeclared (i.e., potential VAT collections under existing VAT policies) and the VAT which has been\ndeclared or assessed. The collections gap is the difference between VAT declared or assessed\nand the VAT actually paid. The collections gap, in other words, represents known outstanding\ndebt by taxpayers, while the assessment gap represents taxable activity that the administration\nhas not assessed. These two gaps are also sometimes referred to as the known portion of the\ncompliance gap (the collections gap) and the unknown portion of the compliance gap (the\nassessment gap). [7]\n\n\n**12.** **The great majority of the overall compliance gap was attributable to the**\n**assessment gap - but the collection gap could not be properly measured (Figure 9).** It is\ngenerally the case in most countries that the assessment gap is much higher than the collection\ngap – the latter represents identified liabilities that can be subject to enforcement action,\nwhereas the former represents unidentified liabilities. This was found to be the case in Belgium.\n2020 is notable in these charts in that in this case there is an apparent spike in the collection gap,\nindicating that the collections fell off even though the assessed VAT due did not. As discussed\nearlier, this is in part a cash effect, wherein deferred payments that were allowed to be made for\nobligations from 2020 are not able to be correctly aligned with the period of accrual – this would\nbe a direct result of the relaxation of the obligations to make advance payments that occurred in\nDecember 2020, shifting those collections into 2021. This also appears to have partially been the\n\n\n7 These basic measures, with compliance gaps in general, do not take into account uncollectible arrears. This\nwould include arrears written off for cases of bankrupt businesses for example. As such, the collections gap will\ntend to overstate the amount of potential gain to be achieved from further closing the identified portion of the\ntax gap. In other words, there might be some normal, or even optimal, nonzero state for the collections gap.\n\n\n13", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 8. The Compliance Gap\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\nThe Assessment and Collection Gaps\n\n11. The compliance gap can be broken down into an _assessment gap_ and a _collection_\n_gap_ . The assessment gap is the difference between the estimated VAT that should have been\ndeclared (i.e., potential VAT collections under existing VAT policies) and the VAT which has been\ndeclared or assessed. The collections gap is the difference between VAT declared or assessed\nand the VAT actually paid. The collections gap, in other words, represents known outstanding\ndebt by taxpayers, while the assessment gap represents taxable activity that the administration\nhas not assessed. These two gaps are also sometimes referred to as the known portion of the\ncompliance gap (the collections gap) and the unknown portion of the compliance gap (the\nassessment gap). [7]\n\n12. The great majority of the overall compliance gap was attributable to the\nassessment gap - but the collection gap could not be properly measured (Figure 9). It is\ngenerally the case in most countries that the assessment gap is much higher than the collection\ngap – the latter represents identified liabilities that can be subject to enforcement action,\nwhereas the former represents unidentified liabilities. This was found to be the case in Belgium.\n2020 is notable in these charts in that in this case there is an apparent spike in the collection gap,\nindicating that the collections fell off even though the assessed VAT due did not. As discussed\nearlier, this is in part a cash effect, wherein deferred payments that were allowed to be made for\nobligations from 2020 are not able to be correctly aligned with the period of accrual – this would\nbe a direct result of the relaxation of the obligations to make advance payments that occurred in\nDecember 2020, shifting those collections into 2021. This also appears to have partially been the\n\n7 These basic measures, with compliance gaps in general, do not take into account uncollectible arrears. This\nwould include arrears written off for cases of bankrupt businesses for example. As such, the collections gap will\ntend to overstate the amount of potential gain to be achieved from further closing the identified portion of the\ntax gap. In other words, there might be some normal, or even optimal, nonzero state for the collections gap.\n\n13", "text_characters": 1967}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-001", "cr-2023-166-fig-p0016-002"], "markdown": "case in 2015-2016, where we can see in the chart on the right in Figure 9 that the collection gap\nrises slightly in 2015 and 2016, but then goes _negative_ for 2017, indicating that more payments\nwere received than were assessed, which is typically the result of an issue in comparing cash\ncollections (payments less refunds) against the accrued obligations (tax declared and assessed).\nTo properly measure the collection gap data on the collections on an accrual basis is necessary,\nbut this data could not be produced at this time due to system reporting limitations.\n\n\n**Figure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**B. The Policy Gap**\n\n\n**13.** **The** _**policy gap**_ **is the difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption**\n**were taxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT given the current policy**\n**framework.** The size of the policy gap is affected by two factors: changes in the policy structure,\nand changes in the composition of the tax base. In other words, the policy gap may increase or\ndecrease without any explicit changes in policy; if there is a shift in final consumption from items\nsubject to standard-rated VAT to exempt or reduced rate items the policy gap will increase.\n\n\n**14.** **While the policy gap dropped slightly in 2015 it was not significant and has**\n**remained fairly constant at around 6 per cent of GDP (Figure 10).** While there have been a\nfew adjustments in VAT policy over the period, these have for the most part been rather small\nadjustments to the treatment of small categories of goods or services, nothing which has results\nin too significant a change in the potential yield for the VAT.\n\n\n14", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "case in 2015-2016, where we can see in the chart on the right in Figure 9 that the collection gap\nrises slightly in 2015 and 2016, but then goes _negative_ for 2017, indicating that more payments\nwere received than were assessed, which is typically the result of an issue in comparing cash\ncollections (payments less refunds) against the accrued obligations (tax declared and assessed).\nTo properly measure the collection gap data on the collections on an accrual basis is necessary,\nbut this data could not be produced at this time due to system reporting limitations.\n\nFigure 9. The Assessment and Collection Gap\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\nB. The Policy Gap\n\n13. The _policy gap_ is the difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption\nwere taxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT given the current policy\nframework. The size of the policy gap is affected by two factors: changes in the policy structure,\nand changes in the composition of the tax base. In other words, the policy gap may increase or\ndecrease without any explicit changes in policy; if there is a shift in final consumption from items\nsubject to standard-rated VAT to exempt or reduced rate items the policy gap will increase.\n\n14. While the policy gap dropped slightly in 2015 it was not significant and has\nremained fairly constant at around 6 per cent of GDP (Figure 10). While there have been a\nfew adjustments in VAT policy over the period, these have for the most part been rather small\nadjustments to the treatment of small categories of goods or services, nothing which has results\nin too significant a change in the potential yield for the VAT.\n\n14", "text_characters": 1375}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0017-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**The Expenditure and Efficiency Gap**\n\n\n**15.** **The policy gap can be broken down into an** _**expenditure gap**_ **and an** _**efficiency gap**_ **.**\nThe expenditure gap is the difference between the potential VAT where most of final\nconsumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of minimal standard exemptions are\nmaintained, and the potential VAT given the current policy framework. In other words, the\nexpenditure gap is the component of the policy gap due to tax expenditure decisions. The\nefficiency gap is the difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were taxed at\nthe current standard rate and the potential VAT where most of final consumption is taxed at the\nstandard rate, but where a set of minimal standard exemptions are maintained. [8] In other words,\nthe efficiency gap is the portion of the policy gap that results from the typical VAT exemptions\nnecessary due to pragmatic considerations in the design of a VAT. Another way to look at these\ntwo measures is that these two components divide the policy gap into the portion where\nrevenue mobilization opportunities exist (the expenditure gap) and the portion where there is\nlittle opportunity for revenue mobilization (the efficiency gap).\n\n\n8 The set of minimum exemptions includes: maintaining the exemption for financial services, which is typical of\nalmost all VATs in the world; retaining the current treatment of the public sector, since changes to the treatment\nof the public sector might yield revenue changes in the VAT model but would actually be netted out by\nequivalent changes to public expenditures; and maintaining the exemption for housing, as this is a common\ncharacteristic of almost all VATs in the world, and the measurement of housing in national accounts includes\nimputed rents which are not actual market transactions and so would not be subject to VAT in any case. It should\nbe noted that the EU’s sixth directive prescribes a broader set of exemptions than the list included here; this\nnormative structure is not meant to be a policy prescription but is simply an attempt to establish a baseline value\nin line with international norms.\n\n\n15", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 10. The Policy Gap and the Compliance Gap\n\n_Source: IMF staff calculations._\n\nThe Expenditure and Efficiency Gap\n\n15. The policy gap can be broken down into an _expenditure gap_ and an _efficiency gap_ .\nThe expenditure gap is the difference between the potential VAT where most of final\nconsumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of minimal standard exemptions are\nmaintained, and the potential VAT given the current policy framework. In other words, the\nexpenditure gap is the component of the policy gap due to tax expenditure decisions. The\nefficiency gap is the difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were taxed at\nthe current standard rate and the potential VAT where most of final consumption is taxed at the\nstandard rate, but where a set of minimal standard exemptions are maintained. [8] In other words,\nthe efficiency gap is the portion of the policy gap that results from the typical VAT exemptions\nnecessary due to pragmatic considerations in the design of a VAT. Another way to look at these\ntwo measures is that these two components divide the policy gap into the portion where\nrevenue mobilization opportunities exist (the expenditure gap) and the portion where there is\nlittle opportunity for revenue mobilization (the efficiency gap).\n\n8 The set of minimum exemptions includes: maintaining the exemption for financial services, which is typical of\nalmost all VATs in the world; retaining the current treatment of the public sector, since changes to the treatment\nof the public sector might yield revenue changes in the VAT model but would actually be netted out by\nequivalent changes to public expenditures; and maintaining the exemption for housing, as this is a common\ncharacteristic of almost all VATs in the world, and the measurement of housing in national accounts includes\nimputed rents which are not actual market transactions and so would not be subject to VAT in any case. It should\nbe noted that the EU’s sixth directive prescribes a broader set of exemptions than the list included here; this\nnormative structure is not meant to be a policy prescription but is simply an attempt to establish a baseline value\nin line with international norms.\n\n15", "text_characters": 1851}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "**Figure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**16.** **The changes in the policy gap might have had more to do with changes in the**\n**efficiency gap over the period (Figure 11).** Changes in the efficiency gap generally come\nabout due to changes in the relative size of the public sector than they do from explicit changes\nto tax policy. The model shows that there was a definite contraction in the size of the efficiency\ngap in 2014 and 2015, which corresponds to the initial slight drop in the overall policy gap. This\ncorroborates the conclusion that the small changes in VAT policy that have occurred over the\nperiod have not themselves significantly affected potential VAT revenues.\n\n\n**C. The Overall Value-Added Tax Gap**\n\n\n**17.** **Combining the policy gap and the compliance gap into the overall VAT gap yields**\n**an indicator of overall revenue performance.** The overall VAT gap can either be measured\ndirectly, as being difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were taxed at the\ncurrent standard rate and actual VAT revenue or derived by combining the policy and\ncompliance gaps.\n\n\n**18.** **The overall VAT gap has remained constant at around 8 percent of GDP for the**\n**period, with perhaps a slight drop in 2021 (Figure 12).** The slight increase in the compliance\ngap in 2015 is offset by the slight decrease in the policy gap, leading to a relatively level overall\nvalue.\n\n\n16", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 11. The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n16. The changes in the policy gap might have had more to do with changes in the\nefficiency gap over the period (Figure 11). Changes in the efficiency gap generally come\nabout due to changes in the relative size of the public sector than they do from explicit changes\nto tax policy. The model shows that there was a definite contraction in the size of the efficiency\ngap in 2014 and 2015, which corresponds to the initial slight drop in the overall policy gap. This\ncorroborates the conclusion that the small changes in VAT policy that have occurred over the\nperiod have not themselves significantly affected potential VAT revenues.\n\nC. The Overall Value-Added Tax Gap\n\n17. Combining the policy gap and the compliance gap into the overall VAT gap yields\nan indicator of overall revenue performance. The overall VAT gap can either be measured\ndirectly, as being difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were taxed at the\ncurrent standard rate and actual VAT revenue or derived by combining the policy and\ncompliance gaps.\n\n18. The overall VAT gap has remained constant at around 8 percent of GDP for the\nperiod, with perhaps a slight drop in 2021 (Figure 12). The slight increase in the compliance\ngap in 2015 is offset by the slight decrease in the policy gap, leading to a relatively level overall\nvalue.\n\n16", "text_characters": 1168}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-001", "cr-2023-166-fig-p0019-002"], "markdown": "**Figure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**19.** **The largest component of the overall VAT gap is the expenditure gap, but the**\n**efficiency and assessment gaps are also significant contributors (Figure 13).** Of these, only\nthe assessment and expenditure gaps present revenue mobilization opportunities, as the\nexemptions behind the efficiency gap cannot realistically be removed. As noted above, the\ncollection gap was generally nonexistent throughout the period examined.\n\n\n**Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n_Sources: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**20.** **The trends and changes to the level of the estimated VAT gap are consistent with**\n**the observed c-efficiency ratio (Figure 14).** Observed c-efficiency should equal to one minus\n\n\n17", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0094, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Figure 12. The VAT Gap, the Compliance Gap, and the Policy Gap\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n19. The largest component of the overall VAT gap is the expenditure gap, but the\nefficiency and assessment gaps are also significant contributors (Figure 13). Of these, only\nthe assessment and expenditure gaps present revenue mobilization opportunities, as the\nexemptions behind the efficiency gap cannot realistically be removed. As noted above, the\ncollection gap was generally nonexistent throughout the period examined.\n\nFigure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap\n\n_Sources: IMF staff calculations._\n\n20. The trends and changes to the level of the estimated VAT gap are consistent with\nthe observed c-efficiency ratio (Figure 14). Observed c-efficiency should equal to one minus\n\n17", "text_characters": 678}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-001", "cr-2023-166-fig-p0020-002"], "markdown": "the total VAT gap, i.e. (1 - VAT gap) or (1 - policy gap) x ((1 – compliance gap) [9] . This serves as a\nmeasure of assurance that the overall VAT gap estimates have been estimated correctly. In this\ncase there is a strong level of consistency between the two measures, apart from the year 2020.\n\n\n**Figure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n**21.** **There have been minor fluctuations in c-efficiency as compared to the 2011 value**\n**(Figure 15).** For the most part these variations have been small, largely less than two percent,\nwith the changes to the compliance gap tending to decrease the level of c-efficiency, but with\nthat influence being offset by the minor differences between the levels of official VAT and the\nlevel of VAT collections arrived at using the micro data (a rough approximation of the impact of\ncash versus accruals-based measures for revenue).\n\n\n**Figure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Sources: IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n9 See _The Anatomy of the VAT, Michael Keen, IMF, 2013._ Link:\nhttps://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13111.pdf\n\n\n18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "the total VAT gap, i.e. (1 - VAT gap) or (1 - policy gap) x ((1 – compliance gap) [9] . This serves as a\nmeasure of assurance that the overall VAT gap estimates have been estimated correctly. In this\ncase there is a strong level of consistency between the two measures, apart from the year 2020.\n\nFigure 14. One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap versus the C-efficiency Ratio\n\n_Source:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n21. There have been minor fluctuations in c-efficiency as compared to the 2011 value\n(Figure 15). For the most part these variations have been small, largely less than two percent,\nwith the changes to the compliance gap tending to decrease the level of c-efficiency, but with\nthat influence being offset by the minor differences between the levels of official VAT and the\nlevel of VAT collections arrived at using the micro data (a rough approximation of the impact of\ncash versus accruals-based measures for revenue).\n\nFigure 15. Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency\n\n_Sources: IMF staff calculations._\n\n9 See _The Anatomy of the VAT, Michael Keen, IMF, 2013._ Link:\nhttps://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13111.pdf\n\n18", "text_characters": 958}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0021-001"], "markdown": "**Box 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n19", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Box 1. Measurement of Actual Value-Added Tax\n\n19", "text_characters": 40}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-166-fig-p0022-001"], "markdown": "###### **III. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP**\n\n**A. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax**\n\n\n**22.** **It is not enough to understand how compliance has been changing, it is also**\n**necessary to understand why it may have been changing.** While an understanding of how the\ncompliance gap has been changing over time is useful in evaluating the overall performance of a\nrevenue administration, it does not necessarily assist an administration in understanding how to\naddress any compliance issues. This section of the report includes some additional breakdowns\nof factors which affect the compliance gap in order to better understand what might be\ncontributing to the changes in the compliance gap.\n\n\n**23.** **Potential VAT dropped slightly from 2012 to 2013, then remained constant until a**\n**big drop in 2020 (Figure 17).** Potential VAT dropped from slightly over 9 percent of GDP in\n20011 and 2012, to slightly under in 2013. Final consumption, which is a major component of the\npotential VAT base also fell slightly in this period. There was a slight recover of potential VAT in\n2018 and 2019, even though there was no similar recovery in final consumption, which indicates\nthat there could have been a shift in the relative consumption of taxable vs exempt supplies. In\n2020 the drop in potential VAT that occurred, which is not reflected in a drop in final\nconsumption, is an indicator that final consumption was being buoyed up by components not in\nthe VAT base, e.g., public goods.\n\n\n**Figure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**B. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector**\n\n\n**24.** **The largest component of potential VAT is in the trade sector, but this is closely**\n**followed by the professional and managerial services sector, both of which also**\n**contributes the bulk of actual VAT (Figure 18).** For the actual VAT series, the breakdown by\n\n\n20", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 22, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "III. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLIANCE GAP\n\nA. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax\n\n22. It is not enough to understand how compliance has been changing, it is also\nnecessary to understand why it may have been changing. While an understanding of how the\ncompliance gap has been changing over time is useful in evaluating the overall performance of a\nrevenue administration, it does not necessarily assist an administration in understanding how to\naddress any compliance issues. This section of the report includes some additional breakdowns\nof factors which affect the compliance gap in order to better understand what might be\ncontributing to the changes in the compliance gap.\n\n23. Potential VAT dropped slightly from 2012 to 2013, then remained constant until a\nbig drop in 2020 (Figure 17). Potential VAT dropped from slightly over 9 percent of GDP in\n20011 and 2012, to slightly under in 2013. Final consumption, which is a major component of the\npotential VAT base also fell slightly in this period. There was a slight recover of potential VAT in\n2018 and 2019, even though there was no similar recovery in final consumption, which indicates\nthat there could have been a shift in the relative consumption of taxable vs exempt supplies. In\n2020 the drop in potential VAT that occurred, which is not reflected in a drop in final\nconsumption, is an indicator that final consumption was being buoyed up by components not in\nthe VAT base, e.g., public goods.\n\nFigure 17. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax\n\nB. Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector\n\n24. The largest component of potential VAT is in the trade sector, but this is closely\nfollowed by the professional and managerial services sector, both of which also\ncontributes the bulk of actual VAT (Figure 18). For the actual VAT series, the breakdown by\n\n20", "text_characters": 1514}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "sector is based on different sources for the sector codes for taxpayers for the periods 2011-2014\nand for 2015-2021. For the latter period data on the sector codes of taxpayers as codified by the\nstatistical authorities was available to use, providing a more reliable linkage to the breakdown of\neconomic activity by economic sector as estimated for the national accounts. In addition, for the\nperiod 2011-2014, as microdata for Customs collections was not available, aggregate collections\ncould only be attributed to the “Z” sector (taxpayers for which a sector code was not available)\nwhich significantly contributes to the difference in the sectoral allocation between the two\nperiods.\n\n\n**Figure 18. Trends in Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||\n|||||||||||||||\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n\n\n\n|Potential VAT by Sector
5
4
GDP
3
2 of
percent
1
0
-1 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021|Col2|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
~~A~~
~~B~~
~~C~~
~~D-E~~
~~F~~
~~G~~
~~H~~
~~I~~
~~J~~
~~K-L M-N~~
~~O~~
~~P-Q R-U~~
~~Z~~
percent of GDP
Actual VAT by Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|\n|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description**|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description **
Information, Communication
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Professional/Management
Public Sector
Education, Health Care
Other Services
Unknown/unprovided
|\n|**A **|Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing|**J **|**J **|\n|**B **|Mining, Extraction|**K-L**|**K-L**|\n|**C **|Manufacturing|**M-N**|**M-N**|\n|**D-E**|Utilities|**O **|**O **|\n|**F **|Construction|**P-Q**|**P-Q**|\n|**G **|Trade|**R-U**|**R-U**|\n|**H **|Transportation|**Z **|**Z **|\n|**I **|Hospitality|||\n\n\n_Source: staff calculations_\n\n\n21", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 23, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.0, 230.52001953125, 539.7999877929688, 672.5999755859375], "columns": 4, "rows": 11}, {"bbox": [126.36000061035156, 252.00003051757812, 520.4401245117188, 348.17999267578125], "columns": 14, "rows": 6}, {"bbox": [131.0399932861328, 412.43994140625, 529.0198974609375, 505.739990234375], "columns": 15, "rows": 6}], "text": "sector is based on different sources for the sector codes for taxpayers for the periods 2011-2014\nand for 2015-2021. For the latter period data on the sector codes of taxpayers as codified by the\nstatistical authorities was available to use, providing a more reliable linkage to the breakdown of\neconomic activity by economic sector as estimated for the national accounts. In addition, for the\nperiod 2011-2014, as microdata for Customs collections was not available, aggregate collections\ncould only be attributed to the “Z” sector (taxpayers for which a sector code was not available)\nwhich significantly contributes to the difference in the sectoral allocation between the two\nperiods.\n\nFigure 18. Trends in Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector\n\n Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 Col14 \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 Col14 Col15 \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n Potential VAT by Sector 5 4 GDP 3 2 of percent 1 0 -1 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Col2 Col3 Col4 \n\n -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 ~~A~~ ~~B~~ ~~C~~ ~~D-E~~ ~~F~~ ~~G~~ ~~H~~ ~~I~~ ~~J~~ ~~K-L M-N~~ ~~O~~ ~~P-Q R-U~~ ~~Z~~ percent of GDP Actual VAT by Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 ~~A~~ ~~B~~ ~~C~~ ~~D-E~~ ~~F~~ ~~G~~ ~~H~~ ~~I~~ ~~J~~ ~~K-L M-N~~ ~~O~~ ~~P-Q R-U~~ ~~Z~~ percent of GDP Actual VAT by Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 ~~A~~ ~~B~~ ~~C~~ ~~D-E~~ ~~F~~ ~~G~~ ~~H~~ ~~I~~ ~~J~~ ~~K-L M-N~~ ~~O~~ ~~P-Q R-U~~ ~~Z~~ percent of GDP Actual VAT by Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 ~~A~~ ~~B~~ ~~C~~ ~~D-E~~ ~~F~~ ~~G~~ ~~H~~ ~~I~~ ~~J~~ ~~K-L M-N~~ ~~O~~ ~~P-Q R-U~~ ~~Z~~ percent of GDP Actual VAT by Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 \n Sector Code Sector Description Sector Code Sector Description Information, Communication Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Professional/Management Public Sector Education, Health Care Other Services Unknown/unprovided \n A Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing J J \n B Mining, Extraction K-L K-L \n C Manufacturing M-N M-N \n D-E Utilities O O \n F Construction P-Q P-Q \n G Trade R-U R-U \n H Transportation Z Z \n I Hospitality \n\n_Source: staff calculations_\n\n21", "text_characters": 1888}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**C. The Compliance Gap by Sector**\n\n\n**25.** **The compliance gap appears to be the highest in the professional and managerial**\n**services sector (Figure 19).** The inclusion of a lot of white space in this chart is intentional, it is\nthere to illustrate the size of these gaps relative to potential and actual VAT. As stated above,\nthe sectoral distribution of actual VAT is more reliable for the period 2015-2021, and so the focus\nshould be on these results. For this period, the gap is clearly the highest in the M-N sector,\nwhich would include accountancy services, legal services, and corporate head office functions.\nThese activities do tend to have issues with non-compliance in many countries (the other\ncommon sectors being construction, retail trade, and hospitality services). Due to the\nimprecision in the gap estimation exercise, results are only considered significant when they\nexceed a half percent of GDP, indicating that the gap is not all that significant in any other sector,\nalthough the manufacturing sector comes close to this threshold. For the M-N sector, the gap\nbecomes significant due to the relatively large size of this sector in the Belgian economy (which\nis related to Belgium’s position as being the seat of the European Commission and so attracts a\nlot of these type services), and so any level of non-compliance in the sector quickly becomes\nnotable. These results are not a sufficient indicator of a compliance issue in a particular sector,\nthey only are intended to provide an indication that further investigation is warranted.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n||||||||||||||||\n|A|B|C|D-E|F|G|H|I|J|K-L|M-N|O|P-Q|R-U|Z|\n\n\n\n|Figure 19. The Compliance Gap by Sector|Col2|Col3|Col4|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
B
C
D-E
F
G
H
I
J
K-L M-N O
P-Q R-U
Z
percent of GDP
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021|\n|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description**|**Sector Code**|**Sector Description **
Information, Communication
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Professional/Management
Public Sector
Education, Health Care
Other Services
Unknown/unprovided
|\n|**A **|Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing|**J **|**J **|\n|**B **|Mining, Extraction|**K-L**|**K-L**|\n|**C **|Manufacturing|**M-N**|**M-N**|\n|**D-E**|Utilities|**O **|**O **|\n|**F **|Construction|**P-Q**|**P-Q**|\n|**G **|Trade|**R-U**|**R-U**|\n|**H **|Transportation|**Z **|**Z **|\n|**I **
|Hospitality
|
|
|\n\n\n_Sources:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n22", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 24, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.0, 351.015380859375, 549.0, 700.5599975585938], "columns": 4, "rows": 10}, {"bbox": [145.0800018310547, 378.00006103515625, 538.02001953125, 527.9400024414062], "columns": 15, "rows": 6}], "text": "C. The Compliance Gap by Sector\n\n25. The compliance gap appears to be the highest in the professional and managerial\nservices sector (Figure 19). The inclusion of a lot of white space in this chart is intentional, it is\nthere to illustrate the size of these gaps relative to potential and actual VAT. As stated above,\nthe sectoral distribution of actual VAT is more reliable for the period 2015-2021, and so the focus\nshould be on these results. For this period, the gap is clearly the highest in the M-N sector,\nwhich would include accountancy services, legal services, and corporate head office functions.\nThese activities do tend to have issues with non-compliance in many countries (the other\ncommon sectors being construction, retail trade, and hospitality services). Due to the\nimprecision in the gap estimation exercise, results are only considered significant when they\nexceed a half percent of GDP, indicating that the gap is not all that significant in any other sector,\nalthough the manufacturing sector comes close to this threshold. For the M-N sector, the gap\nbecomes significant due to the relatively large size of this sector in the Belgian economy (which\nis related to Belgium’s position as being the seat of the European Commission and so attracts a\nlot of these type services), and so any level of non-compliance in the sector quickly becomes\nnotable. These results are not a sufficient indicator of a compliance issue in a particular sector,\nthey only are intended to provide an indication that further investigation is warranted.\n\n Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 Col9 Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 Col14 Col15 \n\n \n \n \n \n A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U Z \n\n Figure 19. The Compliance Gap by Sector Col2 Col3 Col4 \n\n -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U Z percent of GDP 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U Z percent of GDP 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U Z percent of GDP 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D-E F G H I J K-L M-N O P-Q R-U Z percent of GDP 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 \n Sector Code Sector Description Sector Code Sector Description Information, Communication Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Professional/Management Public Sector Education, Health Care Other Services Unknown/unprovided \n A Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing J J \n B Mining, Extraction K-L K-L \n C Manufacturing M-N M-N \n D-E Utilities O O \n F Construction P-Q P-Q \n G Trade R-U R-U \n H Transportation Z Z \n I Hospitality \n\n_Sources:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n22", "text_characters": 2165}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **IV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS**\n\n**A. Tax Expenditure Estimates**\n\n\n**26.** **The RA-GAP VAT Gap Estimation Model (V-GEM) can be used to produce tax**\n**expenditure estimates (Table 1).** To produce the VAT gap estimates, and the breakdown of\nthose estimates into the constituent gap components (policy gap and compliance gap) the VGEM is designed to estimate the revenue potential from various policy frameworks; the policy\ngap, for instance compares the difference in revenue potential between a “comprehensive” policy\nstructure and the current policy structure. This framework can then be used to compare the\ndifference in revenue potential between any two possible policy structures, as such it can be used\nto compare the revenue potential for the current structure against a structure where one aspect\nof the current structure is removed, a particular exemption for instance. This provides a cost\nestimate for that policy measure, which is what constitutes a tax expenditure estimate. While\ntypically a tax expenditure estimate report, or budget, might provide estimates of policy\nmeasures at a highly granular level, the expenditure estimates produced here will be at a level\naggregated related to the type of policy treatment in question (e.g., exemptions, versus reduced\nrates) and the general area of the tax base affected (e.g., food stuffs versus hospitality services. In\naddition, two estimates for each tax expenditure element are provided; one where the cost of the\nmeasure is calculated assuming an environment of full compliance, and one where the current\naverage level of compliance is applied to the estimate; this secondary estimate is provided in\nacknowledgement that removing a particular tax expenditure would yield less revenue in reality\nthan modelling might suggest, as the current cost of the expenditure is likely already being\nreduced due to non-compliance. As with any tax expenditure estimate, the individual elements\ncannot be added together to produce the overall policy gap, as this would result in some double\ncounting of costs; for example, the cost associated with having a general threshold under which\nbusinesses are not required to register for the VAT would overlap with the costs of most of the\nother expenditures.\n\n\n**27.** **The costliest tax expenditure is the reduced rates for foods, coming in between 0.8**\n**and 1.0 per cent of GDP (Table 1).** Food items are typically one of the highest costing tax\nexpenditures under a VAT, given the importance of their value in final consumption. The next\ncostliest tax expenditures are also rather typical, being those related to construction real estate\nand housing, which, again, is to be expected due to the importance of these purchases in final\nconsumption. At around the same level of this though is the combined cost of the reduced rates\nall the “other goods and services”, which is largely comprised of agricultural inputs, medical\ndevices, and transportation services. The next largest expenditure would then be the reduced\nrate for hospitality services (hotels and restaurants).\n\n\n23", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 25, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "IV. OTHER FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS\n\nA. Tax Expenditure Estimates\n\n26. The RA-GAP VAT Gap Estimation Model (V-GEM) can be used to produce tax\nexpenditure estimates (Table 1). To produce the VAT gap estimates, and the breakdown of\nthose estimates into the constituent gap components (policy gap and compliance gap) the VGEM is designed to estimate the revenue potential from various policy frameworks; the policy\ngap, for instance compares the difference in revenue potential between a “comprehensive” policy\nstructure and the current policy structure. This framework can then be used to compare the\ndifference in revenue potential between any two possible policy structures, as such it can be used\nto compare the revenue potential for the current structure against a structure where one aspect\nof the current structure is removed, a particular exemption for instance. This provides a cost\nestimate for that policy measure, which is what constitutes a tax expenditure estimate. While\ntypically a tax expenditure estimate report, or budget, might provide estimates of policy\nmeasures at a highly granular level, the expenditure estimates produced here will be at a level\naggregated related to the type of policy treatment in question (e.g., exemptions, versus reduced\nrates) and the general area of the tax base affected (e.g., food stuffs versus hospitality services. In\naddition, two estimates for each tax expenditure element are provided; one where the cost of the\nmeasure is calculated assuming an environment of full compliance, and one where the current\naverage level of compliance is applied to the estimate; this secondary estimate is provided in\nacknowledgement that removing a particular tax expenditure would yield less revenue in reality\nthan modelling might suggest, as the current cost of the expenditure is likely already being\nreduced due to non-compliance. As with any tax expenditure estimate, the individual elements\ncannot be added together to produce the overall policy gap, as this would result in some double\ncounting of costs; for example, the cost associated with having a general threshold under which\nbusinesses are not required to register for the VAT would overlap with the costs of most of the\nother expenditures.\n\n27. The costliest tax expenditure is the reduced rates for foods, coming in between 0.8\nand 1.0 per cent of GDP (Table 1). Food items are typically one of the highest costing tax\nexpenditures under a VAT, given the importance of their value in final consumption. The next\ncostliest tax expenditures are also rather typical, being those related to construction real estate\nand housing, which, again, is to be expected due to the importance of these purchases in final\nconsumption. At around the same level of this though is the combined cost of the reduced rates\nall the “other goods and services”, which is largely comprised of agricultural inputs, medical\ndevices, and transportation services. The next largest expenditure would then be the reduced\nrate for hospitality services (hotels and restaurants).\n\n23", "text_characters": 2569}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 1. Estimated Cost of Tax Expenditure Categories for 2021**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Policy Gap Policy Tax Base Component Tax Expenditures Tax Expenditures (current
Component Structure (full compliance, avg compliance, % of
Type % of GDP) GDP)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Input Tax Credit Restrictions|(0.1)|(0.1)|(0.1)|(0.1)|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Capital Goods Credit
Restrictions|‐|‐|‐|‐|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Presumptive Input Credits|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Withholding|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Food|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Hospitality Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Construction, Real Estate,
Real Estate Services|0.6|0.6|0.4|0.4|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Non‐margin‐based
Insurance, Finance|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.2|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Private Education, Health
Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Other Goods & Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Food|1.0|1.0|0.8|0.8|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Utilities/Energy|0.2|0.2|0.1|0.1|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Hospitality Services|0.5|0.5|0.4|0.4|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Construction, Real Estate,
Real Estate Services|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.2|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Private Education, Health
Services|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|**Expenditure**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|Other Goods & Services|0.6|0.6|0.5|0.5|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Base**
**Adjustment**|Export/Import of Services to
Non‐Residents/Residents|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Threshold|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Margin‐Based Finance, Life
Insurance|0.6|0.6|0.5|0.5|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Public Services|3.6|3.6|2.8|2.8|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Other Non‐Market Services
(Religious Orgs, Unions, etc)|0.4|0.4|0.3|0.3|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Exemptions**|Other Non‐Market Output|‐|‐|‐|‐|\n|**Non-Taxable**
**Gap**|**Reduced,**
**Zero Rating**|International Transport|0.2|0.2|0.1|0.1|\n|
|
||||||\n\n\n_Sources:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n\n24", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 26, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [90.23077392578125, 92.09999084472656, 562.5096435546875, 683.739990234375], "columns": 7, "rows": 25}], "text": "Table 1. Estimated Cost of Tax Expenditure Categories for 2021\n\n Policy Gap Policy Tax Base Component Tax Expenditures Tax Expenditures (current Component Structure (full compliance, avg compliance, % of Type % of GDP) GDP) Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 \n\n Expenditure Gap Base Adjustment Input Tax Credit Restrictions (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) \n Expenditure Gap Base Adjustment Capital Goods Credit Restrictions ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ \n Expenditure Gap Base Adjustment Presumptive Input Credits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n Expenditure Gap Base Adjustment Withholding (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) \n Expenditure Gap Exemptions Food 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n Expenditure Gap Exemptions Hospitality Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n Expenditure Gap Exemptions Construction, Real Estate, Real Estate Services 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 \n Expenditure Gap Exemptions Non‐margin‐based Insurance, Finance 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 \n Expenditure Gap Exemptions Private Education, Health Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n Expenditure Gap Exemptions Other Goods & Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n Expenditure Gap Reduced, Zero Rating Food 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 \n Expenditure Gap Reduced, Zero Rating Utilities/Energy 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 \n Expenditure Gap Reduced, Zero Rating Hospitality Services 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 \n Expenditure Gap Reduced, Zero Rating Construction, Real Estate, Real Estate Services 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 \n Expenditure Gap Reduced, Zero Rating Private Education, Health Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n Expenditure Gap Reduced, Zero Rating Other Goods & Services 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 \n Non-Taxable Gap Base Adjustment Export/Import of Services to Non‐Residents/Residents 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n Non-Taxable Gap Exemptions Threshold 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n Non-Taxable Gap Exemptions Margin‐Based Finance, Life Insurance 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 \n Non-Taxable Gap Exemptions Public Services 3.6 3.6 2.8 2.8 \n Non-Taxable Gap Exemptions Other Non‐Market Services (Religious Orgs, Unions, etc) 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 \n Non-Taxable Gap Exemptions Other Non‐Market Output ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ \n Non-Taxable Gap Reduced, Zero Rating International Transport 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 \n \n\n_Sources:_ _IMF staff calculations._\n\n24", "text_characters": 1716}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**B. Other Observations and Remarks.**\n\n\n**28.** **The study was limited due to the unavailability of historical customs collections**\n**data.** To manage data storage costs a decision had been made to delete older customs record\ndata from all systems, and no archival record was maintained. To partially reduce the impact of\nthis issue, aggregated data was used for the period 2011-2014 and included in the results with\ndata for taxpayers without a known sector code. A review of data retention policies should be\nconducted because the loss of this data has ramifications beyond the impact on this limited\nstudy, it severely limits the ability of the revenue authority, and the Ministry of Finance, in\nengaging in other studies on taxpayer behavior, such as is required in developing certain\ncompliance risk management models. A modern revenue administration should consider data as\na critical resource, and should have management, retention, and protection policies which\nproperly reflect the value (current and potential) of this data.\n\n\n**29.** **The collection gap could not be assessed due to limitations in the revenue**\n**administration’s data systems** . To properly assess the collection gap, or the level of taxpayer\narrears at a given point in time, the information technology systems and databases need to be\nable to produce a proper accruals-based measurement of tax collections. This can be a challenge\nin system that use a rolling taxpayer account balance system unless that system also\nmethodologically records and stores the nature of each adjustment to that balance. While the\nsystem can provide information on the amount of taxes in arrears, it cannot currently report on\nthe age of those arrears. In considering the design of any possible new data platform, or in\nconsidering possible significant reforms to the current system, this aspect of the design should\nbe part of the consideration.\n\n\n25", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 27, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "B. Other Observations and Remarks.\n\n28. The study was limited due to the unavailability of historical customs collections\ndata. To manage data storage costs a decision had been made to delete older customs record\ndata from all systems, and no archival record was maintained. To partially reduce the impact of\nthis issue, aggregated data was used for the period 2011-2014 and included in the results with\ndata for taxpayers without a known sector code. A review of data retention policies should be\nconducted because the loss of this data has ramifications beyond the impact on this limited\nstudy, it severely limits the ability of the revenue authority, and the Ministry of Finance, in\nengaging in other studies on taxpayer behavior, such as is required in developing certain\ncompliance risk management models. A modern revenue administration should consider data as\na critical resource, and should have management, retention, and protection policies which\nproperly reflect the value (current and potential) of this data.\n\n29. The collection gap could not be assessed due to limitations in the revenue\nadministration’s data systems . To properly assess the collection gap, or the level of taxpayer\narrears at a given point in time, the information technology systems and databases need to be\nable to produce a proper accruals-based measurement of tax collections. This can be a challenge\nin system that use a rolling taxpayer account balance system unless that system also\nmethodologically records and stores the nature of each adjustment to that balance. While the\nsystem can provide information on the amount of taxes in arrears, it cannot currently report on\nthe age of those arrears. In considering the design of any possible new data platform, or in\nconsidering possible significant reforms to the current system, this aspect of the design should\nbe part of the consideration.\n\n25", "text_characters": 1581}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "###### **V. APPENDIXES**\n\n**Appendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures**\n\n\n**Table 1. Data for Figures 1 and 5: Value-Added Tax Revenues**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|VAT Revenue
Billions (LCU)|VAT to GDP
(percentage)|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2010**|25.26|6.96|\n|**2011**|25.98|6.91|\n|**2012**|27.42|7.10|\n|**2013**|27.74|7.06|\n|**2014**|27.80|6.90|\n|**2015**|27.95|6.71|\n|**2016**|29.18|6.78|\n|**2017**|30.25|6.80|\n|**2018**|31.55|6.86|\n|**2019**|32.18|6.73|\n|**2020**|29.76|6.52|\n|**2021**|34.78|6.87|\n\n\n\n**Table 2. Data for Figure 6: C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European**\n\n**Countries**\n\n|Year|C-Efficiency Ratio|Average Ratio for Region|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2010**|0.49|0.58|\n|**2011**|0.48|0.58|\n|**2012**|0.49|0.57|\n|**2013**|0.48|0.57|\n|**2014**|0.48|0.58|\n|**2015**|0.47|0.58|\n|**2016**|0.48|0.59|\n|**2017**|0.48|0.60|\n|**2018**|0.48|0.61|\n|**2019**|0.47|0.59|\n|**2020**|0.46|0.56|\n|**2021**|0.50|0.60|\n\n\n\n26", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 28, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [162.10287475585938, 420.8999938964844, 467.89715576171875, 622.6199951171875], "columns": 3, "rows": 13}, {"bbox": [179.98284912109375, 160.02001953125, 427.51715087890625, 374.6400146484375], "columns": 3, "rows": 13}], "text": "V. APPENDIXES\n\nAppendix I. Data Tables for Included Figures\n\nTable 1. Data for Figures 1 and 5: Value-Added Tax Revenues\n\n Year VAT Revenue Billions (LCU) VAT to GDP (percentage) \n\n 2010 25.26 6.96 \n 2011 25.98 6.91 \n 2012 27.42 7.10 \n 2013 27.74 7.06 \n 2014 27.80 6.90 \n 2015 27.95 6.71 \n 2016 29.18 6.78 \n 2017 30.25 6.80 \n 2018 31.55 6.86 \n 2019 32.18 6.73 \n 2020 29.76 6.52 \n 2021 34.78 6.87 \n\nTable 2. Data for Figure 6: C-Efficiency for Belgium Compared to Average for European\n\nCountries\n\n Year C-Efficiency Ratio Average Ratio for Region \n\n 2010 0.49 0.58 \n 2011 0.48 0.58 \n 2012 0.49 0.57 \n 2013 0.48 0.57 \n 2014 0.48 0.58 \n 2015 0.47 0.58 \n 2016 0.48 0.59 \n 2017 0.48 0.60 \n 2018 0.48 0.61 \n 2019 0.47 0.59 \n 2020 0.46 0.56 \n 2021 0.50 0.60 \n\n26", "text_characters": 571}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 3. Data for Figure 7: Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2010-2020**\n\n|Country|C-Efficiency Ratio|\n|---|---|\n|Albania|0.53|\n|Austria|0.59|\n|Belarus|0.60|\n|Belgium|0.48|\n|Bulgaria|0.64|\n|Croatia|0.75|\n|Cyprus|0.63|\n|Czech Republic|0.58|\n|Denmark|0.61|\n|Estonia|0.73|\n|Finland|0.56|\n|France|0.49|\n|FYR Macedonia|0.56|\n|Germany|0.56|\n|Greece|0.40|\n|Hungary|0.56|\n|Iceland|0.48|\n|Ireland|0.47|\n|Italy|0.38|\n|Kosovo|0.78|\n|Latvia|0.52|\n|Lithuania|0.52|\n|Malta|0.63|\n|Moldova|0.52|\n|Montenegro|0.82|\n|Netherlands|0.51|\n|Norway|0.57|\n|Poland|0.47|\n|Portugal|0.49|\n|Romania|0.47|\n|Serbia|0.62|\n|Slovak Republic|0.49|\n|Slovenia|0.59|\n|Spain|0.41|\n|Sweden|0.57|\n|Switzerland|0.68|\n|Turkey|0.40|\n|Ukraine|0.61|\n|United Kingdom|0.43|\n\n\n\n27", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 29, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [213.71414184570312, 92.09999084472656, 416.2258605957031, 596.2999877929688], "columns": 2, "rows": 40}], "text": "Table 3. Data for Figure 7: Average C-Efficiencies in Europe over the period 2010-2020\n\n Country C-Efficiency Ratio \n\n Albania 0.53 \n Austria 0.59 \n Belarus 0.60 \n Belgium 0.48 \n Bulgaria 0.64 \n Croatia 0.75 \n Cyprus 0.63 \n Czech Republic 0.58 \n Denmark 0.61 \n Estonia 0.73 \n Finland 0.56 \n France 0.49 \n FYR Macedonia 0.56 \n Germany 0.56 \n Greece 0.40 \n Hungary 0.56 \n Iceland 0.48 \n Ireland 0.47 \n Italy 0.38 \n Kosovo 0.78 \n Latvia 0.52 \n Lithuania 0.52 \n Malta 0.63 \n Moldova 0.52 \n Montenegro 0.82 \n Netherlands 0.51 \n Norway 0.57 \n Poland 0.47 \n Portugal 0.49 \n Romania 0.47 \n Serbia 0.62 \n Slovak Republic 0.49 \n Slovenia 0.59 \n Spain 0.41 \n Sweden 0.57 \n Switzerland 0.68 \n Turkey 0.40 \n Ukraine 0.61 \n United Kingdom 0.43 \n\n27", "text_characters": 552}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 4. Data for Figures 2 and 8: Compliance Gap**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|Compliance Gap
(percent of Potential)|Compliance Gap (percent
of GDP)|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|21.64|1.96|\n|**2012**|21.89|2.00|\n|**2013**|21.76|1.93|\n|**2014**|22.81|2.01|\n|**2015**|25.40|2.24|\n|**2016**|24.14|2.12|\n|**2017**|23.28|2.05|\n|**2018**|24.10|2.15|\n|**2019**|26.24|2.34|\n|**2020**|28.30|2.33|\n|**2021**|22.28|1.91|\n\n\n\n**Table 5. Data for Figure 9: The Assessment and Collection Gap**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|Year|Accrued Net VAT|Collection Gap|Assessment Gap|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|7.11|0.00|1.96|\n|**2012**|7.13|0.00|2.00|\n|**2013**|6.95|0.00|1.93|\n|**2014**|6.79|0.00|2.01|\n|**2015**|6.59|0.04|2.21|\n|**2016**|6.65|0.05|2.07|\n|**2017**|6.76|-0.04|2.09|\n|**2018**|6.76|-0.01|2.16|\n|**2019**|6.58|0.05|2.29|\n|**2020**|5.91|0.59|1.74|\n|**2021**|6.66|0.05|1.86|\n\n\n\n_(In Percent of Compliance Gap)_\n\n|Year|Collection Gap|Assessment Gap|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|0|100|\n|**2012**|0|100|\n|**2013**|0|100|\n|**2014**|0|100|\n|**2015**|1.6|98.4|\n|**2016**|2.41|97.59|\n|**2017**|-2.14|102.14|\n|**2018**|-0.5|100.5|\n|**2019**|2.2|97.8|\n|**2020**|25.3|74.7|\n|**2021**|2.38|97.62|\n\n\n\n28", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 30, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [142.1215362548828, 325.97998046875, 487.8784484863281, 502.60797119140625], "columns": 4, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [148.48153686523438, 92.09999084472656, 477.7984619140625, 279.8399963378906], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [191.98153686523438, 528.8400268554688, 438.0184631347656, 715.0079956054688], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 4. Data for Figures 2 and 8: Compliance Gap\n\n Year Compliance Gap (percent of Potential) Compliance Gap (percent of GDP) \n\n 2011 21.64 1.96 \n 2012 21.89 2.00 \n 2013 21.76 1.93 \n 2014 22.81 2.01 \n 2015 25.40 2.24 \n 2016 24.14 2.12 \n 2017 23.28 2.05 \n 2018 24.10 2.15 \n 2019 26.24 2.34 \n 2020 28.30 2.33 \n 2021 22.28 1.91 \n\nTable 5. Data for Figure 9: The Assessment and Collection Gap\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Year Accrued Net VAT Collection Gap Assessment Gap \n\n 2011 7.11 0.00 1.96 \n 2012 7.13 0.00 2.00 \n 2013 6.95 0.00 1.93 \n 2014 6.79 0.00 2.01 \n 2015 6.59 0.04 2.21 \n 2016 6.65 0.05 2.07 \n 2017 6.76 -0.04 2.09 \n 2018 6.76 -0.01 2.16 \n 2019 6.58 0.05 2.29 \n 2020 5.91 0.59 1.74 \n 2021 6.66 0.05 1.86 \n\n_(In Percent of Compliance Gap)_\n\n Year Collection Gap Assessment Gap \n\n 2011 0 100 \n 2012 0 100 \n 2013 0 100 \n 2014 0 100 \n 2015 1.6 98.4 \n 2016 2.41 97.59 \n 2017 -2.14 102.14 \n 2018 -0.5 100.5 \n 2019 2.2 97.8 \n 2020 25.3 74.7 \n 2021 2.38 97.62 \n\n28", "text_characters": 717}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 6. Data for Figures 3, 10 & 12: The Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|Year|Total VAT Gap|Policy Gap|Compliance Gap|\n|---|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|7.86|5.89|1.96|\n|**2012**|7.88|5.88|2.00|\n|**2013**|8.02|6.09|1.93|\n|**2014**|7.98|5.97|2.01|\n|**2015**|7.88|5.63|2.24|\n|**2016**|7.92|5.81|2.12|\n|**2017**|7.78|5.73|2.05|\n|**2018**|7.84|5.69|2.15|\n|**2019**|7.93|5.58|2.34|\n|**2020**|8.17|5.84|2.33|\n|**2021**|7.47|5.56|1.91|\n\n\n\n**Table 7. Data for Figure 11: The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|Year|Accrued Net VAT|Col3|Expenditure Gap|Efficiency Gap|\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|**2011**|7.11|3.21|2.68|\n|**2012**|**2012**|7.13|3.19|2.69|\n|**2013**|**2013**|6.95|3.47|2.62|\n|**2014**|**2014**|6.79|3.90|2.07|\n|**2015**|**2015**|6.59|3.59|2.05|\n|**2016**|**2016**|6.65|3.20|2.61|\n|**2017**|**2017**|6.76|3.13|2.60|\n|**2018**|**2018**|6.76|3.15|2.54|\n|**2019**|**2019**|6.58|3.15|2.43|\n|**2020**|**2020**|5.91|3.15|2.69|\n|**2021**|**2021**|6.66|3.10|2.46|\n\n\n\n_(In percent of policy gap)_\n\n|Year|Expenditure Gap|Efficiency Gap|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|54.48|45.52|\n|**2012**|54.26|45.74|\n|**2013**|57.01|42.99|\n|**2014**|65.32|34.68|\n|**2015**|63.70|36.30|\n|**2016**|55.09|44.91|\n|**2017**|54.63|45.37|\n|**2018**|55.35|44.65|\n|**2019**|56.42|43.58|\n|**2020**|53.93|46.07|\n|**2021**|55.73|44.27|\n\n\n\n29", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 31, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [140.92153930664062, 325.97998046875, 489.1384582519531, 499.7200012207031], "columns": 5, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [160.30154418945312, 105.96002197265625, 469.6384582519531, 279.76800537109375], "columns": 4, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [190.96153259277344, 524.7000122070312, 439.0384521484375, 710.8679809570312], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 6. Data for Figures 3, 10 & 12: The Tax Gap, Compliance Gap, and Policy Gap\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Year Total VAT Gap Policy Gap Compliance Gap \n\n 2011 7.86 5.89 1.96 \n 2012 7.88 5.88 2.00 \n 2013 8.02 6.09 1.93 \n 2014 7.98 5.97 2.01 \n 2015 7.88 5.63 2.24 \n 2016 7.92 5.81 2.12 \n 2017 7.78 5.73 2.05 \n 2018 7.84 5.69 2.15 \n 2019 7.93 5.58 2.34 \n 2020 8.17 5.84 2.33 \n 2021 7.47 5.56 1.91 \n\nTable 7. Data for Figure 11: The Efficiency and Expenditure Gap\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Year Accrued Net VAT Col3 Expenditure Gap Efficiency Gap \n\n 2011 2011 7.11 3.21 2.68 \n 2012 2012 7.13 3.19 2.69 \n 2013 2013 6.95 3.47 2.62 \n 2014 2014 6.79 3.90 2.07 \n 2015 2015 6.59 3.59 2.05 \n 2016 2016 6.65 3.20 2.61 \n 2017 2017 6.76 3.13 2.60 \n 2018 2018 6.76 3.15 2.54 \n 2019 2019 6.58 3.15 2.43 \n 2020 2020 5.91 3.15 2.69 \n 2021 2021 6.66 3.10 2.46 \n\n_(In percent of policy gap)_\n\n Year Expenditure Gap Efficiency Gap \n\n 2011 54.48 45.52 \n 2012 54.26 45.74 \n 2013 57.01 42.99 \n 2014 65.32 34.68 \n 2015 63.70 36.30 \n 2016 55.09 44.91 \n 2017 54.63 45.37 \n 2018 55.35 44.65 \n 2019 56.42 43.58 \n 2020 53.93 46.07 \n 2021 55.73 44.27 \n\n29", "text_characters": 846}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 8. Data for Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|Year|Accrued Net VAT|Collection Gap|Col4|Assessment Gap|Expenditure Gap|Efficiency Gap|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|7.11|7.11|0.00|1.96|3.21|2.68|\n|**2012**|7.13|7.13|0.00|2.00|3.19|2.69|\n|**2013**|6.95|6.95|0.00|1.93|3.47|2.62|\n|**2014**|6.79|6.79|0.00|2.01|3.90|2.07|\n|**2015**|6.59|6.59|0.04|2.21|3.59|2.05|\n|**2016**|6.65|6.65|0.05|2.07|3.20|2.61|\n|**2017**|6.76|6.76|-0.04|2.09|3.13|2.60|\n|**2018**|6.76|6.76|-0.01|2.16|3.15|2.54|\n|**2019**|6.58|6.58|0.05|2.29|3.15|2.43|\n|**2020**|5.91|5.91|0.59|1.74|3.15|2.69|\n|**2021**|6.66|6.66|0.05|1.86|3.10|2.46|\n\n\n\n**Table 9. Data for Figure 14: One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap and C-efficiency Ratio**\n\n|Year|Inverse VAT Gap|C-Efficiency|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|0.48|0.49|\n|**2012**|0.48|0.49|\n|**2013**|0.46|0.48|\n|**2014**|0.46|0.48|\n|**2015**|0.46|0.47|\n|**2016**|0.46|0.48|\n|**2017**|0.46|0.48|\n|**2018**|0.46|0.48|\n|**2019**|0.45|0.47|\n|**2020**|0.42|0.46|\n|**2021**|0.47|0.50|\n\n\n\n30", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 32, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [55.481536865234375, 111.35993957519531, 574.5184936523438, 297.5142822265625], "columns": 7, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [182.98153686523438, 339.7799987792969, 447.0184631347656, 525.9600219726562], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 8. Data for Figure 13: Actual Value-Added Tax and Components of the Gap\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Year Accrued Net VAT Collection Gap Col4 Assessment Gap Expenditure Gap Efficiency Gap \n\n 2011 7.11 7.11 0.00 1.96 3.21 2.68 \n 2012 7.13 7.13 0.00 2.00 3.19 2.69 \n 2013 6.95 6.95 0.00 1.93 3.47 2.62 \n 2014 6.79 6.79 0.00 2.01 3.90 2.07 \n 2015 6.59 6.59 0.04 2.21 3.59 2.05 \n 2016 6.65 6.65 0.05 2.07 3.20 2.61 \n 2017 6.76 6.76 -0.04 2.09 3.13 2.60 \n 2018 6.76 6.76 -0.01 2.16 3.15 2.54 \n 2019 6.58 6.58 0.05 2.29 3.15 2.43 \n 2020 5.91 5.91 0.59 1.74 3.15 2.69 \n 2021 6.66 6.66 0.05 1.86 3.10 2.46 \n\nTable 9. Data for Figure 14: One minus the Value-Added Tax Gap and C-efficiency Ratio\n\n Year Inverse VAT Gap C-Efficiency \n\n 2011 0.48 0.49 \n 2012 0.48 0.49 \n 2013 0.46 0.48 \n 2014 0.46 0.48 \n 2015 0.46 0.47 \n 2016 0.46 0.48 \n 2017 0.46 0.48 \n 2018 0.46 0.48 \n 2019 0.45 0.47 \n 2020 0.42 0.46 \n 2021 0.47 0.50 \n\n30", "text_characters": 700}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 10. Data for Figure 15: Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency**\n\n_(In percent of change over previous year)_\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Year|Change due
to Cash vs
Accrual|Change due to
Compliance Gap
Changes|Change due to
Expenditure Gap
Changes|Change due to
Efficiency Gap
Changes|Total Change
in C-
Efficiency|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|\n|**2012**|0.21|-0.15|0.15|0.00|-0.08|\n|**2013**|1.15|-0.08|-1.27|0.25|-0.75|\n|**2014**|1.22|-0.73|-2.96|2.11|-1.46|\n|**2015**|1.26|-2.32|-1.72|2.04|-2.17|\n|**2016**|1.39|-1.55|-0.39|0.01|-1.30|\n|**2017**|0.72|-1.00|-0.05|0.02|-1.16|\n|**2018**|1.10|-1.52|0.00|0.29|-1.00|\n|**2019**|1.42|-2.85|0.03|0.64|-1.64|\n|**2020**|4.91|-4.42|-0.97|-0.67|-3.30|\n|**2021**|2.32|-0.41|-0.30|0.29|0.97|\n\n\n\n**Table 11. Data for Figure 16: RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value-**\n\n**Added Tax Collections**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|Year|AV1 – Accrued Net VAT|AV5 - Official VAT|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|7.11|7.05|\n|**2012**|7.13|7.10|\n|**2013**|6.95|7.06|\n|**2014**|6.79|6.90|\n|**2015**|6.59|6.71|\n|**2016**|6.65|6.78|\n|**2017**|6.76|6.80|\n|**2018**|6.76|6.86|\n|**2019**|6.58|6.72|\n|**2020**|5.91|6.47|\n|**2021**|6.66|6.92|\n\n\n\n31", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 33, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [59.981536865234375, 99.96002197265625, 570.0184936523438, 313.0542907714844], "columns": 6, "rows": 12}, {"bbox": [154.9615478515625, 367.1999816894531, 475.0384521484375, 553.4400024414062], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 10. Data for Figure 15: Impact of the Tax Gap Components on C-Efficiency\n\n_(In percent of change over previous year)_\n\n Year Change due to Cash vs Accrual Change due to Compliance Gap Changes Change due to Expenditure Gap Changes Change due to Efficiency Gap Changes Total Change in C- Efficiency \n\n 2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 \n 2012 0.21 -0.15 0.15 0.00 -0.08 \n 2013 1.15 -0.08 -1.27 0.25 -0.75 \n 2014 1.22 -0.73 -2.96 2.11 -1.46 \n 2015 1.26 -2.32 -1.72 2.04 -2.17 \n 2016 1.39 -1.55 -0.39 0.01 -1.30 \n 2017 0.72 -1.00 -0.05 0.02 -1.16 \n 2018 1.10 -1.52 0.00 0.29 -1.00 \n 2019 1.42 -2.85 0.03 0.64 -1.64 \n 2020 4.91 -4.42 -0.97 -0.67 -3.30 \n 2021 2.32 -0.41 -0.30 0.29 0.97 \n\nTable 11. Data for Figure 16: RA-GAP Accrual Measurement and Official Values for Value-\n\nAdded Tax Collections\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Year AV1 – Accrued Net VAT AV5 - Official VAT \n\n 2011 7.11 7.05 \n 2012 7.13 7.10 \n 2013 6.95 7.06 \n 2014 6.79 6.90 \n 2015 6.59 6.71 \n 2016 6.65 6.78 \n 2017 6.76 6.80 \n 2018 6.76 6.86 \n 2019 6.58 6.72 \n 2020 5.91 6.47 \n 2021 6.66 6.92 \n\n31", "text_characters": 821}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 12. Data for Figure 17: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax**\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Potential VAT (current
Year policy structure)|Col2|Actual VAT
(accruals)|\n|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|9.08|7.11|\n|**2012**|9.13|7.13|\n|**2013**|8.89|6.95|\n|**2014**|8.79|6.79|\n|**2015**|8.83|6.59|\n|**2016**|8.76|6.65|\n|**2017**|8.81|6.76|\n|**2018**|8.91|6.76|\n|**2019**|8.93|6.58|\n|**2020**|8.25|5.91|\n|**2021**|8.57|6.66|\n\n\n\n32", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 34, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [163.98001098632812, 106.08001708984375, 466.02001953125, 305.03997802734375], "columns": 3, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 12. Data for Figure 17: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Potential VAT (current Year policy structure) Col2 Actual VAT (accruals) \n\n 2011 9.08 7.11 \n 2012 9.13 7.13 \n 2013 8.89 6.95 \n 2014 8.79 6.79 \n 2015 8.83 6.59 \n 2016 8.76 6.65 \n 2017 8.81 6.76 \n 2018 8.91 6.76 \n 2019 8.93 6.58 \n 2020 8.25 5.91 \n 2021 8.57 6.66 \n\n32", "text_characters": 271}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 13. Data for Figure 18: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|PV1% Potential
VAT - Current
Policy Structure
(% of GDP)|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|2021|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|\n|B|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|\n|C|0.60|0.70|0.80|0.80|0.70|0.60|0.60|0.60|0.50|0.30|0.40|\n|D-E|0.70|0.60|0.30|0.30|0.60|0.60|0.60|0.50|0.50|0.60|0.60|\n|F|0.00|0.00|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.00|-0.10|-0.10|-0.10|-0.10|0.00|\n|G|3.30|3.40|3.40|3.50|3.40|3.40|3.50|3.50|3.50|3.10|3.40|\n|H|0.30|0.30|0.40|0.40|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|\n|I|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.10|0.10|\n|J|0.60|0.60|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.60|0.60|0.60|\n|K-L|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|\n|M-N|2.20|2.10|2.00|1.90|2.00|2.10|2.20|2.30|2.30|2.30|2.20|\n|O|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|\n|P-Q|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|0.30|\n|R-U|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.20|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.10|\n|**AV1% Accrued**
**Net VAT (% of**
**GDP)**|**2011**|** 2012**|**2013**|**2014**|**2015**|**2016**|**2017**|**2018**|**2019**|**2020**|**2021**|\n|A|-0.03|-0.03|-0.03|-0.02|-0.02|-0.02|-0.01|-0.02|-0.02|-0.02|-0.02|\n|B|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.01|0.00|0.01|\n|C|0.22|0.21|0.21|0.26|0.10|0.10|0.19|0.09|0.10|0.09|0.17|\n|D-E|0.60|0.52|0.60|0.40|0.15|0.28|0.27|0.30|0.26|0.12|0.36|\n|F|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|0.02|-0.06|-0.09|-0.09|-0.12|-0.13|-0.14|-0.16|\n|G|3.20|2.84|2.81|2.79|3.60|3.60|3.56|3.61|3.51|3.25|3.46|\n|H|-0.01|-0.01|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.03|0.00|0.00|-0.02|-0.04|-0.04|\n|I|0.15|0.16|0.17|0.17|0.15|0.16|0.16|0.16|0.16|0.06|0.01|\n|J|0.53|0.54|0.52|0.51|0.54|0.55|0.54|0.56|0.57|0.57|0.58|\n|K-L|0.36|0.48|0.48|0.52|0.55|0.41|0.41|0.42|0.41|0.43|0.46|\n|M-N|1.34|1.72|1.66|1.68|1.30|1.30|1.38|1.40|1.38|1.29|1.42|\n|O|0.02|0.02|0.03|0.03|0.06|0.05|0.06|0.08|0.08|0.07|0.07|\n|P-Q|0.04|0.05|0.06|0.06|0.08|0.08|0.09|0.09|0.09|0.08|0.08|\n|R-U|0.10|0.09|0.10|0.10|0.13|0.13|0.14|0.14|0.12|0.09|0.09|\n|Z|0.60|0.56|0.34|0.24|0.00|0.06|0.05|0.04|0.06|0.06|0.16|\n\n\n\n33", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 35, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [62.63249969482422, 104.69996643066406, 567.427490234375, 654.37841796875], "columns": 12, "rows": 31}], "text": "Table 13. Data for Figure 18: Potential and Actual Value-Added Tax by Sector\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n PV1% Potential VAT - Current Policy Structure (% of GDP) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 \n\n A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 \n B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 \n C 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.30 0.40 \n D-E 0.70 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 \n F 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 \n G 3.30 3.40 3.40 3.50 3.40 3.40 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.10 3.40 \n H 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 \n I 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 \n J 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 \n K-L 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 \n M-N 2.20 2.10 2.00 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.20 \n O 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 \n P-Q 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 \n R-U 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 \n AV1% Accrued Net VAT (% of GDP) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 \n A -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 \n B 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 \n C 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.17 \n D-E 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.40 0.15 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.12 0.36 \n F -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 \n G 3.20 2.84 2.81 2.79 3.60 3.60 3.56 3.61 3.51 3.25 3.46 \n H -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 \n I 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.01 \n J 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.58 \n K-L 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.46 \n M-N 1.34 1.72 1.66 1.68 1.30 1.30 1.38 1.40 1.38 1.29 1.42 \n O 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 \n P-Q 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 \n R-U 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.09 \n Z 0.60 0.56 0.34 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.16 \n\n33", "text_characters": 1599}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Table 14. Data for Figures 4 and 19: The Compliance Gap by Sector**\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n|Sector|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020|2021|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|A|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|B|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|C|0.4|0.5|0.6|0.5|0.6|0.5|0.4|0.5|0.4|0.2|0.2|\n|D-E|0.1|0.1|-0.3|-0.1|0.4|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.3|0.5|0.3|\n|F|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|G|0.1|0.6|0.6|0.7|-0.2|-0.2|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|0.0|\n|H|0.3|0.4|0.4|0.4|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|\n|I|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.2|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|\n|J|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|K-L|0.0|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.2|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|-0.1|\n|M-N|0.9|0.4|0.4|0.2|0.7|0.8|0.8|0.9|0.9|1.0|0.8|\n|O|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.3|0.2|0.1|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|\n|P-Q|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|\n|R-U|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|\n|Z|-0.6|-0.6|-0.3|-0.2|0.0|-0.1|0.0|0.0|-0.1|-0.1|-0.2|\n\n\n\n**Table 15. National Accounts Statistics Summary over the period 2011-2021**\n\n_(Millions lcu)_\n\n|Year|Gross Domestic Product|Final Consumption|GFCF|Imports|Exports|\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n|**2011**|375,967.80|284,201.80|86,511.60|303,768.30|303,396.10|\n|**2012**|386,174.70|294,447.10|88,673.00|310,258.70|310,501.80|\n|**2013**|392,880.00|301,629.50|87,113.30|308,514.90|311,649.50|\n|**2014**|403,003.30|306,463.90|91,908.30|318,300.90|321,600.70|\n|**2015**|416,701.40|312,334.50|95,688.90|318,306.80|324,215.70|\n|**2016**|430,085.30|320,644.00|100,114.20|336,479.00|341,615.10|\n|**2017**|445,050.10|331,582.80|103,601.00|365,579.40|370,203.40|\n|**2018**|460,050.80|344,668.00|108,676.30|383,752.10|382,208.50|\n|**2019**|478,645.00|355,916.30|116,213.90|391,408.90|394,415.70|\n|**2020**|459,826.30|340,051.70|111,258.50|357,441.30|365,317.00|\n|**2021**|502,311.60|366,385.20|121,497.30|431,041.10|436,322.70|\n\n\n\n_Source: OECD._\n\n\n34", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 36, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [74.98588562011719, 105.96002197265625, 555.0140991210938, 354.1384582519531], "columns": 12, "rows": 16}, {"bbox": [82.78153991699219, 400.3800048828125, 547.2184448242188, 582.8143310546875], "columns": 6, "rows": 12}], "text": "Table 14. Data for Figures 4 and 19: The Compliance Gap by Sector\n\n_(In percent of GDP)_\n\n Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 \n\n A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n B 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n C 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 \n D-E 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 \n F 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n G 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 \n H 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 \n I 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 \n J 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n K-L 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 \n M-N 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 \n O 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 \n P-Q 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 \n R-U 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 \n Z -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 \n\nTable 15. National Accounts Statistics Summary over the period 2011-2021\n\n_(Millions lcu)_\n\n Year Gross Domestic Product Final Consumption GFCF Imports Exports \n\n 2011 375,967.80 284,201.80 86,511.60 303,768.30 303,396.10 \n 2012 386,174.70 294,447.10 88,673.00 310,258.70 310,501.80 \n 2013 392,880.00 301,629.50 87,113.30 308,514.90 311,649.50 \n 2014 403,003.30 306,463.90 91,908.30 318,300.90 321,600.70 \n 2015 416,701.40 312,334.50 95,688.90 318,306.80 324,215.70 \n 2016 430,085.30 320,644.00 100,114.20 336,479.00 341,615.10 \n 2017 445,050.10 331,582.80 103,601.00 365,579.40 370,203.40 \n 2018 460,050.80 344,668.00 108,676.30 383,752.10 382,208.50 \n 2019 478,645.00 355,916.30 116,213.90 391,408.90 394,415.70 \n 2020 459,826.30 340,051.70 111,258.50 357,441.30 365,317.00 \n 2021 502,311.60 366,385.20 121,497.30 431,041.10 436,322.70 \n\n_Source: OECD._\n\n34", "text_characters": 1408}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "**Appendix II. Definitions of VAT Gap terms**\n\n\n**Components of the VAT gap**\n\n\n**The total VAT gap is the sum of the compliance and policy gaps, which measure**\n**revenue losses due to taxpayer non-compliance and policy reliefs respectively.** The RAGAP approach uses the same analytical model to estimate both components, which can be\nbroken down as shown below. The components of the VAT gap are illustrated in the\nsubsequent chart.\n\n**Overall VAT gap** The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were\ntaxed at the current standard rate and actual VAT revenue. The overall\nVAT gap is the sum of the _compliance_ gap and the _policy_ gap.\n\n\n**Compliance gap** The difference between the potential VAT given the current policy\nframework and actual VAT revenue. The compliance gap is the sum of\nthe _assessment_ gap and the _collection_ gap.\n\n**Assessment gap** The difference between potential collections, given the current policy\nframework, and the VAT declared or assessed.\n\n\n**Collection gap** The difference between VAT declared or assessed and actual VAT\nrevenue collected.\n\n\n**Policy gap** The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were\n\ntaxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT given the\ncurrent policy framework. The policy gap is the sum of the _expenditure_\ngap and the _non-taxable_ gap.\n\n\n**Expenditure gap** The difference between the potential VAT where most of final\nconsumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of minimal\nstandard exemptions are maintained, and the potential VAT given the\ncurrent policy framework.\n\n\n**Non-taxable gap** The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were\n\ntaxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT where most of\nfinal consumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of\nminimal standard exemptions are maintained. Also known as the\n_efficiency_ gap.\n\n\n**C-efficiency** The ratio of actual VAT to potential VAT if all final consumption were\ntaxed at the current standard rate. C-efficiency can be expressed as:\n\n\n𝑐�𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦��1 �𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝���1 �𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝�\n\n\n35", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 37, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "Appendix II. Definitions of VAT Gap terms\n\nComponents of the VAT gap\n\nThe total VAT gap is the sum of the compliance and policy gaps, which measure\nrevenue losses due to taxpayer non-compliance and policy reliefs respectively. The RAGAP approach uses the same analytical model to estimate both components, which can be\nbroken down as shown below. The components of the VAT gap are illustrated in the\nsubsequent chart.\n\nOverall VAT gap The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were\ntaxed at the current standard rate and actual VAT revenue. The overall\nVAT gap is the sum of the _compliance_ gap and the _policy_ gap.\n\nCompliance gap The difference between the potential VAT given the current policy\nframework and actual VAT revenue. The compliance gap is the sum of\nthe _assessment_ gap and the _collection_ gap.\n\nAssessment gap The difference between potential collections, given the current policy\nframework, and the VAT declared or assessed.\n\nCollection gap The difference between VAT declared or assessed and actual VAT\nrevenue collected.\n\nPolicy gap The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were\n\ntaxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT given the\ncurrent policy framework. The policy gap is the sum of the _expenditure_\ngap and the _non-taxable_ gap.\n\nExpenditure gap The difference between the potential VAT where most of final\nconsumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of minimal\nstandard exemptions are maintained, and the potential VAT given the\ncurrent policy framework.\n\nNon-taxable gap The difference between the potential VAT if all final consumption were\n\ntaxed at the current standard rate and the potential VAT where most of\nfinal consumption is taxed at the standard rate, but where a set of\nminimal standard exemptions are maintained. Also known as the\n_efficiency_ gap.\n\nC-efficiency The ratio of actual VAT to potential VAT if all final consumption were\ntaxed at the current standard rate. C-efficiency can be expressed as:\n\n𝑐�𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦��1 �𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝���1 �𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝�\n\n35", "text_characters": 1736}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "�\u0001\u0002\u0003\u0004\u0005�\u0007\b\b\u0004\u0001 \u0002�\n\u000b\f\u0004 \r\u000e\u000b\u000f\n\n\u0010\u0011\u0012\u0013\u0014\u0011\u0015\u0012\u0016\u0017\u0011\u0015\u0018�\u001a\u0017\u0011\u0013\u0012\u0015\u0014\u001b�\u001c\u001d\u0011\n�!\"\u0012#�$\u0012\u0014\u0013\u0013\u0012�%&\n&\u0015'#\u0016\u0011(\u0012\u0017\u0011)�*+�, -.!\n/$0\n#\u0012\u001212334445\u0016675\u0017\u0014(38\u00151\u00158\u0016\u0012\u001b\u001e\u00139\u0013\u0018\u001716\u0013\u0011\u0012", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 38, "report_id": "cr-2023-166", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "�\u0001\u0002\u0003\u0004\u0005�\u0007\b\b\u0004\u0001 \u0002�\n\u000b\f\u0004 \r\u000e\u000b\u000f\n\n\u0010\u0011\u0012\u0013\u0014\u0011\u0015\u0012\u0016\u0017\u0011\u0015\u0018�\u001a\u0017\u0011\u0013\u0012\u0015\u0014\u001b�\u001c\u001d\u0011\n�!\"\u0012#�$\u0012\u0014\u0013\u0013\u0012�%&\n&\u0015'#\u0016\u0011(\u0012\u0017\u0011)�*+�, -.!\n/$0\n\u0012\u001212334445\u0016675\u0017\u0014(38\u00151\u00158\u0016\u0012\u001b\u001e\u00139\u0013\u0018\u001716\u0013\u0011\u0012", "text_characters": 114}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef3e16a0cf362722cd35b6d3ca09e9acdd430de2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:6f487e228db336363a2ed559beaffcec2398f6a04777f13a3817acc3606977ef
+size 151948
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0009-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0009-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66aa1f890e88f8b69a96022d39997c6def3ad863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0009-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1eb3678ba686a8186658a77fc2fdd6d5d804b1a77767becce4089f0b98036a3b
+size 15435
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0010-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0010-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..494e4fa3f61ae41fc3725042daf207843148b4dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0010-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:66ff66b84992a6cdd19858317815b2ce72149a8ea8cd826e6b0d2de24a1ecfcc
+size 26057
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0011-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0011-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7308178f277ccb1b63c7a5464a3d8e0388c8667b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0011-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:adfab94cd401c36d97748b3054c6e4aa3125c14fbe58a9c616bf25d12357bf34
+size 57041
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0012-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0012-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..026c2b9f32e78081dcc599a3492215add7b29be8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0012-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:de8c6a45f72ff8ed95fe53fff031f923ee6cd2c95e4c6260dfe7ea2ce87ad53c
+size 37418
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0013-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0013-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e9887da93b238c3fec7b20977f81a9cef88db6bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0013-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:434986ffb1e347d27802ee1a3f1598ffe64333d7cfac4f53de5a6afb22a5a32d
+size 38069
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0014-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0014-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e737651541db2650f2e6e1ad465fa66c8fd641d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0014-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:cf1c137247b40e09b24f41612591a243f55ab5e7c81e464a034adf6e265dfc23
+size 37248
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0015-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0015-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..360389787ff700bc3be2af3432ebc52403ca91d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0015-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:44c0665984f4421a797c3004548ec467064e250716ecb052f740f9e0b98f5843
+size 46537
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0018-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0018-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f876aacb8b6ddd9d21744132bea6044429974e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0018-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a1ad3761a7e8893d7dcaa786142b2f1f61cdf5e4f69f27a45a9d6efca671d11d
+size 40474
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0019-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0019-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3dd797456a4b96a3d7b6c04bb4146604742460cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0019-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:15d19288bcff1791375f333d9a8d8c099e8c07c77ab31b79e111c15edc732d96
+size 21015
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/document.json b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/document.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..625dd416de89928b29bba23bfd456577374d87d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/document.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "report_id": "cr-2023-167",
+ "title": "Albania: Technical Assistance Report—Investment Funds and Interconnectedness Risks",
+ "source_pdf": "data/raw/pdfs/cr-2023-167.pdf",
+ "source_sha256": "c6c27eb4f57ecd52f245f08bfddc0ecffceaf1006f7d65c5c3fffbc281c5c35a",
+ "source_bytes": 567868,
+ "source_page_url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/05/17/albania-technical-assistance-report-investment-funds-and-interconnectedness-risks-533512",
+ "processor_version": "1.0.1",
+ "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout",
+ "pymupdf_version": "1.28.0",
+ "pymupdf4llm_version": "0.3.4",
+ "processed_at": "2026-07-21T23:20:50+00:00",
+ "duration_seconds": 3.289,
+ "page_count": 21,
+ "text_characters": 33071,
+ "table_count": 1,
+ "figure_count": 11,
+ "needs_ocr_pages": [],
+ "headings": [
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 3,
+ "title": "ALBANIA"
+ },
+ {
+ "page": 1,
+ "level": 6,
+ "title": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT - INVESTMENT FUNDS AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS RISKS"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_metadata": {
+ "format": "PDF 1.7",
+ "title": "Albania: Technical Assistance Report—Investment Funds and Interconnectedness Risks; IMF Country Report No. 23/167; November 2022",
+ "author": "",
+ "subject": "",
+ "keywords": "",
+ "creator": "Acrobat PDFMaker 22 for Word",
+ "producer": "Adobe PDF Library 22.3.86",
+ "creationDate": "D:20230411104329-04'00'",
+ "modDate": "D:20230518115431-04'00'",
+ "trapped": "",
+ "encryption": null
+ },
+ "warnings": []
+}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/document.md b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/document.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..94936dbd12c5fb496b36502439323f3126073325
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/document.md
@@ -0,0 +1,842 @@
+
+
+
+
+May 2023
+
+
+
+**IMF Country Report No. 23/167**
+### **ALBANIA**
+###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT - INVESTMENT** **FUNDS AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS RISKS**
+
+
+This Technical Assistance Report on Albania was prepared by a staff team of the
+International Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was
+completed on November 2022.
+
+
+Copies of this report are available to the public from
+
+
+International Monetary Fund • Publication Services
+
+PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
+Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
+E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)
+
+Price: $18.00 per printed copy
+
+
+**International Monetary Fund**
+
+**Washington, D.C.**
+
+
+© 2023 International Monetary Fund
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+3
+
+
+Contents Page
+
+
+Glossary .......................................................................................................................................... 4
+
+Preface............................................................................................................................................. 5
+
+Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 6
+
+I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 9
+
+A. Background ..................................................................................................................... 9
+
+B. Albania’s investment fund sector.................................................................................. 10
+
+C. AFSA’s approach to identify, monitor, and mitigate risks ........................................... 15
+
+D. Summary of risk analysis .............................................................................................. 16
+
+II. Mitigating risks in the fund sector ........................................................................................ 17
+
+A. Data reporting and risk analysis .................................................................................... 17
+
+B. Stress testing and intersectoral linkages ....................................................................... 17
+
+C. Reducing liquidity risk in the fund sector ..................................................................... 20
+
+III. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 20
+
+
+Tables
+
+1. Key Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 8
+
+
+Figures
+
+Figure 1. Interlinkages within the fund sector ................................................................................ 9
+
+Figure 2. Total net assets of the fund sector ................................................................................. 10
+
+Figure 3. Composition of the fund sector as of Q1:2022 .............................................................. 11
+
+Figure 4. Asset composition as of Q1:2022 .................................................................................. 12
+
+Figure 5. Liquid assets and outflows ............................................................................................ 13
+
+Figure 6. Net flows during the summer of 2022 ........................................................................... 14
+
+Figure 7. Net flows and performance ........................................................................................... 15
+
+
+Boxes
+
+Box 1. An illustrative stress test for Albanian funds .................................................................... 18
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+**GLOSSARY**
+
+
+AIF Alternative Investment Fund
+
+
+AFSA Albanian Financial Services Authority
+
+
+BoA Bank of Albania
+
+
+FSAG Financial Stability Advisory Group
+
+
+HQLA High Quality Liquid Assets
+
+
+LMT Liquidity Management Tool
+
+
+MCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department
+
+
+SFT Securities Financing Transactions
+
+
+UCITS Undertakings for collective investment in
+transferable securities
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+**PREFACE**
+
+
+At the request of the Albanian Financial Services Authority (AFSA), a Monetary and Capital
+Markets (MCM) Department remote mission assisted the AFSA from May 9 to June 16, 2022 to
+assist the authorities in assessing risks related to investment funds and their interconnectedness
+with the financial sector.
+
+
+The mission met with senior officials and representatives of the AFSA and the Bank of Albania
+(BoA). The mission wishes to thank all the senior officials and representatives for their
+cooperation and productive discussions. The openness and engagement of all parties was very
+helpful in supporting the work.
+
+
+
+6
+
+
+**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
+
+
+**This report relies on the information submitted by the AFSA and discussions with AFSA**
+**and BoA.** Detailed data on the fund sector had been shared by AFSA and discussions with
+Authorities covered issues around (i) data reporting, (ii) risk analysis, (iii) regulatory framework
+and (iv) interlinkages.
+
+
+**The fund sector has been expanding and remains highly concentrated.** Since end-2019 the
+net asset value of Albanian funds has increased by 15 percent and accounts for around four
+percent of financial sector assets. The sector remains highly concentrated: (i) on the asset side, as
+domestic sovereign bonds account for most of exposures; and (ii) on the entity side, as the top
+fund represents 62 percent of the asset of the sector and the top 3 funds (all from the same
+manager) around 95 percent.
+
+
+**Interconnectedness between funds and the rest of the financial system is limited.** On the
+liability side, fund shares are mainly held by retail investors, and institutional investors play a
+very minor role. On the asset side, funds do not have significant direct exposures to securities
+issued by financial entities. Fund bank deposits account for around 13 percent of fund assets, but
+represents a relatively minor funding source for banks. Counterparty exposures towards banks
+are also small, since funds barely use repo operations or derivatives.
+
+
+**Exposures to the sovereign market are the main risk transmission channel between funds**
+**and the rest of the financial system, given the lack of liquidity of domestic sovereign bonds.**
+While funds hold only 5 percent of domestic public debt, there is a lack of activity on secondary
+markets. This implies that funds could face challenges in selling quickly sovereign assets to meet
+redemptions. The stress observed during the summer of 2022 shows how liquidity risks can
+materialize in the fund sector.
+
+
+**Funds perform liquidity transformation and are subject to liquidity requirements.** Funds
+have an open-ended structure and offer daily redemptions with settlement done over a maximum
+of 7 days. Funds are typically subject to liquidity requirements (in the form of high-quality liquid
+assets, HQLA) equal to the maximum between (i) 10 percent of total net assets, or (ii) the
+cumulative gross outflows over the last three months. In addition, of the HQLA has to be in cash
+or assets maturing within 7 days.
+
+
+**The review recommends that AFSA should enhance its risk monitoring of the fund sector**
+**and its interlinkages with the rest of the financial system.** Suggested enhancements include (i)
+more frequent data reporting on key items (flows, returns, asset composition); (ii) detailed
+analysis of funds portfolio (including calculation of duration and estimates of portfolio overlap);
+(iii) work on the drivers of (retail) investors flows (including an analysis of the flow/return
+relationship). AFSA should also consider scenario analysis and sectoral stress tests, with a focus
+on liquidity and market risk to analyze how stress could propagate in the fund sector. Joint work
+with the central bank on interlinkages could help identify the main links between financial
+institutions and markets and quantify them.
+
+
+
+7
+
+
+**The review recommends that AFSA consider expanding the range of Liquidity**
+**Management Tools (LMTs) available to funds.** The current regulatory framework only
+foresees suspension of redemptions, while other tools could be used to mitigate the risk of
+destabilizing redemptions. Price-based LMTs, such as redemption fees or anti-dilution levies, as
+well as quantity-based LMTs, such as side pockets or gates, could be made available to fund
+managers –after a cost-benefit analysis– to mitigate liquidity risk for funds. The use of repo
+operations, while already possible but not frequently used, could be also considered by fund
+managers to allay potential downward pressure on the sovereign bond market in case of stress.
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+|Table 1. Key Recommendations Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation|Priority|Timeframe|
+|---|---|---|
+|
**Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation**
|**Priority**
|**Timeframe**
**1 **|
+|**_Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_**
|**_Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_**
|**_Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_**
|
+|Increase the frequency of reporting of key data items such as flows and
returns (AFSA) ¶20-23
|1|Medium-
term|
+|Provide detailed analysis of funds’ portfolio including risks related to
interest rate (duration) and common exposures (portfolio overlap) at
sectoral level (AFSA) ¶6-7; 19-22
|1
|Near-term|
+|**_Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_**
|**_Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_**
|**_Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_**
|
+|Analyze the drivers of investors flows (AFSA) ¶11;21
|2|Medium-
term
|
+|Perform scenario analysis and stress tests (AFSA) ¶25-26
|2
|Medium-
term|
+|**_Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_**
|**_Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_**
|**_Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_**
|
+|Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of price-based and quantity-based LMTs
for Albanian funds (AFSA) ¶27-30
|2|Medium-
term
|
+|Expand the list of available LMTs, including through legislative change if
necessary (AFSA, MoF) ¶27-30
|3|Medium-
term|
+|**_Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_**
|**_Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_**
|**_Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_**
|
+|Conduct a joint work to (i) map the interlinkages between funds and
financial institutions and (ii) quantity the identified interlinkages (AFSA,
BoA) ¶13-14;27
|3|Medium-
term|
+|**_Recommendation 5: Resources_**
|**_Recommendation 5: Resources_**
|**_Recommendation 5: Resources_**
|
+|Increase the number of staff work on risk analysis in the fund sector to
support (i) financial stability assessment and (ii) risk-based supervision
(AFSA) ¶123-24|2|Medium-
term|
+
+
+1Near term: < 12 months; Medium term: 12 to 24 months.
+
+
+
+9
+
+
+**I.** **INTRODUCTION**
+
+
+**A.** **Background**
+
+
+**1.** **In December 2021, AFSA requested TA from the IMF in respect of**
+**interconnectedness risks in the fund sector.** Discussions on the scope of the work took
+place between MCM and AFSA over the period December 2021–April 2022.
+
+
+**2.** **The objective of the mission was to identify and measure risks related to**
+**interconnectedness in the fund sector.** Interlinkages can be related to direct exposures
+to entities within the financial sector through securities or activities, such as derivatives
+trading, or securities financing transactions (repo and securities lending). In addition,
+direct exposures to specific markets, such as the domestic sovereign bond market could
+also be significant. Finally, indirect exposures through common exposures of funds to the
+same issuer or asset could also increase interconnectedness (Figure 1).
+
+
+Figure 1. Interlinkages within the fund sector
+
+
+
+Markets Banks
+
+
+
+Investment funds
+
+
+
+Investors
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Source: International Monetary Fund Staff
+
+
+**3.** **The mission was conducted in several phases:**
+
+
+ - an initial questionnaire prepared by the mission and completed by the AFSA with
+additional supporting material provided in May 2022;
+
+ - a number of virtual meetings then took place between May and June 2022 with
+senior officials and representatives of the AFSA and BoA;
+
+ - an information assessment phase; and
+
+ - drafting of this report.
+
+
+
+10
+
+
+**B.** **Albania’s investment fund sector**
+
+
+**4.** **The fund sector has expanded over recent years to reach Lek 77 billion in Q1:2022**
+**(Figure 2), which equates to approximately 4 percent of GDP, and 4 percent of**
+**financial sector assets.** The growth of the sector has been driven by inflows from
+investors (mainly retail), as well as positive returns on assets (mainly domestic sovereign
+bonds). Funds are held by around 41,000 investors, which are almost exclusively retail
+clients, as the share of institutional investors is less than 0.1 percent of total investors.
+
+
+Figure 2. Total net assets of the fund sector
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary
+Fund Staff.
+Note: Total net assets in Lek bn.
+
+
+**5.** **The fund sector is highly concentrated, with the largest fund accounting for 62**
+**percent of total fund assets, and the three largest funds for 95 percent of the sector**
+**(Figure 3).** As of Q1:2022, there were 14 funds in Albania [2] : 12 non-UCITS [3] funds, and 2
+
+
+2 The regulatory framework for open-ended funds in Albania distinguishes between (i) UCITS, (ii) nonUCITS and (iii) Alternative Investment Funds (see Law No.56/2020 on Collective Investment
+Undertakings).
+
+3 UCITS stands for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities. UCITS are subject
+to a specific European Union (EU) regulatory framework. For the purposes of this report, UCITS should
+be understood as investment fund structures that are subject to requirements broadly equivalent to those
+of the EU framework.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+alternative investment funds (AIF) [4] recently launched [5] . This compares with six funds
+end-2019. The funds are related to five asset management companies, including one
+which accounts for 96 percent of the fund net assets.
+
+
+Figure 3. Composition of the fund sector as of Q1:2022
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary
+Fund Staff.
+Note: Total net assets in Lek bn as of Q1:2022.
+
+
+**6.** **Funds are primarily exposed to the domestic sovereign bond market.** Some funds
+that have launched recently invest in foreign sovereign bonds and corporate bonds, as
+well as in foreign equities, but they remain small. Overall, around 65 percent of funds’
+assets are composed of domestic sovereign bonds (Figure 4). Most funds also have
+significant exposures to cash.
+
+
+4 In the EU, AIFs are all investment funds that are not UCITS, while in Albania AIFs are funds which are
+neither UCITS nor non-UCITS as defined in the Albanian legislation. AIFs are typically marketed to
+professional investors, unlike other types of funds which can be sold to retail investors.
+
+5 One non-UCITS fund was not operational as the time of the report and the two AIFs have to report endyear data once a year to AFSA. Therefore, the data used in this report do not include those three funds.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+Figure 4. Asset composition as of Q1:2022
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary
+Fund Staff.
+Note: Portfolio composition by asset type, in percentage a of Q1:2022.
+
+
+**7.** **Funds’ returns tend to be highly correlated, reflecting common exposures.** Using
+quarterly data on returns since 2017 for the three oldest funds (Prestigi, Vizion and
+Premium), a statistical analysis indicates that performance is highly similar with
+correlation coefficients across funds higher than 0.93. Similar results are obtained using a
+larger sample of funds (including Albsig standard and ABI EIA [6] ), and data for 2022. The
+correlation of returns is driven by common exposures to the domestic sovereign bond
+market. This interconnectedness in returns implies that if domestic sovereign bond
+markets were to be impacted by a negative shock (increase in yields), funds’ returns
+would be likely to deteriorate by a similar magnitude at the same time.
+
+
+**8.** **Most funds are subject to a liquidity requirement.** Funds need to have high-quality
+liquid assets (HQLA) totaling the higher of 10 percent of total net assets or the
+cumulative 3-month gross outflows. At least 50 percent of the HQLA needs to be in cash
+or securities maturing within seven days. Funds that invest at least 50 percent in ‘active
+markets’ are not subject to the 50 percent requirement on cash and securities maturing
+within seven days.
+
+
+**9.** **Most funds did not experience severe outflows in the first half of 2022.** While some
+funds have recorded outflows in 2022, redemptions have been relatively contained except
+
+
+6 Those two funds invest primarily in domestic sovereign bonds and were launched in 2020 and 2021.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+for one fund which saw large redemptions related to outflows from an institutional
+investor (Figure 5).
+
+
+Figure 5. Liquid assets and outflows
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary
+Fund Staff.
+Note: Cash holdings as of Q1:2022 and worst monthly outflows since
+December 2021, in percentage of total net assets.
+
+
+**10.** **However, funds experienced stress in the summer of 2022 as financial conditions**
+**tightened.** In a context of inflationary pressure, the BoA increased interest rates by 25
+basis points in July and 50 basis points in August. As a result, funds’ returns declined,
+and investors redemptions increased. Between June and end-August, cumulative
+redemptions reached almost Lek 11 billion, 15 percent of total net assets of the sector
+(Figure 6). Outflows were concentrated in bond funds, due to their exposures to interest
+rate risk.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+14
+
+
+Figure 6. Net flows during the summer of 2022
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary
+Fund Staff.
+Note: Net flows, in percentage of total net assets.
+
+
+**11.** **Redemptions were very large compared to the decline in returns, indicating a**
+**potential high sensitivity of investors to performance.** Figure 7 shows that for
+government bond funds, negative returns are associated with very large outflows. Some
+of the funds experienced redemptions of 10 percent in August although returns declined
+by only 100 basis points over the same period. This indicates that investors might be
+prone to redeem when performance turns negative or when there are sizeable market
+shocks.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+Figure 7. Net flows and performance
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary
+Fund Staff.
+Note: Monthly net flows and lagged returns for sovereign and corporate
+bonds funds (January–August 2022).
+
+
+**12.** **While funds managed to meet redemptions, this episode illustrates how liquidity**
+**risk can crystallize.** All funds were able to raise cash to pay redeeming investors through
+a combination of cash drawdown, sales of bonds and proceeds from the repayment of
+bonds maturing. However, if returns were to continue to fall sharply and outflows to
+increase, funds exposed to fixed income instruments could face heightened challenges
+related to liquidity risk.
+
+
+**13.** **Counterparty risk is very limited as funds barely use derivatives or securities**
+**financing transactions (SFTs).** While funds can use derivatives for hedging, no funds
+had derivative exposure as of Q1:2022. Similarly, the use of SFTs was very limited with
+only one reverse repo transaction (where the fund lends cash against collateral) and one
+repo transaction (where the fund borrows cash by posting collateral). In both cases,
+Albanian sovereign bonds were used as collateral.
+
+
+**14.** **Funds’ interconnectedness within the financial sector rests mainly on banks.** On the
+asset side, funds hold around 13 percent of their asset in cash (Lek 9.9 billion), and
+funds’ deposits only accounts for 2 percent of banks’ total assets. Funds do not invest
+substantially in securities (debt or equities) issued by banks.
+
+
+**C.** **AFSA’s approach to identify, monitor, and mitigate risks**
+
+
+**15.** **AFSA receives detailed information from funds on a regular basis.** On a quarterly
+basis, funds provide AFSA with full portfolio information as well as balance sheet data
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+16
+
+
+and an income statement. AFSA publishes detailed information on its website every
+quarter through a statistical report. [7] More recently, AFSA has taken steps to increase the
+reporting frequency. [8] Funds have been providing data on returns on a monthly basis since
+early 2022 (against a quarterly frequency previously), net redemptions on a weekly basis
+(against monthly previously), and liquidity indicators (HQLAs and cash buffers) on a
+monthly basis (against quarterly reporting previously) since May 2022. Similarly,
+managers had to report to AFSA the stress test results for the end of March 2022. AFSA
+has the power to request additional information from fund managers.
+
+
+**16.** **AFSA contributes to systemic risk discussions within the Financial Stability**
+**Advisory Group (FSAG).** The Executive General Director of AFSA is a member of
+FSAG, along with the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory
+Authority Board, the Governor the BoA, and the General Director of the Albanian
+Deposit Insurance Agency. FSAG plays an advisory role in the design of policies,
+enhancement of inter-agency coordination and systemic risk monitoring.
+
+
+**17.** **Risk monitoring tends to be done on an individual fund basis.** As part of its
+supervisory duties, AFSA monitors risk at fund-level but not necessarily at sector-wide
+level.
+
+
+**18.** **The Supervisory department focusing on asset management has limited resources.**
+Overall, there are four staff at AFSA in charge of fund supervision in the private pension
+and investment funds market directorate. This compares to six staff in the securities
+market directorate, and four staff in the DLT-based financial market supervision
+directorate.
+
+
+**D.** **Summary of risk analysis**
+
+
+**19.** **The main risks in the fund sector related to liquidity transformation, potential**
+**outflows, and concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond market.** While
+the investor base has been stable over time, in a context of tightening of financial
+conditions through rises in interest rates, Albanian bond funds could experience negative
+returns which could trigger outflows. Redemptions could in turn force asset managers to
+sell assets, including domestic sovereign bonds, and it is uncertain whether the market
+would have the ability to absorb those sales without price discounts.
+
+
+[7 The statistical reports are available at https://amf.gov.al/statistika.asp?id=5&s=2.](https://amf.gov.al/statistika.asp?id=5&s=2)
+
+8 AFSA’ Board decision No. 88 and No. 136 dated respectively 28 April 2022 and 29 July 2022.
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+**II.** **MITIGATING RISKS IN THE FUND SECTOR**
+
+
+**A.** **Data reporting and risk analysis**
+
+
+**20.** **It is key for AFSA to have access to timely data on key items to monitor the fund**
+**sector.** While AFSA already receives detailed information from funds, the frequency of
+reporting should be increased for some key items. Data on flows and returns should be
+reported a least on a weekly basis, in line with the redemption profile of the funds.
+
+
+**21.** **Further analysis of the drivers of investor behavior is warranted.** While investors net
+flows have been contained so far, it is crucial to understand the main factors driving
+redemptions and subscriptions. Further insights on the distribution of fund products,
+including through bank networks, as well as the sensitivity of flows to past performance
+are key to assess potential risks of outflows looking forward.
+
+
+**22.** **More granular monitoring of risks related to fund portfolios is also recommended.**
+With available data, AFSA can already use portfolio information to calculate risk metrics
+related to interest rate risk (duration), and credit risk (credit spread). In addition, given
+concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond market, AFSA could perform an
+analysis of portfolio overlap at instrument-level across funds with sovereign exposures.
+Such analysis could be used to assess potential liquidation costs related to the sale of
+sovereign bonds during stress, and potential spillover to funds holding similar
+instruments. In addition, analyzing the correlation of funds’ returns would also be useful
+in identifying market-based interconnectedness.
+
+
+**23.** **Monitoring risks at sectoral level is key.** Since investment funds in Albania tend to
+have similar concentrated exposures to domestic sovereign instruments, risks should be
+analyzed at sectoral level, as well as individual fund level. The behavior of some funds
+can have a direct impact on other funds. For example, if a fund starts liquidating
+sovereign debt holdings, less liquidity will be available to other funds (given the limited
+absorption capacity of the market), and the sales are likely to put downward price
+pressure on similar bonds held by other funds.
+
+
+**24.** **AFSA should have more resources to perform risks analysis.** Given the limited
+number of staff dedicated to the fund sector, there is a need to increase the resources of
+AFSA for the agency to perform more risk analysis. Analysts with a quantitative
+background would be best placed to carry out this work.
+
+
+**B.** **Stress testing and intersectoral linkages**
+
+
+**25.** **AFSA could use stress tests to assess risks in the fund sector.** Available data could
+already be used to perform stress test and scenario analysis (Box 1). Such an exercise
+could be used to identify vulnerable funds and potential vulnerabilities in the financial
+system.
+
+
+
+18
+
+
+**26.** **AFSA, in coordination with BoA, could perform a joint analysis of intersectoral**
+**linkages within the financial system.** Such analysis would seek to (i) map the
+interlinkages between financial institutions and markets, and (ii) quantify the materiality
+of those linkages. This work could then be used to assess the main risk transmission
+channels within the financial sector, and to perform scenario analysis.
+
+
+**Box 1. An illustrative stress test for Albanian funds**
+
+
+**Scenario design**
+
+
+In this stress test, we assume that yields on Albanian bonds increase by 100 basis points (parallel shift of the yield
+curve). The rise in yield triggers mark-to-market losses on sovereign and corporate bonds held by funds, and we
+assume that the duration of sovereign bond holdings is 2, resulting in a loss of 2 percent.
+
+
+**Impact on returns and flows**
+
+
+Using data on fund portfolios, the impact on fund returns can be calculated. The mark-to-market losses would
+amount to Lek 1.1 billion. We then assume that negative performance would trigger investor outflows. The
+flow/return relationship is estimated to be around 0.75 for funds mainly exposed to sovereign bonds, and 0.38 for
+corporate bond funds, using monthly data on returns and flows over January–August 2022, which include the
+stress observed during the summer. Aggregate investor outflows would amount to around Lek 750 million (1.3
+percent of funds’ total net assets after the interest rate shock), with some variation across funds with outflows
+ranging from around 0.6 percent of assets up to 1.8 percent (Figure 8).
+
+
+Figure 8. Impact of 100bps shock on funds returns and flows
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International
+Monetary Fund Staff.
+Note: Impacts on returns assuming a duration of two. Outflows based
+on a flow/return relationship parameter of 0.75 for government bond
+funds and 0.38 for corporate bond funds (R. Euro and MIKS).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+19
+
+
+**Asset sales**
+
+
+Given investors’ redemptions, we assume that asset managers would follow a pro rata liquidation approach
+whereby they would sell assets in proportion of their share in the fund portfolio. This implies that funds mainly
+exposed to sovereign bonds would sell more sovereign bonds (in relative terms) than funds with a more
+diversified portfolio. Overall, funds would sell around Lek 753 million of assets, including Lek 502 million of
+sovereign bonds.
+
+
+**Absorption capacity of the market**
+
+
+The estimated volume of sales can be compared to liquidity measures in secondary markets. According to BoA,
+bond trading volumes amounted to Lek 3 billion in 2021h1, implying daily volumes of around Lek 25 million.
+Under average trading conditions it would therefore take a least 20 days for the Lek 502 million of sovereign
+bond to be sold, more than twice the settlement period for fund shares. An alternative measure is to compare the
+volumes of sales to banks’ sovereign bond holdings (estimated at around Lek 450 billion). In that case, the
+additional purchase by banks of bonds sold by funds would only represent 0.1 percent of banks’ bond holdings
+(Figure 9). Although such purchases would not represent a material increase in banks’ holdings of sovereign debt,
+the mission team did not assess the feasibility of such purchases nor their compatibility with prudential
+requirements on assets held by banks. Based on discussions with the BoA, commercial banks might have limited
+appetite to increase their sovereign bond exposures.
+
+
+The analysis shows that funds might face challenges in selling sovereign bonds quickly, unless banks were
+willing to increase their portfolio of domestic sovereign debt.
+
+
+Figure 9. Ratio of sovereign bond sales to average daily trading volumes and banks’
+
+holdings of domestic sovereign debt
+
+
+Sources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, Bank of Albania,
+International Monetary Fund Staff.
+Note: Number of days needed to dispose of sovereign assets
+assuming daily volumes of Lek 25Mn, banks’ holdings of ALL
+sovereign debt assumed to be around Lek 450bn.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+20
+
+
+**C.** **Reducing liquidity risk in the fund sector**
+
+
+**27.** **AFSA should consider making additional liquidity management tools (LMTs)**
+**available to funds.** When funds face large redemptions from investors, they need to raise
+cash by using their available liquidity (bank deposits), and/or through the sale of
+securities. Given the lack of liquidity in sovereign bond markets, funds might face
+challenges in disposing of sovereign bonds quickly and at a low cost. LMTs can mitigate
+this risk by (i) reducing the likelihood of large redemptions from investors, and (ii)
+reducing the impact of such redemptions. AFSA should perform a cost-benefit analysis of
+those tools, in coordination with the industry. Operational issues related to the activation
+and use of these tools should also be considered.
+
+
+**28.** **Price-based LMTs could mitigate the risk of large redemptions and reduce the**
+**impact of redemptions on remaining investors.** Price-based LMTs, such as redemption
+fees aim at passing some of the costs related to the disposal of assets to redeeming
+investors. In doing so, they reduce the incentives for investors to redeem (since they
+would have to pay a fee), and protect the remaining investors in case of outflows, since
+some of the costs are directly passed on to redeeming investors. For such LMTs to be
+effective, appropriate and prudent valuation policies are required, which could be
+challenging when markets are not liquid.
+
+
+**29.** **Quantity-based LMTs can reduce the likelihood of large redemptions** . Such LMTs
+include mechanisms, such as side pockets –where illiquid assets are ring-fenced in a
+separate fund–, or gates –where the value of shares or units that can be redeemed in a
+single valuation/dealing day is limited. These could be useful tools for fund managers to
+mitigate liquidity risk and potential downward pressure on domestic sovereign markets.
+
+
+**30.** **The use of repo operations by funds could also be studied.** In case of stress, funds
+might be able to obtain liquidity by pledging sovereign bonds, as collateral for repo
+transactions with banks. Such operations would enable funds to meet redemptions,
+without causing downward price pressure on the sovereign bond markets. AFSA could
+engage with the industry to discuss the set-up of repo operations, given their very limited
+use by funds so far.
+
+
+**III.** **CONCLUSION**
+
+
+**31.** **The growth of the fund sector in Albania can support the development of the**
+**economy, and the expansion of capital markets.** While the financial sector is primarily
+bank-based, funds offer diversification benefits for investors, and risk-sharing
+opportunities within the financial system.
+
+
+**32.** **Financial stability issues in the fund sector are limited at the current juncture.** The
+relatively small size of the sector, its low degree of interconnectedness with the rest of the
+
+
+
+21
+
+
+financial sector, its stable investor base, and the existence of liquidity requirements, are
+important risk mitigants.
+
+
+**33.** **The main risk is related to concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond**
+**market.** The lack of substantial secondary market activity in the sovereign bond market,
+can make it challenging to sell large amounts of sovereign bonds. The stress observed
+during the summer of 2022, shows how liquidity risks can crystallize in the fund sector.
+Ongoing efforts on the establishment of Primary Dealers are welcome and should
+continue.
+
+
+**34.** **The financial system is highly exposed to retail clients and investors, and**
+**maintaining confidence in the financial sector is crucial.** Most bank funding depends
+on deposits from retail clients, and retail investors are by far the main investors in funds.
+In addition, retail investors directly hold a sizeable share of domestic sovereign debt
+(higher than 10 percent of outstanding debt).
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/figures.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/figures.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5907b6c7e0143f05d36453fa3b37945b153b18e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/figures.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0001-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "60e0a0a0a1a4a8e9", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0001-001", "height": 138, "page": 1, "phash_256": "800f6be00fe087502fe0f01ff01f2fe08fc1f00f78fed03ff00f0fe00ff0875e", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d", "width": 898}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0002-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "page_scan_or_full_page_visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "959dcc33606fc941", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0002-001", "height": 1239, "page": 2, "phash_256": "eaaa60be60bebe40bf404b4fa783438f1f839f019c212fc06b5c687e60fec07d", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "6f487e228db336363a2ed559beaffcec2398f6a04777f13a3817acc3606977ef", "width": 952}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0009-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "a4a4a4a6a4a4c4c4", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0009-001", "height": 251, "page": 9, "phash_256": "c4f43c60c39d64f4fe2ba70f58d944b6ef01e707b95b46b4da01ef00bb0904f6", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "1eb3678ba686a8186658a77fc2fdd6d5d804b1a77767becce4089f0b98036a3b", "width": 673}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0010-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "aec1414d41410909", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0010-001", "height": 366, "page": 10, "phash_256": "feaa805f80553775b5453fa03fa84aa8cabed00e90553fc0b5556f8ac51e49ab", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "66ff66b84992a6cdd19858317815b2ce72149a8ea8cd826e6b0d2de24a1ecfcc", "width": 479}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0011-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "e6d6d66060703325", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0011-001", "height": 373, "page": 11, "phash_256": "8f8381aa68d53c3f941e7af194f2eb2c69d861cc63886ac497039e379731da87", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "adfab94cd401c36d97748b3054c6e4aa3125c14fbe58a9c616bf25d12357bf34", "width": 480}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0012-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "06933554342d6565", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0012-001", "height": 369, "page": 12, "phash_256": "becaa11fe135377885d53f8d16de1ebd169a1e4017980a56810968e7e12369f7", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "de8c6a45f72ff8ed95fe53fff031f923ee6cd2c95e4c6260dfe7ea2ce87ad53c", "width": 479}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0013-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "ac92c0e0909c0c76", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0013-001", "height": 357, "page": 13, "phash_256": "d0ae807b2d4036998a353ef1b29de9562fcee1dee96216eec331d4a99621c133", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "434986ffb1e347d27802ee1a3f1598ffe64333d7cfac4f53de5a6afb22a5a32d", "width": 479}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0014-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9386cd34b0904247", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0014-001", "height": 357, "page": 14, "phash_256": "b4c1241def3281173df07fa8c26ee26e807d9dc85f9c2d336733a511bd983c84", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "cf1c137247b40e09b24f41612591a243f55ab5e7c81e464a034adf6e265dfc23", "width": 479}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0015-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "63c0c0a9aba2164e", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0015-001", "height": 351, "page": 15, "phash_256": "e97e92cbb59d2d756a0216d2a5e839496896d6a094edad35cad176d2d02ee528", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "44c0665984f4421a797c3004548ec467064e250716ecb052f740f9e0b98f5843", "width": 479}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0018-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "17292929a85b2953", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0018-001", "height": 336, "page": 18, "phash_256": "ba303a72a98de58dc49b867207c1946b3b3684645f24fe743b9079ce7fc06a71", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "a1ad3761a7e8893d7dcaa786142b2f1f61cdf5e4f69f27a45a9d6efca671d11d", "width": 480}
+{"asset_path": "data/interim/cr-2023-167/assets/figures/cr-2023-167-fig-p0019-001.png", "caption": null, "classification": "visual", "color_mode": "RGB", "dhash_64": "9bd0bcb4b4b0b333", "extraction_method": "pymupdf4llm+pymupdf-layout", "figure_id": "cr-2023-167-fig-p0019-001", "height": 327, "page": 19, "phash_256": "b8f3871fc70c34e34f0c38e3387538eb8161478c85634f9cbd60789034ff487f", "render_dpi": 120, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "sha256_normalized_png": "15d19288bcff1791375f333d9a8d8c099e8c07c77ab31b79e111c15edc732d96", "width": 480}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-167/pages.jsonl b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/pages.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..452056c343c9498305926ede0837a21375f6363b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-167/pages.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0001-001"], "markdown": "\n\nMay 2023\n\n\n\n**IMF Country Report No. 23/167**\n### **ALBANIA**\n###### **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT - INVESTMENT** **FUNDS AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS RISKS**\n\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Albania was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on November 2022.\n\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org/)\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\n\n**International Monetary Fund**\n\n**Washington, D.C.**\n\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0917, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 1, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(1.5, 0.0, 540.0, 82.5)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 125, "number": 2, "size": 9890, "transform": [538.5, 0.0, -0.0, 82.5, 1.5, 0.0], "width": 861, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "May 2023\n\nIMF Country Report No. 23/167\nALBANIA\nTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT - INVESTMENT FUNDS AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS RISKS\n\nThis Technical Assistance Report on Albania was prepared by a staff team of the\nInternational Monetary Fund. It is based on the information available at the time it was\ncompleted on November 2022.\n\nCopies of this report are available to the public from\n\nInternational Monetary Fund • Publication Services\n\nPO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090\nTelephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201\nE-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org\n\nPrice: $18.00 per printed copy\n\nInternational Monetary Fund\n\nWashington, D.C.\n\n© 2023 International Monetary Fund", "text_characters": 577}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0002-001"], "markdown": "", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 2, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE\nREPORT\n\n\nALBANIA\nInvestment Funds and Interconnectedness\nRisks\nNovember 2022\n\n\nPrepared By\nAntoine Bouveret (External Expert/ European Securities and Markets Authority) and\nRichard Stobo (Monetary and Capital Markets Department)\n\n\n\nAuthoring Department:\nMonetary and Capital Markets\nDepartment", "text_characters": 271}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "3\n\n\nContents Page\n\n\nGlossary .......................................................................................................................................... 4\n\nPreface............................................................................................................................................. 5\n\nExecutive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 6\n\nI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 9\n\nA. Background ..................................................................................................................... 9\n\nB. Albania’s investment fund sector.................................................................................. 10\n\nC. AFSA’s approach to identify, monitor, and mitigate risks ........................................... 15\n\nD. Summary of risk analysis .............................................................................................. 16\n\nII. Mitigating risks in the fund sector ........................................................................................ 17\n\nA. Data reporting and risk analysis .................................................................................... 17\n\nB. Stress testing and intersectoral linkages ....................................................................... 17\n\nC. Reducing liquidity risk in the fund sector ..................................................................... 20\n\nIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 20\n\n\nTables\n\n1. Key Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 8\n\n\nFigures\n\nFigure 1. Interlinkages within the fund sector ................................................................................ 9\n\nFigure 2. Total net assets of the fund sector ................................................................................. 10\n\nFigure 3. Composition of the fund sector as of Q1:2022 .............................................................. 11\n\nFigure 4. Asset composition as of Q1:2022 .................................................................................. 12\n\nFigure 5. Liquid assets and outflows ............................................................................................ 13\n\nFigure 6. Net flows during the summer of 2022 ........................................................................... 14\n\nFigure 7. Net flows and performance ........................................................................................... 15\n\n\nBoxes\n\nBox 1. An illustrative stress test for Albanian funds .................................................................... 18", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 3, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "3\n\nContents Page\n\nGlossary .......................................................................................................................................... 4\n\nPreface............................................................................................................................................. 5\n\nExecutive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 6\n\nI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 9\n\nA. Background ..................................................................................................................... 9\n\nB. Albania’s investment fund sector.................................................................................. 10\n\nC. AFSA’s approach to identify, monitor, and mitigate risks ........................................... 15\n\nD. Summary of risk analysis .............................................................................................. 16\n\nII. Mitigating risks in the fund sector ........................................................................................ 17\n\nA. Data reporting and risk analysis .................................................................................... 17\n\nB. Stress testing and intersectoral linkages ....................................................................... 17\n\nC. Reducing liquidity risk in the fund sector ..................................................................... 20\n\nIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 20\n\nTables\n\n1. Key Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 8\n\nFigures\n\nFigure 1. Interlinkages within the fund sector ................................................................................ 9\n\nFigure 2. Total net assets of the fund sector ................................................................................. 10\n\nFigure 3. Composition of the fund sector as of Q1:2022 .............................................................. 11\n\nFigure 4. Asset composition as of Q1:2022 .................................................................................. 12\n\nFigure 5. Liquid assets and outflows ............................................................................................ 13\n\nFigure 6. Net flows during the summer of 2022 ........................................................................... 14\n\nFigure 7. Net flows and performance ........................................................................................... 15\n\nBoxes\n\nBox 1. An illustrative stress test for Albanian funds .................................................................... 18", "text_characters": 2737}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "4\n\n\n**GLOSSARY**\n\n\nAIF Alternative Investment Fund\n\n\nAFSA Albanian Financial Services Authority\n\n\nBoA Bank of Albania\n\n\nFSAG Financial Stability Advisory Group\n\n\nHQLA High Quality Liquid Assets\n\n\nLMT Liquidity Management Tool\n\n\nMCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department\n\n\nSFT Securities Financing Transactions\n\n\nUCITS Undertakings for collective investment in\ntransferable securities", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 4, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "4\n\nGLOSSARY\n\nAIF Alternative Investment Fund\n\nAFSA Albanian Financial Services Authority\n\nBoA Bank of Albania\n\nFSAG Financial Stability Advisory Group\n\nHQLA High Quality Liquid Assets\n\nLMT Liquidity Management Tool\n\nMCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department\n\nSFT Securities Financing Transactions\n\nUCITS Undertakings for collective investment in\ntransferable securities", "text_characters": 315}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "5\n\n\n**PREFACE**\n\n\nAt the request of the Albanian Financial Services Authority (AFSA), a Monetary and Capital\nMarkets (MCM) Department remote mission assisted the AFSA from May 9 to June 16, 2022 to\nassist the authorities in assessing risks related to investment funds and their interconnectedness\nwith the financial sector.\n\n\nThe mission met with senior officials and representatives of the AFSA and the Bank of Albania\n(BoA). The mission wishes to thank all the senior officials and representatives for their\ncooperation and productive discussions. The openness and engagement of all parties was very\nhelpful in supporting the work.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 5, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "5\n\nPREFACE\n\nAt the request of the Albanian Financial Services Authority (AFSA), a Monetary and Capital\nMarkets (MCM) Department remote mission assisted the AFSA from May 9 to June 16, 2022 to\nassist the authorities in assessing risks related to investment funds and their interconnectedness\nwith the financial sector.\n\nThe mission met with senior officials and representatives of the AFSA and the Bank of Albania\n(BoA). The mission wishes to thank all the senior officials and representatives for their\ncooperation and productive discussions. The openness and engagement of all parties was very\nhelpful in supporting the work.", "text_characters": 527}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "6\n\n\n**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**\n\n\n**This report relies on the information submitted by the AFSA and discussions with AFSA**\n**and BoA.** Detailed data on the fund sector had been shared by AFSA and discussions with\nAuthorities covered issues around (i) data reporting, (ii) risk analysis, (iii) regulatory framework\nand (iv) interlinkages.\n\n\n**The fund sector has been expanding and remains highly concentrated.** Since end-2019 the\nnet asset value of Albanian funds has increased by 15 percent and accounts for around four\npercent of financial sector assets. The sector remains highly concentrated: (i) on the asset side, as\ndomestic sovereign bonds account for most of exposures; and (ii) on the entity side, as the top\nfund represents 62 percent of the asset of the sector and the top 3 funds (all from the same\nmanager) around 95 percent.\n\n\n**Interconnectedness between funds and the rest of the financial system is limited.** On the\nliability side, fund shares are mainly held by retail investors, and institutional investors play a\nvery minor role. On the asset side, funds do not have significant direct exposures to securities\nissued by financial entities. Fund bank deposits account for around 13 percent of fund assets, but\nrepresents a relatively minor funding source for banks. Counterparty exposures towards banks\nare also small, since funds barely use repo operations or derivatives.\n\n\n**Exposures to the sovereign market are the main risk transmission channel between funds**\n**and the rest of the financial system, given the lack of liquidity of domestic sovereign bonds.**\nWhile funds hold only 5 percent of domestic public debt, there is a lack of activity on secondary\nmarkets. This implies that funds could face challenges in selling quickly sovereign assets to meet\nredemptions. The stress observed during the summer of 2022 shows how liquidity risks can\nmaterialize in the fund sector.\n\n\n**Funds perform liquidity transformation and are subject to liquidity requirements.** Funds\nhave an open-ended structure and offer daily redemptions with settlement done over a maximum\nof 7 days. Funds are typically subject to liquidity requirements (in the form of high-quality liquid\nassets, HQLA) equal to the maximum between (i) 10 percent of total net assets, or (ii) the\ncumulative gross outflows over the last three months. In addition, of the HQLA has to be in cash\nor assets maturing within 7 days.\n\n\n**The review recommends that AFSA should enhance its risk monitoring of the fund sector**\n**and its interlinkages with the rest of the financial system.** Suggested enhancements include (i)\nmore frequent data reporting on key items (flows, returns, asset composition); (ii) detailed\nanalysis of funds portfolio (including calculation of duration and estimates of portfolio overlap);\n(iii) work on the drivers of (retail) investors flows (including an analysis of the flow/return\nrelationship). AFSA should also consider scenario analysis and sectoral stress tests, with a focus\non liquidity and market risk to analyze how stress could propagate in the fund sector. Joint work\nwith the central bank on interlinkages could help identify the main links between financial\ninstitutions and markets and quantify them.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 6, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "6\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThis report relies on the information submitted by the AFSA and discussions with AFSA\nand BoA. Detailed data on the fund sector had been shared by AFSA and discussions with\nAuthorities covered issues around (i) data reporting, (ii) risk analysis, (iii) regulatory framework\nand (iv) interlinkages.\n\nThe fund sector has been expanding and remains highly concentrated. Since end-2019 the\nnet asset value of Albanian funds has increased by 15 percent and accounts for around four\npercent of financial sector assets. The sector remains highly concentrated: (i) on the asset side, as\ndomestic sovereign bonds account for most of exposures; and (ii) on the entity side, as the top\nfund represents 62 percent of the asset of the sector and the top 3 funds (all from the same\nmanager) around 95 percent.\n\nInterconnectedness between funds and the rest of the financial system is limited. On the\nliability side, fund shares are mainly held by retail investors, and institutional investors play a\nvery minor role. On the asset side, funds do not have significant direct exposures to securities\nissued by financial entities. Fund bank deposits account for around 13 percent of fund assets, but\nrepresents a relatively minor funding source for banks. Counterparty exposures towards banks\nare also small, since funds barely use repo operations or derivatives.\n\nExposures to the sovereign market are the main risk transmission channel between funds\nand the rest of the financial system, given the lack of liquidity of domestic sovereign bonds.\nWhile funds hold only 5 percent of domestic public debt, there is a lack of activity on secondary\nmarkets. This implies that funds could face challenges in selling quickly sovereign assets to meet\nredemptions. The stress observed during the summer of 2022 shows how liquidity risks can\nmaterialize in the fund sector.\n\nFunds perform liquidity transformation and are subject to liquidity requirements. Funds\nhave an open-ended structure and offer daily redemptions with settlement done over a maximum\nof 7 days. Funds are typically subject to liquidity requirements (in the form of high-quality liquid\nassets, HQLA) equal to the maximum between (i) 10 percent of total net assets, or (ii) the\ncumulative gross outflows over the last three months. In addition, of the HQLA has to be in cash\nor assets maturing within 7 days.\n\nThe review recommends that AFSA should enhance its risk monitoring of the fund sector\nand its interlinkages with the rest of the financial system. Suggested enhancements include (i)\nmore frequent data reporting on key items (flows, returns, asset composition); (ii) detailed\nanalysis of funds portfolio (including calculation of duration and estimates of portfolio overlap);\n(iii) work on the drivers of (retail) investors flows (including an analysis of the flow/return\nrelationship). AFSA should also consider scenario analysis and sectoral stress tests, with a focus\non liquidity and market risk to analyze how stress could propagate in the fund sector. Joint work\nwith the central bank on interlinkages could help identify the main links between financial\ninstitutions and markets and quantify them.", "text_characters": 2671}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "7\n\n\n**The review recommends that AFSA consider expanding the range of Liquidity**\n**Management Tools (LMTs) available to funds.** The current regulatory framework only\nforesees suspension of redemptions, while other tools could be used to mitigate the risk of\ndestabilizing redemptions. Price-based LMTs, such as redemption fees or anti-dilution levies, as\nwell as quantity-based LMTs, such as side pockets or gates, could be made available to fund\nmanagers –after a cost-benefit analysis– to mitigate liquidity risk for funds. The use of repo\noperations, while already possible but not frequently used, could be also considered by fund\nmanagers to allay potential downward pressure on the sovereign bond market in case of stress.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 7, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "7\n\nThe review recommends that AFSA consider expanding the range of Liquidity\nManagement Tools (LMTs) available to funds. The current regulatory framework only\nforesees suspension of redemptions, while other tools could be used to mitigate the risk of\ndestabilizing redemptions. Price-based LMTs, such as redemption fees or anti-dilution levies, as\nwell as quantity-based LMTs, such as side pockets or gates, could be made available to fund\nmanagers –after a cost-benefit analysis– to mitigate liquidity risk for funds. The use of repo\noperations, while already possible but not frequently used, could be also considered by fund\nmanagers to allay potential downward pressure on the sovereign bond market in case of stress.", "text_characters": 611}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "8\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|Table 1. Key Recommendations Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation|Priority|Timeframe|\n|---|---|---|\n|
**Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation**
|**Priority**
|**Timeframe**
**1 **|\n|**_Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_**
|**_Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_**
|**_Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_**
|\n|Increase the frequency of reporting of key data items such as flows and
returns (AFSA) ¶20-23
|1|Medium-
term|\n|Provide detailed analysis of funds’ portfolio including risks related to
interest rate (duration) and common exposures (portfolio overlap) at
sectoral level (AFSA) ¶6-7; 19-22
|1
|Near-term|\n|**_Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_**
|**_Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_**
|**_Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_**
|\n|Analyze the drivers of investors flows (AFSA) ¶11;21
|2|Medium-
term
|\n|Perform scenario analysis and stress tests (AFSA) ¶25-26
|2
|Medium-
term|\n|**_Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_**
|**_Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_**
|**_Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_**
|\n|Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of price-based and quantity-based LMTs
for Albanian funds (AFSA) ¶27-30
|2|Medium-
term
|\n|Expand the list of available LMTs, including through legislative change if
necessary (AFSA, MoF) ¶27-30
|3|Medium-
term|\n|**_Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_**
|**_Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_**
|**_Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_**
|\n|Conduct a joint work to (i) map the interlinkages between funds and
financial institutions and (ii) quantity the identified interlinkages (AFSA,
BoA) ¶13-14;27
|3|Medium-
term|\n|**_Recommendation 5: Resources_**
|**_Recommendation 5: Resources_**
|**_Recommendation 5: Resources_**
|\n|Increase the number of staff work on risk analysis in the fund sector to
support (i) financial stability assessment and (ii) risk-based supervision
(AFSA) ¶123-24|2|Medium-
term|\n\n\n1Near term: < 12 months; Medium term: 12 to 24 months.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 8, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [{"bbox": [77.74446105957031, 70.6080322265625, 534.135986328125, 492.6600036621094], "columns": 3, "rows": 14}], "text": "8\n\n Table 1. Key Recommendations Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation Priority Timeframe \n\n Recommendations and Authority Responsible for Implementation Priority Timeframe 1 \n _Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_ _Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_ _Recommendation 1: Data and portfolio analysis_ \n Increase the frequency of reporting of key data items such as flows and returns (AFSA) ¶20-23 1 Medium- term \n Provide detailed analysis of funds’ portfolio including risks related to interest rate (duration) and common exposures (portfolio overlap) at sectoral level (AFSA) ¶6-7; 19-22 1 Near-term \n _Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_ _Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_ _Recommendation 2: Investor behavior and stress tests_ \n Analyze the drivers of investors flows (AFSA) ¶11;21 2 Medium- term \n Perform scenario analysis and stress tests (AFSA) ¶25-26 2 Medium- term \n _Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_ _Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_ _Recommendation 3: Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs)_ \n Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of price-based and quantity-based LMTs for Albanian funds (AFSA) ¶27-30 2 Medium- term \n Expand the list of available LMTs, including through legislative change if necessary (AFSA, MoF) ¶27-30 3 Medium- term \n _Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_ _Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_ _Recommendation 4: Cross-sectoral linkages_ \n Conduct a joint work to (i) map the interlinkages between funds and financial institutions and (ii) quantity the identified interlinkages (AFSA, BoA) ¶13-14;27 3 Medium- term \n _Recommendation 5: Resources_ _Recommendation 5: Resources_ _Recommendation 5: Resources_ \n Increase the number of staff work on risk analysis in the fund sector to support (i) financial stability assessment and (ii) risk-based supervision (AFSA) ¶123-24 2 Medium- term \n\n1Near term: < 12 months; Medium term: 12 to 24 months.", "text_characters": 1702}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0009-001"], "markdown": "9\n\n\n**I.** **INTRODUCTION**\n\n\n**A.** **Background**\n\n\n**1.** **In December 2021, AFSA requested TA from the IMF in respect of**\n**interconnectedness risks in the fund sector.** Discussions on the scope of the work took\nplace between MCM and AFSA over the period December 2021–April 2022.\n\n\n**2.** **The objective of the mission was to identify and measure risks related to**\n**interconnectedness in the fund sector.** Interlinkages can be related to direct exposures\nto entities within the financial sector through securities or activities, such as derivatives\ntrading, or securities financing transactions (repo and securities lending). In addition,\ndirect exposures to specific markets, such as the domestic sovereign bond market could\nalso be significant. Finally, indirect exposures through common exposures of funds to the\nsame issuer or asset could also increase interconnectedness (Figure 1).\n\n\nFigure 1. Interlinkages within the fund sector\n\n\n\nMarkets Banks\n\n\n\nInvestment funds\n\n\n\nInvestors\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSource: International Monetary Fund Staff\n\n\n**3.** **The mission was conducted in several phases:**\n\n\n - an initial questionnaire prepared by the mission and completed by the AFSA with\nadditional supporting material provided in May 2022;\n\n - a number of virtual meetings then took place between May and June 2022 with\nsenior officials and representatives of the AFSA and BoA;\n\n - an information assessment phase; and\n\n - drafting of this report.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 9, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "9\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\n\nA. Background\n\n1. In December 2021, AFSA requested TA from the IMF in respect of\ninterconnectedness risks in the fund sector. Discussions on the scope of the work took\nplace between MCM and AFSA over the period December 2021–April 2022.\n\n2. The objective of the mission was to identify and measure risks related to\ninterconnectedness in the fund sector. Interlinkages can be related to direct exposures\nto entities within the financial sector through securities or activities, such as derivatives\ntrading, or securities financing transactions (repo and securities lending). In addition,\ndirect exposures to specific markets, such as the domestic sovereign bond market could\nalso be significant. Finally, indirect exposures through common exposures of funds to the\nsame issuer or asset could also increase interconnectedness (Figure 1).\n\nFigure 1. Interlinkages within the fund sector\n\nMarkets Banks\n\nInvestment funds\n\nInvestors\n\nSource: International Monetary Fund Staff\n\n3. The mission was conducted in several phases:\n\n - an initial questionnaire prepared by the mission and completed by the AFSA with\nadditional supporting material provided in May 2022;\n\n - a number of virtual meetings then took place between May and June 2022 with\nsenior officials and representatives of the AFSA and BoA;\n\n - an information assessment phase; and\n\n - drafting of this report.", "text_characters": 1157}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0010-001"], "markdown": "10\n\n\n**B.** **Albania’s investment fund sector**\n\n\n**4.** **The fund sector has expanded over recent years to reach Lek 77 billion in Q1:2022**\n**(Figure 2), which equates to approximately 4 percent of GDP, and 4 percent of**\n**financial sector assets.** The growth of the sector has been driven by inflows from\ninvestors (mainly retail), as well as positive returns on assets (mainly domestic sovereign\nbonds). Funds are held by around 41,000 investors, which are almost exclusively retail\nclients, as the share of institutional investors is less than 0.1 percent of total investors.\n\n\nFigure 2. Total net assets of the fund sector\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Total net assets in Lek bn.\n\n\n**5.** **The fund sector is highly concentrated, with the largest fund accounting for 62**\n**percent of total fund assets, and the three largest funds for 95 percent of the sector**\n**(Figure 3).** As of Q1:2022, there were 14 funds in Albania [2] : 12 non-UCITS [3] funds, and 2\n\n\n2 The regulatory framework for open-ended funds in Albania distinguishes between (i) UCITS, (ii) nonUCITS and (iii) Alternative Investment Funds (see Law No.56/2020 on Collective Investment\nUndertakings).\n\n3 UCITS stands for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities. UCITS are subject\nto a specific European Union (EU) regulatory framework. For the purposes of this report, UCITS should\nbe understood as investment fund structures that are subject to requirements broadly equivalent to those\nof the EU framework.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.13, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 10, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.0, 229.4296875, 449.2499694824219, 448.7753601074219)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(176,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 449, "number": 9, "size": 20526, "transform": [287.2499694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 219.34567260742188, 162.0, 229.4296875], "width": 588, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "10\n\nB. Albania’s investment fund sector\n\n4. The fund sector has expanded over recent years to reach Lek 77 billion in Q1:2022\n(Figure 2), which equates to approximately 4 percent of GDP, and 4 percent of\nfinancial sector assets. The growth of the sector has been driven by inflows from\ninvestors (mainly retail), as well as positive returns on assets (mainly domestic sovereign\nbonds). Funds are held by around 41,000 investors, which are almost exclusively retail\nclients, as the share of institutional investors is less than 0.1 percent of total investors.\n\nFigure 2. Total net assets of the fund sector\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Total net assets in Lek bn.\n\n5. The fund sector is highly concentrated, with the largest fund accounting for 62\npercent of total fund assets, and the three largest funds for 95 percent of the sector\n(Figure 3). As of Q1:2022, there were 14 funds in Albania [2] : 12 non-UCITS [3] funds, and 2\n\n2 The regulatory framework for open-ended funds in Albania distinguishes between (i) UCITS, (ii) nonUCITS and (iii) Alternative Investment Funds (see Law No.56/2020 on Collective Investment\nUndertakings).\n\n3 UCITS stands for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities. UCITS are subject\nto a specific European Union (EU) regulatory framework. For the purposes of this report, UCITS should\nbe understood as investment fund structures that are subject to requirements broadly equivalent to those\nof the EU framework.", "text_characters": 1280}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0011-001"], "markdown": "11\n\n\nalternative investment funds (AIF) [4] recently launched [5] . This compares with six funds\nend-2019. The funds are related to five asset management companies, including one\nwhich accounts for 96 percent of the fund net assets.\n\n\nFigure 3. Composition of the fund sector as of Q1:2022\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Total net assets in Lek bn as of Q1:2022.\n\n\n**6.** **Funds are primarily exposed to the domestic sovereign bond market.** Some funds\nthat have launched recently invest in foreign sovereign bonds and corporate bonds, as\nwell as in foreign equities, but they remain small. Overall, around 65 percent of funds’\nassets are composed of domestic sovereign bonds (Figure 4). Most funds also have\nsignificant exposures to cash.\n\n\n4 In the EU, AIFs are all investment funds that are not UCITS, while in Albania AIFs are funds which are\nneither UCITS nor non-UCITS as defined in the Albanian legislation. AIFs are typically marketed to\nprofessional investors, unlike other types of funds which can be sold to retail investors.\n\n5 One non-UCITS fund was not operational as the time of the report and the two AIFs have to report endyear data once a year to AFSA. Therefore, the data used in this report do not include those three funds.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1324, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 11, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.37503051757812, 156.71484375, 449.61004638671875, 380.0648193359375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 451, "number": 8, "size": 75465, "transform": [287.2350158691406, 0.0, -0.0, 223.3499755859375, 162.37503051757812, 156.71484375], "width": 580, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "11\n\nalternative investment funds (AIF) [4] recently launched [5] . This compares with six funds\nend-2019. The funds are related to five asset management companies, including one\nwhich accounts for 96 percent of the fund net assets.\n\nFigure 3. Composition of the fund sector as of Q1:2022\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Total net assets in Lek bn as of Q1:2022.\n\n6. Funds are primarily exposed to the domestic sovereign bond market. Some funds\nthat have launched recently invest in foreign sovereign bonds and corporate bonds, as\nwell as in foreign equities, but they remain small. Overall, around 65 percent of funds’\nassets are composed of domestic sovereign bonds (Figure 4). Most funds also have\nsignificant exposures to cash.\n\n4 In the EU, AIFs are all investment funds that are not UCITS, while in Albania AIFs are funds which are\nneither UCITS nor non-UCITS as defined in the Albanian legislation. AIFs are typically marketed to\nprofessional investors, unlike other types of funds which can be sold to retail investors.\n\n5 One non-UCITS fund was not operational as the time of the report and the two AIFs have to report endyear data once a year to AFSA. Therefore, the data used in this report do not include those three funds.", "text_characters": 1073}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0012-001"], "markdown": "12\n\n\nFigure 4. Asset composition as of Q1:2022\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Portfolio composition by asset type, in percentage a of Q1:2022.\n\n\n**7.** **Funds’ returns tend to be highly correlated, reflecting common exposures.** Using\nquarterly data on returns since 2017 for the three oldest funds (Prestigi, Vizion and\nPremium), a statistical analysis indicates that performance is highly similar with\ncorrelation coefficients across funds higher than 0.93. Similar results are obtained using a\nlarger sample of funds (including Albsig standard and ABI EIA [6] ), and data for 2022. The\ncorrelation of returns is driven by common exposures to the domestic sovereign bond\nmarket. This interconnectedness in returns implies that if domestic sovereign bond\nmarkets were to be impacted by a negative shock (increase in yields), funds’ returns\nwould be likely to deteriorate by a similar magnitude at the same time.\n\n\n**8.** **Most funds are subject to a liquidity requirement.** Funds need to have high-quality\nliquid assets (HQLA) totaling the higher of 10 percent of total net assets or the\ncumulative 3-month gross outflows. At least 50 percent of the HQLA needs to be in cash\nor securities maturing within seven days. Funds that invest at least 50 percent in ‘active\nmarkets’ are not subject to the 50 percent requirement on cash and securities maturing\nwithin seven days.\n\n\n**9.** **Most funds did not experience severe outflows in the first half of 2022.** While some\nfunds have recorded outflows in 2022, redemptions have been relatively contained except\n\n\n6 Those two funds invest primarily in domestic sovereign bonds and were launched in 2020 and 2021.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1308, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 12, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.00001525878906, 99.17864990234375, 449.25, 319.9127197265625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(240,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 448, "number": 8, "size": 30360, "transform": [287.2499694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 220.73406982421875, 162.00001525878906, 99.17864990234375], "width": 583, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "12\n\nFigure 4. Asset composition as of Q1:2022\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Portfolio composition by asset type, in percentage a of Q1:2022.\n\n7. Funds’ returns tend to be highly correlated, reflecting common exposures. Using\nquarterly data on returns since 2017 for the three oldest funds (Prestigi, Vizion and\nPremium), a statistical analysis indicates that performance is highly similar with\ncorrelation coefficients across funds higher than 0.93. Similar results are obtained using a\nlarger sample of funds (including Albsig standard and ABI EIA [6] ), and data for 2022. The\ncorrelation of returns is driven by common exposures to the domestic sovereign bond\nmarket. This interconnectedness in returns implies that if domestic sovereign bond\nmarkets were to be impacted by a negative shock (increase in yields), funds’ returns\nwould be likely to deteriorate by a similar magnitude at the same time.\n\n8. Most funds are subject to a liquidity requirement. Funds need to have high-quality\nliquid assets (HQLA) totaling the higher of 10 percent of total net assets or the\ncumulative 3-month gross outflows. At least 50 percent of the HQLA needs to be in cash\nor securities maturing within seven days. Funds that invest at least 50 percent in ‘active\nmarkets’ are not subject to the 50 percent requirement on cash and securities maturing\nwithin seven days.\n\n9. Most funds did not experience severe outflows in the first half of 2022. While some\nfunds have recorded outflows in 2022, redemptions have been relatively contained except\n\n6 Those two funds invest primarily in domestic sovereign bonds and were launched in 2020 and 2021.", "text_characters": 1418}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0013-001"], "markdown": "13\n\n\nfor one fund which saw large redemptions related to outflows from an institutional\ninvestor (Figure 5).\n\n\nFigure 5. Liquid assets and outflows\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Cash holdings as of Q1:2022 and worst monthly outflows since\nDecember 2021, in percentage of total net assets.\n\n\n**10.** **However, funds experienced stress in the summer of 2022 as financial conditions**\n**tightened.** In a context of inflationary pressure, the BoA increased interest rates by 25\nbasis points in July and 50 basis points in August. As a result, funds’ returns declined,\nand investors redemptions increased. Between June and end-August, cumulative\nredemptions reached almost Lek 11 billion, 15 percent of total net assets of the sector\n(Figure 6). Outflows were concentrated in bond funds, due to their exposures to interest\nrate risk.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1264, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 13, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.00001525878906, 141.5361328125, 449.25, 354.8650817871094)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(222,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 430, "number": 6, "size": 32721, "transform": [287.2499694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 213.32894897460938, 162.00001525878906, 141.5361328125], "width": 579, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "13\n\nfor one fund which saw large redemptions related to outflows from an institutional\ninvestor (Figure 5).\n\nFigure 5. Liquid assets and outflows\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Cash holdings as of Q1:2022 and worst monthly outflows since\nDecember 2021, in percentage of total net assets.\n\n10. However, funds experienced stress in the summer of 2022 as financial conditions\ntightened. In a context of inflationary pressure, the BoA increased interest rates by 25\nbasis points in July and 50 basis points in August. As a result, funds’ returns declined,\nand investors redemptions increased. Between June and end-August, cumulative\nredemptions reached almost Lek 11 billion, 15 percent of total net assets of the sector\n(Figure 6). Outflows were concentrated in bond funds, due to their exposures to interest\nrate risk.", "text_characters": 738}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0014-001"], "markdown": "14\n\n\nFigure 6. Net flows during the summer of 2022\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Net flows, in percentage of total net assets.\n\n\n**11.** **Redemptions were very large compared to the decline in returns, indicating a**\n**potential high sensitivity of investors to performance.** Figure 7 shows that for\ngovernment bond funds, negative returns are associated with very large outflows. Some\nof the funds experienced redemptions of 10 percent in August although returns declined\nby only 100 basis points over the same period. This indicates that investors might be\nprone to redeem when performance turns negative or when there are sizeable market\nshocks.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1268, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 14, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(161.99998474121094, 99.17877197265625, 449.24993896484375, 313.12017822265625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 429, "number": 6, "size": 54411, "transform": [287.2499694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 213.94140625, 161.99998474121094, 99.17877197265625], "width": 576, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "14\n\nFigure 6. Net flows during the summer of 2022\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Net flows, in percentage of total net assets.\n\n11. Redemptions were very large compared to the decline in returns, indicating a\npotential high sensitivity of investors to performance. Figure 7 shows that for\ngovernment bond funds, negative returns are associated with very large outflows. Some\nof the funds experienced redemptions of 10 percent in August although returns declined\nby only 100 basis points over the same period. This indicates that investors might be\nprone to redeem when performance turns negative or when there are sizeable market\nshocks.", "text_characters": 587}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0015-001"], "markdown": "15\n\n\nFigure 7. Net flows and performance\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Monthly net flows and lagged returns for sovereign and corporate\nbonds funds (January–August 2022).\n\n\n**12.** **While funds managed to meet redemptions, this episode illustrates how liquidity**\n**risk can crystallize.** All funds were able to raise cash to pay redeeming investors through\na combination of cash drawdown, sales of bonds and proceeds from the repayment of\nbonds maturing. However, if returns were to continue to fall sharply and outflows to\nincrease, funds exposed to fixed income instruments could face heightened challenges\nrelated to liquidity risk.\n\n\n**13.** **Counterparty risk is very limited as funds barely use derivatives or securities**\n**financing transactions (SFTs).** While funds can use derivatives for hedging, no funds\nhad derivative exposure as of Q1:2022. Similarly, the use of SFTs was very limited with\nonly one reverse repo transaction (where the fund lends cash against collateral) and one\nrepo transaction (where the fund borrows cash by posting collateral). In both cases,\nAlbanian sovereign bonds were used as collateral.\n\n\n**14.** **Funds’ interconnectedness within the financial sector rests mainly on banks.** On the\nasset side, funds hold around 13 percent of their asset in cash (Lek 9.9 billion), and\nfunds’ deposits only accounts for 2 percent of banks’ total assets. Funds do not invest\nsubstantially in securities (debt or equities) issued by banks.\n\n\n**C.** **AFSA’s approach to identify, monitor, and mitigate risks**\n\n\n**15.** **AFSA receives detailed information from funds on a regular basis.** On a quarterly\nbasis, funds provide AFSA with full portfolio information as well as balance sheet data\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1245, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 15, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.0, 99.17869567871094, 449.2499694824219, 309.22711181640625)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 419, "number": 9, "size": 74523, "transform": [287.2499694824219, 0.0, -0.0, 210.0484161376953, 162.0, 99.17869567871094], "width": 573, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "15\n\nFigure 7. Net flows and performance\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International Monetary\nFund Staff.\nNote: Monthly net flows and lagged returns for sovereign and corporate\nbonds funds (January–August 2022).\n\n12. While funds managed to meet redemptions, this episode illustrates how liquidity\nrisk can crystallize. All funds were able to raise cash to pay redeeming investors through\na combination of cash drawdown, sales of bonds and proceeds from the repayment of\nbonds maturing. However, if returns were to continue to fall sharply and outflows to\nincrease, funds exposed to fixed income instruments could face heightened challenges\nrelated to liquidity risk.\n\n13. Counterparty risk is very limited as funds barely use derivatives or securities\nfinancing transactions (SFTs). While funds can use derivatives for hedging, no funds\nhad derivative exposure as of Q1:2022. Similarly, the use of SFTs was very limited with\nonly one reverse repo transaction (where the fund lends cash against collateral) and one\nrepo transaction (where the fund borrows cash by posting collateral). In both cases,\nAlbanian sovereign bonds were used as collateral.\n\n14. Funds’ interconnectedness within the financial sector rests mainly on banks. On the\nasset side, funds hold around 13 percent of their asset in cash (Lek 9.9 billion), and\nfunds’ deposits only accounts for 2 percent of banks’ total assets. Funds do not invest\nsubstantially in securities (debt or equities) issued by banks.\n\nC. AFSA’s approach to identify, monitor, and mitigate risks\n\n15. AFSA receives detailed information from funds on a regular basis. On a quarterly\nbasis, funds provide AFSA with full portfolio information as well as balance sheet data", "text_characters": 1458}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "16\n\n\nand an income statement. AFSA publishes detailed information on its website every\nquarter through a statistical report. [7] More recently, AFSA has taken steps to increase the\nreporting frequency. [8] Funds have been providing data on returns on a monthly basis since\nearly 2022 (against a quarterly frequency previously), net redemptions on a weekly basis\n(against monthly previously), and liquidity indicators (HQLAs and cash buffers) on a\nmonthly basis (against quarterly reporting previously) since May 2022. Similarly,\nmanagers had to report to AFSA the stress test results for the end of March 2022. AFSA\nhas the power to request additional information from fund managers.\n\n\n**16.** **AFSA contributes to systemic risk discussions within the Financial Stability**\n**Advisory Group (FSAG).** The Executive General Director of AFSA is a member of\nFSAG, along with the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory\nAuthority Board, the Governor the BoA, and the General Director of the Albanian\nDeposit Insurance Agency. FSAG plays an advisory role in the design of policies,\nenhancement of inter-agency coordination and systemic risk monitoring.\n\n\n**17.** **Risk monitoring tends to be done on an individual fund basis.** As part of its\nsupervisory duties, AFSA monitors risk at fund-level but not necessarily at sector-wide\nlevel.\n\n\n**18.** **The Supervisory department focusing on asset management has limited resources.**\nOverall, there are four staff at AFSA in charge of fund supervision in the private pension\nand investment funds market directorate. This compares to six staff in the securities\nmarket directorate, and four staff in the DLT-based financial market supervision\ndirectorate.\n\n\n**D.** **Summary of risk analysis**\n\n\n**19.** **The main risks in the fund sector related to liquidity transformation, potential**\n**outflows, and concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond market.** While\nthe investor base has been stable over time, in a context of tightening of financial\nconditions through rises in interest rates, Albanian bond funds could experience negative\nreturns which could trigger outflows. Redemptions could in turn force asset managers to\nsell assets, including domestic sovereign bonds, and it is uncertain whether the market\nwould have the ability to absorb those sales without price discounts.\n\n\n[7 The statistical reports are available at https://amf.gov.al/statistika.asp?id=5&s=2.](https://amf.gov.al/statistika.asp?id=5&s=2)\n\n8 AFSA’ Board decision No. 88 and No. 136 dated respectively 28 April 2022 and 29 July 2022.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 16, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "16\n\nand an income statement. AFSA publishes detailed information on its website every\nquarter through a statistical report. [7] More recently, AFSA has taken steps to increase the\nreporting frequency. [8] Funds have been providing data on returns on a monthly basis since\nearly 2022 (against a quarterly frequency previously), net redemptions on a weekly basis\n(against monthly previously), and liquidity indicators (HQLAs and cash buffers) on a\nmonthly basis (against quarterly reporting previously) since May 2022. Similarly,\nmanagers had to report to AFSA the stress test results for the end of March 2022. AFSA\nhas the power to request additional information from fund managers.\n\n16. AFSA contributes to systemic risk discussions within the Financial Stability\nAdvisory Group (FSAG). The Executive General Director of AFSA is a member of\nFSAG, along with the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory\nAuthority Board, the Governor the BoA, and the General Director of the Albanian\nDeposit Insurance Agency. FSAG plays an advisory role in the design of policies,\nenhancement of inter-agency coordination and systemic risk monitoring.\n\n17. Risk monitoring tends to be done on an individual fund basis. As part of its\nsupervisory duties, AFSA monitors risk at fund-level but not necessarily at sector-wide\nlevel.\n\n18. The Supervisory department focusing on asset management has limited resources.\nOverall, there are four staff at AFSA in charge of fund supervision in the private pension\nand investment funds market directorate. This compares to six staff in the securities\nmarket directorate, and four staff in the DLT-based financial market supervision\ndirectorate.\n\nD. Summary of risk analysis\n\n19. The main risks in the fund sector related to liquidity transformation, potential\noutflows, and concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond market. While\nthe investor base has been stable over time, in a context of tightening of financial\nconditions through rises in interest rates, Albanian bond funds could experience negative\nreturns which could trigger outflows. Redemptions could in turn force asset managers to\nsell assets, including domestic sovereign bonds, and it is uncertain whether the market\nwould have the ability to absorb those sales without price discounts.\n\n7 The statistical reports are available at https://amf.gov.al/statistika.asp?id=5&s=2.\n\n8 AFSA’ Board decision No. 88 and No. 136 dated respectively 28 April 2022 and 29 July 2022.", "text_characters": 2106}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "17\n\n\n**II.** **MITIGATING RISKS IN THE FUND SECTOR**\n\n\n**A.** **Data reporting and risk analysis**\n\n\n**20.** **It is key for AFSA to have access to timely data on key items to monitor the fund**\n**sector.** While AFSA already receives detailed information from funds, the frequency of\nreporting should be increased for some key items. Data on flows and returns should be\nreported a least on a weekly basis, in line with the redemption profile of the funds.\n\n\n**21.** **Further analysis of the drivers of investor behavior is warranted.** While investors net\nflows have been contained so far, it is crucial to understand the main factors driving\nredemptions and subscriptions. Further insights on the distribution of fund products,\nincluding through bank networks, as well as the sensitivity of flows to past performance\nare key to assess potential risks of outflows looking forward.\n\n\n**22.** **More granular monitoring of risks related to fund portfolios is also recommended.**\nWith available data, AFSA can already use portfolio information to calculate risk metrics\nrelated to interest rate risk (duration), and credit risk (credit spread). In addition, given\nconcentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond market, AFSA could perform an\nanalysis of portfolio overlap at instrument-level across funds with sovereign exposures.\nSuch analysis could be used to assess potential liquidation costs related to the sale of\nsovereign bonds during stress, and potential spillover to funds holding similar\ninstruments. In addition, analyzing the correlation of funds’ returns would also be useful\nin identifying market-based interconnectedness.\n\n\n**23.** **Monitoring risks at sectoral level is key.** Since investment funds in Albania tend to\nhave similar concentrated exposures to domestic sovereign instruments, risks should be\nanalyzed at sectoral level, as well as individual fund level. The behavior of some funds\ncan have a direct impact on other funds. For example, if a fund starts liquidating\nsovereign debt holdings, less liquidity will be available to other funds (given the limited\nabsorption capacity of the market), and the sales are likely to put downward price\npressure on similar bonds held by other funds.\n\n\n**24.** **AFSA should have more resources to perform risks analysis.** Given the limited\nnumber of staff dedicated to the fund sector, there is a need to increase the resources of\nAFSA for the agency to perform more risk analysis. Analysts with a quantitative\nbackground would be best placed to carry out this work.\n\n\n**B.** **Stress testing and intersectoral linkages**\n\n\n**25.** **AFSA could use stress tests to assess risks in the fund sector.** Available data could\nalready be used to perform stress test and scenario analysis (Box 1). Such an exercise\ncould be used to identify vulnerable funds and potential vulnerabilities in the financial\nsystem.", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 17, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "17\n\nII. MITIGATING RISKS IN THE FUND SECTOR\n\nA. Data reporting and risk analysis\n\n20. It is key for AFSA to have access to timely data on key items to monitor the fund\nsector. While AFSA already receives detailed information from funds, the frequency of\nreporting should be increased for some key items. Data on flows and returns should be\nreported a least on a weekly basis, in line with the redemption profile of the funds.\n\n21. Further analysis of the drivers of investor behavior is warranted. While investors net\nflows have been contained so far, it is crucial to understand the main factors driving\nredemptions and subscriptions. Further insights on the distribution of fund products,\nincluding through bank networks, as well as the sensitivity of flows to past performance\nare key to assess potential risks of outflows looking forward.\n\n22. More granular monitoring of risks related to fund portfolios is also recommended.\nWith available data, AFSA can already use portfolio information to calculate risk metrics\nrelated to interest rate risk (duration), and credit risk (credit spread). In addition, given\nconcentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond market, AFSA could perform an\nanalysis of portfolio overlap at instrument-level across funds with sovereign exposures.\nSuch analysis could be used to assess potential liquidation costs related to the sale of\nsovereign bonds during stress, and potential spillover to funds holding similar\ninstruments. In addition, analyzing the correlation of funds’ returns would also be useful\nin identifying market-based interconnectedness.\n\n23. Monitoring risks at sectoral level is key. Since investment funds in Albania tend to\nhave similar concentrated exposures to domestic sovereign instruments, risks should be\nanalyzed at sectoral level, as well as individual fund level. The behavior of some funds\ncan have a direct impact on other funds. For example, if a fund starts liquidating\nsovereign debt holdings, less liquidity will be available to other funds (given the limited\nabsorption capacity of the market), and the sales are likely to put downward price\npressure on similar bonds held by other funds.\n\n24. AFSA should have more resources to perform risks analysis. Given the limited\nnumber of staff dedicated to the fund sector, there is a need to increase the resources of\nAFSA for the agency to perform more risk analysis. Analysts with a quantitative\nbackground would be best placed to carry out this work.\n\nB. Stress testing and intersectoral linkages\n\n25. AFSA could use stress tests to assess risks in the fund sector. Available data could\nalready be used to perform stress test and scenario analysis (Box 1). Such an exercise\ncould be used to identify vulnerable funds and potential vulnerabilities in the financial\nsystem.", "text_characters": 2345}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0018-001"], "markdown": "18\n\n\n**26.** **AFSA, in coordination with BoA, could perform a joint analysis of intersectoral**\n**linkages within the financial system.** Such analysis would seek to (i) map the\ninterlinkages between financial institutions and markets, and (ii) quantify the materiality\nof those linkages. This work could then be used to assess the main risk transmission\nchannels within the financial sector, and to perform scenario analysis.\n\n\n**Box 1. An illustrative stress test for Albanian funds**\n\n\n**Scenario design**\n\n\nIn this stress test, we assume that yields on Albanian bonds increase by 100 basis points (parallel shift of the yield\ncurve). The rise in yield triggers mark-to-market losses on sovereign and corporate bonds held by funds, and we\nassume that the duration of sovereign bond holdings is 2, resulting in a loss of 2 percent.\n\n\n**Impact on returns and flows**\n\n\nUsing data on fund portfolios, the impact on fund returns can be calculated. The mark-to-market losses would\namount to Lek 1.1 billion. We then assume that negative performance would trigger investor outflows. The\nflow/return relationship is estimated to be around 0.75 for funds mainly exposed to sovereign bonds, and 0.38 for\ncorporate bond funds, using monthly data on returns and flows over January–August 2022, which include the\nstress observed during the summer. Aggregate investor outflows would amount to around Lek 750 million (1.3\npercent of funds’ total net assets after the interest rate shock), with some variation across funds with outflows\nranging from around 0.6 percent of assets up to 1.8 percent (Figure 8).\n\n\nFigure 8. Impact of 100bps shock on funds returns and flows\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International\nMonetary Fund Staff.\nNote: Impacts on returns assuming a duration of two. Outflows based\non a flow/return relationship parameter of 0.75 for government bond\nfunds and 0.38 for corporate bond funds (R. Euro and MIKS).\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1191, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 18, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.37474060058594, 414.53802490234375, 449.58905029296875, 615.5880126953125)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 3, "cs-name": "DeviceRGB", "has-mask": false, "height": 399, "number": 10, "size": 63681, "transform": [287.21429443359375, 0.0, -0.0, 201.04998779296875, 162.37474060058594, 414.53802490234375], "width": 570, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "18\n\n26. AFSA, in coordination with BoA, could perform a joint analysis of intersectoral\nlinkages within the financial system. Such analysis would seek to (i) map the\ninterlinkages between financial institutions and markets, and (ii) quantify the materiality\nof those linkages. This work could then be used to assess the main risk transmission\nchannels within the financial sector, and to perform scenario analysis.\n\nBox 1. An illustrative stress test for Albanian funds\n\nScenario design\n\nIn this stress test, we assume that yields on Albanian bonds increase by 100 basis points (parallel shift of the yield\ncurve). The rise in yield triggers mark-to-market losses on sovereign and corporate bonds held by funds, and we\nassume that the duration of sovereign bond holdings is 2, resulting in a loss of 2 percent.\n\nImpact on returns and flows\n\nUsing data on fund portfolios, the impact on fund returns can be calculated. The mark-to-market losses would\namount to Lek 1.1 billion. We then assume that negative performance would trigger investor outflows. The\nflow/return relationship is estimated to be around 0.75 for funds mainly exposed to sovereign bonds, and 0.38 for\ncorporate bond funds, using monthly data on returns and flows over January–August 2022, which include the\nstress observed during the summer. Aggregate investor outflows would amount to around Lek 750 million (1.3\npercent of funds’ total net assets after the interest rate shock), with some variation across funds with outflows\nranging from around 0.6 percent of assets up to 1.8 percent (Figure 8).\n\nFigure 8. Impact of 100bps shock on funds returns and flows\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, International\nMonetary Fund Staff.\nNote: Impacts on returns assuming a duration of two. Outflows based\non a flow/return relationship parameter of 0.75 for government bond\nfunds and 0.38 for corporate bond funds (R. Euro and MIKS).", "text_characters": 1600}
+{"figure_ids": ["cr-2023-167-fig-p0019-001"], "markdown": "19\n\n\n**Asset sales**\n\n\nGiven investors’ redemptions, we assume that asset managers would follow a pro rata liquidation approach\nwhereby they would sell assets in proportion of their share in the fund portfolio. This implies that funds mainly\nexposed to sovereign bonds would sell more sovereign bonds (in relative terms) than funds with a more\ndiversified portfolio. Overall, funds would sell around Lek 753 million of assets, including Lek 502 million of\nsovereign bonds.\n\n\n**Absorption capacity of the market**\n\n\nThe estimated volume of sales can be compared to liquidity measures in secondary markets. According to BoA,\nbond trading volumes amounted to Lek 3 billion in 2021h1, implying daily volumes of around Lek 25 million.\nUnder average trading conditions it would therefore take a least 20 days for the Lek 502 million of sovereign\nbond to be sold, more than twice the settlement period for fund shares. An alternative measure is to compare the\nvolumes of sales to banks’ sovereign bond holdings (estimated at around Lek 450 billion). In that case, the\nadditional purchase by banks of bonds sold by funds would only represent 0.1 percent of banks’ bond holdings\n(Figure 9). Although such purchases would not represent a material increase in banks’ holdings of sovereign debt,\nthe mission team did not assess the feasibility of such purchases nor their compatibility with prudential\nrequirements on assets held by banks. Based on discussions with the BoA, commercial banks might have limited\nappetite to increase their sovereign bond exposures.\n\n\nThe analysis shows that funds might face challenges in selling sovereign bonds quickly, unless banks were\nwilling to increase their portfolio of domestic sovereign debt.\n\n\nFigure 9. Ratio of sovereign bond sales to average daily trading volumes and banks’\n\nholdings of domestic sovereign debt\n\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, Bank of Albania,\nInternational Monetary Fund Staff.\nNote: Number of days needed to dispose of sovereign assets\nassuming daily volumes of Lek 25Mn, banks’ holdings of ALL\nsovereign debt assumed to be around Lek 450bn.\n\n\n\n", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.1157, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 19, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [{"bbox": "Rect(162.37474060058594, 415.1869201660156, 449.59393310546875, 610.4368896484375)", "bpc": 8, "colorspace": 1, "cs-name": "Indexed(188,DeviceRGB)", "has-mask": false, "height": 397, "number": 11, "size": 18330, "transform": [287.21917724609375, 0.0, -0.0, 195.24996948242188, 162.37474060058594, 415.1869201660156], "width": 584, "xres": 96, "yres": 96}], "tables": [], "text": "19\n\nAsset sales\n\nGiven investors’ redemptions, we assume that asset managers would follow a pro rata liquidation approach\nwhereby they would sell assets in proportion of their share in the fund portfolio. This implies that funds mainly\nexposed to sovereign bonds would sell more sovereign bonds (in relative terms) than funds with a more\ndiversified portfolio. Overall, funds would sell around Lek 753 million of assets, including Lek 502 million of\nsovereign bonds.\n\nAbsorption capacity of the market\n\nThe estimated volume of sales can be compared to liquidity measures in secondary markets. According to BoA,\nbond trading volumes amounted to Lek 3 billion in 2021h1, implying daily volumes of around Lek 25 million.\nUnder average trading conditions it would therefore take a least 20 days for the Lek 502 million of sovereign\nbond to be sold, more than twice the settlement period for fund shares. An alternative measure is to compare the\nvolumes of sales to banks’ sovereign bond holdings (estimated at around Lek 450 billion). In that case, the\nadditional purchase by banks of bonds sold by funds would only represent 0.1 percent of banks’ bond holdings\n(Figure 9). Although such purchases would not represent a material increase in banks’ holdings of sovereign debt,\nthe mission team did not assess the feasibility of such purchases nor their compatibility with prudential\nrequirements on assets held by banks. Based on discussions with the BoA, commercial banks might have limited\nappetite to increase their sovereign bond exposures.\n\nThe analysis shows that funds might face challenges in selling sovereign bonds quickly, unless banks were\nwilling to increase their portfolio of domestic sovereign debt.\n\nFigure 9. Ratio of sovereign bond sales to average daily trading volumes and banks’\n\nholdings of domestic sovereign debt\n\nSources: Albanian Financial Services Authority, Bank of Albania,\nInternational Monetary Fund Staff.\nNote: Number of days needed to dispose of sovereign assets\nassuming daily volumes of Lek 25Mn, banks’ holdings of ALL\nsovereign debt assumed to be around Lek 450bn.", "text_characters": 1762}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "20\n\n\n**C.** **Reducing liquidity risk in the fund sector**\n\n\n**27.** **AFSA should consider making additional liquidity management tools (LMTs)**\n**available to funds.** When funds face large redemptions from investors, they need to raise\ncash by using their available liquidity (bank deposits), and/or through the sale of\nsecurities. Given the lack of liquidity in sovereign bond markets, funds might face\nchallenges in disposing of sovereign bonds quickly and at a low cost. LMTs can mitigate\nthis risk by (i) reducing the likelihood of large redemptions from investors, and (ii)\nreducing the impact of such redemptions. AFSA should perform a cost-benefit analysis of\nthose tools, in coordination with the industry. Operational issues related to the activation\nand use of these tools should also be considered.\n\n\n**28.** **Price-based LMTs could mitigate the risk of large redemptions and reduce the**\n**impact of redemptions on remaining investors.** Price-based LMTs, such as redemption\nfees aim at passing some of the costs related to the disposal of assets to redeeming\ninvestors. In doing so, they reduce the incentives for investors to redeem (since they\nwould have to pay a fee), and protect the remaining investors in case of outflows, since\nsome of the costs are directly passed on to redeeming investors. For such LMTs to be\neffective, appropriate and prudent valuation policies are required, which could be\nchallenging when markets are not liquid.\n\n\n**29.** **Quantity-based LMTs can reduce the likelihood of large redemptions** . Such LMTs\ninclude mechanisms, such as side pockets –where illiquid assets are ring-fenced in a\nseparate fund–, or gates –where the value of shares or units that can be redeemed in a\nsingle valuation/dealing day is limited. These could be useful tools for fund managers to\nmitigate liquidity risk and potential downward pressure on domestic sovereign markets.\n\n\n**30.** **The use of repo operations by funds could also be studied.** In case of stress, funds\nmight be able to obtain liquidity by pledging sovereign bonds, as collateral for repo\ntransactions with banks. Such operations would enable funds to meet redemptions,\nwithout causing downward price pressure on the sovereign bond markets. AFSA could\nengage with the industry to discuss the set-up of repo operations, given their very limited\nuse by funds so far.\n\n\n**III.** **CONCLUSION**\n\n\n**31.** **The growth of the fund sector in Albania can support the development of the**\n**economy, and the expansion of capital markets.** While the financial sector is primarily\nbank-based, funds offer diversification benefits for investors, and risk-sharing\nopportunities within the financial system.\n\n\n**32.** **Financial stability issues in the fund sector are limited at the current juncture.** The\nrelatively small size of the sector, its low degree of interconnectedness with the rest of the", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 20, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "20\n\nC. Reducing liquidity risk in the fund sector\n\n27. AFSA should consider making additional liquidity management tools (LMTs)\navailable to funds. When funds face large redemptions from investors, they need to raise\ncash by using their available liquidity (bank deposits), and/or through the sale of\nsecurities. Given the lack of liquidity in sovereign bond markets, funds might face\nchallenges in disposing of sovereign bonds quickly and at a low cost. LMTs can mitigate\nthis risk by (i) reducing the likelihood of large redemptions from investors, and (ii)\nreducing the impact of such redemptions. AFSA should perform a cost-benefit analysis of\nthose tools, in coordination with the industry. Operational issues related to the activation\nand use of these tools should also be considered.\n\n28. Price-based LMTs could mitigate the risk of large redemptions and reduce the\nimpact of redemptions on remaining investors. Price-based LMTs, such as redemption\nfees aim at passing some of the costs related to the disposal of assets to redeeming\ninvestors. In doing so, they reduce the incentives for investors to redeem (since they\nwould have to pay a fee), and protect the remaining investors in case of outflows, since\nsome of the costs are directly passed on to redeeming investors. For such LMTs to be\neffective, appropriate and prudent valuation policies are required, which could be\nchallenging when markets are not liquid.\n\n29. Quantity-based LMTs can reduce the likelihood of large redemptions . Such LMTs\ninclude mechanisms, such as side pockets –where illiquid assets are ring-fenced in a\nseparate fund–, or gates –where the value of shares or units that can be redeemed in a\nsingle valuation/dealing day is limited. These could be useful tools for fund managers to\nmitigate liquidity risk and potential downward pressure on domestic sovereign markets.\n\n30. The use of repo operations by funds could also be studied. In case of stress, funds\nmight be able to obtain liquidity by pledging sovereign bonds, as collateral for repo\ntransactions with banks. Such operations would enable funds to meet redemptions,\nwithout causing downward price pressure on the sovereign bond markets. AFSA could\nengage with the industry to discuss the set-up of repo operations, given their very limited\nuse by funds so far.\n\nIII. CONCLUSION\n\n31. The growth of the fund sector in Albania can support the development of the\neconomy, and the expansion of capital markets. While the financial sector is primarily\nbank-based, funds offer diversification benefits for investors, and risk-sharing\nopportunities within the financial system.\n\n32. Financial stability issues in the fund sector are limited at the current juncture. The\nrelatively small size of the sector, its low degree of interconnectedness with the rest of the", "text_characters": 2355}
+{"figure_ids": [], "markdown": "21\n\n\nfinancial sector, its stable investor base, and the existence of liquidity requirements, are\nimportant risk mitigants.\n\n\n**33.** **The main risk is related to concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond**\n**market.** The lack of substantial secondary market activity in the sovereign bond market,\ncan make it challenging to sell large amounts of sovereign bonds. The stress observed\nduring the summer of 2022, shows how liquidity risks can crystallize in the fund sector.\nOngoing efforts on the establishment of Primary Dealers are welcome and should\ncontinue.\n\n\n**34.** **The financial system is highly exposed to retail clients and investors, and**\n**maintaining confidence in the financial sector is crucial.** Most bank funding depends\non deposits from retail clients, and retail investors are by far the main investors in funds.\nIn addition, retail investors directly hold a sizeable share of domestic sovereign debt\n(higher than 10 percent of outstanding debt).", "maximum_raster_image_page_coverage": 0.0, "needs_ocr": false, "page": 21, "report_id": "cr-2023-167", "source_graphics": [], "source_images": [], "tables": [], "text": "21\n\nfinancial sector, its stable investor base, and the existence of liquidity requirements, are\nimportant risk mitigants.\n\n33. The main risk is related to concentrated exposures to the domestic sovereign bond\nmarket. The lack of substantial secondary market activity in the sovereign bond market,\ncan make it challenging to sell large amounts of sovereign bonds. The stress observed\nduring the summer of 2022, shows how liquidity risks can crystallize in the fund sector.\nOngoing efforts on the establishment of Primary Dealers are welcome and should\ncontinue.\n\n34. The financial system is highly exposed to retail clients and investors, and\nmaintaining confidence in the financial sector is crucial. Most bank funding depends\non deposits from retail clients, and retail investors are by far the main investors in funds.\nIn addition, retail investors directly hold a sizeable share of domestic sovereign debt\n(higher than 10 percent of outstanding debt).", "text_characters": 806}
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0001-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0001-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..953c061acf8ab2d82781623112e8319e1a6f9347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0001-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:88c3feaba8ba5090fbd1a60dd8c2cdf2183e3d3317d6a486640f4170a53ff16d
+size 57631
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0002-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0002-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81758b21e8f80342e3debd763ea99329a7c45e5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0002-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:937c7990ca3788e8aae3bcf55fac0ef5d86d2a7f5fb4aeb8a40e74376572059f
+size 200349
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-001.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-001.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fa1994aa2b4190798fbd1be5400f11adcc6a75f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-001.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:b2d83b5ec434627a84d9e4e653aebe7abeb076218c4398ece7560f64d1229469
+size 4587
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-002.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-002.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09057de07f78160745f93a2370199dbe126f9889
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-002.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5915cc6cdd735b6377bc7f91990c1858c3d028f7804a9ed9d64d89e3a1a346d7
+size 3374
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-003.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-003.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c4b6af51eeb2eda014daa56433dd4077b63fb57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-003.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a1ea2c995f4dd781b874c78f2ccff493a7574876f5ea31f9036d9cbfcc502d44
+size 1589
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-004.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-004.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..21185e4028753ee25e42aaba346d9ea133fce9b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-004.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:67a1b95f03f0d9cbcc09fee00096eb2d62bd8c582f8006cf6f3942a70466ee44
+size 1660
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-005.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-005.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e4924c628da5a1081f58e4b6c132f336e5f5d59c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-005.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:8ce15509ac97c21d2c741f3fd573509c9148d2b194ceb39631b9997712469005
+size 7749
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-006.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-006.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0ebef962745113ada4ee2d07b3fb358eafea65cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-006.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:d554cfc5b4f421e327c4abd9e12b59871e4b21f3f46fe97518fd9075d0b2e528
+size 1226
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-007.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-007.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c317d1446d3fcae0b7250eaa38a8770cf02d828b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-007.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:0e297643e47fe0446c27f7351f58afe62052b314abab72ca73e3e4c13dd1b02a
+size 4677
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-008.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-008.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d44997b839de46bdf1edcc841d97abc44db5a5eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-008.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c1fc2d43b840f6b6a05f3970858cbaa8cfc55164a7c97dec189f77e1e6aeef59
+size 4829
diff --git a/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-009.png b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-009.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8202160d6e812ae7e03b1975a51503712b4ff45c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/interim/cr-2023-170/assets/figures/cr-2023-170-fig-p0003-009.png
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:427bcdb63ceb8bbed30942b06be0e94f5c9ed84d363f9fb576b8008c01ed652c
+size 5019