-
+- *Security Objective*: the concise and abstract statement as given for the threats.
+- *Threat References*: List of Threat References of the threats countered by the Security Objective in question.
+
+Additionally, a table matching the Threats and Security Objectives should be given in an annex TR 33.926 [6].
+
+### 5.2.3 Security Requirements
+
+#### 5.2.3.1 Introduction
+
+3GPP will have to list the countermeasures deemed relevant to mitigate the risks identified in the threat assessment. These countermeasures will take the form of either:
+
+- security requirements on the network product with associated test cases; or
+- operational environment security assumptions for a given product class.
+
+The Security Requirements clauses within the the pertinent 3GPP TS contain the security requirements identified according to the threats (see figure 5.2.3.1-1).
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A["Network Product Class Description
+• General description
+• 3GPP Functionnalities
+• Logical Interfaces
+• Physical Interfaces
+• Protocols
+• ...."] --> B["Security Problem Definition
+• Network Product class Assets
+• Operational Environment Assumptions
+• Attacker Model
+• Threats (T1, T2 ...)
+• Security Objectives"]
+ C["Other 3GPP TR/TS (e.g TS 33.401, TS 33.210...) security objectives"] --> B
+ B --> D["Security requirements and test case definition"]
+ E["Catalogue of security requirements"] --> D
+ F["Other 3GPP TR/TS (e.g TS 33.401, TS 33.210...) security requirements"] --> D
+ D --> G["Security Compliance Requirements for the Network Product Class with associated test cases"]
+
+```
+
+Flowchart illustrating the process for deriving security requirements in a SCAS document. The process starts with 'Network Product Class Description' (General description, 3GPP Functionnalities, Logical Interfaces, Physical Interfaces, Protocols, ....). This leads to 'Security Problem Definition' (Network Product class Assets, Operational Environment Assumptions, Attacker Model, Threats (T1, T2 ...), Security Objectives). This step is influenced by 'Other 3GPP TR/TS (e.g TS 33.401, TS 33.210...) security objectives'. The next step is 'Security requirements and test case definition', which is influenced by 'Catalogue of security requirements' and 'Other 3GPP TR/TS (e.g TS 33.401, TS 33.210...) security requirements'. The final output is 'Security Compliance Requirements for the Network Product Class with associated test cases'.
+
+**Figure 5.2.3.1-1: Process for deriving security requirements in a SCAS document**
+
+The security requirements will include security functional requirements as well as hardening requirements and basic vulnerability testing requirements. The security functional requirements are ensuring the existence of security functionalities in the network products in order to achieve security objectives (e.g. 3GPP functional requirements). The hardening requirements are either ensuring the absence of unneeded or insecure functionality, or impose a restriction on a function forcing it to behave in a more secure way. The basic vulnerability testing requirements specify the areas to be subjected to basic vulnerability testing.
+
+The purpose of hardening is to reduce the attack surface and security vulnerability of the network product and to ensure that security functions of the network product cannot be bypassed. SECAM will specify hardening requirements that should be part of the evaluation. Those requirements are only intended to reduce the attack surface rather than directly related to a security function. All security requirements, those related to a specific security function as well as those related to the reduction of the attack surface and basic vulnerability testing requirements, will be treated on the same footing and the text of clause 5.2.3.3 applies to all "types" of requirements. Their evaluation will be based on the tests cases of the SCAS. In any case, hardening requirements imply that they are implemented before evaluation through test cases. Hardening requirements should be formulated generic enough, or in different variants, to be applicable for a variety of anticipated operating systems and applications. Hardening is needed to let network products achieve the given security baseline and assurance level, alongside with other security requirements.
+
+Hardening can be the removal of services, protocols, ports, etc. in order to reduce known security vulnerabilities and minimize the risk in an existing but unneeded functionality. An example of hardening is to remove unnecessary services of general purpose software used in a specific context. It can also be a physical action like removing unneeded USB ports. An example of such a requirement is provided at the end of clause 5.2.3.3.
+
+SECAM security requirements represent the common agreement of operators and vendors on what has to be implemented for a given network product class to achieve the required security baseline. All those requirements (including operator's initialization and configuration requirements which have been channelled through the relevant SECAM standardization processes) have to be taken into account from the beginning of the development and design
+
+phase of the network product as well as in subsequent updates of the network product. This will ensure that network products will be developed in a way that:
+
+- a) Maximizes their likelihood to pass SECAM evaluation.
+- b) They operate correctly and securely when deployed in operator's networks.
+- c) Avoids costly patching cycle to ensure a) and b).
+
+##### 5.2.3.1.1 Level of detail of security requirements
+
+Security requirements can be specified in different levels of detail, with a tradeoff between precision of the requirement and its general applicability.
+
+Detail Level 1: Security requirements of general system-independent nature: What needs to be secured?
+
+Example: data storage in general
+
+Detail Level 2: Security requirements that are system-specific but still product-independent: What needs to be secured, for this system type?
+
+Example: data storage in databases
+
+Detail Level 3: Product-specific security requirements: How does this specific product need to be secured?
+
+Example: data storage in an Oracle database Vx.y
+
+In order to ensure consistency between all requirements in a SCAS, every requirement of detail level 2 or 3 should be derived from a generic level 1 requirement or security objective.
+
+In general, requirements on detail level 3 should be avoided in a SCAS because that would limit direct applicability of a SCAS for some network products.
+
+#### 5.2.3.2 Incorporation of security requirements from existing 3GPP TSs in current releases
+
+In figure 5.2.3.1-1, 3GPP specifications represent an input for both SPD and security requirements definition, where the latter includes test case definition. The reason for this assumption is that 3GPP security specifications (e.g. TS 33.401 [2]) already contain several security objectives and related security functional requirements which 3GPP identified when designing UMTS and LTE. When looking at such type of security functional requirements, they can be grouped into three categories:
+
+- 1) Security functional requirements related to protocols and behaviours necessary for secure interoperability between nodes from different vendors that require a certain positive behaviour of a 3GPP function.
+For example, the security functional requirement " the MME sends to the USIM via ME the random challenge RAND and an authentication token AUTN for network authentication from the selected authentication vector. " retrieved from TS 33.401 [2], belongs to this category.
+- 2) Security functional requirements related to protocols and behaviours necessary for secure interoperability between nodes from different vendors that require that a 3GPP function does not perform a certain action.
+For example, the security functional requirement " Access to E-UTRAN with a 2G SIM or a SIM application on a UICC shall not be granted " retrieved from TS 33.401 [2] belongs to this category.
+- 3) Security functional requirements not related to protocols or behaviours necessary for secure interoperability between nodes from different vendors, but rather dealing with security features which are supported by the network products and consequently strictly related to their implementation.
+For example, the security functional requirements specified in clause 5.3 of TS 33.401 [2] for eNBs and in annex I of TS 33.102 [5] for RNCs in exposed locations belong to this category.
+
+The security functional requirements in the first group are already covered by the interoperability and conformance testing and SECAM documents do not repeat these requirements or add tests for them.
+
+The security functional requirements in the second category may not be covered by the interoperability and conformance testing. In this case a SCAS document may contain a reference to these requirements with the related test
+
+cases which verify that the network products adhere to the security functional requirements. As an example, security functional requirements for the MME in the second category are collected in TS 33.116.
+
+The security functional requirements in the third category are within the scope of SECAM and they will be taken into account by the security requirements for the compliance testing. However, for some network product classes, e.g. the MME, there are no requirements in the third category.
+
+A security compliance requirement in a SCAS that references a 3GPP TS refers to the corresponding TS security functional requirement and also contains a test description how to verify the correct implementation of the described security functional requirements.
+
+SECAM does not provide stand-alone security assurance requirements. Instead, SECAM provides a test case for every security requirement.
+
+#### 5.2.3.3 Handling of security requirements
+
+A SECAM Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and associated test cases is provided because several network product classes will share very similar if not identical security requirements for some aspects. This catalogue therefore allows to maximize the reuse of already written requirements. This approach matches the requirement that a SCAS will have to be developed in a modular fashion such that an individual module is generic enough to be applied to more than one network product class. This approach can help to prevent from writing the same security requirements from scratch several times in different network product class SCAS (see clause 4 of the present document).
+
+It is important to underline that the 3GPP catalogue is constructed while working on SCASs for specific network product classes, and the intention is not to first create the catalogue in an abstract way and then write the first SCAS based on it. No requirements is included in the catalogue before it has been found useful for a specific network product class. This prevents the catalogue from accumulating "good-to-have" requirements that are never used by specific network product classes. Consequently, the way to build the proposed catalogue is an iterative process that counts the following steps:
+
+- 1) Start the normative phase for a specific Network Product Class (e.g. MME).
+- 2) Select from the identified sources the proper security requirements that meet the needs of the security objectives and adapt them to SECAM.
+- 3) Add this adapted requirements in the SECAM catalogue in order to reuse if possible during the normative phase of other Network Product Classes.
+- 4) Start the normative phase of another Network Product Class (e.g. eNB) and refer to the security requirements already available in the SECAM catalogue if possible otherwise select the new ones from the agreed sources and update the Catalogue.
+
+Security requirements are expected to follow a template similar to the one described hereafter:
+
+##### Template for a Security Requirement Description
+
+Statements of security requirements are intended to be clear, concise and unambiguous. In particular, each security requirement includes:
+
+- *Requirement name*: each security requirement is assigned a unique name. The name indicates the topics covered by the requirement;
+- *Requirement reference*: a unique short form of the security requirement is provided as a primary means for referencing the class. The convention adopted is: < requirement class reference > - < the first two letter of requirement name > or similar convention.
+- *Requirement Description*: a detailed description for the security requirements identified by 3GPP to reduce/counteract the risks outlined by the threat analysis.
+- *Security Objective references*: a list of the short identifiers assigned to the Security Objectives achieved through fulfilling this requirement.
+- *Test case*: a description of the test case that defines how the requirement is tested, the expected skills and tools to be used to produce the test outputs.
+
+NOTE 1: The level of abstraction that should be chosen for test cases should allow implementation specific solution as long as they comply with the SCAS intention. This level of details is likely to be variable depending on the test. This work is to be done during the normative phase.
+
+NOTE 2: Tests can consist of different types of activities. It could for example consist in reviewing documentation provided by the vendor for a given security requirement but also be of a more technical nature that will imply interaction and stimulation of the network product with a protocol testing tool for example. The concrete test activities will be defined in the normative phase.
+
+##### Example of an "hardening type" security requirement:
+
+Hardening requirements can also help to make the software/hardware of a network product more robust against unauthorized remote or physical access and can be tested as shown in the following example:
+
+- *Requirement name:* Unauthenticated services binding:
+ - *Requirement reference:* HARDENING\_BINDING.1.1.
+ - *Requirement Description:* No unauthenticated services shall be bound to physically accessible ports of the network product. Unauthenticated service running on the network product and bound to physically accessible ports, even if not security related, can be used by an attacker to gain connectivity on the network product. The attacker could then try to escalate their privileges to further compromise the network product. No unauthenticated service shall be bound to physically accessible ports.
+ - *Security Objective references or more general level requirement:* SO-1, SO-2, SO-3.
+ - *Test case:*
+ - Review the documentation provided by the vendor describing the physically accessible ports and the services bound to them.
+ - Document in the report the services listening on each physically accessible port and the type of credential required for access.
+ - Connect to all documented services and check that authentication is required.
+ - Connect on each physically accessible port and run an appropriate scan to detect listening services on all relevant OSI layers and check whether non documented services are listening and accessible.
+- or where remote scanning results are not meaningful like e.g. in case of UDP, use appropriate in-host tools to verify that only documented services are listening and accessible on the physically accessible port.
+
+Applicability of a hardening requirement may depend on the OS or application running on the network product. E.g. in case the hardening requires removal of all non-public-key based authentication:
+
+- Vendor A has implemented this by running the COTS component OpenSSH. Hardening for this authentication function includes e.g. disabling password based login.
+- Vendor B implements this by a proprietary protocol with public and private keys, i.e. a non-COTS component. Hardening for this authentication function includes e.g. ensuring that password based authentication is not implemented or disabled.
+
+What ultimately matters for the SECAM evaluation (compliance and vulnerability) is that the network products fulfil the security requirement (functional and hardening) and pass the related test cases, not what method was applied by the vendor to do so.
+
+NOTE 3: To fulfil the test cases, implementation and documentation of functional requirements may also include implementation and documentation of some of the hardening requirements.
+
+#### 5.2.3.4 Guidelines for writing test cases
+
+##### 5.2.3.4.1 General
+
+Requirements are to be testable. That is, they are to be specific enough so that a test can be written that effectively decides whether the requirement is fulfilled or not.
+
+Some general guidelines for writing test cases are:
+
+The test case should describe what the aim of the test is and what it is trying to demonstrate. It is not necessary to describe in details what needs to be done and what equipment is to be used. It should be left up to the lab to determine what are suitable tools and methods but it should also be specified what is suitable on high-level in order to ensure that the lab is using the right type of tools.
+
+The test case is to match the requirement and is not allowed to extend the requirement. It is allowed that a test case may test only a subset of what is covered by the requirement as exhaustive testing may be impossible in certain cases.
+
+Duplications should be avoided, e.g. it should be allowed to refer from one test case to (a part of) another test case already covering (part of) the requirement or to state in one test case that another test case should be run successfully before.
+
+It should be possible to execute a test case efficiently and automation is to be preferred over manual work.
+
+Test cases should be applicable to all elements in one or more network product classes and not assume implementation-specific details, e.g. on operating systems, that are not present in the requirement. But examples for specific environments, e.g. specific operating systems, are allowed.
+
+The network product as defined in the present TR shall be the object on which test cases are executed. This means, in particular, that no assumptions on installing additional software, e.g. a network sniffer, on the network product are to be made.
+
+In general, configuration changes (e.g. creating additional accounts) are to be avoided unless they are needed for the purpose of the test. But when modification of the network product is a necessary precondition for testing the requirement (e.g. when the requirement asks for configurability of the product such as in a password policy) configuration changes are allowed.
+
+##### 5.2.3.4.2 Verifiability and repeatability
+
+Tests are verifiable. That is, after the test is executed there cannot be any doubt whether the test passed or failed. If there is doubt, it is a matter of opinion whether the test passed or failed which may result in unnecessary disputes. One of the purposes of the tests in SECAM is to remove opinion based verdicts of test outcome.
+
+The detail level of a test case corresponds to the detail level of its associated requirement (see clause 5.2.3.1.1). In order to be repeatable, every test case performed with a network product needs to be described on detail level 3, i.e. specific for every individual network product. This means that the test laboratory needs to define and document test cases on detail level 3 for the security requirements on detail level 1 and 2 in the SCAS. This documentation needs to be included in the evaluation report.
+
+Tests are repeatable when based on this documentation of test cases on detail level 3. That is, given this documentation, the network product and the corresponding SCAS, a third party should be able to repeat the tests and verify whether the network product passes or fails the test.
+
+For a test to be verifiable, it needs to clearly specify the starting state of the system, pre-requisites for the tester, what actions are taken by the tester, and what the expected results are. The actions taken by the tester are sufficiently detailed to enable someone else to repeat the test. The expected outcome are sufficiently detailed to unambiguously determine whether the test passed or failed.
+
+There is no need to deeply formalize how the tests are written in SECAM, but the three identified pieces of information need to be present, and they need to be clear and unambiguous:
+
+- The initial state of the network product and pre-requisites for the tester.
+- The steps taken to perform the test.
+
+- The expected results of a successful test.
+
+Specifying the tests clearly also helps in formulating clear requirements.
+
+##### 5.2.3.4.3 System under test
+
+The SCAS applies to a network product class. In particular, the security requirements in the SCAS apply to the network product class. It is therefore important that the tests that verify whether a security requirement is met by a network product or not are mapped to the specific network product. More precisely, the expected results of the test show that the network product is acting as expected. The expected results cannot describe behavior of other network entities or personnel in the environment of the network product.
+
+##### 5.2.3.4.4 Template to be used for writing the test cases
+
+Table 5.2.3.4.4-1 describes the template to be used while writing the test cases identified for each security requirement.
+
+**Table 5.2.3.4.4-1 Test case template**
+
+| |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Test Name:
To each test case is assigned a unique name, indicating the covered topic. |
+| Purpose:
In this section the goal of the test (i.e. what it is intended for) should be reported |
+| Procedure and execution steps:
In this section the pre-conditions and the operational steps to perform the test should be reported. |
+| Expected Results:
In this section the expected result should be reported (i.e. the behaviour expected for the referenced requirement). |
+| Expected format of evidence:
In this section the expected format of the evidence should be reported. If not applicable for a specific test, then NA should be used. |
+
+## 5.3 Improvement of SCAS and new security requirements
+
+Vendors, operators or other bodies can propose new security requirements for addition to 3GPP SCASs if a new threat or vulnerability has been identified. This gives 3GPP the flexibility to continuously review and improve their SCASs .
+
+# 6 Vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation
+
+## 6.1 Overview
+
+NOTE: The final choices and rules for the accreditation and monitoring rules are under the responsibility of the SECAM Accreditation Body. The SECAM Accreditation Body is provided by GSMA. This clause outlines what is in scope of the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+The SECAM Accreditation Body describes the rules and processes for accreditation and monitoring of:
+
+- vendor development and product lifecycle processes and
+- test laboratories, whether they are vendor-owned or third-party test laboratories.
+
+In order to be allowed to conduct the evaluation in the scope of the SECAM scheme, the vendors or third-party test laboratories demonstrate they have the skills, working practices and resources to participate in the process. This is achieved by an "audit and accreditation" to evaluate and demonstrate that the test laboratories have the necessary competence, expertise, equipment, methodologies, and processes to conduct an evaluation for conformance to 3GPP SCAS requirements.
+
+All vendors (with or without a test laboratory) will be subject to:
+
+- a quality qualification;
+- an audit and accreditation of network product development and network product lifecycle management process.
+
+The quality and reliability of these demonstrations are of paramount importance to the integrity of the scheme.
+
+In order to manage the accreditations the SECAM Accreditation Body maintains a list of accredited test laboratories and vendors.
+
+A formalized dispute resolution process for accreditation and all the other processes that are defined by the SECAM Accreditation Body is established, as the denial or delay of accreditation may have far-reaching consequences.
+
+A high-level overview of the processes and activities that are defined by the SECAM Accreditation Body is provided in [7].
+
+## 6.2 Audit and accreditation of Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes
+
+The evaluation of the security relevant part of the Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes is done as part of the vendor accreditation process by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes assurance requirements as well as related evaluation activities generic to all network product classes are defined by the SECAM Accreditation Body. The vendor will define their own processes and describe them in written format. During an audit, the processes will be evaluated and their application on development activities in practice will be verified. An accreditation will be awarded, if the requirements are met.
+
+Lifecycle management consists of establishing discipline and control in the updates of network product during its development and maintenance. Lifecycle management controls are important during normal improvement of network product as well as for vulnerability/security flaw remediation (documentation used to track vulnerability/security flaw, remediation procedure with relation to corrective actions for each identified vulnerability/security flaw...). The vendor accreditation for network product development and network product life cycle management processes will provide assurance for these aspects in SECAM.
+
+The Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes assessment covers a vendor's engineering processes and does not necessarily apply only to a single network product. This means that the results of one assessment may apply to more than one network product. Vendors can submit their generic network product development and network product lifecycle management processes or a subset of them for auditing and accreditation. Generic network product development and network product lifecycle management processes are usually used during development of all or some products of the same vendor. As different network product development and network product lifecycle management processes could be utilized within the organization of one vendor, e.g. due to mergers or acquisitions, vendors could obtain and hold accreditation for different generic network product development and network product lifecycle management processes.
+
+Once the vendor obtains accreditation and as long as the accreditation has not expired, vendors are allowed to produce development process compliance declarations for the "network product development and network product lifecycle management processes compliance validation" task on their own.
+
+At the beginning of a SECAM evaluation of a product, the Vendor will have to provide a development process compliance declaration to the compliance tester containing a rationale showing that the generic accredited process was effectively applied in the network product development and network product lifecycle management of the network product under evaluation.
+
+Requirements and accreditation procedures for vendor development lifecycle process and product lifecycle maintenance process accreditation are specified in [9].
+
+NOTE 1: The requirements on the process and acceptable evidences as well as the procedure to obtain an accreditation for these requirements is under the responsibility of the SECAM Accreditation Body which takes into account the cost/complexity/assurance trade-off.
+
+It is avoided that vendors need to obtain a large number of accreditations for their network product development and network product lifecycle management process. The number of requirements is relatively small (an order of magnitude of ten) to keep evaluation cost reasonable and focus on critical controls. As much as possible from existing standards is reused.
+
+NOTE 2: The Vendor is expected to employ Industry related good working practices, e.g. aligned to the relevant parts of the ISO/IEC 27000 series. Although these areas will not be formally audited by the SECAM Accreditation Body, it is unlikely a vendor would be able to provide satisfactory evidence for meeting the SECAM requirements without having such policies and working practices in place.
+
+## 6.3 Audit and accreditation of test laboratories
+
+The accreditation is performed by the SECAM Accreditation Body, and consists of:
+
+- assessing the skills of the vendor's or third-party test laboratories in conducting an evaluation for conformance to 3GPP SCAS requirements for a given network product class or range of classes;
+- assessing the compliance to Test methodology (for security compliance Testing and Basic Vulnerability Testing laboratories).
+
+A test laboratory can be accredited for any combination of 3GPP SCAS documents. During the audit for the accreditation the test laboratory demonstrates its competence, expertise, methodology and processes, to an auditor, by undertaking the tests on a concrete network product. If the test laboratory is capable of performing all the tests of the selected SCAS documents, accreditation is granted for the selected SCAS documents. Accreditation is limited to the selected SCAS documents and thereby to the respective network product classes covered by the selected SCAS documents.
+
+Test laboratory accreditation requirements and the accreditation procedure are specified in [8].
+
+## 6.4 Monitoring
+
+The SECAM Accreditation Body monitors different kinds of accredited actors within the scheme:
+
+- Vendors development and product lifecycle processes, which are expected to comply with the Security Assurance requirements.
+- Test laboratories (for security compliance testing and Basic Vulnerability Testing), which are expected to comply with the Test Methodology and skills requirements.
+
+Monitoring activities lead the SECAM Accreditation Body to maintain the status of these actors (accredited or not accredited).
+
+## 6.5 Dispute resolution
+
+The SECAM Accreditation Body provides a process to resolve conflicts when an accredited operator shows evidence of inconsistencies in:
+
+- Vendor Development process activities (inconsistencies in analysis of compliance against Security assurance process).
+- Test laboratories (for security compliance testing and Basic Vulnerability Testing) activities (inconsistencies in analysis of compliance against SCAS).
+
+In the event that evaluation findings in the evaluation report are in dispute for a network product (for example: by re-doing the tests an operator finds opposite results to the ones provided by the vendors or third-party laboratories in the evaluation report), this methodology also provides a dispute resolution mechanism. This case is believed to be rare and would arise if one or several of the actors (vendors or third-party laboratories) are cheating in the evaluation or compilation of evaluation results of a 3GPP network product.
+
+The entity responsible for deciding that a declaration should be revoked, based on the evidences and the details of the dispute procedure, is the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+The dispute resolution process is specified in [7].
+
+# --- 7 Evaluation and SCAS instantiation
+
+## 7.1 Security Assurance Specification instantiation documents creation
+
+The SCAS instantiation consists of a set of documents provided by the Vendor to give test laboratories and operators the relevant information to understand the critical parts of the network product to be evaluated. The SCAS instantiation provides a concrete mapping of the "theoretical" assets and security requirements of the SCAS into "real" assets and components supporting the security requirements of the network product being evaluated.
+
+The SCAS instantiation is a set of documents and is not expected to have a fixed structure. This will allow vendors to maximize the reuse of existing documentation.
+
+The content of the SCAS instantiation is however defined and it contains details on:
+
+- Network Product description (e.g. software version, documentation version).
+- Scope of evaluation.
+- Mapping of SCAS security requirements to the network product and assets in the network product.
+- References to the applicable document versions containing operational guidance in the documentation of the network product.
+- Information needed to start the Security Compliance Testing, including Basic Vulnerability Testing.
+- Details of licenses that are required for the product to operate in the scope of evaluation (if relevant).
+
+The above document set is updated by the vendors until the testers (Security Compliance Testing, Basic Vulnerability Testing) consider they have enough and correct information to execute the required tests. Details on the content of these documents and of the update process are provided in clause 7.2.2.
+
+## 7.2 Evaluation and evaluation report
+
+### 7.2.1 Network product development process and network product lifecycle management
+
+The security relevant part of the Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process is evaluated during an accreditation administrated by the SECAM Accreditation Body prior to any network product evaluation. During a network product evaluation, the accredited test laboratory validates that the accredited process was used for the network product under consideration. To support this evaluation, the vendor provides the following documents to the accredited test laboratory and, if requested, to the operator:
+
+- The evidence of the vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process accreditation by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+- The Vendor Network Product Development and network product lifecycle management process self-evaluation report for the network product under evaluation containing:
+
+- a rationale showing that the generic accredited security relevant part of the process was effectively applied during the development of the network product under evaluation (free-form).
+
+NOTE: Guidelines as to what constitutes valid evidence will be produced by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+The accredited test laboratory will review this self-evaluation report and evaluate if the rationale provided by the Vendor provides enough evidence that the network product is following the accredited process.
+
+If the report is acceptable, the network product evaluation continues. If not, the test laboratory may request the vendor to provide further evidence which demonstrates compliance to the accredited vendor development and product lifecycle processes. In most cases, network product testing will be undertaken by the vendors themselves and conflicts are expected to be rare. However, the test laboratories have a responsibility in this assessment as the rationale and the description of the generic accredited process will also be given to the operators who are likely to review them as well. Conflict between vendors, test laboratories and operators will be resolved by the dispute resolution process, established by the SECAM Accreditation Body [9], if one of the involved parties raises the dispute towards the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+NOTE: Required and acceptable evidence for the vendor Network Product Development and network product lifecycle management process self-evaluation report are defined by the SECAM Accreditation Body to ensure comparability and facilitate dispute resolution.
+
+### 7.2.2 SCAS instantiation evaluation
+
+#### 7.2.2.1 Overview
+
+SCAS instantiation evaluation is to check whether a SCAS instantiation written by a vendor is a correct instantiation of the SCAS of the network product class and whether it is a good basis for evaluating the network product.
+
+The accredited evaluator (vendor or third-party evaluator) for security compliance testing is responsible for SCAS instantiation evaluation before it is used to evaluate network product. The evaluator confirms at least that the SCAS being instantiated for a given 3GPP network product and the network product for evaluation are consistent.
+
+#### 7.2.2.2 Content
+
+##### 7.2.2.2.1 Scope of the evaluation
+
+###### 7.2.2.2.1.1 Overview
+
+A given network product from a vendor might be packaged in different ways for each commercial transaction to address the tailored request from operators.
+
+SECAM evaluations are conducted for a particular packaging of the network product. One objective in SECAM is to ensure maximum reusability of evaluation results of the evaluation of a particular package while still providing a clear and comprehensive description of the boundaries of what was evaluated. In practice to maximize the reuse, the vendor is likely to have the most commonly sold package of its network product evaluated.
+
+A clear definition of the boundaries of what was evaluated ensures this reusability but also prevents a false perception of what was security tested as additional components are facing well-defined interfaces.
+
+Consequently, in the scope of evaluation of the SCAS instantiation document, the vendor provides a clear description of the network product that will be tested, i.e. a description of the version of the network product in the scope of SCAS.
+
+In particular, the network product description does not contain security requirements or functions, but a logical and physical perimeter for the evaluation. In particular the definition of the network product describes its content in terms of high level description of the components and external interfaces. This description of the network product provides:
+
+- All components mandated by network product class definition in SCAS and implemented by the network product.
+- All external communication interfaces of the network product. Details (including protocols, ports, services and purpose) for each of the external communication interfaces of the network product that allow communications
+
+between functions inside and outside the network product.
+
+Finally, whether a component is part or not of the network product as well as the granularity of the definition of a component is disambiguated by the test cases of the SCAS. For example an SCAS may include the following requirement:
+
+*"Requirement: The product shall include a security audit function, accessible only by a user having the role admin X, logged through SSH on the server.*
+
+*Test case:*
+
+- the tester shall connect as the admin user through SSH and verify that he can access the audit*
+- the tester shall verify that a user without admin rights cannot access the audit using the same connection*
+- the tester shall verify that no other means exist to access the audit except a SSH session".*
+
+In this case it is clear what, from where to test and how to test (physical port of the network product where the SSH server is listening).
+
+NOTE 1: SECAM provides no provision to assess whether the evaluation results for a different package of the network product than the one that was evaluated are still valid. However as the boundaries of what was evaluated are made clear by the scope of evaluation clause in the SCAS instantiation, the operator can make their security acceptance decision with a clear understanding of what was evaluated for this new package.
+
+NOTE 2: The Basic Vulnerability Testing will be conducted on the external communication interfaces of the network product.
+
+###### 7.2.2.2.1.2 Adapting the SCAS instantiation to special circumstances
+
+A network product may need to adapt the SCAS instantiation to its own circumstances.
+
+E.g. this could happen when the network product only partially implements a network product class, for which a SCAS exists. In such cases where there is no fully fitting SCAS for a SECAM evaluation the derivation in the instantiated SCAS might need some special adaptation. The possibility for adaptation is also useful to avoid that SCAS creation and Network Product Class scoping get too complex and have to cover a multitude of parallel versions with very small differences.
+
+A SCAS instantiation might also need to be adapted when a gap is discovered in an existing SCAS, e.g. due to a newly published vulnerability, and the network product evaluation cannot wait until 3GPP has closed this gap.
+
+###### 7.2.2.2.1.3 Exclusion of components
+
+The SCAS instantiation does not exclude a component from testing on the grounds that it was already evaluated under another scheme, different from SECAM, unless this SCAS allows it explicitly to refer to the certificate obtained under this different scheme for a given set of tests.
+
+No component can be excluded from evaluation on the grounds that it was not developed by vendor itself and that it is an outsourced or a 3rd party component.
+
+##### 7.2.2.2.2 Mapping of SCAS security requirements to the network product and assets in the network product
+
+The SCAS instantiation will provide:
+
+- A concrete mapping of the SCAS "theoretical" assets to "real" assets on the network product.
+- A concrete mapping of the SCAS security requirements to the high-level components supporting these functions.
+
+The evaluator confirms at least that:
+
+- all assets from SCAS are present in the SCAS instantiation,
+
+EXAMPLE 1: The SCAS instantiation does not decide, against the SCAS, that some assets need no protection because of physical deployment site protection.
+
+- if SCAS instantiation introduces new assets they are considered assets to be protected in a manner consistent with SCAS,
+
+EXAMPLE 2: If the SCAS instantiation uses two admin roles instead of a single one in the generic SCAS, both have their credentials protected consistently.
+
+- the SCAS instantiation does not waive threats identified in the SCAS.
+
+EXAMPLE 3: The SCAS instantiation does not claim that a threat from the SCAS is not applicable under the assumption that more organizational control is performed during administrators' recruitment.
+
+##### 7.2.2.2.3 Operational guidance documents and configuration of the network product for evaluation
+
+Operational guidance documents are part of the documentation created by the vendor and are part of the SCAS instantiation documentation (see clause 7.2.2 for details on SCAS instantiation evaluation). This documentation contains the information on how to initialize, configure and operate the network product so that SECAM security requirements are met. To achieve security, it is necessary to align the network product and the content of the "operational guidance documents".
+
+E.g. this documentation could be a user manual indicating to the administrator:
+
+- By default, the network product is provisioned with root password "XXXX"
+- The network product will NOT be able to operate as long as this password is not changed using procedure Y
+- The minimum password length is 12 characters for secure operation, at least 12 characters password SHALL be chosen
+
+These documents will be used by:
+
+- vendor or operator staff during initial setup of the network product.
+- vendor or operator staff during operation of the network product.
+- vendor or operator staff during maintenance or upgrade of the network product.
+- evaluators during SECAM compliance and vulnerability evaluations to install a representative test bed.
+
+SECAM tested configuration should reflect the setting that an administrator would choose based on these documents. To install a representative test bed, the evaluators will follow this documentation. During evaluation of a network product, no security-related initialization, configuration or operation activities other than those contained in the "operational guidance documents" will be followed; those in the documents will be followed in full.
+
+NOTE 1: As part of SCAS instantiation documents the evaluators will evaluate these "Operational Guidance documents" and verify that these documents do not make unrealistic assumptions on the environment that waive a security requirement or a threat from SECAM and would make the test bed not representative.
+
+NOTE 2: In the scope of SCEAM it is implicitly mandatory for the vendor to consider the security requirements defined in SECAM for creating the operational guidance documents. If relevant initialization, configuration and operation instructions were missing from the operational guidance documents then the network product will inevitably fail the test cases for the respective security requirements.
+
+##### 7.2.2.2.4 Information needed to execute the required tests for SCT and BVT activities
+
+###### **Information needed to execute the required tests for the Security Compliance Testing:**
+
+The compliance tester assesses whether the SCAS instantiation contains enough information to:
+
+- execute the test cases;
+
+- determine whether the tests completely and accurately cover the SCAS.
+
+In cases where the SCAS instantiation does not include enough information, the compliance tester can ask the vendor to modify/complete the SCAS instantiation.
+
+###### **Information needed to execute the required tests for the Basic Vulnerability Testing:**
+
+The basic vulnerability tester assesses whether the SCAS instantiation contains enough information to:
+
+- determine the tools to be used in the Basic Vulnerability Testing;
+- execute the test cases;
+- determine whether all open ports are explicitly documented;
+- determine the scope of vulnerability scanning to reflect the SCAS requirements.
+
+In cases where the SCAS instantiation does not include enough information, the BVT tester could ask the vendor to modify/complete the SCAS instantiation.
+
+#### **7.2.2.3 Process**
+
+The usage and update of this set of documents during a SECAM evaluation is described in figure 7.2.2.3-1 below.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the evolution of SCAS instantiation documents during a SECAM evaluation across three steps:
+
+- Step 1 (Vendor):** The process starts with **SCAS instantiation**. This leads to the **Initial SAS instantiation document set**, which includes:
+ - Scope of evaluation
+ - Mapping of SCAS security requirements
+ - Operational guidance documents and configuration of the network product for evaluation
+ - Information needed to execute the required tests
+ The first three items are marked as **Final**, while the last two are marked as **being updated**.
+- Step 2 (Vendor + All testers):** An arrow labeled **Evaluation of SCAS instantiation** connects Step 1 to Step 2. This leads to the **Updated SAS instantiation document set**, which includes:
+ - Scope of evaluation
+ - Mapping of SCAS security requirements
+ - Operational guidance documents and configuration of the network product for evaluation
+ - Information needed to execute the required tests
+ The first three items are marked as **Final**, while the last two are marked as **being updated**.
+- Step 3 (Vendor + Security Compliance testers + Basic Vulnerability testers):** Arrows labeled **Security compliance testing** and **Basic Vulnerability testing** connect Step 2 to Step 3. This leads to the **Final SAS instantiation document set**, which includes:
+ - Scope of evaluation
+ - Mapping of SCAS security requirements
+ - Operational guidance documents and configuration of the network product for evaluation
+ - Information needed to execute the required tests for SCT, BVT and EVA
+ - SCT and BVT test related documentation (test output, description of concrete testbed...)
+ The first four items are marked as **Final**, while the last item is marked as **being updated**.
+
+Feedback loops are shown: from Step 2 back to Step 1 (via a top arrow), and from Step 3 back to Step 1 (via a bottom arrow).
+
+Flowchart showing the evolution of SCAS instantiation documents through three steps: Step 1 (Vendor), Step 2 (Vendor + All testers), and Step 3 (Vendor + Security Compliance testers + Basic Vulnerability testers). It tracks the 'Initial SAS instantiation document set', 'Updated SAS instantiation document set', and 'Final SAS instantiation document set' with labels like 'being updated' and 'Final'.
+
+**Figure 7.2.2.3-1: Overview of the SCAS instantiation documents evolution during a SECAM evaluation**
+
+Step 1 is the initial production by the vendor of the required documentation and its update if required by step 2. It is outside of the scope of SECAM to describe this task.
+
+Step 2 is the SCAS instantiation evaluation to check whether an SCAS instantiation written by a vendor is a correct instantiation of the SCAS of the network product class and whether it is a good basis for evaluating the network product.
+
+Step 3 is about performing the SCT and BVT testing tasks as described in the present document, which will use this instantiation documentation as input. The evaluation does not start (neither SCT nor BVT) as long as steps 1 and 2 are not completed.
+
+Further documentation is produced during step 3. During step 3 for example, the SCT and BVT testers will describe the concrete test bed used for testing as well as "instantiated test cases" (i.e. the description of the concrete test case on the network product corresponding to the generic SCAS test case). At the end of step 3, the SCAS instantiation documentation as well as the SCT and BVT documentation is an output document provided to the operator. These documents are described in clauses 7.2.3 and 7.2.4.
+
+After step 3, the SCAS instantiation documentation as well as the SCT and BVT documentation produced in step 3 are given to the operator for its final review and final security acceptance decision.
+
+### 7.2.3 Security compliance testing
+
+#### 7.2.3.1 Inputs
+
+The test bed configured according to the documentation that was produced in step 3 of clause 7.2.2.3.
+
+#### 7.2.3.2 Outputs
+
+In the end of Security Compliance tests, the tester delivers a Security Compliance Testing report which includes:
+
+- a declaration about who carried out the tests;
+- network products/features tested and reasons for not testing where applicable:
+ - in particular, copies of other Security Compliance related third party certificates and test reports of previous evaluation (internal and/or third party), if appropriate and available;
+
+NOTE: Whether SECAM recognizes the results of other evaluation schemes, so the Security Compliance tester can avoid re-testing previously evaluated items, will be decided in the normative phase requirement per requirement. For example, if there is a requirement to implement AES-256 encryption for a component, SECAM might accept a FIPS evaluation of the cryptographic module as a valid test result and might not ask the Security Compliance tester to verify again (source code review, test vectors...) that AES-256 is indeed implemented.
+
+- a description of the testbed used for the tests, which
+ - are accurate,
+ - make the test bed reproducible (non ambiguous),
+ - are representative of real-life network product deployment;
+- the test tools and vectors used for the tests;
+- a rationale which demonstrates that the tests cover the SCAS test cases;
+- the test procedure followed in practice (following SCAS test cases) and results (following SCAS output format indications).
+
+#### 7.2.3.3 Activities
+
+The security compliance of a network product is its compliance to a defined set of security requirements. The security requirements set will be provided in the SCAS. The test case describes the validation technique to be used by the Security Compliance Test laboratories as well as the expected outputs to provide in the evaluation report.
+
+Security compliance test laboratories execute the tests contained in the 3GPP SCAS for the evaluated network product as described in the test cases, collect evaluation evidences and include them in the final security compliance testing report (see clause 7.2.3.2 above for details of outputs).
+
+NOTE: The test results and data may be collected from test execution instance run by the vendor test team as part of its product development cycle.
+
+### 7.2.4 Basic Vulnerability Testing
+
+Basic Vulnerability Testing activities consist of requirements for running automated Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) security testing tools against the external interfaces of a Network Product. Such tools or equivalent alternatives are likely available to all kind of attackers.
+
+NOTE 1: As Basic Vulnerability Testing is universally applicable for all Network Product Classes, the requirements for this testing category are specified as a general SCAS module. This general SCAS module will then be linked and potentially amended by SCASs for individual Network Product Classes.
+
+NOTE 2: The requirements in this testing category are kept general, the wildcard (protocol) indicates a placeholder for the actual protocol relevant as it is implemented in the Network Product and made available on external interfaces. Unless specified otherwise during the normative phase BVT applies to all interfaces providing IP-based protocols.
+
+NOTE 3: The individual tools used for Basic Vulnerability Testing are selected by the Security Compliance Test laboratories. The SECAM Accreditation Body will ensure during laboratory accreditation that the testers are able to utilize adequate tools.
+
+NOTE 4: To avoid creating a monopoly for security testing tool vendors, the usage of a security testing tool having specific capabilities should only be mandatory if there are at least two alternatives by different vendors available for use in most world regions.
+
+This activity covers at least three aspects: Port Scanning, Vulnerability Scanner by the use of Vulnerability scanners and robustness/fuzz testing. The tester delivers a Basic Vulnerability Testing report which includes:
+
+- the test procedures (following SCAS);
+- the test results (following SCAS output format indications).
+
+## 7.3 Self-declaration
+
+After the evaluation process is finished, the vendors review all the evaluation results of the product and give a declaration of their product. In the self-declaration, vendors should:
+
+- give a short summary and conclusion of all the evaluation reports;
+- declare all tests conducted by the vendors are correctly carried out and all the documents provided by the vendors are authentic without intentional deception.
+
+## 7.4 Partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle
+
+The vendor is likely to integrate SECAM requirements and test cases in its continuous development process. During this phase, a given network product might fail fully or partially some of the SECAM compliance and/or vulnerability test. The process of how and when vendor choose to fix or not to fix this network product before the final evaluation is under vendor's responsibility and is outside of SECAM scope.
+
+SECAM scheme describes the final evaluation for the final network product version expected to be bought by operators. SECAM encourages vendors to aim at a full compliance of all SECAM requirements which should represent a minimum baseline. However, the final network product might still only partially fulfil SECAM requirements. This partial compliance will be documented in the test results in the evaluation report. The final security acceptance decision is under operators' control which might accept partially compliant products. This choice is under operators' responsibility and is outside of SECAM scope.
+
+## 7.5 Comparison between two SECAM evaluations
+
+SECAM evaluation considers a given version of a network product. SECAM documents don't describe or evaluate the improvement between two evaluations of the same version of the network product.
+
+## 7.6 The evaluation of a new version
+
+After a network product completes a SECAM evaluation by a test laboratory, the vendor may upgrade the network product e.g. as a result of modified features, remediation of vulnerabilities etc. A re-evaluation of the new version of the network product can be carried out in two ways as described below:
+
+- evaluation as per a new product by using all the test cases as defined in the SCAS's;
+- the vendor provides a detailed list of the updates to the product and provides a list of related test cases that will verify the new version of the product. Once the vendor and the test laboratory agree on the updated test plan, the evaluation takes place.
+
+On completion of the evaluation the test laboratory will include in the evaluation report:
+
+- the list of updates to the network product.
+- Test cases that were executed in the evaluation.
+- The test results from the evaluation.
+
+Operators can then decide on accepting a compliance statement for the updated version of a network product.
+
+**Editor's Note:** It is ffs whether there should be a limit on the number of allowed delta changes before a complete re-evaluation of the product is required and, if so, what this limit should be.
+
+# Annex A: Summary of SECAM documents
+
+| Phase | Sub-phase | Deliverable | Published by |
+|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
+| Methodology building | | Consensus on threats | 3GPP |
+| | | Security Assurance process | |
+| | | Security Assurance Specifications | |
+| | | Test methodology and skills requirements | SECAM
Accreditation
Body / GSMA |
+| | | Test laboratories accreditation and monitoring rules | |
+| | | Network product development and network product lifecycle management Process Assurance requirements | |
+| Accreditation | Methodology Accreditation | Accreditation report | Accreditor |
+| | Audit and accreditation | Evidence of successful accreditation of vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process
Evidence of successful accreditation of Security Compliance test laboratories
Evidence of successful accreditation of Basic Vulnerability Test laboratories | SECAM
Accreditation
Body / GSMA |
+| Evaluation | SCAS instantiation | Instantiation of SCAS | Vendor |
+| | Vendors Development process compliance | For the accreditation:
Design documentation [free-form]
Operational guidance [free-form]
Version and configuration management plan [free-form]
Flaw remediation documentation [free-form]
Process to ensure code quality documentation [free-form]
Vendor's development sites protection [free form]
Before any network product evaluation:
Network Product Development and network product lifecycle management process self-evaluation report providing evidences that the network product was developed under the accredited process [free-form] | |
+| | | Security Compliance Testing report | |
+| | Security compliance testing | Basic Vulnerability Testing report | |
+| Self-declaration | Self-declaration | Self-declaration | Vendor |
+| Monitoring, dispute resolution | | Informal guidance document. Accreditation revocation list | SECAM
Accreditation
Body / GSMA |
+| Dispute resolution | - | Operator claims | |
+
+# --- Annex B: Summary of actors involved in SECAM
+
+| Actor | Tasks and Responsibilities |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 3GPP | Describe SECAM in the security assurance process documentation (i.e. the present document)
Provide SCASes for individual Network Product Classes:
- - Describe and model the network product class: Compile a complete list of features/capabilities considered relevant for evaluation
- - Define the security problem: Identify which assets in the model of the network product class require protection and how these assets can be exploited by an attacker. The security problem definition also contains the security objectives of the network product class under analysis (i.e. which assets require what type of protection), and defines an attacker potential the network product class is supposed to resist. Also, undertaking of a threat analysis
- - Identify the security requirements and test cases: Detail security requirements to reduce/counteract the risks outlined by the threat analysis as well as a description of the test cases and where possible with expected test results. Or, detail environment assumptions to countermeasure to mitigate the risks.
- - Verify the Security Requirements: Once the security requirements have been identified it is verified that the security objectives are met by these security requirements, and that every security requirement contributes to defending an identified security objective.
Define the expected skills and tools for security compliance test laboratories based on the Security Functional Requirements in the SCASes.
Specify general Basic Vulnerability Testing requirements as a SCAS module. This general SCAS module will then be linked and potentially amended by SCASs for individual Network Product Classes. This SCAS module does not specify individual tools but rather BVT categories and the conditions under which the usage of suitable tools are required.
|
+| SECAM Accreditation Body | Describe the rules for accreditation and monitoring of development and test laboratories.
Develop Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assurance requirements as well as related evaluation activities generic to all network product classes in a dedicated document.
Assess the skills of the test laboratory in conducting an evaluation for conformance to 3GPP SCAS requirements for a given network product class or range of classes; This includes assessing the test laboratory's skill in selecting tools for performing the evaluation.
Assess the test laboratory's ability to comply with the test methodology (for security compliance Testing and Basic Vulnerability Testing laboratories).
Administer the evaluation of the security relevant part of the Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process during an initial accreditation.
Provide a process to resolve conflicts.
|
+| (Accredited) Vendor | Ensure Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assurance compliance.
Provide SCAS instantiation document.
Provide self-declaration after evaluation:
- - give a short summary and conclusion of all the evaluation reports
- - declare all tests conducted by the vendors are correctly carried out and all the documents provided by the vendors are authentic without intentional deception.
|
+| (Accredited) Vendor or (accredited) third-party Test laboratory | All Test laboratories:
- - Assess that the vendor documentation and processes are complete sufficiently defined to begin the evaluation
- - Validate the elements (scope of evaluation, instantiated assets...) which will not be modified during the evaluation
Special for Security compliance testing Test laboratories:
- - Check whether a SCAS instantiation written by a vendor is a correct instantiation of the SCAS of the network product class and whether it is a good basis for evaluating the network product.
- - Confirm that the SCAS being instantiated for a given 3GPP network product and the network product for evaluation are consistent.
- - Do Security Compliance Testing according to SCAS instantiation.
- - Deliver Security Compliance Testing report (cf. clause 7.2.3.2)
For Basic Vulnerability Testing Test laboratories:
- - Do Basic Vulnerability Testing.
- - Deliver Basic Vulnerability Testing report (cf. clause 7.2.4)
|
+| Operator | Operator security acceptance decision: Examines the network product, the compliance reports and the test laboratories accreditation published by the SECAM Accreditation Body and decides if the results are sufficient according to its internal policies.
|
+
+# Annex C: Change history
+
+| Change history | | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------|
+| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | | New version |
+| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160574 | | | | Presented for approval | | 14.0.0 |
+| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170104 | 0001 | - | B | Adding evaluation of a new version of a 3GPP network product to TR 33.916 | | 14.1.0 |
+| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170431 | 0002 | - | F | Update of references to GSMA NESAS documents in TR 33.916 | | 14.2.0 |
+| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170431 | 0003 | - | F | Deletion of editor's note in 33.916 | | 14.2.0 |
+| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180123 | 0004 | 1 | F | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG | | 14.3.0 |
+| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | | 15.0.0 |
+| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-191140 | 0006 | - | F | Miscellaneous Editorial clarifications | | 15.1.0 |
+| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | | 16.0.0 |
+| 2021-12 | SA#94e | SP-211369 | 0008 | 1 | A | Editorial and corrections | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2022-03 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-17 version (MCC) | | 17.0.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230677 | 0012 | - | F | Clarification on SCAS | | 18.0.0 |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# 3GPP TR 33.926 V18.2.0 (2023-12) ---
+
+*Technical Report*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+---
+
+The logo for 5G Advanced, featuring a stylized '5G' with a green signal wave icon above the 'G' and the word 'ADVANCED' in smaller letters to the right.
+
+5G Advanced logo
+
+
+
+The 3GPP logo, consisting of the letters '3GPP' in a bold, black, stylized font. Below the 'P' is a red signal wave icon. Underneath the logo, the text 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' is written in a smaller, all-caps font.
+
+3GPP logo
+
+## --- **Keywords**
+
+LTE, UMTS, GSM, security, assurance, security
+evaluation
+
+## **3GPP**
+
+## --- **Postal address**
+
+## --- **3GPP support office address**
+
+650 Route des Lucioles – Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne – FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+## --- **Internet**
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification**
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2023, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+## Contents
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| Foreword ..... | 11 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 12 |
+| 2 References..... | 12 |
+| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 13 |
+| 3.1 Definitions..... | 13 |
+| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 14 |
+| 4 Generic Network Product (GNP) class description ..... | 15 |
+| 4.1 Overview ..... | 15 |
+| 4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class ..... | 16 |
+| 4.3 Generic network product model..... | 16 |
+| 4.3.1 Generic network product model overview ..... | 16 |
+| 4.3.2 Functions defined by 3GPP ..... | 16 |
+| 4.3.3 Other functions ..... | 16 |
+| 4.3.3a OAM functions ..... | 16 |
+| 4.3.4 Operating System (OS)..... | 17 |
+| 4.3.5 Hardware ..... | 17 |
+| 4.3.6 Interfaces ..... | 17 |
+| 4.4 Scope of the present document..... | 18 |
+| 4.4.1 Introduction ..... | 18 |
+| 4.4.2 Scope regarding GNP functions defined by 3GPP ..... | 18 |
+| 4.4.3 Scope regarding other functions ..... | 18 |
+| 4.4.4 Scope regarding Operating System (OS) ..... | 18 |
+| 4.4.5 Scope regarding hardware ..... | 18 |
+| 4.4.6 Scope regarding interfaces..... | 18 |
+| 5 Generic assets and threats ..... | 18 |
+| 5.1 Introduction ..... | 18 |
+| 5.2 Generic critical assets..... | 18 |
+| 5.3 Generic threats..... | 19 |
+| 5.3.0 Generic threats format ..... | 19 |
+| 5.3.1 Introduction ..... | 19 |
+| 5.3.2 Threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces..... | 20 |
+| 5.3.3 Spoofing identity ..... | 20 |
+| 5.3.3.1 Default Accounts ..... | 20 |
+| 5.3.3.2 Weak Password Policies ..... | 21 |
+| 5.3.3.3 Password peek..... | 21 |
+| 5.3.3.4 Direct Root Access ..... | 21 |
+| 5.3.3.5 IP Spoofing ..... | 21 |
+| 5.3.3.6 Malware ..... | 21 |
+| 5.3.3.7 Eavesdropping ..... | 22 |
+| 5.3.4 Tampering..... | 22 |
+| 5.3.4.1 Software Tampering ..... | 22 |
+| 5.3.4.2 Ownership File Misuse ..... | 22 |
+| 5.3.4.3 External Device Boot..... | 22 |
+| 5.3.4.4 Log Tampering ..... | 22 |
+| 5.3.4.5 OAM Traffic Tampering ..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.4.6 File Write Permissions Abuse..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.4.7 User Session Tampering ..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.5 Repudiation..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.5.1 Lack of User Activity Trace ..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.6 Information disclosure..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.6.1 Poor key generation ..... | 23 |
+| 5.3.6.2 Poor key management..... | 24 |
+| 5.3.6.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms..... | 24 |
+| 5.3.6.4 Insecure Data Storage ..... | 24 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| 5.3.6.5 | System Fingerprinting..... | 24 |
+| 5.3.6.6 | Malware ..... | 25 |
+| 5.3.6.7 | Personal Identification Information Violation ..... | 25 |
+| 5.3.6.8 | Insecure Default Configuration ..... | 25 |
+| 5.3.6.9 | File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse..... | 25 |
+| 5.3.6.10 | Insecure Network Services ..... | 25 |
+| 5.3.6.11 | Unnecessary Services ..... | 26 |
+| 5.3.6.12 | Log Disclosure..... | 26 |
+| 5.3.6.13 | Unnecessary Applications..... | 26 |
+| 5.3.6.14 | Eavesdropping ..... | 26 |
+| 5.3.6.15 | Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation..... | 27 |
+| 5.3.7 | Denial of service..... | 27 |
+| 5.3.7.1 | Compromised/Misbehaving User Equipments ..... | 27 |
+| 5.3.7.2 | Implementation Flaw ..... | 27 |
+| 5.3.7.3 | Insecure Network Services ..... | 27 |
+| 5.3.7.4 | Human Error ..... | 28 |
+| 5.3.8 | Elevation of privilege ..... | 28 |
+| 5.3.8.1 | Misuse by authorized users..... | 28 |
+| 5.3.8.2 | Over-Privileged Processes/Services ..... | 28 |
+| 5.3.8.3 | Folder Write Permission Abuse..... | 28 |
+| 5.3.8.4 | Root-Owned File Write Permission Abuse ..... | 28 |
+| 5.3.8.5 | High-Privileged Files..... | 29 |
+| 5.3.8.6 | Insecure Network Services ..... | 29 |
+| 5.3.8.7 | Elevation of Privilege via Unnecessary Network Services ..... | 29 |
+| 6 | Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces ..... | 29 |
+| 6.1 | Introduction ..... | 29 |
+| 6.2 | Generic critical assets..... | 29 |
+| 6.3 | Generic threats..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.1 | Introduction ..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.2 | Threats related to Service Based Interfaces..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.2.1 | JSON Parser Exploits..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.2.2 | JSON Parser not Robust ..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.3 | Threats related to service access..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.3.1 | Elevation of privilege via incorrect verification of access tokens ..... | 30 |
+| 6.3.4 | Threats related to authentication for indirect communication..... | 31 |
+| 6.3.4.1 | Incorrect validation of client credentials assertion ..... | 31 |
+| Annex A: | Aspects specific to the network product class MME..... | 33 |
+| A.1 | Network product class description for the MME..... | 33 |
+| A.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 33 |
+| A.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the MME network product class ..... | 33 |
+| A.2 | Assets and threats specific to the MME..... | 33 |
+| A.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 33 |
+| A.2.2 | Threats related to AKA procedures..... | 34 |
+| A.2.2.1 | Access to 2G..... | 34 |
+| A.2.2.2 | Resynchronization ..... | 34 |
+| A.2.2.3 | Failed Integrity check of Attach message..... | 34 |
+| A.2.2.4 | Forwarding EPS authentication data to SGSN ..... | 34 |
+| A.2.2.5 | Forwarding unused EPS authentication data between different security domains..... | 34 |
+| A.2.3 | Threats related to security mode command procedure..... | 35 |
+| A.2.3.1 | Bidding Down ..... | 35 |
+| A.2.3.2 | NAS integrity selection and use ..... | 35 |
+| A.2.3.3 | NAS NULL integrity protection..... | 35 |
+| A.2.3.4 | NAS confidentiality protection..... | 35 |
+| A.2.4 | Threats related to security in Intra-RAT mobility..... | 35 |
+| A.2.4.1 | Bidding down on X2-Handover ..... | 35 |
+| A.2.4.2 | NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in MME change..... | 36 |
+| A.2.5 | Threats related to security in Inter-RAT mobility..... | 36 |
+| A.2.5.1 | 2G SIM access via idle mode mobility..... | 36 |
+
+| | | |
+|---------|---------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| A.2.5.2 | 2G SIM access via handover ..... | 36 |
+| A.2.5.3 | 2G SIM access via SRVCC ..... | 36 |
+| A.2.6 | Threats related to release of non-emergency bearer..... | 37 |
+
+# **Annex B: Aspects specific to the network product class PGW ..... 37**
+
+| | | |
+|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| B.1 | Network product class description for the PGW ..... | 37 |
+| B.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 37 |
+| B.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the PGW network product class ..... | 37 |
+| B.2 | Assets and threats specific to the PGW ..... | 37 |
+| B.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 37 |
+| B.2.2 | Threats related to IP Address Allocation ..... | 38 |
+| B.2.2.1 | IP Address Reallocation Continuously..... | 38 |
+| B.2.3 | Packet Forwarding..... | 38 |
+| B.2.3.1 | Sending unauthorized packets to other UEs ..... | 38 |
+| B.2.4 | Emergency PDN Connection ..... | 38 |
+| B.2.4.1 | Inactive Emergency PDN Connection Release ..... | 38 |
+| B.2.5 | Threats related to charging relevant data ..... | 39 |
+| B.2.5.1 | Failure to assign unique TEID or Charging ID for a session ..... | 39 |
+
+# **Annex C: Aspects specific to the network product class eNB..... 39**
+
+| | | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| C.1 | Network product class description for the eNB ..... | 39 |
+| C.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 39 |
+| C.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the eNB network product class..... | 39 |
+| C.2 | Assets and threats specific to the eNB ..... | 39 |
+| C.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 39 |
+| C.2.2 | Threats related to Control plane and User plane ..... | 40 |
+| C.2.2.1 | Control plane data confidentiality protection ..... | 40 |
+| C.2.2.2 | Control plane data integrity protection ..... | 40 |
+| C.2.2.3 | User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB ..... | 40 |
+| C.2.2.4 | User plane data integrity protection..... | 41 |
+| C.2.2.5 | Local user plane integrity protection configuration ..... | 41 |
+| C.2.2.6 | UP integrity protection policy selection ..... | 41 |
+| C.2.2.7 | Bidding down on UP IP policy ..... | 41 |
+| C.2.3 | Threats related to key reuse..... | 41 |
+| C.2.3.1 | Key reuse for eavesdropping ..... | 41 |
+
+# **Annex D: Aspects specific to the network product class gNB ..... 42**
+
+| | | |
+|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| D.1 | Network product class description for the gNB..... | 42 |
+| D.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 42 |
+| D.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the gNB network product class ..... | 42 |
+| D.2 | Assets and threats specific to the gNB..... | 42 |
+| D.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 42 |
+| D.2.2 | Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network ..... | 43 |
+| D.2.2.1 | Control plane data confidentiality protection ..... | 43 |
+| D.2.2.2 | Control plane data integrity protection ..... | 43 |
+| D.2.2.3 | User plane data confidentiality protection at gNB ..... | 43 |
+| D.2.2.4 | User plane data integrity protection..... | 44 |
+| D.2.2.5 | AS algorithm selection and use ..... | 44 |
+| D.2.2.6 | Bidding down on Xn-Handover ..... | 44 |
+| D.2.2.7 | Key Reuse..... | 44 |
+| D.2.2.8 | Security Policy Enforcement..... | 44 |
+| D.2.2.9 | State transition from inactive state to connected state..... | 45 |
+
+# **Annex E: Aspects specific to the network product class UDM ..... 46**
+
+| | | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| E.1 | Network product class description for the UDM ..... | 46 |
+| E.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 46 |
+| E.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the UDM network product class..... | 46 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| E.2 | Assets and threats specific to the UDM ..... | 46 |
+| E.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 46 |
+| E.2.2 | Threats related to UDM assets ..... | 47 |
+| E.2.2.1 | Incorrect SUCI de-concealment ..... | 47 |
+| E.2.2.2 | Synchronization failure ..... | 47 |
+| E.2.2.3 | Failure to store the authentication status ..... | 47 |
+| E.2.2.4 | Incorrect security enforcement configuration..... | 47 |
+| E.2.2.5 | Incorrect UP security policy configuration for 5G LAN service ..... | 47 |
+| E.2.2.6 | Use of an invalid public key in the SUCI ECIES protection scheme ..... | 48 |
+| Annex F: | Aspects specific to the network product class AUSF ..... | 49 |
+| F.1 | Network product class description for the AUSF ..... | 49 |
+| F.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 49 |
+| F.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the AUSF network product class..... | 49 |
+| F.2 | Assets and threats specific to the AUSF ..... | 49 |
+| F.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 49 |
+| F.2.2 | Threats related to authentication procedures..... | 50 |
+| Annex G: | Aspects specific to the network product class SEPP ..... | 51 |
+| G.1 | Network product class description for the SEPP ..... | 51 |
+| G.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 51 |
+| G.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the SEPP network product class..... | 51 |
+| G.2 | Assets and threats specific to the SEPP ..... | 51 |
+| G.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 51 |
+| G.2.2 | Threats related to cryptographic material in the SEPP ..... | 52 |
+| G.2.2.1 | Misusing cryptographic material of peer SEPPs and IPX providers..... | 52 |
+| G.2.2.2 | Misusing cryptographic material beyond connection-specific scope..... | 52 |
+| G.2.3 | Threats related to error handling in the SEPP ..... | 52 |
+| G.2.3.1 | Incorrect handling for PLMN ID or SNPN ID mismatch ..... | 52 |
+| G.2.3.2 | Incorrect handling for protection policies mismatch..... | 53 |
+| G.2.4 | Threats related to sensitive information exposure..... | 53 |
+| G.2.4.1 | Weak JWS algorithm..... | 53 |
+| G.2.4.2 | Exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message ..... | 54 |
+| G.2.5 | Threats related to TLS protection between NF and SEPP ..... | 54 |
+| G.2.5.1 | Inter-PLMN routing using the incorrect reference ..... | 54 |
+| G.2.5.2 | Tampering of Target API Root..... | 54 |
+| Annex H: | Aspects specific to the network product class NRF..... | 56 |
+| H.1 | Network product class description for the NRF..... | 56 |
+| H.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 56 |
+| H.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the NRF network product class ..... | 56 |
+| H.2 | Assets and threats specific to the NRF..... | 56 |
+| H.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 56 |
+| H.2.2 | Threats related to NRF authorization..... | 57 |
+| H.2.2.1 | No slice specific authorization for NF discovery ..... | 57 |
+| Annex I: | Aspects specific to the network product class NEF ..... | 58 |
+| I.1 | Network product class description for the NEF ..... | 58 |
+| I.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 58 |
+| I.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the NEF network product class ..... | 58 |
+| I.2 | Assets and threats specific to the NEF..... | 58 |
+| I.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 58 |
+| I.2.2 | Threats related to NEF assets..... | 59 |
+| I.2.2.1 | No authentication on application function..... | 59 |
+| I.2.2.2 | No authorization on northbound APIs..... | 59 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Annex J: | Aspects specific to the network product class SMF ..... | 60 |
+| J.1 | Network product class description for the SMF ..... | 60 |
+| J.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 60 |
+| J.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the SMF network product class..... | 60 |
+| J.2 | Assets and threats specific to the SMF ..... | 60 |
+| J.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 60 |
+| J.2.2 | Threats related to SMF assets..... | 61 |
+| J.2.2.1 | Priority of UP security policy..... | 61 |
+| J.2.2.2 | TEID uniqueness failure..... | 61 |
+| J.2.2.3 | Charging ID Uniqueness failure..... | 61 |
+| J.2.2.3 | UP security policy check..... | 61 |
+| Annex K: | Aspects specific to the network product class AMF..... | 62 |
+| K.1 | Network product class description for the AMF..... | 62 |
+| K.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 62 |
+| K.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the AMF network product class ..... | 62 |
+| K.2 | Assets and threats specific to the AMF..... | 62 |
+| K.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 62 |
+| K.2.2 | Threats related to AKA procedures..... | 63 |
+| K.2.2.1 | Resynchronization ..... | 63 |
+| K.2.2.2 | Failed Integrity check of Initial Registration message ..... | 63 |
+| K.2.2.3 | RES* verification failure ..... | 63 |
+| K.2.3 | Threats related to security mode command procedure..... | 63 |
+| K.2.3.1 | Bidding Down ..... | 63 |
+| K.2.3.2 | NAS integrity selection and use ..... | 64 |
+| K.2.3.3 | NAS NULL integrity protection..... | 64 |
+| K.2.3.4 | NAS confidentiality protection..... | 64 |
+| K.2.4 | Threats related to security in Intra-RAT mobility..... | 64 |
+| K.2.4.1 | Bidding down on Xn-Handover ..... | 64 |
+| K.2.4.2 | NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in AMF change..... | 64 |
+| K.2.5 | Threats related to release of non-emergency bearer..... | 65 |
+| K.2.6 | Threats related to initial registration procedure ..... | 65 |
+| K.2.6.1 | Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities ..... | 65 |
+| K.2.6.2 | Invalid encoding of UE 5G security capabilities on the NG interface ..... | 65 |
+| K.2.7 | Threats related to 5G-GUTI allocation ..... | 65 |
+| K.2.7.1 | Failure to allocate new 5G-GUTI..... | 65 |
+| K.2.8 | NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS in 5G CIoT ..... | 66 |
+| K.2.9 | Threat related to Security for 5G CIoT ..... | 66 |
+| K.2.9.1 | Failed Verification of UE Identity during RRC Reestablishment Procedure for CP CIoT 5GS
Optimization ..... | 66 |
+| K.2.10 | Threats related to session establishment procedure ..... | 66 |
+| K.2.10.1 | Incorrect validation of S-NSSAIs..... | 66 |
+| Annex L: | Aspects specific to the network product class UPF ..... | 67 |
+| L.1 | Network product class description for the UPF ..... | 67 |
+| L.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 67 |
+| L.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the UPF network product class..... | 67 |
+| L.2 | Assets and threats specific to the UPF ..... | 67 |
+| L.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 67 |
+| L.2.2 | Threats related to user plane data transport..... | 68 |
+| L.2.3 | Threats related to signalling data ..... | 68 |
+| L.2.4 | Threats related to TEID..... | 68 |
+| L.2.5 | Threats related to user plane data forwarding..... | 69 |
+| L.2.6 | Threats related to malformed GTP-U messages ..... | 69 |
+| Annex M: | Aspects specific to the network product class N3IWF ..... | 70 |
+| M.1 | Threat to send EAP-Identity Request by N3IWF ..... | 70 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Annex N: | Aspects specific to the network product class NWDAF ..... | 71 |
+| N.1 | Network product class description for the NWDAF ..... | 71 |
+| N.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 71 |
+| N.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the NWDAF network product class ..... | 71 |
+| N.2 | Assets and threats specific to the NWDAF ..... | 71 |
+| N.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 71 |
+| N.2.2 | Void ..... | 72 |
+| Annex O: | Aspects specific to the IMS network product classes ..... | 73 |
+| O.1 | Network product class description for the IMS ..... | 73 |
+| O.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 73 |
+| O.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the IMS network product classes ..... | 73 |
+| O.2 | Assets and threats specific to the P-CSCF ..... | 73 |
+| O.2.1 | Critical assets ..... | 73 |
+| O.2.2 | Threats related to set-up of security associations ..... | 74 |
+| O.2.2.1 | High-priority algorithm selection ..... | 74 |
+| O.2.2.2 | Bidding down on security association set-up ..... | 74 |
+| O.2.3 | Threats related to IMS signalling transport ..... | 74 |
+| O.2.4 | Threats related to SPI allocation ..... | 74 |
+| O.3 | Assets and threats specific to the S-CSCF ..... | 75 |
+| O.3.1 | Critical assets ..... | 75 |
+| O.3.2 | Threats related to de-registration during the authentication ..... | 75 |
+| O.3.3 | Threats related to authenticated re-registration ..... | 76 |
+| O.3.3.1 | Unprotected register message ..... | 76 |
+| O.3.3.2 | No resynchronization ..... | 76 |
+| O.4 | Assets and threats specific to the I-CSCF ..... | 76 |
+| O.4.1 | Critical assets ..... | 76 |
+| O.4.2 | Threats related to network hiding ..... | 77 |
+| O.4.2.1 | encryption in network hiding ..... | 77 |
+| O.5 | Assets and threats specific to the IBCF ..... | 77 |
+| O.5.1 | Critical assets ..... | 77 |
+| O.5.2 | Threats related to network hiding ..... | 78 |
+| O.5.2.1 | encryption in network hiding ..... | 78 |
+| O.5.2.2 | replacement in network hiding ..... | 78 |
+| O.6 | Assets and threats specific to the AS ..... | 78 |
+| O.6.1 | Critical assets ..... | 78 |
+| O.6.2 | Threats related to authorization ..... | 79 |
+| O.6.2.1 | No user authorization ..... | 79 |
+| O.6.2.1 | No ID privacy ..... | 79 |
+| O.7 | Assets and threats specific to the MRFC ..... | 79 |
+| O.7.1 | Critical assets ..... | 79 |
+| O.8 | Assets and threats specific to the IMS AGW ..... | 80 |
+| O.8.1 | Critical assets ..... | 80 |
+| O.9 | Assets and threats specific to the MRFP ..... | 80 |
+| O.9.1 | Critical assets ..... | 80 |
+| O.10 | Assets and threats specific to the IMS MGW ..... | 81 |
+| O.10.1 | Critical assets ..... | 81 |
+| O.11 | Assets and threats specific to the TrGW ..... | 81 |
+| O.11.1 | Critical assets ..... | 81 |
+| O.12 | Assets and threats specific to the MGCF ..... | 82 |
+| O.12.1 | Critical assets ..... | 82 |
+| Annex P: | Aspects specific to the network product class NSSAAF ..... | 83 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| P.1 | Void..... | 83 |
+| P.2 | Network product class description for the NSSAAF ..... | 83 |
+| P.2.1 | Introduction ..... | 83 |
+| P.2.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the NSSAAF network product class ..... | 83 |
+| P.3 | Assets and threats specific to the NSSAAF ..... | 83 |
+| P.3.1 | Critical assets..... | 83 |
+| P.3.2 | Threats related to NSSAAF..... | 84 |
+| P.3.2.1 | Threats related to impersonating attack by AAA-S..... | 84 |
+| P.3.2.2 | Threat to select AAA-P and AAA-S..... | 84 |
+| Annex Q (normative): | Aspects specific to the network product class SCP ..... | 85 |
+| Q.1 | Network product class description for the SCP ..... | 85 |
+| Q.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 85 |
+| Q.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the SCP network product class..... | 85 |
+| Q.2 | Assets and Threats specific to SCP..... | 85 |
+| Q.2.1 | Threats related to tokens handled by the SCP..... | 85 |
+| Q.2.1.1 | Token forwarded to a wrong pNF instance ..... | 85 |
+| Q.2.1.2 | Swapped token forwarded to the target pNF ..... | 86 |
+| Annex R: | Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-CU ..... | 87 |
+| R.1 | Network product class description for the gNB-CU..... | 87 |
+| R.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 87 |
+| R.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-CU network product class ..... | 87 |
+| R.2 | Assets and threats specific to the gNB-CU..... | 87 |
+| R.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 87 |
+| R.2.2 | Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network..... | 88 |
+| R.2.2.1 | Control plane data confidentiality protection ..... | 88 |
+| R.2.2.2 | Control plane data integrity protection..... | 88 |
+| R.2.2.3 | User plane data confidentiality protection..... | 88 |
+| R.2.2.4 | User plane data integrity protection..... | 88 |
+| R.2.2.5 | AS algorithm selection and use ..... | 89 |
+| R.2.2.6 | Bidding down on Xn-Handover ..... | 89 |
+| R.2.2.7 | Key reuse..... | 89 |
+| R.2.2.8 | Security policy enforcement..... | 89 |
+| R.2.2.9 | State transition from inactive state to connected state..... | 89 |
+| Annex S: | Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-CU-CP..... | 91 |
+| S.1 | Network product class description for the gNB-CU-CP..... | 91 |
+| S.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 91 |
+| S.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-CU-CP network product class ..... | 91 |
+| S.2 | Assets and threats specific to the gNB-CU-CP..... | 91 |
+| S.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 91 |
+| S.2.2 | Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network..... | 92 |
+| S.2.2.1 | Control plane data confidentiality protection ..... | 92 |
+| S.2.2.2 | Control plane data integrity protection..... | 92 |
+| S.2.2.3 | AS algorithm selection and use ..... | 92 |
+| S.2.2.4 | Bidding down on Xn-Handover ..... | 92 |
+| S.2.2.5 | Key Reuse..... | 93 |
+| S.2.2.6 | Security Policy Enforcement..... | 93 |
+| S.2.2.7 | State transition from inactive state to connected state..... | 93 |
+| Annex T: | Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-CU-UP..... | 94 |
+| T.1 | Network product class description for the gNB-CU-UP ..... | 94 |
+| T.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 94 |
+| T.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-CU-UP network product class ..... | 94 |
+| T.2 | Assets and threats specific to the gNB-CU-UP ..... | 94 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
+| T.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 94 |
+| T.2.2 | Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network..... | 95 |
+| T.2.2.1 | Control plane data confidentiality protection ..... | 95 |
+| T.2.2.2 | Control plane data integrity protection..... | 95 |
+| T.2.2.3 | User plane data confidentiality protection..... | 95 |
+| T.2.2.4 | User plane data integrity protection..... | 95 |
+| Annex U: | Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-DU ..... | 97 |
+| U.1 | Network product class description for the gNB-DU..... | 97 |
+| U.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 97 |
+| U.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-DU network product class ..... | 97 |
+| U.2 | Assets and threats specific to the gNB-DU..... | 97 |
+| U.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 97 |
+| U.2.2 | Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network..... | 98 |
+| U.2.2.1 | Control plane data confidentiality protection ..... | 98 |
+| U.2.2.2 | Control plane data integrity protection..... | 98 |
+| U.2.2.3 | User plane data confidentiality protection..... | 98 |
+| U.2.2.4 | User plane data integrity protection..... | 98 |
+| Annex V: | Aspects specific to the network product class MnF ..... | 99 |
+| V.1 | Network product class description for the MnF..... | 99 |
+| V.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 99 |
+| V.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the MnF network product class ..... | 99 |
+| V.2 | Assets and threats specific to the MnF..... | 99 |
+| V.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 99 |
+| V.2.2 | Threats related to MnF assets..... | 100 |
+| V.2.2.1 | Over-Privileged Data Processes ..... | 100 |
+| V.2.2.2 | Threats related to Management data..... | 100 |
+| Annex W: | Aspects specific to the network product class AAnF ..... | 101 |
+| W.1 | Network product class description for the AAnF ..... | 101 |
+| W.1.1 | Introduction ..... | 101 |
+| W.1.2 | Minimum set of functions defining the AAnF network product class..... | 101 |
+| W.2 | Assets and threats specific to the AAnF ..... | 101 |
+| W.2.1 | Critical assets..... | 101 |
+| W.2.2 | Threats related to AAnF assets..... | 102 |
+| W.2.2.1 | Control plane data protection with AUSF ..... | 102 |
+| W.2.2.2 | Control plane data protection with AF/NEF ..... | 102 |
+| W.2.2.3 | AKMA key storage and update ..... | 102 |
+| Annex R: | Change history ..... | 103 |
+
+---
+
+## Foreword
+
+This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version x.y.z
+
+where:
+
+x the first digit:
+
+- 1 presented to TSG for information;
+- 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+- 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+
+Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+
+z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+ - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+ - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+- [2] 3GPP TR 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP network products classes".
+- [3] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access".
+- [4] 3GPP TR 33.821: "Rationale and track of security decisions in Long Term Evolution (LTE) RAN/3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)".
+- [5] 3GPP TS 33.116: "Security Assurance Specification for MME network product class".
+- [6] 3GPP TS 33.511: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); NR Node B (gNB)".
+- [7] 3GPP TS 38.300 v15: "NR; NR and NR-RAN Overall Description; Stage 2".
+- [8] 3GPP TS 23.501 v15: "System Architecture for 5G System; Stage 2".
+- [9] 3GPP TS 38.323 v15: "NR; Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) specification".
+- [10] 3GPP TS 38.322 v15: "NR; Radio Link Control (RLC) protocol specification".
+- [11] 3GPP TS 33.250: "Security assurance specification for the PGW network product class".
+- [12] 3GPP TS 33.516: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the AUSF network product class".
+- [13] 3GPP TS 33.517: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) network product class".
+- [14] 3GPP TS 33.501 Release 15: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
+- [15] 3GPP TS 33.518: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Repository Function (NRF) network product class".
+- [16] 3GPP TS 33.519: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Exposure Function (NEF) network product class".
+- [17] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
+- [18] 3GPP TS 33.513: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); User Plane Function (UPF)".
+
+- [19] 3GPP TS 36.300: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN);Overall description;Stage 2."
+- [20] 3GPP TS 33.216: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the evolved Node B (eNB) network product class."
+- [21] 3GPP TS 33.514: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Management (UDM) network product class".
+- [22] 3GPP TS 33.512: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Access and Mobility management Function (AMF)".
+- [23] 3GPP TS 33.521: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF) network product class".
+- [24] 3GPP TS 23.288: " Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to support network data analytics services".
+- [25] 3GPP TS 33.226: "Security assurance for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)".
+- [26] Void
+- [27] 3GPP TS 33.522: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Service Communication Proxy (SCP)".
+- [28] Void
+- [29] 3GPP TS 38.300: "NR; NR and NR-RAN Overall Description; Stage 2".
+- [30] 3GPP TS 38.401: "NG-RAN; Architecture description".
+- [31] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for 5G System; Stage 2".
+- [32] 3GPP TS 33.523: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Split gNB product classes".
+- [33] 3GPP TS 28.533: "Management and orchestration; Architecture framework".
+- [34] 3GPP TS 28.530: "Management and orchestration; Concepts, use cases and requirements".
+- [35] 3GPP TS 33.526: "Security Assurance Specification for the Management Function (MnF)".
+- [36] 3GPP TS 33.537: "5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function (AAnF)".
+- [37] 3GPP TS 33.535: "Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS)".
+- [38] 3GPP TS 33.326: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Function (NSSAAF) network product class".
+
+---
+
+## 3 Definitions and abbreviations
+
+### 3.1 Definitions
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
+
+**GNP Class (Generic Network Product Class):** generic network product class is a class of network products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities for that particular network product
+
+## 3.2 Abbreviations
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------|
+| GNP | Generic Network Product |
+| SCAS | Security Assurance Specification |
+| SECAM | Security Assurance Methodology |
+| MnF | Management Function |
+| OAM | Operation and Management |
+| NP | Network Product |
+| BSS | Business Support System |
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization, Account |
+| TN | Transport Network |
+
+---
+
+## 4 Generic Network Product (GNP) class description
+
+### 4.1 Overview
+
+A 3GPP generic network product class defines a set of functions that are implemented on that product, which includes, but not limited to minimum set of common 3GPP functions for that product covered in 3GPP specifications, other functions not covered by 3GPP specifications, as well as interfaces to access that product. A generic network product also includes hardware, software, and OS components that the product is implemented on. The current document describes the threats and the critical assets in the course of developing 3GPP security assurance specifications for a particular network product class.
+
+**Applicability of the GNP security assurance specification to products:** Assume a telecom equipment vendor wants to sell a product to an operator, and the latter is interested in following the Security Assurance Methodology as described in TR 33.916[2], then, before evaluation according to TR 33.916[2] in a testing laboratory can start, it first needs to be determined which security assurance specifications written by 3GPP apply to the given product.
+
+Each 3GPP Network Product, is basically a device composed of hardware (e.g. chip, processors, RAM, network cards), software (e.g. operating system, drivers, applications, services, protocols), and interfaces (e.g. console interfaces and O&M interfaces) that allow the 3GPP network product to be managed and configured locally and/or remotely A GNP is a 3GPP network product.
+
+**GNP Security Assurance Specification (GNP SCAS):** The GNP SCAS provides a description of the security requirements (which are including test cases) pertaining to that generic network product class.
+
+**Need for a GNP network product model:** This minimum set of functions listed in clause 4.2 is exclusively meant as a membership criterion for the GNP Class. It is not meant to restrict the functionality of a GNP, or the scope of the present document in any way. On the contrary, it is clear that GNPs will contain many more functions than those from the minimum set listed in clause 4.2, and the GNP will contain requirements relating to functions not contained in this minimum set. Some of these functions, beyond the minimum set, can be found from various 3GPP specifications, but by far not all these functions. This implies that there is a need to describe the functions that cannot be found from 3GPP specifications in some other way before the GNP can be written so that the GNP can make reference to this description. This description is the GNP model, cf. clause 4.3.
+
+EXAMPLE 1: 3GPP specifications do not describe a local management interface, but the GNP will have to take it into account, so a local management interface needs to be part of an GNP model.
+
+EXAMPLE 2: The GNP sometimes says e.g.: "Authentication events on the local management interface shall be logged." This implies the presence of a logging function. The logging function is not part of the defining minimum set of functions from clause 4.2. If a product implements this minimum set, but no logging function, then this just means that the product is a GNP, but will fail the evaluation against the GNP SCAS.
+
+The GNP model is further used in clauses 5 and 6 in various ways, e.g. the critical assets can point to parts of the GNP model, threats and requirements can refer to interfaces shown in the GNP model, etc.
+
+## 4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class
+
+According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. This common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in pertinent 3GPP specifications, such as clause 4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [3], Release 8 [3].
+
+NOTE: The reason why the definition of the common set of functions refers to a particular Release 8 version of TS 23.401 [3], contrary to what is customary in 3GPP when referencing other 3GPP specifications, is that a Security Assurance Specification is to avoid having a moving target when defining a network product class. Nevertheless, the set of functions in clause 4.3.1 of 3GPP TS 23.401, Release 8 [3] is expected to be stable, as only FASMO corrections are allowed to Release 8. Furthermore, this set is believed to be minimal, i.e. implemented by all network products, which may not be true for the corresponding set of functions from later releases of TS 23.401 [3]. For the description of these functions compliance with TS 23.401 Release 8 [3] later version is allowed as, obviously, a generic network product should still remain a member of the GNP class when it implements a FASMO correction to Release 8.
+
+## 4.3 Generic network product model
+
+### 4.3.1 Generic network product model overview
+
+Figure 4.3-1 depicts the components of a generic network product model at a high level. These components are further described in the following subclauses.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the GNP model as a stack of layers. On the left, an arrow labeled "3GPP-defined interfaces (e.g. S1, S3, S4, Rx, SGi,...)" points to the top layer. The top layer is divided into two boxes: "Functions defined by 3GPP" and "Other functions". Below this is a box labeled "Operating System", and at the bottom is a box labeled "Hardware". To the right of the stack, a vertical box labeled "OAM functions" spans the height of the top three layers. Two arrows point from this OAM functions box to the right: "Remote management" (pointing to the top layer) and "Local console" (pointing to the Operating System layer).
+
+Figure 4.3-1: GNP model diagram showing the layers of a generic network product model.
+
+Figure 4.3-1: GNP model
+
+### 4.3.2 Functions defined by 3GPP
+
+A GNP will, in many cases, implement 3GPP-defined functions from various releases of pertinent 3GPP specifications. Vendors are, to a large extent, free to select the features implemented in their GNPs. E.g. a GNP could lack support for relay nodes, as introduced in Release 10, but implement all other features defined up to and including Release 10.
+
+NOTE: Functions defined by 3GPP can be network functions and/or management functions.
+
+### 4.3.3 Other functions
+
+A GNP will also contain functionality not or not fully covered in 3GPP specifications.
+
+#### 4.3.3a OAM functions
+
+The OAM functions provide capabilities to support OAM protocols and perform operation and management on the network product.
+
+NOTE 1: OAM function are management functions defined by 3GPP. For example, a network product (NP) for 3GPP defined RAN/CN network function (NF) may include an embedded management function (MnF) defined by 3GPP for operation and management of the RAN/CN NF.
+
+### 4.3.4 Operating System (OS)
+
+The present document assumes that the GNP is implemented on dedicated hardware that requires an operating system to run.
+
+### 4.3.5 Hardware
+
+The present document assumes that the GNP is implemented on dedicated hardware. Aspects of virtualization and cloud are not taken into account in the present version.
+
+NOTE: Aspects of virtualization and cloud are FFS in future releases of the GNP SCAS. They deserve separate study for finding out how to define the boundaries between the GNP class and the hosting environment (e.g. shared HW and Virtual Machine) and which security assumptions to make on this environment.
+
+### 4.3.6 Interfaces
+
+There are two types of logical interfaces defined for the GNP:
+
+- remote logical interfaces; and
+- local logical interfaces.
+
+A **remote logical interface** is an interface which can be used to communicate with the GNP from another network node.
+
+The entire protocol stack implementing the communication is considered to be part of the remote logical interface.
+
+Remote Logical Interfaces also include the remote access interfaces to the GNP for its maintenance through e.g. an Element Management System (EMS) or other management functions.
+
+A **local logical interface** is an interface that can be used only via physical connection to the GNP. That is, the connection requires physical access to the GNP.
+
+The entire protocol stack is considered to be part of the local logical interface. The entire protocol stack and the physical parts of the interface can be used by local connections.
+
+Local Logical Interfaces also include the local hardware interfaces and the Local Maintenance Terminal interface (LMT) of the GNP used for its maintenance through a console.
+
+This means that for both, **local and remote logical interfaces**, the GNP model does not only cover the application layer protocol, for which a GNP function terminates the interface (e.g. S5), but also the protocols (e.g. SCTP, IP, Ethernet, USB) in the protocol stack below the application layer protocol.
+
+There are some major differences between local and remote interfaces from security perspective. For example attaching to a local interface may cause execution of complex internal procedures in the GNP like loading USB device drivers, enumeration of attached devices, mounting file systems etc.
+
+A GNP hosts the following interfaces:
+
+#### Remote logical interfaces:
+
+- Service interfaces that are defined in pertinent 3GPP specifications
+- Service interfaces that are not defined by 3GPP
+- Remote OAM interface
+
+#### Local logical interfaces:
+
+- OAM local console
+- LMT (Local Maintenance Terminal) interface
+- GNP local hardware interfaces
+
+NOTE: There is some overlap between the present clause 4.3.6 and clauses 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in as far as a GNP function (e.g. S5) is part of the termination point for a logical interface.
+
+## 4.4 Scope of the present document
+
+### 4.4.1 Introduction
+
+The present subclause refers to the GNP model in clause 4.3.
+
+### 4.4.2 Scope regarding GNP functions defined by 3GPP
+
+The set of GNP functions actually implemented in an GNP is to be described in the annex of the present document. But the GNP SCAS needs to explicitly address all GNP functions that, if present in an GNP network product, need to be evaluated and hence covered by requirements in the GNP SCAS. Furthermore, it is to be avoided that a particular version of an GNP SCAS becomes a moving target. This leads to the following note:
+
+NOTE: Although the present document intends to cover the security problems and security requirements for all NP functions described in 3GPP, what other NP, in additional to the MME, are to be covered is at the discretion of the working group.
+
+### 4.4.3 Scope regarding other functions
+
+At least the following functions not defined by 3GPP are in scope of the GNP SCAS:
+
+- Non 3GPP defined management functions to support remote OAM.
+- Management functions to support local OAM.
+
+### 4.4.4 Scope regarding Operating System (OS)
+
+The GNP SCAS does not attempt a full evaluation of the correct internal functioning of the OS. However, interfaces (I.e. the restriction on open ports and unnecessary services running in the system) and modifications (e.g. verification of the correct applied patch level, hardening, etc.) of the OS are in scope.
+
+### 4.4.5 Scope regarding hardware
+
+The GNP SCAS does not attempt a full evaluation of the correct internal functioning of the hardware platform. However, interfaces that are implemented in hardware (e.g. USB port) and modifications of the hardware are in scope.
+
+### 4.4.6 Scope regarding interfaces
+
+The interfaces listed in clause 4.3.6 are all in scope of the present document.
+
+---
+
+## 5 Generic assets and threats
+
+### 5.1 Introduction
+
+The present subclause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to more than one network product.
+
+### 5.2 Generic critical assets
+
+The critical assets of GNP to be protected are:
+
+- User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords);
+
+- Log data;
+- Configuration data, e.g. GNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group, command group) etc.
+- Operating System (OS), i.e. the files that make up the OS and its processes (code and data);
+- GNP Application;
+- Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits;
+- Hardware, e.g. mainframe, board, power supply unit etc.
+- The interfaces of GNP to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on MME
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between MME and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the GNP are described in clause 4, Generic Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- GNP Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: GNP files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, GNP applications or GNP Software.
+
+## 5.3 Generic threats
+
+### 5.3.0 Generic threats format
+
+Threats are described using the following format:
+
+- *Threat Name:*
+- *Threat Category:*
+- *Threat Description:*
+- *Threatened Asset:*
+
+### 5.3.1 Introduction
+
+Threat analysis is an important step in the SCAS methodology in order to justify a proposed requirement and ensuring that no relevant requirements have been forgotten.
+
+In particular, to ensure this latter point, the threat analysis needs to be free of gaps and overlapping, and it needs to be ensured that all relevant threats are covered by a requirement.
+
+To resolve the overlapping, it is suggested to first look at the action used to exploit the threat being considered. For example if passwords are stored locally in the GNP (e.g. in a database or file system) in an insecure way (e.g. clear text, unsalted hashes), an attacker can retrieve these passwords (e.g. can retrieve the file containing them and can retrieve them by means of brute forcing if unsalted hashes are used) and later use them. So the threat related to this scenario is Information Disclosure.
+
+To achieve this goal, the identified threats are grouped into the seven categories, one covering threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces and the other six ones corresponding to the categories proposed by STRIDE [[http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee823878\(v=cs.20\).aspx](http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee823878(v=cs.20).aspx)] and reported below:
+
+- **Spoofing identity.** An example of identity spoofing is illegally accessing and then using another user's authentication information, such as username and password.
+
+- **Tampering with data.** Data tampering involves the malicious modification of data. Examples include unauthorized changes made to persistent data, such as that held in a database, and the alteration of data as it flows between two computers over an open network, such as the Internet.
+- **Repudiation.** Repudiation threats are associated with users who deny performing an action without other parties having any way to prove otherwise. For example, a user performs an illegal operation in a system that lacks the ability to trace the prohibited operations. Non-repudiation refers to the ability of a system to counter repudiation threats. For example, a user who purchases an item might have to sign for the item upon receipt. The vendor can then use the signed receipt as evidence that the user did receive the package.
+- **Information disclosure.** Information disclosure threats involve the exposure of information to individuals who are not supposed to have access to it. For example, the ability of users to read a file that they were not granted access to, or the ability of an intruder to read data in transit between two computers.
+- **Denial of service.** Denial of service (DoS) attacks deny service to valid users-for example, by making a Web server temporarily unavailable or unusable. You need to protect against certain types of DoS threats simply to improve system availability and reliability.
+- **Elevation of privilege.** In this type of threat, an unprivileged user gains privileged access and thereby has sufficient access to compromise or destroy the entire system. Elevation of privilege threats include those situations in which an attacker has effectively penetrated all system defenses and become part of the trusted system itself, a dangerous situation indeed.
+
+All the reported threats follow the below template:
+
+- Threat Name: i.e. The name of the threat
+- Threat Category: i.e. of the six STRIDE categories
+- Threat Description: i.e. description of how the threat can be exploited and eventually the impacts/consequences of its exploitation
+- Threatened Asset: e.g. which asset is affected by the threat
+
+## 5.3.2 Threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces
+
+The threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces, cf. clause 4.3.6, may have been sufficiently covered, explicitly or implicitly, in the course of the work on 3GPP security specifications. There is no need to repeat this work for the purposes of the present SCAS, and these threats and risks are therefore not considered here separately.
+
+NOTE: Not all threats and risks covered by security mechanisms in existing 3GPP security specifications may have been adequately documented in a 3GPP TS or TR. They may have also been addressed in contributions to 3GPP Working Group meetings. A good source for these threats and risks is 3GPP TR 33.821 [4]. Note also that threats that relate to actions local to the NP and/or do not affect interoperability may also not have been addressed by existing 3GPP work.
+
+When threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces are found that are not sufficiently covered in existing 3GPP security specifications, they need to be addressed in the present SCAS. Generic threats, e.g. threats relating to protocol robustness, that also apply to 3GPP-defined interfaces are covered in the present clause.
+
+## 5.3.3 Spoofing identity
+
+### 5.3.3.1 Default Accounts
+
+- *Threat name:* Default Accounts
+- *Threat Category:* Spoofing Identity
+- *Threat Description:* A default account with a default password or just a user account with a default password may be provided on GNP and this password may not be modified in time. An attacker can get this password, for example, for low clearance level user, even high clearance level user from document or by brute forcing. With the default password an attacker can access to the GNP, via console (e.g. via direct connection to the GNP via
+
+serial and/or usb ports) or via network interfaces (e.g. management and maintenance), and modify, for example, the configuration and/or interference of the normal network operation.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: User account data and credentials
+
+#### 5.3.3.2 Weak Password Policies
+
+- *Threat name*: Weak Password Policies
+- *Threat Category*: Spoofing Identity
+- *Threat Description*: Weak password policies (e.g. short password length, blank passwords, password age, historical passwords and password dictionary) can make a password cracking very simple (e.g. in a short time the password can be guessed by brute forcing). With these passwords an attacker can access to the GNP, via console (e.g. via direct connection to the GNP via serial and/or usb ports) or via network interfaces (e.g. management and maintenance), and modify, for example, the configuration and/or interference of the normal network operation.
+- *Threatened Asset*: User account data and credentials
+
+#### 5.3.3.3 Password peek
+
+- *Threat name*: Password peek
+- *Threat Category*: Spoofing Identity
+- *Threat Description*: When password in plain text has been displayed on screen, it can be seen easily by another local observer besides operator. With these passwords an attacker can access to the GNP, via console (e.g. via direct connection to the GNP via serial and/or usb ports) or via network interfaces (e.g. management and maintenance), and modify, for example, the configuration and/or interference of the normal network operation.
+- *Threatened Asset*: User account data and credentials
+
+#### 5.3.3.4 Direct Root Access
+
+- *Threat name*: Direct Root Access
+- *Threat Category*: Spoofing Identity
+- *Threat Description*: An attacker fraudulently access directly to the root account via the network/remote connection, for example by brute forcing attack.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+#### 5.3.3.5 IP Spoofing
+
+- *Threat Name*: IP Spoofing
+- *Threat Category*: Spoofing Identity.
+- *Threat Description*: IP spoofing is used to gain unauthorized access to a computer. An attacker forwards packets to a computer with a source address indicating that the packet is coming from a trusted port or system.
+- *Threatened Asset*: GNP.
+
+#### 5.3.3.6 Malware
+
+- *Threat Name*: Malware
+- *Threat Category*: Spoofing Identity, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege, Tampering, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: A malware can act as a legitimate user and perform malicious activities.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+### 5.3.3.7 Eavesdropping
+
+*Threat name*: Eavesdropping
+
+*Threat Category*: Spoofing Identity, tampering, repudiation
+
+- *Threat Description*: Eavesdropping or sniffing is an attack consisting of capturing network traffic and reading the data content in search of sensitive information like passwords, session tokens, or any kind of confidential information. So, an attacker can eavesdrop network traffic, for example, on the management/maintenance interfaces to retrieve credentials which can be used to spoof user identity. Eavesdropping can be performed, e.g. by means of MITM attacks. This type of attacks may be possible, for example, if weak cryptographic protocols or non-industry standard cryptographic algorithms are used or if the communication protocols have been implemented incorrectly.
+- *Threatened Asset*: User account data and credentials
+
+## 5.3.4 Tampering
+
+### 5.3.4.1 Software Tampering
+
+- *Threat Name*: Software Tampering
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering
+- *Threat Description*: Software packages can be tampered/altered during their installation/upgrade on the GNP. An attacker, for example, can inject malicious code, altering their legitimate behaviour. After their installation or upgrade process, the malicious code can be executed to conduct several attacks (e.g. DoS, Information Stealing, Frauds and so on).
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, including hardware assets.
+
+### 5.3.4.2 Ownership File Misuse
+
+- *Threat Name*: Ownership File Misuse
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering
+- *Threat Description*: If files owned by an user (root user as well as not root users) can be altered improperly and illegitimately by an user different than the owner, then an attacker can conduct several types of attacks (e.g. DoS, Information Stealing, and so on)
+- *Threatened Asset*: GNP files.
+
+### 5.3.4.3 External Device Boot
+
+- *Threat name*: External Device Boot
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering
+- *Threat Description*: If GNP operating system can be booted not only from internal memory but also from another source (e.g. USB flash drive, memory card), the GNP bootloader may maliciously be tampered by an attacker. This does not necessarily mean that booting from external memories constitutes a threat.
+- *Threatened Asset*: hardware, operating system
+
+### 5.3.4.4 Log Tampering
+
+- *Threat name*: Log Tampering
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering, Repudiation
+
+- *Threat Description:* if GNP does not securely store log files, an attacker, for example can inject, delete or otherwise tamper with the contents of the logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Log file
+
+#### 5.3.4.5 OAM Traffic Tampering
+
+- *Threat name:* OAM Traffic Tampering
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering
+- *Threat Description:* Usage of weak cryptographic algorithms for transmitted sensitive information/data over OAM interface can expose them to be maliciously tampered. For example an attacker can gain access to the management /maintenance interfaces and can modify the data stream to/from the GNP.
+- *Threatened Asset:* sensitive data transferred over OAM
+
+#### 5.3.4.6 File Write Permissions Abuse
+
+- *Threat name:* File/Directory Write Permissions Misuse
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering
+- *Threat Description:* File write permissions which are far too liberal are potentially vulnerable and can be abused by an attacker to cause DoS. For example file passwords permissions with write permissions too liberal can be altered by an unauthorized user which can change the administration password, causing the impossibility for the administrator to log on the GNP.
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.4.7 User Session Tampering
+
+- *Threat name:* User Session Tampering
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering
+- *Threat Description:* Usage of insufficiently random values used to identify an user session (e.g. sessionID for web sessions) can be exploited by an attacker to tamper this user session by predicting/guessing these identifiers.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User Sessions
+
+### 5.3.5 Repudiation
+
+#### 5.3.5.1 Lack of User Activity Trace
+
+- *Threat Name:* Lack of User Activity Trace
+- *Threat Category:* Repudiation
+- *Threat Description:* A system user, including a possible attacker, can maliciously or erroneously access and modify data in the GNP system, with no or lesser possibility of the actions later being traceable to his/her user identity. One scenario of anonymity is when the user is logged on to a system group account.
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+### 5.3.6 Information disclosure
+
+#### 5.3.6.1 Poor key generation
+
+- *Threat Name:* Poor key generation
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+
+- *Threat Description*: A poor key generation may help an attacker to discover and disclose the key and then read or modify the encrypted data. Attackers can discover a key, for example, if:
+ - It was generated in a non-random fashion (e.g. insecure random generator).
+ - It was generated starting from a passphrase containing low entropy.
+ - The generated key length is too short so the time to retrieve the key by means of dictionary attacks is short.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical asset in the GNP as listed in clause 5.2 except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.6.2 Poor key management
+
+- *Threat Name*: Poor key management
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: A poor key management may help an attacker to discover the key and then read or modify the encrypted data. Attackers can discover the keys if, for example:
+ - Weak key management protocols are used;
+ - The keys are stored in an unencrypted file accessible by everyone;
+ - The keys are not renewed/updated regularly;
+ - The keys which are text strings can be found by looking for all strings in the system;
+ - The keys can be found in memory image of running processes;
+ - RAM does not lose contents immediately after power-down;
+ - RAM can be investigated for keys;
+ - The keys are not safely destroyed after their use.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical asset in the GNP as listed in clause 5.2 except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.6.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms
+
+- *Threat Name*: Use of weak cryptographic algorithms
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: Usage of weak cryptographic algorithms for stored or transmitted sensitive information/data can expose them to be disclosed and eventually tampered.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical asset in the GNP as listed in clause 5.2 except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.6.4 Insecure Data Storage
+
+- *Threat name*: Insecure Data Storage
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: GNP stores locally sensitive data (e.g. communication keys (i.e. $K_{NASenc}$ , $K_{NASint}$ , $K_{eNB}$ ), passwords). An attacker can retrieve these data if they have been stored in an insecure way (e.g. clear text, unsalted hashes).
+- *Threatened Asset*: Any sensitive data stored locally to the GNP
+
+#### 5.3.6.5 System Fingerprinting
+
+- *Threat Name*: System Fingerprinting
+
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: The GNP could potentially disclose information about account details, operating system version and/or other software versions, server names and so on. That can be used by an attacker to perform other attacks.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical asset in the GNP as listed in clause 5.2 except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.6.6 Malware
+
+- *Threat Name*: Malware.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: A malware installed on GNP can access to all the sensitive data stored locally to the GNP (e.g. accounts, keys, and user data).
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical asset in the GNP as listed in clause 5.2 except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.6.7 Personal Identification Information Violation
+
+- *Threat Name*: Personal Identification Information Violation.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: Data containing identities of mobile network subscribers are critical for user privacy. Leakage of these user's identities can lead to loss of privacy, e.g. tracing of a user. Protection of user's identities is also a requirement from regulators.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Mobility Management data (e.g. user identities).
+
+#### 5.3.6.8 Insecure Default Configuration
+
+- *Threat Name*: Insecure Default Configuration
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: An attacker could exploit an insecure default GNP configuration and access to sensitive information/data available on the GNP.
+
+For example a default GNP can use NULL integrity not only for unauthenticated emergency calls. This can compromise the integrity of RRC signalling and make possible Man in the Middle attacks in the AS domain and interception, for example, of user communications.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: GNP configuration data and mobility management data.
+
+#### 5.3.6.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
+
+- *Threat name*: File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure, elevation of privilege, DoS, tampering
+- *Threat Description*: File and directory read permissions which are far too liberal can allow access to the contained data by illegitimate users (e.g. password files with too liberal file permissions can be accessed by unauthorized users).
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+#### 5.3.6.10 Insecure Network Services
+
+- *Threat name*: Insecure Network Services
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure
+
+- *Threat Description:* The GNP can expose insecure/vulnerable services/open ports which can be exploited by an attacker to gain sensitive information/data. For example the GNP can be configured to return sensitive information using telnet on a custom port without any authentication mechanism being configured.
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+#### 5.3.6.11 Unnecessary Services
+
+- *Threat name:* Unnecessary Services
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* The GNP can expose unnecessary services which can be exploited (even if not vulnerable) by an attacker to gain sensitive information/data.
+
+The term unnecessary used in this threat refers to three cases:
+
+- Network service not strictly related to GNP operation (e.g. Splunk Service)
+- Network service available on unexpected interfaces (e.g. SSH enabled on the interface interconnecting GNP and Remote Management)
+- Service that does not enable a network service but that runs on the GNP and is not necessary by GNP normal operation (e.g. fprint service available in the default fedora distribution or Xinetd services).
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+#### 5.3.6.12 Log Disclosure
+
+- *Threat name:* Log Disclosure
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* When operational activities are recorded by GNP, these operation records are called system logs. There are other logs, e.g. operation log, security log. These logs can contain sensitive information/data (e.g. system data, user data, CDR, or also debugging information) which can be accessed by an attacker to gather information about the system and to perform other attacks towards users or the system itself.
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets
+
+#### 5.3.6.13 Unnecessary Applications
+
+- *Threat name:* Unnecessary Applications
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* There are applications (i.e. features and functionalities) in the GNP which can be related to personal privacy (e.g. LCS application). Even if an operator does not deploy these features and functionalities, they can be available in the system as part of a software distribution. Consequently there might be the risk that an attacker enables these applications without authorization (e.g. despite of what is included in the license issued by the vendor). For example, the attacker may enable a feature such as LCS and get the location information of a user.
+- *Threatened Asset:* personal privacy related features, functions and applications, e.g. LCS.
+
+#### 5.3.6.14 Eavesdropping
+
+- *Threat name:* Eavesdropping
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* An attacker can eavesdrop network traffic, for example, on the management/maintenance interfaces. This may be possible if weak cryptographic protocols or non-industry standard cryptographic
+
+algorithms are used or if the communication protocols are implemented incorrectly. Eavesdropping can be performed, for example, by means of MITM attacks, Arp Poisoning, ICMP Redirect and so on.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2
+
+#### 5.3.6.15 Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation
+
+- *Threat name*: Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation
+- *Threat Category*: Information disclosure
+- *Threat Description*: The attack towards signalling traffic can also impact the management traffic and vice versa when these traffics are not isolated. For example, an attacker wants to obtain important information related to signalling, he can intercept and capture signalling traffic on GNP's interface. The important information related management may also be intercepted and captured if the management traffics and signalling traffics are not isolated and use the same physical interface. So the security threats for signalling traffic can impact management traffic and result in unauthorized access on GNP. In the same way, an attacker who attacks GNP's management traffics can obtain important information related signalling, resulting in tampering and privacy leakage of signalling.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical data transferred via the GNP as listed in clause 5.2
+
+### 5.3.7 Denial of service
+
+#### 5.3.7.1 Compromised/Misbehaving User Equipments
+
+- *Threat Name*: Compromised/Misbehaving User Equipments
+- *Threat Category*: DoS
+- *Threat Description*: A large number of compromised or misbehaving user equipments (UE) can cause a fault on the GNP with a consequent denial of service.
+
+For example, an attacker can control a huge number of UEs and can send a lot of contemporary attach/detach requests to the GNP without following the normal protocol flow. The resources on the GNP (e.g. processing resources or radio resources) can be exhausted and the GNP becomes unable to process other, valid NAS signalling requests.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: GNP resources (e.g. system processing capacity (e.g. CPU, memory), network links, radio links and so on).
+
+#### 5.3.7.2 Implementation Flaw
+
+- *Threat Name*: Implementation Flaw.
+- *Threat Category*: DoS.
+- *Threat Description*: An attacker can exploit an implementation flaw in one of the protocols supported by a GNP or in one application available on the GNP and cause a DoS.
+- *Threatened Asset*: all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets.
+
+#### 5.3.7.3 Insecure Network Services
+
+- *Threat name*: Insecure Network Services.
+- *Threat Category*: DoS.
+- *Threat Description*: The GNP can expose insecure/vulnerable services/open ports which can be exploited by an attacker to crash the GNP.
+- *Threatened Asset*: GNP services.
+
+### 5.3.7.4 Human Error
+
+- *Threat name:* Human Error
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of service
+- *Threat Description:* The general threat of human error in operation and maintenance. This can include network-, network element-, and firewall configuration-settings. It can also include the risk of user accounts being forgotten during change or deletion, or other slips in their handlings. Causes can be maintenance workload, fatigue, inexperience, etc., and may arise irrespective of applied policy. This threat, for network operation, is hard to categorize within the STRIDE approach, but with Denial of service being one important threat category.
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets.
+
+## 5.3.8 Elevation of privilege
+
+### 5.3.8.1 Misuse by authorized users
+
+- *Threat Name:* misuse by authorized users
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege
+- *Threat Description:* A malicious employee or his/her co-worker misuses the network access and management authorization to attempts to upgrade his/her account to, for example, administrative privileges or to gain access to password files within the system.
+- *Threatened Asset:* The network access and management authorization.
+
+### 5.3.8.2 Over-Privileged Processes/Services
+
+- *Threat Name:* Over-Privileged Processes/Services.
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege.
+- *Threat Description:* GNP processes/services running with higher privileges than needed, (i.e. root or Administrator) can allow an attacker to obtain elevated privileges as well. An attacker can for example try to leverage a bug in the running program and execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Over-Privileged Processes/Services.
+
+### 5.3.8.3 Folder Write Permission Abuse
+
+- *Threat Name:* Folder Write Permission Abuse
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege
+- *Threat Description:* weaknesses in folder permissions can lead to elevation of privilege. A root user by mistake can accidentally execute malicious files placed into a directory by attackers which have sufficient write permissions. The same applies for other directories where users other than root have write permission. Any account that has folder permission on a directory has equivalent access to the executable file within that directory. These permissions allow a non-administrator to replace directories containing executable files with new directories containing new executable files or simply to delete directories and the executable files they contain.
+- *Threatened Asset:* System folders with weak write permission.
+
+### 5.3.8.4 Root-Owned File Write Permission Abuse
+
+- *Threat Name:* Root-Owned File Write Permission Abuse.
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege.
+
+- *Threat Description.* Failure to protect root-owned executables files from write access by non-administrators exposes them to the possibility of being compromised. For example, this means that non-administrator users can replace or alter the file's contents and that unknown or malicious injected code can then be executed inadvertently by root.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Root-Owned Files with weak write permission.
+
+#### 5.3.8.5 High-Privileged Files
+
+- *Threat name:* High-privileged files.
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege, DoS, tampering.
+- *Threat Description:* If files can be run with higher privileges than what the owner normally has, i.e. with temporarily elevated rights, it can be dangerous to system.
+- *Threatened Asset:* High privileged files.
+
+#### 5.3.8.6 Insecure Network Services
+
+- *Threat name:* Insecure Network Services.
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege.
+- *Threat Description:* The GNP can expose insecure/vulnerable services/open ports which can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access, for example using telnet on a custom port without any authentication mechanism configured.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Insecure network services/ports.
+
+#### 5.3.8.7 Elevation of Privilege via Unnecessary Network Services
+
+- *Threat name:* Unnecessary Network Services
+- *Threat category:* Elevation of Privilege, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* The GNP can expose unnecessary services/open ports which can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access thus leading to elevation of privilege. The term unnecessary used in this threat refers to two cases:
+ - Network services not strictly related to GNP operation (e.g. Splunk Service)
+ - Network service available on unexpected interfaces (eg. SSH enabled on the interface interconnecting GNP and Remote Management)
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GNP as listed in clause 5.2, except hardware assets.
+
+---
+
+## 6 Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces
+
+### 6.1 Introduction
+
+In addition to the assets and threats described in clause 5 for GNP, the present clause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to all network functions supporting service based interfaces.
+
+### 6.2 Generic critical assets
+
+The generic critical assets of NF to be protected are:
+
+- NF Application.
+- NF API data (e.g. API message IEs, access tokens, client credentials assertions).
+
+**Editor's Note:** A formulation for indicating the applicable release for the critical assets is needed.
+
+- The interfaces of NF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service Based Interfaces.
+
+## 6.3 Generic threats
+
+### 6.3.1 Introduction
+
+The threats described in this subclause follow the template in clause 5. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.117 [17].
+
+### 6.3.2 Threats related to Service Based Interfaces
+
+#### 6.3.2.1 JSON Parser Exploits
+
+- *Threat Name:* JSON Parser Exploits
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* one of the JSON parser exploits is that the parsers used by a generic NF may execute JavaScript or any other code contained in JSON objects received on SBIs, which are considered untrusted. Further, these parsers may include resources external to the received JSON object itself, such as files from the NF's filesystem or other resources loaded externally. With such exploit, malicious code can be executed by an attacker to conduct several attacks e.g. tampering, information disclosure/stealing, DoS.
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets as listed in clauses 5.2 and X.2, except hardware assets
+
+#### 6.3.2.2 JSON Parser not Robust
+
+- *Threat Name:* JSON Parser not Robust.
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* there are following threats if JSON parsers are not robust:
+ - For data structures where values are accessible using names (sometimes referred to as keys), e.g. a JSON object, if the names/keys are not unique and duplicated names/keys occur within such a structure, it can result in inconsistent values for that names (or keys), which leads to Denial of Service.
+ - If the format and range of values for the IEs in API messages are not implemented as required (e.g. when the number of leaf IEs exceeds the maximum number or when the size of the JSON body of any HTTP request exceed the maximum size), security vulnerabilities may be introduced such as buffer overflow flow, which may lead to Denial of Service.
+- *Threatened Asset:* NF API data, NF Application, Sufficient Processing Capability.
+
+### 6.3.3 Threats related to service access
+
+#### 6.3.3.1 Elevation of privilege via incorrect verification of access tokens
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect Verification of Access Tokens.
+- *Threat category:* Elevation of Privilege, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* there are following threats if the generic NF cannot correctly verify the access tokens:
+
+- An access token may be tampered so that an attacker can arbitrarily access any services from any NF service providers within the same PLMN or in different PLMNs or SNPNS, which leads to elevation of privilege and consequently information disclosure.
+- An access token may be tampered so that an attacker can arbitrarily access the services of any slices provided by the NF producer instances (excluded from the list of NSSAIs or the list NSI IDs) within the same PLMN or in different PLMNs or SNPNS, which leads to elevation of privilege and consequently information disclosure.
+- An access token may be tampered so that an attacker can arbitrarily access the services provided by the NF producer instances outside the NF Set which it is allowed to access within the same PLMN or in different PLMNs or SNPNS, which leads to elevation of privilege and consequently information disclosure.
+- An access token may be tampered so that an attacker can arbitrarily access the disallowed resources or conduct disallowed actions on the resources for the services provided by a NF service provider within the same PLMN or in different PLMNs or SNPNS, which leads to elevation of privilege and consequently information disclosure.
+- An access token may be tampered so that an attacker can block service access by replacing the granted services/NF service providers with unavailable services/NF service providers, which leads to denial of service.
+- An expired access token can be replayed so that an attack can access the services which may no longer be allowed by the NF service provider, which leads to elevation of privilege and consequently information disclosure.
+- *Threatened Asset:* NF API data, NF Application, Sufficient processing capacity
+
+NOTE 1: This SNPNS authorization aspects only apply to UDMs, NRFs and AUSFs in Credentials Holders Credentials Holder using AUSF and UDM for primary authentication..
+
+## 6.3.4 Threats related to authentication for indirect communication
+
+### 6.3.4.1 Incorrect validation of client credentials assertion
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect Validation of Client Credentials Assertion.
+- *Threat category:* Spoofing Identity, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege.
+- *Threat Description:* for indirect communication where NF service consumer and NRF/NF service producer cannot mutually authenticate each other, the authentication of NF service consumer towards NRF/NF service producer can only implicitly rely on authentication between NF service consumer and SCP and between SCP and NRF/NF service producer with hop-by-hop security protection. An additional authentication for indirect communication is using client credentials assertions signed by NF service consumer and validated by NRF/NF service producer, as defined in TS 33.501 [14] clause 13.3.8. Client credentials assertions are sent end-to-end from NF service consumer to NRF/NF service producer via one or several SCPs. There are following threats if the generic NF (including all typers of NF service producer, NRF) receiving the assertion cannot correctly validate it:
+ - If the NF could not verify the integrity of the assertion, an attacker can deceive the NF by tampering the instance ID of the consumer NF, audience claim, timestamp and expiration time in the client credentials assertion. This can lead to spoofing identity, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege.
+ - If the NF could successfully verify the integrity of the client credentials assertion but could not verify the audience claim in the assertion, an attacker can deceive the NF with an assertion detined for another NF type intercepted from the consumer NF. This can lead to spoofing identity, information disclosure, elevation of privilege.
+ - If the NF could successfully verify the integrity and audience claim of the client credentials assertion but could not verify the expiration time (exp) in the assertion, it can be replayed by an attack, who can abuse the use of assertion for authentication out of its lifetime. This can lead to spoofing identity, information disclosure.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: NF API data, NF Application, Sufficient processing capacity.
+
+---
+
+## Annex A: Aspects specific to the network product class MME
+
+### A.1 Network product class description for the MME
+
+#### A.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### A.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the MME network product class
+
+According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. Therefore, in order to define the MME network product class it is necessary to define the common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities that is constitutive for an MME. As part of the MME network product, it is expected that the MME contains MME application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the MME functions and OAM functions that are specific to the MME network product model. Functionalities specific to the MME network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.116 [5].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 4.4.2 of 3GPP TS 23.401, Release 8 [3].
+
+---
+
+### A.2 Assets and threats specific to the MME
+
+#### A.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the MME to be protected are:
+
+- MME Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. IMSI), subscriber keys (I.e. KNASenc, KNASint, NH), authentication parameters, address of serving eNB, APN name, data related to mobility management like UE status, UE's IP address, etc., session management like PDN type, QoS and so on, or node selection and routing selection, e.g. IP address of UE related S/P-GW, selected routing connection based on UE's identity, etc.
+- The interfaces of MME to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on MME
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between MME and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the MME class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- MME Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: MME files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, MME application, Mobility Management data or MME Software.
+
+## A.2.2 Threats related to AKA procedures
+
+### A.2.2.1 Access to 2G
+
+- *Threat name:* Access to 2G
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If access to 2G is allowed, an attacker can force the system into 2G mode and use smaller key size, weaker algorithm, etc. to make the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credentials
+
+### A.2.2.2 Resynchronization
+
+- *Threat name:* Resynchronization
+- *Threat Reference:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If RAND and AUTS are not included when synchronization fails, the resynchronization procedure does not work correctly. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### A.2.2.3 Failed Integrity check of Attach message
+
+- *Threat name:* Failed integrity check of Attach message
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If integrity check of attach message fails, a user identity cannot be verified. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### A.2.2.4 Forwarding EPS authentication data to SGSN
+
+- *Threat name:* Forwarding EPS authentication data to SGSN
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If EPS authentication data is forwarded to SGSN, the SGSN is not expecting the data and does not know how to handle this data. This can cause processing error on the SGSN and negatively impact system performance.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### A.2.2.5 Forwarding unused EPS authentication data between different security domains
+
+- *Threat name:* Forwarding unused EPS authentication data between different security domains
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+
+- *Threat Description:* If unused EPS authentication data is forwarded between security domains, system resources will be wasted thus requiring HSS to regenerate new EPS authentication data. This can result in waste of system resources for the receiving system to store the data as well as wasting resources in sending the data.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## A.2.3 Threats related to security mode command procedure
+
+### A.2.3.1 Bidding Down
+
+- *Threat name:* Bidding down
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If SMC does not include replayed UE security capabilities of the UE, the UE can force the system to reduce the security level by using weaker security algorithms or turning security off, making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credentials
+
+### A.2.3.2 NAS integrity selection and use
+
+- *Threat name:* NAS integrity selection and use
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If NAS does not use the highest priority algorithm to protect SMC, SMC risks being exposed and/or modified. This can cause the system to turn off security, making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### A.2.3.3 NAS NULL integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* NAS NULL integrity protection
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege
+- *Threat Description:* If NAS NULL integrity protection is not used correctly, an attacker can initiate unauthenticated non-emergency calls.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### A.2.3.4 NAS confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* NAS confidentiality protection
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If security mode complete message is not confidentiality protected, the MME cannot be certain that the SMC is executed correctly. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## A.2.4 Threats related to security in Intra-RAT mobility
+
+### A.2.4.1 Bidding down on X2-Handover
+
+- *Threat name:* Bidding down on X2-Handover
+
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* If MME cannot verify EPS security capabilities received from eNB are the same as the UE security capabilities that the MME has stored, the UE may force the system to accept a weaker security algorithm than the system is allowed forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credentials
+
+#### A.2.4.2 NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in MME change
+
+- *Threat name:* NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in MME change
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* If the highest priority NAS integrity protection is not able to be selected by the new MME in MME change, the new MME could end up using a weaker algorithm forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credential
+
+### A.2.5 Threats related to security in Inter-RAT mobility
+
+#### A.2.5.1 2G SIM access via idle mode mobility
+
+- *Threat name:* 2G SIM access via idle mode mobility
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* If access to 2G is allowed during idle mode mobility, an attacker can force the system into 2G mode and use smaller key size, weaker algorithm, etc. to make the system easily attacked and/or compromised. The attacker can also illegally obtain LTE service via 2G SIM
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credentials
+
+#### A.2.5.2 2G SIM access via handover
+
+- *Threat name:* 2G SIM access via handover
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* If access to 2G is allowed during handover, an attacker can force the system into 2G mode and use smaller key size, weaker algorithm, etc. to make the system easily attacked and/or compromised. The attacker can also illegally obtain LTE service via 2G SIM.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credentials
+
+#### A.2.5.3 2G SIM access via SRVCC
+
+- *Threat name:* 2G SIM access via handover
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* If access to 2G is allowed during SRVCC, an attacker can force the system into 2G mode and use smaller key size, weaker algorithm, etc. to make the system easily attacked and/or compromised. The attacker can also illegally obtain LTE service via 2G SIM.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credential
+
+## A.2.6 Threats related to release of non-emergency bearer
+
+- *Threat name:* Release of non-emergency bearer.
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If authentication fails in the MME and the non-emergency bearer is not released, the UE can continue receiving unauthorized call, wasting valuable system resources.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+---
+
+## Annex B: Aspects specific to the network product class PGW
+
+### B.1 Network product class description for the PGW
+
+#### B.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### B.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the PGW network product class
+
+As part of the PGW network product, it is expected that the PGW to contain PGW application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the PGW functions and OAM functions that are specific to the PGW network product model. Functionalities specific to the PGW network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.250 [11].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 4.4.3.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401, Release 8 [3].
+
+---
+
+## B.2 Assets and threats specific to the PGW
+
+### B.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the eNB to be protected are:
+
+- PGW Application;
+- Session related data: UE network usage and charging data e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. IMSI), TEID, Charging ID, packet count, etc.
+- User plane data;
+- The interfaces of PGW to be protected and which are within SCAS scope: for example
+ - SGi interface
+
+- S5/S8 interfaces
+- Console interface, for local access: local interface on PGW
+- OAM interface, for remote access: interface between PGW and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the PGW class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- PGW Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: PGW files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root users), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, PGW application, or PGW Software.
+
+## B.2.2 Threats related to IP Address Allocation
+
+### B.2.2.1 IP Address Reallocation Continuously
+
+- *Threat name:* IP Address Reallocation Continuously
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering
+- *Threat Description:* If an IP address is reallocated to a UE immediately after released from another UE, then the network side might be mistaken that the same UE keeps using the IP address continuously. Consequently, some network functions (e.g. PCRF) will execute policies on the wrong target UE. And some mis-operations (e.g. mischarging) will be executed on UEs.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Session related data
+
+## B.2.3 Packet Forwarding
+
+### B.2.3.1 Sending unauthorized packets to other UEs
+
+- *Threat name:* Sending unauthorized packets to other UEs
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, DoS
+- *Threat Description:* If the destination address of uplink packets sent by a UE is another UE in the same PGW, the packets will not pass through the PGW and will be forwarded directly to the target UE. In this case, mutual access between two UEs within the same PGW might be requested. If such access is enabled, an attacker can gain control of a UE to send malicious packets (e.g. fraudulent information, malicious trojans, virus packs, etc.) directly to other UEs without security measures (e.g. firewall) at network side.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data
+
+## B.2.4 Emergency PDN Connection
+
+### B.2.4.1 Inactive Emergency PDN Connection Release
+
+- *Threat Name:* Prolonged inactive emergency PDN connections
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* The PGW is expected to release all bearers corresponding to emergency inactive PDN connections after the configured timeout. If emergency bearers of inactive PDN connections are not released, it may lead to system resource exhaustion.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## B.2.5 Threats related to charging relevant data
+
+### B.2.5.1 Failure to assign unique TEID or Charging ID for a session
+
+- *Threat name:* Failure to assign unique TEID or Charging ID for a session
+- *Threat Category:* Spoofing Identity, Tampering
+- *Threat Description:* Both Charging ID and TEID are the identities used for linking the network usage data per UE. If the Charging ID is not unique per IP-CAN session, or the TEID is not unique per GTP tunnel, the charging information for a PDU session would be wrongly correlated, creating charging errors.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Session related data
+
+---
+
+## Annex C:
+
+### Aspects specific to the network product class eNB
+
+#### C.1 Network product class description for the eNB
+
+##### C.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+##### C.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the eNB network product class
+
+As part of the eNB network product, it is expected that the eNB contains eNB application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the eNB functions and OAM functions that are specific to the eNB network product model. Functionalities specific to the eNB network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.216 [20].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 4.1 of TS 36.300, Release 8 [19] and clause 4.4.1 of TS 23.401, Release 8 [3].
+
+---
+
+#### C.2 Assets and threats specific to the eNB
+
+##### C.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the eNB to be protected are:
+
+- eNB Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. IMSI), subscriber keys (i.e. KUPenc, KRRCenc, KRRCint, NH), authentication parameters, address of serving gateway, APN name, data related to mobility management like UE measurements, UE's IP address, etc., QoS and so on, etc.
+- User plane data
+
+- The interfaces of eNB to be protected and which are within SCAS scope: for example
+ - S1 interface
+ - X2 interface
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on eNB
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between eNB and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the eNB class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- eNB Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: eNB files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, eNB application, Mobility Management data or eNB Software.
+
+## C.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane
+
+### C.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data confidentiality protection
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Masquerading attack.
+- *Threat Description:* If the eNB does not provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 reference points, then the control plane packets sent between eNBs (eg. inter-eNB handover) and from eNB to MME (eg. handover on MME change) can be manipulated and the eNB can be compromised by attackers to prevent service to legitimate users (eg. Handover failure). Moreover, the UE identifiers, security capabilities, the security algorithms and key materials exchanged between eNBs and eNB-MME can be accessed by the attackers leading to huge security breach. There, any active attacker can perform masquerading by making use of the legitimate users' UE identifiers to gain access to the network. This threat scenario assumes that the S1, X2 reference points are not within the security environment
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credential
+
+### C.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data integrity protection
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If the eNB does not provide integrity protection for control plane packets on S1/X2 reference points, the control plane packets between eNBs on X2-C and from eNB to MME on S1-MME interface risks being exposed and/or modified. The intruder manipulations on control plane packets will lead to denial of service to legitimate users. This threat scenario assumes that the S1, X2 reference points are not within the security environment
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### C.2.2.3 User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Information Disclosure, User tracking, Denial of Service, Man-in-the-middle
+- *Threat Description:* If the eNB does not cipher and decipher user plane packets between the Uu reference point and the S1/X2 reference points, then the attackers can manipulate and compromise user packets on Uu, X2-U and S1-U interface to launch Denial of Service as well as Man-in-the middle attack. The attackers can gain
+
+access to user identifiers, IMSI, serving network identifiers, location information and can perform user tracking. This threat scenario assumes that the S1, X2 reference points are not within the security environment
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credential
+
+#### C.2.2.4 User plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data integrity protection
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If the eNB does not handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the S1/X2 reference points then all the uplink/downlink user plane packets over X2-U and S1-U can be attacked and/or manipulated by intruders to launch Denial of Service attack. This threat scenario assumes that the S1, X2 reference points are not within the security environment
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+#### C.2.2.5 Local user plane integrity protection configuration
+
+- *Threat name:* Local user plane integrity protection configuration
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data
+- *Threat Description:* When an eNB supports user plane integrity protection, and if the eNB is not preconfigured with a user plane integrity protection policy, and if the UE supports user plane integrity protection, then the protection might be disabled exposing the user plane data to tampering attacks when the MME does not send a user plane integrity protection policy to the eNB.
+- *Threatened Asset:* user plane data.
+
+#### C.2.2.6 UP integrity protection policy selection
+
+- *Threat name:* UP integrity protection policy selection
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data
+- *Threat Description:* When an eNB supports user plane integrity protection, and if the UP integrity protection policy sent by MME does not take precedence over the locally configured one, then the user plane data protection may be disabled which does no longer comply with the service session requirements and exposes the user plane data to tampering attacks.
+
+#### - *Threatened Asset:* user plane data. C.2.2.7 Bidding down on UP IP policy
+
+- *Threat name:* Bidding down on UP IP policy.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the eNB does not send the UP IP policy, the MME cannot verify current UP IP policy is the same as the UP IP policy that the MME has stored, the attacker (e.g. source eNB) may force the system to accept a weaker UP IP policy (e.g. REQUIRED -> NOT NEEDED or none) than the system is allowed, or there may be case that source eNB is not upgraded to support UP IP feature thus UP IP policy from MME is lost, it will force the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient processing capability, Mobility Management data.
+
+### C.2.3 Threats related to key reuse
+
+#### C.2.3.1 Key reuse for eavesdropping
+
+- *Threat name:* Key reuse for eavesdropping
+
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* if the AS keys are not refreshed by the eNB, the key stream reuse is possible. This can result in information disclosure of AS signalling and user plane data. The threat of key stream reuse occurs under the following conditions:
+ - when the PDCP COUNT wraps around and is reused with the same Radio Bearer (RB) identity and with the same $K_{eNB}$ , e.g. due to the transfer of large volumes of data.
+ - when the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity and key stay the same (e.g. the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity and keys, or the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around).
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data, Mobility Management data.
+
+---
+
+## Annex D: Aspects specific to the network product class gNB
+
+### D.1 Network product class description for the gNB
+
+#### D.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### D.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the gNB network product class
+
+As part of the gNB network product, it is expected that the gNB to contain gNB application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the gNB functions and OAM functions that are specific to the gNB network product model. Functionalities specific to the gNB network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.511 [6].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of gNB functions contained in TS 38.300 [7], TS 38.323 [9], 3GPP TS 38.322 [10], and TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### D.2 Assets and threats specific to the gNB
+
+#### D.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the gNB to be protected are:
+
+- gNB Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUCI, GUTI), subscriber keys (i.e. $K_{UPenc}$ , $K_{UPint}$ , $K_{RRCenc}$ , $K_{RRCint}$ , NH), authentication parameters, APN name, data related to mobility management like UE measurements, UE's IP address, etc., QoS and so on, etc.
+- user plane data
+
+- The interfaces of gNB whose data needs to be protected and which are within SCAS scope:
+ - N2 interface
+ - Xn interface
+ - N3 interface
+ - Uu interface
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on gNB
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between gNB and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the gNB class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- gNB Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: gNB files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, gNB application, Mobility Management data or gNB Software.
+
+## D.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network
+
+### D.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name*: gNB control plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: If the gNB does not provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the N2/Xn/Uu reference points, then the control plane packets sent over the N2/Xn/Uu reference points can be intercepted by attackers without detection. This means the UE identifiers, security capabilities, the security algorithms and key materials exchanged can be accessed by the attackers leading to huge security breach. This threat scenario assumes that the N2 and Xn reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Mobility Management data.
+
+### D.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name*: Control plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description*: If the gNB does not provide integrity protection for control plane packets on N2/Xn/Uu reference points, the control plane packets sent over these reference points can be modified. The intruder manipulations on control plane packets can lead to denial of service to legitimate users. This threat scenario assumes that the N2 and Xn reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data.
+
+### D.2.2.3 User plane data confidentiality protection at gNB
+
+- *Threat name*: User plane data confidentiality protection at gNB.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: If the gNB does not cipher and decipher user plane packets on the Uu reference point and the N3/Xn reference points, then the attackers can compromise user packets on Uu, Xn-U, and N3 interface. The attackers can gain access to user identifiers, serving network identifiers, location information and can perform
+
+user tracking. This threat scenario assumes that the N3 and Xn reference points are not within the security environment.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: user plane data.
+
+#### D.2.2.4 User plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name*: User plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description*: If the gNB does not handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the Xn reference points then all the uplink/downlink user plane packets over Xn-U can be attacked and/or manipulated by intruders to launch Denial of Service attack. This threat scenario assumes that the Xn reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capacity, User plane data.
+
+#### D.2.2.5 AS algorithm selection and use
+
+- *Threat name*: AS algorithm selection and use
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description*: If AS does not use the highest priority algorithm to protect AS layer, i.e. RRC and PDCP, data on the AS layer risks being exposed and/or modified, or denial of service.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data
+
+#### D.2.2.6 Bidding down on Xn-Handover
+
+- *Threat name*: Bidding down on Xn-Handover.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description*: If the gNB does not send the UE 5G security capabilities, the AMF cannot verify 5G security capabilities are the same as the UE security capabilities that the AMF has stored, the attacker (e.g gNB) may force the system to accept a weaker security algorithm than the system is allowed, forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient processing capability, Mobility Management data.
+
+#### D.2.2.7 Key Reuse
+
+- *Threat name*: Key Reuse.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+ - *Threat Description*: If AS keys are not refreshed by the gNB when PDCP COUNTs is about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with the same $K_{gNB}$ , key stream reuse is possible. This can result in information disclosure of AS signalling and user plane data. The threat of key stream reuse occurs under the following conditions when the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity and key stay the same (e.g. the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity and keys, or the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around).
+- *Threatened Asset*: User plane data, Mobility Management data.
+
+#### D.2.2.8 Security Policy Enforcement
+
+- *Threat name*: Security Policy Enforcement.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Information Disclosure.
+
+- *Threat Description:* If gNB does not follow the security based on security policy provided by SMF, this can lead to no security or reduced security provided to the UE user plane, (e.g. not applying integrity protection when it is required to do so), etc.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capability, User plane data.
+
+#### D.2.2.9 State transition from inactive state to connected state
+
+- *Threat name:* State transition from inactive state to connected state
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* When state transits from inactive state to the connected state, if the gNB does not reactivate/activate the UP security based on UP activation status included in the UE 5G AS security context, the UP activation status between the gNB and the UE may be different. This will cause the misalignment on UP activation status, and result in the UE has to reconnect to the Network again which wastes resource both at UE and gNB.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capability.
+
+---
+
+## Annex E: Aspects specific to the network product class UDM
+
+### E.1 Network product class description for the UDM
+
+#### E.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the UDM network product class.
+
+#### E.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the UDM network product class
+
+As part of the UDM network product, it is expected that the UDM to contain UDM application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the UDM functions and OAM functions that is specific to the UDM network product model. Functionalities specific to the UDM network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.514 [21].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of UDM functions contained in clause 6.2.5 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### E.2 Assets and threats specific to the UDM
+
+#### E.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the UDM to be protected are:
+
+- UDM Application;
+- User Subscription Data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUPI), Subscription related data (e.g., Credentials, Access and Mobility Subscription data, SMF Selection Subscription data, UE context in SMF data, authentication status, etc.), etc.
+- The interfaces of UDM to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service based interface, Nudm, for providing services to AMF, SMF, AUSF, NEF, PCF, GMLC, SMSF
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from AMF, AUSF, UDR, NRF.
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on UDM
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between UDM and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the UDM class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- UDM Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: UDM files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, UDM application, User Subscription data or UDM Software.
+
+## E.2.2 Threats related to UDM assets
+
+### E.2.2.1 Incorrect SUCI de-concealment
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect SUCI de-concealment
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If the SUPI in the UE and the SUPI retrieved from Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_Get Response message are not the same, the AMF key generated based on the SUPI in the UE is also not the same as the AMF key generated in the AMF/SEAF. As a result, the subsequent NAS SMC procedure will always fail. Hence, UE will never be able to use the services provided by the serving AMF.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### E.2.2.2 Synchronization failure
+
+- *Threat name:* Synchronization failure
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If the UDM cannot handle the synchronization failure case during primary authentication, the SQN value stored in the UE and that stored in the UDM will not be synchronized. Hence, the UE will not be able to successfully authenticate with the core network.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, User Subscription data
+
+### E.2.2.3 Failure to store the authentication status
+
+- *Threat name:* Failure to store of authentication status
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If the UDM does not store the authentication status of a UE, the 5G network cannot support the increased home control, which is useful in preventing certain types of fraud, e.g. fraudulent Nudm\_UECM\_Registration Request sending a malicious AMF for registering the malicious AMF in UDM that is not actually present in the visited network. Without the authentication status in the UDM, or if the stored authentication status is incorrect, the Nudm\_UECM\_Registration Request sent from malicious AMF may be accepted.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, User Subscription data
+
+### E.2.2.4 Incorrect security enforcement configuration
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect security enforcement configuration
+- *Threat Reference:* Tampering data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* In case where the UDM is configured to set and provide the User Security Policy to the SMF for TSC service, if the UP security policy is not set to "required", the gPTP message transferred from gNB to a 5GS TSC-enabled UE in the user plane may be removed, tampered or intercepted by an attacker.
+
+### E.2.2.5 Incorrect UP security policy configuration for 5G LAN service
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect UP security policy configuration for 5G LAN service
+- *Threat Reference:* Tampering data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* It is assumed that two UEs are belonging to one 5G LAN group. In case where the UDM is configured to set and provide User Plane Security policy to the SMF, if the UP security policies set for all the UEs belonging to a specific 5G LAN service are not consistent, e.g. the UP security policy1 for the UE1 is set
+
+to "required", and the UP security policy2 for the UE2 is set to "not needed", the 5G LAN service data transferred from gNB to UE2 may be removed, tampered or intercepted by the attacker, even if the service data transferred to the UE1 is protected. That means, the 5G LAN service data will be in the risk of being attacked with the lowest security level set in the the UP security policy.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* User Subscription Data
+
+### E.2.2.6 Use of an invalid public key in the SUCI ECIES protection scheme
+
+- *Threat name:* Use of an invalid public key in the SUCI ECIES protection scheme
+- *Threat Reference:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* If the protection scheme output of a SUCI contains an invalid point (a point that is not is on the elliptic curve) as the UE's public key, and the UDM uses it to compute the shared secret with the HN's private key to decrypt the SUCI, an attacker can recover the HN's private key using the UDM as an oracle. This consequently undermines the security claim of the SUCI scheme and leads to user identification.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Private Key of the Home Network for SUCI Decryption, User Subscription Data
+
+---
+
+## Annex F: Aspects specific to the network product class AUSF
+
+### F.1 Network product class description for the AUSF
+
+#### F.1.1 Introduction
+
+This annex captures the aspects specific to network product class AUSF.
+
+#### F.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the AUSF network product class
+
+As part of the AUSF network product, it is expected that the AUSF to contain AUSF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the AUSF functions and OAM functions that is specific to the AUSF network product model. Functionalities specific to the AUSF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.516 [12].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of AUSF functions contained in clause 6.2.8 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+## F.2 Assets and threats specific to the AUSF
+
+### F.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the AUSF to be protected are:
+
+- AUSF Application;
+- User Data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUPI), authentication parameters (e.g. Serving network name, authentication vectors, AUSF key), Routing indicator etc.
+- The interfaces of AUSF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service based interface, Nausf, for providing services for AMF and UDM
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from UDM, and NRF
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on AUSF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between AUSF and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the AUSF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- AUSF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: AUSF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, AUSF application, User data or AUSF Software.
+
+## F.2.2 Threats related to authentication procedures
+
+No specific threats are identified for AUSF in addition to the generic threats identified in the main body of this document.
+
+---
+
+## Annex G: Aspects specific to the network product class SEPP
+
+### G.1 Network product class description for the SEPP
+
+#### G.1.1 Introduction
+
+This annex captures the aspects specific to network product class SEPP.
+
+#### G.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the SEPP network product class
+
+According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. Therefore, in order to define the SEPP network product class, it is necessary to define the common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities that is constitutive for a SEPP. As part of the SEPP network product, it is expected that the SEPP contains SEPP application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the SEPP functions and OAM functions that is specific to the SEPP network product model. Functionalities specific to the SEPP network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.517 [13].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 6.2.17 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### G.2 Assets and threats specific to the SEPP
+
+#### G.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the SEPP to be protected are:
+
+- SEPP Application;
+- Service Messages to be sent/received over N32.
+- SEPP security capability (i.e. N32 protection mechanisms): Mechanism 1 (N32 Application Layer Security), Mechanism 2 (TLS), etc.
+- Application layer security data: e.g. N32-f peer information, N32-f security context, cryptographic material of peer SEPPs, cryptographic material of IPX providers, etc.
+- Protection policies: e.g. data-type encryption policy and modification policy for outgoing and incoming messages, as described in clause 13.2.3.5 of TS 33.501 [14].
+- Internal topology information;
+- The interfaces of SEPP to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - N32 (N32-c, N32-f).
+ - Interfaces between SEPP and NFs.
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on SEPP.
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between SEPP and OAM system.
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the SEPP network product class are described in clause 4.3.6 of the present document.
+
+- SEPP Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: SEPP files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, SEPP application, supported N32 protection mechanisms, application layer security data, protection policies, internal topology information, or SEPP Software.
+
+## G.2.2 Threats related to cryptographic material in the SEPP
+
+### G.2.2.1 Misusing cryptographic material of peer SEPPs and IPX providers
+
+- *Threat name:* Misusing cryptographic material of peer SEPPs and IPX providers
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Spoofing identity, Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* There are following threats if cryptographic material of peer SEPPs and cryptographic material of IPX providers are not clearly differentiated and misused:
+ - The SEPP using the wrong cryptographic material will lead to the failure of N32-c TLS connection establishment with the peer SEPP; or lead to rejecting genuine N32-f JSON patches from an authentic intermediate IPX provider. This can result in service interruption as well as waste of system resources.
+ - The SEPP will wrongly accept forged N32-f JSON patches signed by a peer SEPP, which maliciously impersonates an intermediate IPX provider. This can result in service data tampering as well as waste of system resources.
+ - The SEPP will wrongly establish N32-c TLS connection with an intermediate IPX entity, which maliciously impersonates a peer SEPP. This can result in information disclosure as well as waste of system resources.
+- *Threatened Asset:* SEPP Application, N32-c, N32-f, Application layer security data, Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### G.2.2.2 Misusing cryptographic material beyond connection-specific scope
+
+- *Threat name:* Misusing cryptographic material beyond connection-specific scope
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* There are following threats if the SEPP authenticates N32-f message modifications using the cryptographic material from an IPX provider which was not exchanged as part of the *IPX security information list* via the related N32-c connection:
+ - The SEPP using the wrong cryptographic material will lead to failed authentication of N32-f message modifications signed by the authentic IPX provider, who is a part of the related N32-c connection. This can result in service interruption as well as waste of system resources.
+ - The SEPP will wrongly accept N32-f JSON patches signed by an IPX provider, who is a part of a different N32-c connection. This can result in service data tampering as well as waste of system resources.
+- *Threatened Asset:* SEPP Application, N32-c, N32-f, Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## G.2.3 Threats related to error handling in the SEPP
+
+### G.2.3.1 Incorrect handling for PLMN ID or SNPN ID mismatch
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect handling for PLMN ID or SNPN ID mismatch
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Information Disclosure, Spoofing Identity
+
+- *Threat Description:* there are following threats if the SEPP does not make correct handling when detecting that the PLMN-ID or SNPN ID contained in the incoming N32-f message does not match the PLMN-ID or SNPN ID in the related N32-f context:
+- Without receiving error signalling message from the SEPP which detected the mismatch, the peer SEPP is not aware of such error and will continue to send the messages with errors. This can result in waste of system resources.
+- If the SEPP sends an error signalling message without indicating the error cause and the corresponding N32-f message ID, the peer SEPP is not able to identify what error occurs and what is the source message on which the error occurs. Hence the peer SEPP is not able to take actions accordingly. This can result in service interruption as well as waste of system resources.
+- The serving PLMN ID or SNPN ID appended in the subject claim of the access token sent by a NF service consumer in the serving PLMN will not be checked by the NF service producer in the home PLMN. If the SEPP in the HPLMN detected the mismatch of serving PLMN ID or SNPN ID in the access token but still forwards the NF Service Request to the NF service producer, the serving PLMN ID or SNPN ID mismatch will not be detected by the NF service producer and the request will be wrongly accepted if all the other checks on the access token get passed. This can result in unauthorized service access by NF service consumer as well as waste of system resources.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Application layer security data, Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+NOTE 1: SNPN ID mismatch only applies to SEPPs in a Credentials Holder using AUSF and UDM for primary authentication.
+
+### G.2.3.2 Incorrect handling for protection policies mismatch
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect handling for protection policies mismatch
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure. Tampering of Data, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:*
+
+For the following threats if the SEPP cannot detect the mismatch between the policies received on N32-c connection from a specific roaming partner and the policies manually configured on it for this specific roaming partner and IPX provider:
+
+- The policies received on N32-c connection from a peer SEPP could be tampered by an attacker, which is however not detected. Or the policies manually configured on the SEPP could be misconfigured, which is however not detected.
+ - a) If Data-type encryption policies are tampered or misconfigured, the IEs on N32-f which shall be encrypted may be disclosed due to policy tampering. This can result in information disclosure.
+ - b) If Modification policies are tampered or misconfigured, the IEs on N32-f which cannot be modified/added/removed by IPX provider may be tampered. This can result in tampering of data.
+- As the data-type encryption policies in the two partner SEPPs are not equal, a consistent ciphering of IEs on N32-f cannot be enforced.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Protection policies, SEPP Application, Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## G.2.4 Threats related to sensitive information exposure
+
+### G.2.4.1 Weak JWS algorithm
+
+- *Threat name:* Use of weak JWS algorithm.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* There are multiple standard signature algorithms defined for JWS, among which some algorithms may be considered weaker than the others. If an IPX entity is misconfigured, a weak cryptographic
+
+algorithm can be used to sign the modifiedDataToIntegrityProtect JSON object, which is more prone to attacks. If the SEPP does not follow the restriction on the signature algorithm for JWS operation as required (using only ES256), it can be exposed to the threat described in clause 5.3.6.3. This can result in sensitive information exposure.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* SEPP Application.
+
+## G.2.4.2 Exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message
+
+- *Threat name:* Exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* the following behaviours may lead to exposure of confidential IEs in N32-message, which can result in information disclosure:
+ - if the SEPP does not correctly replace the cleartext representations of information elements requiring encryption with the value "encBlockIdx", there is the threat that the sensitive information in original N32-f messages may be exposed to IPX providers in the path or any other parties eavesdropping on the connection between roaming partners.
+ - if the SEPP does not correctly apply the basic validation rule and verify that an intermediate IPX has not inserted an IE requiring encryption at a different location in a JSON object, there is the threat that a misbehaving or compromised intermediate IPX can copy the encrypted IE into a cleartext IE in a request. Then the receiving SEPP decrypts the encrypted IE and puts its value into the cleartext IE field, resulting in the confidential IEs in N32-f message being exposed in the clear.
+- *Threatened Asset:* SEPP Application, Service Messages to be sent/received over N32.
+
+## G.2.5 Threats related to TLS protection between NF and SEPP
+
+### G.2.5.1 Inter-PLMN routing using the incorrect reference
+
+- *Threat name:* Inter-PLMN routing using the incorrect reference
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* TLS protection between the SEPP and NFs within a PLMN may rely on using telescopic FQDN or 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. When telescopic FQDN is used between the NF and the SEPP, the NF shall use a telescopic FQDN in the Request URI of the HTTP Request to convey the target apiRoot to the SEPP. When 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between the NF and the SEPP, the NF shall use the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header in the HTTP Request to convey the target apiRoot to the SEPP. However, there may be the case that a potentially malicious or misbehaving NF would include both the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and a request URI containing a telescopic FQDN when communicating with the SEPP. In this case, the SEPP is given two references for routing the NF request across PLMN. According to TS 33.501 [14] clause 13.1.1.1, when communication between the NF and the SEPP that generated the telescopic FQDN is based on using 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, the NF needs to use the telescopic FQDN in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the HTTP Request. That means whenever the telescopic FQDN is available on the NF, it shall be used to convey the target apiRoot to the SEPP. If a malicious or misbehaving NF includes a 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header containing an element different than the telescopic FQDN contained in the Request URI and the SEPP ignores the telescopic FQDN but uses the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header to route the request, the NF request will not be correctly routed. This can result in Denial of Service and Information Disclosure.
+- *Threatened Asset:* SEPP Application, Service Messages to be sent/received over N32.
+
+### G.2.5.2 Tampering of Target API Root
+
+- *Threat name:* Tampering of target API root
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Information Disclosure
+
+- *Threat Description:* TLS protection between the SEPP and NFs within a PLMN may rely on using telescopic FQDN or 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. Security mechanism negotiated between the SEPPs can be TLS security or PRINS security, and PRINS security shall be used if there are IPX entities on the path between the SEPPs. When PRINS security is used between the SEPPs and 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between the NF and the SEPP, the HTTP Request from the NF received by the SEPP will include the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, which is set to the apiRoot of the target NF. If the sending SEPP forwards the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header together with the HTTP Request on the N32-f interface, there are potentially two threats:
+ - Even if both negotiating SEPPs support the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot custom HTTP header, the IPX entities on the path between the SEPPs may possibly not support this custom HTTP header, which will lead to failed message transmission. This can result in Denial of Service.
+ - Even if all the IPX entities on the path between the SEPPs support the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot custom HTTP header, the apiRoot of the target NF in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header could be potentially modified by a malicious IPX entity, which will lead to the message delivery to the incorrect target. This can result in Information Disclosure and Denial of Service.
+- *Threatened Asset:* SEPP Application, Service Messages to be sent/received over N32.
+
+---
+
+## Annex H: Aspects specific to the network product class NRF
+
+### H.1 Network product class description for the NRF
+
+#### H.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while this clause covers the aspects specific to the NRF network product class.
+
+#### H.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the NRF network product class
+
+According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. Therefore, in order to define the NRF network product class, it is necessary to define the common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities that is constitutive for a NRF. As part of the NRF network product, it is expected that the NRF contains NRF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the NRF functions and OAM functions that are specific to the NRF network product model. Functionalities specific to the NRF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.518 [15].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 6.2.6 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### H.2 Assets and threats specific to the NRF
+
+#### H.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the NRF to be protected are:
+
+- NRF Application;
+- NF profile of available NF instances: e.g. NF instance ID, NF type, PLMN ID, network slice related identifiers, FQDN or IP address of NF, NF capacity information, NF priority information, Names of supported services, NF Specific Service authorization information, Location information for the NF instance, etc., as described in clause 6.2.6 of TS 23.501 [8].
+- OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens for NF-NF authorization;
+- The interfaces of NRF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service Based Interfaces to other NFs.
+ - N27.
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on NRF.
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between NRF and OAM system.
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the NRF network product class are described in clause 4.3.6 of the present document.
+
+- NRF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: NRF files could be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, NRF application, NF profile of available NF instances, OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens, or NRF Software.
+
+## H.2.2 Threats related to NRF authorization
+
+### H.2.2.1 No slice specific authorization for NF discovery
+
+- *Threat name*: No slice specific authorization for NF discovery.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure, Elevation of privilege.
+- *Threat Description*: If NF discovery authorization for specific slice is not supported by the NRF, the NF instance in one slice can discover NF instances belonging to other slices. This can result in reduced assurance level of slice data isolation, making the system easily attacked as well as wasting resource.
+- *Threatened asset*: NF profile of available NF instances.
+
+---
+
+## Annex I: Aspects specific to the network product class NEF
+
+### I.1 Network product class description for the NEF
+
+#### I.1.1 Introduction
+
+This annex captures the aspects specific to network product class NEF.
+
+#### I.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the NEF network product class
+
+As part of the NEF network product, it is expected that the NEF to contain NEF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the NEF functions and OAM functions that are specific to the NEF network product model. Functionalities specific to the NEF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.519 [16].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of NEF functions contained in clause 6.2.5 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### I.2 Assets and threats specific to the NEF
+
+#### I.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the NEF to be protected are:
+
+- NEF Application;
+- NF and User Data: e.g. NF capabilities and events, network and user sensitive information (e.g. DNN, S-NSSAI, etc.), structured data retrieved from UDR, 5G LAN group information, NWDAF analytics, etc.
+- The interfaces of NEF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service based interface, Nnef, for providing services to SMF, and AF
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from AMF, UDM, PCF, SMF, UDR, Binding Support Function, NRF
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on NEF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between NEF and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the NEF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- NEF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: NEF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, NEF application, NF and User data, or NEF Software.
+
+## I.2.2 Threats related to NEF assets
+
+### I.2.2.1 No authentication on application function
+
+- *Threat name:* No Authentication on application function
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure, tampering
+- *Threat Description:* If the authentication of the Application Function is not supported, the application function without a legal certificates, or pre-shared key could be able to establish a TLS connection with the NEF. The data stored in the NEF may be exposed to an attacker.
+- *Threatened Asset:* NF and User Data
+
+### I.2.2.2 No authorization on northbound APIs
+
+- *Threat name:* No Authorization on northbound APIs
+- *Threat Category:* Elevation of Privilege, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* A malicious AF without OAuth-based authorization or with an incorrect access token may invoke the NEF services arbitrarily. For example, an attacker may invoke the Nnef\_EventExposure\_Subscribe service provide by the NEF without authorization. The Event data related with this subscribe will be leaked to the attacker.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, NF and User Data
+
+---
+
+## Annex J: Aspects specific to the network product class SMF
+
+### J.1 Network product class description for the SMF
+
+#### J.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the SMF network product class.
+
+#### J.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the SMF network product class
+
+As part of the SMF network product, it is expected that the SMF to contain SMF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the SMF functions and OAM functions that is specific to the SMF network product model. Functionalities specific to the SMF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.511 [6].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present Annex, this common set is defined to be the list of SMF functions contained in 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### J.2 Assets and threats specific to the SMF
+
+#### J.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the SMF to be protected are:
+
+- SMF Application;
+- Session related data (e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUPI), APN name, UE's IP address, QoS, etc.), network usage, charging data record, charging ID, etc.),
+- User plane data,
+- The interfaces of SMF to be protected and which are within SCAS scope:
+ - Service based interface, Nsmf, for providing services to AMF, AF, NEF, and SMF
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from UDM, AMF, PCF, NEF NRF, UDSF, CHF, and SMF
+ - N4 interface
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on SMF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between SMF and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the SMF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- SMF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: SMF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, SMF application, Mobility Management data or SMF Software.
+
+## J.2.2 Threats related to SMF assets
+
+### J.2.2.1 Priority of UP security policy
+
+- *Threat name:* Non-compliant UP security policy handling
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Information Disclosure,
+- *Threat Description:* It is required that user Plane Security Policy from UDM takes precedence over locally configured User Plane Security Policy in SMF. If SMF fails to comply with the requirement, user plane security may be degraded. For example, if the UP security policy from the UDM mandates the ciphering and integrity protection of the user plane data, but no protection is indicated in the local UP security policy at the SMF, and the local UP security policy takes the priority, then the user plane data will be sent over the air without any protection.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data
+
+### J.2.2.2 TEID uniqueness failure
+
+- *Threat name:* Failure to assign unique TEID for a session
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service, Information disclosure, Spoofing Identity
+- *Threat Description:* TEID, as part of the CN Tunnel information, is used by the UPF and gNB/ng-eNB for user plane routing. The failure to guarantee the uniqueness of the TEID for a PDU session result in interruption of the routing of the user traffic. It also create charging errors. If multiple PDU sessions were to share the same TEID at the same time, the counts for the network usage of a single PDU session will be in fact the counts for the network usage of multiple sessions, creating charging errors.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Session related data
+
+### J.2.2.3 Charging ID Uniqueness failure
+
+- *Threat name:* Failure to assign unique Charging ID for a session.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Information disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* At the SMF if more than one PDU session were to share the same charging ID, the charging information for a PDU session would be wrongly correlated, creating charging errors.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Session related data
+
+### J.2.2.3 UP security policy check
+
+- *Threat name:* Unchecked UP security policy
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Information disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* It is required that the SMF verifies that the UP security policy received from the ng-eNB/gNB is the same as that stored locally at the SMF. If the SMF fails to check, security degradation of UP traffic may occur. For example, if the UP security policy received from the ng-eNB/gNB indicates no security protection, while the local policy mandates the opposite, and SMF uses the received UP security policy without validation, then the user plane data will be unprotected.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data
+
+---
+
+## Annex K: Aspects specific to the network product class AMF
+
+### K.1 Network product class description for the AMF
+
+#### K.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the AMF network product class.
+
+#### K.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the AMF network product class
+
+As part of the AMF network product, it is expected that the AMF to contain AMF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the AMF functions and OAM functions that is specific to the AMF network product model. Functionalities specific to the AMF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.512 [22].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of AMF functions contained in clause 6.2.5 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### K.2 Assets and threats specific to the AMF
+
+#### K.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP as described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the AMF to be protected are:
+
+- AMF Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUCI), subscriber keys (I.e. $K_{NASenc}$ , $K_{NASint}$ , NH), authentication parameters, address of serving gNB, APN name, data related to mobility management like UE status, UE's IP address, etc., session management like PDN type, QoS and so on, or node selection and routing selection, e.g. IP address of UE related UPF, selected routing connection based on UE's identity, etc.
+- The interfaces of AMF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example
+ - Service based interface, Namf, for providing services to SMF, AUSF, NEF, PCF, GMLC, SMSF, LMF and UDM
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from NSSF, SMF, LMF, SMSF, PCF, 5G-EIR, UDM, AUSF, and NRF
+ - Reference point interfaces:
+ - N1.
+ - N2.
+ - N26.
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on AMF.
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between AMF and OAM system.
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the AMF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- AMF Software: binary code or executable code.
+
+NOTE 2: AMF files could be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root users), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, AMF application, Mobility Management data or AMF Software.
+
+## K.2.2 Threats related to AKA procedures
+
+### K.2.2.1 Resynchronization
+
+- Threat name: Resynchronization
+- Threat Category: Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If RAND and AUTS are not included when synchronization fails, the resynchronization procedure does not work correctly. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### K.2.2.2 Failed Integrity check of Initial Registration message
+
+- Threat name: Failed integrity check of Initial Registration message
+- Threat Category: Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If integrity check of attach message fails, a user identity cannot be verified. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### K.2.2.3 RES\* verification failure
+
+- Threat name: RES\* verification failure
+- Threat Category: Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If a malicious UE initiates a registration request using a SUCI and this request is followed by primary authentication in which an incorrect RES\* is sent to the network, then the RES\* verification will fail. In this case, if the RES\* verification failure is not handled correctly, e.g., AMF/SEAF does not reject the registration request directly, or initiates a new authentication procedure with the UE, this would result in waste of system resources.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## K.2.3 Threats related to security mode command procedure
+
+### K.2.3.1 Bidding Down
+
+- Threat name: Bidding down
+- Threat Category: Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: If SMC does not include the complete initial NAS message if either requested by the AMF or the UE sent the initial NAS message unprotected, the UE can force the system to reduce the security level by using weaker security algorithms or turning security off, making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+
+- Threatened Asset: User account data and credentials
+
+### K.2.3.2 NAS integrity selection and use
+
+- Threat name: NAS integrity selection and use
+- Threat Category: Tampering of data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If NAS does not use the highest priority algorithm, NAS layer risks being exposed and/or modified or being exposed to denial of service.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity, Control plane signalling
+
+### K.2.3.3 NAS NULL integrity protection
+
+- Threat name: NAS NULL integrity protection
+- Threat Category: Elevation of Privilege
+- Threat Description: If NAS NULL integrity protection is used outside of emergency call scenarios, an attacker can initiate unauthenticated non-emergency calls.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### K.2.3.4 NAS confidentiality protection
+
+- Threat name: NAS confidentiality protection
+- Threat Category: Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If security mode complete message is not confidentiality protected, the AMF cannot be certain that the SMC is executed correctly. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## K.2.4 Threats related to security in Intra-RAT mobility
+
+### K.2.4.1 Bidding down on Xn-Handover
+
+- Threat name: Bidding down on Xn-Handover
+- Threat Category: Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: If AMF cannot verify that the 5G security capabilities received from source gNB via the target gNB are the same as the UE security capabilities that the AMF has stored, the source gNB may force the system to accept a weaker security algorithm than the system is allowed forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- Threatened Asset: User account data and credentials
+
+### K.2.4.2 NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in AMF change
+
+- Threat name: NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in AMF change
+- Threat Category: Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: If the highest priority NAS integrity protection is not selected by the new AMF in AMF change, the new AMF could end up using a weaker algorithm forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+
+- Threatened Asset: User account data and credential
+
+## K.2.5 Threats related to release of non-emergency bearer
+
+- Threat name: Release of non-emergency bearer
+- Threat Category: Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If authentication fails in the AMF and the non-emergency bearer is not released, the UE can continue receiving unauthorized call, wasting valuable system resources.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+## K.2.6 Threats related to initial registration procedure
+
+### K.2.6.1 Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities
+
+- Threat name: Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities
+- Threat Category: Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: A flawed AMF implementation accepting insecure or invalid UE security capabilities may put User Plane and Control Plane traffic at risk, without the operator being aware of it. If NULL ciphering algorithm and/or NULL integrity protection algorithm of the UE security capabilities is accepted by the AMF, all the subsequent NAS, RRC, and UP messages will not be confidentiality and/or integrity protected. The attacker can easily intercept or tamper control plane data and the user plane data. This can result in information disclosure as well as tampering of data.
+- Threatened Asset: User account data and credentials, Mobility Management data.
+
+### K.2.6.2 Invalid encoding of UE 5G security capabilities on the NG interface
+
+- *Threat name:* Invalid encoding of UE 5G security capabilities on the NG interface
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of data, Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* A flawed AMF implementation that incorrectly encodes the UE 5G security capabilities from the initial UE registration request to the corresponding Context Setup Request message on the NG interface will pose a risk to the AS user plane and control plane. It should be noted that encoding from the NAS to the NGAP protocol in this case is not a one-to-one copy of the UE 5G security capabilities but must consider the specifics of the NGAP protocol. Specifically, four bits are available to the encoder at the NAS layer for NIA0, NIA1, NIA2, NIA3, while only three bits are available at the NGAP layer for these four algorithms. If the algorithms are not transferred correctly to the gNB/ng-eNB due to an incorrect implementation of the AMF, the RAN node will misinterpret the algorithm list, resulting in the selection of an incorrect security algorithm on the AS. In the end, this may result in the selection of an insecure (e.g. null) algorithm letting an attacker easily intercept or manipulate control plane data and user plane data, leading to information disclosure.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User account data and credentials, Mobility Management data.
+
+## K.2.7 Threats related to 5G-GUTI allocation
+
+### K.2.7.1 Failure to allocate new 5G-GUTI
+
+- Threat name: Failure to allocate new 5G-GUTI.
+- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
+- Threat Description: If a new 5G-GUTI is not allocated by AMF in certain registration scenarios (i.e. after receiving Registration Request message of type "initial registration", or Registration Request message of type
+
+"mobility registration update", or Service Request message sent by the UE in response to a Paging message), an attacker could keep on tracking the user using the old 5G-GUTI after these registration procedures. For a CIoT UE in idle state with suspend indication, even though the UE will not initiate Service Request after receiving a paging message, if a new 5G-GUTI is not allocated, the attacker can replay the paging message multiple times, and based on the responding messages the attacker could still be able to track the UE.
+
+- Threatened Asset: Mobility Management data.
+
+## K.2.8 NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS in 5G CIoT
+
+- *Threat name:* NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Information disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* In NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS in 5G CIoT , when a UE initiates registration procedure with the AMF, the AMF may redirect the UE from 5GC to EPC with a Registration Reject message sent to the UE, and if the Registration Reject message with an EMM cause which indicates to the UE that the UE shall not use 5GC is not protected, the attacker can modify the cause and the UE will try to connect to the EPS. This will lead to a bidding down attack to the UE.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capability, N1 interface, Mobility Management data.
+
+## K.2.9 Threat related to Security for 5G CIoT
+
+### K.2.9.1 Failed Verification of UE Identity during RRC Reestablishment Procedure for CP CIoT 5GS Optimization
+
+- *Threat name:* failed Verification of UE Identity during RRC Reestablishment Procedure for CP CIoT 5GS Optimization
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If verification of UE using CP CIoT 5GS Optimization during RRC Reestablishment procedure fails, a user identity cannot be verified. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system. In addition, if the AMF does not correctly indicate the ng-eNB result of verification, an unlegal UE may successfully re-establish on the ng-eNB, and result in waste of system resources.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+## K.2.10 Threats related to session establishment procedure
+
+### K.2.10.1 Incorrect validation of S-NSSAIs
+
+- *Threat name:* Incorrect Validation of S-NSSAIs.
+- *Threat category:* Elevation of Privilege.
+- *Threat Description:* After the successful network slice-specific authentication and authorization, there will be an Allowed NSSAI list both in UE and AMF. Then, the UE will initiate the PDU session establishment request with the requested S-NSSAIs included. If the AMF does not verify whether the received S-NSSAIs is within the Allowed NSSAI list stored at the AMF, an attacker can still include the rejected S-NSSAIs in the request and access the slice after it fails the NSSAA procedure.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Mobility management data, sufficient processing capacity.
+
+---
+
+## Annex L: Aspects specific to the network product class UPF
+
+### L.1 Network product class description for the UPF
+
+#### L.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the UPF network product class.
+
+NOTE: Operators can deploy UPF(s) supporting the Inter PLMN User Plane Security (IPUPS) functionality at the border of their network as specified in TS 23.501[8] clause 5.8.2.14.
+
+#### L.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the UPF network product class
+
+As part of the UPF network product, it is expected that the UPF contains UPF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the UPF functions and OAM functions that are specific to the UPF network product model. Functionalities specific to the UPF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.513 [18].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present Annex, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 6.2.3 in 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### L.2 Assets and threats specific to the UPF
+
+#### L.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the UPF to be protected are:
+
+- UPF Application;
+- User plane data;
+- Session related data, e.g. CN Tunnel information, packet detection rules, network usage, traffic detection information, and etc.;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for N3, N4 and N9 interfaces
+- The interfaces of the UPF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - N3 interface between the UPF and the gNB/ng-eNB
+ - N4 interface between the UPF and the SMF
+ - N6 interface between the UPF and the DN
+ - N9 interface between two UPFs
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the UPF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the UPF and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the UPF class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- UPF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: UPF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, UPF application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+## L.2.2 Threats related to user plane data transport
+
+- *Threat name:* No protection or weak protection for user plane data.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* User traffic is transported between the gNB/ng-eNB and the UPF via N3 interface, or between two UPFs within a PLMN via N9 interface. If the user traffic transported over the interfaces is not confidentiality protected, it can be subject to eavesdropping. Information is leaked to unauthorized parties. If the user traffic is not integrity protected, attackers can tamper with user traffic at will. The receiver of the user traffic obtain false user traffic. If the user traffic is not replay protected, attackers can insert historical legitimate user traffic. This can lead to false network usage reported by the UPF, and consequently resulting in billing fraudulence.
+
+If the protection implemented for the user plane data transported over the N3 interface and the N9 interface within a PLMN uses the wrong security profile, which may contain weak security algorithms or protocol versions known to be vulnerable, the level of the security of the user plane data may be degraded and fail to fulfil the required security.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data.
+
+## L.2.3 Threats related to signalling data
+
+- *Threat name:* No protection or weak protection for signalling data over N4 interface
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of service, tampering.
+- *Threat Description:* SMF controls the user plane path of PDU sessions through N4 interfaces. If the signalling data over N4 interface is not protected e.g. against tampering, the user traffic may be wrongly routed and fail to arrive at the intended recipient. This can create Denial of Service.
+
+To support billing, UPF reports network usage to SMF over N4 interface. Unprotected network usage report can lead to billing fraud.
+
+If the protection implemented for the signalling data over the N4 interface uses the wrong security profile, which may contain weak security algorithms or protocol versions known to be vulnerable, the security level of the signalling data transported over N4 interface may be degraded and fail to fulfil the required security.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* session related data.
+
+## L.2.4 Threats related to TEID
+
+- *Threat name:* Failure to assign unique TEID for a session.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering.
+- *Threat Description:* TEID, as part of the CN Tunnel information, is used by the UPF and gNB/ng-eNB for user plane routing. The failure to guarantee the uniqueness of the TEID for a PDU session interrupts the routing of user traffic. It also interrupts charging. If multiple PDU sessions were to share the same TEID at the same time, the counts for the network usage of a single PDU session will be in fact the counts for the network usage of multiple sessions, creating charging errors.
+- *Threatened Asset:* session related data.
+
+## L.2.5 Threats related to user plane data forwarding
+
+- *Threat name:* invalid user plane data forwarding.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* User plane traffic is transported between UPFs over the N9 interface. If the UPF with IPUPS functionality fails to discard GTP-U packets that do not belong to any active PDU sessions, routing of user plane traffic could be interrupted or Denial of Service attacks to the network could be possible. This threat only applies if the UPF implements the IPUPS functionality.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data.
+
+## L.2.6 Threats related to malformed GTP-U messages
+
+- Threat name: Threats of malformed GTP-U messages.
+- Threat Category: Denial of service.
+- Threat Description: Malicious sender may send malformed GTP-U messages to a victim UPF with IPUPS functionality. If the malformed GTP-U messages are not filtered, they may consume the processing resource of the victim UPF with IPUPS functionality, and even cause the victim UPF functionality to crash, causing denial of service attack.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+---
+
+## Annex M: Aspects specific to the network product class N3IWF
+
+### M.1 Threat to send EAP-Identity Request by N3IWF
+
+- *Threat name:* N3IWF sends EAP-Identity Request
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of service.
+- *Threat Description:* EAP-5G is used between UE and N3IWF. As specified in TS 33.501[14], the N3IWF shall refrain from sending an EAP-Identity request. The UE may ignore an EAP Identity request or respond with the SUCI it sent in the Registration Request. This means if the N3IWF happens to send an EAP-Identity Request to the UE, the N3IWF shall not look forward an EAP-Identity Reply. This is different from normal EAP framework. If the N3IWF behaves the same as normal EAP framework, the N3IWF will wait for a reply till time expires. This may cause the UE cannot access to the network via an N3IWF.
+- *Threatened Asset:* GNP services.
+
+---
+
+## Annex N: Aspects specific to the network product class NWDAF
+
+### N.1 Network product class description for the NWDAF
+
+#### N.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the NWDAF network product class.
+
+#### N.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the NWDAF network product class
+
+As part of the NWDAF network product, it is expected that the NWDAF to contain NWDAF application (for data analysis), a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the NWDAF functions and OAM functions that is specific to the NWDAF network product model. Functionalities specific to the NWDAF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.521 [23].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of NWDAF functions contained in clause 6.2.18 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### N.2 Assets and threats specific to the NWDAF
+
+#### N.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the NWDAF to be protected are:
+
+- NWDAF Application;
+- Collected Data from NFs: e.g. part of mobility management data as depicted in clause K.2.1 collected from AMF, part of Session related data, user plane data as depicted in clause J.2.1 collected from SMF, part of user subscription data as depicted in clause E.2.1 collected from UDM, part of NF and User Data as depicted in clause I.2.1 collected from NEF, data collected from NRF, PCF, AF and OAM, etc.
+- The interfaces of NWDAF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service based interface, Nnwdaf, for providing services to AMF, SMF, NEF, PCF, NSSF, OAM and AF.
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from AMF, SMF, UDM, PCF, NRF, NEF and AF.
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on NWDAF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access and data collection: interface between NWDAF and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the NWDAF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- NWDAF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: NWDAF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, NWDAF application, Collected Data from NFs or NWDAF Software.
+
+## N.2.2 Void
+
+---
+
+## Annex O: Aspects specific to the IMS network product classes
+
+### O.1 Network product class description for the IMS
+
+#### O.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the IMS network products with specific threats.
+
+#### O.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the IMS network product classes
+
+As part of the IMS network products, it is expected that the IMS network product classes (e.g. P-CSCF) contains IMS network product classes application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the IMS network product functions and OAM functions that are specific to the IMS network product model. Functionalities specific to the IMS network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.226 [25].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present Annex, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 4.0 in 3GPP TS 23.228 [24].
+
+---
+
+### O.2 Assets and threats specific to the P-CSCF
+
+#### O.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the P-CSCF to be protected are:
+
+- P-CSCF Application;
+- IMS signalling;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Gm, Mw, Mx, and Iq interfaces
+- The interfaces of the P-CSCF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Gm interface between the P-CSCF and UE
+ - Mw interface between the P-CSCF and the C-CSCF/I-CSCF
+ - Mx interface between the P-CSCF and IBCF
+ - Iq interface between the P-CSCF and IMS AGW
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the P-CSCF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the P-CSCF and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the P-CSCF class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- P-CSCF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: P-CSCF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, P-CSCF application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+## O.2.2 Threats related to set-up of security associations
+
+### O.2.2.1 High-priority algorithm selection
+
+- Threat name: High-priority algorithm selection
+- Threat Category: Tampering of data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If the P-CSCF does not select the highest priority algorithm combination on its own list which is also supported by the UE to protect the messages between the P-CSCF and the UE, the P-CSCF could end up using a weaker algorithm forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling
+
+### O.2.2.2 Bidding down on security association set-up
+
+- Threat name: Bidding down on security association set-up
+- Threat Category: Tampering of data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If the P-CSCF does not check whether the integrity and encryption algorithms list, SPI\_P and Port\_P received in SM7 is identical with the corresponding parameters sent in SM6, and check whether SPI\_U and Port\_U received in SM7 are identical with those received in SM1, the attacker can force the system to reduce the security level by tampering the integrity and encryption algorithms list. Then, weaker security algorithms may be selected, which will make the system easily attacked. Tampering the SPI will cause the negotiated SA cannot be indexed. As a result, the following security association fails to be established, leading to Denial of Service attack. The port number is generally used to identify different applications. Tampering the Port\_P number by the attacker will cause messages to be sent to the UE or P-CSCF through the tampered port. These messages including some sensitive parameters may be leaked to another application, which is not intended to receive this message.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling, security data
+
+## O.2.3 Threats related to IMS signalling transport
+
+- *Threat name:* No protection or weak protection for IMS signalling data.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* The following behaviours may lead to bidding down attacks
+ - If the protection implemented for the IMS signalling over Gm interface uses the wrong security profile, which may contain weak security algorithms or protocol versions known to be vulnerable, the level of the security of the IMS signalling data may be degraded and fail to fulfil the required security.
+ - If the P-CSCF policy requires confidentiality, then all UEs with no encryption support would be denied access to the IMS network. For example, if the UE sends the NULL encryption algorithm to the P-CSCF in SM1, and the SM1 message is not denied by the P-CSCF, the following negotiated SA between UE and P-CSCF may be established without confidentiality protection, which disobeys the P-CSCF policy requiring confidentiality. Hence, the following IMS signalling data will be leaked.
+- *Threatened Asset:* IMS signalling data.
+
+## O.2.4 Threats related to SPI allocation
+
+- *Threat name:* Same SPIs between UE and P-CSCF.
+- *Threat Category:* Information disclosure, Denial of service.
+
+- *Threat Description:* If the P-CSCF selects the same SPIs as received in the *Security-setup-line* from the UE, the attacker could reflect the old messages back to P-CSCF. Since the UE and the P-CSCF use the same key for inbound and outbound traffic, the P-CSCF will decrypt the reflected messages correctly with the same key, and perform the following operation accordingly. Hence, the P-CSCF will suffer reflection attacks. The information may leak within the response message as required by the reflected message, or the ongoing services may be interrupted. The attack is also applicable on the UE side.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* IMS signalling, P-CSCF application.
+
+---
+
+## 0.3 Assets and threats specific to the S-CSCF
+
+### 0.3.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the S-CSCF to be protected are:
+
+- S-CSCF Application;
+- IMS signalling;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mw, Mx, Mm, Mg, ISC, Cx, Dx, Mr, and Mi interfaces
+- The interfaces of the S-CSCF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mw interface between the S-CSCF and I-CSCF/P-CSCF
+ - Mx interface between the S-CSCF and IBCF
+ - Mm interface between the S-CSCF and IP multimedia network
+ - Mg interface between the S-CSCF and MGCF
+ - ISC interface between the S-CSCF and AS
+ - Cx interface between the S-CSCF and HSS
+ - Dx interface between the S-CSCF and SLF
+ - Mr interface between the S-CSCF and MRFC
+ - Mi interface between the S-CSCF and BGCF
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the P-CSCF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the P-CSCF and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the S-CSCF class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- S-CSCF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: S-CSCF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, S-CSCF application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+### 0.3.2 Threats related to de-registration during the authentication
+
+- *Threat name:* No de-registration during the authentication.
+
+- *Threat Category:* Denial-of-service attack.
+
+- *Threat Description:* Assume that a legal UE has already been registered into the IMS network with the IMPU. An attacker could try to register an already registered IMPU and respond with an incorrect authentication response
+
+in order to make the HN de-register the IMPU of the legal UE. In this case, the legal UE will be de-registered in the HSS. Therefore, the attacker could open up a potential denial-of-service attack deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+## O.3.3 Threats related to authenticated re-registration
+
+### O.3.3.1 Unprotected register message
+
+- Threat name: Unprotected REGISTER messages
+- Threat Category: Tampering of data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- Threat Description: If the S-CSCF does not authenticate the user by means of the AKA protocol in case of the UE sends unprotected REGISTER messages, the attacker without a legal certificates, or pre-shared key could be able to access the network. The data and resources stored in the network may be exposed to an attacker, making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- Threatened Asset: S-CSCF Application, Security data
+
+### O.3.3.2 No resynchronization
+
+- *Threat name:* No resynchronization
+- *Threat Reference:* Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* In the synchronization failure scenario, after receiving the CM4 message from HSS, the UE may not be able to access to the network if no new authentication procedure is triggered by the S-CSCF, i.e. the UE is given no opportunity to resynchronize with the network. This can result in waste of system resources and deny a legitimate user access to the system.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+---
+
+## O.4 Assets and threats specific to the I-CSCF
+
+### O.4.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the I-CSCF to be protected are:
+
+- I-CSCF Application
+- IMS signalling, the Address of the S-CSCF, Charging data records
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mw, Cx, Mx, Ma, and Mm interfaces
+- The interfaces of the I-CSCF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mw interface between the I-CSCF and S-CSCF/P-CSCF
+ - Cx interface between the I-CSCF and the HSS and SLF
+ - Mx interface between the I-CSCF and the IBCF
+ - Ma interface between the I-CSCF and AS
+ - Mm interface between the I-CSCF and IP Multimedia Networks
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the I-CSCF
+
+- OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the I-CSCF and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the I-CSCF class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- I-CSCF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: I-CSCF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, I-CSCF application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+## O.4.2 Threats related to network hiding
+
+### O.4.2.1 encryption in network hiding
+
+- Threat name: Encryption in network hiding
+- Threat Category: Spoofing identity, Tampering of data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: In case of the network hiding mechanism is used and the operator policy states that the topology shall be hidden, if the encryption of the hiding information elements is not performed when the I-CSCF forwards SIP Request or Response messages outside the hiding network's domain, and the decryption of the hiding information elements is not performed when the I-CSCF receives a SIP Request or Response message from the outside of the hiding network's domain, the identities of the SIP proxies and the topology of the hiding network will not be protected, and an attacker can read or modify these information elements.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling
+
+---
+
+## O.5 Assets and threats specific to the IBCF
+
+### O.5.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the IBCF to be protected are:
+
+- IBCF Application
+- IMS signalling, Network configuration hiding, Charging data records
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mx, Cs, Ix, and Ici interfaces
+- The interfaces of the IBCF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mx interface between the IBCF and S-CSCF/P-CSCF/I-CSCF/BGCF
+ - Ms interface between the IBCF and the AS
+ - Ix interface between the IBCF and the TrGW
+ - Ici interface between the IBCF and IP Multimedia Networks
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the IBCF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the IBCF and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the IBCF class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- IBCF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: IBCF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, IBCF application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+## O.5.2 Threats related to network hiding
+
+### O.5.2.1 encryption in network hiding
+
+- Threat name: Encryption in network hiding
+- Threat Category: Spoofing identity, Tampering of data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: In cases of the encryption of the hiding information as network hiding mechanism is used and the operator policy states that the topology shall be hidden, and the encryption of the hiding information elements is not performed when the IBCF forwards SIP Request or Response messages outside the hiding network's domain, and the decryption of the hiding information elements is not performed when the IBCF receives a SIP Request or Response message from the outside of the hiding network's domain, the identities of the SIP proxies and the topology of the hiding network will not be protected, and an attacker can read or modify these information elements.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling
+
+### O.5.2.2 replacement in network hiding
+
+- Threat name: Replacement in network hiding
+- Threat Category: Spoofing identity, Tampering of data, Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: In cases of the replacement of the hiding information as network hiding mechanism is used and the operator policy states that the topology shall be hidden, and the hiding information elements are not replaced to constant values when the IBCF forwards SIP Request or Response messages outside the hiding network's domain, and the constant values are not replaced to the hiding information elements when the IBCF receives a SIP Request or Response message from the outside of the hiding network's domain, the identities of the SIP proxies and the topology of the hiding network will not be protected, and an attacker can read or modify these information elements.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling
+
+---
+
+## O.6 Assets and threats specific to the AS
+
+### O.6.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the AS deployed in the user's home network to be protected are:
+
+- AS Application
+- IM service data
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Ma, Ms, ISC, Rc, Cr, Sh, and Dh interfaces
+- The interfaces of the IBCF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Ma interface between the AS and I-CSCF
+ - Ms interface between the AS and the IBCF
+ - ISC interface between the AS and S-CSCF
+ - Rc interface between the AS and MRB
+
+- Cr interface between the AS and MRFC
+- Sh interface between the AS and HSS
+- Dh interface between the AS and SLF
+- Console interface, for local access: local interface on the AS
+- OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the AS and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the AS class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- AS Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: AS files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, AS application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+## 0.6.2 Threats related to authorization
+
+### 0.6.2.1 No user authorization
+
+- Threat name: No user identity authorization
+- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
+- Threat Description: It was described that once the AS have tried to verify the identity of the user, the AS either has a verified identity of the user or it considers the user as anonymous. If the AS configured that anonymous user is not allowed, does not reject the anonymous service request, the attacker could request functionality using the anonymous identity without any authorization.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling, security data
+
+### 0.6.2.1 No ID privacy
+
+- Threat name: No ID privacy
+- Threat Category: Information Disclosure
+- Threat Description: It was described where privacy is required, in any initial request for a dialog or request for a standalone transaction, the AS shall set a display-name of the From header field to "Anonymous" and set an addr-spec of the From header field to Anonymous User Identity. If the AS does not set the ID to anonymous, the content of the From header field will be leaked.
+- Threatened Asset: IMS signalling, security data
+
+---
+
+## 0.7 Assets and threats specific to the MRFC
+
+### 0.7.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the MRFC to be protected are:
+
+- MRFC Application
+- Media stream resource, Charging data records
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mp, Mr, and Cr/Mr' interfaces
+
+- The interfaces of the MRFC to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mp interface between the MRFC and MRFP
+ - Mr interface between the MRFC and the S-CSCF
+ - Cr/Mr' interface between the MRFC and AS
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the MRFC
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the MRFC and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the MRFC class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- MRFC Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: MRFC files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, MRFC application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+---
+
+## 0.8 Assets and threats specific to the IMS AGW
+
+### 0.8.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the IMS AGW to be protected are:
+
+- IMS AGW Application;
+- Media stream resource;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Iq and Mp interfaces
+- The interfaces of the IMS AGW to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Iq interface between the IMS AGW and P-CSCF
+ - Mb interface between the IMS AGW and IMS MGW
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the IMS AGW
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the IMS AGW and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the IMS AGW class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- IMS AGW Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: IMS AGW files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, IMS AGW application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+---
+
+## 0.9 Assets and threats specific to the MRFP
+
+### 0.9.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the MRFP to be protected are:
+
+- MRFP Application
+
+- Media stream resource
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mp interface
+- The interfaces of the MRFP to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mp interface between the MRFC and MRFP
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the MRFP
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the MRFP and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the MRFP class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- MRFP Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: MRFP files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, MRFP application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+---
+
+## 0.10 Assets and threats specific to the IMS MGW
+
+### 0.10.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the IMS MGW to be protected are:
+
+- IMS MGW Application;
+- Media stream resource;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mn, Mb, and CS interfaces
+- The interfaces of the IMS MGW to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mn interface between the IMS MGW and MGCF
+ - Mb interface between the IMS MGW and MRFP/IMS AGW
+ - CS interface between the IMS MGW and CS Network
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the IMS AGW
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the IMS MGW and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the IMS MGW class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- IMS MGW Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: IMS MGW files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, IMS MGW application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+---
+
+## 0.11 Assets and threats specific to the TrGW
+
+### 0.11.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the TrGW to be protected are:
+
+- TrGW Application;
+- Media stream resource;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Ix and Izi interfaces
+- The interfaces of the TrGW to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Ix interface between the TrGW and IBCF
+ - Izi interface between the TrGW and IP Multimedia Network
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the TrGW
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the TrGW and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the TrGW class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- TrGW Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: TrGW files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, TrGW application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+---
+
+## 0.12 Assets and threats specific to the MGCF
+
+### 0.12.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP has been described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the IMS AGW to be protected are:
+
+- MGCF Application;
+- Media stream resource;
+- Security data, i.e. cryptographic materials for Mg, Mj, CS, and Mn interfaces
+- The interfaces of the MGCF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Mg interface between the MGCF and I-CSCF
+ - Mj interface between the MGCF and BGCF
+ - CS interface between the MGCF and CS Network
+ - Mn interface between the MGCF and IM MGW
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on the IMS AGW
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between the IMS AGW and the OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the IMS AGW class are described in clause 4 of the present document.
+
+- IMS AGW Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: IMS AGW files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root users), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, IMS AGW application, user plane security mechanism, or cryptographic materials.
+
+---
+
+## Annex P: Aspects specific to the network product class NSSAAF
+
+### P.1 Void
+
+### P.2 Network product class description for the NSSAAF
+
+#### P.2.1 Introduction
+
+This annex captures the aspects specific to network product class NSSAAF.
+
+#### P.2.2 Minimum set of functions defining the NSSAAF network product class
+
+As part of the NSSAAF network product, it is expected that the NSSAAF to contain NSSAAF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the NSSAAF functions and OAM functions that is specific to the NSSAAF network product model. Functionalities specific to the NSSAAF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.326 [38].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of NSSAAF functions contained in clause 6.2.23 of TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### P.3 Assets and threats specific to the NSSAAF
+
+#### P.3.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the NSSAAF to be protected are:
+
+- NSSAAF Application;
+- User Data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. GPSI), S-NSSAIs, EAP authentication parameters (e.g. EAP ID), etc.
+- Slice information: e.g. the the (S-NSSAI, ENSI) mappings
+- The interfaces of NSSAAF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service based interface, NNSSAAF, for providing services to AMF
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from UDM, and AMF
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on NSSAAF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between NSSAAF and OAM system
+ - AAA interface: interface between NSSAAF and AAA-P or AAA-S
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the NSSAAF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- NSSAAF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: NSSAAF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including user account data and credentials, log data, configuration data, OS files, NSSAAF application, user data or NSSAAF Software.
+
+NOTE 3: The slice information is only applicable when AAA-S belongs to the 3rd party and the mapping of S-NSSAI to ENSI is needed.
+
+## P.3.2 Threats related to NSSAAF
+
+### P.3.2.1 Threats related to impersonating attack by AAA-S
+
+- *Threat name:* Threats related to impersonating attack by AAA-S
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of service, spoofing identity
+- *Threat Description:* Network slice specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA) is performed between UE and AAA server (AAA-S). AAA-S may also trigger network slice-specific authorization revocation by sending a request to NSSAAF. After receiving the request to revoke the slice-specific authorization for a slice for a UE from an AAA-S, if NSSAAF does not check whether the AAA-S is legitimate in the sense that it had performed the NSSAA for the slice for the UE, a malicious AAA-S may masquerade as the legitimate AAA-S to invoke the slice-specific authorization for the slice for the UE. Then UE is denied access to the slice. Similarly a malicious AAA-S may also trick NSSAAF to perform slice specific re-authentication and re-authorization just to incur extra signalling load.
+- *Threatened Asset:* user data related to NSSAA, processing capacity
+
+### P.3.2.2 Threat to select AAA-P and AAA-S
+
+- *Threat name:* AAA-P and AAA-S wrong selection
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of service.
+- *Threat Description:* AAA-S in NSSAA procedure may be hosted by the HPLMN or third party which has a business relationship. When AAA-S belongs to a third party, the AAA-P in the HPLMN may be involved. Different S-NSSAI may go to different AAA-S. If the NSSAAF does not have the ability to select the right receiver, the authentication will always fail.
+- *Threatened Asset:* GNP Application.
+
+---
+
+## Annex Q (normative): Aspects specific to the network product class SCP
+
+### Q.1 Network product class description for the SCP
+
+#### Q.1.1 Introduction
+
+This Annex covers the aspects specific to the SCP network product class.
+
+#### Q.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the SCP network product class
+
+According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. Therefore, in order to define the SCP network product class, it is necessary to define the common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities that is constitutive for a SCP. As part of the SCP network product, it is expected that the SCP contains SCP application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the SCP functions and OAM functions that is specific to the SCP network product model. Functionalities specific to the SCP network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.522 [27].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in clause 6.2.19 of TS 23.501 [8].
+
+---
+
+### Q.2 Assets and Threats specific to SCP
+
+#### Q.2.1 Threats related to tokens handled by the SCP
+
+##### Q.2.1.1 Token forwarded to a wrong pNF instance
+
+- *Threat name:* Token forwarded to a wrong pNF instance
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Information Disclosure, Spoofing Identity, Elevation of Privilege
+- *Threat Description:* According to TS 33.501 [14] clauses 13.4.1.3, the SCP is able to obtain the access token and/or client credentials assertion from the consumer NF, which are/is forwarded to the producer NF for authorization and/or authentication. If the SCP failed to select the correct target pNF instance due to e.g. mis-implementation or misconfiguration or weak internal interface protection, which results in the token being forwarded to the wrong pNF instance, there are the following threats:
+ - The pNF instance receiving the access token will not be able to verify the access token, hence leading to authorization failure for indirect communication. Consequently, the access token, as a piece of sensitive information of the cNF, is exposed to a NF instance which is not meant to have it. This can result in denial of service, information disclosure, as well as waste of system resources. In worse case, if the NF instance receiving the access token wants to access the service granted in the token but not granted to the NF, it may impersonate the cNF to invoke the service of the target pNF using the received access token. This can result in spoofed identity and elevation of privilege.
+ - The pNF instance receiving the client credentials assertion will not be able to verify the assertion, hence leading to failure of authenticating the cNF. Consequently, the credentials assertion, as a piece of sensitive information of the cNF, is exposed to a NF instance which is not meant to have it. This can result in denial of service, information disclosure, as well as waste of system resources. In worse case, if the NF instance receiving the assertion wants to access the service granted in the token but not granted to the NF, it may
+
+impersonate the cNF using the assertion for authentication with the target pNF, so as to facilitate the service access to the target pNF with the exposed access token. This can result in spoofed identity and elevation of privilege.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* SCP Application, Access Tokens, Client Credentials Assertions, Service Messages forwarded/routed between NFs/NF services, Sufficient Processing Capacity
+
+### Q.2.1.2 Swapped token forwarded to the target pNF
+
+- *Threat name:* Swapped token forwarded to the target pNF
+- *Threat Category:* Denial of Service, Information Disclosure, Spoofing Identity, Elevation of Privilege
+- *Threat Description:* When NFs and NF services communicate indirectly via the SCP, the SCP may receive multiple access tokens, which could come from multiple cNFs requesting services or from a single cNF requesting access to various services or network slices provided by the target pNFs. Particularly for indirect communication with delegated discovery, the SCP is delegated to request access tokens from the NRF for service requests from cNFs and then include the correct access token in each of the service requests from cNFs. If the SCP mixes-up the received multiple access tokens and includes the wrong access token in a service request, due to mis-implementation or misconfiguration, there are the following threats:
+ - During indirect communication with delegated discovery, if the SCP mistakenly includes an access token of the requesting cNF destined for a pNF different from the target pNF (i.e. audience mismatch), the target pNF will fail to verify the access token, hence leading to authorization failure for indirect communication. Consequently, the access token, as a piece of sensitive information of the cNF, is exposed to a NF instance which is not meant to have it. This can result in denial of service as well as waste of system resources. In worse case, if the target NF wants to access the service granted in the token but not granted to the NF, it may impersonate the cNF to invoke the service of another pNF using the received access token. This can result in spoofed identity and elevation of privilege.
+ - During indirect communication with delegated discovery, if the SCP mistakenly includes the access token of a cNF different from the requesting cNF (i.e. subject mismatch) or includes an access token of the requesting cNF for a service/slice different from the requested service/slice (i.e. scope mismatch), the target pNF will fail to verify the access token, hence leading to authorization failure for indirect communication. This can result in denial of service as well as waste of system resources.
+ - During indirect communication with delegated discovery, if the SCP includes the correct access token but mistakenly includes a client credentials assertion of another cNF, the target pNF will fail to verify the assertion, hence leading to authentication failure for indirect communication. This can result in denial of service as well as waste of system resources.
+- *Threatened Asset:* SCP Application, Service Messages forwarded/routed between NFs/NF services, Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+---
+
+## Annex R: Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-CU
+
+### R.1 Network product class description for the gNB-CU
+
+#### R.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### R.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-CU network product class
+
+As part of the gNB-CU network product, it is expected that the gNB-CU contains gNB-CU application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the gNB-CU functions and OAM functions that are specific to the gNB-CU network product model. Functionalities specific to the gNB-CU network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.523 [32].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of gNB-CU functions contained in TS 38.300 [29], TS 38.401 [30] and TS 23.501 [31].
+
+---
+
+### R.2 Assets and threats specific to the gNB-CU
+
+#### R.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the gNB-CU to be protected are:
+
+- gNB-CU Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUCI, GUTI), subscriber keys (i.e. $K_{UPenc}$ , $K_{UPint}$ , $K_{RRenc}$ , $K_{RRint}$ , NH), authentication parameters, APN name, data related to mobility management like UE measurements, UE's IP address, etc., QoS and so on, etc;
+- User plane data;
+- The interfaces of gNB-CU whose data is to be protected and which are within SCAS scope;
+ - N2 interface;
+ - Xn interface;
+ - N3 interface;
+ - Uu interface;
+ - F1 interface;
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on gNB-CU; and
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between gNB-CU and OAM system; and
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the gNB-CU class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- gNB-CU Software: binary code or executable code.
+
+NOTE 2: gNB-CU files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, gNB-CU application, Mobility Management data or gNB-CU Software.
+
+## R.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network
+
+### R.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* gNB-CU control plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU does not provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the N2/Xn/F1-C/Uu reference points, then the control plane packets sent over Xn (e.g. inter-gNB handover), N2 (e.g. handover on AMF change), Uu and F1-C reference points can be compromised by attackers. This means the UE identifiers, security capabilities, the security algorithms and key materials exchanged can be accessed by the attackers leading to huge security breach. This threat scenario assumes that the N2, Xn and F1-C reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Mobility Management data.
+
+### R.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU does not provide integrity protection for control plane packets on N2/Xn/F1-C/Uu reference points, the control plane packets sent over these reference points can be modified without detection. The intruder manipulations on control plane packets can lead to denial of service to legitimate users. This threat scenario assumes that the N2, Xn and F1-C reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data.
+
+### R.2.2.3 User plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU does not cipher and decipher user plane packets on the N3/Xn/Uu/F1-U reference points, then the attackers can compromise user packets on F1-U, Uu, Xn-U and N3. The attackers can gain access to user identifiers, serving network identifiers, location information and can perform user tracking. This threat scenario assumes that the N3, F1-U and Xn reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data.
+
+### R.2.2.4 User plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU does not handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the Xn/N3/Uu/F1-U reference points then all the uplink/downlink user plane packets can be manipulated by
+
+intruders to launch Denial of Service attack. This threat scenario assumes that the Xn, F1-U and N3 reference points are not within the security environment.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capacity, User plane data.
+
+### R.2.2.5 AS algorithm selection and use
+
+- *Threat name*: AS algorithm selection and use
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description*: If AS does not use the highest priority algorithm to protect AS layer, i.e. RRC and PDCP, data on the AS layer risks being exposed and/or modified, or denial of service.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data
+
+### R.2.2.6 Bidding down on Xn-Handover
+
+- *Threat name*: Bidding down on Xn-Handover.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description*: If the gNB-CU does not send the UE 5G security capabilities, the AMF cannot verify 5G security capabilities are the same as the UE security capabilities that the AMF has stored, the attacker may force the system to accept a weaker security algorithm than the system is allowed, forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient processing capability, Mobility Management data.
+
+### R.2.2.7 Key reuse
+
+- *Threat name*: Key Reuse.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: If AS keys are not refreshed by the gNB-CU when PDCP COUNTs is about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with the same $K_{gNB}$ , key stream reuse is possible. This can result in information disclosure of AS signalling and user plane data. The threat of key stream reuse occurs under the following conditions when the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity and key stay the same (e.g. the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity and keys, or the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around.
+- *Threatened Asset*: User plane data, Mobility Management data.
+
+### R.2.2.8 Security policy enforcement
+
+- *Threat name*: Security Policy Enforcement.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: If gNB-CU does not follow the security based on security policy provided by SMF, this can lead to no security or reduced security provided to the UE user plane, (e.g. not applying integrity protection when it is required to do so), etc.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capability, User plane data.
+
+### R.2.2.9 State transition from inactive state to connected state
+
+- *Threat name*: State transition from inactive state to connected state
+- *Threat Category*: Denial of Service.
+
+- *Threat Description:* When state transits from inactive state to the connected state, if the gNB-CU does not reactivate/activate the UP security based on UP activation status included in the UE 5G AS security context, the UP activation status between the network and the UE may be different. This will cause the misalignment on UP activation status, and result in the UE has to reconnect to the Network again which wastes resource both at UE and network
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capability.
+
+---
+
+## Annex S: Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-CU-CP
+
+### S.1 Network product class description for the gNB-CU-CP
+
+#### S.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### S.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-CU-CP network product class
+
+As part of the gNB-CU-CP network product, it is expected that the gNB-CU-CP contains gNB-CU-CP application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the gNB-CU-CP functions and OAM functions that are specific to the gNB-CU-CP network product model. Functionalities specific to the gNB-CU-CP network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.523 [32].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of gNB-CU-CP functions contained in TS 38.300 [29], 3GPP TS 38.401 [30] and TS 23.501 [31]
+
+---
+
+### S.2 Assets and threats specific to the gNB-CU-CP
+
+#### S.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the gNB-CU-CP to be protected are:
+
+- gNB-CU-CP Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. subscriber's identities (e.g. SUCI, GUTI), subscriber keys (i.e. $K_{UPenc}$ , $K_{UPint}$ , $K_{RRenc}$ , $K_{RRint}$ , NH), authentication parameters, APN name, data related to mobility management like UE measurements, UE's IP address, etc., QoS and so on, etc;
+- The interfaces of gNB-CU-CP to be protected and which are within SCAS scope;
+ - N2 interface;
+ - Xn interface;
+ - E1 interface;
+ - Uu interface;
+ - F1 interface;
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on gNB-CU-CP; and
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between gNB-CU-CP and OAM system; and
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the gNB-CU-CP class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- gNB-CU-CP Software: binary code or executable code.
+
+NOTE 2: gNB-CU-CP files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, gNB-CU-CP application, Mobility Management data or gNB-CU-CP Software.
+
+## S.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network
+
+### S.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* gNB-CU control plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-CP does not provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the N2/Xn/F1-C/Uu/E1 reference points, then the control plane packets sent over Xn (e.g. inter-gNB handover), N2 (e.g. handover on AMF change), Uu, E1 and F1-C reference points can be compromised by attackers. This means the UE identifiers, security capabilities, the security algorithms and key materials exchanged can be accessed by the attackers leading to huge security breach. This threat scenario assumes that the N2, Xn, E1 and F1-C reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Mobility Management data.
+
+### S.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-CP does not provide integrity protection for control plane packets on N2/Xn/F1-C/Uu/E1 reference points, the control plane packets sent over these reference points can be modified without detection. The intruder manipulations on control plane packets can lead to denial of service to legitimate users. This threat scenario assumes that the N2, Xn, E1 and F1-C reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data.
+
+### S.2.2.3 AS algorithm selection and use
+
+- *Threat name:* AS algorithm selection and use
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
+- *Threat Description:* If AS does not use the highest priority algorithm to protect AS layer, i.e. RRC and PDCP, data on the AS layer risks being exposed and/or modified, or denial of service.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data
+
+### S.2.2.4 Bidding down on Xn-Handover
+
+- *Threat name:* Bidding down on Xn-Handover.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering Data, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-CP does not send the UE 5G security capabilities, the AMF cannot verify 5G security capabilities are the same as the UE security capabilities that the AMF has stored, the attacker may force
+
+the system to accept a weaker security algorithm than the system is allowed, forcing the system into a lowered security level making the system easily attacked and/or compromised.
+
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient processing capability, Mobility Management data.
+
+### S.2.2.5 Key Reuse
+
+- *Threat name*: Key Reuse.
+- *Threat Category*: Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: If AS keys are not refreshed by the gNB-CU-CP when PDCP COUNTs is about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with the same $K_{gNB}$ , key stream reuse is possible. This can result in information disclosure of AS signalling and user plane data. The threat of key stream reuse occurs under the following conditions when the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity and key stay the same (e.g. the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity and keys, or the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around).
+- *Threatened Asset*: User plane data, Mobility Management data.
+
+### S.2.2.6 Security Policy Enforcement
+
+- *Threat name*: Security Policy Enforcement.
+- *Threat Category*: Tampering data, Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description*: If gNB-CU-CP does not follow the security based on security policy provided by SMF, this can lead to no security or reduced security provided to the UE user plane, (e.g. not applying integrity protection when it is required to do so), etc.
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capability, User plane data.
+
+### S.2.2.7 State transition from inactive state to connected state
+
+- *Threat name*: State transition from inactive state to connected state
+- *Threat Category*: Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description*: When state transits from inactive state to the connected state, if the gNB-CU-CP does not reactivate/activate the UP security based on UP activation status included in the UE 5G AS security context, the UP activation status between the network and the UE may be different. This will cause the misalignment on UP activation status, and result in the UE has to reconnect to the Network again which wastes resource both at UE and network
+- *Threatened Asset*: Sufficient Processing Capability.
+
+---
+
+## Annex T: Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-CU-UP
+
+### T.1 Network product class description for the gNB-CU-UP
+
+#### T.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### T.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-CU-UP network product class
+
+As part of the gNB-CU-UP network product, it is expected that the gNB-CU-UP contains gNB-CU-UP application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the gNB-CU-UP functions and OAM functions that are specific to the gNB-CU network product model. Functionalities specific to the gNB-CU-UP network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.523 [32].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of gNB-CU-UP functions contained in 3GPP TS 38.300 [29], 3GPP TS 38.401 [30] and TS 23.501 [31].
+
+---
+
+### T.2 Assets and threats specific to the gNB-CU-UP
+
+#### T.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the gNB-CU-UP to be protected are:
+
+- gNB-CU-UP Application;
+- Mobility Management data: subscriber keys (i.e. $K_{UPenc}$ , $K_{UPint}$ ), UE's IP address, etc., QoS and so on, etc;
+- User plane data;
+- The interfaces of gNB-CU-UP whose data needs to be protected and which are within SCAS scope;
+ - E1 interface;
+ - Xn interface;
+ - N3 interface;
+ - Uu interface;
+ - F1 interface;
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on gNB-CU-UP; and
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between gNB-CU-UP and OAM system; and
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the gNB-CU-UP class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- gNB-CU-UP Software: binary code or executable code.
+
+NOTE 2: gNB-CU-UP files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, gNB-CU-UP application, Mobility Management data or gNB-CU-UP Software.
+
+## T.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network
+
+### T.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* gNB-CU-UP control plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-UP does not provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the E1 reference point, then the control plane packets sent over E1 reference points can be compromised by attackers. This means the UE identifiers, security capabilities, the security algorithms and key materials exchanged can be accessed by the attackers leading to huge security breach. This threat scenario assumes that the E1 reference point is not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Mobility Management data.
+
+### T.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-UP does not provide integrity protection for control plane packets on E1 reference point, the control plane packets sent over this reference point can be modified without detection. The intruder manipulations on control plane packets can lead to denial of service to legitimate users. This threat scenario assumes that the E1 reference point are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data.
+
+### T.2.2.3 User plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-UP does not cipher and decipher user plane packets on the N3/Xn/Uu/F1 reference points, then the attackers can compromise user packets on F1, Uu, Xn-U and N3. The attackers can gain access to user identifiers, serving network identifiers, location information and can perform user tracking. This threat scenario assumes that the N3, F1 and Xn reference points are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* user plane data.
+
+### T.2.2.4 User plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-CU-UP does not handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the Xn/N3/Uu/F1 reference points then all the uplink/downlink user plane packets can be manipulated by intruders
+
+to launch Denial of Service attack. This threat scenario assumes that the Xn, F1 and N3 reference points are not within the security environment.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, User plane data.
+
+---
+
+## Annex U: Aspects specific to the network product class gNB-DU
+
+### U.1 Network product class description for the gNB-DU
+
+#### U.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
+
+#### U.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the gNB-DU network product class
+
+As part of the gNB-DU network product, it is expected that the gNB-DU contains gNB-DU application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the gNB-DU functions and OAM functions that are specific to the gNB-DU network product model. Functionalities specific to the gNB-DU network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.523 [32].
+
+NOTE: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of gNB-DU functions contained in TS 38.300 [29], TS 38.401 [30] and TS 23.501 [31].
+
+---
+
+### U.2 Assets and threats specific to the gNB-DU
+
+#### U.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the gNB-DU to be protected are:
+
+- gNB-DU Application;
+- Mobility Management data: e.g. QoS and so on, etc;
+- User plane data;
+- The interfaces of gNB-DU whose data needs to be protected and which are within SCAS scope;
+ - F1 interface;
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on gNB-DU; and
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between gNB-DU and OAM system; and
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the gNB-DU class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- gNB-DU Software: binary code or executable code.
+
+NOTE 2: gNB-DU files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, gNB-DU application, Mobility Management data or gNB-DU Software.
+
+## U.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane in the network
+
+### U.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* gNB-DU control plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-DU does not provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the F1-C reference point, then the control plane packets sent over F1-C reference point can be compromised by attackers. This means the UE information exchanged can be accessed by the attackers leading to huge security breach. This threat scenario assumes that the F1-C reference points is not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Mobility Management data.
+
+### U.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-DU does not provide integrity protection for control plane packets on F1-C reference point, the control plane packets sent over this reference point can be modified without detection. The intruder manipulations on control plane packets can lead to denial of service to legitimate users. This threat scenario assumes that the F1-C reference point is not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, Mobility Management data.
+
+### U.2.2.3 User plane data confidentiality protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data confidentiality protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-DU does not cipher and decipher user plane packets on the F1 reference point, then the attackers can compromise user packets on F1. The attackers can gain access to user identifiers, serving network identifiers, location information and can perform user tracking. This threat scenario assumes that the F1 reference point are not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* User plane data.
+
+### U.2.2.4 User plane data integrity protection
+
+- *Threat name:* User plane data integrity protection.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering data, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* If the gNB-DU does not handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the F1 reference point then all the uplink/downlink user plane packets can be manipulated by intruders to launch Denial of Service attack. This threat scenario assumes that the F1 reference point is not within the security environment.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Sufficient Processing Capacity, User plane data.
+
+---
+
+## Annex V: Aspects specific to the network product class MnF
+
+### V.1 Network product class description for the MnF
+
+#### V.1.1 Introduction
+
+The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while this clause covers the aspects specific to the MnF network product class.
+
+A 5G MnF NP implement 3GPP-defined functions from various releases. As specified in TS 23.533 [33], a 5G MnF may support management services such as for performance management, configuration management or fault supervision services, etc.
+
+By comparison to the Figure 4.3-1 (GNP model), a 5G MnF NP includes functions defined by 3GPP, other functions, operating system and hardware. According to clause 5.3 of TS 28.533 [34], there are two types of MnFs: cross domain MnF and domain MnF. These MnF types differ slightly in the types of interfaces they support as explained below.
+
+The generic interfaces supported by both MnF NP classes are interfaces for remote management, local console, towards digital portal, to central AAA, to MnF in other domain. The cross domain MnF specific interfaces are interfaces towards external consumer, towards BSS, to TN management system. The domain MnF specific interfaces are interfaces to NF in the same domain.
+
+#### V.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the MnF network product class
+
+According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. Therefore, in order to define the MnF network product class, it is necessary to define the common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities that is constitutive for a MnF. As part of the MnF network product, it is expected that the MnF contains MnF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the MnF functions and OAM functions that are specific to the MnF network product model. Functionalities specific to the MnF network product introduce additional critical assets and/or threats as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.526 [35].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in TS 28.533 [33], TS 28.530 [34].
+
+---
+
+## V.2 Assets and threats specific to the MnF
+
+### V.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the MnF to be protected are:
+
+- MnF Application
+- The interfaces of MnF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example,
+ - External Client access interface,
+ - Interface between MnF and NF,
+
+- Interface between RAN/CN MnFs and Cross Domain MnFs,
+- Interface between MnF and AAA infrastructure, if any,
+- Service based interfaces, if any.
+- Management data: User account data, Performance data, Fault supervision data, Configuration data, Log data, etc.
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the MnF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+## V.2.2 Threats related to MnF assets
+
+### V.2.2.1 Over-Privileged Data Processes
+
+- *Threat name:* Over-Privileged Data Process.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering of Data, Elevation of privilege.
+- *Threat Description:* If the MnF product does not evaluate the user privilege for access to data or can allow an attacker to obtain elevated privileges, an attacker may operate the data with low privilege, this kind of mis-operation not only impacts on the MnF itself, but also the NFs that the MnF connects to.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Management data.
+
+### V.2.2.2 Threats related to Management data
+
+- *Threat name:* Unprotected Management data during transmission.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* Management information transported between Management Service (MnS) Producer and Consumer, if not confidentiality protected, can be subject to eavesdropping. Such information may be leaked to unauthorized parties. In addition, if there's no integrity protection for the management information, attackers can tamper with management information at will, leading to MnS consumers obtaining false management information. If there's no replay protection for the management information, attackers can insert historical legitimate data. This can lead to false network usage reported by MnF, and consequently result in incorrect management operations.
+- *Threatened Asset:* Management data.
+
+---
+
+## Annex W: Aspects specific to the network product class AAnF
+
+### W.1 Network product class description for the AAnF
+
+#### W.1.1 Introduction
+
+This annex captures the aspects specific to network product class AAnF.
+
+#### W.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the AAnF network product class
+
+As part of the AAnF network product, it is expected that the AAnF to contain AAnF application, a set of running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the AAnF functions and OAM functions that is specific to the AAnF network product model. Functionalities specific to the AAnF network product introduce additional threats and/or critical assets as described below. Related security requirements and test cases have been captured in TS 33.537 [36].
+
+Note: For the purposes of the present document, this common set is defined to be the list of AAnF functions contained in clause 4.2.1 of TS 33.535 [37].
+
+---
+
+### W.2 Assets and threats specific to the AAnF
+
+#### W.2.1 Critical assets
+
+In addition to the critical assets of a GNP described in clause 5.2 of the present document, the critical assets specific to the AAnF to be protected are:
+
+- AAnF Application;
+- AKMA context Data: i.e. subscriber's identities (SUPI), AKMA Anchor Key ( $K_{AKMA}$ ) and AKMA Key Identifier (A-KID).
+- The interfaces of AAnF to be protected and which are within SECAM scope:
+ - Service based interface, Naanf, for providing services for AUSF, NEF, AF
+ - Service based interface for consuming services from AUSF, NEF, AF, and NRF
+ - Console interface, for local access: local interface on AAnF
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between AAnF and OAM system
+
+NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the AAnF class are described in clause 4, Network Product Class Description of the present document.
+
+- AAnF Software: binary code or executable code
+
+NOTE 2: AAnF files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non-root uses), including User account data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, AAnF application, AKMA context data or AAnF Software.
+
+## W.2.2 Threats related to AAnF assets
+
+### W.2.2.1 Control plane data protection with AUSF
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data protection with AUSF.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* Control plane traffic is transported between the AAnF and the AUSF via SBA interface. If the control plane data transported over the interface is not confidentiality protected, it can be subject to eavesdropping. Information is leaked to unauthorized parties. If the control plane traffic is not integrity protected, attackers can tamper with user traffic at will. If the control plane traffic is not replay protected, attackers can insert historical legitimate values into the AAnF or to the AUSF. This can lead to denial of service to legitimate users.
+
+If the protection implemented for the control plane transported over the SBA interface uses the wrong security profile, which may contain weak security algorithms or protocol versions known to be vulnerable, the level of the security of the user plane data may be degraded and fail to fulfil the required security.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* AKMA key material, SUPI.
+
+### W.2.2.2 Control plane data protection with AF/NEF
+
+- *Threat name:* Control plane data protection with AF/NEF.
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service.
+- *Threat Description:* Control plane traffic is transported between the AAnF and the AF/NEF via SBA interface. If the control plane data transported over the interface is not confidentiality protected, it can be subject to eavesdropping. Information is leaked to unauthorized parties. If the control plane traffic is not integrity protected, attackers can tamper with user traffic at will. If the control plane traffic is not replay protected, attackers can insert historical legitimate values into the AAnF or to the AF/NEF. This can lead to denial of service to legitimate users.
+
+If the protection implemented for the control plane transported over the SBA interface uses the wrong security profile, which may contain weak security algorithms or protocol versions known to be vulnerable, the level of the security of the user plane data may be degraded and fail to fulfil the required security.
+
+- *Threatened Asset:* SUPI.
+
+### W.2.2.3 AKMA key storage and update
+
+- Threat name: AKMA key storage and update
+- Threat Category: Elevation of Privilege
+- Threat Description: If the AAnF does not maintain only the latest AKMA Context but also past ones, there is a possibility of an AKMA service failure.
+- Threatened Asset: Sufficient Processing Capacity.
+
+## Annex R: Change history
+
+| | | | | | | | Change history | |
+|---------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|--------|
+| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | |
+| 2016-06 | SA#72 | | | | | Upgrade to version under change control | | 13.0.0 |
+| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160577 | 0001 | 1 | F | Remove "shall" from the TR | | 13.1.0 |
+| 2017-03 | SA#75 | | | | | Promotion to Release 14 without technical change | | 14.0.0 |
+| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170512 | 0002 | 1 | B | Adding a generic threat on "User Session Tampering" | | 15.0.0 |
+| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170641 | 0003 | - | B | Adding PWG Annex to TR33.926 | | 15.1.0 |
+| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170641 | 0004 | - | B | Adding eNB Annex to Support SCAS eNB | | 15.1.0 |
+| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190361 | 0006 | 1 | B | Addition of AMF-related Security Problem Descriptions: Not implemented as it was intended as draft CR (MCC). | | 16.0.0 |
+| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190361 | 0007 | 1 | B | Adding gNB Annex | | 16.0.0 |
+| 2019-06 | SA#84 | | | | | Removal of annex X.2 added by accident (MCC) | | 16.0.1 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190689 | 0017 | 1 | A | Additional Critical Assets and Threats to PGW Annex R16 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0019 | 1 | B | UDM critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0020 | 1 | B | AUSF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0021 | 1 | B | Adding SEPP critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0022 | 1 | B | Adding NRF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0023 | 1 | B | NEF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0024 | 1 | B | Adding critical assets and threats for general NFs to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0025 | 1 | B | Adding SMF related critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0026 | 1 | B | Assets and threats specific to the AMF | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190688 | 0027 | 1 | B | Adding UPF related critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | | 16.1.0 |
+| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-191138 | 0029 | - | D | Miscellaneous Editorial clarifications | | 16.2.0 |
+| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-191138 | 0030 | - | F | Clarification on aspects specific to the network product class UDM and AMF | | 16.2.0 |
+| 2020-03 | SA#87E | SP-200139 | 0031 | 1 | B | Adding a clause of Threats related to key reuse for the eNB | | 16.3.0 |
+| 2020-03 | SA#87E | SP-200136 | 0032 | 1 | F | Updating the clause of Key Reuse for the gNB | | 16.3.0 |
+| 2021-03 | SA#91e | SP-210117 | 0039 | 1 | F | Clarification on exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message in TR 33.926 | | 16.4.0 |
+| 2021-03 | SA#91e | SP-210117 | 0037 | 1 | B | Threat to send EAP-Identity Request by N3IWF | | 17.0.0 |
+| 2021-06 | SA#92e | SP-210445 | 0041 | 1 | B | Adding asset, description and threats to TR 33.926 for NWDAF SCAS | | 17.1.0 |
+| 2021-06 | SA#92e | SP-210447 | 0044 | 1 | B | IMS SCAS: living doc for the threats | | 17.1.0 |
+| 2021-06 | SA#92e | SP-210440 | 0045 | - | B | CR to add threat related to R-16 features of network products to 33.926 | | 17.1.0 |
+| 2021-09 | SA#93e | SP-210847 | 0046 | 1 | F | Add threat to TR 33.925 | | 17.2.0 |
+| 2021-09 | SA#93e | SP-210848 | 0048 | - | B | SCAS 5G IPUPS: New threats to IPUPS to TR 33.926 | | 17.2.0 |
+| 2021-12 | SA#94e | SP-211387 | 0049 | - | B | New Annex with Assets and Threats specific to SCAS SCP | | 17.3.0 |
+| 2021-12 | SA#94e | SP-211371 | 0050 | - | B | Minimum set of functions for SCP | | 17.3.0 |
+| 2022-06 | SA#96 | SP-220546 | 0058 | - | A | Correction on clause F.2.1 in TS 33.926 | | 17.4.0 |
+| 2022-06 | SA#96 | SP-220547 | 0059 | - | F | Delete Threat Analysis on Finding the right NF instance are serving the UE | | 17.4.0 |
+| 2022-06 | SA#97e | SP-220887 | 0061 | - | A | Proposed correction to Annex D on gNB network product class | | 17.5.0 |
+| 2022-12 | SA#98e | SP-221148 | 0063 | - | A | Correction to the gNB threats in TR 33.926 | | 17.6.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230597 | 0069 | 1 | A | Correcting some references in TS 33.926 | | 17.7.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230608 | 0066 | 1 | B | Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926 | | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230677 | 0067 | 1 | B | Threat reference for incorrectly encoded UE 5G security capabilities on the AMF NG interface | | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230610 | 0070 | - | B | Addition of critical assets and threats specific to MnF network product class | | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230677 | 0071 | - | F | SCAS release reference corrections | | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230607 | 0073 | 1 | B | Adding critical asset and threats of AAnF | | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230677 | 0074 | - | B | SCAS updates to threats and assets for Release 17 features | | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-09 | SA#101 | SP-230904 | 0077 | - | F | Correction of UDM service naming | | 18.1.0 |
+| 2023-09 | SA#101 | SP-230903 | 0079 | - | A | Addition of critical assets and threats specific to NSSAAF network product class | | 18.1.0 |
+| 2023-12 | SA#102 | SP-231339 | 0080 | 1 | F | Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption | | 18.2.0 |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# 3GPP TR 33.927 V18.1.0 (2023-12)
+
+*Technical Report*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); threats and critical assets in 3GPP virtualized network product classes (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+The logo for 5G Advanced, featuring a stylized '5G' with a green signal wave icon above the 'G', and the word 'ADVANCED' in smaller letters to the right.
+
+5G Advanced logo
+
+
+
+The 3GPP logo, consisting of the letters '3GPP' in a stylized font with a red signal wave icon below the 'P', and the text 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' underneath.
+
+3GPP logo
+
+The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices.
+
+# **3GPP**
+
+---
+
+Postal address
+
+---
+
+3GPP support office address
+
+---
+
+650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne - FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+Internet
+
+---
+
+
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification** ---
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2023, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+# Contents
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| Foreword ..... | 5 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 7 |
+| 2 References..... | 7 |
+| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 7 |
+| 3.1 Terms..... | 7 |
+| 3.2 Symbols..... | 7 |
+| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 8 |
+| 4 Generic Virtualized Network Product (GVNP) class description ..... | 8 |
+| 4.1 Overview ..... | 8 |
+| 4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class ..... | 9 |
+| 4.3 Generic virtualized network product model..... | 9 |
+| 4.3.1 Introduction ..... | 9 |
+| 4.3.2 Generic virtualized network product model of type 1 ..... | 10 |
+| 4.3.2.1 Description of the GVNP model..... | 10 |
+| 4.3.2.2 Functions defined by 3GPP ..... | 10 |
+| 4.3.2.3 Other functions ..... | 10 |
+| 4.3.2.4 Operating system (OS)..... | 10 |
+| 4.3.2.5 Interfaces..... | 10 |
+| 4.4 Scope of the present document..... | 11 |
+| 4.4.1 Introduction ..... | 11 |
+| 4.4.2 Scope regarding GVNP functions defined by 3GPP..... | 11 |
+| 4.4.3 Scope regarding other functions..... | 11 |
+| 4.4.4 Scope regarding Operating System (OS) ..... | 11 |
+| 4.4.5 Scope regarding hardware ..... | 12 |
+| 4.4.6 Scope regarding interfaces..... | 12 |
+| 5 Generic assets and threats ..... | 12 |
+| 5.1 Introduction ..... | 12 |
+| 5.2 Critical assets..... | 12 |
+| 5.2.1 Generic assets of GVNP for type 1 ..... | 12 |
+| 5.3 Threats..... | 12 |
+| 5.3.1 Generic threats format ..... | 12 |
+| 5.3.2 Generic threats for GVNP of type 1 ..... | 13 |
+| 5.3.2.1 Introduction..... | 13 |
+| 5.3.2.2 Threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces ..... | 13 |
+| 5.3.2.3 Threats relating to ETSI-defined interfaces..... | 13 |
+| 5.3.2.4 Spoofing identity..... | 13 |
+| 5.3.2.4.1 Default Accounts..... | 13 |
+| 5.3.2.4.2 Weak Password Policies..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.4.3 Password peek..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.4.4 Direct Root Access..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.4.5 IP Spoofing..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.4.6 Malware..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.4.7 Eavesdropping..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.5 Tampering..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.5.1 Software Tampering..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.5.2 Ownership File Misuse..... | 14 |
+| 5.3.2.5.3 Boot tampering for GVNP of type 1 ..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.5.4 Log Tampering..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.5.5 OAM traffic Tampering ..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.5.6 File Write Permissions Abuse..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.5.7 User Session Tampering..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.6 Repudiation..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.6.1 Lack of User Activity Trace..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.7 Information disclosure ..... | 15 |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| 5.3.2.7.1 | Poor key generation..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.7.2 | Poor key management ..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.7.3 | Weak cryptographic algorithms ..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.7.4 | Insecure Data Storage..... | 15 |
+| 5.3.2.7.5 | System Fingerprinting ..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.6 | Malware..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.7 | Personal Identification Information Violation ..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.8 | Insecure Default Configuration..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.9 | File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse ..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.10 | Insecure Network Services..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.11 | Unnecessary Services..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.12 | Log Disclosure ..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.13 | Unnecessary Applications..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.14 | Eavesdropping..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.7.15 | Security threat caused by lack of GVNP traffic isolation ..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.8 | Denial of Service ..... | 16 |
+| 5.3.2.9 | Elevation of privilege..... | 17 |
+| 6 | Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces ..... | 17 |
+| Annex A: | Change history ..... | 18 |
+
+# Foreword
+
+This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version x.y.z
+
+where:
+
+- x the first digit:
+ - 1 presented to TSG for information;
+ - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+ - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
+
+In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:
+
+- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something
+- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something
+
+The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.
+
+The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.
+
+- should** indicates a recommendation to do something
+- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something
+- may** indicates permission to do something
+- need not** indicates permission not to do something
+
+The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.
+
+- can** indicates that something is possible
+- cannot** indicates that something is impossible
+
+The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".
+
+- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+
+**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+
+In addition:
+
+**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact
+
+**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact
+
+The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.
+
+# --- 1 Scope
+
+The present document captures the virtualized network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class. In another aspect, present document defines different types of virtualized network products compared to only one type defined in [2].
+
+# --- 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+ - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+ - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+- [2] 3GPP TR 33.926 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes
+- [3] 3GPP TR 33.936: "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP virtualized network products".
+- [4] 3GPP TR 23.501: " System architecture for the 5G System (5GS) Stage 2".
+- [5] ETSI GS NFV 002: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural Framework".
+- [6] ETSI GS NFV-EVE 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Virtualisation technologies; Hypervisor Domain Requirements Specification".
+- [7] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Problem Statement".
+- [8] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 011: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 3; Management and Orchestration; VNF Descriptor and Packaging Specification".
+
+# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Terms
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
+
+## 3.2 Symbols
+
+Void
+
+## 3.3 Abbreviations
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| EM | Element Management |
+| GVNP | Generic Virtualized Network Product |
+| NFV | Network Functions Virtualization |
+| NFVI | Network Functions Virtualization Infrastructure |
+| NFVO | Network Functions Virtualization Orchestrator |
+| OAM | Operation and Management |
+| SCAS | Security Assurance Specification |
+| VIM | Virtualized Infrastructure Manager |
+| VM | Virtual Machine |
+| VNFM | Virtualized Network Function Manager |
+
+# --- 4 Generic Virtualized Network Product (GVNP) class description
+
+## 4.1 Overview
+
+A 3GPP generic virtualized network product class defines a set of functions that are implemented on that product, which includes, but not limited to minimum set of common 3GPP functions for that product covered in 3GPP specifications, other functions and softwares not covered by 3GPP specifications, as well as interfaces to access that product. A generic type 1 of virtualized network product may also include software, and OS components that the product is implemented on. The present document describes the threats and the critical assets in the course of developing 3GPP security assurance specifications for a particular network product class.
+
+NOTE: Considering the situation that type 2 and/or type 3 of virtualized product class are dependent of premature specifications from other standard organization, only type 1 of virtualized product class are specified in present document.
+
+**Applicability of the GVNP security assurance specification to products:** Assume a telecom equipment vendor wants to sell a product to an operator, and the latter is interested in following the Security Assurance Methodology as described in TR 33.936 [3], then, before evaluation according to TR 33.936 [3] in a testing laboratory can start, it first needs to be determined which security assurance specifications written by 3GPP apply to the given product.
+
+Different with 3GPP GNP defined in TR 33.926 [2], based on different implementation, 3GPP VNP will be categorized as 3 types. As a result, a type 1 of 3GPP Virtualized Network Product may be composed with software (e.g. operating system, drivers, applications, services, protocols), and interfaces (e.g. console interfaces and O&M interfaces) that allow the 3GPP network product to be managed and configured locally and/or remotely. A GVNP is a 3GPP network product.
+
+**GVNP Security Assurance Specification (GVNP SCAS):** The GVNP SCAS provides descriptions of the security requirements (which are including test cases) pertaining to type 1 of generic virtualized network product class.
+
+**Need for a GVNP network product model:** This minimum set of functions listed in clause 4.2 is exclusively meant as a membership criterion for the GVNP Class. It is not meant to restrict the functionality of a GVNP, nor the scope of the present document in any way. On the contrary, it is clear that GVNPs will contain many more functions than those from the minimum set listed in clause 4.2, and the GVNP will contain requirements relating to functions not contained in this minimum set. Some of these functions, beyond the minimum set, can be found from various 3GPP specifications, but by far not all these functions. This implies that there is a need to describe the functions that cannot be found from 3GPP specifications in some other way before the GVNP can be written so that the GVNPs can make reference to this description. This description is the GVNP model, cf. clause 4.3.
+
+EXAMPLE 1: 3GPP specifications do not describe a local management interface, but GVNPs will have to take it into account, so a local management interface needs to be part of a GVNP model.
+
+EXAMPLE 2: A GVNP sometimes says e.g.: "Authentication events on the local management interface shall be logged." This implies the presence of a logging function. The logging function is not part of the defining minimum set of functions from clause 4.2. If a product implements this minimum set, but no logging function, then this just means that the product is a GVNP, but will fail the evaluation against the GVNP SCAS.
+
+The GVNP models are further used in clauses 5 and 6 in various ways, e.g. the critical assets can point to parts of the GVNP model, threats and requirements can refer to interfaces shown in the GVNP model, etc.
+
+## 4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class
+
+According to TR 33.936 [3], a virtualized network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. This common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in pertinent 3GPP specifications, such as clause 5 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [4].
+
+## 4.3 Generic virtualized network product model
+
+### 4.3.1 Introduction
+
+A virtualized network product class is the class of products that implement 3GPP defined network functionalities running on Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI). The realistic deployment scenarios are summarized in ETSI NFV-SEC 001 [7], based on which a 3GPP network operator can deploy 3GPP defined functionalities in three modes:
+
+- Mode 1. A network operator purchases 3GPP VNFs from its vendors and deploys it on a third party NFVI.
+- Mode 2. A network operator purchases 3GPP VNFs and the Virtualization layer (e.g. hypervisor) from its vendors, and deploys them on a third party hardware layer.
+- Mode 3. A network operator purchases and deploys 3GPP VNFs, the Virtualization layer and the hardware layer from its vendors.
+
+NOTE 1: In order to implement virtualized product, some essential components besides 3GPP defined functions are also needed.
+
+As a result, it defines type 1 of GVNP which is implement 3GPP defined functionalities only.
+
+NOTE 2: Considering the situation that type 2 and/or type 3 of virtualized product class are dependent of pre-mature specifications from other standard organization, only type 1 of virtualized product class are specified in present document.
+
+
+
+Type 1
+
+| |
+|---------------------------------|
+| 3GPP defined
functionalities |
+|---------------------------------|
+
+**Figure 4.3-1: Type 1 of virtualised network product class**
+
+The rest part of device could be seen as a supporting environment and is not considered in scope of those types.
+
+NOTE 3: For the purpose of testing a 3GPP GVNP of type 1, NFVI for GVNP for type 1 are assumed to have gone through security assurance testing in the same rigorous manner that is similarly applied to the security assurance testing of any other 3GPP network product under consideration in SCAS.
+
+The generic virtualized network product model classes are described in the following clauses.
+
+### 4.3.2 Generic virtualized network product model of type 1
+
+#### 4.3.2.1 Description of the GVNP model
+
+For the virtualized network product class type 1 (i.e. implementing 3GPP defined functionalities only), the following figure 4.3-2 depicts the components of a generic virtualized network product model at a high level.
+
+
+
+Figure 4.3-2: GVNP model of type 1. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is a dashed box labeled 'GVNP of type 1'. Inside this box, there are three columns: 'Functions defined by 3GPP', 'Other functions', and 'OAM functions'. Below these columns is a 'Guest OS' block. To the left of the 'GVNP of type 1' box, there are two double-headed arrows: the top one is labeled '3GPP-defined interfaces (e.g. N7, N8, N9, N10, N11, ...)' and the bottom one is labeled 'ETSI-defined interfaces (Ve-Vnfm)'. To the right of the 'GVNP of type 1' box, there is a double-headed arrow labeled 'Remote management'. Below the 'GVNP of type 1' box, there is a block labeled 'ETSI-defined interfaces (Vn-Nf)'. Below this block is a 'Virtualisation layer' block, which is above a 'Hardware' block.
+
+Figure 4.3-2: GVNP model of type 1
+
+The components in the figure 4.3-2 are further described in the following clauses.
+
+#### 4.3.2.2 Functions defined by 3GPP
+
+For a generic virtualized network function, it will implement 3GPP-defined functions. Unlike a generic physical network product defined in [2], a 3GPP-defined function can be deployed in multiple VMs and the features supported in different VM of the GVNP are up to the implementation of vendors.
+
+To maintain generality and avoid overlap, the GVNP SCAS intends to explicitly address all GVNP functions that, if present in a GVNP, need to be evaluated and hence covered by the requirements in the GVNP SCAS.
+
+#### 4.3.2.3 Other functions
+
+A GVNP will also contain functionalities not or not fully covered in 3GPP specifications.
+
+Examples include, but are not limited to, remote management functions.
+
+#### 4.3.2.4 Operating system (OS)
+
+The present document assumes that the functions of GVNP are implemented on multiple VMs. Each VM which is running on a common platform requires a guest operating system to run.
+
+#### 4.3.2.5 Interfaces
+
+Compared to generic physical network product defined in [2], GVNP has also two types of logical interfaces, i.e. execution environment interfaces and remote logical interfaces.
+
+The remote logical interfaces are interfaces which can be used to communicate with the GVNP from another network node and also include the remote access interfaces to the GVNP for its maintenance through e.g. an Element Management (EM), a Virtualized Network Function Manager (VNFM).
+
+A GVNP hosts the following remote logical interfaces:
+
+- Service interfaces that are defined in pertinent 3GPP specifications
+
+- Service interfaces that are not defined by 3GPP- Access interfaces to the GNP for its maintenance through e.g. an Element Management System (EMS) or other management functions, e.g. remote OAM interface, interface between EM (Element Management) and VNF which proprietary interface (see figure 4.3-3).
+- Interface defined by ETSI NFV specifications [5] and [6]:
+ - Interface between VNF and VNFM for GVNP lifecycle management, configuration information exchange, state information exchange necessary for network service lifecycle management, etc. This interface refers to Ve-Vnfm in the figure 4.3-3.
+ - An execution environment interface is an interface that can be used to provide the GVNP with the underlying execution environment, to guarantee hardware independent lifecycle, portability, and performance requirements of the GVNP. A GVNP type 1 hosts the following execution environment interface:
+- Interface towards the underlying Virtualization layer for execution environment provision. This interface refers to Vn-Nf in the figure 4.3-3.
+
+
+
+Figure 4.3-3: NFV reference architectural framework. The diagram shows two identical architectural models side-by-side. Each model consists of a top-level 'NFV orchestrator' connected to a 'VNF Manager(s)'. The 'VNF Manager(s)' is connected to a 'Virtualised Infrastructure Manager(s)'. The 'NFV orchestrator' also has a direct connection to the 'Virtualised Infrastructure Manager(s)'. Below the 'VNF Manager(s)' is a dashed box containing 'EM1', 'EM2', 'VNF1', and 'VNF2'. The 'VNF Manager(s)' connects to this box via the 'Ve-Vnfm' interface. Inside the dashed box, 'EM1' and 'EM2' connect to 'VNF1' and 'VNF2'. Below the dashed box is a 'Virtualised layer' which connects to 'VNF1' and 'VNF2' via the 'Vn-Nf' interface. The 'Virtualised layer' is connected to the 'Virtualised Infrastructure Manager(s)' via the 'Vi-Vi' interface. At the bottom is the 'Hardware' layer, which connects to the 'Virtualised layer' via the 'Vl-Ha' interface. The entire stack is labeled 'NFVI' at the bottom left.
+
+Figure 4.3-3: NFV reference architectural framework
+
+## 4.4 Scope of the present document
+
+### 4.4.1 Introduction
+
+The present subclause refers to the GVNP model in clause 4.3.
+
+### 4.4.2 Scope regarding GVNP functions defined by 3GPP
+
+The set of functions implemented in network products as described in TR33.926 [2] applies to the corresponding GVNP.
+
+The GVNP SCAS needs to explicitly address all GVNP functions that, if present in a GVNP network product, need to be evaluated and hence covered by requirements in the GVNP SCAS. The GVNP SCAS should not be tied to a specific version
+
+### 4.4.3 Scope regarding other functions
+
+At least the following functions, that are not defined by 3GPP, are in scope of the GVNP SCAS:
+
+- Remote management functions
+- Local management functions
+
+### 4.4.4 Scope regarding Operating System (OS)
+
+The GVNP SCAS does not attempt a full evaluation of the correct internal functioning of guest OS. However, interfaces (i.e. the restriction on open ports and unnecessary services running in the system) and modifications (e.g. verification of the correct applied patch level, hardening, etc.) of the OS are in scope.
+
+### 4.4.5 Scope regarding hardware
+
+Hardware is not included based on the type 1 model of GVNP SCAS. As a result, hardware is not in scope of for the type 1 of GVNP SCAS.
+
+### 4.4.6 Scope regarding interfaces
+
+The interfaces listed in clause 4.3.2.5 are all in scope of the present document.
+
+# --- 5 Generic assets and threats
+
+## 5.1 Introduction
+
+The present subclause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to more than one virtualized network product.
+
+## 5.2 Critical assets
+
+### 5.2.1 Generic assets of GVNP for type 1
+
+The critical assets of GVNP for type 1 that need to be protected are:
+
+- User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key);
+- Log data;
+- Configuration data, e.g. GVNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group, command group) etc.;
+- Guest Operating System, i.e. the files that make up the guest OS and its processes (code and data);
+- GVNP Application;
+- Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits;
+- The interfaces of GVNP to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example:
+ - OAM interface, for remote access: interface between GVNP and OAM system;
+ - Interface between virtualised network function (VNF) and VNFM;
+ - Interface between VNF and virtualisation layer, for providing the execution environment to run VNF;
+- GVNP Software package (binary code or executable code) which includes:
+ - VNFD;
+ - VNF image and image description file;
+ - Configuration data (e.g. manifest file as defined in [8]).
+
+## 5.3 Threats
+
+### 5.3.1 Generic threats format
+
+Threats are described using the following format:
+
+- Threat Name:
+- Threat Category:
+- Threat Description:
+- Threatened Asset:
+
+### 5.3.2 Generic threats for GVNP of type 1
+
+#### 5.3.2.1 Introduction
+
+In clause 5.3.1 of TR 33.926 [2], the identified threats are grouped into seven categories, one covering threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces and the other six corresponding to the categories proposed by STRIDE. Since these seven categories are for generic 3GPP network products, they are also applicable to GVNP of type 1. In addition, GVNP of type 1 also needs to consider the threats related to ETSI-defined interfaces. As a result, there are eight categories of threats for GVNP of type 1. The following clauses describe the threats according to these security categories and use the template of threat description in clause 5.3.1 of TR 33.926 [2]. For threats descriptions of current seven categories, the present document will focus on the differences between GVNP threats and GNP threats which are described in TR 33.926 [2].
+
+#### 5.3.2.2 Threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces
+
+For GVNP of type 1 and GNP in TR 33.926 [2], the threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces are the same. So, all texts in clause 5.3.2 of TR 33.926 [2] apply to GVNP of type 1. It means that there is no need repeat the threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces which are covered in 3GPP security specifications. If threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces are found not sufficiently covered in existing 3GPP security specifications, they need to be addressed in the SCAS for virtualised network products.
+
+#### 5.3.2.3 Threats relating to ETSI-defined interfaces
+
+Two of the interfaces defined in ETSI NFV specification [5] are identified as the critical assets of GVNP type 1, i.e. interface between VNF and VNFM, interface between 3GPP VNF and virtualisation layer. The threats on these interfaces are as follows.
+
+- Threats on interface between 3GPP VNF and VNFM: if the interface is not protected, an attacker can attack all the requests/responses sent between the VNF and the VNFM. For example, the attacker can insert, tamper or delete e.g. scaling requests, healing requests, subscribe requests, query requests and other management related requests sent from the instantiated GVNP of type 1 to the VNFM, hence the virtualised resource or relevant status information obtained by the instantiated GVNP of type 1 is not as requested. This affects the normal operation of the instantiated GVNP of type 1, and even causes DoS attacks, information leakage.
+
+NOTE: The Virtualisation layer is out of 3GPP scope, but its protection will affect the security of the upper layer it supports. If the Virtualisation layer is compromised, the VNF on top of it could also be easily compromised. In such case, the messages sent over the VNF-VNFM interface can be manipulated by the compromised VNF, which is however not a threat coming from the VNF-VNFM interface. The analysis above focuses on the threats directly placed on VNF-VNFM interface, when it is not well protected.
+
+- Threats on interface between 3GPP VNF and virtualisation layer: an attacker can attack an instantiated GVNP of type 1 through a compromised virtualisation layer. For example, cryptographic keys or other security critical data of an instantiated GVNP of type 1 could be stolen by an attacker with access to the virtualisation layer, or the virtualised resource provided by the Virtualisation layer to the instantiated GVNP of type 1 can be manipulated or the bootloader of Guest OS of an instantiated GVNP of type 1 can be tampered by an attacker via a compromised virtualisation layer.
+
+#### 5.3.2.4 Spoofer identity
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.1 Default Accounts
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+The difference is that VNF is accessed through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface, an attacker can use a default account to access a VNF via VNC.
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.2 Weak Password Policies
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP.
+
+However, the attacker using the weak password accesses GVNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.3 Password peek
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.3 of TR 33.926 applies to GVNP.
+
+However, the attacker using the peeked password accesses GVNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.4 Direct Root Access
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+There are no differences between direct root accesses for GVNP and GNP described in TR 33.926 [2].
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.5 IP Spoofer
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+However, the objective of unauthorized access is a VNF, not a computer.
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.6 Malware
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.4.7 Eavesdropping
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.3.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+#### 5.3.2.5 Tampering
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.1 Software Tampering
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.4.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+Different from traditional physical network products, as the entire GVNP is instantiated by the image(s) and other information (e.g. configuration data, software environmental parameters, licence terms information, script, manifest file, checksum, etc. as defined in [8]) within a software package, additional threats are analysed as follows:
+
+- *Threat Name:* Software Tampering
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering
+
+- *Threat Description:* Compared with GNP software, GVNP software has additional attack surfaces, e.g. in the process of VNF package on boarding, during which the software package of a GVNP can be tampered/altered if not protected. An attacker, for example, can inject malicious code or tamper the information inside the unprotected package during on boarding. Then after the instantiation of the GVNP, the tampered code can be executed to conduct several attacks (e.g. DoS, Information Stealing, Frauds and so on).
+- *Threatened Asset:* all critical assets of GVNP type 1 as listed in clause 5.2.1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.2 Ownership File Misuse
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.4.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.3 Boot tampering for GVNP of type 1
+
+For GVNP of type 1, there is no hardware. This is different from external device boot of GNP described in clause 5.3.4.3 of TR 33.926 [2]. The threat is described as follows:
+
+- *Threat name:* GVNP of type 1 boot tampering
+- *Threat Category:* Tampering
+- *Threat Description:* the GVNP bootloader may be maliciously tampered by an attacker, e.g. the attacker tampers the bootloader of GVNP through a malicious virtualisation layer.
+- *Threatened Asset:* guest operating system
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.4 Log Tampering
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.4.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.5 OAM traffic Tampering
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.4.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.6 File Write Permissions Abuse
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.4.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.5.7 User Session Tampering
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.4.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+#### 5.3.2.6 Repudiation
+
+##### 5.3.2.6.1 Lack of User Activity Trace
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.5.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+#### 5.3.2.7 Information disclosure
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.1 Poor key generation
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.2 Poor key management
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.3 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.4 Insecure Data Storage
+
+- *Threat name:* Insecure Data Storage
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure
+- *Threat Description:* The GVNP remotely stores sensitive data (e.g. passwords, private keys, logs) on the logical volume that the VIM allocates to the GVNP. An attacker can retrieve these data if they have been stored in an insecure way (e.g. clear text, unsalted hashes).
+- *Threatened Asset:* Any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of the GVNP
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.5 System Fingerprinting
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.6 Malware
+
+- *Threat name:* Malware.
+- *Threat Category:* Information Disclosure.
+- *Threat Description:* A malware installed on the logical volume that the VIM allocates to the GVNP can access to the stored sensitive data (e.g. subscription data, logs).
+- *Threatened Asset:* Any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of the GVNP.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.7 Personal Identification Information Violation
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.8 Insecure Default Configuration
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.8 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.9 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.10 Insecure Network Services
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.10 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.11 Unnecessary Services
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.11 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.12 Log Disclosure
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.12 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.13 Unnecessary Applications
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.13 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.14 Eavesdropping
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.14 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+##### 5.3.2.7.15 Security threat caused by lack of GVNP traffic isolation
+
+The threat in clause 5.3.6.15 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GVNP of type 1.
+
+#### 5.3.2.8 Denial of Service
+
+The threats in all clauses of clause 5.3.7 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GVNP of type 1.
+
+In addition, there is DoS attack due to changing virtualisation resource that is used by GVNP. The detailed threat description is as follows:
+
+- *Threat name*: changing virtualisation resource without authorization.
+- *Threat Category*: DoS.
+- *Threat Description*: There are several ways to cause a DoS attack for the GVNP: attackers having access to a compromised virtualisation layer can change the virtualisation resource used by the instantiated GVNP of type1 without authorization, or a malicious VM deployed for one instance of a VNF on a host can illegally occupy the resources of the instantiated GVNP of type1 deployed on the same host, resulting in resource limitation of the instantiated GVNP of type1, or attackers having access to a compromised VNFM can scale in a Type 1 or scale down the virtualisation resource used by a GVNP or even terminate a Type 1 instance without authorization.
+- *Threatened Asset*: GVNP applications, sufficient processing capacity.
+
+#### 5.3.2.9 Elevation of privilege
+
+The threats in all clauses of clause 5.3.8 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GVNP of type 1.
+
+# --- 6 Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces
+
+The assets and threats for virtualized network functions supporting SBA interface are the same as the assets and threats specified in clause 6 for TR 33.926 [2].
+
+# Annex A: Change history
+
+| Change history | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version |
+| 2023-03 | SA#99 | SP-230130 | | | | Presented for information and approval | 1.0.0 |
+| 2023-03 | SA#99 | | | | | Upgrade to change control version | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-03 | SA#99 | | | | | EditHelp review | 18.0.1 |
+| 2023-12 | SA#102 | SP-231346 | 0001 | | F | Clarification EMS interface to align with TR 33.926 | 18.1.0 |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# 3GPP TR 33.936 V18.0.1 (2023-04)
+
+*Technical Report*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP virtualized network products (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+The logo for 5G Advanced, featuring a stylized '5G' with a green signal wave icon above the 'G' and the word 'ADVANCED' in smaller letters to the right.
+
+5G Advanced logo
+
+
+
+The 3GPP logo, consisting of the letters '3GPP' in a bold, black, stylized font. Below the letters is a red signal wave icon, and below that, the text 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' in a smaller, all-caps font.
+
+3GPP logo
+
+The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices.
+
+## **3GPP**
+
+---
+
+Postal address
+
+---
+
+3GPP support office address
+
+---
+
+650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne - FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+---
+
+Internet
+
+---
+
+
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification** ---
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2023, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+# Contents
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| Foreword ..... | 5 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 7 |
+| 2 References..... | 7 |
+| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 8 |
+| 3.1 Terms..... | 8 |
+| 3.2 Symbols..... | 8 |
+| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 8 |
+| 4 Overview..... | 8 |
+| 4.1 Introduction ..... | 8 |
+| 4.1.1 Considerations on network product class when using NFV technology ..... | 8 |
+| 4.1.2 Considerations on SECAM of the virtualized network products ..... | 9 |
+| 4.2 Scope of a SECAM SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products ..... | 9 |
+| 4.3 Scope of SECAM evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products ..... | 9 |
+| 4.4 Scope of SECAM Accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products ..... | 10 |
+| 4.5 Ultimate Output of SECAM Evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products ..... | 10 |
+| 4.6 3GPP virtualized network products evaluation process..... | 11 |
+| 4.7 Roles in SECAM for 3GPP virtualized network products..... | 11 |
+| 4.8 Operator security acceptance decision for 3GPP virtualized network products ..... | 11 |
+| 4.9 SECAM Assurance level for 3GPP virtualized network products..... | 12 |
+| 4.10 Security baseline for 3GPP virtualized network products ..... | 12 |
+| 5 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) Creation ..... | 12 |
+| 5.1 Introduction ..... | 12 |
+| 5.2 SCAS documents structure and content..... | 12 |
+| 5.2.1 General ..... | 12 |
+| 5.2.2 Security Problem Definition (SPD)..... | 13 |
+| 5.2.3 Security Requirements..... | 13 |
+| 5.2.3.1 Introduction..... | 13 |
+| 5.2.3.2 Incorporation of security requirements from existing 3GPP and ETSI specifications in current releases..... | 14 |
+| 5.2.3.3 Handling of security requirements..... | 14 |
+| 5.2.3.4 Guidelines for writing test cases ..... | 14 |
+| 5.3 Improvement of SCAS and new potential security requirements..... | 14 |
+| 5.4 Basic vulnerability testing requirements for generic virtualized network product ..... | 14 |
+| 6 Vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation ..... | 15 |
+| 6.1 Overview ..... | 15 |
+| 6.2 Audit and accreditation of Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes ..... | 15 |
+| 6.3 Audit and accreditation of test laboratories..... | 16 |
+| 6.4 Monitoring..... | 16 |
+| 6.5 Dispute resolution ..... | 16 |
+| 7 Evaluation and SCAS instantiation..... | 16 |
+| 7.1 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) instantiation documents creation ..... | 16 |
+| 7.2 Evaluation and evaluation report..... | 17 |
+| 7.2.1 Network product development process and network product lifecycle management ..... | 17 |
+| 7.2.2 SCAS instantiation evaluation..... | 17 |
+| 7.2.2.1 Overview..... | 17 |
+| 7.2.2.2 Content..... | 17 |
+| 7.2.2.3 Process ..... | 18 |
+| 7.2.3 Security Compliance testing..... | 18 |
+| 7.2.4 Basic Vulnerability Testing..... | 18 |
+| 7.3 Self-declaration ..... | 18 |
+| 7.4 Partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle ..... | 18 |
+| 7.5 Comparison between two SECAM evaluations ..... | 18 |
+
+7.6 The evaluation of a new version ..... 18
+
+**Annex A: Change history ..... 19**
+
+# Foreword
+
+This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version x.y.z
+
+where:
+
+- x the first digit:
+ - 1 presented to TSG for information;
+ - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+ - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
+
+In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:
+
+- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something
+- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something
+
+The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.
+
+The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.
+
+- should** indicates a recommendation to do something
+- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something
+- may** indicates permission to do something
+- need not** indicates permission not to do something
+
+The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.
+
+- can** indicates that something is possible
+- cannot** indicates that something is impossible
+
+The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".
+
+- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+
+**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
+
+In addition:
+
+**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact
+
+**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact
+
+The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The present document defines the complete Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) evaluation process (evaluation, relation to SECAM Accreditation Body, roles, etc.) as well as the components of SECAM that are intended to provide the expected security assurance for virtualized network product. It will thus describe the general scheme providing an overview of the entire scheme and explaining how to create and apply the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs). It will detail the different evaluation tasks (vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assessment, Security Compliance Testing, Basic Vulnerability Testing and Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis) and the different actors involved. Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis is outside the scope of the present release of SECAM. The present document will help all involved parties to have a clear understanding of the overall process and the covered threats.
+
+In another aspect, compared to [2], present document shows specific methodology to virtualized network product in addition.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+
+- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+- [2] 3GPP TR 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology (SCAS) for 3GPP network products".
+- [3] 3GPP TS 28.500: "Management concept, architecture and requirements for mobile networks that include virtualised network functions".
+- [4] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Problem Statement".
+- [5] 3GPP TR 33.927: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); threats and critical assets; in 3GPP virtualized network product classes".
+- [6] 3GPP TS 33.527: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); for 3GPP virtualized network products".
+- [7] GSMA FS.16: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme – Development and Lifecycle Security Requirements".
+- [8] Void
+- [9] GSMA FS.14: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme - Security Test Laboratory Accreditation".
+- [10] GSMA FS.15: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme - Development and Lifecycle Assessment Methodology v.2.2".
+- [11] GSMA FS.46: "NESAS Audit Guidelines v.2.0".
+- [12] ETSI GS NFV 003: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Terminology for Main Concepts in NFV".
+
+# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Terms
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
+
+## 3.2 Symbols
+
+Void.
+
+## 3.3 Abbreviations
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
+
+# --- 4 Overview
+
+## 4.1 Introduction
+
+### 4.1.1 Considerations on network product class when using NFV technology
+
+The definitions of network product class and network product were documented in the TR 33.916 [2]. For implementing 3GPP defined functionalities in network products, some functionalities that relate to the supporting platform (e.g. hardware components, operating system, etc.) also need to be implemented. The platform provides execution environment for 3GPP defined functionalities. For physical network products, the platform and the 3GPP defined functionalities are tightly coupled, while for virtualized network products, the platform and the 3GPP defined functionalities are decoupled. The platform of virtualized network products composes of a hardware layer and a Virtualization layer, and is common for 3GPP defined functionalities. Concept of 3GPP VNF is defined in TS 28.500 [3]. According to the concept in [3], a 3GPP VNF is 3GPP network function(s) that runs on a Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI), which is the platform of virtualized network products described above.
+
+The realistic deployment scenarios are summarized in ETSI NFV-SEC 001 [4], based on which a 3GPP network operator can deploy 3GPP defined functionalities in three modes:
+
+- Mode 1. A network operator purchases 3GPP VNFs from its vendors and deploys it on a third party NFVI.
+- Mode 2. A network operator purchases 3GPP VNFs and the Virtualization layer (e.g. hypervisor) from its vendors, and deploys them on a third party hardware layer.
+- Mode 3. A network operator purchases and deploys 3GPP VNFs, the Virtualization layer and the hardware layer from its vendors.
+
+Each deployment mode requires the different composition of virtualized network products purchased and deployed by a network operator, which are subject to the testing and evaluation in SECAM scheme. Accordingly, the different composition of virtualized network products maps to three types of virtualized network product class as depicted in Figure 1:
+
+- Type 1: implement 3GPP defined functionalities only
+- Type 2: implement 3GPP defined functionalities and Virtualization layer
+- Type 3: implement 3GPP defined functionalities, Virtualization layer, and hardware layer
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph Type1 [Type 1]
+ T1[3GPP defined functionalities]
+ end
+ subgraph Type2 [Type 2]
+ T2_1[3GPP defined functionalities]
+ T2_2[Virtualization layer]
+ T2_1 --- T2_2
+ end
+ subgraph Type3 [Type 3]
+ T3_1[3GPP defined functionalities]
+ T3_2[Virtualization layer]
+ T3_3[Hardware layer]
+ T3_1 --- T3_2
+ T3_2 --- T3_3
+ end
+
+```
+
+Diagram showing three types of virtualized network product class. Type 1 consists of a single box labeled '3GPP defined functionalities'. Type 2 consists of two boxes: '3GPP defined functionalities' on top of 'Virtualization layer'. Type 3 consists of three boxes: '3GPP defined functionalities' on top of 'Virtualization layer' on top of 'Hardware layer'.
+
+**Figure 4.1.1-1: Three types of virtualized network product class**
+
+NOTE: Considering the situation that type 2 and/or type 3 of virtualized product class are dependent of premature specifications from other standard organization, only type 1 of virtualized product class are specified in present document.
+
+### 4.1.2 Considerations on SECAM of the virtualized network products
+
+The security assurance methodology study in TR 33.916 [2] is a general methodology and already considers virtualized network products in the design of the methodology. The biggest difference between virtualized network products and physical network products is that the former may be run on a common platform, while the latter has a private and exclusive platform. With the current SECAM as the basis, the present document aims to identify and address the gaps when applying the current SECAM to 3GPP virtualized network products as defined in clause 4.1.1.
+
+*Editor's note: The text maybe revisited after update of TR33.916[2].*
+
+## 4.2 Scope of a SECAM SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+As with 3GPP physical network products, the targets of the security attack analysis need to be identified before identifying the potential attack vectors which could be used. This is different from using 3GPP physical network product class composed of hardware, software, and interfaces as the analysis target for attack vectors. The security threat analysis and related security requirements of virtualized network product classes will be described in TR 33.927 [5] and TS 33.527 [6] respectively.
+
+The Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for a given 3GPP virtualized network product class provides a description of the security requirements and associated test cases. The SCAS for a given 3GPP virtualized network product class is described below:
+
+- For type 1 (implementing 3GPP defined functionalities only): the SCAS provides a description of the security requirements and associated test cases pertaining to 3GPP VNF.
+
+Same as SECAM for 3GPP physical network products documented in TR 33.916 [2], evaluations performed in the past remain valid. The environmental assumptions which are contained in SCAS of 3GPP virtualized network products will be validated during product deployment and it is not part of SECAM.
+
+## 4.3 Scope of SECAM evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+The product lifecycle process of a physical network product consists of a number of processes, e.g. first commercial introduction, update, minor release, major release and end of life. The vendor network product development and lifecycle processes in these stages should comply with security requirements such as security by design, version control system, change tracking, source code review and security testing as specified in [7]. This generic product lifecycle process and the related security requirements apply to a type 1 virtualized network product.
+
+## 4.4 Scope of SECAM Accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+According to the definitions of accreditation and SECAM Accreditation Body in TR 33.916 [2], it is a general way to ensure the accuracy and recognition of the evaluation results for the network products through the accreditation and SECAM Accreditation Body. So, it is applicable to all of the network products, regardless of whether the network product is physical network product or virtualized network product. It means, like for physical network products, the actors who perform the SECAM tasks for type 1 of 3GPP virtualized network products should also be accredited by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+**Table 4.4-1: Mapping between SECAM phases and involved party**
+
+| SECAM tasks | Accredited actor |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Vendor Network Product Development and virtualized network product lifecycle management process | Auditor appointed by SECAM Accreditation Body |
+| Compliance declaration with the accredited generic vendor development and lifecycle process requirements | Accredited vendor |
+| Virtualized network product evaluation which includes Security compliance testing and Basic Vulnerability Testing | Accredited vendor or accredited third-party test laboratory |
+
+Consequently, according to table 4.4-1, SECAM can take different forms, depending on who performs security compliance testing and who performs Basic Vulnerability Testing.
+
+SECAM is intended to enable self-evaluation where the vendors evaluate their network products if they have the proper accreditation for that.
+
+The responsibility for writing and managing the accreditation and monitoring rules is taken by a SECAM Accreditation Body. The SECAM Accreditation Body's role also includes the handling of the dispute resolution process.
+
+The decision on who takes the role of SECAM Accreditation Body should be made in cooperation with other SDOs such as GSMA, etc. It is recommended to leave accreditation responsibility to GSMA.
+
+Even if it describes the complete process, including evaluation by accredited actors under SECAM Accreditation Body control and Security Assurance Specifications (SCAS) writing, SECAM does not preclude 3GPP SCAS security requirements and tests cases being used directly by mutual consent between vendors and operators without the accreditation process in place if it so desires. This ensures that the 3GPP SECAM work is not held up by delays in deliverables under the responsibility of external bodies, or by conflicting requirements in different countries (e.g. relating to accreditation).
+
+The presence of a SECAM Accreditation Body as defined above is highly desirable in order to ensure a wide recognition of evaluation results and to have a working dispute resolution process available. Having a SECAM Accreditation Body also avoids the need for each operator to set up a one to one trust relationship with every vendor regarding their testing methods and skills.
+
+Validity of accreditation is defined by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+## 4.5 Ultimate Output of SECAM Evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+The ultimate output of the SECAM evaluation for type 1 of 3GPP virtualized network products is:
+
+- An evaluation report demonstrating compliance of the network product with the 3GPP security assurance specifications.
+- Evidence to demonstrate to the test laboratory that the accredited vendor product and development lifecycle processes have been complied with for the network product.
+- Evidence that the actors performing the evaluation tasks are accredited by the SECAM Accreditation Body. Such evidence is not required if there is consent between operator and vendor to not use the accreditation process.
+
+Like for physical network products, the evaluation report of a type 1 of virtualized network product is examined by the operator and the evidence that the actors performing the evaluation tasks are accredited by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+## 4.6 3GPP virtualized network products evaluation process
+
+The security assurance process defined in clause 4.5 of TR 33.916 [2] includes evaluating network products, outputting the evaluation report, operator's acceptance decision. A vendor also performs certification activities for network products in addition to self-declaration after outputting evaluation report. This process is a general process and applies to 3GPP virtualized network products.
+
+The security assurance process of type 1 of virtualized network products describes how the operator gets assurance regarding the security of the virtualized network product.
+
+## 4.7 Roles in SECAM for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+The roles involved in SECAM evaluation and accreditation described in TR 33.916 [2] also apply to type 1 of 3GPP virtualized network products, i.e. vendor, test laboratory, operator, 3GPP and SECAM Accreditation Body. The clause 4.6.1 of TR 33.916 [2] also applies to GVNP.
+
+This example below of complete self-evaluation is similar to the SECAM defined Security assurance process in the figure 4.7-1 except that the vendor conducts all the phases of evaluation.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the complete self-evaluation process for a 3GPP virtualized network product (e.g., vAMF (AMF VNF) from vendor X). It is divided into two main horizontal sections: "Process and deliverable" and "Supporting documents".
+
+- Process and deliverable:**
+ - Vendor X:** The process starts with "Development and product lifecycle management compliance with security assurance process". This leads to "Security compliance testing", which produces a "Product and documentation: security assurance report: security compliance report: basic vulnerability testing report". This is followed by "Basic Vulnerability testing", which produces a "Basic vulnerability testing report". This is followed by "Enhanced vulnerability analysis", which produces an "Enhanced vulnerability analysis report".
+ - SECAM Accreditation Body:** A "Monitoring" process is shown, which leads to a list of updates: "Vendor development and product lifecycle management process assurance update", "Security compliance testing evaluator status update", "Basic vulnerability testing evaluator status update", and "Enhanced vulnerability testing evaluator status update".
+ - Operator:** The "Enhanced vulnerability analysis report" leads to an "Operator procurement decision".
+ - Feedback:** A "Feedback loop for dispute on evaluation results" is shown between the Operator and the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+- Supporting documents:**
+ - SECAM Accreditation Body:** "Accreditation and monitoring body".
+ - 3GPP:** "VAMF product security assurance specification" and "AMF VNF security assurance requirement and test case".
+
+Figure 4.7-1: Complete self-evaluation of a 3GPP virtualized network product (e.g. vAMF (AMF VNF) from vendor X). The diagram illustrates the flow of information and processes between Vendor X, the SECAM Accreditation Body, and the Operator. Vendor X's process includes development, security compliance testing, basic vulnerability testing, and enhanced vulnerability analysis, resulting in various reports. The SECAM Accreditation Body performs monitoring and updates the status of these reports. The Operator makes a procurement decision based on the final reports. Supporting documents include SECAM accreditation and 3GPP specifications.
+
+**Figure 4.7-1: Complete self-evaluation of a 3GPP virtualized network product (e.g. vAMF (AMF VNF) from vendor X)**
+
+Evaluation results are checked by operators and dispute on evaluation results is resolved by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+## 4.8 Operator security acceptance decision for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+In clause 4.7 of TR 33.916 [2], it was proposed that for the evaluation result of the network products, the operator decides the security acceptance through examining the network product, the security compliance testing, the basic vulnerability testing analysis reports, the self-declaration as well as the optional evidence of accreditation from the SECAM Accreditation Body. In addition, operator security acceptance decision in clause 4.7 of TR 33.916 [2] is general process. So, operator security acceptance decision for type 1 of 3GPP virtualized network products is the same as those for 3GPP physical network products, i.e. operator examines the ultimate outputs of the evaluation, the self-declaration and decides if the results are sufficient according to its internal policies, etc.
+
+## 4.9 SECAM Assurance level for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+SECAM assurance level for 3GPP physical network products was analysed in clause 4.8 of TR 33.916 [2]. This analysis about SECAM assurance level is general and applicable to all of the network products, regardless of whether the network product is physical network product or virtualized network product. In addition, per network product class being considered only one SECAM assurance level could reduce the complexity of the network product evaluation. So, SECAM of the virtualized network products also considers only one assurance level for type 1 of virtualized network product class.
+
+## 4.10 Security baseline for 3GPP virtualized network products
+
+The analysis about security baseline for network products in clause 4.9 of TR 33.916 [2] is general and is applicable for all of the network products, regardless of whether the network product is physical network product or virtualized network product. So, SECAM considers only one security baseline for type 1 of virtualized network product class, which is built on the entire set of security requirements, operational environment assumptions and attacker model.
+
+# --- 5 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) Creation
+
+## 5.1 Introduction
+
+The steps of a SCAS document (i.e. describing and modelling the network product class, defining the security problem, identifying the security requirements and test cases, verifying the security requirements) in clause 5.1 of TR 33.916 [2] is high level and general. So, these steps apply to the process of writing SCAS documents for a given virtualized network product class. According to the description of 3GPP virtualized network product class in clause 4.1, there are three types of the virtualized network product classes, when describing and modelling a given virtualized network product class, the type of the given virtualized network product class should be considered.
+
+NOTE: Considering the situation that type 2 and/or type 3 of virtualized product class are dependent of premature specifications from other standard organization, only type 1 of virtualized product class are specified in present document.
+
+## 5.2 SCAS documents structure and content
+
+### 5.2.1 General
+
+According to clause 5.1, the SCAS documents contain three parts, i.e. Virtualized Network Product Class Description, Security Problem Definition and Security Requirements (including the test cases) for any specific Network Product Class, to counteract the risks outlined by the threat analysis. Consequently SCAS documents for virtualized network products contain the following parts:
+
+- **Network Product Class Description for Virtualized network products (NPCDV):** This clause includes the description of the virtualized network product class defined in clause 4.1.x, e.g. the physical and logical interfaces that the product class supports to interact with external entities and the major functionalities of the VNPC. This material will be contained in a 3GPP Technical Report of the 900-series.
+- **Security Problem Definition (SPD):** This clause defines the security problem that is to be addressed and the security objectives of the virtualized network product class. This material will be contained in a 3GPP Technical Reports of the 900-series.
+- **Security Requirements (SR):** This clause defines the security requirements, which may include hardening requirements, selected according to the Security Problem Definition and the requirements strictly related to the 3GPP security features implemented by the virtualized network product class, as well as the security requirements of Virtualization aspect defined in 3GPP and other standard organization like ETSI NFV, etc. Requirements and test cases will be contained in one or more 3GPP Technical Specifications.
+
+In the following clauses, detailed descriptions of SCAS parts SPD and SR for virtualized network products are provided.
+
+### 5.2.2 Security Problem Definition (SPD)
+
+Clause 5.2.2 of TR 33.916 [2] describes the steps to be accomplished for the SPD part of the SCAS writing phase, principles and structures for threats and security objectives. These are general guidelines and can also be applied to SPD analysis of 3GPP virtualized network products.
+
+### 5.2.3 Security Requirements
+
+#### 5.2.3.1 Introduction
+
+According to the scope of a SECAM SCAS in clause 4.2, a SCAS contains security requirements and associated test cases, and may contain environmental assumptions which will be validated during product deployment. So, like GNP in TR 33.916 [2], the countermeasures deemed relevant to threat mitigation will also take the form of either:
+
+- security requirements on the network product with associated test cases; or
+- operational environment security assumptions for a given product class.
+
+For GVNP, the operational environment security assumptions among different product classes vary greatly, for example some sensitive 3GPP functions may need to be run from special security domain or may need to implement hardware (See clause 4.9 in TR 33.916 [2]) with special security requirement that make it difficult. It may also be necessary to consider such assumptions during testing so that stringent security requirements can be met. Any such consideration should be well-documented as part of both the testing environment so that the validation during product deployment can be carried out and duplicated.
+
+The Security Requirements clauses within the pertinent TS contain the security requirements identified according to the threats (see figure 5.2.3.1-1).
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A["Virtualised Network Product Class Description
+• General description
+• 3GPP Functionalities
+• Logical interfaces
+• Physical interfaces
+• Protocols
+• ....."] --> B["Security Problem Definition
+• Virtualised network product class assets
+• Operational environment Assumptions
+• Decoupling Scenarios
+• Attacker Model"]
+ B --> C["Security Requirements and test cases definition"]
+ C --> D["Security Compliance Requirements for the Virtualised Network Product Class with associated test cases"]
+ E["Catalogue of security requirements"] --> C
+ F["Other 3GPP TR/TS (e.g. TS 33.401, TS 33.501, TS33.210, TR33.848...) Security objectives"] --> B
+ G["Other SDOs, e.g. ETSI GR/GS (e.g. GR NFV-SEC 003, GR NFV-SEC007, GS NFV-SEC 012 ...) Security Objectives"] --> B
+ H["Other 3GPP TR/TS (e.g. TS 33.401, TS 33.501, TS33.210, TR33.848...) Security requirements"] --> C
+ I["Other SDOs, (e.g. ETSI GR NFV-SEC 003, GR NFV-SEC007, GS NFV-SEC 012 ...) Security requirements"] --> C
+
+```
+
+Flowchart illustrating the process for deriving security requirements in a SCAS document. The process starts with 'Virtualised Network Product Class Description' (General description, 3GPP Functionalities, Logical interfaces, Physical interfaces, Protocols, etc.). This leads to 'Security Problem Definition' (Virtualised network product class assets, Operational environment Assumptions, Decoupling Scenarios, Attacker Model). The SPD is informed by 'Other 3GPP TR/TS' (e.g., TS 33.401, TS 33.501, TS33.210, TR33.848...) for Security objectives and 'Other SDOs' (e.g., ETSI GR GS NFV-SEC 003, GR NFV-SEC007, GS NFV-SEC 012 ...) for Security Objectives. The SPD leads to 'Security Requirements and test cases definition', which is informed by 'Catalogue of security requirements' and 'Other 3GPP TR/TS' (e.g., TS 33.401, TS 33.501, TS33.210, TR33.848...) for Security requirements and 'Other SDOs' (e.g., ETSI GR NFV-SEC 003, GR NFV-SEC007, GS NFV-SEC 012 ...) for Security requirements. Finally, this leads to 'Security Compliance Requirements for the Virtualised Network Product Class with associated test cases'.
+
+**Figure 5.2.3.1-1: Process for deriving security requirements in a SCAS document**
+
+The security requirements include security functional requirements and hardening requirements. Since SECAM tasks include Basic Vulnerability Testing, basic vulnerability testing requirements are also included in security requirements of a SCAS. The types of the security requirements are same as in TR 33.916 [2].
+
+The three types of the levels of detail for security requirements in clause 5.2.3.1.1 of TR 33.916 [2] and the relationship between these levels are generic and are also applicable to describe the level of detail of security requirements for a GVNP.
+
+#### 5.2.3.2 Incorporation of security requirements from existing 3GPP and ETSI specifications in current releases
+
+According to GVPN model and threat analysis, the categories of potential security functional requirements can also include the following category extension to the three categories in clause 5.2.3.2 of TR 33.916 [2]:
+
+- Security functional requirements related to virtualization layer, hardware and resource isolation, among others, which may be identified in ETSI specifications etc..
+
+The security functional requirements in this category are within scope of SCAS and related test cases will be proposed.
+
+#### 5.2.3.3 Handling of security requirements
+
+A SECAM Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and associated test cases is proposed in clause 5.2.3.3 of TR 33.916 [2] to prevent from writing the same security requirements from scratch several times in different network product class SCAS. This generic way is also applied to SECAM of virtualized network product class.
+
+Since SECAM and SCAS of physical network product class are bases for SECAM and SCAS of virtualized network product class, the security requirements of a virtualized network product class will refer to the security requirements already available in the current SECAM catalogue if possible otherwise select the new ones from the agreed sources and update the Catalogue. The template for a security requirement description of virtualized network product also uses the template in current SECAM which is described in TR 33.916 [2].
+
+#### 5.2.3.4 Guidelines for writing test cases
+
+Some general guidelines for writing test cases (e.g. describing test case, verifiability and repeatability of test case etc.) are described in clause 5.2.3.4 of TR 33.916 [2]. These general guidelines are also used to guide writing test case of virtualized network product class.
+
+**NOTE:** All the test cases in the present document do not apply to the scenarios where the tested interfaces are not standard compliant, e.g. when the VNF and VNFM are provided by the same vendor who has proprietary implementation on the interface between them.
+
+## 5.3 Improvement of SCAS and new potential security requirements
+
+Vendors, operators or other bodies can propose new potential security requirements for addition to 3GPP SCASs for GVPNs if a new threat or vulnerability has been identified. This gives 3GPP the flexibility to continuously review and improve their SCASs for GVPNs.
+
+## 5.4 Basic vulnerability testing requirements for generic virtualized network product
+
+The basic vulnerability testing activities such as Port Scanning, Vulnerability Scanner by the use of vulnerability scanners are the generic mechanisms to detect the exposures and vulnerabilities of both for the physical network products and the virtualized network products. Currently, the security testing tools already support vulnerability and port scanning for the virtualized network products. So, the existing general requirements of port scanning and vulnerability scanning apply to all types of GVPN.
+
+The target of robustness and fuzz testing are the protocol stacks (e.g. http stack) rather than the applications. The protocol stacks supported by the NF are the same for both of virtualized and physical network products. So, the existing general requirements of robustness and fuzz testing apply to GVPNs.
+
+# 6 Vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation
+
+## 6.1 Overview
+
+According to the description from clause 4.4, the scope of SECAM accreditation described in TR 33.916 [2] is applicable to all of the network products, regardless of whether the network product is physical network product or virtualized network product. GSMA FS.14, FS.15 and FS.16, FS.46 [9], [10] [11] and [7] described test laboratory accreditation, vendor development and product lifecycle processes and security requirements respectively. These are generic accreditation and processes. So, the processes of vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation in clause 6 of TR 33.916 [2], which provide the overview of the processes and accreditation in GSMA NESASG are apply to type 1 of virtualized network products as well.
+
+**Editor's note:** The product development and lifecycle processes as well as test laboratory accreditation procedure described in the present document needs to be revisited once GSMA NESASG publishes new methodology specifications on NESAS.
+
+**NOTE:** GSMA NESASG is ultimately responsible for defining the entire vendor development, product lifecycle processes, and test laboratory accreditation, including dispute resolution process. Therefore, it is the responsibility of GSMA NESASG to confirm if the current process defined in GSMA is sufficient to cover type 1 of virtualized network products.
+
+The final choices and rules for the accreditation and monitoring rules are under the responsibility of the SECAM Accreditation Body. It is recommended to leave accreditation responsibility to GSMA. This clause outlines what is in scope of the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+## 6.2 Audit and accreditation of Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes
+
+Since the scope of SECAM accreditation described in TR 33.916 [2] is applicable to all of the network products, the evaluation of the security relevant part of the Vendor virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes is also done as part of the vendor accreditation process by the SECAM Accreditation Body.
+
+Vendor virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes assurance requirements as well as related evaluation activities generic to all network product classes are defined by the SECAM Accreditation Body. The vendor will define their own processes and describe them in written format. During an audit, the processes will be evaluated and their application on development activities in practice will be verified. An accreditation will be awarded, if the requirements are met.
+
+As described in clause 6.2 of TR 33.916 [2], lifecycle management of virtualized network products also consists of establishing discipline and control in the updates of virtualized network product during its development and maintenance. Lifecycle management controls are important during normal improvement of virtualized network product as well as for vulnerability/security flaw remediation (documentation used to track vulnerability/security flaw, remediation procedure with relation to corrective actions for each identified vulnerability/security flaw...). The vendor accreditation for virtualized network product development and virtualized network product life cycle management processes will provide assurance for these aspects in SECAM.
+
+In addition, for type 1 of virtualized network products, a VNF is instantiated through a series of operations, such as parsing VNF package files, parsing VNFD, instantiating VMs, etc, after a type 1 of virtualized network products (i.e. a VNF package and related softwares, etc.) to a operator delivered by a vendor. The VNF instance can be updated, migrated and deleted, scaled-in, scale-down etc., by VNFM. These processes is called VNF life cycle management defined in ETSI GS NFV 003 [12], it is different from the lifecycle management process of virtualized network products. Its audit and accreditation are out of scope in 3GPP.
+
+The Vendor virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes assessment does not necessarily apply only to a single virtualized network product. Vendors can submit their generic
+
+virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes or a subset of them for auditing and accreditation. Generic virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes are usually used during development of all or some products of the same vendor. As different virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes could be utilized within the organization of one vendor, e.g. due to mergers or acquisitions, vendors could obtain and hold accreditation for different generic virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes.
+
+Once the vendor obtains accreditation and as long as the accreditation has not expired, vendors are allowed to produce development process compliance declarations for the "virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management processes compliance validation" task on their own.
+
+At the beginning of a SECAM evaluation of a product, the Vendor will have to provide a development process compliance declaration to the compliance tester containing a rationale showing that the generic accredited process was effectively applied in the virtualized network product development and virtualized network product lifecycle management of the virtualized network product under evaluation.
+
+Requirements and accreditation procedures for vendor development lifecycle process and product lifecycle maintenance process accreditation are specified in [10].
+
+## 6.3 Audit and accreditation of test laboratories
+
+The process for audit and accreditation of test laboratories in clause 6.3 of TR 33.916 [2] are generic and apply to all types of GVNP.
+
+For type 1 of virtualized network products, to assure the GVNP security during testing process, in addition to assessing the skills of the vendors or third-party test laboratories, the compliance to Test methodology, the SECAM Accreditation Body also needs to accredit the security declaration for NFVI supporting environment (i.e. NFVI for GVNP for type 1) of vendor's or third-party test laboratories.
+
+## 6.4 Monitoring
+
+All text from TR 33.916 [2], clause 6.4 applied to type 1 of GVNP.
+
+NOTE: To assure the GVNP security during testing process and after deployment, NFVI for type 1 of GVNP, which is not provided by the vendor who implements the 3GPP virtual network functions, can be assumed to comply with the monitor process in clause 6.4 of TR 33.916 [2].
+
+## 6.5 Dispute resolution
+
+All text from TR 33.916 [2], clause 6.5 applied to type 1 of GVNP.
+
+NOTE: To assure the GVNP security during testing process and after deployment, NFVI of type 1 for GVNP, which is not provided by the vendor who implements the 3GPP virtual network functions, can be assumed to comply with the dispute resolution process in clause 6.5 of TR 33.916 [2].
+
+# --- 7 Evaluation and SCAS instantiation
+
+## 7.1 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) instantiation documents creation
+
+As described in clause 4.3, the scope of SECAM evaluation for 3GPP physical network products applies to SECAM evaluation of 3GPP virtualized network products. The SCAS instantiation of the virtualized network product also consists of a set of documents provided by the vendor to give test laboratories and operators the relevant information to understand the critical parts of the network product to be evaluated.
+
+The content of the SCAS instantiation of type 1 for GVNP is defined and it contains details on:
+
+- Virtualized Network Product description (e.g. software version, documentation version).
+- Scope of evaluation.
+- Mapping of SCAS security requirements to the virtualized network product and assets in the virtualized network product.
+- References to the applicable document versions containing operational guidance in the documentation of the virtualized network product.
+- Information needed to start the Security Compliance Testing, including Basic Vulnerability Testing. For GVNPs of type 1, the requirements for a NFVI supporting environment should be included in the information.
+- Details of licenses that are required for the product to operate in the scope of evaluation (if relevant).
+
+The above document set is updated by the vendor until the testers (Security Compliance Testing, Basic Vulnerability Testing) consider they have enough and correct information to execute the required tests. Details on the content of these documents and of the update process are provided in clause 7.2.1.
+
+## 7.2 Evaluation and evaluation report
+
+### 7.2.1 Network product development process and network product lifecycle management
+
+According to the descriptions in clause 4.3 and clause 4.5, the tasks and ultimate output of the GVNP evaluation is same with the physical network product evaluation. So, all text from TR 33.916, clause 7.2 basically applies to the GVNP of type 1. The following clauses will focus on the difference from clause 7.2 in TR 33.916 [2].
+
+The description about network product development process and network product lifecycle management in clause 7.2.1 of TR 33.916 [2] applies to type 1 of virtualized network products. In addition, the Vendor Virtualized Network Product Development and virtualized network product lifecycle management process self-evaluation report for the type 1 of virtualized network product under evaluation, which is provided by the vendor, can also contain the security declaration for NFVI supporting environment (i.e. NFVI for GVNP for type 1).
+
+### 7.2.2 SCAS instantiation evaluation
+
+#### 7.2.2.1 Overview
+
+Like the physical network product, SCAS instantiation evaluation of the virtualized network product is to check whether a SCAS instantiation written by a vendor is a correct instantiation of the SCAS of the network product class and whether it is a good basis for evaluating the network product.
+
+The accredited evaluator (vendor or third-party evaluator) for security compliance testing is responsible for SCAS instantiation evaluation before it is used to evaluate virtualized network product. The evaluator confirms at least that the SCAS being instantiated for a given type 1 of 3GPP virtualized network product and the virtualized network product for evaluation are consistent. According to the clauses 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6, the content and the process of SECAM evaluation from TR 33.916 [2] apply to GVNP of type 1.
+
+#### 7.2.2.2 Content
+
+The content of the SCAS instantiation evaluation from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.2.2.2 is generic and applies to type 1 of virtualized network products.
+
+In addition, what the network product description provides is described from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.2.2.2.1, a compatibility description (such as which types of virtualization platforms VNF can be deployed on) can also be included in the type 1 of virtualized network product description, to facilitate the preparation of the NFVI supporting environment in the test phase.
+
+#### 7.2.2.3 Process
+
+The process from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.2.2.3 applies to type 1 of virtualized network products.
+
+### 7.2.3 Security Compliance testing
+
+The security compliance testing in clause 7.2.3 of TR 33.916 [2] is a generic process, the inputs, outputs and activities from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.2.3 apply to virtualized network products. In addition, the accredited test laboratory should prepare supporting environment, i.e. NFVI for GVNP for type 1.
+
+### 7.2.4 Basic Vulnerability Testing
+
+The process of BVT from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.2.3 is generic and applies to the virtualized network products. In addition, the test tools of BVT should support to detect the vulnerabilities in GVNP of type 1.
+
+## 7.3 Self-declaration
+
+Like self-declaration of a physical network products, after the evaluation process is finished, the vendors review all the evaluation results of the type 1 for virtualized network products and give a declaration of their product. All text from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.3 is generic and applies to the virtualized network products.
+
+## 7.4 Partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle
+
+The basic principles for partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle is described in clause 7.4 of [2]. It also applies to the evaluation of type 1 for virtualized network products.
+
+## 7.5 Comparison between two SECAM evaluations
+
+All text from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.5 applies to the virtualized network products.
+
+## 7.6 The evaluation of a new version
+
+All text from TR 33.916 [2], in clause 7.6 applies to virtualized network products.
+
+# Annex A: Change history
+
+| Change history | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|----------|-----------|----|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version |
+| 2022-02 | SA3-106e | | | | | Create draft version on skeleton and scope | 0.1.0 |
+| 2022-02 | SA3-106e | | | | | | 0.2.0 |
+| 2022-08 | SA3-108e | | | | | Merge approved contributions: S3-222407, S3-222408, S3-222409, S3-222410, S3-222411, S3-222157, S3-222412, S3-222413, S3-222166, S3-222169, S3-222414, S3-222415, S3-222416, S3-222417, S3-222176, S3-222177 | 0.3.0 |
+| 2022-11 | SA3-109 | S3-224096 | | | | Merge approved contributions: S3-224080, S3-224081, S3-224082, S3-223461, S3-223553, S3-223554, S3-223555, S3-224083, S3-223564, S3-223572, S3-223575, S3-224084, S3-223633 | 0.4.0 |
+| 2023-02 | SA3-110 | S3-231466 | | | | Merge approved contribution: S3-231098 | 0.5.0 |
+| 2023-03 | SA#99 | SP-230131 | | | | Presented for information and approval | 1.0.0 |
+| 2023-03 | SA#99 | | | | | Upgrade to change control version | 18.0.0 |
+| 2023-03 | SA#99 | | | | | EditHelp review | 18.0.1 |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42043/raw.md b/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42043/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b1d5ecc3712e1198579a2fc943c0bca9b56c2261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42043/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+
+
+# 3GPP TS 42.043 V18.0.0 (2024-03) ---
+
+*Technical Specification*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Support of Localised Service Area (SoLSA); Service description; Stage 1 (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+---
+
+**GSMA**®
+GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR
+MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
+
+GSMA logo
+
+
+
+**3GPP**™
+
+3GPP logo
+
+## --- **Keywords**
+
+---
+
+LTE, GSM, location, services, stage 1
+
+### **3GPP**
+
+### --- **Postal address**
+
+### --- **3GPP support office address**
+
+---
+
+650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne - FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+## --- **Internet**
+
+---
+
+
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification**
+
+---
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+## --- Contents
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Foreword ..... | 4 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 5 |
+| 2 References..... | 5 |
+| 2.1 Normative references ..... | 5 |
+| 2.2 Informative references..... | 5 |
+| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 6 |
+| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 |
+| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 7 |
+| 4 Description..... | 8 |
+| 4.1 Defining subscriber information for localised service area ..... | 8 |
+| 4.2 Service Features ..... | 8 |
+| 4.2.1 Localised service area indication..... | 8 |
+| 4.2.2 Localised service area support in idle mode (camping) ..... | 9 |
+| 4.2.3 Localised service area support in active mode (handover)..... | 9 |
+| 4.2.4 Exclusive access ..... | 9 |
+| 4.2.5 LSA only access ..... | 9 |
+| 4.2.6 Preferential access ..... | 9 |
+| 5 Impact on other services ..... | 9 |
+| 5.1 General ..... | 9 |
+| 5.2 (Void)..... | 10 |
+| 5.3 GPRS ..... | 10 |
+| 5.4 Call Forwarding..... | 10 |
+| 5.5 Completion of Calls to Busy Subscriber (CCBS)..... | 10 |
+| 5 Exceptional procedures..... | 10 |
+| 6 Charging aspects ..... | 10 |
+| 7 Commercial Role Model for SoLSA ..... | 11 |
+| Annex A (informative): Change history..... | 12 |
+
+# --- Foreword
+
+This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3GPP.
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of this TS, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version 3.y.z
+
+where:
+
+- x the first digit:
+ - 1 presented to TSG for information;
+ - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+ - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
+
+# --- 1 Scope
+
+This technical specification, specifies a mechanism, which can be used as a platform for providing special tariffs and/or special set of service features for certain subscribers within a regionally restricted area or areas.
+
+The motivation for this concept is to create means for network operators to build new service and tariff packages, which take into account subscriber groups and their needs.
+
+The localised service area is both an optional network feature and an optional UE feature. Usage and implementation of the different SoLSA service features may vary according to operator's service packages.
+
+This feature is not intended to replace the existing method of cell selection, cell indication and handover.
+
+“Support of Localised service area (SoLSA)” is renamed Phase 2+ item “Support of Home Area Priority”
+
+Note: The present document covers description for GERAN support only. UTRAN support will be added in latter releases.
+
+# --- 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+
+## 2.1 Normative references
+
+- [1] 3GPP TS 22.011: " Service accessibility ".
+
+## 2.2 Informative references
+
+- [2] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+
+# 3 Definitions and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Definitions
+
+### Localised Service Area (LSA):
+
+A localised service area consists of a cell or a number of cells within a PLMN.
+
+Cells being part of different localised service areas may have overlapping coverage areas. The cells constituting a localised service area may not necessarily provide continuous coverage.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Localised Service Area. A diagram showing a grid of hexagonal cells. A group of four cells is shaded grey and labeled 'A LSA of four cells.' with an arrow. Another cell, which overlaps with the grey cells, is outlined with a thick black border and labeled 'An overlapping cell not part of LSA' with an arrow.
+
+**Figure 1: Localised Service Area**
+
+**Subscribed to LSA:** Set of LSAs, which the user has subscribed to.
+
+**Valid LSA:** A LSA ,whichthe user has subscribed to and his UE can receive service.
+
+**Current LSA:** The LSA where a UE is receiving service.
+
+**LSA Priority:** Priority of subscriber's LSAs. When the user has several valid LSAs, the current LSA shall be selected by prioritising LSAs in case of overlapping LSAs.
+
+
+
+Figure 2: Localised Service Areas. A diagram showing three overlapping ellipses labeled LSA 'A', LSA 'B', and LSA 'C'. LSA 'A' is a solid line, LSA 'B' is a dotted line, and LSA 'C' is a dashed line. A smiley face icon representing a subscriber is located inside the intersection of LSA 'A' and LSA 'B'. To the right of the diagram, text explains the status of each LSA: 'LSAs A, B and C are Subscribed to LSAs', 'LSAs A and B are Valid LSAs', and 'LSA A is Current LSA'. A legend at the bottom right shows the smiley face icon with the text '= Subscriber'.
+
+**Figure 2: Localised Service Areas**
+
+**LSA only access:** LSA user is allowed to access PLMN within his allowed LSAs. LSA user is not allowed to receive and/or originate a call outside LSA area.
+
+
+
+A diagram showing a cluster of seven hexagonal cells. Three cells are shaded dark grey, representing LSA only access cells. Two arrows point from the text 'LSA only access cells. All subscribed services available to user.' to two of these shaded cells. Another arrow points from the text 'LSA only access users are not allowed to receive and /or originate calls.' to one of the shaded cells.
+
+Diagram of LSA only access cells
+
+**Figure 3: LSA only access**
+
+**Exclusive Access:** Access to exclusive access cells is restricted to defined LSA subscribers.
+
+
+
+A diagram showing a cluster of seven hexagonal cells. Two cells are shaded dark grey, representing private cells. One arrow points from the text 'Private cell, only allowed for users with exclusive access.' to one of these shaded cells. Another arrow points from the text 'Public cell, allowed for all users including exclusive access users.' to one of the unshaded cells.
+
+Diagram of Exclusive Access cells
+
+**Figure 4: Exclusive Access**
+
+**Preferential Access:** LSA user shall have preferential access to resources of LSA cells, compared to non-LSA users.
+
+
+
+A diagram showing a cluster of seven hexagonal cells. Two cells are shaded dark grey, representing public cells. One arrow points from the text 'Reserved resources for Preferential Access users. Limited capacity available to all other users.' to one of these shaded cells. Another arrow points from the text 'Public cell, capacity allowed on equal basis for all users.' to one of the unshaded cells.
+
+Diagram of Preferential Access cells
+
+**Figure 5: Preferential Access**
+
+## 3.3 Abbreviations
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
+
+| | |
+|-----|------------------------|
+| LSA | Localised Service Area |
+|-----|------------------------|
+
+Further abbreviations may be found in TR 21.905 [2].
+
+# 4 Description
+
+The localised service area concept shall give the operator the basis to offer subscribers different services (e.g. tariffs or access rights) depending on the location of the subscriber.
+
+## 4.1 Defining subscriber information for localised service area
+
+A subscriber can have up to 20 LSAs per PLMN.
+
+It shall be possible to assign localised service areas to subscribers. Subscriber may have service, which contains several LSAs potentially belonging to different PLMNs. There shall be means to allocate LSA priority to each subscriber independently by operator.
+
+Localised service areas for subscriber(s) may overlap, i.e. one cell may be part of several LSAs belonging to that subscriber.
+
+As an example, within a hierarchical cell structure, cells in different layers can constitute different localised service areas. A localised service area could be defined so that it is possible to establish flexible sized areas, which are applicable to
+
+- a very small localised service area ("home area" covering one or several cells dedicated e.g. to a residential subscriber or a company); or
+- a large area covering a part of the city (one or several location areas); or
+- a combination of these.
+
+Thus it is possible to use the various radio network configurations.
+
+The definition of location areas and the definition of localised service areas may be independent of each other.
+
+## 4.2 Service Features
+
+Following service features are building blocks for SoLSA based services. It is up to the operator to decide which service features are required for a specific service.
+
+- Localised service area indication.
+- Localised service area support in idle mode (camping).
+- Localised service area support in active mode (handover).
+- LSA only access.
+- Exclusive access.
+- Preferential access.
+
+### 4.2.1 Localised service area indication
+
+It shall be possible to assign a subscriber defined identifier by the operator to each LSA (alphanumeric text up to 10 characters), which can be provided to the user in idle and active mode. As a UE manufacturer option the user may assign an icon or another form of indication to each LSA.
+
+It shall be possible to indicate a change of localised service area during idle and active mode.
+
+The indication is a network option (activated/deactivated by the network).
+
+### 4.2.2 Localised service area support in idle mode (camping)
+
+The PLMN shall determine, which cells, belonging to the LSA, are to be favoured by the UE when camping.
+
+When camping on a cell in idle mode, the subscriber's mobile station shall use the information provided by the PLMN in selecting cells belonging to his localised service area. The mobile station shall have the ability to reselect a cell in a different LSA with higher priority. This favouring shall not degrade the overall service quality.
+
+There should be no extra delay in cell selection procedure.
+
+### 4.2.3 Localised service area support in active mode (handover)
+
+The PLMN shall determine, which cells, belonging to the LSA, are to be favoured during active mode.
+
+The cells belonging to users LSAs shall be favoured at call setup and when handovers are carried out. This favouring shall not degrade the overall service quality.
+
+### 4.2.4 Exclusive access
+
+For a cell belonging to one or more service areas and where only one or more specific subscribers shall have allowed access, other subscriber's mobile stations shall be prevented from using the cell to obtain any service, other than TS12 (Emergency Calls).
+
+NOTE: This does not prevent other subscriber's mobile stations from camping on the cell to perform Location Updating.
+
+Handovers into cells belonging to localised service areas where only specific subscribers shall have allowed access, shall be possible to be prevented for other subscribers, if required by a SoLSA application.
+
+### 4.2.5 LSA only access
+
+With access allowed only within one or more localised service areas, it shall be possible to prevent receiving and/or originating basic services from non-LSA cells. SMS and Supplementary service operations are allowed in all areas.
+
+It shall be possible to prevent handovers to cells not belonging to allowed localised service areas, if required by a SoLSA application.
+
+### 4.2.6 Preferential access
+
+It shall be possible to allocate resources at call setup and during the active mode to LSA users, if required by a SoLSA application.
+
+NOTE: An example of a requirement: the last traffic channel is not allocated to non-LSA user or in case of congestion an ongoing call of a non-LSA user is released and replaced with a call of a LSA user.
+
+# --- 5 Impact on other services
+
+## 5.1 General
+
+SoLSA is not limited to specific services and there are no modifications necessary for existing services. In particular there shall be no impact to Emergency Call (TS12).
+
+LSA should be able to support all tele, bearer and supplementary services .There is no interaction to supplementary services except those specified below.
+
+## 5.2 (Void)
+
+## 5.3 GPRS
+
+It shall be possible to apply SoLSA services independently to circuit switched services and to GPRS. LSA support in idle mode shall be specified for GPRS.
+
+The definition of routing areas and the definition of localised service areas shall be independent of each other.
+
+## 5.4 Call Forwarding
+
+No interaction.
+
+NOTE: Operators should consider using tools such as ODB and CAMEL to control call forwarding functionality provided in conjunction with any SoLSA services.
+
+## 5.5 Completion of Calls to Busy Subscriber (CCBS)
+
+LSA only access restrictions shall apply to CCBS recall.
+
+# --- 5 Exceptional procedures
+
+None identified.
+
+# --- 6 Charging aspects
+
+Based on the use of the feature "Support of Localised Service Area" it is possible to establish local tariff applications ("home zone applications").
+
+# 7 Commercial Role Model for SoLSA
+
+SoLSA shall support LSAs which, do not belong to the HPLMN. To enable this the following commercial role model shall be used:
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ HO[Home operator]
+ SO1[SoLSA operator 1]
+ SO2[SoLSA operator 2]
+ SO3[SoLSA operator 3]
+ SUB[Subscriber]
+
+ HO -.->|Commercial agreement LSA Definition| SO3
+ HO -->|Subscriber info| SO1
+ HO -->|Subscription SIM configuration| SUB
+ SO1 -->|SoLSA services| SUB
+
+```
+
+Figure 6: SoLSA commercial role model diagram. The diagram shows a Home operator on the left and a Subscriber at the bottom. Above the Subscriber are three stacked boxes representing SoLSA operator 1, SoLSA operator 2, and SoLSA operator 3. Arrows indicate the following relationships: a dashed double-headed arrow between Home operator and SoLSA operator 3 labeled 'Commercial agreement LSA Definition'; a solid arrow from Home operator to SoLSA operator 1 labeled 'Subscriber info'; a solid arrow from Home operator to Subscriber labeled 'Subscription SIM configuration'; and a solid arrow from SoLSA operator 1 to Subscriber labeled 'SoLSA services'.
+
+Figure 6: SoLSA commercial role model
+
+The actors of the SoLSA role model are defined below:
+
+- **Home operator:** The Home operator of a SoLSA subscriber is the owner of the SIM for this subscriber. As such, he is responsible for transferring the necessary SoLSA information to the subscriber SIM. He also holds the SoLSA subscriber information (e.g. in the HLR, CAMEL server, private network node). The Home operator has a commercial agreement with one or several SoLSA operators. A Home operator can be commercially the same entity as a SoLSA operator.
+- **SoLSA operator:** An operator is acting as a SoLSA operator for one SoLSA subscriber if he owns at least one Localised Service Area (LSA) for that subscriber. As such, when the user is attached to the SoLSA operator the SoLSA operator will provide the service for the SoLSA. One SoLSA operator can own a multiplicity of LSAs for a given SoLSA subscriber. A SoLSA operator has a commercial agreement with one or a multiplicity of Home operators (but maximum one per subscriber). A SoLSA operator can be commercially the same entity as the Home operator.
+- **SoLSA subscriber:** A SoLSA subscriber is a subscriber who has subscribed to one Home operator and at least one SoLSA operator (or said differently, who has an authorisation to receive services from at least one LSA). A SoLSA subscriber can have a subscription with a multiplicity of SoLSA operators. A subscriber has always a Home operator, but for example if he is allowed to have services only in LSAs, his Home operator and his SoLSA operator can be commercially the same entity.
+
+# Annex A (informative): Change history
+
+| Change history | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|-------------------|
+| TSG SA# | SA Doc. | SA1 Doc | Spec | CR | Rev | Rel | Cat | Subject/Comment | Old | New | WI |
+| Jun 1999 | | | GSM 0 2.43 | | | | | | 7.1.0 | | |
+| SA#04 | | | 22.043 | | | | | Transferred to 3GPP SA1 | | 3.0.0 | |
+| SP-05 | SP-99479 | S1-99618 | 22.043 | 001 | | R99 | D | Editorial changes for alignment | 3.0.0 | 3.0.1 | Editorial changes |
+| SP-08 | SP-000206 | S1-000325 | 22.043 | 003 | | R99 | F | Clarification of requirements and editorial changes | 3.0.1 | 3.1.0 | |
+| SP-11 | SP-010065 | S1-010258 | 42.043 | | | Rel-4 | | Transferred to 3GPP Release 4 as GSM only. | 3.1.0 | 4.0.0 | |
+| SP-16 | SP-020267 | S1-021043 | 42.043 | | | Rel-5 | | Updated from Rel-4 to Rel-5 | 4.0.0 | 5.0.0 | |
+| SP-26 | SP-040744 | S1-040997 | 42.043 | | | Rel-6 | | Updated from Rel-5 to Rel-6 | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | |
+| SP-36 | | | 42.043 | | | Rel-7 | | Updated from Rel-6 to Rel-7 | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | |
+| SP-42 | - | - | | | | Rel-8 | | Updated from Rel-7 to Rel-8 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | |
+| SP-46 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-9 by MCC | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | |
+| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | |
+| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-11 by MCC | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | |
+| 2014-10 | | | | | | | | Updated to Rel-12 by MCC | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | |
+| 2015-12 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-13 by MCC | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | |
+| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-14 by MCC | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | |
+| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-15 by MCC | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | |
+| SA#88e | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-16 by MCC | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | |
+| 2022-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-17 by MCC | 16.0.0 | 17.0.0 | |
+| 2024-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-18 by MCC | 17.0.0 | 18.0.0 | |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42056/raw.md b/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42056/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5095ad002fc1b84d64b4cb675a8d1053a12fcab0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42056/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,797 @@
+
+
+# 3GPP TS 42.056 V18.0.0 (2024-03) ---
+
+*Technical Specification*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; GSM Cordless Telephony System (CTS), Phase 1; Service description; Stage 1 (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+---
+
+The GSM logo consists of the letters 'GSM' in a bold, blue, sans-serif font. The 'G' and 'S' are stylized and connected at the top. Below the letters, the text 'GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS' is written in a smaller, blue, sans-serif font. A small red square is located to the right of the 'M'.
+
+GSM logo
+
+
+
+The 3GPP logo features the letters '3GPP' in a bold, black, sans-serif font. The '3' and 'G' are stylized and connected at the top. Below the 'P', there are three red curved lines representing signal waves. A small 'TM' symbol is located to the right of the 'P'.
+
+3GPP logo
+
+## --- **Keywords**
+
+---
+
+LTE, GSM, CTS, stage 1
+
+## **3GPP**
+
+## --- **Postal address**
+
+### --- **3GPP support office address**
+
+---
+
+650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne - FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+## --- **Internet**
+
+---
+
+
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification**
+
+---
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+## Contents
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
+| Foreword ..... | 5 |
+| Introduction ..... | 6 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 7 |
+| 2 References..... | 7 |
+| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 8 |
+| 3.1 Definitions..... | 8 |
+| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 8 |
+| 4 Description..... | 9 |
+| 4.1 System overview ..... | 9 |
+| 4.2 Service aspects ..... | 10 |
+| 4.2.1 General ..... | 10 |
+| 4.2.2 User aspects ..... | 10 |
+| 4.2.3 Subscriptions ..... | 11 |
+| 4.2.3.1 CTS-roaming aspects ..... | 11 |
+| 4.2.3.2 Withdrawal of CTS subscription ..... | 11 |
+| 4.2.4 GSM coverage ..... | 11 |
+| 4.2.5 Mobility ..... | 12 |
+| 4.2.5.1 Mode selection between CTS and PLMN ..... | 12 |
+| 4.2.5.2 Attachment of the same CTS-MS with multiple CTS-FPs..... | 12 |
+| 4.2.5.3 Attachment of multiple CTS-MSs with the same CTS-FP..... | 12 |
+| 4.2.5.4 Attachment status of a CTS-MS ..... | 13 |
+| 4.2.6 CTS applications ..... | 13 |
+| 4.2.6.1 Tele-services ..... | 13 |
+| 4.2.6.2 Supplementary services ..... | 13 |
+| 4.2.6.3 Additional support for fixed network supplementary services..... | 13 |
+| 4.2.6.4 Man Machine Interface (MMI)..... | 13 |
+| 4.2.6.5 CTS internal calls..... | 14 |
+| 4.2.6.6 CTS internal call transfer..... | 14 |
+| 4.2.6.7 CTS internal call hold..... | 14 |
+| 4.2.6.8 Mobile hunting..... | 14 |
+| 4.2.6.9 SMS-MT ..... | 14 |
+| 4.2.6.10 SMS-MO..... | 14 |
+| 4.2.6.11 Other services ..... | 14 |
+| 4.3 Radio interface and GSM co-existence aspects ..... | 14 |
+| 4.3.1 General principles..... | 14 |
+| 4.3.2 Broadcast channel functionality ..... | 15 |
+| 4.4 Security requirements..... | 15 |
+| 4.4.1 General ..... | 15 |
+| 4.4.2 Enrolment ..... | 15 |
+| 4.4.3 Attachment ..... | 15 |
+| 4.4.4 Protection of communications ..... | 15 |
+| 4.4.5 Security Parameter Storage Requirements ..... | 16 |
+| 4.4.6 De-activation ..... | 16 |
+| 5 Normal Procedures..... | 16 |
+| 5.1 Enrolment of CTS-FP..... | 16 |
+| 5.1.1 CTS operator procedure for enrolment of CTS-FP ..... | 16 |
+| 5.1.2 User procedure for enrolment of CTS-FP ..... | 17 |
+| 5.2 Enrolment of CTS-MSs..... | 17 |
+| 5.3 De-enrolment of a CTS-MS ..... | 17 |
+| 5.4 Attachment of CTS-MS ..... | 18 |
+| 5.5 Call procedures..... | 18 |
+| 5.5.1 CTS-MS originated calls ..... | 18 |
+| 5.5.1.1 Number compatibility between GSM formats and fixed network formats ..... | 18 |
+
+| | | |
+|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| 5.5.2 | CTS-MS terminated calls ..... | 19 |
+| 5.5.3 | CTS internal calls (optional) ..... | 19 |
+| 5.5.4 | CTS internal call transfer (optional)..... | 19 |
+| 5.6 | Maintenance ..... | 20 |
+| 6 | CTS de-activation ..... | 20 |
+| 6.1 | CTS-FP de-activation by the CTS operator ..... | 20 |
+| 6.2 | CTS-FP de-activation by the user ..... | 20 |
+| 6.3 | CTS-FP de-activation by self controlling features ..... | 20 |
+| 6.4 | CTS-MS de-activation by the CTS operator ..... | 20 |
+| 7 | Exceptional procedures ..... | 21 |
+| 8 | Charging aspects ..... | 21 |
+| 9 | Cross Phase Compatibility ..... | 21 |
+| Annex A (informative): | Later phases of CTS..... | 22 |
+| Annex B (informative): | Change History..... | 23 |
+
+# --- Foreword
+
+This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version x.y.z
+
+where:
+
+- x the first digit:
+ - 1 presented to TSG for information;
+ - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+ - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
+
+# --- Introduction
+
+Today, there exists a clear distinction between the public mobile telephone systems for wide area coverage on the one hand, and private cordless telephone systems for local area coverage on the other hand. Recently, attempts have been made to integrate the wide area cellular and the local area cordless function into one and the same Mobile Equipment (ME). However, because of the incompatibility between the existing cellular and cordless standards, this results in ME implementations with rather low cost-efficiency.
+
+The intention of the GSM Cordless Telephony System (CTS) is therefore to provide cordless functionality to a standard GSM Mobile Station (MS) with minimum impact on the MS. The impact would ideally be limited to an upgrade of the ME and SIM software. This can only be accomplished if the radio interface of the cordless system is identical, or very similar, to the standard GSM radio interface.
+
+# --- 1 Scope
+
+The scope of the present document is to describe the Service aspects of a GSM Cordless Telephony System (CTS), which provides the possibility for users of GSM terminals to have cordless access to a fixed network, such as PSTN/ISDN or a radio network such as GSM.
+
+Due to the time constraints to have a first specification ready for market needs, a phased approach is necessary. The first phase aims primarily at an application supporting the speech teleservice (including DTMF support) in a residential single cell environment. The focus is on the requirements necessary to elaborate the radio interface and the security aspects for such an application.
+
+To not prevent or impede the evolution of CTS to additional services and functions, later phases may have to be considered when now defining the means to fulfil the above mentioned requirements for the first phase of CTS. Therefore, additional support on the CTS radio interface for later phase services (e.g. SMS, subscriber authentication and GSM supplementary services), is included already in CTS Phase 1, provided that such services are clearly defined. Other expected services and functions in later phases are included in annex A.
+
+The standardisation of the physical layers of the GSM-CTS fixed network interface is not in the scope of the present document. However, consideration may need to be given to communication of application data between CTS and PLMN via the fixed network.
+
+# --- 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+ - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+ - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+- [2] 3GPP TS 22.101: "UMTS Service Principles".
+- [3] 3GPP TS 42.009: "Security aspects".
+- [4] 3GPP TS 22.081: "Line identification Supplementary Services - Stage 1".
+- [5] 3GPP TS 22.096: "Name identification Supplementary Services - Stage 1".
+- [6] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Short Message Service (SMS)".
+- [7] ETSI ETS 300 111 (1992): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Telephony 3,1 kHz teleservice, service description".
+- [8] ETSI ETS 300 109 (1992): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Circuit-mode 64 kbit/s 8 kHz structured bearer service category usable for speech information transfer, service description".
+- [9] ETSI ETS 300 110 (1992): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Circuit-mode 64 kbit/s 8 kHz structured bearer service category usable for 3,1 kHz audio information transfer, service description".
+- [10] ETSI EN 301 144-1 (V1.1): "The Signalling application for the mobility management service on the alpha interface; Part 1: Protocol specification".
+- [11] 3GPP TS 22.030: "Man Machine Interface (MMI) of the Mobile Station (MS)".
+
+# 3 Definitions and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Definitions
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:
+
+**FP Enrolment:** procedure where a CTS-FP is loaded with data necessary to obtain CTS operation. After this procedure CTS operation may commence.
+
+**MS Enrolment:** procedure where a CTS-MS is associated for the first time with a CTS-FP. After this procedure CTS-MS has access to this CTS-FP.
+
+**Attachment:** procedure where an MS attaches to a certain CTS-FP. When attached, it is possible to make and receive calls via the CTS-FP. The CTS-MS must have been initialised correctly to the CTS-FP before attachment can take part.
+
+**Generic Frequency List (GFL):** Generic Frequency List (GFL) contains all absolute radio frequency channel numbers (ARFCN), as defined in GSM 05.05, on which the CTS-FP is allowed to operate. The CTS-FP will never use frequencies which are not listed in the GFL.
+
+**CTS Mobile Station:** GSM MS with CTS capability.
+
+**CTS Fixed Part:** CTS-FP is a device which offers a personal cordless coverage and acts as a link between the CTS-MS and the fixed network or the GSM network.
+
+**GSM Operator:** GSM operator is the operator who provides GSM cellular service to the MS.
+
+**CTS licence exempt frequencies:** frequency band that may be allocated by national regulator to CTS usage outside of a GSM licence allocated to a GSM operator.
+
+**CTS operator:** CTS operator is the operator who provides the GFL to the CTS-FP. The CTS operator may be the same than the GSM operator.
+
+**FP-SIM:** FP-SIM is the SIM card inserted in the CTS-FP, which materialised the CTS subscription. The FP- SIM belongs to the CTS operator.
+
+**CTS subscription:** when a GSM licensed band is used, the right to use a CTS operator's frequency spectrum for communication between a CTS-FP and CTS-MS(s).
+
+**CTS-FP owner:** person who has the CTS-FP control and may authorise MS Enrolment.
+
+**CTS user:** person who has a CTS-MS which is allowed to do CTS operations.
+
+**CTS-MS local number:** number in the range of 0-99 optionally assigned to the CTS-MS at enrolment. This number is used for CTS internal calls.
+
+**CTS-Roaming:** right for an additional CTS-MS to be enrolled to a CTS-FP which is initialised to an operator other than the HPLMN operator of the additional CTS-MS.
+
+## 3.2 Abbreviations
+
+In addition to those below, abbreviations used in the present document are listed in GSM 01.04.
+
+| | |
+|----------|---------------------------------------------|
+| CTS | Cordless Telephony System |
+| CTS-FP | Cordless Telephony System - Fixed Part |
+| CTS-MS | Cordless Telephony System - Mobile Station |
+| FP – SIM | Fixed Part – Subscriber Identity Module |
+| GFL | Generic Frequency List |
+| IFPEI | International Fixed Part Equipment Identity |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| MS | Mobile Station |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| SMS - MO | Short Message Service - Mobile Originated |
+
+# 4 Description
+
+## 4.1 System overview
+
+The GSM Cordless Telephone System (GSM-CTS) described in the present document is a radio communications system based on a GSM-compatible cellular interface between a private radio base station called CTS Fixed Part (CTS-FP) and a CTS mobile station (CTS-MS). The CTS-FP is connected either via a wireline to the PSTN/ISDN network or via a radio connection to a GSM network.
+
+When connected to the fixed network, the CTS-FP will be compliant with the existing fixed network standards (e.g. support the telephony 3,1 kHz teleservice (see [7]), the speech bearer service (see [8]) and the 3,1 kHz audio bearer service (see [9] in case of an ISDN CTS-FP and the relevant national standards in case of PSTN CTS-FP). There is no direct radio communication between different CTS-FPs. However, this does not preclude indirect communication, e.g. via the fixed network or via the MS.
+
+When connected to a GSM network, the CTS-FP is compliant with the existing ETSI standards applicable to a GSM mobile. From the GSM network point of view, the CTS-FP is seen as a standard GSM mobile including a standard GSM SIM card. (i.e. the CTS-FP may include 2 SIM cards: one for the GSM subscription and one for the CTS subscription).
+
+An illustration of the CTS concept is shown in figure 1. Due to the low transmit power of the CTS-FP, the coverage area is restricted and limited. When the CTS-MS comes in range of the CTS-FP, it may attach to the CTS. When connected to the fixed network, from then on, the user can make and accept calls directly via the PSTN without the intervention of the public cellular network. When attached, the MS checks whether it is still in range of the CTS and whether it is paged. As an option, the MS may simultaneously work in both the cellular and the cordless mode, in a so called parallel mode, i.e. be attached both in the GSM PLMN and the CTS. When the MS comes out of range of the CTS it may switch to the GSM mode. This switch shall be indicated to the user. When the CTS-MS is in either CTS mode or GSM mode and is searching for a potential channel to attach with in the other mode, it shall be able to respond to paging messages from the mode in which it is currently attached.
+
+The radio interface between the CTS-FP and the CTS-MS is a modified GSM interface. The carrier frequencies used are the same as assigned for cellular service. These carrier frequencies can be part of a licence exempt band or a licensed band.
+
+When CTS-FP operates in a licenced band:
+
+- these frequencies can be reserved by the operator for GSM-CTS usage, or can be shared with the cellular system. In every case, however, the GSM operator controls, on an area and time basis, on which frequencies the CTS is allowed to operate. In case of co-existence in the same operating area, a procedure shall be deployed to minimise interference between GSM PLMN and CTS users.
+
+NOTE: The frequencies used for CTS could be in any frequency band defined for GSM, i.e. GSM900, DCS1800 or PCS1900. This applies both to the CTS-FP and the CTS-MS.
+
+The quality of service (e.g. service accessibility, call set-up time, bit rate for data services) of the 'GSM only' subscribers shall remain unaffected by the introduction of CTS. Means to guarantee that the quality of service of GSM subscribers does not degrade due to CTS introduction have to be defined.
+
+Since the MS uses the same frequency spectrum both for the cellular mode and the cordless mode, the ME hardware can be reused. The intention is that hardware modifications in the radio transceiver of a standard GSM ME should not be necessary. It is also a requirement that the introduction of CTS shall not destabilise any existing GSM mobile equipment or degrade the mobile equipment's dedicated (e.g. in call) or idle mode performance.
+
+When a licensed band is used:
+
+- the CTS operator can administer all CTS-FPs and the corresponding CTS. When the CTS is initialised, the required operation parameters are downloaded into the CTS. This can either be done via the fixed network or via the GSM radio interface.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the concept for the GSM CTS functionality when connected to the PSTN. A dashed line represents the GSM PLMN boundary. Inside, a GSM BTS (Base Transceiver Station) is shown. A dashed circle labeled 'GSM CTS' contains a 'CTS Fixed Part' (a rectangular device) connected to a 'PSTN' (Public Switched Telephone Network) and an 'MS' (Mobile Station, represented by a mobile phone icon).
+
+Figure 1: Concept for the GSM CTS functionality when connected to the PSTN
+
+## 4.2 Service aspects
+
+### 4.2.1 General
+
+In the first phase of CTS an application for residential environment serving one cell is intended. The services and features to be supported relate to this assumption.
+
+### 4.2.2 User aspects
+
+The user of the CTS shall be required to perform a simple installation process in order to initialise the CTS operation. This process shall include:
+
+- connection of the CTS-FP to the power supply and to either the fixed network or the GSM network interface;
+- enrolment of the CTS-FP (CTS-FP enrolment).
+As the CTS-FP shall not be GSM operator specific, it has to be enrolled with operation specific data, e.g. a list of allowed frequencies (Generic Frequency List GFL);
+- enrolment of one or several CTS-MSs with the CTS-FP (CTS-MS enrolment).
+
+Once initialised, CTS operation shall not require any specific action of the user to maintain the operation as long as the CTS-FP is not de-activated (see clause 6).
+
+To have service granted by the CTS-FP, a CTS-MS shall attach at the CTS-FP. In order to attach, a CTS-MS has to be enrolled with the CTS-FP, the user has to bring the CTS-MS in range of the CTS-FP and the appropriate operation mode has to be selected (see subclause 4.2.5.1).
+
+### 4.2.3 Subscriptions
+
+The CTS-FP owner shall have a valid CTS subscription from a CTS operator. This subscription is materialised by an FP-SIM. It gives the right to the CTS-FP owner to initialise the CTS-FP and enroll CTS-MSs under conditions defined by the CTS operator. In exchange of a subscription to a CTS operator, the CTS-FP owner will receive a CTS-GFL in the CTS-FP.
+
+The user of the GSM CTS service shall have a subscription with a GSM operator, which allows CTS service. This CTS authorisation may be given to all the CTS-MSs of a PLMN or may be linked to a specific service subscription given by the GSM operator. By default the CTS-MS are not allowed to do CTS operations. The use of a GSM subscription for 'CTS only' service is not precluded. Corresponding information may be stored in the SIM.
+
+In order to be able to use the CTS service on the fixed network, a subscription to the fixed network is also required. When connected to the GSM network, the fixed network subscription is replaced by a GSM subscription and the CTS-FP shall include a GSM SIM card corresponding to this GSM subscription.
+
+The fixed network, GSM and CTS subscriptions may be independent of each other. However at CTS-FP enrolment (see subclause 5.1) the CTS-FP may obtain operation data specific to the CTS operator, the user of the CTS service has subscribed to, thus the CTS-FP operation may be tied to a specific GSM operator.
+
+The CTS-FP is normally not subscribed to, it is the users' property. After the CTS service subscription to one operator is cancelled, it shall be possible to use the same CTS-FP for a CTS service subscription to another operator.
+
+#### 4.2.3.1 CTS-roaming aspects
+
+A CTS-FP owner may only have one CTS subscription to a single CTS operator. This operator defines which CTS-MSs are allowed to enroll onto a particular CTS-FP. Several control levels are offered by the CTS:
+
+- **uncontrolled roaming:** all CTS-MS from any GSM operator are allowed to enrol on the CTS-FP without CTS-operator control;
+- **no roaming:** the CTS-operator and the GSM operator are the same and only the CTS-MSs from the CTS operator are allowed to attach on the CTS-FP;
+- **control roaming:** on a case by case basis, the CTS-operator controls CTS-MS enrolment using CTS-MS IMSI.
+
+In any cases, the CTS-FP owner authorisation is mandatory for CTS-MS enrolment.
+
+NOTE: CTS-roaming has no impact on CTS-FP operational mode defined by the CTS-operator (e.g. frequency management).
+
+#### 4.2.3.2 Withdrawal of CTS subscription
+
+When used within a licensed band:
+
+- if the CTS subscription is withdrawn, the user looses the right to use a CTS- operator's frequency spectrum for CTS usage and CTS operation shall stop.
+
+As the CTS service is not obtained directly from the GSM network like other GSM services (e.g. SMS), means of subscription control have to be defined.
+
+### 4.2.4 GSM coverage
+
+The concept should allow CTS operation during all GSM coverage scenarios, e.g. the following:
+
+- area with no GSM coverage;
+- area with GSM coverage of the HPLMN operator;
+- area with no HPLMN coverage, but coverage of other PLMN operator(s).
+
+Depending on the enrolment concept being used (see subclause 5.1), a limitation may be that the MS need to be in HPLMN (or at least PLMN) coverage once, before the CTS-FP can be correctly initialised (if the GSM radio interface
+
+is used for enrolment data download).
+
+In the case of a CTS-FP connected to a PLMN, a GSM coverage is necessary for CTS operations.
+
+### 4.2.5 Mobility
+
+#### 4.2.5.1 Mode selection between CTS and PLMN
+
+The CTS-MS may operate in one of six different operation modes. It is not required that the CTS-MS support all the modes. It shall be possible for the user to select between the supported modes at any time, except during an active call.
+
+- a) Manual mode: GSM only, i.e. the normal GSM operation.
+- b) Manual mode: CTS only, i.e. calls can only be originated or received via the CTS-FP. The MS is not attached to the GSM PLMN.
+- c) Automatic mode with CTS preferred: The MS attaches to CTS, when in range, and then automatically tries to attach with GSM PLMN, when out of CTS range. An MS attached with a GSM PLMN and coming in range of the CTS shall not attach to CTS if a connection in the GSM PLMN is active. In that case the MS shall wait until the connection is finished.
+- d) Automatic mode with GSM preferred: the MS attaches to GSM PLMN, when in range, and then automatically tries to attach with CTS, when out of GSM PLMN range. A MS attached with CTS and coming in range of a GSM PLMN shall not attach to the GSM PLMN, if a connection in the CTS is active. In that case the MS shall wait until the connection is finished.
+- e) Parallel mode - single active mode: the MS tries to attach with both GSM PLMN and CTS. If a CTS-MS is attached to both CTS-FP and GSM, it shall offer double service in idle mode (i.e. full service on both systems in idle mode), and at least single service in active mode (i.e. when involved in an active call on one system, no service is required on the other system). Techniques shall avoid excessive signalling load on the GSM PLMN.
+- f) Parallel mode - double active mode: the MS tries to attach with both GSM PLMN and CTS. If a CTS-MS is attached to both CTS-FP and GSM, it shall offer full service on both types of networks, e.g. the CTS-MS shall be able to successfully handle all applicable terminating calls that are addressed to its MSISDN and to the CTS-FP number.
+
+When switched on, the CTS-MS enters the last selected operation mode.
+
+NOTE: The user may, optionally, define a default mode setting, in which case the default mode is always entered when the CTS-MS is switched on.
+
+The selected mode and the current coverage (CTS and/or GSM) shall be indicated to the user.
+
+The user of the CTS-MS might have subscribed to the CTS service only. Access of the CTS-MS to the GSM network may however be required in order to establish a signalling link, e.g. to exchange operation control data.
+
+#### 4.2.5.2 Attachment of the same CTS-MS with multiple CTS-FPs
+
+A CTS-MS shall be able to attach to all CTS-FPs it is initialised with however it may only be attached with only one CTS-FP at a time.
+
+A list of all CTS-FPs, the CTS-MS is enrolled to, shall be stored in the CTS-MS, preferably on the MS-SIM. This list shall for each CTS-FP/CTS-MS pair contain all data which defines their association.
+
+This list may also define the preference of attachment in the case that the CTS-MS is in range of several CTS-FPs when entering the CTS mode of operation. The user may be able to change the preference order of CTS-FPs in the list.
+
+A manual attachment mode may be implemented which enables the user to scan for CTS-FPs the CTS-MS is enrolled to in order to select a specific CTS-FP, of those in range, for attachment.
+
+#### 4.2.5.3 Attachment of multiple CTS-MSs with the same CTS-FP
+
+Enrolment and parallel attachment of multiple MS on a single CTS-FP shall be possible. The CTS-FP control however
+
+what MSs are allowed to be enrolled and attached.
+
+A minimum number of 8 CTS-MSs shall be possible to attach with the same CTS-FP.
+
+#### 4.2.5.4 Attachment status of a CTS-MS
+
+A mechanism to provide information about the attachment status of a CTS-MS shall be supported by the CTS-FP. This mechanism can be used for network information or routing purposes. This mechanism shall provide a notification in the following situations:
+
+- a) when attaching with the CTS;
+- b) when de-attaching with the CTS.
+
+This mechanism shall be transparent to the user.
+
+In addition, when the mobile is leaving the GSM network for CTS attachment (i.e. not in the parallel mode), it shall behave towards the GSM network as if it was being switched off.
+
+### 4.2.6 CTS applications
+
+#### 4.2.6.1 Tele-services
+
+The first phase of CTS shall support the speech teleservice on the CTS radio interface.
+
+Emergency calls shall be supported for attached MSs only. The call origination of an emergency call shall be according to the selected mode. The quality of the speech teleservice shall be at least equal to existing GSM speech qualities. The existing GSM phase 2 requirements on voice codecs according to ref. [xx] shall be applicable to CTS.
+
+If the user attempts to set up calls other than speech or emergency calls, this request shall be sent to the CTS-FP. The CTS-FP may issue a rejection cause.
+
+#### 4.2.6.2 Supplementary services
+
+Supplementary services invoked from the CTS-MS are directed towards the CTS-FP or the GSM network, depending on the current mode and coverage. In parallel mode it should be possible for the user to choose the preferential network and regardless of the preferential origination, to select on a per transaction basis the used network.
+
+As an option (both in the CTS-MS and CTS-FP) the user with CTS should be capable of supporting all the standardized supplementary services that are provided in the GSM. From the point of view of the CTS-MS and the radio interface, the operation of the services shall be the same in GSM and in cordless mode. The CTS radio interface protocol shall therefore support the GSM supplementary services and correspond to the GSM radio interface with respect to the supplementary services. Additional optional procedures may be provided in the CTS-FP, i.e. an interworking function between the CTS radio interface protocol and the fixed network access protocol for the support of supplementary services. Services not supported in the CTS-FP shall be rejected in the same way as in the GSM.
+
+The CTS-MS shall indicate to the user if the CTS-FP cannot be used to handle the requested service, e.g. due to that the line is busy or the CTS-FP do not support the above-mentioned interworking.
+
+#### 4.2.6.3 Additional support for fixed network supplementary services
+
+In order to enable support of supplementary services in the fixed network, DTMF handling on the CTS Radio Interface, during CTS calls, shall be handled in the same way as in GSM. The CTS-FP shall generate the corresponding tones and messages for the fixed network.
+
+Since some fixed networks make use of hook-flash signalling, it shall be possible for the user to send a hook-flash request to the CTS-FP, which shall then perform the hook-flash signalling on the line interface.
+
+#### 4.2.6.4 Man Machine Interface (MMI)
+
+If the CTS mode is selected as the preferential mode for mobile originated activities (see subclauses 4.2.6.2 and 5.5.1 for supplementary service operations and call set-up, respectively), the handset should **not** change its behaviour
+
+regarding input MMI string. Normal rules according to GSM 02.30 should be used by the MS and the CTS-FP, which would then perform the proper interworking towards the fixed network or the GSM network on which the CTS-FP is connected.
+
+#### 4.2.6.5 CTS internal calls
+
+In the case when more than one CTS-MS are attached to a CTS-FP, internal calls (without billing) between the MSs at this CTS-FP should be possible, as an option (both in the CTS-MS and CTS-FP).
+
+#### 4.2.6.6 CTS internal call transfer
+
+As an option (both in the CTS-MS and CTS-FP) the user should be able to internally transfer an external network call from one CTS-MS to another if both CTS-MSs are attached to the same CTS-FP.
+
+#### 4.2.6.7 CTS internal call hold
+
+As an option (both in the CTS-MS and CTS-FP) the user should be able to put a external network call on internal hold, i.e. to release the call on the CTS Radio Interface but keep it active on the external network interface. If this option is supported, it shall also be possible to retrieve the call.
+
+#### 4.2.6.8 Mobile hunting
+
+As an option, it should be possible to trigger a general procedure which makes all the attached MSs ring on a special way and therefore allows the user to locate them. The procedure should be triggered by the CTS-FP or CTS-MS.
+
+#### 4.2.6.9 SMS-MT
+
+As an option the user should be able to have a Mobile Terminated Short Message presented, provided this message is made available to the CTS-FP. The support of SMS-MT on the CTS radio interface is mandatory for the CTS-MS.
+
+#### 4.2.6.10 SMS-MO
+
+As an option the user should be able to generate a Mobile Originated Short Message and send it towards the CTS-FP. The CTS-FP may issue a rejection cause, if the feature is not supported.
+
+#### 4.2.6.11 Other services
+
+Other services are not required for the first phase.
+
+## 4.3 Radio interface and GSM co-existence aspects
+
+### 4.3.1 General principles
+
+It should be possible to use the GSM-Cordless Telephony System (CTS) on the same carrier frequencies as assigned for the cellular service. These carrier frequencies can be part of a licence exempt band or a licensed band. In the second case these frequencies can be reserved for GSM-CTS usage, or can be shared with the cellular system. In any case a set of frequencies (Generic Frequency List) needs to be defined by a CTS operator or a regulator to enable CTS operations.
+
+The CTS licence exempt mode is only applicable in countries where the national regulator allocates a suitable band.
+
+A mechanism shall be employed to insure that the CTS-FP will only operate in Licence exempt mode in an area or country where it is authorized to do so.
+
+When used within a licensed band:
+
+- it is necessary for the CTS operator to have complete control, on an area and time basis, over the frequencies the CTS can use. These frequencies shall be part of the frequency set under its responsibility.
+
+Interference to the cellular system or other CTS systems shall be minimised.
+
+The requirements in respect to the receiver and transmitter characteristics of the CTS FP shall allow communication with a GSM MS.
+
+The CTS-FP shall also have a self-controlling feature to minimise interference in the case where no attached MS is in range of the CTS-FP.
+
+In the case of the CTS-Fixed Part connected to PLMN, means should be implemented in the CTS-FP in order to minimize unnecessary radio transmissions to the PLMN.
+
+### 4.3.2 Broadcast channel functionality
+
+For CTS the BCCH-like functionality shall include the following:
+
+- reveal the presence of the CTS;
+- page the terminals attached to the CTS;
+- accept access requests from the terminals attached at the CTS;
+- support intracell handover;
+- synchronisation.
+
+## 4.4 Security requirements
+
+### 4.4.1 General
+
+1. The use of CTS shall not compromise the security of any PLMN or fixed network.
+2. There shall be a mechanism that ensures that security options and parameters for the CTS-FP provided by the CTS operator or by the regulator are followed by the CTS-FP.
+3. There shall be a mechanism that ensures that the CTS-FP only obeys security options and parameter received from the PLMN operator to which it is enrolled.
+
+### 4.4.2 Enrolment
+
+Enrolment of the MS to the FP shall include authentication of the MS-SIM by the PLMN in accordance with the requirements for subscriber identity authentication defined in GSM 02.09, clause 3.
+
+It shall be possible to conduct all CTS-FP and CTS-MS security mechanisms across the fixed network.
+
+Enrolment of the MS to the FP shall include mutual authentication between the CTS-FP and the CTS-MS.
+
+The mutual authentication of MS and FP shall use a CTS specific secret key.
+
+### 4.4.3 Attachment
+
+Attachment of the MS to the FP shall include mutual authentication between the CTS-FP and the CTS-MS.
+
+The mutual authentication of MS and FP shall use a CTS specific secret key. This key shall not be a key input to the MS via the MS MMI, but shall be a key installed/derived during the enrolment of the MS to the FP.
+
+It shall not be possible for an MS that has not been enrolled to an FP to attach to that FP.
+
+### 4.4.4 Protection of communications
+
+Local CTS communication (both signalling and user data) shall be protected against unauthorized eavesdropping.
+
+This protection need not be as secure as for the GSM air interface, but it shall employ cryptographic methods and a CTS specific encryption key.
+
+A CTS mobile subscriber shall be identified on the CTS radio path by a local temporary, number, similar to, but not, the TMSI.
+
+Communication across the fixed network of sensitive data required for CTS operation shall be protected against unauthorized eavesdropping.
+
+### 4.4.5 Security Parameter Storage Requirements
+
+It shall be possible for the GSM operator to ascertain the IMEI of the MS when the CTS-MS is attached with a CTS-FP. Additionally, in order to detect changes in the ME used for CTS, the IMEI shall be passed to the FP when requested.
+
+The CTS-FP shall have a unique identity (IFPEI) stored in a secure way, in accordance with the requirements for storage of the IMEI, described in GSM 02.09.
+
+It shall be possible for the GSM operator to ascertain the IFPEI of the CTS-FP.
+
+The common keys used by the MS and FP for mutual authentication and encryption of local CTS communication shall be securely stored within the MS and FP. The secret keys used for enrolment and attachment shall be stored in the MS-SIM.
+
+The FP shall not contain any algorithms used for GSM security (e.g. A3, A8) unless the storage of these algorithms within the FP meets the requirements for storage of authentication functionality within the MS as defined in 02.09, subclause 3.2.3.
+
+Key management shall be under the control of the PLMN operator.
+
+### 4.4.6 De-activation
+
+It shall be possible within the operator defined time for the GSM operator to de-activate the CTS service of its subscribers (i.e. de-activate the MS).
+
+It shall be possible, within the operator defined time, for the CTS operator to de-activate a CTS-FP with respect to the use of the operator's frequencies by that CTS-FP (see also subclause 6.3).
+
+# --- 5 Normal Procedures
+
+## 5.1 Enrolment of CTS-FP
+
+### 5.1.1 CTS operator procedure for enrolment of CTS-FP
+
+At enrolment, the CTS-FP shall receive data needed for correct operation of the CTS radio interface, e.g. the following:
+
+- the set of carrier frequencies;
+- the maximum transmit power it is allowed to use;
+- data related to CTS-roaming.
+
+At enrolment, the CTS-FP may also receive other data necessary for the CTS-FP to operate, e.g. the following:
+
+- operation data necessary to contact the CTS operator (e.g. a fixed network destination address where the information shall be sent).
+
+As a minimum requirement one of the following three mechanisms to provide data to the CTS-FP shall be supported:
+
+- a) by means of network information via the radio interface (e.g. a SMS message, or a system-information message) from the cellular network to the CTS-MS, which then forwards the information to the CTS-FP. This implies that the MS must recognize that this information is intended for CTS-FP use, i.e. it shall forward the relevant information, without any display to the user. A means of passing the initial parameters to the CTS-FP is required;
+- b) directly on a fixed network connection between CTS-FP and the CTS operator;
+- c) Directly from the GSM network when the CTS-FP is connected via radio to a GSM PLMN.
+
+Cordless access to the CTS services via this CTS-FP shall not be possible unless enrolment has been successfully completed.
+
+Enrolment shall be based on authentication of the FP-SIM.
+
+### 5.1.2 User procedure for enrolment of CTS-FP
+
+To prevent misuse of the CTS-FP or unintended start of the enrolment procedure, the following user actions may be required:
+
+- the CTS-FP and a CTS-MS may be used for CTS-FP enrolment;
+- a well defined user action at the CTS-FP and/or the CTS-MS in order to enter a CTS-FP enrolment state (e.g. by pressing a button or by entering a certain menu);
+- the user is informed when the procedure is finished (e.g. tones or icons).
+
+## 5.2 Enrolment of CTS-MSs
+
+After enrolment of the CTS-FP it may be possible to initialise several CTS-MSs on that CTS-FP.
+
+To avoid unauthorized enrolment of a CTS-MS onto a CTS-FP, CTS-MS enrolment shall involve mutual authentication of the CTS-MS and the CTS-FP. Some security sensitive information, e.g. the CTS-MS authentication key, shall be securely stored inside the MS-SIM and in CTS-FP. Some other information needs to be exchanged between CTS-FP and CTS-MS to create data records required to recognize and access each other. This shall be done directly via signalling on the GSM-CTS Radio Interface.
+
+Each CTS-MS to be enrolled shall indicate that the CTS service is subscribed to.
+
+In addition, depending on the roaming control level defined by the CTS operator, enrolment may be performed with CTS operator control including CTS-FP authentication by the CTS operator and CTS-MS authentication. To prevent misuse of the CTS-FP by unauthorised users, the following actions shall be required:
+
+- the CTS-FP and a CTS-MS shall be used for CTS-MS enrolment;
+- a well defined user action at the CTS-FP and/or the CTS-MS in order to enter a CTS-MS enrolment state (e.g. by pressing a button or by entering a certain menu);
+- there shall be a mechanism to prove authorisation of that particular CTS-MS to use the CTS-FP;
+- the user is informed, via the CTS-MS, when the procedure is finished (e.g. tones or icons).
+
+At CTS-MS enrolment a unique CTS-MS number is optionally assigned to the CTS-MS. This number is intended to be used to identify a specific CTS-MS, e.g. for de-enrolment or for addressing an internal call or call transfer towards this CTS-MS. This CTS-MS number shall be in the range of 0 to 99.
+
+## 5.3 De-enrolment of a CTS-MS
+
+It shall be possible to de-initialise a specific CTS-MS which is enrolled at a CTS-FP. This can be performed either by a CTS-MS, by the CTS-FP or by the CTS operator.
+
+In the case de-enrolment is performed by a CTS-MS, to prevent misuse by unauthorised users or unintended CTS-MS
+
+de-enrolment, the following actions shall be required:
+
+- the CTS-FP and a CTS-MS shall be used for CTS-MS de-enrolment. The CTS-MS used may be any CTS-MS which is enrolled at the CTS-FP including the one which is going to be de-enrolled;
+- a well defined user action at the CTS-FP and/or the CTS-MS in order to enter a CTS-MS de-enrolment state (e.g. pressing a button or entering a certain menu);
+- there shall be a mechanism to prove authorisation of that particular CTS-MS to use the CTS-FP;
+- the user is informed, via the CTS-MS, when the procedure is finished (e.g. tones or icons).
+
+When de-enrolment is performed by the CTS-FP, the CTS-FP deletes all the data related to the de-enrolled CTS-MS and notifies the CTS-MS when possible.
+
+When de-enrolment is performed by the CTS operator a specific command is sent to the CTS-FP requesting de-enrolment of a given CTS-MS. The CTS-FP sends a de-enrolment notification to the CTS-MS when possible.
+
+The de-enrolled CTS-MS shall not be able to attach to the CTS-FP until it is again enrolled with the CTS-FP.
+
+## 5.4 Attachment of CTS-MS
+
+An MS cannot attach with a CTS-FP without being enrolled to that CTS-FP. An MS cannot make calls via a certain CTS-FP, without being attached with that CTS-FP.
+
+To avoid unauthorized attachment of a CTS-MS at a CTS-FP, mutual authentication between the CTS-FP and the CTS-MS shall be performed during attachment.
+
+## 5.5 Call procedures
+
+### 5.5.1 CTS-MS originated calls
+
+Calls from the CTS-MS are set up via the CTS-FP or the GSM network, depending on the current mode and coverage. In parallel mode it should be possible for the user to choose the preferential call origination network and regardless of the preferential origination, to select on per call basis the call set up network.
+
+The CTS-MS shall indicate to the user if the CTS-FP cannot be used to set-up a call, e.g. due to that the line is busy or the CTS-FP is engaged in a CTS internal call.
+
+In case of network origination, the CTS-MS/CTS-FP pair shall behave as a usual terminal of the network on which the CTS-FP is connected.
+
+If the CTS internal call hold/call retrieve feature is supported, the user can put the call to the network on internal hold, e.g. to set up a CTS internal call, and retrieve it afterwards.
+
+#### 5.5.1.1 Number compatibility between GSM formats and fixed network formats
+
+In order to use the GSM number formats (e.g. using '+' as part of a dialled number) when originating a CTS call via the MMI of the CTS-MS, a number conversion from GSM format to fixed network format is required in the CTS-FP.
+
+The following types of conversions are required:
+
+- replacing the GSM international prefix ('+') with the appropriate fixed network international prefix, as defined by the user, when the country code in the call set-up does not equal the stored (home) country code;
+- replacing the GSM international prefix ('+') and the country code with an appropriate prefix, as defined by the user (e.g. a '0'), when the country code in the call set-up equals the stored (home) country code;
+- route the Emergency call set-up to the appropriate emergency number in the fixed network;
+- removing a potential (home) area code, as defined by the user.
+
+In order to support the above-mentioned features, the user shall either be able to define and modify the following data in the CTS-MS MMI and then pass it to the CTS-FP or define the conversions in the CTS-FP:
+
+- the fixed network international prefix;
+- the (home) country code;
+- the (home) area code;
+- the fixed network emergency number;
+- prefix to replace "international part" of a national number (e.g. replacing +468123 with 08123).
+
+### 5.5.2 CTS-MS terminated calls
+
+External calls to the CTS-MS are directed either via the GSM network (using the MSISDN) or via the CTS-FP (using the CTS-FP network or GSM number). Each network could then direct the call to any destination, e.g. according to registration status or normal "Call forwarding" settings.
+
+In addition, internal calls may be supported, as described in subclause 5.5.3.
+
+Two different types of alerting the CTS-MS from the CTS-FP shall be supported:
+
+- group alerting: all CTS-MSs attached with the CTS-FP will be paged until one CTS-MS (or another fixed network terminal) accepts the call. The other CTS- MSs will then not be paged any more and shall stop alerting the user;
+- individual alerting: if a call can be determined, by the CTS-FP, as intended for a certain CTS-MS, only that CTS-MS will be paged. To determine an individual CTS-MS, different methods can be used, e.g. the following:
+ - use of the CTS-MS local number;
+ - use of the MS-ISDN.
+
+When receiving a call, the user shall be informed where the call comes from, i.e. via GSM network or CTS-FP, and in the case of CTS-FP whether it is a CTS internal call or an external call. As an option in the CTS-MS, an indication on the type of alerting (group or individual) should be given. This could be realised e.g. by different alerting tones.
+
+If an incoming call via the CTS-FP is answered by a fixed terminal (e.g. phone or answering machine), the CTS user shall be able to retrieve the call at any time while the call lasts.
+
+If the CTS internal call hold/call retrieve feature is supported, the user can put the call from the external network on internal hold, e.g. to set up a CTS internal call, and retrieve it afterwards.
+
+If a MS is involved in an internal call and an incoming call for this MS is presented on the CTS-FP, the user shall be informed of the new call, e.g. by a tone. It shall be possible to distinguish internal and external calls. The user will have the possibility to ignore the new call or to release or to hold the current call and to take the new one.
+
+### 5.5.3 CTS internal calls (optional)
+
+To set up an internal call, a specific action or command shall be used in order to distinguish between external calls (to the fixed network or the GSM network) and CTS internal calls. The CTS-MS number, which is assigned at enrolment shall be used for dialling. It should be possible to find the CTS-MS number corresponding to a MSISDN number by a MMI on the CTS-FP and/or on the CTS-MS.
+
+Only the CTS-MS which is associated with the CTS-MS number will be paged. A specific alerting tone or melody may be defined for internal calls in order to differentiate internal and external calls.
+
+### 5.5.4 CTS internal call transfer (optional)
+
+If the internal call transfer feature is supported, the user can transfer a call from the fixed network to any CTS-MS which is attached at the same CTS-FP. The destined CTS-MS is addressed by its CTS-MS number which is assigned at enrolment.
+
+An external network call can directly be transferred to the destined CTS-MS or it can be put on hold before (see above).
+
+## 5.6 Maintenance
+
+The data exchanged during the initialisation may be updated, using the same mechanisms as developed for initialisation. The update of the initialisation parameters intended for correct operation of the CTS radio interface (as described in subclause 5.1.1) after initialisation time shall be under the control of the GSM operator.
+
+Means shall be developed so that a CTS-FP cannot be moved to an area , where the CTS frequencies are not allowed to be used by the CTS subscriber, without having to be re-initialised.
+
+The MS when attached to GSM, but not attached to the CTS-FP, and with a user selection for parallel mode or automatic mode with CTS preferred, shall attach with the CTS-FP within 2 minutes after coming in range of the CTS-FP.
+
+The MS when being switched on within range of the CTS-FP, and with a user selection for CTS mode, automatic mode with CTS preferred, or parallel mode, shall attach with the CTS-FP within 1 minute.
+
+# --- 6 CTS de-activation
+
+Three different types of CTS-FP de-activation are possible.
+
+## 6.1 CTS-FP de-activation by the CTS operator
+
+When used within a licensed band:
+
+- it shall be possible for the CTS operator to de-activate the CTS service on an area and time base. The CTS operator may de-activate specific CTS-FPs. This kind of de-activation shall not delete the data related to the CTS-FP/CTS-MS association.
+
+## 6.2 CTS-FP de-activation by the user
+
+The user shall be able de-activate the CTS-FP, (i.e. erase the data necessary for CTS operation) In order to restart CTS operation, the user has to initialise the CTS-FP again.
+
+A special action shall be required by the user in order to de-activate the CTS-FP.
+
+## 6.3 CTS-FP de-activation by self controlling features
+
+When used within a licensed band:
+
+- the CTS-FP shall stop operation when it has not received any update of operation data for a certain period of time. The period shall be under the control of the PLMN. This kind of de-activation shall not delete the data related to the CTS-FP/CTS-MS association;
+- when the CTS-FP is de-connected from the fixed network or the GSM network, or/and power supply for a certain period of time, it shall be de-activated. This kind of de-activation shall not delete the data related to the CTS-FP/CTS-MS association;
+- when the FP-SIM has been modified (insertion of a new FP-SIM card) the CTS-FP shall be de-activated.
+
+In order to restart CTS operation, the user has to initialise the CTS-FP again.
+
+## 6.4 CTS-MS de-activation by the CTS operator
+
+It shall be possible for the CTS operator to stop the CTS service on an area and time base. The CTS operator may de-activate specific CTS-FPs. This kind of de-activation shall not delete the data related to the CTS-FP/CTS-MS
+
+association.
+
+# --- 7 Exceptional procedures
+
+None identified.
+
+# --- 8 Charging aspects
+
+The only charging aspects assumed is on a subscription basis, for the use of the spectrum, belonging to the CTS operator. The CTS operator may differentiate the amount of charge if CTS-roaming at a CTS-FP is allowed (see subclause 4.2.3.1).
+
+There are no charging aspects when the CTS operate within a license exempt band.
+
+Fixed network charging is out of the scope of the present document.
+
+# --- 9 Cross Phase Compatibility
+
+None identified.
+
+# --- Annex A (informative): Later phases of CTS
+
+NOTE: This annex will be taken out of later versions of the Stage 1 and moved to 10.56.
+
+In order to make the design of the CTS radio interface "future proof", it is of importance that services that are likely to be introduced in later phases of CTS are considered already in the design of the first phase of the CTS radio interface. The following future services shall be taken into account when the first phase of the CTS radio interface is designed (preferably by re-using the existing GSM protocols for these features):
+
+- CTS-CTS handover in a CTS multi-cell environment;
+- data and fax services.
+
+Furthermore, later phases of CTS may also include:
+
+- definition of additional protocols and interface standards towards the fixed network in order to include CTS in IN services in an efficient way;
+- support of multiple fixed lines.
+
+The CTS-GSM handover (in both directions) is a complex issue which needs further study. Thus, it shall for the moment not be considered as a candidate for CTS.
+
+# Annex B (informative): Change History
+
+| SMG No. | TDoc. No. | CR. No. | Clauses affected | New version | Subject/Comments |
+|---------|-----------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| SMG#28 | 99-049 | A001 | | | Integration of SMG10 comments - R98 |
+| SMG#28 | 99-049 | A002 | 4.2.6.4 | 7.1.0 | Management of GSM SS - In order to reduce MS complexity, the MS should behave indifferently in cellular and cordless mode, as much as possible. |
+| SMG#28 | 99-049 | A003 | | | CTS wording clarification: In order to clarify the CTS description, the SMG12 has replaced "MS enrolment" by "MS Enrolment". This clearly separates FP et MS activities. |
+| SMG#28 | 99-049 | A004 | | | Rejected by Plenary, and after removal of Unlicensed band, it was replaced by 0256A005 |
+| SMG#28 | 99-049 | A005 | 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2.3, 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.2, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.6, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 6., 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 8 | | Introduction of a SIM card in the CTS-FP for CTS subscription management: Since the introduction by the SMG12 of a SIM card in the CTS-FP, it is possible to separate GSM operator and CTS operator roles and increase the overall CTS security. |
+| SMG#28 | | | | 7.1.1 | The version number has been updated to 7.1.1 for Public Enquiry. |
+| SMG#29 | P-99-378 | A006 | Overall | 7.2.0 | The CTS stage 1 requires some clarifications of CTS description in order to align on SMG12 :
CTS-MS « registration » is replaced by « attachment ».
Clarification is brought to de-enrolment of a CTS-MS and de-activation of a CTS-FP |
+| SMG#29 | P-99-378 | A007r1 | Overall | 7.2.0 | The introduction of the feature in the GSM-CTS standard, allows national regulators to allocate licence exempt frequencies to CTS usage.
Reason for revision: clarification of the applicability of the license exempt mode and editorial improvements. |
+| SMG#29 | P-99-378 | A008r1 | Overall | 7.2.0 | This introduction of CTS-FP connected to PLMN, extend the CTS concept application to all GSM operators. It should not require any changes to the CTS-MS. |
+| | | | | 8.0.0 | Specification upgrade to Release 1997 version 8.0.0 |
+| | | | | 8.0.1 | Update to Version 8.0.1 for Publication |
+
+| Change History | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|----------|----------|-------|------|-----|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|-----|
+| TSG# | TSG doc | WG doc | Spec | CR | Rev | Ph | Cat | Title | Old vers | New vers | WI |
+| s28 | P-99-030 | 98-795 | 02.56 | A001 | | R98 | F | Integration of SMG10 comments | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | CTS |
+| s28 | P-99-030 | 98-796 | 02.56 | A002 | | R98 | F | Management of GSM SS | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | CTS |
+| s28 | P-99-030 | 98-749 | 02.56 | A003 | | R98 | D | CTS wording clarification | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | CTS |
+| | P-99-049 | | 02.56 | A005 | | R98 | D | Introduction of a SIM card in the CTS-FP for CTS subscription management | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | CTS |
+| s28 | | | | | | | | Updated for PE | 7.1.0 | 7.1.1 | |
+| s29 | P-99-378 | 1-99-108 | 02.56 | A006 | | R98 | F | Clarifications of CTS description and alignment on SMG12 | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | CTS |
+| s29 | P-99-378 | 1-99-106 | 02.56 | A007 | 1 | R98 | B | CTS usage with licence exempt frequencies | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | CTS |
+| s29 | P-99-378 | 1-99-107 | 02.56 | A008 | 1 | R98 | B | Definition of CTS-FP connected to a GSM PLMN | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | CTS |
+| s29 | | | 02.56 | | | | | Specification upgrade to Release 1997 version 8.0.0 | 7.2.0 | 8.0.0 | |
+| s29 | | | 02.56 | | | | | Update to Version 8.0.1 for Publication | 8.0.0 | 8.0.1 | |
+
+| | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|---|---|-------|---|--------------------------------|--------|--------|--|
+| SP-11 | SP-010065 | S1-010258 | 42.056 | | | Rel-4 | | Transferred to 3GPP Release 4 | 8.0.1 | 4.0.0 | |
+| SP-16 | SP-020267 | S1-021043 | 42.056 | | | Rel-5 | | Updated from Rel-4 to Rel-5 | 4.0.0 | 5.0.0 | |
+| SP-26 | SP-040744 | S1-040997 | 42.056 | | | Rel-6 | | Updated from Rel-5 to Rel-6 | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | |
+| SP-36 | | | 42.056 | | | Rel-7 | | Updated from Rel-6 to Rel-7 | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | |
+| SP-42 | - | - | | | | Rel-8 | | Updated from Rel-7 to Rel-8 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | |
+| SP-46 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-9 by MCC | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | |
+| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | |
+| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-11 by MCC | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | |
+| 2014-10 | | | | | | | | Updated to Rel-12 by MCC | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | |
+| 2015-12 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-13 by MCC | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | |
+| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-14 by MCC | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | |
+| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-15 by MCC | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | |
+| SA#88e | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-16 by MCC | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | |
+| 2022-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-17 by MCC | 16.0.0 | 17.0.0 | |
+| 2024-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-18 by MCC | 17.0.0 | 18.0.0 | |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# 3GPP TS 42.068 V18.0.0 (2024-03)
+
+*Technical Specification*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; Voice Group Call Service (VGCS); Stage 1 (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+The GSM logo consists of the letters 'GSM' in a stylized blue font, with a small red square to the right of the 'M'. Below the logo, the text 'GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS' is written in a smaller blue font.
+
+GSM logo with the text 'GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS'
+
+
+
+The 3GPP logo features the letters '3GPP' in a bold, black, stylized font. The '3' is larger and has a red signal icon (three curved lines) below it. A small 'TM' symbol is located to the top right of the 'P'.
+
+3GPP logo with a signal icon
+
+The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organisational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organisational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organisational Partners' Publications Offices.
+
+## --- **Keywords**
+
+GSM, stage 1
+
+## **3GPP**
+
+## --- **Postal address**
+
+## --- **3GPP support office address**
+
+650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne - FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+## --- **Internet**
+
+
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification**
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+## Contents
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Foreword ..... | 4 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 5 |
+| 2 References..... | 5 |
+| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 6 |
+| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 |
+| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 7 |
+| 4 Description..... | 7 |
+| 5 Normal operation with successful outcome ..... | 10 |
+| 5.1 Provision..... | 10 |
+| 5.2 Withdrawal..... | 11 |
+| 5.3 Network related service configuration ..... | 11 |
+| 5.3.1 Void ..... | 11 |
+| 5.4 Normal operation for voice group call establishment ..... | 11 |
+| 5.5 Charging requirements ..... | 11 |
+| 5.6 Security requirements..... | 12 |
+| 6 Exceptional procedures or unsuccessful outcome ..... | 12 |
+| 7 Interaction with other GSM services ..... | 12 |
+| 7.1 Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) ..... | 12 |
+| 7.2 Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR)..... | 13 |
+| 7.3 Connected Line Identification Presentation (COLP) ..... | 13 |
+| 7.4 Connected Line Identification Restriction (COLR)..... | 13 |
+| 7.5 Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) ..... | 13 |
+| 7.6 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy (CFB)..... | 13 |
+| 7.7 Call Forwarding on No Reply (CFNRy)..... | 13 |
+| 7.8 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc) ..... | 13 |
+| 7.9 Call Waiting (CW) ..... | 13 |
+| 7.10 Call Hold (HOLD) ..... | 14 |
+| 7.11 Multi-party Service (MPTY)..... | 14 |
+| 7.12 Closed User Group (CUG)..... | 14 |
+| 7.13 Advice of Charge (AoC) ..... | 14 |
+| 7.14 Barring of All Outgoing Calls (BAOC) ..... | 14 |
+| 7.15 Barring of Outgoing International Calls (BOIC) ..... | 14 |
+| 7.16 Barring of Outgoing International Calls except those to the Home PLMN country (BOIC-exHC)..... | 14 |
+| 7.17 Barring of All Incoming Calls (BAIC) ..... | 15 |
+| 7.18 Barring of Incoming Calls when Roaming outside the home PLMN country (BIC-Roam)..... | 15 |
+| 7.19 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)..... | 15 |
+| 7.20 Enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP)..... | 15 |
+| 7.21 Short Message Service (SMS)..... | 15 |
+| 7.22 Operator Determined Barring (ODB) ..... | 16 |
+| 7.23 Completion of Calls to Busy Subscribers (CCBS)..... | 16 |
+| 7.24 GPRS..... | 16 |
+| 8 Interworking considerations..... | 16 |
+| Annex A (informative): Change History ..... | 17 |
+
+# --- Foreword
+
+This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version x.y.z
+
+where:
+
+- x the first digit:
+ - 1 presented to TSG for information;
+ - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+ - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
+
+# --- 1 Scope
+
+The present document specifies the stage one description of the Voice Group Call Service (VGCS) which allows speech conversation of a predefined group of service subscribers in half duplex mode on the radio link taking into account multiple mobile service subscribers involved in the VGCS call per cell.
+
+The VGCS is applicable to all mobile stations in a certain network and area which have the technical capability and the corresponding subscription, respectively, to participate in a VGCS call.
+
+NOTE: It is not considered as requirement that normal GSM phase 2 mobile stations will be able to be used for this service.
+
+The service is described from the service subscriber's and user's point of view; in particular:
+
+- the procedure for normal operation with successful outcome;
+- the action to be taken in exceptional circumstances;
+- the interaction with other GSM services and features.
+
+The present document does not deal with the Man-Machine Interface (MMI) requirements, but makes reference to the appropriate Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) specifications.
+
+The present document defines a teleservice of the digital cellular telecommunications system GSM. Any interaction with other services and/or networks not dealt with in clauses 7 or 8 are outside the scope of the present document.
+
+# --- 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+
+- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+- [2] 3GPP TS 22.067: "enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP); Stage 1".
+- [3] 3GPP TS 32.005: "Telecommunications management; Charging management; 3G call and event data for the Circuit Switched (CS) domain".
+- [4] 3GPP TS 43.020: "Security-related network functions".
+
+# 3 Definitions and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Definitions
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:
+
+**Network operator:** Entity which provides the network operating elements and resources for the execution of the VGCS.
+
+**Service provider:** Entity which offers the VGCS for subscription. The network operator may be the service provider.
+
+**Voice group call:** An instance of the VGCS initiated by a subscriber. This term is used synonymously with the term “VGCS call”.
+
+**Service subscriber:** Mobile subscriber which subscribes to the VGCS.
+
+**Group identification (group ID):** A numerical classification. The maximum number of group IDs which can be defined in one PLMN depends on the maximum number of group call areas defined in this PLMN. The maximum number of group IDs and group call areas combined is $10^8$ , Service subscriber shall be provided with one or up to 50 group IDs.
+
+**Dispatcher:** Particular fixed line or mobile users are identified within the network as dispatchers. Dispatchers shall receive all voice group calls to a certain group ID in a group call area (this shall be done automatically by the network). In addition they can initiate voice group calls to a group ID in a group call area.
+
+Dispatchers shall be connected to a voice group call by means of standard links via radio or via an ISDN. They shall be called by their MSISDN or ISDN number, respectively. When dispatchers initiate voice group calls, they shall call a particular MSISDN number which is related to a group ID and group call area. Dispatchers using the GSM network can be located outside of this group call area.
+
+The identities of the dispatchers are exclusively predefined in the network by the service provider. There may be none, one or more dispatchers involved in a particular voice group call.
+
+As a mandatory network requirement, a configuration of up to 5 dispatchers shall be supported. Optionally, up to a maximum of 20 dispatchers may be configured for a particular group call reference.
+
+**Destination service subscriber:** Service subscriber to which the VGCS call is directed.
+
+**Calling service subscriber:** Service subscriber which originates the VGCS call.
+
+**Calling dispatcher:** dispatcher which originates the VGCS call.
+
+**Destination dispatcher:** Pre-registered dispatcher to which the VGCS call is directed.
+
+**Destination subscriber:** Destination dispatcher(s) and/ or destination service subscriber(s) to which the VGCS call is directed.
+
+**Group call area:** Predefined area composed of one or a cluster of cells to which a particular VGCS call is distributed. The maximum number of group call area IDs which can be defined in one PLMN depends on the maximum number of group IDs defined in this PLMN. The maximum number of group IDs and group call areas combined is $10^8$ , The composition of a group call area is predefined in the network by the service provider. Changing of cell allocation in the network due to operational reasons will need an adaptation of the group call area definition. The group call area may include more than one MSC area and cells of more than one PLMN.
+
+**Group call member:** Any service subscriber or dispatcher participating in an ongoing voice group call.
+
+**Listener:** see Listening service subscriber
+
+**Listening service subscriber:** Service subscriber who is listening to an ongoing voice group call.
+
+**Originator-to-dispatcher information:** Information sent by the service subscriber originating a voice group call to the network during call setup for distribution to the dispatchers to be attached to the group call during call setup.
+
+**Talker:** see Talking service subscriber
+
+**Talking service subscriber:** Service subscriber who is currently allowed to talk to other group call members.
+
+## 3.2 Abbreviations
+
+Abbreviations used in the present document are listed in 3GPP TR 21.905.
+
+# --- 4 Description
+
+The VGCS is defined in the following. Figure 1 gives an explanation of the logical concept of the VGCS.
+
+- a) The VGCS enables a calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher to establish a voice group call to destination subscribers belonging to a predefined group call area and group ID.
+
+Applications for voice group call services typically involve multiple group members in a small group call area, for which the VGCS should provide spectrum efficient solutions.
+
+- b) The calling service subscriber as well as the destination service subscribers may be any service subscriber which has subscribed to the related group ID. The calling dispatcher may be any dispatcher who is entitled to originate VGCS calls to the related call reference.
+- c) Destination subscribers are all destination service subscribers or a group of destination service subscribers identified by the called group ID which have their present location in the group call area, and pre-registered destination dispatchers. Destination service subscribers shall be notified with the group ID, not by paging the subscriber individually. Destination dispatchers shall be called individually with their identity.
+
+Service subscribers may become late destination subscribers when entering the group call area within 500 ms after reception of the first notification message related to the VGCS call. Service subscribers which leave the corresponding group call area during an on going VGCS call of which they are member cease to be destination subscribers.
+
+- d) The voice group call shall be established in a group call area which is comprised of one or a cluster of cells. Group call areas shall be predefined in the network by the service provider, co-ordinated by the network operator.
+
+In case of a calling service subscriber initiating a VGCS, the group call area is uniquely identified by the actual cell in which the service subscriber resides at the moment of VGCS call initialization and by the group ID they issue.
+
+A calling dispatcher initiating a VGCS call will be connected to a related predefined group call area. The entitlement of the dispatcher is checked by the network element responsible for the voice group call management by verification of the calling identity. Since a dispatcher may be registered to more than one group call area and group ID an indication of the wanted group call area and group ID has to be given in form of a dedicated address called by the dispatcher.
+
+- e) The service shall permit only one talking service subscriber at any moment; additionally all dispatchers may be talking simultaneously at one time. Dispatchers should hear all combinations of voices other than their own. Listening service subscribers shall hear the combination of all voices. The talking service subscriber shall be given some indication if any dispatchers are also talking.
+
+NOTE 1: The indication may be just the dispatcher's voice.
+
+A dispatcher shall be able to talk at any moment, but the network operator may require him to signal the wish to talk to the network. If the network operator requires a dispatcher to indicate his wish to talk then a dispatcher in that network shall also indicate that he has finished speaking.
+
+Service subscribers who wish to talk shall indicate this. They shall only be able to become talking subscribers if there is no other talking service subscriber. The right to be a talking service subscriber is allocated on a first come first served basis without queuing. Once a service subscriber has become a talking subscriber they shall eventually indicate their wish to become a listening subscriber, or the network may detect that they are no longer a talking subscriber due to time-out or other mechanisms.
+
+CW and procedures for supplementary service management are not possible for a service subscriber.
+
+- f) A voice group call will be considered established as soon as the originating cell in case of a service subscriber originated voice group call, or any one cell within the group call area in case of a dispatcher originated voice group call has been included.
+
+The calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher shall be informed by the network with a suitable indication about the successful establishment of the voice group call so that he can start to speak.
+
+The network shall then continue to try to include all remaining voice group call downlink channels and alert related dispatchers not yet alerted.
+
+The system provides that for an established voice group call the uplink assignment to a service subscriber who wishes to talk is performed under normal conditions in <300 ms after a request to talk is made.
+
+The mobile station of the talking service subscriber shall be requested to send its IMSI to the network in order so that the talker's IMSI be stored in the event records.
+
+- g) Authentication is mandatory at GSM-call set up. To allow fast call set up in VGCS authentication of calling service subscribers or calling dispatchers at invocation may optionally be delayed. Similarly authentication of the talking service subscriber may optionally be delayed to allow fast access.
+
+Confidentiality on the radio path is optional.
+
+- h) Different levels of priority and pre-emption shall be applied as defined in the stage 1 description on the enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption Service (eMLPP) in 3G TS 22.067.
+
+- i) A number of voice group calls may exist simultaneously intended for different groups of destination users in the same group call area.
+
+Parallel voice group calls are possible to the same group of destination subscribers in different, possibly overlapping, group call areas.
+
+- j) A voice group call shall be released on demand of the calling service subscriber or by an entitled dispatcher or by the network.
+
+NOTE 2: The release by the calling service subscriber is only possible if the uplink is assigned to the calling service subscriber.
+
+Automatic release of a voice group call after a selectable time of no voice activity is required.
+
+- j1) If the mobile station having the uplink assigned leaves the group call area, it shall also leave the voice group call. However, the voice group call shall be maintained by the network.
+
+This behaviour shall also apply if the mobile station is the calling service subscriber.
+
+- k) VGCS shall also be provided in case of roaming. For this, certain group Ids shall be defined as supra-PLMN group Ids which have to be co-ordinated between the network operators and which shall be known in the networks and in the SIM. A service subscriber which is entitled by his subscription to establish voice group calls while roaming shall only be able to use supra-PLMN group Ids in case of roaming.
+
+- l) For certain levels of priorities an acknowledgement of receipt of a voice group call can be required as an application option (e.g. for railways emergency calls) from all or from nominated destination service subscribers (nomination is recorded on the SIM). The acknowledgement itself shall be performed at the end of the voice group call. The acknowledgement shall indicate the time the reception started and the time the reception terminated. The acknowledgement has to be given to a predefined recipient.
+
+- m) It shall be possible for a service subscriber to activate or deactivate the voice group call reception for different group Ids. The selection list is stored on the SIM corresponding to the subscribed group Ids. It shall be possible to prohibit the deactivation of group Ids used for high priority calls.
+
+Mobile users that are configured as dispatchers and which are registered in the network for a certain voice group call and which have also a subscription for VGCS with the same group ID as the voice group call for which they are dispatcher shall deactivate this group ID when they are located in the corresponding group call area in order to avoid conflicts between paging for the dispatcher and notifications for the group ID.
+
+- n) The calling service subscriber may specify, at call setup, information to be presented at call setup to the
+
+dispatchers. This information is sent as originator-to-dispatcher information to the network, and sent as UUS1 by the network to the dispatchers in the message for call setup. For normal call setup, the information is subject to the same constraints as UUS1 information in the setup of a point-to-point call. For fast setup, the information is restricted to 12 digits (with leading zeros); inclusion of originator-to-dispatcher information at fast setup is only possible if the mobile station has a valid TMSI. It is a network option to support originator-to-dispatcher information, or to ignore it. The inclusion of originator-to-dispatcher information in the VGCS call setup is not subject to provision or withdrawal.
+
+- o) Optionally, a service subscriber may be given a subscription option to receive privilege for the following:
+ - A privileged service subscriber shall be able to release the current talker (i.e. the current talker shall become a listener, but not released from the call) and become the talker. The privileged service subscriber shall not become the new talker until he is accepted by the network.
+- p) Optionally, a service subscriber shall be able to indicate an emergency situation to the network, and become the talker even if the current talker is a privileged talker. Until this service subscriber has stopped being the talker he shall not be released by another service subscriber unless the periodic emergency signalling has been terminated by a privileged service subscriber. Thereafter the privileged service subscriber may indicate an emergency situation to the network, and become the talker. The service subscriber indicating an emergency situation shall not become the new talker until he is accepted by the network.
+ - If more than one subscriber indicates an emergency situation to the network the first one becomes the talker.
+ - It shall be possible to periodically transmit an emergency indication to all service subscribers of the VGCS even the ones that have not accepted the voice group call. This should continue until the voice group call is released or the periodic emergency transmission is terminated by a privileged service subscriber
+ - Subject to the capabilities of the serving network and the UE, it shall be possible to transmit to all dispatchers an emergency indication and an indication that the emergency situation has ended.
+- q) Optionally, it shall be possible to display additional information (short text stings e.g., "fire arm expert") about the current talker to all the listeners of the voice group call, regardless whether they have requested the talker functionality or indicated an emergency situation, and - subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network - to all dispatchers participating in the voice group call. The additional information shall be sent to all listeners and dispatchers participating in the voice group call when the service subscriber becomes a talker. It should be transmitted periodically to all active cells of the ongoing voice group call as long as the service subscriber remains talker. The additional information shall be displayed as long as the service subscriber remains talker.
+- r) Optionally, it shall be possible for a service subscriber or dispatcher in a voice group call to send application-specific data to the network for distribution to group call members. Subject to information available in the network and/ or provided by the sender, the network shall distribute the data to one or more of the following: service subscriber participating in the voice group call, mobile dispatchers connected to the group call, fixed line dispatchers connected to the group call, subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network, and; a VGCS application (e.g. in an external server or network-based).
+
+The data may be time critical, in which case transfer shall be within a short time period (with a target of not more than 500ms) without impacting voice quality of the group call.
+
+- Note 3: The achievement of the transfer times depends on technical realizations and network planning. E.g. in order to achieve a transfer time of 500 ms or less, it may be necessary to restrict the group call area to one single MSC area.
+
+For contention resolution purposes, a service subscriber request to send application-specific data may be assigned a higher priority than a 'normal' or 'privilege' request to talk or a lower priority than all requests to talk.
+
+- s) Optionally, it shall be possible for a VGCS application (in an external server or network-based) to send a small amount of application-specific data to the network for distribution to group call members. The network shall distribute the data to the service subscribers and to dispatchers connected to the group call, subject to information available in the network and/ or provided by the VGCS application,
+- t) Optionally, it shall be possible for service subscribers in a voice group call, dispatchers in a voice group call and a VGCS application (in external server or network-based) to receive a small amount of application-specific data.
+
+- u) Optionally, it shall be possible for a service subscriber in a voice group call to send an application-specific indication for a VGCS application in the network (or in an external server). Subject to information available in the network and/ or provided by the sender or VGCS application, an acknowledgement may be returned.
+
+For contention resolution purposes, a service subscriber request to send an application-specific indication may be assigned a higher priority than a 'normal' or 'privilege' request to talk or a lower priority than all requests to talk.
+
+- v) Optionally, it shall be possible for the network to gather information on the identities of current listeners within a specified time interval, and to inform dispatchers on the identities of current listeners. Also, this information may be provided to service subscribers.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the logical concept of the VGCS. At the top, a 'Network' box contains three VGCS entities:
+
+
+- VGCS 1**: group address a, group call area I, dispatcher x
+- VGCS 2**: group address c, group call area II, dispatcher -
+- VGCS 3**: group address b, group call area IV, dispatcher y+z
+
+ External dispatchers w, x, y, and z are connected to the network. Below, a diagram illustrates group call areas:
+
+
+- group call area I**: contains subscribers A, A, A, A, B, A
+- group call area IV**: contains **group call area III** (subscribers B, A, C, A, C, B, A, B) and **group call area II** (subscribers C, C, C, B, C, B, A, B)
+
+Figure 1: Logical concept of the VGCS. The diagram shows a 'Network' box containing three VGCS entities: VGCS 1 (group address a, group call area I, dispatcher x), VGCS 2 (group address c, group call area II, dispatcher -), and VGCS 3 (group address b, group call area IV, dispatcher y+z). External dispatchers w, x, y, and z are connected to the network. Below, a diagram illustrates group call areas: Area I contains subscribers A, A, A, A, B, A. Area IV contains Area III (subscribers B, A, C, A, C, B, A, B) and Area II (subscribers C, C, C, B, C, B, A, B).
+
+Note 4: VGCS1, VGCS2, VGCS3 = particular voice group calls with the attributes pre-registered in the network.
+ A, B, C, D = service subscriber with group ID a, b, c or d, respectively.
+ II, III, IV = group call areas.
+ w, x, y, z = dispatchers connected via normal GSM links or external networks.
+
+Figure 1: Logical concept of the VGCS
+
+# 5 Normal operation with successful outcome
+
+## 5.1 Provision
+
+The VGCS is provided to be used by the service subscriber after prior arrangements with the service provider. The
+
+provision includes the assignment of group Ids to the service subscriber. A subscription shall not provide more than 50 group Ids to the service subscriber.
+
+The service can be offered with one subscription option:
+
+| Subscription option | Value |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
+| - subscriber has the capability of initiating voice group calls in case of roaming | - No |
+| | - Yes. |
+
+## 5.2 Withdrawal
+
+The VGCS is withdrawn at the service provider's request or for administrative reasons.
+
+## 5.3 Network related service configuration
+
+The network related service configuration defines the attributes of a particular voice group call which shall be pre-registered in the network by the service provider. This is not related to one specific service subscriber.
+
+The attributes of a particular voice group call are group ID, group call area composition, a list of dispatcher identities to be connected to this area, a list of dispatchers allowed to initiate voice group calls to this area, the group call reference which shall be used in case of COLP (see subclause 7.3) and recipient identities to which an optional acknowledgement can be routed. Changes to the group call area composition shall be co-ordinated with the network operator.
+
+### 5.3.1 Void
+
+## 5.4 Normal operation for voice group call establishment
+
+The VGCS shall be automatically initiated by the network when a calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher dials a particular short code or address at call set-up.
+
+On successful initiation of the VGCS, the voice group call shall be established between the calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher and the destination subscribers. The destination subscribers are:
+
+- all destination service subscribers at any time during the voice group call with the corresponding active group ID when located in the group call area where the group call area is uniquely defined by:
+ - the location (radio cell) of the calling service subscriber at invocation if the call is originated by a calling service subscriber;
+ - the addressed group call area if the call is originated by a calling dispatcher;
+ - the pre-registered destination dispatchers related to that group call area and group ID.
+
+The calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher shall be informed by the network with a suitable indication about the successful establishment of the voice group call so that the user can start to speak.
+
+The call can be released by the calling service subscriber or by the calling dispatcher or by the network or by an entitled dispatcher predefined in the network.
+
+Destination subscribers may exit the voice group call separately without releasing the complete voice group call.
+
+## 5.5 Charging requirements
+
+Event data may be recorded as a network option as defined in 3G TS 32.005 for all VGCS calls to one group ID in a specific group call area. In addition other data to be passed to the anchor MSC for charging purposes are the identities
+
+of the talking subscribers, the time in which they were active and the resources (i.e. cell identities) used during a call.
+
+## 5.6 Security requirements
+
+VGCS shall be able to support over-the-air ciphering in order to provide confidentiality protection to group calls.
+
+VGCS ciphering is an operator's option.
+
+VGCS shall provide means such that only a legitimate service subscriber is able to participate in a ciphered VGCS call when the operator requires confidentiality protection for the group call. To include a subscriber into a ciphered voice group the required group data shall be stored on the USIM. Storing these group data on the USIM may be done e.g. during the USIM personalisation process or via OTA (over-the-air) provisioning.
+
+- If the operator configures confidentiality protection for p-t-p SMS over the CS domain then, it shall also apply when a p-t-p SMS is sent/ received by VGCS group call members in parallel to the voice group call.
+- If the operator configures confidentiality protection for the group call then, confidentiality protection at least equivalent to that provided for the ongoing group call shall apply when a group call member sends a SMS to the group call.
+- If the operator configures confidentiality protection for p-t-p SMS over the CS domain then, it shall also apply to a SMS which is sent by a group call member to a different group, in parallel to the voice group call.
+- If the operator configures confidentiality protection for the group call then, confidentiality protection at least equivalent to that provided for the ongoing group call shall apply when a SMS is delivered to group call members,
+
+A pre- Rel-6 VGCS capable mobile shall be able to participate in an un-ciphered group call, if it is part of that group.
+
+An operator shall be able to guarantee privacy for a SMS sent by a group call member to a different group. This ensures that the SMS cannot be intercepted by members of the sender's group.
+
+# --- 6 Exceptional procedures or unsuccessful outcome
+
+If a service subscriber wants to establish a voice group call while not subscribed to the service or the network cannot provide the service for some reason, an indication will be provided to the calling service subscriber to notify him of the reason of failure.
+
+If a dispatcher wants to establish a voice group call while not entitled to do it or the network cannot provide the service for some reason, the call shall be rejected. The network shall give an appropriate indication to calling dispatchers who are GSM subscribers.
+
+A voice group call will be considered established as soon as the originating cell in case of a service subscriber originated voice group call or any one cell within the group call area in case of a dispatcher originated voice group call has been included . If this cannot be achieved within a specified time the call will be released.
+
+If a cell is excluded from the group call area because of pre-emption, the voice group call shall be maintained.
+
+# --- 7 Interaction with other GSM services
+
+## 7.1 Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP)
+
+If CLIP is applied, the group call reference – including the group call area ID and the group ID – shall be presented to the destination dispatchers. In addition the subaddress field of the calling party may be used to identify the calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher to the destination dispatchers.
+
+The receiving mobile stations of the destination service subscribers shall display the paged group ID regardless the destination service subscribers have a subscription to CLIP.
+
+## 7.2 Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR)
+
+CLIR shall be supported.
+
+The network shall have the possibility to override CLIR or reject the request to establish a voice group call for a calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher who has CLIR activated.
+
+## 7.3 Connected Line Identification Presentation (COLP)
+
+If COLP is applied, the group call reference – including the group call area ID and the group ID – shall be presented to the calling dispatcher. No destination subscriber identities will be presented.
+
+Calling service subscribers receive the group call reference via standard group call setup messaging. COLP therefore does not apply to service subscribers.
+
+## 7.4 Connected Line Identification Restriction (COLR)
+
+COLR is not applicable to voice group calls.
+
+## 7.5 Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU)
+
+CFU is not applicable to voice group calls of service subscribers when activate and operative, i.e. CFU shall be ignored.
+
+CFU is applicable for dispatchers, i.e. voice group calls are forwarded by CFU.
+
+## 7.6 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy (CFB)
+
+CFB is not applicable to voice group calls of service subscribers with CFB active and operative.
+
+CFB is applicable for dispatchers if the voice group call does not have a higher priority than the present call.
+
+## 7.7 Call Forwarding on No Reply (CFNRy)
+
+CFNRy is not applicable to voice group calls of service subscribers with CFNRy active and operative.
+
+CFNRy is applicable for dispatchers, i.e. voice group calls are forwarded by CFNRy.
+
+## 7.8 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc)
+
+CFNRc is not applicable to voice group calls of service subscribers with CFNRc active and operative.
+
+CFNRc is applicable for dispatchers, i.e. voice group calls are forwarded by CFNRc.
+
+## 7.9 Call Waiting (CW)
+
+CW is not applicable for service subscribers. Instead, as a network option, a notification of paging for other calls shall be given to the service subscribers involved in the voice group call.
+
+CW is applicable for dispatchers. Subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network it shall be possible for a dispatcher to receive additional information of the talker when accepting a waiting voice group call.
+
+Subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network it shall be possible for a dispatcher to receive an emergency indication for a waiting voice group call.
+
+## 7.10 Call Hold (HOLD)
+
+Call hold is not applicable for service subscribers. For handling of parallel group calls to the same destination subscriber see item i) of clause 4.
+
+The acceptance of a voice group call by a service subscriber while being in a point-to-point call shall release the point-to-point call. This release will be invoked by the mobile station.
+
+If a voice group call is requested by a service subscriber while being in a point-to-point call, the point-to-point call shall be released. This release will be invoked by the mobile station.
+
+Call hold is applicable for dispatchers. Subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network it shall be possible for a dispatcher to receive additional information of the talker when retrieving a held voice group call.
+
+Subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network it shall be possible for a dispatcher to receive an emergency indication and an indication that the emergency situation has ended for a held voice group call.
+
+## 7.11 Multi-party Service (MPTY)
+
+MPTY is not applicable for service subscribers.
+
+MPTY is applicable for dispatchers, subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network.
+
+## 7.12 Closed User Group (CUG)
+
+CUG is not applicable for service subscribers. Consequently, being a member of a CUG has no impact on receiving and establishing voice group calls.
+
+CUG is applicable for dispatchers. Therefore a dispatcher who is a member of a CUG may be excluded from originating, joining and receiving group calls subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network.
+
+## 7.13 Advice of Charge (AoC)
+
+AoC is not applicable.
+
+## 7.14 Barring of All Outgoing Calls (BAOC)
+
+BAOC is applicable, if subscribed to, with the possible exception of high priority voice group calls.
+
+## 7.15 Barring of Outgoing International Calls (BOIC)
+
+BOIC is not applicable for voice group calls of service subscribers.
+
+BOIC is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.16 Barring of Outgoing International Calls except those to the Home PLMN country (BOIC-exHC)
+
+BOIC-exHC is not applicable for voice group calls of service subscribers.
+
+BOIC-exHC is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.17 Barring of All Incoming Calls (BAIC)
+
+BAIC is not applicable for voice group calls to service subscribers.
+
+BAIC is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.18 Barring of Incoming Calls when Roaming outside the home PLMN country (BIC-Roam)
+
+BIC-Roam is not applicable for voice group calls to service subscribers.
+
+BIC-Roam is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.19 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)
+
+ECT is not applicable for service subscribers.
+
+ECT is applicable for dispatchers, subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network.
+
+Note: Dispatcher rights may not be transferred.
+
+## 7.20 Enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP)
+
+Different priorities with corresponding set-up procedures are applicable as defined in the stage 1 description of eMLPP in 3G TS 22.067.
+
+## 7.21 Short Message Service (SMS)
+
+Subject to capabilities of the UE and the serving network, it shall be possible for the talking service subscriber, the listening service subscriber or dispatcher in a voice group call as well as for other initiators of short messages that are not part of the voice group call to send short messages to the group call – addressed by the group call reference - for which delivery will be attempted only one time i.e. there is no re-try mechanism for short messages to group calls.
+
+It shall be possible for the VGCS service provider to configure the short message service to a particular group in such a way that short messages to established group calls are either supported or not supported. If supported then the message shall be delivered immediately to the established group call.
+
+A receipt confirmation, containing the group call reference of the voice group call, may be returned to the sender of the short message. However no receipt confirmation shall be returned by individual members of the voice group call.
+
+Optionally the VGCS may trigger an SMS being sent back to the sender, containing information as to whether or not the group call was established at time of sending.
+
+Subject to capabilities of the UE, service subscribers who have activated the group ID and are currently in the established group call shall be able to receive the content of short messages sent to the group call.
+
+Subject to capabilities of the UE and the serving network, dispatchers who are connected to the group call, shall be able to receive the content of short messages sent to the group call.
+
+The terminal shall treat the received content in the same way as if it would have been received by the normal SMS mechanism.
+
+During an ongoing group call it shall be possible for the talker as well as the listener to send and receive point to point short messages.
+
+Support of Short Message Service is optional in VGCS.
+
+## 7.22 Operator Determined Barring (ODB)
+
+Same as for subscriber controlled barring.
+
+## 7.23 Completion of Calls to Busy Subscribers (CCBS)
+
+The CCBS supplementary service is only applicable for dispatchers and not for VGCS service subscribers.
+
+If a new terminating p-t-p call is set up to a dispatcher who is busy because of an active VGCS call, it shall be possible to allow the calling party to apply the CCBS service. If the dispatcher initiates a VGCS call and the called group ID has been active, then the dispatcher shall be connected to the ongoing VGCS call.
+
+## 7.24 GPRS
+
+Depending on the capabilities of the UE it shall be possible for the mobile dispatcher, the talking service subscriber as well as for the listening service subscriber to use GPRS in parallel to the VGCS subject to the capabilities of the serving network.
+
+# --- 8 Interworking considerations
+
+No specific requirements are identified.
+
+# Annex A (informative): Change History
+
+| TSG# | TSG doc | WG doc | Spec | CR | Rev | Ph | Ca
t | Title | Old
vers | New
vers | WI |
+|-------|-----------|------------|----------------|------|-----|-------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------|
+| S#28 | | March 1999 | 02.68 | A010 | | R99 | | Information required for charging for Group calls: To enable SMG3 to complete 09.02 with regard to the specification of information to be passed between the serving MSC and the anchor MSC for Group calls. Specification version upgrade to Release 1999 version 8.0.0 | 5.2.0 | 8.0.0 | |
+| S#32 | | June 1999 | 02.68 | A013 | | R00 | | Introduction of Originator-to-dispatcher information into VGCS | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | |
+| | | | 02.68 / 42.068 | | | | | Conversion to 3GPP TS format | 02.68 v9.0.0 | 42.068 v4.0.0 | - |
+| SP-10 | SP-000550 | | 42.068 | 001 | | Rel-4 | A | Correction of implementation of Clarification of interaction with CCBS service | 4.0.1 | 4.1.0 | Correct |
+| SP-16 | SP-020267 | S1-021043 | 42.068 | | | Rel-5 | | Updated from Rel-4 to Rel5 | 4.1.0 | 5.0.0 | |
+| | | | | | | | | Title line now shows correct version and date. | 5.0.0 | 5.0.1 | |
+| SP-25 | SP-040508 | S1-040643 | 42.068 | 002 | - | Rel-6 | B | Addition of optional over-the-air ciphering for VGCS | 5.0.1 | 6.0.0 | SEC GKY V |
+| SP-25 | SP-040512 | S1-040707 | 42.068 | 003 | - | Rel-7 | B | VGCS support of service provider specific end-to-end encryption | 5.0.1 | 7.0.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-25 | SP-040512 | S1-040725 | 42.068 | 004 | 1 | Rel-7 | B | Sending of SMS to an ongoing Voice Group Call | 5.0.1 | 7.0.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-25 | SP-040512 | S1-040728 | 42.068 | 005 | - | Rel-7 | B | Enhanced talker functionality for VGCS for the support of emergency situations | 5.0.1 | 7.0.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-26 | SP-040738 | S1-040948 | 42.068 | 006 | - | Rel-7 | F | Sending SMS to a Voice Group Call | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-27 | SP-050174 | - | 42.068 | 008 | 2 | Rel-7 | B | Sending an SMS to a Group | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-28 | SP-050209 | S1-050477 | 42.068 | 012 | - | Rel-7 | A | Correction on the use of calling subscriber and destination subscriber | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | ASCI |
+| SP-28 | SP-050224 | S1-050491 | 42.068 | 013 | - | Rel-7 | B | Sending or receiving of short messages in parallel to an active group call | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-28 | SP-050224 | S1-050492 | 42.068 | 014 | - | Rel-7 | B | Support of the use of GPRS for individual VGCS subscribers in parallel to an active group call | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-28 | SP-050224 | S1-050493 | 42.068 | 015 | - | Rel-7 | F | Addressing SMS to a Group | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-28 | SP-050224 | S1-050528 | 42.068 | 016 | - | Rel-7 | F | Clarification on requirements for talker change | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | EVGCS |
+| SP-29 | SP-050525 | S1-050794 | 42.068 | 0017 | - | Rel-7 | C | Emergency indication to dispatchers | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-29 | SP-050525 | S1-050795 | 42.068 | 0018 | - | Rel-7 | C | Sending additional information to dispatchers | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-31 | SP-060026 | S1-060196 | 42.068 | 0019 | - | Rel-7 | C | EPRT - Modification to setup to remove the need for full conditions | 7.4.0 | 7.5.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-31 | SP-060026 | S1-060198 | 42.068 | 0020 | - | Rel-7 | C | EPRT - Modification to allow delivery of SMS messages to users not in the actual group call | 7.4.0 | 7.5.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-31 | SP-060037 | S1-060201 | 42.068 | 0021 | - | Rel-8 | B | Enhancements for VGCS Applications | 7.4.0 | 8.0.0 | VGCS-App |
+| SP-32 | SP-060306 | S1-060580 | 42.068 | 0024 | - | Rel-8 | B | Requirement for listener identification | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-32 | SP-060306 | S1-060584 | 42.068 | 0025 | - | Rel-8 | C | Additional requirements for transfer of application-specific data | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | EVA |
+| SP-32 | SP-060306 | S1-060635 | 42.068 | 0026 | - | Rel-8 | C | Enhancement for emergency situation | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-33 | SP-060464 | S1-060932 | 42.068 | 0028 | - | Rel-8 | A | Data confidentiality for SMS during voice group calls | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | EVGCS |
+
+| | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|------|---|-------|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|
+| SP-33 | SP-060473 | S1-060933 | 42.068 | 0029 | - | Rel-8 | A | Increasing maximum number of dispatchers to 20 as an optional requirement | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | EVGCS |
+| SP-33 | SP-060511 | S1-061012 | 42.068 | 0031 | - | Rel-8 | A | Privacy for a group SMS | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | EVGCS |
+| SP-34 | SP-060769 | S1-061315 | 42.068 | 0032 | - | Rel-8 | C | Restrict Group call area for transfer of time-critical application-specific data | 8.2.0 | 8.3.0 | EVA |
+| SP-34 | SP-060774 | S1-061316 | 42.068 | 0033 | - | Rel-8 | F | Correction on the use of 'listener' and 'talker' | 8.2.0 | 8.3.0 | TEI8 |
+| SP-35 | SP-070112 | S1-070265 | 42.068 | 0036 | 1 | Rel-8 | A | Removal of requirement for Speech encryption for voice group calls | 8.3.0 | 8.4.0 | EVGCS |
+| SP-37 | SP-070645 | S1-071104 | 42.068 | 37 | 1 | Rel-8 | C | TCRT: Clarification of interactions with supplementary and other GSM services | 8.4.0 | 8.5.0 | TEI8 |
+| SP-38 | SP-070849 | S1-071644 | 42.068 | 0039 | - | Rel-8 | F | TCRT: Removal of the support of long application-specific data | 8.5.0 | 8.6.0 | EVA |
+| SP-38 | SP-070849 | S1-071829 | 42.068 | 0038 | 1 | Rel-8 | F | TCRT: Align the stage 1 to the stage 2 on SMS to established group calls | 8.5.0 | 8.6.0 | EVA |
+| SP-39 | SP-080033 | S1-080300 | 42.068 | 0041 | 2 | Rel-8 | F | TCRT: Tidy up text related to sending SMS to non established group calls | 8.6.0 | 8.7.0 | EVA |
+| SP-46 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-9 by MCC | 8.7.0 | 9.0.0 | |
+| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | |
+| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-11 by MCC | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | |
+| 2014-10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-12 by MCC | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | |
+| 2015-12 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-13 by MCC | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | |
+| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-14 by MCC | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | |
+| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-15 by MCC | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | |
+
+| Change history | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|---------|------|----|-----|-----|--------------------------|-------------|
+| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version |
+| 2020-07 | SA#88e | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-16 by MCC | 16.0.0 |
+| 2022-03 | SA#95e | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-17 by MCC | 17.0.0 |
+| 2024-03 | SA#103 | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-18 by MCC | 18.0.0 |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42069/raw.md b/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42069/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5a395f66d720f5bee3f46ff065831d24a62a0a50
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+++ b/marked/Rel-18/42_series/42069/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+
+
+# 3GPP TS 42.069 V18.0.0 (2024-03) ---
+
+*Technical Specification*
+
+## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; Voice Broadcast Service (VBS); Stage 1 (Release 18)**
+
+
+
+---
+
+**GSM**®
+GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR
+MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
+
+GSM logo
+
+
+
+**3GPP**™
+
+3GPP logo
+
+## --- **Keywords**
+
+---
+
+GSM, voice, broadcast, stage 1
+
+## **3GPP**
+
+## --- **Postal address**
+
+## --- **3GPP support office address**
+
+---
+
+650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
+Valbonne - FRANCE
+Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
+
+## --- **Internet**
+
+---
+
+
+
+## --- **Copyright Notification**
+
+No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
+The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
+
+© 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
+All rights reserved.
+
+UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members
+3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners
+GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association
+
+## Contents
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Foreword ..... | 4 |
+| 1 Scope..... | 5 |
+| 2 References..... | 5 |
+| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 5 |
+| 3.1 Definitions..... | 5 |
+| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 |
+| 4 Description..... | 6 |
+| 5 Normal operation with successful outcome ..... | 9 |
+| 5.1 Provision..... | 9 |
+| 5.2 Withdrawal..... | 9 |
+| 5.3 Network related service configuration ..... | 9 |
+| 5.4 Normal operation for voice broadcast call establishment ..... | 9 |
+| 5.5 Charging requirements ..... | 10 |
+| 5.6 Security requirements..... | 10 |
+| 6 Exceptional procedures or unsuccessful outcome ..... | 10 |
+| 7 Interaction with GSM services and features ..... | 10 |
+| 7.1 Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) ..... | 10 |
+| 7.2 Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR)..... | 11 |
+| 7.3 Connected Line Identification Presentation (COLP) ..... | 11 |
+| 7.4 Connected Line Identification Restriction (COLR)..... | 11 |
+| 7.5 Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) ..... | 11 |
+| 7.6 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy (CFB)..... | 11 |
+| 7.7 Call Forwarding on No Reply (CFNRy)..... | 11 |
+| 7.8 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc) ..... | 11 |
+| 7.9 Call Waiting (CW) ..... | 11 |
+| 7.10 Call Hold (HOLD) ..... | 11 |
+| 7.11 Multi-party Service (MPTY)..... | 12 |
+| 7.12 Closed User Group (CUG)..... | 12 |
+| 7.13 Advice of Charge (AoC)..... | 12 |
+| 7.14 Barring of All Outgoing Calls (BAOC)..... | 12 |
+| 7.15 Barring of Outgoing International Calls (BOIC) ..... | 12 |
+| 7.16 Barring of Outgoing International Calls except those directed to the Home PLMN country (BOIC-exHC)..... | 12 |
+| 7.17 Barring of All Incoming Calls (BAIC) ..... | 12 |
+| 7.18 Barring of Incoming Calls when Roaming outside the home PLMN country (BIC-Roam)..... | 13 |
+| 7.19 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)..... | 13 |
+| 7.20 enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP) ..... | 13 |
+| 7.21 Short Message Service (SMS)..... | 13 |
+| 7.22 Operator Determined Barring (ODB) ..... | 13 |
+| 7.23 Completion of Calls to Busy Subscribers (CCBS)..... | 13 |
+| 7.24 GPRS..... | 13 |
+| 8 Interworking considerations..... | 13 |
+| Annex A (informative): Change History ..... | 14 |
+
+# --- Foreword
+
+This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
+
+The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
+
+Version x.y.z
+
+where:
+
+- x the first digit:
+ - 1 presented to TSG for information;
+ - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
+ - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
+- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
+- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
+
+# --- 1 Scope
+
+The present document specifies the stage one description of the Voice Broadcast Service (VBS) which allows the distribution of speech (or other signals which can be transmitted via the speech codec), generated by a service subscriber, into a predefined geographical area to all or a group of service subscribers located in this area.
+
+The Voice Broadcast Service (VBS) is applicable to all mobile stations in a certain network and area which have the technical capability and the respective subscription to receive a VBS call.
+
+NOTE: It is not considered as requirement that normal GSM Phase 2 mobile stations will be able to be used for this service.
+
+The service is described from the service subscriber's and user's point of view; in particular:
+
+- the procedure for normal operation with successful outcome;
+- the action to be taken in exceptional circumstances;
+- the interaction with other GSM services and features.
+
+The present document does not deal with the Man-Machine Interface (MMI) requirements, but makes reference to the appropriate Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) specifications.
+
+The present document defines a teleservice of the digital cellular telecommunication system GSM. Any interaction with other services and/or networks not dealt within clauses 8 or 9 are outside the scope of the present document.
+
+# --- 2 References
+
+The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
+
+- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
+- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
+- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
+
+- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
+- [2] 3GPP TS 22.067: "enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP); Stage 1".
+- [3] 3GPP TS 32.005: "Telecommunications management; Charging management; 3G call and event data for the Circuit Switched (CS) domain".
+
+# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Definitions
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:
+
+**Network operator:** Entity which provides the network operating elements and resources for the execution of the VBS.
+
+**Service provider:** Entity which offers the VBS for subscription. The network operator may be the service provider.
+
+**Service subscriber:** Mobile subscriber which subscribes to the VBS.
+
+**Voice broadcast call:** An instance of the VBS initiated by a VBS subscriber. This term is used synonymously with the term "VBS call".
+
+**Group identification (group ID):** A numerical classification. The maximum number of group IDs which can be defined in one PLMN depends on the maximum number of group call areas defined in this PLMN. The maximum number of group IDs and group call areas shall be $10^8$ . Service subscriber shall be provided with one or up to 50 group IDs.
+
+**Dispatcher:** Particular fixed line or mobile users are identified within the network as dispatchers. Dispatchers shall receive all voice broadcast calls to a certain group ID in a group call area (this shall be done automatically by the network). In addition they can initiate voice broadcast calls to a group ID in a group call area.
+
+Dispatchers shall be connected to a voice broadcast call by means of standard links via radio or via an ISDN. They shall be called by their MSISDN or ISDN number, respectively. When dispatchers initiate voice broadcast calls, they shall call a particular MSISDN number which is related to a group ID and group call area. Dispatchers using the GSM network can be located outside of this group call area.
+
+The identities of the dispatchers are exclusively predefined in the network by the service provider. There may be none, one or more dispatchers involved in a particular voice broadcast call.
+
+As a mandatory network requirement, configuration of up to 5 dispatchers shall be supported. Optionally, up to a maximum of 20 dispatchers may be configured for a particular group call reference.
+
+**Destination service subscriber:** Service subscriber to which the VBS call is directed.
+
+**Calling service subscriber:** Service subscriber which originates the VBS call.
+
+**Calling dispatcher:** Dispatcher which originates the VBS call.
+
+**Destination dispatcher:** Pre-registered dispatcher to which the VBS call is directed.
+
+**Destination subscriber:** Destination dispatcher(s) and/ or destination service subscriber(s) to which the VGCS call is directed.
+
+**Group call area:** Predefined area composed of one or a cluster of cells, to which a particular VBS call is distributed. The maximum number of group call area IDs which can be defined in one PLMN depends on the maximum number of group IDs defined in this PLMN. The maximum number of group IDs and group call areas combined shall be $10^8$ . The composition of a group call area is predefined in the network by the service provider. Changing of cell allocations in the network due to operational reasons will need an adaptation of the group call area definition. The group call area may include cells of more than one MSC area and cells of more than one PLMN.
+
+**Originator-to-dispatcher information:** Information sent by the service subscriber originating a voice group call to the network during call setup for distribution to the dispatchers to be attached to the group call during call setup.
+
+**Listener:** see Listening service subscriber
+
+**Listening service subscriber:** Service subscriber who is listening to an ongoing voice group call.
+
+## 3.2 Abbreviations
+
+Abbreviations used in the present document are listed in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
+
+# --- 4 Description
+
+The VBS is defined in the following. Figure 1 gives an explanation of the logical concept of the VBS.
+
+- a) The VBS enables a calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher to send speech unidirectional and simultaneously to all entitled dispatchers and to destination service subscribers belonging to a predefined group call area who have a subscription to the applicable group ID.
+- b) The calling service subscriber may be any service subscriber which has subscribed to the related group ID and is entitled to establish a voice broadcast call by his subscription. The calling dispatcher may be any dispatcher who
+
+is entitled to originate VBS calls to the related call reference.
+
+The destination subscriber may be any service subscriber which has subscribed to the related group ID or any dispatcher who is entitled for it by his identity which is registered in the network.
+
+- c) The broadcast call shall be established in a group call area which is comprised of one or a cluster of cells. Group call areas shall be predefined in the network by the service provider, co-ordinated by the network operator.
+
+In case of a calling service subscriber initiating a VBS call, the group call area is uniquely identified by the actual cell in which the service subscriber resides at the moment of VBS call initialization and by the called group ID.
+
+A calling dispatcher initiating a VBS call will be connected to a related predefined group call area. The entitlement of the dispatcher is checked by the network element responsible for the voice broadcast call management by verification of the calling identity. Since a dispatcher may be registered to more than one group call area and group ID an indication of the wanted group call area and group ID has to be given in form of a dedicated address called by the dispatcher.
+
+- d) Destination subscribers are all destination service subscribers or a group of destination service subscribers identified by the called group ID which have their present location in the group call area, and preregistered destination dispatchers. Destination service subscribers shall be notified with the group ID, not by paging the service subscriber individually. Destination dispatchers shall be called individually with their identity.
+
+Service subscribers which leave the group call area during an on going VBS call cease to be destination subscribers. Service subscribers which enter the group call area during an on going VBS call shall become destination subscribers within 500 ms after reception of the first notification message related to the VBS call.
+
+- e) The calling service subscriber shall remain within the voice broadcast call until she terminates the call, loses contact with the network or leaves the group call area. The VBS call shall be terminated by the network as soon as the network has determined that the calling service subscriber has left the VBS call area.
+- f) A voice group call will be considered established as soon as the originating cell in case of a service subscriber originated voice group call, or any one cell within the group call area in case of a dispatcher originated voice group call has been included.
+
+The calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher shall be informed by the network with a suitable indication about the successful establishment of the voice broadcast call so that he can start to speak.
+
+The network shall then continue to try to include all remaining voice group call downlink channels and alert related dispatchers not yet alerted.
+
+- g) Authentication is mandatory at GSM call set up. To allow fast call set up in VBS authentication of the calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher at invocation may optionally be delayed.
+
+Authentication of the destination subscriber, who has no uplink connection, is not required.
+
+Confidentiality on the radio path is optional.
+
+- h) Different levels of priority and pre-emption shall be applied as defined in the corresponding stage 1 description on the enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP), 3GPP TS 22.067.
+- i) A number of voice broadcast calls may exist simultaneously intended for different groups of destination subscribers in the same group call area.
+
+Parallel voice broadcast calls are possible to the same group of destination subscribers in different, possibly overlapping group call areas.
+
+- j) VBS shall also be provided in case of roaming. For this, certain group IDs shall be defined as supra-PLMN group IDs which have to be co-ordinated between the network operators and which shall be known in the networks and in the SIM. A service subscriber which is entitled by his subscription to establish voice broadcast calls while roaming shall only be able to use supra-PLMN group IDs in case of roaming.
+- k) For certain levels of priorities an acknowledgement of receipt of a voice broadcast call can be required as an application option (e.g. for railway emergency calls) from all or from nominated destination service subscribers (the nomination is recorded on the SIM). The acknowledgement itself shall be performed at the end of the voice
+
+broadcast call. The acknowledgement shall indicate the time the reception started and the time the reception terminated. The acknowledgement has to be given to a predefined recipient.
+
+- l) It shall be possible for a service subscriber to activate or deactivate the voice broadcast reception for different group Ids. The selection list is stored on the SIM corresponding to the subscribed group Ids. It shall be possible to prohibit the deactivation of group Ids used for high priority voice broadcast calls.
+
+Mobile users that are configured as dispatchers and which are registered in the network for a certain voice broadcast call and which have also a subscription for VBS with the same group ID as the voice broadcast call for which they are dispatcher shall deactivate this group ID when they are located in the corresponding group call area in order to avoid conflicts between paging for the dispatcher and notifications for the group ID.
+
+- m) The calling service subscriber may specify, at call setup, information to be presented at call setup to the dispatchers. This information is sent as originator-to-dispatcher information to the network, and sent as UUS1 by the network to the dispatchers in the message for call setup. For normal call setup, the information is subject to the same constraints as UUS1 information in the setup of a point-to-point call. For fast setup, the information is restricted to 12 digits (with leading zeros); inclusion of originator-to-dispatcher information at fast setup is only possible if the mobile station has a valid TMSI. It is a network option to support originator-to-dispatcher information, or to ignore it. The inclusion of originator-to-dispatcher information in the VBS call setup is not subject to provision or withdrawal.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the configuration of Voice Broadcast Services (VBS) and their associated group call areas. At the top, a 'Network' box contains three VBS entities:
+
+
+- VBS 1**: group address a, group call area I, dispatcher x
+- VBS 2**: group address c, group call area II, dispatcher y
+- VBS 3**: group address b, group call area IV, dispatcher y+z
+
+ These VBS entities are connected to four dispatchers labeled w, x, y, and z.
+
+ At the bottom, a map shows the geographical distribution of group call areas:
+
+
+- group call area I**: An oval containing subscribers A, A, A, A, B, A.
+- group call area IV**: A large circle containing two other areas:
+ - group call area III**: An oval containing subscribers B, A, A, C, C, B, A.
+ - group call area II**: An oval containing subscribers C, C, C, B, C, A, B.
+- Subscribers A, B, C, and D are shown outside these areas, with A, B, and C appearing in various locations outside the defined areas.
+
+Diagram illustrating Voice Broadcast Service (VBS) configuration and group call areas. The top part shows a 'Network' box containing three VBS entities: VBS 1 (group address a, group call area I, dispatcher x), VBS 2 (group address c, group call area II, dispatcher y), and VBS 3 (group address b, group call area IV, dispatcher y+z). These are connected to dispatchers w, x, y, and z. The bottom part shows a map of group call areas: Area I contains subscribers A, A, A, A, B, A. Area IV contains Area III (subscribers B, A, A, C, C, B, A) and Area II (subscribers C, C, C, B, C, A, B). Subscribers A, B, C, and D are shown outside these areas.
+
+NOTE: VBS1, VBS2, VBS3 = particular voice broadcast calls with the attributes preregistered in the network.
+A, B, C, D = service subscriber with group ID a, b, c or d, respectively.
+
+I, II, III, IV = group call areas.
+
+w, x, y, z = dispatchers connected via normal GSM links or external networks.
+
+Figure 1: Logical concept of the VBS
+
+# 5 Normal operation with successful outcome
+
+## 5.1 Provision
+
+The VBS is provided to be used by a service subscriber after prior arrangements with the service provider. The provision includes the assignment of group IDs to the service subscriber. A subscription shall not provide more than 50 group IDs to the service subscriber.
+
+The service can be offered with two subscription options:
+
+| Subscription option | Value |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
+| - subscriber has the capability of initiating voice broadcast calls | No
Yes; |
+| - subscriber has the capability to initiate voice broadcast calls in case of roaming | No
Yes. |
+
+## 5.2 Withdrawal
+
+The VBS is withdrawn at the service provider's request or for administrative reasons.
+
+## 5.3 Network related service configuration
+
+The network related service configuration defines the attributes of a particular voice broadcast call which shall be pre-registered in the network by the service provider. This is not related to one specific service subscriber.
+
+The attributes of a particular broadcast call are group ID, group call area composition, a list of dispatcher identities to be connected to this area, a list of dispatchers allowed to initiate voice broadcast calls to this area, the broadcast call reference identity which shall be used in case of COLP (see subclause 7.3) and recipient identities to which an optional acknowledgement can be routed. Changes to the group call area composition shall be co-ordinated with the network operator.
+
+## 5.4 Normal operation for voice broadcast call establishment
+
+The VBS service shall be automatically initiated by the network when a calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher dials a particular short code or address at call set-up.
+
+On successful initiation of the VBS, the voice broadcast call shall be established between the calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher and the destination subscribers. The destination subscribers are:
+
+- all destination service subscribers at any time during the voice broadcast call with the corresponding active group ID when located in the group call area, where the group call area is uniquely defined by:
+ - the location (radio cell) of the calling service subscriber at invocation and group ID if the call is originated by a calling subscriber;
+ - the addressed group call area if the call is originated by a calling dispatcher;
+- the preregistered destination dispatchers related to that group call area and group ID.
+
+The calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher shall be informed by the network with a suitable indication about the successful establishment of the voice broadcast call so that the user can start to speak.
+
+The call can be released by the calling service subscriber or by the calling dispatcher or by the network (e.g. in case of a higher priority call) or by an entitled dispatcher predefined in the network.
+
+Destination subscribers leaving the voice broadcast call for any reason shall not release the on going voice broadcast call.
+
+## 5.5 Charging requirements
+
+Normal event data according to 3GPP TS 32.005 shall be recorded as a network option related to calling subscriber or related to all VBS calls to one group ID in a specific group call area. . In addition data to be passed to the anchor MSC for charging purposes is the resources (i.e. cell identities) used during a call.
+
+## 5.6 Security requirements
+
+VBS shall be able to support over-the-air ciphering in order to provide confidentiality protection to group calls.
+
+VBS ciphering is an operator's option.
+
+VBS shall provide means such that only a legitimate service subscriber is able to participate in a ciphered VBS call when the operator requires confidentiality protection for the group call. To include a subscriber into a ciphered voice group the required group data shall be stored on the USIM. Storing these group data on the USIM may be done e.g. during the USIM personalisation process or via OTA (over-the-air) provisioning.
+
+A pre- Rel-6 VBS capable mobile shall be able to participate in an un-ciphered group call, if it is part of that group.
+
+# --- 6 Exceptional procedures or unsuccessful outcome
+
+If a service subscriber wants to establish a voice broadcast call while not subscribed to the service or the network cannot provide the service for some reason, an indication shall be provided to the calling service subscriber to notify him with the reason of failure.
+
+If a dispatcher wants to establish a voice broadcast call while not entitled to do it or the network cannot provide the service for some reason, the call shall be rejected. The network shall give an appropriate indication to calling dispatchers who are GSM subscribers.
+
+A voice group call shall be considered established as soon as the originated cell in case of a service subscriber originated broadcast call or any one cell within the group call area in case of a dispatcher originated broadcast call has been included. If this cannot be achieved within a specified time the call will be released.
+
+If a cell is excluded from the group call area because of pre-emption, the voice broadcast call is maintained as long as the calling subscriber is not pre-empted.
+
+# --- 7 Interaction with GSM services and features
+
+## 7.1 Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP)
+
+If CLIP is applied, the broadcast call reference – including the group call area ID and the group ID – shall be presented to the destination dispatchers. In addition the subaddress field of the calling party may be used to identify the calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher to the destination dispatchers.
+
+The receiving mobile stations of the destination subscribers shall display the paged group ID regardless the destination subscribers have a subscription to CLIP.
+
+## 7.2 Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR)
+
+CLIR shall be supported.
+
+The network shall have the possibility to override CLIR or reject the request to establish a voice broadcast call for a calling service subscriber or calling dispatcher who has CLIR activated.
+
+## 7.3 Connected Line Identification Presentation (COLP)
+
+If COLP is applied, the broadcast call reference - including the group call area ID and the group ID - shall be presented to the calling dispatcher. No destination subscriber identities will be presented.
+
+Calling service subscribers receive the broadcast call reference via standard broadcast call setup messaging. COLP therefore does not apply to service subscribers.
+
+## 7.4 Connected Line Identification Restriction (COLR)
+
+COLR is not applicable to voice broadcast calls.
+
+## 7.5 Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU)
+
+CFU is not applicable to voice broadcast calls of service subscribers when activate and operative, i.e. CFU shall be ignored.
+
+CFU is applicable for dispatchers, i.e. voice broadcast calls are forwarded by CFU.
+
+## 7.6 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy (CFB)
+
+CFB is not applicable to voice broadcast calls of service subscribers with CFB active and operative.
+
+CFB is applicable for dispatchers if the voice broadcast call does not have a higher priority than the present call.
+
+## 7.7 Call Forwarding on No Reply (CFNRy)
+
+CFNRy is not applicable to voice broadcast calls of service subscribers with CFNRy active and operative.
+
+CFNRy is applicable for dispatchers, i.e. voice broadcast calls are forwarded by CFNRy.
+
+## 7.8 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc)
+
+CFNRc is not applicable to voice broadcast calls of service subscribers with CFNRc active and operative.
+
+CFNRc is applicable for dispatchers, i.e. voice broadcast calls are forwarded by CFNRc.
+
+## 7.9 Call Waiting (CW)
+
+CW is not applicable for service subscriber. Instead, as a network option, a notification of paging for other calls shall be given to the service subscribers involved in the voice broadcast call.
+
+CW is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.10 Call Hold (HOLD)
+
+Call hold is not applicable for service subscribers. For handling of parallel voice broadcast calls to the same destination
+
+subscriber see item i) of clause 4.
+
+A calling service subscriber cannot leave the voice broadcast call without releasing the call.
+
+The acceptance of a voice broadcast call by a service subscriber while being in a point-to-point call shall release the point-to-point call. The release will be invoked by the mobile station.
+
+If a voice broadcast call is requested by a service subscriber while being in a point-to-point call, the point-to-point call shall be released. The release will be invoked by the mobile station.
+
+Call hold is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.11 Multi-party Service (MPTY)
+
+MPTY is not applicable for service subscribers.
+
+MPTY is applicable for dispatchers, subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network.
+
+## 7.12 Closed User Group (CUG)
+
+CUG is not applicable for service subscribers. Consequently, being a member of a CUG has no impact on receiving voice broadcast calls.
+
+CUG is applicable for dispatchers. Therefore a dispatcher who is a member of a CUG may be excluded from originating, joining and receiving broadcast calls subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network.
+
+## 7.13 Advice of Charge (AoC)
+
+AoC can be provided to the calling subscriber as network option.
+
+## 7.14 Barring of All Outgoing Calls (BAOC)
+
+BAOC is applicable, if subscribed to, with the possible exception of high priority voice broadcast calls.
+
+## 7.15 Barring of Outgoing International Calls (BOIC)
+
+BOIC is not applicable for voice broadcast calls of service subscribers.
+
+BOIC is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.16 Barring of Outgoing International Calls except those directed to the Home PLMN country (BOIC-exHC)
+
+BOIC-exHC is not applicable for voice broadcast calls of service subscriber.
+
+BOIC-exHC is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.17 Barring of All Incoming Calls (BAIC)
+
+BAIC is not applicable for voice broadcast calls to service subscribers.
+
+BAIC is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.18 Barring of Incoming Calls when Roaming outside the home PLMN country (BIC-Roam)
+
+BIC-Roam is not applicable for voice broadcast calls to service subscribers.
+
+BIC-Roam is applicable for dispatchers.
+
+## 7.19 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)
+
+ECT is not applicable for service subscribers.
+
+ECT is applicable for dispatchers, subject to the capabilities of the UE and the serving network.
+
+## 7.20 enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption service (eMLPP)
+
+Different priorities with corresponding set-up procedures are applicable as defined in the stage 1 description on eMLPP in 3GPP TS 22.067.
+
+## 7.21 Short Message Service (SMS)
+
+Sending and reception of short messages is not possible for destination service subscribers.
+
+## 7.22 Operator Determined Barring (ODB)
+
+Same as for subscriber controlled barring.
+
+## 7.23 Completion of Calls to Busy Subscribers (CCBS)
+
+The CCBS supplementary service is only applicable for dispatchers and not for VBS service subscribers.
+
+If a new terminating p-t-p call is set up to a dispatcher who is busy because of an active VBS call, it shall be possible to allow the calling party to apply the CCBS service. If the dispatcher initiates a VBS call and the called broadcast ID has been active, then the dispatcher shall be connected to the ongoing VBS call..
+
+## 7.24 GPRS
+
+Depending on the capabilities of the UE it shall be possible for the mobile dispatcher, for the calling service subscriber as well as for the listening service subscribers to use GPRS in parallel to the VBS, subject to the capabilities of the serving network.
+
+# --- 8 Interworking considerations
+
+No specific requirements are identified.
+
+## Annex A (informative): Change History
+
+| TSG# | TSG doc | WG doc | Spec | CR | Rev | Ph | Cat | Title | Old vers | New vers | WI |
+|---------|-----------|-----------|----------------|------|-----|-------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|
+| S#28 | | May 2000 | 02.69 | | | R99 | | Specification upgrade to Release 1999 version 8.0.0 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | |
+| S#32 | | June 1999 | 02.69 | A014 | | R00 | | Introduction of Originator-to-dispatcher information into VBS | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | |
+| | | | 02.69 / 42.069 | | | | | Conversion to 3GPP TS format | 02.69 v9.0.0 | 42.069 v4.0.0 | - |
+| SP-10 | SP-000550 | | 42.069 | 001 | | Rel-4 | A | Correction of implementation of Clarification of interaction with CCBS service | 4.0.1 | 4.1.0 | Correct |
+| SP-16 | SP-020267 | S1-021043 | 42.069 | | | Rel-5 | | Updated from Rel-4 to Rel5 | 4.1.0 | 5.0.0 | |
+| | 2002-07 | | | | | Rel-5 | | Correction to version number | 5.0.0 | 5.0.1 | |
+| SP-25 | SP-040508 | S1-040644 | 42.069 | 002 | - | Rel-6 | B | Addition of optional over-the-air ciphering for VBS | 5.0.1 | 6.0.0 | SECGKY V |
+| SP-28 | SP-050210 | S1-050476 | 42.069 | 005 | - | Rel-6 | A | Correction on the use of calling subscriber and destination subscriber | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | ASCI |
+| SP-31 | SP-060028 | S1-060197 | 42.069 | 0006 | - | Rel-7 | C | Modification to setup to remove the need for full conditions | 6.1.0 | 7.0.0 | TEI7 |
+| SP-31 | SP-060027 | S1-060211 | 42.069 | 0007 | - | Rel-7 | C | Increasing maximum number of dispatchers to 20 as an optional requirement | 6.1.0 | 7.0.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-34 | SP-060775 | S1-061319 | 42.069 | 0008 | - | Rel-8 | F | Correction on the use of listening service subscriber | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | TEI8 |
+| SP-34 | SP-060759 | S1-061411 | 42.069 | 0009 | - | Rel-8 | F | Support of the use of GPRS for individual VBS subscribers in parallel to an active broadcast call | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | EGCS |
+| SP-37 | SP-070644 | S1-071103 | 42.069 | 10 | 1 | Rel-8 | C | TCRT: Clarification of interactions with supplementary and other GSM services | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | TEI8 |
+| SP-46 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-9 by MCC | 8.1.0 | 9.0.0 | |
+| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | |
+| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-11 by MCC | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | |
+| 2014-10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-12 by MCC | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | |
+| 2015-12 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-13 by MCC | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | |
+| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-14 by MCC | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | |
+| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-15 by MCC | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | |
+
+| Change history | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|---------|------|----|-----|-----|--------------------------|-------------|
+| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version |
+| 2020-07 | SA#88e | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-16 by MCC | 16.0.0 |
+| 2022-03 | SA#95e | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-17 by MCC | 17.0.0 |
+| 2024-03 | SA#103 | - | - | - | - | Updated to Rel-18 by MCC | 18.0.0 |
\ No newline at end of file